"ARE YOU TRYING TO BECOME GERMAN OR SOMETHING!?":

ENTRENCHING THE NATIVE/MIGRANT BINARY IN A GERMAN CIVIC INTEGRATION CLASS

By

Markus Koeck

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisors: Dorit Geva

Andreas Dafinger

Budapest, Hungary

2020

Abstract

This thesis explores and challenges the alleged re-configuration of German national belonging in connection to Germany's shift towards civic integration. By zeroing in on civic integration classes, this thesis counters assertions about a civic-political reformulation of German belonging as well as the polarization between diversity-embracing and rejecting societal camps. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in a civic integration class in Southern Bavaria, I argue that doxic notions of native belonging and migrant non-belonging are re-produced not despite, but within civic integration classes. This analysis scrutinizes the practices of two teachers with differing political persuasions (conservative vs. leftist) and attitudes towards migration (skeptical vs. embracing). I show that their shared doxic self-positioning as natives informed their interpellations of migrant students as standing outside and opposite of the national community. I demonstrate how they entrenched a native/migrant binary throughout their teaching of history and the political system, the racializing, Islamophobic centering of liberal culture and values, and the sidelining of labor as a central dimension of students' life and self-identification in Germany. Moreover, by pointing to the resistances of the students I highlight their agency in the shaping of civic integration policy on-the-ground.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor Dorit Geva for her guidance. I thank her for her patience, understanding, and continued support in the face of happy but chaotic early family days. I equally extend my gratitude to Professor Andreas Dafinger for stepping in as second examiner and for his crucial support throughout the completion of my degree at CEU. I also want to thank Professors Ju Li, Alexandra Kowalski, and John Clarke for their inspiring classes and academic encouragement.

I furthermore want to extend my gratitude for their friendship and support throughout the writing of this thesis to Cory, Dragan, Natasa, Martin, Ari, John and Margot.

Above all, my wholehearted gratitude goes to my family whose unwavering support and love has constantly exceeded all reasonable expectations throughout my studies. To Jana, thank you for believing in the worth of my ideas, inspiring discussions, love and support. To Maya, although I hope your curiosity will guide you to more exciting places than your father's MA thesis, thank you.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Changes in the understanding of national belonging have been at the forefront of public discussion in Germany in recent years, spanning political debate, widely noted academic and literary works and a plethora of media publications. Common to these discussions has been the perception of a decisive shift in the state's "politics of belonging" (Yuval-Davis 2006). Germany had long been the textbook example of ethno-exclusionary nationhood, but around the turn of the millennium its citizenship law was liberalized, the reality of being a country of immigration politically acknowledged, and federal integration policies were implemented. In its political representation Germany underwent a shift from "no country of immigration" to being a "country of integration" (Böhmer cited by Fogelman 2020, 60). At the heart of the state's turn to integration lie federal integration classes, which are supported across the political board and represented as "endpoint" of Germany's "re-arrangement of immigration and integration" (Bundesregierung 2007). However, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in a civic integration class in Southern Bavaria this thesis argues that doxic notions of native national belonging and migrant non-belonging are re-produced not despite but within civic integration classes.

The classes, introduced in 2005, teach German history, the political system, culture, and values as well as everyday knowledge to immigrants who are obliged to take them or pursue them for the prolongation of residence statuses or naturalization. While most analyses enquire into Germany's alleged re-configuration of identity from "above", through policy material, elite politicians' or media discourses, this work approaches it from below. This is by enquiring into the on-the-ground practices of the frontline

workers of Germany's turn to integration: teachers. While integration class teachers are guided by the curriculum, class material and institutional structures, in a certain way they resemble "street-level-bureaucrats" (Lipsky 1980) who do not merely implement but make policy in practice. This thesis zeroes in on the practice of two teachers with contrasting politics (conservative vs. leftist) and attitudes (skeptical vs. embracing) concerning migration and migrants. As Gullestad writes in her seminal piece "Invisible Fences", "by linking the voices of people who can be expected to argue with each other, doxic fields of underlying values and perceptions can be identified" (2002: 58). In my case, I identified the teachers' doxic self-positioning as natives as instructive for the reproduction of the binary between belonging natives and non-belonging migrants in the classes.

The question guiding this work is: How are migrants positioned as non-belonging to the national community in integration class practices? Connected to this, I will elaborate how the teachers construe the national community and integration. In addition, I enquire how students contest their positioning. Throughout the thesis I will argue that the classes entrenched a binary between belonging natives versus non-belonging migrants. This was facilitated by participants' institutional positioning, the teachers' non-interpellation of the students as future or potential Germans, as well as the teachers' racializing privileging of culture against labor in their interpellation of the students. Thereby a "differential inclusion" (Mezzadra and Neilson 2012) of migrants, not into the national community, but into society, was facilitated.

This thesis contributes to the empirical study of civic integration policy in Germany. It fills a gap in the study of Germany's integrationist turn by placing the importance of the self-positioning of its frontline workers in the foreground, as well as by focusing on racializing interpellative structures, and on participants' resistances. The

argumentative thrust and political relevance of this thesis is threefold. Instead of relegating nativist notions of German belonging to the extreme or conservative right, it centers them in federal integration policy. It questions emerging popular and academic accounts of the "civic" or "territorial" supersession of ethno-national concepts of belonging. Finally, it challenges recent analytical takes that posit a polar societal division between pro- and anti-plural forces in relation to the re-imagination of the German community.

Conceptually, I draw on scholars working in the fields of nationalism, race, and critical migration studies. My understanding of integration as a racializing practice re-producing a differentiation between migrants and natives draws on the works of Korteweg (2017), Lentin and Titley (2011) and Schinkel (2017). I frame the self-positioning of the teachers' by borrowing Ghassan Hage's concept of *governmental belonging* (2000), and the teachers' practices through his concept of racializing interpellations divided into: non-, negative and mis-interpellation (2010).

My methodological approach bears resemblance to what Vincent Dubois describes as "critical policy ethnography" (2015). It shares in the conviction that policies are not simply implemented from paper to reality, but to understand their effects their making on-the-ground must be scrutinized. Consequently, to understand what relations of belonging are expressed or foreclosed by civic integration classes, viz. how actors position themselves and are positioned benefits from ethnographic analysis. My approach further aligns with Dubois' "critical" thrust as it aims to "deconstruct[s] prevailing categories of understanding and reveal[s] the relations of domination that structure the situations observed" (Dubois 2009, 223).

I drew on a number of qualitative methods in my ethnographic work. I reviewed policy documents, laws and decrees forming the legal basis of the classes, the (sole) federal

scientific review, statistical reviews, and the course materials (the class curriculum and the two federally endorsed course books). I did this to gain an understanding of the institutional architecture, content, and history of the classes as well as how they position immigrants. Above all, my analysis rests on the ethnographic immersion in a class in Southern Bavaria from March to May 2018. Throughout this period, I attended twelve class sessions each of which lasted four teaching units[1]. I sat with the students as a participant observer, engaged in classroom exercises, and at times acted as teacher's assistant. I also gained insight into the class dynamics from a teacher's perspective after a teacher's dog ran off – not a German proverb – and I stood in as a replacement teacher.

In addition, I conducted ethnographic interviews and engaged in small talk with the teachers and the students before, during, in-between and after the classes. I took notes on the classroom interactions, systematized them afterwards, and taped memos to elaborate on observations and to document conversations and ethnographic interviews. To get a better understanding of the integration course program, I also spent two days observing language acquisition integration classes. In addition, I was recruited as secondary examiner for the test completing the class. To systematize and expand on my observations, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the two main teachers Michaela and Christian after the end of the course. For ethical reasons I use pseudonyms for all people involved as well as the school's location.

I do not claim that the dynamics I outline can simply be scaled up to all German civic integration classes. Different positionalities of the teachers (e.g. migration experiences), the locale of the school (urban spaces or rural hinterland, East or West Germany) or a different group of students could yield a wide variety of observations. However, the heuristic value of this work is that contrary to inclusionary government

[1] Each unit lasted 45 minutes.

rhetoric and the popular embrace of "integration", it problematizes the persistence of an exclusionary nativist doxa of national belonging.

A central shortcoming of my work lies in the fact that, even though the practices of the teachers form the fulcrum of this thesis, the perspective of the participants' deserved more attention. In order to quickly normalize my presence in class and to avoid appearing like an institutional figure, I initially refrained from conducting formal interviews with the students. However, interviewing the participants following the class, which did not materialize due to time constraints, would have enriched this work. Nevertheless, I do contend that through my informal ethnographic interviews, small talk in and outside the classes and close observation of class interactions, I gathered a valuable perspective on their resistances. I also do not believe that, by not centering their perspectives this thesis is guilty of reproducing the myth of effective integration management. To the contrary, the gulf between pompous policy rhetoric and the on-the-ground reality of the classes show how ineffective integration practices are and how students' resistances crucially shape them.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the first chapter, I set out the context in which contemporary civic integration classes unfold. I do this by narrating Germany's shift from ethno-exclusionism to civic integration as well as outlining the policy framework of the classes, a review of prior work on them, and how my field immersion shaped my conceptualization of integration, the self-positioning of the teachers and their practices. In the second chapter, I introduce my entry to the field as well as the central dynamics that shaped the class: the centrality of the test, students' resistances as well as the doxic self-positioning of the teachers as governmentally belonging natives. Based on this, I elaborate how the teachers entrenched the difference between Germans and non-belonging migrants in their teaching grouped in three thematic

clusters: history and the political system, liberal culture and values, and labor. First, I outline the teaching of history and the political system and how they combined to conjure a democratically enlightened, trans-generational community vis-à-vis migrants who were non- and negatively interpellated. Second, I illustrate the teachers' varied racializations of the students related to the teaching of German liberal culture and values through culturalizing and Islamophobic discourses. Third, I demonstrate how the emphasis on "culture" was mirrored by the erasure of the topic of labor from the classroom. This facilitated the mis-interpellation of students' as refugees and non-essential laborers, which, however, drew the latter's fierce contestation.

Chapter One

Contextualizing German Civic Integration Classes

In this chapter I will contextualize contemporary civic integration classes. I will do this through a brief historicization of citizenship, migration, and integration policy in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), an outline of the civic integration class policy framework, and a concise review of prior analyses of civic integration classes in Germany as well as my conceptualization of the classes, which emerged under the impression of my immersion in the field.

1.1 Historicizing Germany's Shift towards Civic Integration

Germany's citizenship and immigration policy has long made it the classic example of ethno-exclusionary nationhood (Brubaker 1992). Following World War II, the FRG largely re-instated the *Wilhelminian* citizenship law including its infamous privileging of *ius sanguinis* over *ius soli*. This facilitated the inclusion of millions of ethnic Germans from the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Central and Eastern Europe into the "homeland" (Fulbrook 1996). After the flow of ethnic German labor started to dry up in the mid-1950s, the government resorted to "guestworker" recruitment. However, the presence of workers from Turkey, South- and South Eastern Europe as well as North Africa was only ever envisioned as temporary. The segregationist guestworker system facilitated segmented economic inclusion along with socio-political and legal exclusion (Castles et al. 2014, 266). After the economy stalled in the late 1960s, recruitment was stopped and federal "foreigner" policy carried out return programs (Schönwälder and Triadafilopolous 2016, 369). In the 1990s,

ethnic German settlers[2] and foreigners were again subjected to different treatment: settlers were received with citizenship rights and programs facilitating their inclusion, while migrants from the periphery as well as former guestworkers and their descendants faced a hostile atmosphere of racist media campaigns, street violence, a newly curtailed asylum law and a cumbersome path to citizenship (Prantl 1993). According to the official government line Germany was still not a country of immigration and federal integration policy remained a "non-policy" (Joppke 2014, 288).

At the dawn of the millennium, the first Social Democrat and Green coalition government acknowledged that Germany was a country of immigration and reformed the citizenship law (by including a stronger element of *ius soli*). In addition, it implemented the first comprehensive federal integration policy, with integration courses at its core. While the country's ethno-exclusionary segregationism had set it apart from countries with assimilationist (e.g. France) and multiculturalist (e.g. Great Britain and the Netherlands) immigration policies, it aligned with the Europe-wide policy paradigm shift to civic integration. "Civic integration", in short, stands for an immigrant incorporation approach that obliges immigrants to acquire the language of the host country as well as to familiarize themselves with its history, cultural and liberal-democratic values as condition for inclusion into the citizenry or residence rights (Joppke 2007a). This process is facilitated by mandatory citizenship or integration and language tests and classes (or contracts) and enforced by punitive measures such as the withholding of residence permits. While civic integration policies represented a more assertive shift in the integration policy trajectories of the Netherlands and Great Britain, in Germany, combined with the reform of citizenship

[2] This designates people with claim to German descent "settled" across Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia.

law, they signified a move from *whether* to *how* people should be integrated (Palmowski 2008).

The embracing of integration policy engendered assertions of a civic-territorial shift of citizenship and national belonging (Heckmann 2003). In recent years, a number of factors have cumulatively given rise to a host of scholarly accounts that stress the increasing openness of German national identity. These include the political and popular declarations of a new inclusive nationhood, the emphasis placed on the importance of integration, the call for a "Willkommenskultur", and the initially welcoming reception of refugees in the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. For example, Schmidtke asserts that there has been a political-civic transformation of nationhood (2017), Fogelman indicates the increasing territorialization of citizenship and belonging (2020), and Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos state that Germany's policy development reflects the popular development of a "more fulsome recognition and accommodation of diversity" (2016, 377), a "new differentialism" which spells a move beyond a native/migrant binary.

However, the narrative of a civic-political or territorial supersession of ethno-exclusionary nationhood is at odds with a number of developments in the last two decades. The "civic shift" was swiftly followed by the *Leitkultur* debate in which Germans were posited as embodying a "guiding culture" – an ill-defined ragbag of Enlightenment and Christian values, constitutionalism, and the German language. Meanwhile, immigrants and people with a "migration background" were naturalized as lacking *Leitkultur* (Pautz 2005). Moreover, gendered Orientalist debates concerning hijab bans, honor killings, and forced marriages frequently emerged which positioned Germans as progressive and rational, contrasted against backward Muslims (Rostock and Berghahn 2008). The debate surrounding Thilo Sarrazin's infamous book *Germany*

Does Away With Itself, which entailed crude biological racism against Muslim migrants, further indicated the persistence of biological racism at the center of German society. The more recent rise of the rightwing *AFD*, reinforced border controls, and the emergence of a popular anti-immigrant "rejection culture" (Bojadžijev 2018, 342) further complicate the narrative of a broad civic-territorial consolidation of German belonging.

However, in recent years prominent German social scientists have responded to these developments by diagnosing a societal polarization. For instance, Herfried and Marina Münkler view a split between "old Germans" and "new Germans". This does not describe a generational divide but rather a division between those embracing ethnic homogeneity and others open to novel heterogenous notions of Germanness (2016). Naika Foroutan equally asserts that in the German "post-migrantic society" – a society which has acknowledged the reality of diversity - a division between a pro-plural camp embracing diversity and equality and an anti-plural camp rejecting both has emerged (2019).

This thesis problematizes both the narrative of a civic-political supersession of ethnic belonging, as well as that of social polarization which neatly confines ethno-exclusionary notions of belonging to an "anti-migrant" camp. Instead, it enquires into persisting doxic nativist concepts of belonging, across "pro" or "anti"-migration camps, in a German civic integration class. I will now outline the institutional architecture, development, content, and target groups of integration classes.

1.2 German Civic Integration Classes

Integration courses, introduced in 2005, consist of language classes (600 teaching units), and civic integration classes ("Orientierungskurse") (100 teaching units). The administrative and curricular responsibility lies with the Federal Office for Migration

and Refugees[3]. The facilitation of the classes is contracted out to public, public-private, and private institutions such as language schools and adult education centers. Thematically, teaching is divided into three blocs: *Politics and Democracy, History and Responsibility,* and *People and Society*. These segments respectively cover the political system, national history, and democratic culture and values (especially gender equality, religious freedom and the rule of law) as well as everyday knowledge (BAMF 2017).

The class is completed by the multiple-choice exam *Leben in Deutschland* (Life/Live in Germany), which focusses on German history and the political system.[4] The classes are devised in a contractual logic of the state offering classes to promote the students' social participation ("fördern") and demanding ("fordern") "integration effort" (Bundesregierung 2007). Class completion serves as formal "proof of integration" which can be drawn on for residency permits or continued access to state benefits. Punitive measures, such as financial penalties, the withholding of benefits, the denial of residence permits or naturalization applications loom for non-compliance.

Who are the participants of the classes? Foreigners who received their first residence permit and German citizens with an "integration need"[5] can "voluntary" participate. This translates into people taking the classes to fulfill naturalization requirements, acquire prolonged residence permits, or utilizing the language training. In addition, federal agencies can obligate foreigners who cannot communicate in simple German and are deemed to be "in particular need of integration" (e.g. foreigners dependent on welfare or caretakers of children) to participate (BJV 2004). Since 2016, people with

[3] I henceforth use the German abbreviation *BAMF*.
[4] 33 question are randomly selected from 310 question-strong test question catalogue. 15 correct answers are needed to pass. Since the federal test standardization of 2007, no questions about value judgements or attitudes, as was the case before in some German regions, are posed (see Joppke 2014, 290).
[5] All excerpts from legal, policy, and class material as well as conversations in the field and interviews were translated by the author.

granted asylum or subsidiary protection status as well as refugees with a good "staying perspective" can be obliged to participate. This is noted as of particular importance to foster integration into society and sustainable and quick integration into the labor market (BMAS 2016). Inversely, foreigners from within the EU or "recognizably little need for integration" and "positive integration prognosis", viz. integration without state aid, are exempt from mandatory participation (Bundesregierung 2007). This extends to people with recognized higher qualifications, employment in designated industries with a shortage of skilled workforce, youths and young adults in education and people in vocational or other professional training (BJV 2004). In practice, the participants come from the Middle East, Africa and Southeastern Europe (BAMF 2019). In other words, people from the periphery whose varied qualifications and employment status do not satisfy the state's definition of sustainable job market integration.

1.3 Review of Prior Work on German Civic Integration Classes

In this section I will briefly outline prevalent angles to the study of civic integration and prior analyses of German civic integration classes. Second, I will demonstrate how my field immersion shaped my conceptual approach and delineate the key tenets of my conceptualization of the classes.

The shift to civic integration policies has engendered a burgeoning literature across Europe scrutinizing how effective, forceful, and exclusionary civic integration policies are. Eventually this has led to assertions that no integrative effect is observed (Wallace Goodman and Wright 2015), and that the underlying goals of civic integration policies are states' regulation of immigration and sending a symbolic message of control (ibid.; Joppke 2007a; Permoser 2012). A particularly controversial point of debate has been how assertive and exclusionary the policies are especially concerning their promotion of "liberal" values". Joppke distances the policy from the racial "smell of yesteryear"

(2007b, 16), and in contradistinction to his earlier work (ibid.), as not particularly repressive because they do not enforce cultural homogenization but merely aim at knowledge building by teaching language, liberal values and trivia (Joppke 2017). Kostakopolou and Lewicki, among others, have by contrast stressed that the discourses and institutional tools of civic integration are discriminatory in their targeting of low-skilled laborers, their responsibilization of migrants for endangering social cohesion and liberal values, and for invoking an antagonism between superior Europeans and inferior non-European Others (Kostakopolou 2010; Lewicki 2017).

Concerning integration classes in Germany, the works of Hentges (2013) and Hübschmann (2015) review the implementation and history of integration classes uncritically through the lens of the state's policy objectives and are interested in the effectiveness of integration. By contrast, Ha and Schmitz's (2006) trenchant post-colonial critique stressed the power asymmetry between nationals and migrants that is re-articulated by integration classes. While their theoretical critique overstates the disciplining character and assimilative nationalization aimed for by the classes, my empirical work connects to their early warning of the inscription of migrant Otherness and the reinforcement of the dominance of majority Germans.

Across Europe civic integration policies have especially garnered analytical attention as terrain of the state's (re-)drawing of symbolic boundaries of national belonging, in other words, as places of classifying the ideal national We and its Other (see Bonjour and Duyvendak 2018, 884). Brown (2016) and Williams (2018) picked up on this in their ethnographic work on German civic integration classes. Williams visited classes in Berlin and Frankfurt and frames the courses as "sites for the making of national identities" (5). He largely brackets off the hierarchical power relations outlined by Ha and Schmitz. Therefore, he views a "blurring" of the German/migrant boundary and a

positioning of migrants as "prospective citizens" as evident in the classes. By contrast, the critical ethnographic work that Jessica A. Brown (2016) undertook in 2006-7 in Frankfurt, highlights the divisive usage of liberal democratic values as symbolic boundary to exclude Muslims – which she terms "boundary liberalism". She views the class practices as distinct from nativism and racialization because, in theory they "extend an inherent *promise* of membership, albeit under 'fixed rules' that may systematically disadvantage particular outsiders while requiring a subversion of fundamental characteristics of their identities" (457), italics in the original) and hence warns of the construction of "liminal membership categories" as regular membership becomes "difficult to attain" (468) for Muslims.

My work picks up Brown's ethnographic and Ha's theoretically informed critical thrust. Contra Williams, it rejects the treatment of the classes as terrain of member-making and takes the mandatory and punitive frame of the policy seriously. It picks up on Brown's sensitivity for the exclusionary usage of liberal values but stresses teachers' nativism and racializing interpellative practices as key factors. This is because by contrast to Brown, I do not consider the classes through the lens of botched citizenship-making and do not view them to extend an (even as she stresses dubious) offer of membership. Instead I present them to be places of the production of racialized migrant difference.[6] Finally, I take up Ha and Schmitz's attention to the power hierarchy and differentiation between German majority vis-à-vis migrants while refuting their depiction of the classes as instruments of overbearing assimilative nationalization. I do this by shifting the attention to the self-positioning and interpellative practices of the teachers. Moreover, by contrast to these authors, I pay attention to the students'

[6] When Brown undertook her fieldwork in 2006-7 the classes were characterized as having a predominant service function for naturalization purposes (Joppke 2007a). Since then the group of students who can be obliged to take them has been widened and the percentage of mandatory participants has risen steeply in recent years (BAMF 2019).

resistances. My conceptualization of the classes did not emerge solely informed by the review of literature, but, as I will outline below, was primarily informed by my immersion in the field.

1.4 Conceptual Points of Departure

I initially started my fieldwork with the aim to analyze what symbolic properties were used in the representation of ideal national belonging in the classes. And how thereby differentially permeable symbolic boundaries "conceptual distinctions used to construct notions of 'us' and 'them'" (Bail 2008, 37) of national belonging would emerge. Originally similar to Williams' (2018) ethnographic work, which was published during my fieldwork, I had planned to draw on Alba (2005) to extrapolate "bright boundaries" (clear boundaries only transgressable by individuals who fully assimilate into the host society) and "blurred boundaries" (allowing the inclusion of whole groups into mainstream society) to elaborate on the possibilities of "boundary crossings" towards national belonging (Zolberg and Woon 1999). This was based on the hypothesis that complex ethno-racial, liberal, and neoliberal boundaries of national belonging would be expressed in the classroom.

However, I realized this offered limited analytical purchase for my research. On the one hand, this was because of the curriculum's framing of the desired relation of participants to the national community. The classes are stated as "an offer to all immigrants to open up to a closer *getting-to-know* of the German state and German society and to enter a positive dialogue which paves the way for the longer-term goal of integration" (BAMF 2017, *7*; emphasis added). In addition, the courses curriculum states that the classes should foster potential "Identifikationsmöglichkeiten" (possibilities of identification) (ibid.). In sum, a far cry from a republican rhetoric invoking the goal of full citizen- or national membership. Furthermore, this stood in

contrast to both Ha and Schmitz's vision of the classes as tools of forceful assimilation and ideological reprogramming, and Williams' and Brown's framing of them as spaces concerned with national citizen- and membership.

My first day in the field fully shattered my expectation of complex "bright" or "blurred" boundaries of Germanness. After the first lesson I attended Ezmir", a laborer from Kosovo in his mid-30s, frantically copied notes from the blackboard before we had to leave the classroom. Meanwhile Michaela, one of the teachers who was supportive and in general sympathetic of the students, collected her belongings and spoke with me about the next lesson. She briefly shifted her attention to Ezmir mockingly asking: "Oh wow Ezmir, still copying notes? Are you trying to become German or something!?[laughter]". Ezmir, dumbfounded for a second, eventually joined her with sheepish laughter and answered: "Haha, no, no, of course not! I mean, no, [pause] I am an Albanian!". Turning immigrants into "Germans", as evident in this banal interaction, was simply not the problem of the classes. *Becoming* German was a ridiculous thought. Instead of a complex assemblage of symbolic boundaries, a doxic binary between a native "we" embodied by the teachers and non-belonging migrant participants materialized.

I had implicitly built my approach on an understanding of integration classes as *potentially* facilitating a boundary crossing towards national membership. This was clearly not the case. Accordingly, I shifted my conceptualization, as Korteweg (2017) urges drawing on Brubaker's vocabulary, from integration as a "category of analysis" to integration as "category of practice" (Brubaker cited by Korteweg 2017, 440).

My analysis consequently came to rest on three conceptual tenets. First, a focus on integration practice not as facilitating the transgression of boundaries, but the

racializing production of difference. Second, attentiveness to the latent self-positioning of the teachers as natives occupying the position of "governmental belonging" (Hage 2000) as key to this production of difference. Third, an operationalization of the teachers' actions by paying attention to their interpellative practices. Let's unpack this.

First, my understanding of integration practices rests on authors such as Korteweg (2017) and Schinkel (2017) who have asserted that integration discourses and policies are despite their inclusionary rhetoric not antagonistic but a key medium of the racializing differentiation between "natives" and "foreigners" and engender stratified notions of legitimate presence in society (see also Valluvan 2018). Korteweg stresses that integration discourses and practices constitute those "who become the 'real' population" (2017, 429) by a racializing and gendered problematization of migrants as "subjects against whom belonging is defined" (ibid.). Equally, Schinkel emphasizes that "assimilation is never really at stake" in integration discourses but serves the host nation to imagine itself against migrants, thereby constituting the "difference between those for whom integration is an issue – however well assimilated or integrated – and those for whom it is not" (2017, 115).

Schinkel views this process as producing a "negatively coded form of belonging" of migrants (147). This is also captured by Mezzadra and Neilson's concept of "differential inclusion" which describes the hierarchized societal inclusion of "subjectivities that are included but do not 'belong'" (2012, 67). Furthermore, central to these understandings of integration practices is that differences are racialized. I understand the process of racialization to be "a discourse and practice which constructs immutable boundaries between collectivities which is used to naturalize fixed hierarchical power relations between them" (Yuval-Davis et al. 2017, 1048). After biological or phenotypically racism largely became discredited throughout the second

half of the 20th century, racial discrimination is mostly couched "in the language of culture and values" which, while often serving to deny racism, yields "racial dividends: division, hierarchy, exclusion" (Lentin and Titley 2011, 62; see also Balibar 1991a).

Second, central to my approach of elucidating the entrenchment of difference in integration classes is a focus on the teachers' doxic self-positioning as natives vis-à-vis the immigrant students. In order to understand the teachers' self-positioning, I draw on Ghassan Hage's concept of "governmental belonging" (2000). In his work *White Nation* Hage urges that sociological inquiries of racism should "capture the way that racist classifications […] bear the traces of the positions of power from which they emanate and the practices in which they are located" (36). To this end, he outlines his concept of "governmental belonging". It goes beyond judicial belonging, or a passive feeling of belonging to the nation but denotes a dominant position, a historically accumulated cultural capital, in the national symbolic order. This entails a "governmental", managerial sense of embodying the national core subject of the nation and the position of ordering others in relation to the nation (ibid., 55). The reproduction of governmental belonging hinges on the naturalization of its holders' (i.e. white Australians') topography of the nation and themselves as national "aristocracy of the field", who merely "have to be what they are" (62) to embody the nation. Hage contends that regarding integration debates the position of governmental belonging is taken and performed by exclusionary as well as by "tolerant" political camps. This is because whether the aim is to exclude or integrate the division between managing national subject and managed migrant object is reproduced.

The teachers performed their "governmental belonging", as I will demonstrate, commonsensically based on their "nativeness". Nativism, as De Genova elaborates, is not predominantly concerned with the "foreign-ness of immigrants", although migrants

are differentiated via culturalist or racialized discourse, but with the presupposed "native'-ness of the putative citizens, and the promotion of the priority or prerogative of the latter" (2016, 233). Immigration discourses express and reinforce a "native's point of view" because they hinge on the logic of "what a native 'we' should do with a foreign 'them'" (ibid.).

In order to show how the teachers performed their governmental belonging and entrenched the difference between a native German "we" and a foreign "them" in the classes, I furthermore draw on Hage's threefold conceptualization of racializing interpellations (2010). Hage utilizes Althusser's concept of interpellation, the ideological constitution of subjects through their (i.e. classed, gendered and racialized) hailing, to scrutinize the affective experience of racialization of the interpellated. I predominantly utilize it to scrutinize the practices of the interpellators, viz. the teachers. In other words, how did they "hail" the students in relation to the nation?

The first mode of interpellation that Hage notes is "non-interpellation". The racialized are naturalized as non-belonging to the community by simply not being recognized and addressed as standing in connection with it. The second mode is "negative interpellation" which groups and relates the racialized in relation to the symbolic order, in my case the national community, via their negative characteristics. The third mode of racial interpellation is "mis-interpellation". The "to-be-racialized" recognize themselves in a hailing as belonging to the community only to be reprimanded as non-belonging. I do not draw on these modes of interpellation to proclaim a successful subjectification of the students. To the contrary, as I demonstrate students contested them. However, in light of the insight that identities are relationally constituted these interpellations are a crucial component in the constitution of the relation of migrants to the national community (see Valluvan 2018).

Chapter Two

The Civic Integration Class in Waldhofen

In this chapter I will introduce the central parameters of my fieldwork. I will first describe how I gained access, and the locale, then I will introduce the teachers and the participant cohort as well as my role in the field. I will counter both the official policy representation of the classes as facilitating behavioral attunement (BAMF 2017), and Ha's and Schmitz's depictions of the integration classes as spaces of forceful assimilation and political re-education (2006). To this end, I will stress how the students' focus on exam preparation and their resistances structured the interactions in the field. Finally, I outline the contrasting classroom practices and politics of the main teachers, Michaela and Christian, and outline their shared sense of "governmental belonging" which was pivotal for the production of participants' national non-belonging.

2.1 Entering the Field

From March to May 2018 I participated in the biweekly four-hour evening sessions of a civic integration class in the small Bavarian town of Waldhofen. Several schools I contacted declined or did not get back to me. One administrator explained his reservations: "It is difficult, the classes are a very sensitive place, because you know, [pause] people are basically forced to attend". Finally, the *Volkshochschule*[7] in Waldhofen, operating in a small secondary school building, invited me to sit in and assist in a newly starting class. Waldhofen is located south of Munich, nested in rolling

[7] *Volkshochschulen* are adult education facilities which date back to the late 19th century's "people's education" movement. They offer a wide variety of courses ranging from *Intermediary Portuguese* to *Easy and Enjoyable Pizza Baking*. The 900 branches strong network has become the biggest integration course provider and held 37,8% of all integration courses with a total of 76 716 participants in 2018 (BAMF 2019).

green hills before the alpine panorama. Migration from Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia has co-shaped the rural, but increasingly suburbanizing and prospering area from the 1950s onwards. In recent years thousands of refugees from the Balkans, Mid-East and Africa were temporarily housed here, and some settled more permanently. This reflects the development of many wealthy rural areas in Germany, which through a combination of booming local economies and the distribution of refugees by the central administration increasingly resemble "super-diverse" (Vertovec 2007) communities.

Integration course teaching staff is generally recruited from university graduates of "German as foreign/second language" as well as university graduates with a teaching background, who sat through *BAMF*-qualification seminars. The teachers are either employed by the institutions offering the classes, or more commonly contracted as freelancers, such as the teachers in Waldhofen. Initially, the class was taught by Brigitte and Michaela both in their fifties. Michaela is bubbly, friendly and humorous. She had originally acquired a law degree but had extensive teaching experience as a German language teacher. Brigitte is a former primary school teacher and alternative practitioner. She was mild mannered, patient, bemused by the students' rowdy behavior and embarrassed by their politically incorrect jokes. She quit the course after the second week. Christian replaced Brigitte, he is of similar age, articulate, erudite and polite, and held a PhD in history; due to the precarious academic job market he had started German language teaching.

13 students attended the class: ten men and three women ranging from their early twenties to fifties. Three of them were in the asylum process whereas the others were industrial and service workers or carers. They had migrated from Afghanistan, Albania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone and Syria. Five students from

Kosovo formed the biggest national group. At times the class was complemented by the two-year-old son of an Afghan couple, who roamed around the tables or pestered the dog that Michaela occasionally brought along. Some students lived in Waldhofen and the surrounding villages, others came from neighboring districts or Munich. All of them attended the classes because they needed a formal "proof of integration" for their refugee status, residence permits or future naturalization. Although many attended the classes sporadically, they were remarkably engaged. Their hopes and hardships, and agentive reshaping of German belonging deserve a more expansive dissertation, this thesis, however, predominantly focuses on their differentiation from the national community through the teachers' practices.

During my first class visits I told the teachers that I was writing about integration classes for my master's thesis, wanted to gain an "on-the-ground perspective", and was happy to observe and assist. Christian introduced me as a social science student, Brigitte and Michaela as a student and their assistant. While Christian mostly treated me as an observer, the other two treated me like a teaching assistant: addressing me to take part in exercises, to confirm facts and contribute anecdotes, or elaborate on textbook material. The participants treated me friendly, or with benevolent disinterest. While two young participants initially questioned what business I had in attending the course and "joked" that they would "break me", they instead shared cigarettes and music videos with me during the first class break. At first the students were skeptical or mildly amused as to why I would voluntarily spend my evenings in the classes. After explaining the purpose of my presence a few times, they got used to me and often reasoned that I was becoming a teacher. They cracked jokes, shared stories about themselves, their work, countries of origin, occasionally asked for explanation of German historical or political oddities, or more frequently, for answers to the teachers'

questions. Overall, my role oscillated between observing participant, participant observer and teaching assistant.

2.2 Power Dynamics Shaping the Classroom

The class curriculum presents an enormously ambitious framing of the classes. The curricular learning goals for the students are defined as "acquiring knowledge" and "competence development" to navigate German society as well as to enable "reflected affirmation" of democracy and constitutional rights (BAMF 2017, 8). In addition, the course aims to guide participants to reflect on expectations of migrants and members of the host society, gain clarity about "rooms of maneuver" (Spielräume) and boundaries, and the improvement of their ability to evaluate their own conduct in German society and the integration process (ibid. 38). Ha and Schmitz's theoretical critique characterizes the classes as migrant objectifying "political re-education" technology (ibid., 2006). The classes' ambitious goals, mandatory nature, and their counterposing of Germans' possession vs. alleged migrant deficit of competences to navigate liberal society lend Ha and Schmitz's Foucauldian-inspired framing some plausibility. However, the classes in Waldhofen neither resembled the transformative vision of the *BAMF*, nor as envisioned by Ha and Schmitz (2006), did they attempt the "re-programming" of migrants' identities or ideological adherences. Instead, I found that the classes' mundane on-the-ground reality was shaped by the goal of test preparation, and students to be no passive vessels absorbing the teaching.

2.2.1 The Centrality of Test Preparation

I entered the class under the fresh impression of acquainting myself with the legal and curricular material which stresses the courses' key role for integration. However, I quickly came to understand that the students' focus on the test centrally shaped the operation of the class. This realization was facilitated when I unwittingly ended up

teaching a session as a substitute teacher. One evening after Michaela's dog ran off from the school building right before class, she asked me to take over "Just do history!". After brief hesitation, I took up her request. About 30 minutes into the session, emboldened by our familiarity, Behrooz a middle-aged participant from Kosovo pointed out what mattered: "Markus, I mean that is interesting and so on [pause] but if you don't mind, can we just go through the questions for the test?". The rest of the class nodded enthusiastically in apparent relief that somebody had stated the obvious.

Far from the political representation as crucial pedagogical intervention catalyzing behavioral attunement, the classes were structured by their mandatory character and the goal of test preparation. This resembles Suvarierol and Kirk's observation from the Netherlands that civic integration classes have become bottom-line "rituals to prepare for the civic integration examination" (2015). Acquiring a proof of integration, "getting through the test and be done with it" as participants often voiced, was what they cared about.[8] Hence, the teachers spent much time practicing exam questions, especially when participants' attention was waning. While the teachers thought that teaching the class content was worthwhile in principle, they understood the test to be students' main priority which also gave them a measure of control over them. Moreover, as I will demonstrate later, they did not think that the classes could decisively contribute to participants' integration or affect behavioral or ideological change.

2.2.2 Students' Resistances

Beyond the centrality of the test, students' challenges against their pedagogical subjugation, cultural Othering, and German claims to democracy and liberal values prevented the classes from materializing as disciplining practices of pedagogical

[8] In 2018, 88% of participants across Germany passed the exam. In the class I observed all participants passed.

reprogramming (Ha and Schmitz 2006). The participants were vocal about the power imbalance between "Germans" and themselves which they recognized in their obligation to take the classes. For example, when Brigitte was teaching detailed principles of the German parliamentary order, Ezmir challenged her:

> "Why do us foreigners have to learn that? The Germans certainly don't know these things, but we need to know them. Why? Because we are foreigners!?"
>
> Brigitte: "Yes, it is true, but this is good, no? If I go to the USA, I would also do something like this. I would just want to know about the country. You should be glad!
>
> Ezmir: "Yes ok, but we *must* learn about it So why do Germans not need to know these things?"
>
> Brigitte: "Yes, but that is good, I mean…just be glad."

A couple of minutes later when I briefly hesitated to answer a question directed at me, Ezmir interjected sarcastically: "It is your turn Markus! But don't you worry, no need for you to know that, you are not a foreigner after all!".

The students did not merely submit to this power imbalance, but regularly contested the elevated representation of Germany's democratic standing. They pointed out that without resources and politically disenfranchised they often did not feel like they were in a very democratic country. At other times they mocked the teacher's idealized representation of liberal-constitutional principles. When Christian proclaimed that "The history of Europe has always been the history of rights", Behrooz added mockingly: "Oh yes, on paper maybe!". Another time when Christian lectured about the importance of secularity in Germany, they relished in questioning him about the crucifix adorning the classroom wall behind him.[9] They equally mocked the teachers' insistence on the importance of tolerance. When Brigitte talked about tolerance, e.g. of homosexuality, some students reacted with homophobic jokes and laughter. Behrooz sarcastically disciplined them "*No, no!* Nowadays we must tolerate everything!

[9] In the federal state of Bavaria all public-school classrooms are equipped with crucifixes.

Tolerance is important!" triggering others to chime in with nasal German intonation and exaggerated nodding of their heads "Yes, *of course*! *This is democracy*! You know, *human dignity*!". In addition, they asserted a claim, not to national belonging, but to legitimate presence in and contribution to society in relation to their roles as laborers, to which I will return later.

Another more subtle way of contesting their Othering occurred when their contributions were belittled, or their home countries misrepresented by the teachers. The students would turn to each other or me to convey what Ethiopia, religious co-existence in Kosovo, or their school experience in Afghanistan "really was like". In addition, a rhetorical peculiarity in defense of their normality emerged halfway through the course. Some of the older participants and soon large parts of the classes started to close off their comments with the rhetorical question "Ist normal, oder!?" (That is normal, right!?). This occurred when they answered questions about principles of democracy or appropriate social behavior and values. Faced with the continuous im- and explicit devaluing of their experiences and countries of origin by contrast to Germany, it was a rhetorical strategy of wresting back the power of normalizing their origin, life conditions and knowledge.

However, the predominant way in which participants asserted their agency was absenteeism. Half of the students attended fewer than 60% of the sessions. All but two frequently came late. At times they left during break times or before the end of classes. At most, eleven out of 13 students attended. On some other evenings only two or three were present. [10] Why did this not result in disciplinary measures as formally required

[10] The extent to which the mandatory character of the civic integration course dragged down attendance and enthusiasm became clearer to me after I visited two sessions of the language integration class. People appeared motivated and engaged. The perks of learning the dominant language were evidently more convincing than the study of Germany's parliamentary system and alleged liberal democratic culture.

by the *BAMF*? Because the school's budget, and teachers' honoraria, both provided by the *BAMF*, hinged on students' attendance and class completion. Therefore, to keep the set-up from collapsing, Michaela and the school administrator, Marlene, worked as bricoleurs flexibly managing the "pipe dreams" (Michaela) of the *BAMF*, as well as the on-the-ground needs of the school, teachers and students. Hence, the mandatory attendance requirements were in practice dropped. The occasion of the final exam, for which I had been recruited as second examiner by Marlene and Michaela, marked the first time that all participants were present, and they were asked to fill in the attendance sheets retrospectively.

2.2.3 The Teachers – Disciplining and Caring Governmental Belonging

Despite students' agency, in class interaction the production of their non-belonging to the national community was pervasive. This hinged on the *doxic* self-positioning of the two main teachers Christian and Michaela as governmentally belonging natives. I initially viewed them as emblematic embodiments of Foroutan's "plurality rejecting" and "plurality embracing" camps in the "post-migrantic society" (2019). Christian, a political conservative, viewed contemporary "mass migration" as problem-ridden. He wanted to "prepare" the students for life in Germany which would help them but also to prevent "parallel societies"[11]. In his view, without state intervention, migrants had the potential to endanger Germany's social cohesion and economic prosperity. Michaela, a self-identified "lefty" had a more positive attitude towards immigration and her "great students". Immigrants were a welcome enrichment for Germany. She wanted the participants to feel supported and acknowledged, viewing her classes as an exchange of "teaching with love" and receiving humor, warmth, and gratitude.

[11] "Parallel Societies" have been a prominent discursive figure in migration debates in Germany. Usually drawn on by Conservatives they invoke migrant milieus decoupled from mainstream society's values and state authority.

Unsurprisingly, the classroom atmospheres differed markedly. Initially patient and polite, Christian's teaching style became gradually gruffer. For example, he aggressively corrected participants' German pronunciation ("Not Nasi! *Nazzzi*, with a zzzzzz!"), or talked over them. His sources of frustration were, on the one hand, the *BAMF's* "armchair planning" evident in a lack of time and disciplinary tools to reach the curricular goals, and on the other hand, the students' lack of discipline and meager learning capacities. As he told me relating to students of another class he held, "If you spent your first few years in school not doing anything but learning the Quran by heart, then let's say, not too much sticks"[12].

Michaela shared the frustration with the *BAMF* but acted considerably more empathetic towards the students. The class atmosphere in her lessons was remarkably laidback. In one lesson, at the sight of Michaela's dog gnawing on chalk, while the two-year-old son of an Afghan participant couple frantically raced around us, caused Ezmir to declare "What a class! Next time I will bring my grandma along to top it off!" which was answered with an approving collective roar of laughter. Michaela cared for the students, she sorted participants' study materials ("just like for my daughters!") and applauded them for their knowledge and application ("You are so good, I and most Germans would be completely lost in that exam!"). However, when she perceived that the students questioned her authority or knowledge (her factual statements were at times dubious) she rebutted them forcefully. She did this through her superior German skills, by invoking cultural capital ("As a famous philosopher once said"), and by infantilizing the students via the confiscation of their mobile phones or condemning them to clean the blackboard.

[12] He considered the class I participated in as exceptionally well educated by contrast to other classes.

Despite the teachers' contrasting politics (conservative vs. left), attitudes towards migration and diversity (skeptical vs. welcoming), teaching styles and relation to the participants (disciplinary vs. caring), Michaela and Christian shared a latent self-understanding as governmentally belonging natives, and an ontology neatly separating between Germans and foreigners. This became pivotal in my understanding of how the classes entrenched migrant non-belonging. This "native's point of view" (De Genova 2016) did not emerge as an explicit political ideology but as a deep doxic embodiment guiding the teachers' practices. As I will outline, throughout the class neither Christian nor Michaela interpellated the participants as potential, or future Germans, but instead oscillated between non-, negatively and mis-interpellating them in relation to the national community. Before demonstrating this, two anecdotes will illustrate how Christian and Michaela performed the native/migrant binary, naturally positioning themselves as managerial governmental subjects with the power to objectify foreigners to the extent of deliberating their il-/legitimate presence in and deportation from Germany.

Christian occasionally stressed Germany's "extremely lenient asylum policy". When he bemoaned that more than 90% of rejected applicants for asylum did not face deportation, he caught a glimpse of my involuntary grimacing, and challenged me to state my disagreement. I cautiously noted that he underestimated the forceful actions of the German state. Egged on by this, Christian eagerly started a several minute-long online search to find the exact percentage of deportations of rejected asylum seekers on the class projector. In the process, pie charts of granted and denied asylum applications, and pictures of the deportations of handcuffed refugees escorted to planes by police forces flashed across the wall. The students – some of them former and three of them current refugees – looked on, some lowered their heads and sadness crept

across their faces. Eventually Christian triumphantly presented the discrepancy between denied refugee claims and enforced deportations, viewing this as regrettable evidence of an overly lenient state. His complete disregard for the students experience in this scenario underlined how at home he felt in adjudicating which migrant presences in Germany were legitimate or not. He thereby performatively reinforced his governmental belonging and migrants' precarious outsider status.

While I did not observe such crass displays of dominance with Michaela, in our interview she gave an example of how she ensured the maintenance of authority in class, which equally explicates her sense and position of governmental belonging. She described how she had arrived in the first session of a prior class and caught the students sitting separated between Africans and non-Africans. She recalled:

> The 'Blacks' refused to sit with the 'Whites', you know the Arabs and so on. I asked them what this was about and one said, 'You know my skin is black'. So, I said 'You know my skin is white. What are you gonna do about that now? Do you have a problem now? Do you need to go now or are you gonna stay?'. And then I said 'You know what, in Germany there are primarily white people' how does he imagine that things would work out. Then I said that if he had problem with that 'Very quickly, there are train tickets back home!'. There all people would be black again and then he would, in his eyes apparently, fit in again [laughter]. You cannot imagine how his jaw dropped!

In the name of tolerance, she threatened the African student with deportation, demonstrating that despite her pro-migration views she self-evidently inhabited and practiced from a position of governmental belonging. From this vantage point deliberating about the "deportability" (De Genova 2002) of participants that did not fit her expectation of tolerance appeared legitimate.

In sum, while Christian treated the participants more harshly and Michaela more benevolently, both teachers shared a self-positioning as governmentally belonging natives which entailed the power to define the il-/legitimate presence and behavior of migrants. This was based on a presupposed dichotomy between naturally belonging

natives managing non-belonging objectivized foreigners. Based on this positionality they differentiated the students from the German community throughout their teaching practices and entrenched a native/migrant binary which I will demonstrate in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

Entrenching Non-Belonging

In this chapter I scrutinize the teachers' classroom practices regarding their positioning of the students in relation to the national community. I group this analysis in three thematic clusters. First, I will outline how the students were non- and negatively interpellated in relation to the teaching of German history and the political system. Second, after a brief overview of how Germany's liberal culture and values are framed in the policy material, I demonstrate how the students were racialized via discourses of liberal culture and values by Christian, Michaela's racial groupism and highlight their shared Islamophobic racializing interpellations[13]. Third, after having outlined how culture was centered as the problem space of integration, I will elaborate how labor was sidelined as a central dimension of students' life in Germany and their self-identification. I will counterpose the centrality of work in the legal basis of the classes and students' everyday talk to its peripheral treatment in class. Then I will show how the teachers mis-interpellated the participants as refugees as well as victimized or non-essential laborers. This provoked forceful pushback from the students who identified as crucial labor force. In sum, the chapter illustrates how the teaching constructed a binary between migrants and Germans.

3.1 History and the Political System – Constructing the Democratic Trans-Generational Community

One noticeable feature of the classes was the presentation of the German nation as a trans-generational community that had learned an unparalleled lesson from history. The

[13] Brigitte had stopped teaching the class before it had progressed to the *People and Society* section.

participants, by contrast, were not interpellated in relation to the German community but merely cast as passive audience.

According to the class curriculum, history is taught to enable the students' "development of an understanding of the German and European present" (BAMF 2017, 32). Whereas Germans are implicitly posited to share in a complicated historical heritage which engenders democratic competence, immigrants have to learn about German history and the resultant political system in order to understand "cultural differences and acquire the necessary competence to act in German society" (Bundesregierung 2007, 10).

In line with the curriculum's emphasis on "the responsibility for democracy and basic rights, deriving from national socialist rule and the Holocaust" (Curriculum 2017, 10), the teaching focused on Germany's 20th century history. Rather than stressing historical contingencies, the textbook (Schote 2017) and the classes laid out an unambiguous "national memory" of redemption, stretching from murderous fascism to a constitutional model democracy (see Geschiere 2009, 25, 159). The teachers presented the downfall of the Weimar Republic, the Nazis' rise to power, the Holocaust, warfare, and Germany's partial destruction. This was followed by a proud recollection of the reconstruction of constitutional democracy and a competitive social market economy. In addition, they stressed the country's, allegedly peerless, "working-through-history" regarding the crimes of the Third Reich as central marker of national identity.[14] Beyond this, they cast the GDR as a less formative regime, while positively referencing European integration. By contrast to France's popular self-representation as expressing

[14] This was particularly evident when Christian discussed Willy Brandt's knee fall at the Warsaw ghetto memorial. As Christian noted: "Not many politicians do such things. Usually countries don't apologize. They deny, they want to forget". In this context Christian – *for the only time* throughout the course – directly interpellated the students as potential future Germans: "To all who want to become Germans: we carry responsibility [against antisemitism and for Israel]! I am not guilty, I was born in the sixties. But we all carry responsibility!".

democratic universalism based on a "heroic, glorious, and Promethean" past (Mbembe 2011, 10), the teachers represented Germany's ascent to democratic gold standard as resting on a laborious national journey of redemption. This journey had been deeply formative for Germans. The teachers never grew tired to stress that "us Germans" had learnt our democratic lesson from history, that German pupils were deeply made aware of this and that we had built our crowning contemporary political system on it. As Balibar argues, national narratives represent the "us" of the nation (in this case the Germans), as standing in continuity with previous generations and as a culmination of the national development (1991b, 86).

Christian stressed this trans-generational character of the democratic national community in our interview:

> I usually even go further back than National Socialism, even to the Enlightenment […] to show nowadays' status did not descend from heaven, but [that] it is the result of a painful history […] how can we make clear, in particular to people from and who think in traditional or religious contexts, why we are like we are? By making clear that *we* consider our current status as progress, and that all our progress is based on us at some point daring to question old beliefs.

Christian imagined himself and I, born in the 1960s and 90s, respectively, in a "symbolic kinship" (Gullestad 2002, 53) with previous generations of Germans – even reaching back to the Enlightenment - and consequently as heirs to Germany's democratic development. However, in relation to immigrants who supposedly come from and think in "traditional and religious contexts", natives' imagined level of transgenerational democratic achievement posed a problem. Latent in the assumptions of the class material and the class practices but clearly articulated by Christian, is that the inclusion of people "from traditional or religious backgrounds" appeared difficult. This was because they lacked natives' history-engendered democratic socialization.[15]

[15] See Jensen and Mouritsen (2019) for the discussion of the exclusionary, nationalist utilization of universal liberal values in European integration politics.

In sum, within this class section, migrants were cast as a passive audience that would marvel at Germany's journey of democratic redemption. Moreover, because they could not hold a similar claim to a deeply formative democratic history, their difference vis-à-vis the German national community was entrenched.

3.1.1 Differentiating Migrants from the Historical Democratic Community

Beyond this, the teachers actively differentiated the participants in relation to the nation's history and its democratic institutions. Students' non-belonging was produced through the discarding of their experiences as points of shared historical learning, sidelining migrants from national history, and continuously interpellating them in relation to the "un-" or "not quite democratic" political systems of their countries of origin.

As outlined, the history of war and dictatorship shaped the narrative about how Germany had learned its democratic lesson. Several times students tried to contribute personal experiences of war and authoritarianism to connect with these historical experiences. However, the teachers brushed them aside. When Christian lectured about the formative effects WW II and the following refugee experience for contemporary Germans (notably the refugee experience of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe) Ezmir, from Kosovo, attempted to show his understanding by connecting this to his own still very raw experience of war:

> "Yes, I was in war. I was traumatized cause…"
>
> Christian interrupted: "Yes who has been in war can understand…"
>
> Ezmir attempted to continue his comment: "Yes, that is what I meant to say: you know I actually was in war and…".

Christian unceremoniously talked over him and continued to lecture what us Germans had learned from the experience of war. Such passing over direct experiences equally

played out when students attempted to connect to lessons learned from past state repression by offering their experiences. Bizarrely, Germans born at least a generation after World War II lectured people from Syria, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Kosovo about the democracy engendering lessons of war, repression and flight while passing over their direct claims to such "learning experiences". Germany's historical learning experience was conveyed both as a monologue and possessively. Participants might have experienced real horrors, but that did not bring them any closer to "us" Germans who had *learned* from ours.

Moreover, students' own insights into German history were simply discounted, as they were never interpellated as a part of German society. This was despite some of the students having lived and worked in Germany several times and for several years. The construction of migrants being inside the national territory but outside of the history of the national community was replicated when the classes touched on the history of the guestworkers. Crucially, the guestworkers were not narrated as a historical part of the national community but as foreigners residing in Germany. Both times when Michaela and Christian lectured on the guestworkers, Llazar a Kosovar in his 50s, himself somewhat in the position of a modern day guestworker working night shifts in a local baking factory, attempted to tell the class about his father's experience as a guestworker. He highlighted his father's contribution to the "economic miracle" and how he was eventually sent home. Both times the teachers barely took notice. German history was conveyed unidirectionally, students' stressing of similarities or long standing national or personal interconnectedness did not fit into this script.

The teachers furthermore entrenched the students' difference by continuously stressing the sophistication of the German political and constitutional system by comparison to "their" countries'. Michaela presented the German constitution resembling a scripture,

half-jokingly complementing references to it by adding: “God be thanked for it!”. In contradistinction, the participants were asked to tell about the status of basic democratic rights, such as press freedom or electoral rights, in “their country” with the underlying assumption that they were underdeveloped. Even if students claimed comparable democratic status for their countries their objections were disregarded. Exemplary were two separate exchanges between Michaela and Brigitte respectively, and the Kosovar participants. When Michaela lauded Germany’s historical achievement of becoming a democracy, they remarked: “Well, Kosovo has also become democracy”. Michaela smirked and replied: “Well, it is a different kind of democracy. *We* really do have the separation of powers and equality before the law!”.

Similarly, when Brigitte lectured about the German party system, she asked how many parties there were in Kosovo. Valmir a middle-aged construction worker answered, “About 30”. Brigitte remarked that this certainly must cause political disruption and, seemingly content with this input, disregarded Valmir’s intervention that (similar to Germany) only about five or six of these parties were in parliament. In the next lesson when explaining Germany’s 5% electoral parliamentary threshold (often presented as a lesson from the political fragmentation of Weimar) she remarked that in a country like Kosovo “with all these parties” certainly no 5% threshold existed. “No” answered Valmir, Brigitte nodded content and turned to the blackboard, disregarding his follow-up: “But we have a 4% threshold”. The reinforcement that Germany was a democratic country and participants’ countries of origin were not (quite), served as, what Harrison terms an “undoing of resemblances” which is crucial for the boundary maintenance of national identities “similarities, and shared features of identity” [are] disavowed, censored, or systematically forgotten” (2003, 345).

In sum, throughout the teaching of history and the political system, students were never interpellated as future members of the national community. Instead, they were hailed as members of democratically backward communities and hence bereft of comparable democratic learning experiences and competence. The discarding of students' experiences both before and after migration, and the unmaking of resemblances between Germany and "their" countries caricatured any pretense of the fostering of identificatory potential noted in the curriculum. Instead, a sharp contrast to Germans as heirs to a democratic history and competent members of the political system was entrenched. The gulf between Germans and migrants was significantly deepened and racialized in the teaching of Germany's liberal culture and values.

3.2 The Production of Racialized Non-Belonging Via Culture

While German history was everywhere, race was nowhere to be found in the classes. Well, almost nowhere. The curriculum thematizes "racism" only in relation to the Third Reich, in contrast the present is depicted as merely having tensions between "constitutional aspirations and reality" (BAMF 2017, 28). In class, all teachers mentioned racism: "it did not matter", "was reprehensible", "unlawful" and predominantly lay in Germany's past. What this mirrored was Germany's "post-racialism" (Lentin 2014), the positing of race in the past, while racism, predominantly transfigured into culturalist discourses which state the existence of separate, incompatible and behavior determining cultural units, remains central to the structuring of societies (ibid.; Lentin and Titley 2011). This section outlines how the classes were ripe with racializing discursive practices in relation to the teaching of "liberal culture" and "values" which negatively interpellated the students.[16]

[16] The point is not to label the teachers as racists – both condemned racism – but to enquire how their racializing practices positioned students as non-belonging to the German community. This is based on the premise, as Lentin and Titley write by drawing on Winant, that "racism is a question of practices,

The German integration law stresses that faced with immigration the state must "maintain a peaceful, liberal, communal society" (BMAS 2016, 23), and the curriculum presents the classes as an answer to the "lasting challenge, of guiding cultural and religious diversity into a constructive and peaceful togetherness" (BAMF 2017, 38). This reflects that civic integration discourses frame immigrants as danger to Western societies' social cohesion and liberal values (Kostakopolou 2010; Lewicki 2017). By contrast to the domestic population, this a priori assumes migrants' non-adherence to or lacking internalization of liberal "universal" values (ibid.). The class segment *People and Society* is the civic integration classes' answer to this conundrum. The section aims to convey Germany's liberal democratic culture and societal values to engender participants' self-reflection and tolerance (BAMF 2017, 38). German culture, interchangeably used with European culture, is presented as guided by principles such as individual freedom, secularity, non-violence, tolerance, and the embrace of constitutional human rights. Furthermore, the self-determination and equal treatment of women and religious tolerance are stressed as essential to all class segments (ibid.).

Again, as observed in the history and political system sections, the teachers mostly non-interpellated the students in relation to the culture and values of Germany. There was no sense of their presence in Germany having made them cultural "hybrids". They were merely addressed to comment on German culture and values as outside observers. "How is it in your country?" constantly echoed through the classroom. Again, akin to the teaching of history and the political system, the teachers actively unmade similarities and undermined the expertise of students in relation to "their" countries. When Michaela for example discussed the issue of punctuality in Germany, Richie, from Sierra Leone, claimed that punctuality was also important in his home country.

not intent, and has to be 'comprehended in terms of its consequences, not as a matter of intentions or beliefs' (Winant 2004: 135)"(Lentin and Titley 2011, 92).

She repeatedly investigated these remarks with a confident smile: “But really? It is important, yes? The buses in Africa are punctual. Yes?”. Equally, Christian showed his skepticism whenever Muslim participants would declare that gender equality was also important in their countries of origin. Despite these commonalities, Christian’s and Michaela’s teaching practices differed markedly, reflecting diverging beliefs regarding the salience of cultural groups.

3.2.1 Christian – Cultural Racialization

During our interview, Christian stressed that most participants came from “completely different cultures” so that the classes needed to provide a basic orientation for life in Germany. His teaching was permeated by the drawing of an *Orientalis*t binary (Said 2003), contrasting “our” German progressive culture and values with the backward equivalents in most participants’ countries of origin. While he associated German culture with discipline, tolerance, and communicative ability, participants’ cultures privileged family and “honor” often leading to undisciplined, aggressive, and egoistic behavior. Hence, migrants often lacked an appropriate understanding of legitimate critique and dialogue and showed aggressive behavior. This was exemplified when he told the students about reactions to the criticism of religion; “They [immigrants] often see themselves attacked! But they are just confronted with an open society!”. He explained to them that in contrast German children were already learning in kindergarten how to deal with criticism, carry communal responsibility and come to peaceful agreements.

Christian often cushioned his negative interpellations by reiterating that “clearly” not all Germans adhered to these values. He also veiled some criticism of foreigners by using third person references such as “a lot of people coming here think”, or stating that other values were not necessarily worse but merely stem from different cultures.

He explicitly criticized Germans, for example, by pointing out that their privileging of career chances resulted in the loneliness of many pensioners. However, when students picked up on this criticism and stated that elderly family members should not be shuttled off to die alone, he swiftly declared that career orientation was a requirement of modernity, whereas their strong family values were "admirable" but outdated. Therefore, most self-critical introspections merely amounted to what Bourdieu calls "strategies of condescension" (Bourdieu cited by Hage 2000, 87).

He elaborated on his understanding of cultural difference in our follow-up interview:

> We are definitely not determined by genetics or blood. But what defines humans is their cultural conditioning. […] In face of the speed of change which somebody experiences catapulted here from the desert of Eritrea, such fast cultural change in the head cannot work. Because there are ideas that are mentally rooted and anchored so deeply you cannot just throw them overboard.

In other words, culture is deeply rooted and hardwired, so intentional assimilation into a new culture is hardly possible. Almost reading like a textbook definition of cultural racism (see Balibar 1991a), people were determined by their cultural conditioning. He expanded on the im-/possibility of integration by pointing to the differing developmental stages of people's societies of origin:

> There are countries and cultures which are not that distant from us. Even if they are different, they are at least already closer to modernity, or in modernity. Then we have 0.0% problems. And there are others who are far, far away. When people are from areas left behind from modern urban development, then it [integration] simply cannot work. This is why I don't believe in it [integration]. I still do believe it is important to bring all these things to them.

Accordingly, as most people in the courses did not have the prerequisites to integrate successfully, he believed that the cause of integration courses was limited:

> I cannot effect a change of mentality in an integration course. I can give it an initial push, I can sensitize. But when one exits an integration course that I led, he will not necessarily have changed his traditional attitude about the role of women. And the other way around because of it women certainly won't fundamentally question their own role […]. So the integration course is an euphemism […] I don't think that the person who thought of that name for this kind of course, window dressed on

> purpose or with bad intention, but they did indeed want a pretty name. And that name is "integration course". But integration cannot be manufactured, it is not a lever that can be pulled, or a couple of screws that can be turned. The human is not constituted that way.

As our interview showed, he viewed people's behavior as determined by the developmental stage of their country of origin. Following from this, in a rather colonial logic, the participants from "pre-modern" countries were not to-be made members of the community via the classes, but should, to their and Germans' benefit, at least be acquainted to our progressive cultural values. In sum, while Christian often declared "race" to be meaningless, his negative cultural interpellation of the students racialized them by naturalizing "fluid categories of difference" viz. countries of origin or religion into "fixed species of otherness" (Silverstein 2005, 364) and positing them in unbridgeable contrast to Germans.

3.2.2 Michaela – Conscious Deconstruction, Latent Racial Groupism

Michaela covered the topic of culture and values less extensively in class. Both during her teaching and the follow-up interview she stated that "cultural belonging" is hard to define and irrelevant. She held the values of the *Grundgesetz*, which she named as respect for women, democratic conviction, and fair communication to be of immense importance. However, she did not think Germans adhered to them and would actually need value classes themselves. In our interview she elaborated on this and ended in a de-facto deconstruction of Germanness: "What does Germanness mean? Ha, nothing! You tell me what Germanness is? Pork Roast? Well, too bad, they also have that in Czechia!". She also deconstructed integration, contending that it was vapid, and used to discriminate against foreigners. What counted was individual character. She stated that integration could already be impossible for Germans who moved between regions:

> Now go ahead and try it [integration] coming from Eritrea[17], that is impossible, right!? […] The word "integration" is pretentious, completely obsolete, because it is not possible. Firstly, it fails because of the Germans not the immigrants, because the Germans don't want it!
>
> Markus: We are we. You are you?
>
> Michaela: Yes, we are we, you are you, and: where are you from? […] This word by itself is already strange 'In-te-gra-tion', what does that mean? To include yourself in society? What society?

Integration was a pipe dream, because Germans were too narrow-minded and hence people remained fixed in "their" groups. However, her explicit embrace of migrants and her deconstruction of German belonging was undercut in several ways. First, while Michaela spent decisively less time than Christian covering the *People and Society* section, the dynamic of a German woman teaching adults that they "must not patronize women" or that freedom of speech was a precious good, highlighted the policy's assumption of German mastery versus participants' lack of liberal values.

Second, even though she stressed multiple times that people's "stamp", a metonym she used for race, did not matter. These "stamps" structured her perception as naturalized principles of "vision and division" (Bourdieu cited by Brubaker 2004, 66). For instance, at the end of a class Michaela started a subchapter about "everyday culture" in Germany. Above the section was a picture of a group of young people walking and joking with differing skin color:

> Michaela: "Ok, so Richie where do these people come from?
>
> Richie: "Umm, well I don't know."
>
> Michaela: "It is a colorful coming together of people. How do they look, what nationality do they have?"
>
> Richie: "Umm...[looking embarrassed and shrugging]"
>
> Michaela: "Well, there is a blonde, maybe Swedish. Then this one, black, a guy from Africa. The others look a bit Turkish, Muslim. The other one might be German."

[17] The example of the "Eritrean", also used by Christian above, is hardly chosen by accident, but rather names sub-Saharan African migrants as antithesis to the commonsensical understanding of white Germans.

Despite her critical approach to fixed groupings, instead of entertaining the possibility that this "everyday" picture might show Germans of differing skin color, she drew on phenotype to neatly group them by descent. This ethno-racial *"groupism",* defined by Brubaker as "tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial or cultural blocs" (Brubaker 2004, 8) frequently surfaced in her discourse relating to national groups, contradicting her deconstructionist statements. She referred to Eritreans as "a really kind people" or Arabs as "a rather *special* people" for whom their "type" and "culture" made it impossible to speak and write concise German like "us". In sum, despite her politics and sympathy for migrants she articulated a doxic understanding of German nationality that, bottom line, rested on the latent imagination of Germans as white natives (see Müller 2011 for ethnographic work concerning the racial imagination of Germanness).

3.2.3 Islamophobic Racialization

Despite their differing views regarding the importance of cultural groups and the problems of integration, Michaela's and Christian's practices converged in the racializing negative-interpellation of Muslims. This was predominantly in relation to the topics of gender equality and freedom of belief. The curriculum foregrounds both issues in a way that problematizes Muslims, viz. by encouraging the discussion of "contemporary debates" such as "the headscarf and burqa debate, forced marriage, violence in families, and honor killings" (BAMF 2017, 15).

Michaela elaborated on the importance of gender equality and secularity by pointing to the *Grundgesetz*. Standing next to a wooden crucifix she emphasized that freedom of speech, religion and secularity were great national achievements. She elaborated on this in class by suddenly quipping: '*Allah is stupid*!' I am allowed to say that, *no*?" pushing her chin forward daringly. Fazeer answered "Well you can, but it'd be better

if you would not" while Behrooz weighed in defending her right to say so. Michaela, now somewhat bizarrely prancing triumphantly on one leg, replied "Yes, *in Germany*, I can say 'Allah is stupid!'". Furthermore, she claimed that headscarves were not allowed for teachers in public schools, only to admit her error after students had repeatedly disproved this as false.

Christian equally stressed Germany's secularity ("We are not a religious community but an enlightened community!") and the country's striving for gender equality by contrasting these with assumed Muslim practices. He, however, often veiled his criticism more carefully. He thematized child-rearing and cautioned that "domestic values" often collided with constitutional ideals of gender equality, "for example mandatory swimming classes for boys and girls have to be accepted *by everybody*". When called out by the students if he was talking about Islam, he defensively rebuffed them: "regardless of religion, non-adherence to constitutional values is anti-integration!". However, he was visibly content and gave time to Fazeer, a student from Afghanistan, when the latter explained unequal gendered inheritance practices in Afghanistan. Inversely, Christian appeared inconvenienced and grimaced when the Kosovar students objected to this characterization as a generic Muslim practice. In addition, he showed remarkably less interest and gave less time to Fazeer's elaborations why he thought veiled women should simply make their own bodily choices.

The problematization of Islam as antithesis to German culture was confirmed in my interviews with the teachers. Without any probing from me, both problematized the wearing of headscarves as a central signifier of non-integration and diametric to German liberal values (see also Brown's elaboration on Anti-Muslim "boundary liberalism" 2016). As many scholars have pointed out the bodies of Muslim women are frequently the battleground of racist integration debates, represented as the passive

victims of their culture and men, and proclaiming their saving by Western civilization (Fekete 2006; Korteweg 2017; Said 2003). For Christian the headscarf was a sign of regressive ideology. For example, he told me about an encounter he had in a continued-learning class with a "Turkish" woman who appeared very emancipated" at first but told him that she was considering wearing a headscarf based on qur'anic commandment:

> I of course immediately ask myself– and many Germans do the same – if she wears the headscarf because it is in the Quran, what is her position towards other divine qur'anic demands? Those in terms of criminal justice? Does she reject them or is she selective? Many Germans then say: that [wearing the headscarf] is a statement for backwardness, for archaic thinking which does not have a place here with us. You must know about that, that you will be confronted with that if you go onto the street with a headscarf. So again, I say it is important to take part in the orientation course, so that they aren't surprised when that happens to them.

The headscarf indicated adherence to an archaic version of Islam that was antithetical to German progressive values and integration. Already present in this quote, but even clearer in the following story he shared, is how he attributed the responsibility and cancelled out the significance of Islamophobic discrimination:

> I cannot change the world, be it that they are extremely depreciated, or that people face them with aggression or just the public debate. I have one sitting in my course now, a highly educated Tunisian. Intelligent *with headscarf*! We discussed the topic headscarf, and I had to tell her – obviously, she has not had much contact with Germans so far – she must be aware about the fact that she can at times get problems, and that then she is not allowed to act surprised. We talked about freedom and she says: 'For me this is plain and simple' – as I mentioned she is very clever – 'it is simply my freedom to dress the way I want to dress'. I said 'Yes you are completely right! This is the way it is. You have the freedom to dress the way you want! *But*, you must not forget, many others understand that as a statement of you.

Christian performed a victim-perpetrator inversion cancelling out the racism of Germans discriminating against women wearing the hijab. The problem was not primarily Germans' racism, it was the act of Muslim women veiling themselves and thereby demonstrating their cultural backwardness.

Michaela displayed an equal fixation on the headscarf in the follow-up interview. When I asked her what she wanted to convey most through her teaching she stated "a basic democratic understanding", entailing respect for women, tolerance, democratic values, and secularity. When I noted how difficult it must be to teach these abstract notions, she objected by pointing out that the *Grundgesetz* contains all these and then elaborated:

> I have a great example. A student whose daughter goes to school. She is from Syria, and is always veiled from top to bottom, only her face remains uncovered. So, I asked her: how do you handle this? Your daughter goes to school, and all the other students they are *free* and they wear T-shirts and short skirts. What do you think how does your daughter want to be? Then she said 'Well, I don't really know' and so I said 'Do you think that she wants to wear *that*? You have put her through coming to this country, and now you stop her from enjoying its rewards? How do you deal with that?' Then you can use the *Grundgesetz*, you can build so much around and from it! The student matter of fact really started pondering about this! And then I said, 'Do you want your child to be happy or do you want religion to dominate?' And then she said that she wants her child to be happy. So I said 'In that case you will have to make many concessions. You are now in a free country!'

For Michaela it was abundantly clear that the *Grundgesetz* equates to freedom, liberty and even happiness. However, she noticeably did not specify how the constitution instructed her teaching but derived the constitution's meaning from standing in contrast to traditional Islamic practices. The latter barred people from enjoying the former's values and relegated them to an unfree and unhappy existence. To be in a free country meant assimilation. She continued to explain:

> They [children] want to be like other kids, that is logical, they want to belong! I have a pupil I mentor with much attention, Nara, she is almost like a daughter to me. She eats sausage and pork roast with joy! With *love*! I always tell her: if you are happy with it, do it! It is your life and here nobody is allowed to take that from you! She does that. Well, the mother does not know. Oh god, one does not need to tell everything!

Assimilation via pork roast[18] and sausage, viz. the embrace of traditional German cuisine against Islamic dietary laws, amounted to freedom. Michaela summed up her elaboration by stating the most important thing was "to let all these women running around in burqas know: it is OK to run around like that, but that the relation to their children, that this will be difficult".

In sum, both teachers deindividualized and racialized women wearing a headscarf as determined by their backward culture and bereft of agency. Despite stressing their anti-racism and Germany's "post-racial" present, they constituted Muslims as non-belonging antipode to the German liberal-democratic community. While Christian viewed Muslim women as offending against the enlightened Germans, for Michaela they primarily offended against their own children's prospects of integration. While, Christian was skeptical about integration even in the second generation, Michaela framed Muslim women, as Korteweg asserts is common in European integration debates (2017), as "conduits" of the integration of the next generation. By letting their religious grip on them go, mothers could still absolve their children and enable their assimilation into the mainstream. In light of the teachers' contrasting attitudes concerning both migration and the salience of cultural groups, it can hardly be reduced to exceptional individual Islamophobia, or the latent emphasis of Muslims as a problem group in the curriculum, that they strongly converged in reinforcing the non-belonging of Muslims. Instead, it confirms the hegemonic marking of the Muslim Other as antithetical to the progressive European (Fekete 2006; Lewicki 2017; Korteweg 2017) and German Self (Rostock and Berghahn 2008; see Dietze et al. 2009).

[18] In the same interview, as briefly mentioned, she had ridiculed "pork roast" as having no identificatory potential for Germany as "too bad, they also have that in Czechia", however, much like the Grundgesetz pork roast unfolded this potential vis-à-vis Muslims.

In sum, far from presenting a non-exclusionary terrain of civic liberal values that would allow for membership regardless of origin, the teachers negatively interpellated Muslims through an Islamophobic discourse of liberal culture and values (see also Brown 2016). Instead of enabling national membership, the classes thereby manifested as practices of "differential inclusion" racializing Muslims and hierarchizing the legitimacy of (imagined) ways of living in Germany. First-generation immigrants firmly remained separated from the national community. This questions Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos'(2016) depiction of a "new differentialism" in Germany that moves beyond the differentiation between natives and migrants, respectful of difference, indicating a shift towards inclusionary notions of national belonging. Instead, pace the acknowledgement of diversity in Germany, the above analysis highlights the necessity for attention to newly emerging "hierarchies of belonging" (Back et al. 2012).

Moreover, it complicates Foroutan's (2019), and the Münklers' (2016) depiction of Germans increasingly separated between a plurality rejecting and a plurality embracing camp, holding different notions of Germanness. Although Christian could be easily categorized in the former camp, the case of Michaela poses a problem for such neat accounts. While she embraced diversity and even deconstructed notions of German homogeneity and culture, she performatively positioned herself in the native German "we", which was, as illustrated by her flickering racial groupism, white and, evident in the negative racializing interpellation of Muslims, non-Muslim. What this indicates is, that a nativist doxa counterposing migrants to the latently assumed national community proper, continues to permeate parts of society that condemn racism and hold decisively pro-migrant views. In addition, it raises the question, going beyond the scope of this

work, how fractured and co-determined by nativism notions of German belonging are not only across society but even within the practices of individuals.

3.3 Erased Labor – Mis-Interpellating the Migrant Laborer

In the previous sections, I outlined the differentiation of students from the national community through their non- and negative interpellation in relation to German history, the political system and culture. In this section, I argue that a further key factor for the constitution of participants' non-belonging was the erasure of labor as a central dimension of their movement to, life and self-identification in Germany. I will first outline the central role that labor market consideration played in the legal and curricular class material. Second, I will elaborate how the teachers positioned the students in relation to the labor market, and counterpose the centrality of work in out-of-class conversations to its peripheral covering in class. Then I will show how the teachers mis-interpellated the participants as refugees as well as victimized or non-essential laborers.

Labor market considerations take a central place in the integration policy material. Not only does the obligation to take part in the classes hinge on the state's assessment of economic conduct and prospects, but job market integration is noted as one of the prime objectives of integration policy. This is in order to combat Germany's demographic decline and shortage of skilled laborers (BMAS 2016). The classes are framed as "investments into the future viability of the domestic job market" which will prevent high costs for social peace and welfare budgets and yield income tax and social insurance as returns (ibid.). In other words, the prospective participants are framed as in need of the state's pedagogic intervention as otherwise they might constitute a socially unsettling and welfare budget draining *lumpenproletariat*. By contrast to the legal and policy material, work is touched upon to a more modest extent in the

curriculum and course books. These materials stress the importance of economic competitiveness for national identity, the development of the FRG's market economy, labor rights and adequate workplace behavior including entrepreneurialism and continued learning.

3.3.1 Labor In- and Outside the Classroom

In class the teachers only fleetingly touched on the topic of labor. Michaela briefly covered the workings of labor unions and work councils as well as the students' rights to non-discrimination at the workplace. Christian emphasized discipline, flexibility and continued learning as requirements of the German job market. Unsurprisingly in light of their respective choice of topics, the teachers' understanding of the participants' relation to the German job market differed markedly. Michaela was supportive of the students. In part, as she said, because she realized that work was why most participants were here and the classes were an extra burden for them. She said in our interview that many were mentally "broken", "their sense of self-worth, oh well, quote unquote: they wipe off the Germans' butts". Consequently, reasserting her more caring governmental belonging, she saw it as her task to "Give them self-worth again" and let them know that "we want to keep them here". When participants excused themselves for coming late to class or leaving early by referencing work, she authorized their actions with a compassionate nod.

Christian viewed the students' relation to the job market entirely different. He did not condone the early leaving of classes for work reasons. Instead, after students requested it, he schooled them about the illegality of informal labor and lectured the people engaged in these activities about the meaning of *Zeit*- (temp), *Schicht*- (shift) and *Nachtarbeit* (nightwork). When students, regardless of his protest, eventually left *for work* he took it as evidence of how hopeless their sustainable job market integration

would be because of their lack of discipline. Several times, taking the position of governmental manager, he emphasized – absurdly considering that his audience consisted in large part of meat-packers, printers, construction workers and industrial bakers – : "Back during the time of the guestworkers Germany needed manual laborers. But today this is different, today these things are done by machines, we don't need many manual workers anymore". He thereby effectively told the participants that they were surplus to requirement. In another class session that only four students attended, two left during the break. The remaining two decided to leave an hour early because of their following nightshift. After Christian had protested in vain, and they closed the door, he vented to me: he had no understanding for immigrants' unqualified labor being "cheered on" in the media because due to their "broken" German skills "they end up doing unskilled labor. Then they are stuck in it. We don't need one million menial laborers!". In our interview he re-stated his doubts that migrants could fill labor shortages due to their poor linguistic and, consequently, lacking social skills.

What was striking was the gulf not only between the peripheral role that work played in the teaching versus its central position in the policy material, but also in contrast to its ubiquitous presence as a topic of students' and teachers' everyday talk before, after and in-between classes. The participants frequently talked about their work and highlighted that after grueling shifts grinding away their backs and lungs, the classes were a burden keeping them from rest. However, whereas students were continuously faced with questions concerning their countries of origin, non-democratic political order and cultural values in class, next to never did the teachers question them about their past and present occupations or interpellate them as laborers.

This was contrasted by the proud, emphasis of many participants of their identity as laborers and the fierce contestation of their mis-interpellation as beneficiaries of

German humanitarianism. When Christian declared that "Germany takes in migrants and refugees because of our historical sense of humanitarian responsibility", several participants retorted: "But no! You need us because your population is shrinking, and you don't have enough workers for the economy!".

While the teachers hardly addressed the students in their role as laborers, they all addressed them as refugees, for example Brigitte when teaching on the German constitution:

> "Article 16: the right to asylum. Some of you are here based on it. Like you, from Afghanistan, you are here based on it."
>
> Fazeer: "No, no! I am not here on asylum. I worked with German soldiers in Afghanistan and got a visa. I work in a print factory!"
>
> Brigitte: "Ah ok [pause], but you Joy [a student from Kenya] you are here based on it, right!?"
>
> Joy: [Visibly annoyed] "No, no, no. My husband is German."

Brigitte then turned to the group of Kosovar students who immediately erupted in protest with Llazar declaring: "We are no refugees, we are laborers, we work!". Finally, Brigitte was relieved when she identified Richie, who promptly appeared embarrassed, as a refugee.

In similar occurrences when Michaela and Christian addressed the students as refugees, they were equally offended. This is unsurprising as the labeling as refugee (*Flüchtling*) contains a disparaging, passive subtext (Bojadžijev 2018, 336), equates to state dependency, and that since 2015 the public and political discourse has become increasingly hostile against refugees. Here a strong contrast to the participants' reactions to previous interpellations emerged. The participants generally did not seem to mind their non-interpellation in relation to the German national community, contested their negative interpellation in relation to their countries' political systems in factual manner, and their negative hailing as cultural problems with mockery and

derision. However, they perceived a mis-interpellation as passive refugees and were incensed. Instead, they proudly asserted their identity as workers and their essential role for the German economy.

The sidelining of labor as a central dimension of migration and this mis-interpellation of participants is particularly significant in the German context. The country's economy has been a key factor for the movement to and life in Germany for many migrants. Work and economic prowess have been essential for the national identity of the self-declared *Wirtschaftsnation* after World War II (see e.g. Habermas 1990; Mommsen 1990). At the same time the country has long depended on a legally and ethnically stratified workforce (Miles 1986; Bauder 2006). In recent decades, political and business elites merged the call for immigration for the sake of economic competitiveness with humanitarian concerns (see Adam 2015; Bojadžijev 2018). Moreover, in public discourse, the economic contribution of immigrants, consistently co-determined by racializing dynamics, has been foregrounded as a central dimension of the re-negotiation of migrants' belonging (Ulbricht 2017).

As outlined, the participants were acutely aware that in public discourse the legitimacy of their presence is associated with their economic utility. As mentioned above, they explicitly drew on this discourse to frame their "migrant deservingness" (Chauvin and Garces Mascarenas 2014) to lend their presence in Germany legitimacy. However, their indignation and constant talk about their work during breaks, also demonstrated that their lived and bodily experience gave them an apt understanding, or in Gramsci's sense a "buon senso", of their condition as crucial, needed labor force in German society. Their mis-interpellation as welfare dependent refugees (all teachers), superfluous (Christian) or passively victimized (Michaela) laborers, instead of poorly paid but essential and agentive workers amounted to a symbolic dispossession in the struggle

over legitimate presence in the polity. Crucially, in this instance, the teachers thereby tried, and failed, to reproduce the distinction between native disciplining (Christian) or caring (Michaela) governmental subjects and passive migrant objects.

Viewed in combination with participants' racial culturalization, their mis-interpellation in relation to labor substantiates an understanding of the classes as part and parcel of the broader tendency of integration discourses and policy to mystify immigration and immigrants as cultural problems. They thereby facilitate the obfuscation of the economic dimension of the migration conjuncture in terms of: migrants' reasons for movement, their racialized inclusion in the labor market and structural economic and redistributive inequalities in the host society (see Schinkel 2017, 150-155; Lentin and Titley 2011; Kostakopoulo 2010). Thereby culture is centered as the discursive terrain of (non-) belonging instead of alternative identifications such as class. However, as I demonstrated, the students resisted such a culturalizing mis-interpellation. Instead, while not formulating a claim to belonging in the national community, they asserted their legitimate presence in and essential contribution to Germany.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I analyzed the workings of a civic integration class in Southern Bavaria. I demonstrated that a binary between belonging natives and non-belonging foreigners was entrenched in the government program that purports to facilitate the inclusion of migrants. I did this by focusing on the practices of two civic integration teachers of differing political persuasions and with distinct attitudes towards migration and migrants, and showed how their teaching practices were informed by a doxic self-positioning as "governmentally belonging" natives. Based on this, I illustrated how the teaching of history and the political system, liberal culture and values, and the treatment of labor in class cemented the native/migrant binary.

I first analyzed how the students were non- and negatively interpellated in the teaching of history and the political system *vis-à-vis* the national community that had learned its unparalleled democratic lesson from history. Secondly, I demonstrated how the stress on liberal values and culture negatively contrasted the students to the progressive liberal national community and racialized them via culturalist, groupist and Islamophobic interpellations. While the national community was not explicitly formulated by the teachers, in combination with their refutation of the possibility of integration, it was constructed as inaccessible and defined in opposition to the students. While no inclusion into this national community was imagined or facilitated, the classes resembled a practice of a hierarchizing "differential inclusion" (Mezzadra and Neilson 2012) into wider society.

Against the background of Germany's celebrated "civic shift" to integration and assertions of a transformation of political and popular notions of belonging, I highlighted the persistence of nativist conceptualizations of belonging within

integration practices. The fact that I identified the persistence of native notions of Germanness within Germany's "endpoint" of the "re-arrangement of immigration and integration" (Bundesregierung 2007), indicates that a broader political and societal acceptance of diversity in Germany must not be confused with the absence of national "hierarchies of belonging" (Back et al. 2012). Michaela and Christian's case highlights that nativist presuppositions obtain across "pro" and "anti-plural" societal camps. And Michaela illustrated that even individuals who explicitly deconstruct "Germanness" and the fixity of cultural groups, may hold doxic nativist notions of belonging and practice the differentiation between migrants and the latent national community proper.

However, my fieldwork did not only show how integration class students were differentiated from the national community, but it also demonstrated that they set limits to the effectuality of the classes. Neither the policy objectives of attuning migrants' behavior, nor their effective subjectification took place in class. This was because students asserted their agency by prioritizing the exam, by absenteeism, by restating their normalcy in the face of their differentiation and ridiculing the elevated self-representation of German democracy. In addition, I elaborated how faced with the classes' privileging of culture over labor, and their interpellation as state-beneficiaries and non-essential laborers, the students contested their perceived mis-interpellation. This resistance demonstrated that regardless of attempts to manage them through integration policy and their racializing differentiation to the national community, students asserted a claim to legitimate presence in and contribution to German society. Further research taking the perspectives, experiences and actions of migrant participants in integration classes as point of departure, as well as comparing the practices of "native" teachers to those with migration experience, can develop deeper

insights into the notions of belonging that are constructed, resisted and subverted by German civic integration class policy.

Bibliography

Adam, Heribert. 2015. "Xenophobia, Asylum Seekers, and Immigration Policies in Germany." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21(4): 446-464.

Alba, Richard. 2005. "Bright versus Blurred Boundaries: Second Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28: 20-49.

Back, Les, Shina Shamser, and Charlynne Bryan. 2012. "New Hierarchies of Belonging." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 15(2): 139–54.

Bail, Christopher A. 2008. "The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 73(1): 37–59.

Balibar, Etienne. 1991a. "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" In *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 17-28. London: Verso.

Balibar, Etienne. 1991b. "The Nation Form: History and Ideology." In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 86-106. London: Verso.

Bauder, Harald. 2006. *Labor Movement. How Migration Regulates Labor Markets*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Bojadžijev, Manuela. 2018. "Migration as Social Seismograph: an Analysis of Germany's 'Refugee Crisis' Controversy." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 31: 335–356.

Bonjour, Saskia and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2018. "The 'migrant with poor prospects': racialized intersections of class and culture in Dutch civic integration debates*." Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41(5): 882-900.

Brown, Jessica A. 2016. "'We Must Demonstrate Intolerance toward the Intolerant': Boundary Liberalism in Citizenship Education for Immigrants in Germany." *Critical Sociology* 42(3): 455-471.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity without groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bundesamt für Arbeit und Soziales. 2016. *Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung. Entwurf eines Integrationsgesetzes*.

Retrieved from:

http://ggua.de/fileadmin/downloads/integrationsgesetz/integrationsgesetz_meseberg/Igesetz_250516-3.pdf [Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Bundesamt für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz. 2004 *Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (Aufenthaltsgesetz - AufenthG)*.

Retrieved from: https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/aufenthg_2004 /BJNR195010004.html

[Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. 2017. *Curriculum für einen bundesweiten Orientierungskurs. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*.

Retrieved from:

https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Integration/Integrationskurse/Kurstraeger/KonzepteLeitfaeden/curriculum-orientierungskurs-pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 [Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. 2019. *Bericht zur Integrationskursgeschäftsstatistik für das Jahr 2018*. Retrieved from:

https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Statistik/Integrationskurszahlen/Bundesweit/2018-integrationskursgeschaeftsstatistik-gesamt_bund.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. [Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Bundesregierung. 2007. *Erfahrungsbericht der Bundesregierung an den Deutschen Bundestag zur Durchführung und Finanzierung der Integrationskurse nach § 43 Abs. 5 Aufenthaltsgesetz*. Berlin: Bundesregierung. Retrieved from:

http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/060/1606043.pdf [Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Castles, Stephen, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller. 2014. *The Age of Migration – International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chauvin, Sébastien and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas. 2014. "Becoming Less Illegal: Deservingness Frames and Undocumented Migrant Incorporation." *Sociology Compass* 8: 422-432. doi:10.1111/soc4.12145.

De Genova, Nicholas P. 2002. "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31: 419-447.

De Genova, Nicholas P. 2016. "The 'native's point of view' in the anthropology of migration." *Anthropological Theory* 16(2–3): 227–240.

Dietze, Gabriele, Claudia Brunner, and Edith Wenzel. 2009. *Kritik des Okzidentalismus. Transdisziplinäre Beiträge zu (Neo-)Orientalismus und Geschlecht*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Dubois, Vincent. 2009. "Towards a critical policy ethnography: lessons from fieldwork on welfare control in France." *Critical Policy Studies* 3(2): 221-239.

Dubois, Vincent. 2015. "Critical Policy Ethnography." In *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*, edited by Frank Fischer, Douglas Torgerson, Anna Durnová, and Michael Orsini, 462-480. Northampton-Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Fekete, Liz. 2006. "Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the Right." *Race & Class* 48(2): 1–22.

Fogelman, Tatiana. 2020. "Becoming-German: Integrationism, citizenship and territorialization of Germanness." *Geoforum* 113: 60-68.

Foroutan, Naika. 2019. *Die Postmigrantische Gesellschaft - Ein Versprechen der pluralen Demokratie*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Fulbrook, Mary. 1996. "Germany for the Germans? Citizenship and Nationality in a Divided Nation." In *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, edited by David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook, 88-105. London: Routledge.

Geschiere, Peter. 2009. *Perils of Belonging – Autochthony, Citizenship and Exclusion in Africa and Europe.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gullestad, Marianne. 2002. "Invisible Fences: Egalitarianism, Nationalism and Racism." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 8: 45-63.

Ha, Kien Nghi und Markus Schmitz. 2006. "Der nationalpädagogische Impetus der deutschen Integrations(dis)kurse im Spiegel postkolonialer Kritik." In *Cultural Studies und Pädagogik*, edited by Mecheril, Paul and Monika Witsch, 226-266. Bielefeld: transcript.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. "Der DM-Nationalismus." Die Zeit, 30.3.1990. Retrieved from:

https://www.zeit.de/1990/14/der-dm-nationalismus [Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Hage, Ghassan. 2000. *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*. New York and London: Routledge.

Hage, Ghassan. 2010. "The Affective Politics of Racial Mis-interpellation." *Theory, Culture & Society* 27(7–8): 112–129.

Harrison, Simon. 2003. "Cultural Difference as Denied Resemblance: Reconsidering Nationalism and Ethnicity." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45(2): 343-361.

Heckmann, Friedrich. 2003. "From Ethnic Nation to Universalistic Immigrant Integration: Germany." In *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies,* edited by Friedrich Heckmann and Dominique Schnapper, 45-78. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.

Hentges, Gudrun. 2013. "Integrations- und Orientierungskurse – eine Bilanz nach sieben Jahren." In *Dabeisein und Dazugehören*, edited by Heinz U. Brinkmann and Uslucan Haci-Halil, 343-364. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Hübschmann, Zuzanna. 2015. "Migrant Integration Programs: The Case of Germany." Global Migration Research Paper 11, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Retrieved from: https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/292694?ln=en

[Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Jensen, Kristian K., and Per Mouritsen. 2019. "Nationalism in a Liberal Register: Beyond the 'Paradox of Universalism' in Immigrant Integration Politics." *British Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 837-856.

Joppke, Christian. 2007a. "Do Obligatory Civic Integration Courses for Immigrants in Western Europe Further Integration?" *Focus Migration Policy Brief* No. 8. Retrieved from: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/58099/integration-courses [Accessed 14.06.2020].

Joppke, Christian. 2007b. "Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 30(1): 1-22.

Joppke, Christian. 2014. "The Retreat is Real—but what is the Alternative? Multiculturalism, Muscular Liberalism, and Islam." *Constellations* 21: 286-295.

Joppke, Christian. 2017. "Civic integration in Western Europe: three debates." *West European Politics* 40(6):1153-1176.

Korteweg, Anne C. 2017. "The failures of 'immigrant integration': The gendered racialized production of non-belonging." *Migration Studies* 5(3): 428–444.

Kostakopoulou, Dora. 2010. “The Anatomy of Civic Integration.” *The Modern Law Review* 73: 933-958.

Lentin, Alana. 2014. “Post-race, post politics: the paradoxical rise of culture after multiculturalism.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(8): 1268-1285.

Lentin, Alana and Gavan Titley. 2011. *The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age.* London and New York: Zed Books.

Lewicki, Aleksandra. 2017. “The blind spots of liberal citizenship and integration policy.” *Patterns of Prejudic*e 51(5): 375-395.

Lipsky, Michael. 1980. *Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Mbembe, Achille. 2011. “Provincializing France?” *Public Culture* 23(1): 85–119.

Mezzadra, Sandro and Brett Neilson. 2012. “Between Inclusion and Exclusion: On the Topology of Global Space and Borders.” *Theory, Culture & Society* 29(4–5): 58–75.

Miles, Robert. 1986. “Labour migration, racism and capital accumulation in Western Europe since 1945: an overview.” *Capital & Class* 10(1): 49-86.

Mommsen, Wolfgang J. 1990. *Nation und Geschichte – Über die Deutschen und die Deutsche Frage*. München: Piper.

Müller, Ulrike A. 2011. “Far Away So Close: Race, Whiteness, and German Identity.” *Identities* 18(6): 620-645.

Münkler, Herfried and Marina. 2016. *Die Neuen Deutschen – Ein Land vor seiner Zukunft*. Berlin: Rohwohlt.

Palmowski, Jan. 2008. “In search of the German nation: citizenship and the challenge of integration.” *Citizenship Studies* 12(6): 547-563.

Pautz, Hartwig. 2005. “The politics of identity in Germany: the Leitkultur debate.*” Race & Class* 46(4): 39–52.

Permoser, Julia. 2012. “Civic Integration as Symbolic Politics: Insights from Austria.” *European Journal of Migration and Law* 14(2), 173-198.

Prantl, Heribert. 1993. “Hysterie und Hilflosigkeit. Chronik der Asyldebatte seit der deutschen Einheit.“ In *Zuwanderung und Asyl in der Konkurrenzgesellschaft*, edited by Bernhard Blanke, 301-337. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.

Rostock, Petra and Sabine Berghahn. 2008. “The ambivalent role of gender in redefining the German nation.” *Ethnicities* 8(3): 345–364.

Said, Edward W. 2003. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.

Schinkel, Willem. 2017. *Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immi grant Integration in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schmidtke, Oliver. 2017. “Reinventing the Nation: Germany’s Post-Unification Drive Towards Becoming a ‘Country of Immigration’.” *German Politics* 26(4): 498-515.

Schönwälder, Karen and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos. 2016. “The New Differentialism: Responses to Immigrant Diversity in Germany.” *German Politics* 25(3): 366-380.

Schote, Joachim. 2017. *Orientierungskurs – Grundwissen Politik, Geschichte und Gesellschaft in Deutschland*. Berlin: Cornelsen.

Semin Suvarierol and Katherine (Kate) Kirk. 2015. "Dutch civic integration courses as neoliberal citizenship rituals." *Citizenship Studies* 19(3-4): 248-266.

Silverstein, Paul A. 2005. "Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 2005 34(1): 363-384.

Ulbricht, Christian. 2017. *Ein- und Ausgrenzungen von Migranten - Zur sozialen Konstruktion (un-) erwünschter Zuwanderung*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Valluvan, Sivamohan. 2018. "Racial entanglements and sociological confusions: Repudiating the rehabilitation of integration." *The British Journal of Sociology* 69(2): 436– 458.

Vertovec, Steven. 2007. "Super-diversity and its implications." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(6): 1024-1054.

Wallace Goodman, Sara and Matthew Wright. 2015. "Does Mandatory Integration Matter? Effects of Civic Requirements on Immigrant Socio-economic and Political Outcomes." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(12): 1885-1908.

Williams, Daniel.2018. "Suspect Outsiders or Prospective Citizens? Constructing the Immigrant/German Boundary in Germany's Integration Courses." *Social Sciences*, MDPI, Open Access Journal, 7(4): 1-15. Retrieved from: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/7/4/61 [Accessed: 15.06.2020].

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 2006. "Belonging and the politics of belonging." *Patterns of Prejudice* 40(3): 197-214.

Yuval-Davis, Nira, Georgie Wemyss, and Kathryn Cassidy. 2017. "Introduction to the special issue: racialized bordering discourses on European Roma." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40(7): 1047-1057.

Zolberg, Aristine R., and Litt Long Woon. 1999. "Why Islam Is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States." *Politics and Society* 27(1): 5–38.