Demobilized Poor, Reduced Altruism, or None? A Test of the Literature on the Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Preferences for Redistribution

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Abstract

Motivated by an extensive literature inspired by social identity theory, under which ethnic differences generate dynamics that affect negatively redistributive demands, this thesis will address the following two research questions. Is ethnic diversity in a country detrimental to the public demand for redistribution? What are the channels by which ethnic diversity impact individuals' redistributive demands, i.e., are richer or poorer individuals most affected by ethnic divisions? While much of the literature focuses only on objective indicators of income to tackle these questions while relying on class identity notions, I test these questions by incorporating subjective class. The arguments in the literature can thus be tested beyond the scope in the OECD area by posing the following three main hypotheses. First, what I call the demobilization hypothesis: lowclass individuals have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries (H1). Second, labeled as the altruistic bias hypothesis: upper-class individuals have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries (H2). Finally, the common hypothesis present in the literature: ethnically heterogeneous countries have on average lower preferences for redistribution (H3). By relying on the World Value Survey dataset, the hypotheses are tested on an extensive set of countries from all the continents, applying multilevel models with country-level covariates. Various empirical strategies lead to rejecting the three hypotheses, casting doubts on the validity of the arguments drawn by the literature around the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on redistributive demands, especially beyond Europe and the US.

Key words: Preferences for redistribution, ethnic heterogeneity, subjective class

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Introduction

Given the growing concerns regarding income and wealth disparities, inequality has become a topic of interest for many scholars in the past years. The multidimensional nature of inequality affects a wide set of phenomena, from the psychological well-being and behavioral attitudes of individuals (Markus & Stephens, 2017) to broader political phenomena such as globalization (Lee, Nielsen, & Alderson, 2007). A general process of decreasing inequalities between countries (Milanovic, 2019, p. 130) is parallel to the growing within-country inequalities that posit the "return of class" in the twentieth century (Therborn, 2011). Thus, although economic power between countries has been converging since the 1980s, in many cases, the poor have not seen substantial improvements in their living standards.

However, these growing inequalities have not led univocally to redistributive policies; neither have they led to consistent increasing concerns among the population (Kenworthy & Mccall, 2008). Instead, the role of subjective perceptions and other mediating factors have been emphasized by the literature to understand individuals' concerns about income disparities (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018). Subjective perceptions of inequality or inequality experienced at a lower level than the country (Newman, Johnston, & Lown, 2015) and the role of sociological factors and identities (Shayo, 2009) became an important branch of research to overtake the difficulties that classic models of policy preference formation have to predict responses to inequality.

This latter shift towards the inclusion of sociological perspectives can be traced back to Tajfel and Turner (1979) and the formalization and incorporation of these sociological perspectives into economic models of behavior by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In the field of economic inequality, these contributions influenced later research, especially by the inclusion of national (Shayo, 2009) and ethnic identities (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004) into the economic

analysis. Under these views, identities such as ethnicity influence and determine —along with economic considerations— the individuals' policy preferences, having an important impact on attitudes towards redistribution. Thus, the increasing ethnic diversity present in many western countries has led the literature to face the potential implications of ethnic cleavages on attitudes towards redistribution among the population.

The general assumption in the literature is that ethnic heterogeneity negatively influences redistributive demands (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). To support this proposition, the literature emphasizes various arguments, which converge towards the notions of social affinity¹. Under these views, social disaffinities between ethnic groups erode solidarity among the society, and consequentially their preferences for redistribution decrease. However, there are two alternative emphases by which ethnic heterogeneity affects redistributive demands; either it affects negatively redistributive demands of the rich (Rueda, 2018) (Finseraas, 2012) or the poor (Houle, 2017) (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004), with divergent implications on the assumed relationship. By knowing which social strata are mostly affected by ethnic heterogeneity, we can shed light on how ethnic cleavages arise and affect redistributive demands, either in a top-down or a bottom-up manner.

Given these considerations, the present literature can be advanced in two directions. First, the literature implicitly draws its theoretical mechanisms from notions of class identities. Under these views, individuals rank themselves on the social ladder, and ethnic identities are included in such calculations, consequentially affecting the preferences for redistribution of

¹ An alternative branch of the literature focuses on the relationship between immigration and the labor market. In this view, it is the relative position in the labor market and the competition between native and immigrant workers where the ethnic cleavages may arise, rather than social affinity concerns. Thus, ethnic conflicts do not play a role by themselves but as a way to approach labor conflicts (Alt & Iversen, 2017). Given the extensive literature on this issue, the present paper will focus on the general reasoning behind social affinity and homophily, i.e., the assumed tendency of humans to have in-group biases, leaving aside the potential explanatory power of labor market relations.

the individual. Thus, the basic assumption is that ethnic and class identities interact with each other, influencing how individuals form their preferences for redistribution (Lindqvist & Östling, 2011). Secondly, most of the studies focus on western or OECD countries. Thus, the theoretical claims by which ethnic heterogeneity affects preferences for redistribution are not tested beyond the mentioned spatial scope, casting doubts on the universality of these claims. This thesis contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it empirically tests the arguments in the literature regarding the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and social class by directly using class identities. This approach gives a closer linkage to the arguments in the literature regarding how ethnic heterogeneity affects rich or poor people by setting class categories that speak by themselves about the position in where the individual situates herself on the social ladder. Second, it broadens the scope beyond the usual restriction to OECD countries, testing if the general notions between ethnic heterogeneity and redistributive demands are universally valid. Since income indicators at the individual level are hardly comparable, especially between countries in different continents, the approach based on class identities helps to homogenize the analysis, fixing a small set of categories.

Therefore, the present paper presents the following two research questions. First, does ethnic heterogeneity have a negative effect on preferences for redistribution? And second, has ethnic heterogeneity different effects among upper and lower classes? To address these questions, the present paper will have the following structure. The first chapter is an overall literature review that emphasizes the role of sociological perspectives on the general framework of individual preferences for redistribution. The second chapter introduces the theoretical framework and the hypotheses regarding the role that ethnic heterogeneity has on preferences for redistribution and the mechanisms present in the literature. The third chapter presents the data and methodology to test the hypotheses. The fourth chapter shows the results from the analyses, followed by a summary of the results. Finally, the fifth chapter reviews the

limitations of the present study, the possibilities for further research, and the main conclusions of this thesis.

1 Redistributive demands: beyond economic self-interest

The Downsian theorem, assuming individuals' rationality based on pure economic selfinterest, has been extremely influential in understanding the formation of policy preferences and political behavior for several decades (Downs, 1957). Under this influence, the modeled predictions in response to economic inequalities can be summarized in two, the Meltzer-Richard model (1981) and the Moene-Wallerstein model (2001), which offer contradicting predictions. While Meltzer-Richard anticipates that more inequality would lead to increasing demands for redistribution, the Moene-Wallerstein model predicts the opposite. Since none of these models have found consistent empirical evidence (Olivera, 2015, p. 4), their assumptions started to be disputed, which led the literature to shift from models based on purely economic self-interest with complete information to models which include broader sociological factors and relax the assumptions regarding fully-informed voters.

Identity and redistribution

An important branch of literature in preferences for redistribution has been developed towards the role of identities, implying that the individual attitudes are no longer explained only by economic or monetary self-interest but by broader sociological perspectives concerning identity formation. Under these perspectives, individuals include in their utility functions their identities, by which the sense of belonging to a group provides non-material payoffs (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Guided by instrumental (chosen) or by given identities (Costa-Font & Cowell, 2015), the individual faces strong incentives to form and preserve a specific identity, which provides an inherent value in the form of personal self-esteem or sense of belonging (Collier, 2019).

Moreover, the role of identity goes beyond the inclusion of non-material payoffs. Identification introduces inertia and path-dependency in individuals' patterns of behavior with

important implications for models of rational self-interest behavior. Past experiences generate routines that powerfully explain the observed present behavior. At the same time, these routines give the individuals incentives to keep committed to the existent behavior even at the face of losing utility (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011).

Furthermore, identifying oneself with a particular group has a different meaning in different contexts and periods, while at the same time the meaning of a certain identity is determined by the symbolic boundaries of the group (Lamont & Duvoux, 2014). Although these accounts carry substantial subjectivity and are often hard to measure and operationalize, the study of identities and the inclusion of non-material payoffs and path dependency helps to explain individuals' behavior, especially when the decisions deviate substantially from the prescriptions of economic self-interest.

The consequence is that these sociological directions can often enter into conflict with economic self-interest models of behavior, leading to a more complex landscape in which the study of identities and how they interact can explain apparent contradictions in the observed behavior of individuals. In this way, an individual at the bottom of the income scale could be interested in redistribution from a purely economic perspective. Nonetheless, a potential identification with a higher class or with a high-status ethnicity could shape her policy preferences in the opposite direction. Similarly, identities can also be aligned and reinforce the individual motivations derived from economic self-interest (in terms of policy preferences), such as of those poorer individuals with working or low-class identifications. Thus, the interaction and influence of identities became one focus on the literature in preferences for redistribution, mainly regarding nationality and ethnicity, with the notion of social class at the center.

National, ethnic, and class identities

Along this line, Shayo (2009) builds a model in which identities such as nationality (identifying with the idea of nation and the nationhood) or class carry different social statuses and interact with each other. The model states that the distance between the individual and a certain group, along with the social status of that group, determine the adoption of the identity by the individual (Shayo, 2009, p. 147). Naturally, poorer individuals tend to identify more with lower classes, while at the same time, individuals tend to prefer nationality since it enjoys a higher status than class. Then, somewhat contradictory forces are at the stage since lower classes are cross-pressured by class and national identities, and those identities have opposite implications regarding the individuals' policy preferences. The evidence shows that poor people tend to be more nationalistic and that those who have stronger nationalistic feelings tend to hold lower preferences for redistribution (Shayo, 2009), generating a paradox that goes against the assumptions of the Meltzer-Richard model. Moreover, at the aggregate level, countries with more nationalistic populations tend to redistribute less on average (Shayo, 2009, p. 159). Therefore, national and class identities interact with each other distorting —in different ways depending on the country— the models of preference formation based on economic self-interest.

Moreover, ethnic identities can also affect the patterns of identification and public support for redistribution in similar ways. Ethnically heterogeneous countries may have developed political settings by which class and ethnic identities interact with each other regarding preferences for redistribution, dividing the electorate into the racial cleavage (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Either fueled by political entrepreneurs who mobilize these ethnic divisions or by possible human tendencies to cooperate more with genetically similar people (Freeman, 2009), the case is parallel to the one relating nationalist and class identities. Individuals facing proximity to a specific ethnic identity with a different social status may interact with class

identities, generating deviations from the predictions of the Meltzer-Richard model in regards to policy preferences.

An extensive set of literature has addressed the relationship between ethnic cleavages and public preferences for welfare spending. In a pioneering study, Gilens (1996) discusses the relationship between attitudes towards welfare policies and racial attitudes in the US, showing substantial evidence around how ethnic cleavages predispose whites' policy preferences. Gilens shows that blacks are subjectively perceived poorer than they are (p. 594), potentially distorting whites' positions towards redistributive policies. Moreover, he finds that the stronger predictor of attitudes towards welfare spending among whites is the prejudices towards blacks, specifically the acceptance of the notion that "blacks are lazy" (p. 597). More importantly, these attitudes have even more explanatory power than mere prejudices towards poor people (p. 598). This suggests the potential tensions between ethnic and class identities, with important implications on policy preferences.

Therefore, the boundaries of group identities and the deservingness of different groups can distort the predictions of a mere class-based model of policy preference formation. Along with this reasoning, salient identities such as national or ethnic ones have the potential to influence the policy preferences of individuals along with economic or monetary considerations. While in the US, the notion of being "American" is more commonly identified as being white (Devos & Banaji, 2005), these tensions can influence the preferences for redistribution of individuals since minorities are perceived more often as an out-group that holds lower levels of deservingness. In the US, ethnic minorities hold at the same time lower perceived status and, at the same time, are more often excluded from the national identity, suggesting the interrelation of ethnicity, nationality, and class which consequentially affects the rationales behind individuals' preferences for redistribution.

Class and inequality perceptions

In parallel with ethnic identities, the scholarly literature on preferences for redistribution and class identities has been growing recently. A new focus on class self-identification and social self-rankings have shifted the discussion from the study of the effects of inequality to the study of the effects of "perceived inequality" (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018, p. 27), questioning the assumptions regarding complete information by classic rational models. For instance, Duman (2019) finds that those who self-identify as low or working-class, regardless of their actual income and other objective factors, tend to have higher preferences for redistribution.

In this line, class self-identification and perceptions of inequality represent two sides of the same coin, which ultimately play a central role in the formation of preferences for redistribution. For instance, Köllner and Gründler show how aggregate measures of individual self-rankings can be added to measure overall perceptions of inequality, which correlate strongly with the level of redistribution of the country (2017, p. 30). Countries like the UK or the US contrast with Nordic countries in their perception of inequality, which are lower in the former Anglo-Saxon countries (2017, p. 29). More generally, high-income countries, in opposition to low-income countries, seem to follow the Meltzer-Richard model, with higher market inequality correlated with higher redistribution (2017, p. 11). This finding suggests that contextual factors present in more economically developed countries are behind these divergences.

In other words, class identities or class self-rankings have become a substantive tool to understand the divergences from the predictions of the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. By studying class identities and other sociological factors, these divergences can be properly approached by digging into more precise estimates of where individuals situate themselves on

the social ladder. Moreover, the combination of class and ethnic identities can shed light on the potential trade-offs between them and their relation with preferences for redistribution.

In conclusion, although the Meltzer-Richard model presents a powerful framework, it is contested and nuanced by two main grounds. First, by the role of national and ethnic identities, among other sociological factors, which generate a more complex and uncertain portrait of how individuals form their preferences for redistribution. Secondly, by the role of class identities and perceptions of inequality. Since all the mentioned studies show that objective factors such as income, education, or occupation remain strong predictors of individual preferences for redistribution, the literature is situated on a middle ground between the persistence of objective factors and the role of more uncertain sociological factors that could be influencing the models. This meaning that the study of identities is a complementary one rather than a substitutive of objective factors.

Final remarks and the broader perspective

Although beyond the scope of the present paper, it is important to mention that the reviewed literature is instilled by historical perspectives, which in turn have an enormous weight on how identities, objective factors, and policy preferences relate. The different country paths play a determining role in the nation-building processes, generating concrete institutions that ultimately produced the environmental conditions which shaped the populations' policy preferences. In this way, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that the differences between the US and European welfare states can be found among their different historical departure points. The low population density and the initial ethnic heterogeneity of the US disabled the American left to have a voice on the country's institutional design and development, leading to weaker leftist institutions compared to the European ones and sharp divergences between Americans and Europeans preferences regarding welfare policies (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Although the present study will not go into these historical details, the study of class

and ethnic identities and their relationship with redistributive demands are understood to be inserted into different country (or other boundaries) specific historical developments.

In sum, the validity of the classic models of preference formation based on economic selfinterest has to be put in a broader perspective. Different contextual factors generate different dynamics under which the responses of increasing inequalities consequentially diverge. The inclusion of class and ethnic identities and their interactions into the classical Meltzer-Richard model can be helpful to discover how and in which sense do they affect individuals' preferences for redistribution. Thus, the ethnic composition of a country and the role of class seem to be a fruitful branch of research to understand the formation of preferences for redistribution and the broader dynamics of inequality.

2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses

The increasing inequalities starting in the 80s in western countries and the lack of consistent public response have shifted the literature to dig into sociological perspectives. In this regard, one main discussion goes around the assumed detrimental effects that ethnic differences have on individuals' preferences for redistribution and public spending in general. The importance of the political debate around this issue grows along with the changing demographics of Europe and the US, with increasingly ethnically heterogeneous populations. In parallel, anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric is becoming common among right-wing parties in the West, having considerable success and impact (Golder, 2016). By its part, the left debates around the potential trade-offs between carrying out pro-ethnic diversity and pro-redistribution policies (Goodhart, 2004). Thus, understanding how the ethnic diversity cleavages arise and relate with preferences for redistribution is of central importance to the general puzzle of inequality.

The general assumption in the debate around ethnic heterogeneity is that people care more about their group or tend to have an in-group bias. There is extensive evidence in the literature showing that social and ethnic groups affect a comprehensive set of phenomena linked to policy preferences and behavior. For instance, survey data from communities in the US with high ethnic heterogeneity show lower levels of social trust (Alberto Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002) and lower charitable giving (Hungerman, 2008). Glaeser et al. find similar ingroup biases, showing that people tend to give more to those of the same nationality or race (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). In a laboratory experiment, Bay and Pedersen show that Norwegians defect more often from their initial favorable positions towards a basic income proposal when non-Norwegians are included as recipients (2006). Furthermore, even arbitrary social groups formed in laboratory settings show similar ingroup biases by participants when making allocating decisions (Heap & Zizzo, 2009). Thus, ethnic

divisions are related to a wider set of phenomena, suggesting the powerful mechanisms underlying ethnic politics.

Ethnic diversity and redistributive demands: the rich and the poor

The rationale behind the debates around ethnic heterogeneity is the substantial evidence showing that social identification or ethnic divisions affect individual redistributive demands. Under these assumptions, the ethnic identity of the recipient is included in the individuals' rational calculation, modifying her preferences for redistribution (Luttmer, 2001). It is understood that individuals are often more willing to be solidary with co-ethnics, and their preferences for redistribution are consequentially affected by this cleavage. Therefore, in an ethnically heterogeneous society, class or social hierarchies are supposed to be fragmented into ethnic divisions, influencing individuals' attitudes towards redistribution by the ethnic as well as the class cleavage.

Several scholars have developed models that include the ethnic cleavage into the former model of economic self-interest. Along this line, Houle shows how the dynamics of inequality are affected by the ethnic composition of a country (2017). Specifically, the ethnic composition of the poor strongly affects the level of redistribution in unequal countries. For Houle, countries with a more ethnically homogeneous lower stratum present more capacity to mobilize the poor and consequentially to generate higher aggregate demand for redistribution among the society (2017). Therefore, countries with an ethnically heterogeneous lower stratum would face more difficulties to crystalize class cleavages, which consequentially would generate lower concerns about inequality and lower preferences for redistribution, especially among those most economically interested in such redistribution.

Similarly, Lind explores how the presence of different groups in a society undermines the demand for redistribution (2007). Lind builds a model where individuals integrate the in-

group payoffs and their economic self-interest into their utility functions. Thus, the medianvoter is no longer one imaginary individual, but as many individuals as different salient groups in the society, and these median voters have utility functions attached to the status of their group, such as the ethnic group. Then, inequality has different effects depending on the kind of inequality, either within-group, between-group inequality, or both. While withingroup inequality tends to increase the demand for redistribution, between-group inequality has the opposite effect (Lind, 2007). In sum, societies with more ethnic groups will have lower preferences for redistribution, and that holds even if the poor group is the majoritarian one (Lind, 2007, p. 53).

Luttmer (2001) reaches similar conclusions by posing different mechanisms. In his view, individuals in ethnically heterogeneous countries have lower preferences for redistribution, specifically in countries with a poorer minority, which is perceived to be the main recipient of redistributive policies. The underlying argument is that individuals in ethnically heterogeneous countries have lower levels of solidarity with the recipients. Therefore, do not consider themselves as potential recipients after facing potential downward mobility (Luttmer, 2001).

Departing from the common assumption, Rueda emphasizes that the effect of ethnic heterogeneity regarding preferences for redistribution poses different rationales among richer and poorer individuals (2018). On the one hand, poorer individuals do not have many options but to prioritize their economic self-interest. Therefore, their preferences for redistribution are not largely affected by in-group bias in ethnically heterogeneous countries. On the other hand, for richer individuals, their preferences for redistribution are not only the result of economic self-interest but of moral calculations that include values such as altruism. By establishing this asymmetry, the potential in-group biases are observed more often among richer individuals in ethnically heterogeneous countries since their "moral" payoff to prefer

redistributive policies in favor of the poor is lower in such ethnically heterogeneous countries (Rueda, 2018). Dahlberg et al. find evidence in the same direction from a natural experiment in Sweden (Dahlberg, Karin, & Lundqvist, 2012). The increases in immigration in Swedish municipalities led to a general decrease in support for redistribution. Furthermore, this effect was significantly larger among richer individuals (Dahlberg et al., 2012).

Although the reviewed literature shows some consensus around the adverse effects that ethnic cleavages have on preferences for redistribution, the mechanisms under which these ethnic divisions have an influence are diverse and still under scrutiny. More specifically, how ethnic divisions affect the preferences for redistribution of upper and lower strata remains a contested question that has significant implications on policy design and to understand how ethnic divisions could affect responses to inequality. Whether ethnic cleavages are formed in a top-down or a bottom-up fashion has also implications on the debates around whether ethnic cleavages are explained by political entrepreneurship (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004, p. 136) or if they arise due to strong natural human tendencies to dislike out-group others (Freeman, 2009).

In sum, the cited literature points to different effects among rich and poor individuals. For Houle, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity tends to diminish the preferences for redistribution, especially among the poor (2017). In this case, the identified mechanism will be designated as the *demobilization* one. On the other hand, some findings point that it is the rich, and not the poor who tend to have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous societies (Rueda, 2018) (Dahlberg et al., 2012). In this second case, the mechanism will be identified as the *altruistic bias* one. Rather than testing and scrutinizing these specific mechanisms, this thesis will further address them and test empirically their implications.

The role of class identities

However, these arguments are tested by using only objective indicators of income and are mainly focused on the US and Europe, with high internal consistency but less external validity. For instance, Finseraas (2012) finds strong evidence among western European countries regarding the negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution among the rich. However, when translating the arguments to post-communist countries, these effects disappear (p. 177). Moreover, the use of income indicators faces more difficulties in supporting the causal mechanisms by which the economic differences operate in different regions, especially beyond the US and Europe. This raises several problems, such as the heterogeneity between individual income indicators across regions, the institutional heterogeneity across countries in those different regions, or the different ethnic configurations in contrast with the US and Europe.

To overcome some of these issues, I argue that subjective indicators of social class can complement the analysis in different ways. First, most of the literature explicitly or implicitly rely on the social status of the ethnic group/social class when individuals form their preferences for redistribution. By putting the (implicit in most of the studies) notion of social status at the center and measuring it directly, individuals' motivations regarding their redistributive demands can be tested explicitly. While the social status of ethnic groups is hard to measure, indicators of subjective social class seem to be a good indicator of selfperceived class status, clarifying one part of the puzzle. Moreover, the use of subjective class can help to make visible unobserved characteristics linked to social status, such as wealth.

Second, to draw valid inferences beyond Europe and the US about the rationality of individuals, indicators of objective income can be incomplete or be inconsistent across regions. The ISSP, one of the main datasets available to address issues around inequality, has inconsistent measures of objective income across countries and periods (Rueda & Pontusson,

2010, p. 15). For instance, belonging to the second decile in the income scale may have different implications in different countries regarding social position due to substantial heterogeneity regarding educational levels, occupation, or exposition to cultural influences. Instead, indicators of subjective class are directly linked to a universal latent component of class. Thus, notions of subjective social class can cross these lines, uniting all the potential factors around the phenomena of class.

Moreover, subjective indicators can help to disentangle the contradictions regarding the theorization of individual utility functions, as class self-conscious categorizations can add evidence on how individuals rationalize their policy preferences building on the selfconscious observation of their position in society. Since the notion of subjective social class, rather than representing a different aspect of class compared to objective indicators such as income or occupation, is usually embedded in it, subjective social class can be considered an accompanying feature of social class² (Bottero, 2004). Presented in a more obvious way, subjective self-positioning can clarify the causal path underlying the formation of preferences for redistribution and its relation with ethnic divisions. On the contrary, objective indicators of income can face more difficulties to disentangle the individuals' rationalizations when forming policy preferences since. As explained by Bourdieu (1984), a complex set of conscious and unconscious processes can operate when individuals form their identities. Therefore, subjective indicators of social class can openly reveal the potential utility functions of the individual, shedding light on the mechanisms underlined by the literature regarding the effect that ethnic divisions have on preferences for redistribution among different social classes.

² Where social class represents the overall phenomena measured by objective and subjective indicators of class.

Hypotheses

To my knowledge, little or no study has tested the relationship between subjective indicators of social class and individual preferences for redistribution depending on the level of ethnic heterogeneity of a country. Regarding such identities, there is little known about "which categories matter the most, and how people trade them off" (Costa-Font & Cowell, 2015, p. 371). If, as the literature suggests, different income strata are affected in different ways when forming their preferences for redistribution depending on the ethnic composition of a country, this effect should be observed in the linkage between these class self-identifications and the preferences for redistribution in countries with different ethnical composition. Following the argumentation in former chapters, the present paper aims to test various theories from the literature by using subjective notions of class. At the same time, this empirical strategy will be replicated using income indicators to control for potential divergences between objective and subjective class and to contrast the findings regarding the causal paths and mechanisms drawn by the literature.

In the next section, I formulate two main hypotheses, which are labeled as the *demobilization* (*H1a, H1b*) hypotheses, under which low-class individuals are the most affected by ethnic heterogeneity regarding preferences for redistribution, and the *altruistic bias* (*H2a, H2b*) hypothesis, under which are upper-class individuals those most affected by such ethnic heterogeneity. As argued before, these hypotheses will be tested by using both indicators of objective and subjective class. Regarding subjective class, I will focus on those self-identified as low, working-class, and upper-class individuals, leaving out from the main discussion those identified as middle class since the relation with individual preferences for redistribution seem more ambiguous. The discussion on ethnic heterogeneity will be based on the indicator of Drazanova (2019), which denotes the probability in a given country that two randomly-selected individuals belong to different ethnic groups.

The demobilization hypothesis

As presented before, the literature shows different focuses on how ethnic divisions can affect the formation of individual preferences for redistribution. An important branch of the literature has emphasized the demobilizing potential that ethnic divisions exert on the poor. Although most scholars focus implicitly or explicitly on the low-classes, I review three different studies to summarize this point of view.

An intuitive rationale applies in this case, since the poor are the most economically interested in redistribution, having more ground to lose in terms of redistributive demands than richer individuals. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) advanced the argument by studying the US case, detailing its deeply rooted history of ethnic divisions. They show how the role of ethnic divisions prevented the adoption of redistributive policies, making class-based coalitions harder to form in the face of such ethnic cleavages (p. 135). Consequentially, these ethnic divisions were politically exploited by dividing the poor electorate into the racial cleavage, generating contradictory forces regarding the economic self-interest of the poor. Thus, the most economically interested in redistributive policies become distracted or demobilized by the presence of such ethnic divisions (p. 134).

Inspired by the framework proposed by Shayo (2009), under which individuals incorporate their identities based on the proximity and the status of such identities, Lindqvist and Östling (2011) build a model focusing on ethnicity and class. Under their framework, the availability of class and ethnic identities generates contradictions regarding preferences for redistribution since class and ethnic identities carry different statuses. Thus, if the poor are ethnically fragmented, it is first less likely that poorer individuals identify as poor due to lower similarity within the poor group, and second it is more likely that poor people identify with their ethnicity due to higher similarity (Lindqvist & Östling, 2011). Consequentially, individuals decide between ethnic and class identities, decreasing the overall preferences for

redistribution, and this is especially important for the poor, who are more status-seeking than richer individuals.³

For Houle, ethnic divisions in a country undermine the potential of lower classes to mobilize around a pro-redistribution coalition (2017). This would make the class identification among lower classes less attractive, and weaken the link between low-class identifications and preferences for redistribution. Houle identifies two related mechanisms by which the lower strata may have fewer preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Firstly, in ethnically homogeneous countries the group loyalty or closeness between the poor would be higher, consequently creating stronger social networks and making class identifications more likely (Houle, 2017, p. 6), which is ultimately translated to higher preferences for redistribution. Secondly, ethnic heterogeneity may generate a more complex political landscape, "increasing the number of issues and their salience" (p. 6), which potentially decreases the salience of economic issues. In addition, it can be argued that these multiple axes of political competition due to ethnic divisions can generate institutional or party-voter linkages by emphasizing other issues than redistribution, which in turn can shape the individual preferences for redistribution due to reasons based on partisanship loyalty rather than self-interest economic reasons.

Under these arguments, it can be stated that ethnic fractionalization leads to weaker class identification and a lower salience of class-based politics among the poor, leading to a softened link between self-economic interest and preferences for redistribution among the

³ Although this thesis focuses on those who already have a class identity, this is not necessarily contradictory to the simultaneous adoption of a more salient identity, such as an ethnic one, which potentially shapes the preferences for redistribution of the individual. While the model developed by Lindqvist and Östling class and ethnic identities are mutually exclusive, the presented empirical strategy can serve as a test for this assumption in relation to preferences for redistribution. An extended discussion follows in the formulation of the hypotheses and regarding figures A1-A9 in the appendix.

poor. Those identified with the lower classes will have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries since their class under such ethnic divisions tends to be demobilized and divided, dealigning class-based policy preferences and consequentially preferences for redistribution. Thus, these related mechanisms have one main implication on preferences for redistribution among the lower strata of the society, leading to the first hypothesis, which I label as the *demobilization* hypothesis:

H1a: Individuals who identify as low-class have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries, compared to individuals who identify as low-class in ethnically homogeneous countries.

However, ethnic and class identifies can interact, biasing the expectations. Individuals in ethnically heterogeneous countries may identify more often with low-status ethnicities, generating a positive effect through class identification on preferences for redistribution, which can have the opposite expected effect. For instance, individuals with higher incomes may identify more often as low-class in ethnically heterogeneous countries, due to ethnic identifications. This is observed in some countries analyzed in figures A1 to A7 in the appendix, showing that high-incomers of certain ethnicities tend to hold more often low-class identifications. An extended discussion in the appendix briefly addresses this potential relationship. In other words, ethnic identifications more often in ethnically heterogeneous countries, masking the effects through class identifications. To control for this potential bias, objective class, or income indicators can help to contrast the findings. Since the arguments are usually translated in the literature to objective class, I test the following complementary *demobilization* hypothesis:

H1b: Poorer individuals have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries, compared to poorer individuals in ethnically homogeneous countries.

The altruistic bias hypothesis

Other studies have focused on the upper strata of the population, emphasizing the greater influence that upper classes have on the policymaking process (Anderson & Beramendi, 2012). Rather than drawing general models under which ethnic heterogeneity affects the preferences for redistribution of individuals, these studies emphasize the different rationales that apply to poor and rich individuals. Thus, the formation of preferences for redistribution derives from a hierarchy of considerations that is different for people in upper strata, since rich individuals would be less affected by redistributive policies in comparison with the poor (Rueda & Pontusson, 2010, p. 12). This would allow richer individuals to incorporate "other-regarding preferences" such as altruism (p. 11), which consequentially can affect the preferences for redistribution of the upper strata.

Along with this reasoning, Rueda (2018) finds that the rich are those who are affected by the ethnic composition of a country since their economic position allows them to incorporate to their rational calculations other non-economic utilities linked to in-group rewards. Since altruistic behavior is more prevalent towards co-ethnics, in ethnically heterogeneous countries, rich individuals tend to prefer lower redistribution. By its part, poor individuals do not incorporate other-regarding values simply because they do not have an analogous choice. Therefore, their preferences for redistribution remain high even when there is ethnic heterogeneity (Rueda, 2018).

By focusing on western Europe, Finseraas (2012) finds similar evidence, showing that the regional ethnic heterogeneity of the poor affects only the preferences for redistribution of rich individuals, showing that the weakened risk-aversion of the rich to potential downward mobility when the ethnic heterogeneity is high tend to reduce their preferences for redistribution. On the other hand, individuals in the upper-income strata tend to perceive more

risks of downward mobility if more proportions of their ethnic group are present in the lower strata (2012, p. 174), leading to higher preferences for redistribution.

Through alternative mechanisms, this second set of studies emphasizes and shows evidence that the rich and not the poor are those negatively affected by ethnic heterogeneity regarding their preferences for redistribution. Following the emphasis on the potential altruistic concerns around the formation of policy preferences among the rich, I formulate the following *altruistic bias* hypothesis:

H2a: Individuals who identify as upper-class have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries, compared to individuals who identify as upper-class in ethnically homogeneous countries.

In parallel with the reasoning for hypothesis H1b, the effect of ethnic identities can bias the estimations more often in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Richer individuals identified with a low status ethnicity would prefer higher levels of redistribution than those with a high status ethnicity, and the different ethnic configurations may lead the results in unexpected directions. As well as with the hypotheses H1a and H1b, I refer to the brief discussion in the appendix regarding figures A1-A9, which tries to shed some light on the relationship between ethnic and class identities. Given the uncertainty of these considerations, the use of twofold hypotheses (relying on subjective and objective class) should diminish these concerns. Thus, I test this mechanism by using income indicators by posing the following complementary *altruistic bias* hypothesis:

H2b: Richer individuals have lower preferences for redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries, compared to richer individuals in ethnically homogeneous countries.

Expectations

In sum, if the evidence is consistent with only one of these two hypotheses, the results should be represented by either one of the graphs in Figure 1. The left panel in Figure 1 shows the

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potential effect of ethnic heterogeneity among lower classes (H1a, H1b), while the right panel only shows the effect among upper classes (H2a, H2b). If the points between ethnically heterogeneous and homogeneous countries form parallel lines, then the effect (or non-effect) of ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution would be equally prevalent among different classes. This would mean that either both H1a/H1b and H2a/H2b find support or none of them. In that case, the theorizations around the different rational calculations or utility functions of richer and poorer individuals would be contested.

Figure 1. Expected effects (if H1 and H2 find support, respectively) from the interaction between subjective social class and ethnic heterogeneity regarding preferences for redistribution.



The common hypothesis: ethnic heterogeneity and preferences for redistribution

Finally, these theories go in the same direction around the average effects that ethnic heterogeneity has on preferences for redistribution. Either more prevalent among lower or upper-class individuals, there is a substantial consensus on the effect that ethnic heterogeneity has on preferences for redistribution. A brief look at Figure 2 shows the correlation between the degree of ethnic heterogeneity and the average preferences for redistribution in 55 countries. Figure 2. Ethnic heterogeneity (0-1) (x-axis) and average preferences for redistribution (1-10) for each country (y-axis). Own calculations based on the WVS (Inglehart et al., 2014) and the data by Drazanova (2019).



To test the preliminary correlations observed in Figure 2 and complement the former hypotheses, replicating the broader literature on preferences for redistribution, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H3: Ethnically heterogeneous countries have on average lower preferences for redistribution.

3 Data and methods

To test the hypotheses, the analysis will mainly rely on the 6th wave of the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014), collected through the period 2010-2014. With more than 60 countries along the five continents, the total number of respondents is almost 90,000. It contains a rich set of questions regarding socioeconomic indicators and attitudes that allows to control for a large number of factors. Due to these characteristics, it is especially valuable to test the external spatial validity (beyond OECD countries) of the hypotheses derived from the literature, allowing at the same time to identify regional variation. To increase the comparability with the existing literature, I build the analyses on the study by Duman (2019), which links the notion of subjective class with preferences for redistribution by using the same dataset. Therefore, the selection of control variables for the analysis will follow those of Duman to increase the replicability and the addition of knowledge. At the same time, the inclusion of income indicators in the WVS allows to test simultaneously H1b and H2b hypotheses.

In contrast, hypothesis H3 will be tested by using country averages from WVS and other databases. The data for ethnic heterogeneity is based on the dataset by Drazanova (2019), while other country-level indicators consist of various sources detailed below.



Figure 3. Multilevel models for hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H1b, H2b.

Figure 4. Regression models (country-level) for hypothesis H3.



I build three main analyses, two with two levels of analysis and a mediating variable (first model for hypotheses H1a/H2a, the second model for hypotheses H1b/H2b) and a third one (for hypothesis H3) with only country-level variables. The corresponding individual-level variables and macro country-level variables are presented in the same order below. A simplified model is represented in Figure 3 for hypotheses H1 and H2. It consists of an independent individual-level variable, subjective class (1st analysis) or objective class (2nd analysis), a dependent individual-level variable, preferences for redistribution, and a country-level mediator variable, ethnic heterogeneity (present in all three analyses). Figure 4 represents the basic model for the hypothesis H3, which only includes country-level factors.

Individual level

The dependent variable, preferences for redistribution, consists originally of the individual opinion in a 1-10 scale, 1 being "Incomes should be made more equal" and 10 "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort". I change the direction of the variable to identify higher scores with higher preferences for redistribution. However, when the independent variable is categorical, i.e., subjective class, preferences for redistribution is further recoded as a binary response, where respondents fully agreeing with the statement "Incomes should be made more equal" are coded as 1 and the rest as 0. The first independent variable, subjective social class, consists of self-identifications with one of the following five categories: *upper class, upper-middle class, lower-middle class, working-class, lower class.* Finally, the second independent variable, income, is the decile to which the individual belongs on a 1-10 scale.

Following the literature on preferences for redistribution and the study by Duman (2019), I include a set of socioeconomic indicators such as age, education, gender, and employment status. These indicators are standard in the literature on preferences for redistribution and expected to have a relationship with the dependent variable and the main independent variable, subjective class. Age is included since it can be an important factor regarding preferences for redistribution. Older people are more often recipients, while younger people are more often among the active population. Therefore, they could follow different rationales regarding their preferences for redistribution (Ashok, V., Kuziemko, I., & Washington, 2015). In general, the pattern found in most of the scholarship is that older people prefer more redistribution (Finseraas, 2009; Rueda, 2018). However, the causal mechanism has not been extensively studied by the literature. Education also has a consistent relationship with preferences for redistribution in most of the reviewed empirical studies. The basic rationale behind the effect of education is that more educated people often have more market-oriented skills, so they can be more adaptive to the labor market and therefore tend to be less riskaverse and prefer less governmental redistribution (Finseraas, 2009, p. 99). Thus, I include an indicator of the respondent level of education. Identifying as a female also has a positive effect on preferences for redistribution among studies (Guillaud, 2013), probably due to the greater difficulties women face in the labor market (Finseraas, 2009, p. 99). Therefore, I include a dummy variable for gender.⁴ Finally, the employment status of the respondent can affect her preferences for redistribution due to the relative position of employed and unemployed people towards the job market. Therefore, I include a categorical variable indicating if the individual is employed, unemployed, or non-employed.

⁴ As explained in Table A4 in the appendix, this variable is further operationalized as the sex categorization by the interviewer.

Furthermore, I add a small set of attitudinal indicators, following those included by Duman (2019). First, the literature on the role of social capital shows the importance of interpersonal trust, where individuals with higher social trust tend to prefer higher levels of redistribution (Alberto Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Therefore, I include a dummy variable on social trust, indicating if the person thinks that "most people can be trusted" or if one "needs to be very careful" with others. Second, religion is also usually an important attitudinal factor that influences preferences for redistribution. The rationale is that religions are often social safetynets that undermine the attractiveness of redistributive policies for individuals of those religiosity that indicates how often the individual attends religious services. Third, ideology is a powerful factor in most of the reviewed literature, showing substantial independence from socioeconomic factors (Duman, 2019). Therefore, I include a variable indicating the individuals' self-positioning on a 1-10 left-right scale.

Country-level

The main country-level variable, ethnic fractionalization, is extracted from the indicator developed by Alesina et al. and updated by Drazanova (2019). It indicates the likelihood, in a given country, that two randomly selected individuals are members of different ethnolinguistic groups. Thus, it takes the value 0 when the population is entirely homogeneous, and 1 when all the individuals are ethnically distinct. As a macro variable, it takes the same value for all individuals in a given country, interacting with the main independent variables, subjective class and income, or being the independent variable itself in the third analysis.

Various country-level indicators are included to control for potential sources of bias. First, the general level of inequality can affect how different classes form their preferences for redistribution. At the same time, it can be related to the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of the

country, biasing the inferences. Therefore, I include a variable for the country-level inequality, following the same strategy as Duman, who uses 5-year averages for each country (2019, p. 188). Since the period of the survey varies across countries in the WVS dataset, the Gini coefficient is taken from different years, depending on the country. Secondly, the GDP of a country can influence the linkage between subjective class and preferences for redistribution due to different institutional settings derived from economic development. It may also bias the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution since many developed countries have low levels of ethnic fractionalization. Therefore, I include a variable for the country GDP, using the same 5-year average indicator as in Duman (2019, p. 188). Thirdly, substantial evidence shows the effect of country-level cultural factors. For instance, it is found that several attitudes connected to preferences for redistribution are consistently different between East and West Germany (B. A. Alesina & Fuchs-schündeln, 2007), due to the socialist past of the Eastern part. As well, Guillaud finds significant differences in the average preferences for redistribution among former communist and other countries (2013, p. 71). Thus, I include a variable indicating the number of years the country has been ruled by a socialist regime.

Finally, I introduce three control variables regarding institutional country settings. It is argued that individuals who believe in future upward mobility tend to hold fewer preferences for redistribution (Benabou & Ok, 2001). By a similar token, positive perceptions of equality of opportunities negatively influence the preferences for redistribution of the individual (Alberto Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). Since education, and more specifically, educational equality, impacts heavily on the actual social mobility and potentially on individuals' perceptions about fairness, it can affect how individuals form their preferences for redistribution. Therefore, I include a variable indicating the level of educational equality in the country.

Two additional and related control variables indicate the level of democracy and the accessibility to democratic participation in the country, respectively. First, the level of democracy may be correlated with population redistributive demands, given the regimes' higher levels of confidence, among other factors. For this reason, I include a variable indicating the level of democracy in the country. However, democratic indexes are multidimensional, including liberal components as well as democratic components. Thus, given that the relationship between raw measures of democracy and redistribution is not straightforward (Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2015), I include a complementary variable measuring the democratic regime component, i.e., the ability to absorb and perform democratic participation.

Data summary and methods

Table 1 summarizes the data for the analyses. The parameters are similar to those presented by Duman (2019, p. 179). Special mention deserves the fact that the average preferences for redistribution are slightly above half of the scale, while the mean income situates below half of the 1-10 scale. Moreover, the mean class identification is situated above the original central category of "lower-middle class". Finally, the mean ethnic heterogeneity is 0.38, with a standard deviation of 0.23. Most of the variables in Table 1 contain a similar number of observations, except for ideology. Because of this, the addition of ideology in the models substantially decreases the total number of observations. Moreover, the simultaneous inclusion of subjective class and ideology may not help to disentangle the causal effect of class identification on preferences for redistribution (Guillaud, 2013, p. 70). However, I keep ideology for the main model to follow Duman's specifications, eliminating the variable in further specifications in the appendix.

Table 2 presents the recoded variables. Preference for redistribution is recoded into two categories, as in the analysis by Duman (2019). As expected, the binary response contains

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more responses in the reference category (0). Subjective class is recoded into three categories. Given the categories' configuration, with few responses in the first item *upper-class*, I consider that *upper-class* and *upper-middle class* should increase the responses of this category. Similarly, since lower-middle class appears as the central category, it can be labeled as *middle-class*. Thus, these five categories are reduced to three, the first adding upper and upper-middle class in the original survey and labeled "Upper-class", the second consisting on the lower middle class, labeled as "Middle-class", and the third consisting on the addition of working and lower classes, labeled as "Low-class". These categories are shown in Table 2.

			Std.		
Variable	Obs.	Mean	dev.	Min.	Max.
Individual-level					
Redistribution	86680	5,72	2,98	1	10
Subjective class	86883	3,31	1,00	1	5
Ideology	68199	5,65	2,36	1	10
Income decile	86311	4,83	2,11	1	10
Religiosity	84720	4,11	2,19	1	7
Education	88766	5,65	2,42	1	9
Age	89382	41,94	16,55	16	102
Trust	87177	0,75	0,43	0	1
Gender	89474	0,52	0,50	0	1
Employment status	88038	3,40	2,15	1	8
Country-level					
Redistribution (country-averages)	60	5,60	1,08	3,85	8,08
GDP per capita					
(constant 2010, thousand US\$)	59	15,512	17,450	0,558	64,184
Gini	57	37,77	7,92	24,44	63,2
Socialist past	59	19,88	27,42	0	72
Participatory democracy	60	0,37	0,22	0,04	0,78
Democracy index	60	4,22	6,31	-10	10
Educational equality	60	0,79	1,44	-2,39	3,04
Ethnic heterogeneity	59	0,38	0,23	0,02	0,86

Table 1. Summary statistics. Sources and other specifications in Table A4 i	in the appendix.
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Variable	Category	Observations
Preferences	0	71814
for		
redistribution	1 (fully in favor)	14866
Subjective	Upper-class	19086
Subjective	Middle-class	31268
Class	Low-class	36529

Table 2. Summary statistics of recoded variables. Preferences for redistribution: 1 for those who fully agree on the statement "Incomes should be made more equal", and 0 for the rest.

As described above, the models for hypotheses H1 and H2 will include two levels of observations, individual-level, and country-level covariates. Moreover, they include a cross-level interaction between the independent variables, subjective class and income, and the mediating variable, ethnic heterogeneity, to test the first and second hypotheses. Since the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in a country is supposed to change the relationship between subjective class and preferences for redistribution, there is a need to include an interaction variable to properly capture such effect.

The empirical analysis for the first two hypotheses H1 and H2, consists of multilevel models, where individuals in the first-level are clustered into different country second-level variables with independent coefficients. The use of multilevel models is justified for two reasons. First, by the expected clustering between countries due to the explanatory power of country-level covariates, and secondly by the unsuitableness and potential "gross errors of prediction" (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013, p. 1491) that ordinary least regression techniques can lead when analyzing cross-level interactions. Finally, the third analysis includes only one level of observations for country-level factors.

First analysis (H1a, H2a)

Due to the categorical nature of the first independent variable, subjective class (see Table 2), the first analysis estimations will be based on multilevel ordered logistic regressions. Moreover, the expected variation between countries and the theoretical explanatory power of country-level variables leads to the inclusion of country-level variables. I include different specifications to explore the data and the variation between countries, including random intercepts and random slopes. For the interaction between subjective class and ethnic heterogeneity, I include two different specifications. Since the effect of subjective class is expected to have the same direction in most of the countries, the first interaction is accompanied only by random intercepts. A second specification tries to control for potential heterogeneity regarding the effect of subjective class on preferences for redistribution among different countries, including a random slope for subjective class. Regardless of the theoretical arguments, current scholarship recommends the inclusion of random slopes in multilevel models, even when implementing cross-level interactions (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019), due to the risk of underestimating the standard errors when the random slopes are omitted (Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones, 2019, p. 1052). For these purposes, I use the command *meologit* in Stata 16, since it allows a random slope for the categorical independent variable. Moreover, two robustness checks are added in the tables A1 and A2 in the appendix with different data and specifications.

Second analysis (H1b, H2b)

The second analysis closely replicates the specifications present for the first analysis. In this case the independent variable is continuous, allowing the use of the original continuous dependent variable, preferences for redistribution. Thus, I use the command *mixed* in Stata 16 due to the continuous nature of the dependent and independent variables.

Third analysis (H3)

The third analysis consists of simple OLS regressions, which only incorporates the documented country-level variables. Although the multilevel analyses include ethnic heterogeneity as a covariate along with other country-level variables, this third analysis tries

to eliminate any inferential bias since multilevel methods are less suited to estimate secondorder or higher level covariates (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016).

4 Results

First analysis (H1a, H2a)

Table 3 presents four models. The first model only includes first-level indicators. The second model incorporates country-level covariates. The third model includes the cross-level interaction between class self-identification and ethnic heterogeneity of the country, and the fourth model replicates the third with a random slope for the independent variable.

The multilevel modeling is empirically justified by the initial intraclass correlation between clusters or countries and its reduction by the implementation of the multilevel models. Following the recommendations in the literature (Aguinis et al., 2013), I implement three steps to validate the application of multilevel models empirically. First, a null model to capture the total between-country clustering, and subsequent likelihood ratio tests to validate the improvements of sequential models. The intraclass correlation of the null model is substantially improved in subsequent models, meaning that much of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by between-country factors included in the covariates and unobserved by individual-level variables. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio tests validate the implementation of country-level covariates.

Model 1 in Table 3 closely replicates the analysis by Duman (2019), showing similar results. All of the indicators in the first model exerts coefficients in the expected direction. Those individuals identified as low-class tend to prefer higher levels of redistribution compared to the reference category, upper class. However, identifying with the low class only increases by 1.2% the likelihood of having higher preferences for redistribution (falling into category 1 in the binary dependent variable). On the contrary, those identified as middle-class do not have different preferences for redistribution compared to those identified as upper-class. The rest of the controls run in the expected direction addressed in preceding chapters. As expected, those with higher incomes prefer less redistribution, as well as those with higher education. Older individuals also tend to prefer more redistribution, while the effect for gender is not statistically significant. The non-employed tend to prefer more redistribution compared to those in the reference category, as well as those active members of a union compared to non-members.

Among the attitudinal variables, ideology exerts a powerful effect on preferences for redistribution. One standard deviation from the mean to both sides of the political spectrum in the ideological scale exerts a difference in the likelihoods of responding 1 (prefer more redistribution) to the dependent variable of around 3.6%, while a change from the extreme left (responding 1) to the extreme right (responding 10) represents an increase of 6.9%. Since ideology represents a powerful variable and its relationship with class identification can be substantial, table A2 in the appendix replicates the analysis of Table 3 without the variable ideology. Finally, people who attend religious services more often have fewer preferences for redistribution, while those who agree with the statement 'most people can be trusted' show a positive relationship with preferences for redistribution.

Model 2 improves the AIC and BIC indicators substantially, giving support to the use of country-level indicators. Moreover, the AIC and BIC indicators are similar to those in the Duman's (2019) analysis, giving support to the specifications in Table 3. The inclusion of the country-level variables affects the significance level of most of the individual-level indicators, except income, age, ideology, and to a lesser extent, employment status. More importantly, subjective class identifications do not have a significant effect in Model 2, casting doubts on the strength of the indicator and its dependence on contextual country-level factors.

Table 3. Preferences for redistribution and subjective class, mediated by ethnic heterogeneity. Logistic regression (Model 1),
multilevel ordered logistic regression (Model 2), multilevel ordered logistic regression with cross-level interaction, random
intercepts (Model 3), multilevel ordered logistic regression with cross-level interaction, random intercepts and slopes (Model
<i>4). The dependent variable, preferences for redistribution, binary (0-1), being 1 those who fully agree to the statement</i>
"incomes should be made more equal". The independent variable, subjective class, categorical. Mediating variable, ethnic
heterogeneity, continuous (0-1).

	Mod	lel 1	Mod	Model 2		Model 3		lel 4
Reference (Upper-class)								
Middle-class	0.005	(0.033)	-0.034	(0.136)	0.068	(0.077)	0.077	(0.265)
Low-class	0.091**	(0.035)	0.147	(0.136)	0.423***	(0.076)	0.427	(0.264)
Income	-0.125***	(0.006)	-0.101***	(0.007)	-0.103***	(0.007)	-0.101***	(0.007)
Age	0.002^{**}	(0.001)	0.004^{***}	(0.001)	0.004^{***}	(0.001)	0.004^{***}	(0.001)
Education	-0.049***	(0.005)	-0.005	(0.006)	-0.005	(0.006)	-0.005	(0.006)
Female	-0.008	(0.023)	0.040	(0.024)	0.037	(0.024)	0.040	(0.024)
Reference (Employed)								
Non-employed	0.176***	(0.025)	0.068^*	(0.027)	0.068^*	(0.027)	0.068^*	(0.027)
Unemployed	-0.033	(0.038)	0.077	(0.041)	0.091*	(0.041)	0.077	(0.041)
Ideology	-0.056***	(0.005)	-0.046***	(0.005)	-0.047***	(0.005)	-0.046***	(0.005)
Trust	-0.129***	(0.027)	-0.045	(0.030)	-0.061*	(0.030)	-0.045	(0.030)
Religiosity	-0.014**	(0.005)	-0.001	(0.006)	-0.001	(0.006)	-0.001	(0.006)
Country-level		· /		~ /		· · ·		
GDP			0.005	(0.006)	0.007	(0.009)	0.005	(0.006)
Gini			0.012	(0.010)	0.010	(0.015)	0.012	(0.010)
Years socialist			0.013***	(0.003)	0.013**	(0.004)	0.013***	(0.003)
Participatory democracy			1.036**	(0.367)	1.073	(0.567)	1.037**	(0.365)
Educational equality			-0.255***	(0.052)	-0.253**	(0.079)	-0.254***	(0.052)
Ethnic heterogenity Interaction			-0.548	(0.287)	-0.219	(0.454)	-0.190	(0.461)
Middle- class*EthnicH					-0.105	(0.171)	-0.288	(0.595)
Low- class*EthnicH					-0.635***	(0.164)	-0.730	(0.591)
N level 1	594	166	594	66	59466		59466	
N level 2	5	1	5	1	51		51	
AIC	52.97	4,89	48.51	1,24	48.475,15		48.513,68	
BIC LL log-	53.08	52,81	48.68	52,11	48.66	04,00	48.70	12,54
likelihood	-2.65	e+04	-2.42	e+04	-2.42	e+04	-2.42	e+04

All of the country-level indicators in Model 2 run in the expected direction, having a mixed influence on individuals' preferences for redistribution. Years of socialist past and educational equality exert the stronger results, whereas Gini inequality and GDP per capita are not significant. Most importantly, ethnic heterogeneity goes in the expected direction, individuals in more ethnically heterogeneous countries have less preferences for redistribution on average. However, the effect is not significant. All of these country-effects will be further examined in the third analysis.

Models 3 and 4 test hypotheses H1a and H2a, introducing the interaction between the ethnic heterogeneity and the effect of subjective class on preferences for redistribution. The two different specifications in Model 3 and Model 4 help to understand better how they interact across countries. Model 3 has more relaxed assumptions by omitting the random slope coefficient for the independent variable. Thus, the valid results are represented by Model 4, which includes both random slopes and intercepts.

However, this differentiation serves to show the cross-country variation in the, mediated by ethnic heterogeneity, relationship between subjective class and preferences for redistribution. First, when the slope of the effect of the independent variable (subjective class) on the dependent variable (preferences for redistribution) is fixed across countries (interaction coefficient in Model 3), the positive effect of identifying with lower classes on preferences for redistribution decreases with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. This specification would support the demobilization hypothesis (H1), under which ethnic divisions demobilize lower classes. However, introducing a random slope across countries, meaning that the relationship between subjective class and preferences for redistribution can vary randomly and not only dependent on the level of heterogeneity, gives a bigger and non-significant coefficient. This means that first, the effect can be found in some countries, and second that they run in unexpected directions in some others.

Thus, the direction of the effect of subjective class on preferences for redistribution goes in substantial different directions across countries, but with no significant relationship with ethnic heterogeneity. In other words, it is "unobserved contextual variation" (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019, p. 3) that correlates with ethnic heterogeneity what explains the relationship observed in Model 3 rather than an actual mediating role of ethnic heterogeneity on the link between subjective class and preferences for redistribution.⁵ Thus, although the coefficient gives some support to the first hypothesis (and consequentially rejects the second hypothesis), the effect in Model 4 is not significant, leading to the rejection of H1a and H2a hypotheses. Moreover, the effects remain with a different specification for the dependent variable (table A1 in the appendix) and with the exclusion of the variable ideology⁶ (table A2 in the appendix).

Second analysis (H1b, H2b)

The second analysis in Table 4 tests hypotheses H1b and H2b by replicating the models 2 and 4 from the former analysis in Table 3. In Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficients for individual and country control variables change compared to the analysis in Table 3, although these changes are small in most cases. The now main independent variable, income, gives similar strong results as in the first analysis. The preferences for redistribution of those in the first decile are 0.92 points higher than of those in the 10th decile. Among the individual-level variables, low-class identification shows a strong relationship with preferences for redistribution, even with country-level controls. Moreover, among country-level covariates, only years of socialist past remains significant with this specification.

⁵ Further justifying the inclusion of random slopes for the independent variable.

⁶ Which dramatically limits the number of observations.

Table 4. Preferences for redistribution and income, mediated by ethnic heterogeneity. Multilevel mixed-effects regression (Model 1), multilevel mixed-effects regression with cross-level interaction, random intercepts and slopes (Model 2). The dependent variable, preferences for redistribution, continuous (1-10), being 10 those who fully agree to the statement "incomes should be made more equal". The independent variable, income, continuous (1-10). The mediating variable, ethnic heterogeneity, continuous (0-1).

	Mode	el 1	Model	. 2
Income Reference (Upper-	-0.102***	(0.013)	-0.109***	(0.025)
class)	0 1 47***	(0.022)	0.147***	(0.022)
Middle-class	0.14/	(0.032)	0.147	(0.032)
Low-class	0.176***	(0.034)	0.175***	(0.035)
Age	0.003***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
Education	-0.022***	(0.006)	-0.022***	(0.006)
Female	0.067^{**}	(0.023)	0.067^{**}	(0.023)
Reference (Employed)				
Non-employed	0.047	(0.026)	0.047	(0.026)
Unemployed	0.057	(0.039)	0.057	(0.039)
Ideology	-0.159***	(0.005)	-0.159***	(0.005)
Trust	0.076^{**}	(0.028)	0.076^{**}	(0.028)
Religiosity Country-level	0.003	(0.006)	0.003	(0.006)
GDP	0.006	(0.012)	0.006	(0.012)
Gini	0.019	(0.020)	0.019	(0.020)
Years socialist	0.013*	(0.006)	0.013^{*}	(0.006)
Participatory democracy	0.668	(0.771)	0.670	(0.772)
Educational equality	-0.140	(0.108)	-0.140	(0.108)
Ethnic heterogeneity	-0.954	(0.591)	-1.131	(0.776)
Interaction				
Income*EthnicH			0.020	(0.055)
N level 1	5946	66	5946	6
N level 2	51		51	
AIC	2.86e-	+05	2.86e+	05
BIC	2.86e-	+05	2.86e+	05
LL log-likelihood	-1.43e	+05	-1.43e+	-05

Standard errors in parentheses p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001

The inclusion of the interaction variable in Model 2 exert results in the same direction as in the first analysis. The positive coefficient in the interaction means that poorer individuals prefer lower levels of redistribution in ethnically heterogeneous countries compared to poorer individuals in ethnically homogeneous countries, giving support to the demobilization

hypothesis. However, as in Table 3, the results are not significant, leading to the rejection of H1b and H2b hypotheses. In sum, the combined results from the first and second analyses give strong grounds to reject the general H1 and H2 hypothesis.

The presented analyses show that the ethnic heterogeneity of a country does not change the preferences for redistribution of richer and upper-class individuals or poorer and lower-class individuals. Moreover, the covariate ethnic heterogeneity does not give significant results in any of the specifications. However, the next analysis addresses it with observing only at the country-level.

Third analysis (H3)

Table 5 shows the results of the third analysis. As in the former analyses, ethnic heterogeneity has a negative relationship with preferences for redistribution, although it is not significant in any of the specifications, leading to the rejection of the third hypothesis. The adjusted R squared in Model 1 indicates that ethnic heterogeneity hardly explains much of the variation on average preferences for redistribution. The inclusion of GDP and Gini in Model 2 does not improve the fit, meaning that those indicators do not explain aggregated preferences for redistribution among countries. However, the inclusion of the variables socialist past, educational equality, and one of the democratic indexes in Model 3 improves the fit substantially. Lastly, Model 4 shows the best fit of all the models, although of modest value.

Among the control variables, GDP per capita and Gini inequality show a relationship with preferences for redistribution in Models 3 and 4, but with standard errors about the same value as the coefficients. Democracy index and educational equality show as well a slightly stronger correlation, although insignificant. The stronger indicators are participatory democracy and years of socialist past. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, these indicators show interesting results. Regarding participatory democracy, one standard

deviation above and below the mean value increases the average preferences for redistribution by 0.8 points in the 1-10 scale. Moreover, the effect the variable socialist past with a change of one standard deviation below (0 years) and above (47.3 years) the mean is about 1 in the 1-10 scale of preferences for redistribution. These effects are shown in Figures 5 and 6, along with the non-significant effects of educational equality and ethnic heterogeneity (Figures 7 and 8, respectively).

Table 5. Preferences for redistribution and ethnic heterogeneity by country. Ordinary Least Regression analyses. Dependent variable: average country-level preferences for redistribution (continuous,1-10). Details on the data in Table A4 in the appendix.

	Model 1		Model 2		Mo	del 3	Mo	del 4
Ethnic heterogeneity	-1.020	(0.601)	-0.934	(0.706)	-1.133	(0.675)	-1.029	(0.647)
GDP per capita			0.002	(0.008)	0.022	(0.011)	0.017	(0.011)
Gini			-0.002	(0.021)	0.025	(0.023)	0.020	(0.023)
Years socialist					0.020^{**}	(0.007)	0.021**	(0.007)
Educational equality					-0.214	(0.131)	-0.234	(0.127)
Democracy index					0.044	(0.024)		
Participatory democracy							1.873*	(0.700)
Ν	4	59	57		57		57	
adj. R^2	0.0	031	-0.009		-0.009 0.115		0.175	

Standard errors in parentheses

Preferences for redistribution

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001







Participatory democracy

.8

.6

Figure 7. Educational equality and preferences for redistribution (not significant). Marginal effects holding other variables at their means and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 8. Ethnic heterogeneity and preferences for redistribution (not significant). Marginal effects holding other variables at their means and 95% confidence intervals.



Summary of results

Altogether and with several specifications, the results show that ethnic heterogeneity does not have a strong correlation with preferences for redistribution. Although ethnic heterogeneity correlates negatively with preferences for redistribution in all the specifications in Tables 3-5, none of the coefficients is statistically significant, leading to the rejection of hypothesis H3. This is in line with existing meta-analyses on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and preferences for redistribution, which shows that the evidence is "mixed at best" (Van der Straeten & Stichnoth, 2013, p. 380). Although the theory behind most of the theories seem very compelling, empirical analyses do not validate often these theoretical claims.

Thus, neither are consistently the preferences for redistribution of the lower (rejection of H1) or the upper classes (rejection of H2) affected by ethnic divisions. Furthermore, this result is substantiated by examining subjective class and income indicators. Although the results show slight support for the *demobilization* hypothesis (H1), it disappears when the slopes are allowed to vary across countries in Table 3, meaning that a group of countries guides the overall initial results. When accounting for cross-country variation of the effect of subjective class on preferences for redistribution, subjective class do not show different preferences for

redistribution when ethnic diversity varies across countries. Moreover, this result is similar to the use of subjective class and income indicators. Given the large-N dataset presented, which substantially decreases the error terms, this results cast doubts on the arguments drawn by the literature, by which ethnic heterogeneity tends to demobilize the lower classes or either tends to limits the solidarity of upper classes with the rest.

5 Limitations, conclusions, and further research

This last chapter discusses three main limitations present in this thesis, along with the main conclusions and suggestions for further research. First, the analyses suggest that the utility of indicators based on subjective class may not be appropriate since they are sometimes dealigned from objective factors such as indicators of income when predicting regarding preferences for redistribution. The natural translation, especially in Europe, from objective categories such as income or occupation indicators into class identification and to policy preferences may not be present in other parts of the world. Thus, the lack of comparable data on individual income indicators beyond the US and Europe introduces difficulties to theorize the mechanisms of individual preferences for redistribution beyond these regions. At the same time, individual self-rankings or subjective social class face difficulties to complement the lack of such income indicators, which at the same time do not translate equally across regions into similar class consciousness and policy preferences. Institutional settings and the relationship of different occupational status with the state (Chen & Lu, 2011) differ across countries, leading to a substantial variation on the formation of class consciousness and policy preferences. Therefore, although self-class identification can be helpful to understand class cleavages and divergences regarding policy preferences formation, its meaning and implications are not necessarily consistent across countries.

As shown by the alternative specifications in Table 3, there is substantive cross country variation regarding the effect of subjective class on preferences for redistribution. This is found as well by Duman, who observes that lower classes in countries with high ethnic heterogeneity like Ecuador or the Philippines lead to fewer preferences for redistribution (2019, p. 183). The direction of this effect is hardly accommodated under the assumptions of policy preference formation based on the European schema of class cleavages. Thus, more

and comparable data on individual income is required to disentangle the effects of income and subjective class beyond the US and European countries.

Nonetheless, the present paper seems to partially overcome these issues by following a twofold strategy that relies on subjective and objective indicators of class that further produces consistent results in the same direction. At the same time, it shows the prevalence of income and other objective factors when individuals form their preferences for redistribution. Either through unconscious and conscious non-class related factors, differences in income, occupational status, or education, segregate people in different degrees into different socialization clusters. This suggests that broader norms and specific policy preferences will differ among people in such varied categories, either by unconscious or by non-strictly class-based conscious factors (Bourdieu, 1984). This thesis and its empirical evidence is consistent with this view, along with most of the empirical evidence in the literature.

However, these arguments do not translate to the discussion on ethnic divisions, leading to a second limitation. While an income difference leads more consistently to social divisions, an ethnic difference will only lead to such social clusters and cleavages under more uncertain historical and sociological factors. Therefore, their impact on policy preferences is much more uncertain and dependent of underdeveloped or inexistent data, especially beyond western countries.

Along this line, the literature on redistribution and ethnic heterogeneity often emphasizes constructivist perspectives, under which such ethnic heterogeneity is only influential to broader political phenomena in specific contexts or dependent on "entrepreneur politicians" (A. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004, p. 136). While many authors have adopted this constructivist perspective to explain ethnic cleavages and their implications on other political phenomena, many empirical analyses, including this thesis, use measures that indicate only the presence of

ethnic differences rather than their relative importance or the inequality among them, depicting an important limitation. Thus, although indicators of ethnic heterogeneity take into account to some extent the salience of the groups (A. Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, & Kurlat, 2003), they are not necessarily related to ethnic conflict or divisions that could affect other political phenomena. A substantive number of different ethnic groups can coexist with commonly shared notions of nationhood, or the combination of their differences could not lead to substantive cleavages around the welfare state and redistributive issues. Moreover, the ethnic composition of elites is rarely mentioned in the literature on preferences for redistribution, although there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that ethnic cleavages at the elite level are a necessary condition to the existence of such ethnic cleavages among the population (Somer, 2001) (Barrio & Rodríguez-Teruel, 2017). Thus, although substantial evidence on the link between ethnic heterogeneity and redistributive demands has a lot of internal validity (due to experimental settings or strong evidence), the variety of arguments for different regions regarding how ethnic differences operate and the different conceptualization casts substantial doubts on the universal validity of these specific arguments. Further constructivist approaches to the formation of ethnic divisions (Wimmer, 2008) could explain why raw measures of ethnic heterogeneity are not related to preferences for redistribution.

Consequentially, further research could implement other approaches to observe the potential effects of ethnic divisions on preferences for redistribution. The relationship between ethnic divisions and preferences for redistribution may depend on indicators different from the common ethnic fractionalization. The relative size of the ethnic groups, the specific ethnic composition of different income strata (Finseraas, 2012), the relative distance between ethnic groups (Kolo, 2012), between and within-group inequality (Lind, 2007), political ethnic polarization (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2002), or insights into the relative social status of

different ethnicities⁷ are different approaches in this regard. Moreover, the elaboration of mathematical models based on concepts with a lower level of complexity, such as notions of social status of different ethnicities (Lindqvist & Östling, 2011), may help to clarify the potential relationship between ethnic divisions and preferences for redistribution.

Thirdly and more generally, most of the literature often focuses on OECD countries, and even more frequently on Europe and the US, with somewhat similar institutional and sociological configurations. This introduces a set of specific scope conditions that cannot be easily extrapolated to other regions. Since this thesis relies heavily on such literature, the implications have to be taken cautiously.

Moreover, theorization departs mainly from Europe and US perspectives, increasing the potential biases. The variety of configurations, salience, and relative status of ethnicities among countries can lead to unexpected results when studying individual preferences beyond the US and Europe. Specifically, ethnic cleavages, their importance, and their effects on broader political issues could be epiphenomenal to the US and European countries due to the colonial and slavery past of these regions and in some cases foundational myths based on the idea of racial purity. For similar reasons, this could as well lead European and American scholars to overestimate the role of ethnic heterogeneity on broader political phenomena. Indeed, even in European post-communist countries, "the debates concerning immigration and welfare state issues are less intertwined" (Finseraas, 2012, p. 172). Although differences between American and European scholars are usually emphasized, for similar historical

with African or Asian scholars, decreasing the ability of academic research to calibrate the

reasons, their points of view are probably closer to each other in comparison, for instance,

⁷ A brief discussion on this issue is extended in the appendix.

scope of the theoretical claims. These, along with other dimensions, might generate particular conditions in those regions that affect other political phenomena in general and preferences for redistribution, creating and reinforcing loops between nationality and ethnicity in Europe and the US, which may not be present beyond.

In sum, although arguments around the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution seem strong and compelling, the evidence is inconsistent (Van der Straeten & Stichnoth, 2013). This should encourage the literature to either reject the trade-off or "relationship between multiculturalism and solidarity" (Kymlicka, 2015), or to refine the conceptualizations regarding ethnic divisions and their effects on preferences for redistribution. This thesis presented evidence showing that, across the world, ethnic heterogeneity does not have an overall negative effect on preferences for redistribution, and neither this effect is more prevalent among lower or upper classes. Thus, the present thesis contributes to the scholarship by limiting the spatial scope, beyond Europe and the US, of the claims linking ethnic heterogeneity and preferences for redistribution. Moreover, it suggests that specific ethnic configurations and historical cleavages may support these claims in Europe and the US but not beyond. Thus, this thesis is aligned with various meta-analyses showing that the empirical evidence regarding the links between ethnic diversity, social cohesion (Meer & Tolsma, 2014), and redistributive demands (Van der Straeten & Stichnoth, 2013) is not consistent.

However, this complexity should not make scholars leave out the inclusion of sociological perspectives into the analyses. The omission of such variables would lead to even worse biases in economics scholarship which are being overcome in the last years (Akerlof, 2020). Furthermore, introducing new and better indicators based on sociological perspectives should complement contemporary developments in comparative political economy, which can help

us understand and test theoretical claims derived from the challenges that globalization or economic inequalities pose to our societies.

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Appendix

Class identities can sometimes be strongly related to ethnic identities. Figure A1 shows that, in South Africa, among those with high incomes and identified as black, more than 60% also identify themselves as low-class. On the contrary, those identified as white with high incomes identify as low-class in less than 10% of the cases. Similarly, among low-incomers, those



Figure A 1. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels (South Africa). Lowincome as those falling into 1-3, and high-income as those falling into 8-10 in the 1-10 income scale. N (Black)=1033, N(White)=149. Own elaboration with data from the World Value Survey.

identified as black tend to identify much more consistently as low-class than the same lowincomers identified as white. Although the patterns found in South Africa are extreme in comparison with other countries, Figures A2-A7 show that ethnic and class identifications can be related in many ethnically heterogeneous countries. In the US (Figure A2), high-income blacks, and to a less extent, high-income Hispanics tend to identify as well more often as low class than whites. In Ecuador (Figure A3), similar relations are found between mestizo and mulato identities. Some similarities as well are found in Algeria (Figure A4) and Uzbekistan (Figure A6), while Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Figures A5 and A7 respectively) do not show substantial differences in the identification patterns between ethnolinguistic groups. These figures suggest that ethnolinguistic groups that theoretically hold lower statuses tend to identify more often as low class even though they have the same income as other ethnolinguistic groups. Blacks in the US, mulatos in Ecuador, Chaoui in Algeria, and to a lesser extent, those who speak Uzbek and not Russian in Uzbekistan represent groups that hold lower status.

However, some other patterns are present, such as low-income blacks in the US identifying themselves more often as upper-class, as is the case as well of Chaoui or Kabyle in Algeria. These last directions can be explained by the fact that class identifications could be generated through the observation of the closest social environment, and the fact that often many ethnolinguistic groups socialize apart from the rest of the society more often. However, the small number of observations in some cases limits any substantial inference.

At the same time, the mere existence of different ethnolinguistic groups, as in Kazakhstan (Kazakhs and Russians), does not necessarily have an impact in the patterns of identification (see Figure A7), as in other substantial policy or political attitudes (Laruelle, Royce, & Beyssembayev, 2019). Indeed, Russian and Kazakh languages and ethnic groups seem integrated enough to have similar views in different policy positions and attitudes (Laruelle et al., 2019, p. 221). However, migrations through the last decades generate relationships between age and ethnic identification and language differences (219), entangling the patterns



Figure A 2. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by

income levels (US). N (White)=450, N(Black)=74, N(Hispanic)=

Figure A 3. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels (Ecuador). N (Mestizo)=145, N(Mulato)=97. Own elaboration with data from the World Value Survey.



between class identifications, ethnolinguistic groups, and potential policy differences due to

these identifications.

Figure A4. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels (Algeria). N (Arab)=338, N(Kabyle)=74, N(Chaoui) = 51. Own elaboration with data from the World Value Own elaboration with data from the World Value Survey. Survey.



Figure A 5. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels (Ukraine). N (Russian)=87, N(Ukrainian)=501.



Figure A 6. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels (Uzbekistan). N (Russian)=33, N(Uzbek)=355. Own elaboration with data from the World Value Survey.



Figure A 7. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels (Kazakhstan). N (Kazakh)=221, N(Russian)=167. Own elaboration with data from the World Value Survey.



In sum, although there are some potential patterns, these figures show that the directions and intensity of these relations are difficult to disentangle, leaving the general question open about how ethnic and class identities relate to each other and their potential influence on preferences for redistribution.

Figure A8 summarizes the class identifications of low and high-incomers in ethnically homogeneous, somewhat heterogeneous, and highly heterogeneous countries (regardless of ethnic identifications). High-incomers in ethnically heterogeneous countries tend to identify more often as low-class compared to high-incomers in ethnically homogeneous countries. At the same time, low-incomers in ethnically heterogeneous countries tend to identify more often as upper-class than low-income individuals in ethnically homogeneous countries. Thus, objective class (income) and subjective class tend to be dealigned more often in ethnically heterogeneous countries, especially among high-incomers. However, these patterns are not found among different levels of education. In sum, ethnic identities can influence subjective class identifications and consequentially preferences for redistribution, although the direction of these influences would require further research.

Figure A 8. Ethnic self-identification and subjective class by income levels. Low-income as those falling into 1-3, and highincome as those falling into 8-10 in a 1-10 income scale. Ethnic heterogeneity categories based on the mean ethnic heterogeneity +/- 1sd in Table 1. Low ethnic heterogeneity (0-0.15), medium ethnic heterogeneity (0.15-0.61), high ethnic heterogeneity (0.61-1). Own elaboration. Data on income and class identification from the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014). Data on ethnic heterogeneity from Drazanova (2019).



Figure A 9. Subjective class for individuals with primary and high educational training in ethnically homogeneous, medium, and highly heterogeneous countries. Own elaboration. Data on income and class identification from the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014). Data on ethnic heterogeneity from Drazanova.(2019).



	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Reference (Upper-class)								
Middle-class	0.130***	(0.024)	0.094	(0.133)	0.244^{***}	(0.050)	0.143	(0.259)
Low-class	0.120***	(0.025)	0.138	(0.134)	0.289***	(0.052)	0.231	(0.259)
Income	-0.097***	(0.005)	-0.081***	(0.005)	-0.084***	(0.005)	-0.081***	(0.005)
Age	0.006^{***}	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
Education	-0.019***	(0.004)	-0.017***	(0.005)	-0.017***	(0.005)	-0.017***	(0.005)
Female	0.058***	(0.017)	0.069***	(0.019)	0.068^{***}	(0.019)	0.069***	(0.019)
Reference (Employed)								
Non- employed	0.048^{*}	(0.019)	0.012	(0.021)	0.016	(0.021)	0.012	(0.021)
Unemployed	-0.091**	(0.029)	0.020	(0.032)	0.035	(0.032)	0.020	(0.032)
Ideology	-0.136***	(0.004)	-0.134***	(0.004)	-0.134***	(0.004)	-0.134***	(0.004)
Trust	0.096***	(0.020)	0.070^{**}	(0.023)	0.060^{**}	(0.023)	0.070^{**}	(0.023)
Religiosity	-0.056***	(0.004)	-0.005	(0.005)	-0.004	(0.005)	-0.005	(0.005)
Country-level GDP Gini			0.010 0.012	(0.006) (0.010)	0.010 0.010	(0.009) (0.016)	0.010 0.012	(0.006) (0.010)
Years socialist			0.015^{***}	(0.003)	0.015^{**}	(0.005)	0.015***	(0.003)
Participatory democracy			0.946**	(0.363)	0.881	(0.584)	0.946**	(0.363)
Educational equality			-0.126*	(0.051)	-0.122	(0.082)	-0.126*	(0.051)
Ethnic heterogeneity Interaction			-0.532	(0.282)	-0.229	(0.455)	-0.405	(0.446)
Middle- class*EthnicH					-0.242*	(0.108)	-0.129	(0.582)
Low- class*EthnicH					-0.321**	(0.106)	-0.242	(0.581)
N level 1	59466		59466		59466		59466	
N level 2	51		51		51		51	
AIC RIC	79.058,17 79.166.09		72.712,60		12.013,49 72 862 35		72.716,43	
LL log- likelihood	-3.95e+04		-3.63e+04		-3.63e+04		-3.63e+04	

Table A1. Replication of Table 3 in the main analyses, with modified dependent variable (Preferences for redistribution), being 1 if respondent falls between 6-10 and 0 otherwise.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		
Reference (Upper- class)							
Middle-class	0.010	(0.031)	-0.032	(0.128)	0.058	(0.246)	
Low-class	0.136***	(0.032)	0.169	(0.129)	0.406	(0.245)	
Income	-0.127***	(0.005)	-0.101***	(0.006)	-0.101***	(0.006)	
Age	0.003***	(0.001)	0.004^{***}	(0.001)	0.004^{***}	(0.001)	
Education	-0.041***	(0.005)	-0.006	(0.005)	-0.006	(0.005)	
Female	0.007	(0.021)	0.051^{*}	(0.022)	0.052^{*}	(0.022)	
Reference (Employed)							
Non-employed	0.146***	(0.023)	0.068^{**}	(0.025)	0.068^{**}	(0.025)	
Unemployed	-0.033	(0.035)	0.073	(0.038)	0.073	(0.038)	
Trust	-0.141***	(0.024)	-0.049	(0.027)	-0.049	(0.027)	
Religiosity	-0.022***	(0.005)	-0.006	(0.006)	-0.006	(0.006)	
Country-level							
GDP			0.005	(0.005)	0.005	(0.005)	
Gini			0.010	(0.009)	0.010	(0.009)	
Years socialist			0.013***	(0.003)	0.013***	(0.003)	
Participatory democracy			1.323***	(0.310)	1.325***	(0.308)	
Educational equality			-0.253***	(0.050)	-0.253***	(0.050)	
Ethnic heterogeneity Interaction			-0.482	(0.269)	-0.174	(0.434)	
Middle- class*EthnicH					-0.241	(0.564)	
Low- class*EthnicH					-0.636	(0.561)	
N level 1	72890		728	72890		72890	
N level 2	54		54		54		
AIC	65.026,86		59.39	59.394,45		59.397,13	
BIC	65.128,02		59.55	59.559,99		59.581,06	
LL log-likelihood	L log-likelihood -3.25e+04		-2.97e+04		-2.97e+04		

Table A2. Replication of Table 3 in the analyses, without individual-level variable ideology.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Ethnic	-0.774	-0.296	-0.206	-0.475	-0.375	-0.203
heterogeneity	(0.862)	(0.900)	(1.078)	(0.770)	(0.819)	(1.054)
CDP	0.004	-0.001	0.002	0.015	0.016	0.013
ODI	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Income top 1%	0.014			0.048		
income top 170	(0.038)			(0.038)		
Income top 10%		-0.022			0.005	
		(0.021)			(0.023)	
Income bottom			0.083			0.019
50%			(0.057)			(0.067)
				0.023**	0.022*	0.021*
Years socialist				(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Educational				-0.214	-0.290	-0.246
equality				(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.213)
oquanty D						(0.215)
Democratic				2.597**	2.359*	2.096
participation				(0.804)	(0.897)	(1.1/6)
Ν	42	41	33	42	41	33
adj. R^2	-0.055	-0.026	0.021	0.237	0.203	0.166

Table A3. Replication of Table 5 in the main analyses, with income inequality indicators from World Income Inequality Dataset (Solt, 2016).

Table A 4. Variables specification and source.

Variable	Specification	Source
Preferences for redistribution	Variable V96. From 1 ("Incomes should be made more equal") to 10 ("We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort").	WVS (Inglehart et al., 2014)
Subjective social class	Variable V238. Self-categorization, from 1 ("Upper class") to 5 ("Lower class")	WVS
Income	Variable V239. Self-categorization, from 1 (first decile) to 10 (10th decile in the income scale)	WVS
Age	Variable V242.	WVS
Education	Variable V248. Highest educational achievement, from 1 (no formal education) to 9 (university-level with degree)	WVS
Sex	Variable V240. Coded by the interviewer as 0 (male) or 1 (female)	WVS
Employment status	Variable V229. Ranging from 1 to 8, where 1-2 are "employed", 3 is "self-employed", and 4-8 are "non-paid employment"	WVS
Trust	Variable V24. Binary response, from 1 ("most people can be trusted") to 2 ("you need to be careful")	WVS
Religiosity	Variable V145. Attending religious services (apart from weddings and funerals), ranging from 1 ("more than once a week") to 7 ("never, practically never")	WVS
Redistribution (country-averages)	Calculated average preferences for redistribution for each country.	WVS
GDP per capita	GDP per capita (constant 2010, thousand US\$). 5 year averages, starting from the preceding survey year in WVS	World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2015)
Gini inequality	Gini inequality, from 0 to 100. 5 year averages, starting from the preceding survey year in WVS	World Development Indicators
Years socialist	Years under a socialist regime, 1900-2010	Various sources
Participatory democracy	Variable v2x_partipdem. Active participation of citizens in political processes. Ranging from 0 (low) to high (1) participation.	V-Dem indicators (Lindberg et al., 2020)
Democracy index	Polity IV score. Ranging from -10 to 10. Autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to 5), and democracies (5 to 10).	V-Dem indicators
Educational equality	Variable v2peedueq. High quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable the exercise of basic rights as citizens. Ranging from 0 (extremely unequal) to 4 (equal).	V-Dem indicators
Ethnic heterogeneity	Probability of selecting two randomly selected individuals belonging to different ethnolinguistic groups. 5 year average, starting from the preceding survey year in WVS	Alesina et al., updated by Drazanova (2019)