CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020
| Author | Ivankovic, Viktor |
|---|---|
| Title | The Liberal Politics of Behavioral Enhancement |
| Summary | Over the last two decades, advancements in cognitive and behavioral science have stirred lively debates in various academic disciplines on whether it is permissible for governments to use behavioral influences (so-called ‘nudges’) on citizens to improve their welfare. My dissertation shows why a careful moral consideration of behavioral influences goes beyond the standard nudge debate. I take up a broader approach which assesses whether cultivating and regulating behavioral influences for various purposes can be accommodated within the framework and principles of political liberalism. I call this approach behavioral enhancement. In the dissertation, I engage with three normative concerns at the core of behavioral enhancement: 1.) Under what institutional circumstances is it allowed for governments to nudge? 2.) Should the utilization of behavioral influences in markets be regulated? 3.) Should behavioral influences be used by government to get people to abide by enforceable moral duties? The permissibility of government nudging, as well as the utilization of influences by market agents, is tested against the backdrop of liberal principles, of which personal autonomy is the most considered and explored here. I claim that this moral inquiry requires an account of personal autonomy updated by relevant considerations from the cognitive and behavioral sciences. I develop such an account under two empirical stipulations – pervasiveness of non-reflective behavioral influences and limited reflective resources of individuals. The account suggests that although intentional (as well as unintentional) behavioral influences have the capacity to undermine autonomy, they are also compatible with many individual management styles. The first normative concern of behavioral enhancement engages us most with the standard moral debate on nudging. I particularly address the worry that nudges, as non-transparent influences, cannot be reconciled with democratic principles of publicity and contestation, and cannot respect autonomy if they steer individuals without their consent. I develop a principle of ‘watchfulness’, which establishes institutional conditions for nudge transparency that allow individuals to accommodate nudges into their autonomous pursuits if they agree with them, or circumvent them without much burden if they do not. The second normative concern starts with the observation that standard moral objections to government nudges should make us a lot more wary of influences by marketers. This is because these influences are not curtailed by principles of government nudging (mildness and sensitivity to agent preferences), and are more likely to overwhelm agents by virtue of sheer numbers. I lend further normative support to this observation, and recommend policy solutions for influences by marketers. The third normative concern takes the first step in exploring the extent to which influences should be used to facilitate moral behavior. Here, I limit my advocacy of moral influencing on getting people to discharge duties that are either enforceable or non-enforceable due to feasibility constraints. I address worries that such influences promote mere conformity with duties, and that they stifle moral disagreement. The last chapter explores nudging to promote charity giving, which I claim is a case where the balancing of different duties – respect for autonomy and alleviation of poverty – is uncertain. |
| Supervisor | Moles, Andres |
| Department | Political Science PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2020/ivankovic_viktor.pdf |
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