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How the Hungarian Government's Anti-Migration Campaign Affected Attitudes Towards the Roma Minority?

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Abstract

This study looks at the effects of the Hungarian government's anti-migration campaign, which started in relation to the 2015 Refugee Crisis but continued throughout recent years. Several previous studies have found that as a result of the extensive campaign of the government, attitudes towards immigrants (from outside Europe) became significantly more negative in Hungary. The study tries to identify spillovers in attitudes between attitudes towards immigrants and attitudes towards the Roma minority. The study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods of empirical inquiry. Changes in views in terms of subgroups of immigrants and the Roma between 2011 and 2020 are uncovered through using the Bogardus scale that measures the social distance between the majority and minorities, respectively. Additionally, multivariate linear regression models are constructed to determine what socio-political factors explain negative attitudes towards these outgroups in 2011 and in 2020. The study provides micro-level mechanisms to explain changes seen on the macro-level through a focus group inquiry conducted in three different locations in Hungary. The results indicate that there was a negative correlational spillover in attitudes caused by the government's campaign, suggesting that the sudden growth in negative attitudes towards immigrants had the effect of lowering negative attitudes towards the Roma. This is consistent with findings from previous studies on spillovers in attitudes and meaningfully furthers our knowledge in this understudied area of social sciences.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Bottom up approaches are crucial in producing meaningful knowledge about political processes. To understand and explain larger political trends, one has to study the electorate of a country, which can only be done by understanding that given country's society more generally. It is hard to understand and analyse attributes of a society in general terms, as societies are composed of heterogeneous subgroups and these groups might have varying or even conflicting beliefs, convictions or motivations. To understand a society on-the-whole, we have to study the attitudes of the members of whom a given society is constructed of. The reason why there is a huge body of social science literature that is concerned with the studying of these beliefs, convictions and motivations is that attitudes can be well studied on an aggregate (macro) level. Furthermore, many macro-level attitudes are rather stable and only change slowly with the passing of time. If attitudes do shift significantly on the short run, it is likely due to some significant social, political or economic event. Thus, studying and understanding attitudes of a society, i.e. attitudes of the electorate, furthers our knowledge on how societies evolve over time and, in relation to that, better understand political choices made by the electorate along the way.

When looking at the attitudes of the majority population towards different minority groups (subgroups of society), we can see that public opinion in terms of different groups is in constant motion. (See e.g.: Sik, 2012; Bernát et. al., 2012; Barna and Bulcsú, 2015; Messing and Ságvári, 2016; Sik et. al., 2016). However, the 2015 refugee crisis brought about unprecedented negative discourses as responses by populists, to the threat of an influx of immigrants and asylum seekers, across Europe. This then caused an abrupt rise in xenophobic attitudes in a number of countries (ESS, 2014 comparted to ESS 2016). Thus, it provides a unique opportunity to study the consequences of sudden shifts in attitudes towards certain outgroups. It is a plausible presumption to think that attitude changes in terms of different minority groups are not

independent of each other, rather there might be spillover effects in attitudes towards different subgroups of society. There is a growing body of literature studying these spillover effects, yet this field of study is still in its infancy. Researchers have identified spillovers in attitudes and established positive correlations, meaning that, if for example, attitudes of the majority towards one minority group became more positive, it had positive spillovers in attitudes towards different minorities (see e.g.: Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch et. al., 2010). Recent studies have established negative correlation spillovers. Though little is yet known about this phenomenon, a few papers identified a relationship between the emergence of immigrants from certain countries (newly emerging minorities) bringing about a growth in negative attitudes towards the newcomers, while also resulting in a reduction of negative attitudes towards existing (traditional) minorities (Hainmuller and Hangartner, 2013; Fouka et. al., 2019a; Fouka et. 2019b). This mechanism goes against conventional research describing majority attitudes, because for a long time, scholars only found evidence supporting positive correlational spillovers (e.g. Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch et. al., 2010). My thesis will contribute to this understudied area of negative correlational spillovers in attitudes, taking the line of thought one step further by looking at how political communication influences the above described mechanism. Throughout my study I will look at how changes in attitudes, driven by politics, towards one minority group (immigrants, and subgroups of immigrants) affect attitudes towards other (traditional) minority groups?

Social identity is a way to establish one's identity in a social context, by differentiating between oneself (and his/her ingroup) and other subgroups of society (be it ethnic groups, classes, etc.) (see: Giddens, 1989a; Hogg, 2006; Allport, 1954; Staszak, 2009). Ethnicity and nationality are understood to be the two most important identity forming components (Grosby, 2005), thus we can derive that the strongest identities often are formed by an individual's sense of belonging (by default) rather than by individual achievements. Social identities determine individual and

collective attitudes; because attitudes of the general public are dynamic and respond to manipulation and persuasion, political elites can mobilize support based on different cleavages which are formed on identity lines (McClauley, 2014). Specific issues like immigration or national identity might become more salient due to increased engagement by politicians that can potentially result in changes in identities and thus also in judgement (attitudes) of the general public on such topics (Bos et. al., 2019).

Recently, we saw a surge in populists (movements, parties and governments alike) around the world, also with particular relevance in Europe, thematizing immigration as a threat to the identities of societies (Bevelander and Wodak, 2019). Populist politicians rely heavily on identity politics in their communication in an attempt to persuade voters and thus maximize votes. One potential explanation to why populist communication has been so successful in shaping attitudes concerning immigration (in many different countries) is that populists often use communication that appeal to the emotions of individuals, instead of using rational arguments (Wirz, 2018). This, according to Bos et. al. (2019) helps populists shape the identity of citizens, because identity itself stands on an emotional rather than rational footing. Thus, by appealing to the emotions of the electorate through emotional persuasion populists can realise higher support and votes in elections.

To understand how political communication can influence attitudes, we have to resort to seminal works explaining the role of the media in transmitting information from the public sphere to audiences (the electorate). According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), agenda setting is when the media defines the talking points of current affairs. While priming, according to Iyengar et. al (1982), refers to the importance of a given issue, determined by the amount of attention it receives in the media. The practice of framing is to be understood on two levels, on the level of the frame setter (media frame) and on the level of the receiver of information through the given frame (audience frame) (Goffman, 1974; Scheufele, 2000). Additionally,

Lakoff (2004) emphasises the importance of language use in the process of framing. Both shifts in attitudes and possible spillovers would somehow have to be the result of events and issues in the public and political spheres transmitted to the electorate through agenda setting, priming and framing.

Based on the theory of negative correlational spillovers in attitudes (Hainmuller and Hangartner, 2013; Fouka et. al., 2019a; Fouka et. 2019b), my main assumption is as follows. A rise in negative attitudes towards immigrant groups (driven by politics) has the spillover effect of reducing negative attitudes towards traditional minority groups, because of the heightened negative discourse being primed towards immigrants makes people weary of a new emerging outgroup, comparisons in terms of immigrants and other minorities likely manifest (both implicitly, subconsciously; and explicitly, in discourse), which reduce negative attitudes in terms of them. Additionally, building on the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008), I also make the assumption that personal contact with immigrant group members and with members of traditional minorities affect the attitudes towards them in two ways. Superficial contact increases negative attitudes, while more in depth experiences (e.g. friends and acquaintances with outgroups) reduce negative attitudes. Finally, building on the findings of De Benedictis-Kessner et. al. (2019), I hypothesize that attitude changes (driven by politics) are more significant among supporters of the incumbent (in case of governmental camping), because, as they have found, voters tend to change their attitudes in accordance with the messaging of their preferred partisan sources.

To test the above outlined theory, I turn to the case of Hungary. Hungary is to be viewed as an extreme case for two reasons. For one, the majority population in Hungary has always held widespread negative attitudes towards immigrants and subgroups of immigrants (even though Hungary only had a marginal number of immigrants from outside Europe predating the 2015 Refugee Crisis) (Melegh, 2011; Sik, 2012) and also held widespread negative attitudes in terms

of the Roma minority (the largest ethnic minority in Hungary, accounting for about 8-10% of the population) (Policy Solutions, 2012). Secondly, the right-wing Fidesz government in Hungary has engaged in a rather extensive communication campaign since the beginning of the 2015 refugee crisis that framed migration as a great threat to Hungarian livelihood and established a narrative that migrants and refugees were not welcome in this country. There are societies other than the Hungarian that have long held high rates of xenophobic attitudes (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2003); there are also populists parties and governments around the world that have been engaging in extensive anti-immigrant campaigns. Yet what makes Hungary a unique case is that these two conditions met under the Fidesz government. (A couple of countries in the region also could qualify for these two conditions, yet in Hungary both the initial high rates of xenophobia and the extent of the government's communication campaign is unprecedented, and thus can be viewed as a forerunner in this respect; e.g. Bogaards, 2018). Thus, the Hungarian case, although not conventional by any means, is especially well suited to study the relationship between communication and attitudes.

The Orbán government's campaign against migration had resulted in an abrupt rise both in the salience of immigration and in negative attitudes towards immigrants. Before the start of the refugee crisis in 2014, 48% of Hungarians would not have welcomed any immigrants from outside Europe (ESS, 2014) (predating the campaign), two years later, after immigration had been one of the most salient issues of Hungarian politics for more than a year (Benczés and Ságvári, 2019), exclusionary attitudes grew to 62% (ESS, 2016). This new, heightened level of xenophobia seem to have stabilized, as the same response (to the same question) in 2018 was 59% (ESS, 2018). But did attitudes towards the Roma minority change as a result of this shift?[1]

[1] Unfortunately, ESS does not answer this question, thus further inquiry is needed.

This sudden growth in negative attitudes towards immigrants (from outside Europe) provides a unique opportunity to test the previously outlined theory along with my hypotheses.

To empirically test my claims and assumptions I apply mixed research methods, both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Through the quantitative analysis, I am able to trace attitude changes before and after the refugee crisis and the Hungarian government's anti-migration campaign. To do so, I utilize nationally representative surveys measuring the attitude of the Hungarian majority in terms of different minority groups and subgroups of immigrants. from 2011 and 2020.[2] Additionally, I run multivariate linear regression models to find out which socio-political factors influence attitudes the most in the two observed periods. The regression analyses results then can be compared to that of the focus groups, thus I will only delve as far as to explore the direction of the relationship and statistical significance of each relevant explanatory variable (and controls) in terms of the dependent variable (attitudes towards immigrants and towards the Roma, respectively).

By comparing the two cross-sectional datasets I will be able to trace macro-level changes in attitudes, yet I will not be able to control for events that happened during the 9-year period, nor account for the missing variables. In order to uncover more substantial possible explanations as to why attitude shifts might have occurred, how potential spillovers were driven and what role the Fidesz government's anti-migration campaign might have played in shaping these attitudes and spillovers, I will rely on focus groups analysed through thematic analysis.[3] Additionally, by complimenting macro-level data with micro-level discourses I will be able to

[2] From a grant that I have received with fellow CEU students (MA and PhD) (RSS Grant at CEU) we payed Tárki Zrt. to include questions in their quarterly Omnibus survey (conducted in January 2020), representative for the whole of Hungary, which I used alongside a previous database constructed also by Tárki back in 2011.

[3] Thanks to receiving research funding though another grant (MA Thesis Grant offered by my Department), I was able to conduct focus groups (with a PhD research partner) in three different settlements in Hungary: Zsámbok, Mohács and Budapest (8th District).

test the contact hypothesis in the Hungarian context. Though qualitative methods results are not in any way comprehensive, nor are they representative for the Hungarian society, it could compliment the quantitative inquiry by providing a mechanism explaining the attitude changes that might have occurred. By using a mixed-methods approach, I will hopefully be able to maximize both internal and external validity, while minimizing the trade-offs associated with both approaches. The structure of my study will be as follows. First, I will construct the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 by elaborating on individual and social identity and how those relate to otherness; how political elites can use different communicational vehicles to influence attitudes of the electorate; and how there can be both positive and negative correlational spillover effects in terms of societal attitudes. I will finish this chapter by presenting my working hypotheses. In Chapter 3, I will introduce the context of Hungary in more detail by describing and explaining how attitudes in terms of immigrants and in terms of the Roma had changed in the (far and more recent) past. Then, I will turn to present the empirical considerations and findings of the study, by presenting the details of the quantitative inquiry in Chapter 4 and details of the qualitative (focus group) inquiry in Chapter 5. I will finish the study by summarizing my most important findings and deciding upon the validity of the three hypotheses, by discussing the contribution of my research (in a narrower and wider sense) and by acknowledging some of its limitations as well as considerations concerning further research related to my study.

Chapter 2: What Determine Intergroup Relations and Attitudes

The structure of the theoretical section is as follows. First, I introduce the concepts of culture and cultural identity, human divisiveness and othering, the concept of the stranger and social distance, and I also briefly touch upon the intergroup contact hypothesis as well. I identify the socio-demographic characteristics that best predict the rejection of outgroups (e.g. minorities). This will help me construct a framework for the better understanding of the mechanisms shaping intergroup prejudices and negative attitudes of the majority in terms of different outgroups (traditional vs. new minorities). Second, I describe framing, agenda-setting, priming, scapegoating and securitization, as discussed in existing literature (using the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of securitization), as well as populism and populist social identity framing and the effects of partisan persuasion. This will help me with understanding how political elites can frame certain issues, like immigration, for their own political ends (e.g. to build political support and maximize votes). Third, I elaborate in some detail on the literature theorising the spillovers in attitudes in terms of different minority groups, considering evidence for both positive and negative correlational relationships. Finally, I conclude the chapter by offering my three working hypotheses that will guide the empirical part of my study.

2.1 Understanding Identity and Factors that Shape Our Relationship to Otherness

Anthony Giddens (1989a) writes that every culture has its own distinct cultural patterns and norms which might seem very unfamiliar for people outside of that given cultural group. He claims that we cannot comprehend cultural practices and beliefs of a certain group or cultures without understanding their wider context; each culture has to be studied within its own confines, own values and own meanings (Giddens, 1989a). Yet, it is hard to judge a certain alien culture without any bias, based on our antecedent knowledge, norms and values; "judging other cultures by comparison with one's own" is the definition of ethnocentrism (Giddens, 1989a: p. 39.). "Ethnicity refers to cultural practices and outlooks that distinguish a given

community of people. Members of ethnic groups see themselves as culturally distinct from other groupings in a society and are seen by those others to be so" (Giddens, 1989b: p. 253.). Thus, identifying between group difference and holding biases in terms of other cultural groups is unavoidable, yet these biases can vary significantly depending on the observer of "alien cultures". It is scientifically important to measure and understand the extent of these biases and, as in the case of my study, compare biases towards different cultural groups with each other and see how they might change over time.

Giddens (1989b) also states that in the sociological concept of a minorities, group members are somehow disadvantaged, due to some form of discrimination; group members have solidarity amongst themselves; and members are usually isolated from the majority in some way (e.g. socially or physically). Most minorities are both ethnically and physically distinct from the majority, and opinions and attitudes towards them can be understood as prejudices (Giddens, 1989b). Prejudice is a passive state, while discrimination refers to active action based on it: it aims to "disqualify the members of one grouping from opportunities open to others" (Giddens, 1989b: p. 256.). While I am primarily focusing on prejudices of the majority, such inquiries also have important implications for discrimination. Prejudice can translate into acts of discrimination which then lead to disadvantages and inequality.

Self-identification often relies on distinguishing oneself from others. Thus, we need to better understand how individuals and groups may come to think of otherness. Nationalism studies offers a rich conceptualization of otherness as well as describing the process of othering. Grosby (2005) explains why human divisiveness has been, and still is, present in every society. According to him, humans always organize themselves into smaller groups rather than the universal identities (e.g. based on religion, ethnicity, nationality etc.), this then creates the opportunity for divisiveness between different groups. It has been commonly agreed in the past that racial differences, by default, also entail other kinds of differences, thus prescribe the

culture and civilization of one race. There is a consensus between scholars today that between-group differences (e.g. in performance, intelligence etc.) are not in any way given, as they are created by culture and social construction (Grosby, 2005) instead of being the result of e.g. genetic dispositions.

Grosby (2005) goes on to argue that divisiveness between different subgroups of humanity can also have a security aspect. As he explains, people are always in competition with one another for scarce resources (be it basic needs like food, economic goods, or other types of resources such as prestige, status, social capital, physical security etc.) and by limiting the circle to whom these resources are provided (i.e. security, wellbeing etc.) allocation can be more effective. This naturally causes divisiveness. If this line of thought holds true, between group tensions can be reduced with heightened cooperation (Grosby, 2005), this seems somewhat plausible as we could see reduced intergroup conflict in areas that e.g. increased their trade and economic cooperation, the EU being an apparent example. However, division between humans is by no means over today (Grosby, 2005). When looking at the reasons of divisiveness from the point of view of the majority, keeping scarcity of resources in mind, it is understandable that certain individuals are willing to share some recourses with given outgroups, but not with others. But what determines the willingness to extend well-being outside one's own ingroup? And where do we draw the line between in-group and outgroup? To answer such questions, we need to take a closer look at what creates a sense of belonging in certain people and why they treat certain groups differently than others. Furthermore, we need to understand the concept of social distance.

Because self-identification often relies on distinguishing oneself from others, the concept of the "stranger" is of particular importance. Georg Simmel (1921) was one of the first scholars in social sciences that came up with this concept, thus laying the foundations of cultural identity theory. The stranger is not an outsider, neither a visitor; is a member of society in some way,

yet he/she remains distant from the society that hosts him/her. He described strangers in pre-modern societies as having had distinct jobs or activities – e.g. trade activities or giving out loans (like Jewish people in Europe in past centuries). According to Simmel, these functions were important, but for some reason members of the majority could not fill these positions (e.g. for religious reasons), so familiar strangers (outgroups) were entrusted with these activities (Simmel, 1921). The conception of a stranger can refer to both newly emerging minorities (immigrants), who choose to settle in a given country or traditional minority groups who have persisted in the country for decades, maybe even centuries.

Simmel's theory needs to be further developed, because groups and individuals, from the perspective of the majority, can be strangers to various degrees. That is why we need the concept of social distance, in order to understand intergroup relations even better. Emory Bogardus's approach to conceptualize the non-material difference between individuals and groups remains a very important theory today. (He also contributed to our empirical understanding of social distance by operationalizing it into a scale, called the Bogardus scale, on which I will elaborate on later in my thesis.) He explained (Bogardus, 1947) that social distance does not directly correspond to physical distance, though physical distance can in fact shape social distance (e.g. segregated areas or location in different countries may very well affect social distance). Social distance is based on affectivity; thus, it is not a rational attitude of one's relationship to otherness; it can be understood as the level of sympathy and fellowship individuals hold in terms of members of an outgroup or an outgroup in general. (Outgroup in this sense does not necessarily refer to ethnic difference – social distance can also be understood e.g. in terms of social stratification or profession.).

Staszak (2009) describes the process of othering as a discursive practice where an ingroup (Us or the Self) constructs one or more outgroups (Them, Other). It emphasises the differences between the ingroup and outgroups (real or perceived), which then creates a stronger internal

(ingroup) identity in contrast with the outgroup(s). According to him, otherness does not equal difference, as difference is based on facts while otherness is based on perceived difference. He writes that ingroups view outgroups through stereotyping lenses, which lead to simplification and stigmatization. He also writes that power asymmetry is also central to othering, although this can mostly be understood on a discursive level, it can result in real instances of oppression by the ingroup (often the majority) exercising political, social and economic powers over the outgroup(s) (the minority). The process of othering crates social distance between social groups through marking, naming and defining their otherness relative to each other (Barter-Godfrey and Taket, 2009).

Gordon Allport (1954) constructed the intergroup contact hypothesis in his seminal work on the relationship between personal contact and intergroup prejudice. He argued that intergroup contact (e.g. between different races) often reduces prejudice towards an outgroup, although sometimes it can in fact enhance intergroup prejudice depending on the forms of contact. He also argued that if four conditions hold true at times of intergroup contact, it will result in reduced prejudice between any two groups. These conditions are: (1) equal status between groups, (2) common goals, (3) intergroup cooperation and (4) support of the law and authorities. However, one could point out that these four conditions are rarely present in most cases of intergroup contact, and prejudice is more prevalent between groups that do not share these conditions. Nevertheless, this does not contradict Allport's hypothesis, rather supports its assumptions. According to Pettigrew and Tropp (2008), many scholars have since built on this theory. Some of these studies found that the socio-political context and the predating historical experiences between groups shape the extent of prejudice as a result of intergroup contact. Others found empirical evidence suggesting that emotions like anxiety and fear are important negative factors, linking personal contact with a growth in intergroup prejudice. Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) conclude that inter-group contact will most likely increase personal prejudice in

terms of an outgroup if contact is on a superficial level (e.g. seeing someone on the street) but will decrease prejudice when contact is more in depth (e.g. meeting someone through a friend). I will test this latter hypothesis developed by Pettigrew and Tropp (2008), because there is no available data to test that of Allport's (1954), while I find this version of the contact hypothesis equally intriguing.

It is also important to consider which groups in society tend to be more distrustful of strangers and rejecting of otherness. To put it differently, what are the socio-demographic characteristics that best predict prejudice and negative attitudes towards outgroups (e.g. immigrants, or other minorities, such as traditional minorities). Based on findings of empirical studies, Ballassa (2007) states that people that are rejecting certain minorities tend to reject other minorities as well. Sik (2012) finds that politically disenfranchised, lower educated (primary school educated and under), the Roma (in the context of Hungary) tend to more often hold xenophobic attitudes then others. Messing and Ságvári (2016) finds that people that suffer from uncertainties in their lives (fear of losing a job, housing etc.) are the most rejecting towards immigrants and other minorities. Simonovits and Szeintl (2016) identify low social status and poverty to be most important factors behind the rejection of otherness. I will use some of these factors as control variables when contracting the multivariate models measuring the socio-political factors of holding negative views in terms of immigrants and the Roma (those that are available in the databases).

2.2 Ways through which Politics can Influence and Manipulate Attitudes

McCombs and Shaw (1972) came up with the conception of the agenda-setting role of the media. They describe agenda setting as the practice of the media (and politicians) defining what the important talking points, concerning public affairs, should be about; in other words what to have on the political or public agenda. Agenda setting does not refer to the content of a given issue, it does not specify opinions or what to think about that given theme. They argue that the

media is not always very good at persuading individuals to think in a certain way in terms of a topic, yet they have the power to determine what counts as newsworthy, thus what receives attention in the public and private spheres. Iyengar et. al. (1982) through conducting controlled experiments came up with the concept of priming. Because media is the vehicle through which people can experience and learn about public affairs, it has the ability to create the reality and the context in which a given issue is discussed. The media has the ability to provide context for given issues, thus providing the basis for public discussion. The amount of time that is dedicated to a given topic in the media (and place, e.g. evening news segments) will shape the salience of the given issue.

According to Goffman (1974), framing can be understood on two levels (both levels being social constructions). Firstly, as the perception of a journalist understanding and mediating an event; secondly, on the level of perception of the audience, perceiving an event indirectly through a frame constructed by the journalist. The frame provides a means of interpretation for the audience on how one should understand a given event or issue, what the narrative and meaning of it might be. Scheufele (2000), building on Goffman's theory further specifies media (journalist) and audience frames. Media frames are the organising idea or a story line that give context to events and happenings, through which journalists can classify information quickly and easily and "re-pack" them for audiences, suggesting a narrative and a frame of how to think of a specific event or a line of occurrences. While audience frames, he claims, can be understood as people having clusters within their brains that help process information quickly and efficiently.

George Lakoff (2004), examining framing from the audience's perspective, emphasised the importance of language in terms of individual-level outcomes of framing. He claims that if a political party is arguing for something, it should not use language of the opposing side, thus it should create its own frame explaining an issue according to its stance on it. For this, he gave

the simple example of President Nixon – when resigning over the Watergate scandal – poorly choose his words stating that "I am not a crook", resulting in people thinking just that. But Lakoff states that it is not as simple as to understand framing as only the use of language: "Framing is about getting language that fits your worldview. The ideas are primary – and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas" (Lakoff, 2004: p. 4.).

Dillard (2010) writes about persuasion that it can be defined as the "the use of symbols (sometimes accompanied by images) by one social actor for the purpose of changing or maintaining another social actor's opinion or behaviour" (p. 203). This, when translated into more specific terms, can be simply understood as the practice of persuasion as a means of political elites influencing the attitudes and behaviour of the electorate through intermediaries (such as e.g. the media, public speeches or billboards). Frames can define both topics and how we think of these topics Scheufele (2000). De Benedicts-Kessner et. al. (2019) found through analysing controlled experiments, that partisan media consumption (consuming media associated with one's own political affiliation or party affiliation more specifically) has an effect of changing people's attitudes towards the media's message, even if initially held attitudes were confecting with information presented by the media.

I consider two of the most common framing devices used in relation to immigration: scapegoating and securitization. According to Giddens "scapegoating is common in circumstances in which deprived ethnic groupings come into competition with one another for economic rewards… Scapegoating frequently involve projection, the unconscious attributing to others one's own desires of characteristics" (Giddens, 1989b: p. 257.). Yet it would be unwise to handle the basis for scapegoating as simply an economic issue. Using migrants as scapegoats is just one way to speak to the insecurities of individuals. These insecurities might be rooted in economic hardships but could also have other underlying reasons for why there could be receptive audiences on the demand side (any other kind of grievances and problems, e.g. high

crime rates or the state of the social welfare system can be attributed to immigrants if done in a convincing manner). To understand further factors shaping the attitudes of receptive audiences, I now turn to the theory of securitization (as conceptualized by the Copenhagen School) to uncover some of these further factors, focusing on both the supply and demand sides of the practice.

The Copenhagen School, in explaining the of securitization of migration, goes beyond the socio-economic scope and understanding (previously dominant), and also focuses on the question of the security of social identity (McSweeney, 1996). Barry Buzan (1991), who is one of the early exponents of the Copenhagen School, stated that societal dimension is, as a subordinate unit of the state, one sector of the public sphere in terms of it being subject to security. Waever (1993) took this idea one step further and already considered society as an object of security in its own right, creating the concept of security of identity (of people who share the same culture). Thus, according to them, the securitization of migration can have a new dimension which aims at securing social identity (McSweeney, 1996). But who can claim that they are the defenders of society and social identity? According to Waever (1993), the most credible actors in the eyes of the electorate, in terms of security, are political elites (e.g. incumbent government) and security professionals, because they have the power to shape the discourse on security and the potential (or perceived) threat to it meant by migration. Thus, these political elites have the power to shape attitudes and public opinion concerning migration through public discourse (Waever, 1993).

Mudde (2004) argues that from the 1980's onwards, we can see a surge in populist political parties that engage in populist rhetoric on both side of the political spectrum. He offers a rather minimalist definition to of populism: "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general

will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004: p. 562.). Rodrik (2017) further explains that societies can be divided into elites, the majority and minorities. He claims that if the social divide is between the elites and the majority, it builds the grounds for left-wing populism. If, however, the social divide is between majority and minority(s), that builds the case for right-wing populist movements. Populist political elites, whether in power or not, often resort to the framing devices of scapegoating or securitization in terms of immigrants or other minority groups (can also utilize other issues, such as e.g. economic grievances etc.) in an effort to build political support. Wirz (2018) offers a potential explanation as to why populist communication has been so effective in many countries' contemporary politics. Based on his own findings, he claims that populists often use communication that appeals to emotions of individuals instead of using rational arguments. Referring to one's identity in a common technique of emotional persuasion. Hogg (2006) claims that social identity theory entails that group membership is central to how individuals identify themselves, thus by shaping the salience of certain identities (e.g. national pride) politicians can alter the attitudes of individuals (potential voters). According to McCauley (2014), elites can mobilize political support based on different cleavages, which cleavages are always grounded in the identity of individuals. Individuals hold many different identities that can all be leveraged politically. Identity politics can be meaningful and genuine and bring up issues that otherwise would not come to the forefront of political debates in more policy oriented political processes. However, such issues can also be evoked opportunistoically. Bos et. al. (2019) argue that populist politicians rely on persuasion in their political communication, by emphasising certain issues like immigration or national pride and identity, they can influence attitudes that potentially lead to a change in judgment on political issues. This is called populist identity framing, where ordinary citizens (the people) are being threatened by various outgroups or at least this is what they are made to believe.

2.3 Spillovers in Attitudes in Terms of Different Minority Groups

So far, only few researchers focused their attention on how attitudes towards different minorities are correlated to each other, and how these might change due to specific events, tendencies, political strategies etc. It seems rather plausible that attitudes majorities' hold in terms of different minority groups are not independent of each other, as they are often shaped by similar events (e.g. far rights surge in certain countries). But do they also shape each other? Is it possible to identify spillovers in attitudes?

Pettigrew (2009) conducted a study to uncover intergroup relations and attitudes towards different outgroups by looking at positive correlational changes in attitudes towards different minorities in Germany, also utilising the contact hypothesis to ground his inquiry. He found that positive personal contact with a minority individual reduced prejudice towards that given minority group, but more interestingly, it also reduced prejudice towards a third group (also minority) even though this group was not involved in the contact. This reduction in prejudice only worked in terms of minorities that were perceived similar to that of the contacted minority. He named this phenomenon the secondary reduction in prejudice, which others (e.g. Fouka et. al., 2019a) renamed as spillovers in attitudes. Tausch et. al. (2010) also uncovered positive correlational attitude changes in other contexts. They looked at cross-sectional and longitudinal data from Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Texas (US) and also found that contact with one outgroup predicted attitude change towards another (non-contacted group) in all three countries. Positive experiences with one outgroup resulted in improved attitudes towards that given group but also improved attitudes towards a third groups (not involved in the interaction).

Though very limited in number, there have been studies that uncovered negative correlation changes in terms of different outgroups. Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) looked at macro-level data of referendum results (proxy for attitudes) in a study conducted in Switzerland. The referendums were on naturalization of certain immigrant groups where citizens could vote

whether or not to give citizenship to certain subgroups of immigrants. They found that the discrimination of the Swiss (i.e. the unwillingness to give citizenship to certain group members) towards Southern European immigrants was reduced when a new wave of immigrants from Yugoslavia and Turkey changed the composition of minorities in Switzerland. In other words, the emergence of new immigrant groups (new minorities) reduced negative attitudes held towards more traditional minorities. Fouka et. al. (2019a), using historical data, looked at how the integration of earlier immigrants (traditional minorities) in northern cities of the US was affected by a new wave of African American migrants (around 1,5 million between 1915-1930) that moved to cities from southern states. They found that as a result of the change in ethnic composition of cities, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe; and Western and Northern Europe became better integrated, while attitudes towards African Americans became more negative. Interestingly, there was also varying levels of integration within European immigrants. Western and Northern immigrants were more widely accepted as a result then Southern and Eastern Europeans.

Fouka et. al. (2019b), in their most recent study, also looking at historical data from the US between 1970 and 2010, measured social distance in terms of Mexican immigrants and African Americans and how the perceived distance of the majority in terms of these minority groups changed over time. They found that the influx of Mexican immigrants in higher numbers reduced majority prejudice and shifted radical attitudes towards more liberal policy preferences in terms of the African American minority (while increasing prejudice towards Mexicans). Their explanation for this was that nativity (or nationality) became more salient, shifting the attention of the majority away from ethnicity, thus changing ingroup boundaries for some Americans, meaning that more Americans saw African Americans as ingroup members then before.

2.4 Working Hypotheses

Building further on the above cited literature, I now elaborate on my hypotheses in more detail. We can assume that there are certain mechanisms that facilitate spillovers in majority attitudes in terms of different outgroups (minorities) (e.g. Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch, 2010; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Fouka et. al. 2019a; Fouka et. al. 2019b). Furthermore, recent studies suggest that there could be negative correlational relationships in these (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Fouka et. al. 2019a; Fouka et. al. 2019b), meaning that for example an increase in negative attitudes towards newly emerging minorities (immigrants) could result in a decrease in negative attitudes towards traditional minority groups due to a sub-conscious mechanism that reduces social distance (Bogardus, 1947) and reduces the feeling of otherness (Staszak, 2009), when the threat of a new, culturally and socially more distant outgroup, emerges. Based on the above, I anticipate that negative attitudes toward traditional minorities in Hungary, the Roma more specifically, decreased as a result of heightened negative attitudes towards new outgroups, i.e. migrants. (H1)

We saw that personal contact with a member of an outgroup can reduce or increase prejudice towards that groups depending on the form and depth of the contact. Contact with an outgroup on a superficial level increases negative attitudes, while more in depth contact reduces negative attitudes in terms of the given group (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). I will test this version of the contact hypothesis both in terms of attitudes towards immigrants and towards the Roma. (H2)

My third and final hypothesis explores the effects of the government's anti-migration campaign, transmitted mainly through party-controlled media. Through consistently framing the issue of immigration as something detrimental to Hungary, the government was able to prime (Iyengar et. al., 1982) audiences according to these negative audience frames (Goffman, 1974; Scheufele, 2000) and created its own powerful language (Lakoff, 2004) against migration and migrants. Yet, we learned that persuasion has a larger effect along partisan lines, through the

consumption of partisan media. This leads to my hypothesis that the anti-migration campaign was more affective in persuading government voters. Thus, in accordance with the logic of my first hypothesis, negative correlational spillovers should also be most noticeable among supporters of the government. (H3)

Chapter 3: Understanding the Hungarian Context

Before putting theory into practice and before testing my hypotheses on Hungarian data, I will elaborate in some detail on the context of Hungary for the sake of more clarity and better understanding of my analysis to follow. First, I show how attitudes towards immigrants from outside Europe changed over time and provide possible explanations for why shifts in attitudes might have occurred. Second, I introduce how attitudes towards the Roma minority have changed and what events and socio-political processes might have influenced possible shifts in attitudes. Because my assumption going into the research is that attitude shifts both in terms of immigrants and in terms of the Roma are occurring due to changes in discourse in the political and public spheres, I will limit the scope of this chapter to present changes in discourse and their possible effects on macro-level attitudes.

3.1 Attitudes towards Immigrants in Hungary: Persistent Xenophobia Growing in Recent Years

Before the regime change in Hungary (in 1989), there was a negative balance of migration each year, but since then, more people had arrived each year than those who had left (Melegh, 2011). However, immigration, especially that of immigration from outside Europe, was, for the most part, not a salient issue within Hungarian society. For a long time, the most significant groups that migrated to Hungary were ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders of the Hungarian kin state (immigration mainly from Romania, Serbia, Ukraine and Slovakia). Although Hungarian society had little experience with immigrants coming to the country from different continents, public opinion nevertheless was against the acceptance of such immigrants in hypothetical scenarios (Sik, 2012). There is an abundance of data and literature on how the Hungarian majority perceives immigrants from outside Europe and how it has changed over time. Data is collected on the issue on a regular basis both through international (e.g. ESS, Eurobarometer etc.) and domestic (e.g. Tárki) data collection initiatives.

1. Figure: Attitudes towards Immigrants from Outside Europe (Simonovits, 2020 citing Tárki Omnibus, 1992-2017)



Figure 1. shows how attitudes towards immigrants from outside Europe changed over time by dividing respondents into three groups based on their willingness to accept such immigrants. Xenophiles accept everyone, disregarding the reasons behind the choice to migrate or where migrants/refugees come from. Thinkers are those respondents that consider the reasons behind migration and decide whether or not to accept someone based on their reasons for fleeing or based on their origin (nationality/ethnicity). Xenophobes are those that reject all immigrants from outside Europe regardless of their origin or reasons for leaving their homes.

Because attitudes (of the majority) are in constant motion, it is inevitable to account for volatility in attitudes. By observing Figure 1, we can see that xenophobic attitudes have been volatile even before 2015 refugee crisis, yet they were rather stable when viewed over a longer period of time. Because the issue of migration was not of significance in Hungary before 2015, I will not elaborate on possible processes that shaped attitudes before this date in this section (however, I will do so when analysing the results of the multivariate results on 2011 data). Instead, I will look at what happened in Hungary after the Refugee Crisis started. We can see that from 2015 onwards there is quite a significant shift towards less openness to accept immigrants unconditionally, less readiness to consider reasons for fleeing one's home country

or one's origin and a growing tendency to reject everyone from outside Europe. But what might have caused this surge in xenophobia?

The refugee crisis somewhat changed the experience of the Hungarian society with immigration from outside Europe. For one, for many people, this was the first time they were actually confronted with the possibility of an influx of a large number of refugees and migrants of various background. Although many that had arrived mostly continued their journey towards western European countries. There was a brief period, during the summer months of 2015, when large numbers of refugees were stranded at Keleti Station in central Budapest. Stranded refugees were then permitted to continue their journeys towards Germany. In Hungary, this period of the crisis was the most visible for the population, both through media and through personal encounters. Even though there was a brief period when a large number of migrants and refugees arrived in Hungary, the perception of the crisis was kept alive much longer than what actual events would have justified. (Benczés and Ságvári, 2019)

The refugee crisis became one of the top salient issues in Hungarian public (and probably private) life. Both phenomena, the changing public discourse and the relatively low rate of new arrivals, can largely be attributed to the Hungarian government. On the one hand, high levels of salience, have been sustained through the government's monopolization of many media outlets, embedding tailored messages in order to manipulate public opinion (Benczés and Ságvári, 2019). On the other hand, the Orbán government was quick to declare a zero-tolerance policy towards immigration, building a fence on the southern border of Hungary to keep migrants (and also refugees) out, among other measures aimed at making it hard for migrants to access Europe through Hungary, while simultaneously seeking public support for such measures through communication campaigns. This significant shift in public opinion must be (at least partly) due to the Fidesz government's prolonged propaganda campaign aimed at

demonising migrants and refugees and capitalising on controlling the agenda on the issue of migration both in the domestic and the European public spheres.

According to a report done by Political Capital (Juhász, Monlár and Zgut, 2017), when looking at the rhetoric elements and terms the Fidesz government used in its anti-migration campaign, we can understand it as fitting into the wider narrative of the securitization of migration. The Hungarian government, apart from negatively framing immigrants (and refugees) in the media and through other means of communication (e.g. national consultations), cut the budget of the asylum system, cut back on the financing of integration programs etc., sending the message that immigrants from outside Europe are unfit to assimilate into Hungarian society, thus pose a threat to it. The government also built a fence on the southern border of Hungary to "keep migrants out", which was a successful communication manoeuvre, according to the report, with which opposition parties could not engage meaningfully. Some parties were against the fence initially but backtracked later when it became apparent that building a fence became a very popular policy among the electorate. In the spring of 2015 only 13% of respondents saw immigration as a major problem for Hungary, while in the autumn of 2015 the percentage of respondent to the same question was 65% (p. 15). Finally, Viktor Orbán and his party used the threat of migration as successful communicational vehicles in consecutive elections (EP: 2015; general elections: 2018), where the overarching message directed toward the electorate was that opposition parties along with civil society groups (founded by George Soros) plan to help immigrants invade Hungary.

The significant shift towards more negative attitudes in terms of migrants and refugees in past years is, to a large extent, most likely the result of the Hungarian government's handling of the refugee crisis on a policy level and the result of its far-reaching communications efforts to frame migration (from outside Europe) as the biggest threat to Hungary. This was done in a way to

maximize public support for anti-migration measures, push general attitudes to be more hostile towards migrants and also build support for the incumbent party, Fidesz.

3.2 Attitudes Towards the Roma in Hungary: A Relationship Battered by Intergroup Tensions

The Roma minority in Hungary has been the most marginalised minority group in the past decades and even centuries (Balassa, 2007). They were always considered to be on the margins of society and faced discrimination and persecution often throughout the past. After the regime change in 1989 a large number of low-skilled Roma workers lost their jobs in state run factories, many never being able to fully re-enter the labour market after that (Policy Solutions, 2012). After the regime change, successive governments in Hungary all failed to address the so called "Roma issue" meaningfully, thus a large number of Roma people got stuck in severe poverty with stagnating income (Policy Solutions, 2012), while the majority population was benefiting from the newly acquired market economy and freedoms granted by a liberal democracy.

Today, the Roma minority is still the most economically and socially marginalised group within Hungary, suffering from poverty, poor living conditions, unemployment etc. At the same time, they are discriminated against in many spheres of public and private life (Balassa, 2007). Issues like school and housing segregation, workplace discrimination all contribute to the permanent marginalisation of this group (Policy Solutions, 2012). Furthermore, outright racism and even racially motivated criminal violence against Roma makes the Roma minority's situation in Hungary even more full of hardship. The second Orbán government (from 2010 onwards) went against the existing benefit-based system, by creating a work-fare system, significantly cutting welfare benefits, disproportionately affecting Roma communities (Policy Solutions, 2012). Though in principle, the Orbán government is committed to solving the issues the Roma face, a number of policies they have introduced in fact further marginalised them, one indication to that being the declining rate of social mobility among the Roma (Policy Solutions, 2012).

To understand the marginalization of the Roma minority, we have to understand how the majority population views them. However, it provides us with a "chicken or egg" kind of problem. It is unclear whether negative attitudes or discriminatory behaviour towards the Roma is what made them a marginalized group to such extent, or whether their marginalisation translated into negative sentiments. Even though the "Roma issue" in public discourse was one of the most salient ones (especially before the refugee crisis), data on the majority's attitudes toward the Roma have been scarce in recent years. This provides for a rather significant methodological issue concerning my study, on which I will elaborate in more detail later.

2. Figure: Attitudes Towards the Roma (%) (Bernát et. al., 2012 citing Tárki, 2012)

	1994	2002	2008	2011
POSITIVE ITEMS				
More social benefits should be given to the Gypsies than the non-Gypsies.	15	12	8	11
All Gypsy children have the right to attend the same classes as non-gypsies.	–	89	86	82
Respect for traditional values is stronger among Gypsies than among non-gypsies.	–	66	66	63
NEGATIVE ITEMS				
The problems of the Gypsies would be solved if they finally started working.	89	88	78	82
The inclination to criminality is in the blood of Gypsies.	64	53	60	60
It is only right that there are still pubs, clubs and discos where Gypsies are not let in.	46	33	36	42
N	988	1,022	4,040	3,040

Figure 2 shows the changes in attitudes toward the Roma minority in Hungary between 1994 and 2011, both in terms of positively and negatively framed questions. Percentages represent those that agree with the given statements.

3. Figure: Acceptance of a Roma Person as Head of State of Hungary (own figure based on Special Eurobarometer, 2012-2019)



Figure 3 shows changes in attitudes towards the Roma in terms of one specific indicator, namely, whether or not the Hungarian population would readily except a head of state of Roma ethnicity. Even though the "Roma issue" in public discourse was one of the most salient ones (especially before the Refugee Crisis), data on attitudes toward the Roma have been scarce in recent years (from 2011 onwards). Although accepting a Roma person as the head of state might not be the best possible indicator of attitudes in terms of the Roma, yet it still gives us an illustration of how attitudes changed over time after 2011.

To explain these changes in attitudes, I will outline a timeline of events and processes that influenced public discourse on the "Roma issue", providing for possible explanations as to why certain shift in attitudes occurred. I will use the answers referring to "Roma criminality" in Figure 2 to track changes in attitudes between 1994 and 2011, because it was the feud over the criminality of Roma that thematized most of the political and public discourses as the most contested talking points of the "Roma issue". We can see that the highest percentage of respondents, that think criminality is genetically coded into the ethnic group of the Roma (something that had been repeatedly argued for in the public domain), was recorded in 1994. The high rate of negative sentiment towards the Roma was likely the knock-on effect of the regime change. As previously stated, after the regime change in 1989, a large number of low-skilled Roma workers lost their jobs in state run factories. It is often said that the Roma minority

was the one social group within Hungarian society that was harmed the most by the switch to a capitalist system from a redistributive one. This sudden shift in the position of the Roma minority (meaning mass unemployment) and an intensified competition among marginalized social groups (it was not only the Roma that had lost their jobs in great numbers) could be a possible explanation of such high rates of negative sentiments.

Later, the normalization of Hungarian context, the consolidation of liberal democracy and the stabilisation of the market economy were possible reasons for a relatively significant drop in negative attitudes towards the Roma (from 64 to 53 percent between 1994 and 2002). Intergroup tension between the Roma and non-Roma rose significantly between 2002 and 2008, as a result of a few incidents that brought ethnic disputes to the forefront of Hungarian public and political discourse. In May of 2005, the so-called Mortimer case started a row between the Hungarian far-right and liberal activists. A 15-year old Roma boy was seriously injured with a samurai sword on Moszkva square (Széll Kálmán square today), which was quickly deemed a racially motivated crime by mainstream media and by political parties (including the incumbent MSZP government) (Népszava Online, 2005). Even though it was later uncovered that the perpetrator was in fact also of Roma ethnicity, it created a considerable public debate (Népszabadság, 2007a). There was an anti-racist march organized by liberal activist shortly after the crime occurred, which was faced off by an anti-antiracist demonstration lead by a far-right activists who first sought public notoriety, later becoming a leading figure in arguing for the criminality of Roma. Tamás "Tomcat" Polgár, the person in question, later was the founder of an anti-Roma informal activist group called the "Tolvajkergetők" (thief chasers) (Népszabadság, 2007a), who saw themselves as vigilantes going after Roma perpetrators of crimes as a means for laying out the case for Roma criminality.

An incident that became even more contested in the public and political domains occurred in the autumn of 2006. A non-Roma teacher was driving through a segregated Roma area within

Olaszliszka (a village in the north-east of Hungary). He accidentally hit a Roma girl playing on the street and when he stopped to check on the girl (who was not hurt) he was attacked by local Roma men (relatives of the girl) and was lynched to death (Népszabadság, 2007b). This again, caused public outrage and a tension between the majority and the Roma minority, which went further than at previous incidents, thus possibly contributing to the rise in negative attitudes in terms of the Roma. The period between 2002 and 2008 also saw the emergence of a far-right party, Jobbik, which became a key political player by arguing for the neglect of the "Roma issue" by Hungarian politics, and the denial of Roma criminality by the mainstream media. Because political parties and consecutive governments did in fact avoid many issues relating to the Roma (intergroup tension only being one particular element), Jobbik was able to mobilize support by starting and controlling the political discourse on the "Roma issue", also making it become one of the most salient in public affairs (Pytlas, 2016).

In 2007 a paramilitary group, with close connections to Jobbik, was formed that was named the Hungarian Guard (Kovács, 2007). It was later responsible for a number of activities of "activism", where the Guard would incite fear among the Roma by organising marches in segregated Roma areas. The Hungarian Guard was banned from existence by the High Court of Hungary in 2009 for openly promoting racism and discrimination against the Roma (Index, 2009a).

After 2008, intergroup tensions between the majority and the Roma persisted, culminating in further incidents. In 2009, the stabbing of a well-known handball player, Marian Cozma, by Roma perpetrators continued the heated public debate on majority-Roma-relations and on Roma criminality. It was also around this period when the worst case of racially motivated crimes occurred in Hungary (since the regime change, but possibly long before). Four majority men, who held far-right political views and were also associated with the Hungarian Guard, over the course of one year (2008-2009) attacked Roma victims in 10 separate incidents (with

the use of guns and Molotov cocktails), killing six people all together (including one child) (Miklósi, 2011a). These horrific crimes thematized the media during this period and incited fear among the Roma. Another incident, that brought intergroup tensions to the forefront of public debate, happened in the village of Gyöngyöspata (north-east from Budapest). A local feud started in 2011 with a Roma family trying to buy a house outside the segregated Roma area (among the "Hungarians"), as an alleged result of which a local (non-Roma) man committed suicide. The local leader of the Jobbik party claimed this to have been the result of "gypsy criminality and gypsy terror" (Miklósi, 2011b). Shortly after around 2000 far right "volunteers" arrived at the village (some in the uniform of the then already banned Hungarian Guard), who marched along the segregated Roma areas of Gyöngyöspata, threatening and abusing Roma people (Miklósi, 2011b).

In 2010, Jobbik first got elected to the Hungarian parliament, providing an even wider communicational platform for them to continue their anti-Roma communicational agenda. The above outlined incidents and socio-political processes, along with Jobbik making it to the political mainstream most likely were behind the high rate of negative attitudes towards the Roma recorded in 2011. I would now like to call the attention of the reader to Figure 3 on which we will be able to trace attitude changes in terms of the Roma minority between 2012 and 2019. As one can see, between 2012 and 2015, there was quite a significant raise in acceptance of a hypothetical head of state of Roma ethnicity (from 27% to 48%). Though possibly not the most perfect indicator of attitudes towards the Roma, yet a clear sign of a decrease in negative attitudes towards them. I argue that this was the result of Jobbik becoming more moderate during their first term in parliament (2010-2014) in an effort to become a more mainstream party. This meant that negative discourses in terms of the Roma had to be limited. It is also possible that crimes committed against the Roma were condemned by many and thus also contributed to the reduction of negative attitudes.

Kovarek and Farkas (2017) demonstrated, by looking at the official parliamentary statements made by its MPs between 2010-2014, the way Jobbik changed its rhetoric on the "Roma issue". They found that Jobbik started operating in parliament as a far-right party would do, making anti-Semitic and anti-Roma remarks both in parliament and outside of it. Yet, leading up to the 2014 general elections they started to be more moderate in their communication of these issues as an effort to move towards the centre, in hope of also taking more moderate conservative votes from Fidesz (Bíró-Nagy and Boros, 2016). This was in part a successful manoeuvre, as they managed to increase their shares of MPs in the Hungarian parliament in the 2014 elections. By early 2015, at the start of the Refugee Crisis, Fidesz started its new far-right agenda moving towards the right of the political spectrum. This was arguably a calculated strategy by Fidesz to reclaim some votes from Jobbik on the ideological far-right. After the 2015 Refugee Crisis the "Roma issue" became less salient in the media and public discourse of Hungary, while anti-migrant messaging by the Fidesz government thematized political discourse for years to come. Up until the 2018 general elections Fidesz used anti-migration communication extensively, somewhat toning it down after its third two-third majority parliamentary victory in 2018. At the same time as a decrease in negative discourses in terms of the Roma, acceptance of them also decreased between 2015 and 2019 (from 48% to 40%).

Attention shifted back to Gyöngyöspata at the beginning of 2020 (in the first half of January), when the Court of Debrecen ruled that the Roma should receive compensation for their more than decade-long segregated education in the local school (Szurovecz, 2020). This is when Viktor Orbán chose to enter the feud with remarks made at a press conference. He declared that the government will not pay compensation to the Roma victims of segregated education, because "they will not give handouts to those that do not work for the money, while everyday

Hungarians are working hard for a living"[4] (Orbán, 2020: p. n.a.). Orbán's remark revitalized the debate over the "Roma issue" by it resorting to commonly used stereotypes about the Roma living off benefits instead of earning a living (even though Hungary has made the transition from a welfare state to a workfare state, years earlier). By promoting stereotypes in association with the Roma, and by doing so in relation to a settlement of such symbolic significance in Roma non-Roma relations Orbán's words thematized Hungarian public and political discourses for a number of weeks, before the Covid-19 pandemic took over the agenda.

[4] Here, I used paraphrasing to describe the essence of Orbán's message, it should not be seen as a direct quote.

Chapter 4: Quantitative Inquiry: Analyses and Results

In this chapter I present the analyses and findings of the quantitative inquiry. (1) I start out by explaining the methodological considerations and the methods chosen to analyse the two cross-sectional datasets. (2) Secondly, I turn to presenting and explaining results by showing how attitudes towards (sub)groups of immigrants and towards the Roma had changed between 2011 and 2020. (3) Finally, I describe what socio-political factors shape negative attitudes towards these groups, still operating on the macro-level, using multivariate linear regression models.

4.1 Methodology and Data

The quantitative inquiry will be based on a previous survey study conducted by Tárki (2011)[5], back in 2011. The reason why I choose this dataset as the basis of my quantitative analysis is that it measured the social distance of the Hungarian majority both in terms of the Roma and the different immigrant subgroups (e.g. Arabs, Africans, Chinese, Hungarians outside of the kinstate). During the data collection, Tárki used Bogardus scales to measure the relative distance of the majority to these groups. To my knowledge, no other database has been constructed which looks at social distance in terms of both the Roma and migrants since then.

Along with other CEU students we commissioned Tárki to run a representative (for Hungary) survey within which I included a number of variables from the baseline dataset for a repeated query. Most importantly, Tárki collected data using the same three item Bogardus scale that they used before. I use this scale to trace attitude changes of the majority in terms of subgroups of immigrants as well as the Roma minority. A common way how social scientists measure social distance between different groups is by using the Bogardus scale. The scale usually consists of 7 items (but can vary in the number of items, like in Tárki's data collection) on

[5] Data was provided to me upon formal request.

which one has to choose the one he/she feels to be the most appropriate, in relation to a specific minority individual (e.g. (7) "would not let them live in the same country"; (1) "would marry the individual"). The curative nature on the scale means that people who agree with a certain type of intimacy would also agree with less intimacy in relation to a minority individual (Wark and Galliher, 2007). By using the Bogardus scale, I am able to determine how attitudes and relative distance in terms of migrant subgroups, and the Roma living in Hungary had changed during these 9 years. I compare the frequencies of answers to these questions between the two inquires, showing any possible changes in attitudes towards any of the above shown groups, respectively and relative to each other.

In addition to using simple descriptive statistics as a means to analyse my data I also build multivariate linear regression models trying to explain what factors shape attitudes towards different outgroups at any given time. For this, I build four separate models, two using baseline data from 2011 and two using the data from January 2020. The dependent variables in all models are given items of the Bogardus scale. I choose to look at the most negative item on the scale (i.e. those who do not accept any outgroups as family, neighbor of colleague) as a dummy dependent variable both in case of the Roma and in case of migrants.

I choose not to run separate models for all subgroups of immigrants in order to keep the comparison simple and straight forward. I will thus use the attitudes towards Arab immigrants to represent attitudes towards all other immigrant groups (acting as a proxy for general attitudes towards immigrants)[6]. The reason for this is that it is towards this group that we could see the

[6] I have also run regressions with attitudes towards Africans as dependent variables, which also yielded the exact same results (same socio-political explanatory factors were statistically significant), which indicated to me that I was right to use attitudes towards Arabs as a proxy for general attitudes towards immigrants. Results are attached to the Appendix.

most significant shift towards a more negative sentiment (also starting out with the highest rate of rejection in the baseline), thus understanding factors shaping such views could be most visible and thus most informative in doing so. The main independent variable that I am using in all models is personal contact (personally knowing someone of Roma or immigrant descent), referring to the contact hypothesis, complemented with various socio-economic and political control explanatory variables that the literature refers to.

4.2 Significant Rise in Negative Attitudes towards Immigrants, Simultaneous Decrease in Negative Attitudes towards the Roma

At a very first glance it becomes apparent that during the nine years that had passed between the two data collections, a lot had changed in terms of the majority's attitude towards sub-groups of immigrants and the Roma.

4. Figure: Would accept as... (Tárki, 2011) *5. Figure: Would accept as... (Tárki, 2020)*[7]



[7] Figures 4 and 5 were done by me.

By comparing the frequencies in Figure 4 and Figure 5, we can see that while negative attitudes in terms of immigrant grew substantially between the two periods[8], negative attitudes towards the Roma decreased. Let us take the rate of those who do not accept outgroups as any of the three options (as family, neighbor or colleague). In terms of Chinese, there was a 9,2% rise in negative attitudes between 2011 and 2020. Corresponding rates were 18,2% in terms of Africans and 19,1% in terms of Arabs. Even as we view attitudes towards Hungarians from abroad (from outside of the kin state), we can observe a significant raise in negative attitudes, an 8,6% rise to be precise. This is rather surprising, as the government (and Fidesz as a party) has been perusing a "united nation" policy in terms of Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries. They also campaigned for them receiving double citizenship back in 2004. This, to me indicates that there have been positive correlational spillovers in terms of subgroups of immigrants even in relation to ethnic Hungarians, resulting in more negative attitudes towards them (which was definitely not indented by the government).

In this same period, negative attitudes towards the Roma decreased by 5,8%. If we now turn to the first item on the Bogardus scale, the rate of those who would accept outgroups as their family members, we can see that it very slightly decreased in terms of the Chinese by 1,4%, decreased slightly more in terms of Africans by 7,5%, decreased by 7,5% in terms of Arabs and by 13,3% points in terms of Hungarians from abroad. Simultaneously, we saw a significant rise in acceptance towards the Roma, by 10,1%, which I attribute to a negative correlational spillover in attitudes, meaning that it is (at least party) the result of a growth in negative attitudes towards migrants.

[8] Attitudes towards Hungarians from outside Hungary were added as a control group.

It is a plausible claim to make that such significant changes of majority attitudes in terms of different minorities would not occur as a natural tendency, it rather seems likely that observable changes are at least partly the result of the Hungarian government's extensive campaign against immigration and migrants (or refugees), however, we have to explore further to find evidence to support this claim. More importantly, it also seems plausible that potential negative correlational spillovers might have accrued between attitudes towards newly emerging minorities (in perception) and traditional minorities, such as the Roma, corresponding with the results of previously cited literature (Hainmuller and Hangartner, 2013; Fouka et. al., 2019a; Fouka et. 2019b). However, these figures indicating significant changes in attitudes fall short of providing any explanations to why certain changes might have occurred, thus again, we have to result to more thorough analysis.

In relation to my main hypothesis (H1), I can already claim that the assumption I had, of negative attitudes towards the Roma lessening while negative attitudes in terms of (subgroups) of immigrants increasing, is clearly supported by empirical evidence. Results from the focus groups will help determine the mechanism that might be responsible for causing these changes, thus allowing me to decide on the correctness of H1.

4.3 Socio-political Factors Shaping Negative Attitudes: Personal Contact, General Prejudice and Level of Education as Main Explanations

The main reason for constructing multivariate regression models is to see whether given individual-level factors can explain any of the above detailed changes, these factors can later be compared and cross-checked with explanations provided by the analysis of the focus groups. In order to better understand why changes described in the previous section might have happened, we first have to understand what socio-political factors shape attitudes towards minority communities. To do so, I present the results of the multivariate regression analysis, which was done by using data from the same two datasets collected by Tárki (2011, 2020).

Some explanatory variables included in the models correspond to two of my hypotheses, while others act as controls (also corresponding to hypotheses offered in similar previous studies).[9] I start out by presenting the two regression models run on the 2011 data.

1. Table: Socio-political factors that shape negative attitudes towards Arabs (Model 1), and towards the Roma (Model 2) (2011)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Block of Predictors	**β**	**Std. Err.**	**β**	**Std. Err.**
Level of Education	**-0,0192(***)**	0,0063	0,0112	0,0049
Settlement Type	0,0075	0,0043	-0,0044	0,0046
In Support of the Government	0,0147	0,0220	-0,0050	0,0139
Xenophobic (Anti-Arab)	-	-	**0,6552(***)**	0,0296
Anti-Roma	**-0,6196(***)**	0,2770	-	-
Contact with Arab	**-0,8620(***)**	0,3361	-	-
Contact with Roma	-	-	**-0,1161(***)**	-0,1161
Is of Roma Ethnicity	0,0920	0,0046	-	-
Net Income	-6,2100	0,3001	-1,300	2,0600
Constant	0,2046(***)	0,0317	0,1836(***)	0,0400
Model Characteristics				
F-value	**0,0000**		**0,0000**	
R^2	**0,4375**		**0,4267**	
R^2 (adjusted)	**0,4350**		**0,4251**	

*Note: *** = P‹0,01; ** = P‹0,05; * = P‹0,1.*

Observing Model 1 shows us that as predicted by the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008), personal contact with Arabs (personally knowing someone of Arab ethnicity to be precise), does in fact seem to reduce negative attitudes towards them, ceteris paribus[10]. Also, the higher one's education level is, the less likely he/she is to hold negative attitudes in terms of Arabs (which is consistent with previous finings, e.g. Sik, 2012). Additionally, those that

[9] Notably, independent variables are included to measure the effects of in-depth contact with both Roma and Arabs (dummy variable; 1-if "yes"; 0-if "no"), in line with predictions of the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008) (The original question in the survey was "whether one knows a member from these outgroups personally"). Additionally, the effects of partisan support for the government are measured through the original question of "which party would someone vote for in if there were elections this Sunday?". Categorical variable was also recoded into a dummy (with 1- "supporting gov."; 0- "not supporting gov."), corresponding to De Benedicts-Kessner et. al.'s finings (2019), which suggest that partisan support makes people more susceptible to their own affiliated party's persuasion.

[10] The term, ceteris paribus should be used after every observation I make regarding any one explanatory variable, yet I choose not to write at the end of every observation for the text to be more fluid and freer of redundancy.

hold negative attitudes in terms of the Roma are also more likely to generally reject Arabs on all levels of the Bogardus scale. The latter, in general terms, shows that people that hold prejudice towards certain outgroups are likely to hold prejudice towards others, which is both seems intuitive and consistent with results from previous studies (Simonovits and Szalai, 2013, Balassa, 2007).

Similarly, to Arabs, Model 2 revels that personal contact with the Roma reduces negative attitudes towards them, while negative attitudes towards Arabs predicts negative attitudes towards the Roma. Interestingly, the level of education when included into this model was by no means statistically significant, thus indicating that level of education is not a good predictor of negative attitudes held in terms of the Roma. This could be because while some lower educated people could be more rejecting towards the Roma, others could have friends and relatives of Roma ethnicity. Additionally, Roma people also tend to be lower educated (Policy Solutions, 2012), thus there could be opposite effects at play, hence the lack of statistical significance.

2. Table: Socio-political factors that shape negative attitudes towards Arabs (Model 3); and towards the Roma (Model 2) (2020)

	Model 3		Model 4	
Block of Predictors	**β**	**Std. Err.**	**β**	**Std. Err.**
Level of Education	0,0012	0,0081	**0,0101(*)**	0,0057
Settlement Type	-0,0073	0,0148	-0,0160	0,0128
In Support of the Government	-0,0162	0,0302	**-0,0590(***)**	0,0225
Xenophobic (Anti-Arab)	-	-	**0,5672(***)**	0,0225
Anti-Roma	**0,6521(***)**	0,0260	-	-
Contact with Arab	**-0,1077(***)**	0,0381	-	-
Contact with Roma	-	-	**-0,2434(***)**	0,0244
Is of Roma Ethnicity	**0,0931(***)**	0,0488	-	-
Net Income	-2,8200	2,8000	-2,3300	2,5300
Constant	0,5674 (***)	0,0220	0,2195(***)	0,0368
Model Characteristics				
F-value	**0,0000**		**0,0000**	
R^2	**0,3994**		**0,4518**	
R^2 (adjusted)	**0,3976**		**0,4497**	

*Note: *** = P‹0,01; ** = P‹0,05; * = P‹0,1.*

As compared with the Model 1 from 2011, Model 3 shows that personal contact with Arabs still reduces prejudice, while holding anti-Roma attitudes increases the likelihood of also being rejecting towards migrants. However, two important factors changed in shaping anti-Arab (or xenophobic more generally) attitudes. For one, the level of education is no longer a significant explanatory variable, which is rather interesting as it goes against conventional findings of existing literature in Hungary which consistently found that lower educated people were more likely to hold xenophobic attitudes (e.g. Juhász, Monlár and Zgut, 2017; Messing and Sárvári, 2016; Simonovits and Szeitl, 2016). One possible explanation to this could be that the government's anti-migration campaign cut across demographics in terms of persuading voters to be more rejecting towards migrants. It will be up to the focus groups to explain this further and uncover possible mechanism that could account for this. Another difference compared to the baseline model is that in 2020, being Roma became a statistically significant explanation for holding anti-Arab views. Although I initially did not plan to explore this aspect of prejudice towards migrant, as I am primarily focusing on majority attitudes, this result is consistent with my findings from the Roma focus group which we conducted in Mohács, on which I will elaborate later. There is also evidence for this in existing literature (Sik, 2012; Messing and Sárvári, 2016), which claims that this can be explained by ethnic competition (for economic and social rewards) and the established relationship that those in the most precarious socio-economic position tend to be the most threated by the emergence of a new outgroup. The increased salience of immigration could have increased the Roma's sense of ethnic competition.

Compared with the baseline model (Model 2) on anti-Roma attitudes, Model 4 indicates that personal contact with the Roma still seem to reduce; while xenophobic attitudes still incense the likelihood of rejecting the Roma on all items of the Bogardus scale. Two important changes, however, apply. Interestingly, based on the model we can state that the higher one's level of education is, the more likely one rejects the Roma (though the small beta only indicates a small

marginal effect). This could be due to the fact the survey for this dataset was done at the end of January 2020, shortly after the already mentioned Orbán statement on the court ruling which found evidence for the practice of segregated education in Gyöngyöspata. Comments made by Orbán most likely stirred up anti-Roma sentiment among the Hungarian electorate, thus could be the reason behind this surprising result. This also goes against the findings of conventional research done on the issue (Policy Solutions, 2012) which would foresee a converse relationship of the level of education reducing prejudice towards Roma. I, however, would not derive far reaching conclusions based these findings as it was likely due to only a spike in negative sentiments. Finally, out of all four multivariate models, this was the only one where electoral support for the incumbent party, Fidesz, proved to be a statistically significant explanatory factor. The direction of the relationship is yet again surprising because it shows that Fidesz voters are marginally less likely to hold negative attitudes in terms of the Roma. It surprises me for two reasons: (1) the already mentioned Orbán statement could have potentially affected attitudes of Fidesz's own voters to become more rejecting towards the Roma, yet this is not what these results indicate. (2) Fidesz, ever since the start of the Refugee Crisis, has become considerably more right leaning, which would also make one anticipate that supporting the incumbent reduces the acceptance of Roma. Although it assumes a far from trivial mechanism, I think the combination of my first and third hypotheses can explain this. If based on my first hypothesis, we anticipate a negative correlational spillover in attitudes (a rise in negative attitudes towards immigrants resulting in a decrease in negative sentiment in terms of the Roma), and we also assume that the government's anti-migration campaign affected the attitudes of Fidesz supporters more (H3), it becomes a plausible relationship that support for the incumbent party marginally reduces negative attitudes towards the Roma. However, in order to accept or reject this latter explanation, I first have to find evidence in support (or in contradiction) of H1 though the qualitative analysis that will shortly follow.

Corresponding to my other two hypotheses, I can also already make important observation. H2, referring to the contact hypothesis (Pattigrew and Tropp 2008), seems to be partly supported by the multivariate models. I can state with confidence that (more in depth) personal contact with both immigrants and the Roma reduces negative attitudes towards them. Focus groups will help explain this relationship further and will also show how superficial contact might influence these attitudes. Quantitative result so far seems to support H3. I initially was anticipating that supporters of the incumbent government would have been influenced more by the anti-migration campaign, developing more negative attitudes towards immigrants then non-Fidesz supporters. Although electoral support for the government was not a statistically significant explanation in any of the constructed regression models measuring the factors influencing attitudes towards Arabs, Model 4's indication of support for the government lowering negative attitudes towards Roma could be a sign of larger effects of partisan persuasion if negative correlational spillovers in attitudes (as predicted by H1) are supported by qualitative evidence.

Chapter 5: Qualitative Inquiry: Analyses and Results

I now turn to the micro-level explanations of attitude change using qualitative methods. I start out by presenting methodological considerations and the analysis of the qualitative inquiry. Second, I describe the micro-level, by presenting results derived from the focus groups in order to identify some of the underlying factors and mechanism shaping negative attitudes towards outgroups. I follow the thematic structure as discussed under section 6.1 while introducing the results.

5.1 Qualitative Inquiry: Methodology and Analysis

To compliment the quantitative part of my study, I explore what mechanisms that might have been responsible for the changes in attitudes towards different minority groups. I include a number of considerations when choosing where to conduct focus groups as a means to uncover the underlying mechanisms of potential spillovers in attitudes. I had to choose the locations for the field study very carefully, in order to maximize external validity (to the extent that is possible in qualitative terms) in the face of limited resources.

For one, I account for the rather large ideological divide between the urban and rural populations in Hungary (see e.g. Messing and Ságvári, 2016) by making my sampling resemble the composition of Hungarian society in this respect. Thus, I chose to conduct only 2 focus groups in Budapest; the remaining 4 in cities and villages outside of the capital.[11] I also chose to include different settlement types: a large metropolitan city (Budapest), an average-sized rural town (Mohács) and a rural village (Zsámbok). Apart from trying to produce a

[11] I conducted a total of 6 focus groups: 2 in Zsámbok, 2 in Mohács and 2 in Budapest. I initially planned to carry out two other group discussions in Miskolc, this plan, however, unfortunately was fizzled out by the Covid-19 pandemic. Focus groups in Zsambok and in Mohács were conducted in person, while the two groups conducted in Budapest were done remotely, online. I will elaborate on this limitation further on in the study.

heterogeneous sample in these two respects, other determining factors in terms of composition were considered. Because the primary focus of my study is to uncover attitudes of the general public and how it changed as a result of the Hungarian government's anti-migration campaign, I chose both (1) areas that had experienced effects of the Refugee Crisis, and participants whom might have come into direct contact with immigrants or refugees coming from outside Europe (Budapest and Mohács). Furthermore, I chose a settlement (2) where the issue of the influx of migrants was not experienced directly, and people most likely did not come into contact with immigrants from outside Europe. This enabled me to investigate predictions made by the contact hypothesis (Pattigrew and Tropp, 2008) in terms of the effects of superficial contact. Because personal contact between the Hungarian majority population and the Roma minority can be considered much more common, I did not have to account for this when choosing the specific settlements (all the settlements have Roma populations).

Recruitment for the focus groups was done through various local Facebook groups and Facebook ads with the exception of Zsámbok, where recruitment was done with the help of a local informant (because of the size of the village it would have been difficult to recruit enough participants through other means). Consequently, the focus group sizes varied rather significantly. In the case of Zsámbok, both groups consisted of 8 participants (our original target number). In case of Mohács, where we had to recruit individuals remotely through posting into local Facebook groups, we had 4 and 3 participants, respectively. Recruiting through targeted Facebook ads for online focus groups, due to the Covid-19 epidemic intervening before we could conduct our study in Budapest, was a painstaking procedure, resulting in only two participants per group taking part in the conversations.[12] Given the low numbers, I chose to

[12] Even though we offered 3000ft book vouchers for participation it was extremely hard to recruit people due to the Covid-19 epidemic and although we provided a detailed manual on how to access the Zoom meeting (where

pool the results of the two Budapest groups into one, and treat them as one focus group, conducted at two separate occasions, during the analysis. This is justified by the fact that the two groups are homogeneous both in terms of composition and in terms of their answers on given issues and thus do not distort the results.

Those approached through Facebook had to apply for participation through an online pre-focus group questionnaire which asked basic demographic questions. This was mainly to ensure the ethnic composition of the groups. Because I am inquiring into the attitudes of the Hungarian general public (majority population), I had to exclude both members of the Roma minority and members of immigrant groups. The presence of someone belonging to any of the already stated groups would have distorted the results of the focus groups. While excluding immigrants (from outside Europe) was not a major challenge (no one of such background applied), excluding the Roma proved to be somewhat more challenging. The issue of Roma applicants came up in Mohács, which we chose to resolve by organizing a separate focus group with Roma participants. This proved to be a good choice, because it gave us unanticipated insight into some new aspect in our research. For one, we were able to inquire into what attitudes Roma people hold in terms of immigrants. Second, we could also explore attitudes of the majority from a minority perspective. This led us to some interesting findings which will soon follow.

Analysis of the focus groups is done through thematic analysis, as done by Vicsek (2006), focusing on seven sub-topics of the conversations that came up in the focus group, deliberately (through asking specific questions) and spontaneously (through individuals brining up certain

we held the discussions), many applicants did not show up on the day of the focus groups. To illustrate the hardship of recruiting for online focus groups: 341 people from our target groups clicked on our pre-focus group survey (where we provided all necessary information), out of whom only 8 people submitted the survey and only 4 showed up on the day.

aspects by themselves). The sub-topics in some way all correspond to the hypotheses, some more directly then others. The themes are the following:

1. Responses that indicated support or judgment on the government, pointing towards partisan support (Fidesz vs. opposition);
2. Participant's views on the political communication on immigration and the Refugee Crisis (both of the government and of other political voices);
3. Attitudes towards immigrants from outside Europe;
4. Attitudes in face of personal contact with immigrants;
5. Attitudes towards the Roma minority;
6. Attitudes in face of personal contact with Roma;
7. Comparing immigrants with the Roma and how attitudes towards one outgroup might influence attitudes towards the other group.

5.2 Many Reject the Government but also Reject Immigrants; What About the Roma?

Throughout explaining results, I highlight the results referring to each hypothesis and, by also referring back to the findings of the quantitative analysis, decide whether to accept them or reject them.

5.2.1 Support or Criticism of the Incumbent Government

In order to fully grasp the effects of the Hungarian government's anti-migration campaign on the attitudes of the electorate, it is important to know which focus group participants are in favour of the incumbent Fidesz government. As De Benedicts-Kessner et. al. (2019) write, persuasion can be more effective in terms of one's own political supporters, because partisan media effects the views more of those in support of given parties and incumbents.

Because Hungarian society is rather polarized on supporting or criticizing the Orbán government, we did not want to introduce divisive or sensitive issues, thus we chose not to ask

participants about their political affiliations directly. However, through spontaneous answers, a question on their media consumption and general nature of the discussions, I could retrospectively determine one's support of or opposition to the government with confidence (I was not able to determine this in relation to a few people). All who participated in the Budapest and Mohács focus groups were critical of the government in general and in relation to the anti-migration campaign, though reasons for this varied, while groups in Zsámbok were much more divided in terms of support or opposition to the government. Corruption and manipulation of the electorate were again the main point of criticism, while those in favour of the incumbent generally thought the government was doing a good job. Most of the people supporting the opposition, again, thought that the refugee crisis was handled well on a policy level, but not in communication, with which I will continue in the next section. In the Budapest group, individuals were critical of the government in practically all issues. When asked about the biggest issues Hungary had faced in recent years, they all mentioned democratic backsliding and the government influence over the media landscape. Some issues noted were the limiting of civil rights, the state of the education and healthcare systems and the expulsion of CEU. Although one participant mentioned that there could have been some advantages to controlling immigration in some way, there was a consensus in the group that the government mishandled the crisis. In the second group in Mohács (the one with Roma participants) some said that they had voted for the government is 2018, yet they all agreed that it should be dismissed (they most likely changed their stance because of the recent comments on Göyngyöspata, though this was not said explicitly). Both Mohács groups cited corruption as a serious issue and there was also a consensus on the government using media to manipulate public discourses and opinions. Yet, both groups agreed with the government's decision to build the fence on the southern border and the general sense was that the government handled the crisis well on a policy level (though not in communication).

5.2.2 Government Media Manipulation Through the Issue of Migration

A commonly occurring theme that came up in all groups without exception was that immigrants from outside Europe did not want to come to Hungary but were simply on route to destinations like Germany. Regardless of one's political standing or views on immigration this was a generally accepted fact. Based on this, many people did not see immigration as a major issue concerning Hungary, especially today, but again all groups, excluding the one in Budapest, had people that were genuinely worried and anxious back when the refugee crisis started in early 2015. Another important general observation is that even those that explicitly condemned the communication of the government on migration, and saw it as deliberate technique of political manipulation, often used the language or arguments of the government when it came to immigration. This shows how powerful the government's framing and priming of the issue of migration were, achieving supporters of the opposition to also internalize some of the elements of their communication.

Let us take a closer look now. In the village[13] (not directly affected by the crisis), there were people in both groups that thought that when migrants and refugees were stranded at Keleti railway station back in the 2015, it was because of the government wanted people to see how big of an issue the migration crisis was. When asked about the campaign, the dominant view of the first group can be summarized by this short dialogue:

> Zs_1_2: "Misleading people, completely."
> Zs_1_3: "And intimidating them. I think they wanted to make people afraid that they would come here and 'take our jobs'!"
> Zs_1_2: "There is another twist in story, they wanted to turn people's consciousness away from the real things going on in the country."[14][15]

[13] I will refer to Zsámbok as the „village" from now on, but in full I will mean the village not directly affected by the refugee crisis.
[14] Focus groups were naturally conducted in Hungarian, translations for quotations were done by the author.
[15] All of the quotes are from focus groups conducted by the author and his associate.

However, there were some people in the group that saw the crisis as a real threat and appreciated the government's communication and action on the matter. In the second village group, a number of people complained about not being able to avoid the communication by the government on migration, while others said that in order to have a more balanced view, they regularly watch news on both government media and independent media (this was also said by one person in the first group). People that support the government from the second group also acknowledged that the campaign might have gone a bit too far, but in their view the ends justified the means.

In the first border town group[16], people generally saw the campaign as means to manipulate voters and they complained about it making it harder for them to receive trustworthy information. They complained about it dominating television airtime, but they all said that they do not pay attention anymore, one of them, by not watching pro-government TV at all, and the other two by purposefully shutting out news related to migration by simply not paying attention. In the second group, many also stated that they do not trust information coming from pro-government channels. One woman expressed empathy towards immigrants (or refugees) that were harassed by Hungarian police at the border fence. In general, they thought that the campaign was somewhat disgraceful and was aimed (and succeeded) to build support for Fidesz.

In the group in Budapest, all purposefully avoided any media that they associated with the government, but they complained that it was still not enough to shut campaign messages out (they came across it on the streets or through YouTube commercials). "As Vera mentioned, it was inciting, I think that was a good word she used." (As said by BP_1). They were also angry

[16] How I refer to Mohács from now on.

about the "anti-humanitarian frame" the government used and were astonished about how effective it was in convincing people that immigration was an existential threat. As another noted, the message "was inciting, I think that was a good word she used [to describe the government message]" (BP_2). They talked about how over-simplified the government messaging was, and how they used specific colors to compliment slogans. They also complained about the national consultation, which worked in a way that there was, only one right answers to all posed questions, simply acting as an additional channel of communication.

5.2.3 Immigrants Should Not Come to Hungary

Even if most respondents thought that the governmental communication on immigration and the migration crisis went too far and was a way to build electoral support through manipulating the public, many people expressed surprisingly negative, in some cases even hostile, attitudes toward immigrants from outside Europe. It is important to note here that general attitudes towards immigrants in Hungary were always quite rejecting (Sik, 2012), thus not all negative views can be attributed to the government's communication, yet the previously described language use of participants suggested a strong influence on attitudes. All people also emphasised the large cultural gap between Hungarians and immigrants. There was a stark contrast between views of participants from the capital and that of the countryside in this respect. I will start by describing the more moderate (overwhelmingly positive) attitudes of the Budapest participants and will finish by elaborating on some of the more extreme (negative) views expressed both in the village and border town.

Respondents in Budapest all emphasised the humanitarian nature of the crisis. However, there was some disagreement on whether immigrants and refugees should be able to come to Hungary freely. Half of the participants thought that it was our absolute duty to help everyone in need, yet one participant expressed some concerns connected to the successful integration of migrants with very different cultural backgrounds. The two other participants thought that there should

be some limit to who should be let in the country, and one of them said that it was an objectively good move on the side of the governments that it chose to control the influx of immigrants by building the fence. The other participant, although very much against the incumbent government, who admittedly avoided any news sources associated with them, said this on immigrants arriving to Hungary:

> BP_3: "I'm not completely against change, but I'm reluctant to - or rather dislike - a group coming here and demanding rights right away. And if our social welfare system can, we should be happily giving, but no one should demand anything."

Though this participant was not particularly rejecting towards immigrants, he would have happily accepted a migrant family to be his neighbour, the influence of governmental communication on his attitude is quite apparent, as it clearly reflected rhetoric of the government (Benczés and Ságvári, 2019).

Out of all the groups in the countryside there were only four people who emphasized the humanitarian nature of immigration or asylum seeking, by expressing solidarity with some of those caught up in the situation. I would, emphasize that these people did not hold particularly positive attitudes in terms of migrants (mostly did not want immigrants in the country either), they simply felt like adding this aspect to the conversations. Things that often came up in conversation were that many immigrants were actually quite well-off financially, that they did not have any intentions to seek employment once in the country (rather exploit the welfare system) and that they behave in an intolerable and uncivil way. Many had this picture of a faceless mass of people wanting to disrupt life in Hungary in some way, although there was significant difference in terms of bluntness in expressing such views.

The first village group and the first in the border town were noticeably less extreme in their views, though they generally did not like the idea of any immigrants from outside Europe

coming to Hungary. A few people in the village group said (but many agreed) that the migrants often behaved outrageously, they left a lot of litter wherever they went and did not respect women in general. People from the border town group were generally relived that the government built the fence to keep migrants out, none of them saw any advantages of immigrants coming to Hungary (even though earlier on there was a lot of talk about labour market shortages) and thought that those holding Muslim religion would not be able to conform to Christian values (another often used rhetoric by the government, see Benczés and Ságvári, 2019). Most people in the pro-government village group[17] were enraged by the very idea of immigrants coming here, raising further arguments against letting immigrants in, such as acts of terrorism associated with Muslim migrants, and their unwillingness to conform to the norms of Hungarian society. When asked about how the government handled the situation:

> Moderator: "Did the way the Hungarian government acted on this matter, e.g. building the fence, reassure you?"
> Zs_2_8: "Yes."
> Zs_2_6: "If that besieging crowd came here, it would reassure me that if they would use a gun on the border, because otherwise this mass cannot be stopped."
> Zs_2_1: "If any organization has the courage to continue to support them, they are definitely crazy."

This dialogue reflects the most extreme attitudes held among members of this group, which shows quite well how strongly people feel about not letting migrants in. The last statement refers to organizations funded by George Soros. He became somewhat of a symbol of the conspiracy of immigrants flooding Hungary, due to persistent messages from the government suggesting so. The Roma group[18], also categorically rejected any migrant wanting to come to Hungary:

[17] How I identify the second Zsámbok group from here on.
[18] As I refer to the second group in Mohács from now on.

M_2_3: “If one wants to come into the country just like I want to go to say, America. ‘Have a nice day, here is my ID and address card. I want to settle down for a short time, I want to work. I ask for the help properly. Why can't they also do so? Because there is butter behind their ears.[19] Anyone with butter behind their ears should not come here.”
(…)
M_2_2: “They should stay where they are or go back home (if they are already here).”
M_2_1: “I don't want them.”
M_2_4: “Neither do I.”
M_2_2: “Go home! That’s the right place for them.”

Based on the indications from the multivariate linear regression models, (1) that negative attitudes towards immigrants could not be explained by support for the government, (2) yet support for the incumbent was a significant explanatory factor of holding more positive attitudes in terms of Roma; and based on the results of the above outlined three themes, indications related to H3 (Assuming that attitude changes, driven by politics, are more significant among supporters of the incumbent (in case of governmental camping), because, as they have found, voters tend to change their attitudes in accordance with the messaging of their preferred partisan sources; based on De Benedicts-Kessner et. al., 2019) are somewhat ambivalent. It is clear that the Hungarian government’s anti-migration campaign significantly affected also attitudes of those who otherwise do not agree with the government on other issues. Additionally, there were a number of instances when people dismissed the government’s communication on migration, yet when asked about immigrants, used the language of the government to describe migrants, and often cited worries that the campaign very likely incited in their sub-conscious thinking. Based on indications of finding (1) of the regression analysis and of findings from the focus groups, I decide to reject H3, even if evidence (2) could potentially indicate a contrary mechanism.

[19] Butter behind one’s ear means that they are guilty of some deed.

5.2.4 The Ambivalent Nature of Personal Contact with Immigrants

I looked at personal contact in terms of immigrants on two different levels in order to validate my contact hypothesis (based on Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008) made on the difference in effect on attitudes depending on the type of contact (superficial vs. more in depth). I found that contact on a superficial level in case of Budapest participants evoked empathy (these comments were made in relation to when there were many refugees and migrants stranded in Budapest back in 2015) and a sense of frustration with how the situation was handled by the government. One participant in the group reported on an instance where he had a somewhat negative experience with an immigrant, describing these kind of incidents as "friction" between minority and majority:

> BP_3: "This can be seen as friction between cultures. Frictions between habits. The black African man comes out of the restaurant and makes a loud phone call on the street at two in the morning. Interesting, - I didn't even know that they had such deep voices... so I'm not saying I was scared, but I didn't know what was going on."

In the countryside, there was only one person who expressed feelings of empathy when she encountered migrants travelling domestically. She explained how sorry she felt for them for having to go through all of this hardship. All others that encountered migrants (either by travelling to Budapest, Keleti station in 2015 or at settlements at the border) described it as a negative experience. Some cited fear, others disgust, some even anger when they came across larger groups of migrants and refugees. Not everyone had more in-depth experiences with immigrants from outside Europe, but based on some of the responses, an interesting pattern seems to emerge. Of those who knew immigrant families and individuals personally (through family or by living in close proximity with them) held positive, sometimes even very positive, attitudes in terms of them. Yet, respondents were quick to point out that they were not the same as immigrants coming to Hungary since the 2015 refugee crisis. In Hungarian we have a nice way to say immigrant ("bevándorló") and a less nice way ("migráns"), which was brought into

public discourse by incumbent government since early 2015. Those that they knew personally were labelled as "bevándorló", while the faceless mass wanting to come to live in Hungary (or Europe) were labelled as "migráns". I argue that this distinction helps reduce cognitive dissonance and lets them hold negative attitudes towards migrants coming since the 2015 refugee crisis even when their own in-depth personal experiences contradict them holding such views. Here I provide dialogues to illustrate my case, from the first village group:

> Zs_1_1: "There used to be one here, in Zsámbok, now his wife… Magdi lived in Kisdiófa or Nagydiófa. He was also Arabic. He told me where he came from."
> Zs_1_8: "Oh, that was a nice man!"
> Zs_1_1: "Mohamed, or whatever he was called."
> Many from the group: "Oh, Mohamed!"
> Zs_1_6: "He was a good man, worked in the TSZ. I knew him well."
> Zs_1_1: "Helpful - how many times he offered me to bring snake meat and shark meat and everything. I asked him whether to bake the snake to cook it? (…) He was a very regular kid anyway."

And from the pro-government group:

> Zs_2_8: "I know someone who resides in Budapest who had a job in Gödöllő, has broken Hungarian. He is of Syrian origin, has been living here in Hungary for a long time, but he is not the problematic type, he takes pride in his job."
> Zs_2_1: "Yeah, I had the same kind of experience."
> Zs_2_8: "But he didn't come with this wave, he didn't jump the fence to cross the border."
> Zs_2_7: "Well then, he is not a migrant."
> Zs_2_8: "He is not a migrant. I also knew a Syrian, (…) I made kitchen furniture for him, then for his son. We keep in touch to this day. (...) We joked around; they were completely normal. This can happen (them being nice), but they're obviously not migrants, they've been living here for a long time."

This also indicates the extent of how much the government's messages got through to people, leading them to hold attitudes that somewhat contradict their own personal experiences. The results of the multivariate linear regression analysis, which showed a statistically significant relationship of in-dept personal contact with immigrants (Arabs, more precisely) reduces negative attitudes in terms of them, is also confirmed by the results from the focus groups. However, it is important to note that some positive in-dept experiences might not feed into

general attitudes because they simply might be seen as an expectation to the rule (meaning that some positive experiences might not limit negative attitudes towards migrants). In terms of the second part of the (contact) hypothesis, I also conclude that evidence from the focus groups support Pettigrew and Tropp's (2008) claim of superficial contact increasing negative attitudes.

5.2.5 Attitudes Toward the Roma

In terms of attitudes towards the Roma there were also significant differences between participants from Budapest and participants in countryside groups. Out of four Budapest participants, all four would have accepted a Roma person as a family member, although only half of them would have accepted them as neighbours (which does not correspond to the logic of the Bogardus scale). Those who accepted the Roma as family, but not as neighbours reasoned that they generally trust their relatives in only bringing regular Roma into the family, while they had some reservations about having Roma neighbours. A consistent fear that came up was that Roma people can be loud and thus hard to live around. It was only one participant that explicitly said that there are issues and friction between Roma and non-Roma and that sometimes the Roma are the ones responsible, but I will elaborate on this under the next section.

In the remaining three groups there were a variety of attitudes and grievances mentioned, both negative and positive in terms of the Roma. Naturally, we did not ask members of the Roma focus groups to express their attitudes towards the Roma, rather we asked them about what they think the majority population thought about them. Their responses were interesting, especially contrasted with the other groups' opinions. The Roma generally thought that there was not really an issue of prejudice towards them and they all agreed that attitudes significantly improved in the recent decade. They attributed this change to the fact that more and more Roma made it into mainstream media and that there is a growing number of Roma people in reality

shows, TV series or in pop music (notably Roma rappers).[20] One of the participants said that "it became cool to be Roma" (M_2_3).

Turning the focus back to the three remaining groups, some important similarities came up in all three of them. There tendency to be loud and listen to loud music also came up in all groups as it did in the Budapest one. This could indicate the cultural difference between majority and minority. A number of common stereotypes usually associated with the Roma (Bernáth et. al., 2012) also came up in three groups. E.g. There seemed to have been somewhat of a consensus that many Roma (not all of them, this was emphasized a number of times by some participants) are not particularly willing to seek employment. Some even said that it was "in the Roma's blood (in their genes) not to work" (Zs_2_7). One other consistent issue they had was that the Roma are very good at knowing what they are entitled to and that they are somehow able to abuse the social welfare system to their advantage in a way the non-Roma cannot. "They only think they have rights, not duties" (Zs_1_1:); "When I was working for the local municipality I counted; they received eleven different types of benefits." (Zs_2_8:) Also:

> M_1_1: "And if I were to go to the local municipality, where they distribute benefits, and I would say that I would also like to ask for some financial assistance because I am also part of a minority (German national minority)… They would say 'turn around, go home!'"
> M_1_3: "That's right! And they would"
> M_1_1: "So, they wouldn't even give 20 pennies."
> M_1_3: "I think they give to a gypsy first, before they do to a non-gypsy."

Although attitudes towards the Roma in all three of these groups were generally somewhat negative (most, did not accept them as neighbours), some also emphasized that generalization in terms of the Roma was not helpful. One of the groups became more positive towards the end

[20] This, in itself was a very interesting suggestion and could provide for a great sociological study. However, this aspect never came up in other focus groups, thus I will not consider it as an alternative explanation to improvements in attitudes towards the Roma.

of the discussion which came as a backdrop to some of the more negative views previously expressed. In the pro-government group, a consensus formed around the end of the discussion which suggested that they were lucky to have "normal Roma people" in the village, unlike those living in surrounding villages (also can be seen as evidence for the contact hypothesis, in-depth vs. superficial, Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008).

5.2.6 Contact with the Roma

Again, there were significant differences between views of Budapest residents and views of rural respondents. What was strikingly different was the number of interactions Budapest people had with the Roma. Although all of them could come up with some ex-college or an old acquaintance when pushed on the question of whether they know Roma people personally, they did not have in-depth contact with Roma throughout their lives. Contact on a superficial level was generally more common, however, none of them attributed too much meaning to these interactions.

Turning to rural groups, members of the Roma group said that their contact with non-Roma people is generally frictionless and that it had also improved in recent years. Though one of the participants noted that she thinks that non-Roma generally look down upon the Roma, which is consistent with the views described in the previous section by majority respondents.

The remaining three groups reported mostly on negative experiences, although a few also reported on positive encounters in their contact with Roma. Those that highlighted negative experiences often complained about how loud the Roma were: how loudly they spoke, how loudly they listened to music and how loudly celebrated different life events (birthdays etc.). A few noted encountering aggressive behaviour of Roma in various situations (witnessing domestic abuse or rows on streets). These negative impressions were mostly all based on superficial contact. Interestingly, when it came to more in-depth personal encounters, attitudes

tended to be more positive. A number of people reported to have regular Roma colleagues who "did not cause any problems" (M_1_1) and some even said that they liked them. In the village, there was a respondent who worked in the local school and another that led the local kindergarten. They both said that they did not have any issues with Roma children specifically and that their families were also cooperative and sometimes even more helpful then that of parents of non-Roma kids. A woman, also from the village, repeatedly mentioned how fond she was of her Roma neighbours.

Similarly, to attitudes in terms of immigrants in light of more in-depth personal contacts, it seems as though attitudes towards the Roma also become more positive as a result of more profound experiences, however, again, a further conclusion should be noted. Even though many of the in-depth accounts were positive, they were all brought up as counterexamples to how the Roma normally act. Some people who otherwise reported positive experiences with Roma still held somewhat more negative views in general terms.

5.2.7. The Idea of an Influx of Migrants Affects the Accommodation of Roma

At the end of each focus group, we asked participants to express their attitudes in terms of the Roma minority while having the immigrants from outside Europe in mind. This was first done indirectly, through asking them different items of the Bogardus scale (accept them as family, neighbour or colleague), where they had to choose between immigrants and the Roma. Later, we explicitly asked what they thought of the Roma in light of the refugee crisis. Though no one explicitly said that their attitudes towards the Roma became more positive as a result of their attitudes becoming more negative towards migrants, responses uncovered a possible sub-conscious mechanism that supports my main hypothesis.

In case of the focus group conducted in Budapest, not much had changed in their attitudes towards Roma, but they generally held positive views in terms of both immigrants and the

Roma. They would have accepted both groups on all items of the Bogardus scale, with one exception where someone would have accepted both groups as family but not as neighbours (which is slightly counter-intuitive if we rely on the claims of Bogardus, 1933). This, again, is explained by the trust in a family member's choice for choosing an immigrant or Roma a partner.

In the remaining three groups[21], a few people (e.g. in the first village group and in the first border town group) claimed that the issue of immigration and the Roma issue had no relationship whatsoever. This, however, was contradicted by other things said in the conversation. For one, in all three of the groups, before the Roma were mentioned by the moderator (we were careful not to evoke any associations between the two groups before the last theme), spontaneous comparisons arose. I give an example from the pro-government group:

> Zs_2_7: "Like a gypsy."
> Zs_2_5: "Well, we have our hands already full with them."
> Zs_2_7: "More than enough."
> Zs_2_2: "Because it is similar to the gypsy question. There are normal, good-natured gypsies, but in the majority of cases, unfortunately, this is not what one receives as confirmation, and therefore a preconception is formed. Whether this is exaggerated or not is hard to judge, or isn't it?"

When they were explicitly asked to compare the two groups (Roma and immigrants), these were the kind of answers that were given in the first village group:

> Zs_1_6: "If I have to choose between a migrant or a gypsy. I would choose the gypsy. There's a difference in culture…"
> Zs_1_4: "At least I understand what they're (the Roma) are talking about."
> Zs_1_6: "So, I can understand what he/she is talking about. I also see that in school and kindergarten even the folk costumes are being worn by gypsies. But I don't know anything about them (migrants)."

[21] Naturally, we did not ask Roma participants to do such comparison.

In the pro-government group, someone who previously reported on rather negative attitudes in terms of the Roma (and in terms of immigrants) had this to say when asked to compare them:

> Zs_2_1: "It is in the interest of every good-natured, right-minded individual (member of the majority), even for their own sake, to help these gypsies. I don't mean to say one needs to help materially or by giving them a piece of clothing, but to try to integrate them in some way, even if it takes a long time. (...) We have no energy and no capacity, I think neither in the countryside nor in the city, to accommodate another (out)group, even worse than the existing one. (...) Our culture is at least similar to that of gypsies."

This brings me to answer the main hypothesis of my thesis. Based on the comparison of attitudes in terms of sub-groups of immigrants and the Roma minority (between 2011 and 2020), it is clear that while attitudes towards migrants have become more negative, attitudes toward the Roma significantly improved. Based on the findings of the focus groups, I conclude that there are a number of mechanisms that point towards a negative correlational relationship (as predicted by Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Fouka et. al. 2019a; Fouka et. al., 2019b). All agreed that attitudes towards the Roma had improved in previous years (including the Roma). Furthermore, all seemed to have accepted "regular Roma people", as well as some people also accepted "regular immigrants". Nearly all respondents stated that they would choose Roma over immigrants, which was mostly argued on the basis of immigrants being more culturally distant from "Hungarians". These all indicate that attitude changes viewed on a macro-level could be (at least party) due to such spillovers in attitudes. If we add the government's anti-migration campaign to the explanatory mechanism, this argument becomes even more persuasive. As the threat of immigration to Hungarian livelihood was persistently emphasized by the government in its campaign, comparisons in terms of immigrants and Roma likely manifested (both implicitly, subconsciously; and explicitly, in discourse), thus the idea of a more culturally distant outgroup likely reduced the social distance between "Hungarians" and the Roma, from the majority perspective.

Chapter 6: Discussion

Let me conclude the most important findings of my study. The qualitative and quantitative analyses yielded a variety of results, yet I will refrain from reiterating all of them, limiting my focus to the most impactful findings, their implications and their contribution to the scientific community.

In relation to my main hypothesis, which assumed that the shift towards more negative attitudes toward immigrants (and subgroups of immigrants) will have the spillover effect of reducing negative attitudes towards the Roma, as a positive externality of the government's anti-migration campaign, I found evidence suggesting that I was right. On the one hand, the comparison of attitudes towards these minorities (measured on a Bogardus scale) between 2011 and 2020 showed a significant rise in negative attitudes towards immigrant subgroups. In this same period, negative attitudes towards the Roma reduced significantly. On the other hand, based on the findings of the focus groups, an interesting mechanism appeared that can both indicate negative correlational spillovers in attitudes and can explain this phenomenon. Nearly all focus group participants agreed (including the Roma) that there has been an improvement in attitudes towards the Roma in the recent past. Results strongly suggest that attitudes towards the Roma did not improve because daily interactions or general perception towards them changed, rather as a consequence of the emergence of a new outgroup (immigrants), portrayed by the government communication as a major threat. As a result, comparisons in terms of immigrants and Roma likely manifested (both implicitly, subconsciously; and explicitly, in discourses), which reduced negative attitudes in terms of the Roma. These findings are consistent with implications of previous studies (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Fouka et. al. 2019a; Fouka et. al., 2019b), which found similar mechanisms in the contexts of Switzerland and the USA.

Connected to my second hypothesis, which was based on the suggestion of Pattigrew and Tropp (2008), who claim that contact with members of an outgroup on a superficial level tend to increase prejudice towards that group, while more in-depth contact reduce prejudice towards given, I also found evidence in support. The multivariate regression models consistently showed that negative attitudes both in terms of immigrants and in terms of the Roma are reduced by more in-depth personal contact (knowing someone personally from these minorities). Thus, I can accept this part of the assumption with confidence. However, because there were not any good measurements of superficial contact in the databases, I had to determine the other part of the claim based on the results of the focus groups. In conclusion of the focus groups, I cannot provide a definitive indication as to whether superficial contact increases prejudice or not. I am inclined to confirm this part as well, as encounters of superficial contact with immigrants and with the Roma were overwhelmingly negative in nature, suggesting that it most likely increases prejudice towards these groups. Based on the results produced by the focus groups, we also must think of in-depth contact reducing prejudice in a much more nuanced way. It was noticeable that both in terms of the Roma and in terms of immigrants; positive experiences with in-depth contact were often seen as being exceptions to the rule. Stated explicitly in relation to immigrants, by many participants emphasising the difference between immigrants who have been living in Hungary for a while and immigrants trying to come to Hungary as part of the current wave of migration. However, only stated implicitly in case of the Roma, where many people drew the line between "good" or "bad" Roma depending on whether they were employed.) Thus, when accepting the contact hypothesis, we have to keep in mind that some positive in-depth encounters might not result in a reduction in negative attitudes in relation to given outgroups.

My third hypotheses, which anticipated that the Hungarian government's anti-migration campaign affected the attitudes of its own electorate more (see De Benedictis-Kessner et. al.,

2019), turned out to be misguided, as evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses indicate that the government campaign was also successful in persuading non-Fidesz voters to become more hostile towards immigrants. In terms of negative attitudes towards immigrants, none of the multivariate regression models saw support for the government as a statistically significant explanatory factor. Even though Model 4 (factors determining negative attitudes towards the Roma in 2020) produced results suggesting that support for the government explained slightly more positive attitudes towards the Roma, which I interpreted as a potential sign of a larger partisan effect through the spillover mechanism, I see the former as a more plausible result. Furthermore, focus groups also showed that those very critical of the government, in many cases reported on views in accordance with governmental rhetoric on immigration, often using the government's language to express their rejection of immigrants from outside Europe. Which also indicates that the government was able to persuade people far beyond its electorate (also confirms Lakoff, 2004's claims emphasising the importance of language in framing).

My results clearly indicate the large impact of the Hungarian government's anti-migration campaign. Although a number of scholars have previously connected the campaign with the sudden rise in xenophobic attitudes (e.g. Messing and Ságvári, 2016; Sik et. al., 2016), my study clearly demonstrates that it had other far-reaching consequences. My results suggest that the government clearly got its message through to opposition supporters and managed to persuade Fidesz and non-Fidesz supporters alike, that immigration from outside Europe should be viewed as a great threat to Hungarian livelihood and culture and that immigrants (and refugees) should generally stay out of Hungary. At the same time, the campaign also had the positive externality of lowering negative attitudes towards the Roma. I would argue that this was not an initial intention of the government. If we take Orbán's comments made on the segregated education of Roma at the beginning of January 2020 (Orbán, 2020), it becomes clear that he has no

reservations about using the Roma as scapegoats either. If we understand Orbán's comments to have had an effect of evoking negative attitudes towards the Roma, that would indicate that negative correlational spillovers in attitudes (in terms of immigrants and the Roma) could have potentially been even greater if the survey by Tárki was conducted for example in December, 2019, not at the end of January 2020. Regardless, it is clear that attitudes towards the Roma became more positive in recent years which, whether a consequence of deliberate political strategy or not, should be seen a positive change and a step in the right direction for the better integration of Roma on the long run.

If we take a step back and view my study in the context of international literature and middle-level theories, it becomes clear that my research contributes to an extremely understudied field within social sciences. Very few scholars have so far studied the spillovers in attitudes in terms of different outgroups (minorities) (e.g. Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch et. al., 2010) and even fewer have identified negative correlational relationships in these spillovers (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Fouka et. al. 2019a; Fouka et. al., 2019b). Thus, my study and results contribute to this latter area in a meaningful way, demonstrating that these tendencies can be present not only in Switzerland and the USA, but also in significantly different contexts, such as in Hungary.

To see my results in a slightly more nuanced way, some limitations of my study need to be accounted for. A rather apparent limitation in terms of the quantitative analysis is that 9 years passed between the two data collections. A lot can and had happened between these 9 years in Hungary even if we narrow our focus to things that might have influenced attitudes of the majority in terms of different outgroups. However, I was able to fill in the void between the two cross-sectional snapshots by offering alternative data sources and a possible narrative that could account for some of observable changes in attitudes. Most importantly, negative attitudes towards immigrants grew significantly after 2015 (although attitudes were traditionally rather

negative) (Simonovits, 2020), while there was some variance in attitudes towards the Roma under the current government, attitudes became more positive than what they were in the early 2000s (Special Eurobarometer, 2012-2019).

Limitations of the focus group inquiry can be mainly attributed to the composition of the groups. Because remote recruitment was hard enough before life had to permanently move online, consequently becoming even harder after the lockdowns had started, we could not carefully construct the composition of our groups. Ideally, we would have needed somewhat heterogeneous groups based on social status, gender, level of education and age, though it is all about finding the right balance because group homogeneity also contributes by making participants more comfortable, thus more reliably reporting on their true intuitions and attitudes (Vicsek, 2006). In case of the Zsámbok focus groups, we were able to represent the village quite well, as the two groups accounted for a wide range of demographics and socio-economic backgrounds. The groups in Mohács were already somewhat less diverse, some of this deriving from fact that the groups were considerably smaller (3 and 4 participants). Finally, because of the limited number of participants in the Budapest group (4 participants), there, again, was the issue of homogeneity and a possible selection bias. Based on these differences in composition, one can argue that there is some between-group distortion, especially in terms of the level of education, however, these distortions simply magnified urban rural differences, which, if carefully accounted for, and stressed, furthers our knowledge on the issue and points to some important differences in terms of how people see migrants and the Roma in Budapest and in the countryside. Furthermore, when I chose to pursue qualitative inquiry through conducting focus groups, I was aware of its limitations in providing representative results. I have used this method to provide possible explanations and mechanisms to explain macro-level tendencies. Consequently, I strongly believe that results advance our knowledge on the issue in a

meaningful way, especially when the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses are presented side-by-side.

There are a number of areas connected to my study that further research could explore in more detail. The theory of negative correlational spillovers in attitudes could be studied in a number of different contexts. Because ethnic tensions and xenophobia are persistent in many countries, and will most likely continue to be so in the foreseeable future, there are an abundance of countries where similar hypotheses could be tested. In a later study, I would like to do a comparative analysis in European countries that were affected by the 2015 Refugee Crisis and where political rhetoric (by the government or by other parties) was hostile towards migrants and rejecting towards immigration (e.g. Italy, Germany, Hungary, France). By looking at attitude shifts in these countries in terms of immigrants and in terms of traditional minorities, I could potentially find further substantial evidence in support of this theory.

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Appendix

1. Regression Outputs

1.1 Full regression model output (including non-significant variables) (Arab, 2011)

```
. reg xeno iskola teltip kormanypart romaellen contarab cigany netto
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1005
				F(7, 997)	=	127.65
Model	90.4068906	7	12.9152701	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	100.872711	997	.10117624	R-squared	=	0.4726
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4689
Total	191.279602	1004	.190517532	Root MSE	=	.31808

xeno	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
iskola	-.0120648	.0048494	-2.49	0.013	-.0215811	-.0025485
teltip	.007523	.0043568	1.73	0.085	-.0010267	.0160726
kormanypart	.0147527	.0228536	0.65	0.519	-.0300939	.0595993
romaellen	.6465325	.0220072	29.38	0.000	.6033467	.6897183
contarab	-.0569037	.0251828	-2.26	0.024	-.106321	-.0074863
cigany	.0920145	.0467689	1.97	0.049	.0002378	.1837912
netto	-6.21e-08	1.96e-07	-0.32	0.751	-4.46e-07	3.22e-07
_cons	.0865849	.0300753	2.88	0.004	.0275668	.1456031

1.*2 Full regression model output (including non-significant variables) (Roma, 2011)*

```
reg romaellen iskola teltip kormanypart xeno contropa netto
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1005
				F(6, 998)	=	146.48
Model	99.1068724	6	16.5178121	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	112.540889	998	.112766422	R-squared	=	0.4683
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4651
Total	211.647761	1004	.210804543	Root MSE	=	.33581

romaellen	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
iskola	.0111768	.0049024	2.28	0.023	.0015567	.0207969
teltip	-.004366	.0045983	-0.95	0.343	-.0133895	.0046576
kormanypart	-.0049837	.0239307	-0.21	0.835	-.0519439	.0419766
xeno	.7120717	.0244927	29.07	0.000	.6640086	.7601348
contropa	-.0873341	.029943	-2.92	0.004	-.1460926	-.0285756
netto	-1.33e-07	2.06e-07	-0.64	0.520	-5.38e-07	2.72e-07
_cons	.1716562	.0405286	4.24	0.000	.0921252	.2511872

1.3 Full regression model output (including non-significant variables) (Arab, 2020)

```
. reg xeno iskola teltip kormanypart romaellen contarab cigany netto
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	744
				F(7, 736) =	62.65
Model	69.1310208	7	9.87586012	Prob > F =	0.0000
Residual	116.028925	736	.157647996	R-squared =	0.3734
				Adj R-squared =	0.3674
Total	185.159946	743	.24920585	Root MSE =	.39705

xeno	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
iskola	.0012322	.0081421	0.15	0.880	-.0147523	.0172166
teltip	-.0073305	.0140819	-0.52	0.603	-.0349759	.0203149
kormanypart	-.0162268	.0302266	-0.54	0.592	-.0755674	.0431137
romaellen	.617782	.0314306	19.66	0.000	.5560778	.6794863
contarab	-.1125692	.045331	-2.48	0.013	-.2015626	-.0235757
cigany	.093118	.059624	1.56	0.119	-.0239353	.2101714
netto	-2.82e-07	2.80e-07	-1.01	0.314	-8.32e-07	2.67e-07
_cons	.3853223	.0758715	5.08	0.000	.2363719	.5342727

1.4 Full regression model output (including non-significant variables) (Roma, 2020)

```
. reg romaellen iskola teltip kormanypart xeno contropa netto
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	744
				F(6, 737) =	94.04
Model	74.8254987	6	12.4709164	Prob > F =	0.0000
Residual	97.7336411	737	.132610096	R-squared =	0.4336
				Adj R-squared =	0.4290
Total	172.55914	743	.232246487	Root MSE =	.36416

romaellen	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
iskola	.0130009	.007262	1.79	0.074	-.0012558	.0272576
teltip	-.016011	.0128901	-1.24	0.215	-.0413168	.0092948
kormanypart	-.0504717	.0274605	-1.84	0.066	-.1043818	.0034385
xeno	.5396312	.0272193	19.83	0.000	.4861946	.5930679
contropa	-.251793	.0286514	-8.79	0.000	-.308041	-.1955449
netto	-2.33e-07	2.53e-07	-0.92	0.359	-7.30e-07	2.65e-07
_cons	.301666	.0719063	4.20	0.000	.1605004	.4428317

1.5 Supporting regression output (African, 2011)

```
reg afrikaellen iskola romaellen contafrika
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	1013
				F(3, 1009) =	282.39
Model	82.6188914	3	27.5396305	Prob > F =	0.0000
Residual	98.3998648	1009	.097522165	R-squared =	0.4564
				Adj R-squared =	0.4548
Total	181.018756	1012	.178872289	Root MSE =	.31229

afrikaellen	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
iskola	-.0132341	.0045927	-2.88	0.004	-.0222464	-.0042219
romaellen	.6183399	.0214019	28.89	0.000	.5763425	.6603373
contafrika	-.018619	.0328105	-0.57	0.571	-.0830036	.0457656
_cons	.1044655	.0222705	4.69	0.000	.0607637	.1481672

1.6 Supporting regression output (African, 2020)

```
. reg afrikaellen contafrika cigany romaellen
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	106.880307	3	35.6267689	Number of obs	= 1018
Residual	147.100047	1014	.14506908	F(3, 1014)	= 245.58
				Prob > F	= 0.0000
				R-squared	= 0.4208
				Adj R-squared	= 0.4191
Total	253.980354	1017	.249734861	Root MSE	= .38088

afrikaellen	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
contafrika	-.1354155	.0446169	-3.04	0.002	-.2229674	-.0478635
cigany	.1326633	.0478896	2.77	0.006	.0386893	.2266373
romaellen	.6721131	.0254207	26.44	0.000	.6222299	.7219963
_cons	.2386028	.0163073	14.63	0.000	.2066029	.2706026

2. Focus Group Guideline and Questions

Problem Map

- What do you see as most the pressing issues in relation to the settlement?

I. Opinions on Communication Related to Migration

- On an average day, how much time do you spend consuming news? What kind of radio, newspaper or TV channel do you get information from?
- How did the migration crisis in the country make you feel?
- How (from which media sources) did you inform yourself about the migration crisis?
- Do you feel that the government has acted correctly in relation to the crisis?
- What do you think about government's communication on the issue?
- What motives and messages can they recall from government communication?
- What emotions did these messages evoke in you?

II. Attitudes Towards Immigrants

- How worried are you about immigrants coming to Hungary?
- Which non-European country do you think most immigrants come to Hungary from?
- Have you met immigrants in your settlement or other location in the past few years?
- Do you know an immigrant personally or through acquaintances?
- What do you think about immigrants from outside Europe?

III. Attitudes Towards the Roma

- What do you think about local Gypsies living in your settlement?
- Do they have gypsy acquaintances or friends?
- Have their perceptions of gypsies changed in recent years? If so, why?

IV. Comparing Immigrants and the Roma

- Would you accept an immigrant or a gypsy as a family member (through marriage to a relative)?
- If they had to choose, would you rather accept an immigrant or a gypsy as a neighbour?
- Would you accept an immigrant or a gypsy a colleague?
- All things considered, how do you think about immigrants and gypsies in relation to each other?