

# **ZONING EUROPE**

**THE IM/MOBILIZATION OF LIFE FORMS IN THE DANUBE BASIN**

By

Johannes Hollenhorst

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

*In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of*

*MA Sociology and Social Anthropology*

Supervisors:

Prem Kumar Rajaram

Alexandra Kowalski

*Budapest, Hungary*

2020

# Abstract

Starting from the New Danube Bridge at the Hungarian-Slovakian border, this thesis seeks to analyze and propose the “Zoning of Europe” in a double sense. Adding to the literature of governmentality studies, it first analyzes how this EU financed infrastructure project contributes to the micro-politics of attracting foreign capital investments to industrial parks in postsocialist Hungary. Zoning is understood here as the cultural process of parceling space in specific manners, creating moral topologies which organize movements in a desired way. Connecting this setting to the transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border, the present taxonomy of movement in the Danube basin becomes clear: While in the case of capital investments space is deployed for the establishment relations, in the case of migration it is oppositely deployed to prevent it. By tracing this nexus back historically while staying situated in the Danube basin the second form of zoning is proposed following the conception of “critical zones”. Through this situated methodology, the contingency of the present zoning of Europe becomes apparent: While in the present, migration is stopped between Hungary and Serbia, the very same habitat appears as a central destination for migration from German lands after the Habsburgs defeat of the Ottomans at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Enlarging the empirical basis of governmentality studies towards the emergence of Cameralism, it becomes clear that this historic migration movement was also already organized through the technology of zoning: It was meant to cultivate life in the Danube basin in the form of a “civil society” as part of the emerging political discourse of Europe. In going beyond this analysis of zoning, it is asked whether the Danube as fundamentally relational socio-ecology might inspire new forms of solidarity beyond these translations of the discourse of Europe to the river’s basin.

# Acknowledgements

There were these moments when I was working on this thesis when I felt all alone. But now I feel like this was rather a feeling of being overwhelmed by all the contributions that other people made to my life and work during the last two years. First, I want to thank my supervisor, Prem, who became a true source of inspiration throughout my Master at CEU. I am struggling to bring my own past together with the insights he opened to me and my classmates in his classes on marginalization and colonialism – this thesis is a first attempt to bring them together in one way or another. Also I would like to thank my second reader, Alexandra, who challenged me especially with her feedback on the proposal for this work and thereby pushed me to conduct my research in a way I would not have done otherwise – even if I am well aware that I could not fully follow through on her advice. Additionally, I would like to thank Ute Tellmann for introducing me to the field of governmentality studies and cultural economy at the very end of my Bachelor studies as well as for providing me with advice, opportunities and assistance well beyond. Especially, I want to thank her for the chance to discuss a preliminary version of this work in a colloquium in Darmstadt. Moreover, I would also like to thank the Spolka Collective for a truly inspiring summer school in Kosice directly before my research started in 2019. It gave me confidence for my research and opened my eyes for alternative ways to perceive, think and map the ways in which we live in and through spaces. Jack for staying in close touch with me since we have met in Beloit and started to explore Anthropology together, as well as for proofreading this work. Gesa and Jonas for their valuable comments and suggestions which remind me of our common academic roots somewhere between “Staatswissenschaften” and International Relations. Next to these direct contributions, I want to thank my classmates and friends in Budapest. Especially, I would like to thank Endre for being so eager to help me with my research at the beginning – I hope this has not ended too disappointing. Marietta and Eszter for their valuable inputs as well as Menna, Slobodan, Ruslana, Ishan, Moslem, Lukas, Irina, Dorina, Orsi and Alexandra for their friendship. Szabad Egyetem has provided me with a political home and a place of learning well beyond academic reflection – thank you Charlotte, Miriam, Azamat, Theresa, Nima, Ottavio, Simily, Adrien, Giorgia, Filip, Viktor, Hannah, Lauritz, Mandula and many more. Looking back, I wish I would have been devoted to our common goals from the beginning to the end, but I hope to have at least contributed a little something with what I was able to give under the circumstances I felt myself in. Thanks to Lisette and Jan for living together with me in a place which became a true home for the first year and which I severely missed later. And finally, ElSayed for becoming a great friend and academic companion throughout these two years whom I will severely miss after all of this will end, as well as Rebekka for her great support, understanding, our discussions and the incredibly valuable moments we shared in these relatively tough times.

# Table of Contents

Abstract .....	ii
Acknowledgements .....	iii
Table of Contents .....	iv
List of Illustrations .....	v
List of Abbreviations .....	vi
Europe and the Danube: Two concepts of zoning .....	1
Zoning the EU in the Danube basin: Mobilizing Investment, Immobilizing Migration .....	7
Mobilizing Investments through Zoning .....	9
The European Dimension of Zoning.....	13
Immobilizing Migration through Zoning .....	20
Zoning Europe in the Danube basin: Mobilizing the Civil Society, Immobilizing Subsistence .....	25
Mobilizing German migration down the Danube .....	26
Immobilizing Pastoralism through Zoning .....	30
The Technology of Zoning as part of the Birth of Europe .....	37
From Europe to the Danube? .....	46
References .....	51

# List of Illustrations

1 The construction site of the new Danube bridge in Komárom in October 2019 .....	7
2 The industrial park in Komárom with the newly built roundabout which connects it with the EU financed Danube bridge .....	9
3 TEN-T Core Network Corridors 2013 .....	17
4 The gate to the transit zone in Tompa (Jardany 2016).....	20
5 The inauguration ceremony of the Ulmer Schachtel at the Hungarian-German School in Baja .....	25
6 The model of the Ulmer Schachtel at the Hungarian-German School in Baja .....	26
7 Migration of the Serbs (Seoba Srba) in 1690 (Jovanović 1970).....	31
8 An example of the compartmentalization of land in the predominantly German settlement of Nadwar (Richter 1997) .....	34
9 The Danubian notch system (Loczy 2008:11) .....	36
10 J.J. Becher's draft for an Art- and Work House in Vienna (Hatschek and Bödiker 1990:91) .....	37

# List of Abbreviations

CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EEC	European Economic Community
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
ESF	European Structural Funds
HIPA	Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

# Europe and the Danube: Two concepts of zoning

I ask for a history that deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms its own repressive strategies and practices, the part it plays in collusion with the narratives of citizenships in assimilating to the projects of the modern state all other possibilities of human solidarity.

*(Chakrabarty 1992:23)*

The discourse of Europe is not new: It now spans more than 300 years of history since its emergence in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century in response to the political split of the European Christendom (Schmidt 1966). In recent years, this discourse of Europe has been dissected and “provincialized” by postcolonial studies to overcome its underlying assumption of universal human life forms (Chakrabarty 2008). This attempt was supported by decolonization movements and intellectual efforts to recreate displaced histories throughout the 20th century. With the end of the “cold war”, the discourse of Europe has, however, changed further and now also needs to be situated in a postsocialist view (Chari and Verdery 2009; Owczarzak 2009). And most recently, climate change additionally started to challenge the European principle of distinguishing human and natural history as Dipesh Chakrabarty has also laid out (2009:201ff.). In response to these changes, there have been academic attempts to offer a global picture of power which does not start from the primacy of Europe or the West. One prominent example is Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s dispersed biopolitical empire which goes beyond territorialization under the banner of globalization (2000). In rejecting such a complete reframing of power away from its concrete spatialization which is so crucial to the original project of Provincializing Europe, other scholars have retreated to Europe itself and tried to take a closer look at European integration. With the formal end of colonialism and even more so with the end of the “cold war” this process changed the discourse and governmentality of Europe (Haahr and Walters 2004). Accounts like this, which center on

European integration, remain however too centered on institutions which are placed on the continent of Europe. They effectively silence the multifold connections and translations of Europe across the world which cannot be simply ignored because they are crucial for its reality (Bhambra 2009). Another strand of scholars has accordingly started to take a more situated look at European integration through the lens of postcolonialism, pointing to the colonial origins of the EU integration process (Hansen and Jonsson 2015) and postsocialism, elaborating on the concurrent forms of inclusion and exclusion in the process EU integration (Dunn 2004; Gille 2009). These accounts offer a much more fruitful path to the discourse of Europe today by understanding its specific forms of translation in a situated manner (Callon and Latour 1981; Haraway 1988). But these approaches also share a substantial shortcoming: By offering a specific perspective along the lines of postcolonialism and postsocialism, they reinscribe an analytical division between these two crucial influences instead of seeking to identify how they play out in a certain place – an approach which would also allow to connect these phenomena with the ecological question.

As Arturo Escobar's points out, a focus on place-based struggles allows to link "body, environment, culture, and economy in all of their diversity" (Escobar 2008:7). While the observation of such situated "socio-ecological metabolisms" can be traced back to the writings of Karl Marx (Foster 2010:Ch. 5; Swyngedouw 2006), they persist and intensify in relevance today as the crucial connections between different life forms become most visible. The increasing circulations across the globe which Hardt and Negri stress are in fact very much grounded in diverse places, attracted by the valorization of these differences (Tsing 2009). While this creates a challenging analytical puzzle, this groundedness also offers a methodological entry point to make sense of the discourse of Europe as *a* part of globalization. European governmentality with its postcolonial and postsocialist influences and the process of European integration then appear as a translation of this larger discourse of



Europe which becomes visible in the making of places and its emerging life forms – also, but not exclusively on the continent of Europe.

Inspired by an emerging literature of zoning which shares the basic assumptions of this framework (Bach 2011; Easterling 2016; Ong 2006; Opitz and Tellmann 2012), I suggest to analyze this translation of the discourse of Europe through the technology of the zone. The most prominent effect of zoning is the creation of specific civil and political life forms in a place through the organization of space into distinct zones. Accordingly, Jonathan Bach stresses in reference to Michel-Rolph Trouillot that zones are sites where “modernization as the geography of management is inextricably intertwined with modernity as the geography of the imagination.” (Bach 2011:99). In this sense, analyzing zoning also includes the insights of border studies with its focus on topologies of connectivity and disconnectivity. Borders are here understood as places of differential inclusion and exclusion to realize imagined geographies – like Europe. This turns inhabitants of these borderscapes from marginal subjects to “central protagonists in the drama of composing the space, time and materiality of the social itself” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:159). The focus on the border and its inhabitants does, however, miss the socio-ecological complexity of places which I stressed above, and which becomes more crucial in times of climate change. The concept of the zone is here advantageous to the border(scape) as it does not reduce space and life forms to mere performative notions but acknowledges that these technologies of power intervene in already existing socio-ecological metabolisms.

This notion of ecology is also stressed by the concept of the “critical zone” which aims to identify the different “ingredients” which define a part of the earth (Latour 2014). The critical zone I focus on in this thesis is the Danube basin. Here, the negotiation of postcolonial and postsocialist influences becomes directly visible, while the negotiation of Europeanness has also historic significance (Delanty 2002:49ff., 101ff.). *What I am doing in this thesis is*

*consequentially to assesses zoning as a technology of cultivating European life forms as the discourse of Europe translates into the Danube basin and effects changes in its socio-ecology.*

The collapse of the postcolonial and postsocialist histories of Europe in the Danube basin became most obvious in 2015 when Europe became prominently negotiated in relation to migration movements at the Hungarian-Serbian border. While in the 1990's most migrants in Europe originated from the postsocialist world (Fassin 2005), in the 2010's migration was associated with the aftermath of the Arab Spring and ongoing Syrian war. In their ethnographic study of the situation of Budapest's Keleti train station in Hungary which became part of the bordering process, Annastiina Kallius, Daniel Monterescu and Prem Kumar Rajaram specifically refer to "thought-provoking parallels between Hungarians' and migrants' positioning toward western Europe, both seeking a better life" (2016:31). In the case of Hungary, this "better life" has been described by Kisztina Fehérváry in terms of seeking a "normal life" in which the socialist history of the country is being written out of the national identity, seeking to reconnect "Hungary with its own presocialist, bourgeois-democratic historical trajectory" (2013:44f.). In the case of migrants who were coming to the Danube basin, the imagined destination was most often situated in non-postsocialist Europe, partially with direct adversaries against Hungary which is, in tendency, not identified as anything else than a place of transition (Crawley and Hagen-Zanker 2018).

Personally, as someone who lived in Germany for most of his life, I was however most upset by German politics in this situation. While being one of the most prominent destinations for migration, the border situation was here reduced to a problem of the nationalist government of Hungary. The border fences were understood as being constructed against the will of the majority of EU members while the EU was also perceived as having no major stakes in the Syrian war. This positioning of Germany as a "silent observer" was only doubled by the suspension of the Dublin Treaty for a couple of months which gave the Chancellor Angela Merkel a human face which was once again followed by a *Leitkultur* (leading culture)

debate. It is, as Rajaram writes elsewhere (2016:4), the “validity of the violence”, which he identifies in Viktor Orbán’s ascription of “lack” to migrants while placing Europe in “fullness”, that I therefore want to carve out for Austria and Germany. This is also my very personal motivation for this thesis. I want to make clear that the situation at the Hungarian-Serbian border was among other things a negotiation of Europe. This negotiation, in turn, is reflected in the place making of the Danube basin in which Austria and Germany have decisive historic and present stakes.

This thesis is divided into two larger chapters which are drawing a present and a historic picture of the technology of zoning in the Danube basin. In the first chapter, I start from the New Danube Bridge at the Hungarian-Slovakian border which has become a focal point of the cultivation of life forms in the Danube basin. Being built as a direct connection point to an industrial park in Komárom on the Hungarian side of the Danube, this bridge exemplifies today’s dominant form of zoning: the economic zone which has also been at the heart of most analyses of this technology (Bach 2011; Easterling 2016; Ong 2006). This cultivation of mobility in adherence to European governmentality is then compared to an immobilizing form of zoning: the transit zones at the Southern Hungarian border to Serbia. The constitutive relation between the two is explored by looking at the argumentation of Viktor Orbán as the Prime Minister of Hungary who stresses the need to limit migration for inner-EU trade to stay fluid. Overall, this chapter allows to see these two forms of zoning in the Danube basin today as part of a postsocialist nationalist discourse of citizen life which is oriented towards the postcolonial European social bond of trade and commerce.

In the second chapter, I then seek to historicize this nexus of the mobilization of capital investments on the one hand, and the immobilization of migration on the other. By starting from the creation of a model of the *Ulmer Schachtel*, a historic barge which was used in the 18<sup>th</sup> century for the settlement of German colonist in the South of Hungary, I present how at this time, zoning was used for the facilitation of migration down the Danube. Looking

closer at the affiliations of this form of zoning which was concentrated on turning common lands into parts of a system of allodial farming, I make clear that the differences between past and present are accompanied by a continuity of the social bond of trade and commerce. Diving deeper into this phenomenon, the three discussed forms of zoning appear as specific translations of the discourse of Europe which emerged in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Europe appears here as a discourse which stresses the primacy of trade and commerce for the creation of a social bond among different nations. This solution to the political problem of managing differences started as a problem of religious differences and signifies European integration until today in varying ways. While in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century this principle became translated to the Danube basin in the form of migration, today this European governmentality is represented by the establishment of industrial parks as junctures in the inner-EU supply chain. While the consequential displacement of othered life forms appeared historically through a direct displacement from land, today the immobilizing expropriation of resources which feeds into the civil society becomes visible in migration movements across continents.

## Zoning the EU in the Danube basin: Mobilizing Investment, Immobilizing Migration



*1 The construction site of the new Danube bridge in Komárom in October 2019*

The timing was good: Just one day before the 6<sup>th</sup> Forum of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region in 2017, the official foundation stone ceremony of the new Danube bridge took place in Komárom, a small town located at the Hungarian-Slovakian border in the North-West of Hungary. Together with Robert Fico, the Slovakian Prime Minister at that time, Viktor Orbán gave a speech in which he declared this new Danube bridge “a symbol of the fact that we are protecting Europe’s external borders and enabling the internal borders to remain open” (2017b). His Slovakian counterpart agreed: “When we are talking about Europe, about the EU and the future, then I feel that we are thinking completely alike. We have the same views on migration, and we believe that the basic condition is to protect the external borders of the Schengen area and that it's a gross violation of rules and promises ... when internal controls are carried out on the EU's internal borders” (Rendl 2017; Shoebridge 2017). This fear for the closure of the Schengen borders was triggered by the increase of migration movements to the EU in 2015 points to the relevance of the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border beyond the anti-migration attitude which is often too simply reduced to nationalist rhetoric.

The fear for an inner-EU “rebordering” must be understood as a fear for the reintroduction of the border controls, which the Schengen agreement from 1985 was supposed

to abolish. Indeed, the 2015 migration movements made countries without an own border to the outside of the Schengen area reintroduce temporary border controls on the basis of recently introduced exceptions (Hess and Kasparek 2017). The then EU Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker promptly stated that this rebordering could “kill the internal market” (Tempest 2016). In a parallel way, it is these inner-EU border controls which Fico and Orbán fear could hit their countries’ economic strategy of creating employment by becoming an integral part of the inner-EU value chain – with car production being the most prominent example in the two countries (Gerócs and Pinkasz 2019; Pavlínek 2002). In following this sentiment, I want to argue in this chapter that these two aspects, the mobilization of movement inside the EU and the immobilization at the Hungarian-Serbian border since 2015, have to be understood in a combined manner as a specific translation of the discourse of Europe into the Danube basin (Callon and Latour 1981). The Danube basin is here understood as a socio-ecological metabolism which stretches from the Black Forest in the South-West Germany to the Romanian shores of the Black Sea. In postmodern literature, this basin has already been acknowledged for its rich history, inner diversity and liquidity (Magris 1986), turning it into a epistemological contrast point to the “Fortress of Europe” or “Schengenland”.

The histories of turning this basin into a place of mobilization and immobilization through technologies of zoning which are at the heart of this inquiry, can in this way directly be reflected against an ecology which affords many different and alternative realities as well. Arguing that the realities I describe here, like the mobilization of transport inside the EU and the bordering of migration at its margins, are translations of the discourse of Europe means to take the situatedness of lived realities serious and try to understand how they emerge (Haraway 1988). By examining the bridge project endorsed by Fico and Orban in 2017, this chapter illuminates how the EU financed project emerges in the context of the making of industrial parks in Hungary’s postsocialist path towards European integration and capitalist development (Kiss 2003; Kiss 2010). Based on interviews in Komárom, I carve out the

crucial connection between the emergence of these industrial parks as economic zones and the logic of the EU structural funds that financed nearly 85 percent of the Komárom bridge. While this infrastructure financing is often communicated by leading EU politicians as a form of solidarity, I will argue that it is rather a translation of the postcolonial principles of European integration on the basis of a developmental approach which was developed in response to the decolonization movements in the 1950's (Hansen and Jonsson 2018). The complementary technology of zoning, namely the establishment of transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border since 2015, will then emerge in another light: They appear as complementary translations of the European discourse which is centered on economic exchange and cultivates respective civil and political life forms.

### **Mobilizing Investments through Zoning**



*2 The industrial park in Komárom with the newly built roundabout which connects it with the EU financed Danube bridge*

During a forum after the foundation ceremony, Orbán stressed the size and relevance of movement in the Danube valley: “[C]ompared with 2010, movement in the Danube Valley region has increased by 300 million tonnes of goods and 300 million people, and this necessitates further investment” (2017a). As he further elaborated, this is the reason why a Danube bridge was built in Esztergom in 2001 and the foundation for yet another bridge was

laid by him the day before. This centrality of movement as a political objective today becomes explainable when it is put in the context of Hungary's shift from socialism to capitalism in the 1990's. As Éva Kiss and Tibor Tiner argue in an article with the fitting title "Depending on motorways" that transportation costs have played a marginal role for the localization of industrial sites during socialist times while they became a major issue afterwards: "Recent investigations have underlined the positive effects of highways constructions on economic and regional development. Motorway M1 is a good example for that statement because it contributed to the establishment of several industrial plants and the shaping of a new spatial structure of industry by attracting foreign capital investments" (2012:136). While this fits David Harvey's argument that physical infrastructures like highways constitute a "spatial fix" to the constant contradiction of capital accumulation (2001), the universal application of the category of capital to the Danube region omits the crucial political work of establishing capital relations through micro-politics (Pasquino 1991; Read 2003). To account for this making how capital relations through zoning, it is necessary to analyze the process of how capital settlement in the Danube basin.

In the industrial park right next to the newly build bridge in Komárom, one interviewee affirmed what Kiss and Tiner found:

"[A] lot of investors are looking for areas here. We are in a lucky situation. Not just because things are going so well here but also, we are in a unique location from a logistics point of view. We have the Budapest-Vienna highway [M1] nearby, [the] Budapest-Vienna railway [...], we have the Danube and to be honest, the industry which is the largest in this area is the automotive industry in Hungary and Slovakia also, and we are somehow in the middle of this, the center of the automotive industry."

But when I was asking for the detailed procedures of making an investor settle in the industrial park, it became clear that despite the attractive location the establishment of a complex set of relations is crucial. This process of tying capital investors to specific places is the point where the governmental technology of zoning becomes directly visible. Describing this process, the interviewee laid out how the land in the industrial park is transformed from simple land into a place in which it is profitable to invest: A whole assemblage of people and



things is necessary to achieve this (Ong and Collier 2004). One of them was one of my interviewees who became the manager of the industrial park after the financial crisis. Another prominent actor is the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) which acts among other things as provider of state subsidies and a first point of contact. Together they establish the larger assemblage:

“At the beginning it is the confidential phase when they [HIPA] contact me. Which happens very often. And they say we have an investor looking for an area of two hectares, they need this kind of capacity, this larger capacity of gas and this and that. So, they ask whether we can offer them a location, and could you please send a map or, sometimes it is even more detailed like with Electric Supplies<sup>1</sup>, there was a huge list, it was really hard to deal with. Actually, I was in Germany on vacation and I had to negotiate the deal with them. Because they needed an answer, you know, until yesterday, so and there were really tough questions you know. Like the price of electricity connections for like 60 megawatts and things like that and it is not really easy to answer. So, I think this is also a really important factor: To give right answers, you have to impress them that someone is taking care of them, like giving the right answers as quickly as possible [...].”

He added that even if he gets in contact with potential investors directly or through a real estate agent, he usually refers them to HIPA first, because they calculate the possible subsidies the state could give – a sum which usually depends on the size of the investment, the location, the type of industry and the future number of employees. This aspect points to a crucial political motivation behind the zoning of land into places of investment: The employment of the population.

As regards this political aim of employment, the “good old days” in Komárom are still the early days of the industrial park which was founded in 1998 with Nokia settling in the park in 1999 with a large investment. This pushed employment in the park to a never again reached level of 18.000 workers. At the time of the interview, the region and also Hungary overall was, however, in a stage of labor shortage which, next to attracting investments, created a second political problem. A lot of the local citizens had found a job elsewhere when

---

<sup>1</sup> Name changed

the Nokia facilities shut down in 2014 after having already lowered its capacity since the financial crisis:

“Because we, even by the time Nokia was closed, and the other facilities were closed, people could get jobs because in the nearby industrial parks there were huge developments and they needed people. So, most of the Hungarian employees were taken by other companies. So, a lot of people, even today, are travelling daily to get to their jobs. Not so far, 40 km... but even sometimes you can see, it is really interesting, VW bus coming from Bratislava [...] or to Dunaújváros which is also very far you can see a bus coming here for Hankook, so that is also interesting to see. *The city's aim is also to get in contact with these people who travel daily and try to get them back.*” (emphasis added)

It is in this sense that the technology of zoning is taking place: Locally, in terms of the parks’ manager who tries to match investors, construction sites in the industrial park and workers in the region. And nationally through HIPA which negotiates the form of investments by providing subsidies in accordance with the political goal of creating employment.

In this process, it is also interesting to see the subsequent political tensions arise. In the local elections in 2019, the form and size of the “successful” industrial park in Komárom became a central political issue through the campaign of the opposition party to the governing Fidesz Party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). Building on a hostile attitude to the investments in the industrial park by Electric Supplies due to concerns of the safety of their production for life, health and environment, they claimed that the industrial park became a problem to the city as it was growing too large without serving the needs of the people. While the MSZP was not able to seriously challenge Fidesz as the governing party in the election (winning 2 out of 14 seats), the concern of an insubstantial growth of industry and the situatedness of Hungary in the EU as an assembly line of the “West” is now also shared by the governing parties:

“Because, rarely, it is a pain for the Hungarians, that we used to be, even during the communist time, we used to have a lot of research and development activities. And now it is more like we became an assembly [line] of the West. A lot of people say we should not be like this, we should have more activities that involve people's talent. Not to have people leaving to use their talent, that is a problem because mostly the educated once are leaving, especially. So, that's not really good. Even the government says they want to involve more R&D activities, so they would give more money, more funds for that.”

This aspect of securing the right type of employment in the process of zoning brings me back to the role of the new bridge at Komárom, which was mainly financed out of the EU structural funds. As I have outlined at the beginning, the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia were seeking to declare the bridge a substantial part of their commitment to the openness of borders inside the Schengen area for which they claim the borders to the outside would need to remain closed. Clearly, the bridge project is part of their strategy for growth and employment as the connection between infrastructure development and the zoning of land into industrial parks shows. But here it must be stressed that the bridge is not a national project, but a transnational one which involves political process on the EU level. And while HIPA and those responsible for local industrial parks are trying to govern the investments coming to Hungary on the given infrastructural basis – adjusting them through the described means – this kind of politics also emerges in the context of infrastructure development itself. To complete the picture, it is therefore necessary to show the relation of the local zoning to the EU which facilitates capital mobility and transportation of manufactured goods.

### **The European Dimension of Zoning**

While I have treated the logistically favorable position of Komárom as a given to show the politics involved in producing capital relations beyond the provision of infrastructure, I will now deepen the European dimension of the technology of zoning and show how this contributes to the shaping of the Danube basin as well. While the entanglement of infrastructural provision and European integration has already been discussed (Opitz and Tellmann 2015), the link to the historical emergence of Europe (see chapter 2) on the one hand and the situated entanglement with economic zones like the industrial park in Komárom on the other hand has not yet been spelled out. To better understand the role of the European Structural Funds (ESF's) in the making of industrial parks it is crucial to trace their emergence through a genealogical historicization.

The ESF's can be related back to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 which marked the transformation of the European Communities to the EU. The shift which underlies these institutional changes was the establishment of the European Single Market. In the process of its creation, the ESF's were at first demanded by Southern European countries to make their less competitive regions more competitive and enable them to stand the increased market pressure which would be created by the unification of markets. This very problem was also observed in the impact studies which were commissioned in the 1980's by Jacques Delors, the then commissioner of the European Communities, to the economist Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. The report published in 1987 warned:

“There are serious risks of aggravated regional imbalance in the course of market liberalisation. This is because different economic processes will be at work as markets integrate, some tending towards convergence, others towards divergence [...] Opportunities for convergence will be increased, but adequate accompanying measures are required to speed adjustment in structurally weak regions and countries, and counter tendencies towards divergence. In addition, reforms and development of Community structural funds are needed for this purpose.” (Padoa-Schioppa 1987:4)

While this argumentation and the subsequent implementation of the ESF's could be understood as an attempt to counterbalance market forces, I want to show that they rather have to be understood as the very basis on which the market liberalization became possible.

As Nicolas Jabko outlined in his book *Playing the Market* (2006), the European approach to “neoliberalism” took a “developmental approach” which actively produced market forces even when private businesses were not demanding it. In a parallel way, Michel Foucault has argued in his analysis of neoliberalism that the infrastructure provision argued for by German and Austrian ordoliberals is directed upon the making of markets and does not “limit” or “counteract” it (2010). Instead, infrastructure provision ties up with the zoning of industrial parks as joints of the European market society. In combination, they shape life and land alongside the principle of transnational exchange of goods and services while making other forms of living and land use invisible.

To show how the ESF's got shaped in this way, it is necessary to go even further back in history and show that the idea is not only affiliated with the political debates in the 1980's but also with the context of decolonization. As Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson have brilliantly analyzed, the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC), went along with the establishment of a common budget "that would finance social and economic development in the associated territories" (Hansen and Jonsson 2018:40). Back in 1957, this was a direct reaction to the Algerian uprisings since 1954 and an attempt to convince former European colonies of a common future under the header of "development". In 1957, the French Premier Minister, Guy Mollet, accordingly, told the UN General Assembly:

"France is negotiating at this time with her European partners for the organization of a vast common market, to which the Overseas Territories will be associated. All of Europe will be called upon to help in the development of Africa, and tomorrow Eurafrica may become one of the principal factors in world politics. Isolated nations can no longer keep pace with the world. What would Algeria amount to by itself? On the other hand, what future might it not have, as one of the foundations of the Eurafrican community now taking shape?" (cited in: Hansen and Jonsson 2013:16–17)

As Germany and Italy had lost all their overseas territories throughout the World Wars, they had a specifically articulated interest in a common market with the so-called overseas territories of France to get access to crucial resources which they missed themselves:

"The architects of European integration clearly understood that the west European landmass lacked the natural resources necessary for Europe's rebuilding into a viable geopolitical and geo-economic power bloc able to compete with the emerging superpowers to the east and west." (Hansen and Jonsson 2018:36)

While the Bretton-Woods System and the close cooperation with the USA also allowed to access the most crucial resources and provided a stable monetary system for its members despite the failure of "Eurafrica" (Hudson 2003 [1972]), the European integration gained new relevance with the end of this very system and the oil crises of the 1970's. In one of his pieces of remembrance of the time, Jacques Delors, articulates the reconfiguration of Europe writing:

"The crisis suggested that it would be a good idea to impart a fresh boost to the construction of Europe, and as the new president of the Commission, I had toured the capitals to submit three projects: a common currency, or common defence, or simply an institutional reform making it possible to extend the qualified majority voting method. There were ten member states at the time and there was no unanimity over these

projects, as there had been in 1946. Thus I resolved to ask them: ‘Why do we not set up a genuine single market? Remember that over the past five years you have lost 1.5 million jobs between the ten of you, and you have a very weak growth rate’. The plan convinced them, especially since the mood, the general climate at the time, was favourable.” (Delors 2012:2)

This makes clear that the EU emerged out of a situation of crisis and must therefore be understood as a historically specific response to the redistribution of power after decolonization became a primary economic factor in the 1970’s.

It is this shift which caused also a change in the mode of political organizing. From the controlled release of resources for incremental growth of the basis of Keynesian economics (Tellmann 2017:142ff.), towards a new regime of resource scarcity. The consequent omen of competition found its expression in the rise of neoliberal economics and the politics of market liberalizations which is reflected in the European Single Market (Mitchell 2010:199f.). As Can Yıldız and Nicholas De Genova show in reference to Roma migrants in the EU today, it is the determination of European citizenship along these very lines of resource scarcity that shapes the possibility to enact the freedom of movement (2018). Zoning appears also in this context as the technology which enables market mobility while discouraging other forms of movement: “Through the criminalising and securitising lens [...] of welfare protectionism and ghettoisation [...] ‘free movement’ is configured as a distinctly neoliberal project. [...] The mobility of Europe’s working poor, and particularly of Roma, transmutes the ‘free movement’ of presumably self-governing and ‘responsible’ individuals into a ‘problem’ perceived to be always a matter of unruly collectivities – (racial) formations of ‘group’ mobility” (Yıldız and Genova 2018:10f.).

Contextualized in this way, the infrastructural provision through the EU budget which was translated to Hungary with the PHARE agreement in 1989, becomes clearly related to the transformation of life forms in postsocialist countries and the respective enablement of the European Single Market:


“The need for infrastructure support is particularly important to enable the countries to meet EU requirements in areas such as competition, environment, energy (including

nuclear safety), transport safety, veterinary and phytosanitary standards and legislation for industrial products. Given the scale of the problems identified in the Commission's Opinions, a major investment effort by the applicant countries to meet EU standards is the only alternative to long and protracted transitional periods. If these investments were not made, the countries' ability to cope with market forces and competition would be weakened and, consequently, the benefits of enlargement reduced.” (European Parliament 1998:8).

In the field of transport infrastructure to which the New Danube Bridge belongs, the specific approach to organizing this infrastructure provision for the enablement of the market is reflected in the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). This network can also be traced back to the Maastricht Treaty in which this set of priority routes is already laid down and connected to the Cohesion Fund, one of the ESF's:

“The Cohesion Fund enshrined in the Treaty on European Union will help outlying regions equip themselves better for closer participation in the single market. The Community's contribution will focus on stimulating projects of European interest, helping to integrate regional and national projects and linking isolated regions with the heart of the Community.” (European Commission 1992)

Later, when Hungary joined the EU together with Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, this TEN-T was expanded towards their countries, as it was also done later when new members joined. This resulted in this most recent version from 2013 which includes Croatia as the last joining member until today.



3 TEN-T Core Network Corridors 2013

While the ESF's are meant as a response to the market pressures, these priority axes narrow the ability of the ESF's to respond to the needs of a specific country. As part of the larger idea of the Single Market, an individual countries' ability to withstand the market pressures created through the liberalization is limited by the *priority of European interest* articulated in the 1992 statement above. This primacy of European interest here recalls the interest of infrastructure development in the project of Eurafrika. Here, the goal was to develop infrastructure in exchange for access to crucial resources. While the postsocialist countries joining the EU have not many scarce resources to offer, they provide two crucial factors which are reflected in my analysis of zoning in Komárom and which are also reflected by analyses of economic zones around the world (Bach 2011; Easterling 2016; Ong 2006): Land and labor which differs from the conditions which are already present in the EU, enriching the diversity that can be valorized along the inner-EU supply chains (Tsing 2009). As my interviews show, the infrastructural development creates the basis for investment and employment – but it also creates an immobilization of life forms which diverge from this approach of development. In this context, it must be reinstated what became the concern of the Hungarian government as well: Even where the zoning strategies are successful, they mainly create manufacturing jobs while “talents” leave the country towards the “West” where the engineering, design or management jobs with high salaries are located.

It is in this context that the mutual constituency of industrial parks and transit zones at the border becomes clear: The approach of European integration is built on a development model which favors “European interests” over creating equal living conditions which were never part of European politics. Accordingly, EU citizenship is nothing that is simply achieved by joining the EU. Instead, belonging is acquired by establishing positions in inner-EU supply chains. The “pain” this creates is exemplified by the forms of labor which the zoning of industrial parks requires. While Orbán seems to firmly believe in the possibility of increasing the overall wealth of the Hungarian nations with this approach, the unleashed



competition renders migrants into obstacles of achieving this form of European belonging.

The work-state approach underlying this ideology was outlined by Orbán himself as part of his famous speech at the Bálványos summer camp:

“Since the state is nothing more than a form of organising the community, which in our case sometimes coincides with the country’s borders and sometimes doesn’t [...] the determinative moment in today’s world can perhaps be described by saying that there is a race underway to find the method of community organisation, the state, which is most capable of making a nation and a community internationally competitive. [...] The Hungarian answer to this question is that the era of the work-based state is approaching. We want to organise a work-based society that, as I have just mentioned, undertakes the odium of stating that it is not liberal in character” (2014).

Contextualizing this “Illiberal democracy” with the described challenges that come along with the EU’s developmental approach, it becomes clear that Orbán operates on an understanding of fundamental resource scarcity. This scarcity can only be alleviated by working people who are accordingly the basis to succeed in the regime of international competition. As Rajaram has rightly suggested, the resulting approach of organization renders migrants into surplus populations due to their ascribed lack of contributing to this work-based society (2016). To avoid reducing this problem to simply being nationalist politics, it is additionally necessary to link it to the broader processes of place making as I have tried in this first part of the chapter. From here, I now proceed with a more in-depth analysis of how the technology of zoning is not only employed to mobilize as in the case of industrial parks, but also to immobilize before I get to the rootedness of the idea of the work-based society in the discourse of Europe.

## Immobilizing Migration through Zoning



4 The gate to the transit zone in Tompa (Jardany 2016)

When the Hungarian government closed its southern border to Serbia through the construction of a fence, it also introduced transit zones at the former official border crossings Tompa and Röszke. On the first day of the borders closure, the 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2015, Ilias Ilias and Ali Ahmed entered the Röszke transit zone where they applied for asylum in Hungary. On the same day, their applications were rejected for being inadmissible, forcing them to return to the Serbian side of the border after their appeal against the decision was also rejected 23 days later (European Court of Human Rights 2019:3). Like many others who were waiting in front of the transit zone, they soon realized that entering the transit zone was in no way an equivalent to actual passage into Hungary: Almost all the people who entered the zone would be returned to Serbia within hours. Their attempts to claim asylum were thereby rejected without in-merit assessment. Effectively, the border was therefore closed from mid-September onwards, while a certain indetermination of this border closure remained (Hess and Kasperek 2017:66). The basis on which the closure of the border was judicially legitimized, and the transit zones implemented was a “state of crisis” which the Hungarian

government declared on the 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2015. It lasted for almost three years until 2018. The declared crisis effectively suspended the regular procedures for claiming asylum in Hungary by relocating the asylum procedure to the border and declaring Serbia a safe country of origin. This localization was crucial for the immobilization of migration. In the case of the industrial parks, political organizing is deployed to establish relations with investors who are at the edge of leaving for another place. Transit zones are instead used to push undesired migrants as far away from the ability to settle as possible by preventing access to support.

Giorgio Agamben defined such “states of exception” as “a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other” (Agamben 2005:23). In the case of the Hungarian transit zones at the Serbian border this indifference became clear through the way the two asylum seekers were turned back to Serbia on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2015. Despite the fact that they had decided to appeal against the rejection of their claims by the Szeged Administrative and Labour Court with the help of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Hungarian police and asylum authorities told Ilias Ilias and Ali Ahmed that following the judgement they would need to leave the transit zone towards Serbia voluntarily or be forced out and directly handed over to the Serbian police (European Court of Human Rights 2019:9–10). Rejecting to consider the evidence of their appeal against the judgement, the Hungarian authorities replaced legal procedures by direct political actions and effectively prevented the enactment of judicial rights. Agamben calls this form of action the “status necessitates” where “de facto proceedings, which are themselves extra- or antijuridical, pass over into law, and juridical norms blur with mere fact” (Agamben 2005:29). These de facto procedures were enabled through the technology of zoning as it placed the asylum procedures directly at the border and thereby ensured the formal legality of this approach:

“[T]he sum of all other relevant factors did not point to a situation of *de facto* deprivation of liberty and it was possible for the asylum seekers, without a direct threat

for their life or health [...] to return to the third intermediary country they had come from.” (European Court of Human Rights 2019:68)

While at no point, the migrants were legally entitled to re-enter Serbia and the Hungarian authorities also did not organize a transfer before threatening them with the forceful removal from the transit zone, the ECtHR based its argument that they were still not deprived of their liberty on the mere physical possibility to return to Serbia without the direct fear for their lives. Based on this physical possibility to leave, the Court finally also found that they left the transit zone out of free will (European Court of Human Rights 2019:65).

In a later judgement, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in another case that due to legal changes in Hungary after 2015, the transit zones now constitute a de facto deprivation of liberty because this ability to leave the transit zones to Serbia was no longer given (2020). Accordingly, this caused the Hungarian government to close the transit zones, raising the open question in which form the Hungarian government will ensure the effective right to asylum in the future. The crucial effect of the zoning approach was that it effectively reduced the chances of claiming asylum without discontinuing the possibility to claim asylum. That this was the intention, having in mind the primary goal of keeping the European Single Market functioning, becomes clear by looking closer at the statements of Viktor Orbán in 2015 after his talks with the Austrian Prime Minister Faymann:

“We believe that Hungary has been let down at a time when it needs to deal with a problem. The problem is, of course, mainly ours, because it is developing on our borders; but this is not only ours, as it is also the problem of Austria, Germany, and a fair number of other European countries. We feel that while Hungary is straining every sinew to observe the agreements that we all entered into – collectively called the Schengen Agreement – and to act in strict compliance with that agreement, we are receiving friendly fire from behind. We are protecting the border – which is also Austria’s southern Schengen border. Meanwhile, we are being subjected to criticisms and statements which are not only unjust – that would not be unprecedented in the history of Austrian-Hungarian relations – but, more importantly, which undermine otherwise flourishing Austrian-Hungarian relations” (Orbán 2015).

The criticism he is referring to in this part of his statement was formalized in 2018 with a vote of the European Parliament (EP) on the “clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded” (European Parliament 2018). Among the long list of

breaches which are referring to different sources and reports, number 66 regards the transit zone at Röszke. It includes the “violent pushbacks of migrants and refugees from Hungary to Serbia”, “the asylum procedures, which are conducted in the transit zones, lack adequate safeguards to protect asylum seekers against refoulement to countries where they run the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 [right to life] and 3 [prohibition of torture] of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights]” and the concern “that a transit zone, which is effectively a place of deprivation of liberty, cannot be considered as appropriate and safe accommodation for victims of trafficking” (European Parliament 2018). In the view of the Hungarian government, these allegations are wrong. Not necessarily because they are not factual, but because they stand in the context of the larger question of Europe which justifies extraordinary measures: “We have built a fence, we have stopped illegal migrants, hundreds of thousands of them. We have defended Hungary and we have defended Europe. This is the first case in the history of the European Union that it condemns its own border guards” Orbán said in his speech on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2018 before the vote on the above-mentioned report. The state of exception that made the border fence and the transit zones possible are justified by the Hungarian commitment to other European treaties – first and foremost the Schengen agreement which concerns the freedom of movement across the European member states.

To make sense of this justification, it is useful to go back to Foucault’s concept of governmentality and examine the relationship between disciplinary institutions and the state:

“We may say that the disciplinarization of the army is due to its control by the state (étatisation). However, when disciplinarization is connected, not with a concentration of state control, but with the problem of floating populations, the importance of commercial networks, technical inventions, models [...] community management, a whole network of alliance, support, and communication constitutes the ‘genealogy’ of military discipline. Not the genesis: filiation. (Foucault 2009:119)

In that sense, an analysis of the transit zones in Hungary needs to take Orbán’s justification of the defense of Schengen seriously as it concerns exactly the regulatory problems Foucault refers to. *The Schengen reference of Orbán points to a governmental taxonomy which allows*

*or deems disciplinary measures necessary to achieve a larger regulatory goal.* This allows, in turn, to reduce the Danube basin from a habitat of different lived realities to zoned elements of a larger framework towards which the space is being oriented. Analyzing the this affiliation is even more pressing as, to my knowledge, none of the Schengen members ever requested a discontinuation of the obligations for Hungary deriving from the treaty. A fact Orbán pointed to in his response to the criticism of the border fence:

“According to Croatia, we should dismantle the fence, and Croats and Hungarians should together set up a corridor leading to Austria, through which migrants can reach their final destination in humane circumstances. After all, they do not want to go to Croatia or Hungary, but to Austria – and above all, to Germany. [...] This Croatian proposal is contrary to all existing European legislation. But as I made clear in Bavaria, if Germany and Austria – the countries to which the refugees want to go – support this proposal, we can consider it. [...] The Austrian chancellor has explicitly stated that he does not accept this proposal. He has said that the existing international agreements must be observed, and he will make a statement to this effect. [...] In the light of this I asked him to fully support the efforts Hungary is making to control its borders. [...] In this respect, I did not receive a reassuring answer. The statement which the Chancellor will release will say that protecting the external borders is everyone’s individual duty.” (Orbán 2015)

It therefore appears that the disciplinary measures of zoning at the Hungarian-Serbian border are a direct attempt to secure the persistence of the European Single Market which relies on internal mobility and the deployment of “scarce” resources for the settlement of capital investments which are creating employment through the integration into inner-EU value chains. The resulting nexus can be summarized as a combined disciplinary-regulatory deployment of space in a differential zoning of the Danube region.

Situating this nexus in its historical emergence, I will now trace this web of relations along the Danube to the time when the discourse of Europe was born. In the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century Danube region, migration was enacted and perceived quite differently. With the help of the *Ulmer Schachtel*, a specific type of barge or boat, colonists resettled mainly from today’s South-Western Germany to today’s Southern Hungary in the aftermath of the Great Turkish War. Based on the then prominent form of Cameralist thought which emerged alongside the discourse of Europe, zoning played a role contrary to today.

## Zoning Europe in the Danube basin: Mobilizing the Civil Society, Immobilizing Subsistence



5 The inauguration ceremony of the *Ulmer Schachtel* at the Hungarian-German School in Baja

In October 2019, on a still warm and sunny day, a crowd of about 200 people gathered on the schoolyard of the Hungarian-German Center in the city of Baja in the Southern Great Plain in Hungary. On the stage towards which everyone had turned after the brass band stopped playing, one of the teachers of the school started to read out a story. It is the story which unites the people who came to this place because it deals with the early days of German colonies in Hungary. The teacher starts to explain in German: “In the 17th and 18th century, thousands set out from German lands with the ‘*Ulmer Schachtel*’ to find a new home in Hungary”. It is exactly such an *Ulmer Schachtel* which is inaugurated in the form of a monument on this day. Building a model of such a single-use ship which was used for the resettlement of people from the Southern German city of Ulm down the Danube has been the common idea of three different initiatives in the city. All of them engage in preserving and fostering the language, culture and community of Hungarian-Germans in the region. All the aspects which are so important to the initiatives have seriously deteriorated since the Second World War and even more so since the end of the Hungarian People’s Republic. The war first constituted a collective guilt of all Germans and hit those living outside of Germany most directly. Some were made to pay for the crimes conducted by the Nazis during the war by being deported from Hungary to the Soviet Union as forced laborers. But inside Hungary things also changed: It became prohibited to speak German in the Hungarian public, for



instance, which severely weakened the cohesion of the remaining community. After the fall of the iron curtain, many of those who had not assimilated into the Hungarian society, migrated to Germany – a place which was not their home in any way but where they hoped to find a better place to live. The very same reason that had already motivated their ancestors, with the decisive difference that they came from the other direction: Down, not upward the Danube.

### **Mobilizing German migration down the Danube**



6 The model of the *Ulmer Schachtel* at the Hungarian-German School in Baja

In this context between past and present, *Hoffnung* (hope) appears as a keyword which draws these times together with respect to the colonization and migration between Germany and Hungary. On the one hand, hope is what today's Hungarian-Germans understand as the main driver of their ancestors' resettlement to Hungary. On the other hand, it is also the hope that the ship will help to recreate the historic trust in this place and thereby help to save the existence of Hungarian-Germans as a minority in the area. What becomes clear in this reasoning is that it is not the relative ease of movement between Germany and Hungary today which gives Hungarian-Germans hope for their future. While the school at which the model of the *Ulmer Schachtel* is now placed organizes student and teacher exchanges with German schools and teaches German to almost all its students, this rather appears as a threat to the initial motivation behind the school's foundation after WWII: The preservation of the



Hungarian-German culture in the counties of Tolna to the West, Bács-Kiskun to the East and the Baranya to the South of Baja. Next to this explanation of “hope” as the naming of the barge and the very cautious reactions to my direct questions about the importance of the relations with contemporary Germany, this also became clear from the composition of the crowd that had gathered for the inauguration of the ship: The large majority of the people were older than 50 or 60, while younger people were only present as part of the cultural program organized by the school as part of the ceremony. For the new generation of German speakers who are educated at the school, the primary hope is no longer the preservation of the local culture but, if at all, the chance to employ their German skills for the realization of their professional dreams. One of the students I talked to told me that her mother had already studied in Germany and that she would like to become an interpreter after school. Nevertheless, the model of the ship on the schoolyard will in the future be used as a classroom for civics classes, in the hope that this will provide a more vivid experience of the past to the students and inspire the preservation of traditions and their roots.

Next to the ambivalent connections to today’s Germany, one of the most striking aspects during the inauguration of the ship was the absence of any reference to the political background of the historic resettlement of Germans to Hungary. In the story the teacher told, and which was later continued as a play by students on the ship itself, the focus was solely on individual fates and not on questions of governance. The motivation to emigrate from Germany was seemingly based mainly on individual problems in the livelihoods of people from different parts of Germany: “We are from Baden, we had to leave because there were no free plots for us”, said one actor who was dressed in traditional German clothing. “We are from the Rhine, since many years we were facing huge flooding. Now also our house was hit so that we lost everything”, said another. More reasons were meagre harvests or the rising taxes due to continuous wars in some parts of Germany. What was left out in these personal accounts is the question of why those people ended up settling in Hungary instead of leaving

for other emerging colonies. The Pennsylvania colony in today's USA, for instance, also attracted thousands of Germans in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Fogleman 1996). In both cases, it can be shown that the resettlement of people to the colonies was politically planned and organized through state administrations in one way or another. In the case of the resettlement of Germans to Hungary, it was the crown of the Habsburgs which was seeking to populate the territory they had reconquered during the late 17<sup>th</sup> century from the Ottomans through "state-sponsored immigration" (Bartlett and Mitchell 1999). The plan for this population of the territory was laid out for the first time in 1688 in the *Einrichtungswerk* (establishment treaty) which was developed by a special committee chaired by Leopold Karl von Kollonitsch with the crucial input of the Palatine Pál Esterházy (Hodson 2007). Kollonitsch was responsible for the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Kingdom as it was declared its hereditary land in 1687/88 by the Hungarian plenary diet under the impression of the war against the Ottomans (Mayer 1980:11f.). While the Hungarian nobility was able to keep most of its historic privileges, Hungary was now in principle subdued to the Habsburg crown up until the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867. In this setting and under the influence of Cameralist thought that gained popularity at the court of Vienna during the time (Seppel 2017), the resettlement of Germans to Hungarian colonies was organized.

While this political shaping of the role of the *Ulmer Schachtel* seemed to play no role in the remembrance of the foundation of the Hungarian-German colonies at the Hungarian-German school in Baja, *these circumstances are crucial for understanding the ways in which the movement of people and the creation of different life forms emerge across time and space*. This is not to say that the colonists were just political agents and that their struggles were only a byproduct of a larger agenda. On the very opposite: *It is through the composition of the different factors of land shortage through overpopulation in the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire on the one hand and the conquering of new land by the emerging state apparatus of the Habsburg Empire with a new economic policy which created a political*

*event that matters for people until today.* This conceptualization of the historic migration movement as an event in the larger spatial transformation of the Danube basin also points to the most striking aspect of the whole inauguration of the *Ulmer Schachtel*: Even though the stories of the hardship in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century brought up striking parallels to today's situation of migration in the other direction (see the first chapter), this unifying aspect of hope for a better future not only across time but also across different people was totally left out of the opening ceremony. This fact points to a moral differentiation between the remembrance of the personal migration background and today's migrants who are caught in hardship due to very parallel reasons: Wars, lack of economic resources and natural disasters. There are two related aspects which allow to make sense of this moral differentiation between the immigratory past of today's Hungarian-Germans and the situation of migrants at the Hungarian-Serbian border today.

The first aspect is the situatedness of German immigration in the era of colonization, rendering migrants into economic agents of change while today's migrants are rendered incapable of contributing to contemporary economic needs. Secondly, the underpinning economic logic of cameralism sought to create profit by enlarging the infrastructures of the state (*Kameralgut*) for which a parallel increase in population was deemed necessary. In today's neoliberal understanding, on the opposite, the population is deemed to be limited to save state resources for the good of private investments. Before I get to the aspect of cameralism as the driving force of the historic migration movement, I will now focus on the reversed form of zoning regarding migration: *While my analysis of transit zones in the first chapter pointed to the material deployment of space for a politics of immobilization, I show for this historic case of German migration to Hungary that the Danube basin was historically deployed for the mobilization of migration.* This form of zoning will serve as a first analytical point of contrast to the contemporary situation, laying out a cut in the history of the basin (cp. Foucault 1977:154). This cut consequentially points to the quality of the shifts at stake.

### Immobilizing Pastoralism through Zoning

In the last part of the play at the inauguration ceremony in Baja, an estate manager is welcoming the colonists with their families. He tells them to work hard, manage their land well, construct their own houses and cultivate the fallow estates. It is this story of unproductive land with untapped economic potential due to the long and devastating control of the area through the Ottomans which constituted the justification for colonial settlements, and which is remembered by Hungarian-Germans until today. In one of the many *Heimatbücher* (homeland books) in which mostly emigrated, former residents of Hungarian-German villages write about the history and culture of their lost homes, Gerhard Richter writes: “The retreating Turkish troops and the following Imperial-Hungarian army left the area between Danube and Tisza almost devastated. [...] At the time of the push back of the Turks, the southern and western part of the landscape between Kalocsa and Baja was empty for the most part” (Richter 1997:61). While most of the historical scholarship agrees on the depopulation of large parts of today’s Southern Great Plain of Hungary, Gerhard Seewann argues that the depopulation of some vast areas of land did not go along with the disappearance of the former inhabitants, but that they rather migrated further to the north, to cities or were hiding somewhere in the forests to escape the burden of double taxation. In reference to that, the idea that German settlers filled these gaps in the aftermath of the war is also called into doubt. Seewann argues that next to those returning from the north or the cities, the first people to settle in the territory severely marked by the war were not Germans, but Serbs. They fled the ongoing war against the Ottomans on the Balkan which would break out again many times during the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Seewann 1999; Seewann 2012:89ff.). Already during the still ongoing rule of the Ottomans, Serbs were settling on the territory because they mainly practiced pastoral agriculture which allowed an easier evasion of the double taxation through the Turkish and the Hungarian side in addition the socages for the landowners or because they were granted a special status as warriors by the Ottomans (Seewann 2012:82f.).

But in 1690, the Great Migration of Serbs intensified this trend based on a privilege by the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I. himself. The Serbs were granted religious freedom, free choice of leadership and exemption from taxes in exchange for their military defense of the reconquered territories (Seewann 2012:95f.). This makes clear that at the time when Kollonitsch formulated the *Einrichtungswerk*, including the plan to bring German settlers to Hungary, the military situation did not allow for these plans to be carried out on a grand scale. Instead, the Habsburgs relied on Serbs to secure the newly conquered territories militarily.



7 Migration of the Serbs (Seoba Srba) in 1690 (Jovanović 1970)

At the same time, substantial changes in the management of the land were already underway, recalling the infrastructure development of the EU today. During the Ottoman rule since the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Hungarian nobility still enjoyed most of their historic privileges, including the ownership of estates and claims on the respective taxes (Mayer 1980:11; Seewann 2012:82f.). But with the victory of the Habsburgs, the conquered land was declared *neoacquisita* (newly acquired territory) because it “got under the emperor’s submission and legitimate power and therefore befits our free disposal and benefit according to the rule of war” (cited in: Mayer 1980:21). Therefore, every former landowner who wanted

to claim historic possessions had to bargain with the *neoacquistica commissio*. While this measure was introduced on a provisionary basis during the still ongoing war to prevent the Hungarian nobility from making any larger claims on the territory as soon as the war would end, it became the new de facto situation over the years. The justification of this procedure, even if it was juridically based on the rule of war, was mainly of financial and therefore economic nature. As the war against the Ottomans after the long years of the Thirty-Year War had strained the budget of the Viennese Court, it was argued that the *neoacquisita* had to be turned into sources of profit. But the Hungarian state administration was deemed incapable of providing sufficient financial assistance on the basis of its own organizational structure (Kalmár and Varga 2010:154f.). Based on this justification, the policy of centralization deprived mainly the lower nobility of its land. Because they could not prove their former ownership in a sufficient way, their land became now managed directly by the *Hofkammer* (court chamber) in Vienna (Seewann 2012:108). After the first peace treaty with the Ottomans in 1699, this redistribution of land and the establishment of court-owned colonial zones for the settlement of migrants resulted quickly in an internal conflict between the deprived lower nobility under the leadership of Ferenc II Rákóczi on the one side and the Habsburgs with the support of Serbs on the other. In this conflict, the Serbs were forced out of Southern Hungary by those in favor of Hungarian independence for a certain period. However, the actual end of their privileged position in Hungary emerged with the Treaty of Passarowitz, which consolidated the Habsburgs rule over Hungary (Seewann 2012:98).

In this altered situation of relative peace with the Ottomans, the development of the *neoacquisita* based on the principles of cameralism became the new priority. While the Serbian peasant warriors had served the Habsburgs needs well during the situation of war, they were now understood to hinder the turn to arable farming which was supposed to intensify the usage of the land and thereby increase the profit for the nobility and the administration. Therefore, the Serbian peasant warriors were then forced from their former


plots to make space for German settlers. The estate manager of the Boly seigneurie, Ferenc Somogyi, expressed this in the following way: “We have decided to populate our district of Siklós with German subjects after our Serbs did not make progress on the side of arable farming, nor on the side of viticulture” (cited in: Seewann 2012:98). While there were various ways in which the resettlement of the land was enforced, what was central in this process was the instrument which stands in direct relation to the different economic approach of the German settlers, namely the principle of *allodial farming*. While this principle allows for higher yields through crop rotation, it requires the compartmentalization of land which before could be used commonly.

In parallelism to the zoning processes of mobilization and immobilization presented in the first chapter, I argue that this compartmentalization turned the Serbs from valued serfs into thieves and thereby displaced them from Hungary in large numbers: “In Southern Transdanubia, the settlement of Germans oftentimes served the landowners to supersede the Serbs out of economic reasons. This is because steady conflicts arose between the Serbs who herded their animals also on the freshly prepared fields and the conflict, the mapping of the land, varied according to the circumstances: As part of the state organized resettlements, it was often conducted before the settlement was initiated while in the case of resettlements which were organized by remaining or new landowners<sup>2</sup> the distribution of land was oftentimes self-organized among the German settlers agriculture practicing colonists” (Seewann 2012:156). The constitutive process of this conflict, the mapping of the land, was thereby also very different according to the circumstances: In the state organized resettlement, it was often conducted before the settlement was initiated while the privately organized distribution of land was oftentimes self-organized among the German settlers. Crucially, also,

---

<sup>2</sup> The Habsburgs rewarded some of their higher military servants in the war against the Ottomans with land ownership from the pool of the *neoacquisita*. One of the most prominent figures in this respect was Claude Florimond de Mercy who became the governor of the Banat of Temesvar (today South-West Romania) but also bought additional land in the Tolna and pursued a very active population politics (Fata 2008).

the immigration of German settlers and the displacement of Serbs was a process that started at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and lasted for many decades.



8 An example of the compartmentalization of land in the predominantly German settlement of Nadwar (Richter 1997)

The conflicts between landowners, German settlers and Serbs arose as part of the respective local situations of the land, the settlements and the preferences of the responsible landowners or administrators. In any case, the arising conflicts triggered a moral shift in respect to the Serbs. In the church chronicle of Egyházaskozár from 1737 the author writes: “Because the Serbs are a people of thieves our landlord, the family of Esterházy, strives to replace them through the settlement of Germans” (quoted in: Seewann 2012:86). This way, it becomes clear that the sentiment against Serbs and the settlement of German colonist was a vicious cycle that had its origin in the redistribution of land for the creation of higher profits. Accordingly, it is a substantial shortcoming to characterize the German settlements solely as an answer to the long Ottoman rule or the devastations of the war.

In reference to Frantz Fanon, the zoning of land along the lines of allodial farming must be understood in the context of European colonialism which spatially reflects the racially enacted taxonomy of a new economic era: “When you examine at close quarters the



colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. (Fanon 1963:39–40). In addition to this understanding of the crucial relationality between spatialization and racial taxonomies, I would argue following Foucault that it is not a “given race, a given species” which is reflected in and recreated by the organization of space. Instead, the positionality in a governmental web of power which is produced through zoning is what creates forms of mobilization and immobilization. As I have shown, the Serbian peasant warriors were for some time welcomed migrants to Hungary, while a shift in the political problematization and accordingly the governmentality turned them from peasant warriors into thieves.

In the same manner, the historic form of the Hungarian water economy (Kiss 2019:117f.) has been displaced through the transformation of the Danube area to which Germans immigrant contributed because they were transforming the meaning and arrangement of the land along the Danube. As the Hungarian ethnographer Bertalan Andrásfalvy has shown (2007), the water economy was based on the notch (*fok*) system which is “a man-made ditch cutting through natural levees and during high stages allowing water flow out over the entire floodplain and during recession back to the channel” (Loczy 2008:10). While, on the one hand, this system prevented devastations from uncontrolled flooding and constantly fertilized the land as it was practiced along the Nile in Egypt until the construction of the Aswan dam (Mitchell 2002:Ch. 1), it also provided a constant source of food in the form of fishes which could be held in ponds filled with fresh water from the Danube (Kiss 2019:114ff.).




Fig. 6 Typical 'notch' system along the Danube in the Gemenc Forest, 5 km north of the town of Baja (rectangle 3 in Fig. 1)  
 1 = Danube channel and traces of 'notches' in 1950;  
 2 = Danube channel and 'notches' in 1820 (source: Episcopal Archive, Kalocsa, map code KÉGL.T. 97);  
 3 = backswamps and lakes


#### 9 The Danubian notch system (Loczy 2008:11)

As the new form of agriculture relied on the utilization of as much space as possible and at the same time also in a time independent environment without seasonal flooding, the regulation of the Danube became a major concern ever since the 18<sup>th</sup> century shift in the economic reality in the area as it is noticed in research on the political ecology of water (Bakker 2012; Swyngedouw, Kaika and Castro 2002). The changing socio-ecological metabolisms of this new economic form carried out by German settlers in Hungary have already been noticed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century for the Boly seignury: “The woodland has decreased in this seignury especially in the German settlements because they were all eradicated, partially turned into fields, partially vineyards planted instead” (cited in: Krauss 1999:297). Today, some Hungarian researchers are attempting to employ this knowledge of the notch system to solve contemporary problems of flooding (Karácsonyi 2001).

As previously demonstrated in this chapter, the remembrance, production, practice and spread of knowledge constitutes a major aspect in the transformation of the Danube region. The deployment of space for state organized migration can safely be understood as being

rooted in a shift of the desired form of economic production. This shift towards something as coherent as an “economy” went clearly along with the emergence of the nation state which becomes also expressed in its very beginnings in the dominance of the administration at the court in Vienna over the nobility in Hungary<sup>3</sup>. The next section looks closer at this shift and grounds its emergence in the Danube basin of that time.

### The Technology of Zoning as part of the Birth of Europe



*A. Ist die untere galleri des Kunsthause. B. Ist die obere galleri des Kunsthause. C. Ist die Wohnung des Directors von dem Kunsthause. D. Ist die Vorkellereyische Schmelzhütt. E. Ist die vorersterische glashütt. F. Ist ein Brunnen. G. Ist ein Teich zu den Mühlwerken. H. Ist eine galleri zum Verkauf der waren.*

10 J.J. Becher's draft for an Art- and Work House in Vienna (Hatschek and Bödiker 1990:91)

In 1676, and therefore a couple of years before the Great Turkish War began, Johann Joachim Becher started his project of an Art- and Workhouse in Vienna (Hermann and Schönbeck 1991:138). The 16<sup>th</sup> century in Europe had already seen the establishment of many different correction houses which go back to the first of its kind: The Rasphuis of Amsterdam which opened in 1596 (Foucault 1995:120ff.). Becher, who had traveled to the Netherlands many times with the purpose of establishing connections for overseas trade and potential colonies, advertised an extended form of such a project in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century. While he had

<sup>3</sup> This thesis is also partially a contribution to the very problematization of the concept of “economy” while its time frames are set in a way that it circumvents discussing the times of the making of the economy again. For a discussion of the concept see Mitchell 2002:Ch. 3 and a methodological approach of studying the making of the economy see Escobar 1995:54ff.

observed that many workhouses were only used for punishment and forced labor, his main goal was to increase the wealth of the empire and its hereditary lands through education and training of a new generation of workers and merchants which would take on the dominance of the guilds at that time (cp. Walker 1998:73ff.). As a member of the newly established *Kommerzienkollegium* (council of commerce) in Vienna, where he arrived in 1665 after his service for the Elector of Bavaria (Hassert 1918), he published his main work *Politischer Discurs* which stands in direct relation to his life as political advisor and businessmen of which the Art- and Workhouse was only one aspect. The full title of this work is worth quoting because it nicely summarizes the main argument of this cornerstone of early Cameralist thought: “Political Discourse on the Actual Causes of the Rise and Decline of Towns, Lands, and Republics. Specifically, how a Land can be made Populous and Nourishing and turned into a proper civil Society.” Given this ramification of his political aims of a populous and nourishing land in the form of a “civil society”, I start the analysis of the Art- and Workhouse from his conceptualization of this very term and thereby contextualize its erection in Vienna.

On the first pages of *Political Discourse*, Becher starts to define the civil society as a nourishing community by identifying nourishment as the basis on which the population of a community can grow. While this already appears like a circular argument, he adds another point which makes it even more confusing: Nourishment originates from the community itself. But by articulating the underpinning moral principle, it becomes clearer what he is referring to, “namely that the people assist each other (*unter die Arme greifen*) and one helps the other to provide for a piece of bread through common trade and commerce (*Handel und Wandel*)” (Becher 1688 [1673]:3). For this principle to work, it is then crucial to bring the number of people of the three main estates (peasants, craftsmen, merchants) into a proper relation while the peasants are seen as the most crucial group because they provide the material basis on which the society can be build (Becher 1688 [1673]:6). The proper relation

does, however, also include the “servants” of the community who are not meant to rule but to organize. In this sense, the *state* is supposed to become a *government* which has the overview over the situation in the respective land and intervenes only to ensure the persistence of the main principles of the society. Everything that hinders the trade and commerce of the community is accordingly identified as a problem to the governors and must be challenged through their action. Becher himself discusses some of the typical problems of German lands at that time and thereby introduces also the idea of various state organized houses which allow for the smoother operation of trade and commerce. Next to the idea of a virtual house for the prevention of preemption through peasants, he here also introduces the idea of the workhouse.

In parallelism to what Foucault observed for the case of Rasphuis in Amsterdam, Becher’s idea was to increase the productivity of individuals to increase the nourishment of the community. But instead of focusing solely on beggars and criminals as most work or correction houses did, his approach was to give everyone who was unemployed or outcast from a guild the possibility to work, improve one’s skills and spread the knowledge across the empire, raising the overall wealth (Becher 1688 [1673]:244ff.). Instead of solely integrating “non-productive” people into the “productive” sphere of an already established civil society, *Becher’s plan was to implement this very structure of a productive civil society by the means of the Art- and Workhouse*. While in the Netherlands, England and France the transformation towards manufacturing and overseas trade was already on its way in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Habsburg lands along the Danube were much more caught in the principle of guilds which Becher accordingly identified as the main evil. From his point of view, the rigid structure of the guilds hampered the increase of trade and commerce (Hatschek and Bödiker 1990:63–64). While the privileges of the guilds would have to be suspended through the Imperial Diet which posed a political problem, by focusing on the implementation of workhouses and granting them extraordinary privileges could ease the problem by providing a sanctuary for those craftsmen who are not part of a guild without suspending the historically significant

structure of the guilds right away. Becher's idea was that as soon as someone masters their craft, they would be allowed to settle anywhere in the land, could train apprentices themselves and be exempt from forced itinerancy which would seriously widen the means by which trade and commerce could be conducted. *In short, the Art- and Workhouse can be understood as an example of Becher's vision of the civil society which breaks with the historic principle of the guilds and creates new forms of circulation of people and products across the Empire.*

The basis on which this new circulation would be conducted and held together is the described principle of mutuality. This mutuality can be understood as a bond that is based on the principle of work. The remaining task of the governor is to integrate as many people as possible into this work-based society and thereby increase the overall wealth of the lands. It is this new task of the government which Foucault analyzes in *Security, Territory and Population* for the time in which Becher was active at the Viennese court: "Things begin to change in the seventeenth century, at the time distinguished by cameralism and mercantilism, not so much as economic doctrines as a new way of posing the problems of government" (Foucault 2009:68). While he observed that the subject of the "population" has before been understood in the context of war as a direct support to the sovereign and therefore had to be obedient to the sovereign on the one hand and animated by zeal on the other hand, the subject of population was now placed in a more dynamic relation to the sovereign. This relations was oriented towards the expansion of the overall forces of production, not only to its adherence. And Foucault adds a point which is not directly visible from what Becher writes about but which can be understood as an interpretation of the idea of creating a new workforce outside of the guilds, namely the competition among the people of the civil society for the competition with other states: "[T]he population is a fundamental component of the state's power because it ensures competition within the possible workforce within the state, which of course ensures low wages. Low wages mean low prices of products and the possibility of export, and hence a new guarantee, a new source of the state's strength." (Foucault 2009:69).

Competition is then what becomes the guiding principle of the civil society. It is meant to ensure an increase of the overall wealth which indirectly helps to extend the power of the state in its international dimension.

But from where does this new principle of the society arise and how did it translate into the migration movement from German lands to Hungary which I described above? For both questions, it is crucial to consider the basic question of how the discourse of Europe translates into the Danube basin. Crucial for the rise of this discourse itself was the political division of European Christendom into Protestants and Catholicism in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. During the Thirty-Year War on the continent, the Baltic Sea to the North and the Danube to the South constituted the geographic boundaries of the respective Protestant and Catholic forces which they respectively were not able to cross (Münkler 2017). The Westphalian Peace Treaty, which is often referred to as the founding moment of the modern nation state, left the Holy Roman Empire and European Christendom divided by laying the basis for a politics of difference which Foucault calls security (2009:296–97). In the almost concurrent English Civil Wars, a quite similar problematic emerged. In response to this context, Thomas Hobbes published his famous book *Leviathan* (Foucault 2003:87ff.). In an attempt to de-historicize the arguments between the Catholic Royalty as the inheritors of William's Norman Conquest of England and the Protestant Saxonians who made their claims on the basis of the Saxonian laws, Hobbes was arguing not for one of the two sides but combined them in the idea that the king represents the people in the common interest of survival, eyeing the threat of the civil war. While Hobbes is often interpreted as a theorist of anarchy or the war of all against all, the basis of his compromise is accordingly the choice of life over death which the king as the sovereign must ensure – a view which shimmers through the vision of the state as primary organizer of the society that Orbán articulates in his Bálványos speech.

In the Holy Roman Empire, however, this Hobbesian compromise seemed quite impossible to reach: As Samuel Pufendorf analyzed, the Emperor did not hold any sovereign

rights on his own because the German lands were too heterogeneous and consisted of lands which themselves needed to be understood as sovereign entities (Schröder 1999:965) and acknowledged as such in the Westphalian Peace Treaty (Boucher 2001:561). Therefore, Pufendorf attempted to find a different solution to the problem of the Holy Roman Empire and found it in the principles of the *civil society* to which Becher later also adheres, taking obvious inspiration from Pufendorf. Instead of arguing for a solution of representation as Hobbes did, he builds his theory on *mutual obligations* to promote and cultivate the society on the basis of the imperfection of single humans (Boucher 2001:564). While Pufendorf upholds that the state is required to ensure this natural law of mutuality, his approach creates a very different picture of the state than Hobbes' Leviathan: Hobbes sees the state as the very basis of any sociality and thereby legitimizes the *politics of necessity* which becomes visible in states of exception as I have shown for the case of transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border. Instead of relying on this principle of sovereignty, Pufendorf advertised a *cultura vitae*, understood as “the cultivation of those arts that ministered ‘to the necessities and conveniences of Life’” (Hont 2010:46). These necessities and conveniences of life are, after all, the products of human labor which Becher focused on directly. The Art- and Workhouse can, in this sense, be understood as a place of the cultivation of life: It orients people towards the production of things through which they can fulfill their mutual obligation of contributing to the bond of the society. Accordingly, it is a bond of commerce which builds the basis of the civil society and not the sovereign state. Pufendorf and Becher aimed to find approaches for a politics of difference after the fall of Christian unity. They wanted to secure the peace among the heterogeneous and sovereign lands which could not be united under one “Leviathan”. To do so, they turned trade and commerce into the primary political principles.

It is at this point that *Europe* appears as a political term as an alternative to the formerly valid and widely used concept of Christendom (Schmidt 1966). As Schmidt describes, it is through the conflict between protestant forces in Britain and the Netherlands



on the one hand and Catholic France on the other that the term acquires its political meaning: It is the attempt to find an expression for the politics of difference which did not only prevail in the Holy Roman Empire, but also on the overall continent. In response to Max Weber's claim that Calvinism favored the rise of capitalism as dominant form of societal organization (2007), the governmental perspective of Europe allows for a different argument. Understood as a solution to the political problem of difference between sovereign lands and states, trade and commerce appear as central aims of political organizing and not as individual ethics. Protestantism is therefore not capitalist in nature while Catholicism or any other religion is not. It simply created a new political situation which was marked by fundamental difference. It is this situation which constitutes the basis of the discourse of Europe. The new forms of life produced by European governmentality are therefore also not sensible to religion per se, rather its respective technology of zoning aims at contributions to trade and exchange.

It is then in consequence of this new political mode that the state arises more and more in the form of a bureaucracy as the form in which the bond of the civil society becomes organized to ease the possibilities of trade and commerce as it is described for example by James C. Scott as the "gridding" of the state's gaze (1998). This gridding, which Weber described as "rationalization", is what brings the technology of zoning directly into the context of the discourse of Europe. It is through the creation of zones of land that the grid took shape in European colonies, as Scott describes for the case of America: "There it was a question less of mapping preexisting patterns of land use than of surveying parcels of land that would be given or sold to new arrivals from Europe and of ignoring indigenous peoples and their common-property regimes. [...] Not only did the regularity of the grid create legibility for the taxing authority, but it was a convenient and cheap way to package land and market it in homogeneous units." (Scott 1998:51). This shows that by attempting to facilitate trade and commerce, the state's first and foremost task became to reorganize already existing socio-ecological metabolisms in a way that would increase the circulation of produced goods

and money. As I have shown in the first chapter, the EU now inherits this principle of Europe in the form of market-making.

As I have outlined above, it was also in this context of the emergence of Europe that the immigration of German settlers to Hungary was organized by the Habsburg court in Vienna. While I have already made a case for the translation of Pufendorf's ideas to the court in Vienna through the person of Becher, I need to make clear how this directly connected to the principles of resettlement. Here, it becomes important that Becher has been a controversial figure who had many enemies among his contemporaries, especially also at the court in Vienna. Due to his radically transformative ideas, more traditionally oriented servants of the state were trying to prevent his thought and practice from becoming too influential while local merchants feared for their privileges. Accordingly, the Art- and Workhouse was not widely acknowledged as a step towards a better future but was manipulated most prominently by Georg Ludwig von Sinzendorf as well as local merchants who sought to put the new employees of the Art- and Workhouse at odds with Becher (Erdberg-Krczenciewski 1896:57; Hatschek and Bödiker 1990:21ff.). One of Becher's firm supporters, on the other hand, was Leopold Karl von Kollonitsch with whom he also made the first contract for the Art- and Workhouse as he was granted a respective privilege by the Emperor Leopold I after becoming the Bishop of Wiener Neustadt in 1670. Becher and Kollonitsch were influenced by each other and cooperated in Vienna to realize their common ideas. And it was exactly Kollonitsch who – as I have mentioned above – was responsible for the *Einrichtungswerk* which suggested the settlement of German colonists in Hungary. In the justification of this policy, the influence of Becher and consequently the political philosophy of Pufendorf become obvious: Instead of arguing for the forced repopulation of the land, the idea is to incentivize settlers to come to the *neoacquisita* by providing free pieces of land, generous tax exemptions in the first years as well as reduced socages and religious freedoms (Kalmár and Varga 2010:131). What emerges here as counterpart to the zoning of land is the *free subject* who is

no longer a serf but now bonded to the band of the *civil society* in the sense that the main relation is not obedience but *contribution*. This citizen relationship is therefore not simply “free” but turns from direct subordination to the landowner to the sovereign of the land. The specific focus on German settlers can therefore be understood mainly from this perspective of the expected economic contributions as outlined above.

On the basis of the insight of this chapter, namely that the technology of zoning has to be understood in the context of the emergence of Europe as a strategy of difference which relies on the creation of a civil society as a commercial bond among sovereign states, the momentary situation of attraction of capital investments and rejection of migration can be understood as part of this discourse of Europe. The historical difference explored in this chapter becomes explainable through the different understanding of German migration: Based on Cameralist thinking, their resettlement was deemed a contribution the principle of the civil society, while today this contribution materializes in capital investments. Due to the politics of scarcity that got inscribed into the European Single Market, migrants are today perceived as threat or challenge to the realization of the civil and political life of the work-based society.

## From Europe to the Danube?

Starting from the industrial park in Komárom at the Hungarian-Slovakian border, I have pointed to different forms of zoning which translate the discourse of Europe into the Danube basin. Bringing the micro-politics of capital relations together with the history of EU infrastructure projects like the adjacent New Danube Bridge, I first presented the technology of zoning in the way it mobilizes a certain European imaginary. Then, I identified its immobilizing counterpart in the transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border. While being migrant's first point of contact with the EU member Hungary, it often also stays the only one due to the direct rejection of most asylum claims. While the micro-politics of establishing capital relations through zoning implies the deployment and preparation of space for the immediate settlement of capital investors, transit zones organize space for the immediate rejection of migrants to Serbia.

Situating this nexus of mobilizing capital investments on the one hand and immobilizing migration on the other in the historical making of the Danube basin, I went back to the time when the discourse of Europe gained prominence for the first time in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century. Through this comparison, I made clear that migration to the region has historically been mobilized by yet another form of zoning: The gridding of pastureland into arable land. The *Ulmer Schachtel*, a type of barge with which the resettlement of Germans down the Danube towards Hungary was organized, appears here as an equivalent to the New Danube Bridge in contemporary Europe. Providing the necessary transport infrastructure to facilitate specific movements, both infrastructures appear as constitutive parts of the zoning of Europe. Together, these infrastructural and micro-political organizations of space can be identified as parts of the governmentality of Europe.

It is through the mapping of this governmentality of Europe, that the observed historic discontinuities become intelligible. The mobilization of migration in the past and its immobilization in the present, are both based on the idea of the civil society as defining

moment of the governmentality of Europe. The described technologies of zoning all aim at spatializing desirable life forms in the Danube basin which become defined through respective economic contributions. Religious unity, which was the defining moment before the emergence of the discourse of Europe, became replaced by a new social bond that is oriented towards trade and commerce. The resettlement of German settlers was consequentially facilitated because their approach to agricultural production was more profitable than pastoralism. Today, this desired economic contribution and increased profitability is instead ascribed to foreign capital investments which are also supposed to increase employment.

The resource scarcity underlying the creation of the European Single Market in the 1980's and the focus on international capital investments, finds its immobilizing expression in the transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border. Migrants' ability to contribute to the work-based society in times of specialized supply chain-oriented manufacturing is here generally called into question. The same holds true for the situation in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, when the formerly officially invited Serbian peasant warriors with their pastoral orientation were displaced through the zoning of pastureland into arable land, rendering them from protectors to thieves. The difference is, however, that the historic displacement of Serbs and the dismissal of the Hungarian water economy which went along the German settlements were situated in the same space. Today's supply chain capitalism tears the mobilization of industrial parks and the immobilization of migration apart due to its dispersed valorization.

Throughout this analysis of the technology of zoning as part of the governmentality of Europe, I have shown how the historically different moral landscapes of mobilization and immobilization become translated into the socio-ecological context of the Danube basin. As I have argued at the beginning, this allows for a strategic starting point of my analysis which furthers the concept of Provincializing Europe by grounding the discourse of Europe and its affiliated technologies. While I am aware that the respective results of this thesis are only a

small and quite weak application of this idea, it aims towards a contribution to a new discourse which is looking to re-zone Europe. The destructive socio-ecological processes which the orientation of the societal bond on economic production has created became known under different headings from Anthropocene to Capitalocene (Moore 2016). As part of the need to challenge this development, I used the idea of the “critical zone” to slightly reorient the concept of governmentality from the technology of zoning for the enablement of global circulations towards a situated or grounded understanding of zoning. The concept of metabolism in political ecology suggests that all processes are inevitably engrained in socio-ecological exchange processes – a generality which Karl Marx tried to capture with the term labor which is not necessarily exchanged for wages but situates humans in the world (Swyngedouw 2006:109). What I tried to show in the awareness of this fundamental basis of the human condition is then how the governmental technology of zoning creates forms of life which appear separated from this condition through a spatial order which emphasizes exchange over (re)creation and creative change.

While this form of zoning enables social bonds among different people, it finds its limits in the capability to exchange and contribute by being denied access to the very resources which enable this exchange activity. The “critical zone” is accordingly an attempt to develop an alternative orientation point which tries to navigate this political problem towards a new socio-ecological bond. Arturo Escobar can be mentioned here as an anthropologist who has already started to explore such alternatives in the Pacific Region of Columbia (2008; 2018). In reference to the Danube region, Claudio Magris points to the river as a situated and yet constantly displacing socio-ecology of Europe because it emerges not in zones but as a vulnerable and distributed concert of different influences:

“If the river is visible water, exposed to the sky and to the eyes of humanity, that gutter is Danube. So far the report is above criticism. If one goes to the banks of a river at different places and at different times, pointing one’s finger at the water each time and

saying ‘Danube’ [...] we eventually arrive at the identity of the Danube. The Danube exists, there is no doubt about it. If Amedeo [looking for *the* source of the Danube] clambers panting up the slope, pointing his index finger and saying ‘Danube’ over and over again, indicating the source of the Breg, the rivulets in the meadow which feed it, and the gutter which feeds the rivulets, then that is the Danube.” (1986:Ch. 3)

The Danube is in this sense a multiplicity of life forms which is created through the flowing relationality among them. None of these constituents alone can be identified as *the* origin and thereby give way to a Danubian identity – as it was attempted in the Habsburgian past (Király 2017). Instead, the flowing of the Danube is an expression of the principle of a “change-exchange” (Castro 2014:218). This means that the movement of the water which constitutes the Danube basin creates an interdependent socio-ecological system which does not allow for an essentializing of individual positions as the exchange among them is in fact changing the present life forms. The vulnerability or precarity of identities is therefore what makes the principle of the Danube go beyond the discourse of Europe.

Pufendorf’s idea presented in this thesis was an answer to the problem of difference in the Holy Roman Empire and gave way to practices of civil and political life which influence life forms in the Danube basin until today. The idea of exchange here fundamentally relies on the production of exchangeable goods among different people and nations. But the effect of this reduction to the exchange of things and labor also results in an intensification of national identities. The trade wars in the mercantilist and imperialist eras and the colonization which influences Europe until today are clear expressions of this “exchange division”. Here, the Danube offers a counter imaginary as it is a multiplicity with vulnerable connections and relations where exchange is not prevented from causing change among the precarious life forms to which the water gives way. In this picture, the socio-ecological bond is then not to be understood a matter of survival but a matter of living interdependently which entails the acknowledgement of death and failure as Donna Haraway stresses: “I think an affirmative

biopolitics is about finitude, and about living and dying better, living and dying well, and nurturing and killing best we can, in a kind of openness to relentless failing” (Haraway and Wolfe 2016:227). In this sense, the Danubian alternative to Europe is not one with an abundance of resources and unrestricted freedom – this would rather be a continuation of capitalist dreams which can only be realized for a small minority on the backs of the majority of life forms. Rather, it is about an ethics of place, where change is allowed through the exchange of life forms. Where migration, for instance, is not understood as a threat to a set of guiding principles which are to be left untouched but as encounters which might or might not open new paths while disclosing essentialisms. It is the violent attempt to constantly disentangle death and life worlds through the described technology of zoning which prevents this change from happening. Here, the Danube might inspire life forms beyond Europe.



# References

- Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. *State of Exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Andrásfalvy, Bertalan. 2007. *A Duna mente népének ártéri gazdálkodása: Ártéri gazdálkodás Tolna és Baranya megyében az ármentesítési munkák befejezése előtt*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Budakeszi: Ekvilibrium.
- Bach, Jonathan. 2011. "Modernity and the Urban Imagination in Economic Zones." *Theory, Culture & Society* 28(5):98–122. doi:10.1177/0263276411411495.
- Bakker, Karen. 2012. "Water: Political, biopolitical, material." *Social Studies of Science* 42(4):616–23. doi:10.1177/0306312712441396.
- Bartlett, Roger, and Bruce Mitchell. 1999. "State-Sponsored Immigration into Eastern Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries." Pp. 91–114, in *The German Lands and Eastern Europe: Essays on the History of their Social, Cultural and Political Relations*, edited by R. Bartlett and K. Schönwälder. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Becher, Johann J. 1688 [1673]. *Politischer Discurs: Von den eigentlichen Vrsachen, deß Auf- und Abnehmens, der Städt, Länder und Reublickten*. In specie, Wie ein Land Volckreich und Nahrhafft zu machen, und in eine rechte Societatem civilem zu bringen. Auch wird von dem Bauren- Handwercks und Kauffmannsstand, derer Handel und Wandel, Item, Von dem Monopolio, Polypolio und Propolio, von allgemeinen Land-Magazinen, Niederlagen, Kauffhäusern, Montibus Pietatis, Zucht- und Werckhäusern, Wechselbäncken und dergleichen außführlich gehandelt. Franckfurt: Zunner.
- Bhambra, Gurinder K. 2009. "Postcolonial Europe, or understanding Europe in times of the postcolonial." *Sage Handbook of European Studies*. London: Sage :69–85.
- Boucher, David. 2001. "Resurrecting Pufendorf and capturing the Westphalian moment." *Review of International Studies* 27(4):557–77. doi:10.1017/S0260210501005575.
- Callon, Michel, and Bruno Latour. 1981. "Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do so." 277–303, In *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*, edited by K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Castro, Eduardo B. V. de. 2014. *Cannibal Metaphysics: for a Post-Structural Anthropology*. Minneapolis, MN: Univocal.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 1992. "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for "Indian" Past?" *Representations* 37:1–26.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2008. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2009. "The Climate of History: Four Theses." *Critical Inquiry* 35(2):197–222. doi:10.1086/596640.

- Chari, Sharad, and Katherine Verdery. 2009. "Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51(1):6–34. doi:10.1017/s0010417509000024.
- Court of Justice of the European Union. 2020. *The placing of asylum seekers or third-country nationals who are the subject of a return decision in the Röszke transit zone at the Serbian-Hungarian border must be classified as 'detention'*. Retrieved May 25, 2020 (<https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-05/cp200060en.pdf>).
- Crawley, Heaven, and Jessica Hagen-Zanker. 2018. "Deciding Where to go: Policies, People and Perceptions Shaping Destination Preferences." *International Migration*. doi:10.1111/imig.12537.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2002. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Delors, Jacques. 2012. *The Single Market, Cornerstone of the EU*. Paris. Retrieved November 16, 2018 (<http://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/singlemarketeucornerstone-delors-ne-jdi-nov12.pdf>).
- Dunn, Elizabeth C. 2004. "Standards and Person-Making in East Central Europe." Pp. 173–93, in *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, edited by A. Ong and S. J. Collier. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Easterling, Keller. 2016. *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space*. London, New York: Verso.
- Erdberg-Krczenciewski, Robert A. W. von. 1896. *Johann Joachim Becher: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Nationalökonomik*. Vol. 6. Jena: Fischer.
- Escobar, Arturo. 1995. *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Escobar, Arturo. 2008. *Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes*. Durham, London: Duke University Press Books.
- Escobar, Arturo. 2018. *Designs for the Pluriverse: Radical Interdependence, Autonomy, and the Making of Worlds*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- European Commission. 1992. *Future Development of Common Transport Policy: An Overall Approach*. Retrieved December 9, 2019 (<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/P9263>).
- European Court of Human Rights. 2019. *Case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary* (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-198760>).
- European Parliament. 1998. *Briefing No 33: The PHARE Programme and the enlargement of the European Union* ([http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm)).
2018. *European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)): The situation in Hungary* ([https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340_EN.pdf)).

- Fanon, Frantz. 1963. *Wretched of the earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Fassin, Didier. 2005. "Compassion and Repression: the Moral Economy of Immigration Policies in France." *Cultural Anthropology* 20(3):362–87. doi:10.1525/can.2005.20.3.362.
- Fata, Márta. 2008. "Die Rolle des Militärs in der habsburgischen Impopulationspolitik außerhalb der Militärgrenze in der Übergangszeit zwischen Krieg und Frieden (1686–1740)." Pp. 251–64 in *Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der frühen Neuzeit*, Bd. 9, *Krieg, Militär und Migration in der frühen Neuzeit*, edited by M. Asche. Berlin, Münster: Lit Verlag.
- Fehérváry, Krisztina. 2013. *Politics in color and concrete: Socialist materialities and the middle class in Hungary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Fogleman, Aaron S. 1996. *Hopeful Journeys: German Immigration, Settlement, and Political Culture in Colonial America, 1717-1775*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Foster, John B. 2010. *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1977. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Pp. 139–64, in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, edited by D. F. Bouchard. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1995. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, Michel. 2003. *"Society must be defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. New York: Picador.
- Foucault, Michel. 2009. *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Foucault, Michel. 2010. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-79*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Geröcs, Tamás, and András Pinkasz. 2019. "Relocation, standardization and vertical specialization: Core-periphery relations in the European automotive value chain." *Society and Economy* 41(2):171–92. doi:10.1556/204.2019.001.
- Gille, Zsuzsa. 2009. "The Tale of Toxic Paprika." Pp. 57–77, in *Food & everyday life in the postsocialist world*, edited by E. C. Dunn, M. Nestle, and M. L. Caldwell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Haahr, Jens H., and William Walters. 2004. *Governing Europe: discourse, governmentality and European integration*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. 2013. "A Statue to Nasser?: Eurafrica, the Colonial Roots of European Integration, and the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24(4):5–18.
- Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. 2015. *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

- Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. 2018. "European Integration as Colonial Project." Pp. 32–47, in *Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics*, edited by O. U. Rutazibwa and R. Shilliam. Oxon, New York: Taylor & Francis.
- Haraway, Donna. 1988. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective." *Feminist Studies* 14(3):575. doi:10.2307/3178066.
- Haraway, Donna J., and Cary Wolfe. 2016. *Manifestly Haraway*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2001. "Globalization and the "Spatial Fix"." *geographische revue* 2:23–30.
- Hassert, Kurt. 1918. "Johann Joachim Becher, ein Vorkämpfer deutscher Kolonialpolitik im 17. Jahrhundert." *Koloniale Rundschau: Zeitschrift für Weltwirtschaft und Kolonialpolitik* 1918.
- Hatschek, Hans J., and Tonio Bödiker. 1990. *Das Manufakturhaus auf dem Tabor in Wien*. Bad Feilnbach: Schmidt.
- Hermann, Armin, and Charlotte Schönbeck, editors. 1991. *Technik und Kultur, Technik und Wissenschaft*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
- Hess, Sabine, and Bernd Kasperek. 2017. "De- and Restabilising Schengen: The European Border Regime After the Summer of Migration." *Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto* (56):47. doi:10.18543/ced-56-2017pp47-77.
- Hodson, Brian A. 2007. "The Development of Habsburg Policy in Hungary and the Einrichtungswerk of Cardinal Kollonich, 1683–90." *Austrian History Yearbook* 38:92. doi:10.1017/S0067237800021433.
- Hont, Istvan. 2010. *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press.
- Hudson, Michael. 2003 [1972]. *Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Jabko, Nicolas. 2006. *Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
- Jardany, Bence. 2016. *Rebecca Harms: Visit to Röske and Tompa*. Gate. Hungary ([https://www.flickr.com/photos/rebecca\\_harms/26518256570](https://www.flickr.com/photos/rebecca_harms/26518256570)).
- Kallius, Annastiina, Daniel Monterescu, and Prem K. Rajaram. 2016. "Immobilizing mobility: Border ethnography, illiberal democracy, and the politics of the "refugee crisis" in Hungary." *American Ethnologist* 43(1):25–37.
- Kalmár, János, and János J. Varga, editors. 2010. *Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Mitteleuropa Quellen, Einrichtungswerk des Königreichs Hungarn (1688 - 1690) [Establishment Act of the Kingdom of Hungary]*. Stuttgart: Steiner.

- Karácsonyi, Zoltán. 2001. "Rehabilitation of the 'notch'-System as Tool for Multipurpose Floodplain Management on the Upper-Tisza River." Pp. 119–23, In *River Restoration in Europe: Practical Approaches*. Conference on River Restoration, Wageningen, The Netherlands, 2000, edited by H. J. Nijland and M.L.R. Cals. Lelystad: RIZA.
- Király, Edit. 2017. *"Die Donau ist die Form": Strom-Diskurse in Texten und Bildern des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Band 27. Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag (<https://doi.org/10.7767/9783205206118>).
- Kiss, Andrea. 2019. *Floods and Long-Term Water-Level Changes in Medieval Hungary*. Cham: Springer.
- Kiss, Éva. 2003. "Industrial Parks in Hungary: Their Furthering and Role in Regional Economic Development." *Regional Symbiosis* (11):47–64.
- Kiss, Éva. 2010. *Területi szerkezetváltás a magyar iparban 1989 után*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus K.
- Kiss, Éva, and Tibor Tiner. 2012. "Depending on motorways – transport connections of Hungarian industrial parks and their enterprises." *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 61(2):131–54 ([http://epa.oszk.hu/02500/02541/00014/pdf/EPA02541\\_hungeobull\\_2012\\_2.pdf](http://epa.oszk.hu/02500/02541/00014/pdf/EPA02541_hungeobull_2012_2.pdf)).
- Krauss, Karl-Peter. 1999. "Ansiedlung als Prozess: Deutsche Kolonisten in der Herrschaft Bóly." Pp. 291–315 in *Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde*, vol. 4, *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen, Formen, Verlauf, Ergebnis*, edited by M. Beer and D. Dahlmann. Stuttgart: Thorbecke.
- Latour, Bruno. 2014. "Some Advantages of the Notion of "Critical Zone" for Geopolitics." *Procedia Earth and Planetary Science* 10:3–6. doi:10.1016/j.proeps.2014.08.002.
- Loczy, Denes. 2008. "The Changing Geomorphology of Danubian Floodplains in Hungary." *Hrvatski geografski glasnik/Croatian Geographical Bulletin* 69(02):5–19. doi:10.21861/HGG.2007.69.02.01.
- Magris, Claudio. 1986. *Danube*. London: Vintage.
- Mayer, Theodor. 1980. *Verwaltungsreform in Ungarn nach der Türkenzeit*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke.
- Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2013. *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham, London: Duke University Press.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 2010. "The Resources of Economics." *Journal of Cultural Economy* 3(2):189–204. doi:10.1080/17530350.2010.494123.
- Moore, Jason W., editor. 2016. *Kairos, Anthropocene or Capitalocene?: Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.

- Münkler, Herfried. 2017. *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Europäische Katastrophe, deutsches Trauma 1618-1648*. Berlin: Rowohlt.
- Ong, Aihwa, and Stephen J. Collier. 2004. "Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems." Pp. 3–22, in *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, edited by A. Ong and S. J. Collier. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Opitz, S., and U. Tellmann. 2015. "Europe as Infrastructure: Networking the Operative Community." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 114(1):171–90. doi:10.1215/00382876-2831356.
- Opitz, Sven, and Ute Tellmann. 2012. "Global territories: zones of economic and legal dis/connectivity." *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 13(3):261–82. doi:10.1080/1600910X.2012.724432.
- Orbán, Viktor. 2014. *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 (<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp>).
- Orbán, Viktor. 2015. *Statement by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the international press conference Website of the Hungarian Government*. Retrieved October 27, 2018 (<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/statement-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-international-press-conference>).
- Orbán, Viktor. 2017a. "Europe should have external borders which are closed, and internal ones which are open." (<https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/europe-should-have-external-borders-which-are-closed-and-internal-ones-which-are-open>).
- Orbán, Viktor. 2017b. "We are protecting Europe's external borders and enabling the internal borders to remain open." (<https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/we-are-protecting-europe-s-external-borders-and-enabling-the-internal-borders-to-remain-open>).
- Owczarzak, Jill. 2009. "Introduction: Postcolonial studies and postsocialism in Eastern Europe." *Focaal* 2009(53):3–19. doi:10.3167/fcl.2009.530101.
- Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso. 1987. *Efficiency, Stability, and Equity: A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community*. Brussels: Study Group on the Integration Strategy of the European Community. Retrieved May 1, 2019 ([http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu\\_history/documentation/chapter12/19870410en149efficien cstabil\\_a.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documentation/chapter12/19870410en149efficien cstabil_a.pdf)).
- Pasquino, Pasquale. 1991. "Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital - Police and the State of Prosperity." Pp. 105–18, In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault, edited by G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Pavlínek, Petr. 2002. "Transformation of the Central and East European Passenger Car Industry: Selective Peripheral Integration through Foreign Direct Investment." *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 34(9):1685–709. doi:10.1068/a34263.

- Rajaram, Prem K. 2016. "Europe's 'Hungarian Solution'." *Radical Philosophy* 197:2–9.
- Read, Jason. 2003. *The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Rendl, Jürgen. 2017. "Orban und Fico setzen Spatenstich für neue Brücke in Komarno." *Rozhlas a televízia Slovenska*, October 18. Retrieved May 20, 2020 (<https://dersi.rtvs.sk/clanky/corona-krise/145785/orban-und-fico-setzen-spatenstich-fur-neue-brucke-in-komarno>).
- Richter, Georg. 1997. *Geliebtes Nadwar: Erinnerungen an die verlorene Heimat H-6345 Nemesnádudvar*. Horb am Neckar: Geiger.
- Schmidt, H. D. 1966. "The Establishment of 'Europe' as a Political Expression." *The Historical Journal* 9(2):172–78. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00026509.
- Schröder, Peter. 1999. "The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648: Samuel Pufendorf's Assessment in his Monzambano." *The Historical Journal* 42(4):961–83. doi:10.1017/S0018246X99008754.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Seewann, Gerhard. 1999. "Migration in Südosteuropa als Voraussetzung für die neuzeitliche West-Ostwanderung." Pp. 89–108 in *Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde*, vol. 4, *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen, Formen, Verlauf, Ergebnis*, edited by M. Beer and D. Dahlmann. Stuttgart: Thorbecke.
- Seewann, Gerhard. 2012. "Einrichtung des Königreichs Ungarn 1689.", in *Dokumente und Materialien zur ostmitteleuropäischen Geschichte: Themenmodul "Deutsche in Ungarn"*, edited by Herder Insitut (<https://www.herder-institut.de/go/XS-a6c8bd>).
- Seppel, Marten. 2017. "Cameralist Population Policy and the Problem of Serfdom, 1680–1720." Pp. 91–110 in *People, markets, goods*, vol. 10, *Cameralism in practice: State administration and economy in early modern Europe*, edited by M. Seppel and K. Tribe. Woodbridge: Boydell Press.
- Shoebridge, Gavin. 2017. "New Slovak-Hungarian bridge across Danube begins construction." *Rozhlas a televízia Slovenska*, October 18. Retrieved May 20, 2020 (<https://www.rtvs.sk/clanok/145771>).
- Swyngedouw, Erik, Maria Kaika, and Esteban Castro. 2002. "Urban Water: A Political-Ecology Perspective." *Built Environment* (1978-) 28(2):124–37.
- Swyngedouw, Erik. 2006. "Circulations and metabolisms: (Hybrid) Natures and (Cyborg) cities." *Science as Culture* 15(2):105–21. doi:10.1080/09505430600707970.
- Tellmann, Ute A. 2017. *Life and Money: The Genealogy of the Liberal Economy and the Displacement of Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tempest, Matthew. 2016. "Juncker: Restoring borders will kill internal market." *EURACTIV.com*, January 15. Retrieved May 20, 2020

(<https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/juncker-restoring-borders-will-kill-internal-market/>).

Tsing, Anna. 2009. "Supply Chains and the Human Condition." *Rethinking Marxism* 21(2):148–76. doi:10.1080/08935690902743088.

Walker, Mack. 1998. *German home towns: Community, state, and general estate, 1648-1871*. Ithaca, New York, London: Cornell University Press.

Weber, Max. 2007. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Routledge.

Yıldız, Can, and Nicholas de Genova. 2018. "Un/Free mobility: Roma migrants in the European Union." *Social Identities* 24(4):425–41. doi:10.1080/13504630.2017.1335819.