

**SPACE OF SECURITY AND A SPACE OF THREAT:  
THE PERCEPTION OF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM IN MOSCOW**

By

Galina Karpova

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

*In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts*

Supervisors: Prof. Claudio Sopranzetti

Prof. Vlad Naumescu

*Budapest, Hungary*

*2020*

## Abstract

This study explores the role of surveillance system as CCTV cameras and facial recognition cameras in creating the understanding of threat in public places of Moscow. The problem of public surveillance became particularly relevant in Moscow in previous years, when Mayor Sergey Sobyenin introduced the launch of «Safe City» program. Surveillance technologies, assumed in this program, were claimed to be used for counter-terrorism purposes and the detection of wanted criminals. After political protests in summer 2020, the usage of CCTV with facial recognition system was criticized for violating human rights and invasion to personal privacy of citizens. Although facial recognition was introduced in Moscow not a long time ago, it raised the problem of digital rights. CCTV technologies have invoked the discussion about limits of surveillance. The purpose of my research is to find out how citizens' perception of security measures and threat in urban environment correspond with the state agenda. Security is considered as a socially constructed category, and I analyze it from works of Copenhagen school of securitization and Paris school, which move the focus of security from international relations to sociology. Following Savitch's assumptions of security's reterritorialization tendencies and Harvey's concept of «right to the city», citizens are seen as political actors in urban space, who should feel the effect of public surveillance.

For the research data, I collected answers of Moscow citizens about their perception of security measures in different public places. They also shared their opinions on security situation in Moscow and suggested possible justifications of its installation. I also analyzed media publications from databases and conducted expert interviews with lawyers specialized on human rights in digital sphere.

My findings demonstrated that in Russian society the trust in rational and moderate use of surveillance technologies in future exists simultaneously with low credibility to police's actions. While citizens showed awareness on abuse of power connected with facial recognition technologies, they don't feel certain danger for themselves even while staying suspicious to them. The perception of urban threat has moved from terrorism and serious crimes to the danger that comes from other citizens. The results also uncovered the problem of understanding privacy as a concept belonged to human rights. Facial recognition lead to emergence of discussion about privacy in Russian society.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank my thesis supervisors Prof. Claudio Sopranzetti and Prof. Vlad Naumescu for working with me and supporting me in such challenging times. I also deeply appreciate the help of Prof. Alexandra Kowalski throughout this academic year.

In Russia, I also thank my experts and citizens who agreed to participate in my research.

Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends who encouraged me.

## Table of contents

<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 1. Methodology .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Chapter 2. Theoretical background of studying securitization in public spaces.....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1. Securitization process in social paradigm.....	7
2.2. Urban surveillance systems .....	10
2.3. Public securitization in urban spaces and everyday interactions of citizens .....	14
<b>Piloting stage: cases of Komsomolskaya and Lubyanskaya squares.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Chapter 3. Data analysis .....</b>	<b>19</b>
3.1. Lack of trust with hopes for the best: citizen's opinion on CCTV cameras from open questions survey results .....	19
Urban security and threat in public spaces: from society to infrastructural problems .....	20
Safety in Moscow generally vs safety in neighborhood of living: street lights matters .....	22
The purposes underlies cameras installation: difference between theory and practice .....	24
Places we cannot avoid: the impact on urban environment.....	26
The fact of being recorded: «I have nothing to hide».....	28
3.2.Limits of surveillance: the comparative statistical analysis of privacy perception depending on locations .....	31
3.3 Awareness on surveillance in media: the analysis of contexts in Russian publications.....	35
3.4.The crisis of privacy institution in Russia: expert interviews.....	41
<b>Main findings and conclusion.....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Appendix 1. Survey questions .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Appendix 2. Expert interview questions.....</b>	<b>57</b>

## Introduction

Closed-circuit television, or CCTV, has become the major tool for monitoring counter-terrorist security in Moscow for the last 2 years<sup>1</sup>. The Mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyenin and the Department of Municipal Security are currently working on the face-detecting system of video-surveillance that, was first introduced to citizens in autumn 2017<sup>2</sup>. According to information from official Mayor website, by the end of 2019 more than 145 thousands CCTV cameras were installed in different places around the city<sup>3</sup>. Authorized officials, law enforcement employees and executive authorities have access to CCTV recordings for security reasons. It is also stated that all recordings are preserved from 5 to 30 days depending on the location; for example, cameras installed in outskirts keep data for 5 days only, comparing with 30 days for locations in downtown of Moscow. Mayor website provides free access to interactive map where all Moscow CCTV cameras are indicated, so citizens can verify whether cameras are installed or not in particular areas<sup>4</sup>.

The rapid increase in number of CCTV cameras has provoked public discontent<sup>5</sup>. Some cameras were updated with face detectors, which means everyone's identity is automatically recognized. The movement against facial recognition was started by Russian activist Alyona Popova last year. She was the first who raised this problem in court<sup>6</sup>. Alyona claimed that constant facial recognition violates 23<sup>th</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation<sup>7</sup>. The vulnerability of CCTV system was analyzed in liberal media, where journalists and security experts found out that data from cameras was sold on undeclared market<sup>8</sup>. After the start of COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, facial recognition was unofficially used by the police in

---

<sup>1</sup>Moscow entered the top 40 cities in the world for security. RBC Society. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.rbc.ru/society/29/08/2019/5d6769009a7947a2fa6bb878>)

<sup>2</sup> CCTV system with facial recognition began to function in Moscow. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2017/09/28/735806-v-moskve>)

<sup>3</sup> The official website of Moscow mayor: technologies. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://video.dit.mos.ru/>)

<sup>4</sup> Open Data Portal of Moscow CCTV system. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://data.mos.ru/opendata/2386/data/map?versionNumber=1&releaseNumber=15>)

<sup>5</sup>Moscow artists launched a campaign against the facial recognition system. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://snob.ru/news/188512/>)

<sup>6</sup>Muscovite asks court to prohibit face recognition by CCTV system. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/10/06/812955-moskvichka-prosit-sud>)

<sup>7</sup> The Constitution of the Russian Federation Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-03.htm>)

<sup>8</sup> 170 thousand CCTV with face recognition system were installed in Moscow. Access to this data can be bought on the undeclared market. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://meduza.io/feature/2019/12/05/v-moskve-ustanovili-170-tysyach-kamer-i-nachali-vnedryat-sistemu-raspoznavaniya-lits-dostup-k-etim-dannym-mozhno-kupit-na-chernom-rynke-mbh-media>)

order to detect people who violated obligatory curfew<sup>9</sup>. At first, it was intended to control only those who recently came back from foreign countries, but when president Putin officially announced quarantine, the system of QR-codes was considered to be integrated with facial recognition<sup>10</sup>. QR-codes was the Mayor solution for forcing people stay at home during the pandemic; every Moscow citizen received individual digital pass on mobile phone for any purpose of going outside. Shop workers, public transport and taxi drivers could ask citizens for their pass beforehand with the help of special apps<sup>11</sup>. Thus, the system of facial recognition turned into a manipulation mechanism in extraordinary circumstances of pandemic.

The CCTV system first appeared as a part of counter-terrorist security measures. The protection of urban spaces from terrorism became one of state priorities<sup>12</sup>, and many other security technologies were developed in recent years. For example, after a series of explosions in the subway, metal detectors at the entrances and baggage inspection tapes appeared. Also, after several incidents of terrorists hitting pedestrians in trucks, concrete blocks were installed around squares in order to prevent the entry of large vehicles. However, those measures were circumvented. On 19 December 2019, a central square, totally equipped with CCTV cameras, became a place of shooting in front of the Federal Security Service building. Up to three people FSS officials were killed and five were wounded<sup>13</sup>. In addition, terrorists' tactics are changing into individual actions rather than a group assault as it used to be in the beginning of 2000. The examples of individual terrorist attacks can be the incident in Nice on 14 July 2016, attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, attack with a truck in Christmas market in Berlin on 19 December 2016 and the explosion in Saint-Petersburg's subway on 3 April 2017.

The image of threat in Russia was formed by cases which are mostly connected with Chechen war and criminal groups of North Caucasus. The examples are: an attack in living neighborhood with explosions of two living houses (9<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> September 1999) on Guryanova street in Moscow, taking hostages in Dubrovka theater during the play «Nord-Ost» (23<sup>th</sup>- 26<sup>th</sup> October 2002), attack in Beslan school (1<sup>st</sup> September 2004). It happened the early years of

---

<sup>9</sup> Coronavirus: Russia uses facial recognition to tackle Covid-19. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-52157131/coronavirus-russia-uses-facial-recognition-to-tackle-covid-19>)

<sup>10</sup>«Cybergulag»: Russia looks to surveillance technology to enforce lockdown. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/02/cybergulag-russia-looks-to-surveillance-technology-to-enforce-lockdown>)

<sup>11</sup>Taxi drivers will check passengers passes through the "Moscow Assistant" app. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.interfax.ru/moscow/704208>)

<sup>12</sup>Tight control: Putin has set tasks for the FSS. Retrieved May 31, 2020. ([https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2020/02/20\\_a\\_12968653.shtml](https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2020/02/20_a_12968653.shtml))

<sup>13</sup>Deadly Gunfire at Russia Spy Agency's Moscow Headquarters. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/world/europe/fsb-headquarters-shooting-russia.html>)

Putin's power, so the president defined counter-terrorist security policy as a priority for the following years. From the beginning of 2010-ies, the image of threat has undergone transformations. In 2016 the «Yarovaya law», named after Duma deputy Irina Yarovaya, was legislated in order to tighten up the control on terrorism and extremism. For instance, social networks and messengers have to provide the real identity data of users as well as the content of messages/videos/photos to authorized officials<sup>14</sup>. This measure was considered as invasion to personal privacy by many Internet users. In addition, the new law placed restrictions on places for religious service. Consequently, according to this law religious minorities like Pentecostals are considered illegal<sup>15</sup>.

In my research, I'm interested in the question of how the implementation of CCTV cameras, especially with facial recognition technology, influenced on citizens' perception of security at Moscow public spaces. The study consists of several tasks. Firstly, I would explore people's awareness about CCTV and its role in securitization. Secondly, I will estimate how citizens perceive the presence of cameras with and without face recognition in different parts of the city. My principal aim of this study is to find out how the understanding of «what is secure» appears and what is the role of CCTV cameras in the image of security. I consider the security to be a socially constructed category that cannot be separated from social and political views on definition of threat and danger.

---

<sup>14</sup>Russia's 'Big Brother' Law Enters Into Force. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/07/01/russias-big-brother-law-enters-into-force-a62066>)

<sup>15</sup>How will the "Yarovaya's law" affect religious people? Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-36662722>)

## Chapter 1. Methodology

In my research, I focus on two following concepts: perception of urban space and securitization.

*Perception of urban space* - according to the concept of Lefebvre, the perception of urban space is a combination of the following components:

1. Representations of space - the image of space from the point of view of power discourse, with the help of which power structures control the daily routine of citizens.
2. Spaces of representation - an image filled with ambiguous symbols that are significant for inhabitants.
3. Spatial practices - a set of routine practices of citizens that provides social cohesion (the route from home to work, the trajectory of movement in the supermarket and more). The authorities' view of the city, including the architectural one, often contradicts spatial practices (Lefebvre 1968).

*Securitization* - this term is introduced by Ole Waever and the Copenhagen School of security studies. It assumes the process when state actors turn social subjects into matters of security, so they become top priorities for the state affairs even if they aren't existentially dangerous for state's legitimacy. According to Copenhagen School, securitization act consists of four parts: securitizing actor, existential threat (object of securitization), a referent object that needs to be protected, and the audience (for example, citizens). Subjects of securitization can be a threat of authorities' legitimacy, and the process of securitization is successful when audience is persuaded in securitization act, what means the belief in actual threat (Waever 1993).

My research was initially planned to be an ethnographical observation of two places that I considered to take as cases - Lubyanskaya and Komsomolskaya squares in Moscow. My choice was justified by the difference in objects of securitization in two squares; on Lubyanskaya square the security system was targeted on authorities' safety, while securitization process of Komsomolskaya square was initiated to protect the civilians from street criminals, because three main Moscow railway stations are situated on this square. Railway squares are typically associated with homeless people, illegal migrants and drug traffickers – social groups who also represent potential danger from authorities' perspective. People who often visit squares (for example, who work or live not far from them) were supposed to be interviewed about their perception of security measures in particular places. Unfortunately, because of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in the planning period of fieldwork in Russia, I had to reconsider my object

of study and the targeted sample of participants. I decided to focus on the Moscow CCTV system in general. This is also partially happened in an outcome of my piloting stage. While participants didn't problematize the security situation in particular places of interest, they expressed their ideas and feeling about other parts of Moscow, where security problem is more significant for them personally (for example, in districts of residence). I decided to switch my methodology to mix-method approach that can provide more data and will let me observe problem from multiple sides.

To collect primary empirical data I use survey with open questions and semi-structured online interviewing with security professionals.

Survey method allows me to reach people with different social and economical characteristics, so the research data won't be biased and a bigger amount of answers can be achieved. My research sample is modified accordingly. The suitable sample criteria for the survey participants is the following: living in Moscow or Moscow district, age 18 years old and above, and visiting the city center for different reasons. Survey was distributed by the snowball-method of sample recruitment in social media. The absence of special requirements for the targeted sample is supposed to increase the representativeness of a study.

The second part of primary data collection is online interviewing with experts. The professional viewpoint can give insights on the whole mechanism of security project and complement data from surveys. For my research, I interviewed lawyers from «Roskomsvoboda» and «Agora» – organizations specialized on human rights protection in digital sphere. The interviewing was conducted via Skype. Interviews and answers to open questions were coded in Atlas.ti by analytical categories.

To collect secondary data, I used media analysis of existing public debates around issues of security in Russia. Newspaper articles, magazines and online news portals' publications on CCTV cameras and their role in social life of citizens are relevant for my study. For that purpose I used LexisNexis and Factiva research databases, where I can find publications by key words.

### *Research limitation*

Apart from unexpected research limitations that appeared because of the COVID-19 pandemic such as changing methodology and sample criteria, my research has a set of other limitations. Firstly, while all core concepts of my research relate to public spaces and technologies, not people, I can't choose the one particular group of citizens to focus on, so I don't have targeted sample as a distinct social group. Secondly, primary data is collected online, and interviewing is arranged via Skype, what leads to some inevitable bias of data and exclusion of those social groups without Internet access (labor migrants, old people, people with limited

access to Internet). Thirdly, mix-method approach can provide contradictory information that can be conditioned by both personal political views of participants and their position in relation to authorities. There is always a risk that participants will give politically accepted answers because of the fear of being revealed to the state. Finally, short timing of fieldwork can shape the overall representativeness of data.

## **Chapter 2. Theoretical background of studying securitization in public spaces**

The understanding of security mechanisms is closely connected with the way we approach to the role of governmental structures in social life. In my research I assume the Foucauldian viewpoint on power relations, that they are not only enclosed in public sphere, but also invade personal life of individuals too (Foucault 2004). Power relations between government and citizens are embodied in discipline that is reproduced institutionally in schools, hospitals, prisons, army, family relations (Foucault 1982). Every sphere of life is political in its nature. The metaphor of panopticon-prison illustrates the invisibility of constant surveillance and control – the main mechanism that keeps power in authority's hands. Later he developed his ideas on surveillance and discipline in concept of bio-politics. CCTV system, in my case, carries out these functions of reproducing hierarchies and power dependencies on institutional level. It creates the obedient citizen. Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence also structures the analytical landscape of surveillance. Symbols like education, title, wealth, family background determine individual's status in society, form his symbolic capital and provide legitimized right on symbolic violence - judgments and power realization in many ways (Bourdieu 1991). In other words, symbolic violence is a mechanism of legitimizing the form of domination as taken for granted in social field – in the space of social struggle (Bourdieu 1998). Securitization measures in public spaces are examples of symbolic violence coming from state by determining the securitization through monopoly on legitimate naming what constitutes threat.

### ***2.1. Securitization process in social paradigm***

A large body of existing research relates to the mechanism of securitization in context of international relations. Securitization was longer perceived as a tool that states use for speaking about war conflicts and governmental protection, but in my research I locate security in a sphere of social interactions. When securitization moved from being solely authorities' obligations to a public matter, the question about its legal and ethical frameworks came up. Looking from the perspective of agency theory, Jennifer Mitzen proposes that state needs ontological security. She separates it from physical security in the usual sense. The ontological aspect of security, as Mitzen claims, provides us insights about what underlies the need in securitization. Firstly, it gives a structural explanation for the irrationality of conflicts among security-seekers that persist for long periods of time. One solution in securitization doesn't satisfy needs of another actor who is interested in securitization too, because it may make his identity vulnerable. Secondly, the assumption of ontological security-seeking helps ending conflicts by achieving reflexivity.

Ontological security is formed around a basic trust system, which plays role in routinizing practices and reactions on society. Routinized relations support identities and maintain the construction of the self. «Self» is a turning point in all Mitzen's arguments, thought which she demonstrates the humanization of security dilemma. Security concerns everyone. It is important to mention that at the individual level the need of ontological security only emerges when our cognitive-affective organization of the environment is ruptured, as in cases of trauma (Mitzen 2006). Trauma in this sense can be anything related to instability of identity and inability to defend it. This is the reason why Mitzen promotes ontological security as an essential need, reformulating assumptions of Durkheim about organic and mechanic solidarity. She suggests two steps of understanding the ontological characteristics of security dilemma. The first is through demonstrating the social nature of state identities, referring to socializing type. The second step is an internalization, that shows how interaction over time transforms state identity. Such measures pull the focus away from the idea of state that opposes the rest of society, a view traditionally promoted in realistic approach.

Copenhagen school of security studies elaborated new understanding of security in international relations, regarding securitization problems as through principles of political constructionism approach. Its major focus is on the way objects become a threat to security and how they are going through securitization process. In other words, what makes them so dangerous to the state regime and society? In realistic paradigm, the security is equal to power, while under constructionism many societal factors as national identities, religion, genders can become sources of insecurity. Copenhagen school scholars came up with term «existential threat», which stands for situations potentially dangerous to the whole existence of governmental basement and its legitimacy as a «monopolist on power» within a determined territory. Here I could have used «monopolist on violence» in Foucauldian terms, but referring to power better reflects the essence of state's existence. Thus, existential threat requires the state to take «extraordinary measures» - basically, all decisions in securitization field to reduce threat. These ideas were demonstrated in Balzacq's work, where he says that securitization is a rule-governed practice that doesn't necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion (Balzacq 2005). It means that securitization submits first to the performativity of language we use to speak about it. Language is a powerful mechanism in modifying context of securitization. For making something securitized, the speech act of communication should be successful first, and the language is a mechanism that use to make something secure or insecure, to build the discourse around certain events. Securitization, according to Balzacq, should be viewed as s strategic (or a

pragmatic) practice, opposed to the dominant speech act. In his text, Balzacq outlined the following components of securitization: audience's frame of reference, its readiness to be convinced and its ability to grant or deny a formal mandate to public officials. All three components closely relate to identity issues: groups are afraid to lose their frame of reference and become easily convinced by other parties.

Agents of securitization can be both social groups and single individuals, those who relate themselves to political process and those who do it indirectly. For example, Copenhagen school approach can explain why LGBTQ+ groups and religion minorities appear to be a threat for ruling government in some states where right-wing parties are influential. Audience constitutes from all actors involved in securitization process, who recognize the problem as a potential danger. The problem of audience was raised by another personality of Copenhagen school Ole Waever, whose assumptions about grouping that differs from nation and its borders cover the notion of duality in social structure. Waever pays attention to definitions of nations, communities and cultures as agents of security (Waever 1993). The work of Bigo is also useful and illustrative, who states that migrants become a cause of new politics of securitization around the conflict of interests and identities (Bigo 2002). Thus, identity can be forgotten or reinvented. The same happens with the reality of ethnic features, that doesn't depend on the actual existence of ethnic groups, however there can be a degree of groupness, of unity in particular category (for example, between people of the same nationality or race). The problem of groups is that they mean something prescribed or attached for each unit, while the degree that certain characteristics are manifested can differ. The fear of losing identities leads to crisis in ontological security.

Another important point in a debate on identity's vulnerability and ontological security is a discourse about desecuritization practices. Hansen builds an argument around Waever's description of insecurity control, Derridian critique of universalism and Habermasian statement on ethics. Four ways of desecuritization were suggested: change through stabilization, replacement, rearticulation and silencing. First one puts forward rethinking the role of insecure and making it politically normative. Replacement means switching attention to other upcoming situation, and in this case desecuritization happens in contrast with something actual and more emotionally captive for actors (Hansen 2012). Rearticulation suggests a more direct, radical form of political engagement. Rearticulation works as a political ontology on the first level, and brings political transformations in public sphere, the identity and personal interests. On second level, it suggests measures of preventing new securitization. Finally, silencing is the policy of ignoring facts and pretending them not to happen. Although desecuritization methods are aimed to diminish political intervention in securitization process and separate social sphere from

governmental restrictions, the methods I mentioned put identity in the risk. They cannot be implemented from the only initiative, and even if they are, personal ontological vulnerability remains because of individual's inability to modify its identity to state's needs.

In conclusion to this part I would like to highlight the significance of Copenhagen school and Paris school in my research, because they provide starting point for studying urban securitization. The need of ontological security justifies my choice in focusing on citizens in my research and separate governmental initiatives in securitization from civil ones.

## ***2.2. Urban surveillance systems***

While surveillance is seen through prism of biopolitics as its institutionalized form, it contributes to the theoretical debate on the behavior of crowds. Crowds can be perfectly analyzed with the help of technologies, what provides understanding that division between individual body and social body is not enough; «crowd surveillance is the urban body in motion» (Nishiyama 2018). In his article Nishiyama explores crowd behavior analysis technology, introduced by NEC Corporation in Tokyo at 2013. Although his study is built around Tokyo data, apparently Moscow CCTV security system implemented in 2017 has exactly the same name «Safe City». It is designed in a way when high congestion, crowding around a particular location, or a static group formation are detected as abnormal, potentially dangerous behavior, and the technology alerts an operator about it (Nishiyama 2018). «The securitization of the urban crowd therefore consists of two concurrent securitizations: the securitization of a crowd vis-à-vis that of an urban space» (Nishiyama 2018, p.206). – here he reveals that surveillance technologies function with predetermined level of abnormality, that measures the crowd reactions in every case. The urban space is secured from crowds, while it was only about the personal security of people before. Crowds don't have agency in comparison with an individual. Crowd behavior monitoring demonstrates how authorities want to minimize their physical intervention to situations of threat by digitalizing their presence – in other words, developing more typologies on people's behavior. In another study dedicated to municipal corporate security in Canada, researchers found out that security system is highly dependent on risk management (Walby & Lippert 2012). All city areas from the research sample underwent threat assessment checks. Above terrorist threat, MCS system also involved in more urban – related securitization, such as «removing undesirables and trespassers from city owned/operated properties in Toronto» (Walby & Lippert 2012, p. 448). Homeless people and substances addicts come to this category of unwanted visitors of public and semi-public spaces such as business areas designed for workers only. The next issue mentioned in the article was the control of City Hall area in

Victoria, in particular the access to washing rooms in order to prevent drug users entering them. Study results prove that a right to be secure is held by rich people, whose behavior is socially acceptable, while other categories of citizens are excluded, and thus alienated from usage of public spaces.

To continue the debate about the role of risk in constructing threat, or better say about the meaningful difference between risk and threat that sometimes can be overlooked in analysis, I refer to the work of Williams. Risk is always about a possibility, while a threat is an already existed fact that has certain evidence and probability to happen or to be repeated again. Risk is a dynamic variable, whose nature cannot be predicted, and thus face a proper resistance:

«Expectations that the political organization is to serve in an active fashion as a risk manager will most likely lead to failure. Risk precipitates the production of new organizations to manage risk, while, at the same time, degrading old collective security institutions» (Williams 2008, p.72). The mismatch between risk and threat often results in overreacting of authorities trying to find a proper model of behavior. Sometimes the chosen level of protection cannot be validated and justified externally. It's also important to remember cultural roots of risk perception, what challenge ontological security and engender uncertainties by inability to standardize the perception of danger.

The outcome of Foucault's tradition is visible in further articles on relations between government, disciplined and securitization. Connecting securitization with neoliberal context and Keynesian rationality, Deukmedjian suggests to restructure Foucault's triangulation of sovereignty, government and discipline into matrix by adding security as an independent variable (Deukmedjian 2013). Government and sovereignty are expressed through discipline and security, they are institutions derived from these abstract concepts in discourse. The study of profiling at New York City by Kaufman also relates to the exclusion of people from public spaces connected with Foucault's biopower concept. Profiling is ID checking the police makes in public spaces, especially in transport like subway, and ethnic minorities are always targeted in some extent due to racial prejudices reproduced by security system itself. Mobility started associating with the fear of being stopped (Kaufman 2016, p.75), what leads to isolation in districts far from city center and creates challenges for social mobility of individuals. Coaffee argues that security politics is now in the process of reterritorialization. It means the political decisions are mostly concentrated around urban security in cities, rather than on national level (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). The most accessible measure of security, the CCTV cameras, give power to decide what is secure and what isn't to individuals and organizations (Graham, Brooks,

Heery 1996). With the introduction of security measures, the city undergoes transformation of its meaning (Coaffee 2009; Nemeth J. and Hollander J. 2010).

The pragmatist framework of defining security suggest analyzing it in particular cases referring to situation, avoiding the division on advantages and drawbacks. The problem of choosing actors arises (Nyman 2016), and can be potentially solved by taking security as a situated interactive activity. Securitization practices should be considered in broader sense, avoiding classical explanations given by elites and turning to diversity and pluralistic definitions. Thus, the awareness and reflexivity should become an entry point of any analysis (Nyman 2016, p.17). Security in context of emancipation takes part in transformation of arrangements that are implicated in the (re)production of insecurities (Nunes 2012, p. 351). In the critique of Booth, the author suggests to see security as an immanent critique that makes security political in the light of how they respond to the needs of the most vulnerable (Nunes 2012, p. 352). Who exactly can benefit from emancipatory effect of securitization? The approach needs to shift from an unquestioned reliance upon material individuals suffering insecurity towards an analysis of the politics of materialization: «Not enough attention has been given to the complexities of what one is to be emancipated from» (Nunes 2012, p. 353). Here emancipation's function is to conceptualize insecurities by identifying what gives certain social relations the condition of insecurity, not just naming them as a threat.

A body of research about public surveillance includes many works about United Kingdom, where this system already existed for decades. In UK, the strategy aimed at preventing society from radicalization came into force in 2003. This is how the strategy was described:

*«The system is structured around four «P»s: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. While «Pursue» focuses on detecting, disrupting and prosecuting terrorism plots, «Protect» deals with reinforcing the security of «critical infrastructure», such as the transport system, power plants and public spaces; «Prepare» aims at increasing «resilience» (i.e. the ability of the British population and state agencies to deal with the consequences of an attack), and «Prevent» occupies a place of its own» (Ragazzi 2017, p.165).*

After a while authorities realized that a program created for preventing terrorism and escalation turned into ideological machine. As a result, researcher noticed the re-colonization of social policy, for example against British Muslims (Ragazzi 2017, p.172). It is described as a crisis of politic of tolerance. By falling into creating categories of suspicion, authorities discredit themselves in relation to the goals they pointed out at first. The similar results were discovered in another study on UK policing in regeneration of urban spaces. It ended up as measures for sanitizing spaces in favor of capital accumulation. They accepted theoretical views of Chicago

school sociologists that every place can be potentially urbanized unless it's safe. UK authorities were working on providing safety in faster growing towns for making them attractive to live in: «The regeneration of the town center should reflect both enhanced security measures and a high degree of public access to urban space» (Raco 2003, p. 1876). However, regeneration requires new methods of approaching social interaction and emerges difficulties of another level small towns have never dealt with before. For example, after the number of tourists coming in Reading have increased, «the promotion of alcohol-based recreation has created new problems over the control of public space» (Raco 2003, p.1879).

In case of Moscow, security measures are questioned from the point of making surroundings publicly available not in the sense of systematically excluded groups of people, but for the majority. For example, metal detectors at subway entrances create crowds of people and unregulated flows, what can be potentially risky and contradicts the goal of securitization measures. Here we see how the idea of creating attractive environment can be promoted on the initiatives of market developers only. In Russia, the stigmatization of ethnical minorities was analyzed in context of Medvedev's presidential decisions on the politics of counter-terrorism. Although his leadership was short and considered insignificant under the influence and dictating of Putin by many Russian citizens<sup>16</sup> at the end of his presidency, this period was characterized by adoption of the so-called "comprehensive approach" with soft and hard power skills (Campana 2013, p.468). In my opinion, this article provides clear understanding of security politics during the transition period between the two presidential terms of Putin, however it doesn't provide information about urban securitization. During the early years of Putin's power many destructive terrorist attacks had happened in various parts of Russia, that took a lot of lives. Because of that president defined the counter-terrorist policy as a priority for the following years associated with North Caucasus. «The official discourse switched from one that mainly envisioned terrorism as a threat masterminded from the outside and weakening national sovereignty, to a discourse pinpointing the internal factors conducive to violence» (Campana 2013, p.464), - the process of de-securitization and elimination of Caucasus threat was gradually coming in social understanding in Medvedev's years of ruling. Moscow mayor Sergey Sobyannin, who was elected in 2010, with his new urban politics in Moscow seemed like trying to reassure citizens that terrorist threat is irretrievably gone because the city itself is changing toward more European-style representation. Security measures planned to be hidden from pedestrians, but their number

---

<sup>16</sup>Sinking together, Putin will surface. Ratings of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin are equally bad. Retrieved May 31, 2020. ([https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2011/09/26\\_a\\_3781690.shtml](https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2011/09/26_a_3781690.shtml))

increased dramatically. This transformation of leading approach reflects the authorities' attempt to develop a city for being competitive with largest world capitals from urban perspective.

### ***2.3. Public securitization in urban spaces and everyday interactions of citizens***

In this part I am going to introduce theoretical framework of my research and speak about main findings in the field of urban securitization and digitalization. My research is closely connected with the concept of «right to the city» (Harvey 2006). This right was taken from citizens to authorities, and consequently citizens are limited in ways they can use to change urban environment according to their needs. They became alienated in front of technologies, what challenges the habitual understanding of security. According to Lefebvre's approach, the «right to the city» is a concept when citizens have an access to perceived space (a set of objects in the city people interact with on daily basis), conceived space (the ideas about how the social space of the city should look like) and lived space (the combination of perceived space and conceived space) (Lefebvre 1968). In his work, Marcuse argues that city becomes a place of anxiety because of being militarized and turns into a place that controls social boundaries through architectural solutions. Security measures are often used to restrict civil rights, what deteriorates the quality of life (Marcuse 2005). Graham elaborates the term «military urbanism» in relation to US cities. He claims that the process of urbanization has traits of geographical colonization from North to South within the country, which goes along with militarization of borders and tendencies of consolidation among internal urban minorities (Graham 2010).

Regarding my case, Moscow districts are known by the heterogeneity of local civilian activism. While in some places neighbors control all urban changes at their districts and don't afraid the reach the local authorities (for example, activists were protesting against enlarging the railways in one of Moscow central districts)<sup>17</sup>, others stay reluctant to changes and don't intervene. The city center itself is very touristic and mostly consists of public spaces with high density of visitors, what makes it a place of the fight between citizens and authorities. A series of mass protests on the rejection to register candidates from opposition parties for running in the Moscow Parliament elections that took place last summer demonstrated that Moscow urban planning initiatives are political on a great extent. Moreover, these protests were supported in other regions, what made them so significant.

---

<sup>17</sup>Due to railway megaproject in the center of Moscow, the tracks are being expanded. The nearest house will be five meters away (or not). Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.the-village.ru/village/city/situation/353995-mcd-destroy>)

The phenomenon of urbanization's impact on the social interactions is traditionally connected with the fundamental work of Simmel, who was one of the first in his field to study urban society. From «The Metropolis and Mental Life» we know that metropolis is the space of «surface social contacts», where individuals don't have close attachments to each other because of the urban rhythm of life. It demands maximizing efficiency for gaining profit from everything. Citizens don't have time at their disposal to be concentrated on single social connection and build close relationships with little number of individuals, because they need to focus their attention on multiple social roles: being a worker, family member, friend, pedestrian, passenger, entrepreneur and others (Simmel 1976). So, Simmel states that urban type of sociality is radically different from the community one.

According to De Certeau, a rational organization of the city should come first and subjugate physical and mental life of a citizen to it (Certeau 1990). This self-replicating hierarchy makes spaces urbanized. City architecture and its organization reflect collective memory of citizens from a particular time (Boyer 1994). (Public spaces are also seen as territories for interaction and whereas should encourage communications between both acquaintances and strangers (Kohn 2004), what originates from work of Jacobs «The Death and Life of Great American Cities». She criticizes the arrangement of cities that is aimed at prioritizing private transport while excluding pedestrians. As a result, public places turn into abandoned and unpleasant areas. To prevent this, Jacobs puts sidewalks as a core mechanism for developing social interactions in city and maintain its safety. Clear distinction between private and public spaces and the surveillance directed on major buildings at the place are, according to Jacobs, sufficient measures to keep city safe (Jacobs 1961). She also developed the natural surveillance strategy as «eyes on the street», that was inherited and used in urban design. Its point is that the architectural design of urban place should be made in a way to increase the visibility of criminals in public spaces. It works when the area's infrastructure doesn't prevent people from observing each other freely, for example, one of the most important criteria of natural surveillance is good street lightening.

The lack of urbanization can lead to uniting people for creating facilities collectively, without governmental support. The process of creating civil initiatives among residence of a particular place was studied by Simone, who looked at how people create necessary facilities for other community members. Representing people as infrastructure is about analyzing how needs of a community are negotiated and solved collectively, what consequently creates a platform of social interactions:

*«This process of conjunction, which is capable of generating social compositions across a range of singular capacities and needs (both enacted and virtual) and which attempts to derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements, is what I call people as infrastructure» (Simone 2004).*

The concept «people as infrastructure» found support by Simone's followers, who divided the cooperation process between residents into stages: coordination, consolidation and speculation (McFarlane, C., & Silver, J. 2017). In my research it can be valuable for understanding in what ways citizens confront authorities at the matter of security.

Public securitization of urban landscapes was a long time analyzed through prism of counter-terrorist measures after 9/11 attack. The ability of cities to regenerate easily after terroristic destruction and become more fortified was stated by Savitch. In his analysis cities are resilient because citizens have an ability to adjust after repeated terror (Savitch 2007). The turn from perceiving securitization as a national affair to smaller local level was made by Coaffee. He argues that security politics is now in the process of reterritorialization, which means that political decisions on securitization moved to urban security in cities from state level (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Scholars in anthropological field stated that security operates in two ways: it was produced by social forces and leads to institutional transformations (Gluck Z. and Low S. 2017). Newburn outlined three problematic aspects of security politics in late modernity: the operating of public police in pluralistic society, the governing of private sector and its separation from public, and the establishing of security systems (Newburn 2001). The CCTV system is largely implemented in urban environment of Great Britain from 1990es. Fay stated that CCTV cameras in Great Britain were implemented with an aim «to facilitate the exclusion from town and city centers of groups of citizens adjudged, often arbitrarily, to be of little or no commercial value or to pose a threat to the shopping ambience which commercial interests and local authorities wish to create» (Fay 1998, p. 338). In his work, he demonstrates how CCTV system supports exclusion of poor social groups by criminalizing them and helping authorities in erosion of civil liberties of unfavorable social movements. The increasing interest in CCTV cameras for private property on market can be explained by the lack of trust to the police and security officials, as it was demonstrated in Brazil. While in developed (mostly European Union) countries CCTV system is intended to revitalize declined urban public areas, in developing countries CCTV is commonly used by individual households to defend the real estate from threat coming from urban spaces (Firmino, Kanashiro, Bruno, Evangelista & da Costa Nascimento 2013).

### **Piloting stage: cases of Komsomolskaya and Lubyanskaya squares**

The piloting research is built around two interviews taken in Skype with a 21-years-old art student studying close to Lubyanskaya square and a journalist of the same age, who is working near Komsomolskaya square and visits courts located there for professional reasons. I reached them in social media using snowballing recruitment method. Interviews were taken on 30<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> of March.

Infrastructural transformations and change of perception toward a place didn't get a lot of attention in narratives. As a square where three railway stations are situated, Komsomolskaya has somehow stable image for citizens, whose associations with this place don't change within time. Even if the place itself is developing in more urbanized way, the relations around it stays in «railway-style» - temporary, vulnerable, superficial.

This description resonates with Jacobs's and Lynch's assumptions on what makes place urbanized and comfortable for daily usage and satisfying citizens' needs. Public life near railways is active, but not safe because of intense passengers flows. According to Lynch, railways are characterized as abandoned gaps that have higher possibility to attract threats (Lynch 1960).

Security-wise, participants think that Moscow is generally more safe than unsafe place because of making comparisons with previous Mayor ruling times, where the governmental main threat was terrorism. Participants' assumptions and believes confirm theoretical statements of Chicago school security scholars (Waeber 1993, Balzacq 2005) that a starting point in estimating security for a long time was a terror threat. They also justify conclusions made by Savitch on urban terror (Savitch 2005, 2007), that measures are necessary if they preserve safety from terrorist threat. The concept of human rights in relation to CCTV cameras with facial recognition wasn't developed, even though participants personally don't want to be visible.

Another point I would like to add about the general awareness is a shift of focus from city center to remote districts. A student said about the increasing amount of cameras at her residence area because of nuclear reactor and military buildings located there, so, in her opinion, this place of CCTV is justified. The same purpose can be in Lubyanskaya square – for protecting governmental structures. However, cameras in city center don't bothers her privacy as much as those in the area of living, because outskirts are associated with comfort surroundings of home, typical blocks of flats and the absence of threat. Indeed, «threat» is opposed to residential districts.

I outlined three main findings that made me change my research design: lack of awareness about CCTV cameras in Lubyanskaya and Komsomolskaya squares, attention focused on remote districts (such as residential areas) and little personal experience of interactions with cameras, which not sufficient for qualitative interviewing. Consequently, I decided to switch to mix-method approach.

### Chapter 3. Data analysis

This chapter of research consists of 4 parts of data analysis and description of findings. First part is dedicated to analysis of open questions of survey participants and outlines their positions on security measures. Second part is about quantitative analysis of other questions in survey and demonstrates statistical distribution of privacy perception depending on locations. Third contains media analysis of sources for estimating context of publications, suggested measures of solving the facial recognition controversies and the following debate around it. Fourth part of analysis includes two expert interviews with digital rights lawyers from Russian human rights organizations.

#### *3.1. Lack of trust with hopes for the best: citizen's opinion on CCTV cameras from open questions survey results*

##### *General data description*

Answers of open questions were collected by the survey form in Google Forms, distributed in social media Facebook, Instagram and via chat groups in messengers. The survey period lasted 7 days. There are 63 participants in total who completed the survey, 55 of them currently live in Moscow, 8 of them live in Moscow region, aged from 20 to 55 years old. The number of male participants is 22, the number of female participants is 40, one preferred not to indicate any gender. Speaking about area of spending time apart from the area of residence, 76% of participants visit Central district, on second place – Northern district with 11% of participants and on third place - 10% of participants who visit South-Eastern district. Among those who live in Moscow 12 participants live in Central district, 9 participants live in South-Western district, 8 – North-Western district, 7 – Northern district, and then numbers decreases. Here I provide categories with highest index only. According to income distribution in the sample, 47 participants indicated that they are financially secured, but cannot afford expensive purchases without applying for a loan or pre-accumulating the necessary amount. Considering occupation, 41% of all participants work full-time, 40% study in university at full-time program, 24% work part-time, 19% are freelance workers or work remotely (it is important to indicate that question about occupation was asked on the situation before COVID-19 pandemic measures, so the isolation rules with remote work haven't come into force yet), 8% don't work or study at the moment and 3% study at university in part-time program.

### ***Urban security and threat in public spaces: from society to infrastructural problems***

The survey started with questions about giving definitions to urban security and naming what threats we can face in city environment. Many participants defined security as a safety from other people who can be dangerous outside the house, what was mainly described as a possibility to go alone at night without fear to be robbed or harassed by antisocial people such as addicted or members of low-classed street semi-criminal subculture «gopniks»:

*«This is a security outside the house, when it's safe for women to go alone at night, when on public transport you are sure that you won't be robbed»* - female, 21 y.o.

Another role in a discussion of urban security was taken by precise and immediate functioning of local power structures and community services. Participants said that security demands effective work of authorities, as the police forces for preventing crimes and detecting them:

*«When threats and various destabilizing factors are promptly and correctly regulated and eliminated in accordance with the law, that allows the normal functioning of the city»* - female, 37 y.o.

The liability of community services to provide the best assistance goes along with importance of infrastructure, that in some cases needs to be ameliorated. Street lightening is the first measure for providing safety, as many participants mentioned:

*«Well-structured organization of space, comfortable environment for disabled people and low-mobility citizens, the presence of roads, streets and entrances lightening, absence of places where the antisocial people get together»* - male, 48 y.o.

In general, a lot was said about the community services and urban infrastructure, that is claimed to be the major project of city development for local authorities (the recent Moscow Mayor's plan of parks and streets renovation is an example). From the quotations above I can see that understanding of urban security is firstly associated with good infrastructure (street lightening, roads, traffic regulations), and secondly with the absence of people of antisocial behavior, who are perceived dangerous due to unpredictability of their actions. In my opinion, such references can be explained by the addiction problem in Russia that stands relevant throughout past decades. According to data from Prosecutor General's office's website, every

third crime in Russia in 2018 (32% from all registered criminal cases) was made in state of alcoholic intoxication<sup>18</sup>.

The risk that comes from road accidents and drivers who violate traffic regulation rules was also noted, as the rate of death caused by disregard of traffic conduct is high. This issue connects both with infrastructural problems and the threat from strangers, as the city is characterized with unpredictability of social behavior around, and this increases the risk of facing dangerous situations. This result generally proves notions of Simmel on social detachment and high level of contradictions between strangers in urban environment (Simmel 1976).

When we turned to the next question about threats to citizens in urban public spaces, the opposition in responses between «me, the citizen» and «them» - low-class street criminals, addicts, drunk drivers, rapists and other «suspicious people» significantly increased, but was mentioned shortly without particular elaboration. However, the attention also turns to threats related to governmental structures and the lack of visibility in their actions, such as elevated taxes designed for authorities benefit from citizens:

*«Without mentioning criminal threats, I consider the high social tension and irritation to be extremely negative. In my opinion, it is caused by excessive regulation of urban life, especially traffic and parking spaces. Extremely excessive control ( surveillance cameras), with motivated by nothing but greed, the amount of fines, tariffs costs of public utilities and other city services, which are designed to make the city's life comfortable and safe with taxes, and not to engage in profit-making, i.e. commercial activities» - male, 55 y.o.*

The social tension described above, in my opinion, represent the alienation from the city that is described in «Right to the City» (Lefebvre 1968, Harvey 2006). In contrast with the previous question on urban security definitions, some participants stayed critical to the police and provided their concerns on authority abuse cases:

*«The danger of police in combination of its guaranteed impunity and unpredictability (the range of its potential behavior is much wider than of all other threats), -that's why I put it first» - male, 25 y.o.*

The threat coming from personal data vulnerability and the lack of privacy is usual for urbanized spaces, where technologies are constantly advancing:

---

<sup>18</sup>In 2018, more than 931 thousand people were identified who committed crimes. Retrieved 31 May 2020. (<http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2019/0809/barom05.php>)

*«Personal data collection, I don't believe that my personal data won't be leaked, stolen or hacked» - female, 35 y.o*

The outlined problems are viewed as institutional ones and connected with urban globalization. The main conclusion of this part I would like to indicate is the gap between understanding security and citizen's opinions on actual threats. This outcome is important for my research and it will be elaborated further.

### ***Safety in Moscow generally vs safety in neighborhood of living: street lights matters***

In this part I measured the difference in security perception in Moscow and in area of residence. Participants were asked to explain their position. Why city and certain district are dangerous places or not? What criteria determines it?

Moscow was generally estimated as safe city by referring to low level of street crimes and ability to comfortably walk on streets at night. In citizen's arguments I saw the inner comparisons with past times of Luzhkov's authorities, that were more associated with the process of «recovering from 1990-ies trauma»: counter-terrorism infrastructure and the fight against street crime were the greatest concern of 2000s and thus, the top priority for local power to prevent. Cameras are supposed to be the coping mechanism with crime cases:

*«In places with good lighting, where tracking systems are installed in visible places, the number of attacks has decreased. The number of street criminals, in my opinion, has decreased precisely because of deterrent cameras function» - female, 46 y.o.*

Moscow environment of Sobyenin's ruling increased the overall standart of living, socially and financially secure, as the capital dramatically stands out from other Russian regions in terms of quality of life. However, citizens express discontent on teenagers, students and young adults gathering on squares and around historical buildings. The police and cameras system in city center are seen as positive in solving problems with massive drinking and partying in public spaces, in spaces of cultural heritage:

*«In general, the city center is quite calm, there are police if we are talking about crowded places. But there are a lot of different people, some of them are inadequate. For example, there are a lot of them in Kitay Gorod, and you can expect anything from them. They could be dangerous. But there are cameras, therefore the city is not as dangerous as possible» - female, 21 y.o.*

Central district residents see some threat in mass movements of political protests that traditionally take place in Boulevard ring of Moscow and Pushkinskaya square. During the

protest streets turn into the place of confrontation and escaping from the police, what affects the usual lifestyle in the area. Facial recognition system that was installed in subway stations also contributes to the general anxiety and the feel of vulnerability:

*«I think it reflects my feelings about, to start with, the introduction of cameras in the subway (to be honest, they infuriate me wildly and I systematically have to fight with the desire to break them), and secondly, with protests and all this that has appeared in my life after moving to Central district. Plus, I've had to hide in playgrounds and other places from drunk men several times over the past couple of years when I was walking home at night in a residential area» - female 20 y.o*

Moreover, I noticed a tendency that general safety of Moscow is more associated with police efficiency and controlling systems in city center, then the one in residential districts. I explain it with politicizing the city center as a place where all significant political events happen.

Speaking about neighborhoods of residence, participants demonstrated the importance of lightening infrastructure, as it solves problem of limited space observation at night. This is the example of «natural surveillance» introduced by Jane Jacobs in her book and its functioning in practice. Street lights, as it was shown in previous narratives as well, is a metaphor of security, associated with 1990ies and the beginning of 2000s:

*«When I was living in a residential area, it felt safer during the day and not very safe at night, especially during holidays, and this feeling was more related to the fact that I didn't feel able to go out at night for a pack of chips or something like that in a closest shop. When I was living in the center, it was very comfortable during the day and especially at night, even better, because there are public spaces everywhere and everything is lightened, the police is constantly observing» - female, 20 y.o*

Sometimes participants have heard about accidents, but as long as they didn't affect their lives or somebody's from their close ones, they don't stick to them as a systematic problem as the area. The feeling of safety is also elevated with the presence of state institutions and important objects – for example, the state highway and the military school.

Citizens also said that they perceive their areas as secure because of the routine and roads they have formed a long time ago and follow since then. For example, residents tend to use same streets and paths every time for getting to shopping centers, local hospitals or subway stations, because for many of them residential area is a place they come just to sleep after a working day:

*«All my movements around the native area are extremely linear for me. I go along familiar routes, where, as a rule, I don't meet either cops, or gopniks, or fast-moving cars» - male, 25 y.o*

However, I understand that such patterns of behavior can be more familiar to working class citizens without little children or elder relatives, because otherwise I guess they would spend much more time in their areas of living, as many Russians choose kindergartens and schools in short distance from their homes, in the same area. Taking care of elder relatives also requires visiting nearest state and private hospitals and pharmacies. So to say, the results I have on the security perception in residential areas are shaped by the sample limitations and have only partial representativeness of middle class in Moscow.

From the presented data I see that civil initiatives coming from residents contribute a lot to safety, so the safety issue stopped being an ultimate state's concern and became a part of citizens' responsibility. In my opinion, this is the most insightful result of this part.

### ***The purposes underlies cameras installation: difference between theory and practice***

The participants were asked whether they have noticed the change in the number of CCTV cameras and if so, what are the possible reasons of that change. What I observed the first is a distinction between official rhetoric – what is a supposed aim of CCTV control announced by the government, - and unofficial, where participants mainly expressed their concerns on privacy violations, information leakage and abuse of authority:

*«They want to use more budget money. This is an initiative "from above" to control people, especially in such a politically active city as the capital. Perhaps this is normal practice and this is done for our benefit but I'm not entirely certain» - female, 21 y.o*

The use of words «I hope», «I suspect», «I want to believe» in answers indicates the ambivalence of citizens' attitude to the CCTV system. There is a combination of distrust towards authorities and attempts to «give them a chance» in the hope of justified, legal use of cameras with respect to human rights. Some participants have difficulties in developing their position because they don't really notice cameras in everyday life, but they demonstrate awareness and think in perspective:

*«I don't pay much attention to the cameras, I just don't notice them, but it seems that the number of them has increased, just based on the evidence that cameras are now on subway gates. It is related to urban security improvement, tracking down criminals or any situations that threaten the safety of citizens and the public environment. Of course, there is an opinion that it's*

*done not only for security, but also to monitor citizens, that this information may later be used by the state not exactly for the benefit of society and citizens, but on the contrary used against them. And most likely this is how it goes and it's very bad, and is an abuse, but...»* - female, 23 y.o.

For older participants, the appearance of new cameras can be explained by the general technological progress. Local authorities follow the example of their foreign colleagues and take advantage from technologies in political sphere:

*«This is a natural outcome of technology development and the functioning of security systems»*- male, 49 y.o.

In my survey, such statements were both in negative, positive and neutral sense relatively to authorities. Negative assessment of CCTV growth consisted of taking control over private life of citizens and the opportunity for corruption; positive assessment included criminals prosecution and security politics; neutral assessment mentioned the expansion the geography of observation in Moscow and digitalization of urban environment (mostly describing the mechanism of functioning).

Similar tendencies of differentiation between official and unofficial positions are seen in answers on the aim of facial recognition, but in this case, they turned into the contrast between theory and practice. It is visible that citizens have a level of expectations from facial recognition - to prosecute criminals. Bad experience of being arrested at 2019 Moscow summer protests, - there are many articles on the role of facial recognition system in deanonymizing visitors of political protests even if they aren't public persons, - don't provide enough ground to reject positive intentions of facial recognition installation:

*«Well, after summer protests detention I have paranoid habits, but I'm sure that the Moscow authorities need this for its own security first, and only after it - to make it easier to catch real thieves and criminals, return stolen wallets to people. But I'm still not sure. Briefly, the aim is to make surveillance on political opposition»* -male, 22 y.o.

The doubt in the position I already described above expressed in words «I don't know for sure», «there are risks that the system will affect ordinary citizens», «knowing the corruption level, I'm afraid that the system is needed to monitor the opposition». Such answers also demonstrate participant's awareness of the general debate around facial recognition:

*«Allegedly - for tracking criminals, this, in theory will help to find them faster. But I don't know for sure, if such a system is extended to the whole country, it can easily be turned against ordinary citizens»* - female, 24 y.o.

Moreover, I found interesting the following consideration on the purpose of facial recognition: exploring purchasing habits, that sounds more like a marketing research method of private sector companies than a governmental concern. What is called «purely technical» is thought to be justified and safe for privacy, because of the comparison with policing measures mentioned in the second part of sentence. This is not the unique answer that brings up a problem of cameras' eligibility depending on location:

*«For full control over the city's residents in various aspects: from purely technical (purchasing and traveling habits) to policing and repressive measures» - male, 31 y.o.*

Why citizens give a chance to the authorities' motives while they share doubts and concerns on the power abuse at the same time? The contradiction between official rhetoric - how the CCTV system should work and why is it installed, and unofficial - personal fears and doubts on the abuse of power in CCTV system, -can provide a clue to understanding how civil society functions. This question will be elaborated in more detailed way in the part of expert interviews.

### ***Places we cannot avoid: the impact on urban environment***

The only change in perception participants expressed is related to subway stations; people have mentioned the increasing amount of cameras appeared near subway gates and on platforms, what can be also explained by the sustainable growth of subway lines and stations during past year. Facial recognition cameras are located on each gate, so it's quite hard not to look at them while validating the ticket:

*«Well, when the cameras were put at subway entrances, it became uncomfortable, and I regularly cover my face with a scarf or hide it in my collar entering the subway, but more for fun than seriously hoping to avoid being depicted. First of all, I wonder if this will ever confuse subway employees who stand behind gates, pretending to be there for security» - male, 25 y.o*

Survey participants demonstrated that they won't change their routine practices and directions in city just because of the cameras. Their strategy is to tolerate with the presence of cameras as a new reality that shapes public spaces. CCTV system is not an outstanding measure and its functioning isn't sufficient for reconsidering the public behavior:

*«Urban objects that are interesting for me don't cease to be less attractive if they have several cameras hung on them» - female, 42 y.o.*

However, drinking in public spaces which is against the law in Russia, is getting more challenging for citizens who gather outside. This measure concerns not only the prohibition to

drink in city center, but also in residential districts, where police patrols do checks quite often. Nevertheless, cameras don't prevent citizens from public drinking:

*«Because I have never violated anything, except that now I look around when I'm going to drink alcohol in public spaces»* - female, 23 y.o

Overall, people shared feelings of discomfort and vulnerability while being observed, thus the psychological mechanisms motivate them to avoid cameras, however most of my participants do cope with it and continue behaving normally, ignoring the surveillance.

*«I feel safer in banks, but in the subway - rather less safe (but the effect is mixed)»* - male, 21 y.o

Negative emotions don't find physical realization and don't result in collective actions so far. It's important to remember that subway stations are also equipped with metal detectors gates, that create a double security control. Plus, there are always subway security stuff nearby, or the police in central stations. The multiplicity of control measures and their excessiveness might lead to the feeling of danger, what contradicts the ultimate goal of the CCTV system.

While subway cameras confuse people and accumulate irritation, house entrances became neat and comfortable for citizens, which is probably connected with the confrontation to antisocial behavior (throwing garbage, writing on the walls and breaking mirrors at the elevator) and stigmatization of homeless people.

In public places, cameras control resulted in diminution of street art, that is generally accepted by Moscow authorities, but every time the place and the content of work should be negotiated ahead:

*«Alleys in the area of Novoslobodskaya street: cameras targeted at unattended walls led to the disappearance of the street art»* - male, 22 y.o

Parks and historical spots that turned into places of teenage gatherings underwent changes after initiative to construct walls around them. CCTV cameras helped this measure to come into force and perform efficient results:

*«Gorka- park on Kitay-Gorod and "Yama" became cleaner»* - female, 22 y.o

Mostly participants referred to the Central district of Moscow without precision of places, or they were hesitant to name any place at all. This proves my previous statement about general awareness without personal involvement by ignoring CCTV unless anything particular happens. The practical usage of spaces and buildings hasn't changed, and this is a major criteria for estimating the total appearance of urban places.

***The fact of being recorded: «I have nothing to hide»***

In the following questions, participants were asked about their personal experience of interaction with CCTV cameras both with facial recognition and not in a more detailed way. I was particularly interested whether any situations have happened when cameras have played important role.

The participants referred to cameras as a helpful mechanism in different situations, meaning those without facial recognition. There were quite small number of cases described, participants mostly didn't share any stories, and those who did told about debatable situations where the evidence was needed, for example, the suspicion in shoplifting:

*«I was accused of shoplifting, with the help of cameras I was able to prove that this is not true»* - male, 21 y.o.

Another case is also related to CCTV cameras installed on private initiative, same as in shops. Banks are also equipped with surveillance, especially corners that face ATMs:

*«They helped me recognize the robbers when my credit cards were stolen, and thanks to the cameras, I confirmed that I did not withdraw the cash. Bank returned the money to me, because the credit card was insured»* - female, 35 y.o.

Only one participant mentioned a camera installed by recent governmental program – in subways:

*«My husband found documents thanks to a surveillance camera in subway»*- female, 38 y.o.

Entrance cameras also were highlighted but in negative way as being broke and therefore not efficient:

*«No, these cameras on the house entrances are useless, and when a friend of mine was robbed, the police said that the camera was broken»* - male, 33 y.o.

While participants don't personally have any accidents related to facial recognition system, one of them mentioned in a context of last summer's political protests in Moscow, where the system was used for deanonymizing members of the protest and their political prosecution. In particular, participant's brother was being recorded, and the police came to him:

*«Not in my life, but the police came to my brother after the protest»* - female, 21 y.o.

Although the mechanism of surveillance is not studied in depth, there was an evidence that it started being broadly used by the police during Moscow protests in 2019. This is the first issue that raised public concern about the system, and the second one appeared as a result of curfew policy in pandemic.

Last part of the survey was dedicated to explore the perception of surveillance limits: where the CCTV system stops being a security control and starts to intervene private life? What can be discovered about the fact that people's personal data is stored in state archives? Opinions were controversial. Some citizens expressed the concerns about data confidentiality and referred to the violation of human rights:

*«First of all, this is intervention to privacy. Secondly, there is no assurance in the reliability of data storage, as well as in the absence of abuse from people who have access»* - female, 24 y.o.

At the same time, others didn't see any abuse, treating it as a necessary measure for preserving security on a national level. They don't separate themselves from the community and legitimate surveillance control as part of state, what is known as social contract theory of Locke's and Hobbes:

*«I respect the law, so there is nothing wrong in the fact that I'm being watched. I live in a big city. If I want to be safe, I must understand that my personal security is impossible without full control»* - female, 46 y.o.

The credibility to authorities here reminds statements from previous part about urban change: those who don't disturbed by the fact of being recorded have nothing to hide because they don't violate laws. They are mostly obedient citizens. People clearly stated that a fear of being placed in state database can arise only as an outcome of illegal behavior. Negative feelings about surveillance take place only when you have something to hide, what contradicts both governmental and social expectations from citizen:

*«This is authorities' cameras, not individual's. I have nothing to hide. And if criminals are recorded on the cameras and they are punished thanks to these cameras, then why not keeping the records as long as needed?»* - female, 26 y.o.

Participants clearly distinguish private zones of securitization and public spheres while providing arguments. They express hopes that CCTV system will be exploited properly, with respect to human rights, while their personal attitude to the ruling authorities and their decisions remain critical and negative:

*«Well, with absolute suspicious to Moscow authorities and knowing that records from city cameras can be sold in Darknet, I think so. But this doesn't mean that I'm against cameras everywhere. Let's say, I completely understand the situation when shop owner puts cameras at his shop, because camera here has a protective function and doesn't violate the personal boundaries of others (they are on private territory)»* - male, 22 y.o.

How can the tolerance to recognition system match with the criticism and low support of authorities? In people's minds, these two things are separated, they evaluate everything by its results within time. Given answers have created a strong feeling that the main statement people have toward facial recognition so far is «we give a chance to fair launch of facial recognition for the sake of security, but the abuse of data should be prevented»:

*«The fewer people have access to this data, the better. I think that data should be available to officials only, in a generalized form. Among other things, I don't trust authorities very much, but I'm quite tolerant to the facial recognition system itself» - male, 22 y.o.*

Unless the necessary measures are taken, the credibility to the police will stay low and the police institution itself will be a threat to personal security and privacy.


### ***3.2. Limits of surveillance: the comparative statistical analysis of privacy perception depending on locations***

In this part I present some statistical findings based on the data gathered in survey. Due to the limited number of participants in my sample the findings I describe below may not be full, however they supplement qualitative analysis I'm doing in my research. While some of my participants haven't elaborated their opinions enough for the qualitative analysis, their answers in quantitative part of the survey can provide better understanding of the views on CCTV and facial recognition.

The chart below (see *Chart 1.*) represent how citizens estimated the admissibility of CCTV cameras on percentage to the whole sample (63 participants). The places where CCTV cameras are currently installed in Moscow are chosen and ranged by the increasing in a degree of privacy. The Kremlin and the Red square are considered to be the most public in this scale both because of their political meaning and touristic value. The Red Square is also a place of many themed festivals and parades that are organized all year round, and crowds, as was stated in literature (Graham, S., Brooks, J., Heery, D. 1996; Nishiyama 2018) can become a source of danger. The last position on the scale is the space near apartment, as the most personal and private one that can be in public space, where «public» means everything outside the apartment. I marked values only on 2 graphs out of 5 to demonstrate the fluctuations of total acceptance and total unacceptance of CCTV cameras. I see that CCTV surveillance was estimated as very acceptable or rather acceptable in most places, and the domination of «rather acceptable» scale may demonstrate that citizens don't have exact opinion on CCTV system or they prefer to avoid explicit judgments on it. The level of unacceptability is steadily increases while the level of justifying the presence of CCTV cameras declines, what proves my general assumption on the sensitivity of perception in dependence with changing level of privacy. As a whole, positive attitude toward CCTV dominates, and at some places, like parks and children playgrounds neutral attitude equals positive one. This can be possibly explained by invisibility of cameras in these places. Also people usually are deeply engaged with communication and sports while walking in parks, or playing with their children while spending time on playgrounds, so they may not notice cameras. The argument about invisibility of cameras in public spaces has appeared in many survey responses, so the chart also depicts it. Another interesting values are about subway stations and entrances near validators. These spots considered dangerous, and the history of terrorist attacks in Moscow underground might influence here.

Chart 1.

### Estimation of CCTV cameras acceptability depending on different public areas




Comparing to the ordinary CCTV cameras, when citizens were asked about facial recognition cameras, answers significantly differ (see *Chart 2*). From the first glance we see that «Neutral», «Rather unacceptable» and «Definitely unacceptable» fluctuate around the same indicator of 15% average, with increase up to 25% and 24% in cases of parks and shopping malls accordingly. None of the graphs exceeds 33% except the total unacceptability in the last variable, but the general trend is still positive. The chart demonstrates the difference in perception between CCTV cameras and CCTV with facial recognition system, but the fluctuations around the same numbers can be explained by the lack of understanding how technologies work and whether the particular cameras have recognition function or not. Facial recognition cameras are usually not supported with warning about recognition in the area, and the only place we know for sure equipped with recognition is the space next to ticket validation in subway. However, even subway recognition surveillance was estimated positively. The unacceptability graph is steadily growing only after «shopping malls» variable, what I transmit

to the understanding of privacy. Privacy emerges in your house; the place you live in is understood as the most private place, and everything around it is also more or less private, but when you go beyond the designated area, the privacy disappears. Facial recognition becomes justified just because you are no longer at your home, which means you are in a space of potential danger.

Chart 2.

**Estimation of facial recognition cameras acceptability depending on different public areas**



Also in my analysis I tried to investigate the correlation dependency between variables. The table below (see *Table 1.*) represent the significant correlations between variables «security\_moscow» (the estimation of security in Moscow) and «security\_livingarea» (the estimation of security in the area of residence) on the confidence interval of 95%. It means that with 95% probability there is a significant correlation between the estimation of security level in Moscow generally and in the area of residence. Citizens who tend to perceive Moscow as secured city also estimated highly the security level of their residence area.

Another significant correlation is between variables «security\_changingcityperception» (how your perception of city objects has changed under the influence of CCTV cameras) and «security\_moscow» (the estimation of security in Moscow). I colored all significant coefficients in the table so they were visible. It means that with 95% probability there is a significant correlation between the change in perception of city objects under the influence of CCTV cameras and estimation of security level in Moscow generally. So, by these results I can suppose that citizens who think that Moscow is safe city in general tend to change their perception of city objects after implementation of CCTV system.

Table 1.

**Pearson rank correlation coefficient**

		The estimation of security in Moscow	The estimation of security in the area of residence	How your perception of city objects has changed under the influence of CCTV cameras
The estimation of security in Moscow	Pearson Correlation	1	,507**	,372**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,003
The estimation of security in the area of residence	Pearson Correlation	,507**	1	,126
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,325
How your perception of city objects has changed under the influence of CCTV cameras	Pearson Correlation	,372**	,126	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,003	,325	

### 3.3 Awareness on surveillance in media: the analysis of contexts in Russian publications

In this part of analysis I will address the way surveillance systems and facial recognition are described in Russian media: what issues are mostly mentioned in the context of surveillance and how they differ depending on the search phrases. I used LexisNexis and Factiva databases, both are databases of various types of publications – news, journals and newspapers articles, analytical notes, reviews. Publications are primarily divided by the geographical locations of the source, authors, types of media, themes, professional spheres and other criteria. As databases don't assign positive, negative or neutral tones of publications automatically, I estimated the general attitude of publications and included examples of some topics to illustrate my findings.

In both systems of media analytics, I selected the following search criteria:

1. Timeline – 1 year
2. Location by publication – Russia
3. Language of publication – Russian

My analysis starts with searching phrase «facial recognition or CCTV or surveillance cameras», where «or» is a logical operand for programming the request for search on key words. Then I look through publications and their main description presented in databases. The second search I use in both databases is «(facial recognition or CCTV or surveillance cameras) and human rights» to see cases closely connected specifically with the private life of citizens. In this part I start with estimating the general theme of publication and where the mentioned topic is placed there, for what purpose. Then I narrow down the search to specific topic of human rights and privacy for better understanding whether any difference in tone of publications appears.

The first search showed 14 393 publications in both databases overall, and 767 of them are from professional or amateur IT-literature. These articles include not only estimation of CCTV mechanisms of functioning given by experts, but also social outcomes of this digital surveillance in public spaces (*«The Pope supported Microsoft and IBM on the issue of control over facial recognition technologies»*). Articles often start from summarizing the international experience of CCTV system with references to London, Singapore, Los Angeles and Beijing (*«Alexey Kadeishvili: «There are almost no significant differences between the Russian and global facial recognition market»*). Many publications are dedicated to business interactions between companies on the topic of surveillance software (*«Microsoft will stop investing in facial recognition firms after the Israeli AnyVision scandal»*), that don't matter a lot for ordinary

citizens but can be useful for IT-professionals. Foreign and Russian news of IT industry demonstrate facial recognition as an inevitable step of technological advance that is about to be implemented (if not already) in many spheres of life. It is seen as lucrative and promising area of research and development. Although these articles involve mentioning opportunities that facial recognition technology brings to programmers and developers, in my opinion they have more neutral than positive tone. Sometimes I saw alarming news on the topic of governmental control and unregulated use of cameras. In those cases, authors described the surveillance mechanisms as «total», what brings negative tone and personal attitude of authors or experts that give comments in the text (*«Experts: under the cover of the pandemic there is a development of surveillance tools for citizens»*). Phrases «under the cover» have negative sense because it means that authorities benefit from pandemic situation to the detriment of citizens. Another topic – the data leakage, - also highlights negative side of facial recognition, what can be both interesting for citizens as their privacy is in danger, and for professionals – for better work on the system itself to minimize its weaknesses (*«The developer of the acclaimed facial recognition system reported a data leakage»*).

Apart from IT-sphere, other publications belong to news portals, papers, magazines and other online editions, sponsored by the government and independent (both oppositional and neutral). No matter where mass media are situated on a political scale, they all subject to the law on censorship. I noticed the following trends:

Firstly, cameras are mentioned as elements of infrastructural improvements, for example, in articles about opening schools, kindergartens, squares, any other buildings. In these cases the idea to write about them is to give a feeling of safety and control in renovated spots, so the context here is positive. Referring to the part of the research where I analyzed open questions, the good estimation of cameras role in remote areas given by survey participants also coincides with media agenda. *«Cigarette smoke in the entrance: how to stop neighbors from smoking on stairwells»* - for example, in article neither of the searched words is mentioned in the heading, but in the body of text cameras are suggested as a measure of preventing people from smoking inside the building in common areas, in other words, creating safety. At schools, the facial recognition was already tested in one of Russian regions, and the article shows that «the system blocks unauthorized people from entering the school without special permission».

Secondly, facial recognition received a lot of attention during COVID-19 pandemic as a measure of control for isolation and social distancing (*«More than a thousand cases of violation the self-isolation regime were detected in Yamal»*) Russia announced curfew 2 weeks after European countries, but the technologies took a key role in reinforcement measures from the

very start. Before the pandemic people mostly haven't heard about surveillance and facial recognition that much, but now it became a prime concern for their coping strategies («*Sberbank, VisionLabs and Rambler found out whether the computer recognizes through a medical mask*»). Cameras are seen as a threat for continuing «normal life» and ignoring pandemic prescriptions, because self-isolation regime in Russia was announced as a «non-working month» for the whole country.

Cameras were mentioned in news about someone being caught in crimes like theft in shops or violation the administrative laws, like vandalism in playgrounds at residential areas. For such cases it's common to see the use of words «cameras recorded», «when the police watched CCTV recordings they found out», «the criminal was caught in the cameras installed around the place», that put surveillance technologies in a key point of such stories. This provides answers to questions on how victims were found, and demonstrate positive assessment of cameras. I found more articles related to this topic in Factiva database, they mostly came from regional local media and those news don't relate to Moscow or any major political events either («*How the "Safe region" program helps solving crimes and which objects will be connected to it this year*»).

Many information was given about implementation of facial recognition in future. For example in airports it can replace boarding pass verification in each step of control. The software based on artificial intelligence (AI) will also personalize services by identifying passengers, that has been tested on VIP-class customers so far. Banks also test the recognition system in their services («*VTB bank can implement facial recognition technology in all departments if testing is successful*»). Marketing functions of CCTV system is out of my research area, therefore cases of facial recognition usage in commercial or corporative purposes are not analyzed here.

Social institutions like Orthodox Church shared concerns about the unregulated access to facial recognition and the absence of rules. «*The bishop is convinced that technology is only good for solving the COVID-19 – related problems. The representative of the Russian Orthodox Church is skeptical that technologies will stop being used after the pandemic. According to him, there is a risk of interference in daily life of citizens*»<sup>19</sup> - this article from RIA News demonstrates the alternative position of Orthodox Church that contradicts state politics. Other articles that share warning messages about the abuse in security systems use images of excessive surveillance from literature, like «*Big brother's hostages. What information do city surveillance*

---

<sup>19</sup>Bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church: increasing methods of control over the person is a problem. Retrieved 31 May 2020. (<https://ria.ru/20200523/1571896236.html>)

*cameras get about us*»- the reference to Big Brother in this article is negative connotation of security measures that draw connection with totalitarian interventions in private life.

Finally, Sobyenin's mayor figure and Moscow security regulation are provided in details, often in headings, with naming of places and approximate sums in budget given for system's installation and development (*«Sobyenin: the implementation of facial recognition will be completed in the subway by 1<sup>st</sup> of September»*). Infrastructural news on urban development are designed for providing transparency and regular reports on authorities' actions to citizens. Back to 2000s, the knowledge about current actions of government was limited and the access to it was closed from ordinary citizens. The ruling of new Mayor Sobyenin proclaimed detailed reports about every transformation in the city. However, with the number of corruption scandals appeared in media for the last years we cannot be sure on what degree the information we receive is true. While the formal request of increasing the transparency of actions was satisfied, the verification of data sometimes is far from official numbers, what creates an illusion of control over information that people possess.

I found 205 results in LexisNexis and 12 in Factiva by the search *«(facial recognition or CCTV or surveillance cameras) and human rights»* from well-known media as RIA News, Business journal, Kommersant, Vedomosti. In contrast with previous results, these articles were mostly about concerns and calls for regulation and limitation of AI, aimed at governmental structures, IT-corporations and influential organizations. The pandemic difficulties made privacy problem relevant and visible, so the awareness about negative impact of CCTV has spread among non-activists and politically inactive citizens (*«Will artificial intelligence stop the pandemic? Or make it worse?»*; *«COVID-19 and the control: is video surveillance legal?»*) In articles like *«CCTV: surveillance or security?»* surveillance mechanism has negative meaning and opposes protection and safety. The transparency that government tries to achieve is called inadequate and unhealthy, so there is a high risk that temporary measures of security may become permanent. Some authors see here a possible crisis of credibility to the ruling party (*«Not just a crisis: coronavirus is a test for Putin's police state»*). It seems that pandemic crisis finally demonstrated the holes in ethical code of AI with references to international experience of surveillance regulations. The space of privacy is decreasing worldwide, and cases of CCTV legal regulations appeared in Europe and US. Indeed, the absence of juridical base helps corporations to collect digital data excessively, and determining private photographs (for example, from social networks) as biometric data can stop their businesses (*«Figures first. «Big advertising Brother» knows more than it seems»*). While authorities seem to accumulate all possible information about

citizens, how far corporations can go? «Sooner or later this discussion will become inevitable in Russia», - is written in one of the articles. The main question raised here – what personal data is and how to estimate the level of privacy for human features. «*Another exchange of rights to security*», - this heading is an example of confrontation between human rights and safety, and safety actually means a threat to human rights in a kind of wordplay.

Governmental structures can adopt surveillance system and it will become a commonplace as the power will expand accordingly in response to it. Not only Orthodox Church as an institution stands against CCTV system, but also believers have raised the problem of oversecuritization in churches («*Russians began to complain about video cameras in churches and monasteries*»). In contrast, the prevention of violence in prisons and detection of such crimes were mentioned as a breakthrough of facial recognition system. While reading articles, I noticed two main comparisons in arguments – with the Chinese model of surveillance and the British one. Chinese type is mostly mentioned in negative context with references to Xinjian district of China, where facial recognition is used for detecting uigur population. Xinjian district is an example of territory with outrageous cases of islamophobia and violation of human rights, and facial recognition system supports the operation of inhumane laws<sup>20</sup>. The British type of surveillance is also known for their part in increasing prejudices and stigmatizing people of color, because the mechanism reproduces biases of their developers<sup>21</sup>. Nevertheless, British experience is demonstrated as positive because of the discussion on digital regulation taken place in the country and the constant improvement of the technology. Another positive context where British counts is the efficiency of CCTV cameras in counter-terrorism – the origin of surveillance introduction in Britain.

When the pandemic started, the question «Does the facial recognition system violate human rights?» became crucial for the first time. Citizens resisted self-isolation measures, being unable to go for a work that is impossible to do online, for example, in service and industries. Under these circumstances governmental intentions that were hidden before became meaningful and visible for citizens; they began thinking about possible fallout of surveillance system. While the emergence of facial recognition in subway is the most noticeable innovation among all other places, it draws a lot of attention. Some editions say that in the future biometric data collected by facial recognition cameras at subway entrances can replace ticket validation. By looking directly

---

<sup>20</sup>How China uses high-tech surveillance to subdue minorities. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html>)

<sup>21</sup>What's wrong with public video surveillance? Retrived may 31, 2020. (<https://www.aclu.org/other/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance>)

at the camera, the passenger will be identified and money will be taken from his private account. On the contrary, only a few articles dedicated to human rights in digital sphere defend surveillance and facial recognition by referring to the inevitability of privacy in public spaces. They think that the prevalence of technologies is what we should reconcile with: *«We have entered the age of complete information transparency, and the availability of sudden video recording for any person is now a reality of our time»*. Authors often appeal to the juridical background from 1990ies, as current actions are seen through prism of post-soviet transformations and the construction of democracy in a country with hybrid regime: *«In situations where political expediency faces formal legality, the second one is defeated. It happens because laws were written before the need to violate them. Liberal trends in legislation from early 1990s left so many loopholes for criminals that now any movement towards control over public processes is seen as an attack on human rights»*<sup>22</sup>.

The analysis of publications demonstrated awareness and increasing concerns on the privacy problem under securitization measures. While the analysis was conducted during the pandemic in Russia, I wonder how CCTV system and facial recognition will be positioned in media during next months after the official end of curfew restrictions. While reading articles in databases, I haven't noticed the glorifying views on surveillance system, neither I found any promotion of these measures sponsored by the authorities. Indeed, I recognized many similarities between media overview of the security problem and the way citizens described their concerns in survey. The attitude toward facial recognition as «necessary evil» and the logical outcome of urban digitalization are the main points I outlined from this part.

---

<sup>22</sup>Does the facial recognition system violate human rights? Retrieved 31 May 2020. (<https://regnum.ru/news/2791676.html>)

### 3.4. The crisis of privacy institution in Russia: expert interviews

In the following part, I address experts from law and IT spheres. They gave comments on what problems facial recognition creates, and how people perceive it in Russian society. As the technological mechanism of CCTV is outside the area of my research, I will mostly focus on expert's explanations of CCTV legislation process. Both of my experts came from two Russian NGOs that provide juridical help for human rights protection. «Agora» is known for protecting political prisoners as «Pussy Riot» activists, dealing with prosecution for memes in social media and helping people who were arrested for participation in opposition protests from 2011 until now<sup>23</sup>. «Roskomsvoboda» is a social project focused on tracking blocking of Internet resources and increasing awareness about digital rights<sup>24</sup>. While criminal cases concerning digital sphere, domestic violence and political protests are weakly regulated or even not functioning at all (especially on domestic violence<sup>25</sup>), «Agora» provides legal help and lawyer will help in writing a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights. It's also important to mention that both organizations are in political opposition to the ruling party, so their personal political views are seen in their positions.

When I talked with Sarkis - a lawyer in the field of cyber law with more than 10 years of experience, a co-founder of «Roskomsvoboda» project, - he outlined the absence of legal regulation of CCTV cameras and facial recognition as the major problem:

*«We are trying in different ways, well, at least not to prohibit the facial recognition, but to suspend it until some guarantees against abuse are came into force, and the understandable guideline for using facial recognition is established. We don't want to become luddists, but we claim that it's necessary to adopt a moratorium on the use of facial recognition until the mechanism is studied and some legislative guarantees appeared».*

Damir, a lawyer from Agora, agrees with Sarkis and mentions that «Roskomnadzor» - the federal service for supervision of communications, technologies and media, - doesn't do the job it was established for. Criminal prosecution, started last summer due to Moscow protests, is a turning point for rethinking the sphere of personal data in juridical system:

*«There is a bill «On personal data» that doesn't take into account neither any new technological solutions nor new approaches and standards in the field of guaranteeing rights and respect for privacy. There is no specific regulation yet. We continue to sue with the*

---

<sup>23</sup> Agora – international human rights organization. Retrieved 31 May 2020. (<https://agora.legal/>)

<sup>24</sup> Roskomsvoboda's website. Retrieved 31 May 2020. (<https://roskomsvoboda.org/>)

<sup>25</sup> Russian domestic violence: Women fight back. Retrieved May 31, 2020. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019-50493758>)

*Department of Information Technology and the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the use of facial recognition cameras in relation with protests. In court, the authorities admitted the absence of regulation».*

From his experience, Damir admits that a problem with official approval for using personal data exists from 2000s, even before advanced technologies were introduced, for example, with mobile phones wiretapping:

*«Even if you take the statistics of court cases on permission to wiretap phones, this is one of the few examples of digital tracking that requires a court permission. According to statistics, 98-99% of such requests are satisfied by the court. The depth of published statistics is only increasing with years. This is such a «peak of the iceberg», because it's obvious that in most cases no one applies for permission, they listen because the system allows».*

Both experts in interviews recalled European and American experience of legislation with respect to digital rights, from limiting the number of places where facial recognition is operating to stating openly in laws what is perceived as private data in public places:

*«But what we lack, and what was proposed in California, is that at the entrance to each such infrastructure facility, there should be a sign that will indicate to a person that a recording with facial recognition technology is taking place in this place, so that a person can make a decision whether they want to go there or not» - Sarkis, «Roskomsvoboda».*

Why citizens' understanding of privacy allows facial recognition to operate and the resistance to police's abuse on personal data is still low? The notion about being a «law obedient man», who doesn't have anything to hide, already appeared in narratives of my survey. Experts admit this view, blaming post-Soviet features of social development for poor awareness of personal rights. Our society is only at the beginning of the way to understand its independence:

*«Many citizens still don't understand the nature of the right to privacy, and the institute of privacy in Russia has not yet been formed during last 30 years, and therefore people may not fully understand the danger coming from the system of non-targeted surveillance. (...)Therefore, we have to explain people the possible risks, and if you ask them enough questions, of course, they are more likely to say that they don't want cameras to track them and don't want someone to have access to their personal data» - Sarkis, «Roskomsvoboda».*

The perception of privacy as something what exists within the territory of your apartment doesn't solve problems with human rights and results in decrease of social support – the remarkable sign of the civil society crisis:

*«This is a complex problem, related to the disregard to human rights in Russia, and the situation can only be changed with reforms, when liberal elections and a competitive political environment appear. Then a free discussion will be possible» - Damir, «Agora».*

Having the drop in credibility to authorities and unwillingness to protect personal rights at the same time indicates on the institutional problem and underdevelopment of political sphere, that don't encourage people to stand against restrictions they find excessive.

### Main findings and conclusion

In my work I tried to study how Moscow citizens perceive CCTV cameras and facial recognition system, and how these technologies contributed to the social understanding of public security. Because of the limited sample and the constantly changing circumstances of securitization measures my findings may have partial representativeness, and for larger extrapolation of them further research required. However, I successfully achieved the aim of the study and explored both designated tasks.

I can say that Moscow citizens have demonstrated sufficient awareness about implementation of CCTV cameras and facial recognition in the framework of city program «Safe city», which was introduced by Moscow Mayor two years ago. People read the news and know cases of both positive and negative outcomes of this security system, although it haven't affected their lives directly so far. Due to the ambiguity of information they receive from media, citizens have certain suspiciousness to facial recognition cameras. They can provide arguments why they prefer not to be recorded and how the security politics increase the distrust to policymakers and the police. Nevertheless, the popular tendency that appeared among Moscow citizens is to share the hope for reasonable use of surveillance technologies in combination with low thrust to the police. I noticed a gap between understanding security and citizen's opinions on actual threats. There seems to be an official rhetoric of danger that citizens reproduced in their answers, but they personally may consider dangerous opposite things, for example, police abuse and unregulated violence stimulated by corruption of authorities. While citizens don't exclude the possibility of power abuse in establishing surveillance control, they «give a chance» to security measures with hope that the use will be justified. **Distrust to authority structures co-exists with loyalty to surveillance systems.** Main justifications of surveillance and recognition are the decreasing of crimes and general safety in crowds and places with lack of infrastructure. The operation of CCTVs in residential areas provide a feeling of being secured by replacing infrastructure, creating an illusion of safety by constant surveillance, representing Jacobs's idea of «natural surveillance». The understanding of threat has moved from terrorism to more routinized danger, not extraordinary one, that comes from other members of society – other citizens. Here I see the proof of Copenhagen School of security (Balzacq 2005, Bigo 2002) assumptions that authorities create a securitized object and their goal is to persuade citizens that danger really exists. Citizens see threat in each others and transmit function of disciplining from society to state's field of responsibility.

The context of media publications and expert opinions proved another important point: the crisis of privacy. The results of my research demonstrated that individual understanding of privacy develops slowly. People still think that privacy is limited inside your apartment, and once you left it, you don't have the privacy anymore just because you're in public space. **Privacy is equal to private space.** Other parts of the city are places of potential threat whose origin is unpredictable. However, younger generation citizens started critically approaching this statement, trying to define their privacy borders independently. Younger generations, who are politically active nowadays, can force a step toward new understanding of privacy by influencing governmental decisions. The concept of privacy is deeply rooted in digital sphere, but Russians share traditional understanding of personal privacy and stick to it while defining the possible level of governmental intervention to their lives. Therefore, a question about causes and motives that construct the sense of privacy arises.

In further research I see a potential to study deeper the «neo-liberal» concept of privacy and how people construct perception their perception of privacy. I think the relations between digital interventions to daily life and personal privacy is a promising area of research for behavioral and cognitive sciences. An outcome of research in this area will bring new perspective in studying human nature's actions and motives in social transformation under digitalization.

## References

- Balzacq, T. (2005) The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.11, №2, pp. 171-201.
- Bigo, D. (2002) Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives*, Vol.27, Special Issue, pp. 63-87.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998) Acts of resistance. Polity press, 106 p.
- Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and symbolic power. Polity press, 1991, 292 p.
- Boyer, Ch. (1994) The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments / Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 560 p.
- Campana, A. (2013). Beyond norms: the incomplete de-securitisation of the Russian counterterrorism frame. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 6 iii, pp. 457–472.
- Certeau., M. (1990) Marches dans la ville. *L'invention du quotidien*, Vol. 1. Arts de faire. Paris: Gallimard.
- Coaffee, J. (2009) Terrorism, Risk and the Global City: Towards Urban Resilience. Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Coaffee, J. and Wood, D. (2006) Security is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk. *International Relations*, 20(4), pp. 503-5017.
- Deukmedjian, J. (2013). Making Sense of Neoliberal Securitization in Urban Policing and Surveillance. *Canadian Review of Sociology*, 50(1), pp. 52–73.
- Fay, S. (1998) Tough on crime, tough on civil liberties: Some negative aspects of Britain's wholesale adoption of CCTV surveillance during the 1990s. *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology*, Jul.98, Vol. 12 Issue 2, pp.315-346.
- Firmino, R., Kanashiro, M., Bruno, F., Evangelista, R., & da Costa Nascimento, L. (2013). Fear, Security, and the Spread of CCTV in Brazilian Cities: Legislation, Debate, and the Market. *Journal of Urban Technology*, 20(3), pp. 65–84.
- Foucault, M (1982) The subject and power. In «The essential works of Foucault» 1954–1984. Vol. 3: Power, ed. J. Faubion, pp. 326–48. London: The New Press.
- Foucault, M. (2004) The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France. 1978–1979. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gluck, Z and Low, S. (2017) A sociospatial framework for the anthropology of security. *Anthropological Theory*, Vol. 17(3), pp. 281–296.
- Graham, S. (2010). Cities under siege : the new military urbanism. Verso.

- Graham, S., Brooks, J., Heery, D. (1996) Towns on the television: Closed circuit TV in British towns and cities. *Local Government Studies*, 22:3, pp. 1-2.
- Hansen, L. (2012) Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. *Review of International Studies*, №38, pp. 525–546.
- Harvey, D. (2006) The Right to the City. In Richard Scholar (ed.), *Divided Cities: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2003*. Oxford University Press.
- Jacobs, J. (1961) *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random House. – 458 p.
- Kaufman, E. (2016). Policing mobilities through bio-spatial profiling in New York City. *Political Geography*, 55(1), pp. 72–81.
- Kohn, M. (2004) *Brave New Neighborhoods: The Privatization of Public Space*. New York: Routledge.
- Lefebvre, H. (1968) *Le droit à la ville*. Anthropos, Paris.
- Lynch, K. (1960) *The Image of the City*. The MIT Press.
- Marcuse, P. (2005) The Threat of Terrorism and the Right to the City. *Fordham Urban Law Journal*, № 25, p.767-785.
- McFarlane, C., & Silver, J. (2017). Navigating the city: Dialectics of everyday urbanism. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 42(3), 458–471.
- Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. *SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research*, Vol. 12(3): pp. 341–370.
- Nemeth, J. and Hollander, J. (2010) Lost Space: Security Zones and New York City's Shrinking Public Space. *International Journal of Urban and Regional research*, № 34, pp. 20-34.
- Newburn, T. (2001) The Commodification of Policing: Security Networks in the Late Modern City. *Urban Studies*, Vol.38, Nos.5 –6, pp. 829–848.
- Nishiyama, H. (2018). Crowd surveillance: The (in)securitization of the urban body. *Security Dialogue*, 49(3), pp. 200–216.
- Nunes, J. (2012). Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies. *Security Dialogue*, 43(4), pp. 345 –361.
- Nyman, J. (2016). What is the value of security? Contextualising the negative./positive debate. *Review of International Studies*, pp. 1 - 19.
- Raco, M. (2003). Remaking Place and Securitising Space: Urban Regeneration and the Strategies, Tactics and Practices of Policing in the UK. *Urban Studies (Routledge)*, 40(9), 1869

- Ragazzi, F. (2017). Countering terrorism and radicalisation: Securitising social policy? *Critical Social Policy*, 37(2), pp. 163–179.
- Savitch, H. (2005) An Anatomy of Urban Terror: Lessons from Jerusalem and Elsewhere. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.361–395.
- Savitch, H. (2007) Cities in a Time of Terror : Space, Territory, and Local Resilience. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Simmel, G. (1976) The Metropolis and Mental Life The Sociology of Georg Simmel' New York: Free Press.
- Simone, A. (2004). People as Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments in Johannesburg. *Public Culture*, 16(3), 407-429.
- Waeber, O. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter, Chapter 2: Societal Security: The Concept, pp. 17-40.
- Walby, K., & Lippert, R. (2012). The new keys to the city: uploading corporate security and threat discourse into Canadian municipal governments. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 58(4), pp. 437–455.
- Williams, M. (2008). (In)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society. *Cooperation and Conflict*, № 43, pp. 57-79.

## Appendix 1. Survey questions

Good afternoon! My name is Galina, I am a MA student at the faculty of Sociology and Social Anthropology, and I am currently conducting a research about the attitude of Moscow residents to CCTV cameras. I am interested in how people perceive their safety in public places. After data collection, all materials will be encoded and presented only in a generalized form as part of my research. I guarantee the anonymity of your responses.

It will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete the survey.

### *Instructions*

In each question, please choose one answer. If it is indicated in a description that the choice is limited to two or three options, please specify all the answers that are suitable for you. In questions with an open response form, try to answer as fully as possible.

### **Part 1. General information about the participant**

1. To start with, please indicate where you live at the moment:
  1. Moscow
  2. Moscow region
2. Please, indicate your age (the number of full years): \_\_\_\_
3. What is your gender identity? (*open question*) \_\_\_\_
4. If you live in Moscow, what is the administrative area you live in? (*The list of Moscow administrative regions*)
5. In which area you spend time the most, without including the area of residence (before the beginning of self-isolation regime due to COVID-19 pandemic)? Select up to two suitable responses. (*The list of Moscow administrative regions*)
6. Please, indicate your type of occupation before the beginning of self-isolation regime due to COVID-19 pandemic (Please, select all suitable responses):

1. Full-day occupation
2. Part-time occupation
3. Remote job/Freelance
4. Doing studies in high school (10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> forms of general education)
5. Doing university studies (full-time education program)
6. Doing university studies (part-time education program)
7. I don't work or study at the moment
8. Other (*please, specify*):

7. Please, choose the option that most accurately describes the financial situation of your family:

1. We have enough for daily expenses, but buying clothes is already a difficulty
2. There is enough means for food and clothing, but buying large technical appliances without applying for a loan is problematic
3. In general, we are financially secured, but we cannot afford expensive purchases without applying for a loan or pre-accumulating the necessary amount
4. We can easily afford buying a car or an expensive vacation
5. Can't answer

## Part 2. Security measures in Moscow

1. Please, tell me what is the security of urban spaces means for you? Give your definition of "urban security". (*open question*)

---

2. What do you think may become a threat to the safety of city residents in public spaces? What exactly are they expressed in? (Describe in as much detail as possible). (*open question*)

---

3. How do you estimate the safety of public spaces in Moscow in general? In your opinion, Moscow...

1. Very secured
2. At a certain point secured
3. Neither secured nor unsecured
4. At a certain point unsecured
5. Not secured at all

4. Please tell me more about your choice in the previous question. Why do you think that?

(open question) \_\_\_\_\_

5. How do you estimate the safety of the area you live in? In your opinion, your area of residence...

1. Very secured
2. At a certain point secured
3. Neither secured nor unsecured
4. At a certain point unsecured
5. Not secured at all

6. Please tell me more about your choice in the previous question. Why do you think that?

(open question) \_\_\_\_\_

### **Part 3. CCTV-surveillance in Moscow**

1. Did you notice security cameras in your area of residence?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Can't answer

2. Did you notice security cameras in places in the city you visit often (with the exception of the area of residence)?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Can't answer

3. In your opinion, how the number of video surveillance cameras installed in Moscow has changed over the past year?

- 1) Significantly increased
- 2) At certain point increased
- 3) Stayed the same
- 4) At some point decreased
- 5) Significantly decreased
- 6) Can't answer

4. If you noted a change in the number of CCTV cameras in previous question, what do you think is the reason for this? (Describe it in as much detail as possible) (*open question*)
- 
5. Many outdoor surveillance cameras are connected with a facial recognition system integrated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs databases. At the moment, the Moscow local government is working on expanding the geographical coverage of this system. Have you heard anything about it?
- 1) Yes
  - 2) No
  - 3) Can't answer
6. Why, in your opinion, was the facial recognition system introduced? For what purpose? (Describe it in as much detail as possible) (*open question*)
- 
7. There is a hypothesis that urban security measures change the perception of citizens of the urban space. To what extent is it relatable to Moscow?
- 1) Very relatable
  - 2) At certain point relatable
  - 3) Neutral
  - 4) At certain point not relatable
  - 5) Not at all relatable
8. Do you think that your attitude towards city objects (buildings, squares, infrastructure objects, etc.) has changed since the introduction of video surveillance cameras?
- 1) Changed a lot
  - 2) Probably changed
  - 3) Neutral
  - 4) Probably hasn't changed
  - 5) Hasn't changed at all

9. Please tell me more about your choice in the previous question. Why do you think that your attitude changed or didn't changed? (*open question*)

---

10. Can you name places in Moscow that have changed significantly under the influence of CCTV cameras? In what ways exactly? (*open question*)

---

11. Have you ever had a history or situation in your life when security cameras (without facial recognition technology) helped you, or vice versa, harmed you? Tell us what it was. (*open question*)

---

12. Have you ever had a history or situation in your life when security cameras with facial recognition technology helped you, or vice versa, harmed you? Tell us what it was. (*open question*)

---

13. How acceptable is it for you when CCTV cameras without facial recognition are installed...

	Very acceptable	Rather acceptable	Neutral	Rather unacceptable	Definitely unacceptable
Inside the Kremlin and on the Red Square					
On main squares in Moscow (Manezhnaya, Teatral'naya and others)					
On pedestrian streets (Nicol'skaya, Kamegregsky, Arbat and others)					
On Boulevard Ring (Strastnoy boulevard, Tverskoy boulevard and					

others)					
Along highways and avenues (Leningradsky highway, Leninskiy avenue and others)					
In parks and gardens (Gorky park, Bauman's garden and others)					
At the entrances and exits of subway and suburban railways and underpasses (outside)					
At the entrances and exits of subway and suburban railways at the ticket control					
On the ground transport stops					
In shopping malls inside the building and on entrances					
On children playground next to your house					
On the entrance to your house					
On the entrance of your apartment					

14. How acceptable is it for you when CCTV cameras with facial recognition are installed...

	Very acceptable	Rather acceptable	Neutral	Rather unacceptable	Definitely unacceptable
Inside the Kremlin and on the Red Square					
On main squares in Moscow (Manezhnaya, Teatral'naya and others)					
On pedestrian streets (Nicol'skaya, Kamegregsky, Arbat and others)					
On Boulevard Ring (Strastnoy boulevard, Tverskoy boulevard and others)					
Along highways and avenues (Leningradsky highway, Leninskiy avenue and others)					
In parks and gardens (Gorky park, Bauman's garden and others)					
At the entrances and exits of subway and suburban railways and underpasses (outside)					
At the entrances and					

exits of subway and suburban railways at the ticket control					
On the ground transport stops					
In shopping malls inside the building and on entrances					
On children playground next to your house					
On the entrance to your house					
On the entrance of your apartment					

15. Data from Moscow video cameras is stored in a Data processing and storage center, which officials and federal agencies have access to. How do you feel about the fact that records with you can be stored in this archive?

- 1) Absolutely positively
- 2) Rather positively
- 3) Neutral
- 4) Rather negatively
- 5) Absolutely negatively

16. Please tell me more about your choice in the previous question. Why do you think that?  
(open question) \_\_\_\_\_

That was the last question. Thank you very much for your time, your opinion is valuable to me! :)

## **Appendix 2. Expert interview questions**

1. To start with, please tell me about the history of the face recognition system in Russia. What motivated authorities to switch from an ordinary CCTV system to a facial recognition mechanism?
2. What similarities does Russian security model has with the Chinese and British one?
3. What is known about the functioning of the facial recognition system? How can it be avoided?
4. What are the digital rights of a citizen? When, in your opinion, did the problem of protecting citizens' personal data arise in Russia? What events led to this?
5. Are Russian citizens concerned about surveillance technologies in cities? In which way?
6. How can we explain the concern or reluctance of citizens about the issue of state interference in private life by installing facial recognition technology?
7. How do you think urban spaces change after the introduction of security measures?
8. Do you think that the perception of infrastructure objects may change over time due to the influence of the facial recognition system? What are your forecasts on this issue?
9. What can be done to prevent the negative impact of the facial recognition system in the lives of citizens?