NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: THE CASE OF THE COPTIC ORTHODOX DIASPORA IN BUDAPEST

By

Tamás Farbaky

Abstract

This research aims to understand how Copts in the Hungarian diaspora negotiate their identities. Its research method consisted of semi-structured interviews and participant observation. It started with the observation the Copts fit well into the narrative of the Hungarian government which is hostile towards Muslim immigrants but ready to help persecuted Christians, which is true for the Copts in Egypt. The research approached their identities (Coptic, Christian, Egyptian, Arabic and Hungarian) by conceptualising them as content and contestation. Furthermore, it introduced a hybridised methodology, combining content and salience of identities. It also built on social identity theory. Arabic identity thus was conceptualised as the out-group and the Hungarian identity as the new in-group they want to belong (hybridisation). The research found three different identity clusters. It also found that some of them subscribe to the ideology of pharaonism. In terms of Arabic identity, they were mostly hostile, but some of them assumed this identity. Towards the immigrants, they were expressed mostly negative or mixed attitudes, some of them considered it as an invasion spreading Islam. In this sense they are natural allies of the Hungarian government, which has similar views. However, some of them showed strong solidarity towards the refugees. So, it can be said that throughout the research there was a variation or contestation even if this community is rather small and close-knit.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to say a thank you to my supervisor, Erin Kristin Jenne who throughout the research was present and easy to reach as well as very supportive and made sure I was going into the right direction. I am happy we could work together. I am also thankful to John Maximos whom I could ask all kind of questions related to the Copts or to Egypt. Finally, I am grateful for the Coptic community. That they were so open and collaborative and welcomed me with love and trust. I am thankful to Father Youssef who said yes to my request and I am also indebted to each of my interlocutor for all the interesting things they entrusted to me. Without them, this research could never have been born.

Contents

Introduction

For Europe, the 2015 migration or refugee crisis proved to be a great shock. Due to the chaos and right-wing xenophobia immigrant communities became much more visible and less tolerated. Hungarian politics have changed for good in 2015 when Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán and his governing party took a very determined position.[1] Before the crisis, even in 2015 Orbán was very respectful toward the global Muslim community.[2] The chaos of the crisis and the continuous government propaganda since 2015 shifted the attitudes of Hungarians towards xenophobia against foreigners. In the 2017 Standard Eurobarometer survey, Hungarians considered the migration issues the biggest challenge for the EU (52 % of the respondents).[3] In 2017, another study showed that 48 % of Hungarians rejects immigrants from poorer countries, which is by far the highest number.

At the same time, Hungarian governments took up more responsibility for persecuted Christians all over the world, many of them in the Middle East. The State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians was found in 2016, and the Hungary Helps[4] agency in 2019. Hungary also teamed up with USAID to help Christians.[5]

Hungary's strategy regarding the migration into Europe is based on two principles. First, they want to minimise any kind of migration, they do not want Muslim immigrants; in order to do that without getting too much criticism from other EU countries, they are trying to help people to stay where they are and to work with them so that they find opportunities in their own

---

[1] Attila Juhász, Csaba Molnár, and Edit Zgut, 'Menekültügy és migráció Magyarországon' (Prague - Budapest: Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Political Capital, 2017).

[2] 'Orbán Viktor Beszéde Az Arab Bankok Szövetségének Éves Közgyűlésén', Kormányzat, accessed 24 April 2020, https://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/orban-viktor-beszede-az-arab-bankok-szovetsegenek-eves-kozgyulesen.

[3] 'Special Eurobarometer 467', 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2179. 23.

[4] 'Hungary Helps – Hungary Helps', accessed 3 June 2020, http://hungaryhelps.gov.hu/en/.

[5] 'To Direct More Funding to Christians, USAID Looks to Hungary', Devex, 25 November 2019, https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/to-direct-more-funding-to-christians-usaid-looks-to-hungary-96055.

country.[6] This encompasses the operations of Hungary Helps, which mostly but not only helps persecuted Christians.[7] So, there is some kind of positive discrimination towards those who are sharing this Christianity with Hungary's government, which would like to portray itself as a Christian democracy and as a country which promotes and preserves Christianity of Europe against the Muslim immigrants as well as liberals promoting multiculturalism.[8] The key difference with what the liberal Open Society professes, for example, that the Hungarian government does not believe in multiculturalism – that co-existence of people with different cultures and religions is possible and imagines this only among people with shared ethnic or religious kinship.[9]

With this thinking it is logical that Hungary has been committed for the persecuted Christians. In September 2015 at the height of the migration/refugee crisis, Zoltán Balogh, the then minister of human capacities announced that Hungary had welcomed around thousand Oriental Christian families coming from Iraq and Egypt in 2013-2014.[10] According to Balogh, in order to protect their identities, they had come secretly, and they had also been granted Hungarian citizenship.[11] However, Father Youssef, the priest of the Copts in Budapest never met any such Egyptian family, which is telling, as Coptic families when they emigrate always look for the church in Hungary as top priority.[12] Even if the case was not settled properly, it clearly shows a significant effort by the government to portray themselves as the saviour of the persecuted Christians.

---

[6] 'Hungary Helps – Hungary Helps'.
[7] 'Hungary Helps – Hungary Helps'.
[8] 'Orbán Viktor: A keresztény szabadság szellemében rendeztük be Magyarországot', *Magyar Nemzet* (blog), accessed 3 June 2020, https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/orban-viktor-a-mai-magyar-allam-a-keresztenydemokracia-es-nem-a-liberalizmus-talajan-all-7349246/.
[9] 'Orbán Viktor'.
[10] Szabolcs Panyi, 'Rejtélyes a befogadott kopt családok ügye', 11 September 2015, http://index.hu/belfold/2015/09/11/kereszteny_csaladok_befogadas/.
[11] Szabolcs.
[12] Zrt HVG Kiadó, 'A kopt egyház vezetője sosem hallott a Balog és Orbán által emlegetett családokról', hvg.hu, 17 September 2015, https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150917_A_kopt_egyhaz_vezetoje_sosem_hallott_a_be.

At the crossroads of the heightened xenophobia, and the intent of the Hungarian government to help these Christians, there is a tiny diaspora whose members are living in Hungary: they are the Coptic Orthodox Egyptians. The Copts of Egypt is the biggest Christian community in the Middle East. Even if they are big, they constitute only a minority in Egypt, approximately 16 million of around 101 million inhabitants of Egypt, according to Open Doors.[13] Christians in some Middle Eastern countries are seriously threatened and might be wiped out, according to a report commissioned by the Foreign Secretary of UK, Jeremy Hunt.[14] Open Doors estimates that the level of persecution in Egypt is very high.[15] Even if persecution is a serious problem, it is not the only reason why Copts leave the country; economic turmoil and striving for better opportunities as well as political instability are behind the decisions of emigrants.[16] Those who left created diasporas in other countries. In the US, Canada and Australia, there are around 553,000 Copts according to an estimate.[17] There are smaller diasporas as well, such as 800 families in Germany.[18] In Hungary, there are around 100 families, according to the priest of the community.[19] This diaspora is the actual object of this research.

---

[13] 'Egypt - Open Doors USA - Open Doors USA', accessed 24 April 2020, https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/egypt/.

[14] 'Christians Are "Most Persecuted Group"', *BBC News*, 3 May 2019, sec. UK, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48146305.

[15] 'Egypt - Open Doors USA - Open Doors USA'.

[16] Kail C. Ellis, ed., *Secular Nationalism and Citizenship in Muslim Countries: Arab Christians in the Levant*, Minorities in West Asia and North Africa (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). X.

[17] Bosmat Yefet, 'The Coptic Diaspora and the Status of the Coptic Minority in Egypt', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no. 7 (19 May 2017): 1205–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1228445. 1208.

[18] Emily Jane Carter Hein, 'The Semiotics of Diaspora: Language Ideologies and Coptic Orthodox Christianity in Berlin, Germany' (PhD Dissertation in Anthropology, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, n.d.), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/97982. 12.

[19] Father Khalil Youssef, in-depth interview, February 8, 2020.

Research question and puzzle

Who are these Copts and why they are interesting? This chapter presents the puzzle, details the research question, and explains the significance of the research itself. The community in Budapest, or diaspora is not big, but still, if someone enters their church on Sunday morning, when they hold their most important liturgical service, the Sunday mass, he or she will be overwhelmed by this peculiar experience: icons, women in headscarves as well as chants and prayers in multiple languages. The liturgy on Saturday morning is even more interesting, in the smaller chapel on the ground floor, with all curtains sealed, only some candles are lit, one can smell the sweet fragrance of the burning incense in the thurible of the priest. Only a few people are present, and their chant and the incense mix with each other permeating the space.

These gatherings are central to the life of the diaspora. Apart from Monday, there is a liturgy every day. Not only Egyptians come to pray, as there are mixed marriages and people from other Arabic-speaking countries, such as Iraq or Sudan, for example. The community prays in three languages, and if the liturgy is upstairs (on Sundays), the brethren can follow it in Arabic, Coptic and Hungarian.

The Coptic community is first and foremost a religious diaspora, a persecuted one in its home country. As it was clear from the introduction, Hungary might not be the best destination in terms of hospitability of citizens, as numerous studies cited above found considerable rise in xenophobia over the last few years. How has the community responded to that?

This is the central research question of this thesis: how the members of the Coptic community negotiate their identities in the hostility of the home and host countries? It seeks to understand and explicate how this diaspora rejects or claims identities. Also, the thesis would like to reply to the question whether indeed they experience it as a xenophobic environment, whether discrimination is present in the experience of these people.

The study of the Coptic diaspora is interesting because it surpasses the traditional triadic relationship between home country, host country and diaspora (and other diasporas in the kinship).[20] The Coptic diaspora is a religious diaspora, which means that membership is not based on citizenship but religious orientation,[21] this additional layer makes it more intriguing, as it seems more complex than just an identity formation in the home country – host country nexus. An important question to understand would be whether Copts downplay their Egyptian identity as an identity related the turmoil and persecution if experienced or they still embrace this identity. Or, will this identity be less articulated compared with the Coptic identity?

The Arabic identity presents another important puzzle and research question. In her dissertation about the Coptic diaspora of Germany, Emily Carter Hein observed the downplay of the Arabic language and thus the relatedness to the Arabic identity among Copts because it is considered to be connected to the Muslim identity.[22] The research would like to understand how and why diaspora members accept or reject Arabic identity, in addition to others.[23]

An important part of the research is focusing on the question of solidarity concerning the migration question in Europe. Since 2015 the question of migration is a hot topic in the EU and even beyond. However, the discourse is changing. While in 2015, Angela Merkel promoted the *Wilkommenskultur*, in 2020 when Turkey gave free passage to the migrants towards Europe, Greece and the whole EU responded by sealing the borders, Ursula van der Leyen even used the metaphor of *shield* to thank Greece for the defence of Europe.[24] According to the Meeusen

---

[20] Steven Vertovec, 'Three Meanings of "Diaspora," Exemplified among South Asian Religions', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 6, no. 3 (1997): 277–99, https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1997.0010. 280.

[21] We can say that almost all Copts are Egyptians but hardly all Egyptians are Copts.

[22] Hein, 'The Semiotics of Diaspora: Language Ideologies and Coptic Orthodox Christianity in Berlin, Germany'. XXVI.

[23] This Reddit is extremely interesting, relevant and informing: 'R/Arabs - Do You Consider Copts to Be Arabs?', reddit, accessed 30 March 2020, https://www.reddit.com/r/arabs/comments/195fi8/do_you_consider_copts_to_be_arabs/. Also: Hein, 'The Semiotics of Diaspora: Language Ideologies and Coptic Orthodox Christianity in Berlin, Germany'. XXVI.

[24] 'Migration: EU Praises Greece as "shield" after Turkey Opens Border', the Guardian, 3 March 2020, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border.

et al. migrants with citizenship in a given country will be more against immigration.[25] Here, cultural difference, the relationship between the two ethnic groups and the time spent in the host country also matter.[26] After all, this is again an identity question or a good proxy to understand the identification of the Copts.[27] Would they be more open to immigrants coming from the same Arab world or would they be less welcoming because they presume those who come are mostly Muslims and they identify more with the Christian Europe where, on the other hand, this Christianity can be rather relative.[28] In this vein, I would like to understand how they negotiate their fractal identities in relation to the 2015 refugee or migration crisis and its aftermath. Asking about these real events will reveal how Copts identity themselves, whether they assume solidarity or consider refugees/migrants as threats for themselves or for Europe.

Furthermore, the thesis would like to understand the level of integration, but in terms of identification. The research thus focuses on the question how much they assume a Hungarian identity, how hyphenated identifications are created, how hybrid identities function.[29]

Finally, I argue, this research can be significant for several reasons. First, it can provide important information for Hungarian policymakers in three ways. Although researcher has examined Hungary's big Chinese diaspora,[30] other communities, probably because of their smaller size, were not researched.[31] In this regard, this thesis could help policymakers to study

---

[25] Cecil Meeusen, Koen Abts, and Bart Meuleman, 'Between Solidarity and Competitive Threat?', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 71 (July 2019): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2019.04.002. 4.
[26] Meeusen, Abts, and Meuleman. 4.
[27] Meeusen, Abts, and Meuleman. 4.
[28] How much Christian Europe is, can be relative, for someone from a Western country, it would be safer to say that European culture has Christian, or Judeo-Christian roots but for someone coming from a Muslim majority country, Europe might be Christian.
[29] Soon, the question of hybridity will be explained, here it will only be mentioned shortly. See: Stuart Hall, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora', in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Larence Wishhart, 1990), 222–37, http://www.mclass.ca/uploads/1/3/0/4/1304973/stuart_hall_cultural_identityanddiaspora.pdf. 235. And Virinder S. Kalra, Raminder Kaur, and John Hutnyk, *Diaspora & Hybridity*, Theory, Culture & Society (Unnumbered) (London; Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2005). 14.
[30] Attila, Csaba, and Edit, 'Menekültügy és migráció Magyarországon'. 9.
[31] Pal Nyiri, 'Chinese in Hungary and Their Significant Others: A Multi-Sited Approach to Transnational Practice and Discourse', *Identities* 9, no. 1 (January 2002): 69–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/10702890210369., Anna Irimiás, 'The Chinese Diaspora in Budapest: A New Potential for Tourism', ed. Harald Pechlaner, *Tourism Review* 67, no. 1 (6 April 2012): 23–33, https://doi.org/10.1108/16605371211216341. And Dorottya Nagy, 'Displaying Diaspora:

immigrants and their integration. Secondly, it can be interesting for the decisionmakers of Budapest to show the invisible Budapest so that they could understand the development of Budapest into a global city where people from different countries live together. Thirdly, my thesis can contain crucial information for the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and for the Hungary Helps agency. As they are trying to help persecuted Christians and Copts are persecuted in Egypt, this paper can provide many insights for them. The current paradigm of these entities is that it is the best to bring help to these people in need in-country, rather than encouraging migration, which ultimately will not solve the problems which lead to the migration.[32] My thesis could thus contribute to the question on what to do when those people are already in Hungary.

It can be interesting for Hungarian readers as well. Due to the government propaganda which portrays migration and migrants as bad and conveying that Hungarian borders are sealed;[33] people might get the false sense that there no immigrants in the country. This paper, however, shows a more accurate representation of the country that could contribute to the public knowledge about the invisible but real Hungary.

Literature review

Aristotle posited that everything "is a compound of matter and form."[34] This also applies to my thesis. In this vein, my thesis too has form and matter. There is the matter, or in this case,

---

Chinese Christian Presence in Hungary after 1989', *Hungarian Cultural Studies* 5 (1 January 2012): 277–89, https://doi.org/10.5195/AHEA.2012.80.

[32] 'Kiemelt Cél a Keresztény Közösségek Támogatása', Kormányzat, accessed 27 April 2020, https://www.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/hirek/kiemelt-cel-a-kereszteny-kozossegek-tamogatasa.

[33] 'Magyarország kitart szigorú migrációs politikája mellett', accessed 27 April 2020, https://www.magyarhirlap.hu/belfold/20191230-magyarorszag-tovabbra-is-kiall-migracios-politikaja-mellett.

[34] Thomas Ainsworth, 'Form vs. Matter', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2020 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/form-matter/.

the actual content, the issue of the Copts, the practical reality. On the other hand, there is the form, the different theories whose forms are recognizable in the matter, in the content. This insight is especially useful in the literature review, as this metaphor provides for a two-tier structure. This part will locate the topic in the matrix of the theoretical literature. However, the part presenting the actual matter is situated later as an independent chapter (chapter 1) and it will present the literature on Copts and on Coptic diasporas in detail.

This review will be based on a thematical approach. It goes from the broader topic and narrows down to focus on the most relevant papers. In this way, it first tackles the global literature on diaspora, then the religious diasporas, as this will be the point of focus, finally it concentrates on the question of identity in general, and on diaspora identity, in particular. It can be said that this paper is situated in the triangular matrix of these three threads – diaspora, religious diaspora, and diaspora identity.

Many reviewed papers belong to the constructivist thread on diasporas,[35] which also informs this thesis. Following the constructivist stream, Brubaker addresses the diaspora not in a substantialist way, not as a "bounded entity" but rather something in motion.[36] The same way, following this essentialist-constructivist debate, migration does not necessarily lead to "diasporic consciousness", it takes more.[37] For example, Sökefeld spoke about diasporas in parallel to social movements.[38] The diaspora thus needs to be organised and created.

[35] Some examples: Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, 'Diasporas and International Relations Theory', *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (2003): 449–79, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573015., Fiona B. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou, 'Remapping the Boundaries of `State' and `National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing', *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (December 2007): 489–526, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107083145. Or Kalra, Kaur, and Hutnyk, *Diaspora & Hybridity*.
[36] Rogers Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997. 13.
[37] Stephen Vertovec, 'Religion and Diaspora. Paper Presented at the Conference on "New Landscapes of Religion in the West"' (University of Oxford, 2000), http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/Vertovec01.PDF. 12.
[38] Martin Sökefeld, 'Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora', *Global Networks* 6, no. 3 (July 2006): 265–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00144.x. 1

This thesis will follow Brubaker's definition of diaspora.[39] It is a tripartite definition. The three constitutive criteria of diasporas are: "dispersion in space", homeland orientation and boundary-maintenance.[40]

Homeland orientation is elaborated on by Benedict Anderson, who speaks about long-distance nationalism which informs support for homeland struggles, even sometimes by financing terrorist groups by diaspora members.[41] According to Jenne et al. mobilisation can be considered as "identity preservation", through intervening at home diaspora members can cultivate their identities.[42]

Here, it is important to mention the triadic relationship which encompasses the relations between the diaspora and homeland, hostland as well as other diasporas.[43] In this triadic framework, the relationship with kinship-based diasporas is not so important; much more important is the homeland-hostland dynamic, which will be addressed later at the diaspora identity section. This triadic or dual formula will be especially interesting with the Coptic diaspora.

In this triadic relationship, the question of hostland is also important. Adamson and Demetriou wrote that the diaspora is a form of resistance against the homogenization of the nation-state.[44] According to Safran diaspora members believe they will never fully be integrated into the hostland.[45]

The third component of the definition is about boundary-maintenance which again will be elaborated on in the identity part as it is more adequate there. For here, I offer just a short

---

[39] Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora'. 3-4.

[40] Brubaker. 5.

[41] Benedict R. O'G Anderson, 'Long-Distance Nationalism. World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics' (Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam, 1992), http://www.mariteslmendoza.com/english242dfiles/WL_Anderson.pdf. 11-12.

[42] Stephen M Saideman, Erin K Jenne, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, 'Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses', n.d., 24. 15.

[43] Vertovec, 'Three Meanings of "Diaspora," Exemplified among South Asian Religions'. 280.

[44] Adamson and Demetriou, 'Remapping the Boundaries of `State' and `National Identity''. 499.

[45] William Safran, 'Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (1991): 83–99, https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1991.0004. 83.

remark. Boundary-maintenance means that the diaspora members preserve a distinctive identity against the host society.[46]

Religion and diaspora

Shain and Barth in their definition when addressing the homeland question, speak about relationship with ethnic or religious homeland.[47] Here, it is important to see that they also mention religious homeland, indeed, there are religious diasporas as well. The intersection of religion and diaspora is an interesting topic, and this part presents the most important developments in the literature, which will also help to better conceptualize and understand the Coptic diaspora – the object of this research.

Matory notes that diasporas and religions are cognate phenomena. Both direct our attention from the "present Place" to the "Other Place".[48] This similarity can be found also in their relationship to community. Even if dispersed, the members of the diaspora imagine themselves as being part of a "unified ethnos; in the same way, religion creates a "moral community and protect the individual against the forces of anomie," as it is with the Muslim umma.[49]

Diasporas and religions have a very complex relationship. Johnson talks about two terms, the diasporic religion, and the religious diaspora to untie the conceptual knots.[50] Religious diasporas owe their creation to reasons directly related to religion and their most salient identity is their religious identity. Good examples for that might be the Mormon diaspora

---

[46] Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora'. 6.
[47] Shain and Barth, 'Diasporas and International Relations Theory'. 452.
[48] J. Lorand Matory, '"The Many Who Dance in Me: Afro-Atlantic Ontology and the Problem with 'Transnationalism."', in *Transnational Transcendence: Essays on Religion and Globalization*, ed. Thomas J. Csordas, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 231–62. 238. Quoted by Paul Christopher Johnson, 'Religion and Diaspora', *Religion and Society* 3, no. 1 (1 January 2012), https://doi.org/10.3167/arrs.2012.030106. 103.
[49] Manuel A. Vásquez, 'Diasporas and Religion', in *Diasporas. Concepts, Intersections, Identities*, ed. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin, 1st ed. (London; New York: Zed Books, 2010), 128–33. 128.
[50] Johnson, 'Religion and Diaspora'. 104.

in Mexico or the Puritan "emigrating to North America".[51] However, the case is different with diasporic religions, which were transported from homeland along other identities so that it does not constitute the most important one. Also, the reason for emigration was unrelated to religion.[52] Here, we can think of the South American diaspora in the US.[53] While this creates some conceptual clarity, it cannot account for all cases. Copts do not necessarily speak about persecution, a fact related to their religion, but they do consider their identity of being Coptic as the most salient as it will be visible later.

Often, however, one diaspora can contain multiple religions, or one religion can be attributed to many ethnicities, such as the Muslim diasporas whose members can be Kosovar or Bangladeshi for example.[54] However, there are cases when diaspora and ethnicity coincides.[55] Cohen, even if he thinks that religions cannot constitute a diaspora normally, mentions special cases, such as Sikhs and Jews where ethnicity and religion coincide.[56] Others conceptualise this problem as the difference between the universal and particular. There are universal religions, such as Islam or Christianity, but there are ones which are particular or ethnic religions such as Judaism.[57] But often even universal religions such as Christianity can become particular, or closely connected to an ethnic group.[58] This is informing because Copts are very close to this case where religion (Coptic Orthodox) and ethnicity (Egyptian) almost overlap as the Coptic Church is traditionally functions in Egypt although they are present in other African countries such as in Sudan, for example.

---

[51] Johnson. 104.
[52] Johnson. 104.
[53] Johnson. 104.
[54] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, 2. ed, Global Diasporas (London: Routledge, 2008). 153-154.
[55] Cohen. 53.
[56] Cohen. 153.
[57] Vásquez, 'Diasporas and Religion'. 130. And Seán McLoughlin, 'Religion and Diaspora', in *Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, ed. John R. Hinnells, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 558–80. 571-572.
[58] McLoughlin, 'Religion and Diaspora'. 572.

Yet another approach speaks about diaspora religion which means that religion in the diaspora is necessarily different from the far away religious centre.[59] People in diaspora tend to be more religious than people in the homeland. Also, if ethnicity and religion work together, they can enhance social cohesion of the group.[60] A good example for that the Armenian mostly following the Armenian Apostolic or the Armenian Catholic Churches, or the Irish mostly belonging to the Catholic Church.[61]

Transnationalism and religion also have a relationship. Transnationalism refers to interactions and linkages among people and institutions beyond and across nation-states.[62] Religions are maybe the first transnational organisations,[63] and religions have been diasporic since ancient times, it is enough to think about the Jewry and Christianity.[64] Modern technology has enhanced the quality and intensity of ties between homelands and host countries. This in turn affected religion as well.[65] As for the diaspora and the hostland, acceptance or rejection of the religion can be an important factor in the diaspora religion.[66] At this point we can also think of compatibility between host country and homeland identities whether Coptic identity is compatible with Hungarian.

Ackerman's paper on the Yazidi diaspora living in Germany is very relevant.[67] Yazidis are minority within the Kurd nation, and they are separated by their religion, which is non-

---

[59] John R. Hinnels, 'The Study of Diaspora Religion', in *A New Handbook of Living Religions*, 1st ed., 1997, 682–90, DOI:10.1002/9781405166614. 686.

[60] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction.*, 2002, http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=166043. 189. Quoted by McLoughlin, 'Religion and Diaspora'. 570

[61] Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, 2002. 189.

[62] Vertovec, 'Religion and Diaspora. Paper Presented at the Conference on "New Landscapes of Religion in the West"'. 22.

[63] Susanne H. Rudolph, 'Introduction', in *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, 1st ed. (Westview Press, 1996), 1–24. 1.

[64] Vertovec, 'Religion and Diaspora. Paper Presented at the Conference on "New Landscapes of Religion in the West"'. 8.

[65] Vertovec. 22.

[66] McLoughlin, 'Religion and Diaspora'. 573.

[67] Andreas Ackerman, 'A Double Minority. Notes on the Emerging Yezidi Diaspora', in *Diaspora, Identity and Religion. New Directions in Theory and Research*, by Waltraud Kokot, Khaching Tölölyan, and Carolin Alfonso, Transnationalism (Routledge, 2004), 156–69.

Muslim.[68] When they enter Germany, they realise that they are no longer persecuted, and this has a great impact on them. In contrary, they need to present their religion for a multicultural society.[69] Belonging to the Yezidi group meant persecution and the necessity to hide one's identity and religious beliefs as well as practices. Based on the definition, Ackerman uses (dispersal of the home country, desire to return, common identity, connection with diaspora groups) in other countries, he posits that the Yezidi community is not yet a "full-fledged diaspora" and they are in the process of diasporisation.[70] Similarly, the Coptic diaspora also shows signs of adapting to the host country and the end of persecution is a fact for them as well.

Identity and diaspora

Identity

Tajfel and Turner are credited with creating the social identity theory, according to which identity is a "self-image" that "derives from the social categories to which he [the individual] perceives as belonging."[71] They strive for a positive self-image for the in-group, and because of that they tend to assign negative qualities to the outgroup.[72] Therefore measuring identity necessarily happens through comparison of relevant out-groups.[73]

In this vein, there is literature on intergroup relations, an important subsection of which is the attitudes towards immigrants, an important aspect of this research as well. There can be many determinants here. According to Knoll, religious identity measured for by attendance can

---

[68] Ackerman. 156.
[69] Ackerman. 156.
[70] Ackerman. 167.
[71] Henry Tajfel and John Turner, 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict', in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co, 1979), 33–47, http://www.ark143.org/wordpress2/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Tajfel-Turner-1979-An-Integrative-Theory-of-Intergroup-Conflict.pdf. 40.
[72] 'Social Identity Theory | Simply Psychology', accessed 19 May 2020, https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html.
[73] Maruice Mangum and Ray Block, 'Social Identity Theory and Public Opinion towards Immigration', *Social Sciences* 7, no. 3 (8 March 2018): 41, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030041. 41.

lead to more open attitudes towards immigrants.[74] Also, minority religions are more likely to support liberal immigration policy.[75] Furthermore, historical, or cultural relations can influence attitudes towards the other group.[76] On the other hand, established migrants can be against immigration to create an identity which includes them into the majority group.[77]

Diaspora identity

Diaspora identities is a well-researched question. If we go back to the definition of Brubaker, the third constitutive component of diaspora is boundary maintenance.[78] It means the "preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society".[79] There is however, another, and rather strong thread in the literature which instead emphasises fluidity, creolization and hybridity, it is thus a debated question. As for hybridity, Stuart Hall in his seminal paper said that

> The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by *hybridity* (italics from the author).[80]

According to Brinkerhoff „immigrants neither fully accept their host country culture, nor do they automatically embrace their traditional ethnic culture to the exclusion of other influences."[81] Their identity is not a "fixed end".[82] Identities are in continuous reproduction.[83]

[74] Benjamin R. Knoll, '"And Who Is My Neighbor?" Religion and Immigration Policy Attitudes', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48, no. 2 (June 2009): 313–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01449.x. 316.
[75] Knoll. 317.
[76] J. Eric Oliver and Janelle Wong, 'Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings', *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (October 2003): 567–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00040. 569.
[77] Liliia Sablina, '"We Should Stop the Islamisation of Europe!": Islamophobia and Right-Wing Radicalism of the Russian-Speaking Internet Users in Germany', *Nationalities Papers*, 17 December 2019, 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.76. 3.
[78] Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora'. 6.
[79] Brubaker. 6.
[80] Hall, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora'. 235.
[81] Jennifer M Brinkerhoff, 'Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement', n.d., 289. 32.
[82] Brinkerhoff. 33.
[83] Brinkerhoff. 33.

According to Friedmann, acculturation exceeds code learning, it actually means identity change.[84] A version of hybrid identities are hyphenated ones, popular in the US, which alludes to the more or less similar importance of two identities.[85]

In yet another approach by Meeusen et al. while examining solidarity, posits that immigrants are more or less in solidarity with newcomers depending on their self-identification, whether they identify themselves with the host country majority population or with the fellow immigrants.[86]

A very important paper in terms of this research is that of Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw.[87] They study the Congolese diaspora in Brussels, based on 20 semi-structured interviews.[88] According to their paper, a hybrid identity is created in the matrix of homeland, host country and the migrant community. They argue that members of this diaspora have a hybrid identity based on Congolese, Black, African European, Belgian, and urban identities.[89] The relationship between those identities are nested, they are not hierarchical meaning that salience and importance do not necessarily correlate.[90] Furthermore, "those who are less embedded in the locality emphasise their 'Congolese' side."[91] My research, in a similar way, would like to understand the identities claimed or rejected by the Copts and how Copts prioritise in the context of the migration conflict in Hungary.

In another important paper, Richards studies second-generation West Indian immigrant

---

[84] Jonathan Friedman, *Cultural Identity and Global Process*, Theory, Culture & Society (London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994). 28.

[85] Bedelia Nicola Richards, 'Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora. Second Generation West-Indians in Brooklyn', in *Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations*, ed. Keri E. Iyall Smith and Patricia Leavy, vol. 12, Studies in Critical Social Sciences (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 265–89. 268. And Brinkerhoff, 'Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement'. 32.

[86] Meeusen, Abts, and Meuleman, 'Between Solidarity and Competitive Threat?' 2.

[87] Eva Swyngedouw and Erik Swyngedouw, 'The Congolese Diaspora in Brussels and Hybrid Identity Formation: Multi-Scalarity and Diasporic Citizenship', *Urban Research & Practice* 2, no. 1 (7 April 2009): 68–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/17535060902727074.

[88] Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw. 75.

[89] Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw. 74-75.

[90] Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw. 80

[91] Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw. 78.

adolescents living in Brooklyn, and how their identity is hybridised.[92] She emphasises the importance of institutions such as churches, schools, workplaces which, as being shared by people from the same ethnicity, helps preserve their distinct identities.[93] She found among her interlocutors that there are monocultural and bicultural people depending on whether they identify only as West Indian or as Grenadian and American, for example.[94] In this second one, there are many hyphenated identities.[95] Finally, there are ethnic Americans for whom American identity is the strongest.[96] They losing their immigrant "cultural competence" as they get more ethnically American.[97] Also, here there can be disharmony between their cultural competence and their will to identify as West Indians.[98] Interestingly, Copts too have the opportunity to socialise with other Copts, as the church provides a lot of services to take part in and spend time together afterwards.

Argument and theoretical framework

This thesis examines the identities of a diaspora community and looks at attitudes concerning immigration. While doing this, it builds extensively on the social identity theory first described by Tajfel and Turner.[99] First, the framework will address the measurement question. The existing research has very good measurement tools in this regard. My research will draw on the papers of Abdelal et al. as well as Brady and Kaplan.[100]

---

[92] Richards, 'Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora. Second Generation West-Indians in Brooklyn'.
[93] Richards. 267.
[94] Richards. 270.
[95] Richards. 279.
[96] Richards. 270.
[97] Richards. 270, 274.
[98] Richards. 270.
[99] Tajfel and Turner, 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict'.
[100] Rawi Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable', in *Measuring Identity. A Guide for Social Scientists*, ed. Rawi Abdelal et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17–32. And Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity', in *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 33–71.

Abdelal et al. conceptualise identity as content and contestation.[101] In terms of content they mean the following components: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models.[102] As, the research is based on only 16 interviews, it would be hard to find examples for each of these subgroups but some of them are still important such as the relational comparisons which will be addressed in the second section.

Contestation again is a good measurement tool which looks for variation in the sample. How much the given identities and their content are contested. It is based on constructivist assumptions, that the identities are not fixed but they are in constant negotiation and production.[103]

Following the lines of the social identity theory, Brady and Kaplan uses a similar but different framework than Abdelal et al. They mention attributes like qualities that are relatively easy to perceive such as skin colour which will be important in terms of discrimination, as we will see it later. Also, "every group tells narratives about what it means to be a member and what the group's goals are. This story is typically much more favourable to the in-group than to out-groups."[104]

Measuring the salience or intensity of identities can seem positivist. Robert Cox wrote about the problem of fluidity. He said that there might "periods and places" when these meanings are stable enough to study with social scientific methods.[105] This is also the assumption of this research, namely that social scientific methods, in this case a Likert scale, is able to tell something substantial about those members of the community. Identities can be measured thus not only in terms of content but also in terms of salience.[106]

---

[101] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 19.
[102] Abdelal et al. 19.
[103] Abdelal et al. 27.
[104] Brady and Kaplan, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity'. 34.
[105] Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders', in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 204–54. Cited by Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 28.
[106] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 30. And Rawi Abdelal et al., 'Treating Identity as a Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity and Contestation of Identity', n.d. 10.

Salience or intensity is measured with a Likert scale in this thesis and it will be approached in a tandem with questions related to the content of identities, thus giving a hybrid character to the research as its dominant interpretative character is fused with a positivist subsection. Intensity, this paper argues will be important factor in terms of content and contestation, thus the necessity to combine the two. For example, people who reject the Arabic identity are more prone to be against the immigrants among my interlocutors.

Indeed, the question of immigrants or the question of the Arabic identity, one of the most important findings of the research, are both related to the relational comparisons mentioned above. Also, the relationship to the Hungarian identity can be added here, although the causal link there will be different. Relational comparison means that we can learn a great deal about an identity by looking at how people claiming that identity look at others with other identities. For Bartelson, following Derrida, the relational content of an identity is more important than when people refer to their own identities.[107] Bell wrote that French nationalism was constructed in a way that it refers to the English barbarism against which France has to be protected.[108] This comparison is part and parcel of the social identity theory where comparisons with out-groups play an important role. In order to strive for positive self-image, group members will devaluate out-groups.[109] Also, cooperation with similar groups are more likely than with more different groups; in this sense, Copts can relate to Christian Hungarians more easily than to Muslim Arabs, as we will see it later. Thus, Arabs and immigrants are considered as possible out-groups.

My research found that Copts are rather mixed about or are against the immigration, this shows that they do not conform to the theory of that minority religions are more tolerant and open to liberal immigration policies,[110] but rather it is closer to what Sablina argued – that

---

[107] Jens Bartelson, 'Second Natures: Is the State Identical with Itself?', *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 295–326, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004003002.
[108] David Avrom Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680 - 1800* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001). 84-88.
[109] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 24.
[110] Knoll, '"And Who Is My Neighbor?' 317.

established immigrants by rejecting newcomers "redefine their senses of identity and belonging in order to include themselves in the category of 'majority'" .[111]

Hungarian identity is also an out-group but here the casual link is different. The connection is through hybridisation. Through integration, immigrants learn the language and codes of the new country and assume a new, hybrid identity.[112] The findings are inconclusive here, as there will be people who even after living here for 15 year and with full integration experience Hungarian identity as distant.

Indeed, this is a striking finding that even within a relatively small and identic community (everyone found the Christian identity very important), there is plurality and contestation. Even when the leader of the community, who definitely has a role in how people in the community think about the world, framed the Arabic identity in a normative way that there could be no questions that Copts are not Arabs, still, there were two members of the community who clearly identified themselves as Arabic.[113]

Another important aspect based on the findings of this research, I argue, is that a toxic environment of oppression characteristic of the Egyptians society can have negative influence also on the oppressed minority. It is probably thus not enough to speak about suffering of oppressed minorities but also how they might contribute in perpetuating the conflict and this way, they are no longer victims with no agency but might be able to the change the course of events.

---

[111] Sablina, "'We Should Stop the Islamisation of Europe!'" 3.
[112] Brinkerhoff, 'Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement'. 33.
[113] Brady and Kaplan, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity'. 35.

Research methodology

The research is based on semi-structured interviews and on participant observation. Interviews are very helpful because if a research is focusing on identities, it seems the most straightforward way to go and ask the people. As for participant observation, it gives a good background and context to the research.

Between January and March 2020, I regularly took part in the liturgical activities of the diaspora, mostly on Sundays, when many people gathered (around 60-80) in the small church of the community on the outskirts of Budapest. Normally, at the end of the liturgy when people go out to talk and eat, I approached my future interviewees who were selected and not sampled, meaning that I was not striving to get an ideal sample necessary for positivist research plans, but started talking to the people and asked them for an interview.[114] Interviews took place either there or at another time. However, since the pandemic reached Hungary and the government ordered the lockdown of the country at the end of March 2020, including the suspension of all gatherings as well, the church liturgies have been suspended, too. Thankfully, due to the already existing contacts, new interviewees could be found using the snowball method. Interviews were conducted through video calls; only participant observation had to be forgone.

The interview questions set[115] has around 17 questions, but as it is a semi-structured interview, further questions will be asked to make things more explicit and clearer. The fixed questions can be grouped into the following units. First of all, demographical data were recorded from each participant, such as age, education, marital status, occupation, and place of origin in Egypt (question 1, 3, 4), from this it will be possible to infer socioeconomic status. I assume that demographic data might be relevant when assessing the following questions because more

---

[114] Lee Ann Fujii, *Interviewing in Social Science Research. A Relational Approach*, 1st ed., Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods (New York: Routledge, 2018). 37-40.
[115] See the Appendix.

time in the host country can lead to closer identification. In the same way, possible intermarriage or relations with the majority population can help in the formulation of hybrid identities.

The set includes a Likert scale as well to measure the importance of different identities (Coptic, Egyptian, Arabic, Christian, Hungarian; question 9), from a scale of 1 to 5.[116] This question (question 9) will show relative and absolute intensity or salience of the identities and will help to interpret other questions which rather aim to understand the content of different identities, and see the connections.[117] For example, stronger identification with Arabic identity can coincide with more solidarity towards immigrants at question 15.

Furthermore, these numbers will be organized into identity clusters based on similarity. I expect a spectrum in which on one end and there will be a stronger identification with Coptic and Hungarian identities. According to the literature, hyphenation is an important milestone in integration, as it means assuming different identities with the same salience, such as the Hungarian and the Coptic or Egyptian.[118] On the other end, I anticipate a strong identification with Coptic, Christian and Egyptian identities; Hungarian identity will be a function of the time spent in Hungary. Secondly, I expect another spectrum or variation in terms of the importance the Arabic identity, on one end more animosity towards it, on the other end, possibly the cosmopolitans, more openness to it.

Integration could also be called hybridisation when immigrants assume the identity of the majority population of the host society but keeps their original identities as well. In this vein, strong identification with Coptic and/or Egyptian as well as Hungarian identities might testify not only about integration but about the birth of hybrid identities as well.

---

[116] Saul McLeod, 'Likert Scale Definition, Examples and Analysis | Simply Psychology', accessed 30 March 2020, https://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale.html.

[117] Abdelal et al., 'Treating Identity as a Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity and Contestation of Identity'. 10.

[118] Richards, 'Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora. Second Generation West-Indians in Brooklyn'. 279.

Finally, this question gives context and weight to the unpacking of the same identities in the next question (question 10). This question aims to establish the content of the different identities and will also give an insight into the level of contestation.[119]

Also, it is clear from the literature that Copts do not consider Arabs,[120] but the question addressing the Arabic identity stayed in the set because, according to the social identity theory, in order to understand the identity of the in-group, it is important to make social comparisons with the out-group, in this case, with the Muslim Arabs of Egypt.[121]

There are questions which measure the relation to the Hungarian identity through integration, such as any experienced negative behaviour which might be caused by failures in integration (or just xenophobia), or the confidence in the usage of the language (question 13-14). A further question asks whether they plan to stay in Hungary for good and whether they are planning to apply for citizenship, or they are already Hungarian citizens. These questions too will show how they relate to the Hungarian identity (question 5).

Also, their relationship to the church will be explored. They will be asked how often they come to the church, how they have found the community here. These questions will show the Coptic or Christian identity in work; it is expected that people who come more often, have a stronger identity (question 2, 7). Also, the nationality/religion of the spouse and closest friends will be asked, as it shows embeddedness in ethnic, religious nexuses (questions 11-12). If an interviewee has a Hungarian wife or husband, it can contribute to assuming the Hungarian identity. Also, if they have closer friends from the Muslim community, it could signal less othering and more openness towards the "other", in this case, the Muslims.

Another set of questions will focus on the relationship with the wider, regional Arabic and Muslim identity through the vignette method. The vignette method is a good way to find

---

[119] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 18.
[120] See the third chapter.
[121] Mangum and Block, 'Social Identity Theory and Public Opinion towards Immigration'. 41.

answers for delicate or tough questions, it often uses a story about a fictitious person to gain information about the beliefs or in our case, attitudes of the respondent.[122] The story is usually something that comes across as familiar for the interviewee and he or she can relate to it.[123] In the similar vein, I give two photos to my interlocutors (question 15) which depict the refugee crisis of 2015 when a reporter used physical force to stop refugee families escaping police.[124] It is not a hypothetical story, but a story they can relate to, as immigrants from the Middle East. This photo reached even the international media and caused an outcry among those who raise their voices for a more humanitarian treatment for the refugees.[125]

The photos gauge how they position themselves, regarding their relations to their identities, mainly the Arabic and Hungarian identities, it is expected that those less adamant against the behaviour of the Hungarian reporter would be more prone to reject the Arabic identity and are doing this to get closer to the majority thus, to the Hungarian identity.[126] On the other hand, more empathy towards the refugees can mean the activation of an immigrant identity. This could show an interesting pattern of identification in the context of relations and discrimination between migrant groups. The time since arrival or gender can again be important here, also level of education can lead to more openness towards others. Also, place of origin in Egypt can matter (question 3), as sectarian violence is the highest in Upper Egypt where there

---

[122] Annabelle Gourlay et al., 'Using Vignettes in Qualitative Research to Explore Barriers and Facilitating Factors to the Uptake of Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission Services in Rural Tanzania: A Critical Analysis', *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 14, no. 1 (December 2014): 21, https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-14-21. 1-2.

[123] Gourlay et al. 2.

[124] The photo can be seen in the question set in the Appendix. The case has had a great impact worldwide: Márton Kasnyik, 'László Petra, a Menekült Gyerekeket Rugdosó Operatőr Máris Negatív Világsztár Lett', 444, 8 September 2015, http://444.hu/2015/09/08/laszlo-petra-menekult-gyerekeket-rugdoso-operator-maris-negativ-vilagsztar-lett.

[125] Source: Index.hu and Twitter/@RichterSteph, 'Journalist Appears to Kick and Trip Fleeing Refugees – Video', *The Guardian*, 8 September 2015, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/sep/08/journalist-appears-to-kick-and-trip-fleeing-refugees-video.

[126] Meeusen, Abts, and Meuleman, 'Between Solidarity and Competitive Threat?' 4. And Sablina, '"We Should Stop the Islamisation of Europe!"' 3.

are higher number of Copts and less articulated in the big cities.[127] We might see differing answers based on demographic variability. Finally, the findings could be compared with the identity clusters.

The usage of vignette is useful in this question as it might provide more substantial answers. As for some of my interviewees or people I met, it was hard to speak about questions related to Muslims. Therefore, an indirect way to ask about their relationship to Muslims can prove more efficient, as well as it can help to answer the research question on how they see immigration.

Finally, they will be asked about their opinions regarding the Hungarian policy on migration and refugees for the same reasons as well as to see how they relate to the xenophobic turn of the government propaganda and its implications for them.

The total number of interviews are 16. There is one meta-interview as well, with Father Youssef, the priest of the community and. A meta-interview is an interview that does not consist of the question set I normally use but it asks further questions to understand better the regular interviews. In this vein, I asked Father Yousef about the story of the diaspora and the immigration waves, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

Then interviews were coded using the Atlas.ti qualitative research tool to search for patterns and recurring themes. Later, this was combined with the salience of different identities measured by Likert scale along the different identity clusters found among the members of the diaspora.

---

[127] Sana Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-Long Struggle for Coptic Equality* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 52. And 'Egypt 2018 International Religious Freedom Report', *US Government*, 2018, 20. 2. 11.

Positionality, limitations, ethical concerns

My position in the research as well as in the interviews is an important question. Positionality relates to identity in terms of race, class, gender, and sexuality.[128] It shows how one's identity might influence one's understanding of the world, leading to potential biases.[129] As a Hungarian, I am at home, and things I take for granted are not necessarily as straightforward for immigrants. If I conduct an interview in my mother tongue, it might be comfortable for me, but complicated for my interviewees. As someone from the majority, and thus in a power position, they might want to live up to my imagined expectations, hence they say things, they think I am interested to hear. Or they change their views to gain a positive feedback from someone in the majority population. Or maybe they will be less critical towards the government or Hungary because I represent the majority population.

Also, as a man, I can more easily approach people, I have less to worry about, I can defend myself more easily, however, it has a downside as well, based on my research experience with the Copts so far, women often declined interview requests. Probably, if I were a woman, I could interview more women; other question if I were taken seriously the same way I was. So, gender, too, played a role in my research.

Finally, as a Christian and former theology student, despite language differences, I could move around with ease and could more easily untie the puzzles using my theology background. On the other hand, however, this position could also mean that because I am too close to them, I don't have enough distance to be objective.

The COVID-19 pandemic has considerably hindered my research. Since March 27, 2020 until mid-May, Budapest was under lockdown, and as of May 11, 2020, the strict measures still

---

[128] 'What Does Positionality Mean? | Gender & Sexuality by Dictionary.Com', *Dictionary.Com* (blog), accessed 2 June 2020, https://www.dictionary.com/e/gender-sexuality/positionality/.
[129] 'What Does Positionality Mean?'

prohibit gatherings in and around Budapest, so Coptic liturgies are still suspended. Only at the end of May could liturgical life resume but with serious cautionary measures. Finding new interviewees proved hard without physical contact and the number of interviews stopped at 16. Also, video calls, the interview method I eventually used, are hardly as personal as in-person, real meeting. I estimate that the building up of trust and therefore the sharing of valuable information on behalf of the interviewees are considerably more difficult, thus limiting the existing data of the research. This is, however, an obstacle I have to accept and work with. In the current situation with no vaccine in sight, this is the only responsible way of conducting the research, even if it might entail data loss as well.

As for ethical issues, when starting the interviews, I approached first the priest, interviewed him, and asked for his permission. Only when it was granted, I proceeded to interview the others. However, a few were worried that what they will say to me will be published in my thesis, and it might have negative repercussions, as the Egyptian secret service might spy on them. Therefore, keeping identities completely anonymous and avoiding anything that might identify them, is a very important precondition of this research.

Therefore, I do not disclose any real names, except that of the priest and will use pseudonyms. Also, I will avoid mentioning anything concrete so that later identification will not be possible. During the interviews, I began by clarifying this point assuring them that their identities would be protected throughout the research. Consent forms were handed out, too, which were read, but not returned in all cases.[130]

---

[130] See Appendix.

Outline of the chapters

The first chapter will give a short historical background to the Copts, as part of Egypt and also about the Coptic diasporas worldwide and in Hungary. The second chapter will introduce and interpret the results of the Likert scale question and will describe the different clusters. The third chapter will study the content of the Coptic, Egyptian and Christian identities. The fourth chapter will focus on the Hungarian identity and will study the phenomenon of hybridisation. The fifth chapter will analyse attitudes towards the Arabic identity. The sixth chapter will look at the problem of solidarity with the refugees, and how different interviewees approached the migration problem through the vignette. The last chapter will conclude.

1. The Copts

In order to make sense of the interviews, it is important first to understand the situation of Copts. This part provides a short survey of the history of Copts. It also furnishes a summary of Coptic-Muslim relations and reviews the Coptic diasporas with a focus on the Hungarian one.

The word Cop means Egyptian and is derived from the Greek *Aigyptos*. Until the Arab conquest and the following spread of Islam, it designated the Egyptians who spoke the Coptic language.[131] Now it denotes a large Christian minority. Copts proudly consider themselves the original inhabitants of Egypt. Through endogamy they are pride of having preserved their racial purity since the time of the pharaohs in contrary to the Muslim Egyptians who emerged due to miscegenation.[132]

It is important to mention that Copts can trace back their Church to its founder, Saint Mark, one of the writers of the gospels and through the exile of the Holy Family, they consider Egypt to be the part of the Holy Land.[133] Later in Antiquity, Alexandria has become a very important Christian theological centre.[134] Furthermore, the birthplace of Christian monasticism is Egypt, and this and the martyrdom are important pillars of Coptic tradition.[135]

Due to mostly political reasons, Copts departed from the then imperial church in 451 AD when at the Council of Chalcedon, they were humiliated.[136] Ever since then, they are a separate church, where state borders and those of the Church overlap. However, they are also present in some African countries and in diasporas in the West. The separation was sharp until

---

[131] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 17.
[132] Hassan. 20. Hassan is Muslim, even though she is not practising her faith. Therefore, she cannot be accused of being biased based on ethnic-religious belonging.
[133] Hassan. 21. 23-24.
[134] Hassan. 23-24.
[135] Hassan. 22. 66.
[136] Hassan. 28.

the late twentieth century and some believe it helped Christians side with Muslims against the Christian Byzantium, and later against the British.[137]

However, since the Arab Conquest in the 7th century, oppression is the determining experience of Christians.[138] There was a short period, nonetheless, in the 20th century when Muslims and Christians were working together to bring about a tolerant secular state.[139] The Wafd party orchestrated these efforts in the first half of the century starting around the First World War. At this time, the ideology of pharaonism was articulated by intellectuals which emphasised the pharaonic origins of Egypt, and downplayed 13 centuries of Arabic presence since the conquest.[140] This ideology with its pre-Muslim and pre-Christian focus could unite the nation, they argued, and it especially appealed to Copts, who preferred to look back to a moment of no political subjugation.[141] Through this ideology, Copts could even consider themselves aristocracy due to racial purity.[142] This moment, however, did not last for long. But, still today, Copts often emphasise their pharaonic origins, as it will be clear from this research as well.

The idea of secular Egypt was lost because during this time, politicians endorsing it, could not solve the problems of Egypt, the field was open for increasing Islamization. The fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood has been a major force since 1934. Although banned in 1948, it could no longer be annihilated.[143] Nasser (1956-70), was not tolerant towards them, but Islamization permeated the whole society during the regime of Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) who allied with the group.[144] It has grown too much, and was no longer possible to hold in check, it

---

[137] Hassan. 29.
[138] Hassan. 109.
[139] Hassan. 40.
[140] Hassan. 41-42.
[141] Hassan. 41. And Michael Wood, 'The Use of the Pharaonic Past in Modern Egyptian Nationalism', *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 35 (1998): 179, https://doi.org/10.2307/40000469. 182.
[142] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 41.
[143] Hassan. 51-53.
[144] Hassan. 104-106.

was unleashed for good. Preachers in many mosques spoke about an Islamic country with no other institutions and thus wanted to eliminate Coptic ones.[145]

There were lot of bloody attacks on Christians by extremists during the regime of Sadat and Mubarak, but the government failed to do anything meaningful about it.[146] And even if the current leader, Sissi, sides in words with the Christian minority, persecution is not acknowledged and sectarian violence is still widespread.[147] In recent times often happened that if a Muslim and a Christian had a quarrel, or a Christian was accused rightly or wrongly of committing something against a Muslim, the Muslim majority of the village or town exercised collective punishment on Christians, burning their property and sometimes even killing some of them.[148] Of course, there were Muslims who sided with the attacked Christians but they were the minority and often it had painful consequences for them.[149] The conflict then was usually followed by a mandatory arbitration, which is not necessarily a bad institution, as it works well in Bangladesh, for example, but in Egypt, these processes usually lead to the relinquishment of the charges brought up by Christians and the release of the arrested Muslims.[150] So, it is discriminatory and contribute to silencing the minority as it prevents trying the perpetrators, thus makes such acts possible in the future.[151] In general, authorities are afraid of taking steps against Muslim perpetrators because of the reaction of the majority Muslim population.[152] Unfortunately, in recent times, in the society, because of strong Islamisation[153] and segregation, in schools and hospitals for example, Christians and Muslims are much farther from each other

---

[145] Hassan. 106.
[146] Hassan. 108.
[147] Sarah Yerkes, 'What Egypt under Sissi Is Really like for Coptic Christians', *Brookings* (blog), 30 November 1AD, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/06/20/what-egypt-under-sissi-is-really-like-for-coptic-christians/.
[148] Mariz Tadros, *Copts at the Crossroads: The Challenges of Building Inclusive Democracy in Contemporary Egypt* (Cairo; New York: The American University In Cairo Press, 2013). 48-50, 99-100.
[149] Tadros. 50.
[150] Tadros. 112. And 'Egypt 2018 International Religious Freedom Report'. 11.
[151] Tadros, *Copts at the Crossroads*. 112.
[152] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 20.
[153] See above.

and the sectarian tensions have gotten higher, especially in rural areas.[154] Also, Copts cannot get high positions in institutions, the highest rank is that of vice president in a company.[155] So, according to the 2018 Religious Freedom Report of the US, there is both state and societal persecution of Christians.[156]

The strong Islamization has led to a counter-movement on behalf of the Copts and to "the politization of the Coptic ethnic identity".[157] "The radicalisation of a distinct religious and ethnic identity among Copts corresponds with the increasing Islamization of the social environment."[158] The Coptic Church through the Sunday School movement, which meant a comprehensive reform of the community, sought to build up strong Coptic identities to give posture to the Coptic youth overwhelmed by the Islamic propaganda that loomed large in the education suggesting that Muslims are superior.[159] The Church successfully promoted the Coptic identity as the first loyalty for Copts, even more important than loyalty towards the state.[160]

Finally, Copts reject the designation of "minority". They are a minority only numerically, but not "racially, nationally, culturally".[161] The minority term would "abrogate their deep Egyptian identity, an identity that makes them unique but also links them inseparably to their homeland".[162]

---

[154] Marc Michael, 'Is Liberalism Killing the Copts?', accessed 27 May 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/2011111616317813239.html. And Tadros, *Copts at the Crossroads*. 50.
[155] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 171.
[156] 'Egypt 2018 International Religious Freedom Report'.
[157] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 18.
[158] Sebastian Elsässer, 'The Copts in the January Revolution of 2011', in *Copts in Context. Negotiating Identity, Tradition, and Modernity*, ed. Nelly van Doorn-Harder, Studies in Comparative Religion (Columbia, South Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 2017), 21–33. 22.
[159] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 194-195.
[160] Hassan. 201.
[161] H. Labib, *Azmat al-himaya al-diniyya: al-din wa'l-dawla fi misr* (Cairo: Dar al-Shouruq, 2000). Cited by Yefet, 'The Coptic Diaspora and the Status of the Coptic Minority in Egypt'. 1212.
[162] Yefet, 'The Coptic Diaspora and the Status of the Coptic Minority in Egypt'. 1212.

1.1.   Copts in the US

The largest Coptic diaspora is in the US where the Church has sent priests since the 1960s.[163] There were around 150 churches throughout the country as of 2013.[164] Due to the large size of the diaspora and the importance of the country, there are many associations who are also active in lobbying.[165] In the US diaspora, rebuilding and strengthening the identities oppressed in the homeland are very important.[166]

1.2.   Copts in Hungary

The Coptic diaspora in Hungary consists of only 100 families, its political weight in terms of potential lobbying might be way less than that of the US one. However, the articulation and cultivation of identities are still important. Its story is also interesting. Pope Shenouda, the then pope of the Coptic Church, sent Khalil Youssef, who has been serving as a priest here ever since 2004, to Budapest answering a request of Copts already living in Hungary that time. They did not have their own church initially, they consecrated theirs only in 2011, in celebration Pope Shenouda himself participated on the invitation of the Hungarian government. In 2017, the Coptic Church founded a new Central European diocese which incorporates Romania, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary with Budapest as the episcopal seat presided by Bishop Giovanni.[167]

According to Khalil Youssef, there were three waves of Coptic immigration to Hungary. The first wave consisted of Copts arriving under Nasser (1956-70) They are mostly very old or

---

[163] Yvonne Haddad, 'Good Copt, Bad Copt: Competing Narratives on Coptic Identity in Egypt and the United States', *Studies in World Christianity* 19, no. 3 (December 2013): 208–32, https://doi.org/10.3366/swc.2013.0058. 212.
[164] Haddad. 213.
[165] Yefet, 'The Coptic Diaspora and the Status of the Coptic Minority in Egypt'. 1209.
[166] Yefet. 1207.
[167] Father Khalil Youssef, in-depth interview, February 8, 2020. The whole paragraph is based on the information received from him.

have already passed away. The second is made up of people coming in the 90s looking for a better life. The third is composed of students coming to study in Hungary. The government has an agreement through the Hungary Helps agency with the Coptic Cultural Center in Cairo which provides scholarships for Christians to pursue studies in Hungarian higher education institutions. I met numerous people who came on that scholarship.[168]

They have liturgical activities almost every day, except Monday. The highlight of the week is the Sunday liturgy when the Church is nearly full. Despite the long liturgy (2.5 hours), people come regularly. Occasionally, there are spiritual days as well, organised always for a subgroup, like children or women. Beyond that, Father Youssef is also visiting students studying in other Hungarian cities to help them spiritually. Bishop Giovanni is visiting the communities in other countries belonging to the diocese. But they have connections with other European communities as well. The sense of community is also strong with the motherland. Father Youssef told me that people often know about the Coptic church in Hungary in advance and newcomers are picked up at the airport by him. But the direction of migration is one-way. Very few people return to Egypt.[169]

On one occasion when I was there in February, Bishop Giovanni made an announcement at the end of the Sunday liturgy. He said he just bought a land in Budapest to build up a major church there for the community. His statement was warmly welcomed. It showed that the diaspora is stable, and they reckon on staying in Hungary long-term and expect further growth in numbers.

Father Youssef spoke about the merger of the Egyptian, Coptic, and Hungarian identities and about the building of a "new mindset" based on these three identifications. They are indeed at the crossroads of multiple identities. Let us see what the interviews confirm and how identities are negotiated in the community.

---

[168] Father Khalil Youssef, in-depth interview, February 8, 2020.
[169] Father Khalil Youssef, in-depth interview, February 8, 2020.

2. Identity clusters

This chapter presents the different findings based on what kind of groups or clusters one can find in terms of identity salience measured by the Likert scale of the question set. But first, it is time to learn more about the informants of the research. I had fifteen interviews with the informants and one with Father Youssef whose structure was different.[170] Furthermore, a government related news outlet, the *Magyar Nemzet,* interviewed Father Youssef; it will be also included as data.[171] Also, two interview structures were different, as they were the pilot ones, and the question set was finalised later.[172]

In terms of age, they are between 16 and 60 including Father Youssef, with around 32 as average. The time since arrival in Hungary ranges from 0.5 to 21 years, with the average being approximately 10 years and the dispersion being six years. Out of 16, five had citizenship; others were here as students or have working or job seeking visas. There are seven women and nine men. Twelve of them have university diplomas, two of them are doing their PhDs here, one is currently in high school, another in professional school, yet another has a professional school diploma and one is unknown.

As for the average importance of identities, out of the 13 who gave answers to these questions, the following order of priority was found: Christian with 1.00, meaning that each respondent gave the highest possible score to this identity. It is followed by the Coptic and Egyptian identities with 1.15, then comes Hungarian with 2.46 and finally Arabic with 3.83 out of five.

In terms of identity clusters, there were three. In identity cluster, I mean recurring patterns of identity configuration where numbers measuring importance of given identities are

---

[170] See the methodology section.
[171] Velkei Tamás, 'Az iszlám terjesztése a migránsok célja', *Magyar Nemzet* (blog), accessed 23 May 2020, https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/belfold-archivum/az-iszlam-terjesztese-a-migransok-celja-4029453/.
[172] Therefore, they did not contain Likert scale for example.

nearly identic. The first cluster (green cluster, See Appendix) is the 1-1-1-5-1 (Coptic – Egyptian – Christian – Arabic – Hungarian) where one means very important, and five means unimportant. In total, four people gave these number.

An interesting finding about this group is that people here are all beyond 30 (34, 37, 38 and 42 respectively), so this is the oldest group. It suggests that older people in the diaspora are more prone to reject Arabic identity. Also, two of the four people here are from Minya where, as it was clear from the literature and one interviewee confirmed this, is the hottest place in terms of sectarian strife and persecution of Christians,[173] as due to the higher proportion in the population Coptic presence is more visible, and as one of my interviewees (Kerolos) said, "it is not easy for the other side to accept this."[174] Finally, the members of this group spent the longest average time (12 years) in Hungary which accounts for their assumption of Hungarian identity as all of them gave one for it, furthermore, three out of these four interviews were conducted in Hungarian. Finally, half of them have Hungarian citizenship.

The second cluster (blue cluster, see Appendix) is close to this with the difference that for the people here, not only the Arabic, but the Hungarian identity is also unimportant or close to unimportant. Two people gave 1-1-1-4-3 (Coptic – Egyptian – Christian – Arabic – Hungarian), one gave 1-1-1-5-4, and another 1-1-1-5-0 but refused to indicate the importance of the Hungarian identity probably because he arrived half a year ago and for him it was irrelevant. The average age here is considerably younger compared to the first group with an average of 24 years. Also, they are all students and none of them has citizenship.

Out of the remaining five, four (orange cluster, see Appendix) are close to a pattern which could be defined as all identities are salient, the numbers here are the following: 1-1-1-2-3, 1-1-1-2-1, 1-1-1-3.5-2 and 2-1-1-1-3. In this group, the Arabic identity is the most positive, ranging between 1 and 3.5. Unsurprisingly, all of them are from big cities, either Cairo or

---

[173] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 52.
[174] Hassan. 12. And Luke, in-depth interview, 2020.

Alexandria. Probably, coexistence is much easier in these metropolises. They are probably the most cosmopolitan group. Later, it will be also addressed how they relate to the Arabic identity.

As for the Hungarian identity, it had the second highest dispersion, with 1.39. But it is likely that its importance is exaggerated (the average being 2.46) as people might have given more favourable numbers because I myself am a Hungarian.[175]

There can be many reasons why we see these clusters. In a hypothetical immigration story, we would see a Coptic person entering Hungary with strong Coptic and Christian identities. Then we would see her develop a stronger and stronger Hungarian identity. She also has an attitude towards the Arabic identity, which probably will not change in Hungary. If we continue, second-generation Copts would lose cultural competence, which the first-generation immigrants naturally have, in terms of all identities except the Hungarian, as we could see with Abanoub (in the orange cluster) who was ignorant of the sectarian strife in the Egyptian society.[176] In this sense, the clusters can be considered as steps or phases of this integration or hybridisation process, albeit with two end results, the cosmopolitan and the green cluster; the difference might be the Arabic identity. The blue cluster could represent a preceding phase. Average time spent in Hungary somewhat conforms to this: for members in the green cluster 12 years, for those of the orange 10, for those of the blue 8.

In conclusion, there are three different clusters, in the green all identities were strong, except the Arabic which was rejected. The blue cluster consists of strong Coptic, Christian and Egyptian identities but Hungarian and Arabic identities are less important. For people in the orange cluster usually all identities were salient.

---

[175] Laura L. Adams, 'Techniques for Measuring Identity in Ethnographic Research', in *Measuring Identity. A Guide for Social Scientists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 316–41. 325.
[176] Richards, 'Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora. Second Generation West-Indians in Brooklyn'. 274.

3. Content of identities

Salience was studied in the previous chapter. However, as Abdelal et al. argued, there are other ways to measure identities, such as through content or contestation.[177] Therefore, this paragraph analyses the answers given to the question 10.[178] According to Abdelal et al. the content of the identity is made up of constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons with other social categories and cognitive models. The relational comparisons, which applies to the often-rejected Arabic identity, will be addressed in the next chapter.

3.1. Coptic identity

The Coptic identity proved to be very important for all informants (averaged 1.15 with 0.38 as dispersion). Also, almost all of them go at least once per week to the church, usually on Sundays, however, there are respondents, like Bishoi and Eman, who are there on an almost daily basis. Unfortunately, interviewees had to be located on the spot, so those who are only loosely connected to the community probably are not in my sample.

Historical facts about the identity were brought up by several respondents. The long history of the Coptic Church by two interviewees, its martyrs, and their importance by four respondents. Also, the Coptic monasticism was mentioned by someone as having global significance. We can see here the seeking for positive self-image for the in-group as described by the social identity theory.[179]

It seems that the respondents mostly considered it as a religious identity, saying that a connection with God is important as well as celebrations and fasting seasons are central for them. However, Rami even claimed that the Coptic identity is a national identity: "Yes, it's a

---

[177] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 18.
[178] What does it mean for you to be Coptic, Egyptians, Christian, Arabic, Hungarian?
[179] Tajfel and Turner, 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict'. 40.

national identity, before being a Christian or any religious identity." This would undermine the unity of Egyptians including both Christians and Muslims. Bishoi said that "all Egyptians are Copts", meaning that true Egyptians are the Copts. Yet another (Rami) said that "Coptic means Egyptian." This phenomenon subscribes to the narrative of pharaonism, which is missing from the mainstream Muslim majority or is only present in tourism,[180] which emphasised pharaonic origins, however five respondents (Father Yousef, Rami, Mina, Adam and Kerolos) used this narrative to refer to the Copts as coming originally from the Egypt of the pharaohs. This finding corresponds with what Hassan wrote about the existence of pharaonism among Copts.[181] Interestingly, only men subscribe to that narrative among my interlocutors. Also, only people from the green and blue clusters, no one from the orange.[182] And also, those endorsing pharaonism were all negative about the Arabic out-group as we will see later. However, George did not think it would be so important, introducing some contestation regarding the importance of this narrative. Finally, this kind exclusivity can be an answer to the challenge of the exclusivity of the Muslim majority of Egypt.

As for the constitutive norms, there was a very interesting interview with Anna. There was a Muslim boy in the elementary school where she went, and some people started the gossip that she fell for him based on her also coming from the Middle East. Here is how she reflected on how she dealt with the situation:

> „Yes…[laughing] I explained them I was Christian. But if I did this [dated him], I would betray my God. So, for sure not. But they didn't believe me. And ever since, I have cut all form of relationship with him [the Muslim boy], I haven't greeted him, not even from a distance."[183]

---

[180] Wood, 'The Use of the Pharaonic Past in Modern Egyptian Nationalism'. 186.
[181] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 98.
[182] Quick reminder: the green cluster consists of strong religious and Hungarian identities and non-existent Arabic identity. The blue is made up of strong religious and Egyptian identities and weak Hungarian and close to non-existent Arabic identities. In the orange all identities are salient.
[183] Translated by the author.

This clearly showes a situation not necessarily understandable for Hungarians, but still very understandable for Anna who arrived to Hungary at the age of two, having no memories of Egypt: interfaith marriages are not allowed in Egypt and Copts are conditioned against it to preserve themselves.[184] I learned it myself when I was visiting Saint Anthony Monastery, one of the most famous and ancient Coptic monasteries of Egypt, and I told the monk who drove me back to Cairo that I was about to date a Muslim girl, he said with determination that I should stay away from Muslims. Another respondent, Abanoub, who was born in Hungary seemed not be aware of the Christian-Muslim sectarian strife.

As for relations with the in-group, many interviewees said that they are mostly in touch with other Copts or Hungarians, and fewer with Muslim Egyptians. One person (Catherine), however, greeted her Muslim friends on Ramadan.

3.2. Egyptian identity

The Egyptian identity has almost the same importance as the Coptic identity across the clusters (1.15 as average with 0.55 as dispersion). Pharaonism also relates to the Egyptian identity since it is about what truly matters about the country. Rami claimed that only Copts are pure Egyptians, Muslim are only "mixed Egyptians". Kerolos said that even Egyptian Muslims are unsure about their Arabic identities, and they want to be considered as Egyptians. Yet another said that "Egyptians are not Arabs". So, there is some kind of contestation here as well. Furthermore, there is a kind of religious approach to the national identity or rather there is a Coptic version of it. Catherine, for example, emphasised that Egypt is the land where Jesus and Moses walked when I asked her about what it means for her to be Egyptian; surely for the Copts, Egypt has a different topography.[185]

---

[184] Michael, 'Is Liberalism Killing the Copts?'
[185] Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt*. 17.

Another interesting finding is that they are proud of being Egyptians despite the hardships or persecution, for example, Tawadros confirmed this. Anna focused rather on the development of the country. Sara mentioned that people in the diaspora probably dislike Egypt, but I did not find it at all, although maybe they did not want to denigrate themselves in front of me. This finding coincides with the Coptic survey of the US diaspora conducted by Brinkerhoff in which identification with Egypt remained very strong.[186]

3.3. Christian identity

Christian identity as a global religious identity was the most important according to the Likert scale but with much less controversy or contestation. Mina said that in Hungary he would only say that he is Christian because Hungarians would not understand what Coptic means.

For Anna it was important the she could go to a Christian school because the values of her Coptic Christian upbringing situated in the Egyptian context and the more liberal European customs that boys and girls can kiss in schools were in conflict. Two other persons mentioned that Christianity is important because it gives goals for their lives.

Adam even said that "Coptic, Egyptian and Christian have the same meaning." This shows that Christian identity for him is rather understood in its narrow, Coptic Christian sense.

---

[186] Jennifer M Brinkerhoff and Liesl Riddle, 'General Findings: Coptic Diaspora Survey', 2015, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1729.8082. 11.

4. Hungarian identity and hybridisation

To understand the content of the Hungarian identity, it makes more sense to insert it into the context of hybridisation. Hybridisation according to Brinkerhoff means that „immigrants neither fully accept their host country culture, nor do they automatically embrace their traditional ethnic culture to the exclusion of other influences.[187] So, there is a hybrid identity in constant production and reproduction.[188] However, another thread in the literature doubts the possibility of this type of hybridisation and argues instead for unchanging identities meaning that the immigrants will preserve the distinct identities they brought with themselves from their home country and will not assume the majority identity of their new host country .[189] This chapter will look at the Coptic case, and presents the findings: the situation is rather mixed.

The Hungarian identity got 2.46 as average with a dispersion of 1.39, ranging from one to four. In total five persons have Hungarian citizenships, but others would like to have it. Father Youssef spoke about an interesting phenomenon in his interview. When I said to him that it was for me interesting to hear the children singing in Hungarian, he replied the following:

> And they are speaking fluent Arabic and learning fluent Coptic. So, they can think in many ways, it is a new mindset. We are establishing a new mindset here, which is a very rich mindset because it is a deeply rooted one.

This new mindset is the result of being „Egyptian, Coptic and Hungarian" at the same time as he said it earlier. But throughout his interview, Father Youssef tried to convey an embellished image of the Copts in the diaspora. Like he said that most probably I will be able to interview them in Hungarian. However, it was not true and the findings of my research regarding their Hungarian identity are rather mixed even if in some cases hybridisation and the integration of identities are present.

---

[187] Brinkerhoff, 'Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement'. 32.
[188] Brinkerhoff. 33.
[189] Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora'. 6.

Kerolos for example said that he considers himself Coptic-Hungarian, which is an interesting case of hyphenation. Also, Eman presented herself as Coptic and Hungarian when I asked about her Arabic identity. Hyphenated identites show that former and new identities are equally important, in this case a religious and a national identity were juxtaposed.[190]

Kerolos referred to his Hungarian identity as a Christian and European identity and considered the Hungarians as distinct from other Europeans where religion is more important still. This kind of religiously framed Hungarian identity is also present at Catherine's interview who just like to Egypt spoke about the beauty of Hungary in religious, spiritual terms. So, it seems that for some of them, through considering Hungarian identity a religious one, they can combine it with their already existing Coptic identity, thus the two identities are compatible.

It can be argued that integration and hybridisation are going in parallel and if discrimination prevents integration then it might prevent hybridisation as well. Most of the respondents did not have real experiences of discrimination, however stories from two interviews stand out. Mina said that when coming to Egypt, he was not given a flat because it turned out he was from Egypt. Abanoub's story is, however, much stronger, and painful. His relationship with his previous girlfriend ended over the non-acceptance of the girl's father that he was from Egypt. Furthermore, he said that even if he wanted to become Hungarian, his skin colour would not make it possible, being browner than the Hungarians. He said the following:

> Abanoub: So, it is important and unimportant at the same time, because if you look at me, you can tell that I am not Hungarian.
>
> Tamás: Oh, I see, and then it is in vain to… I see.
>
> Abanoub: It is like written on me that I am not [Hungarian].
>
> Tamás: So, even if you wanted to be Hungarian, you could not, that is hard?
>
> Markó: Yes, or they can repaint my skin.

---

[190] Richards, 'Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora. Second Generation West-Indians in Brooklyn'. 276.

This confirms the theory of Brady and Kaplan that attributes such as skin colour are constitutive of ethnic identities such as white skin colour and Hungarian ethnic identity.[191] Language is also an attribute which is probably necessary so that the majority population accepts someone as Hungarian but he spoke it as the natives. [192] Also, I too related to him at some points during the interview as a fellow Hungarian. Abanoub was born in Hungary, thus has 19 years of experience here. Bassem, however, who just arrived three years ago but with his Egyptian wife, experienced Hungarians as tolerant. Mina who arrived within a year heard that Hungarians are racist but did not find it so despite the problem with the landlord. There is thus a mixed experience here.

However, overall, it seems, that they don't speak explicitly about their special situation meaning that they are an ethnic group which is welcomed by the Hungarian government while others such as the Muslims are not. Although Father Youssef mentioned to me that the Hungarian government was really helpful and welcoming towards them, and he was also against the immigration of Muslims and shared the view of the government in this regard.[193] However, he did not reflect on how it is to be the one towards whom positive discrimination was extended. From the example of the secretly neutralised Copts, it is clear that they can count such kind of positive discrimination.

In terms of emotional attachment to the Hungarian identity, some people were ambivalent. They are very close to their Hungarian friends, however they cannot identify as Hungarians, like Anna and Abanoub. Or they are willing to adapt to the Hungarian culture, dressing appropriately for national celebrations out of respect but they just cannot consider themselves Hungarian, like Anna and Diana who are sisters. Two others, however, Adam and Kerolos spoke about their Hungarian identity in emotional terms. Kerolos considers Hungary as their

[191] Brady and Kaplan, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity'. 35.
[192] Brady and Kaplan. 35.
[193] Velkei, 'Az iszlám terjesztése a migránsok célja'.

43

"first love", and he also said that he could relate to it as having a parallel history with Copts, centuries of Arabic oppression compared with the Ottoman occupation of Hungary. Adam spoke about how he feels compassion for Hungarians because they lost the majority of their territory at the Trianon peace treaty. Also, George, being married to a Hungarian woman, identifies himself with his Hungarian family, thus establishing a hybridised identity.

Hybridisation is probably also hindered because of the language barriers which is an important step in integration.[194] However, despite the fact that according to Father Youssef, most probably I will be able to interview people in Hungarian, only six interviews out of 16 were conducted in Hungarian, eight in English, one in Arabic and one in Arabic and English.

In conclusion, findings are very mixed. I had interlocutors which are very far from the Hungarian identity, despite being residing in the country for more than a decade. For example, Diana who has been living here for 15 years said that she does not consider herself Hungarian and whenever she spoke about Hungarians, she took a distance and spoke from the outside. However, there are others who are (almost) equally Hungarian and Egyptian, as confirmed by some cases. It looks like that they can attach to the Hungarian identity by emphasising that Hungary is a religious country, thus religion (Christianity) is a kind of bridge between the two identities. Also, it seems, that despite the xenophobic environment, discrimination is less present than expected although there were some cases confirming it.

---

[194] Rahsaan Maxwell, 'Evaluating Migrant Integration: Political Attitudes across Generations in Europe <sup/>', *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (March 2010): 25–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00797.x. 27.

5. Arabic identity, a glimpse at the out-group

As Tajfel and Turner argued, people strive for positive self-image for the groups they belong, part of this process is to denigrate or other out-groups.[195] Abdelal et al. also emphasised that when measuring identity, relational comparisons with out-groups are important.[196] In this vein, this chapter focuses on the attitudes towards the Arabic identity. Although this identity was the most rejected among the surveyed identities (3.83 on average), here there was the highest dispersion (1.47), ranging between 1 and 5. So, it seems, the narrative "we are not Arabs" presented by Father Youssef is shared by many, but not by all. Thus, there is a spectrum here, with the majority rejecting this identity and a minority having more positive attitudes toward it. It is also visible in the different clusters. For people in the blue and green clusters this identity is not important, for those in the orange cluster, this identity, too, matters.

In terms of othering, it is important to mention that it is usually described by an activity of the dominant group. However Copts are not dominant either in Egypt or in Hungary, thus their othering is rather a response to the othering already present in majority discourses about Copts.[197] Father Youssef said for example that Copts are considered infidels by many in the majority Muslim society who worship three gods (it actually refers to the Holy Trinity) which shows ignorance about what Copts really believe.

Eight people rejected the Arabic identity in their interviews; some considered it an offense, and Adam even wanted me to remove the related questions from the interview. Two of them, Anna and Tawadros talked about the Arabic and Muslim identities interchangeably,

---

[195] Tajfel and Turner, 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict'. 40.
[196] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 19.
[197] Poul Rohleder, 'Othering', in *Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology*, ed. Thomas Teo (New York, NY: Springer, 2014), 1306–8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7_414.

implying that they belong together. There was, however, Sara who did not consider it as an offense. Nonetheless, she grew up in the Emirates going to non-segregated schools.[198]

I heard negative stereotypes from two persons. Anastasia said that they are not clean and cannot follow the rules, and Rami claimed that they are shallow. This kind of essentialising stereotypes, however, were not recurring in my interviews, nonetheless they clearly show negative out-group categorization and othering at the margins. Rami and Tawadros found it strange that Arabs can be proud of themselves. So, they technically contested the pride members of the other group feel about their identity according to the terms used by the social identity theory.[199] It seems, this not letting the other relate freely to their identity, testifies about animosity. Catherine, even said that there could be no connection between Arabs and Copts, as if there should be a perpetuated segregation.

Those who showed more openness towards the Arabic identity often referred to the language as something beautiful (Sofia and George, orange cluster), Rami even writes poems in Arabic and loves the language. Sara considers that she is related to the Arabic identity through the language only, but she gave two to her Arabic identity. Not everyone saw the positive side of the language, Kerolos and Sara think that they are actually forced to speak it since the Arabic conquest. Interestingly, Kerolos was so negative about the Arabic language despite being an Arabic teacher himself. He emphasised that

> it is like the Austrian speak the German language, but they are not German. In Latin America, Spanish is spoken but they are not Spanish. So, the applies to Egypt. We speak Arabic but we are not Arabs. And this is very very important.

This is very likely a comparison other interviewees would agree on.

The Arabic conquest of Egypt came up by some of my interlocutors as something wich should not have happened. This ethnic grievance narrative was also present by some members.

---

[198] Michael, 'Is Liberalism Killing the Copts?' The author argues that segregated schools considerably contribute to the comprehensive segregation of the Egyptian society.
[199] 'Social Identity Theory | Simply Psychology'.

According to Anna, Arabic invasion meant spreading Islam. Catherine who was adamantly anti-Arab in her discourse said that after the invasion everything (language and religion) was made obligatory.

It is interesting to see that this grievance has been kept alive for 13 centuries since the Arabic conquest. Often, Copts like Mina go back to the time of the pharaohs with nostalgia or just before the invasion and consider it as a golden age, as if since the invasion nothing important had happened. This conforms to the usual narrative that the first centuries were the golden age for the Coptic Church. On the other hand, it also shows the oppression Copts have had to endure during this time, which kept alive this nostaliga probably.

On the other side, it is important to mention George (orange cluster), who gave two to his Arabic identity and is an active member in the Arabic-speaking community of Budapest. He is responsible for organizing the programs for the group. He spoke very positively about his Arabic identity. He dismissed mildly the pharaonism and related to the Arabic identity more than through the language. He spoke with admiration about the constitutive norms regarding how a good man and father is or should be according to the Arabic culture. How there is a good tradition of responsibility for these roles.

There is thus a spectrum here where even of most of the members do not like to be considered Arabs, there are some who are positive about it. Probably with less emphasis on pharaonism and more openness one could promote a less segregated society.[200]

---

[200] Michael, 'Is Liberalism Killing the Copts?'

6. Solidarity with the immigrants: the case of the Syrian refugees

Attitudes towards immigrants can be interesting because it shows whether another immigrant group, in this case the Copts, positions itself with the majority society or not.[201] In the US context, minority religious groups being or having been subjects of discrimination are more open to liberal policies toward immigration.[202] Here, however, we are dealing with different setting: the immigrants in Europe might embody the Muslim other for the Copts in the diaspora. So, the puzzle is whether they will opt for a more liberal approach based on the theory about minority religious groups, or they will include themselves into the majority, thus they belong to the host society, not to the group of immigrants and be more against them.

In terms of findings, there is a great variation here as well. If we go back to the clusters, there is some kind of order to how they approach the question of refugees. The blue group (see Appendix) with the least strong Hungarian and Arabic identities seem to be rather against the refugees. Interestingly the two women here were much less negative than the two men, Anna and Diana had mixed views on the issue. Diana for example told that there are terrorists among them but also that these people do suffer. However, the two men were adamant against them, Rami emphasized that

> Most of them, I don't say all of them, but most of them are killers, can be killers. Most of them are hating the country which they are trying to enter. They came to kill the unbelievers, the qufar, if you know this word.

Although he has not expressed it completely, this is the narrative that was also shared by Father Youssef, in a public interview from September 2015, where he said that the aim of the refugees is to spread the Islam, and invade Europe.[203] Gulf countries did not let them in, so that they come to Europe.[204] They are not refugees.[205] And the same thing is happening as during the

---

[201] Sablina, '"We Should Stop the Islamisation of Europe!"' 3.
[202] Knoll, '"And Who Is My Neighbor?' 317.
[203] Velkei, 'Az iszlám terjesztése a migránsok célja'.
[204] Velkei.
[205] Velkei.

Arabic conquest in Egypt, in the 7th century, this too is an invasion[206] Interesting to see how ethnic grievances work to frame future situations as well based on past suffering. It is also important to mention, that the priest says that he agrees with Viktor Orbán on his migration policy as a Hungarian citizen, activating here his Hungarian identity. Finally, he had to apologize in a later statement for his utterings in this interview. In that subsequent statement, he spoke more about the importance of love towards the refugees and that Arabs too fight the terrorism of Islamic State. A good question whether he really changed his mind. Also, whether he wants his brethren to think along these lines.

The green cluster (see Appendix) is rather close to this with even two people mentioning this invasion narrative. They are the most integrated, and they rejected most strongly the Arabic identity. Catherine and Tawadros spoke about the possibility that they might eventually outnumber the Hungarian due to immigration. And also, that it might take very long or forever for them to integrate (Tawadros) and also that the Christian approach and the helping of others will eventually be very counterproductive for Europe. Here Tawadros used the parallel of Arabic conquest when the invaders pressured the indigenous Copts to convert to Islam, with this he implied that this might happen again.

Catherine got angry during the interview when she said that the refugees came to Europe. She emphasised that they should have gone to the Gulf countries with whom their culture is much closer. Finally, she added that she is happy to help them but not here in Europe or Hungary. It shows natural alignment with the principles of the Hungary Helps agency and that of the Hungarian government. She spoke about the different cultures of the immigrants and the local population, indicating that the difference is too big. There is this puzzle that an immigrant is against the immigration of others. Based on her interview, it seems that she included herself into the majority society based on the similar religion (Christianity) as she spoke a lot about

---

[206] Velkei.

Hungary as a Christian country. However, she is also half-Hungarian, through this strong connection she might be much more related to Hungary than other interlocutors. Finally, despite her views she has many Muslim friends whom she greeted on Ramadan. Very interesting to see that her attitudes are both negative and positive towards the same group. This ambivalence was present throughout my interviews.

Interestingly, in this group was an outlier, Adam who expressed full compassion towards the Syrians saying that it is not their fault that they needed to leave. Interestingly, he was the only one I interviewed in English in this group. He also included himself in the refugees when he spoke about the Hungarian reporter's behaviour: "because of the knowledge she had in her head about us (sic!). Later he added that Europeans have a lot of negative stereotypes about Arabic immigrants. However, eventually he emphasises that "we are not Arabs", thus disjointing himself for the immigrants. But there was a moment of identification with them.

The orange cluster (the cosmopolitan group, see Appendix) was the most compassionate towards the refugees. Sara worked for the UNCHR as an intern and said that they deserve to be treated well as they are fleeing wars; she also has many Syrian friends. Sofia said that this treatment might be the reason of the lack of education and that the behaviour of the reporter was inhumane. She spoke about the security-humanity dilemma but emphasized that even if she agrees with Orbán that security is important, the others must be considered as humans. George spoke about the role of the media influencing the people and inculcating fear. He went to see the situation at Keleti railway station back in 2015 at the height of the crisis, and he was very compassionate about them, relating to them through his Arabic identity. When I asked about solidarity based on common Middle Eastern origin, he said this:

> Not only from the Middle East. They are Syrian, most of them, they are Syrian. So, for sure, they are Arabic people. So, they belong as well, so, I am supporting them for sure. Not only because they are Arabs, I think that human-wise, any of it would happen to any nation around Hungary, they find a lot of support from everyone, so, it is not only about their nation but I see it because I went there, when the refugees were here and I was like going and seeing what is happening.

Unsurprisingly, this cluster was the most positive about the Arabic identity. Anastasia, who is not in any of the clusters, also said that the reporter's behaviour was inhumane, and she got angry about it.

Also, it seems that people do not include themselves into the refugees or migrants even if they are immigrants, and also they do not consider themselves the targets of the government propaganda, as Catherine's example showed, they are probably considering themselves as more legitimate immigrants as they are Christians. Kerolos spoke about the parallel of Hungarians and Copts enduring oppression from the Turks and Arabs respectively, so there is some kind of relatedness.

In terms of hybridisation we can say that the Hungarian identity seemed to be compatible with the Coptic one, as my respondents did refer to Hungary as a Christian country, in this sense it makes sense that the cluster where Hungarian identity is strong (green), is more against the immigrants. However, for the orange cluster too, Hungarian identity was important, but the Arabic as well, so it can be said to be an inclusive variant of the green one.

So, again, there is here a variation, although most of the people are rather mixed about the question, but also, there are some who referred to the invasion narrative even bringing up the Arabic conquest from the seventh century as a parallel or rather as an influencing ethnic grievance. There were, however, others who would not agree with the religious leader's utterings and expressed considerably more positive views about the refugees or migrants. In terms of clusters, both clusters (blue and green) where Arabic identity is rejected, were more against the immigrants, thus the initial theory on correlation between the rejection of Arabic identity and hostility towards the refugees outlined in the methodology section proved right. The cosmopolitan group coming from big Egyptian cities expressed considerably more compassion towards the refugees.

Conclusion

This research aimed to understand how members of the Coptic diaspora in Hungary negotiate their identities. While studying it, it has built on theory of Abdelal et. al and approached identity as content and contestation.[207] Furthermore, it introduced a hybridised methodology, combining content and salience of identities measured by a Likert scale.[208] Also, it built on the social identity theory and tried to understand how they relate to other identities, such as Hungarian and Arabic. Arabic identity was approached as the out-group while the Hungarian identity as possible part of a hybrid identity together with the Coptic and/or Egyptian. Also, still in this framework, it studied attitudes towards migration. The way established migrants view newcomers can show a great deal about how they position themselves between the immigrants and the host society. The research was based on semi-structured interviews and participant observation.

Coptic presence itself in Hungary is an identity project, as the Hungarian government is hostile towards immigrants but is ready to help the persecuted Christians. Copts are probably the largest persecuted Christian group. Therefore, they fit into the government narrative even if they do not know in-depth about these connections and do not speak explicitly about the positive discrimination.

In terms of findings, the thesis found three different identity cluster. In the green, all identities are very salient, except the Arabic which is unimportant. In the blue neither the Hungarian, nor the Arabic was important. In the orange, the cosmopolitan one, all identities were salient. I argued that these cluster can be conceptualised as stages of hybridisation with two being end results (green and orange), and the blue being a preceding stage.

---

[207] Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable'. 18.
[208] Abdelal et al. 18, 30.

In terms of content, some mentioned pharaonism as an important narrative while others spoke about Copts as true Egyptians. This kind of exclusive identity could be harmful for Muslim-Christian relations. However, it was not shared by everyone.

Concerning hybridisation, Copts in the diaspora showed a great level of variation, some people already had hyphenated identities while for others the Hungarian identity was distant. Often it was a function of time spent in Hungary, also across clusters as average years spent here. Furthermore, they often related to Hungary through the similar religion with that of the Copts (Christianity). So, it can be argued, that for them there is compatibility between their Coptic and their new, Hungarian identities. This is what this new mindset advanced by Father Youssef can mean.

The Arabic identity proved to be clearly an out-group. Here too, there was a great variation, ranging from strong hostility against it until seeing positive things into it. And these findings are even more interesting because the leader of the community, Father Youssef spoke against the Arabic identity in a normative way.

In terms of immigrants, the findings are mixed. Usually, they were against them or ambivalent, and some of them even considered the situation as an invasion which aims to spread Islam. However, not all of them were against them, some showed a lot of compassion. Usually those showing compassion were closer to the Arabic identity (orange cluster). People in the blue and green cluster with unimportant Arabic identity were usually against them.

Globally, it was interesting to see the variation in the findings, especially with the Arabic identity and the attitudes towards immigrants/refugees. Even such a small and close-knit community can produce a great variation. Also, that hybridisation of their original as well Hungarian identities is made easier through the compatibility of these identities. It also coincided with the narrative of the Hungarian government. Finally, they could work for the

same compatibility with Arab Muslims in order to make co-existence possible. In this regard,

they too have an agency.

54

Appendix

1. Green cluster (strong Hungarian identity and firm rejection of Arabic identity)

Pseudonym	Catherine	Kerolos	Adam	Tawadros
Age	37	38	34	42
In Hungary in years	10	11	5	21
Citizenship	yes	yes	no	no
Gender	Woman	Man	Man	Man
Education	University (BA)	University	University	N/A
Occupation	Recruitment	University teacher	Civil engineer	Entrepreneur
Identities				
Coptic	1	1	1	1
Egyptian	1	1	1	1
Christian	1	1	1	1
Arabic	5	5	5	5
Hungarian	1	1	1	1
Reasons to leave Egypt	Revolution citizenship	wife is Hungarian	Economic	Economic
Attitudes about refugees	against, very negative	Did not answer the question	Mixed but rather positive	Order narrative negative, invasion
Origin in Egypt	Cairo	Minya	Cairo	Minya
Religiosity	once Sunday school	very rarely with the Copts (goes to the Catholic church instead)	1-2 per week	2-3 times per week Altar service
Wife	Egyptian	Hungarian	Egyptian	Egyptian
Language of the interview	Hungarian	Hungarian	English	Hungarian

2. Blue cluster (Arabic and Hungarian identities are both unimportant)

Pseudonym	Rami	Anna	Diana	Mina
Age	33	16	21	26
In Hungary in years	3	15	15	0.5
Citizenship	no	no	no	no
Gender	Man	Woman	Woman	Man
Education	PhD in process	High school 9th grade	University	University
Occupation	PhD student	Student	Student	Biology
Identities				
Coptic	1	1	1	1
Egyptian	1	1	1	1
Christian	1	1	1	1
Arabic	4	4	5	5
Hungarian	3	3	4	5
Reasons to leave Egypt	Studies discrimination no opportunities	Economic, better future for the kids	Economic, better future for the kids	MA studies
Attitudes about refugees	order, terrorism invasion	Mixed	Mixed	Invasion, against
Origin in Egypt	Cairo	Dakahlia	Dakahlia	Cairo
Religiosity	Once per week	1-2 times per week	1-2 times per week	twice per week altar service
Wife	Egyptian	N/A	N/A	N/A
Language of the interview	English	Hungarian	Hungarian	English

3. Orange cluster (all identities are salient, cosmopolitan)

Pseudonym	Sara	George	Sofia	Abanoub
Age	22	38	23	19
In Hungary in years	5	10	5	19
Citizenship	no	yes	no	yes
Gender	Woman	Man	Woman	Man
Education	University	University	University (BA)	Professional school 12th grade
Occupation	MBA	IT Manager	Financial management	Student
Identities				
Coptic	1	1	1	2
Egyptian	1	1	1	1
Christian	1	1	1	1
Arabic	2	2	3,5	1
Hungarian	3	1	2	3
Reasons to leave Egypt	Expat, studies	Marriage, revolution	Economic	Economic
Attitudes about refugees	Mixed	Visited Keleti in 2015, positive	Compassion but security	Mixed
Origin in Egypt	Alexandria	Cairo	Cairo	Cairo
Religiosity	Once per week	Once, Sunday School	twice Sunday School	three times altar service
Wife	N/A	Hungarian	N/A	N/A
Language of the interview	English	English	English	Hungarian

4. Interview questions for the members of the Coptic community

I tell this at the beginning: I am Tamás Farbaky. I am a master's student of international relations from Central European University. I visited Egypt in 2019 and found the Coptic community very interesting. I decided to write my thesis bout the Coptic diaspora in Budapest. I am mainly interested in the management of different identities, be it Egyptian, Coptic, Christian, Arabic and/or Hungarian. I will anonymise your identity and everything is based on your informed consent for both the interview and later analysis. It means that you need to approve that I use the date you provide for the research. That is very important for me.

The questions

1. How old are you? When did you arrive to Hungary? How and why did you come to Hungary?
   (circumstances of arrival)
2. How did you find the Coptic diaspora/community here?
3. Where do you come from Egypt?
4. Tell me about your life here! (Including: occupation, marital status, date of marriage)
5. Do you plan to stay in Hungary for good? Are you already a citizen of Hungary?
6. Why did you leave Egypt?
7. How often do you come to the church? (per week or per month)
8. Who are your closest friends? What is their nationality or ethnicity?
9. What is the most important for you? Being Coptic, Egyptian, Arabic or belonging to Hungary? Please give numbers from 1 to 5 to each of these identities. How much do you identify yourself as
   Coptic
   Egyptian
   Christian

   Arabic
   Hungarian
   (1 – very important, 2 – important, 3 – moderately important, 4 – slightly important, 5 – Unimportant.)

10. What does it mean for you to be…?

    Coptic

    Egyptian

    Christian

    Arabic

    Hungarian?

11. Do you have Arabic friends and or Muslim friends here? Do you know Egyptian Muslims here?

12. Is your spouse also Egyptian? Also, Copt?

13. How is your Hungarian, do you feel confident about it?

14. Have you experienced any kind of discriminatory behaviour directed against you? Like on the street, someone said something about you, or someone was aggressive because you might have made a language mistake?

15. Photos (see below)

    The story: in 2015, during the migration/refugee crisis, at the Hungarian border, already in Hungary, a lot of people were trying to escape a police encirclement and a Hungarian reporter with a camera was close to the escaping people. On two footages, it can be seen that she first kicks a father running away with his kid who shortly before her kick was tried to be stopped by a policeman, in vain.

    In another footage, she is kicking towards a kid. Who is running away from the police. What do you think about it based on the story and pictures? What do you feel about it? What is your church saying about that?

16. How do you see the situation of the Syrian refugees?

17. What do you think about the approach of the Hungarian government towards the
    refugees?

5. Interview Consent Form

Project topic: Identities in the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox diaspora of Budapest by Tamás Farbaky

Please read the following information carefully. My name is Tamás Farbaky and I am a master's Student at the Department of International Relations at Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, Hungary. This interview is being conducted for the purpose of my Master Thesis which focuses on the identities of the members of the Coptic diaspora in Budapest. It is an informal, semi-structured interview whose main goal is to understand your story, the identities you claim or reject and what they mean for you.

All the information you provided will be processed for the thesis purposes only and will be anonymised and treated with confidentiality. Because a subsequent transcription of the interview might be required, I will have to record it. As, stated, the recording will not be shared with any other person, and will be treated anonymously, so that no one can identify you. If you, for any reason, start to feel uncomfortable during the interview, we can take a break and continue later, or you can withdraw at any time.

If you have additional questions, please ask me now.

In case, you have any doubts regarding the purpose, technique, or fairness of the interview, do not hesitate to contact my supervisor, Professor Erin Kristin Jenne (jennee@ceu.edu).

I thank you very much for your help and cooperation, I very much appreciate the time and the information you share with me.

Date and place:

Signature:

6. Interview Consent Form for the parent(s) of minors

Project topic: Identities in the Egyptian Copt Orthodox diaspora of Budapest by Tamás Farbaky

Please read the following information carefully. My name is Tamás Farbaky and I am a master's Student at the Department of International Relations at Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, Hungary. This interview is being conducted for the purpose of my Master Thesis which focuses on the identities of the members of the Coptic diaspora in Budapest. It is an informal, semi-structured interview whose main goal is to understand your story, the identities you claim or reject and what they mean for you.

All the information you provided will be processed for the thesis purposes only and will be anonymised and treated with confidentiality. Because a subsequent transcription of the interview might be required, I will have to record it. As, stated, the recording will not be shared with any other person, and will be treated anonymously, so that no one can identify your child. If your child, for any reason, starts to feel uncomfortable during the interview, we can take a break and continue later, furthermore he/she or you as well can withdraw at any time.

If you have additional questions, please ask me now.

In case, you or your child have any doubts regarding the purpose, technique, or fairness of the interview, do not hesitate to contact my supervisor, Professor Erin Kristin Jenne (jennee@ceu.edu).

I thank you very much for the help of you and your child and for the cooperation, I very much appreciate the time and the information your child shares with me.

Date and place:
Signature:

Bibliography

Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Terry Martin. 'Treating Identity as a Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity and Contestation of Identity', n.d.

Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 'Identity as a Variable'. In *Measuring Identity. A Guide for Social Scientists*, edited by Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, 17–32. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Ackerman, Andreas. 'A Double Minority. Notes on the Emerging Yezidi Diaspora'. In *Diaspora, Identity and Religion. New Directions in Theory and Research*, by Waltraud Kokot, Khaching Tölölyan, and Carolin Alfonso, 156–69. Transnationalism. Routledge, 2004.

Adams, Laura L. 'Techniques for Measuring Identity in Ethnographic Research'. In *Measuring Identity. A Guide for Social Scientists*, 316–41. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Adamson, Fiona B., and Madeleine Demetriou. 'Remapping the Boundaries of `State' and `National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing'. *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (December 2007): 489–526. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107083145.

Ainsworth, Thomas. 'Form vs. Matter'. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2020. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/form-matter/.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 'Long-Distance Nationalism. World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics'. Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam, 1992. http://www.mariteslmendoza.com/english242dfiles/WL_Anderson.pdf.

Attila Juhász, Csaba Molnár, and Edit Zgut. 'Menekültügy és migráció Magyarországon'. Prague - Budapest: Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Political Capital, 2017.

Bartelson, Jens. 'Second Natures: Is the State Identical with Itself?' *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 295–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004003002.

Bell, David Avrom. *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680 - 1800*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001.

Brady, Henry E., and Cynthia S. Kaplan. 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity'. In *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*, 33–71. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 'Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement', n.d., 289.

Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M, and Liesl Riddle. 'General Findings: Coptic Diaspora Survey', 2015. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1729.8082.

Brubaker, Rogers. 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (January 2005): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997.

'Christians Are "Most Persecuted Group"'. *BBC News*, 3 May 2019, sec. UK. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48146305.

Cohen, Robin. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction.*, 2002. http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=166043.

———. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. 2. ed. Global Diasporas. London: Routledge, 2008.

Cox, Robert W. 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders'. In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert Keohane, 204–54. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

'Egypt - Open Doors USA - Open Doors USA'. Accessed 24 April 2020. https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/egypt/.

'Egypt 2018 International Religious Freedom Report'. *US Government*, 2018, 20.

Ellis, Kail C., ed. *Secular Nationalism and Citizenship in Muslim Countries: Arab Christians in the Levant*. Minorities in West Asia and North Africa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Elsässer, Sebastian. 'The Copts in the January Revolution of 2011'. In *Copts in Context. Negotiating Identity, Tradition, and Modernity*, edited by Nelly van Doorn-Harder, 21–33. Studies in Comparative Religion. Columbia, South Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 2017.

Eric Oliver, J., and Janelle Wong. 'Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings'. *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (October 2003): 567–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00040.

Friedman, Jonathan. *Cultural Identity and Global Process*. Theory, Culture & Society. London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994.

Fujii, Lee Ann. *Interviewing in Social Science Research. A Relational Approach*. 1st ed. Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods. New York: Routledge, 2018.

Gourlay, Annabelle, Gerry Mshana, Isolde Birdthistle, Grace Bulugu, Basia Zaba, and Mark Urassa. 'Using Vignettes in Qualitative Research to Explore Barriers and Facilitating Factors to the Uptake of Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission Services in Rural Tanzania: A Critical Analysis'. *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 14, no. 1 (December 2014): 21. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-14-21.

Haddad, Yvonne. 'Good Copt, Bad Copt: Competing Narratives on Coptic Identity in Egypt and the United States'. *Studies in World Christianity* 19, no. 3 (December 2013): 208–32. https://doi.org/10.3366/swc.2013.0058.

Hall, Stuart. 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora'. In *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, 222–37. London: Larence Wishhart, 1990. http://www.mclass.ca/uploads/1/3/0/4/1304973/stuart_hall_cultural_identityanddiaspora.pdf.

Hassan, Sana. *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-Long Struggle for Coptic Equality*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Hein, Emily Jane Carter. 'The Semiotics of Diaspora: Language Ideologies and Coptic Orthodox Christianity in Berlin, Germany'. PhD Dissertation in Anthropology, University of Michigan, n.d. https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/97982.

Hinnels, John R. 'The Study of Diaspora Religion'. In *A New Handbook of Living Religions*, 1st ed., 682–90, 1997. DOI:10.1002/9781405166614.

'Hungary Helps – Hungary Helps'. Accessed 3 June 2020. http://hungaryhelps.gov.hu/en/.

Index.hu, Source:, and Twitter/@RichterSteph. 'Journalist Appears to Kick and Trip Fleeing Refugees – Video'. *The Guardian*, 8 September 2015, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/sep/08/journalist-appears-to-kick-and-trip-fleeing-refugees-video.

Irimiás, Anna. 'The Chinese Diaspora in Budapest: A New Potential for Tourism'. Edited by Harald Pechlaner. *Tourism Review* 67, no. 1 (6 April 2012): 23–33. https://doi.org/10.1108/16605371211216341.

Johnson, Paul Christopher. 'Religion and Diaspora'. *Religion and Society* 3, no. 1 (1 January 2012). https://doi.org/10.3167/arrs.2012.030106.

Kalra, Virinder S., Raminder Kaur, and John Hutnyk. *Diaspora & Hybridity*. Theory, Culture & Society (Unnumbered). London; Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2005.

Kasnyik, Márton. 'László Petra, a Menekült Gyerekeket Rugdosó Operatőr Máris Negatív Világsztár Lett'. 444, 8 September 2015. http://444.hu/2015/09/08/laszlo-petra-menekult-gyerekeket-rugdoso-operator-maris-negativ-vilagsztar-lett.

Kormányzat. 'Kiemelt Cél a Keresztény Közösségek Támogatása'. Accessed 27 April 2020. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/hirek/kiemelt-cel-a-kereszteny-kozossegek-tamogatasa.

Knoll, Benjamin R. '"And Who Is My Neighbor?" Religion and Immigration Policy Attitudes'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48, no. 2 (June 2009): 313–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01449.x.

Labib, H. *Azmat al-himaya al-diniyya: al-din wa'l-dawla fi misr*. Cairo: Dar al-Shouruq, 2000.

'Magyarország kitart szigorú migrációs politikája mellett'. Accessed 27 April 2020. https://www.magyarhirlap.hu/belfold/20191230-magyarorszag-tovabbra-is-kiall-migracios-politikaja-mellett.

Mangum, Maruice, and Ray Block. 'Social Identity Theory and Public Opinion towards Immigration'. *Social Sciences* 7, no. 3 (8 March 2018): 41. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030041.

Matory, J. Lorand. '"The Many Who Dance in Me: Afro-Atlantic Ontology and the Problem with 'Transnationalism.'"' In *Transnational Transcendence: Essays on Religion and Globalization*, edited by Thomas J. Csordas, 1st ed., 231–62. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Maxwell, Rahsaan. 'Evaluating Migrant Integration: Political Attitudes across Generations in Europe <sup/>'. *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (March 2010): 25–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00797.x.

McLeod, Saul. 'Likert Scale Definition, Examples and Analysis | Simply Psychology'. Accessed 30 March 2020. https://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale.html.

McLoughlin, Seán. 'Religion and Diaspora'. In *Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion*, edited by John R. Hinnells, 2nd ed., 558–80. London; New York: Routledge, 2010.

Meeusen, Cecil, Koen Abts, and Bart Meuleman. 'Between Solidarity and Competitive Threat?' *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 71 (July 2019): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2019.04.002.

Michael, Marc. 'Is Liberalism Killing the Copts?' Accessed 27 May 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/2011111616317813239.html.

the Guardian. 'Migration: EU Praises Greece as "shield" after Turkey Opens Border', 3 March 2020. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border.

Nagy, Dorottya. 'Displaying Diaspora: Chinese Christian Presence in Hungary after 1989'. *Hungarian Cultural Studies* 5 (1 January 2012): 277–89. https://doi.org/10.5195/AHEA.2012.80.

Nyiri, Pal. 'Chinese in Hungary and Their Significant Others: A Multi-Sited Approach to Transnational Practice and Discourse'. *Identities* 9, no. 1 (January 2002): 69–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/10702890210369.

Magyar Nemzet. 'Orbán Viktor: A keresztény szabadság szellemében rendeztük be Magyarországot'. Accessed 3 June 2020. https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/orban-viktor-a-mai-magyar-allam-a-keresztenydemokracia-es-nem-a-liberalizmus-talajan-all-7349246/.

Kormányzat. 'Orbán Viktor Beszéde Az Arab Bankok Szövetségének Éves Közgyűlésén'. Accessed 24 April 2020. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/orban-viktor-beszede-az-arab-bankok-szovetsegenek-eves-kozgyulesen.

reddit. 'R/Arabs - Do You Consider Copts to Be Arabs?' Accessed 30 March 2020. https://www.reddit.com/r/arabs/comments/195fi8/do_you_consider_copts_to_be_arabs/.

Richards, Bedelia Nicola. 'Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora. Second Generation West-Indians in Brooklyn'. In *Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations*, edited by Keri E. Iyall Smith and Patricia Leavy, 12:265–89. Studies in Critical Social Sciences. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008.

Rohleder, Poul. 'Othering'. In *Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology*, edited by Thomas Teo, 1306–8. New York, NY: Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7_414.

Rudolph, Susanne H. 'Introduction'. In *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, 1st ed., 1–24. Westview Press, 1996.

Sablina, Liliia. '"We Should Stop the Islamisation of Europe!": Islamophobia and Right-Wing Radicalism of the Russian-Speaking Internet Users in Germany'. *Nationalities Papers*, 17 December 2019, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.76.

Safran, William. 'Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return'. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (1991): 83–99. https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1991.0004.

Saideman, Stephen M, Erin K Jenne, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 'Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses', n.d., 24.

Shain, Yossi, and Aharon Barth. 'Diasporas and International Relations Theory'. *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (2003): 449–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573015.

'Social Identity Theory | Simply Psychology'. Accessed 19 May 2020. https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html.

Sökefeld, Martin. 'Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora'. *Global Networks* 6, no. 3 (July 2006): 265–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00144.x.

'Special Eurobarometer 467', 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2179.

Swyngedouw, Eva, and Erik Swyngedouw. 'The Congolese Diaspora in Brussels and Hybrid Identity Formation: Multi-Scalarity and Diasporic Citizenship'. *Urban Research & Practice* 2, no. 1 (7 April 2009): 68–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/17535060902727074.

Szabolcs Panyi. 'Rejtélyes a befogadott kopt családok ügye', 11 September 2015. http://index.hu/belfold/2015/09/11/kereszteny_csaladok_befogadas/.

Tadros, Mariz. *Copts at the Crossroads: The Challenges of Building Inclusive Democracy in Contemporary Egypt*. Cairo; New York: The American University In Cairo Press, 2013.

Tajfel, Henry, and John Turner. 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict'. In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 33–47. Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co, 1979. http://www.ark143.org/wordpress2/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Tajfel-Turner-1979-An-Integrative-Theory-of-Intergroup-Conflict.pdf.

Devex. 'To Direct More Funding to Christians, USAID Looks to Hungary', 25 November 2019. https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/to-direct-more-funding-to-christians-usaid-looks-to-hungary-96055.

Vásquez, Manuel A. 'Diasporas and Religion'. In *Diasporas. Concepts, Intersections, Identities*, edited by Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin, 1st ed., 128–33. London; New York: Zed Books, 2010.

Velkei Tamás. 'Az iszlám terjesztése a migránsok célja'. *Magyar Nemzet* (blog). Accessed 23 May 2020. https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/belfold-archivum/az-iszlam-terjesztese-a-migransok-celja-4029453/.

Vertovec, Stephen. 'Religion and Diaspora. Paper Presented at the Conference on "New Landscapes of Religion in the West"'. University of Oxford, 2000. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/Vertovec01.PDF.

Vertovec, Steven. 'Three Meanings of "Diaspora," Exemplified among South Asian Religions'. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 6, no. 3 (1997): 277–99. https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1997.0010.

Dictionary.com. 'What Does Positionality Mean? | Gender & Sexuality by Dictionary.Com'. Accessed 2 June 2020. https://www.dictionary.com/e/gender-sexuality/positionality/.

Wood, Michael. 'The Use of the Pharaonic Past in Modern Egyptian Nationalism'. *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 35 (1998): 179. https://doi.org/10.2307/40000469.

Yefet, Bosmat. 'The Coptic Diaspora and the Status of the Coptic Minority in Egypt'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no. 7 (19 May 2017): 1205–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1228445.

Yerkes, Sarah. 'What Egypt under Sissi Is Really like for Coptic Christians'. *Brookings* (blog), 30 November 1AD. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/06/20/what-egypt-under-sissi-is-really-like-for-coptic-christians/.

Zrt HVG Kiadó. 'A kopt egyház vezetője sosem hallott a Balog és Orbán által emlegetett családokról'. hvg.hu, 17 September 2015. https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150917_A_kopt_egyhaz_vezetoje_sosem_hallott_a_be.