

# **Why did legitimacy crisis occur in Hong Kong but not in Macao?**

By

Roko Koštan

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Inna Melnykovska

Budapest, Hungary

2020

## Abstract

After the handover of former colonies, Macao Special Administrative region of China, and Hong Kong Special Administrative region of China, exhibited different outcomes in terms of legitimacy crisis. This research aims to answer why the legitimacy crisis occurred in Hong Kong but not in Macao. As both SARs exhibit similarities with regards to colonial history, institutional arrangements and are in close proximity, Mill's method of difference and most similar case design is applied in this research. Aim of this method is to establish a causal effect of the independent variables on the outcome. Legitimacy crisis is defined in a comprehensive way that includes popularity of the incumbent, diffuse and specific support. Special emphasis is put on the mass protests that frequently occurred in Hong Kong but not in Macao which was completely exempt from it. Explanatory research design is used in this research to look at the legitimacy crisis from three streams of scholarship. Findings show that the more state capacity the regime has, the more it is successful in the management of the crisis or it is possible to avoid it. The smarter the tactics of the united opposition, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid the legitimacy crisis. Finally, the more profound emancipative and post-materialistic values, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid legitimacy crisis without accommodating those beliefs. Empirical evidence related to linkage was inconclusive and hypothesis was not confirmed.

Keywords: Macao, SAR China, Hong Kong, SAR China, legitimacy crisis, "One country, two systems", hybrid regime, mass protests, civic unrest, universal suffrage, repression

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Inna Melnykovska for her exquisite help and mentorship throughout the process of writing the thesis. I am grateful to my family and friends for their support.

## Table of Contents

<b>1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>2 Theoretical Framework</b> .....	<b>4</b>
2.1 Incumbent- capacities and institutions .....	4
2.2 Opposition- agency based explanation .....	13
2.3 People- human development and emancipative values.....	19
<b>3 Research design</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.1 Variables, hypotheses and measurement</b> .....	<b>21</b>
3.1.1 Dependent variable .....	21
3.1.2 Incumbent- capacities and institutions .....	23
3.1.2.1 Capacity .....	24
3.1.2.2 Linkage .....	26
3.1.3 Smart tactics of the opposition .....	27
3.1.4 People- human development and emancipative values .....	28
<b>3.2 Method</b> .....	<b>29</b>
<b>3.3 Justification of cases</b> .....	<b>29</b>
<b>3.4 Time Frame</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>4 Empirical analysis</b> .....	<b>31</b>
<b>4.1 Dependent variable – Legitimacy crisis</b> .....	<b>31</b>
4.1.1 Popularity of the Chief Executive .....	31
4.1.2 Specific support .....	34
4.1.2.1 Gross domestic product .....	34
4.1.2.2 Human development index .....	36
4.1.3 Diffuse support – confidence, trust, protests .....	37
4.1.3.1 Confidence .....	37
4.1.3.2 Trust .....	40
4.1.3.3 Protests .....	43
<b>4.2 State capacity and Linkage</b> .....	<b>47</b>
4.2.1 Capacity .....	47
4.2.1.1 Legitimation .....	47
4.2.1.2 Repression .....	48
4.2.2 Linkage .....	53
<b>4.3 Smart tactics of the opposition H3</b> .....	<b>60</b>
4.3.1 Decentralized leadership .....	62
4.3.2 Mass mobilization of different societal groups .....	63
4.3.3. Coordination of protests .....	63
4.3.4 Communication with the population and the media .....	64
<b>4.4 People- human development and emancipative values</b> .....	<b>65</b>
4.4.1 Identity .....	67
4.2.2 Values .....	70
<b>5 Discussion of findings</b> .....	<b>73</b>
<b>5.1 Findings related to dependent variable</b> .....	<b>73</b>

5.2 Findings related to independent variables .....	74
<b>6 Conclusion .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>7 Literature.....</b>	<b>79</b>

## List of Figures

Figure 1 Support for the Macao, SAR China Chief Executive .....	32
Figure 2 Support for the Hong Kong, SAR China Chief Executive.....	33
Figure 3 Average support for the Chief Executive.....	34
Figure 4 GDP per capita (current US\$).....	35
Figure 5 Human development index .....	36
Figure 6 People’s confidence in “One country, two systems” Macao, SAR China .....	38
Figure 7 People’s confidence in “One country, two systems” Hong Kong, SAR China .....	39
Figure 8 People’s confidence in “One country, two systems” net value .....	39
Figure 9 People’s confidence in “One country, two systems” average net value .....	40
Figure 10 People’s trust in the MSAR government collapsed data.....	41
Figure 11 People’s trust in the HKSAR government collapsed data.....	42
Figure 12 People’s trust in the SAR government net value .....	42
Figure 13 Peoples trust in the SARs government average net value after the handover .....	43
Figure 14 Macao, SAR China – Imports.....	54
Figure 15 Macao, SAR China – Exports.....	55
Figure 16 Macao – Total Exports and Imports 1999-2018 West, Mainland China.....	56
Figure 17 Macao – Total Exports and Imports 1999-2018 West+6, Mainland China .....	57
Figure 18 Hong Kong SAR, China – Imports .....	58
Figure 19 Hong Kong, SAR China Exports .....	58
Figure 20 Hong Kong – Total Exports and Imports 1997-2019 West, Mainland China.....	59
Figure 21 Hong Kong – Total Exports and Imports 1997-2019 West+6, Mainland China.....	59
Figure 23 People’s ethnic identity Macao, SAR China.....	69
Figure 24 People’s ethnic identity Hong Kong, SAR China.....	69
Figure 25 HKU POP – What kind of society would you most like Macao to become?.....	71
Figure 26 HKU POP – What kind of society would you most like Hong Kong to become? .....	72

## List of Tables

Table 1 Protests Macao, SAR China .....	43
Table 2 Protests Hong Kong SAR, China .....	43
Table 3 Evolution of slogans.....	45
Table 4 Identification with the slogans .....	45
Table 5 HKU POP – People’s ethnic identity .....	68
Table 6 HKU POP – What kind of Society would you most like Macau to become .....	70
Table 7 HKU POP – What kind of society would you most like Hong Kong to become? .....	71
Table 8 Legitimacy crisis summary .....	74
Table 9 Summary of findings.....	75
Table 10 Summary of hypotheses .....	76

# 1 Introduction

After the handover of former colonies, Special Administrative Regions Macao and Hong Kong were promised to enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the Mainland China under the “One country, two systems”. A constitutional principle was set to allow both SARs self-rule for fifty years which is supposed to last until 2049 in the case of Macao and 2047 in the case of Hong Kong. General hope was that these two SARs would further democratize but the opposite trend of further autocratization is visible. Two SARs received same treatment in the form of institutional arrangements that are defined in the regions “mini-constitutions” called the Basic Law which are almost identical with some difference with regards to introduction of universal suffrage.

Therefore, it is interesting to answer why Hong Kong is facing mass protests since 2003 while Macao does not exhibit similar public unrests. Two kinds of large-scale protests can be identified in Hong Kong, annual protests that occur every year to commemorate the victims of the Tiananmen Square Incident and pro-democracy 1 July and New Year marches. The second kind are protests that happen as a response to Government actions. Most important being National Security reform in 2003, protests against "Moral and national education" in 2012, Occupy central/Umbrella Movement in 2014, and anti-ELAB movement as a protest against the proposed extradition bill. Contrary to that, Macao never showed signs of such a large-scale protest. The biggest protest was policy specific and it covered the topic of better protection of labor rights but never questioned the regime itself demanding democratization or revolution. This research claims that upon closer inspection mass protests are just one of the components



of what is perceived to be a crisis of legitimacy. Hence, this research will try to answer why legitimacy crisis is occurring in Hong Kong but not in Macao. As both SARs exhibit similarities with regards to colonial history, institutional treatment and are in close proximity, Mill's method of difference and the most similar case design is applied.

In this research I will use innovative exploratory research design that will test the hypotheses through three streams of scholarship. Researchers of instability and regime change often put emphasis on only one kind of theory thus prescribing and drawing conclusion without necessarily looking at other explanations. Instability which I identify with legitimacy crisis can also happen even when the regimes survive and do not change. This research contributes to the existing literature because it will explore the legitimacy crisis from different theories at the same time which is usually not the case. From the viewpoint of the incumbent's capacities and institutional arrangements, from the agency-based explanation which sees opposition and their tactics as detrimental in defining the outcome, and from the theory of human development which in center of its explanation has emancipative values. Limitation of this approach is that this research is broad in scope but there are limitations in terms of depth due to several explanations I am trying to test for. Hence, future research should deal with each of the streams in more detail.

The value of this research is both of academic and policy forming nature. By using the theories that are usually applied to Color Revolutions, design of this research has external validity because it is relevant for the application in other instances that are dealing with democratization, hybrid regimes and autocratization. With the growing importance of China, both in economic and geo-political terms, it is indicative that the Central Government is pursuing more aggressive

foreign policy. “One country, two systems” was originally designed to serve as an example of successful model which would allow for reunification with Taiwan. Hence, these two cases might show in which direction would situation develop if “One country, two systems” were ever applied in the case of Taiwan.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

This literature review will cover the streams of literature that look at instability from the perspective of incumbent, the opposition and the people. Doing so will allow for forming competing hypothesis and to empirically test them.

### 2.1 Incumbent- capacities and institutions

Instability of the regime or in my case what I call the crisis of legitimacy can be understood as a failure of the incumbent to tie other ruling elite, extend his formal and informal powers and ensure state capacity necessary to withstand protests or even crush them. Different authors provide complementary explanations why some autocrats survive while others do not. In this section I will mention most important factors and what authors saw as causal mechanisms for the incumbents to stay in power. One stream of authors such as Hale (2005), Way (2008), Levitsky and Way (2020), Gerschewski (2013) interpret the instances of protests as the failure of authoritarian incumbent to ensure the survival of the regime. All of these authors are interested in long-term structural explanations.

The object of their analysis are institutions, both the formal ones, such as the in the case of formal terms limits on the incumbent (Hale), and those which are seen as behavioral patterns which are in fact compliance procedures (Gerschewski 2013). Hale centers his explanation around institutions which he calls *patronal presidentialism* and which shape elite expectations about the future which can make the incumbent vulnerable to removal, "a lame duck syndrome".

A cyclical approach around the hybridity is advocated by H. Hale (2005) in contrast to the approach which sees these regimes as trajectory towards democracy or autocracy. Countries are not necessarily going towards a democracy or autocracy, but they are orbiting around the category of hybrid regimes with features both found in democracies and autocracies, periodically exhibiting more democratic and in other times authoritarian characteristics. It is about "specific institutional features" (Hale, 2005: 134) of hybrid regimes and how elites interact with each other. Hale backs his claims through the concept of patronal presidentialism. Institutions revolved around patronal presidentialism include elites' expectations about the incumbent and his ability to stay in power. Hale (2006) claims that in the moment the president is perceived as a lame duck whose departure is imminent the business elites try to hedge themselves by supporting the rivals.

Hale says that protests are connected to the cyclical process of elite contestation and consolidation as to whether they expect the incumbent to leave the office. In the case of Hong Kong and Macao, Chief Executives can serve for a maximum of two terms of five years. Presidents that are limited with institutional boundaries such as term limits, public opinion that is not in incumbents favor and international pressure can all make the incumbent a "lame duck" which make it more probable for the regime to change. Hale looks at the degree of political participation which is measured by the level of input in political outcomes and contestation which refers to the balance of power and the intensity of their interactions (Hale, 2005: 136). According to Hale elites are primarily motivated to secure or improve their positions. Patronal presidentialism is characterized by the institution of directly elected president with large formal powers *vis a vi* other state institutions and informal power through patron-client relations in which the president has influence on distribution of state resources and influence on the

economy. Incumbent's powers are thus not only formal ones but also extend in a way that he holds the ability to transfer resources to a network of elites which in turn support him in exchange for him to stay in power. This allows him to indirectly punish those who are not his allies by not giving them business deals or co-opt others. Incumbent and the elite are dependent on each other. However, relation is asymmetrical in the patron-client relationship as elites face collective action problem if they wish to act against the incumbent. However, the potential bargaining power changes "near the potential points of presidential power transfer" (Hale, 2005: 139). Elite contestation can happen in form of support to mass rallies, popular appeal or even mass media in cases where elite hold significant resources. When elites for reasonable expectations on who is going to win, they once again enter the patron-client relation where they support him regardless of the nature of the new leader. Finally, presidentialism in the context of hybrid regimes can be at least partially explained through fairly predictable regime cycles which are the consequence of a specific institutional framework (Hale, 2005: 160).

Way (2008) also identifies institutional arrangement as important explanation but adds western linkage as important for the regime change. He also adds specific conditions and institutional arrangements, such as term limits, that should be able to *a priori* determine autocratic stability. The author expands the approach beyond the *patronal presidentialism* and lame duck syndrome. He identifies two key points for authoritarian stability. The less the country is connected to the West through economic, political and social ties, the less obstacles for authoritarian consolidation exists (2005:60). Second point which is in the center of explanation for cases with low linkage to the west is the state capacity. State and party capacity are what allows the incumbent to retain "the loyalty of allies and to defuse, coopt, or crush protest." (2008: 62). The capacity is claimed to be possibly determined *a priori* " by the presence of a

single, highly institutionalized ruling party; an extensive and well-funded coercive apparatus that has won a major violent conflict; or state discretionary control over the economy" (2008: 62).

The incumbent's ability to survive the instability is linked to the capacity to form a single party with "a highly salient ideology, a history of violent struggle, or a long track record of electoral success". (Way, 2008: 63). Another important feature is the ability to use coercive apparatus against the opposition. Apparatus emerged from violent and large-scale conflicts is said to be the most effective (Way, 2008: 63) Finally, control of the natural resources and wealth in the society by the autocrat are of high importance because the incumbent can decide not to fund or do business with anyone who is in the opposition or wishes to support the opposition.

If western linkage and leverage have lost its significance Levitsky and Way (2020) are posing question why only five out of thirty-five countries identified as competitive authoritarian in 1990-1995, developed into full scale authoritarianism by 2019, while fifteen became democratic and fifteen remained competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2020: 56). Reasons for robustness were found to be the following. Although actors that were perceived as the "international community" - the USA and the EU have weakened they still remain the most influential global players in the world. US military spending outmatches any other country and the fact that nine out of ten world's largest economies are democracies show that liberal democracies are still the strongest regimes. "Unlike in previous periods in history, moreover, no legitimate alternative model has emerged to challenge liberal democracy in the early twenty-first century." (Levitsky & Way, 2020: 56). It is interesting to apply this in the case of Hong Kong and Macao because another process might exist as well. If western linkage

is important, and empirical data suggests so, then being part of such a strong authoritarian country, which has a sovereign authority to interpret the Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macao can act as a pull effect in authoritarian direction. Influence from economic ties to the West and China would have balanced each other, but institutional factor, that of both SARs being *de jure* and *de facto* territory, of PRC has even larger influence on the regime and its survival in both SARs.

As in their previous articles, Levitsky and Way argue that the reason why so many countries did not develop into fully fledged authoritarian regimes then must lie in the lack of capacity by the autocrats to eliminate their opponents and consolidate their rule. They themselves are vulnerable in the situations when the state is weak, and the coercive apparatus is underpaid and badly managed. In such weak states (such as Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and Madagascar in 2002 and 2009), autocrats are susceptible of being overthrown easily even when the number of people participating in protests or riots are not big. In cases where there was a military coup such as in Honduras in 2009, fair elections were restored just a year after, albeit the regime later on turned into competitive authoritarianism. It seems like even in those countries where citizens are not too fond of democracy, they still want to choose their leaders on elections or be able to remove bad governments. "Multiparty elections continue to be widely viewed as the most legitimate means of ascending to power." (Levitsky & Way, 2020: 57). Another factor which prevents countries to become full autocracies are weak parties which prevent incumbents from consolidating power and intra-party conflicts. Hence, state and party weakness results in what Levitsky and Way call pluralism by default.

Somewhat surprisingly, in contrast to top-down approach of leaders in weak countries where conditions for democracy were unfavorable, several new examples of competitive authoritarian regimes emerged in countries with stronger democratic institutions. In countries such as Hungary, the Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela different tactics were used by incumbents to generate mass support in order to further authoritarian agenda. Vast support was necessary to amend constitutions and electoral rules. Ethno-nationalistic discourses, anti-elite sentiments, populism and economic crisis were main topics used by the incumbents wishing to consolidate their rule, crush the opposition, civil society and independent media (Levitsky & Way, 2020:59-60).

So far Hale's (2005) and Way's (2008) explanation tackled color revolutions in the post-communist countries, and although I argue that their theoretical framework can be extrapolated for the case of Hong Kong and Macao as well, Gerschewski (2013) develops a theoretical framework which in start he claims to be applicable to all autocratic regimes. He wonders while some autocracies persist for a long time while others fail. Special feature of his approach is that he provides for methodological instructions on how to empirically measure each concept responsible for autocratic survival. According to Gerschewski (2013) there are three causal factors of autocratic regime stability. These are legitimation, repression and co-optation. Three pillars have their stabilizing effect within and between the pillars and they are sought to be valid for all autocracies. These causal processes which are crucial for the autocratic stability do not exist from the beginning but are being built over time. Through the process of exogenous reinforcement of the material resources and power of the regime, self-reinforcement process of path dependency and reciprocal reinforcement of complementarity between the pillars they hold the regime stable (Gerschewski, 2013: 14). These pillars are supposed to counteract the



potential sources for the regime breakdown which are the people who can protest and rebel, the opposition and finally, the powerful elites within the regime who are can deviate from the incumbent (Gerschewski, 2013: 18).

Gerschewski bases his explanation on neo-institutionalism and defines institutions as behavioral patterns which are in fact compliance procedures which regulate relationships between individuals. In case of successful autocracies that translates into citizens accepting the legitimation norm, opposition structurally being unable to rise, and other important actors being compliant with the current regime. Gerschewski argues that two processes of institutionalization occur. The exogenous one which is from outside the pillars and is in constant need of power and resources to sustain the pillars and which determine the level of institutionalization. If the regime fails to have enough resources to keep these processes going and different actors in control the "institutionalization process ends" (Gerschewski, 2013: 25). Another way of institutionalization is through mechanism of self-reinforcement through path-dependency in which every next decision and available alternatives were the result of previous choices. Self-reinforcement Gerschewski explains that empirically through: 1) High fixed or set-up costs - legitimation; 2) Learning and coordination effects and 3) The creation of adaptive expectations are connected with - co-optation and the 4) Network effects - repression. Two stable paths exist, an "over-politization configuration" and "de-politization configuration". First one relies on hard repression, diffuse support through ideology and co-optation through party structures. De-politization one is characterized by high performance with subtle forms of repression combined with subtle and low intensity repression through informal channels of patronage and clientelist networks (Gerschewski, 2013: 29).

It is argued that even autocracies need form of legitimation and it goes beyond the ideological indoctrination of people which has its limits "autocratic regimes are more performance-dependent than is often assumed" (Gerschewski, 2013: 19). Legitimation is explained through specific and diffuse support. Specific support is performance oriented and comes from regimes ability to secure internal order and social security (Gerschewski, 2005: 20). It is about fulfilling citizens demands through socio-economic development, in short, a support for something in return from the regime. It is measured through various economic indicators such as HDI, GDP, literacy or proxy indicators for public order such as riots, crime rate etc. Diffuse support is broader and can come from different forms of political ideologies such as "religious, nationalistic, or traditional claims, from the charisma of autocratic leaders as well as from external threats that lead to domestic rally-around-the-flag effects." (Gerschewski, 2005: 20). Such legitimation is harder to measure as the survey data is either non-existent or unreliable. Gerschewski proposes three ways to measure it. The more there are public protests the regime is less legitimate. However, it does not present those who support the regime and they also depend on initial ability to protest which in context of authoritarian regime means that the regime already has weakened. Another possibility is to measure it through qualitative assessments of country experts or secondary literature. Lastly, content analysis of the legitimacy claims can be used (Gerschewski, 2005: 20-21).

Repression is said to be the defining feature of autocracy; however, repression solely cannot account for regime stability as it is too costly and impossible to carry it on in long term. "Repression comes with unintended consequences and can weaken the legitimation function, which again brings repression mounting problems" (Gerschewski, 2005: 29). Gerschewski relies on Davenport's definition of repression in which it is defined as "actual or threatened use

of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, [...], for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities” (Gerschewski, 2013: 21). Moreover, in operationalization Gerschewski relies on Levitsky and Way's distinction of low and high repression. Low repression is measured by low intensity of coercion such as intimidation, surveillance, low level physical harassment, but also more subtle forms such as limiting someone from the job market or denying some group or individual of education opportunities or preventing them from assembling. It is said to be measured by CIRI's "New Empowerment Index". On the other hand, high coercion includes violent repression of demonstrations, campaign against parties, arrests, (attempted) murders and other. It is measured by CIRI's "Physical Rights Index".

Co-optation is the capacity to tie those who are strategically important whether as individuals or a group to the regime elite. Military and business elites which contest the incumbent within the regime need to be co-opted so they would not obstruct, use their power and act against the ruling elite. Its function is to maintain intra-elite cohesion and "maintain the balance between competing subordinate actors and to avoid a situation in which one actor grows too strong by simultaneously tying all relevant actors to the regime". (Gerschewski, 2013: 22) Co-optation can be achieved through formal channels via institutions such as parliament or elections or through informal channels of patronage and corruption. Formal channels can be operationalized through measuring the institutionalization while informal ones are harder to measure and usually rely in reports from experts.

## 2.2 Opposition- agency based explanation

In their research Bunce and Wolchik are trying to answer what is the reason behind the victory of the opposition in some competitive authoritarian regimes and failure in others "[...] regime vulnerability in the context of competitive authoritarian regimes does not by any means translate easily or usually into electoral victories of the opposition"(Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 73). They came up with two hypothesis, first explanation was centered around "structural influences" of the regime and opposition strength just before the elections, while second questioned the role of agency and the characteristics of the elections. In their analysis of eleven elections between 1998 and 2008 of competitive authoritarian regimes in post-communist countries Bunce and Wolchik found out that six resulted in the removal of incumbent authoritarian leaders while five managed to stay in power. From what were at the beginning comparable regimes countries diverged into much more democratic such as in Slovakia (1998), Croatia (2000), Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) while in Armenia (2003, 2008), Azerbaijan (2003, 2005) and Belarus (2006) incumbents remained in power.

They found out that structural differences and capacity play a role and have some explanatory power but unlike Way (2008) they claim that such factors lack deeper explanatory potential. Reason for that is empirical evidence which suggests that even weak regimes were capable of pertaining their rule despite the fact that they were faced with protests. What was important was the lack of alternative to the current regime which made it for the incumbent more likely to survive. Structural and institutional explanation examines the strength of the regime at beginning of the electoral season. Whether the regime is open to contestation trough rules of

electoral contestation and how capable it is to withstand that challenge "(Bunce & Wolchik, 2009:47-48). The more open the democratic procedures are already in place the less incumbent should have the capacity to influence the people, the opposition and civil society.

Economic performance also affects the capacity of the incumbent in a way that bad economic performance causes less support for the regime among the general public and it also makes it for the incumbent harder to maintain patronage networks. (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 49). In general, group with failed attempt of replacing the incumbent showed less variation in terms of economic performance which was in all cases stronger. On the other hand, group with successful removal of the incumbent showed large variation which means bad economic performance does not necessarily mean removal of the incumbent. (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009:56). In addition to that, they found out that regime context and its role was not that determinant as those countries which were successful in replacing the incumbent ranged from being relatively democratic to relatively authoritarian. Those which failed to do so, were all relatively authoritarian. They also challenge the idea of the inverse relationship between the regime repression and opposition strength. Both the successful list of countries and the failed ones used repression and violence while having rising authoritarianism before the elections (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 52-53). Institutionalization of the regime was also not the predictor whether the regime will survive. As shown in the article only some protests resulted in the opposition winning the elections. "This pattern reinforces our earlier findings that successful electoral challenges to authoritarian rule in the post-communist region have occurred in quite different political and economic contexts." (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 59).

Heading back to the agency-based explanation of elections and their characteristics Bunce and Wolchik found out the following. The reasons behind the victory of the opposition were the use of "sophisticated strategies" by the opposition and their allies, mainly the civil society. Beating the incumbent on the elections was less a matter of the regime to change a more about the capability of the opposition to win (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 46-47). One of the most important among electoral factors is the unity of the opposition in a manner of forming a political block or a coalition in order to gather votes. United opposition gives out impression that they are ready to win the elections and that peoples votes would not go to waste. It is also about the actual will of the opposition to go hard against the incumbent and to partner with civil society groups. In order to better their chances opposition should monitor elections, register voters, use public opinion polls to show that there is a chance to win, provide exit polls, do parallel vote tabulation and other (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 51).

They build on their inquiry on the literature which says that elections have served as key contributor to democratic progress; that in countries outside the West people perceive elections as a defining feature of democracy; that elections make protests more likely (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009: 49). This explanation looks at short-term periods which are seen as critical junctures. Hence, elections are seen as a window of opportunity for the opposition to remove the incumbent. During the elections it is very important whether the incumbent or a person who he chose as their successor have their name on the ballot. Such elections then serve as verdict for the regime. When incumbent is exiting politics because of the death, illness or formal reasons, it is more likely for the opposition to win. Holding fair elections also makes it more attractive for people to go out and cast their votes. Involvement of the international community also makes it more likely for the opposition to win.

One particular phenomenon in the focus of Tucker (2007) is the moment in which there is an electoral fraud in the national elections. Tucker is concerned with the relation between the elections and protests. Author forms the inquiry around the collective action problem explained by Schelling and Olson. In regular circumstances and day to day life it is unfeasible for the individual to take the risk, skip job and invest resources because the possibility to achieve the goal and remove the government are very slim. Hence, citizens are not likely to engage in protests. However, when the government commits a fraud individuals calculus changes as the possibility that the protest will occur increases and perceived costs are lowered. In particular Tucker explains why protests occur after fraudulent elections through collective action problem on the example of colored revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

All of the countries where colored revolutions occurred after major electoral fraud were also very corrupt countries which Tucker uses to support that people had significant grievances against the regime. Going back to his application of collective action framework on major electoral frauds. In regular circumstances collective action against the regime is highly unlikely and individuals' risks outweigh possible gains, especially if likelihood of success is shaped by past experiences of failed protests. "While the "costs" associated with combating an unrestrained state differ significantly across these examples, they all share the common feature of almost complete certainty that if there is punishment associated with defying the regime, it will be borne by the person doing the defying." (Tucker, 2007: 541). That is why elections can serve as focal points around which the cost of inaction is higher than usual. Time around the elections is also constrained so there is a brief window of opportunity. As the attention of both people in the country and international community shifts towards the regime and its actions, it is less likely that the regime will use violence against the protestor which makes it less risky for the

people to engage. Using violence against the protestors would hinder the legitimacy of the regime and probably ignite even more people.

On similar trace was McFaul (2005). He identifies four aspects in which revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine differed from democratic transitions or revolutions in other countries. Fraudulent elections served as the key moment for the regime change; challenges to the old regime used extraconstitutional means to defend already existing democratic constitution and, in all cases, both the incumbent and the challenger claimed to have sovereign authority and replacing the old regime occurred without mass violence (McFaul 2005: 6). The opposition insisted on peaceful and non-violent methods while the incumbent used forms of oppression but not large-scale coercion in the form of military or security apparatus.

McFaul used Mill's method of similarity in identifying a list of shared characteristics for Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, which must be present in order to claim that they are causal to the effect of protests and regime change. Seven independent variables that McFaul (2005:7) identified are the following:

- 1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2) an unpopular incumbent; 3) a united and organized opposition; 4) an ability quickly to drive home the point that voting results were falsified, 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote, 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, and 7) divisions among the regime's coercive forces

Conditions which were identified as non-detrimental for people going to protest in order to replace the incumbent are the condition of state economy. Although long term economic stagnation or recession can cause general discontent with the regime, no uniform causal connection was found. Correlation between higher economic development and middle class exists but as shown in the cases above, three countries differed. Western programs and linkage



were also does not show clear causal effect as Milosevic had much worse connection than Shevardnadze in Georgia. Splits within the regime elite happened couple of years ago in all cases, so in the moment of protests that was also not something that could be described as triggering event.

Beissinger (2007) also deals with the problem of collective action in the study of democratic revolutions in post-communist countries. He looks at the revolutions through the prism of modular political phenomena and modular action in which modular refers to the spread of collective action among different groups. Modular action in one done by the actors which used success of some other actors for example in different country as a model for their action. "There is indeed considerable cross-national statistical evidence, much of it coming from the international relations field that demonstrates that cross-case influence has played an important role in fostering democratization." (Beissinger 2007:260),

Modular democratic revolutions Beissinger explains with seven independent variables. Stolen elections as the triggering event for mass mobilizations, foreign support for democratic movement; radical youth movements and their unconventional tactics, united opposition, external diplomatic pressure and electoral monitoring, mass protests after the announcement of fraudulent electoral results. The cross-national linkage of NGOs and emulation of techniques of non-violent resistance such as in the case of Otpor and Georgian civil society activists which later created Georgian version called Kmara which means enough. Such organizations were backed by funds from international organizations such as Soros Foundation which donated them large sums of money.

There are several criticisms of this approach and how they describe events happening during the revolutions/protests. Unlike what Beissinger writes, Way (2008) claims that opposition heavily relied on violent means. Even though they were trained on non-violent resistance techniques, some of the violent youth groups set on fire the federal parliament building with the Molotov cocktails while " scores of police and military veterans organized into armed paramilitaries with the aim of taking over key government buildings"(Way, 2008: 58). Hence, violence "[...] was not simply incidental but rather considered a core element of opposition strategy. (Way, 2008: 58). In addition to that Way dismisses that the size of the protestors is a clear sign that the opposition will succeed as autocrats in some cases have been able to hold onto power despite mass demonstrations. Such cases include Armenia after presidential elections in 1996 and Serbia in 1996 and 1997 in the protests against Milošević.

### 2.3 People- human development and emancipative values

Another possibility is that whether the regime will face protests and public unrest depends on the people their social progress. Modernization theory concerns with how societal change occurs and how societies develop from traditional to modern ones. It identifies three processes involved that go together in somewhat expected trajectory. Socioeconomic development and industrialization, changes in values and political institutions. Socioeconomic development was the result of industrialization, people moving to cities, widespread education, better healthcare, technology and individual financial resources. That resulted in intensification of human activities and broadening of possible choices for people which strengthened their autonomy. This process of liberation from authority, especially one related to society and traditional

communal values is described as emancipative value change. Finally, modernization includes transformation of political institutions into democratic ones. Welzel et al. (2003) found human development to be a comprehensive combination of socioeconomic development, emancipative cultural values and level of democratization. They argue that it is not the preceding democratic traditions that cause emancipative values but that it is the other way around. Emancipative values, controlled for individual resources and democratic traditions, have positive impact in promoting effective democracy (Welzel et al., 2003: 366). It is the elite integrity and what they channel from people through legal and institutional sphere that impacts formal democracy. It is important to notice that elite behavior is highly shaped by the emancipative mass values of the society that produces "[...] 'proper' elites who act in ways that make formal democracy effective" (Welzel et al., 2003: 368). However, creating a formal democracy through formal institutions and constitutional format is not likely to produce effective democracy. Authors suggest that there is "a causal priority of individual resources and emancipative values over effective democracy" (Welzel et al., 2003: 371). Hence, in order to achieve a functioning democracy, it needs to be based in a society where people possess enough individual resources which in turn allows them to move from survival to emancipative values which then become regular behavior and norm in the society.

## 3 Research design

Explanatory research design is formulated in a way to test for the three streams of scholarships and hypothesis testing. In this research I take a deductive approach and derive hypothesis from the existing literature. Idea is to compare Hong Kong and Macao and to test why legitimacy crisis occurred in former but not the latter case. These three scholarships streams put emphasis on different actors and events which they see as determinant in posing challenge to the regime and potentially replacing the old regime. All of the streams explain the same phenomena, but they have different conceptualizations.

### 3.1 Variables, hypotheses and measurement

#### 3.1.1 Dependent variable

In this research I will take a comprehensive approach to dependent variable. Legitimacy crisis is often associated with the regime change, but legitimacy crisis can happen even if the regime does not break. Legitimacy is a result of legitimation process, Haldenwang (2016: 8) identifies four dimensions of how the success of legitimation can be measured. From the perspective of common-interest orientation of rulers, "revealed *attitudes and opinions* of individual and collective actors determine the range of *performance* responses on behalf of the political leaders or the 'government'." If to measure legitimacy one focuses on individuals and collective actors than legitimacy is described as successfully guiding behavior of the ruled by looking at their *behavior*, namely elections, protests and mobilization. If the focus is the government then for measuring legitimacy one needs to look at the *claims*, that is, access to law, political procedures,

civil right, symbols and other. These four dimensions are actually different conceptualizations of legitimacy.

Hence, for the purpose of legitimacy crisis in this research I argue that there needs to exist unpopular incumbent which causes negative attitudes and opinions among the population. Those negative attitudes reflect themselves in popularity of the incumbent. Crisis of legitimacy thus emerges when we observe unpopular incumbent who is ignoring societal demands, causes elite defections - in this case part of the population that are intelligentsia, which then serve as example or a triggering event - such as in the case of Occupy Central, for other people to join the protests. For the purpose of measurement, I rely on Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme surveys. Moreover, I assess behavior through the analysis of protests. Moreover, I will look whether there were any elite defections, who was leading and organizing the protests and if some prominent people were not involved in the regime but decided to join the opposition.

It is puzzling to answer why Hong Kong exhibited long history of public unrest after the handover while Macao did not. As both Hong Kong and Macao are not democracies with universal suffrage, in this research protests are taken as a proxy for legitimacy issues. "[...] public demonstrations and protests are usually considered a positive feature of open democracies, adding to their legitimacy, while they are typically regarded an indicator for legitimacy problems when occurring under persistent autocratic rule (Josua, 2016)" (Haldenwang, 2016). Besides looking at the protests I will qualitatively look at the slogans that were written on banners during demonstrations. I will show what topics were covered and what did the protestors demand.

### *Operationalization*

1) Popularity of the incumbent → HKU Public Opinion Programme; time series surveys on the support for the Chief Executive will offer insight whether there is unpopular incumbent

2) Specific support is more goal oriented → GDP, HDI are said to be adequate indicators

3) Diffuse support:

Confidence → Confidence in “One country two, systems”;

Trust → as trust in SARs government

Protests → type, demand, size, duration, year, slogans → what kind of slogans were used during protests, how they evolved and why, how many people identified with them

#### 3.1.2 Incumbent- capacities and institutions

In this section I will look at the instability and legitimacy crisis as the failure of the incumbent to consolidate its power. For that I will combine the approach of Way (2008) and Gerschewski (2013) because it most accurately provides for verifiable hypothesis in this particular context. I will try to add to Ways explanation by introducing another kind of linkage. Way (2008) claims that the less the country is connected to the West through social, political and economic ties there is less obstacles for the authoritarian ruler to consolidate its power while Levitsky and Way (2020) argue that Western linkage makes a difference why competitive authoritarian countries do not slide back into full authoritarianism. However, if Western linkage matters then another process, namely the linkage to the mainland China that is fully authoritarian country and sovereign over the two SARs, must matter as well. Hence, I will test not only for Western

linkage but also the linkage to the mainland China to see whether this influences balance each other or one of the two linkages is stronger and is pulling the SARs in one or other direction.

Capacity is defined as possibility to tie the ruling elites, or in my case business sector which always had very strong influence. That influence is not only informal one but formal one through the institution of participating in the election of Chief Executives and direct ties to the Central Government and mainland China. I will examine what are the SARs capacities to crush or withstand protest through coercive apparatus. I look into formal limitations to government such as term limit from Hale (2005) and look at other capacities as Gerschewski (2013) defined them. I will look how the regime legitimized its rule, how it co-opts the ruling elites and how it uses repression.

### 3.1.2.1 Capacity

*Hypothesis #1, independent variables and their operationalization.*

*The more state capacity regime possesses, the regime is more successful in the management of the legitimacy crisis or it is even possible to avoid it.*

*Operationalization*

State capacity will be operationalized through three causal factors which influence regime stability: legitimation, repression and co-optation.

## Legitimation

1) What steps did the government take to gain specific support, in particular what kind of social programs they introduced, what did the government claim to put emphasis on, what kind of benefits did they introduce for citizens; what did the government do to make their work more efficient and performance better

2) What was the process of establishing diffuse support among the population to change their attitudes and opinions, what did the government do to justify their rule and make people believe in righteousness of one country two systems, what other ideological efforts did it make

Repression → because there is no CIRI data for Hong Kong and Macao, I will rely on qualitative approach to repression analysis, this will include information available from the media, size of the SARs coercive apparatus; how many of the forces are under the direct control of the incumbent and whether they are fragmented; I will check for legal constraints, whether there exist institutions of public control; and finally, what is the relation between the recent National Security Law and repression

Co-optation→ what did the government do to co-opt business elites, opposition and/or other influential sectors



### 3.1.2.2 Linkage

#### *Hypothesis #2, IV#1 and its operationalization*

*The more the regime is connected to the mainland China, while still having large Western linkage, the more conflictive configuration becomes which leads to legitimacy crisis*

Explanation: After the period of handover both SARs are expected to have rising linkage to China. Such trend is expected to be pulling both SARs to autocratic direction. However, large linkage to the West is pulling the SARs into democratic direction. If linkage changes in one or other direction, the situation is expected to result in legitimacy crisis.

#### *Operationalization*

For the purpose of this research linkage will be measured only through economic component as operationalized in Appendix III (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 374-375). Levitsky and Way's operationalization of economic ties are "Measured by the extent of trade with the United States and 15 EU member countries (exports and imports over GDP) (log)<sup>3</sup> (1990– 2000)". I will replicate that design by taking Western linkage as European Union plus United States. But I want to test also for extended version of "the west" by adding six other consolidated democracies. Each of them is either in close proximity to the region and can be seen as allies of the West and have had large US influence or are generally seen as US allies. Those are Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Canada, New Zealand and Canada. Linkage to China will be operationalized the same way. Macao and Hong Kong will be tested for economic ties to China through imports, exports and total trade for the period after the handover.

### 3.1.3 Smart tactics of the opposition

Both Tucker (2007) and Beissinger (2007) deal with the problem of collective action problem of those who are opposing the regime for which elections and moments prior to election serve as solution. However, because there is no universal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong and Macao, other events can serve as focal points and incentives for the collective action of protests. Other events can serve as solution for collective action problems. Such focal points can be epidemics- such as in the case of SARS breakout in 2003, National Security reform in 2003, protests against "Moral and national education" in 2012, Occupy central/Umbrella Movement in 2014 for introduction of universal suffrage in 2017 and anti-ELAB movement as protest against proposed extradition bill.

*Hypothesis #3, independent variables and their operationalization*

*The smarter the tactics of the united opposition, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid the legitimacy crisis*

Attributes of smart tactics:

- 1) Decentralized leadership*
- 2) Mass mobilization of different societal groups*
- 3) Coordination of protests*
- 4) Communication with the population and the media*

### 3.1.4 People- human development and emancipative values

Hong Kong is claimed to have much larger "sociocultural distinctiveness" with the rule of law and British traditions firmly set in the city's identity, while at the same time such self-perceived uniqueness lacked in Macao which always had stronger Chinese identity than the local one (Chan & Lo, 2010:40).

*Hypothesis #4, independent variables and their operationalization*

*The more profound emancipative and post-materialistic values, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid legitimacy crisis without accommodating those beliefs*

*Operationalization*

*Emancipative values are connected with more developed societies, while China is characterized for its low emancipative values. People's high identification with the Chinese ethnicity would indicate less emancipative values, while low identification would mean more profound emancipative values.*

*HKU POP survey → peoples ethnic identity*

*The more people want to become a free society the more profound are emancipative values, the less people want to become a free society the less they exhibit emancipative values*

*HKU POP survey → what kind of society would you like to become*

### 3.2 Method

In line with (Przeworski and Teune 1970) the most similar case design will be implemented as “cases must express strong differences with respect to the main independent variable of interest, and they must be as similar as possible with regard to variables associated with other potential explanations” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012: 25). In this research I decided for a small-n study. Namely, I will look into two cases which show similarities with regards to colonial history, and institutional treatment, but differ in the effect. This case study is interested in the causes of effects. Aim of this method is to establish a causal effect of the independent variables on the outcome. Cases are selected because they are similar in respect to certain independent variables that are causal to the effect but exhibit other independent variables that are different. Hence the purpose is to see which independent variables are responsible for the dependent variable change.

### 3.3 Justification of cases

Two former colonies, Macao and Hong Kong, are selected according to the method of difference. They demonstrate the meaningful similarities in terms of cultural background, colonial rule, handover to China, but exhibit different outcomes in terms of dependent variable, protests, after the handover. Despite these similarities, these countries demonstrate differences as regards the values of the independent variables. The hypotheses will be tested for the period of 1997-2020, which is the period after the handover. Hong Kong has been facing strong public unrest and mass protests in the years following the handover to China. Macau on the other hand, went through similar path as Hong Kong, but is somehow completely exempt from civic

unrest. The same policy of “One country, two systems” was implemented in both cases. It is especially puzzling to answer why there are different outcomes in terms of legitimacy in SARs after the handover.

### 3.4 Time Frame

The hypotheses will be broadly tested for the period of 1997-2020, which is the period after the handover. The sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao was transferred to China in July 1997 and December 1999 respectively. Although Macao transferred two years later than Hong Kong, appointed officials started engaging in local Macao affairs even before the official handover. Thus, when available and if relevant, data will be shown for the period preceding the handover of the colonies. This research will approach public unrests that were happening in Hong Kong on several occasions after the handover to China in 1997. Biggest protests were those against National security reform in 2003; Protests against “Moral and National Education”; the Umbrella movement in 2014; a rally for Hong Kong independence in 2016; Anti-ELAB movements in 2019-20; and annual Tiananmen vigils (Gunia, 2019). For the purpose of this research emphasis will be on the Umbrella movement and Anti-ELAB protests, also known as the Water Revolution.

## 4 Empirical analysis


### 4.1 Dependent variable – Legitimacy crisis

#### 4.1.1 Popularity of the Chief Executive

Surveys conducted for Macao are usually done once a year, in December, while those for Hong Kong are done multiple times a year and are combined into half-yearly average. For the purpose of showing most recent data for Hong Kong, presented data is always for the first half of the year. Calculating yearly average would be more precise but would not yield significant change in the results. In the case of popularity of the Chief Executives, data is shown for the incumbent and not the newly elected Chief Executive for the years where there is change in the government. Half -yearly data for Hong Kong 2020 was manually calculated from 12 surveys.


As visible in Figure 1, throughout the period after the handover support for the Chief Executive in Macao was higher than 50% with the exception in 2017 when it was just below that threshold at 49,5% which is within the margin of the standard error of the survey. Average support for the Chief Executive for the total period after the handover was 61,58% (Figure 3). Hong Kong Chief Executive on the other side enjoyed less support with an average support after the handover standing at 50,6% (Figure 3). Data showed that in 11 out of 24 years of measurement support for the Chief Executive was below 50% (Figure 2). It reached its lowest in 2020 when it stood at 24,3% for the Chief Executive Carrie Lam.

Figure 1 Support for the Macao, SAR China Chief Executive



<sup>1</sup> HKU POP "Please use a scale of 0-100 to rate your extent of support to the Chief Executive, with 0 indicating absolutely not supportive, 100 indicating absolutely supportive and 50 indicating half-half."


Figure 2 Support for the Hong Kong, SAR China Chief Executive



<sup>2</sup> HKU POP "Please use a scale of 0-100 to rate your extent of support to the Chief Executive, with 0 indicating absolutely not supportive, 100 indicating absolutely supportive and 50 indicating half-half."



Figure 3 Average support for the Chief Executive




#### 4.1.2 Specific support

##### 4.1.2.1 Gross domestic product

In measuring specific support, I refer to GDP per capita and HDI of both SARs. As cited in Biegoń, D. (2017: 24) “[...] specific support is short-lived and dependent on concrete outputs and the beneficial performance of a political system. (Easton 1975: 444).” When comparing GDP and HDI I decided to add Singapore as a control to case which did not receive the treatment of “One country, two systems” policy but is comparable to Hong Kong in terms of land size, population, British colonial rule, self-governance etc. By adding Singapore, I can compare in relative terms how much each of the two SARs improved under the “One country, two systems” policy and whether both SARs advanced equally. This is important because it is

not just about the objective well-being of each individual but about how each individual perceives they are well off because of current institutional arrangement or by being member of a specific country, in this case being part of People’s Republic of China and not a sovereign country like Singapore. Data from the World Bank (Figure 4) shows that Hong Kong had higher GDP per capita in the initial years before and after the handover. Its citizens were richer than those of Macao and Singapore. In the years after, Singapore and then Macao surpassed Hong Kong which fell into last spot. In the period from 1997 to 2018 Macao’s GDP per capita rose 385%, while Hong Kong’s GDP per capita grew for 78%. In conclusion, Hong Kong citizens became less well of than those of Macao and Singapore by a large margin. Hence, taking this GDP per capita as indicator it can be said that the both regimes delivered in terms of improving the wealth of the people in absolute terms, thus satisfying the specific support requirement, but Macao and Singapore had higher growths.


Figure 4 GDP per capita in (current US\$)



4.1.2.2 Human development index

Because United Nations do not calculate HDI for Macao, I refer to data by Government of Macao Special Administrative Region Statistics and Census data. Data is measured from 2002 in the form of Life Expectancy Index (LEI), Education Index (EI) and Income Index (II). HDI is the geometric mean of the three-dimension indices. Hence, I calculate HDI according to formula  $HDI = \sqrt[3]{LEI \cdot EI \cdot II}$ . First, I multiply the three sub-indices together and then take the cube root of the product. Data for Hong Kong and Singapore was taken from United Nations Human Development Reports. Both SARs improved their HDI (Figure 5) which means their citizens enjoy higher per capita income, they live longer, and they get better education then they did before the handover.

Figure 5 Human development index



#### 4.1.3 Diffuse support – confidence, trust, protests


Diffuse support is more stable than specific support, it is harder to measure and “It consists of a 'reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants“ (Easton 1975 :444). For measuring diffuse support, I refer to HKU POP and PORI survey data regarding “People’s confidence in One country, two systems” and “Peoples trust in SARs government”. According to Gerschewski “[...] the number and intensity of public protests can be taken as a proxy-indicator for societal discontent” (2013: 20) so I look at the protests and slogans that were used during the demonstrations.

##### 4.1.3.1 Confidence

Data suggests clear difference between the two SARs for the period after the handover. Macao citizens have confidence in “One country, two systems” as net value between those who have and those who do not have confidence never fell under 50% (Figure 8), with an average of 68,85% (Figure 9) for the period after the handover. Hong Kong people seem to have much lower confidence in “One country, two systems” as aggregated net value for the period after the handover stands at 22,95% (Figure 9) and it reached its lowest in 2019 when it stood at minus 14% (Figure 8) which means there were more people who did not believe in the system than those who did. If we look at the year 2003 in Figure 8 and Figure 12, which was a year of the SARS outbreak, it is interesting to notice that confidence in the system proved to be more resilient than trust in government. That indicates that people might lose trust in their

government, but not necessarily the system itself. However, repetitive loss of trust in government is followed by the loss of confidence in the system.

Figure 6 People's confidence in "One country, two systems" Macao, SAR China



3

<sup>3</sup> People were asked "On the whole, do you have confidence in "One Country, Two Systems"?"

Figure 7 People's confidence in "One country, two systems" Hong Kong, SAR China






Figure 8 People's confidence in "One country, two systems" net value



CEU eTD Collection

Figure 9 People's confidence in "One country, two systems" average net value



#### 4.1.3.2 Trust

Macao and Hong Kong were promised “high degree of autonomy” which was explained in detail in their respective Basic Laws. However, Macao Basic Law and Hong Kong basic law have few important differences. HK basic law presupposed eventual universal suffrage both for the role of the Chief Executive and the legislature “[...] in Hong Kong it is that the ultimate aim is the election of the Chief Executive by universal upon nomination by a broadly representative body (art. 45(2)). There is no such vision in Macau.” (Ghai, 2000:191). Such privilege was not given to Macao as the Portuguese had much lower bargaining power than the British and were much more willing to transfer Macao’s sovereignty back to China. “In respect of Macau, China avoided committing itself to a legislature “constituted by elections” as in Hong Kong (Annex

I, section I of the Declaration; art. 68, BL), [...] nor is there any statement as in Hong Kong that the ultimate goal is election of all members by universal franchise.” (Ghai, 2000:191). That is why not implementing universal suffrage is highly disputed topic in Hong Kong and it is seen as a breach of trust between the Central Government and the people of Hong Kong, but also between the HKSAR government and the people of Hong Kong in cases when the government is trying to introduce laws which would hinder regions autonomy and promised freedoms.

Figure 10 People’s trust in the MSAR government collapsed data






Figure 11 People's trust in the HKSAR government collapsed data






Figure 12 People's trust in the SAR government net value



CEU eTD Collection

Figure 13 Peoples trust in the SARs government average net value after the handover



#### 4.1.3.3 Protests

Table 1 Protests Macao, SAR China

Macao, SAR China						
Known as	Type of protests	Demands	Size*	Duration	Year	
<b>Macau labor protest</b>	Policy change	Better labor protection	5-10,000	<1 day	2007	

Table 2 Protests Hong Kong SAR, China

Hong Kong SAR China					
Known as	Type of protests	Demands	Size*	Duration	Year
<b>Hong Kong New Year Marches</b>	Regime change (democratization)	Universal suffrage	10 000 – 1 000 000	1 day	annual
<b>Hong Kong 1<sup>st</sup> of July marches (day of the handover)</b>	Regime change (democratization)	democracy, universal suffrage, rights of minorities, protection of freedom of speech	10 000- 550 000	1 day	annual

<b>Memorials for the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests</b>	Regime change (democratization) Commemorating the victims on 1 4 <sup>th</sup> of June	Democracy, mourning the killed	12 000 – 200 000	1 day	annual
<b>December 2005 Protest for democracy in Hong Kong</b>	Regime change (democratization)	Democracy	63 000 – 250 000	1 day	2005
<b>Marche for Universal Suffrage</b>	Regime change (democratization)	Universal suffrage	3000	1 day	2010
<b>Protests against Moral and National Education</b>	Protests against indoctrination	Make government pull back its plans of Moral and National Education	36 000 – 120 000	9 days occupation	2012
<b>Umbrella Movement</b>	Regime change (democratization)	More transparent elections and universal suffrage; rescission of the NPCSC decision	80 000 – 100 000	79 days	2014
<b>Mong Kok civil unrest/ Fishball Revolution</b>	Bad relationship between the police and the public	Allow street vendors to sell food and goods	300	2 days	2016
<b>2019–20 Hong Kong protests Anti-ELAB/ Water revolution</b>	Regime change (democratization)	Five demands: 1) Full withdrawal of the extradition bill 2) Retraction of the characterization of the 12 June 2019 protests as “riots” 3) Release and exoneration of arrested protesters 4) Establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into police behavior 5) Universal suffrage for the Legislative Council and the chief executive elections	up to 1.7 million	1 year 4+ months	2019- 2020 (ongoing)

\* there is no single credible source to establish size of the protests, official police reports differ from organizers reports which also differ from scientific estimations; which differ from media to media outlet, numbers presented in the table contain lowest estimations and highest estimations and should be only taken as approximation

## Slogans

As identified in Dapiran (2020:58-59)

Table 3 Evolution of slogans

Time dimension	Reason	Evolution of slogans
early stages	identity-centric nature of the movement	Hong Kongers, add oil!’ 香港人加油
4 October 2019	After Chief Executive Lam used emergency powers to implement a ban on face masks	‘Hong Kongers, resist!’ 香港人反抗
8 November 2019	following the death of a young student protester who fell trying to evade police	‘Hong Kongers, revenge!’ 香港人報仇

As the situation in Hong Kong was getting worse, the slogans developed and got more violent (Table 3). With regards to slogans in Table 4, “No rioters, only tyranny” refers to Chief Executive characterization of protest as riots. HK Police consciously violating the law refers their excessive use of force in contrast to international standards. No snitching, no severing of ties, refers to the need to maintain group cohesion.

Identification with the slogans as shown in “Table 2. Perceived representativeness of movement slogans” (Lee, 2020: 26).

Table 4 Identification with the slogans

	Date of protest onsite survey				
	4/08/2019	10/08/2019	11/08/2019	13/08/2019	16/08/2019
<b>No rioters, only tyranny</b>	92,1	92,2	89,3	91,8	88,8
<b>HK police consciously violating the law</b>	90,4	87,4	85,4	90,9	86,4

<b>No snitching, no severing of ties</b>	65,3	70,0	70,7	69,1	82,0
<b>Brothers climbing mountains, each offering one's own effort</b>	65,4	67,3	69,7	60,8	78,8
<b>Going up and down together</b>	75,1	74,8	79,3	73,8	78,0
<b>Liberate HK, revolution of our times</b>	69,1	67,0	66,4	73,6	81,5
<b>HK people, add oil</b>	78,4	77,0	73,8	70,7	63,8
<b>I want genuine universal suffrage</b>	51,3	50,7	56,9	45,8	51,3
<b>N</b>	1272	2309	412	485	632 <sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Note: Entries are percentages indicating the slogan as “quite representative” or “very representative” in a five-point scale

## 4.2 State capacity and Linkage

### 4.2.1 Capacity

#### H1

*The more state capacity regime possesses, the regime is more successful in the management of the legitimacy crisis or it is even possible to avoid it.*

#### 4.2.1.1 Legitimation

Specific support is performance-oriented, so the regime has to secure citizen's needs for social and other security. Because of Macao's budget surplus and income generated from the gambling industry, in order to gain specific support, the Macao government introduced Wealth Partaking Scheme since 2008. It is an annual state bonus under which Macao residents are entitled to receive an annual unconditional basic income. For example, for the year 2017 permanent residents were entitled to 1,128USD while non-permanent residents were entitled to 672 USD ((DSF), Wealth Partaking Scheme, 2019). Amidst the COVID-19 outbreak, the government announced benefits for its citizens in the form of vouchers that can be used for catering, retail, or groceries. (Scher, 2020) All of this suggests the government often spends money to boost the local economy and ensure citizen's support. The government's efforts to fight corruption are supported by Macau's Commission Against Corruption. In 2020 the Hong Kong Government decided to offer similar benefits to their permanent resident by introducing cash handouts in the amount of 1290 USD. Handouts are officially given to boost the economy and help people; however, such policies can be described as calculated moves to gain legitimation. "It is a positive sign when HongKongers shift their focus to spending.

Consumerism no doubt has a certain power to heal individuals and society, if not the world.” (Tam, 2020).

The process of establishing diffuse support is more difficult and can stem from political ideologies. The government of Macao does not seem to have problems when it comes to diffuse support among the citizens as people of Macao were never too fond of the Portuguese and looked much more positively on the handover than the people in Hong Kong. Because of that Macao does not need to implement national education as people are said to love Macao but also “one country” (Ho, 2012). In Hong Kong situation is different, as there are many world-class universities, and education is based on liberal ideology. That is why the HKSAR Government tried to introduce Moral and National Education in 2012 so the youth would look more favorable towards mainland China which sparked outrage and protests (Lai, 2012).

#### 4.2.1.2 Repression

Macao’s security apparatus is comprised of The Unitary Police Service which is a part of Macao’s internal security system. According to Macao Year Handbook it manages police units that include Public Security Police and Judiciary Police. It is led by The Commissioner- General who is appointed by the Central People’s Government upon the nomination of the Chief Executive to whom he reports, while the supervision of his work is handled by the Secretary for Security. Secretary for Security is in charge of the internal security of SAR, such as for criminal investigations, application of penalty provisions and other. (Macao Yearbook 2019). Public Security Police Force has 5116 personnel. Macao also has Police Tactical Unit consisted of 670 members. It was established in 1979 comprised of six special units among which there

are anti-riot team and special operations team. From the 2016 a city-wide electronic surveillance system is in operations with 820 cameras in total it is referred to as the “eye in the sky” while a total of 1620 cameras will be installed by the end of 2020 (Macao Yearbook 2019).

Apart from the vast security forces, Macao implemented National Security law in March of 2009 which according to new Chief Executive of Macao, Ho Iat-seng, helped the city avoid unrest that faced Hong Kong (Wong & Kang-chung, 2019).

The new law punishes acts of treason, secession, or subversion against the PRC with prison terms of 10 to 25 years; preparing to commit those acts is also punishable, with a term of up to three years in prison. The maximum sentence under the criminal law of the Region is 30 years, a sentence that could be given as a maximum for combined offenses (Johnson, 2009).

The law punishes treason, secession or subversion and someone who commits one of those offences or prepares to act on one of these charges can be sentenced up to 30 years. Hence, state capacity was legally extended with the introduction of this law as it discourages such behavior.

Contrary to Macao, Hong Kong Government did not manage to pass the law in 2003 and has withdrawn the bill. State capacity was thus limited and punishments for these offences do not exist, but the government pursued charges against protestors on the basis of public nuisance and illegal assembly. Thus, state capacity and its legal framework was limited in relation to protests. Because the local HKSAR government failed to pass the law ever since 2003, Beijing’s highest lawmaking organ, the National People’s Congress (NPC) drafted and passed the National security law on June 30 2020. By doing so it bypassed the Hong Kong legislative council and avoided any scrutiny. “The new legislation criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign powers. People who are convicted of such crimes can face sentences up to life in prison.” (Regan, 2020). Life sentences, no oversight, as well as the right of final adjudication remain highly disputable parts of the new law. The new law is much stricter



than that passed in Macao and was tailor made for Hong Kong to put an end to protests. State capacity was highly increased with its introduction, but its effects are beyond the scope of this research.

Hong Kong Police force consists of 30,800 police officers. Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance is an independent oversight authority appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of the Chief Justice. Its operation is based on “The Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance provides a statutory regime for the authorization and regulation of interception of communications and covert surveillance conducted by law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to prevent or detect serious crime and protect public security.” (Hong Kong Yearbook 2018: 266) Two types of cover surveillance exist. Type 1 which entails higher degree of intrusiveness into privacy and requires panel judge’s authorization while Type 2, called executive authorization can be issued by officer of Law Enforcement Agencies equal to the rank of Senior Superintendent or higher. Surveillance was issued in 41 cases on the ordinance of Section 4 and 6 referring to Dangerous drugs, Section 4 and 6 prevention of bribery and Section 11 and 12 regarding Elections Ordinance (Table 2 (b)), page 91, Annual Report 2018 to the Chief Executive, by The Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance).

Although, reports about surveillance are handed to Chief Executive and later on to Legislative Council, it will be interesting to see whether numbers increase after the adoption of the new National Security Law. South Morning Post reports about public discussions between experts and government officials about the interpretation of the new National security law. Some legal experts like Albert Chen Hung-ye who is a member of the Basic Law Committee and chair

professor of constitutional law at HKU said “Not amenable to judicial reviews does not mean everything the committee has decided will not be judicially reviewable. The court has the power to determine if the committee has gone beyond those powers (Lau, 2020). However, different messages were sent by the Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam which is the chair of the new national security committee, who said that the committee is required not to reveal its work thus being beyond the inquiry of the judicial branch. That is exactly what is problematic in relation to interception and communication surveillance.

#### Excessive use of force

During the protests in 2019 police forces were accused of using excessive force towards the demonstrators. Several incidents that occurred involving security apparatus was recorded and broadcasted through social media and news outlets. Incidents spurred negative perception towards the police and severed the trust, enticing the sentiment that the Hong Kong Police are not serving to protect the Hong Kong people. “These incidents [...] led many people to believe that the Police could not distinguish between violent and peaceful protesters (on 12 June), that they were indifferent to the safety of non-protesters (14 July), and that they colluded with triad gangsters (22 July).” (Purbrick, 2019: 477). Moreover, police often resorted to rubber bullets, water cannons with blue-dyed solution that causes a stinging sensation on exposed skin, and tear gas in highly populated business districts and closed spaces such as MTRs and offices which is against international standards which permit its use only in open space. Such, often disproportionate use of force, an expert in the Hong Kong police force at the Education University of Hong Kong, said that use of tear gas in enclosed spaces almost certainly “” [...] violated guidelines and changed how the public viewed the police. Their actions

“indiscriminately affected all passengers, [including] children, infants, elders and housewives,” Lawrence Ho” (Mahtani, McLaughlin, Liang, & Kilpatrick, 2019).

Regarding the protest on June 12, 2019 Amnesty International concluded the following “Based on our careful examination of these incidents, we find that the use of force by police in the largely peaceful protest that took place on 12 June violated international human rights law and standards.” (How not to police a protest, Unlawful use of force by Hong Kong Police, Amnesty International, 2019:4). They identified four aspects in which Police Force did not adhere to general international human rights standards: Unlawful use of batons and rubber bullets; Improper use of riot control agents (RCA)- tear gas and pepper spray; Lack of visible identification and restriction on journalists and medics. Similar thing is claimed by Purbrick “The negative public perception was worsened by the use of aggressive tactics, such as from the Special Tactical Squad wearing black jump suits with no rank, serial number, or other insignia.” (2019: 477). Subjected to police brutality were not only protestors but health care workers. In favor of that speak multiple statements given by medical and first aid personnel to one of the best-know medical journals, the Lancet. Health care workers reported being targeted by the Hong Kong police while attempting to reach the injured. That was said to be “[...] a gross breach of international humanitarian standards”, Dr Darren Mann” (The Lancet, Vol 394 December 7, 2019: 2056).

#### 4.2.1.3 Co-optation

Hale’s (2005) is useful because it allows us to understand why almost all business elites in Hong Kong and Macao are not defecting from the incumbent but on the contrary, are supporting

the Chief Executives. First of all, current institutional arrangement allows them to have major influence on the election of the Chief Executive as there is no universal suffrage, second of all, they have direct connection to the Liaison Office and access to sovereign state through National People's Congress and to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. "As a consequence of the partnership between Beijing and the business sector, business elites have taken their concerns straight to the mainland authorities whenever they see their interests affected by the post-colonial state." (Fong, 2014: 199). Finally, there is no visible alternative for the change of rules of the game, as without the Beijing's approval there will be no change in the way of electing the Chief Executives. Thus, as long as the Beijing supports the incumbent, the incumbent is not perceived as a lame duck.

#### 4.2.2 Linkage

##### H2

*The more the regime is connected to the mainland China, while still having large Western linkage, the more conflictive configuration becomes which leads to legitimacy crisis*

To empirically test for linkage, which in this research is simplified and limited to economic ties, I calculate Macao's and Hong Kong's imports and exports for the period after the handover. I use the data from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) from the International Monetary Fund. I make a comparison of Macao's and Hong Kong's imports and exports to mainland China and the West, European Union and the United States. I also test for the West + 6 (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan). I also compare the total trade (imports and exports over GDP in current US\$) for the total period after the handover. Such trade comparison will allow us to see the aggregate trade and hence, the influence of the

West versus the influence of the mainland China on both SARs. It can be seen from the Figure 14 that Macao imported from the mainland China more than it did from the European Union and the United states combined (West), throughout the period after the handover. When other six countries are added to the EU and the US (West +6) it can be seen that imports were higher than those from the mainland China after the 2008. On the side of exports, after the financial crisis in 2008 it can be seen from Figure 15 that exports to the West and West +6 dropped significantly and never recovered, thus leaving Macao to mainland China influence.

Figure 14 Macao, SAR China – Imports in millions US\$





Figure 15 Macao, SAR China – Exports in millions US\$



When it comes to Total Exports and Imports for the period of 1999-2018 the total trade seems evenly distributed (Figure 16). However, one should note that in large part was that due to vast exports to the West and West+6 before 2009. Also, countries are more concerned with exports, which in case of Macao is almost non-existent in relation to the West. Thus, Macao is not dependent on the West for its exports, leaving the West little or no bargaining power in relation to economy.

Forecasting the total trade for the future under current trends would show balance of trade in favor of openness to the mainland. Moreover, although the West often has similar reactions in international relations, aggregate influence of so many countries in comparison to a pull factor of one agent, the mainland China, is probably not the same, but the influence should be weighted and adjusted. On top of that one should not forget institutional arrangements which

make both SARs and integral part of People’s Republic of China, regardless of difference in the regimes.

Figure 16 Macao – Total Exports and Imports in millions US\$ 1999-2018 West, Mainland China





Figure 17 Macao – Total Exports and Imports in millions US\$ 1999-2018 West+6, Mainland China



In the case of Hong Kong, the balance is even clearer in favor of the mainland China (Figure 20,21). In the period after the handover both imports and exports rose significantly towards the mainland. While imports (Figure 18) from the mainland were higher than those from the West from the beginning, they surpassed West +6 in 1999. Exports (Figure 19) on the other hand surpassed West in favor of the mainland in 1999 and 2001, after which in 2004 they surpassed even West+6 in favor of the exports to the mainland. Influence of the financial crisis in 2008 is visible in the case of Hong Kong as well, but the crisis did not constitute the change in trade relations as it did in the case of Macao.



Figure 18 Hong Kong SAR, China – Imports in millions US\$




Figure 19 Hong Kong, SAR China Exports in millions US\$




Figure 20 Hong Kong – Total Exports and Imports in millions US\$ 1997-2019 West, Mainland China





Figure 21 Hong Kong – Total Exports and Imports in millions US\$ 1997-2019 West+6, Mainland China



### 4.3 Smart tactics of the opposition

H3

*The smarter the tactics of the opposition, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid the legitimacy crisis*

*Attributes of smart tactics*

- 1) Decentralized leadership*
- 2) Mass mobilization of different societal groups*
- 3) Coordination of protests*
- 4) Communication with the population and the media*

The Hong Kong protests changed a lot from 2014 Umbrella movement to 2019 Anti Extradition Bill protests or what was later labeled as the Water Revolution due to its character. In 2014 the movement started as a planned three-day sit-in but evolved into 79 days of protests which spanned through Admiralty, Central, Mong Kok and Causeway Bay. The demonstrations started as civic disobedience campaign called “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” aim of the campaign was to advocate and signal the will of the people for the election of the Chief Executive by universal and equal suffrage in 2017. Plan was to occupy roads in the Central and block the traffic. On their official website the organizers (Occupy Central with love and peace) said the tactics for civil disobedience was the following:

“When the police come for their arrest, the first ring of participants, i.e. the hard-core members, will not clash with the policemen and will not hire any lawyer to defend themselves when in court. The second ring of participants will not resist arrest either, but they may hire a defense lawyer. The third ring of participants simply support the first and the second rings in a lawful manner, e.g. silent standing by the road, presentation of bouquets, etc. The power of this third ring can be enormous. To some people the most significant power of the movement is to paralyze the financial hub, while some believe that it is to awaken the public to the awareness of social inequality through self-sacrifice.”

The campaign had clear leaders from the academic circles and prominent Hong Kong Universities. The civil disobedience campaign was initiated by what can be labelled as “the intelligentsia” of Hong Kong society. Three men, Benny Tai from the University of Hong Kong’s law school, Chan Kin-man- a sociology professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming from the Chai Wan Baptist Church. All of them later sentenced to 16-months for conspiracy to cause public nuisance and inciting others to cause public nuisance. Their movement was later joined by student leaders Joshua Wong Chi-fung, Nathan Law Kwun-chung, both founders of a group called Demosisto which fought for the right of self-determination of people of Hong Kong. Both of them were later found guilty of unlawful assembly and inciting others for illegal assembly among other charges.

Their organization dropped self-determination as their goals from their manifesto at the beginning of 2020 and was officially dissolved on 30 June 2020, hours after NPCSS passed the National Security Law due to possibility of life imprisonment of its members under the new law. (SCMP, Hong Kong adopts national security law with life in jail maximum penalty, 2020). Among student leaders who joined the movement were Alex Chow Yong-kang and Lester Shum, both from the leadership of the Hong Kong Federation of Students. Occupy movement developed to what was later known as the Umbrella movement. All of the leadership of the peaceful protests were later prosecuted by the government. It was named after umbrellas protestors were using to protect themselves against the pepper spray used by the security apparatus.

#### 4.3.1 Decentralized leadership

Because of the HK Government's response to tougher the stance and punish those who emerged as leaders during the protests in 2019-20 appeared to have no leadership, while in fact, some argued that leadership is intentionally decentralized. Activists divided themselves into smaller groups and protests spread to many more locations than it was the case in 2014. Apart from original ones, they included Airport, Tung Chung, Tsuen Wan, Tsing Yi, Yuen Long, Tuen Mun, Sha Tin, Kwun Tong and Sai Wan Ho. This time, protests were not peaceful but targeted Government headquarters, Legislative Council buildings, police and Massive Transport Railways stations while universities turned into battlefields. It was obvious that different tactics were necessary in order for protests to survive the coercive security apparatus.

Protestors drew inspiration from the famous Hong Kong martial artist Bruce Lee. Protestors have taken the famous Bruce Lee quote "Empty your mind. Be formless, shapeless, like water... Be water, my friend." As their tactics and signature. No longer were protestors peacefully waiting for the Government to arrest them. They moved like water and hence the movement got the name Water revolution. "Kajimoto says this year's protests differ significantly from the so-called Umbrella Movement of 2014. The Umbrella Movement was the opposite of "water," he says. "They were in one place and demanding certain things with a group of people as their leaders. And that failed. If you look at this strategy this time, it's 180 degrees the opposite of what happened then. It's a leaderless movement, and they go to many different places around Hong Kong." (Satoshi, 2019 *"Be water": Hong Kong protesters learn from Bruce Lee: NHK World-Japan News*).

#### 4.3.2 Mass mobilization of different societal groups

Protestors were successful in mobilizing different age groups. For example, on 17 July 2019 thousands of elderly HongKongers participated in a so called “silver haired” rally. Around 9000 thousand protestors gathered in Central and marched to Admiralty government headquarters. “Activist Yeung Po-hi, one of the protests organizers, read aloud a statement in support of “our youth in their struggle of no return.”” (Chan, ‘No rioters, only a tyrannical regime’: Thousands of Hong Kong seniors march in support of young extradition law protesters 2019). Seniors wanted to show that the movement is all encompassing, and not only young people participate in demonstrations. Another interesting feature of the protests was the use of sign language. Uniquely developed system was used to quickly pass messages through the crowds. Special signaling was developed for need of helmet, umbrella, nylon cable, eye mask, mask, asthma, saline, wrap paper, marker, scissors, pliers, Allen key and sign signaling sufficient supplies. During several rallies, youngsters were teaching the elders of how to use the sign language during demonstrations. “This sign language has become so iconic that on a recent “silver haired” rally of elderly Hong Konger’s marching in support of the young generation, the elders were learning and practicing the youngsters hand signals in solidarity.” (Dapiran, “Be Water!”: seven tactics that are winning Hong Kong’s democracy revolution 2019).

#### 4.3.3. Coordination of protests

Organization of 2019-20 protests was handed mainly by young activists whose tactics showed extremely well coordination and combination of tactics. Apart from being very mobile and unpredictable in movement, what I earlier described as “be water strategy”, protestors relied

heavily on open source sharing of information. For that purpose, forums like LIHKG that resemble Reddit, were used to share posts and people were able to vote on the next steps regarding dispersion, staying in one place or do something else, all in real time. Megaphones, walkie-talkies and other equipment was used to spread information on the ground (Dapiran, “Be Water!”: seven tactics that are winning Hong Kong’s democracy revolution 2019).

#### 4.3.4 Communication with the population and the media

Other forms of communication included Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Apple Airdrop, and YouTube. Telegram proved especially useful because it can have up to 200,000 participants in one group chat hence, it provided platform for dissemination of information to thousands of people in the groups. According to Telegrams official website, it is also more secure than for example WhatsApp because of its multi-data center infrastructure and encryption. Oiwan Lam, a media activist, researcher and educator currently based in Hong Kong said that during the Anti-ELAB movement, citizens took much more diverse approach in communication and diversifying the way the organize. “Verified Anti-ELAB channel” was for example used to collect evidence and information from credible media broadcasters. Special tasks teams among the protestors included ones which collected footage from different sources to serve as evidence in defending those who were arrested (Lewis, Hong Kong’s Anti-ELAB Demonstrations: Tools, Platforms, and Tactics, 2019).

That was especially important in cases where police were found to fabricate evidence such as in the case of a protestor whose white rod was replaced with a larger metal one (Wong, Hong Kong police seen replacing white rod student was holding with black metal rod, 2019). Apart

from above mentioned channels, protestors used District Lennon Wall to reach for the grassroots and the elderly, CCTV maps so people would be aware of them being surveilled and reordered, traditional wire as an end-to-end encrypted tool for communication and Google Forms for signature campaigns.

#### 4.4 People- human development and emancipative values

H4

*The more profound emancipative and post-materialistic values, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid legitimacy crisis without accommodating those beliefs*

Beijing always wanted Hong Kong to remain an economic city. However, through movements such as against the reclamation of the Victoria Harbor in 2004 or against the demolition of the Star Ferry Pier in 2007 Hong Kongers showed post materialistic values. Ones which go beyond the material well-being and neo-liberal economy. “These movements symbolized resistance against pervasive developmentalism, against business domination of land policy and top-down decision- making by the government.” (Ngok, 2011: 708) Such sentiments were present as well in anti-express rail link (XRL) in 2009-10. Some citizens were required to relocate so the Government could build better rail connection to mainland China. Government advocated for it claiming better integration and economic benefits. Eventually, despite protests, Government pushed for it. In times, many people were rethinking Hong Kong’s identity and questioning how to preserve it “The XRL was seen as something that served China more than Hong Kong [...] physically, the XRL may bring better China-Hong Kong integration in the future, but sentimentally, it strained relations.” (Ngok, 2011: 710).



Macao and Hong Kong were promised “high degree of autonomy” which was explained in detail in their respective Basic Laws. However, Macao Basic Law and Hong Kong basic law have few important differences. HK basic law presupposed eventual universal suffrage both for the role of the Chief Executive and the legislature “[...] in Hong Kong it is that the ultimate aim is the election of the Chief Executive by universal upon nomination by a broadly representative body (art. 45(2)). There is no such vision in Macau.” (Ghai, 2000:191). Such privilege was not given to Macao as the Portuguese had much lower bargaining power than the British and were much more willing to transfer Macao’s sovereignty back to China. “In respect of Macau, China avoided committing itself to a legislature “constituted by elections” as in Hong Kong (Annex I, section I of the Declaration; art. 68, BL), [...] nor is there any statement as in Hong Kong that the ultimate goal is election of all members by universal franchise.” (Ghai, 2000:191). Although 100 000 people joined a rally on 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2004 in support of election of Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2007-8, Beijing did not want to give in to demands because “ [...] a popularly elected government was more likely to stave off intervention from Beijing and defend Hong Kong’s way of life, or in a popular phrase at the time, *minju kanggong* (resist communism by democracy).” (Ngok, 2011: 689).

After the demonstrations in 2003 which happened as the result of the HKSAR governments attempt to introduce national security legislation, the Central Government became increasingly interventionist, thus infringing on the promised autonomy “[...] interpretation of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to the Basic Law in April 2004 introduced new procedural requirements [...] on the selection of the Chief Executive and the formation of the Legislature, which significantly increased the role of central authorities” (Steinhardt et al., 2018:275). That however could not mitigate the change that occurred in Hong Kong in relation

to their values to post-materialist ones “[...] historical events could bring sudden changes in values, leading to breakthroughs or retrogression. [...] Events in 2003 served as accelerators in the value change toward post-materialism.” (Ngok, 2011: 706). It was a critical juncture in which support for democracy rose again, people became empowered and politically engaged.

#### 4.4.1 Identity

Identity is inextricably linked to one’s values. Results of the surveys shows the divergence between the Hong Kong’s identity from that of the PRC. At the same time citizens of Macao do not experience such decline in identifying as citizens of PCR. Data is compared from the first polls conducted in 1997. Category of “Macao Citizen” is comparable to the category “HongKonger”; Citizens of PCR are directly comparable in both polls; third Category “Chinese” is added in the case of Hong Kong as an approximation to the category “Citizen of PCR”, as polls which included category “Citizen of PCR” for Hong Kong start only from 2007.

Polls on Hong Kong are done multiple times in a year, and data is taken from the half-yearly average table. Because the polls in Macao are done at the end of each year, for the sake of comparison a second half-yearly average for Hong Kong is presented in this table. People were asked to identify on a scale of 0-10 to rate the strength of their identity, with 10 indicating extremely strong and 0 indicating extremely weak, and 5 indicating half-half. What is visible is that in the case of Macao citizens’ self-identification is roughly the same for both being Macao Citizens and Citizens of PCR. On the other hand, people of Hong Kong have stronger identification as HongKongers, and that identity is rising. At the same time their identification as being Citizens of PCR is declining and upon further inspection of the PORI survey for 2019

it is even more surprising that they identify as Global Citizens stands at 6.89 which is more than the Citizens of PCR that stands at 4.82.

Table 5 HKU POP – People’s ethnic identity

Peoples ethnic identity	Macao, SAR China (handover 1999)		Hong Kong, SAR China (handover 1997)			
	Year	Macau Citizen	Citizen of PCR	Half year	HongKonger	Citizen of PCR
-			1997	7.99	-	7.28
-			1998	7.74	-	7.18
<b>1999</b>	7.12	7.87	1999	7.64	-	7.27
<b>2000</b>	7.83	8.56	2000	8.01	-	7.62
<b>2001</b>	7.12	7.77	2001	7.89	-	7.85
<b>2002</b>	7.48	7.79	2002	7.87	-	7.63
<b>2003</b>	7.83	8.12	2003	7.41	-	7.52
<b>2004</b>	8.06	8.17	2004	7.54	-	7.47
<b>2005</b>	7.71	7.74	2005	7.91	-	7.73
<b>2006</b>	7.91	8.17	2006	7.98	-	7.82
<b>2007</b>	7.84	8.42	2007	8.09	6.72	7.87
<b>2008</b>	7.77	8.36	2008	7.99	6.88	7.79
<b>2009</b>	7.99	8.46	2009	8.14	6.92	7.79
<b>2010</b>	7.77	8.14	2010	8.12	6.27	7.10
<b>2011</b>	7.99	7.87	2011	8.23	6.28	7.01
<b>2012</b>	8.31	8.11	2012	8.43	6.39	7.47
<b>2013</b>	7.92	7.62	2013	7.87	6.08	6.91
<b>2014</b>	7.97	7.66	2014	8.18	5.66	6.54
<b>2015</b>	7.86	7.94	2015	8.12	5.75	6.59
<b>2016</b>	8.24	8.03	2016	8.09	6.25	6.88
<b>2017</b>	8.02	8.01	2017	8.27	6.00	6.89
<b>2018</b>	8.15	7.82	2018	8.34	5.91	6.59
			1-6/2019*	8.61	4.82	5.87

Figure 22 People's ethnic identity Macao, SAR China





Figure 23 People's ethnic identity Hong Kong, SAR China



#### 4.2.2 Values

When asked what kind of society should MSAR and HKSAR become, respondents could choose only one of the categories. Few trends are visible. The most important being that for the years for which the data exists the average percentage Hong Kong citizens choose a category “A free society” is 17.45%. The average for which the data exists for Macao is 6.44% in favor of “Free society”. This clearly shows that there are clear differences between the preferences of the citizens of the two SARs.

Another important trend is that from 2007 citizens of both Macao and Hong Kong choose the category “A Corruption Free” society. What exactly caused this great shift is a topic for further research but, a possible answer may be that a change in people’s opinion might be the result of Governments attempts to present corruption as primary issue society should be dealing with regardless of the actual data regarding corruption.

*Table 6 HKU POP – What kind of Society would you most like Macau to become*

<b>What kind of society would you most like Macau to become?</b>						
<b>Date of Survey</b>	A Prosperous society	A Corruption-free society	A fair society	A free society	A welfare society	Don't know/hard to say
<b>2005</b>	30.7%	8.5%	28.6%	8.7%	16.8%	6.8%
<b>2006</b>	26.7%	7.8%	31.5%	9.2%	22.8%	2.0%
<b>2007</b>	22.4%	28.7%	22.0%	5.4%	17.7%	3.9%
<b>2008</b>	26.00%	35.4%	18.1%	3.5%	13.6%	3.3%
<b>2009</b>	19.6%	41.9%	18.0%	6.5%	12.3%	1.8%
<b>2011</b>	15.2%	34.1%	19.7%	6.5%	21.5%	3.0%
<b>2011</b>	17.3%	27.6%	21.9%	9.5%	20.9%	2.8%
<b>2012</b>	17.3%	33.3%	22.0%	5.2%	19.7%	2.7%
<b>2013</b>	16.7%	40.3%	20.2%	5.9%	14.9%	2.1%

<b>2014</b>	17.8%	38.3%	19.7%	6.7%	15.2%	2.3%
<b>2015</b>	19.4%	33.7%	18.0%	7.1%	19.5%	2.3%
<b>2016</b>	20.8%	33.9%	16.5%	9.0%	17.8%	2.0%

Figure 24 HKU POP – What kind of society would you most like Macao to become?





Table 7 HKU POP – What kind of society would you most like Hong Kong to become?

What kind of society would you most like Hong Kong to become?						
Date of Survey	A prosperous society	A Corruption-free society	A fair society	A free society	A welfare society	Don't know/ hard to say
<b>1997</b>	35,70%	2,00%	24,50%	20,90%	7,10%	9,70%
<b>1998</b>	46,50%	3,10%	22,80%	15,80%	9,40%	2,30%
<b>1999</b>	38,90%	4,70%	17,90%	17,70%	9,60%	11,20%
<b>2000</b>	40,90%	5,30%	18,30%	16,30%	6,10%	13,10%
<b>2001</b>	47,20%	2,80%	16,30%	17,10%	4,50%	12,10%
<b>2002</b>	47,00%	2,90%	20,20%	21,50%	2,60%	5,80%

<b>2003</b>	37,90%	4,80%	23,50%	21,80%	5,60%	6,50%
<b>2004</b>	37,90%	6,00%	23,80%	23,30%	4,90%	4,10%
<b>2005</b>	36,80%	4,30%	29,00%	17,80%	7,20%	5,00%
<b>2006</b>	34,70%	6,90%	31,30%	15,30%	9,20%	2,70%
<b>2007</b>	31,40%	21,70%	21,00%	11,50%	10,80%	3,60%
<b>2008</b>	35,70%	22,50%	19,80%	10,40%	8,70%	2,90%
<b>2009</b>	28,30%	25,20%	21,50%	13,70%	8,40%	3,00%
<b>2010</b>	21,70%	22,60%	27,40%	13,40%	11,60%	3,30%
<b>2011</b>	21,30%	26,50%	28,50%	10,40%	10,20%	3,10%
<b>2012</b>	17,80%	31,10%	22,70%	17,60%	8,50%	2,30%
<b>2013</b>	20,50%	32,90%	22,50%	13,60%	8,80%	1,70%
<b>2014</b>	22,40%	27,20%	23,20%	15,50%	8,70%	2,90%
<b>2015</b>	20,30%	27,50%	23,40%	18,20%	8,40%	2,10%
<b>2016</b>	21,1%	30,70%	21,30%	15,70%	9,00%	2,30%
<b>2017</b>	22,20%	29,00%	24,30%	14,20%	7,90%	2,40%
<b>2018</b>	19,30%	26,30%	24,10%	15,10%	13,10%	2,10%
<b>2019</b>	19,80%	22,00%	27,10%	24,60%	3,50%	2,90%

Figure 25 HKU POP – What kind of society would you most like Hong Kong to become?



## 5 Discussion of findings

### 5.1 Findings related to dependent variable

Macao and Hong Kong were analyzed in relation to dependent variable that was defined in comprehensive way. Legitimacy crisis has been explained through different components such as support for the incumbent, specific and diffuse support. Support for the incumbent in the case of Macao was much higher during the whole period after the handover. On the other hand, support for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong was consistently lower, reaching its lowest levels in 2020 thus clearly showing an unpopular incumbent. Both SARs exhibit very high GDP and HDI which is a clear indicator that both regimes are mostly fulfilling people's needs with regards to socio-economic development. Analysis of government actions with regards to specific housing and other problems would allow for better understanding of specific support for the government policies. However, contribution for this research which deals with legitimacy crisis would be limited as other indicators, such as protests, show that no large-scale demonstrations occurred because of the specific housing or other policy, meaning that people's opinion regarding specific policies was not as relevant for mass mobilization.

Diffuse support was operationalized through several components, trust in SARs government, confidence in the system and protests. Data suggests clear difference between the two SARs for the period after the handover. Macao citizens have confidence in "One country, two systems" and were proven to trust their government while those of Hong Kong do not trust their government nor they have confidence in the system. Finally, Macao exhibited only one case of protest in the period after the handover. The protest was organized for better labor rights and



the protection of workers. On the other hand, protests in Hong Kong were much more frequent and larger in scale. They also differed in their demands which were democratization and introduction of universal suffrage. Such protests were actually challenging the regime itself and were pointed against the local HKSAR Government and the Central authorities. Taking into account all components I conclude that there is indeed a difference between Macao and Hong Kong in a sense that Macao, SAR China is not facing legitimacy crisis but Hong Kong SAR, China is (Table 8).

*Table 8 Legitimacy crisis summary*

Dependent variable components			Legitimacy crisis
<b>Macao, SAR China</b>	Support for incumbent	yes	no
	Specific support	yes	
	Diffuse support	yes	
<b>Hong Kong, SAR China</b>	Support for incumbent	no	yes
	Specific support	yes	
	Diffuse support	no	

## 5.2 Findings related to independent variables

There are several differences between Macao and Hong Kong that resulted in latter having a crisis of legitimacy. State capacity in the case of Macao was stronger than in the case of Hong Kong because Macao was able to implement National Security Law in 2009 while Hong Kong did not. That was especially evident on the side of repression. Stronger state capacity meant tighter controls and legal framework which discouraged any future behavior that could be seen as subversive for the MSAR Government or the regime itself. In the case of Hong Kong, people opposed the law and the HKSAR government backed down and retracted the proposal because it lacked the capacity to pass it through. That meant that in any future occasion HongKongers

enjoyed larger freedoms to protests and they gradually developed smart tactics that culminated with almost two million people taking to the streets in 2019. From the beginning of the period after the handover annual demonstrations, that for the victims of Tiananmen massacre, July 1<sup>st</sup> demonstrations and New Year marches, taught HongKongers political participation and put democratization demands on the spot. Opposition in Hong Kong was first led by the university intelligentsia during the Occupy Central movement and was later joined by the enthusiastic youth that carried on the movement. Government response in a form of repression to the non-violent Occupy Central and Umbrella movement caused disenchantment with police forces, Government and the system itself which later prosecuted and convicted leaders of the movement. All of that, lead to loss of trust and development of tactics that included violence and exhibited traits of a full-scale revolution. Emancipative values do not seem to be priority in Macao, as they prefer performance-oriented goals such as being corruption free and prosperity for their society. It can be said that Hong Kong society on the other hand prioritizes post-materialistic goals such as being a free society.

*Table 9 Summary of findings*

Summary of finding		
	Macao, SAR China	Hong Kong
<b>State Capacity</b>	high	medium*
<b>Linkage</b>	West	high
	West + 6	high
	Mainland China	high
<b>Opposition</b>	low	high
<b>Emancipative values</b>	low	high

\*state capacity on the side of repression for Hong Kong was significantly increased after the introduction of National Security Law in June 2020, implications of future higher state capacity are beyond this research

H1 was confirmed. The more state capacity the regime has, it is more successful in management of the crisis or as in the case of Macao it is possible to avoid it. H2 was inconclusive and I found no evidence to support it through this research. Hypothesis 3 was confirmed, opposition in Hong Kong proved very resourceful and it managed to mobilize millions of people not only to participate in demonstrations but to change the perception about the government and the system thus causing legitimacy crisis. Finally, H4 was also confirmed. It showed the difference between the two societies and confirmed that in the case of societies with emancipative and post-materialistic values it is difficult to avoid legitimacy crisis without accommodating those beliefs.

Table 10 Summary of hypotheses

Summary of hypotheses		
<b>H1</b>	The more state capacity regime possesses, the regime is more successful in the management of the legitimacy crisis or it is even possible to avoid it	<b>Confirmed</b>
<b>H2</b>	The more the regime is connected to the mainland China, while still having large Western linkage, the more conflictive configuration becomes which leads to legitimacy crisis	Not confirmed
<b>H3</b>	The smarter the tactics of the united opposition, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid the legitimacy crisis	<b>Confirmed</b>
<b>H4</b>	The more profound emancipative and post-materialistic values, the more difficult it is for the regime to avoid legitimacy crisis without accommodating those beliefs	<b>Confirmed</b>

## 6 Conclusion

Aim of this research was to answer why legitimacy crisis occurred in Hong Kong but not in Macao and I can conclude the following. Legitimacy crisis in Hong Kong appears to be a “perfect storm” meaning that a combination of factors, namely weaker state capacity, well organized and smart opposition and emancipative values contributed to the outcome. High state capacity seems to be important especially in the prevention of legitimacy crisis as weaker state capacity results in constant challenging of the regime. Hypothesis related to linkage did not offer sufficient evidence to make conclusive claims about its contribution to the legitimacy crisis. That does not mean linkage does not play a role in legitimacy crisis, but further research should look in other aspects of linkage apart from economic ties. It should also improve Levitsky and Ways operationalization in terms of variables they use in their measurements as there might be better indicators for linkage. Opposition tactics and mobilization seems to be a relevant factor not only in challenging the regime, but they may influence people who were not politically active to join them in the collective action. Emancipative values confirmed the human development theory that claims institutions do not necessarily precede and create values but values influence institutions. Hence, priority for becoming a free society and not identifying with the ethnicity characterized with low emancipative values indicates HongKongers differ than citizens of Macao.

Finally, legitimacy crisis concerns not only democratic regimes but also autocratic ones, as no regime can rely solely on repression for its long-term survival. Thus, if one wants to know whether institutional arrangement such as “One country, two systems” can function in some other case without causing legitimacy crisis, one needs to look at the reasons that this research

identified as causal to the outcome. Such empirical application could be used to test whether reunification of mainland China with Taiwan would lead to similar legitimacy crisis as in Hong Kong. In broader terms, this approach could also benefit those who study other cases of hybrid regimes as possible predictor of their stability or tendency to democratize or move towards full authoritarianism.

## 7 Literature

Beissinger, M. R. (2007). Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(02).  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707070776>

Biegoń, D. (2017). *Hegemonies of Legitimation: Discourse Dynamics in the European Commission (Transformations of the State)* (1st ed. 2016 ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Blatter, D. J., & Haverland, M. (2012). *Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research (ECPR Research Methods)* (2012th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Chan, H. (2019, July 17). 'No rioters, only a tyrannical regime': Thousands of Hong Kong seniors march in support of young extradition law protesters. Retrieved July 13, 2020, from <https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/17/no-rioters-tyrannical-regime-thousands-hong-kong-seniors-march-support-young-extradition-law-protesters/>

Chan, M. K., Lo, S. H. (2010). *The A to Z of the Hong Kong Sar and the Macao Sar*. Scarecrow Press.

Christian von Soest & Julia Grauvogel (2017) Identity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule, *Contemporary Politics*, 23:3, 287-305, DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2017.1304319

Dapiran, A. (2019, August 01). "Be Water!": Seven tactics that are winning Hong Kong's democracy revolution. Retrieved July 13, 2020, from <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2019/08/be-water-seven-tactics-are-winning-hong-kongs-democracy-revolution>

Dapiran, A. (2020). HONG KONG'S RECKONING. In Golley J., Jaivin L., Hillman B., & Strange S. (Eds.), *China Dreams* (pp. 50-68). Australia: ANU Press. doi:

10.2307/j.ctv12sdxmk

'Dropping self-determination not a compromise'. (n.d.). Retrieved July 11, 2020, from <https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1502384-20200112.htm>

(DSF), F. (2019, July 01). Wealth Partaking Scheme 2019. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from <https://www.gov.mo/en/news/114358/>

Easton, D. (1975). A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4), 435-457. doi:10.1017/s0007123400008309

Fong, Brian C.h. "The Partnership between the Chinese Government and Hong Kong's Capitalist Class: Implications for HKSAR Governance, 1997–2012." *The China Quarterly*, vol. 217, 2014, pp. 195–220., doi:10.1017/s0305741014000307.

Gerschewski, J. (2013). The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes. *Democratization*, 20(1), 13–38.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860>

Government of SAR Macao, Statistics and Census Service <https://www.dsec.gov.mo/zh-MO/> July 7th, 2020

Ghai, Y. (2000). The Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau: Some Reflections. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 49(1), 183-198. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from [www.jstor.org/stable/761584](http://www.jstor.org/stable/761584)

Haldenwang, C. von. (2016). *Measuring legitimacy - new trends, old shortcomings?* Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH.

Hale, H. E. (2006). Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39(3), 305–329. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.06.00>

Hale, H. (2005). Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia. *World Politics*, 58(1), 133-165. Retrieved June 7, 2020, from [www.jstor.org/stable/40060127](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060127)

Ho, J. (2012, September 16). Beijing-friendly Macau sees no need for national education. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1037943/beijing-friendly-macau-sees-no-need-national-education>

Hong Kong adopts national security law with life in jail maximum penalty. (2020, July 01). Retrieved July 11, 2020, from <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3091241/national-security-law-chinese-president-xi-jinping-signs>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme - support for Chui Sai On  
[https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/macau/ceRating/poll\\_chart.html](https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/macau/ceRating/poll_chart.html)

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme - support for Edmund Ho  
<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/macau/motp4/morelease.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme - support for Tung  
<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ceall/ceq/halfyr/datatables1.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme - support for Donald Tsang  
[https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ce2005/donald\\_new/halfyr/datatables.html](https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ce2005/donald_new/halfyr/datatables.html)

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme – support for Leung Chun-ying  
<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ce2012/cy/halfyr/datatables.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme – support for Carrie Lam  
<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ce2017/cl/halfyr/datatables.html>



Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme – support for Carrie Lam

<https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/chief-executive/a003/rating>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme “On the whole, do you trust the HKSAR Government?”

<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/trust/trusthkgov/halfyr/datatables.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme “On the whole, do you trust the MSAR Government?”

<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/macau/trustMauGov/datatables.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme. (2020a). Hong Kong ethnic identity, timeseries [Dataset]. Retrieved from

<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/overall/halfyr/datatables.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme. (2020b). Macau, ethnic identity [Dataset]. Retrieved from

<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/macau/identity/datatables.html>

Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme. (2020c). Macau, society [Dataset].

Retrieved from <https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/macau/soc2be/datatables.html>

Johnson, C. (2009, March 10). Global Legal Monitor. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from

<https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/macau-national-security-bill-passed/>

Lai, A. (2012, July 30). 'National education' raises furor in Hong Kong. Retrieved July 23, 2020, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/30/world/asia/hong-kong-national-education-controversy/index.html>

Lau, C. (2020, July 11). National security committee decisions 'not beyond judicial review'.

Retrieved July 11, 2020, from [https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-](https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3092792/national-security-law-decisions-new-committee-hong-kong-not)

[kong/politics/article/3092792/national-security-law-decisions-new-committee-hong-kong-not](https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3092792/national-security-law-decisions-new-committee-hong-kong-not)

Levitsky, S., Way, L. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Problems of International Politics)* (0 ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Lee, F. (2020) Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill movement in Hong Kong, *Critical Asian Studies*, 52:1, 18-32, DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2020.1700629

Levitsky, S., Way, L. (2020). The New Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy*, 31(1), 51–65. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0004>

Lewis, D. (2019, August 23). Hong Kong's Anti-ELAB Demonstrations: Tools, Platforms, and Tactics. Retrieved July 13, 2020, from <https://www.digitasiahub.org/2019/08/23/hong-kongs-anti-elab-demonstrations-tools-platforms-and-tactics/>

Macao Yearbook. (n.d.). Retrieved July 23, 2020, from <http://yearbook.gcs.gov.mo/en/books>

Mahtani, S., McLaughlin, T., Liang, T., & Kilpatrick, R. H. (2019, December 24). In Hong Kong crackdown, police repeatedly broke their own rules - and faced no consequences. Retrieved July 23, 2020, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/world/hong-kong-protests-excessive-force/>

McFaul, M. (2005). Transitions from Postcommunism. *Journal of Democracy*, (3), 5-19

Ngok, M. (2011). Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-industrial Hong Kong. *Asian Survey*, 51(4), 683-712. doi:10.1525/as.2011.51.4.683

Occupy Central with love and peace. (n.d.). Retrieved July 23, 2020, from <http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy%2Farticle>

Purbrick, M. (2019). A REPORT OF THE 2019 HONG KONG PROTESTS. *Asian Affairs*, 50(4), 465–487. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672397>

Regan, H. (2020, June 30). China passes sweeping Hong Kong national security law. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/29/china/hong-kong-national-security-law-passed-intl-hnk/index.html>

Satoshi, Y. (2019, November 13). "Be water": Hong Kong protesters learn from Bruce Lee: NHK WORLD-JAPAN News. Retrieved July 11, 2020, from <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/745/>

Scher, I. (2020, February 14). The casino hub of Macau will give residents money to keep its economy going during the coronavirus pandemic. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from <https://www.insider.com/macau-to-give-residents-cash-to-boost-local-economy-2020-2>

Tam, L. (2020, June 27). Cash payout shows money can buy happiness in Hong Kong. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3090738/hong-kong-cash-handout-proves-money-can-buy-happiness-city>

Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(03), 535. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707071538>

Way, L. (2008). The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(3), 55–69. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0010>

Wong, K. (2019, October 4). Hong Kong police seen replacing white rod student was holding with black metal rod. Retrieved July 13, 2020, from <https://mothership.sg/2019/10/news-hong-kong-police-student-shot-stick/>

Wong, C., & Kang-chung, N. (2019, September 12). National security law has helped Macau succeed; next leader says. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3026984/national-security-law-has-contributed-macaus-success-next>