Crisis, Memory, and Change: The Philosephardic Reinterpretation of Spanish National Identity

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the development of an unorthodox idea about Spanish identity that arose at the end of the 19th century: the idea that, because of racial mixing that took place centuries ago in the Iberian peninsula, Sephardic Jews should actually be considered Spaniards. This broadening of traditional views of Spanishness to include and encompass Jewishness was also accompanied by a wider movement to "repatriate" Sephardic Jews to Spain, where it was hoped they would bring about a renewal of Spanish society. It is argued here that both of these developments were linked to a widespread perception of crisis among Spanish élites. Furthermore, by using process tracing to look more closely at the causes of these sentiments, one can arrive at a better understanding of how collective identities and memories change over time.

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Thank you.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1.1 Argument and Research Questions

In my thesis, I will argue that the origin of Spanish philosephardism (roughly, the idea that the descendents of exiled Sephardic Jews should be allowed to return to Spain) can be traced back to pervasive sentiments of crisis that emerged among a section of the country's intellectual class at the turn of the 20th century. Using a form of process tracing, I will try to understand how particular aspects of this discourse developed, and link it to what appears to be a longer-term shift in how Spanish identity and history are talked about. In the process of doing so, I hope to address several questions that I think are quite relevant in our own time. For example, from where do changes in national identity or historical memory originate? How do crises influence these changes? And what are some of the consequences of these changes?

I contend that looking more closely at Spanish history may offer some tentative answers. Interestingly, the idea of repatriating Sephardic Jews first gained wide currency as a way of "regenerating" the Spanish nation. Amid widespread concern with Spain's "decline" at the turn of the 20th century, a number of Spanish élites believed racial mixing to have been one of the sources of Spain's original strength, and that, accordingly, it had actually been the forced conversions and expulsions of Jews and Muslims in late medieval Spain that had originally precipitated the process of Spanish decline (Goode 2009, 184). The most famous and effective proponent of these ideas was undoubtedly Ángel Pulido Fernández, a Spanish doctor, anthropologist, and, later, a liberal senator, who first encountered Sephardic Jews while voyaging around *fin-de-siècle* Southeastern Europe. In his book *Españoles sin patria y la raza sefardí* ("Spaniards Without a Country and the Sephardic Race"), Pulido actually went so far as to argue that repatriating Sephardic Jews to Spain

would lead to a "reconstitution of the Spanish race and improvement of the fatherland" (Pulido 1905, 18, translated and cited in Goode 2009, 194).

In effect, Pulido claimed the exiled Sephardic Jews as a kind of Spanish diaspora, and insisted that the reunion of the members of this diaspora with their long-lost homeland would help heal the convalescent Spanish body politic. Aspects of this discourse about the Sephardic Jews, as well as of the subsequent campaigns that Pulido launched, are particularly consequential even a century later. Thus, in 2015, during the unveiling of a new law designed to provide a path to Spanish citizenship for descendants of Sephardic Jews, the Spanish MP Rafael Catalá emphasized that "estamos seguros que van a ser muchos los sefardíes que podrán *recuperar* su nacionalidad" ("we are certain that many Sephardic Jews will be able to recover their nationality"; emphasis mine). Although the racial and regenerationist facets of Pulido's ideas no longer hold sway, present-day Spanish officials seem to partake equally of his belief in the Sephardic Jews' Spanish "essence", here rendered as "nationality".

§ 1.2 Literature Review and Expected Contribution

If one goes by the title of his most significant work, for example, one gets the impression that, for Pulido, Sephardic Jews were simply another species of Spaniard. A look at the title of his other most significant work, *Intereses nacionales: los israelitas españoles y el idioma castellano* ("National Interests: Spanish Jews and the Spanish Language"), reveals the extent to which he found this important. For Pulido, Sephardic Jews were to be identified both with the Spanish nation and with Spanish national interests. As the historian Anna Lena Menny writes, "the philosephardic minds around Pulido at the beginning of the 20th century saw the Sephardim first and foremost as

Spaniards, and not as Jews" (2013, 74)[1]. All of this would seem to imply a profoundly unusual conceptual shift: by incorporating the Sephardic Jews, one of Spain's several historic "Others", into his idea of the Spanish nation, Pulido effectively turned a number of discourses about the Spanish people on their heads. In the process of doing so, he recast Spain's relationship with the Jews, and arguably redefined what it meant to be Spanish. This is the *first* argument that I want to make; I will focus on it more extensively during the final part of the second chapter.

How to account, though, for this innovation? A look at the available literature gives a fairly clear picture of how philosephardism finally became mainstream: in the 20th century, it actually did become tied to the Spanish "national interest", particularly with respect to Spain's attempts at colonial expansion in the Mediterranean. Yet understanding the origin of Pulido's philosephardic interpretation of Spanish identity is much harder; no definite answer for it seems to exist yet in the various academic works on Spanish history and society. The most thorough overview of Spanish philosephardism that exists seems to be Alfons Aragoneses's short history of the roles played by "convivencia"[2] and "filosefardismo" in Spanish nation-building. In Aragoneses's view, both became popular during the 19th century as a result of Spanish intellectual and political élites' tendency to interpret history, and in particular the Middle Ages, to suit their current needs. As in other European countries, this search for a usable past gave élites several discursive instruments with which to legitimize various policies and political projects, thus furthering the nation-building process (Aragoneses 2015, 23–25). Aragoneses argues that even Pulido, who was one of the most

[1] All translations mine unless otherwise stated.
[2] This phrase, first popularized by the Spanish diplomat and historian Américo Castro in his 1948 volume *España en su Historia: Cristianos, Moros, y Judíos* ("Spain in Her History: Christians, Moors, and Jews"), posits the existence of a complex but peaceful coexistence between the three religious cultures of the medieval Iberian peninsula—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

influential *filosefardistas*, drew from many of the same "clichés" and "racialist" ideas permeating 19th century Spanish intellectual culture that his contemporaries did (Aragoneses 2015, 19).

Other historically-oriented authors, such as Maite Ojeda-Mata and, more prominently, Joshua Goode, have expanded upon Pulido's participation in this broader culture in various ways. The work of all three researchers has strongly shaped my own views of this subject. However, I diverge with each of them in one key respect. Whereas Ojeda-Mata is concerned with the *function* of philosephardism in élite discourses, and Goode is concerned with its *content*, and Aragoneses is concerned with both, I am concerned instead with *causation*—that is, with how and why philosephardic campaigns such as Pulido's first emerged. As I will argue, it is only by exploring the pervasive sense of crisis in late-19th century Spain that we can understand how Pulido first conceived of these philosephardic ideas. In this respect, although Pulido's views about Sephardic Jews and Spanish identity were not directly caused by any particular crisis, neither can be separated from the idea of "crisis" in retrospect. Thus, I will attempt to situate the emergence of Pulido's heterodoxy in its proper historical context: the aftermath of the so-called "Disaster of 1898". This is the *second* argument I want to make, and I will make it more fully in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

§ 1.3 Methodology and Theoretical Framework

But what exactly do I mean by "crisis"? It would certainly be misleading to take the various uses of the word "crisis" during this time period and treat them as objective assessments of an external reality. In this respect, I am borrowing heavily from the conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck, who identified "crisis" as a concept that has become increasingly polysemous since its

earliest invocations in the ancient world, and particularly since the 19th century, when it all but became a "catchword" (Reinhart 2006, 397).

Is there such a thing as a relatively "objective" crisis, for starters? Intuition might say: yes, an economic one, or else anything which threatens some unsustainable form of material deprivation or destruction. Indeed, this is something which Koselleck himself seems to have agreed with: "compared with its use as a political or historical term, the economic concept of crisis [has] now achieved far greater theoretical rigor" (2006, 392). Yet "economic crisis" is not necessarily a good explanation for the kind of changes that I am exploring. In the present day, for example, it is not uncommon to hear economic precarity or economic destabilization being linked to increases in the prevalence of xenophobia and national sentiment. On this view, an economic crisis—such as the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and its subsequent reverberations—has the capacity to "affect the salience of, and people's affiliations with, different groups, and thus affect the level of social cohesion and connectedness between different groups in society" (Abrams and Vasiljevic 2014, 332). Yet even this highly abstract relationship between macroeconomic change and social identity is not a straightforward one. Additionally, even where it is agreed that there is some relationship, this is usually only discussed in terms of increasing identification with or attachment to a given national identity (cf. Inglehart and Norris, 2016, and Hierro and Rico, 2019). Such studies do not help to explain how economic crisis could eventually produce contestations of the *content* of particular identities—a phenomenon we might tentatively call "identity revisionism".

Nor is it clear that economic factors are typically the motors of such changes. A closer look at history shows that even ostensibly "objective" crises cannot be cleanly separated from the subjective perceptions of a society's members. In fact, in a large number of cases, the perceived causes of crisis are not even physical, let alone material. Describing the reaction of indigenous

Muslim intellectuals such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī to European colonialism, for example, the historian Pankaj Mishra has emphasized that "crisis convulsed the world of Islam the moment that it was confronted and then penetrated by the West" (2012, 277). And in interwar East Central Europe, crisis discourses were typically linked to narratives of spiritual or moral decay, and drew alternately from Spenglerian declinism and the juxtaposition of various (mainly East-West) symbolic geographies (Trencsényi et al. 2016, 162-163).

So how might subjective perceptions of crisis induce identity revisionism? For István Bibó, who describes nations as a kind of problem-solving community, the consequences of being unable to resolve a problem—such as the dissolution of an old social or political order—can be quite severe. As an example, he cites what happened in East Central Europe during the interwar period, where successive upheavals "gave birth to the most fearsome monstrosity in modern Europe's political development: anti-democratic nationalism" (Bibó 1991, 41-42, translated and cited in Kovács 2012, 81). This follows naturally from the political hysteria that such crises engender, "which, in Bibó's theory, is [an] extreme case of emotional, irrational politicizing" (Kovács 2012, 81). In a perceived crisis, then, false narratives are created to explain the failure of the community, which in turn serve as bases for subsequent action (Kovács 2012, 81). Bibó observes, however, that this kind of behavior often has disastrous consequences. With its sense of self so severely shaken, a community's "reactions to the outer world's challenges" become "unreal" and "exaggerated" (Kovács 2012, 81). It follows that revised identities which come into being during such a time are also likely to have a distorted relation with reality.

A related, equally promising notion is Jeffrey C. Alexander's idea of "cultural trauma". For Alexander, a cultural trauma takes place when "members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness" (2013,

6). He discusses identity revisionism as one possible consequence of this: "insofar as traumas are [...] experienced, and thus imagined and represented, the collective memory will shift" (Alexander 2013, 26). In this way, dramatic historical events can have visible consequences on future political life. Yet Alexander also points out that this can only occur through a socio-culturally mediated digestion of the events in question: "trauma is not the result of a group experiencing pain [...] it is the result of [an] acute discomfort entering into the core of a collectivity's sense of its own identity" (2013, 15). The means by which this takes place are typically multiple: mass media, public speeches, and private conversations can all play an important role in rewiring prevailing cultural codes. This includes political culture—and hence, political relations with other groups (cf. Berger 1998, 7, Wang 2014, 7–8).

Thus, subjective perceptions of crisis, rupture, or trauma all seem to be more consequential than the objective elements which occasionally induce them. This makes it somewhat easier to understand how such sentiments might lead to identity revisionism premised on campaigns for Spanish-Sephardic reconciliation. Even still, it is no small challenge to identify and trace a pattern of change leading from the crisis of 1898 to Pulido. In addressing this problem, I hope to draw out and elaborate upon the connection between sentiments of crisis and decline in Spanish society and the changes that these induced in élite discourses about national identity. To accomplish this, I will attempt to analyze Pulido's ideas using a process-tracing methodology.

Using this methodology should help me reveal and analyze longer patterns of social change. In order to construct a model of these changes, it will be important to describe the context in which Pulido's ideas appeared. In the course of doing so, aspects of Spanish history throughout the long 19th century, such as the Bourbon Restoration, will inevitably need to be discussed. Although this study can only really focus on the period extending from 1898, when imperial Spain

lost most of her remaining colonies, to 1905, when Pulido published *La raza sefardí*, the story cannot start there. Even the manner in which the outcome of the Spanish-American War was construed as an unmitigated "disaster" cannot be genuinely appreciated without exploring the social and political context in which the war occurred. In effect, I will be keeping the subjective expressions of "crisis" (as reflected in ideas, cultural production, and political projects) in the foreground, while holding more objective elements of "crisis" in the background.

Delineating the objective elements of "crisis" in my case study is actually the easier task. The more subjective or intersubjective aspects of this period, on the other hand, are harder to pin down. My answer to this is to designate several elements of late-19th century Spanish society as "sites of transformation". I borrow this term from Louise Young's book *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, where she uses it in her description of the reciprocal relationship between Japanese society and the consolidation of a Japanese empire. By loosely adapting Young's term, I believe it is possible to account for how certain social processes in Spanish society served as reactants that eventually facilitated long-term discursive and social changes. However, because covering these processes in a holistic way is outside the scope of what I can accomplish in this study, I will instead rely on an analysis of what I think are representative organs: the cultural review *La España Moderna* (Modern Spain) and the educational project known as the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Free Teaching Institution). From there, it will be necessary to designate catalysts that acted on these sites of transformation to spur subsequent developments. This, of course, is where the Disaster of 1898 will come in.

From there, things mostly become a matter of doing intellectual history. To do this, I intend to rely on some of the methodological conceits of Andrzej Walicki's magisterial study *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian*

Thought. As in that study, the important thing here is not to define the ideas of a person through "a sociological interpretation of biographical factors", but to emphasize and explore the structural relationship between their way of seeing the world and the society in which they lived (Walicki 1975, 4). This is another reason why I intend to analyze *La España Moderna* and the Institución Libre de Enseñanza as representative expressions of these sentiments. Many of Spain's most famous regenerationists were educated at the Institución—and Pulido, who once worked at the latter, maintained many social contacts with the former. By analyzing *La España Moderna* and the Institución, I can analyze a sizable chunk of Pulido's social and intellectual world. For the sake of space, however, I will not attempt to examine his campaigns in full, or their subsequent consequences.

THE CONTEXT: LATE-NINETEENTH CENTURY SPAIN

Depending on the book one is reading, the political history of 19th-century Spain can be divided into a potentially dizzying number of periods. For the purposes of this study, which are quite general, the categories which most historians tend to use will suffice. These are: (1) the period beginning in 1808 with the deposition of Spain's Bourbon king, Fernando VII, and the occupation of the Iberian peninsula by Napoleonic forces, resulting in an 6-year war for independence and the promulgation of Spain's first constitution in 1812 by a diverse national assembly in Cadiz; (2) a following period of back-and-forth movement between the absolutism of the returned Fernando VII and the more liberal aspirations of Spain's constitutionalists, lasting from 1814 to 1833; (3) a period of constitutional constitutional monarchy presided over by Fernando's daughter, Isabel II (and her various regents), marked by multiple civil wars and profound political instability, and culminating in Isabel's deposition by a military rebellion (*pronunciamiento*); (4) a brief, revolutionary interlude lasting from 1868 to 1874, involving a brief misadventure with Italian rule, and culminating in a radical but short-lived democractic experiment known as the First Spanish Republic; (5) the restoration of constitutional monarchy in Spain, this time under the Bourbon king Alfonso XII, now held together by a façade of democracy, behind which lay pervasive, oligarchical clientelism (*caciquismo*), and peaceful but scripted exchanges of power (*turno pacífico*) between the hegemonic Conservative and Liberal Parties.

This final period extended from 1874 to 1931, and will generally be referred to as "Restoration Spain" throughout the remainder of this thesis. Throughout the five time periods listed above, the Spanish Empire, which once stretched from the Americas to the Indo-Pacific, gradually broke apart. By 1821, the Viceroyalty of New Spain (comprising Spain's North

American, Caribbean, and Pacific territories such as Florida, Mexico, Cuba, and the Philippines) had come apart, after being drastically reduced to only a few islands and archipelagos. By 1825, Spanish rule in South America had followed suit, leaving a mosaic of new nation-states in its wake. When at last Spain went to war in 1898, all that remained of its former maritime empire was Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. All that remained afterwards were a few enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla) and tiny archipelagos in and around Morocco.

My division of Spain's 19th century into these time periods also comes with the added benefit of according closely with the chronological schemas of the three authors whose work I cited in the first part of this thesis: Alfons Aragoneses, Maite Ojeda-Mata, and Joshua Goode. In the following two chapters, I will refer back to diverse events that occurred during these five periods, and in particular to events that occurred during the Restoration, in order to explicate the sense of crisis that I alluded to in the introductory chapter. This will provide a context to my two larger arguments about the origins of Spanish philosephardism, so that I may identify conditions in Spanish society that paved the way to Pulido's campaign to repatriate Sephardic Jews *en masse*. Not all of the subjects that I touch upon here will directly support my three larger arguments—but they will all, I hope, allow me to provide insightful and pertinent analysis, or at least to adumbrate important conclusions. Specific factors from this context which I believe help to explain the birth of philosephardism in 19th century Spain will be listed and then analyzed in greater detail in the conclusion of this thesis.

§ 2.1 Decadence, Regeneration, and the Consolidation of Liberalism in Spain

To begin, with, the sense of crisis in *fin de siècle* Spain can and should be given further specificity. It was not merely the feeling that "the official Spanish identity [was] obviously obsolete", as the Catalan historian Borja de Riquer would have it—its empire crumbling, its culture moribund, its society impoverished, backward, and peripheral to important European affairs (translated and cited in Vincent 2007, 80). This sense of crisis not only comprised widespread perceptions of Spain's "decline" relative to other European countries, but particular attitudes of thought (to use Hegel's term), which identified Spain as a "problem" to be understood, wrestled with, and ultimately solved. In this respect, the invalidity of the "official" Spanish identity was not quite the problem; rather, it was the struggle for a reinvigorated Spanish identity that truly mattered (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 45–46). To be sure, there were aspects of this kind of thinking that were more practical in orientation, and which therefore resulted in concrete proposals for solutions to Spain's social, economic, and political problems (the objective elements of "crisis"). Yet its practical aspects cannot so easily be separated from the metaphysical, organicist vocabulary which was frequently used to define Spain's problems.

A relatively paradigmatic example of this preoccupation with Spain's *regeneración* (regeneration) can be found in the works of Ángel Ganivet García, a philosopher and diplomat who is often remembered as an important precursor (or member) of the so-called Generation of '98[3]. In his book 1897 *Idearium Español: El porvenir de España*[4]—described by the historian José Luis Abella as "the classic, founding text of Spanish nationalism"—Ganivet, who was one of the

[3] The "Generation of 1898" or "Movement of 1898" was a diverse grouping (and not a group, as it is sometimes supposed) of novelists, poets, playwrights, essayists, and other artists who became engaged with questions about Spain's identity and place in the modern world. Although not all of them can be considered *regeneracionistas* (another vague, sometimes problematic term to group people under), there was certainly some overlap, as evidenced above in the case of Ganivet.

[4] The title is often translated in English as simply "Spain: An Interpretation", although the subtitle actually means "The Future of Spain".

first intellectuals to use the word *regeneración*, attempted to discern what had gone wrong with Spain by trying to identify its "essence" (translated and cited in Krauel 1996, 15). He argued that the Disaster of 1898 proved that Spain desperately needed a spiritual renewal, a kind of "reconstitution" of its vital forces that would allow it to overcome its *aboulia*, or lack of will. This lack of will, of course, was construed in national terms; as such, Ganivet's project of "regeneration" was addressed to Spain's middle and lower classes, who he thought needed to be shaken from their apathy and stimulated into decisive civic engagement (Vincent 2007, 88).

As the nature of this project might suggest, at the end of the 19th century, Spanish intellectuals like Ganivet (who committed suicide in 1898) had come to form a distinct class of individuals who saw themselves as having a task apart (Vincent 2007, 88). As the historian Santos Juliá writes, these *regeneracionistas* often devoted themselves to the "denunciation of social ills, the enlightenment of citizens, and the formation of public opinion"—and their sense of importance would only grow as the 19th century drew to a close (Juliá 2010, 10). As the Catholic philosopher Miguel de Unamuno wrote in November 1898: "No somos más que los llamados, con más o menos justicia, *intelectuales* y algunos hombres públicos los que hablamos ahora a cada paso de la regeneración de España" ("We are merely those who, with some justice, are called *intellectuals*—men of the public, that is, who speak now at every opportunity of Spain's rejuvenation") (cited in Juliá 2010, 9). There is a great deal of evidence to support the idea that these Spanish "intellectuals" took a cue or two from their cousins across the Pyrenees, both with respect to their understanding of the vocation of intellectuals, and their profound cultural pessimism[5]. Yet to

[5] A rather famous example is Miguel de Unamuno's retrospective comparison between how élites in France felt about France's loss to Prussia in 1870, and how Spanish intellectuals felt in 1898. Still, given France's position in the world, the comparison between the two was never understood as justifying an equivalence. On the contrary, it heightened the sense of Spanish inferiority—after all, "if France was degenerating, then Spain was dying" (Juliá 2010, 84).

construe the appeal of regenerationism during this time as a mere epiphenomenon of French soft power would be both misguided and misleading. The sentiment of crisis also had its roots in Spanish society, even if those roots had a complex, dialectical relationship with non-Spanish thought. To understand these roots, however, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of my timeline. As the historian Tamar Herzog affirms, "for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Spanish exceptionalism was an accepted fact" (2003, 164). And indeed,

> [This fact] was cherished and lamented by Spaniards and foreigners alike. 'Europe' served as the standard against which Spain was measured, and it appeared that Spain was indeed different. For some people, this difference meant that Spaniards were superior to other Europeans. For others, it signaled, on the contrary, Spain's relative decline and backwardness. (2003, 164).

Initially, however, Spanish "difference" seems to have most frequently been accentuated by foreign powers. This was visible even in European countries that were allied with Spain. Shortly after the conclusion of the Iberian-American Wars of Independence, for example, the British writer Moyle Sherer speculated in a diary entry that, one day, "when forced, by the loss of her American colonies, to examine her resources at home, and to learn the true value of her possessions in the Peninsula, Spain shall, once more, exhibit herself in greatness and in glory to astonished Europe" (Daly 2013, 217). Like many of his British comrades, Sherer, who had fought in the Peninsular War to free Spain from Napoleonic rule at the beginning of the 19th century, came away from his experience with strong impressions of the country's decadence and backwardness (Daly 2013, 217). This was therefore a rather optimistic projection from a man who, in line with much of the Enlightenment thinking of his countrymen, saw Spain as a borderland of civilization, where Europe began to fade into Africa and the Orient[6]. Of course, contemporary historians know that

[6] For two other paradigmatic examples, see Dominique Dufour de Pradt, *Mémoires historiques de la Révolution en Espagne*, 1816, p. 163: "It is a mistake to have included Spain within Europe, for she belongs in actuality to Africa. Blood, customs, language, ways of living and fighting—in Spain, everything is African [...] If Spain were Muslim, in fact, she would be an African in all

foreign discourses about the Spanish, inflected as they were by these "black legends" (cf. Juderías 1914, 15–34), were nevertheless not monolithic. For the British in particular, orientalizing Spain also sometimes meant romanticizing Spain (Daly 2013, 127). And while in Napoleonic Sicily in 1812, for example, the British Lord William Bentinck was said to have "told Archduke Francis of Austria that the Italians had become 'passive' under French rule, that they had none of the 'the character or the greatness of soul shown by the Spaniards' and that their protests, such as they were, were the 'complaints of slaves rather than the murmurs of a magnanimous people who want to conquer and die for liberty and independence'" (Duggan 2008, 65). Still, these more positive discourses had a much less profound effect on Spanish historiography, and on ideas about Spanish identity, than their counterpart.

From Nicolas Masson de Morviller's tendentious question "*¿Qué se debe a España?*" ("what is owed to Spain?") in 1782, to José Ortega y Gasset's prescription in the 1910s that Spain be "Europeanized", claims about the atypicality or even inferiority of Spaniards go back a long way—a state of affairs which only worsened as the 19th century drew on (McKay 2018, 211; Braster and del Pozo Andrés 1999, 76). In 1876, during a debate about the contents of what would later become Spain's new constitution, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo—in many ways the architect of the Restoration system of governance—is reported to have commented acerbically that Spaniards were to be defined as those "who could not be anything else" (Malefakis 1992, 3). On May 4th, 1898, roughly two weeks after the United States declared war on Spain, and 22 years

things; it is only religion that has given her a place in Europe.". See as well Immanuel Kant's entry on "the Spaniard" in his *Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht*, 1798, p. 297: "The worst thing is: he does not wish to learn from foreigners, and does not travel to become acquainted with different peoples; is centuries behind in the sciences, obdurate against all reform, and thoroughly proud of not having to work; is of a romantic spirit, as the bullfight confirms, cruel, as the former *auto-da-fé* shows, and displays in his taste an origin that is partially non-European." Importantly, both authors thought of the Spanish character as having originated from a mixing of European peoples with African, and in particular Moorish, blood (de Pradt 1816, 163; Kant 1798, 297).

after Cánovas had vented his spleen, the British prime minister Lord Salisbury declared that one could "roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and the dying", that "the weak states [were] becoming weaker and the strong states [were] becoming stronger, and that "[the] living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying" (McKay 2018, 236). In this way, as Spain's power and international standing diminished during the 19th century, narratives of national identity increasingly engaged with and innovated upon cultural criticisms that had been made abroad, wielding them as tools to make a case for differing visions of Spain's past and future. The vituperative, conflictual quality of Spain's domestic politics no doubt only sped this tendency along.

In this respect, however, Sherer's speculations were more astute than he could know—and this is precisely the greatest difference between Ortega y Gasset's adamant reformism and de Morviller's denial of any significant Spanish contributions to European culture. When in 1898 wars in Cuba and the Philippines resulted in a much-weakened Spanish Empire finally losing the last of its colonial possessions in the Americas and Asia, a shocked populace turned inward, and the desire for reform, already evident in widespread criticism of the Restoration regime, became even more palpable (Davies 2000, 92). Before long, *regeneración* had become a theme current in all the arts, from theatre to painting to architecture (Davies 2000, 91–92). A similar pattern was also visible in the written word. Although it is difficult in retrospect to discern just how impactful regenerationism was—by all accounts, the vigorous activity of the *regeneracionistas* initially did little to alter the political and economic *status quo*—the list of publications pertaining to it is large indeed (Davies 2000, 92). In 1890, Lucas Mallada's *Los males de la patria*; in 1895, Miguel de Unamuno's *En torno al casticismo*; in 1897, Ángel Ganivet's *Idearium Español*. In the years after the Disaster of 1898 came Ricardo Macías Picavea's *El Problema Nacional* (1899), José

Rodríguez Martínez's *Los desastres y la regeneración de España* (1899), Damian Isern's *Del desastre nacional y sus causas* (1899), César Silio's *Problemas del día* (1899), Luis Morote's *La moral de la derrota* (1900)—and so on and so forth, even into the first World War (Davies 2000, 92). This list, of course, does not touch upon the literary output of the Generation of '98, and becomes even larger if one adds materials drawn from personal correspondences, newspapers and print ephemera, and writings circulated at meetings, conferences, and other events, such as Joaquín Costa's *Quiénes deben gobernar después de la catástrofe*: *Reconstitución y europeización de España* (1903)[7]. By the turn of the century, even politicians had begun to throw the term around—although apparently with a great deal less sincerity, since, as the 20th-century historian Raymond Carr writes, they self-servingly construed "regeneration as the 'dignification of politics' and not the modernizing of society" (1982, 407, cited in Davies 2000, 93). In this way, the *fiebre regeneradora* (regenerationist fever) of Spain's intellectuals became so virulent that the very idea of regeneration was sometimes thought to have been divested of its meaning (Davies 2000, 92–93).

We have seen, then, how a distinct and increasingly prominent public sphere of intellectual élites spearheaded an effort to identify and remove the causes of Spain's decline, often by undertaking an analysis of Spanish history and society, and, in particular, of Spanish identity. These intellectuals often worked with themes that had previously been articulated in various contexts by foreign writers—such as backwardness, barbarity, alterity, mixedness, and decline—but incorporated them into original critiques of Spanish life. Such was the intellectual culture in

[7] The titles of these works can be *very* roughly translated into English as follows: Mallada, "The Misfortunes of Our Homeland"; Unamuno, "On Purity"; Ganivet, "Spain: An Interpretation"; Picavea, "The National Problem"; Rodríguez Martínez, "The Disasters and the Regeneration of Spain"; Isern, "Of the National Disaster and Its Causes"; Silio, "The Problems of Our Day"; Morote, "What Is to Be Learned from the Defeat"; Costa, "Who Ought to Govern After the Catastrophe: The Reconstitution and Europeanization of Spain".

which Ángel Pulido worked and formulated his ideas. Before proceeding further, however, there are three other aspects of these intellectual trends that are worth noting. The first is that many accounted for the position of Spain vis-à-vis other Western societies with *internalist,* not *externalist* modes of explanation. By this I mean that those who pontificated about Spain's "degeneration" often saw the root of the problem as being internal to Spain, and not imposed from without. As Edmund Burke III writes, from Spain to the Ottoman Empire, "the national histories of most Mediterranean states [have] tend[ed] to explain their delayed modernization to cultural weaknesses (among others, amoral familism, patron/clientage, religion) [...] internal to their respective national histories" (2012, 921)[8]. "This predilection for internalist accounts", he adds, "connects the modern histories of Mediterranean states to those of the rest of the Third World" (Burke III 2012, 921). Secondly, it is interesting to see that, through these internalist explanations, Spanish intellectual élites often understood problems that were variously economic, political, or territorial in nature as *problems of identity*. By this I mean that consequential problems—such as, for example, the lack of a bourgeois revolution in Spain[9], or the drastic reductions in state finances

[8] What one might now refer to as "Southern Europe" or "Mediterranean Europe" includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and, in some accounts, Turkey. For more on the respective histories of these concepts, see Guido Franzinetti and Vaso Sereinidou's entries in *European Regions and Boundaries*, eds. Diana Mishkova and Balázs Trencsényi, New York City, NY: Berghan Books, 2017, p. 79–121. For more on how Spaniards historically responded to their marginalization relative to a dominant northwestern European paradigm, see Martin Baumeister, "Diesseits von Afrika? Konzepte des europäischen Südens", in *Der Süden, Neue Perspektiven auf eine europäische Geschichtsregion*, eds. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk and Martina Winkler, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2007, p. 23–48.

[9] As explained by the historian Carles Sirera Miralles, "the traditional interpretation of Spanish history," guided by comparisons to the economic and political development of Great Britain and France, "has described an unsuccessful liberal revolution led by a weak bourgeoisie incapable of achieving significant political reforms who ultimately had to negotiate the settlement of a pseudo-liberal regime with the old aristocratic elites [...] This negotiation represented the failure of their historical mission and was portrayed as a sterile attempt to bring modernity and economic development [...] As there was not a bourgeois revolution, an industrial revolution could not occur [...] Finally, economic backwardness made the democratization process impossible, and therefore Spain, as an underdeveloped country, could not maintain a democracy during the Second

resulting from the fragmenting of its colonial empire—were often translated into observations or questions about Spanish identity, regardless of how strong a relation they had with this subject (if at all) (Ringrose 1998, 391–392).

Finally—and this is important—the solutions that the *regeneracionistas* offered for these problems varied significantly according to the *differing political perspectives* of their authors. Like in any other society, there were important divisions in Spain between liberally-minded and conservatively-minded Spaniards, just as there were sharp divisions between Spaniards with more radical inclinations and those who were more moderate. By the end of the 19th century, the number of different positions around the political spectrum had multiplied rather extensively. For the purposes of this study, the most important of these ideologies is Spain's tradition of liberal thought, which, like the Spanish exceptionalism mentioned earlier, had its origin in the beginning of the 19th century, when Spain's first modern constitution was drafted at the Cadiz Cortes. We can say specifically as well that Pulido belonged to this liberal tradition, albeit to its more moderate wing; although a practicing Catholic, he took positions on several issues (such as the death penalty) that were to the left of what many then considered to be Catholic dogma.

But although the ideas of the reformers at Cadiz, and the political order that they attempted to establish, would have profound, far-reaching effects on Spanish society during the 19th century, liberal ideas struggled to consolidate themselves in Spain. Indeed, for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, the frequently undemocratic character of Spanish society has been understood (often retrospectively) as stemming from the inability of liberal politics to implant themselves

Republic" (2015, 23). As he notes, such an implicitly normative view unfairly criticizes Spain for being Spanish instead of British or French, and obstructs a potentially deeper understanding of how processes of economic and political development in Spain actually unfolded. Still, this view has been quite consequential in Spanish historiography, and it has not quite yet been replaced with a credible alternative (Quiroga 2011, 145).

successfully on Spanish soil (see footnote 7). Additionally, "due to the tension between supporters of absolutism and advocates of the Enlightenment and political liberalism, the nineteenth century in Spain was one of great political instability, especially during the first half," states Maite Ojeda-Mata. "Liberals and absolutists, and later progressive liberals, moderates, conservatives, and Catholic fundamentalists defended their different views of the national model, at times violently" (2017, 11). This description of Spain in the long 19th century as a site of contestation between liberal forces and an array of anti-liberal ideologies is a particularly pertinent lens for my analysis, as is the idea that these different factions promoted different "models" for Spanish society. The fact that such models proliferated during the Restoration era, when the ruling regime was increasingly perceived as illegitimate, provides a useful clue about why philosephardism developed in a country and a subcontinent still so sharply defined by antisemitism.

So far, however, I have only provided a general account of the intellectual culture to which Ángel Pulido was connected. In the next two sections, it will be my aim to elaborate upon some of the nuances of that culture, even if, given the space constraints in this thesis, I can only do so in a relatively schematic way. In doing so, I will also identify the differences which generally divided progressive and liberal models of the nation from their more conservative counterparts, and expand upon the idea of late-19th century Spain as a site of contestation between such models. As I hope to show in the following section, although Spanish political and intellectual figures expended a great deal of energy trying to define, analyze, and codify "Spanishness", "Spanishness" remained a divisive topic well into the 20th century. Additionally, the fact of such constant contestation throughout the 19th century meant that liberal intellectuals, including those of the later regenerationist variety, began to develop rather particular ideas about the historical relationship between Spain and Jews. (The nature of these ideas, as well as their influence on Pulido's writings

on *la raza sefardí*, will be discussed more in the third chapter.) In the third section, I will explain how liberal intellectuals, particularly progressive ones, were able to take advantage of the relative weakness of the Spanish state to mold a public sphere dedicated to critical inquiry and civic engagement, and to circulate ideas about the reform and regeneration of Spanish society. As I will argue, these efforts constituted what Louise Young calls "sites of transformation", and helped midwife a durable change in Spanish society in the wake of the events of 1898.

§ 2.2 Conflicting Political Cultures and Their "Models" of the Spanish Nation

The birth of a liberal political tradition in Spain was accompanied by the creation and advancement of distinctly liberal (and non-liberal) perspectives on Spanish history. As summarized by Michal Rose Friedman, modern, professionalized Spanish historical writing

> emerged in close dialogue with critical trends in the broader landscape of European historical thought and the growth of academic institutions dedicated to the study of history. The decisive factor in the development of history as a scientific discipline was the rise of European nationalist thinking born of the Romantic movement's anti-universalist claims in the wake of the French Revolution. The universalism of the Enlightenment and the Revolution were now replaced with the idea of the uniqueness of national identities; the role of history was to trace the particular "authentic" trajectories of such identities back to a remote, primeval past. History thus served the construction of national traditions that were aimed (even if not always successfully or intentionally) at legitimating nation-states and their diverse territorial, political and cultural designs. (2012, 6)

The attempt at the reconstruction of a "national memory" was an explicit aim of Spanish historians such as Modesto Lafuente, who, through his 29-volume *Historia General de España* ("General History of Spain"), established his reputation as the father of modern Spanish historiography in the 1850s and 1860s (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 246). It continued to be an aim of

writers working on more specialized topics, even those who wrote about Jews, such as José Amador de los Ríos. Lafuente's own work was widely read by the political and intellectual élites of his time, and his *Historia* would serve as an inspiration for the different varieties of historical textbooks used in Spanish public schools (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 249; for more on this subject, see Boyd 1997, Chapters 1 and 2). However, what material made it into textbooks was almost certainly a matter of secondary or tertiary concern for many professional Spanish historians. Modern Spanish historiography instead "emerged from attempts to keep pace with wider European disciplinary innovations, as well as the desire to claim a unique and even foundational place for Spain within the unfolding of European or 'Western' history" (Friedman 2012, 17). The definition of Spain's place within the sweep of European history was initially considered a necessary first step *before* the inculcation of appropriate patriotic values, behaviors, and rituals, even if this distinction would erode in later years.

In general, authors with a liberal outlook, such as Lafuente, were able to agree with more conservative writers, such as the ultramontanist Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, on one matter: the importance of Catholicism to Spanish identity. "Contrary to [the] first generation of individualistic European constitutionalism," Aragoneses explains, "Spanish liberalism was born of a fusion between liberal ideas and Catholicism, and from the identification of the [concept] "Spanish" [with the concept of] "Christian Catholic" (Aragoneses 2016, 8). Both liberal and traditionalist historians thus saw Roman Catholicism as integral to Spanish nationhood. Besides this, however, liberals and conservatives were hardly of one mind about Spanish identity and history: they proposed different theories and interpretations, placed differing degrees of emphasis on different events, persons, and time periods, and generally disagreed about many other matters. Given that, in all cases, the key to Spain's future was thought to lie in Spain's past, their proposals for Spain's

regeneration differed accordingly. Liberals tended to view the Spanish nation as being the primary agent in Spanish history (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 249). Theirs was a secular history which emphasized the actions of particular people, institutions, and communities, not divine providence, as in traditionalist Catholic narratives (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 249). Additionally, whereas conservative-Catholic writers tended to exalt the political unification of the different kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula into a "composite monarchy", liberals preferred to praise the proto-democratic traditions of local medieval communities (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 250). Thus it was that Agustín de Argüelles Álvarez, a politician and diplomat speaking before the Cadiz Cortes in 1812, extolled Spain's medieval *fueros* (local charters) as having recognized "personal freedoms and national sovereignty", and instantiated "democracy and fundamental rights" in the medieval Iberian peninsula (Aragoneses 2016, 9).

For liberals, Spain's "Golden Age" therefore lay in its pre-imperial[10], quasi-liberal character (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 249; Nuñez Seixas 2018, 33). As a consequence, their view of the age of exploration and conquest that followed was less favorable, as "the necessity of consolidating the [empire] meant the reinforcement of absolutist and authoritarian rule and the exploitation of the Iberian resources at home to maintain the Catholic faith in distant lands" (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 250). Although many liberal writers would claim (especially later in the 19th century) that this had had the benefit of advancing civilization in the Americas, they also thought that it had "destroyed any possibility of commercial and industrial progress, buttressed the repressive power of the Catholic Church, [...] suppressed authentic Iberian traditions", and generally led to Spain's decline (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 250; Nuñez Seixas 2018, 33). This rather dim view of the Spanish Habsburgs

[10] This does not necessarily entail, however, that most liberals were *opposed* to the Spanish Empire—far from it. See Xosé Nuñez Seixas, "Nation-Building and Regional Integration: The Case of the Spanish Empire, 1700–1914." In *Nationalizing Empires*, eds. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller. New York City, NY: Central European University Press, 2015, p. 213.

was not shared by conservative-Catholic historians, who "dated the beginning of Spain's decadence in the world from the seizure of power by a dynasty of French origin, the Bourbons", and everything that had followed (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 252). Such a perspective allowed reactionary authors to decry Enlightenment ideas for their foreign provenance, and to castigate liberals[11]—and later, republicans and socialists—as "un-Spanish" (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 252). In traditionalist Catholic historical narratives, "the liberal revolutions of the nineteenth century [were] factors of permanent unrest, as well as responsible for the loss of the greatest portions of the [empire], and thus responsible for prolonging the decadence" of Spain (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 252). Unsurprisingly, for such writers the appropriate way to restore Spain was by restoring Catholic supremacy—that is, by making Spain "more Spanish". In contrast, liberals—particularly those of a more progressive variety—tended to think that the future of Spain lay in its modernization and democratization.[12] Until the beginning of the 20th century, however, the historiography of the former group was not quite as intellectually impactful as that of the latter (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 251).

As previously stated, the differences between liberal and conservative-Catholic "models" of the nation belied some important similarities. Liberal writers were often Catholic as well, after all. Yet although liberal thinkers affirmed the importance of Christianity in Spain's society and

[11] A common name for a supporter of liberal ideas during and after the French occupation of Spain was *afrancesado*—in English, a rough translation would be "Frenchified". The term encapsulated both a dilemma and a challenge: while "Catholic traditionalists could argue that, true to their national heritage, in 1808 the Spanish people fought for independence and absolutism against foreign heresy [...] for liberals, the war was harder to situate [;] if France was the enemy, why did patriotic Spaniards adopt liberalism?" (Boyd 1997, 88).

[12] The difference between these two poles is captured with excellent clarity in the terms of the early 20th century debate between Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset about the relation between Spain and Europe. Whereas Ortega y Gasset thought that Spain needed to become more like Europe, Unamuno thought that Europe ought to become more like Spain (i.e. "*europeización de España*" or "*españolización de Europa*?").

history, they were often strongly opposed to the conservative, repressive principles of the Church, and maintained that its power, wealth, and influence ought to be restricted. Subsequent to the definitive establishment of a liberal state in 1833, the Spanish Inquisition was abolished, "Church lands were disentailed and sold, limits were placed on the numbers of religious orders and clergy, and the state began to challenge the Church's role in education and welfare provision" (Friedman 2012, 12). Importantly, this liberal amenability to reconsidering the role of Catholicism in Spanish society led to a concomitant reconsideration of the role played by Jews in Spanish history.

Prior to the 19th century, Jews were only a peripheral subject in historical study, and historians tended to base their accounts on "medieval and early modern mythology, [as well as] rumor and stereotype, steeped in Christian interpretative traditions" (Friedman 2012, 9). According to Nitai Shinan, however, the events of the 19th century caused three new schools of thought to emerge: the "Liberal-Radical", the "Neo-Catholic", and the "Moderate", which each corresponded to the political divisions mapped out earlier between progressive liberals, Catholic fundamentalists, and moderate liberals (Shinan 2006, 303, translated and cited in Weisz 2019, 11–12). For those adhering to the second and last schools of thought, the Jews had always had a chiefly antagonistic role with Spain; it was only within the "Liberal-Radical" school that a more positive view of the Jews was formulated. Most frequently, this accompanied the juxtaposition of the cruel intolerance of the Catholic Inquisition with the more cosmopolitan *convivencia* exhibited under Islamic rule in the medieval Iberian peninsula. "Departing from complete Spanish identification with Catholicism in 1812, liberals and republicans advocated a tolerant, open Spain based on the idea of religious tolerance and [...] coexistence of the three religions in the Middle Ages", writes Aragoneses (2016, 6). In this way, by decrying the Catholic Church's persecution of Jews, Spanish liberals were able to criticize the Church for its authoritarian, narrow-minded dogmatism, and

make a case for a reformed, liberal Spain freed from excessive ecclesiastical influence. Or, as Michal Rose Friedman argues, "through its appropriation and integration into the nation's official historical narrative", "the Jewish past became central to efforts to construct and claim a Spanish *patria*" (national heritage) (2012, 1). One especially paradigmatic author in this regard was Adolfo de Castro y Rossi (Friedman 2012, 37–38). Another was Emilio Castelar y Ripoll, who, as we shall see, served as an important mentor figure for Ángel Pulido.

In describing the use of these historical narratives, I have already mentioned two figures who are often remembered for their work beyond history writing: Agustín de Argüelles (who was not an historian whatsoever) and Emilio Castelar. During their lifetimes, both of these men worked as prominent politicians; Argüelles, who was nicknamed "El Divino" ("the divine one") for his brilliant oratory, later served as a tutor to the controversial queen Isabel II, while Castelar, an anti-monarchist who had been exiled for his ideas, became one of the many heads of government during the short-lived First Spanish Republic, taking up a position afterwards as a liberal senator in the Restoration era. It is important to point out that, during the 19th century, definitions of "Spanishness" were just as often provided by men such as these through *politics* as they were through *historical writing*. Indeed, "Spanishness" was also articulated and enacted in parliamentary debates, legal provisions, and various social and political practices. Debates about citizenship serve as a good example of this, particularly since they had implicit implications for Jews, who, as a consequence of the 1492 Alhambra Decree[13], were not permitted to reside in Spain unless they converted to the Catholic faith.

[13] Said decree is also sometimes known in English as the "Edict of Expulsion". For the purpose of clarity, I will only use "1492 Alhambra Decree" in this paper, since Spain was not the only European country to issue such an edict.

Perhaps more so than in other Western European countries[14], ideas about citizenship in Spain wavered at times between different perspectives. Such perspectives overlapped somewhat in practice, and are therefore not necessarily best defined as opposite extremes of a spectrum. On the one hand, particularly around the turn of the 19th century, there existed a more inclusive imperial model, defined by loyalty to the Bourbon monarchy (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 23). According to this conception, "Spain" was really only a "society of subjects" that lived "under the authority of the enlightened sovereign, whose function was above all else to procure his subjects' well-being" (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 23). At the beginning of the 19th century, this proto-national "dynastic patriotism", advanced by a relatively small number of thinkers, co-existed alongside other, more local citizenship practices spread throughout Spain and Hispanic America (Herzog 2003, 199; Nuñez Seixas 2018, 23). In the writings of a number of these thinkers, a more familiar definition of "the nation" which required a "certain uniformity of language, legislation, customs, [and] religious and ritual practices" was only just beginning to take shape (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 23). Consequently, a widespread sense of "national identity", in the conventional sense that that phrase is understood today, could not be said to have existed in Spain prior to the mass struggle against French occupation (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 23–24). Although this conception of "Spain" as a political

[14] In his 1997 book, *Citoyenneté et Nationalité en France et Allemagne*, the sociologist Rogers Brubaker described two diametrically opposed understandings of citizenship which quickly became very influential in the field of citizenship studies. One, appearing in France in the wake of the French Revolution, defined membership as inclusion in the French state's territorial and political framework, was assimilationist (and therefore maintained that Frenchmen and Frenchwomen could be "made"), and defined the French nation as something bounded by the French laws, institutions, and customs. The other, which consolidated itself in Germany after the Napoleonic wars, defined membership as genealogical descent from ethnic Germans, was differentialist (and therefore maintained that one could not simply "become" a German), and separated Germans from other *Völk* on the basis of ethnic and racial characteristics. Brubaker's account of these cases has been challenged (for example, see Patrick Weil's book *How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789*), but his distinction between more "ethnic" and more "civic" conceptions of citizenship is useful for understanding the dynamics of the Spanish case.

community defined by its loyalty to the Crown was not so prominent[15] in the 1812 Cadiz Constitution, it continued to be influential in the 19th century (particularly among absolutists), and gradually evolved and adapted some of the Herderian notions of Spanish identity then popular among Romantic writers (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 27).

On the other hand, there existed a more exclusive—but, paradoxically, also more universalist—ethno-religious model of Spanish citizenship, according to which the defining characteristic of the Spanish people, regardless of what hemisphere they resided in, was their adherence to a common Catholic faith. This conception of citizenship arguably had its origin in the 1812 Cadiz Constitution, which, in addition to locating political sovereignty with the Spanish people for the first time in modern Spain's history, declared that "the religion of the Spanish nation is, and ever shall be, the Catholic Apostolic and Roman and only true faith" (translated and cited in Ojeda-Mata 2017, 14). The Cadiz Constitution also declared that "the State shall, by wise and just laws, protect" Catholicism as the official faith of Spain, and "prevent the exercise of any other" (translated and cited in Ojeda-Mata 2017, 14). This "Catholic citizenship" (as it has also been described by the historian Gregorio Alonso García) created a privileged relationship between membership in the Catholic Church and civil status in Spain, resulting in the establishment of discriminatory legislation that made it very difficult for non-Catholics to reside, let alone worship, in the country (2017, 69). This is particularly apparent in the punishments for apostasy set forth in the 1848 penal code, which placed adherence to the Roman Catholic faith under civil jurisdiction, and allowed the state to strip apostates of their citizenship and banish them for life (Ojede-Mata 2017, 14). It is also quite visible in even a brief glance at the constitutional history of 19th century

[15] For more on the criteria of citizenship used in the Cadiz debates, and the controversy surrounding the inclusion of Spanish-American creoles, Native Americans, *mestizos*, *mulattos*, and Africans, see Herzog 2003, 152–162.

Spain: with the partial exception of the 1869 constitution, which guaranteed private freedom of worship for foreigners residing in Spain, each of Spain's constitutions expressly identified Spaniards as intrinsically Catholic, and forbade the practice of other faiths (Ojede-Mata 2017, 14–15).

As a result of its Catholic citizenship regime, religious intolerance was the rule in Spain throughout most of the 19th century. Such intolerance was, however, challenged on numerous occasions by Spanish liberals such as Emilio Castelar, who championed freedom of worship, and drew vividly from the achievements of medieval Spain's Jews and Muslims to defend it (Aragoneses 2015, 12). Indeed, according to Aragoneses, debates about religious freedom in Spain "occupy more pages than any other question" in the Spanish Parliament's records (2015, 12). Such debates were frequently encouraged by exiled liberals and Republicans—and Jews (Aragoneses 2015, 12). However, this conception of citizenship as membership in an ethno-religious community clearly remained hegemonic, and actually became even more important in the wake of the events of 1898, when it began to be used as one way of describing continuing transatlantic cultural and civilizational ties (*hispanidad* or *hispanismo*) between Spain and its ex-colonies.

Towards the end of the 19th century, finally, both liberal and conservative views of history became "dominated by an ethnic perspective" (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 248). "The 'race'", writes Xosé Nuñez Seixas, one of the leading scholars of Spanish nationalism, became "perceived as the main actor in national history, since it was identified with the nation" (2011, 248). The elements that were seen as making up the Spanish "race" varied widely, but included, among other things, "history", "culture", "soil", and "material culture" (Nuñez Seixas 2011, 248). By the 1860s, this preoccupation with "race" was reflected not only in history or politics, but in Spain's developing scientific disciplines—above all in the field of anthropology, which drew both from previously

existing medical-anatomical and ethnographic currents (Goode 2009, 38–39). It "exploded" in particular between 1870 and 1900, during which time insights derived from the natural and human sciences were increasingly brought to bear on contemporary Spanish problems, such as regional nationalism, criminal behaviors, and even the ineffectiveness of Spain's military (Goode 2009, 37).

Two aspects of this development are particularly noteworthy. First of all, as suggested by Nuñez, these trends had the effect of partially unifying liberal and conservative-Catholic visions of Spanish identity and history (Goode 2009, 37). As the historian Joshua Goode argues, "race offered far more possibility for providing a usable past to liberal and Catholic conservative thinkers alike", and helped to "unify" an increasingly diverse array of nationalist thought in the late 19th century (Goode 2009, 63). The topic on which liberals and their counterparts seem to have agreed the most often, secondly, was that the Spanish were a "mixed" race (Goode 2009, 37). Depending on what an author meant by "race", this could entail various things—for example, authors who believed in the existence of a "Latin" or "Mediterranean" race, as separate from "Anglo-Saxon", "Teutonic", or "Nordic" races, supported the idea of biological intermixture, but also strongly emphasized non-biological qualities, such as Catholicism and other forms of shared cultural heritage (Goode 2009, 30). For others, such as Pedro González de Velasco, "Spain's first institutionalizer of anthropological investigation" and an important associate of the younger Ángel Pulido, the Spanish race was more likely to be visible in physical measurements, morphological study, and craniological data (Goode 2009, 47–49).

Thanks in particular to Velasco's work, anthropology became the vanguard of a wave of new efforts to map the "cultural, intellectual, and social potentials of the Spaniard" (Goode 2009, 47). Almost from the beginning, anthropological studies moved in concert with campaigns for

Spain's modernization and reform. Indeed, as Velasco wrote in the first edition of the *Anfiteatro Anatómico Español* ("Spanish Anatomical Amphitheatre"), one of the two journals associated with the Free School and Laboratory of Anthropology that he had founded in 1875, all science was "medicine for the nation", and understanding the Spanish race was key to Spain's progress (Goode 2009, 45; *ibid*, 43). Later researchers innovated upon Velasco's methods and extended his findings by bringing both more closely into dialogue with the work of their European peers. The results were often quite interesting: for instance, Federico Olóriz y Aguilera, a close friend of Velasco, concluded in 1882 that the Spanish "racial type" was not only a conglomeration of earlier ethnic groups, but perhaps represented the "racial vanguard" of Europe as well (Goode 2009, 57).

Olóriz's thesis, which garnered both international acclaim and widespread consensus from his peers, was ironically premised both on the alleged "purity" of Spaniards as an example of racial mixture and a transvaluation of prior hierarchies of racial groups. Of course, the extent to which Spain's normally opposing political cultures agreed about the Spanish "racial type" should not be overstated. Scientists with different political orientations still proposed different mechanisms of racial fusion, identified different constituent elements in the Spanish "race", and sometimes disagreed about the salubriousness of racial mixture in general (Goode 2009, 59–60). Furthermore, the concept of "racial mixture" was itself rather capacious, and could accommodate conservative political agendas just as well as it could liberal ones.

To cite just one example, numerous Spanish conservatives, from Mañuel Antón to the *caudillo* Francisco Franco, argued that Catholicism had served throughout Spain's history as the most crucial element binding together the various racial elements that were thought to make up the Spanish "race" (Goode 2009, 72–73; *ibid*, 1–3). As reflections upon Spain's transatlantic, post-colonial legacy became more widespread, Catholicism also reappeared as an element which

supposedly had allowed Spanish colonists to "integrate" foreign populations into the Spanish "race". In this way, racial mixture, via Catholicism, came to function in debates about Spain's empire as a sign of Spain's civilizing, harmonizing racial "strength" and beneficence. In the aftermath of the 1898 defeats, as more and more right-wingers became preoccupied with the "enemy within" Spain—anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, separatists, republicans, and the like—it also began to operate more schizophrenically as a kind of cultural code for Spain's national unity, reproducing colonial hierarchies within Spain itself (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 45; Goode 2009, 91–93). If Spain had come together as a product of racial amalgamation or unification, this naturally implied that it could come apart as a consequence of racial decay or disintegration. This belief was given even more force by the fact that Spain's overseas colonies were construed as being a part of Spain itself.

§ 2.3 Two Sites of Transformation and Their "Disaster"

Clearly, "Spanishness" remained an essentially contested concept well into the 20th century. However, the two clashing political cultures described above not only made these claims in academic, literary, and political circles, but attempted to inscribe them in institutions as well. Of course, aside from these clashing viewpoints, the Restoration regime had its own version of history too. In the Restoration period, the attempt to construct a unified, coherent national identity based around potent symbols and historical narratives assumed a great deal of importance. Indeed, "as the architect of the Restoration, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, was himself an historian, it is perhaps not surprising that the regime's principal instrument of forging a national identity proved the construction of an official *historia patria*" (history of the homeland) (Friedman 2012, 89). Yet

this unified *historia patria*, where it appeared, remained only one part of a larger, unresolved political struggle over the future of Spanish society (Boyd 1997, 83).

One reason for this is that the legitimacy of state authority in Spain was often contested during the long 19th century. By the time of the Restoration, however, both mainstream conservatives and moderate liberals had typically had enough of civil discord and popular, military, and dynastic conflict. They accordingly thought it much more prudent to entrench an anti-democratic *status quo* premised upon the peaceful, non-contentious exchange of power than to encourage the development of a potentially revolutionary national consciousness. In contrast to other European countries during this time period, mobilizing the masses was simply not very convenient for Spain's ruling élites (Boyd 1997, 87). Instead, "Restoration history textbooks rarely extended the national story into the nineteenth century," since "recent Spanish history was a political minefield that was perhaps best avoided" (Boyd 1997, 86). Neither did schoolbooks "explain how [recent] rights had been won or examine the social and economic forces that motivated 'the people' to act", argues the historian Carolyn P. Boyd (1997, 87). Indeed, "to do so would have undermined the notion of a 'community' without conflict and invited reflection on the limitations of democracy under the parliamentary monarchy" of the Restoration Period (Boyd 1997, 87). In contrast to other European countries such as Germany, Restoration Spain's "invented traditions" were not used by the state to consolidate its power, but rather to reinforce "passivity, complacency, and obedience to constituted authority" (Boyd 1997, 91; cf. Hobsbawn 2012, Chapter 7).

Another related reason was that, due to a lack of money and (increasingly) a lack of legitimacy, the centralizing tendencies of the Spanish state were often not very successful[16]. In

[16] A third and final reason is the still-substantial power which remained at the disposal of the Catholic Church; however, due to space constraints, I will not explore that topic here.

older works on Spain's 19th century, this is often described, once again, in terms of atypicality or backwardness, and linked with protracted political conflict (see footnote 7). There is also the complicating factor of what many scholars of Spanish nationalism have referred to as "weak nationalization": that is, the relative failure of the few nation-building efforts that the Spanish state's saw fit to engage in. Unlike in other European countries with stronger centralizing states (such as France, which is often taken as a paradigmatic example[17]), a unified "national" identity was not promulgated in Spain quite so easily. This becomes especially evident through a comparison of Catalan-speakers on different sides of the Pyrenees. Whereas in French Catalonia Catalan-speakers had become almost completely assimilated into the national culture by the early 20th century, in Spain, a distinct regional identity developed in the mid-19th century that eventually evolved into a fully-fledged peripheral nationalism. This "weak nationalization" thesis has historically been one way of explaining why proposed "alternatives models of the nation" such as Catalan nationalism enjoyed greater success in Spain than in Spain's neighbors and, by extension, why the Spanish state was not able to contain the tensions or conflicts which they sometimes engendered.

Both of these frameworks have been problematized in recent decades. The thesis of "weak nationalization" has come under particular attack, as scholars have emphasized more bottom-up modes of nationalization[18]. Nevertheless, with careful application, I believe that elements of both

[17] For more on this topic, see Weber, Eugen. "Cultures and Civilization." In *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, p. 485–498.

[18] A good overview of the historiography of this concept can be found in Molina, Fernando, and Miguel Cabo Villaverde. "An Inconvenient Nation: Nation-Building and National Identity in Modern Spain. The Historiographical Debate." In *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 47-72. A recent intervention in this debate which has inspired my own approach is Alejandro Quiroga's distinction between three *espais de nacionalització* (spaces of nationalization) in 19th century and 20th century Spain: an "official public sphere", associated with the institutions described by Eugen Weber, a "semi-public

can help to supply a serviceable starting point for describing important societal issues in the Restoration era. Examining the past from the perspective of intellectual and other élites, for example, is not necessarily the same as examining the past from the perspective of the state and its institutions. A meso-level view may not be a bottom-up view, but as a way of organizing empirical data, it has its own distinct virtues and deficiencies (Quiroga 2015, 156).

As we know from other examples, civil conflict not only happens in places where the state is absent, in a putatively Hobbesian war of all against all. It also occurs in places where the terms of the state's social contract are heavily contested. This accurately describes much of modern Spain's history: whether in confrontations between absolutism and liberal constitutionalism, between capitalism and socialism, or between republicanism and autocracy, the question of what the future of Spain should be permeated élite discourses in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Said discourses became even more tendentious in the wake of the 1898 defeats. On the day the war with America ended, Spaniards "passed, as if awakened brusquely from a century-long dream, from vainglory and baseless triumphalism to disappointment, disenchantment, protest, and demands for responsibility-taking" (Casanova 2012, 22). Such was the outlook, for instance, of one of the regenerationists' leading intellectual handmaidens, Joaquín Costa: "No se trata de *regenerar* una nación que ya exista; se trata de algo más que eso; de *crear* una nación nueva" ("it is not simply about *regenerating* a nation which already exists; no, it is more than that; it is about *creating* a new nation") (cited in Davies 2000, 91). I have already expressed my doubt that

sphere", consisting of "private groups" such as political parties and cultural associations acting in "public spaces", and a "private sphere" having only to do with the individual and their relations. The various groups of progressive reformers I have been discussing clearly fall into his second category, and are very important as "agents of nationalization", since, as he emphasizes, "they can reproduce the official discourse but can also create alternative spaces of sociability, where diverse and often openly conflicting national identities may be created" (Quiroga 2015, 150).

regenerationists were able to do that much initially to alter the Restoration regime; what cannot be disputed, however, is that 1898 marked a turning point in their desire to do so.

1898 also marks the point in time when the Restoration regime fully lost its remaining legitimacy in the eyes of many Spanish intellectuals. Of course, many of them also had misgivings about empowering "the people" in its place (like Gustave le Bon and Sigmund Freud, Ortega y Gasset was intensely skeptical about the benefits of mass politics). Indeed, many "progressive intellectuals [actually] viewed the pueblo with ambivalence; it was at once the repository of their hopes and the source of despair and frustration" (Boyd 1997, 124). Yet this ambivalence towards the masses was not the same as the cynical self-interest of ruling élites; we must recall that many Spanish intellectual élites had become convinced that Spain's very survival was at stake. As one commentator put it, "the question that we face today is not even the principal one, but the only and exclusively important one; it is that of life and death, of whether or not we will exist as a nation" (cited in Balfour 1997, 60). Others were even more pessimistic: in the memorable words of Francisco Silvela, a prominent Restoration-era politician and academic, 1898 had left Spain "sin pulso" (without a pulse).

Additionally, the *pueblo* was one of the few means by which opponents of the Restoration system could challenge the existing order. Because of the inertia and indifference which defined the Restoration regime, the *caciques* which mediated the relationship between the national government and average citizens, and the centrifugal tendencies of peripheral and anti-colonial nationalisms, the relationship between state and nation in Spain had become visibly "fractured" by the end of the 19th century. This is where the *intelectuales* came in. The relative weakness of the Spanish state, and in particular "the absence of a vigorous state educational agenda for nationalizing the masses", also "offered opportunities" for Restoration Spain's many critics (Boyd

1997, 20). Spanish liberals as well as their opponents leveraged these openings to create "counter-hegemonic projects" in which their revisionist views of Spanish history and aspirations for Spanish society were enshrined (Boyd 1997, 20). Their frustration with the politics of Restoration society, as well as their palpable dissatisfaction with the political regime which underlay it, meant that progressives and conservative-Catholics alike often tried to "fill in for" the state where possible, creating a patchwork of different initiatives and institutions which enacted their "alternative models of the nation" with varying degrees of success (Vincent 2007, 87–89).

The many late-19th century struggles over the education of the masses provide a powerful example of this. The Spanish state had tried to reassert control over education as early as 1857, when it passed the so-called Moyano Law, which brought more of Spain's patchwork educational system under governmental oversight, and gave both the central government and the Church the power to regulate curricula and educational institutions (Boyd 1997, 4–6). Repeated state censorship of progressive curricula and the expansion of the Church over primary and secondary education, however, "alarmed Spanish progressives, who saw them as impediments to the creation of a modern democratic society" (Boyd 1997, 30). In response to this, a group of professors (*catedráticos*) who had participated in the democratic revolution of the 1860s founded an alternative educational institution in 1876 called the Institución Libre de Enseñanza (hereafter, ILE).

Among the founders of the school was Francisco Giner de los Ríos, a former professor of philosophy at the University of Madrid, whose faith in the ideas of the German philosopher Karl Friedrich Krause provided a guiding spirit for the ILE. In Spanish Krausist philosophy, humans were thought of as "rational and moral being[s] whose evolving nature was shaped by ongoing processes of self-discovery and self-creation" (Boyd 1997, 31). Said humans were also ideally

guided by rational, independent thought; indeed, for this exact reason, Krausism served as an "ideology of both protest and renewal" in a country that had "largely escaped the intellectual and cultural repercussions of the Reformation and the Enlightenment" (Boyd 1997, 31). The ILE was also founded upon a commitment to the "independence [from] all political, religious, and philosophical dogma", as well as an allegiance to "academic freedom" (Boyd 1997, 30). And after 1881, when it became "exclusively dedicated to political and cultural reform through the application of modern pedagogy", the ILE established itself as the vanguard of a new, progressive cultural and political élite. Although the number of students enrolled at the ILE was always small, "many former students achieved prominence in left-Liberal, republican, and Socialist circles" (Boyd 1997, 35).

Above all, the ILE "aimed to provide the rationalist humanist education [that] a modernizing elite would need to 'Europeanize' Spain", and attracted many of the leading intellectual and public figures of its time, including Joaquín Costa and Ángel Pulido[19] (Vincent 2007, 89). For Francisco Giner de los Ríos, the founder of the ILE, "education was the key to revitalizing the nation, whose greatest impediments were illiteracy and ignorance" (Vincent 2007, 89). Not only would the appropriate kind of education provide the next generation of Spanish leaders and public figures with the virtues and capacities needed to carry out reforms, but it would also inject some much-needed civic feeling into Spain's largely "apathetic" citizenry (Vincent 2007, 89). In this sense, the ILE's curriculum was basically a lever of democratization (Boyd 1997, 36). Yet the ILE opposed, of course, by the conservative-Catholic right, who alleged that the ILE was promoting cultural values which were contrary to the Spanish character (Boyd 1997, 35). In

[19] I have not been able to find out when precisely Ángel Pulido served as a professor at the ILE; that he was indeed a professor at the ILE, however, is a fact which is attested to on the website of the Real Academia de Historia:
http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/24734/angel-pulido-fernandez

keeping with their perspective on Spanish society and history, "the right urged a return to the Catholic values historically and indissolubly linked with the nation and allegedly betrayed by the liberal state" (Boyd 1997, 20). One way in which the conservative-Catholic right attempted to effect this return was through the founding in 1886 of the first private Catholic university in the country, the University of Deusto (Vincent 2007, 90). The University of Deusto was intended to provide an education that was both "modern" and "Catholic": it was responsible for "educat[ing] a new generation of Catholic men in public life" (Vincent 2007, 90). One of these same men, Ángel Herrera Oria, would also play a pivotal role in establishing the National Catholic Association of Propagandists (ANCP) in 1908 (Vincent 2007, 90). "The ACNP's prevailing self-image was that of a Catholic fifth column, influencing society from within," affirms the historian Mary Vicent. Additionally, "as with the ILE, its principal aim was for the regeneration of the nation, here understood as the restoration of Catholic morals and renewed religious faith" (Vincent 2007, 91).

Spanish progressives responded in turn by "adamantly insist[ing] that it was precisely [the] anachronistic values [of the Catholic Church], in conjunction with the shortcomings of a corrupt and illiberal state, that had enervated the most dynamic social groups and retarded national economic growth" (Boyd 1997, 21). Introducing a revamped history curriculum into Spain's school systems was one way that the ILE tried to combat this (Boyd 1997, 139–140). As I have already explained, the "nationalist historiography produced by the dominant Moderados [liberals] was essentially retrospective and conservative; it invoked the national past from a position of 'arrival', of general satisfaction with present arrangements" (Boyd 1997, 71). At the ILE, however, history education "was structured so as to instill the habits of firsthand observation and responsible citizenship that were at the heart of [the ILE's] educational project" (Boyd 1997, 140). Indeed, history was vitally important for a number of scholars associated with the ILE. The work of Rafael

Altamira y Crevea, an historian who "dedicated much of his professional life to transmitting a modern vision of historical study and the national past to the educated public", provides one instructive example of this (Boyd 1997, 134–145). Altamira "indefatigably promoted the renovation of both the history and writing of history in the 1890s until his death in exile in 1951", and several of his books proved particularly paradigmatic in this regard (Boyd 1997, 134).

Ironically, the very same Restoration regime that was intended to constrain political conflict "encouraged the factions that occupied the unstable fringes of the Liberal and Conservative Parties to demand changes in educational policy as the price for their allegiance to the system" (Boyd 1997, 21). These demands became more vehement after the events of 1898, which also managed to make educational reform a subject of nation-wide concern (Boyd 1997, 41–43). Even conservative-Catholics, whom the *status quo* actually benefited more than progressives, were forced to admit that "a National Pedagogy [...] would work the miracle of renovating our soul, and in renovating it, would automatically bring along the rest [of what we need] with it" (cited in Boyd 1997, 42). The formation of the first Ministry of Education in Spanish history was one consequence of this, as was "the growth of informal education systems that politicized Spaniards in ways the state could not foresee", creating "a broader, more politically savvy, and less docile citizenry" as a result (Ortiz 2001, 74).

In the end, however, neither the ILE or its conservative counterparts were able to replace or substantially reform the prevailing educational system (Vincent 2007, 91). At bottom, the failure of both groups to make their vision of a revitalized Spain a reality stemmed from the fact of the country's intensifying political polarization. "Increasingly," Vincent argues, "plans for reform or renewal were framed either for the right or the left: conspicuously few politicians translated regeneration into an integrative project of national reform" (2007, 91). Indeed, "as the struggle to

regenerate the nation [...] became a struggle to control the state [...] the competition between the ILE and the ACNP only emphasized how regeneration fragmented into exclusionary politics" (Vincent 2007, 91). Additionally, any "major transformation of secondary education" such as that which the *institucionalistas* desired was "thwarted by financial constraints, ideological disagreement, and the [...] mentality of the military classes" (Boyd 1997, 52).

Schools and their ilk were not the only vehicles of "regeneration" after the 1898 "disaster", however. Another was the press. Periodicals and other print publications flourished in Spain during the early- and mid-19th century, during which time they were both "strongly political" and seen as "having an educational role" (Davies 2000, 5–6). As the century progressed, many commentators began "to discuss the press's social responsibility, questioning the use of periodical publications to express political concerns and to educate the reading public" (Davies 2000, 7). Despite Spain's generally abysmal literacy rate during the 19th century, such publications gradually became an increasingly central part in everyday life, eventually earning the name of *cuarto poder* (Fourth Estate) from detractors who were concerned by what a politically influential press could entail (Davies 2000, 8, 10). As time passed, however, more and more publications also began to focus on news, dissociating themselves more strongly from political parties and generally becoming more financially independent (Davies 2000, 9–10). The publications that most strongly retained their educational aspirations were not *gacetas* (gazettes), but *revistas* (reviews). Indeed, as Rhian Davies argues, by the late 19th century many were actually "increasingly concerned with education" (2000, 12). The *revista* "was a more responsible publication than the *periódico* or newspaper, and hence proved, as time went by, to be a more suitable forum for the regeneration of Spain" (Davies 2000, 12).

Like its ACNP, which had *El Debate*, the ILE ran its own review, named the *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (hereafter, BILE), from 1877 to 1937. Writers for the BILE tended to espouse "tolerance, liberalism [and] openness towards other European intellectual currents", all of which came to bear quite impactfully on the ILE's "interpretation of the Jewish question in the history of Spain" (González García 1991, 87). Furthermore, beginning in the mid-1880s, the BILE began to serve as an "organ of rapprochement and awareness-building among a good number of Spanish intellectuals and Sephardic Jews", even providing a platform for Jews such as Ḥaim Enrique Bejarano, a later associate of Ángel Pulido, to make Sephardic Jewish culture known to a broader audience (González García 1991, 79).

Unlike other reviews such as *La España Moderna*, however, the BILE was not strongly engaged with questions about Spain's regeneration. *La España Moderna* (hereafter, LEM) was founded in 1889, but continued to be published until 1914, and garnered a significant domestic and international readership, even being named once as Spain's sixth leading periodical (Davies 2000, 27, 164). Its mission, like that of the ILE, was heavily influenced by current affairs in Spain. In one of his letters to the British literary scholar James Fitzmaurice-Kelly, José Lázaros Galdiano, the review's founder and chief editor, wrote of his desire to play a role in his country's improvement: "it would please me beyond measure if I could propagate a bit of culture among the members of my race," he claimed, adding that contributions to the national culture were "what is most lacking in this unhappy country" (translated and cited in Davies 2000, 41). On the basis of this, Davies argues that "Lázaro regarded setting up a review as a way of capturing the public's attention and contributing to the regeneration of Spain" (2000, 42). This aim was also recognized by Unamuno, a regular contributor at LEM, who noted that "what others did as business and

sometimes even as vile business, he [Lázaro] did as a work of patriotism and of education" (cited in Davies 2000, 158).

Additionally, although "on no occasion did *La España Moderna* explicitly align itself with *regeneracionismo,* [...] the term *regeneración* and its synonyms featured regularly in its pages" (Davies 2000, 95). The review also featured contributions from a large number of intellectuals associated with regenerationism, including Joaquín Costa and Luis Morote, who contributed regularly (Davies 2000, 95). Writers associated with the ILE, such as Rafael Altamira, were frequent contributors as well (although Lázaro did not formally identify the review with Krausist philosophy, either) (Davies 2000, 100). So too were leading and lesser-known political voices of the day, including Pulido, Cánovas, Castelar, and the founder of Spain's socialist party, Pablo Iglesias Posse (Davies 2000, 98). With such a wide variety of positions and perspectives available, it was little wonder that LEM lacked for competitors (Davies 2000, 173).

LEM was distinguished above all by its cultivation of a wide range of thought about Spain's apparent decadence. Lázaro, who reportedly read widely across the political spectrum, prized the independence and impartiality of the review that he had founded, and solicited conservative as well as liberal voices to comment on current affairs (Davies 2000, 97). Among the different contributions, there was "a good deal of breast-beating on national characteristics such as apathy, *pereza* [laziness], and pessimism", yet "contributors to LEM remained confident that their philosophies for correction would be successful" (Davies 2000, 106). Furthermore, despite their different proposals, "they generally agreed that the first step in the process of regeneration was to instill hope and confidence in the Spanish public about their nation and future" (Davies 2000, 106). Then, "once the mental health of the public had been taken care of, practical methods could play their part in the second phase, that of curing Spain" (Davies 2000, 106). Said practical methods

ranged across a wide variety of economic and social issues: "agriculture, industry, finance, the working class, education, criminal law, defense, colonial policy, and women" were frequent topics of discussion in LEM (Davies 2000, 109–110).

Like Davies, I would argue that this review fits with aspects of Jürgen Habermas's description of the historical formation of public spheres[20] in 18th century Western Europe. The formation of a distinct intellectual class in 19th century Spain was coëval with the development of regenerationism (a fact recognized by Davies), and both of these phenomena paralleled and contributed to the press's growing centrality to élite contestation of the Restoration regime. For this reason, the Spanish press was generally quite vocal in its response to the events of 1898. "Everything is broken in this accursed country," wrote one commentator two years later in the influential liberal newspaper *El Correo* ("The Courrier") (cited in Balfour 1997, 9). "There is no government, no electoral body, no political parties, no navy; everything is a fiction, everything is decadent, everything is in ruins" (cited in Balfour 1997, 9). For its part, however, LEM only printed articles with this kind of vociferous pessimism for a short period of time, shirking it afterwards for a pragmatic approach that focused on more grounded means of reform (Davies 2000, 95). Even still, LEM did not separate itself from the wave of regenerationism sweeping Spain. And while not as successful in its mission as the ILE, it was because of periodicals like LEM, which provided

[20] It might be objected that Jürgen Habermas's conceptualization of "public spheres" over-idealizes their unity (cf. "the public sphere appeared in the light of public opinion as unitary and indivisible", Habermas 1990, 121), thus lending itself to simplistic descriptions that ignores sites of cross-cutting social conflicts and masks the agency of those involved in them. I do not disregard this critique of Habermas, but I nevertheless think that the implications of such a critique are probably immaterial to my analysis here. For an opposing, more critical view of the use of Habermas's theory in historical studies, see Mah, Harold. "Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians." *The Journal of Modern History* 72, no. 1 (2000): 153-182. Another, broader perspective on the idea of a Spanish "public sphere" is supplied in the recent collection of essays in *The Configuration of the Spanish Public Sphere: From the Enlightenment to the Indignados*, eds. Torres, David Jiménez, and Leticia Villamediana González. NYC: Berghahn Books, 2019, p. 1-24.

readers with an informal political education about the major topics of the day, that "the last decade of the 19th century saw the advent of a broad, politically active citizenry in Spain" (Ortiz 2001, 73).

Through institutions like the press and alternative educational projects like the ILE, progressives (and their opponents) effectively created the groundwork for a "new" Spanish society. For this reason, they bear more than a passing resemblance to what historian Louise Young refers to as "sites of transformation". I borrow this term from her book *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, where she uses it to describe "locations in the domestic landscape where the process of mobilization [...] erected a building block of empire, one of the many structures that produced and reproduced dominance in [Japan's colony of] Manchukuo" in Northeast China (1999, 416). In Young's formulation, these "sites" were not necessarily either physical locations or physical objects; rather, they were akin to social and political processes, out of which the fabric of a new social reality is woven. Thus, she designates mass media, imperial interest groups, public-private partnerships, utopian dreams, increasing state intervention in society, and Japan's increasingly bureaucratic governmental institutions as discrete elements which all eventually converged and congealed into the phenomenon of Japanese imperialism (Young 1999, 416-422). Importantly, this imperialism was also double in its effect: as Young argues, "Manchukuo was a *total* empire because its impact on the Japanese metropolis was as profound as Japan's impact on Northeast China" (1999, 430; emphasis mine). In effect, these six "sites of transformation" not only created *actual* colonies on Chinese soil but also "created a network of support at home" for Japan's imperial project, "reconfiguring the institutions of mass politics, mass society, and mass culture" in the process, and transforming how the idea of empire was communicated, reified, and experienced by Japan's citizens (Young 1999, 430).

That Spain lost its war with the United States was not really so surprising. As the head of the Liberal Party Práxedes Mateo Sagasta put it in 1903: "we are a poor country, is it strange that we have been beaten?" (translated and cited in Vincent 2007, 87). Yet paradoxically, if I may once again paraphrase Young, it was precisely this belief in the backwardness of Spanish society that lent the events of 1898 their "peculiar force" among Spain's intellectual class (1999, 422). Élite responses to 1898 reflected a kind of self-reinforcing feedback loop: already distrustful of the Restoration regime, Spain's defeat catalyzed their dissatisfaction, fostering new social forces in the process that only further popularized the perception of Spanish "decline". Here again one can see how "crisis" has both an objective and a subjective basis. At once responsive to and productive of social pressures in Spain's domestic landscape, cultural reviews like LEM and educational projects like the ILE were both effect and instrument in the social construction of "crisis" among Spanish intellectual élites. Initially intended as a starting point for Spain's reform, after 1898 they also became two of many nodes from which a perceived need for "regeneration" emanated, percolated, and became pervasive in a broader network of evolving social relations. Within that network, they were also the crucible in which opposing and sometimes unorthodox visions of Spain's past could crystallize and become consolidated.

THE CONTENTION: ESPAÑOLES SIN PATRIA

In the preceding chapter, I have shown how the changing shape of Spanish society, as well as élite contention over this, created a fertile environment for alternative "models" of the Spanish nation. The search for new ways of understanding Spanish history became increasingly urgent in the wake of the 1898 defeats, since an "alternative past" could provide "exemplars, models, and neglected or truncated traditions that might point toward new directions for the nation and reestablish its links to the more progressive and cultivated Europe beyond the Pyrenees" (Boyd 1997, 128). For the "patriotic regenerationists and democratic reformers at the turn of the century" in particular, this attempted "recovery of a serviceable national past—a past not only held captive, but actually lost or unknown"—transformed itself into an imperative of vital importance (Boyd 1997, 128). Importantly, efforts to create new understandings of Spain's past ran parallel to efforts to create effective programs of reform. History was not necessarily the key to Spain's "regeneration", but it was seen as an important part of any attempt to regenerate Spanish society.

§ 3.1 The Jewish Question in Spain: A Renaissance?

Additionally, as we have seen, these changes corresponded rather fortuitously with shifting views of the role of Jews in Spain's history. This history was still very much in the process of being codified, and as such, it could accommodate a variety of views regarding Jews. We need look no further than the 1869 debate in the Cortes between Emilio Castelar and Vicente Manterola, a priest from the Spanish Basque Country. I have already described how Castelar had previously emerged as a strong supporter of religious tolerance in these kinds of debates. In this particular exchange, one can see some of his reasons. Going even further than the typical liberal narrative of

medieval tolerance and proto-democracy, Castelar linked Spain's former greatness to the brilliance of the non-Christians who had lived on its soil. Indeed, he argued,

> we do not have agriculture [in Spain] because we expelled the *Moriscos*, those who built the three paradises of our country: the [gardens] of our country in Murcia, in Granada, and in Valencia [...] [and] we have no industry because we expelled the Jews who taught Alfonso X to read, who dictated to him and the Arabs the *Tablas alfonsinas*, the greatest monument of the Middle Ages. (cited in Aragoneses 2016, 13)

For Castelar, then, the expulsion of the Jews (and of the Muslims) had been a deadly mistake. The Jews had not only benefited from a religious tolerance which had made Spain admirable, but had also taken advantage of that religious tolerance to make Spain flourish. Although it is hard to know to what extent Castelar also believed in the existence of a literary, intellectual, and spiritual "Golden Age" in Spain—a thesis first advanced by 19th century Germanophone Jewish historians, such as Heinrich Graetz—his words definitely suggest that he considered the flourishing of the Spanish Jews an apogee of Spanish and European culture. His opponent Manterola, on the other hand, disagreed with him on nearly all of these points:

> Where is the architecture of the Jews today, the sciences and schools of the Jews? Apart from some knowledge in Chemistry they learned from the Arabs, Jewels, and the small industry of slipper[s], I do not know what the Jews know. What do the Jews have? They have money! Money they should use to rebuild their temple in Jerusalem. (cited in Aragoneses 2016, 14)

For Manterola, furthermore, the Jews had deserved their expulsion. Recalling the traditional Catholic narrative of Jewish conduct, he emphasized that it had been the "fanaticism" of the Jews that had led to the medieval pogroms and expulsion orders targeting them (Aragoneses 2016, 14). Although the character of the Spanish people (as he put it) was also somewhat to blame, it was the zealous sectarianism of the Jews, as well as the ritual crimes they committed against Spain's Christian population, that had served as the final, fatal catalyst (Aragoneses 2016, 14).

I should emphasize, of course, that these opposing narratives about Iberian Jews were not always mutually exclusive. A good example is provided by José Amador de los Ríos, whose 1848

treatise *Estudios históricos, políticos y literarios sobre los judíos de España* ("Historical, Political, and Literary Studies about the Jews of Spain") "celebrated Jewish contributions to 'Spanish civilization' and the 'extraordinary' influence and privileges [that] the Jews had attained in Spain, yet also described their persecution by Christians, which [stemmed] in part [from] 'transgressions' they had committed" (Friedman 2012, 41–42). Additionally, it is worth noting that stereotypes about Jews continued to abound even in more positive depictions of the relationship between Spain and the Jews. Agustín de Argüelles Álvarez, who I have also mentioned before, was certainly subscribing to a kind of liberal revisionism when he identified an indigenous democratic tradition in the *fueros* of the medieval Iberian peninsula. Yet he was quite average when it came to describing the Jews, who he associated with a great many "deceits" and "riches" (Israel Garzón 2019, 71). In spite of the many changes that I listed in the previous chapter, Spanish culture remained deeply shaped in many ways by Christian ways of thinking (Friedman 2012, 9). Consequently, although the Spanish right was certainly influenced by traditional Christian anti-Judaism, the Spanish left was not always much better, and often fell victim to Christianity's traditional ignorance of Judaism. This general picture would not change substantially until later in the 19th century, around the time that the regenerationist movement began to pick up steam.

What changed, exactly? One cause of this change was, once again, a series of new developments happening on the other side of the Pyrenees. As in Spain, the different social, political, and economic changes seen elsewhere in Europe during the 19th century impacted how other European peoples perceived Jews. An exemplar in this case was France, the first European country in which Jews were given civil liberties equal to those of the rest of the population (Hyman 1998, 17). This accomplishment, which was brought about initially by the revolutionary fervor sweeping France at the end of the 18th century, eventually gave way to new, even more

controversial debates at the end of the 19th. Indeed, although in France "the social mobility of French Jewry and their integration into state institutions was more far-reaching than in any other European country", the renewal of the "Jewish Question" in France was arguably one of the more crucial factors in the rise of political antisemitism in Europe at the end of the 19th century (Hyman 1998, 95–96).

Once consequence of these trends, of course, was the dissemination of liberal ideas in Spain. However, these developments also led to the birth of new forms of anti-Judaism in Spain, including modern antisemitism as it is known and understood today (2002, 171–172). Certain Spanish writers, inspired by the antisemitism of their European peers, also innovated upon it. Eduard Drumont's *La France juive* ("Jewish France"), first published in 1886, was summarized for readers in the pages of the Carlist periodical *La Cruz* ("The Cross") that same year, and translated three years later; however, it was also used as the basis for a distinctly Spanish spin-off titled *La España Judía* ("Jewish Spain") (Álvarez Chillida 2002, 198). The same would hold true in later years, when the myth of a Judeo-Masonic-Bolshevist conspiracy crossed the Pyrenees (Álvarez Chillida 2002, 279–288; Ojeda-Mata 2017, 25–26). Here too, the development of new conservative and ultraconservative ideas in France would have a concomitant influence on political thought in Spain—to cite just one example, the *Action Française* ("French Action") organization of Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras would later be directly paralleled by Ramiro de Maeztu's work in *Acción Española* ("Spanish Action").

Another cause of changes in attitudes towards Jews in Spain, however, were specific developments which were more or less internal to Spanish culture and society. These can broadly be classified in three categories. There was, first and most importantly, an increased degree of contact between Spaniards and Sephardic Jews, borne of Spain's increased involvement in the

affairs of its North African neighbor, Morocco. Secondly, as transportation and communication networks expanded and improved over the course of the 19th century, the fruits of antisemitism in Europe and beyond became more visible, prompting wider consideration of the fate of the Jews in the Spanish press. And finally, as a consequence of both of these developments, the possibility of Jews returning to Spain increasingly became a subject of speculation. Although Spain's relationship with the Jews remained "mixed with disputes over freedom of religion [and] religious intolerance, it was chiefly because of these three other developments that the "Jewish Question", long absent in Spain on account of its non-existent Jewish population, was again revived (González Garcia 1991, 84).

Spain had had a foothold in the Islamic world for a very long time. So too had Sephardic Jews (Benbassa and Rodrigue 1993, 53–57). After being forced to leave the many lands conglomerated under Castilian rule in 1492, Sephardic Jews typically went to one of three places: either to the kingdoms of Portugal or Navarre, to North Africa (mostly what is now considered Morocco and Algeria, but also in some cases Tunisia and Libya), or to the Ottoman Empire further east (Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 44–67)[21]. In Morocco, where expelled Jews (*megashorim*) eventually became integrated with local Jews (*toshavim*), and "played an active role in commercial relations between the north[ern] and south[ern] Mediterranean" (Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 50; Ojeda-Mata 2017, 42). Only a portion of Morocco's Jews spoke Judeo-Spanish[22], and they tended to be located

[21] Some Jews also traveled to medieval Provence or to the Italian peninsula. Furthermore, additional migrations sometimes took place after Jews had already settled in a new land. This happened twice in Portugal, where pogroms and the long reach of the Inquisition convinced Sephardic Jews to leave for the New World or other parts of Western Europe (Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 47–48). A somewhat more peaceful migration also occurred in the Ottoman Empire, once its conquest of large swaths of the Mashreq allowed Jews to resettle in the Holy Land (Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 66–67).

[22] There are various names for the language of the exiled Sephardic Jews, including Ladino, Judezmo, Spanyolit, Djidio, Haketia, Djudeo-espanyol, and many others (particularly since the

in port cities in the north, such as Tétouan, Tangier, and Larache (Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 50). However, this gave them an advantage in the late 18th century when trade between Spain and Morocco began to increase. In 1780, Spanish merchants scored a windfall when a treaty was signed allowing them unrestricted access to Moroccan markets and settlement rights in the kingdom (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 41). These merchants quickly established trading associations with local Muslim and Jewish traders, using their insider knowledge of the area to bring additional commercial benefit (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 41). Sephardic Jews in particular would continue to aid in Spain's commercial penetration into Morocco for the next century and a half to come.

Yet this was not the only capacity in which Sephardic Jews furthered Spanish interests. Because of their knowledge of both Spanish and Arabic, as well as their familiarity with local conditions, Sephardic Jews were generally quite useful in a variety of other roles, and served in past centuries as "informants, spies, and interpreters" in a variety of Spanish territorial holdings, including in Oran and Tunis[23] (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 42). In the 19th century, these trends came to a head, as a greater number of Sephardic Jews were drawn into the orbit of the Spanish state. This development corresponded in some measure to the political changes happening in the peninsula. As Maite Ojeda-Mata writes, "relations between [these] Spanish colonial elites and the important Sephardic Jews in Morocco began to consolidate in the 1830s and early 1840s under the first liberal governments" in Spain (2017, 45). By the mid-19th century, for example, the Spanish state had begun to directly "employ Jews in Morocco, for the most part Sephardim, as consular agents", or

orthography of the language is not standardized). For ease of comprehension, however, I would only use "Judeo-Spanish" when referencing this language.

[23] Spain controlled the city of Oran (in what is today Algeria) from the beginning of the 16th to the beginning of the 18th century. It briefly lost Oran to the Ottoman Empire in 1708, but regained it in 1732, ruling uninterrupted until 1792, when the king decided the increasingly unprofitable trading outpost was better off being sold to the Ottoman Sultan. Tunis, on the other hand, was only ever a temporary possession. Although Spain fought intermittently with the Ottomans for control of it between 1535 and 1574, it abandoned the effort afterwards.

semsars, each of which was accorded formal diplomatic protection (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 43–45). Those Spaniards who were involved with the Jews reportedly preferred them to Muslims, who they considered inferior commercial intermediaries and guides. For their part, a number of Jews also benefited quite a great deal from the *protégé* system, and were happy to change "protector nations" when it suited them, or to work for more than one (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 47).

Things changed somewhat in 1859, when an "African War" (*Guerra de África*) saw the Spanish military pitted against the forces of the Moroccan Sultan. Spain's victory resulted in the signing of a treaty granting further rights in Moroccan territory, and consequently also resulted in a deeper interlinking of Sephardic Jewish interests with Spanish interests (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 46). But the war is also noteworthy for having introduced the Judeo-Spanish-speaking Jews to a broader audience. "When troops entered Tétouan they discovered Jewish families speaking Spanish", Alfons Aragoneses writes (2016, 11). "This episode", widely reported in the Spanish press, "made the existence of Jews descending from those who lived in the Peninsula and speaking Spanish visible to the Spanish public" (Aragoneses 2016, 11). As a consequence of this, there was a surge of Spanish interest in the ethnic and social composition of Moroccan lands (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 47). In the years after the war, for example, Spanish soldiers supplied popular narrative chronicles of their time in Africa—just in time to satisfy Spain's growing reading public. Indeed, Spain's soldiers also became some of Spain's staunchest supporters of neo-colonialism in Morocco (*africanistas*), sometimes even borrowing from the methods of French colonial ethnographers (a key component in the later establishment of colonial rule in French Morocco[24]) for their narratives in the process (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 47).

[24] For more on this topic, see Burke III, Edmund. *The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. Burke III discusses the pivotal role played by French anthropologists and ethnographers in the social construction of a distinctively "Moroccan" form of Islam, thus consolidating colonial rule by borrowing from and

This popular dimension of the Hispano-Moroccan War cannot be understated. As Xosé Nuñez Seixas makes clear, "the wars with external foes enriched and renewed the repertoire of Spanish national myths, many of which incorporated new symbols and *lieux de mémoire* [sites of memory], from the admiral Casto Méndez Núñez to the African battles in Wad Ras and Tétouan" (2018, 36). This also had the additional effect of creating "new stereotypes about the *other* and images of alterity" (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 36). In the imagination of many Spaniards, the *other* "came to be the Moor or the Cuban rebels (*mambises*), who were always supposedly colored runaway slaves [...] all of these would become the heirs of Spain's traditional enemies, against whom the medieval *Reconquista* had been fought" (Nuñez Seixas 2018, 36). At the same time that the medieval Moor was being resurrected in the minds of many Spaniards, the Jew—also a traditional enemy of Spain, according to conservative-Catholic and liberal narratives—was undergoing a further reinterpretation. A good example of this is José María Murga y Mugartegui's novel *Recuerdos marroquíes del moro vizcaíno* ("A Basque Moor's Memories of Morocco"), which characterized Moroccan Jews as "more reliable as commercial intermediaries and interpreters and with a better head for trade and crafts than the Muslims" (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 46). Additionally, journalists such as Adolfo Llanos y Alcaraz were surprised and pleased by the "sincere love for Spain" shown by Moroccan Jews during the Hispano-Moroccan War (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 46). News soon spread in Spain that Morocco's Jews had "provided good services, offering their houses and showing their resolve to be useful and alleviate the suffering of [Spain's]

linking it to pre-colonial traditions of politico-religious authority. Indeed, "the French claimed a superior understanding of Moroccan Islam, by virtue of which they alone could express, organize, and make legible the diverse components of Morocco's political identity" (Burke III 2014, 7). Similar claims would also later be made by Spain's colonial élite, who argued that the well-known past contact between Spaniards and "Moors"—which may or may not have involved racial mixing, depending on the outlook of the author—made them uniquely qualified to work with local populations.

expeditionary army" (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 46). Some Jews reportedly even "requested the opportunity to convert to Catholicism so they could legally enter Spain as Spanish citizens", while others "requested permission to reenter Spain and establish trading and financial centers" (Goode 2009, 190).

In the previous chapter, I have already noted how Spanish historians and public figures increasingly integrated Jewish history into their accounts of Spain's past over the course of the 19th century. This trend was greatly enhanced by the events in Morocco: in fact, Emilio Castelar's defense of a Jewish contribution to Spanish history was greatly influenced by the stories he heard about Moroccan Jews during the Hispano-Moroccan War (Goode 2009, 190). In this way, Spanish writers in Morocco did not only contribute to the sale of adventurous tales: they also contributed to a reassessment of Spain's historical relations with Jews. From this point forward, "Spanish liberals [showed] an increased interest in exploring the potentials of [this] population that seemed to have preserved the Spanish language and Spanish culture for such a long period" (Goode 2009, 190). Later on, a number of these liberals (one must remember, again, that their understanding of Jews and Judaism was influenced by their Christian outlook) believed that Moroccan Jews, "whom they associated with finance and capital [...] could be used to jump-start Spain's moribund international trade relations with Europe and the East" (Goode 2009, 190).

For this reason, at the end of the 19th century, a significant number of liberal Spaniards came to support further Spanish involvement in Morocco and the rest of Africa. They were just in time, too—with the loss of its remaining colonies in 1898, a greater foothold in Africa was the only way that Spain could ever again assume a semblance of its former empire. Yet as the rest of Europe engaged in a "scramble for Africa" towards the end of the 19th century, Spanish colonial élites also became increasingly concerned that they were being left behind. Spanish political

leaders also began to fear that a much-weakened Spain would be encircled by its European rivals if nothing was done. These concerns became even more urgent in the early 20th century, when tensions between Spain, France, and Germany over their individual national stakes in Morocco increased substantially. Once Morocco became a French protectorate, "Spain would see itself reduced to seeing itself besieged perpetually in the North and South by the same power," argued Eugenio Montero Ríos, a liberal politician directly involved in signing the peace treaty that ended the 1898 Spanish-American War (translated and cited in Rohr 2008, 19). A Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco was therefore necessary for Spain's security.

For philosephardists and other regenerationist intellectuals, however, increased Spanish influence in Morocco had also become essential to maintain Spain's fraying cultural, economic, and international power. To be sure, "philosephardism was [initially] slow to influence state policies and was basically limited to the military hierarchies in Morocco and [Spain's] Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 50). Yet increasingly, "cultural policies—particularly those related to the Spanish language—were transformed into foreign policy tools used to stem the loss of Spain's international prestige" (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 52). Ironically, the reassessment of relations with Spanish-speaking Jews that followed from this was also accompanied by an identification of Spain's decay with the predominance of non-European or even "Semitic" values. Even more puzzling than this is the regenerationists' conviction that even greater involvement in Africa would provide a solution. It was as if Spain could only become European again through Africa. Joaquín Costa is, once again, a perfect example of this: although he continuously advocated as an *africanista* for further Spanish expansion abroad, he also once famously exhorted his fellow Spaniards to remove "the Africa that has invaded us" from the national body (translated and cited in Boyd 1997, 125).

Towards the end of the 19th century, Spanish élites were also increasingly aware of events which affected Jews in other countries. The increasing ease of transportation and communication across geographical and political boundaries meant that Jewish topics in places as far-flung as Damascus was reported upon in the Spanish press. Consequently, running parallel to the increasing Spanish political and economic penetration of Morocco was a new and increasing awareness of antisemitism in the faraway places where Spaniards tended to come into contact with Sephardic Jews. This sometimes worked to the advantage of those who desired a closer relationship with said Jews. For example, Manuel Luis Ortega Pichardo, the editor of the 20th century philosephardic cultural review *Revista de la Raza* ("Review of the Race") argued that the Jews owed a debt to Spaniards because the Spanish had saved them from Muslim persecution during the Hispano-Moroccan War (Ojeda-Mata 2017, 53). In many cases, however, antisemitism in the Islamic world only aroused indifference.

This was true *a fortiori* of antisemitism among Spain's European neighbors, where traditional anti-Judaism had deepened in many places into a more variegated and overtly political form of prejudice. A good example of this is the intense reaction in Spain to the Dreyfus affair. Another example which is more pertinent to my argument is provided by the wave of pogroms in 1881 in the Russian Empire. The pogroms caused an international outcry and, in conjunction with other measures taken by the tsar, induced massive Jewish emigration. While the violence in the Romanov Empire was unpopular with many of its neighbors, so too was the prospect of an influx of Jewish migrants. Certain countries, such as Romania, closed their borders outright, while other countries, such as Germany instead tried to limit the protections and services that they offered to Jews (Avni 2001, 15). In Spain, on the other hand, opinions about what to do were more mixed.

Spain's ambassador to Constantinople, Juan Antonio de Rascón, had personally seen many Jews trying to flee Russia into Europe or the Ottoman Empire. He quickly drafted a report describing the situation and sent it to the Foreign Ministry in Madrid, and maintained a steady stream of communication with the Spanish state about how best to respond to the situation. At the same time, Rascón reportedly maintained close connections with the Jewish community in Constantinople (Avni 2001, 15). As the situation developed further, he proposed that the fleeing Jews be resettled and protected within Spanish borders (Avni 2001, 15). Doing so, Rascón claimed, would have a number of benefits for Spain. According to Rascón, Jewish immigration into Spain would "stimulate commercial ties with thousands of Spanish Jews scattered throughout the Turkish Empire", particularly if Spain also established Spanish secondary schools in key cities such as Constantinople and Salonika, and schooled Jews in modern Spanish (Avni 2002, 15). The cultural influence that would follow from this was also worth considering (Avni 2002, 15).

It is unclear to what extent Rascón himself genuinely believed in what he was saying (Avni 2001, 15). He would not have been ignorant, for instance, of the pervasive dislike of Judaism and Jews that still existed in Spanish society. In any case, whether he believed in his proposal or not is a moot point: regardless of how he felt about it, it garnered a positive reaction in Madrid. Spain's Foreign Minister Marques de la Vega de Armijo presented Rascón's proposal to the king, Alfonso XII, and obtained his approval. The Spanish government sent a missive to Rascón informing him that the Jews would be "permitted to enter Spain and settle there permanently" (Avni 2002, 15). Although the Russian Jews seeking protection were Ashkenazic, not Sephardic, no attention was paid to this. Nor did Spanish officials seem to be fazed by the fact that the Jews with whom Rascón had been speaking had claimed to speak on behalf of 60,000 Russian Jews: actually, the Spanish government seemed to *welcome* them, saying that "'all Jews desirous of coming to Spain would

find the protection they sought in the country in which dwelt so many of their ancestors'" (cited and translated in Avni 2002, 15). News of this decision spread widely and quickly—in addition to coverage of the subject in Spain, Rascón's plan was also mentioned or described in places as varied as Britain, France, Holland, Austria, and Argentina (Avni 2002, 16).

In this way, the visibility of antisemitism abroad led to an astonishing reversal of policy on the part of the Spanish government, who had neither abolished the 1492 Edict of Expulsion banning Jews and the practice of Judaism nor changed the Constitution and other legislation to allow for greater religious freedom. Given the perdurance of anti-Jewish legislation, however, it is little surprise that the Spanish government's proposal had a significant catch. Although Spanish officials were fine with allowing Jews to settle in Spain as refugees (a practice which they had allowed before in the aftermath of the Hispano-Moroccan War[25]). Although the Spanish government was happy to welcome Jews to Spain, it did not intend to provide them with any assistance in settling. The "60,000 Jews" mentioned at the gates of the Spanish consulate in Constantinople and mentioned incessantly in the press never made it to Spain (Avni 2002, 17).

Still, the amount of interest in the idea Jewish resettlement shown by Spanish liberals in this incident demonstrates the idea's increasing appeal. In a strange way, it also demonstrates the increasing appeal of Jews themselves. Although the argument presented by Rascón in favor of resettling Jewish refugees drew upon antisemitic tropes—Jews were good at finance, banking, and the promotion of industry, etc.—these were no longer elements of antisemitism *per se*. Instead, Rascón's argument invoked an emerging strain of philosemitic thought in liberal and progressive circles which valorized Jews for the many economic contributions that they had made to Spain in the past—and could make again, if given the chance. This financial philosemitism would be

[25] For more on Moroccan Jewish refugees during the Hispano-Moroccan War, see Israel Garzón 2019, 108–118.

invoked time and time again with reference to the idea of Jewish resettlement—which is one reason why this idea was so fruitfully invoked in debates about Spain's "regeneration".

§ 3.2 The Jews in Spain: A Rebirth?

Despite all this, much stayed the same as before. "The discovery of the Sephardim in Tétouan in 1860 did not have a great impact," argues the historian Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, since, "in spite of their language, all the Spanish saw was the Jew of their imaginations" (Álvarez Chillida 2002, 261). The work of people like Rascón during the troubled years of the Russian pogroms did not accomplish much either, except to prove the sympathies of liberals to Jewish resettlement and to provoke opposition to the same idea from the Church and most of the general populace. The Russian Jews were just as "imaginary" as the Jews in Morocco, additionally: as I have already mentioned, the Spanish officials involved in Spain's response to the Russian pogroms seemed to hold some fundamentally mistaken ideas about the ancestry of the Russian Jewish refugees who they were trying to help. Furthermore, all of these initiatives generally "changed and affected very little" (Álvarez Chillida 2002, 261).

Yet "everything changed when the doctor Ángel Pulido began his inexhaustible campaigns" for Sephardic repatriation (2002, 261). Indeed, Ángel Pulido Fernández can truly be said to have done more than any other to popularize the idea of nationalizing large numbers of Sephardic Jews. Every academic work describing philosephardism has described him as a seminal figure. In the following section, I will endeavor to explain why. Pulido not only incarnated the different aspects of Spanish society that I have been describing during these last two chapters, but

provided a unique contribution to 19th and early 20th century debates about Spain's relationship with Jews.

As his son Ángel Pulido Martin writes in his biography of his father, Ángel Pulido was "always a democrat, in the Christian and Spanish sense of the word [...] he was the friend of all, and well aware of the sadnesses and wants of the poor" (1945, 44). Born in 1852 in Madrid to a family of innkeepers, he eventually worked his way up Spain's socio-economic ladder and frequently rubbed shoulders with the country's intellectual and literary élite, including people such as Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Benito Pérez Galdós, Emilia Pardo Bazán, Jacinto Benavente, José Echegaray, Miguel de Unamuno, Ramiro Maeztu, and Carmen de Burgos, among others (Lemoine 2018, 24). In his lifetime, Ángel Pulido was many things. He worked variously throughout his career as a physician, an anthropologist, a publicist, a public health official, and a politician; however, despite changing professions many times, he would remain a practicing Catholic all his life. Initially of a republican bent, he began his studies in medicine the same year as the 1868 Spanish Revolution, and participated in a few of the student revolts that occurred in the fall of that year (Lemoine 2018, 23). Over the course of his studies, Pulido also came to know other figures associated with republicanism, including Emilio Castelar, who he personally served as a doctor, and Pedro González de Velasco (Goode 2009, 187). Upon graduating in 1873, Pulido worked again as a doctor in the medical corps of the Spanish army (Goode 2009, 184). He quickly tired of his work there, however, and was reconnected through Castelar with González de Velasco, who hired him to work as a secretary for the new anthropological society he had just founded (Goode 2009, 185).

While working with Velasco, Pulido began to "study and promote craniometry as the most effective tool in acquiring [...] information about nations" (Goode 2009, 185). We must recall here

how in late-19th century Spain, anthropology was widely understood as the key to divining the past and present of the Spanish "race". Pulido accordingly became quite vested in the discipline's intellectual "vocation", and reportedly considered Spanish scientists uniquely well-situated to test the theories of earlier anthropological schools of thought (Goode 2009, 185). "With respect to various civilizing tendencies, it is important to determine the relative accuracy of all the portraits provided," he claimed in an 1875 speech before the Spanish Society of Anthropology (translated and cited in Goode 2009, 185). Indeed, he asked,

> does Civilization exist only in relation to a specific atmosphere and environment, as the French would have it? Or is the truth closer to the specific physiological ideas of Vogt, who as a member of the Germanic Race, with a much more pronounced and desirable dolichocephalic cranium, considers the French conclusions as examples of their vanity and confusion[?] (translated and cited in Goode 2009, 186).

Pulido had his own ideas about the answer. Suspecting that the arguments of major French and German anthropologists were "tinged with national chauvinism", he insisted that the "cultural and religious attributes of a nation were as systemic as their physical features" (Goode 2009, 187). Additionally, he took issue with how much emphasis many of these scientists placed on racial purity (Goode 2009, 196). No race could be "pure" in this sense, Pulido argued, for all racial groups had undergone different degrees of mixing at different points in the past (Goode 2009, 196). Finally, although he clearly subscribed to a kind of polygenism—the idea that there are a number of distinct human races, each with distinct racial origins—Pulido nevertheless believed that the racial determinism of scientists like Arthur de Gobineau was incorrect. Indeed, as he wrote in *Españoles sin patria*,

> "We have always believed that circumstance and education are the factors that most distinguish people from one another [...] when one looks at the history of nations, especially when it was long, one can appreciate the ups and downs of their power or through the ebbs and flows of their culture, that the success is defined by the morality of the governing bodies, by the levels of civilization a nation's neighbors have achieved, and by the genius of its public figures" (Pulido 1905, 568, translated and cited in Goode 2009, 196).

It was precisely this belief in the possibility of ameliorating one's race which Pulido built his later career on. After his initial appointment as a secretary to Velasco's anthropological society in 1873, Pulido's success as an anthropologist and medical practitioner only continued to grow. In 1884, he was appointed a member of the Royal Academy of Medicine, and became increasingly involved in discussions of criminology and public health. By 1893, he also served as the director of Spain's Department of Public Health. By this time, Pulido had also begun to work his way into politics; at Castelar's urging, he broke with the republicans and joined the Liberal Party, becoming a senator for the Royal Academy of Medicine in 1899. Throughout this time, Pulido maintained his belief in "positivist philosophy, in progress, and [the] advancement" of his country (Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 264). Yet by the time he was appointed senator, it had become plain to see that something was wrong with Spain:

> The national disaster of 1898, which put an end to our colonies and our legends, requires the country to rectify its mistakes, dispel its illusions, and acquire a feeling of reality. This was never especially a distinguishing characteristic of ours—studying how and why empires grow and decline, and how work, order and wisdom can restore to us even more than that which we have already lost. (cited in García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 30).

Pulido was a regenerationist through and through. The so-called "apostle of the Sephardic Jews" was also a self-proclaimed "apostle" of public health, which Pulido considered synonymous with the health of the Spanish "race". In his capacity as director of Spain's Department of Public Health, Pulido lamented the lack of education, norms, and infrastructure dedicated to sanitation in Spain, claiming that, in Spain, the "population is stagnant, the stature of individuals diminishes[,] and the vigor of the race decreases" with every passing day (García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 27). In such a situation, he argued, the Spanish people would "necessarily [be] condemned to die" unless something was done (García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 27). Indeed, for Pulido, sanitary conditions in Spain at times seemed comparable to those in Berber settlements in

Morocco (García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 29). He saw this situation as having been aggravated even further by the "ruinous dispossessions" now being endured by the Spanish people—another clear reference to the events of 1898 (cited in García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 27). Speaking before the Senate in 1899, he spoke at length of the benefits that a new national Sanitation Law would bring to Spain, and of how Spain's recent defeat necessitated a new approach to public health. "The vigor of [our] race weakens", he stated, and "this much has been shown to us, unfortunately, by the latest devastating events, which bring tears to the eyes and anguish to the heart whenever we think of them" (cited in García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 27). "As we reflect upon this," he added, "[we must realize that] we have a need for a *national reform* such as that which is being proposed with this law" (cited in García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 27).

Although he was able to bring about some meaningful changes in his lifetime as a practitioner of medicine, Pulido was less successful as a politician. He would retire from the Department of Public Health in 1902 without having achieved all the reforms that he desired, pessimistic and resentful of the corruption and bureaucracy which inhibited Spain's progress. In a subsequent interview with Antonio Maura y Montaner, Pulido attested unhappily to the "grave importance of the functions of public health, [and] of the meanness and disrepair of the body called to fulfill them, and of how useful and patriotic it would be to provide even a little attention to a service which would bring about the reconquest of our homeland, the development of our race, and the enhancement of our power, wealth, and happiness" (cited in García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 27). Pulido's failure to create a culture of public sanitation during this time was also partially a failure of the scientific positivism espoused by Spain's Krausists to penetrate into the country's governing structures (García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 33). And, like many

other progressively-minded regenerationists, Pulido blamed corruption and *caciquismo*[26] for this (García Guerra and Álvarez Antuña 1994, 39). This is pretty unsurprising given the social circles which he frequented.

Pulido's proposed remedy for Spanish decline, however, was quite unusual. Extending his interest in public health beyond mere education, laws, and institutions, Pulido also advocated for the repatriation of 20,000 to 25,000 Sephardic Jews, among which might be as many as 1,000 or 2,000 Jews with "extraordinary capabilities"[27] (Pulido 1905, 539). In addition to that, he claimed that Spain would benefit from deepening ties with Sephardic Jews that Bejarano had described. Echoing the language of other Spanish liberals, he argued that Spain should also invest more in its commercial and cultural relationships with Sephardic Jews around the world.[28] The sum of these actions, he added, would create mutual benefit for both Spain and the Jews, and lead to a "reconstitution of the Spanish race and improvement of the fatherland" (Pulido 1905, 18, translated and cited in Goode 2009, 194).

Pulido first encountered Sephardic Jews during a voyage he took down the Danube River in 1883. Along the way, he was approached by three businessmen who began to speak to him in a form of antiquated Spanish (Judeo-Spanish), and called themselves "Jewish Spaniards" (Goode 2009, 192). This event, however, appears to have made little impact on Pulido; indeed, "despite an occasional mention of issues related to Spanish Jewry in [publications such as] *El Siglo Médico* or *El Liberal*, it did not seem to have much impact on Pulido's active political interests or his

[26] For a more up-to-date account of what role *caciquismo* may or may not have actually played in obstructing reforms, see Luzón, Javier Moreno. "A Historiografia sobre o Caciquismo Espanhol: Balanço e Novas Perspectivas." *Análise Social* 178 (2006): 9-29.
[27] Although Pulido supported the immigration of Sephardic Jews, he thought of Ashkenazic Jews as "degenerate" and backwards, and was also wary about allowing a large quantity of poor Jews from Central and Eastern Europe to flood into Spain (Goode 2009, 194, 196).
[28] A full list of Pulido's recommendations (minus his suggestion that tens of thousands of Jews be repatriated to Spain) can be found in his 1905 book *Españoles sin patria*, on p. 640.

medical activities" (Goode 2009, 192). Additionally, given the momentary confusion Pulido described himself as feeling upon hearing the phrase "Jewish Spaniard", it is difficult to ascertain how much he may have known at this time about the Spanish-speaking Jews of Morocco (Goode 2009, 192). It was only during another Danube voyage in 1903 that Pulido seems to have become attached to the idea of Sephardic repatriation. On this trip, he met a man from Romania named Ḥaim Enrique Bejarano and his wife, both of whom were Sephardic Jews. Conversing in Spanish, Bejarano described the work he did as a director for a Sephardic school in Romania that he had modelled after the schools of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* ("Universal Alliance of the Israelites"), attesting in the process to the existence of "more than 2 million Sephardic Jews spread throughout Asia Minor, the Middle East, the Americas, and the entire Mediterranean littoral" (Goode 2009, 192). And, like him, these Jews continued to speak and treasure the Spanish language (Goode 2009, 192).

Upon returning to Spain, Pulido set about gathering more information and raising awareness about this extraordinary find. The speeches that he gave and the articles that he published in the years immediately after his encounter with Bejarano (who he continued to communicate with) were quickly compiled and republished in a 1904 book called *Intereses nacionales: los israelitas españoles y el idioma castellano* (Goode 2009, 192). This was followed in 1905 with another book called *Españoles sin patria y la raza sefardí*. In this book, after describing an extensive ethnographic survey that he had conducted (with Bejarano's help) of Sephardic communities in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, Pulido made the case for Spanish-Sephardic reconciliation and Jewish immigration to Spain (Goode 2009, 193). For Pulido, Sephardic Jews' "persistent use of [the Judeo-Spanish] language bespoke a deeper connection with Spain" which was both laudable and remarkable (Goode 2009, 193). Additionally, in his

justification for his proposed policies, Pulido argued that Spain had made a grave mistake in exiling its Jews. “It does not require much exposition or persuasive dialectic to demonstrate that Spain suffered a serious loss when it expelled the Jews,” he once wrote of Jewish feats in medieval Spain (Pulido 1905, 529). But, he added, “we [also] lost more [...] we lost the aristocracy of a race” by expelling the Jews (Pulido 1905, 531).

The influence of his mentor Castelar is clearly visible in Pulido’s ideas here[29]. Like Castelar, Pulido campaigned for a policy of religious tolerance that would allow Jews to settle and worship freely in Spain, and credited them for much of Spain’s earlier development in economic and intellectual spheres (Pulido 1905, p. 529–531). Additionally, like Castelar, Pulido thought of the Spanish as victims of their own intolerance. Towards the end of *Españoles sin patria*, for example, he also linked the decline of Spain’s empire with Spanish intolerance, comparing the “fanaticism” of Spain’s leaders with that of the people in the blighted Russian Empire (Pulido 1905, 654). “For this reason,” he argued, “there are some who affirm that Spain cannot be considered a free nation as long as she does not thoroughly and completely recognize that most basic of human liberties: religious freedom” (Pulido 1905, 654). For Spaniards to become reacquainted with the part of their past that had lent the Spanish nation so much of its former splendor, they would have to “overcome their ridiculous prejudices” (translated and cited in Goode 2009, 193).

Yet the ideas about Jews that Pulido developed over the course of his lifetime were philosemitic in other ways. Indeed, in some instances it almost seems as if they drew inspiration from the different articulations of the sacred “mission of Israel” in the German lands west of Spain.

[29] This is something which Pulido actually admits to in his 1905 book *Españoles sin patria,* on p. 601–602. He goes into great detail there about the impact of Castelar’s debate with Manterola on the overall spirit of the book.

These views were an outgrowth of the differing responses of European Jewry to the challenges posed by their emancipation, and gained in strength as these responses divided Jewish communities in places as varied as France and Hungary. As David Einhorn, a radical Reform rabbi, once declared at a conference in Frankfurt in 1845:

> The decline of Israel's political independence was at one time deplored, but in reality, it was not a misfortune, but a mark of progress; not a degradation, but an elevation of our religion, through which Israel has come closer to fulfilling its vocation. The place of the sacrifices has been taken by sacred devotion. From Israel, the word of God had to be carried to the four corners of the earth, and new religions have helped in carrying out the task. (translated and cited in Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz 1995, 184)

It is possible that Pulido heard similar words spoken during his journeys throughout Europe, particularly since he formed working relationships with Jews in Germany, Austria, and other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An echo of these words is certainly contained in Pulido's own estimation of the historical significance of the Jewish people: he spoke of the

> extraordinary character of Israel; of its ministry without compare in the moral evolution of humanity; of its genesis in the development of Christianity; of the noble stoicism of the Hebraic race, without equal among the knowledgeable, and of the tremendous energies and social aptitudes that [they] incarnated, each of which were, are, and will continue to be a sublime factor in the moral progress and positive enrichment [of humankind]. (cited in Álvarez Chillida 2002, 262)

This fact might also explain why Pulido was so disappointed by the turn to Zionism that followed the Dreyfus *débâcle* in France at the end of the 19th century. "Israel should have no doubt [that] the era of its rehabilitation has already begun" he wrote at the conclusion of *Españoles sin patria* (Pulido 1905, 656, translated and cited in Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 287). "[But] we do not know if its Zionist expectations will be fulfilled [and] we do not know whether concentrating life in a small state will be good for mankind and the people of Moses" (Pulido 1905, 656, translated and cited in Meyuḥas Ginio 2015, 287). In 1903, as a consequence of his son's studies in Vienna, Pulido had "discovered" and begun to correspond with a community of Sephardic Jewish students

there (named *Esperanza*)[30]. This organization worked for the preservation and renewal of Sephardic life in Vienna, often advocating for the reform of the Judeo-Spanish as a result (Ayala and von Schmädel 2010, 86). The efforts of the group apparently delighted Pulido, who sent them a letter[31] in which he praised them for wanting to bring their Judeo-Spanish more in line with modern Castilian. Yet by 1904, a year before *Españoles sin patria* was finally published, the members of *Esperanza* had seemingly lost their passion for Castilianism and turned instead to Zionism (Pulido 1905, 156–157).

Pulido's disappointment with Zionism also speaks volumes about his underlying racialist beliefs. Clearly, in Pulido's worldview, the Sephardim—or at least many of the Sephardim—were not merely representatives of what he sometimes called "the Hebraic race", with its own autonomous history and goals. Indeed, it is not clear to what extent he viewed them as Jews at all. If one digs deeper into Pulido's views about the Jews, one finds a mass of beliefs which set him apart from his contemporaries and which are not easily traceable to any single source.

At bottom, Pulido the scientist thought of the Sephardic Jews he had encountered as "Spaniards" because their physical and cultural attributes made them largely indistinguishable from Spaniards. "Our personal impressions of the physiognomy of the Jews is that it exactly resembles the Spanish type," he claimed (Pulido 1905, 30). "When regarding their gestures, their vestments, and their visages, nothing can be seen that suggests to us that they belong to a race different from the Spanish" (Pulido 1905, 30). Furthermore, Pulido believed "Jews of Spanish

[30] For more in general on the Sephardim in the German lands, see Rafael D. Arnold's article "Forschungsüberblick über die Sefardischen Studien im deutschsprachigen Raum". For more on *Esperanza* and Sephardic Jewish life in Vienna specifically, see the literature review in Martin Stechauner's 2019 doctoral thesis *The Sephardic Jews of Vienna: A Jewish Minority Crossing Borders*.

[31] Said letter was published in 1904 the left-leaning Madrilene newspaper *El Liberal* and then reprinted in Pulido's 1904 book *Intereses nacionales: los israelitas españoles y el idioma castellano* on p. 115.

origin to be a repository of Spanish attributes from the period of its greatest national success", and approached the subject of their expulsion "in scientific terms, as an excision from the national body" (Goode 2009, 193). Both Spaniards and Spanish Jews had benefited from racial mixing, but now, with the "cruel amputation" of the latter, the former was subjected to unhealthy, even dangerous, degenerative effects (Pulido 1905, 529). Pulido argued that "many years later, when the hemorrhaging brusquely initiated at the end of the 15th century and slowly sustained throughout the 16th and 17th centuries had produced its effects, there occurred such a terrible anemia [...] that [Spain's] industry, agriculture, and commerce fell gravely ill" (Pulido 1905, 531). Sephardic Jews had similarly suffered: indeed, Pulido thought that their conservation of the Judeo-Spanish language was a defense against "the social environments in which they lived [which] were intolerable for them [...] like unblendable or repellant liquids" (Pulido 1905, 60). For Pulido, the solution was clear: racial fusion, once disrupted, led to racial decay for both Spaniards and Sephardic Jews. Remaking this "good fusion" (as Joshua Goode puts it) would accordingly mutually benefit both groups. For Spain in particular, he argued, couching his prescription in clinical terms, "returning Jews to Spain would reintroduce the catalyst—the racial energy and creativity—needed for Spanish modernization" (Pulido 1905, 534; Goode 2009, 196).

Quite naturally, Pulido's views about Jews differed drastically from those of the antisemitic right (Álvarez Chillida 2002, 273–279). Yet they differed as well from those of the Zionists of *Esperanza*, for whom Judeo-Spanish was implicated in a specifically Jewish, not Spanish destiny (Ayala and von Schmädel 2010, 88). They differed too from those of his mentor Castelar, who, at the end of the day, saw Jews as a noble but separate people (Goode 2009, 189). And they differed from a number of Pulido's contemporaries, such as Unamuno, who preferred language and not physiognomy as the defining barometer of racial identity (Goode 2009, 198–199). Yet Pulido's

argument proved popular: with the support of other public figures from Carmen de Burgos to the King Alfonso XII, a variety of associations, schools, and other initiatives supporting Spanish-Sephardic reconciliation were soon founded (Rohr 2008, 18; Ojeda-Mata 2017, 52–53). In his 1919 book about Moroccan Jews (*Los Hebreos en Marruecos*, or "The Jews of Morocco"), Ortega Pichardo wrote that Jews living in Spain's Moroccan Protectorate and other African territories should be "nationalized", since "the Jews in Morocco were not 'foreigners', but 'ancestral Spaniards' who loved Spain" (translated and cited in Ojeda-Mata 2017, 53). Indeed, he claimed that "we [the Spanish] will *fail in a sacred duty of patriotism* if we do not attract the Jews our brothers, to reintegrate them into the shared homeland" (translated and cited in Ojeda-Mata 2017, 53; emphasis mine). In 1924, the Spanish government, then headed by the military dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera, did precisely that for Sephardic Jews living in the Balkans and Turkey (Rohr 2008, 26–27). As Alfons Aragoneses, notes the *Decreto Real* (Royal Decree) did not even use the words "Jew", "Jewish", or "Sephardic" in the text, instead making reference to *protegidos españoles* (protected Spaniards) and individuals of demonstrable Spanish descent (2015, 27). The core of Pulido's ideas about Sephardic Jews—that they were not distinct from the Spanish "race", that they were in fact part of what had made the Spanish "race" what it was, and that Spain's different problems could be substantially resolved through their reintegration—flew in the face of several centuries of previous thinking about Jews. By the end of the first World War, however, these same ideas had nevertheless become mainstream.

CONCLUSIONS

§ 4.1 Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research

Let us call Pulido's core ideas about Sephardic Jews his "philosephardic reinterpretation of Spanish identity, or Conception Y. This conception of Spanish identity, as well as the understanding of the historical relation between Spaniards and Jews that is implicit in it, can be contrasted with a number of more traditional views that conceived of the two as separate, such as by identifying Spanishness with the Catholic faith, and the Jews with ritual murder, usury, and deicide. For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that these traditional views can safely be aggregated under the name of Conception X. How did Conception Y come to exist, and why did it eventually displace Conception X as a predominant way of understanding the relation between Spaniards and Jews?

In my introduction, I contended that the genesis of Conception Y was a consequence of a crisis-level event in Spanish society: the so-called "disaster of 1898". After going more systematically through the evidence, this hypothesis seems to have been proven correct. There are both inductive and abductive reasons for this. Inductively speaking, 1898 seems to have dramatically affected the image that many Spanish intellectual élites had of their country. As a consequence, élites began to search for when and where things had gone wrong, and theories about the "problem of Spain" proliferated. It should not be surprising that unorthodox interpretations of Spain's past might arise in such an environment. At a very basic level, then, my hypothesis seems correct because it fits with the available evidence. Additionally, on a more abductive level, there does not seem to be any other good explanation for why Pulido only began to campaign for

Spanish-Sephardic reconciliation in 1903, after meeting Jews a second time, instead of campaigning in 1883.

However, it no longer seems entirely sufficient to say that a crisis caused Conception Y. With process tracing, "analysts [ask] the generic question, 'What *X*s caused *Y* in case *Z*?'", where "X" is understood as a mechanism effecting the outcome under study from a group of initial conditions (Mahoney 2015, 201). It allows scholars to "open the black box of causality" by "identify[ing] or test[ing] hypotheses on causal mechanisms" with fine-grained qualitative data (Trampusch and Palier 2016, 441). To posit that the "disaster of 1898" was the *only* mechanism involved in this case, however, seems superficial in light of the gathered evidence. Such an account also seems improperly contextualized: for instance, a monocausal account of Pulido's identity revisionism seems reductive, since aspects of Conception Y have precedents in other, earlier trends in 19th century Spanish society. Pulido's attitudes about Jews, for example, were influenced in part by the progressivism of his mentor, Emilio Castelar. Additionally, as I have emphasized, the "crisis" of 1898 was itself a partially socially constructed event; although Spain's defeat was dramatic, it was largely considered a "disaster" because many intellectual élites were already primed to perceive it that way. Even if "crisis" was meaningful, then, as a mechanism in the production of new interpretations of Spanish identity and history, more attention must be paid to *why* it was such a powerful motor of change. As Tulia G. Falleti and Julia F. Lynch have argued, context is vitally important for making causal inferences, since "causal effects depend on the interaction of specific mechanisms with aspects of the context within which these mechanisms operate" (2009, 1144).

A closer look at the context seems to reveal several factors other than "crisis" that also played a role. In general terms, there were four preceding factors which appear to have been

especially salient. The first of these was the birth of a liberal tradition in Spanish politics. The growth of liberalism in Spain was not only a political affair. At the same time that it shifted the balance of power in Spain away from absolutism and the Church, it encouraged contestation of traditional narratives about Spanish history and offered new interpretations in their place. Another factor was the increasing visibility of Jews and issues relating to Jews in Spanish public discourse during the 19th century. It is not entirely fair to say that Jews were purely an abstract issue for Spaniards prior to the 1859 war in Morocco (the blood libel, for all its unhinged irreality, is hardly ever considered an "abstract" issue by those convinced of its existence). However, being in close physical proximity to Jews and the issues that affected them made discussions about Jews harder to avoid. As we have seen, Spanish liberals were quick to form more positive political and historical views of Jews, even if their perspectives often remained compromised by their Christian worldview. And in a very real sense, the increased visibility of Jews and Jewish issues also provided liberals with more opportunities to formulate and express these positive ideas. A third factor were the many debates surrounding reforms during the Restoration period. Amid the growing popularity of social Darwinism and scientific racialism, "degeneration" became an increasingly popular lens through which Spanish intellectual élites viewed contemporary affairs. The belief in Spanish "decline" relative to other European countries became an important factor motivating critiques of the Restoration regime and calls for thorough reform. A fourth and final factor were the institutions that said critics created in order to hasten the implementation of desired reforms. The Institución Libre de Enseñanza (ILE) was one of these, as was the cultural review *La España Moderna* (LEM). Such institutions were the tip of the spear for the ideology of regenerationism sweeping the nation in the aftermath of Spain's defeat. For this reason, they played a crucial role in the social construction of that event's larger meaning.

Conceptualizing 1898 not only as a *crisis*, but as a *critical juncture*, is another helpful way of making my explanation of Conception Y more robust. In Hillel David Soifer's theory of critical junctures, critical junctures mark a period of "heightened contingency, or increased causal possibility", where there is greater likelihood both of changes being produced and of those changes being durable. During a critical juncture, two kinds of causal conditions are in play: "the *permissive conditions* that represent the easing of constraints of structure and make change possible and the *productive conditions* that, in the presence of the permissive conditions, produce the outcome or range of outcomes that are then reproduced after the permissive conditions disappear and the juncture finally comes to a close" (Soifer 2012, 1573). The former consist of those "factors or conditions that *change the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency*" (Soifer 2012, 1574). Said conditions are also complemented by what Soifer calls *critical antecedents*, or "factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce a divergent outcome" (2012, 1576).

The permissive condition in this case clearly appears to be Spain's loss in the Spanish-American War. As an exogenous shock, it interacted with all the contextual factors described above, catalyzing the already-widespread dissatisfaction with late-19th century Spanish society into a *fiebre regeneradora* in which a pervasive sense of crisis and profound pessimism became the prevailing cultural idioms. In the process, it effectively created a new socio-cultural context in which ideologies that contested the political *status quo* gained strength at the expense of the Restoration regime. This was certainly a productive condition. Furthermore, the five factors which I listed above all fit the definition of critical antecedents; not actually related to the "disaster" itself,

they also preceded it temporally, and in fact were substantially related to the effect engendered by the productive condition (Soifer 2012, 1576–1577).

And then, of course, there is Pulido himself. I believe that agents like Pulido are critically important in explaining this case, not only because of their *specific* causal relation to the outcome under consideration, but also because they *generally* help to account for the contingency inherent in critical junctures (Soifer 2012, 1574). In addition to thinking that a monocausal explanation will not suffice here, I do not believe that Pulido's identity revisionism can be accounted for within a purely deterministic framework. I say this for three reasons. Firstly, as with the phenomenon of Japanese imperialism, Conception Y was both "overdetermined and contingent" (Young 1999, 415). As I have argued, it was brought about by a variety of internal and external factors, each of which arguably constituted their own independent causal chains. At the same time, it depended on more than just the cumulative effect of these causal chains, or the loosening of political opportunity structures set in motion by a contingently occurring permissive condition. It depended as well on their mutual co-occurrence. In this respect, Conception Y can be understood as the product of an unlikely nonlinear *confluence* of several independent causes (Bennett and George 2007, 212; cf. Lebow 2000, 596–597).

This brings me to my second point. Close inspection of the role played by institutions like the ILE in shaping the outcome of this case also reveals elements of path dependency. Scholars such as James Mahoney have argued that path dependency can take the form of "reactive sequences [...] of temporally ordered and causally connected events", each of which exists "in part [as] a reaction to temporally antecedent events" (2000, 509). Importantly, in such sequences "contingent events [are able to] set in motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties"—or, in other words, they have a tendency to "begin tracking a particular

outcome" and to "continue to track this outcome" in a relatively deterministic way (Mahoney 2000, 507, 511). This is analogous to a snowball effect that seals off a mountain pass—given certain contingent events like the "disaster of 1898", certain social processes are set in motion with great force, while others are made less feasible or even improbable. This is one reason why, instead of rallying around and shoring up the Restoration regime under which they lived, many intellectuals preferred to invest in creative alternatives. 1898 drastically deepened élite discontent with the *status quo*, thus creating a fertile climate for "alternative models of the nation". Another related point is that this seems to reveal an important interaction effect (Bennett and George 2007, 212). Conceptually and logically, the causal chains I have described were distinct—however, the "sites of transformation" that I have listed as critical antecedents not only responded to the "crisis" of 1898, but also constructed it, reified it, and reproduced it, creating the productive condition.

Finally, as a third point, the individual experiences of Pulido must be considered. The past is not interpreted by social structures—rather, it is interpreted by the people that inhabit them. It accordingly makes little sense to view Conception Y as wholly or even mostly predetermined by the latter. For this reason, Pulido's encounter on the Danube with Ḥaim Enrique Bejarano should also probably qualify as a productive condition. It seems rather difficult (counterfactually-speaking) to imagine Pulido embarking on his campaigns if not for the inspiring information he acquired from Bejarano. In summary, although "crisis" was certainly an important cause of Pulido's philosephardic re-interpretation of Spanish identity, this statement has to be qualified somewhat. A pervasive sense of crisis was only one of several intervening variables that helped to effect a shift away from an older, more intolerant view of Jews to one which embraced them as another kind of Spaniard. Additionally, this sense of crisis was a product of a complex, path dependent interaction effect between particular critical antecedents and an exogenous shock.

Although a model can be constructed of these causal effects (see Figure I below) contingency is visible throughout. Indeed, contingency veritably stands out.

*Figure 1 The "Disaster of 1898" as a Critical Juncture**

Initial condition(s) (X)	Traditional conception(s) of Spanish identity
Critical antecedent(s)	(1) Birth of liberal tradition in Spain, with historical revisionism; (2) High visibility of Sephardic Jewry during mid- to late-19th century, along with greater reconsideration of Spain's relations with Jews; (3) Debates about reforms in the aftermath of the Bourbon Restoration, amid sentiments of Spanish "decline" and backwardness; (4) Institutions (sites of transformation) involved in contesting state hegemony and advancing desired reforms
Permissive condition(s)	(5) "Disaster of 1898", and the end of Spain's colonial empire
Productive condition(s)	(6) A pervasive sense of crisis among Spanish intellectual élites (7) Ángel Pulido's second encounter with Sephardic Jews on the Danube River
Outcome(s) (Y)	Philosephardic conception of Spanish identity
End of critical juncture	Consolidation of Franco regime
Mechanism(s) of reproduction	Close alignment of Pulido's recommendations with Spanish national interests
Consequences	Spanish-Sephardic reconciliation

*** Chart design borrowed from Soifer 2012, 1579.**

Of course, given the impossibility of analyzing them any further within the space of this thesis, these conclusions are necessarily tentative and provisional. At the level of theory, a comprehensive answer to the three questions I posed in my introduction has not entirely been provided, although a number of elements of one can now be identified. If a deeper understanding of this case is to be acquired, however, a stronger theoretical account is necessary. More detailed modelling can help with this, as can tests of the model. On a more historical level, my study

admittedly focuses quite narrowly on re-evaluations of Spain's relationship with Jews, without asking larger questions about how such processes may have been intimately interconnected with re-evaluations of Spain's relationship with different "Others", such Muslims. Asking these sorts of questions may also reveal more about how new, more inclusive formulations of identities affect relations with minority groups. The same could perhaps be accomplished by comparing this case to others.

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