THE SULTANS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE: THE GIRAYS' DISPLACEMENT INTO OTTOMAN RUMELI AND THEIR WIDESPREAD ROLES IN NETWORKS OF VIOLENCE (1792-1807)

By

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Submitted to Central European University Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary

June 2020

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Budapest

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Abstract

After the fall of the Crimean Khanate in 1783, the majority of the Giray dynasty was forced to settle in the Ottoman Balkans. Their immigration to Rumeli impacted the region in profound ways, and its repercussions reverberated beyond that province throughout the Selimian era (1789-1807). This thesis explores what happened in the aftermath of the Giray khans' immigration to the Ottoman Balkans. It seeks to understand how the Ottoman central administration managed to absorb the Giray dynasty into Ottoman society, exert Ottoman central control over them, and it also explores how the Girays responded, collectively, to these dramatic shifts in their privileged place within the Ottoman imperial system. On the other hand, it seeks to explore the position of the Girays in Rumeli politics and their roles in shaping the networks of violence and rebellion they found there upon their immigration.

Acknowledgement

This thesis is a result of intensive work during the two years I spent at the Central European University. These years were filled with encounters with new people and places that significantly broadened my intellectual horizons. I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Tolga Esmer, who not only helped me identify and illuminate the challenging aspects of the subject matter found in this thesis but also served as an example of inspiring teacher. He was always ready to provide me with necessary information and wisely guided my work. I am also grateful to my second reader, Jan Hennings who always provoked me with broad questions that made me think about this thesis differently.

I would like to thank to all the professors who formed me throughout my experience at the CEU during the classes. I am grateful to Günhan Börekçi for many insightful conversations that shaped my approach to Ottoman history. I am thankful to all of those who provided advice and guidance along the way, especially, Robyn Dora Radway and Charles Shaw who provided fruitful feedbacks on my work.

During the process of writing this thesis, many dear friends and colleagues encouraged and supported me with their priceless friendships, helps, and advice. I am grateful to all of them and pleased to be able to express my thanks to Cevat Sucu, Samuel Huckleberry, Florik Khazarian, Ulzhan Rojik, Halit Serkan Simen, Müberra Kapusuz, Rabia Merve Demirkan Aydoğan and many others.

I owe my deepest gratitude to my family. My father Ahmet Mazı and mother Leyla Mazı, and sister Kevser and brothers Süleyman, Abdurrahman and Mustafa showed continuous self-sacrifice, support, affection, and understanding.

Finally, I owe my thanks to my friends in Istanbul, Burak Koçan, Fatma Aladağ, Göksu Keserbi, Ebubekir Güzeldere, Elif Dönmez, whose friendships and supports were priceless during the process of writing this thesis.

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To Istanbul Şehir University, my home, has recently been shut down, and to its excellent academics

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Introduction

After the fall of the Crimean Khanate and official annexation of that province by Romanov Russia in 1783, the majority of the Giray dynasty was forced to settle in the Rumeli countryside (i.e., Ottoman Balkans), mainly in territories stretching from Istanbul as far as to Macedonia and from the banks of the Danube, down to the shores of the Marmara Sea. The Giray dynasty had a legitimate Ghingisid lineage that made them one of the most respected dynasties in the early modern Islamic world. They ruled the Crimean Khanate from mid-15th century onwards, and they were considered lords that defended the northernmost frontiers of the abode of Islam. In this regard, the Giray khans were the most distinguished elite group within the Ottoman domains with respect to their illustrious ancestry and distinct martial culture.

After their recognition of Ottoman authority in 1478, the Girays had a privileged status within the Ottoman imperial system and maintained their unchallenged right to dominate the Crimean Khanate and its steppe hinterland. To that end, the Giray khans and their family were the only elite group within the Ottoman domains entitled to use the prestigious appellation "sultan"— often rendered collectively as the *Selâtin-i Cengiziyye* (Ghingisid Sultans)— alongside the sultans of the house of Osman. Under the Ottoman vassalage, the Girays retained the trappings of independence and had the right to pursue their own military and diplomatic affairs with the northern states beyond Crimea. In this regard, the Crimean Khanate was by no means politically, culturally, or militarily inferior to its neighbors.¹ Indeed, the Ottomans imposed certain surveillance mechanisms upon the Girays to render them 'readable' and 'useful' to Ottoman sovereignty. However, their deep-seated prestige and unruly martial culture

¹ Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 38–49.

were beyond the reproach of Ottoman disciplining and control, since they stood far enough away from the Ottoman center up until the Russian annexation of the Crimea.

For centuries, the Giray khans were incessantly sending cavalryman regiments deep into the steppe, engaging in relationships with various regional and imperial powers, and boosting their treasury by extracting handsome booties and tributes. The fact that they were forced to flee into core Ottoman territories *en masse* but could not integrate into successfully into more regulated Ottoman provincial milieus resulted in numerous problems for the Giray family, their servants, Ottoman subjects, and the central government in Istanbul. It was incumbent upon the Ottoman center to reduce the Girays' status to the level of the other provincial families and dynasties like the '*ayân* (notables; notable families, *hânedân*) whilst curtailing their marital capacities and traditions as borderland warlords.

However, it was not an easy task for many Giray scions to acknowledge this sharp decline in their status. To that end, the Girays and Ottomans found a middle ground for purporting their claims to one another. The Ottoman sultans re-organized their place within the Ottoman imperial organization considering the mutual principles of tune-honored, interdynastic traditions and guaranteed their financial livelihood. To clarify, throughout the early modern period, the Ottoman sultans and Giray khans developed a unique type of relationship that was based on customary and ambiguous principles of "brotherhood."² While they pursued their Ghingisid traditions and distinct martial culture, they were expected to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Ottoman imperial establishment and conform to its traditions.

The Girays' migration *en masse* to the Rumeli countryside coincided with times in which both the Ottoman central administration and localities witnessed profound

² Halil İnalcık, "Giray," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 1996, 76–77. As it reflected upon the inter-dynastic correspondences, the Giray princes addressed to the Ottoman sultans denoting the titles (elkāb) of berâder or karındaş (brother), even after the fall of the Crimean Khanate. For the examples of usage of these titles by the dynasty representatives in Rumeli; Presidential Ottoman Archives, (hereafter to be cited as *BOA*), C.HR. 3/120, 23/1138, 52/2558, 58/2859.

transformations. At the imperial center, Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807) introduced an extensive reform project—the so-called the "New Order" --which aimed at restructuring the basic stately institutions and configurating Ottoman provincial administration. In this environment, the Giray dynasty found themselves on the threshold of expulsion from the imperial level of politics. The Balkan provinces, on the other hand, became the new arena in which the Ottomans, their imperial rivals, as well as different Ottoman subject populations, began to interact with one another in novel ways. Throughout the Selimian period, a complex web of violence, banditry, and rebellion found fertile grounds and became endemic in de-centralized provinces. The Mountaineer Rebellions (*Dağlı İsyanları*) especially stormed localities in Rumelia from 1791 to 1808 directly affecting the Girays' estates.

Given that these "Ghingisid Sultans" were theoretically superior in rank to provincial powerholders due to their unquestioned lineage and martial culture, their immigration to Rumeli impacted the region in profound ways whose repercussions were felt by communities beyond that province throughout the Selimian era (1789-1807). The hundreds of Giray scions engaged in multilayered relationships with various strata of Ottoman society ranging from humble peasants to the Ottoman pashas. However, the process of integration to the Rumelian society and their agencies in the spread of the endemic violence and rebellion constitute a void in historiography. This thesis explores what happened in the aftermath of the Giray khans' immigration to the Ottoman Balkans. It seeks to understand how did the Ottoman central administration (and the Sultan in particular) managed to absorb the Giray dynasty into Ottoman society, exert Ottoman central control over them, and it also explores how the Girays responded, collectively, to these dramatic shifts in their privileged place within the Ottoman imperial system. On the other hand, it seeks to explore the position of the Girays in the Rumeli politics and their roles in shaping the networks of violence and rebellion they found there upon their immigration.

Historiography

The story of the Girays in the Rumeli countryside has attracted the attention of very few historians. In Ottoman historiography, the Balkans of the Selimian era have been traditionally characterized as "the age of 'ayâns" that highlighted the excessive power of local notables visà-vis the central administration that lost its authority over its provinces in Europe.³ Since the Girays were considered a waned dynasty, their influence in Rumeli had long been overshadowed by the competing agendas of the provincial notables. Most archival material was used to construct center-periphery binaries by giving voice to the perspectives of the imperial center versus provincial governors and the 'ayân who were fashioned as agents that 'decentralized' the Ottoman empire. The Girays, however, engaged in multilayered relationships with various strata of Ottoman society ranging from humble peasants to the Ottoman pashas. Although, they had remarkable clout in regional and imperial politics, there is no in-depth study that reframe the shifts in their social status and relationships with the Ottoman central administration that traces the impact of their mass migration to Ottoman central lands with hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars that joined them.⁴ That being said, there are growing numbers of case studies which addressed the novel relationships that they pursued with the Balkan populace, and here I will discuss these to show how my thesis contributes to this literature.

In recent years, some historians unearthed preliminary archival documents and called for historians' attention to the Girays in Rumeli and other parts of the empire. Nicole Kançal-

³ Robert Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin in the Age of Ottoman Social Change, 1791-1815" (Phd Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004); Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1822," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

⁴ See, Brian G. Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*; Alan W. Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years After the Crimean War," *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge*, 1987.

Ferrari is one of the first historians who unearthed basic archival evidence about the Girays and encouraged further studies. She made an inventory of the Girays' construction activities and tombstones in the Crimea and the Ottoman domains.⁵ She revealed important troves of information about the Girays' financial subsidies, land holdings, and waqfs investments (i.e. Muslim pious foundations) in Rumeli along with the legacies of their presence in the Rumelia inasmuch as it reflected upon their architectural styles.⁶

Ali Karaca, in contrast, explored the reduced status of the Giray khans in the Ottoman imperial system and looked at the shifts in the Giray-Ottoman relation through financial and military lenses.⁷ He argued that the Girays retained their familial ties and intra-dynastic hierarchy under through an elderly figure who was recognized by the Ottoman sultans as their dynasty representative. Karaca traced the male and female Girays' payrolls that belong to the year of 1840 and called for the historians to examine the financial subsidies of these scions within the context of Ottoman-Giray financial relations. Kançal-Ferrari and Karaca's surveys are useful to lay the grounds for investigating the Giray's livelihood and biographies in the Balkans and get a sense of their numbers.⁸

Hakan Kırımlı and Ali Yaycıoğlu have most recently written one of the most in-depth studies on the Girays. They examined the joint insurgence of the brothers Cengiz and Bahadır Giray and revealed how these Crimean princes became active participants in the schemes and intrigue of imperial politics during the Selimian era that extended beyond the Ottoman empire itself. By so doing, they discussed the ways in which the Girays operated in provincial and imperial politics. But the authors also demonstrated how the Giray princes spearheaded regional and trans-imperial networks spanned from Rumeli to Napoleonic France and Imperial Russia.

⁵ Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]" (Master's Thesis, Istanbul University, 1998).

⁶ Ibid., 8–39.

⁷ Ali Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," Bir, 1997.

⁸ Ibid., 90–104. Ali Karaca suggested that around one hundred thirty Giray princes scattered across the Rumelia in the early 19th century.

They suggested that the Ghingisid ancestry of the Girays served as diplomatic capital for the Girays between 1798 and 1802 when Ottoman imperial rivals were anxious to undermine the Ottoman center at a time in which radical transformations of the global, revolutionary age had already rattled the foundations of empires like the Ottomans'.⁹ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu argued that the dynasty's "Ghingisid charisma" provided some opportunities for some Giray scions to re-harness their ancient credentials amidst widespread crises and instability. In the Ottoman Balkan domains, they argued, Ghingisid charisma also heightened by the ambitions of new political entrepreneurs gave birth to a new coalition of old and new, ancient pedigree and new provincial notable upstarts, 'old-world' social capital and modern military and financial power.¹⁰

The first Ottoman historian who discussed the impact of the Crimean Tatar migration to Rumeli was the Bulgarian historian Vera Mutafchieva.¹¹ She argued that the arrival of the bellicose Giray dynasty was a rupture that played an important role in undermining order in the Ottoman Balkans. She examined local dynamics that led to the Mountaineer Rebellions (*Dağlı İsyanları*) that rocked the Balkans throughout the Selimian era and argued that the Girays' activities were among numerous catalysts that sparked these rebellions. She looked at different Giray scions to analyze their role in environment and emphasized the activities of the fugitive Tatar forces of Devlet Giray that led the Rumelian peoples to collaborate and adopt guerilla tactics that they partially learned from the Crimean immigrants. Mutafchieva pointed out that many Muslim and non-Muslim groups began to rebel and engage in banditry themselves, preying upon neighboring communities both for sustenance and in protest against the injustices

⁹ Hakan Kırımlı and Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," *Der Islam*, 2017, 525; See also, Hakan Kırımlı, "A Scion of the Crimean Khans in the Crimean War: The Allied Powers and the Question of Future of the Crimea," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2013.

¹⁰ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 522–23.

¹¹ Vera Mutafchieva, *Kürdzhalijsko Vreme [The Time of the Kŭrdzhalis]*, 2nd ed. (Sofia: Bŭlgarskata Akademija na Naukite, 1993); Tolga U. Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808" (Phd Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2009).

they endured at the hands of bellicose Crimean groups under the Giray princes.¹² Mutafchieva's approach was also pioneering to overcome the "ayân paradigm" in the Ottoman historiography by demonstrating how these disorders were independent of the *'ayân* problem.¹³

Lastly, Tolga Esmer called for historians' attention to the multiplicity of the local and imperial actors involved in the Rumeli politics and emphasized the blurry, unstable boundaries between each multilateral group.¹⁴ He addressed the relation between the Girays' economic conditions and networks of violence in which they partook. He argued that under severe economic conditions, networks of violence became an alternative channel of power and "career advancement" for all of the diverse groups involved, ranging from peasants to the highest Ottoman bureaucratic and military echelons. Esmer highlighted the roles of charismatic bandit/rebel chiefs like Kara Feyzi with regard to their large capacity for re-configuring regional politics, bringing a certain level of order and economic opportunities for the Muslim and Christian folk alike barred from social mobility through 'licit' channels in imperial institutions.¹⁵ He argued that the Giray princes fostered networks of violence to reinvent their political and economic power. From the archival evidence, Esmer revealed that many branches of the Giray family suffered from poverty although their livelihood was traditionally guaranteed by the Ottoman sultans. To that end, he argued that the Giray scions were one of the most recalcitrant and perhaps resentful groups of Ottoman society who attempted to develop alternative channels of power and took up arms against the state and local communities throughout Rumeli.¹⁶

¹² Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 59–61.

¹³ Ibid., 60–61.

¹⁴ Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808."

¹⁵ Ibid., 195–98, 259–61.

¹⁶ Esmer, 219; See also, Esmer, "War, State and the Privatisation of Violence in the Ottoman Empire."

Reframing the Girays in the Selimian Rumelia

Previously, Ottomanists have either revealed the general framework of shifts in the Girays socio-political status, focused on the insurgency of Cengiz and Bahadır Giray, or examined the roles of other Girays vis-a-vis the endemic violence and rebellion that plagued the Balkans at the turn of the nineteenth century. However, the immigration of a prestigious dynasty to the core territories of another dynasty constitutes a rare phenomenon in the histories of modern empires. The Giray case was further distinguished on two other important points: on the one hand, their dynasty was one of the most respected dynasties that developed an accommodating relationship with the Ottoman sultans. On the other, they were "warrior elites" who had long been considered as masters of Eurasian steppe frontiers until the rise of imperial Russia. As their military function was considerably waned, they became the only elite group within the Ottoman Empire that became isolated in the countryside and entirely bound to the sultanic beneficence for their financial solvency. Therefore, the Girays' absorption into Ottoman central lands brings to the fore important dynamics that juxtapose local, imperial, and inter-imperial perspectives.

This thesis seeks to raise new questions about how the Ottoman sultans treated the Giray dynasty to demonstrate how their Giray policy differed significantly from other customary relationships it forged with other historical actors. It does so, in order to offer a new approach to inter-dynastic relationships between the Girays and Ottomans, the character of the Selimian empire with regard to his management of the Giray question, the novel ways of social interaction on the eve of so-called 'age of revolutions' and the relationship between the warrior populations and widespread violence in the Ottoman society. There is no holistic study on how Istanbul rearranged its relations with the Giray question and re-calibrated the position of the Giray families along with their retinues, elites of Tatar society (i.e., *mirzas*) and the other Crimean migrants within their imperial domains. In this regard, this thesis aims to cover the

following questions: how did Sultan Selim III re-organize inter-dynastic traditions; how did the coexistence of two dynasties in the central territories of the empire affect the overall Ottoman polity in an age rampant with crises and transformation; what was the extent of the autonomy that the Ottomans granted for the Girays compared with their older arrangements when they were masters of the Eurasian steppes; while the Girays tried to expand their power beyond their estates, how did Istanbul approach the Girays' pursuit of their own interests; and ultimately what does this Giray episode tell us about Selimian statecraft in conjunction with state authority over local powerholders?

This thesis aims to incorporate the Girays' perspective to develop new frameworks for understanding their integration into core Ottoman territories. In this regard, this thesis seeks to investigate the Girays' responses to the central authority and unstable circumstances in the localities. The vantage point of the Girays offers us new perspectives to understand their attempts to reinvent their political and economic power during a period of rampant transformations of power and influence on regional, imperial and trans-imperial levels. In this context, this project seeks to explore the capacities and novel ways in which the Girays forged multilayered relationships with disparate groups across the Ottoman empire and beyond. Furthermore, to understand the Girays involvement in multilayered networks of violence that began to dominate Ottoman society, this thesis will explore their impulses and socio-political goals.

Methodology

In the Balkan frontiers in which violence and chaos became endemic, many Giray khans engaged in shifting relationships with different local, regional and imperial groups. Each Giray descendant had a different status, network, relationship, experiences and personality that brought the interacted social group a divergent dynamic that shad very few connections with the other cases that another Giray scion involved. Therefore, inquiring about the agency of the

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Girays in the local politics cannot be limited into the local context on the grounds that they often involved in trans-regional and trans-imperial networks. In fact, this sort of micro level of inquiry requires incorporation of broad spectrum of sources in different languages that reveal trans-imperial connections with the European empires alongside the Ottoman sources. However, this thesis does not aim to unearth the networks and relationships of the Giray scions with a variety of Ottoman and European actors, but it rather aims to address the main issues between the state and the Girays and incorporate the perspective of the letter as much as possible.

In doing so, I will do a twofold examination. I firstly investigate the experiences of the dynasty representative, Sahib Giray (rep. 1792-1807) whose tenure was considerably coincided with Sultan Selim III's reign (1789-1807). Through the dynasty representative, the central administration primarily aimed to maintain intra-dynastic order under the auspices of a senior figure from the dynasty.¹⁷ Sahib Giray not only transmitted the complaints and requests of his relatives to Istanbul, but he also observed the Girays' welfare and mediated intra-dynastic struggles among the Girays as well as conflicts they had with local communities as well as imperial officials throughout Rumeli.

At the same time, however, focusing mostly on Sahib Giray can impose numerous problems in interpreting just how power and authority worked within the family itself. For example, the scarcity of documents on Sahib Giray in contrast to more numerous sources concerning the recalcitrance of other Giray scions begs the question: how much influence could this representative hand-picked by Selim III exert upon his relations given the sultan's wellknown legitimation crisis among other imperial elites? Considering the customs of the dynasty, there were some other elderly figures who were as much respected as the dynasty representative

¹⁷ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 504.

and they also enjoyed direct contact with the Porte. Since they were also responsible for maintaining order within their family, their experiences are equally important.

Furthermore, Sahib Giray resided in Çatalca, a district 30km away from Istanbul, whereas the majority of their estates were more distant from the central authority. To be sure, it is also questionable how effectively Sahib Giray could observe and discipline his relatives scattered farther off in the countryside. I will therefore investigate numerous cases and mishaps that local officers and Sahib Giray either reported or those upon which Sultan Selim issued decrees. I will also question the traditional Ottoman strategy of trying to impose order upon large groups like the Giray and Tatar refugees that flowed into the Ottoman empire *en masse*: by elevating and appointing respected figures among the family, could the central authority discipline other members of the family through his newfound charisma and influence, or was this wishful thinking on the part of Selim III and his officials?

Secondly, I will shift my attention to the social, economic and political practices of the time to locate the diverse arenas in which disparate Girays attempted to augment their power and prestige. I will focus on the Girays who came to the forefront of local and regional politics and analyze the extent of their influence in comparison with other actors upon which existing literature on the Selimian era of Rumelia traditionally concentrates like the *a* 'yân, janissaries, etc. As I direct a lot of attention to the Rumeli countryside, this thesis has a local flavor; however, it will not be a local history.

I will pursue various Girays' activities across localities and regions, along with the perspective of the central administration. Therefore, this thesis embraces the perspectives of the localities impacted by the migration of warrior populations like the Girays, the Girays' own contentious behavior, as well as Selim III and his advisors' policies vis-à-vis these charismatic 'outsiders.' By doing so, this thesis will address larger question in the Ottoman society; what

the nature of the socio-economic dynamics in endemic violence and rebellion in Selimian era was, and how did the Girays' arrival to the region affected these dynamics.

Primary Sources

Despite a scarcity of the secondary sources, there is a flurry of archival production concerning the affairs of the Girays in the Balkans after the 1770s in the Presidential Archives in Istanbul (*BOA*). The *Ali Emiri* and *Cevdet* collections of miscellaneous sources, especially, cover many domestic, judicial, financial, military and administrative issues of the Girays. Also, documents in the *Bab-i Asafi* (the bureau of the Grand Vezirate), *Mühimme* (the bureau of the Imperial Council) and *Hatt-i Hümâyûn* (the imperial decrees) collections include correspondence between the central administration and the Girays, as well as the discussions at the Porte concerning communal and personal affairs of the family. In addition to archival materials, I will utilize various primary sources. Popular and imperial chronicles of the time, *Câbî Târîhî* and *Şânî-zâde Târîhî* include references to the Crimean Khans along with information about their properties. I mainly use them to explore in further detail some of the incidents that documents I found describe on the local level.

Chapter Outline

In the first chapter, I will examine inter-dynastic traditions upon which the Ottomans and the Girays rested their social, political, economic and military claims in the Rumeli. In this regard, I will explore the formation of Ottoman-Giray relations and how they evolved in aftermath of their immigration. I will secondly examine the responsibilities and extent of the authority of Sahib Giray among other dynasty members in order to understand their intradynastic order on the one hand as well as new forms of inter-dynastic relationships they forged with the Ottoman dynasty itself.

In the second chapter, I will focus on the Girays' fiscal arrangements and welfare. I will compare their customary financial resources that they had to abandon in the Crimean Khanate to understand why they reacted to this profound change in their financial status. I will inquire the ways of making a living in the Rumelian countryside by the turn of the nineteenth century in order to understand the 'legal' and feasible extents of reimbursing some financial resources. Thirdly, I will investigate the Girays' opportunities of inventing alternative economies in the vicinities of their estates.

In the third chapter, I will examine the new social dynamics of the Balkans during the Selimian era and attempt to locate the Girays on the local, regional, and trans-imperial levels of social interaction. I will investigate the loose boundaries between various strata of Rumeli society including the local notables, *vizier*-officials, *pashas*-military governors, irregular forces, bandits and urban and rural populations. Furthermore, I will explain the Mountaineer Rebellions, referring to Vera Mutafchieva's approach together with Tolga Esmer's "economies of violence" to demonstrate how the Girays forged their roles as integral parts of networks of violence in the empire. In doing so, I will explore the Girays' ascent to regional and imperial power brokers by telling the stories of various Girays princes. Thirdly, I will investigate the responses of the central authority—along with the elderly figures among the Girays—to the younger Giray scions who attempted to augment their power by joining or leader networks of violence that roamed Ottoman society. I specifically look to Sultan Selim III's strategies for disciplining the Girays. Lastly, I will inquire the waning of networks of violence towards to the end of the Selimian era and I will question the Girays' position in the before and aftermath of the rebellions.

Chapter One

Traditions Reconsidered

From the fifteenth century onwards, the Ottomans and Girays had developed unique relationships based on unstable and ambiguous inter-dynastic traditions. After the Girays' flight to the Balkans in the late eighteenth century culminating with Romanov Russia's annexation of the Crimea in 1783, the Ottoman sultans still showed their commitment to the Girays' privileged position within the Ottoman imperial system but rearranged their socio-economic status given that as refugees that fled to Ottoman core lands, the Girays were entirely dependent upon the Ottoman sultanate's beneficence for their subsistence. As potential rivals to the Ottoman throne, the Girays historically held a special position in Ottoman political imaginations; therefore, while Sultan Selim III (r. 1789 to 1807) still respected the Girays' unique pedigree and claims to elite status, the political turmoil as well as the financial straits that marked the period after the 1787 war with the Habsburgs and Russians informed the sultan's allocating very limited lands and subsidies for the Giray's resettlement in the Balkans.

In this first chapter, I will examine the place of the Giray dynasty within the Ottoman imperial system alongside the nature of inter-dynastic traditions upon which the Ottomans and the Girays rested their social, political, economic and military claims in the Rumeli. In this regard, I will firstly explore the formation of Ottoman-Giray relations and how they evolved in aftermath of their immigration. I will secondly examine the responsibilities and extent of the authority of Sahib Giray among other dynasty members in order to understand their intra-dynastic order as well as new forms of inter-dynastic relationships they forged with the Ottoman dynasty itself.

The Formation of Ottoman-Giray Relations

The Crimean Khanate was founded in the fifteenth century by Hacı Giray (r. 1441-1466), one of the most powerful contenders of the disintegrating Golden Horde's throne. Hacı Giray had a legitimate Ghingisid lineage that constituted the basis of his claims over the former territories of the Golden Horde in which his successors continued to assert their political and financial rights. Hacı Giray established his authority in much of the peninsula and its steppe hinterland, and he encouraged the Turkic tribes to populate these territories by granting them various privileges.¹⁸ In a time-honored Mongol tradition, over a decade of violent succession crises among the sons of Hacı Giray after their father's death culminated with Mengli Giray's ascension to the throne thanks to the support of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II in 1478. Despite the uncertainties, the sultan and khan allegedly concluded a treaty that conditioned the support of the former to the acknowledgement of the Ottoman protectorate over the Khanate under Giray rule.¹⁹

The status of the Crimean Khanate within the Ottoman imperial system is a complex phenomenon. As the scope of Ottoman domination over the Crimea increased over time starting at the end of the fifteenth century, the khanate was brought more into the political orbit of the Ottoman administration.²⁰ Nevertheless, the Crimean Tatar's ruling elite had always enjoyed a very distinguished status within the Ottoman Empire and retained their rights in the former

¹⁹ For the discussions on the alleged treaty between Mehmed II and Mengli Giray, see; Halil İnalcık, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Tâbiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi," *Belleten*, 1944; Natalia Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Gabor Karman and Lavro Kunčević (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 43–47. Halil Inalcık argued that such a treaty never existed. It appears in the epic descriptions of Evliya Çelebi who compiled his travelogue in the late seventeenth century. However, as İnalcık argued, Evliya Çelebi's points may have been represented the realities of the relationships between the khans and sultans during the late seventeenth century, Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 10–13.

¹⁸ The renowned Turkic clans that migrated to the peninsula in the fifteenth century enjoyed various privileges in return for their migration. These newcomer clans, like the Şirin, Argin, and Konghurat, could lead their own people and run their own assemblies. The prominent leaders of these clans, namely the *Karachi Beys*, constituted an exclusive circle of Crimean aristocracy that enjoyed great influence over the Khans. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 21–23.

²⁰ See also; Halil İnalcık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 1980 1979.

territories of the Golden Horde which were derived from their Ghingisid heritage, not the heritage or charisma of their Ottoman overlords.²¹ Despite Ottoman suzerainty, the Crimean Khanate retained almost all signs of sovereignty, such as having its own: ruling dynasty, distinct state structure and traditions, diplomatic relations with other states, financial system, etc. To that end, the Crimean Khanate was by no means politically, psychologically, or militarily inferior to its neighboring states like Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy.²²

The Ottomans did not treat the Crimean Khanate as the other tributary vassals of the empire which were subjected to serve to the sultan such as princely *boyars* and *phanariots* that ruled Wallachia and Moldova. As an important marker of distinction, the Ottomans did not expect any tribute from the Girays. In contrast, they distributed handsome grants to the Crimean ruling elites in return for their services to the empire, especially when they participated in Ottoman campaigns. In internal affairs, the Crimean khans were mostly independent from the Ottoman interference. That being said, the Girays' authority within the Crimean domains was restricted by distinguished tribal leaders, namely *Karachi beys*, whose consent was necessary in stately affairs in accordance with the Ghingisid traditions.²³ The Giray khans received all Ghingisid, Islamic and Ottoman symbols of sovereignty within their domains: their name was read in Friday prayer sermons; they collected the poll-tax and tribute from their steppe vassals; they commanded a share of spoils in war; they adhered to and executed the sharia law. To that end, they had four areas of exclusive royal authority mostly independent from Ottoman subordination.²⁴

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²¹ Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 14.

²² Ibid., 38–49.

²³ The tradition set certain limitations to the khans' power who were expected to recognize the active role in both internal and foreign affairs alongside the tribal control in their own territories. Natalia Krolikowska-Jedlinska, *Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate (1532-1774)* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 53; See also, Beatrice Forbes Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466-1534," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 1978.
²⁴ Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," 46–57.

In foreign policy, the Ottomans recognized the Girays' traditional claims over the steppe peoples and Eastern European states. The Sublime Porte left its diplomatic affairs with Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy to the Giray khans who played the roles of diplomatic intermediaries up until the eighteenth century when the Muscovite state, for example, began emerging as a world power that could singlehandedly defeat the Ottoman empire on the battlefield. On the one hand, they were obliged to adhere to the instructions of Istanbul and provide crucial intelligence and logistical support to its bureaucracies and armies. On the other, they would pursue their diplomacy independently from the Ottomans so much that they developed a more sophisticated correspondence web and espionage system than that of the Ottomans.²⁵

As the only other legitimate Muslim dynasty in the Ottoman realms other than the house of Osman, the Girays commanded a deep-seated respect and prestige in the Ottoman realms. Tough they did not attempt to emulate the Ottoman sultan, the Giray khans used the titles of $p\hat{a}dish\hat{a}h$ and *sultân* to bolster and maintain their high-ranking position vis-a-vis their northern counterparts. In their letters to the Christian rulers, the Crimean khans did not hesitate even to use the title of Caliph to legitimize their claims over the Muslim Tatar people who lived in their rivals' realms.²⁶ Their distinctive status was also recognized by the Ottomans. When the Giray princes visited Istanbul, their position was second after the sultan in all protocol.²⁷

²⁵ The Crimean and Ottoman objectives sometimes differed. In some occasions, the sultans intervened in the Crimean foreign policy when their interests and alliances contradicted. Therefore, complete mistrust existed between some sultans and khans, like that of between Selim I and Muhammed Giray. Halil İnalcık, "Power Relationships Between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire," in *Passé Turco-Tatar, Présent Soviétique: Études Offfertes à Alexandre Bennigsen*, ed. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay and et. al. (Louvain and Paris, 1986), 187; Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 37–49; See also, Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century) A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011).

²⁶ İnalcık, "Power Relationships Between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire," 197.

²⁷ Hakan T. Karateke, "The Peculiar Status of the Crimean Khans in the Ottoman Protocol," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, 2019; The khans claimed to be superior to the Grand Vizier, and the meeting during a campaign of the khan with the Grand Vizier often caused difficulties in protocol; İnalcık, "Power Relationships Between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire," 198.

Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals were well-aware of the Girays' claim as equals in terms of status and pedigree to the Ottomans.²⁸ The Crimean dynasty was considered the only family worthy of replacing the Ottoman sultans should the house of Osman have discontinued. To that end, some contentious factions at the imperial center even attempted to replace the sultanate with the Giray dynasty.²⁹ After the Giray khans migration *en masse* to the Balkans, the Ottoman Sultans 'Abdü'l-hâmîd I (r. 1774-1789) and Selim III accordingly endeavored to keep them as far away from Istanbul lest different power factions in the capital use them to threaten Ottoman sovereignty during turbulent times of crises and rebellion. Nevertheless, the presence of a rival dynasty in the Balkans continued to attract the attention of many power holders after 1783. For example, some powerful local notables, like Pazvandoğlu and 'Alemdâr Mustafa Pasha, allegedly conspired to replace the Ottoman sultanate with that of the Giray dynasty during a time of great turmoil in the Balkans that spread to the imperial capital.³⁰

Given that the Crimean khans enjoyed deep-seated prestige, Istanbul imposed certain surveillance mechanisms upon the Girays to render them 'readable' and 'useful' to Ottoman sovereignty. Though the degree of the Crimean khans' subordination to the Ottomans remains unknown, both dynasties gradually formulated a code of honor—albeit ambiguous—upon which they endured their inter-dynastic and foreign relationships. As the scope of Ottoman domination over the Crimea increased over time, the sultans adjusted new mechanisms to impose central authority over the khans. The procedures of succession to the Crimean throne reflects simultaneously the large degree of Ottoman subordination as well as ambiguity of the inter-dynastic relationships. According to Ghingisid traditions, the assembly of the Crimean

²⁸ Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa 'Ali (1541-1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 277–79.

²⁹ İnalcık, "Power Relationships Between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire," 198 and Derin Terzioğlu, "Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyâz-i Misrî (1618- 1694)" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1999), 346–52.

³⁰ Feridun Emecen, "Osmanlı Hanedanına Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve Mülahazalar," *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2001, 55; Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 517.

notables, the *Karachi beys*, could select the khan among the eligible Giray descendants. The Crimean and Ottoman ruling elites defined the sultans' role in the selection of the khan differently. The former limited the sultans' role to the conformation of Crimean assembly's decision, while the Ottomans claimed the power of appointing the khan.³¹

As matter of fact, the Sublime Porte made its hegemony over the selection of the khans paramount by the second half of the seventeenth century. In doing so, the presence of Girays in Rumeli played a significant role. To clarify, in accordance with the Ghingisid tradition, Mengli Giray left one of his sons in Istanbul as a hostage (*rehin*) that served as a sign of loyalty to the sultan. This practice was continued until the point when Devlet Giray I murdered the ruling khan Sahib I and his family during a civil war in 1551. Realizing that some insurgent princes might attempt to eliminate the rest of the dynasty to claim their sole authority, the Ottomans attempted to end intra-dynastic violence by moving many dynasty members to Rumeli where they had already been allocated certain plots of lands and land-revenues.³² When the khanate switched hands thereafter, the deposed khans or rival family members were moved to the Rumeli along with their households in the Ottomans' bid to ensure security in the Crimea and intra-dynastic integrity.³³ It approved to be a prudent arrangement once again when another civil war broke out in the early seventeenth century. After the insurgents Mehmed and Şahin Giray usurped the Crimean crown, the rest of the dynasty members rushed to the Balkans to escape the imminent threat of massacre.³⁴

According to the seventeenth-century Ottoman humanist writer Evliya Çelebi, Sultan Mehmed II firstly apportioned an estate to Mengli Giray's son in Yambol and initiated the

³¹ Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," 57.

³² Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]," 8; İnalcık, "Giray," 78.

³³ Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]," 8.

³⁴ İnalcık, "Giray," 78.

practice of giving them subsistence grants in sultanic law ($k\bar{a}n\bar{u}n$).³⁵ However, the degree of their presence in Rumeli had already increased by the late sixteenth century. The Girays' estates were scattered across the Rumeli countryside, primarily near Tekfurdağı [Tekirdağ], Islimiye [Sliven] and Yanbolu [Yambol].³⁶ The Ottoman administration rearranged the financial resources of hundreds of the Girays including their courtiers who were directed to Rumeli: they were granted large estates, *çiftlik*s, and/or annual pensions and handsome land-revenues.³⁷ The presence of the Girays in Rumeli countryside provided the Ottomans a mechanism to increase the power they could wield over the Crimean Khanate by bringing the Girays under the closer watch of the sultanate. Since they constituted a handy pool for the Ottomans from which they could select the best ones to send to rule the Crimea, it ensured the loyalty of the ruling Girays in the Crimea and provided the Ottoman government opportunities involvement intervene directly in Crimean politics.³⁸

Although the Girays considered their stay in Rumeli as temporary, bringing them into a core province close to the capital afforded the Ottomans the ability to keep them under surveillance and integrate them more intimately into folds of Ottoman imperial governance. Before some members of the family settled in the Balkans, the Girays enjoyed considerable opportunities that came with frontier economics in the Crimea as marauders that could prey upon non-Muslim populations in neighboring states; however, in the core Ottoman province Rumeli, Istanbul expected the Girays to conform to the licit conditions of provincial living and economy within the empire. Integrated into the countryside life, the Girays were charged with taking proper care of the local peasantry in exchange for the incomes that they collected from them. In close proximity to the capital, moreover, Giray princes cultivated long-lasting,

³⁵ Evliyâ Çelebi b. Derviş Mehemmed Zıllî, *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, ed. Robert Dankoff, Seyyid Ali Kahraman, and Yücel Dağlı, vol. 8 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003), 20.

³⁶ İnalcık, "Giray," 77–78.

³⁷ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 93–95.

³⁸ Kırımlı, "A Scion of the Crimean Khans in the Crimean War: The Allied Powers and the Question of Future of the Crimea," 192–93.İnalcık, "Giray," 77–78.

personal relationships with Ottomans sultans and their high-ranking officials. For the Rumelian Girays, their service and loyalty to sultan, their ability to rule over their estates in the Balkans in an efficient and just manner, and the close relations they forged with Ottoman officials therefore determined their prospects of becoming either the actual Khan of Crimea or a lesser dignitary in. It is no coincidence that these Rumelian towns were also the place of exile for prominent political figures, since the proximity of the region to the capital enabled Istanbul to monitor the activities and behavior of the Girays closely: deposed as well as the most prominent khans were settled especially in close proximity to Istanbul, whereas, those sentenced with exiles were sent close-by to Aegean Islands so that the state could keep them close by should they cause problems.³⁹

Considering inter-dynastic traditions, there are various forms of narratives that interpret the code of honor between the Ottoman and Giray dynasties. Among them, the Crimean chronicler, Abdügaffar Kırımî's version is significant in the sense that it may have represented the realities of the relationships in the eighteenth century. Kırımî re-interpreted the alleged treaty between Sultan Mehmed II and Mengli Giray Khan as the basis of inter-dynastic traditions. Kırımî explained that the Sultan and Khan agreed upon these principles: the Ottoman sultan had the right to select the khan only among Giray family members; the Sublime Porte had no right to decree the execution of any Giray prince; the Ottomans could not intervene in the domains of the khan and residences of Giray families; the khans' name would come second to that of the Ottoman sultan in Friday prayer sermons; any requests of the Giray khans would be approved by the sultan.⁴⁰ As it will be explained in the following chapters, both the Giray scions and Ottoman sultans often made reference to these inter-dynastic codes of honor after they migrated to Rumeli.

³⁹ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 88; İnalcık, "Giray," 76–78.

⁴⁰ İnalcık, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Tâbiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi," 225; See Also, Derya Derin, "Abdülgaffar Kırımî"nin, Umdet"ül Ahbar (Umdet"üt Tevarih)"ına Göre Kırım Tarihi" (Master's Thesis, Ankara University, 2003).

Dynastic Representation under Sahib Giray (1792-1807)

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783, virtually all members of the Giray dynasty left their ancestral homeland, and most of them immigrated to the Ottoman Balkans.⁴¹ The state reorganized dozens of Giray households into a dynastic network in exile, since the displaced Girays considered their presence in the Balkans as temporary and still harbored hopes to reconquer their domain from the Russian empire. After losing hopes for reclaiming Crimea at the end of the Russo/Austrian-Ottoman War of 1787-1792, the Ottoman administration strove instead to absorb the large majority of the Girays in the Rumeli countryside and reorganized their status within the imperial system with regard to their distinctive pedigree and martial culture.⁴² To this end, the central administration pursued a twofold policy: on the one hand, they supported the Ghingisid intra-dynastic order and hierarchy, along with traditional inter-dynastic relationships. On the other, they forced them accept their reduced status as royal refugees completely dependent upon Ottoman benevolence.

By settling an influx of displaced Giray family members and other members of the Tatar elite on prescribed estates already occupied by their kin, the Ottomans attempted to maintain intra-dynastic order in Rumelia by integrating newcomers within the traditional hierarchy of Tatar society already living in the Balkans. Furthermore, the presence of this prestigious dynasty at the capital was traditionally unwelcomed on the grounds that they could meddle in the courtly politics and/or constitute a threat to the sultanic authority. The sultans, therefore,

⁴¹ Many of them continued to live in the Caucasus where the Ottomans allowed them to retain their traditional titles and functions by appointing them as *ser-'asker*, commander-in-chief, over the Crimean Tatar regimens and Caucasian tribes. On the other side of the border, many Girays enjoyed some privileges granted by the Russian Empire including acceptance to the hereditary nobility. Although they were not allowed to return back to the Crimean Peninsula, the Russian administration continued to appoint them over Kabardian and Nogai tribes and granted them large estates. Considering the whole branches of the dynasty, however, their settlements in the Russian territories were limited. See also, Hakan Kırımlı and Hazan Kırımlı, "Crimean Tatars, Nogays, and Scottish Missionaries: The Story of Katti Geray and Other Baptised Descendants of the Crimean Khans," *Chahiers Du Monde Russe*, 2004, 64–65; Kesbî Haşim Mehmed Efendi, *Ahvâl-i Anapa ve Çerkes*, ed. Mustafa Özsaray (Istanbul: Kafkas Vakfı Yayınları, 2012).

⁴² Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 27; Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 504–5.

strictly forbid their move to other urban centers and conditioned any sort of new property acquisitions to the permission of the Ottoman sultan.⁴³ Apparently, Istanbul aimed to absorb these martial elites into the central establishment merely by isolating them from the rest of Ottoman elite groups.

To ensure intra-dynastic order, the sultan appointed an elderly representative of the family, possibly a former khan or a senior Giray as the *şāḥibü'l-'arż*,⁴⁴ or representative of the dynasty. The representative was responsible for monitoring all of the affairs of the Girays in the Ottoman realm. The sultans selected the dynasty representative among the most elderly, wise, and esteemed (*erşed ü dirāyet-kār ve şāhib-i nüfūz ü i'tibār*) figures of the dynasty.⁴⁵ According to archival evidence, the Ottomans appointed first Şahbaz Giray as the *şāḥibü'l-'arż* during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1789-1792 in order to reorganize Crimean Tatar regiments under his command.⁴⁶ In 1798, he was replaced by Baht Giray because of disagreements among the Giray princes in the warfare.⁴⁷ Considering the appointments for civil purposes, however, Sultan Selim III appointed Sahib Giray II (r. 1772-1774) as *şāḥibü'l-'arż* in 1792, and his term of office coincides with the rest of the sultan's reign.⁴⁸

⁴³ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 90–97; Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 503–5. *BOA*, HAT 201/10336
⁴⁴ In a general sense, *sāḥibü'l- 'arż* means "the possessor of the right of representing a group [before the Sultan]. "In the Ottoman Turkish, *sâhīb* means: "a possessor, owner, or responsible master; somebody endowed with a quality"; and *'arż* as a noun and verb has the meanings of "a presenting, offering, submitting, representing a thing; to present, offer, submit, represents for consideration" Sir James W. Redhouse, *Turkish and English Lexicon* (Istanbul: A. H. Boyacijan, 1890), 1152, 1293.

⁴⁵ Şānī-zāde Mehmed 'Ata'ullah Efendi, *Şānī-Zāde Tārīhi (1223-1277/1808-1821)*, ed. Ziya Yılmazer, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2008), 871.

⁴⁶ The Rumelian Girays had always contacts with the Sublime Porte through an elderly figure who observed the welfare of the dynasty. Although I could not reach any document concerning the appointments of the *sāhibü'l-'arż* before the year of 1787, the correspondence between Selim Giray III (d. 1786) and the Porte suggests that he was in position of observing the general welfare of the Rumelian Girays. For instance, Selim Giray transmitted the financial complaints of Sahib II to the sultan-though Sahib Giray was another elderly name among the dynasty, *BOA* AE.SABH.I. 96/6585.

⁴⁷ BOA CA 29/1327; HAT 11/427, 1393/55671. See also, Halim Giray, *Gülbün-ü Hanan: Kırım Hanları Tarihi*, ed. Bekir Günay (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Avrasya Enstitüsü, 2013), 106–12.

⁴⁸ I could not find any document that indicates the exact time and conditions of the appointment of Sahib Giray as the dynasty representative, but, the correspondence between Sahib Giray and the central administration indicates that he was running inter-dynastic affairs after 1792. For the documents that refer to Sahib Giray as $s\bar{a}hib\ddot{u}$ 'l-'arz after 1792: BOA C.MTZ. 17/828; HAT 202/10375, 201/10336.

The appointments of $s\bar{a}hib\ddot{u}'l$ -'arz' were useful for the Ottomans to reorganize and control hundreds of discounted Giray scions dispersed throughout the Balkans. For the duration of his tenure, Sahib Giray observed the welfare and integrity of the dynasty. On the one hand, he dealt with relocation procedures to ensure that each Giray family member dwelled in a definite plot of land and did not move to the urban centers.⁴⁹ As it will be shown in the second chapter, Sahib Giray paid special attention to the financial situation of his relatives and directly reported their fiscal problems to the Porte. On the other, the dynasty representative played the role of mediator between the Girays, local people and the state. He participated in court trials in which Giray princes were involved. The dynasty representative also took an active role in the state's incarceration and sentencing of unruly princes who undermined imperial authority and order in Rumeli. Archival evidence suggests that both the central administration and the dynasty representative adopted the discourse of loyalty and disorder which redefined the legal limits of the Girays' activities. By imposing a language that underlined the margins of "dynastic honor" ('*urż u edeb*) and "dynastic shame" (*hicāb*), the dynasty representative acted as an agent that evoked the moral codes of the dynastic integrity of Girays to prompt them to act in compliance with their reduced status and abide by sultanic decrees.⁵⁰

The dynasty representative served to enforce, essentially, the reduced status of the dynasty. Firstly, his physical location between Istanbul and the vast majority of the dynasty living farther away in Rumeli served to undermine symbolically the status of all other family members given that his mediation reduced the direct links other family members could have cultivated with the sultan and his closest ministers. Secondly, this configuration of

⁴⁹ Sahib Giray observed the settlements of the Giray scions and reported their situation to the Porte: as the sultanic decree, dated on 5th July 1796, indicated, Sahib Giray investigated how many Ghingisids were still residing in Istanbul and the Porte prescribed these residents to return their estates after termination of their licenses with regards to Sahib Giray's opinions. *BOA* HAT 201/10336. See also, Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 511–12.

⁵⁰ For example, *BOA* C.DH. 95/4744.

representation reduced the status of the Girays to that even below the level of the other community leaders like local notables, religious leaders, etc.⁵¹ In fact, communal representation remains a controversial issue in the Ottoman historiography. Antonis Hadjikyracou recently discussed the discrepancy between theory and practices of communal representation by looking at a pre-nineteenth-century, Cypriot Orthodox community. Hadjikyracou showed that despite the assumption that the office of religious representatives had a corporate character as the head of a hierarchical and bureaucratized communal structure, the formation and function of communal institutions were anything but clear and streamlined. Rather, channels of representation were more ad-hoc, full of bottlenecks and abrupt twists with no consistent or uniform evolutionary character.⁵²

Although the Giray dynasty's representativeness was not part of a religious institution that witnessed widespread competition among diverse groups of its members, Hadjikyracou's study points to the ad-hoc and indeterminate nature of representation of a given community recognized by the Ottoman government. In fact, there are two factors question the extent of Sahib Giray's influence and control over the whole branches of the dynasty. In accordance with the Ghingisid traditions on the one hand, each member of the dynasty was an equal bearer of the title "sultan" that gave him a certain degree of legitimacy and power. Secondly, the Girays' settlements scattered across a wide geography in Rumeli. Given that Sahib Giray resided in Çatalca, a district 30km away from Istanbul in contrast to the fact that the majority of their estates were more distant from central authority, it is also questionable how effectively Sahib Giray could observe and discipline his relatives.

⁵¹ See also, Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 149–56.

⁵² Antonis Hadjikyracou, "Beyond the Millet Debate: Communal Representation in Pre-Tanzimat-Era Cyprus," in *Political Thought and Practice in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marinos Sariyannis (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2019), 95.

In fact, Sahib Giray was not the only elderly figure who observed the welfare of the dynasty and had a direct contact with the Porte. Archival sources underscore how other elderly names were responsible for observing welfare and disciplining of their households and relatives. To this end, the state showed respect to other elderly figures who observed the welfare of Giray scions, like Şahbaz Giray in Edirne who transmitted the complaints of their relatives to the Porte.⁵³ Furthermore, Sahib Giray might have an important influence over his relatives on the grounds that the state mostly observed his petitions and took his advice on some issues. In this regard, the state mostly observed Sahib Giray's petitions on the apportionment of financial subsidies, the disciplining of an unruly prince through exile, and the ruling of amnesty to chastised princes. Since the state empowered Sahib Giray on these crucial issues, the Giray scions sought for his favor and embraced his mediation.

⁵³ BOA C.HR.35/1750.

Chapter Two

The Fiscal Arrangements and Welfare of the Giray Khans Between the Steppes and Core Ottoman Provinces

In the nineteenth century, the pioneering Ottoman intellectual Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1823-1895) who compiled a history of Ottoman Empire comprehensively focused on the events that prompted the fall of the Crimean Khanate. Quite limited in scope, he touched upon the migration of the Crimean royal elites to Rumeli and their struggles to adapt to provincial life within the empire. By doing so, he mainly pointed to how the Girays preyed upon localities throughout the Balkans, ascribing their recalcitrance and unruly behavior to their "steppe" martial culture and personal greed. As he stated: "the Ghingisid Sultans' oppression of the Rumeli peasantry went too far. Their estates became lairs of brigands and bandits. Governors and judges proved incapable of preventing and combating their crimes."⁵⁴

Considering the Girays' violent acts and alliances that they pursued on the ground, traditional narratives often associated their trans-regional marauding with their frontier, 'steppe' traditions and greed for plunder. These sort of oversimplified narratives that overwhelmingly relegate the Giray scions to common troublemakers and criminals menacing local populations and imperial authorities obfuscate the fact that they forged multi-layered relationships with many different individuals and communities running the gamut from peasants to *paşas*, a few villagers to much larger warrior-populations like Tatars and Albanians. Zeroing in on their behavior, practices, and alliances therefore demonstrates what prestigious, Muslim 'outsiders' who fled the Russian conquests of the Crimea and Caucasus had to do to forge the fastest routes to wealth and power within core territories of the Ottoman Empire

⁵⁴ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ṭārīḫ-i Cevdet*, ed. Dündar Günday and Çevik Mümin, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Hikmet Neşriyat, 1972), 1394–95.

commensurate to their conditions prior to Russian ascendancy and the conquest of their homeland. Their story shows us the available paths to relevance that prestigious newcomers could follow to establish meaningful alliances with older as well as new power centers and magnates in Rumeli, and it amplifies the symbolic and moral discourses that bolstered and authorized these new sources of power. As "transplanted" elite figures, they brought different backgrounds, sources of legitimacy, and competences that together forged new forms of social and economic relations in the core territories of the Ottoman empire.

There was indeed a firm link between their distinguished financial status that they had to abandon in Crimea and their controversial motives and methods at reinventing their political status and financial resources in Rumeli at all costs. In this regard, this chapter seeks to understand the evolution of the fiscal status of the Ghingisid sultans within the Ottoman imperial system in order to understand the ways that they engaged in socio-economic relations as well as how prestigious refugees from far-off territories conquered by Ottoman rivals responded to their changed fortune and circumstances.

I will firstly compare their customary financial resources that they had to abandon in the Crimean Khanate to understand why they reacted to this profound change in their financial and social status once they stepped foot in core provinces. I will secondly inquire into the ways of making a living in the Rumeli countryside by the turn of the nineteenth century in order to understand the 'legal' versus plausible extents to which elite refugees could both claim financial compensation from the central government and create new ways of generating the kind of wealth they needed to return back to a level of comfort and status that they had been stripped of after they fled Crimea. Lastly, I will investigate the Girays' drive to forge alternative economies in the vicinities of their estates.

The Customary Financial Resources of the Girays in the Ottoman Empire

The origins of Ottoman economic support for the Giray household trace back to the times when the Crimean Khanate was incorporated into the Ottoman imperial system. As the scope of Ottoman domination over the Crimea increased over time starting at the end of the fifteenth century, the khanate was brought more into the financial orbit of the Ottoman administration. Nevertheless, the Crimean Tatar ruling elite had always enjoyed additionally their autonomous sources of revenues until Romanov Russia's annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783. In parallel to their distinguished status, the ruling khans were financially neither subjects nor equals of the Ottoman sultans. They had a large pool of financial resources derived from a generous combination of the sultanic grants, Crimean levies, and remunerative opportunities that the steppe frontiers offered for themselves such as slave trade.

The Sultanic grants constituted the symbolic, if not the crucial, part of the Girays' economic resources in the sense that it signified Ottoman suzerainty over the khanate. Before Mengli Giray sailed for the Crimea from Istanbul to bring to an end a decade of civil war in 1478, he appeared before Sultan Mehmed II at a courtly ceremony and pledged his obedience in exchange for the sultan's patronage and conferring to him legitimacy as the Crimean Khan. As the noble protégée of the Sultan, Mengli Giray received annual pensions, various grants and a subsidized personal elite guard, called *sek-bâns*, to assist him in seizing the throne for the khanate.⁵⁵ Ordering any financial requests of the khan to be fulfilled, Sultan Mehmed II enacted such practices to sultanic law (*kânûn*) and formed the basis of future relationships.⁵⁶ Thereafter, the first sign of recognition of a khan became the ceremonial held at the Sultan's court where the favored Giray candidate received insignia of authority bestowed upon him by the sultan such as the Crimean standard, a gilded sword, a bejeweled *kalpak* (fur cap), as well as

⁵⁵ Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 13.

⁵⁶ Karaca, 93.
ceremonial furs (*kürk*).⁵⁷ The khans traditionally received significant amounts of annual and monthly salaries from the sultans. These generous grants were not restricted to the dignities of the ruling khans and the crown princes (*kalgay* and *nureddin*) either; many branches of the Giray family enjoyed various kinds of sultanic pensions along with their large households, retinues, courtiers and servants.⁵⁸

In respect to their pedigree, the Giray khans were not treated as other tributary vassals of the Ottoman Empire which were subjected to serve to the sultan such as princely *boyar*s and *phanariots* that ruled Wallachia and Moldova. They were not expected to pay tribute to the Ottoman government. In contrast, however, the sultans had to distribute handsome grants to the Girays in return for their more consistent military service to the empire, especially when they participated in Ottoman campaigns.⁵⁹ When the Tatars considered Ottoman military campaigns too insignificant for their interests or not lucrative enough to recap their costs, the khans could oppose to the sultans' orders lest they face internal rebellions among their skeptical steppe vassals.⁶⁰ Ottoman-Tatar military relations were therefore multilayered and volatile; however, the Ottoman government honored the interests and welfare of the Crimean ruling elite in order to utilize their highly mobile Tatar cavalries in times of war and distributed generous stipends and reimbursements to the Girays up till the mid-nineteenth century.⁶¹

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⁵⁷ İnalcık, "Giray," 77.

⁵⁸ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 94.

⁵⁹ Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 13–14.

⁶⁰ In many occasions, the Tatar notables requested the return of the Crimean army from the battlefield when they felt that it threatened their interests. The Crimean khans also opposed to offer military assistance to the Ottoman armies when their interests were at stake-for instance, a proposed campaign did not promise enough booty or slaves for their soldiers' subsidy. Famously, when Sultan Suleiman I invited the Crimean khan to participate in the campaign against the Safavid Iran in 1547, Sahib Giray Khan demanded 5000 *akçe* or 83 ducats for each Crimean Tatar soldier, claiming that they would not gather enough booty for their livelihood, and eventually did not show up at the battlefield despite the potential of opening rift between himself and the Sultan. Inalcık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I," 450–51; Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," 53–54.

⁶¹ Ottoman sultans continued to offer handsome grants to Giray descants at least until the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829, when many scions of the dynasty were called for the battle under an elderly figure who served as the *ser- 'asker*, commander-in-chief, of the Crimean Tatar regiments, *BOA* C.MTZ 3/144

All through the Crimean domains and its steppe hinterland, the Giray khans enjoyed royal right to manage their own finances and tax system free from Ottoman interference. They even minted their own coins as the symbol of their fiscal and political autonomy.⁶² In accordance to Islamic law and Ghingisid traditions, the Giray khans had the right to impose various kinds of annual and provisional taxes that flowed through the ruling khans' and his crown princes' treasuries.⁶³ The Giray khans nevertheless faced serious financial restrictions on Crimean soil due to the division of power within the khanate's own base of power. Most of the economically productive lands in the peninsula were in the hands of sundry clans and Islamic charitable foundations (*waqf*s) the khans could not tax.⁶⁴ In the end, the wide range of financial resources derived from sultanic grants and the Crimean soil were only enough for the Giray khans' to afford their courtly activities and upkeep the Khanate's finances.⁶⁵ Therefore, they were bound to the frontier economics to a great extent for their wealth and surplus.

The Girays' autonomous financial resources were not restricted to the territories of the Crimean Khanate, but they rather had aspirations of dominating the greater Central Asian steppe frontiers with the financial and military backing of Istanbul. The Ottomans also recognized the Crimean khans' rights and claims on the former territories of the Golden Horde

⁶² Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," 51,59.

⁶³ The substance and development of Crimean finances have combined Islamic principles with Mongolic traditions and Ottoman fiscal adjustments. Considering the Islamic canonical taxes, the revenues from the tithe (*'ushr*), from all agricultural products, and the poll-tax (*jizya*), payable by non-Muslim subjects, flowed through the ruling khans' and his crown princes' treasuries. As the pursuant of the Ghingisid laws, the Giray khans could also demand various dues from their subjects to be paid to his own dignity. For instance, they imposed a tax on sheep, which is called *şişlik*, and a tax due from the slave owners-to be paid every thirty years to the khan. Furthermore, the Crimean khans collected extraordinary taxes patterning on the Ottoman fiscal arrangements, like cask fee on wine consumption and fines on crimes (*cera'im resmi*). They also demanded extra taxes for their military expenditures, either specifically directed to a section of Tatar army, like the taxes for maintenance of musketeers, or dedicated to compensating constant military campaigns. Natalia Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "The Law Factor in Ottoman-Crimean Tatar Relations in the Early Modern Period," in *Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors*, ed. Jeroen Duindam et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 184–91.

⁶⁴ The revenues of the largest port in the peninsula also belonged to the Ottomans who established its central administration over the *eyalet* of Kefe [Feodosia]. Despite the restrictions on land-taxes, the ruling Girays were given a share of revenue from the customs of Kefe and they also owned monopoly of the salt production in the peninsula. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 13–14, 19; İdris Bostan, "Salyane," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 2009, 60. ⁶⁵ Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 19.

from which these Ghingisid descendants had royal right to collect tribute and engage in political relationships independently. From the perspective of Istanbul, the Girays' status and power were reciprocal to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovite states that were subjected, moreover, to pay annual tributes to the Giray khan for protection against, well, the Giray khans' armies. The tribute paid by Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth comprised a large part of khans' income so much so that they were referred to as the "great treasure" (*uluğ hazine*) in khanate documents.⁶⁶ The Porte also allowed the Girays to receive tributes from Ottomans' vassals in the Danuban Principalities as well as collecting taxes from its inhabitants on occasion, again often for protection against the khanate's own forces.⁶⁷ Moreover, the Crimean khans considered themselves the overlords of the western Caucasian tribes. This nominal claim was recognized by Ottoman governance in the first half of the sixteenth century. For the khanate, the Caucasian tribes were the subjects of the Giray khans who expected to receive tributes that for the most part consisted of large trains of slaves.⁶⁸

In addition to these periodic tributes, spoils of war, ransom-slavery, and slave-trade constituted important sources of income for the Girays' finances. Tatar warriors were renown for plunder-runs across borders in war and peacetime alike. According to *hums* in the Islamic and *savga* in the Mongol tradition, the khans maintained their right to claim a fifth percentage of all booty his warrior-subjects accumulated.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the related massive traffic of slave trade was an important source of Crimean wealth. Indeed, the northern shores of the Black Sea had always been an important hub for slave-trade in the insatiable slave markets of the eastern Mediterranean world, and the Crimean khans enjoyed a lion's share of these revenues as the

⁶⁶ Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," 49.

⁶⁷ Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 19.

⁶⁸ Murat Yaşar, "The North Caucasus between the Ottoman Empire and the Tsardom of Muscovy: The Beginnings, 1552-1570," *Iran & the Caucasus*, 2016, 108.

⁶⁹ Krolikowska-Jedlinska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," 51–52.

primary purveyors of these lucrative "commodities." Rather conservative estimates project that the number of Slavic slaves transported across the Black Sea between 1500 and 1700 was comparable in scale to the much better studied Atlantic slave trade approaching close to two million people.⁷⁰

The Crimean Tatars also fueled their treasury with the ransom monies of slaves and captives their warrior-subjects frequently captured in war and peacetime alike. The Rurik and Romanov Muscovites especially had long expended pecuniary resources into the Crimean territories, as they encouraged government officials, merchants, foreign envoys and native rulers to purchase the freedom of Russian/Slavic captives that frequently fell into the clutches of Tatar marauders. So ubiquitous a problem was Tatar ransom-slavery for the Muscovites was that they formulated a particular ransom tax, called the *polonianichnyi sbor*, implemented for ransoming Slavic captives between 1551-1679.⁷¹ All in all, the Crimean khans owed their prosperity to widespread opportunities that came with "*Kleinkrieg*" (small-scale warfare) skirmishes and raids, the spoils of larger conventional wars the Ottomans waged with their help against the Habsburg, Polish-Lithuanian, and Russian states, and slave-trade alongside their Ghingisid prestige.

The Crimean Tatars' financial dominion, however, begun to unravel by the end of the seventeenth century. After the Ottoman defeat at the hands of the Holy League, the treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700) heralded about dramatic shifts in the Crimean Khanate's position both in the steppe frontiers and Ottoman imperial political system. In these armistices, the Porte conceded to accept three novel concessions they never consented to imperial rivals in the past by signing these armistices: they clearly differentiated boundaries between the empires

⁷⁰ Kolodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century) A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents, xiv. Will Smiley, From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia, and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 24–25.

⁷¹ Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500- 1800, 22–23;* See also, Smiley, *From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia, and International Law,* 44–46.

of the Ottomans' and their rivals; created joint apparatuses and policing mechanisms for the demarcation of these permanent boundaries; and acknowledge for the first time the territorial integrity of its neighboring rivals.⁷² As the "wild steppe frontiers" were steadfastly transformed into demarcated inter-imperial borderlands, discrepancies escalated between the Porte and its steppe protectorates following shifting balances of power in western Eurasia. As a result, the this shift in power from the Ottomans to their rivals made its weight felt in the Crimean affairs.

These treaties immediately impacted the status of the Crimean khans in Ottoman politics, as the dynasty increasingly became a burden for Istanbul who could single-handedly jeopardize peace with rivals like the Russians and the Habsburgs. The novel treaties likewise severely deprived Tatar society its most lucrative sources of revenue, as their northern neighbors ceased to deliver periodic protection payments to the khans in 1700. The deprivation of this "great treasure" remained minor in scale compared to the broad-spectrum of opportunities they had lost throughout the eighteenth century as the Muscovite state transformed into a powerful imperium that could efficaciously protect its subjects from Tatar raids. What also gets lost in the historiography that focuses on Russian and Ottoman warfare is that dignitaries from both empires, moreover, gradually took legal steps together towards transforming the steppe frontier into a more peaceful inter-imperial borderland. This also meant that there was a radical decline in the booty and slave traffic from sea raids spearheaded by Tatar privateers, as the sultans agreed to rein in the Crimean Tatars to unequivocally cease raiding into the Russia and its protectorate territories.⁷³ Meanwhile, the growing power of neighboring Cossack hetmanates working in conjunction with imperial Russia put more severe burdens on the Crimean Tatars not only through repulsing their incursions to the depth of the

⁷² Rif'aat Abou-el-Haj, "The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1969, 467, 471.

⁷³ Brian J. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 139–48; See Also, Smiley, From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia, and International Law.

steppes, but they also carried out destructive raids themselves into the Crimean territories. Alan Fisher even suggested that Cossack raids were one of the primary causes of the economic decline of Crimea starting from the 1680s onwards.⁷⁴

According to Abou-el-Hajj, the Crimean Tatars whose livelihood for centuries was based upon almost constant borderland skirmishing and slave runs on a fluid frontier were prepared neither ideologically nor institutionally for this sea change in Eurasian inter-imperial power configurations.⁷⁵ The Crimean Tatars' responses to post-Karlowitz inter-imperial dynamics are beyond the scope of this study; however, the Girays at no times abandoned their prerogatives in the steppes they had received from their Ghingisid heritage, not their Ottoman overlords.⁷⁶ In hope of reversing their finances straits, they attempted to re-invent their customary weight in the region through refashioning their martial and diplomatic competences. To that end, this period is significant to demonstrate their zeal to reinvent the financial status in the Crimean Khanate's hinterland.

Despite limitations on border incursions during peacetime, the Tatar armies never gave up their "frontier habits," namely pillaging local populations out of Crimea to get by and poising themselves into stronger negotiation positions with neighboring imperial powers by threatening their subjects. During increasingly frequent wars between the Ottomans and Romanovs throughout the eighteenth century, however, they made incessant incursions into the Russian steppes that offered the Crimean elite opportunities to replenish their coffers through the spoils of war and slave-trade revenues. During the Russo/Austrian-Ottoman War of 1735-1739, for instance, Tatar armies marauded Russian territories and enslaved tens of thousands of its inhabitants. The impact of only one Tatar raid in 1736, in particular, is telling, as the excessive

⁷⁴ Boeck, Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great, 135–36.

⁷⁵ Abou-el-Haj, "The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703," 475.

⁷⁶ Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 14; See also, Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great*, 231–48.

number of captives taken to the Giray Khan's camp were enough to drop significantly slave prices Eastern Mediterranean slave markets.⁷⁷

Indeed, these raids were a matter of survival for the Giray khans, since they had to procure and supply their own armies when fighting alongside Istanbul's imperial forces. As it will be discussed in the following chapters, they often elected to pillage, subjugate, and ransom Ottoman subjects in similar enterprises when they migrated to the Balkan provinces that were turned into contested inter-imperial frontiers from the late 1760s onwards. Furthermore, Kırım Giray Khan (r. 1758-1764) succeeded in to reinstituting the "great treasury" from the Russian Empire in 1763 when his Tatar armies' pushed as far north as far as the outskirts of the Russian imperial capital St. Petersburg.⁷⁸ Tatar armies made their last forays into the Imperial Russian territories a couple of years later during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774. The decisive Ottoman failure on the battlefields unfolded the turbulent events that paved the path toward imperial Russia's annexation of the Crimea almost a decade later in 1783.

All in all, the Ghingisid Giray dynasty had a unique place in the Ottoman imperial system and constituted one of the major elite groups who managed their own fiscal system free from the sultanic interference. To that end, they had a large pool of financial resources derived from sultanic grants alongside the Crimean Khanate's own levies and profitable opportunities that the northern frontiers offered them. Although sultanic grants constituted only a symbolic portion of the Girays' treasury, it signified Ottoman authority—particularly the sultans' benevolence--over the Crimean Khanate. Considering Crimean finances, the ruling khans had the right to manage their own fiscal system, which nevertheless was restricted by the Tatar clan leaders who likewise enjoyed remarkable autonomy within the Khanate's establishment.

⁷⁷ Smiley, From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia, and International Law, 33.

⁷⁸ V. D. Smirnov, Osmanlı Dönemi Kırım Hanlığı [Krimskoe Hanstvo pod Verhovenstvom Otomanskoe Porti v XVIII Stoletie], trans. Ahsen Batur (Istanbul: Selenge Yayınları, 2016), 513.

As the royal sovereigns of the former territories of the Golden Horde, the Giray khans had long enjoyed indisputable rights to pillage localities, collected tributes, and enslave non-Muslim populations outside the khanate. The fact that Crimean martial elites owed their wealth and prosperity to these steppe rewards explains the reason why they persisted in their frontier habits and reinvented their Ghingisid competences following the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Throughout the eighteenth century, they hardly reserved themselves to the fall in status and lucrative resources the Ottoman central government had in mind for them when they settled the Girays and their unruly subjects in Rumeli. The Girays persistently attempted to reclaim their former power and lucrative resources that they had to abandon in Crimea. As the following chapters will demonstrate, there are certain parallels in motives and methods of reinventing their financial means by using the Ghingisid competences and claims.

Making a Living in Rumeli in the late Eighteenth Century

Not long after Kirim Giray Khan succeeded to reverse their financial woes in the 1760s, the Giray khans found themselves displaced in the Ottoman Balkans. They became completely dependent upon sultanic grants and benevolence as displaced refugees who could no longer augment their wealth by preying upon steppe peoples and Russian subjects. This sharp decline in symbolic and financial independence was not unusual for many descendants of this dynasty who had already travelled back and forth from Rumeli to the Crimean Khanate. However, the Giray descendants, as a whole, began to hold large revenue units as sinecures-providing a service that is nonexistent or outmoded. Nevertheless, Ottoman sultans initially remained committed to their responsibility of maintaining the wealth of Giray descendants and honored their Ghingisid pedigree and bygone services to the empire. Istanbul observed the inter-dynastic traditions and treated these after 1783 newcomers in the similar manner to the ways in which they treated other Giray migrants who relocated to Rumeli centuries earlier.⁷⁹

In the first chapter, I explained the procedure of the Girays' forced integration into the Balkan countryside. From the financial perspective, the state obliged the Girays to settle onto permanent *ciftliks*, private or quasi-private commercial agricultural estates. From the perspective of the center, the objective was to ensure that their economic activity was sustainable and legible, that is, taxable and capable of being confiscated in its entirety if the Giray estate holder undermined local or imperial officials' maintaining order. Now officially confined solely to agrarian pursuits for the first time in their history, the Girays in Rumeli struggled to accept their new position *fait accompli* and continued to pursue other sources of revenue given their *sui generis* relations to the Ottoman dynasty. The Girays' financial subsidies in the Balkans consisted of the sultanic grants, *waqf* incomes and the apportioned salaries from the imperial center in return for their services. They were also allowed to accumulate wealth through investing in tax-farming to a certain extent in the vicinities of their estates.

On the other hand, the central administration imposed upon them their economic practices certain restrictions to which other groups in the Ottoman fiscal system were not subject. The problem was that as refugees not completely embedded in the core territories of the Ottoman empire, the Girays were completely dependent upon the Ottoman dynasty for its benevolence after 1783. The Girays' displacement was exacerbated by the fact that the Ottoman governments banned them from settling in urban centers like Istanbul, Edirne, or even provincial towns farther west in the Balkans.

⁷⁹ It seems that the Ottoman governance continued to observe welfare of the Giray descants who appealed to the imperial authorities for financial support up till the late 19th century-as the Ottoman monetary records suggests. Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 93-102.

These restrictions may have stemmed from the fact that because the Girays were second in line to the Ottoman dynasty should that dynasty discontinue or be ousted from power, the Ottoman sultans wanted to keep them as far away from Istanbul lest different power factions in the capital use them to threaten Topkapı during these turbulent times of unsuccessful wars and foreign invasions.⁸⁰ Being expected to make due following agrarian pursuits solely in the countryside, the Girays accustomed to urban culture in Bahçesaray resented being relegated to such an inferior, limited position. In this chapter, I will firstly explore the fiscal arrangements the central administration had in mind for livelihood of Giray households along with the restrictions these 'licit' ways of making a living in Rumeli humiliated the Crimean khans and their descendants. Secondly, I investigate the factors that threatened their welfare in order to draw a general picture of their solvency. Considering the methodological difficulties, this chapter will reveal the broadest spectrum of possible economic pursuits based on the monetary records of some prominent branches of the dynasty.

Sultanic grants, as mentioned earlier, constituted an essential source of the Girays' property and income. Yet there was neither a standard amount of financial backing distributed equally, nor did all of the Girays enjoy the sultanic revenues. But instead, Ottoman sultans assigned various amounts of grants considering their welfare and Ghingisid prominence. These grants could be apportioned as land, cash or provisions. While some of the Girays enjoyed a generous combination of these grants, some others had no share in them.⁸¹

The Ottoman administration ascertained, to begin with, that each Giray scion should be placed into a definite plot of rural land. They were either granted new estates or directed to

⁸⁰ Emecen, "Osmanlı Hanedanına Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve Mülahazalar"; Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808"; Terzioğlu, "Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyâz-i Misrî (1618- 1694)."

⁸¹ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 93–96.

existing estates of their relatives.⁸² These estates were usually given in the form of life-term tax-farms, *mālikāne*, or *hass*⁸³ imperial crown lands.⁸⁴ They generally sprawled large areas sometimes consisting of farms, gristmills and pasture lands that were thought to yield enough profit for their livelihood. From primary sources, there little information concerning the populations living these estates that varied in number as well as the confessional and ethnic affiliations. Some sources reveal that around thirty to forty residents lived on the estates of elderly dynasty members.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the Girays had migrated from Crimea along with their Tatar and Circassian courtiers and servants who resided either on their estates or constructed homes near the Girays' mansions. The Ottomans customarily guaranteed the welfare of some of these groups by offering them sultanic grants as well thus creating Tatar enclaves that are still heavily under-researched in Ottomanist literature.⁸⁶

In addition to *çiftlik*s, the Girays enjoyed various kinds of sultanic revenues distributed in cash. From the day they set foot in the Ottoman territories, their travel expenses ($h\bar{a}rc-i r\bar{a}h$) and daily subsistence (harclik) were covered by the central government along with those of their household members and courtiers.⁸⁷ After being settled on their fiefs, the central administration granted annual pensions to those Girays who petitioned the sultan for more financial backing.⁸⁸ Most commonly, they were allocated periodic salaries mainly in the form of *ocaklik*,⁸⁹ that is public revenues from certain fixed-sum land taxes (*mukāta 'a*) and customs

⁸³ The *hass* lands were the most valuable crown lands that was amounted to more than 100.000 *akçe* per year.

⁸² Seldom, the Ottoman administration allowed some Girays not to move some of these estates by issuing a special residence license that had a certain due date. Ultimately, the center obliged any Giray descents to move one of their relative's estates, *BOA* HAT. 201/1036.

⁸⁴ Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]," 8–13.

⁸⁵ For example, Baht Giray's household consisted of almost thirty people, BOA HAT 177/7795; Selim Giray's household consisted of about forty residents, Câbî Ömer Efendi, <u>Tārīh-i Sultān Selim Hān-i Sālis Ve Maḥmūd-i Sāni</u>, ed. Mehmet Ali Beyhan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 297. Need proper transliterations ⁸⁶ Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları" [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans], 20.

⁸⁷ BOA AE.SLM.III; 95/5736, 280/16228; C.MTZ; 5/216, 5/248, 6/249; D.bşm.d. 4722.

⁸⁸ BOA HAT 221/12358.

⁸⁹ The *ocaklik*s were the long-term revenue assignments to non-administrative expenditures of the state. In this manner, the state assigns certain revenue units to the statesmen instead of waging salary from the center. Most

(*gümrük*) directed to favored Girays dignities.⁹⁰ They received these sultanic salaries either annually (*sālyāne*) or monthly (*şehriyye* / *māhiyye*)—sometimes both—depending upon the Giray family member in question.

Moreover, some elderly Girays received periodic incomes from Istanbul described in sources as "gifts" ('*ațiyye*) during Ramadan or religious festivals.⁹¹ In contrast with younger Giray scions who did not receive as much beneficence from the state and who were, consequently, more recalcitrant, the rewarding of gifts to elderly Giray family members can be interpreted as disciplining rewards from Ottoman sultans to Giray family members that obeyed the orders of Istanbul and adhered to its rules and laws. The sultans also distributed '*ațiyye* to each Giray who demonstrated their usefulness for the state, especially in warfare.⁹² Furthermore, the Ottoman administration assigned to family members certain provisions (*ta 'yināt*) besides cash subsidies. As the certain victuals like bread, barley and meat, were apportioned, they allocated the sum of money instead (*ta 'yināt bahāst*).⁹³ These provisions were assigned to dignity of a given Giray in the manner of life-long payments (*kayd-1 hayāt şarțıyla*) in addition to the other revenues. Like the '*ațiyye*, these life-long provisions were mainly assigned to those Girays who demonstrated their loyalty and utility to the state in various capacities.⁹⁴

Girays in Rumeli did not receive financial support merely because of their illustrious Mongol pedigree; those that received the most support from the state regularly offered Topkapı their services and devotion. In such cases, they were treated like the other imperial officials

importantly, the *ocaklıks* were the hereditary revenues allocated to the families of the statesmen. Orhan Kılıç, "Ocaklık," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 2007, 317–18.

⁹⁰ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 93–94.

⁹¹ BOA C.HR. 90/4454.

⁹² For example, Bahadır Giray Sultan received *atiyye* during Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-1812, *BOA* C.HR. 101/5015; Devlet Giray Sultan received *atiyye* during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829, *BOA* C.AS. 259/10798; Also, the dynasty representatives and former Crimean khans received periodical *attiyes*, *BOA* C.MTZ. 13/624.

⁹³ BOA C.HR. 35/1747, C.AS. 564/23671, C.MTZ. 12/587

⁹⁴ For example, the Ottoman government granted life-long provisions for each Giray sultan who assisted to the imperial armies during wartime, *BOA* C.AS, 511/21332.

(*me'mūr*) remunerated for their services. Firstly, frequent warfare with the Russian Empire meant for the Girays an opportunity to fill their treasuries, and Giray military divisions proved particularly effective against the Russians given that they intimately "knew" their enemies. The Porte continued to make use of their martial culture and traditional rights over Tatar populations by appointing one senior figure among the dynasty as the governor-general (*ser-'asker*) over multiple Tatar regiments.⁹⁵ In wartime especially, the sultans treated the Giray princes in a similar manner as they had treated to Crimean khans in the past. The governor-general received insignias of authority, flags, swords, furs and significant amounts cash, while the other princes received comparable rewards commensurate to their respective services.⁹⁶ Though their tenures were provisional, they had chance the chance to gain life-long annuities alongside various grants if they were successful in battle against the Russians and other imperial rivals.⁹⁷

Archival evidence suggests that the Ottoman state favored the Girays for certain positions and functions by the turn of the nineteenth century. Some Giray princes were given key positions in Ottoman defensive lines like the protection of the Bosphorus or frontiers towns in the Balkans.⁹⁸ Furthermore, Istanbul continued to appoint some Giray princes to rule over Caucasian tribes so that these men could organize local populations militarily against the threat of Russian invasions; however, these Giray nobles were gradually replaced by centrally appointed Ottoman officials in these regions.⁹⁹ Lastly, some dynasty representatives were considered outstanding imperial officers entitled to lucrative salaries other than ordinary

 ⁹⁵ Şahbaz Giray and Baht Giray were respectively appointed over the Tatar and Caucasian armies as the *Khans of Kuban* during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-1792; Bahadır Giray and Halim Giray were also commanded over the Tatar regiments as *ser- 'askers* of their own divisions during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-1812. Also, some Giray princes were particularly appointed over the Caucasian tribes under Ottoman protectorate. *BOA* C.AS. 259/10798; AE.SABH.I. 13/1148; HAT 1378/54256, 1381/54490. Tatar mirzas who accompanied to the Giray khans were also received a particular payment, known as '*tirkeş akçası*', *BOA* C.HR. 49/2406.
⁹⁶ BOA C.AS. 364/15084, 259/10798; HAT, 1383/54747, 1384/54797, 20/977; C.ML. 57/2630.

⁹⁷ BOA C.AS. 511/21332, 564/23871

⁹⁸ For example, Mehmed Giray was charged with the protection the Bosphorus in 1829, *BOA* AE.SMHD.II 9/465.

⁹⁹ For example, Mehmed Giray was appointed as the governor-general over the Circassian tribes in the northern Caucasus alongside the Ottoman officers in 1816, *BOA* C.DH. 257/12329.

sultanic grants.¹⁰⁰ All in all, Istanbul found novel ways to incorporate the Girays into the imperial governance, although they were restricted by number and ranking. The social mobility of Giray family members, therefore, was significantly limited, as family members were prohibited ultimately from leaving their rustic enclaves.

In addition to sultanic grants and official service salaries, *waqf* revenues constituted a third unit of the Girays' financial resources. In the Ottoman land system, the apportioned life term assets (i.e. tax-farms, *mālikānes*) could not be sold or inherited; however, they could be transformed into *waqf* land (i.e., endowments) for the public good under the protection of Islamic law. In these foundations, namely family/posterity *waqfs* (*zurrī/evlādlık vakf*), a symbolic rate of endowed assets or revenues were donated to charity, while most of the assets were bequeathed to family members. In Ottoman society, it was one of the most common strategies to preserve wealth for progeny by providing the right to inherit most of the assets to family members as annuities.¹⁰¹

For centuries, Girays in the Balkans transformed their estates, mansions, mills, vineyards and orchards into the *waqf* status in order to guarantee their posterity's livelihood and familial integrity of a branch of the dynasty assembled under the same roof. To that end, it was a useful way to avoid confiscation from the state as well as the diminishing effects (i.e., taxation) of the law of inheritance.¹⁰² After 1783, some branches of the Giray dynasty moved to these family *waqf* lands and inherited various property and annuities. For instance, Hacı I Selim Giray Khan's (d. 1703) assets in proximities of Istanbul and Burgos (today Lüleburgaz,

¹⁰⁰ As an example of salaries specifically allocated to the dignity of the $s\bar{a}hib\ddot{u}$ 'l-'arz see BOA HAT 754/35588.

 ¹⁰¹ Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 27–28, 75.
¹⁰² Hüseyin Çınar, "Hacı I. Selim Giray Han ve Çiftlik Vakıfları," Karadeniz Araştırmaları Dergisi, Güz 2006, 28–30; Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]," 16–19.

Turkey) and Arslan Giray Khan's (d.1768) estates in the Edirne province provided sustainable, legal resources to their descendants.¹⁰³

Lastly, the Girays were able to accumulate wealth through tax-farming which also gave them administrative capacities over sundry districts throughout Rumeli. Contract-based taxfarming was expanded by the Ottoman government in response to economic pressure throughout the eighteenth century. In this order, the central state separated some revenue units, mainly agricultural estates, and either outsourced these divisions to contractors or managed them directly through salaried supervisors.¹⁰⁴ These revenue units were reassessed by fiscal experts and rented to financiers and entrepreneurs under life-term contracts ($m\bar{a}lik\bar{a}ne-yi$ $muk\bar{a}ta'a$). Provincial revenue units were outsourced together with the communities -whose rights were protected by the judiciary- attached to them and it furnished the contractor with an administrative authority in these zones. Contractors collected revenues in these enterprises, remitted the amount agreed on in their contracts to the state or primary holders, and kept the rest as profit.¹⁰⁵ In this way, various individuals and families established monopolies over local resources and acted as brokers between local communities and the central administration. Gradually, the central authority became dependent on these newly established notables ('ayans) for maintaining order,¹⁰⁶

The Girays did not compete with *'ayâns*, since their higher status did not allow for the acquisition of such low-ranking administrative posts. Even the attempts at establishing connections to local elites through marriages provided no nominal change in their place within

¹⁰³ For example, Arslan Giray's endowment continued to operate up till the second half of the 20th century. Çınar, "Hacı I. Selim Giray Han ve Çiftlik Vakıfları," 30–37; Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]," 18–19; Kırımlı, "A Scion of the Crimean Khans in the Crimean War: The Allied Powers and the Question of Future of the

Crimea," 193. BOA C. EV. 432/21851, 50/2468, 385/19546.

 ¹⁰⁴ Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 27–28.
¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 28–30.

¹⁰⁶ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 504.

society.¹⁰⁷ Any effort of the Girays to accumulate substantial local properties and assets lay in contempt of the socio-political position that imperial officials countenanced for this dynasty. However, Ottoman governance seemed to allow smaller scale enterprises in some division of revenues. Some of the Giray sultans who had enough capital purchased tax-collection rights in villages that were in close proximity to their estates.¹⁰⁸ Restricted though these tax-farm investments were, it linked enterprising Girays to Ottoman localities through joint agricultural pursuits.

As the *mutaşarrıf*s (administrators), these entrepreneurial Giray descendants were given administrative jurisdiction in these enclaves and protected from the intervention of governors or other authorities, except the judiciary.¹⁰⁹ While the *mutaşarrıf*s received their salaries and executive expenditures from the local population, they were also obliged to maintain order and public utilities with their incomes in these villages. Amidst the monetary pressures, they had to manage local finances which are open to judicial intervention.¹¹⁰ Thus, becoming more intimately involved in local agricultural production and fiscal management exposed the Girays more to the purview of imperial authorities and sultanic sanctions in cases of their corruption and overtaxing the peasantry.¹¹¹

It is noteworthy that not only the enterprising entrepreneurs, but also entire dynasty members were considered *mutaṣarrıf*s in territories surrounding their estates. It meant that they had to meet large sums of expenditures for running their household and its surrounding territories. They were obliged to maintain law and order as well as carrying out infrastructure

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 506. In the third chapter, the symbolic and material meanings of such strategies will be discussed in more detail.

¹⁰⁸ For example, Sahib Giray invested in tax-farm in several villages of the Thrace, *BOA* AE.SABH.I 26/2001 ¹⁰⁹ In the broader meaning, *mutaşarrıf* refers to the master or owners of an office or rank. It also refers to the governors of provinces- *sanjak* or *liva*- or holders of *mālikāne*, *hass* and *timar* lands. Örenç, "Mutasarrıf," 377.

¹¹⁰ Örenç, "Mutasarrıf," 377–78; Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 27–30.

¹¹¹ For example, Sahib Giray, Selamet Giray and Adil Giray were warned and later chastised because of oppression of the peasantry, *BOA* AE.SSLM.III 269/155262. This point will be discussed in the third chapter more thoroughly.

and public utilities.¹¹² They had to protect their communities against sundry forms of violence, especially banditry and brigandage, and observe the consent of the people in their neighborhoods.¹¹³ Among their responsibilities to the local populations also included maintaining public works such as roads and drainage systems along with religious and public buildings.¹¹⁴ In this respect, they undertook various construction projects from their collected revenues they were charged with building bridges, mosques and fountains for public service.¹¹⁵

Overall, the Giray descendants secured for themselves a privileged fiscal status in the Ottoman imperial system and held likewise augmented their subsidies by acquiring numerous sinecures. Having isolated the Ghingisid households in the countryside milieus, Ottoman central authorities guaranteed the welfare and financial solvency of each dynasty member. To that end, Giray progenies had the potential to combine a large pool of financial resources derived from sultanic grants, state service returns, *waqf* incomes and tax-farming.

However, all branches of the Giray dynasty faced the common threat of losing their 'licit' subsidies which were always under state surveillance and subject to being revoked. Throughout the Selimian era, many branches of the dynasty gradually lost their land holdings, annual incomes and provision supplies. This can generally be ascribed to the grave economic conditions of the Ottoman Empire that vigorously applied confiscations to ameliorate the constant pressures on treasury. Financial burdens multiplied as the widespread social and economic disorder fundamentally threatened the Giray khans limited resources. All in all, many branches of the Girays had to endure their consistent loss of subsidies, revenues, and assets.

Considering the landholdings, some Giray families had serious problems preserving the estates that they had received through sultanic rewards, entailed *waqfs* or personal investments.

¹¹² Örenç, "Mutasarrıf," 377.

¹¹³ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 91; Örenç, "Mutasarrıf," 377.

¹¹⁴ Örenç, "Mutasarrıf," 377.

¹¹⁵ Kançal-Ferrari, "Kırım Hanlarının İmar Faaliyetleri ve Mezar Taşları [Construction Activities and Tombstones of the Crimean Khans]," 36–37.

Archival sources show that they frequently lost their estates because of inheritance blocks, the central government's seizing their assets, and heightened local competition over commercial lands and resources. After the Girays' migration to Ottoman core territories, the size of the plots of lands and subsidies given to older dignitaries of with the family was determined by their past services to the state. Sometimes, these parcels included non-heritable lands which became a source of contention and complaint for their progeny. In such cases, the Ottoman administration transferred nonheritable estates over to the treasury or offered the heirs preemptive rights to buy these lands in state auctions.¹¹⁶ Rarely, Giray families even encountered problems securing hereditary tax-farms which were under *waqf* jurisdiction. In many cases, local notables or authorities intervened in the legal process and postured claims on some pieces of commercial estates. Together with some intra-familial disagreements, these inheritance issues resulted in the partition or contraction of the acreages earlier generations of the Girays secured for themselves upon migrating to Rumeli.¹¹⁷

The Ottoman administration often confiscated the properties of Giray princes as forms of punishment for their excesses and breach of the law. However, quite a few letters Ottoman sultans received from their households indicated that they might have received smaller estates or were directed to related descendants of the dynasty. After the sultans released exiled Girays, more fortunate ones were granted more modest landholdings, while others were directed to their relatives' households; some were no longer entitled to receiving an estate or imperial stipend. Many branches of the Giray dynasty lost their commercial estates, because they invoked the wrath of central authorities.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ For example, Baht Giray bequeathed three estates to his sons, K1rIm Giray, Selim Giray and Devlet Giray. However, Ottoman authorities annulled these documents claiming that these were non-transferable estates. As the result, the sultan granted the transfer of two of these estates to Giray's heirs; however, he ordered that one of those properties go up for auction at the price of a 1000 *kuruş*, *BOA* C.ML 53/2546.

¹¹⁷ BOA C.EV. 605/30535, C.HR. 82/4073, C.ADL. 47/2840.

¹¹⁸ BOA C.ZB. 27/1322, C.HR. 23/1124, HAT 202/10375. See also, Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond."

The Girays encountered numerous problems preserving their assets, as local entrepreneurs and even their own relatives coveted and contested lands surrounding and within their *çifiliks*. It seems that especially the first years of the Girays' *en masse* migration witnessed intra-dynastic struggles because of land partitioning and confused boundaries among the family members' estates.¹¹⁹ Given that *çiftlik* ownership was closely linked to the acquisition of power and wealth, local notables and entrepreneurs sought opportunities to expand their territories by claiming *mutaşarrıf*-ships over the Girays' asset. Especially, competition over lands created a wave of intense land usurpations by the turn of the century.¹²⁰ Archival evidences show that some Giray families also suffered financially from these local groups' violent land grabs and lost some of their possessions permanently.¹²¹

Considering the annual pensions and provisions, the beneficiaries were bound solely to the generosity of the Sultan who tended to reclaim these annuities back to the imperial treasury because of the financial crises of the time.¹²² The Giray households experienced one of the most a dramatic downturns in their subsidies by the gradual decay in these periodic annuities of $s\bar{a}ly\bar{a}ne$ (yearly salary) and *şehriyye* (monthly salary). Having stronger ties with the central government, the first generations of the dynasty were privileged to receive the annual pensions which constituted a significant part of their income. Sometimes, the Ottoman sultans decreed the confiscation of these annual payments upon the bestowal of an estate or death of an elderly figure in the family.¹²³

Archival evidence shows that Sultan Selim III generally decreed on the inheritance of half of the annual pensions to the heirs and confiscated all-or-none in some occasions. Even

¹¹⁹ BOA C.ADL. 102/6146.

¹²⁰ Aysel Yıldız, *Crises and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 50.

¹²¹ BOA C.HR. 82/4073, AE.SABH.I. 167/11197.

¹²² "Abdulhamid I and Selim III vigorously applied confiscations to ameliorate the constant fiscal pressures on the central administration," Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions*, 25–26.

¹²³ BOA C.ML. 100/4436; C.HR. 68/3359; C.MTZ. 17/849, 18/872.

those subsides which were apportioned as *ocaklık* (hereditary salaries) were reversed back to the imperial treasury in varied proportions.¹²⁴ Payrolls indicate, however, that while the it tended to reclaim annual pensions bequeathed to male heirs, the imperial government was less likely to intervene with the inheritance of female members of the family.¹²⁵ Elderly Girays frequently complained about confiscations stating that they were traditionally given these pensions since the 16th century, and Giray offspring fell into severe poverty because of these policies.¹²⁶ In this regard, the Ottoman government continued to pay these annual salaries throughout the nineteenth century despite the shortages.¹²⁷

The livelihood of the Giray families was consistently undermined, furthermore, by the extreme volatility and incessant economic hardship that marked the Balkans during this age of heightened inter-imperial war and foreign invasion. All strata Ottoman society suffered from the socio-economic crises that ensued throughout the Balkans. Notwithstanding their prestigious pedigree, the Girays' estates were frequently subject to the threats of bandits, *'ayâns*, imperial officials who often partook in largescale criminal enterprises that attacked, pillaged and burned down their properties.¹²⁸ Being restricted cultivate on their farmland estates, Giray migrants were affected firsthand by fluctuations in the agrarian economy. Their migration to Rumeli was followed by exceptionally long seasons of droughts.¹²⁹ Archival evidence underscores how droughts made conditions for some members of the Giray family so unbearable that they implored imperial authorities for basic foodstuffs.¹³⁰

All in all, the Crimean royal dynasty had long enjoyed a large pool of economic resources derived from the sultanic grants, Crimean finances, and profitable opportunities that

¹²⁴ BOA C.HR. 102/5070; C.ML. 1084795; AE.SSLM.I. 42/2430; C.DH. 3/114.

¹²⁵ BOA C.ML. 212/8736; C.HR. 108/5360; C.MTZ. 12/558. Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 98–109.

¹²⁶ BOA C.MTZ. 14/660.

¹²⁷ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 98–109.

¹²⁸ BOA C.ZB. 44/2198; HAT 36/1841.

¹²⁹ Yıldız, Crises and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution, 45–51.

¹³⁰ Karaca, "Giraylar (1440–1840)," 91.

the steppe frontiers offered for themselves. Having abandoned these licit and autonomous sources of wealth in the Crimea, they found themselves financially restricted to sultanic grants which now signified indisputable Ottoman authority over this Ghingisid dynasty. Although the Ottoman government strove to absorb them into the Rumeli countryside, they guaranteed royal prosperity and fiscal solvency with regard to their pedigree and bygone services to the state. To that end, many branches of the Giray dynasty continued to hold large revenue units derived from a varying combination of sultanic grants-as sinecures, waqf incomes, returns for state services and tax-farming.

Despite Ottoman guarantees, the Giray families in practice had a disadvantaged position in the Ottoman fiscal system and tended to lose their licit possessions. Although they were theoretically superior than any other group of Ottoman society, the stagnant social status that the central countenanced for themselves included certain restrictions and anomalies. In the Rumeli countryside as newcomers, they were at a distinct disadvantage to more established power brokers in Ottoman society and could not reinvent their economic identities reminiscent of their financial status and resources in the Crimea in the steppe frontiers north of the Black Sea. In this regard, they might be considered as the most disadvantageous elite group in the Ottoman Empire.

Inventing an Alternative Economy

The Crimean royal dynasty had long enjoyed deep-seated prestige in the Ottoman imperial system and constituted a major elite group who managed their own regional economy free from Istanbul's interference. Having abandoned all of these resources and privileges once they fled the Crimea, they became the only elite group within the Ottoman domains whose welfare was almost completely bound to the benevolence of Ottoman sultans. Indeed, the Ottoman central administration initially acknowledged the dynasty's entitlement to their former wealth and prestige in their new setting in Rumeli and reorganized their fiscal status in accordance with inter-dynastic traditions. In this regard, the state endeavored for the family to enjoy a large pool of financial resources derived from a combination of sultanic grants, state service opportunities, *waqf* income, and tax-farming.

From the day they arrived in Rumeli, however, many branches of the dynasty faced financial insolvency given the grave economic conditions of the Ottoman empire. On the one hand, they were severely affected by the dearth of wealth, resources and security in provincial Ottoman society. Their relegation to agricultural pursuits along with the reluctant benevolence of Selim III and his government, on the other hand, severely limited the family's ability to get by solely on "licit" economic ventures. Throughout the Selimian era alone, many branches of the dynasty gradually lost their land holdings, annual incomes and provision supplies within decades of their migration to the Balkan peninsula. As they were strictly prohibited to move to the urban centers, they had to endure the steady loss of their limited assets in the Balkan countryside.

As response to decline in their status and adverse material conditions, many of the Girays attempted to re-invent their financial resources by engaging in or leading plundering bands of irregular soldiers-turned-bandits that marauded the Rumeli countryside to make ends meet and force the central government to offer them new, more powerful positions commensurate with the amount of terror they could wield upon the sultan's subjects. Investing in small-scale tax-farms with limited capital and cultivating these small plots of lands were "licit" pursuits that could only provide the family with very humble sources of income. Plus, even these small holdings were subject to attack by roaming bandits and hostile neighbors who augmented their power by usurping land-holdings adjacent to their own holdings. In this core province that had been ravaged by over a century of war, foreign invasion, and inter-confessional strife stemming from the latter, powerful players had to break the law and

accumulate armed bands in outlaw enterprises that both protected their own households and augment their material wealth by preying on their neighbors.

Despite the large number and diversity of the Girays that immigrated to the Balkans, it is not possible to draw general framework of motives: some might have been resentful of the state because of their reduced social status; some may have been bent to recapture former glory of their ancestors; or some simply adopted to the "economies of violence" that had long been established in the region to which most powerful players conformed to augment their power, clout with both local populations and imperial officials, and their wealth.

The arrival of the Crimean Tatars coincided with a time in which the Balkan provinces became a new contested frontier in which the Ottomans, their imperial rivals, and local populations within the empire began to interact with one another in novel ways. Throughout the Selimian era, a complex web of violence, banditry, and rebellion became endemic throughout this province where state-presence naturally subsided after disastrous wars that devastated these areas. "Mountaineer Rebellions" (*Dağlı İsyanları*) especially stormed localities in Rumelia from 1791 to 1808 and directly affected the provinces in which the Giray descants had estates. This environment offered a fertile ground for Giray scions to forge alternative sources of in Ottoman society given that they were barred from social mobility commensurate to their former status. To that end, many Giray scions attempted to reinvent their clout and financial resources by emphasizing their Ghingisid pedigrees and reverting back to their marauding ancestry as masters of the steppe frontier. They mainly refashioned their "frontier habits," namely pillaging and terrorizing local populations to get by thereby poising for themselves concomitantly stronger negotiation positions with imperial authorities

Even before the fall of the Crimean Khanate, royal family at the helm of pillaging enterprises ravaged localities and brought the turmoil of frontier zones into the depths of central Ottoman territories in the Balkans. Vera Mutafchieva was one of the first historians to explore how bellicose groups from the Crimean played a key role in legitimating large-scale marauding as a "legitimate" means of making a living in Rumeli. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, the fugitive forces of Devlet Giray Khan came all the way down to Eastern Thrace and joined other militarized groups and together relentlessly pillaged the region only a couple of hundred miles away from the imperial capital. As a response to the influx of these violent groups, Ottoman subjects fled the towns and sought refuge in the surrounding Balkan and Rhodope Mountain ranges. Thereafter, these groups took arms themselves and began to prey on neighboring communities for sustenance and as a sign of protest against the oppressions of bellicose steppe warriors from Crimea.¹³¹

As the extent of violence augmented from the late 1760s onwards, Rumeli peoples collaborated and adopted guerilla tactics that they at least partially learned from Crimean immigrants. They generally attacked cities and towns along the Maritsa Valley and fled back to the mountain ranges. This form of social mobility had an indelible mark on Rumeli society, for it began to normalize banditry as a legitimate means of subsistence as well as protest.¹³² Throughout the decades surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century, these mountaineer bandit groups stormed Rumeli territories and provided alternative channels of "career" and power for different sections of Ottoman society. At the end of the Russo/Austrian-Ottoman Wars of 1787-1793, post-war conditions pushed many groups into joining bands and brigands which sparked the Mountaineer Rebellions that spread violence from the Rhodope foothills to the urban center throughout the entire region.¹³³

¹³¹ Extracted from, Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 59–61; Mutafchieva, *Kŭrdzhalijsko Vreme [The Time of the Kŭrdzhalis]*. The marauders of forces belong to other Crimean princes, like Gazi Giray, also widened the extent of violence and disorder in the Rumelian localities, *BOA* C.ZB. 70/3464.

¹³² Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 60.

¹³³ Ibid., 195–98, 259–61.

After 1783, the Crimean royal dynasty, as a whole, found themselves in the midst of extreme violence that surrounded their new homes. In this regard, they were both catalysts and participants of these networks of violence throughout Rumeli. Ottoman archival sources show that there is a marked increase in violent acts and alliances that the Giray princes engaged in the Balkan towns after the 1790s. It seems that the next generation of Giray scions were particularly destitute and subject to finding more controversial ways to make ends meet. Later nineteenth-century chroniclers like Ahmed Cevdet ascribed their recalcitrance and unruly behavior to their "steppe" martial culture and personal greed: "the Ghingisid Sultans" oppression of the Rumeli peasanty went too far. Their estates became veritable centers of brigandage and banditry. The governors and judges were incapable of preventing their crimes."¹³⁴

Traditional narratives resembling that of Ahmed Cevdet often associated the Girays' trans-regional marauders with their habitual greed and lust for power. Recent studies, however, have demonstrated how this type of behavior had long been conventionalized among local populations and imperial officials themselves.¹³⁵ In a region rife demobilized networks of violence armed to the teeth, these sorts of moralizing narratives obfuscate the multi-layered relationships amplified by symbolic and moral means of collaboration.

In the Ottoman historiography, Tolga U. Esmer made a holistic contribution to the field by investigating the driving forces of networks of violence. He emphasized the constellation of power within the Ottoman establishment in which many players, including, the local notables, bandits, peasants, non-Muslims, and imperial grandees who came up with new roles and capacities interacted with one another in novel ways. In this environment, the "economy of violence" became an alternative channel of power and "career advancement" for all of the

¹³⁴ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ṭārīħ-i Cevdet*, 2:1394–95.

¹³⁵ Sebastian R. Prange, "Outlaw Economics: Doing Business on the Fringes of the State. A Review Essay," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2011; Tolga U. Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," *Past & Present*, 2014.

diverse groups involved, ranging from humble peasants to the highest Ottoman bureaucratic and military echelons. Esmer highlighted the roles of charismatic bandit/rebel chiefs like Kara Feyzi with regard to their large capacity for re-configuring regional politics, bringing a certain level of order and economic opportunities for the Muslim and Christian folk alike barred from social mobility through 'licit' channels in imperial institutions.¹³⁶

Esmer argued that socially and religiously inclusive economies of violence generated an alternative social organization over which the Porte had limited control. In core Balkan provinces, the practices of pillaging, capturing and enslaving Ottoman subjects became part of a larger economy since its vanguards operated big business which juxtaposed multifaceted connections between the illicit organizations, local communities and the state. In these transregional violent enterprises, this complex 'economy of violence' entailed exchanges of resources, prestige, symbolic capital and promotion among the all groups involved.¹³⁷

The presence of the Giray khans contributed a new dynamic into this framework of relationships with regard to their Ghingisid status and martial competences. As it will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapters, many Giray scions interacted with different sections of the Ottoman society, including influential bandit chiefs -like Kara Feyzi and Cenkçioğlu Kara Mustafa, provincial notables-like Pavandoğlu of Vidin and Tirsinikli İsmail of Ruse-, Ottoman officials, local landholders, irregular warriors and jobless peasants.

On the one hand, the Girays' estates attracted the attention of many 'ayân claimants, bandit chiefs and fugitives who sought Ghingisid alliance or protection. Archival sources reveal that its extent was not restricted to the Rumelian provinces, but instead, many powerholders or entrepreneurs interacted with the Giray khans coming from the greater Marmara region.¹³⁸ On

¹³⁶ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800."

¹³⁷ Ibid., 164.

¹³⁸ For example, the 'ayân claimant and bandit groups from Karamürsel (today in Kocaeli province, Turkey), namely Tombazoğlu, Hamid Bey and Koca Mehmed sought refuge in Şahbaz and Sahib Giray's estates. *BOA* HAT, 188/8983

the other, they actively involved in networks of violence by offering financial resources, armed forces and prestige to the groups they allied. The nature of relationships they established with the local groups reveal that they did not merely roam around the Balkans replicating their frontier habits, but they rather took part of a shared culture of rebellion which was integral part of the economy of violence. In doing so, they refashioned their steppe competences and made use of the social dynamics of the already militarized Rumelian provinces.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ As the pursuant of the Ghingisid laws, the Giray khans could demand various dues from their subjects to be paid to his own dignity. In the Rumelia, some Giray scions imposed extraordinary levies to the Ottoman subjects in similar manner that they had long done in the Crimean soil. For example, Toktamış Giray asked for "*kudūmi*" taxes from the peasanty -a specail taxt to paid to the Ottoman authorities after the return from a campaign. Furthermore, in the steppe frontiers, the Crimean khans had received the percentage- that was called *savga*- from the spoils of war and plunders that the Tatars armies gathered. In much the same way, the Giray khans nominally protected some bandit groups who shared a certain percentage from their loots to the Giray scions. *BOA* AE.SSLM.III 221/12946; C.ADL. 3/174; C.HR. 95/4721

Chapter Three

The Girays in the Midst of (Dis)Order in Rumeli during the Selimian Era

The Girays' migration *en masse* to the Rumeli countryside coincided with times in which both the Ottoman central administration and society underwent profound transformation. At the imperial center, Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807) introduced an extensive reform project, the so-called "New Order" (*Nizâm-i Cedîd*). The Balkan provinces, on the other hand, became the new arena in which the Ottomans, their imperial rivals, as well as different subject populations within the empire began to interact with one another in novel ways. The fluctuating constellations of power among Ottoman institutions and traditional elites in the Balkans provided sections of Ottoman society that hailed from humbler backgrounds distinct opportunities to acquire more authority and wealth through sheer force and terror. These fluid social hierarchies provided the ancient Giray nobility many opportunities to push the limits of their heavily curtailed existence in Rumeli and expand their power beyond the meagre estates Istanbul envisioned for them in their new settings. In this chapter, I will examine the new social dynamics of the Balkans during the Selimian era and attempt to locate the Girays on the local, regional, and trans-imperial levels of social interaction.

I will firstly investigate the loose boundaries between various strata of Rumeli society including the local notables, *vizier*-officials, *pashas*-military governors, irregular forces, bandits, as well as urban and rural populations. Secondly, I will explain the "Mountaineer Rebellions," referring to Vera Mutafchieva's approach together with Tolga Esmer's "economies of violence" to demonstrate how the Girays forged their roles as integral parts of networks of violence in the empire. By doing do, I will explore the alternative ways Girays' made their disparate bids to rise again as regional and imperial power brokers in their new

setting by telling the stories of various Girays princes. Thirdly, I will investigate the responses of the central authority—along with elderly figures among the Girays—to the younger Giray scions who attempted to augment their power by joining or leading networks of violence that roamed Ottoman society. I specifically look to Sultan Selim III's strategies for disciplining and containing the Girays. Lastly, considering the waning of networks of violence towards to the end of the Selimian era, I will compare the activities of the Girays scions before and after the larger "Kırca'alî," "Mountain Rebellions" that rocked the Ottomans Balkans in order to understand their contributions to these movements and how this impacted their later integration into the society.

The Loose Boundaries of Disorder

Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807) ascended the throne in the middle of a war with Russia and the Habsburg empire which had been launched by the Ottomans to restore the Crimean Khanate. The new Sultan found the Ottoman armies had badly defeated at Belgrade by the Austrian forces which were currently heading to Wallachia. In the meantime, the Russian armies penetrated twice deep into the north of the Danube.¹⁴⁰ As the Peace of Sistova and Jassy respectively concluded the disastrous war with Austria and Russia, Ottoman statesmen were convinced of the army's incompetence against the modernized infantries of the European empires, not least because they failed to reclaim the Crimea. In 1792, the sultan invited his advisers to prepare projects of reform mostly concerning with reorganization of the military along with tax-collecting institutions and mechanisms to finance these changes. The proposals outlined for the Sultan generally aimed to refurbish the traditional mechanisms of the state, but it radically varied from the previous reform projects by of the promulgation of the novel initiative to form a completely new army, called the *Nizām-i Cedīd*, or New Order, in March

¹⁴⁰ Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 166–67.

1793, alongside the traditional military units.¹⁴¹ The promotion of these European-style infantry units meant a direct threat to the vested interests of the janissaries and of social groups economically associated with them, unsurprisingly breeding fiery oppositions from the start.¹⁴² To that end, Istanbul during the Selimian era constantly lived on tenterhooks in which contending parties posed the potential of visiting chaos and terror upon the imperial capital.

The Ottomanists have often dealt with the socio-political (dis)order during the Selimian era through the binary categories which highlighted the polarization between the state and society, center and periphery, and reformers and conservatives. In this view, the prevalent tensions in the Ottoman Empire were generally associated with the centralizing efforts of the absolutist sultan Selim III vis-à-vis the resistance of traditional, peripheral groups all of which were assembled by virtue of their stance towards the New Order. As Aysel Yıldız explained, the Ottoman polity was basically divided into two opposing camps: the pro-reformists and the "coalition of outsiders," consisted of the groups alienated by the New Order or distant from the Selimian program. Yıldız also specified that "neither camp was unified; their members combined and recombined in a complicated, shifting web of patron–client relationships and changing factional alliance."¹⁴³

Furthermore, the struggle between the center and the "urban periphery" was imagined as another predominant feature of the Selimian period. Supposedly, the conflict between the ruler and the ruled originated from the resistance of the "urban" periphery, whose interests were

¹⁴¹ Betül Başaran questions the common assumptions that represents Sultan Selim as a radical reformer. As she stated, "when [Selim III] ascended to the Ottoman throne, his concept of reform was highly conventional and not much different than that of his predecessors in the eighteenth century. As far as he was concerned, the reason for the empire's failures vis-à-vis its rivals was the inefficiency of the traditional institutions: they had to be revived and renewed in accordance with ancient custom. His ideas of change and reform were generally guided by the necessity to secure the cooperation of the established classes for the ongoing war effort," Betül Başaran, *Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 80–82. See Also, Kemal Beydilli, "Küçük Kaynarca'dan Tanzimat'a Islâhât Düşünceleri," *İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 1999; Ergin Çağman, *III. Selim'e Sunulan Islahat Lāyihaları* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2010).

¹⁴² Fikret Adanir, "Semi-Autonomous Provincial Forces in the Balkans and Anatolia," in *Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire 1603-1839*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 179–80.

¹⁴³ Yıldız, Crises and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution, 131.

represented by the provincial notables and pro-janissary blocs against the absolutist policies of the Sultan.¹⁴⁴ Not only the janissary-affiliated groups at the center, but a broad spectrum of Ottoman society ranging from laities to the local notables were considered as the corporate entities in this socio-political scene as the defenders of either the New Order or the estranged peripheral groups.

Indeed, the Selimian government acquired the support of various sections of the society, while facing the opposition of some others. For instance, the center charged some of the *'ayâns*, such as Çapanoğlus and Karamanoğlus with special mission to draft soldiers from among the Anatolian peasantry who saw Selimian reforms as an opportunity to consolidate their regional power in Anatolia.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, they faced fierce resistance of some influential notables in the Balkans, like that of Pazvandoğlu Osman of Vidin, who provided a safe haven for the janissaries, the *yamaks* of Belgrade¹⁴⁶, and paramilitary groups against the New Order.¹⁴⁷ In this regard, much of the violence and disorder that agitated local groups was attributed to the practices of the dissident notables who employed irregulars and endorsed banditry.¹⁴⁸

The traditional scholarship characterizes the Selimian era as the "age of 'ayâns" in which provincial notables were the main powerbrokers in the Ottoman society that played the key role in endemic rebellion and the demise of sultanic prerogative during the eighteenth-century.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, recent studies emphasize the fact that the symbiotic relationship between the groups associated with the center and provincial powerholders did not necessarily pose a concrete social polarization. As Tolga Esmer argued, the polarization between the state and society is untenable much as the alleged dichotomy between Selim III's reform agenda and

¹⁴⁵ Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 48–50.

¹⁴⁴ Yıldız, 170–72; See also, Şerif Mardin, "Türk Siyasasını Açıklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Çevre

İlişkileri," in Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset: Makaleler 1, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 30-66.

¹⁴⁶ The auxiliary janissaries and irregular forces were also referred to collectively as the *Belgrad matrūdları*.

¹⁴⁷ Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 55.

¹⁴⁸ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 172.

¹⁴⁹ Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 8–9.

those who vociferously opposed it.¹⁵⁰ As he argued, "the layers of Ottoman political culture during the Selimian Era that are often obscured in studies that imagine social interactions of the period in terms of dichotomies" underpin what he called "the 'ayâns paradigm." Considering the contentious life of Pazvandoğlu, Esmer demonstrated that Ottoman imperial documents revolving around the magnate's antics mention nothing about reforms or his opposition to them. Indeed, he tried to convey that he is not an enemy of the state, asking pardon of the Selim III who eventually agreed to an alliance for a joint front along the Danube against Russian forces later on in 1806. Likewise, different actors in Ottoman society were not corporate entities that acted in predictable ways constantly struggled to resist the centralizing efforts of the state.¹⁵¹

Considering the socio-political disorder in the Selimian era, recent studies emphasize the roles of shifting constellations of power among various actors along with the fluid nature of new forms of social alliances and interaction. Recent studies have focused on the entangled relationships and contesting agendas of different sections of the Ottoman society, instead of readily employing binary oppositions to describe social discontent and rebellion during this period. The (dis)order of Selimian-era politics rested on entangled, fluid relationships among the Porte, local notables, Ottoman officers, military governors, irregulars, bandits, urban and rural populations. In an already decentralized empire, these groups found new opportunities to foster their position in the society especially by forging alliances and appropriating different methods of terror and violence. As the Ottoman Balkans turned into inter-imperial contested territories in which Istanbul struggled with its Habsburg, Russian, and French rivals for control over these lands, Ottoman subjects established trans-imperial networks and made use of the militarization of the region by arming and organizing themselves to protect their communal interests. The multilayered nature of interactions in the Ottoman society is key to understanding Selimian politics and the position of the Girays in this volatile environment.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 25–26.

¹⁵¹ Esmer, 64–75, 200.

Local notables were considered as one of the major powerbrokers that commanded clout in the imperial politics. By the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman state became more dependent upon provincial notables for tax collection, policing, the management of public services, and drafting soldiers. Having a great extent of autonomy within their domains, *'ayâns* were given responsibilities of collecting taxes, managing public deeds, providing security, and assembling regional militias.¹⁵² Though the government resolved to bring the provinces under closer central control, its dependence on military support of the notables rendered these attempts futile. For example, Sultan 'Abdü'l-hâmîd I declared the abolition of *'ayâns*hip in 1786 and transferred all its functions to the office of *şehir kethüdâst* (a mayor-like urban executive). However, the 1787 war that broke out with Russia and Austria compelled the Porte in 1790 to revert to the previous arrangement.¹⁵³

From the eighteenth century onwards, local notables were divided among two main categories: the semi-official heads of the districts, towns and villages were called 'ayân, and respected members of local society were named with "*ayân-1 vilāyet*", "'*ayân* and *eşrāf*" or, as Vera Mutafchieva stated, "*maḥallī 'ayân*" who assisted chief 'ayân in the administration of districts.¹⁵⁴ The designation of the 'ayâns was theoretically based upon collective "elections" that reflected the acceptance and consent of the state and society. The main principle of the '*ayâns*hip was that the local populations' election that was held at local assemblies in a process in which the governors had no right to interfere. After elections, the proof of popular consent (*maḥżar*) had to be specified in a testimonial document (*i'lām*) in order to be confirmed (*buyruldu*) by the governor of the region.¹⁵⁵

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¹⁵² Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 111–12.

¹⁵³ Adanır, "Semi-Autonomous Provincial Forces in the Balkans and Anatolia," 179.

¹⁵⁴ Erol Ozan Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)" (Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2016), 25.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 26–27; Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions, 136–39, 151–54.

Nevertheless, Mutafchieva explained that by the late eighteenth century, the election system could hardly be wrought in licit ways. The centrally appointed judges and governors often confirmed the 'ayânships of those notables who offered generous bribes for themselves. This sort of corruption resulted with an extra tax burden on the local populations, since the selected 'ayân usually had to recoup the costs of bribing themselves into office. Furthermore, the struggle for 'ayânship most often witnessed bloody rivalries marked by full-fledged military violence in the localities given how important a role the 'ayân played in waging war. At the district level, various factions took part in the elections and resorted the use of large units of irregular forces and bandits to influence elections or simply usurp the lands and districts of rivals through brute force.¹⁵⁶

Besides officially recognized notables, unauthorized 'ayân imposters, or claimants ('ayânlık iddiâ 'sında olanlar), had a significant place in the Ottoman society given their high number and capacity to bring various military and official groups together to operate their districts. These 'ayân claimants acted like officially recognized 'ayâns: they collected taxes from the local people and even composed local expenditure account books (*tevzī defteri*) to show the legality of the tax-ratio that they allocated for themselves. Given that 'ayân claimants controlled mountain passages and even performed identity checks on people, local populations had little recourse to prompting the imperial government to intervene on their behalf against these men that usurped local power and authority. Even if the local population could reach imperial authorities, 'ayân claimants could already strike lucrative deals with local judges and governors that ensured these officials did not interfere with their activities. The central government, furthermore, quite often recognized the 'ayânship of these usurpers if they could amass enough force to serve the imperial war machine well or dispatch enough force against

¹⁵⁶ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 26–28; Vera Mutafchieva, "XVIII. Yüzyılın Son on Yılında 'ayânlık Müessesesi," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, 1978.

other 'ayân claimants who imposed larger threats to the center regardless of the local population's discontent.¹⁵⁷

The centrally appointed ministers and governors also had important clout in the provincial politics. Since they paid hefty lump sums ($c\bar{a}$ 'ize) to receive their tenures, they often had to resort to bribery and even oppress the local towns and villages to meet their expenditures and livelihood. In particular, the governors imposed illegal levies (referred to as the tekālīf-i $s\bar{a}kka$, literarily meaning the "heavy tax") over peasantry who abandoned their lands.¹⁵⁸ As mediators between local notables and the central government, Ottoman imperial officials emerged as important powerbrokers in the provinces. They engaged in the symbiotic relationships with 'ayân contenders whose authority the central government recognized as long as they could prove useful in mobilizing military force against foreign and domestic threats to Ottoman society.¹⁵⁹ In other words, Istanbul turned a blind eye to the antics of these men as long as they proved useful in the center's own struggles. As a consequence, state officials contributed much to the endemic disorder in the provinces by aligning themselves-at first clandestinely but later overly as Selim III's reign progressed-with criminal operations irregular forces, janissaries and mountain bandits alike forged together. As Esmer explained, "the state was complicit in crime, as sources describing the insurgency of Rumeli bandits consistently show that the stranglehold they exerted over communities was facilitated by local officials."160

The central administration primarily attempted to exert its authority through empowering certain positions with top-ranking officials, such as the governors of Rumeli and Anatolia, and *mutaşarrıfs* of key towns, like Çirmen and Silistre, or the *bostancıbaşıs* of

¹⁵⁷ Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'unda Dağlı İsyanları (1791-1808) (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Basımevi, 1983), 196–97.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 11–13.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶⁰ Esmer, "War, State and the Privatisation of Violence in the Ottoman Empire.," 210–12.

Edirne.¹⁶¹ They directly received orders from the Porte and often mercilessly advanced on the disorderly groups. Nevertheless, the Porte had to observe the consent of the local groups while entrusting a high-ranking general over the localities. In some occasions, local notables requested removal of centrally appointed officers. Therefore, if they forged symbiotic relationships with 'illicit' groups, local notables could directly intervene with the appointment of high-ranking officials like provincial governors who served their interests best. To that end, the central authority was restricted even in its attempt to increase its authority on the provincial level through its own, hand-picked dignitaries.

Irregular forces and warrior populations constituted another social group involved in multilayered and fluid relationships with the other sections of Ottoman society. Beginning from the late seventeenth century, the Ottoman military gradually evolved from a largely commissioned state army into a federative military system that was dominated by semi-autonomous fighters, first as auxiliaries and then as entrepreneurial ethnic bands.¹⁶² In a system in which local officials became military contractors, provincial households were empowered as gatherers of the regional militia for imperial campaigns. Furthermore, the protection of imperial borders along the Danube, Black Sea and Caucasus became a matter of survival for the Ottomans and engendered novel relationships between the center and warrior populations. As Virginia Aksan emphasized, two noteworthy aspects of this incited violence in Ottoman society arose: "the mobility and utilization of diverse ethno-religious nomadic and warrior populations

¹⁶¹ *Bostancıbaşıs* had both municipal and police function in the provinces. Especially, the bostancıbaşı of Edirne were one of the top generals that were given broad autonomy in the local affairs. Abdülkadir Özcan, "Bostancıbaşıların Beledi Hizmetleri ve Bostancıbaşı Defterlerinin İstanbul'un Toponimisi Bakımından Değeri,"

in *Tarih Boyunca İstanbul Seminerleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1989), 31– 38.

¹⁶² "Over the long history of the empire, words such as *deli, başıbozuk, sek-bān, sarıca*, and *levend*, terms for bands of warriors, or semi-autonomous regiments, unpredictable and often lethal, have come to exemplify the breakdown of the Ottoman 'classical' military after 1650. In the nineteenth century, the notorious *başıbozuks* (literally "broken- headed" or "masterless" ones), Ottoman irregulars, were blamed for almost all disturbances." The terms *sek-bān, deli*, and *başıbozuk*, very often signified ethnic warrior bands. Especially, after the 1770s the warrior ethnic groups such as Tatars, Albanians, Circassians and Kurds emerged as autonomous military forces that stormed the regions in their neighborhoods. Virginia H. Aksan, "Mobilization of Warrior Populations in the Ottoman Context, 1750-1850," in *Fighting for a Living*, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 336–47.
and the expansion of the military (*'askerī*) population via the redistribution of the wealth of the state."¹⁶³

In fact, the Habsburgs and Romanovs also employed autonomous warrior populations, like the Cossacks, Serbs and Croats whom they hoped to tame in the peacetime through relocating them in military colonies within territories they recently gained. However, the Ottomans faced serious problems in absorbing irregular forces and warrior populations who flooded across newly established borders. Especially, during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787-1792, the Ottoman war machine relied heavily on regional and contractual forces because of the inefficiency of the janissaries. The State's failure to absorb these demobilized populations into urban undermined its Ottoman monopoly over 'legitimate' forms of violence as well as negotiating effectively with the warrior subjects.¹⁶⁴

Faced with the increasingly centralized and well-trained Habsburg and Russian armies concomitantly, the Ottoman polity was forced to cultivate an unwieldy paramilitary culture where irregulars and warrior populations forged large networks of violence and terror involving common subjects, janissaries, provincial notables and governors alike.¹⁶⁵ As Tolga Esmer explained, the state over-outsourced the violence of Muslim warrior populations against Christians that joined enemy ranks during eighteenth-century wars. This policy relieved Istanbul of paying its irregular soldiery who were allowed, even encouraged, to pillage and plunder the Serbian and other Christian societies that joined enemy flanks.¹⁶⁶

However, throughout the rest of the Selimian era, the central power struggled with the grave consequences of its over-outsourcing violence to the warrior populations in a manner that pitted ethnic groups like Albanians and Bosnians against Serbs and other Christian subjects. This spiraling collective violence not only expanded terror and rebellion driven by the need to

¹⁶³ Ibid., 332–35.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 336-48.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 350–51; Esmer, "War, State and the Privatisation of Violence in the Ottoman Empire.," 200–201.

¹⁶⁶ Esmer, "War, State and the Privatisation of Violence in the Ottoman Empire.," 205-6.

seek revenge against belligerent neighbors during the war but also made ethnic belonging the basis of political claims the informed "national" movements that would precipitant that fall of the Ottomans' control over the Balkans later in the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, leaders of demobilized irregular forces turned into imperial power brokers exploiting struggles among Ottoman imperial and provincial elites.¹⁶⁸ As Esmer argued, "it is clear that the privatization of security fostered organized crime. Men who were recruited into autonomous nodes of coercive force across the Ottoman Empire subjected different regions to rackets, forcing people to pay protection against the disorder and violence that these men themselves perpetrated."¹⁶⁹

Lastly, the irregular warriors-turned-bandits and janissary racketeering networks ascended into important players in imperial politics. Having emerged out of the militarization of region and the state's incompetence to maintain order and justice, these multi-confessional bands of marauding men conventionalized pillaging and racketeering as a common form of livelihood, and they provided order and security for large sections of society—often from the very violence and terror that they themselves visited upon other pockets of the population. That being said, they recruited heavily from the local population, often offering common subjects social mobility the state could not grant them or by coercing these groups into fighting for their respective operations. These networks provided not only an alternative channel of power for warrior populations barred from the imperial administration but also offered an opportunity of career advancement for Muslim and Christian folk alike. Charismatic irregular-turned-bandit commanders, like Kara Feyzi, were distinguished among others by virtue of their highly mobile, trans-regional networks and large capacities of absorbing various groups into their web of violence which facilitated the expansion of their operational clout throughout the entire

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¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 210–14.

¹⁶⁸ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 72–79.

¹⁶⁹ Esmer, "War, State and the Privatisation of Violence in the Ottoman Empire.," 211–12.

Balkans. To that end, these networks of violence brought together many sections of the Ottoman society ranging from humble peasants to the highest Ottoman bureaucratic and military echelons.¹⁷⁰

All in all, the Selimian empire can be distinguished from other periods of Ottoman history given that power was extremely fragmented among all sections of society. It created novel, multilayered and fluid relationships among the Porte, local notables, 'ayânship usurpers, state officials, irregulars, warrior populations, bandits, as well as common subjects in provincial towns and the countryside. It is important to note that all of these social categories comprising imperial taxonomies were fluid and open to the constant change and redefinition. Irregular forces could weave in and out of banditry and licitness, just their ringleaders could become 'ayâns or state officials and vice versa. Therefore, these rigid imperial categories historians still use did not reflect realities on the ground in Ottoman society by the turn the turn of the nineteenth century, thus prompting us to think of new registers and terminology to reevaluate this era.

The Integral Role of Girays in Ottoman Economies of Violence

After the Ottomans' attempt to reclaim the Crimea shattered with the Peace of Jassy, the Giray scions understood that they had to trail controversial paths to wealth and power in this fluid Rumeli context if they were to reclaim their former status in Ottoman politics. The palace, on the other hand, strove to isolate the Giray households from the rest of the society lest they meddle in the regional affairs and re-ascend in imperial politics and challenge their authority in these hard times precisely because other groups could form alliances with them against the Ottoman dynasty. As it was shown in previous chapters, the Giray scions had to cope with reduced wealth and social status that the sultan countenanced for themselves. Given

¹⁷⁰ Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 195–96.

that grave economic conditions exacerbated by endemic violence desolated Rumeli towns and the countryside, the Girays were one of the local groups that found themselves 'displaced' in the midst of socio-economic disorder.

The Giray khans were theoretically more superior in rank than the Ottoman ruling elite and provincial notables due to their undisputed Ghingisid lineage and martial culture. Amidst the dispersion of power and fluidity of social relationships, their immigration to Rumeli impacted the region in profound ways whose repercussions were felt by communities beyond the Rumeli provinces. Although they were engaged in multilayered relationships with Ottoman society, they are one of the major elite groups whose impact is overlooked in the period's historiography of the Selimian era. Indeed, there are various methodological restrains that obfuscated the Giray scions' agency in shaping Rumeli. First of all, there were hundreds of dynasty members who engaged in regional and imperial politics on different levels throughout the tumultuous reign of Selim III. In the chaotic environment of the Rumeli, it is not possible to decipher the role of the Giray scions as whole dispersed throughout Rumeli and the Caucasus. But the fact that they were often involved in local politics backing contentious groups that would serve in their interests overtly as well as covertly necessities zooming into local contexts and microhistorical analysis.

In the Balkan frontiers in which violence and chaos became endemic, many Giray khans engaged in shifting relationships with different local, regional and official groups. Each Giray descendant cultivated different personalities, relationships, networks, and status positions, and some of them pursued networks and statuses that were trans-regional and trans-imperial in scope; therefore, studying the younger generation Girays' attempts to use any means to rekindle the wealth, glory, and status commensurate to their pre-migration days to the Balkans reveals how some family remembers were ruthless in rebuilding the name of the family. Many of the Girays constituted integral parts of key networks of violence that operated across the Balkans. As Tolga Esmer explained, the "economies of violence" that engulfed Rumeli and other provinces of the empire were no mere "black-market" economies run by bandit fugitives and itinerate irregular warrior populations.¹⁷¹

Highly mobile groups that marauded and terrorized the province had long been byproduct of eighteenth-century wars in which the Ottomans and the Habsburgs pitted sundry confessional and ethnic groups against each other to achieve their respective palace's shifting goals in the region. By the 1787 war, the policing and military defense of the empire had been so severely outsourced that Ottoman society simply could not demobilize after wars. What made this recurring situation worse was that Istanbul would characteristically turn against warrior populations like Albanians, Bosnians, and even local janissaries once it signed armistices with its imperial rivals to end all hostilities. That is, during wars, the Porte often incited the local Muslim population to mobilize against Serbian and other Ottoman Christian communities that joined invading Habsburg forces by promising the lands and possessions of non-Muslims communities only to renege after the wars and criminalize, collectively Albanian irregulars or local janissaries to boot.¹⁷²

As a result, massive groups and institutions that comprised the imperial war machine rebelled *en masse* across the peninsula by running pillaging and racketeering operations with which all groups of society had to interact—all in order to terrorize their way into more lucrative, stable, and official positions. These economies of violence now integrated intimately with imperial governance therefore entailed exchanges of resources, prestige, symbolic capital and promotion, and the lines between "licit" and "illicit," consequently, became blurry at best.¹⁷³ The Giray scions who joined some of this ready-made infrastructure for alternative ways of career-advancement with their own retinues of Tatar warriors only brought Rumeli

¹⁷¹ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 191.

¹⁷² Esmer, "War, State and the Privatisation of Violence in the Ottoman Empire.," 204–10.

¹⁷³ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 193–96.

networks great prestige and legitimacy with their ancient pedigrees. Having their own small Tatar units, they also provided militarized groups in Rumeli with skilled manpower that had been tested over time against wars and skirmishes they traditionally fought against Romanov Russian forces. In this regard, they made use of their symbolic and military competence to operate networks of violence rallying various strata of the Rumeli society together against perceived injustices and insecurity emanating from Ottoman governance. Their presence replete with "sultan" appellations to their name not only captivated local populations throughout the Balkans but also attracted many local groups running the gamut from powerful local landowners, bandits and irregulars to common peasants who together sought the Girays' collaboration and/or protection. Their conspicuous presence and notoriety even attracted various violent groups and powerholders from Anatolia who sought protection and patronage in their estates in Rumeli.¹⁷⁴

The presence of the Giray khans contributed to the endemic disorder of the Selimian era on different levels. Some of the Girays fashioned their own title of "sultan" and preyed on the local communities in vicinities of their estates to augment their heavily restricted income.¹⁷⁵ Some of the Girays helped mobilize unemployed peasantry, irregulars, bandits and other armed groups to roam around the villages and collect unauthorized taxes as well as surpluses.¹⁷⁶ Given that they could not compete to be 'ayân, many Giray scions sought to climb their way in regional politics through manipulating elections for district 'ayâns they hand-picked to ensure they served their interests or intervening in local politics behind the scenes.¹⁷⁷ More ambitious Girays, however, established close connections with ruling elites and regional powerholders. Tough their social mobility was theatrically precluded by the sultanic law, they engaged on an

¹⁷⁴ BOA HAT 188/8983, 188/8993.

¹⁷⁵ BOA AE.SSLM.III 236/13624.

¹⁷⁶ BOA AE.SSLM.III 221/12946

¹⁷⁷ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 506.

imperial level of politics through alliances with the 'ayâns and trans-imperial elites of the Ottoman empire. All in all, the younger generation Girays commanded indispensable clout in the Rumeli politics by establishing connections with almost all fringes social groups with whom they and their Tatar followers shared common interests and could identify.

Though deciphering the impact of the Giray khans, as a whole, in the region is not possible due to the large numbers of their offspring and the mounds of documentation that imperial authorities wrote about them, it is evident that they took an active role in the Kırcali rebellions of the 1790s and engaged in symbiotic relationships with almost all prominent powerbrokers.

As mentioned earlier, Vera Mutafchieva explored the early roles bellicose Crimean refugees under Devlet Giray Khan played in the spread of violence along the Maritsa Valley. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, Ottoman subjects fled riverine urban centers like Filibe (Plovdiv), Tatar Pazarcık, Hasköy, etc. and sought refuge in the surrounding Balkan and Rhodope Mountain ranges as response to the influx and pillaging campaigns of these violent groups. Mutafchieva maintained that this form of social mobility began to normalize banditry as a legitimate means of subsistence as well as protest well before the Kırcalı rebellions.¹⁷⁸

The exact time in which mountain bandits, or the Kırcalis, became a full-fledged problem for Ottoman governance is a controversial topic in the historiography. Though most of the literature associates it with to the end of the 1787 war with Habsburgs and Russians in 1792, Ottoman documents that date back to the mid-1780s denote the term *dağlı eşkıyâsı*, mountain bandits, to address marauding brigand groups in Rumeli.¹⁷⁹ The Ottomans used this

¹⁷⁸ Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 60.

¹⁷⁹ Yücel Öztürk and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı considers the first Ottoman campaign against these bandits in 1792 as the beginning of the mountaineer rebellions. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'unda Dağlı İsyanları* (1791-1808), 5; Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 44–45.

blanket label to describe brigands that hid in the Balkan or Rhodope mountain ranges, descended the mountains to attack cities and towns, and then retreated back to the mountains when the pressure from local militias or imperial forces became too hot. As the one of the first groups that developed efficient guerilla tactics, the imperial forces could not pursue and destroy them.¹⁸⁰ Considering the denotation of the term Kırcali, Mutafchieva indicates that the events in Haskovo in 1785, in which 700-800 bandits operated under Hacı İbrahimoğlu, Ak Osman and Kıvırcıklı Halil, were nicknamed as Kırcali rebellions among the folk. Nevertheless, the date of June 1791, when Ottomans entrusted the general Tahir Paşa to repel the mountaineers was considered as the actual starting of the Kırcali rebellions given that the issue was added to the agenda of the Porte.¹⁸¹

Throughout the 1780s, the networks of violence that emerged out of bandit groups and 'ayân claimants spread over much of the Central and Northeastern Bulgaria, Thrace and Western Macedonia. Irregulars and war fugitives especially began to participate in violent competitions over local lands and resources. In conditions in which bellicose groups refused to demobilize after wars, these groups gradually rose and shaped one of the feature characteristics of future mountain rebellions by brokering local politics through sheer force.¹⁸² By the mid-1780s, the rivalry for legal 'ayânships in the northeastern Bulgarian towns, such as Ruse and Targoviste, amplified the degree of disorder among the notables and violent 'ayân claimants who had close relationships with mountaineer battalions. Bandit bands continued to gather around, moreover, renowned bandit leaders like Kuru Hasan and Deli Kadrî. In 1785, the numerous bands had already hammered the countryside of Plovdiv, Gradski, Stari-Zagora and Novi-Zagora and engaged in pitched battles with Ottoman forces. The following year, bandits

¹⁸⁰ Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790–1808," 61–62.

¹⁸¹ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 45.

¹⁸² Ibid., 52–53.

especially concentrated on the Northeastern Bulgaria in which contenders for 'ayânships in that region engaged in prolonged armed conflicts.¹⁸³

Ottoman documents reveal that the Giray khans were some of the most prominent agents in regional politics in this period of evolution of banditry into the Kırcali rebellions. Prior to the 1780s, Gazi Giray established links with some bandit groups and 'ayân contenders and operated in a large area including the towns of Yambol, Sliven, Nova-Zagora and Kazanlık. Although his protection of many pioneering bandits in these regions resulted with his exile, Gazi Giray's role in local politics paved the path for further turmoil and violence in the following decade.¹⁸⁴ He forcefully appointed one of his companions, Hüsmen Ağa, to the 'ayânship of Nova-Zagora. Hüsmen Ağa was one of the hostile entrepreneurs that had strong ties with brigands in Northeastern and Central Bulgaria. After Gazi Giray's exile, Hüsmen Ağa continued to attract hundreds of militias and usurped the 'ayânships of the surrounding towns, like Stari-Zagora. He even engaged in armed conflict with the Ottoman authorities to release some notable bandits that had close relation with mountaineer leaders like Kuru Hasan.¹⁸⁵ Ottoman documents suggest that the Giray khans began to turn into one of the focal points of bandit networks. As the local populace complained, for example, Mehmed Giray hosted dozens of bandits under renowned chief Deli Ahmed in his estate in Shumen.¹⁸⁶

Mutafchieva indicated that the traditional countermeasures of the state totally failed against this new phenomenon of violence between 1780 and 1785. The center therefore adopted new countermeasures based on sending special punitive troops and calling for the resistance of the local population against criminal networks (*nefīr-I 'āmm*).¹⁸⁷ Contemporary sources

¹⁸³ Ibid., 49–51.

¹⁸⁴ BOA C.ZB. 70/3468.

¹⁸⁵ Ahmet Hezarfen, *Rumeli ve Anadolu Ayan ve Eşkiyası 2: Osmanlı Arşiv Belgeleri* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2004), 136–38.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 101.

¹⁸⁷ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 60; Alper Başer, *Eşkıyalıktan Ayanlığa Kırcaalili Emin Ağa* (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2014), 14.

attribute the state's incompetence to combat banditry to an insufficient number of the officers, especially the Edirne *bostancibaşıs*, who controlled forty-eight districts around the city.¹⁸⁸ But there were more systematic problems on the ground. State officials, like the *haşekī*s and Edirne *bostancibaşıs* mentioned above, were charged with organizing resistance among the inhabitants of Shumen against bandit bands had to reimburse local populations for arming themselves and taking a stand against these organized criminals. The fact that these countermeasures increased the financial burden over the district notables and the peasantry accounts for one of the main reasons why the state could not efficiently clean up bandit networks in Rumeli towns: the state expected local notables to foot the bills for fighting bandit bands but was reluctant to reimburse them for their expenses.¹⁸⁹

Unsuccessful warfare with the Austrian and Russian empires escalated the unrest in the Rumeli province and became a rallying point for irregulars and brigands that refused to demobilize. The incorporation of recruits from different regions into Rumeli irregular-turnedbandit militias continuously augmented these networks' capability to pillage and terrorize town and countryside alike in hope of forcing new, 'licit' positions for their leaders and followers. Mountain bandits' numerous attacks on the localities and merchants completely ruined especially the region of Yambol and Edirne.¹⁹⁰ Ottoman documents suggest that the presence of Giray households in the region directly impacted enterprising 'ayâns who were bent on using their militias to expand their power locally during war and peace alike. After unsuccessful bouts with imperial forces, local leaders of bandit bands endeavored to make use of the elderly Giray khans' prestige to directly ask pardon of the sultan only to resume illegal marauding and banditry once they were pardoned by the state. In 1788, the notorious bandit leader in Ruse Çelebioğlu, by way of example, sought refuge at the estate of Selim Giray after his defeat at

¹⁸⁸ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 52.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 60-61.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 52.

the hand of imperial forces, and his Tatar patron duly petitioned the sultan asking for mercy on the bandit leader's behalf. Once granted amnesty, Çelebioğlu intensified his activities, began to gather roaming bandit groups under his wing, and brutally usurped the 'ayânship of numerous towns.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, Giray khans ultimately integrated in the networks of violence personally and provided them logistic and armed support. In 1790, the 'ayân of Razgrad, Hacı Ömeroğlu, was also an influential bandit leader who secretly sought refuge on the estates of Salih Giray. Ömeroğlu's son, Abdullah Ağa, also usurped 'ayânships over certain towns in Northeastern Bulgaria in which he illegally collected taxes by asserting that he was under protection of Mehmed Giray. As imperial inspectors reported back to Istanbul, Hacı Ömeroğlu moved to the estate of Mehmed Giray in Yambol, while Salih Giray hosted Abdullah Ağa in Sliven. Their combined bandit bands likewise camped in one of the prominent estates of this dynasty at Varbitsa.¹⁹²

At the beginning of 1792, social unrest in the Rumeli took a new form as separate Kırcali battalions united and consolidated in the Rhodope and Balkan mountain ranges. In the period between 1792 and 1795, banditry in the region peaked and gained regional characteristics. As mentioned earlier, Kara Feyzi became the lynchpin of the Kırcali movement by bringing different strata of Ottoman society into a contact with one another. Under these circumstances, the Rumeli-based bandit groups operated their activities in a large geography extending so far as to Gallipoli and the outskirts of Istanbul.

In this period, the Giray khans contributed the post-war violence of Rumeli in different ways and degrees. Some of the Girays claimed ownership over some enclaves and preyed on the local communities in the vicinities of their estates. The Ottoman sources reveal that, many of the Giray scions, like Murad Giray in Sliven, Sahib Giray in Tekfurdağı, Devlet Giray in Karrnobat, as well as Saadet Giray in Yambol extracted illicit taxes from the peasanty and

¹⁹¹ Hezarfen, Rumeli ve Anadolu Ayan ve Eşkiyası 2: Osmanlı Arşiv Belgeleri, 237–38.

¹⁹² Ibid., 274–80.

artisans by force. ¹⁹³ Asserting their affiliation with the ruling '*askerī* class, some of the Girays made use of decentralized Ottoman authority and demanded additional taxes from subjects in the vicinities of their estates. For example, Toktamış Giray asked for "*kudūmi*" taxes from the local peasantry—a special tax paid to the Ottoman authorities after the return from a campaign.¹⁹⁴ In a region rife with demobilized networks of violence, this type of behavior had long been conventionalized among local populations and imperial officials themselves. Some Girays incorporated local bandit groups and unemployed peasants into their personal militia and pillaged Rumeli towns and the countryside; thus, some of their estates served as bandit refugees in which warriors accumulated and distributed their stolen loot among themselves.¹⁹⁵

Beginning in 1791, the state responded to the rise of violence by dispatching forces to fight mountaineers after their renown vanguards like Hacı İbrahimoğlu Bilal and Kör Yusuf drew too much attention by attacking traveling merchants along the imperial highway near Sliven. The state also pursued conventional countermeasures of garnering popular support by ordering officers to arm and mobilize the local population against these groups.¹⁹⁶ Under the leadership of the *mutaşarrıf*s of Çirmen and *bostancıbaşıs* of Edirne, the state launched a series of large offensives against bandits and their elite interlocutors, though these campaigns resulted in little success.¹⁹⁷ Faced with endless battles and skirmishes exacerbated by merciless draughts, a large part of the local peasantry fled from their homes and migrated to safer places like Wallachia or Istanbul.

The state struggled to cope with threats like the emigration as well as over-militarization of the local population. The townspeople therefore had to turn to bandit networks themselves for mercy in order to protect their properties and households from harm's way. It is in this

¹⁹³ BOA C.HR 4723/28, 47/2328; C.MTZ 17/849, C.DH. 50/2454.

¹⁹⁴ BOA AE.SSLM.III 221/12946; C.ADL. 3/174; C.HR. 95/4721.

¹⁹⁵ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ṭārīħ-i Cevdet*, 2:1367–68.

¹⁹⁶ Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'unda Dağlı İsyanları (1791-1808), 21.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 26–27.

respect that the vicious circle of economies of violence comes to light: the lines between licit and illicit behavior were already blurry, because countless local *'ayân* and imperial officials alike had to engage with irregular-turned-bandit networks to protect their own properties rivals or advance their interests. At the same time, the only recourse to justice and protection that the local population had was to assist covertly or participate overtly in the violent enterprises of bandit bands to protect their own interests and kin. In fact, at a time in which the state treasury had to recuperate after expensive wars and Istanbul offered little social mobility, common subjects not only were forced to cooperate with local strongmen, but they also depended upon them for protection, patronage, and career advancement.¹⁹⁸

It was in such a manner that the unconventional social and economic behavior of bandits and brigands was conventionalized on a much larger spectrum, impacting the recalcitrant behavior of *paşas* and peasants alike.¹⁹⁹ Given that the local notables continued to forge symbiotic relationships with mountaineers and directly benefited from growing numbers of armed militias among the folk, they could increasingly manipulate imperial politics through hindering appointments of conscientious officers from the center who could threaten their joint operations.²⁰⁰ It was in such a fashion that all of these factors contributed to the proliferation of banditry and violent alliances in the second half of the 1790s.

From the year 1795 onwards, the provincial notables, charismatic brigand leaders and Giray progenies played a crucial role in overextension of networks of violence to such a degree which even threatened large cities and towns. Pazvandoğlu Osman of Vidin was probably one of the greatest patrons of recalcitrant 'ayân and bandit networks who used them not only to usurp more land and power near his own domains along the Danube but also throughout the Balkans to deflect attention from his own illegal activities. As Pazvandoğlu Osman became the

 ¹⁹⁸ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 193–96.
 ¹⁹⁹ Tolga U. Esmer, "The Precarious Intimacy of Honor in Late Ottoman Accounts of Para-Militarism and Banditry," *European Journal of Turkish Studies [Online]*, 2014, 3–7, http://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4873.
 ²⁰⁰ Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'unda Dağlı İsyanları (1791-1808)*, 29–32.

leading figure of opposition against the central authority, he attracted various dissidents and bandits around himself. He attracted notorious bandit leaders from the Danubian region such Macar Ali and Gavur İmâm (i.e., the "Infidel Priest") as well as others from afar such as Rami Bayraktar, Poriçeli, Çanak Veli Musli, and Kara Mustafa .²⁰¹ Within only a year after the 1787 war, Pazvandoğlu's influence stretched beyond Sofia and Black Sea coasts, as his associate bandits expanded their illegal operations well beyond the Danubian region throughout much of Ottoman Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Wallachia. On the one hand, Pazvandoğlu's patronage consolidated the mountaineers' activities providing them a safe stronghold in Vidin. On the other, his dominance attracted the attention of European powers which contested on the Balkan peninsula.²⁰²

Despite traditional historiography's emphasis on his patronage as the major factor that spread disorder and terror across the Balkans, however, there were other charismatic leaders among irregular warrior castes that become important, trans-regional brokers of power and violence. As Tolga Esmer's work demonstrates the new generation of borderland warrior-entrepreneurs were the most prominent agents of socio-economic disruption. Among them the renowned bandit chief Kara Feyzi best represented the nature of bandit leadership with regard to its messy interactions with state and society given that different confessional and ethnic groups along with elite ministers themselves forged relations with his inclusive enterprise.²⁰³ Kara Feyzi and his followers' maneuverability, pervasive information web and capacity to visit pillage and visit terror on multiple regions simultaneously not only augmented their notoriety and reputation but also enabled them to sustain widescale extortion rackets upon provincial populations throughout the Balkan peninsula for decades on end.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Ibid., 32–39; Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 55.

²⁰² Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 55-56.

 ²⁰³ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 166–70.
 ²⁰⁴ Ibid., 174–80.

In such an environment, the Giray princes took a very active role in spread of violence according to archival sources that frequently connect them to bandit ringleaders like Kara Feyzi. The Girays provided symbolic as well as practical material, logistic and strategic power to the networks of violence with which they forged alliances. To that end, both local notables like Pazvandoğlu and renowned bandit chiefs like Kara Feyzi, Manav İbrahim, İsaoğlu and Gavur İmam collaborated with the Giray khans. The Girays not only took their prestigious place in these networks but they also used them to posture as patrons of violent organizations that spanned even beyond the Ottoman empire in hope of forcing the Porte to offer them better positions and packages than the bucolic life it initially envisaged for the prominent dynasty.

Especially after 1797, the Giray khans attempted to reinvent their financial and political clout by backing networks of violence that had already roamed the peninsula for over half a decade. In this period, the mountaineers dramatically spread down to the region stretching along the major imperial highway (the *Sol Kol*, or "Left Branch Highway") from Sofia to Edirne and established strategic relationships with the Giray households. While Hızır and Manav İbrahim operated in northern Rumelian towns around Sliven, the most elusive leaders like Kara Feyzi, Cenkçioğlu and İsaoğlu concentrated in the region of Kırıkkilise and Burgas.²⁰⁵ Saadet Giray, who resided in Karnobat, was one of the most active figures that operated alongside a wide web criminals and provided them safe havens when they were under too much pressure. He had a very close relationship with İsaoğlu whom he provided logistic support for his activities. As the Ottoman officers reported, Saadet Giray took on the task of treating dozens of wounded mountaineers on multiple occasions.²⁰⁶ Saadet Giray also dispatched his sons to İsaoğlu's side as highly mobile auxiliaries, and he also cultivated a close relationship with Pazvandoğlu and other notables with whom he manipulated regional contests for 'ayânship.²⁰⁷ Saadet Giray's

²⁰⁵ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 57.

²⁰⁶ BOA HAT 64/2813A, C.ZB. 88/4378, C.MTZ. 17/844.

²⁰⁷ BOA C.MTZ 11/525; C.DH. 33/1601 48/2307.

wide spectrum of relationships with local 'ayân contenders, mountaineers and Pazvandoğlu shows that he represents one of the most entrepreneurial Girays who engaged in complex economies of violence, though because he did not personally maraud alongside bandit bands, there was a limited number of sources that speak to his direct involvement in these economies.

Hacı Giray, who resided in Shumen, also played an active role in bandits' pillaging runs in northern Rumelia after the 1800s. Together with Kara Feyzi and Cenkçioğlu Kara Mustafa, Hacı Giray operated in a large area and became an important regional player in local politics. Considering the fact that the Ottomans consistently sent forces to the Balkans to chastise the Girays, neither Saadet Giray's family nor Hacı Giray refrained from engaging in open combats with the Ottoman officials and their retinues. Like Saadet Giray and his sons, Hacı Giray openly fought imperial armies on numerous occasions; however, Hacı Giray's audacity reached more distinct levels when he ran an operation against the commander (*ser-dâr*) of Shumen, Osman Ağa, and even kidnapped his son to boot.²⁰⁸

Among the Ghingisid descents, Mehmed Cengiz Giray and his brother Bahadır Giray who inherited their estates in Vyrbitsa near Shumen were the most controversial figures. Their recalcitrance and shenanigans catapulted them beyond an imperial stage of politics when outside powers like Romanov Russia and Napoleonic France began to show interest in their potential to undermine Ottoman authority to their respective governments' benefit. Prior to 1798, Cengiz Giray and his brother Bahadır Giray forged a reputation that was trans-imperial in scale: their collusion with notorious *'ayân* and mountaineers resulted in Istanbul's exiling them from the Ottoman empire, and dignitaries in St. Petersburg were happy to host them in Moscow while they assessed whether or not they could use them against their Ottoman foes.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ BOA HAT 64/2813A, C.ZB. 88/4378, AE.SSLM.III. 302/17662.

²⁰⁹ Cengiz Giray and his brothers brought one of the few victories to the in the disastrous war of 1787-1792 at Yergöğü and they received special grants from the sultan with regard to their bravery at the battlefield. Considering the grievances of local peoples, the Giray brothers manipulated elections for district *'ayâns* and collected illicit taxes from the local peasantry. From the early 1790s, their reputation spread among the bandits and entrepreneurial groups that furnished with protection or patronage. Nevertheless, Cengiz Giray's friendly relations with the

In 1799, Selim III pardoned Cengiz Giray and he came back to Ottoman lands. Rather than following instructions and settling on the estate of a relative Istanbul instructed him to settle upon, he fled back to northern Bulgaria as an outlaw. Alarmed by Cengiz Giray's re-appearance in Rumeli, his former rivals, the 'ayâns of Shumen and Razgrad collaborated to bar him from the region. Even the powerful magnate of Ruse, Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail Ağa—once one of the companions of Cengiz Giray's as a mountaineer bandit—joined this coalition.²¹⁰ In the meantime, after the Porte failed to subdue him with its massive invasion of Vidin in 1798, Pasvandoğlu sought to expand his domains eastward along the Danube towards the Black see; however, Tirsiniklioğlu's large forces in Ruse remained as the last obstacle to Pasvandoğlu's goals. Because Cengiz Giray could muster of force of 5000-6000 Muslim and Christian mercenaries in Tărgovishte (Eski Cuma) and potentially help him build a front against Tirsiniklioğlu, Pazvandoğlu allied with Cengiz Giray by the spring of 1800. Strengthened by Pazvandoğlu's forces, Cengiz Giray began to pillage and terrorize a large area stretching from Wallachia all the way down to the outskirts of Istanbul.²¹¹

In the meantime, the Napoleonic invasion of Ottoman Egypt and rapprochement with Russian and British empires deeply transformed the political landscape in the Ottoman Empire. Considering the constellation of power within the decentralized Ottoman domains, regional powers played a novel, important say in inter-imperial politics. In this environment

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Ottoman authorities deteriorated with the visit of the Grand Vizier to area close his estate. As the common practice, the Grand Vizier asked necessary provisions for his campaign against the mountaineers from Cengiz Giray, he refused to meet the Ottoman authorities' high demands. After the Porte declared Cengiz Giray's chastisement through exile to the island of Bozcaada, he raised a sizeable force among the mountaineers and escaped to northern Rumeli with his brothers. As Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu explained, they changed political dynamics in central Bulgaria and their departure from Shumen created a power vacuum to be filled by the local competitors. Thereafter, Cengiz Giray fled to the Russian Empire where he was granted an estate near Moscow and established close connection with Russian dignitaries. The Ottoman-Russian rapprochement against France enabled the Russian authorities to lead Cengiz Giray to return to the Ottoman lands. After bitter discussions at the Porte, Sultan Selim III pardoned Cengiz Giray disregarded the sultanic decree on his residence near Tekirdağ and headed to Rumeli as an outlaw. Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 507–11.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 511–12.

²¹¹ Ibid., 514.

Pazvandoğlu and Cengiz Giray emerged as prestigious entrepreneurs that would bargain with the Ottomans rivals in ways regional players of the empire could not imagine in the past. Pazvandoğlu negotiated with Russia authorities through the bishop of Vidin and Cengiz Giray who lobbied himself by contacting various Russian dignitaries he there while in exile. In 1800, Cengiz Giray delivered a letter to Tsar Paul, through Vasilii Stepanovich Tomara, the Russian Minister in Istanbul and openly asked for protection. Though he received the reply only two years later from Tsar Alexander I, Pazvandoğlu searched in meantime alternative ways to gain Russian support for his proposed invasion on Wallachia. Fashioning himself as the protector of the people of Wallachia, Pazvandoğlu likewise sought ways for alliance by lobbying Russian diplomats in Wallachia for his cause.²¹²

Meanwhile, a senior representative of Pazvandoğlu arrived in Paris to meet with the foreign minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand. One was Pazvantoğlu's chief of commercial and foreign affairs, Nedel'ko Popovich, and the other was a Greek professor in Vienna, Polisoi-Condon. They transmitted a latter consisted of four ambitious proposals, as Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu put:

"First, he proposed to assist the French government in a partition plan for the Ottoman Empire. Second, if the Republic of France attacked the Ottoman Empire, Pazvandoğlu promised to cooperate on the condition that the French government offered him and Cengiz Giray a province to rule in peace under the protection of France. Third, in case the French government chose to preserve the Ottoman Empire as it was, Pazvandoğlu pledged to cease hostilities against the Ottoman Court. In turn, the French government would request a pardon for him from the Ottoman State. Fourth, Pazvandoğlu gave his word to be faithful to the

²¹² Ibid., 514–15.

French Republic and serve its aims, provided they did not conflict with the principles of Islam."²¹³

Since Napoleon was about to establish an alliance with Sultan Selim III, he ignored the proposal. Thereafter, Pazvandoğlu and Cengiz Giray re-established relations with the Tsar whom they had just received a reply. Transmitting his "hopes of protection and friendly greetings," Alexander I officially requested pardon for Pazvandoğlu. Nevertheless, Pazvandoğlu and Cengiz Giray's posturing to Ottoman rivals nevertheless incited the consternation of the French, Austrian, or Russian governments given their mistrust of each other's motives vis-à-vis the Ottoman empire. Meanwhile, rumors and reports from Napoleon surfaced along the lines that Pazvandoğlu and Cengiz Giray would launch a raid on Istanbul to dethrone the Sultan, and Cengiz Giray would usurp the sultanate and appoint Pazvandoğlu as his Grand Vizier. Despite the fantastic nature of the report, it was precisely at this time that both of them received pardon from Selim III along with considerable concessions.²¹⁴ As mentioned in the first chapter, the Ghingisid Girays were often considered as an alternative option to the Ottoman sultans in the times of crises and rebellion in the Ottoman Empire. Cengiz Giray's posturing resulted perhaps only in his receiving a pardon with some concessions. In the end, he did in Vidin a year of two before Pasvandoğlu's own death in 1807, but as limited was the success of his fantastical attempts to draw in Ottoman imperial rivals into his grandiose schemes, his story constituted the last hurrah of the Giray scions in inter-imperial diplomacy.

State Surveillance

The reign of Sultan Selim III witnessed the most violent attempts of the Girays to move beyond the humble lives Istanbul envisaged for them in bucolic settings in the Balkans. The fact that the family's prestige could impose a problem to the Sultan's own authority, therefore

²¹³ Ibid., 516.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 517–18.

prompted Selim III to do everything in his power to eliminate threats they could collectively pose to his sultanate. The heightened volume of archival documents that speak to the punishments Istanbul delved out to the family, as a whole, underscores this harsher stance the Porte assumed. Sultan Selim III monitored the Girays much more closely than the other migrant populations throughout his reign in order to exert more control over them, and his measures vis-à-vis the dynasty were successful on the grounds that the Girays became entirely dependent upon the benevolence of the state for their subsistence.

In Ottoman historiography, the Selimian era has always been associated with the reformist agenda of the New Order and decentralized policy in the localities. However, Betül Başaran investigated social control and policing in the Ottoman Empire and emphasized the dominant role of Sultan Selim III in his affairs with migrant groups. As she stated, "rarely do we think of Selim as a fierce autocrat, compared to the most common descriptions that portray him as a sentimental, lenient, and progressive man."²¹⁵ Given that that migrants played crucial roles in revolts at the imperial center, especially in 1730 and 1740, the Ottoman state had long been concerned about transient migrant populations in urban centers. By investigating social control and policing, Başaran argues that the early 1790s witnessed an unprecedented emphasis on sultanic surveillance to such an extent that laid the ground for "neo-absolutist" policies that would characterize his successors' reigns.

Considering the mindset of the sultan and his advisors, the Ottoman ruling elite was therefore quick to make the association between immigrants and the disruption of social harmony. The state therefore endeavored to enforce mechanisms of social control upon migrant populations. Ottoman documents often refer to the necessity to "purify" or "cleanse" ($tath\bar{i}r$) society from 'indecent' outsiders and to punish (te ' $d\bar{i}b$) and frighten ($terh\bar{i}b$) them to set an example for others.²¹⁶ The Giray khans were not viewed as negatively as other immigrant

²¹⁵ Başaran, Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century, 105.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 33–34.

populations not only because they were distinguished by virtue of their pedigree but also because they were isolated from major urban centers. Nevertheless, the central administration paid close attention to absorb them into Ottoman core territories and to render them readable subjects for the sultan.

In Ottoman documents, unruly members of the dynasty were referred as 'indecent' princes that neglected their dynastic honor. Therefore, the sultans targeted to be cleanse ($tath\bar{i}r$) and punish ($te'd\bar{i}b$) them typically through exile. The Ottomans' chastisement policy for the Girays was not a new phenomenon. When the polity switched hands in the Crimea, the overthrown khans, crown princes or combative branches of the dynasty were moved to Mediterranean islands earlier. It was a useful policy for Istanbul not only because it rectified the Ottomans' concern over succession crises and intra-dynastic integrity, but it also secured their subordination in the northern frontiers of the Empire.²¹⁷

After their migration *en masse*, the state took similar measures and applied a harsh disciplining policy. The Sultan even desecrated the old code of honor between the Ottomans and the Girays to secure dynastic order and social harmony once they commenced to oppress the peasantry and allied with criminal organizations in the Balkans. For example, once Ottoman authorities incarcerated Devlet Giray after he joined Pazvandoğlu's bands, they desecrated him and his family by beheading him and dispatching his head to Istanbul along with those of other executed brigands. This was an obvious violation of the inter-dynastic relations according to which the blood of no Giray should have be spilled in normal circumstances.²¹⁸

The central administration adopted a multifaceted – albeit ad hoc- disciplining policy towards those Girays whence they challenged state authority or oppressed its subjects too conspicuously. First of all, it was not the place of the central administration to monitor and

²¹⁷ Özge Togral, "Akdeniz Adalarına Sürgün Edilen Kırım Hanları," *Mediterranean Journal of Humanities*, 2018.

²¹⁸ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chingis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," 513–14.

discipline unruly dynasty members, but rather, they were treated in accordance with the dynastic tradition of communal order. If an individual went beyond the compliance of communal or an imperial order, his own family, inhabitants of his estate and the whole dynasty were responsible for his chastisement. Therefore, the central administration preferred not to get involved in the cases as long as responsible relatives undertook the responsibility of disciplining their unruly kin. In this regard Istanbul bestowed the elderly Giray designated as the *sahib-i* '*arz* with the task of punishing unruly family members. The Porte stepped in to punish those Girays that ignored their elderly representatives' warnings or were too recalcitrant and power for the latter to exert influence over.

The Girays continued to receive their revenues and rights to their estates as long as they obeyed and fulfilled the requests of the central authority. From the day they settled onto their estates, they receive a diploma from the government indicating that their possessions and salaries were conditioned upon the satisfaction of the peasantry under their protection. Accordingly, the central administration encouraged complaints of the peasantry under their jurisdiction and decisively acted upon them when incidents emerged. Since the Girays entirely depended upon the state for their subsistence, abiding by sultanic decrees kept many of the Girays in check and made them think twice about breaking the law or drawing too much attention to themselves. As the first step of the chastisement policy, the Porte generally sent a warning letter.²¹⁹ For example, after Sahib Giray II moved to his estate in Tekirdağ in 1776, he (or someone from his household) begun to mistreat and pillage local peasants and shopkeepers. As response to the letters of complaints that were repeatedly sent to the Porte, the Sultan 'Abdü'l-hâmîd I (r. 1774-1789) duly warned:

"[...] In return for my benevolence [grants of an estate and annual pensions],

you were permitted to reside on your estate with decency and honor, and you in

²¹⁹ BOA C.HR. 19/902,

turn were supposed to make a conscientious effort to ensure that neither you nor your children harm in the least subjects on your estates. However, the local residents and the poor complained that you unexpectedly indulged in immoral acts seizing the possessions, extorting unauthorized taxes, and even violently oppressing innocent people [...] I issued this verdict to remind you about your obligation to appreciate the honor and decency of Genghisid pedigree. I also write to warn you about your heedlessness and negligence: it will result in your deportation should you not heed my warning. Although your aforementioned transgressions already merited your deportation, now let this letter now serve as a final warning. Refrain from visiting atrocities and oppression upon those living on your lands, for this behavior does not suit to your dignity. Protect the residents and the poor with your decency and honor [...] If you continue to follow base desires and fail to heed my warnings, you will be duly exiled to a remote Mediterranean island like your predecessors. Act, therefore, accordingly.²²⁰

Given that Sahib Giray was appointed as the dynasty representative in 1792, he paid heed to this bitter warning and hereafter served the well-being of the people under his protection.

²²⁰ "Sen ki han-ı sābik muşārün-ileyhsin bundan akdem mahżā istihsāl-i esbāb-ı terfi 'ye-bāl ve istikmāl-i levāzim-ı refāh hāliñ zimnında Tekfurdağı'nda ikāmetine izn ve ruhşat-ı şāhānem [...] țarafiña irsāl olunup eslāf-ül emsālin haklarınıñ senevi ityān bu 'ināyet-i hulūşāneme [...] şān ü veķārınla ikāmet ve ebnā'ın țarafiñdan ferd-i āferideye [...] ser-i mû-yı rencide vuķū 'olmamak hālātına teşmir-i sa 'id-i himmet eylemek iktizā eder iken sekene ve fukarā haklarında bir vechle senden me mūl olmayan mezālim ve tegayyurāta ve tecrīm ve tekdīr misüllü etvār-1 nā-bercāya mübāderet olunduğundan [...] kasaba-y1 mezkūr țaraflar1ñdan peyder-pey küllī vevm divān-1 'adālet-ünvān-1 husrevāneme ref'-i ruk 'a-i iştikā' ve üzerlerinden seniñ mezālim ve ta 'zibātını def' ü ref'i bābında istirhāmdan hāli olmadıklarına binā'en [...] ba 'de 'l-yevm bu makūle hālāt mazlūm-āmīzden mubā 'adet 'irk-i asīl-i Cengīzī mukteżāsınca 'irż ü vekārinla ikāmet ve her hālde sānini şiyānete dikkat ederek tahşīl-i rizā'-yı sa'id iktizā-yı pādişāhāneme nisār-ı nakdine liyākat eylemek fermānım olmağın tenbīhen ve tekmīlen ve seni hāb gafletten ikāzen ve inzāren hāssaten işbu emr-i şerīfi işdār ve öyle irsāl olunmuşdur imdi bālāda mestūr harekāt-i gayri-merziye muktezāsi senin ol tarafdan āhar irsālini icāb etmiş iken bu def 'a tenbīh ile iktifā' olunduģunu ma'lūmuñ olmakda ber-minvāl-i muharrer o makūle şāniña lāyik olmayan mezālim ve te 'addīvātdan keff-ü yed ve mücānebet ve 'irz ü vekārınla ikāmet-birle siyānet-i 'aceze ve mesākīne himmet ve fī-mā-bā 'd [...] şöyle ki eslāf ve āharınıñ haklarında sunūh etmeyen sunūh şāhānem şükrünü bilmeyip [...] bundan böyle [...] lāzım gelir ise em<u>s</u>āl ve eslāfiñ misüllü cezāyirden birine irsāl ve ikāmet ettirileceğiñ muhakkaktır ona göre hareket eylemek bābında" BOA C.MTZ 17/849.

In much the same way, the Porte warned those Girays who collaborated with the bandits or local notables who spread terror to the Rumeli.²²¹ When corrupt Girays ignored the sultan's warnings, the Porte typically disciplined them by exiling them to an Aegean island as well as to the Cyprus. On many occasions, the sultan punished them without any warning, especially when they committed murder. Nevertheless, Sultan Selim III applied different sentences for different incidents according to the personality and record of the culprit. While some of the Girays were exiled without warning in their first act of oppression of the peasantry,²²² some of them were pardoned and granted an estate although they took part in violent rebellions against the central authority, as was the case with Cengiz Mehmed Giray.²²³

As privileged elites of the empire, the Girays also enjoyed certain advantages when it came to their amnesties. Selim III sometimes pardoned exiled Girays within a couple of years of their punishment based on their promise to act hereafter with decency and honor.²²⁴ Based on archival evidence, it seems that Selim III, however, was not so complacent to grant amnesty to the exiled Girays – so much so that he repeatedly declined multiple requests of the dynasty representative, Sahib Giray, whose favors he otherwise carefully took into consideration. For example, although the dynasty representative along with many respected Giray elders and families of exiled Girays repeatedly requested amnesties of four very prominent dynasty members, Selim III stated his unwillingness:

"What did they do in the Rumelia for such a long time? They devastated the $re \, {}^{\bar{a}}y \bar{a}^{225}$ in their towns through illegal punishments and oppressions; therefore, I ruled accordingly. If I grant amnesty now, I will only soon hear about their

²²¹ BOA C.MTZ 11/526, AE.SELM.III 5/218, C.ADL. 3/ 177.

²²² BOA C.HR 47/2328, C.DH. 50/2454, AE.SSLM.III 221/12946.

²²³ Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu, 519-520; BOA C.HR 47/2328, C.DH. 50/2454, AE.SSLM.III 221/12946.

²²⁴ BOA C.HR 23/1124, C.MTZ 17/ 828, C.DH 51/2513.

²²⁵ i.e., the tax-paying Ottoman subjects, the Christian peasants. For the discussions on this term, Aleksandar Fotic, "Tracing the Origin of a New Meaning of the Term in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Balkans," *Balcanica*, 2017.

oppression and cruelty as before. God knows, then, I do not respect to their ancestry and will kill them all. If they act decently, we know, it is incumbent upon us to show honor to them. But you forgive them if you are thinking that they will mend their ways [which constitutes a neglect on my part]."²²⁶

Selim III did not grant amnesty unless he was convinced of the Girays' willingness to reform their habits. His decrees also show that he was highly suspicious about their return to Rumeli, since their arrival would only serve to reinvigorate regional networks of violence. For instance, he granted amnesty to Baht Giray and apportioned an estate to his dignity in Tekirdağ. Since brigandage and disorder increased immediately after his return, however, Selim III exiled Baht Giray back to Lesbos.²²⁷

To sum up, Giray descendants were the only elite group in the empire that were bound directly to the generosity of the sultan for subsistence, and that severely hampered their status and mobility within a corrupt imperial system in which might made right. The Rumeli people, notables, bandits and the other entrepreneurial groups collectively participated in turbulent local politics in cahoots with networks of violence that operated throughout the peninsula, and they could ultimately do so with impunity. However, because the Girays were dependent upon the state for their subsistence and social mobility as refugees, the central government could exert much more power over them than other elite groups that were much less prestigious when it came to their pedigrees.

The Ottoman documents indicate that Sultan Selim III tactically imposed a harsher disciplining policy on the Girays especially towards the end of his reign, and the punishment of the Girays served as an example for all of Rumeli society to see. The dramatic decrease in

²²⁶ "Bunlar bir müddetten beri Rumeliñde neler eylediler fukarā'-ı re 'āyāyı tecrīm ve zulm ile harāb eylemeleri ile böyle olmuş idi şimdi itlāk eylediğiñ şūretde yine evvelki gibi bir zulm ü gadrları işitirim 'alim- Allāh sulālelerine hurmet etmeyip cümlesini katlederim yoksa 'irzları ile olsalar bize muruvvet onlara ikrām etmek dersiñ bilirsiñ eger irzları ile olacaklarıñdan 'akl-ı kesir isen itlāk edesin" BOA HAT 202/10375.
²²⁷ BOA AE.SSLM.III 218/12836.

the numbers of the Girays' receiving disciplinary measures and exile sentences after 1800s also reflects a certain degree of success in the central government's "big-stick" policy, as the Girays' gradually elected to conform more intimately to their new agrarian pursuits and local economies, and they participated alongside the state in restoring communal order. This does not mean that they completely gave up seeking alternative paths to expanding their power beyond their estates. But they rather refrained from directly annoying the central administration.²²⁸ The central administration gradually left their legal imbrications to jurisprudence of the local *sharia* courts instead of getting directly in their affairs.

The Waning of Networks of Violence

Despite the fact that the mountain bandits' dominance reached as far as to outskirts of Istanbul, Mutafchieva argues that the shifts in power relations did not allow bandit terror and disorder to proliferate in Rumeli beyond 1805. Indeed, banditry entered into a new phase as the degree of rebellions increased after Tirsiniklioğlu was declared an outlaw.²²⁹ Nevertheless, the state' harsh oppression of Tirsiniklioğlu asserted to be the last straw for the well-equipped brigandage activities, as it a created a widespread fear among the bandits. Furthermore, the state executed some pioneering 'ayâns who helped the mountaineers, like Tokatlıkçı Süleyman Ağa, the 'ayân of Plovdiv, Hüseyin Bey, and Menlikli Osman Bey. Pazvandoğlu's rapprochement with the central authority also dismantled brigandage networks whose power and prestige had long rested on his activities. Meanwhile, the state pardoned the most notorious bandits like Kara Feyzi and Deli Kadri and ratified them as the 'ayâns of Breznik and Burgas. As a war with imperial Russia lay close on the horizon, Kara Feyzî's settlement in Breznik along the border of Ottoman Serbia served as a front against Serbian irregulars Istanbul rightly envisioned would join Russian forces during the 1806-1812 Russo-Ottoman war.²³⁰

²²⁸ Kırımlı, 194-195.

²²⁹ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 59.

²³⁰ Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," 195.

As Mutafchieva argued, the Rumelian 'ayâns, many former bandits themselves, did not tolerate mobile bandit enterprises once they were award positions as 'ayâns consolidated their own power.²³¹ In 1808, the Charter of Alliance, *Sened-i İttifāk*, regulated the power of the 'ayâns vis-à-vis the central authority and established more concrete relationships between the magnates of Rumeli and Istanbul. In addition to the reconciliation between the state and pioneering bandit chiefs like Kara Feyzi and Deli Kadri, the Charter of Alliance put an end to the entangled networks of violence to a degree to which they no longer threatened the central authority.²³²

As Mountaineer Rebellions ended in 1807, the Girays lost most of their networks of violent men that could help them usurp more power. Various sections of Ottoman society had goals of predictable channels of social mobility when they participated in various criminal organizations and rebellions, and they ultimately were either neutralized or co-opted, in the latter case being showered with grants and official positions depending on how successful their terror and violence were. However, the Girays had less options than their recalcitrant counterparts, regardless of their illustrious pedigrees. Upon defamation, the state either revoked their financial stipends, confiscated their properties, or exiled them to remote Aegean islands when they pushed their luck too far against the state. Due to the restrictions on their social mobility, their only real options were accepting their fate on *çiftliks* or get exiled to the Aegean.

During the reign of Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), some Giray scions attempted to revive their activities in Rumeli. After 1812, the post-war conditions were much different than that of 1787-1792 war. It seems that the 'ayâns' dominance in Rumeli relatively thwarted alternative channels of social advancement through networks of violence. To that end, the entrepreneurial Girays faced serious obstacles in their attempts to reinvent their socio-economic positions in comparison with the Selimian era. For example, Arslan Giray, who resided in the Kızılağaç

²³¹ Yılmaz, "Militarization of Ottoman Rumelia: The Mountain Bandits (1785-1808)," 91.

²³² Ibid., 94.

village in Edirne, preyed on local populations and attempted to augment his power by "acting against the state." As a response, the Grand Vizier of the time, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, had ordered the 'ayâns of Yambol, Sliven and Karaağaç to raid his estate and pillage his belongings as a punitive measure.²³³ In the following years, Arslan Giray turned back to banditry and oppressing the local populations to get by.²³⁴ They ultimately ordered either his execution or exile given that "the Ghingisid sultans do not appreciate the value of their favor by the imperial Porte."²³⁵

The fact that Arslan Giray could not establish a following for his bandit bids and was routed decisively by a number of 'ayân several times shows a dramatic decline in the Giray scions' incapability putting together long-lasting bandit enterprises. Another example that shows how 'ayân dominance restricted the Girays' attempts to reinvent themselves is the case of Hacı Giray whose estate was also pillaged by the local notables in Yambol.²³⁶ Furthermore, it seems that the state entrusted the *mutaşarrıf* of Çirmen, Celaleddin Paşa, in its affairs with Giray families, especially with unruly members of the dynasty. The state entrusted the *mutaşarrıf*'s take on the Girays so much that it heeded his opinion regarding which dynastic representative it should chose to represent the entire family.²³⁷

I argue that the Giray scions sustained their capacity for reinventing their power despite state surveillance by forging new forms of power networks with "licit" Ottoman authorities and by developing novel forms of relationships with different sections of common people in the countryside. In this regard, Hakan Kırımlı's work on the story of Mesud Giray, who sailed for the Crimea as military agent of France destined to organize Tatars on the peninsula against the Russians during the Crimean War (1853-6), portrays well the kind of symbiotic relationships

²³³ BOA C.ADL. 21/1250, C.DH. 63/3109.

²³⁴ Şānī-zāde Mehmed 'Ata'ullah Efendi, Şānī-Zāde Tārīhi (1223-1277/1808-1821), 2:874.

²³⁵ BOA HAT 496/24373.

²³⁶ BOA C.ZB. 44/2198.

²³⁷ BOA HAT 751/35500.

some members of the Giray clan could forge with the Porte in the long run. Mesud Giray was a member of the renowned branch of the dynasty that resided in Vyrbitsa near Shumen. As Kırımlı explained, Mesud Giray was a controversial figure who had plenty of supporters and foes in both the Balkans and Istanbul. On the one hand, Mesud Giray and his brother Mehmed Giray were accused of terrorizing forty-eight villages in the county of Gerlobad, brutally oppressing the peasantry and committing arbitrary murders. Local suitors even claimed that he established a dungeon underneath his mansion to be used as a sort of judgement hall and prison which was rife with henchmen and their instruments.²³⁸ On the other hand, Mesud Giray had an impressive number of local supporters so much so that he was praised as the benevolent protector of the local population, especially Bulgarian folk.

Imprisoned for fifty days during a trial in Istanbul, Mesud Giray used his network of allies in the imperial center and took the issue with the highest court in Istanbul, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances. Finally, in October 1852, the Supreme Council declared Mesud Giray innocent and only warned him not to imprison anyone in his personal mansion. As Kırımlı indicated, hundreds of litigants, defendants, and eyewitnesses were involved in this case with conflicting arguments; hence, it was difficult to determine the reliability of the claims and counterclaims. The fact that Mesud Giray was acquitted from these serious accusations with help of dozens of peoples with different background demonstrates that he had powerful connections and numerous supporters in Rumelia and Istanbul.²³⁹

Given that more than one hundred Giray scions lived in Rumelia during the first half of the nineteenth century, they might have established similar connections, novel forms of social relationships and different roles in local affairs. To that end, I argue that James Scott's monumental work on the people of Zomia sheds light on some issues to understand the process

²³⁸ Kırımlı, "A Scion of the Crimean Khans in the Crimean War: The Allied Powers and the Question of Future of the Crimea," 193.

²³⁹ Ibid., 193–95.

of the Girays' integration into the Rumalian countryside in the *longue durée*. Having experienced a harsh chastisement policy of the Selimian reign, the Giray would have developed new spheres of, as Scott put, *the art of not being governed*.²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2010).

Conclusion

The Crimean Tatars were one of the warrior populations that once dominated the steppe frontiers between the Austrian, Russian, Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman empires. Yet, the Giray dynasty was compromised of the most distinguished elites of the steppe regions with regard to their distinctive pedigree and martial culture. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the Ottoman Balkan territories transformed into contested territories of rival imperial powers each of which supported different groups of warrior populations: the Austrians mobilized Serbs, Montenegrins and Croats; the Russians allied with Cossacks and Nogays, and the Ottomans backed the Albanians, Bosnians, Tatars and Caucasian tribes against their rivals. Contrary to their northern counterparts, the Ottoman administration struggled to absorb these defeated warrior populations in its core territories of the empire, while the Russians pushed the Cossacks further away to the newly conquered peripheries of the tsardom.

The mass migration of refugee populations was an important, recurring facet of late-Ottoman history. The Crimean khans and their Tatars, perhaps, were the first among the great warrior populations Russian expansion forced to flee the Eurasian steppe frontiers and sought refuge outside of their homelands. From the perspective of the Porte, the absorption of the Giray dynasty was further distinguished on two important points: on the one hand, the Giray dynasty was one of the most respected dynasties that developed an accommodating relationship with the state. On the other, they were "warrior elites" who had long been considered masters of Eurasian steppe frontiers who enjoyed great prestige and established multifaceted networks with both Ottoman and European elites. Therefore, the Girays' absorption into Ottoman central lands brought to the fore important dynamics that juxtaposes local, imperial, and inter-imperial perspectives.

The Porte showed its adherence to the distinguished status of the Giray dynasty and reorganized their status with regard to centuries old inter-dynastic traditions. In this regard, it

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primarily attempted to maintain order in Rumeli by integrating newcomers within the traditional hierarchy of Tatar society already living in the Balkans. Furthermore, the government alienated the Girays from the imperial system by restricting their movements within the confines of their state-provided estates in the countryside while keeping them out of Istanbul yet within striking distance of the capital in order to control their activities should they undermine order in their new settings. The fact that some oppositional groups in Ottoman society considered the Girays as legitimate alternatives to the sultanate also informed the discomfort of Ottoman sultans when it came to retaining the dynastic privileges of Giray princes. Inter-dynastic traditions, however, were also emphasized to legitimize the reduced status that they envisioned for the Girays in a way that accentuated Ottoman supreme authority. When Sultan Selim III felt that his authority was at risk, he did not refrain from ignoring many principles of these traditions. Nevertheless, the Ottomans and Girays negotiated their positions vis-à-vis one another evoking their ancient relationship up until the late nineteenth century.

The appointment of Sahib Giray after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1792 as the family's dynastic representative served the Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807) three purposes: it helped his government reorganize and control the dynastic network; it established a sort of practical distance between the Porte and the vast majority of the dynasty by reducing their direct contacts with the center to the dignity of one elderly figure; it reduced, moreover, the status of the Girays and their followers to the level of the other provincial players [e.g., local notables as well as *ahâlî* (Muslim) and *re'âyâ* (non-Muslim) populations] that were also represented by communal representatives. The central administration and the dynastic representative adopted the discourse of loyalty and disorder which redefined the legal limits of the Girays' activities. By imposing a language that emphasized the ambiguous discourse of "dynastic honor" and "dynastic shame", the Sultan nevertheless defined the moral codes of the dynastic integrity of

Girays to prompt them to act in compliance with their reduced status and abide by sultanic decrees.

As the masters of the steppes, the Giray khans were used to having a large pool of financial resources derived from the more lucrative opportunities that the northern frontiers offered for the themselves. The Girays' situation markedly changed upon moving to Ottoman Rumeli: they had rare opportunities other than investing in small-scale tax-farming ventures to augment their wealth in the Balkans. In many cases, neighboring Girays fought with each other by claiming rights to the same pasture as well as agricultural lands. Although most of the Girays had multiple sources of income, it is evident from Sahib Giray's case and his correspondence with the Porte that even the most prominent dynasty members suffered heavily from financial crises that marked this period. Although it traditionally guaranteed their financial solvency in theory, the central government often could not even to afford to pay their annual pensions in practice.

To make matters worse for the Girays' posterity, the cash-strapped Ottoman government furthermore confiscated cash revenues and assets of Giray family members upon their deaths. Although many Girays founded *waqf*s to protect their revenues, it did not bring an end to threat of imperial confiscations. Given that they were strictly prohibited to move to the urban centers and constantly faced with financial insolvency, many of the Girays elected to pursue alternative ways of making a living alongside the limited, bucolic pursuits the state had in mind for them. Particularly destitute and desperate to make ends meet, second-generation Giray princes stopped at nothing to reinvent their family's former prosperity.

Despite the large number and diversity of the Girays that immigrated to the Balkans, it is not possible to pinpoint all-encompassing motives for the Girays' transgressions: some might have been resentful of the state because of their reduced social status; some may have been bent on recapturing the former glory of their Ghingisid ancestors; or some simply adopted to the "economies of violence" that had long been established in the region to which the most powerful players conformed to augment their power, clout with both local populations and imperial officials, and their wealth.

In the Balkan provinces in which violence and terror as a form of political brokerage became endemic in order to force the state to reward violent entrepreneurs more permanent, lucrative positions, many Giray khans utilized their lineage and prestige to engage in shifting relationships with different local, regional and official groups. The loose boundaries and fluid relationships of different sections of Ottoman society provided the Girays many opportunities to reinvent some means of power. The Girays were an integral part of networks of violence across the Balkans. On the one hand, they made use of their symbolic and military competence to operate networks of violence rallying various strata of Rumeli society. On the other hand, their presence attracted many local powerholders, especially local landowners, bandits and irregulars who sought the Girays's fame, collaboration, or protection. Their collaboration with charismatic, "mountain bandit" criminals either by pillaging sundry communities alongside or providing them covert support exacerbated and prolonged rebellions that undermined imperial sovereignty in the Ottoman Balkans. They made use of the various violent groups to re-invent their economic clout and increase their power beyond their humble estates.

The Girays either harbored ready-made networks of violence by providing their members symbolic and practical means of power with regard to their Ghingisid charisma or forged new alliances and groups of bandits with whom they preyed upon the local communities. I will argue that although they were theoretically superior than provincial notables, they in fact were much more restricted and, therefore, had a more limited impact on the Rumeli society for two reasons. Sultan Selim III monitored the Girays much more closely than others throughout his reign in order to exert more control over the Girays, and his ability to control the family was largely successful on the grounds that the Girays were entirely depended upon the benevolence of the state for its subsistence refugees who had limited connections in their new settings. The fact that the imperial center monitored the Giray family so closely reveals that Selim III understood that the family's prestige could impose a problem to his own authority; hence, he did everything in his power to eliminate threats they could collectively pose to his sultanate.

The activities of the Girays were bound to ongoing crises and rebellions in Rumeli. As Mountaineer Rebellions ended in 1807, the Girays lost most of their recourse to networks of violent men that could help them usurp more power "illegally." Various sections of Ottoman society had goals of predictable channels of social mobility when they participated in various criminal organizations and rebellions, and they ultimately were either neutralized or co-opted, in the latter case being showered with grants and official positions depending on how successful their terror and violence were. However, the Girays had less options than their recalcitrant counterparts, regardless of their illustrious pedigrees. Upon defamation, the state either revoked their financial stipends, confiscated their properties, or exiled them to remote Aegean islands when they pushed their luck too far against the state. Due to the restrictions on their social mobility, their only real options were accepting their fate on *ciftliks* or perish in exile on Mediterranean islands at a point in history when these wonderful spaces were, well, not considered so wonderful.

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Appendix

بف وبى 1 لولوب م ل المخارف فالمرافي فالم بوبع فتفاى ولتنوس طلوب هيون عذيمغرونا سجنيه نعبت وملدهن تعيين والليه المت لم في عتبو بم لعب رايد في بول فرد مادد المرية ليجود جلفا هد مرما لمرمية تخبر لولي المفعر بن وفرور ل ولا بر المجري والمعنوة العوم التكوم فراح العقاق سط ويمود فروس شرية تحفي والمراج والرفة مر الطخ 68.0.2 فمتبو لكرتي لصمدو بصغله محتر ممنه ونعجد صفرا فحزه مردتا لعب ملاماه المن المرقب طرفزة للنذ وقبعه وهل يعرفك موه المقط C.MTZ.00012.00552.001

Apportionment of monthly salary to Sahib Giray II with regard to "his loyalty to the state." (20 March 1776)

OSMANLI ARSIVI DAIRE BAS 4 روينه رعاياسدن فربی مياسی نام بهودی ناجرای سابقا فرم خان جلد دلو صاحبکای خان حضرتی جرن لر. عسلی مصبحه فقود و آشاجهلان خيرارت بيم سنزيل اللی تحرض الوجوحتی اولوب مبلغ منبور بالهن طب اولند ايراد به اداده محاطه ايرولی روسيکه لوی مرموله غدر وضرين مصب برکيفت المخله مبلغ منبولي مشاراتيه تماماً اعطلسی خصوصنه هم سنده معذول بيولستين به مرد اللي مدين اللي برآن اوّل LIARSIV

İE.HR.00020.01840.001

The complaint of a Russian Jew merchant who lent Sahib Giray money and could not get the loan back. (25 November 1783)

هاده فانوف وللتجار ولد ترا يحادم وحدد وكر فركم ومطلوع وفاله كوركا واوق يوافى تفطيل اواركتال فعدتني وفنه تماني عبادا والوعرية وحفظ فأحذونو عامه به مغا عنا بتحد مظهرعنات ولطاه مروف ودف حصة باجا ا وع الى غور فله به وى ال سارى وطاد مغرف ودف اضطر محصوبه ماعد وادى احفو باز وق كافى تع الخعنه عنارعد به محاج ا وفرق مای کو ماوله ده وک وفه مالا او طهودامد جنربي مدرمعا تحرولو سلماء مركت بحاضا صا وموتر فيعرد فلي اودمغد بغرب الخرهد ا مفت توى اود معتقا احدة الأرة دايرة و مردمهد نفت در فان اورد اولی برا می سابد مرمی خدمی در ماین اور معاد مار المربعه کف وقای فبور و ور مدخر مدخرار وزور دوال مستحصان فالحكت وتصاري الحارية دوم معالى ووه وعا مور منو متفالا ودور وفقيه او، دس وكفهد كمفرة در ولا مود درونه مراحد دورى مورفور بارتد معادتو محلو مفتو فتعلم معام ما رفين طحفوية بروطعه المتمساء مزادي فنحفوله أبخد مناجه حاد يتنك كأحش عاديتورد فريسا لقدرند خاما وهمي خاطرمحصيد مزعة وحاد فنظح مصابدت مردنا ومصاحب فودد أمرحه معتاد ودده عناية تخطا سور دائرا فرضا ارد اعدي و ومصل در ماد ومعد بولو وكريه فاستلاصها احمد واعدد ومه مود عنا ومريد وسا معادم مورى من الدف المتربي لدى فالوطو او: بنرى ول بخشرة عفاما وصحدى اولو أكاف وطوو مرر محفظالى وو فد هما والجنامد مرفومد العجب حفو فاديد نود مروافى مجذم ومربر المفند عرمان مرز أو مرين سودن مود مفروص مدارق افضا الوكائ ومى مودي مودي مولد المحت افطر كالمح كدى وروف مركود وعدادى ودد وطعن بروعة ما دجم معنى الموجد ومحد المف موفود لرى مصرو ودوكار بوالد مرد وزياجي فيضا بزدر 2shf box C ML 00568 23213 003

A request of Sahib Giray indicating his need for imbursement of '*ațiyye* to afford his debt to a Jewish merchant. (4 March 1801)

بم ديك مادند محملو مونو اد والقدم مطاغ مفله ونيقة برايحة وافيات حواره فاصمان حامة اصفانيه دفغ افراى وهرما وه مظهرت فقوصا ومفقه محر ما موللة علما فا فرقوه غان عنى فلي فلغ بداد ا فاستا ومحال داد و مع احمدكم معطان بزج ينك ومعطي فقيطال عديما لتؤال وبوزون مَحدُورِن مَانَ ا هِ بِي المَارِي الْجَاهَلِ أَوادِهِ وَابْرَهِ عَاجَرَا: سَيَ اوَ رَدِه عَدَيَ سَتَح وبويهم متضور مدا ومعاشدن بحله ويجله خد منص علي وا داد ور معاشره منشي م ومكأرا هيعتدن فابسته عنايت ومثا وازلفف ويمكن إدليعنى امتانته وكرقظك فاله خوان رافت ماهدا عتبار بدأسصول كمركم مقاطعه يحتذف المدا ووزه موم فيرفع فيتخب برمعذار مددمان غفصكتين عناب حفص جهانالخا مرءارزانيه خاكدن فمع وكالأجرائة افتد ماجدا وزجاني فعم فاف ولار ودرده محاكا ها والم محد ومحفد اصفانه ومباعفات منبه كزمائهم مبغل واوزانى جعيلق ثنازى كحسبه اجا واطلص فخطيتم المتردان تاالله تعالى سرور عا بركيب عاليات المحقق صرورت حادثه ترجما وخاط الملاصكاً وى مراعه زمان وف اقدائل فاصه astie روای زنان مدر بالفالذكم برمعدا دعفي وادمعان عناية واحسان معتبي حرعن أصفاء ومستعقد يتدعيها فرومين لماتنا المجلي اخصا خاز وتتعا فكخط عرفها لأيرر etter l C.HR.00071.03545.001

Sahib Giray's report on Ahmed Giray who fell in poverty because his salary was insufficient to afford the expenses of his household. (17 October 1801)

C. C. C. S. S. S. فبمسعادتك رضك مندم وكي تجدوفادوم افرو لك حفال حفاق مر المراجع عواده مدسعاد واقتال بددمم ونلافها عراده ودي الله ىن نىسى مورس فاستغنى الرديجة بالتا الكوزدوج سنق فاعتا والله فينوز يمنوا فحه ساكمان مقرف ووجهاد دكوا فالحاجا وزكره جرجره دارهاد ارج مهم مسادهم تحقوبان ما بنب مطح افا صرفة بالاشاجيدن فياره مسكا الجوعناي ومحشه متوفى درى محلولذن فدعزه حدد احاج ف عنايت معانى وتبه مزعته جاليمية كمهه زخااده جفرترنه تحرو فاده برا مساعدة عن وزرادلي برقطعه فاغمة ناد المزيخ راد لنمذله محلة شلخ وا. بف ود و د ساق ما مو ليله قا والحاف موقداري مم العلال كينة فرستم هدى سورادق مفع بعنام بمتمضلى لرجينز المسيابة ففقااره عنجيله فكزط ليحصرف ودكار ورفه مامل مخلفا بجرد C.DH.00003.00114.002

Confiscation of most of the properties and salaries of Bahadır Giray upon his death. (11 December 1791)

T.C. BASBAKANLIK OSMANLI ARSIVI DAIRE BASKANLIGI (BOA) 9 متوفى مصرلك مناعمة ومعلى وتميه فالجع معناذ فلنه tes no no to vier En 2 B.18. **OSMANLI ARŞİVİ**

C.ML.00115.05114.001

The register of Sahib Giray II indicating confiscation of a certain proportion of his properties. (19 March 1807)

5. $\sqrt{}$ مقدّمًا طرف شاها نه لرزن ستوطيق جنيمزيّ بيه صاّحب محصنتيين ادفنان صاحبكا ي خان طرفين بودفعه ودراديون برفطعه فاتمه مير معدّما طرف شاها نه لرزن ستوطيق جنيمزيّ بيه صاّحب محصنتيين ادفنان صاحبكا ي خان طرفين بودفعه ودراديون برفطعه فاتمه دوم این حوالیدین اخامت اعذه اولان سرطین جنمیزیر ومتعلقا طریک ودما وعلانقراده بوذم الانها خصطری خان مشادانیه طرفت تحرر والتما مدم این حوالیدین اخامت اعذه اولان سرطین جنمیزیر ومتعلقا طریک ودما وعلانقراده بوذم الانها خصطری خان مشادانیه طرفت تحرر والتماسی مدم این حوالیدین الفامت المعده اولان سرطین جنمیزیر ومتعلقا طریک و دما وعلانقراده بوذم الانها خصطری خان مشادانیه واستناسين منظم ادليكلمه سعين حكونة فك دومادة غنيت وعوالدوام افا ملاي حفنا التمريكي بوائنا دوميعنداي بردسيله الله دريعات اختيا داخات الدكيني انها وبومقوله لرك جفتكارية اعاده وأوجاع التخذيني التماني المفتيني المنابعة بعديد بعديد الم ما منها داخات الدكيني انها وبومقوله لرك جفتكارية اعاده وأوجاع التخذيني التجامي المجنوع للفائق المحالية هذت وتوب سوطين جنكيزير فاج نفايردنى تحق اولدفره كرفيع عبّدة عبرا لاى فنان دفترده اساميليم طعو سلطين كرجه اليوم درمادين المناقج سلاطين جنكيزير فاج نفايردنى تحق اولدفره كرفيع عبّدة عبدا لاى فنان دفترده اساميليم طعو سلطين كرجه اليوم اعلیٰن سی الدانی سرح ایله اشارت اوندینی وجله سبیمرای خان ذاره حاجی کرای مطان بودن قدم حرکسه طرفین درسادتر وادون به سطان مدیمانیه اهل عطن درصا جری دون عمیر ارمنی ملوسب بله عواطف عوّیهٔ خاها ، دن کنوم معدادتفا پرسانیا، وعطیه احسان سینین سطان مدیمانیه اهل عطن درصا جری دون عمیر ارمنی ملوسب بله عواطف عوّیهٔ خاها ، دن کنوم معدادتفا پرسانیا، وعظیر ، دا روم ا بیری حفتنکن اخامته غیمت اونده ایمی حفتنکی خلصا ولایغندی بسفته روم ا بیرج ا ولادی فرزاندی مغابر مضاع مد برخوکت بودر ا خاید کندوبر دخی عزواولدهنی متوسطه به مدهنیه ده افا منه تخصت اعطا بودندی بودن درسدی سارویه می در مرتب با درکافی اید کندوبر دخی عزواولدهنی متوسطه به ده ده افا منه تخصت اعطا بودندی بودن فریچه باغضال است. بعدائيض دايوسيندان سمطان معملها الما العمارى جوادنح الحاصلة وشهاذكراعان دادة جعيكراى سعلان دينى كذلك العراعين ودخا جرى رين ارى دادى مدى وفاتن دوم البس دلان خىنكارى فروخت ومدى ومنع الما المتكله ودماديم الخامتى خشا رونيا ون اوديغنه انبناز كذلك اكارخى درساوت افامته وصت وليتما وديني وشاهندا يضان ذاده دولتماي مطان دخى صبى وروالق كالمن كوندجادين درسادين مقيم ديوب ماعداسنك اقاميل كندى مسختارى منحندن اودينى تحقيق اويفون انى اومقوله طختاريه كلونلم مسختارى كوندجادين درسادين مقيم ديوب ماعداسنك اقاميل كندى مسختارى منحندن اودينى تحقيق اويفون انى اومقوله طختاريه كلونلم س خدا مذى بنه مفدلكارته مكرى تنبيه ادفيه فى وموعول سوطين جنين زلك در معادت اقاملرى فقاى تتعيل السود كى وستراها في تعيل درحادته اقامتي أخسا دليه سبب دخى بعضرى هفنه مقدما ظهوراً بين قاديا نه ناذ سطيق عضب خاها «لرف كال خطيه منى ارونى هرنقدد لماه داشکادان ، دخی خان منا لایه لی نخرینه نادً مصور کودنده نه حقدلکانه ممریحین بروجه محرد تبیه قنیه ی موسل عدا يوسوم ماد شاها; الى بعودان البحق خاكماى شاها; النه اشعاده البواد أونشي فريم الدي بوداد قوا مروضان مؤكلو كرائس كاللو عذا يوسوم ماد شاها; الى بعودان البحق خاكماى شاها; النه اشعاده البواد أونشي فريم عرجا ديدى بوداد قوا مروضان مؤكلو فدنكر ولحينهم اختم مادناهم حفارتيد 201/10376 HAT **HAT. 0201** 10

Sahib Giray's investigation on the Giray progenies who were living in Istanbul. (5 July 1796)

لا الما عي همتين جعاد تد له لقة المكان معدها العظى مسل برتفال محد لوفع فر لوف ولا ما مفع ولا برماني بر و في فرهزة لصلد وفق مسود والفراد عقد من الله ما عند الله ما ملا ما منع لاغل وعندة مقلة م عموم وجوم مناولة مو من ولمع ما مع وطر فعط لعذ مليدته مرو لاتمر ود خلاي فيس الخلي فتقو هجي فسر مع ووق ركل لقم وطرطونا عن على المنا للذ عليه كلور لقل علوفنا متد جوري مر عصر مقد مترجط محقد الع في وله المال م فولان معد ، روموز فع معمد ويلى لقف لدرلي كمذ ففوصفدت ردها الخور زجه مالس فالخد فعاة دور وك م رفع مد تفقا ار ع فلمن سب قائس وي خطب فس و is can والمعرفة ومقال المحالية المراق

C.MTZ.00017.00849.002

The Sultan's warning on Sahib Giray II because of his oppression to local merchants and peasants in Tekirdağ. (11 November 1776). (see: footnote 221).

المتراف عور معتر وفر مرفل تفرود ولاول والراج في وفي الفريد فعات مر س جواد الفرادف فيسودار مع الفاعظة وفنى الرطاق بعدع وفنا الدوانا وفرد الدوالم · Broidview مودود فرف معان في مالم مع المارية المدادة العد ولد ولد ولعد ومن وفر ومرد والزوار الم في محك على فوار فل فلورى والعلامة وملك هاشار وبغدم ومتسرعين من فيك مانة بوهر مدار مان فرنار المر مع الم لعد ولا فرا مان منه والم لا من في في لا ماد و يب بعد والمد والماد لابغ الله من مدم الموجر ووا فلدها الم في يوينه من من مد الله معد الله معد الله في الله الله الله من الله معالمة الله معد الله ما الله على الله في المعالية المعالية المعالية المعالية المعالم المعالمة المعالية المعالية المعالية المعالية المعالية المعالية الم tome ille dos ى ى ى مەد ب 3

The decree of Sultan Selim III on chastisement of Saadet Giray who attacked to an Ottoman officer with the mountaineer groups. (17 December 1789)

Deije دفيلو مرزمونونخط سادتو المحدد مسادف وافالده بردوام ويزاففا عطردات دادين به مسرور ويجام ولمل د عولقهاد وترکاداده بخسیافته نمان**د مخ**طان مردد ویز، قضا سد افتهام قریس الميكاخلن ذادارة وولكراى وبايزيركرا يخام مطا لمرحقل نومون اقم ودودايرن امتن معجنيه طرفردن دخحة تبله اللخشى نه حاكة محافظة وودمي فريج مذکور اکلونون فاضر شام کمنته با بزیرکا معطان کا اطاکه وسان ایدی جریوم م فتزايدي يحتر اولغله بونلك فأدبله لاذمه حكمنا ومعغذنا جناجته لمبة اولفيم صرح نفس وليحد فردتا ويسلانيته لرى لمتح جزم سده برادد لرى المناهمون د. و ما خود برقی اطسنه می نقی ایتر بور ، وج به اولدایشه د ، خصص فروز و دولتوسید. وكبرالمافت يددبخ حضترنية أقاده وذاى دودت عبيها وهابنى وجه اوند فاقب وكلح بابن طرفرة ويوسابخوا شاغا بخطاباً منكة برقطه امطحاصا رفادساته مزيسات ما موليه فاعة حادثا منطوريه بإدى وفرسا ددفا ديسا يعقبون فلمت وفيق لدى فمالع كمينة فريعا حادفا ، دى بودين مرض كما ذب وكونماكترى ومحزما الصكيان المحكىاتله افضأابرن مبانتري دسكته مريرسيا وعتمك مأتو مختط 2urk (2shf box) C.HR.00111.05501.001

Chastisements of Devlet and Bayezid Giray brothers with regard to the complaint of Sahib Giray. (12 June 1794)

2 من وری می این این ورانی من وری می این این می موری این مرید این می این می موری موری موری المرجعة واج وطرائطا عار فاطانه اوداخ مدوسا فمما دين مبارى وخاد ففى فشاهسام خزية جهانا بذرد اعطا وينائ وحساني وف زماني هلا و دومورد معن ناد وارتدام فاعن دربه و الح ومصالعاته ماوان معصال والتحف ارتعنا ماحد ربه اودده هم مقامی وسی وقام موطندی الجرانه مدو والحكارم المعانة لغك فوعيرا رسارية اولو ا ماركود مدد ا وافقه ناءً بير مارك ده دی مفاولان ماونه عل اعطا ومسافى وروساعفة شاهادة مورسه مفضى عنى و شاماته وادواى بوليق ناذ وكبمكيله فأبمة مامامه مريحير ومفتح فمناه دأف فرار فرقانعة د بعانها لى وص متعام بوسطهادى مودون محد في وسكادونك حال مرود مفاقعه وربه برما والمرامة من فادمر الطور يحطية بهنة مادشاه عناما ويحطا مؤرسته مصفحا عو مفانه درى أمامه وأرداني مودو معرو وسراعا ومدالي

C.HR.00023.01138.00

The amnesty decree of Adil Giray-who was exiled to Lemnos- with the favor of Sahib Giray. (3 February 1794)

C. BASBAKANLIK OSMANLI ARSIVI DAIRE BASKANLIGI (BO خاصه فیکوزن اشفیانفزن: تأمود بیاچ حرضکی ذواری طفرن کملو ادراندن. دیکان الخاره تك خلوصة سبرد 2 يانونى فضاحت فرمەنى وطنان حر واردزن تحق قاما خەمسى وفرق طائم اربى وباتا ق سندىسى انغاشاق علا ودۇمسى ورمى ولونەندزنوچى وايمه قفاسنة تابع دىنى تفيه دن بوتا تخارى خونسى ولغاز دى بىھيا ارتىسى دىرى تەلقى توقى ولكن عر وقص ارتى مىلىح ودارد اربى وصلى استىك دنيتى مصطفى ودلى برحث نام تقيلر فسل نفوس وغصب أموال انه مالون اولرقارى احبا ا ا دنيعي بدزن اذم نخ ادنيان غاركراى تطائك عنة لرزن ذغن حدر قضاشه اعيان تفت مسماغا نام مفدق بشه خصى مرقومك ودودن فرادا برق برف ادلو امعانسات اجراى بالنفاق انها اولذف عدم اعتبار وحواني مأ يوري الملى على وليش علراره اردس خابارهای اور معاصر عمار و معامر ما و رعام ما وری علی می ورس هماره اردب فضاء مراوره ما مورش موه دوارد اینایی تو ما معام او مکند رابقه سطان مرام در معه زران حقارم ادار معد مدورا مداریایی تو مهتری مودّ و ما تا مع مطلحه وجاری مشدن و دارم مجلس مدورت و دفته خرست دی ما ارمنا معلی و طحان فرم سندن فرا حسن و تاغ مجلس من و دفته خرست دی مدیو بایی و مسال مولان موده ما تا تا تو مسدن در دادی غرب اردفتا ارتبا استواب مشق نفوس و خارت اموان اماده ده ما تا تا تا تا معان از معان از معان مودن می موده از معان موده از معان مودن معان موان موده از معان موده از معان ادلرقدى مرین بری وسط است بواده و مذکور با بوری ولید وطرعتی تامیر وفرانی فضاری ولی زمع عنق فعتلى اختراده ملاكن اعباق المجلي فندل شيون مقامل كارات احتكى فرقت روخواروست الميتكي خداة دانلاد حضائ احساق ترتيم جزاراديك حذ وريق قراع هذ اشقيا احذ شرس ادنترق ذمن جدر اعداى مرقص من شيود دن دناده حتر تراك رولورايي تاقيا به دوريد و محصول حاحذ واولد في خان مريوم من الميرين مالورايي تاقيا به دوريد و محصول حاحذ واولد في خان مريوم من مريوم وفلاتمه كان دادة ديروشفا وشرائل مالحض واضرارها ووضلال لنظاك وسوت نسيح ترفي فن تغوي وغصب موال مناد حال تاجسا يف ايرن ددون منوصدده اعلمت محرتك فرا وللخاخير وتتفق الاندفق بخ متعان ا حیان مرفقه حاصطنال حفظ صدودارن امتثانیانی خدی رفق المفتری رفقت ۱ عیان ارتب بانجزه آحالی کندودن دکترا ویرولزین حذی فرا دولردن جانجا همارت بر كلنك إبعظ وعلى مسعد فرنتا ومرتمام اولن ففاهاى تعده اها در المرق كمرى كردهن ولو الفردس ولو مرى قان مرجد حبن وابق ومعامده والمخاصطنى وقورى وتهجه المطاق وكرعداد وقراتني دنى عوان زام تقبل وزغره عنى ففتلنون عباهم مطومان عمان وبلى على وإما إطلى اوزده اوجافت برمبتر بغير وتبدوين معمى مدالة يمح اومغل وربادهمان قارددون تقررده طوداوى اعقا مرتوك بانق مصبر ادن الجنى شقا وقرائله سالموف اولدى لضز ونمرى مفضى اولد ور ورتعصار رق شغلبه دن ادلغله مفارَّه نظهر وَبِن ادينودَارِه مُنظِ دامَه عالما مِذكِن مسحقه ادنيل معضرتك مجارات لونغرلي اجرا دوصوفتفادن فضاهاى مقينطير وتعير فنظم ولمخد ارده ويرفى مورز المشغراى مقعالتنزن فتخرى وولفترى محدو لضر وصغيلرى يمخرى فزائلق تفتلزه اغتبا موال ادلنقته بالفالبيان تقادكادل فزودفط عنق فطيلته وشغا ومرى يوليخفق تما دميرى اقتضا اينكما مب فخويز وزينب حنابه مرايي هنامه اعباطال المندي بالف ليداد عاديادر فرز درم عني ها باين ايزيد درم انتذادن درزما اخترص من زخ جذيع خدي طوراجي تلحصي الدي لدى اذخارة قاق ارديني عورالانتكى عراجتار وقت غزيجة اخذ تتبغ تخدامته تزاران قلتالمن صدارى انتقاطيو داردارد احذ ومقدن محفظي بيا ما هيكريج حفيقة اكان اولنهم بالق انتزودت متنا تك ينظي بابن امعلى صدودى حققت مايتهاى ايدى خصى مقم بخرارد مستخدد ومندل معرض فيوجا راف لانعة لرى اجرا سيله تعلير خدا ويحين امت فنظيم بودوكر في مال عباد ، بونحا دا فدام ومب ماى وكال سجرم مطلومية سلاخسترق ما ده با نيه ظلم وتورى ويخرعن نجانى دريين الملمى وصايالى تهيدويخريرا ولذيق فضاهاى مقع ما كملرية وا وجافت معرف الفاويجرى فاطلمى ومصلى موالد وتجد اعداد مسواران واهل عرص كروهى ومن ارتبة خطا ما ليرمزين يَّى مرَفْعِ مَسْمَانِ مَانَ ادْدَيْنِي اعدم ادَسْنِعْدُوْ لِنِقَّهِ حَعَارَتُ ادَامِعِدِصِدُودَارِنَ ^{وروع} احدم مطورا لآلى تقاوف مثه لرى خصى مقم نوما لدى المطاوم عما أطاعت موضحت مرقعان سينى تخليه اعذائيه اعتباع مقص منا معدد دون فف بركلاه احقال ادورس رِبْسَان ادله حقيقى مودّارادينغه حزّارى ترضي بأني اركله مددى تنا دُنْنَ ادْتَعَلَيْتُ صدورى مواقف رأى فى والمادة ساسلوى مورمول والم بالفاقع ددته عنا باسطام مفلا وَانَ مَنْ مَعْنَهُ مَكَا مَدْدِهِ حَفَّنَ المَطْلَقُ صودِيَّةٍ مَنْ اروَّزَادَ خَفَفَ عَلَى ادلَّهُ مَدْخَبَّ طرالصى دردق قفنا برطاف الجزابية بريت اعادل فقطة المكارل لمقاجزا سحر ترجي بنارق المُقِلري الحية قرّاناتي تمني المجتطه احتن تحريا دير 81 OSMANLI ARȘIVI 70 7468 2 (Isht bas C.ZB.00070.03468.002

A report on the activities of Gazi Giray in the northeastern Bulgaria. (19 September 1780)

Policies عليه قضاسك ودوداين كاغدلا فدوم بدد ١١٠ حي اسمبه فضاسى والزيق المسيرلي فزينت ففيم سطين جنكزبردن ارست كأى سطانك اغلوجاجي كأى سيطان بسلفلا ددوننى انواع فسقه ابناد ابتكنت غبى بون افع طاغلى شفا سنا فرافض المه كشت وكزاد سدو آری عثمان اغاذات ا وغلی علیملدادی بنودجلی تربیش وا فر مفتلکنده با سب مفتی مجود ورنغ ادسینی ختل و بو اولد بغناي بشفيه فضا فبوده وانع وبنوعان في لهن خوناته وعود ونك ملك بدل وراغورك وتركوع فرالك دعايا شك افدر دسوهم دجرة ليحكمنك أخذ ابتمكله اهالى قرا دواغتلزن منفطع اولمغرب بيني مقاطع مفوم تلك كروفقصا لذيادى وصرفغ فرجه ماب الحسنة ماعت عكهنك امن وداحتلي مساق المغله حالاته من سطان معليك كجر وبجيع بسرية وتد وتقرير جمله الهالى فطالبته رهاسة مساعت علم اوذابي بيورى ما ون اولفرس اسليه فابنى اعدوم والها ل AE. SSIM. D. 302/17662

AE.SSLM.III.00302.17662.001

A report on Hacı Giray's cooperation with Kara Feyzi and his mountaineer companions.