

POLITICAL REGIMES IN PLURAL SOCIETIES:

Institutions and Performance of

Majoritarian and Power-Sharing Democracy

in Ethnically Divided Countries

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“Establishing the absolute right of the majority to impose its will on the minority, or minorities, amounts to establishing a working rule that works, in the longer run, against the very principle that it extols. If the first winner of a democratic contest acquires unfettered (absolute) power, then the first winner can establish itself as a permanent winner. If so, a democracy has no democratic future and ceases to be a democracy at its inception; for the democratic future of a democracy hinges on the convertibility of majorities into minorities and, conversely, of minorities into majorities. At a second view, then, the limited majority principle turns out to be *the* democratic working principle of democracy”

Giovanni Sartori

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ABSTRACT

The thesis classifies cases of majoritarian and power-sharing democracy in plural societies. The research questions are: *How are democratic regimes in plural societies articulated? Which dimensions can grasp the institutional varieties and practical performances of political regimes in ethnically divided democracies? What is the effect of majoritarian institutions in plural democracies, in terms of ethnic inclusion and exclusion?*

Accordingly, I shall map 47 plural democracies through 18 variables along 2 institutional dimensions: (i) majoritarianism or power-sharing in the government, parliament and electoral system and (ii) the territorial articulation of power. I shall then add another dimension on (iii) regime quality related to group relations: ethnic inclusion or exclusion. This framework, coupling *de jure* institutions with *de facto* performances, proves that: (i) *power-sharing democracy is associated with ethnic inclusion*; nonetheless (ii) *majoritarian democracy occurs in plural societies and can coexist with ethnic inclusion*.

A simple quantitative analysis is insufficient to explain this pattern. I will thence conduct a *most similar* comparison of 2 majoritarian democracies of my sample – Turkey (majoritarian/exclusive) and Mali (majoritarian/inclusive) – to confirm that: (i) *majoritarian institutions in plural societies often lead to ethnic exclusion*, albeit (ii) *this scenario can be avoided when exogenous factors are at play* (party system, political culture/tradition of accommodation). However, as the diachronic analysis will show, these factors remain precarious and (iii) *majoritarian institutions, in particular the centralization of power, are demonstrated to be ill-suited to deal with territorially concentrated minorities*.

The thesis offers a detailed and useful classification and discusses examples of majority rule and power-sharing in plural democracies, and finally proposes further research directions, including authoritarianism and regime change.

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With the (not only personal) wish that in an increasingly sick, divided and polarized world, academia will no longer be a privilege of the few, but rather a useful and concrete beacon of hope, critique to the power, equality, democracy and justice for the many.

*E subito riprende
il viaggio
come
dopo il naufragio
un superstite
lupo di mare*

Giuseppe Ungaretti

INTRODUCTION

The thesis introduces a comprehensive classification of examples of majoritarian and power-sharing democracy in plural societies. In so doing, it aims at exploring an urgent, though often neglected, topic: the role of majoritarian institutions in ethnically divided places. Arguably, existing political science theories on ethnic politics and political regimes have often assumed that in contexts where ethnic, national, religious, or linguistic identities are politically salient, majoritarian institutions lead to patterns of ethnic exclusion. However, these theoretical affirmations have *not* been empirically and extensively tested in academia. Accordingly, I shall map out a large number of ethnically divided countries along two structural, institutional dimensions, namely majoritarianism or power-sharing in the government, parliament and electoral system and the territorial articulation of power. I shall then add another dimension on regime performance or quality as *de facto* political practices, in order to examine whether majority rule reinforces ethnic cleavages in these contexts, e.g. undermines specific elements of democratic quality, or otherwise whether, and under which conditions, it can rather coexist with democracy and ethnic inclusion. In short, the purpose of the thesis shall be to scrutinize political regimes *in* ethnically divided democracies, bridging past and normative contributions on regime-types *for* plural societies and overarching classifications of democratic institutional varieties and qualities. Being ethnicity a social construct, understanding how these regimes work is paramount for homogeneous and diverse countries alike, but also academics, policymakers and the whole society. The driving research questions of the thesis shall be: *How are political regimes in plural societies articulated? Which dimensions can grasp the institutional varieties and practical performances of political regimes in ethnically divided democracies? More specifically, what is the effect of majoritarian institutions in plural democracies? How do majoritarianism and democratic quality connected to ethnicity interact, in terms of ethnic inclusion and exclusion?*

Refining existing and introducing my own definitions, operationalizations and measurements of, in turn, a deeply/ethnically divided/plural society, power-sharing and majoritarianism, I shall conduct a nested analysis, integrating quantitative and qualitative methods. Firstly, combining sources from different datasets for creating my own array of data, I will map a large sample of 47 consolidated or semi-consolidated plural democracies along two institutional dimensions, and then I will analyze how these dimensions interact with ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Secondly, the inquiry will furtherly examine, throughout a more in-depth discussion of cases of majoritarian and plural democracy, how majority rule and ethnic politicization interact. Consequently, I shall redefine some analytical categories introduced by previous scholars paving the way for future researches.

For many scholars, inequalities and heterogeneity in the articulation of social cleavages are deemed “unfavorable [conditions] for the development of democracy” (Merkel & Weiffen, 2012: 388). Therefore, an empirical stream of the literature focuses on those institutional architectures fostering ‘inclusion’ as a systemic answer to social diversity. In his seminal contribution, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, firstly promoting the idea of ‘consociational democracy’ in ethnically divided countries, Lijphart stated: “the real choice of plural societies is not between the British (majoritarian) model and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all” (1977: 238). This research aims at partly revising this statement – never tested empirically – widely investigating power-sharing *and* majoritarian democracy in plural societies, to see how political regimes and ethnic inclusivity or exclusivity are intertwined. However, as anticipated above, my research will *not* be limited to a negative exploration on the absence of power-sharing. Rather, I will tackle the issue through a ‘double-root strategy’ (Bogaards, 2009), directly accounting for and explicitly redefining *majoritarianism* in plural societies, in its theoretical and empirical facets. In fact, taking the cultural dimension ‘seriously’ (Bormann, 2010: 10) in the articulation of the political regime,

the thesis shall compare power-sharing *and* majoritarian ethnically divided democracies on different dimensions to thence evaluate their practical performance.

I will now more in detail describe the articulation of the work. The first chapter is structured as follows: a first paragraph on majoritarian/power-sharing democracy and the most important contributions and critiques stemmed by Lijphart's pathbreaking works (1977, 1984, 1999, 2012), a second section reviewing the quantitative and more recent literature on power-sharing and democracy, a third one examining the theoretical dangers of majoritarian rule in heterogeneous countries – and the lack of empirical evidence to verify this claim – and finally a fourth paragraph presenting some alternative concepts to analyze deeply divided countries devoid of power-sharing (such as 'ethnic democracy'). The first chapter shall thence assess what the literature has achieved so far and, most importantly, underline its limitations and puzzles. I shall thus argue that scholarly contributions on ethnically divided societies (i) lack a systematic classification of political regimes in these contexts – being divided in fragmentary and often incongruent definitions (of power-sharing) – and (ii) overlook other fundamental concepts (namely, majoritarianism) in their research agenda.

The second chapter, the core of the empirical and quantitative part, shall first advance my own definition, operationalization and measurement of, firstly, a deeply divided democracy, namely a democratic regime with politically salient ethnicities, elaborating data from the 'Ethnic Power Relations' and 'Varieties of Democracy' datasets. After having selected 47 plural democracies, excluding ethnically homogeneous or highly fragmented countries, I will re-define power-sharing and majoritarianism, in order to propose a classification mapping plural democracies along two axes, measuring *de jure* political institutions on a spatial and two-dimensional continuum. Factor analysis will be used to locate the variables I will consider on these two dimensions. The first, horizontal dimension will thence be 'executive-legislative-electoral institutions', integrating and modifying the indicators provided by the 'Inclusive, Dispersion

and Constraints’ dataset (Strøm et al., 2017), such as the presence of a grand coalition or the explicit reservation of seats for minorities in the government/parliament, together with a own recalculation of Gallagher index and average district magnitude for my units of analysis – in order to have a more nuanced measurement of the electoral system taking also majoritarianism into account. The second, vertical dimension will be the territorial division of the state, labelled ‘territorial-autonomous-federal’ institutions, always building upon the ‘Inclusive, Dispersion and Constraints’ dataset, considering the presence of decentralization, e.g. autonomous competences and local elections. Therefore, the second paragraph should present some descriptive statistics: the selected countries will be thus observed along this two-dimensional space (majoritarianism or power-sharing in executive/legislative/electoral institutions and throughout the territory). This will present, with a more accurate selection of variables for these peculiar contexts, a full-scale classification of democratic regimes in plural societies based on formal institutions – a first attempt thereof in the literature. I will not consider time, calculating the average values for each variable for each country in the examined timespan (1989-2010). Afterwards, the third paragraph will go more into detail, in order to add a third variable, most notably a measurement of democratic quality and performance related to ethnicity. For examining different types of majoritarian democracies in plural societies (in the government or the territory), I should in fact include another distinguishing aspect. This will be the *de facto* articulation of political power among ethnic groups, as reported by the ‘Ethnic Power Relations’ dataset, measuring ethnic inclusion or exclusion, in order to see whether a specific configuration is more present in one angle of my classificatory map. I shall articulate this third dimension through the concept of democratic quality.

This framework of democratic and plural regimes, coupling *de jure* political institutions (horizontal and vertical majoritarianism or power-sharing) with *de facto* performances (ethnically inclusive or exclusive group relations), shall empirically prove that: (i) *power-*

sharing (in particular when the two institutional dimensions are combined) *is associated with ethnic inclusion, although with a low statistical significance*; nonetheless (ii) *majoritarian democracy occurs in plural societies and can coexist with ethnic inclusion*.

A simple quantitative analysis might be insufficient to explain this pattern. In the third chapter, in fact, I will thence conduct an in-depth qualitative discussion of two majoritarian democracies within my sample: Turkey (majoritarian and ethnically exclusive) and Mali (majoritarian and ethnically inclusive). This *most similar* comparison shall illustrate that: (i) *majoritarian institutions in plural societies often lead to ethnic exclusion*; (ii) *this scenario can be avoided when exogenous factors are at play* (e.g. political culture, party system, legacies/tradition of minority accommodation). However, as the diachronic analysis of Mali will show, these conditions remain highly context-dependent and therefore mutable. In fact, (iii) *majoritarian institutions, in particular the centralization of power, are demonstrated to be ill-suited to deal with territorially concentrated minorities*. I shall finally return to the theory, to consider the limitation of my analysis and propose future research directions, such as including authoritarian regimes in the analysis and scrutinizing more directly regime dynamics and change.

To sum up, the thesis aims at enlarging political regime and nationalism studies through a frontier examination, offering innovative and fruitful knowledge. It will propose a methodologically mixed analysis to explain the features and performance of power-sharing and, more specifically, majoritarian plural democracies. However, to reaffirm the crux of this introduction, albeit the application of the thesis should be limited to a set of cases, inquiring *whether and when* majority rule leads to ethnic exclusion is crucial *beyond* heterogeneous societies. Today, ‘ethnopolulist’ impulses are everywhere, manifested in the worldwide re-ethnicization of politics (Jenne, 2018). Consequently, since ethnicity is artificial and eventful, its study “matters because we are all ethnics of one kind or another (...) and our community relations are too important to be left to ethnic partisans” (McGarry & O’Leary, 1993: 38).

CHAPTER I

MAJORITARIAN AND POWER-SHARING DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES

1.1 Majoritarian and power-sharing regimes for and in ethnically divided countries: origins and critiques of an unbalanced typology

The type of political regime matters.¹ This chapter shall evaluate what the literature on political regimes in plural societies has achieved so far and, most importantly, underline its limitations and puzzles, to frame the relevance of my thesis. In this paragraph, I shall henceforth analyze the most important contributions classifying varieties of democracy, in particular the category of consociationalism and the distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracy, their conceptual origins and criticisms. In fact, many scholarly efforts have been trying to categorize democratic and autocratic politics, according to different dimensions and variables. Moreover, institutional variance has been often associated with performance. However, for the peculiar, ethnically divided countries I am going to scrutinize throughout the thesis, the attention of scholars has been *not* specifically on clustering and sequentially evaluating regime-types, but mostly on normative proposals of political institutions *for* these societies. This resulted in an unbalanced attention to, as we will see, the concept of power-sharing, while other institutional principles, namely majoritarianism, remained overlooked. This was neither by chance nor without some merits.

In fact, the over-quoted, pessimistic and perhaps ethnocentric sentence by John Stuart Mill (1861), about the impossibility of reaching an established democracy where the state is made up by different nationalities, has been progressively overturned by many social and political scientists demonstrating how democracy could and should be able to cope with ethnic cleavages. However, the assumption that ethnicity, or rather through the catchy – as perhaps

¹ For ‘political regime’, to specify, I will consider those sets of formal and informal measures determining who and how will rule (Geddes, 2003).

analytically controversial – term ‘identity’ (Fukuyama, 2018; cf. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), is *a priori* bad for democracy is still present in academia and contemporary society (Snyder, 2000; cf. Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). Even recently, many studies are said to be devoted to debunking the assumption that ‘diversity hurts democracy’ (Fish & Brooks, 2004), thus showing that this presumption still exists, albeit maybe more latently than previously (Offe, 1998).² Anyhow, according to Fish and Brooks (2004: 160), “there is scant correlation between social diversity and political regime”. Even though they do not distinguish *within* democratic regimes in divided societies, for Fish and Brooks there are thus “few excuses for authoritarianism [which] are trotted out more frequently than the claim that multiform societies need a strong hand to prevent all hell from breaking loose” (2004: 164).³

Nevertheless, the merits of having demystified these scholarly understandings following Mill’s footprints on the democratic impossibility in plural societies should be conferred to most of ‘ethnopolitics literature’, which has been molded by consociationalism, and later the power-sharing approach – among the most consolidated fields of comparative politics – examining indeed political regimes *for* plural societies (Lijphart, 2004; Choudhry, 2008; McCulloch, 2014a; cf. Bogaards et al., 2019). Consociational democracy, in short, was a category introduced by Lijphart (1969)⁴ to empirically demonstrate that democratic stability is possible in ‘pillarized’ societies, if the political elites are coalescent (Reynolds, 2000). This type of democracy was conceived to be opposed to Almond’s (preferred) Anglo-Saxon model, against the putative fragmented and instable continental version of democracy (e.g. the French Fourth Republic and Italy; cf. Almond, 1956). As widely known, from the study of a small set of

² Moreover, it is still remarkable how homogeneous countries are nowadays experiencing high levels of democratic backsliding and autocratization (e.g. Poland and Hungary). Cf. Cianetti, Dawson & Hanley (2018).

³ Mentioning the (unfortunate) examples of Singapore, Malaysia, Uganda, China, Burma and Central Asian countries.

⁴ Resumed from the original work on confederal entities by the German jurist Althusius (for the linkages between confederal and consociational theories cf. Lijphart, 1985).

European democracies,⁵ deviant from Almond's typology (1956; Bogaards, 2000: 401), Lijphart proposed a fourfold categorization of democracy, combining societal structure and elite behavior, thus describing depoliticized, centripetal, consociational and centrifugal types of democracy (1968). Afterwards, he introduced a more sophisticated definition of 'consociational democracy' in four core principles: executive power-sharing (formal or informal, in a grand coalition or collective presidency), proportionality (in the electoral system, public service and funds allocation), autonomy (firstly non-territorial and later extended to encompass decentralization) and veto rights for minority protection (Lijphart, 1977).

Developing this original classification, Lijphart proposed the most quoted and implemented typology of democracy in social sciences, distinguishing among consensus and majoritarian varieties of democracy, applicable to homogeneous and heterogeneous countries alike (1984).⁶ Only political, rather than *socio*-political characteristics can be now found in the 'second Lijphart' (Bogaards, 2000: 410). In the last version of his research, in fact, Lijphart examines 10 features of 36 established democracies (2012). "To Lijphart's surprise" (Bogaards, 2017), from these ten variables two dimensions emerge by factor analysis, namely 'executive-parties' and 'federal-unitary', with the former based mostly on the electoral and party systems and government and parliament relations and the latter embracing the territorial division of power as well as other indicators, such as judicial review or the independence of central banks (Lijphart, 2012; cf. Bernauer et al., 2016: 476).

As widely recognized, Lijphart's focus shifted from the analysis of elite coalition in multiethnic societies to mapping and evaluating two polar and ideal types of democracies, either consensus or majoritarian, distinguishing whether the political authority has granted to 'the majority of the people' or to 'as many people as possible' (Lijphart, 2012). As remarkably explored by

⁵ The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Switzerland.

⁶ Which he thereupon detailed by integrating the original inductive classification from the selected sample of cases with a more comprehensive analysis on regime performance (1999, 2012; cf. Bogaards, 2017).

Bogaards (2000; cf. Reynolds, 2000), a significant terminological confusion permeates the concepts of consociationalism, consensus democracy and the broader power-sharing, as I will describe in the next paragraph.⁷ Suffice here to say, consociationalism developed from being an empirical analysis of a democratic regime-type in plural societies to having a more prominent normative potential (Lijphart, 1977),⁸ while the consensus-majoritarian distinction embodies a complementary, still incongruent normative typology when referred to consociationalism, in a mixture of empirical, polar, and again normative characteristics (Bogaards, 2000: 395). Moreover, through the imposition of the consensus-majoritarian distinction in academia, according to Doorenspleet and Pellikaan (2013: 242), from a first “analysis of ideal types that can achieve and maintain democracy, (...) the empirical investigation of which type of democratic system performs best” was the focus. Of interest here is that, diversely from consociationalism, for consensus democracy, “instead of institutions being shaped by society, they now shape society”, most remarkably in the evaluation of performance (Bormann, 2010). Even more analytical confusion is added in the attempted definition of the ‘contrary’ of consociationalism, with majoritarian democracy as the opposite polar type of consensus democracy, and centrifugal democracy as the opposite empirical type of consociational democracy, in the fourfold typology presented above (Bogaards, 2000: 398). A possible subsequent and logical question – *are all majoritarian democracies in plural societies centrifugal democracies?* – has never been explored in academia and remains perhaps difficult to prove empirically, as the thesis shall extensively demonstrate.

More generally, many have been the critiques to Lijphart’s *opus* which are worth mentioning here. Particularly for the majoritarian-consensus distinction, it has been observed that it encompasses too many variables and different indicators and, most significantly, it does not

⁷ See also recently Jakala et al. (2018) and Kelly (2019).

⁸ Consociationalism was firstly described as ‘the second best for problematic societies’ (Lijphart, 1969) and then as the democratic *best* type therefor (1977). The apex of Lijphart’s prescriptive intents were reached in his institutional proposals for post-apartheid South Africa (1985a; Bogaards, 2000: 403).

distinguish between institutions and practices, as I will specify in my empirical strategy. In fact, the confusion of formal and informal features is probably the aspect where Lijphart's typology has been more radically questioned. Also, in the evaluation of democratic performance, Lijphart himself focused on one dimension only, namely executive-party (Lijphart, 2012), since the federal-unitary has no statistical significance in his multivariate regression analyses. Moreover, *causal explanations* between institutional settlements and performance remain obscure. However, although many other scholars found very contradictory, and hardly cumutable findings replicating regression analyses matching institutions with performances, as reported by Bogaards (2017), "none of these critical studies, however, argues that majoritarian democracies enjoy superior performance". This aspect on democratic quality shall be paramount in my analysis, together with a very important contextual condition (the replication of the classification for plural democracies), as I will scrutinize in the empirical chapters.

Without going too much into details, it is to be noted that the consensus-majoritarian classification has been integrated with many other efforts by scholars, distinguishing several other variables to map democracies. The results of these researches have been very diverse (Bogaards, 2017). In a comprehensive review of Lijphart's works, Bormann (2010) states that the majoritarian-consensus division is inductive and inapplicable to cases outside the selected set of countries, especially for new democracies. Moreover, it does not include presidential systems or direct democracy institutions (Bormann, 2010: 8). In these aspects, some authors have tried to propose integrations or changes to Lijphart's typology. However, I argue, those contributions focused on developing *the consensus more than the majoritarian angle*.⁹ Among the most significant integrations, we can nonetheless start with Ganghof (2005), who distinguishes among 'super majoritarian', 'truly majoritarian' and 'pluralitarian democracy'.

⁹ In his examination on power-sharing democracy in Africa, Reynolds tried to integrate the work of the 'first and second Lijphart' with a more sophisticated analysis of majoritarian regimes (2000), though with the lens of the so-called centripetalism or integrative power-sharing, as I will describe in the next paragraph.

In fact, relying directly on the works by Mill, Ganghof introduced an alternative classification, combining electoral proportionality and legislative majority, namely the category of ‘true majoritarian democracy’, useful to explain minority governments and those regimes mixing proportional representation and majority rule in the legislative (2005). For him, moreover, the Westminster model is more about *plurality*, rather than proper majority and also, where consensus is required by institutionalized vetoes, it would be more correct to speak about *super-majoritarianism* rather than consensus (2005: 9). With a much simpler division, being the distinguishing variables the minimum number of votes to have an absolute majority of seats in the parliament (through the Gallagher index of disproportionality) *and* the additional votes for a legislative coalition to be able to change the *status quo* (measuring institutional vetoes), Ganghof’s framework will be, in part, of inspiration for my research strategy, in particular in the design of the two institutional dimensions I shall present in the second chapter.

Additionally, combining ‘the first and the second Lijphart’, Doorenspleet and Pellikaan, in their classification of political regimes and evaluation of their performance, introduced a cubic, tridimensional classification on “three axes: the x-axis represents the electoral system, the y-axis the political system, and the z-axis the societal structure” (2013: 242). Albeit they combine Lijphart’s fourfold and twofold classifications presented above, the definition of their concepts is unclear and debatable: for instance, they use the label consociational for consensus *and* unitary democracy in plural societies (Bogaards, 2017), as they were perfectly and analytically superimposable. Anyway, their combination of the ‘consociational’ and ‘consensus periods’ of the works of Lijphart shall be also the departing point of my contribution.

Among other and broader typologies combining “institutional features *with* performance indicators” (Bogaards, 2017), we must include the works by Bochslers and Kriesi (2013), enlarging Lijphart’s dichotomy with other three dimensions. Going beyond a two-dimensional model, Bochslers and Kriesi analyze ‘institutional rule and practices’ (2013: 70) in consolidated

and also new democracies through a large bunch of indicators. In particular, to Lijphart's two dimensions they add the 'liberal-illiberal' distinction, the presence of institutions of 'direct democracy' and finally a fifth dimension on the 'inclusivity or exclusivity' of the political system – outlining an interesting aspect for my analysis. Anyhow, for the 'inclusive-exclusive' dimension Bochsler and Kriesi consider only the share of registered voters among the adult population (2013: 78) and, after having performed factor analysis, they add wage coordination, as the inclusion of labor unions in policy making (88-89). Interestingly enough, more recently, Kriesi (2015) repeated this analysis in a larger set of countries, though with four dimensions only (indeed dropping the same inclusivity-exclusivity dimension). Very similarly, the importance of direct democracy has been also emphasized by Bernauer and Vatter (2012, 2019), in their analysis on voters' satisfaction and consensus-majoritarian democracy. Unfortunately for this study, Bernauer and Vatter do not consider ethnic cleavages in their analysis.

In particular, recovering from the structure proposed by Maleki and Hendriks (2015; cf. Bogaards, 2017), this thesis would like to combine an examination on democratic types with their performance, through a consideration of societal cleavages as an essential contextual factor. In brief, coupling the interest towards plural societies with the classification of democracy, the thesis aims at scrutinizing *democratic regimes with politically salient ethnic cleavages*. A specific accent on majoritarianism in deeply divided societies will thence follow. This aspect indeed remains uncharted by scholars. Moreover, even when present, the attention to specific cultural contexts is approximate. For instance, even though Maleki and Hendriks (2015) declare to be interested in cultural factors as essential *values* underpinning democratic qualities – using data from the World Value Survey to analyze voter attitudes – they do not look how the boundaries between social groups can shape the political regime itself.

After having introduced some of the most significant distinctions of democratic regimes in academia, and underlined their limitations and importance for this thesis, it is now necessary to describe more precisely what is meant by power-sharing and its relationship with democracy.

1.2 Power-sharing and democracy: old and new variants

Power-sharing – instead of consociational or consensus – democracy will be the wider concept preferred in the thesis (Reynolds, 2000; cf. Bogaards et al., 2019). But which are the conceptual origins of this term? Initially, it developed in a very narrow sense, as a synonym of consociationalism and multiethnic coalition government centered on elite accommodation. Afterwards, it shifted from being one of the components of consociational democracy (in the executive) to becoming its much more general, extensive and conceptually less intensive affiliate (cf. Sartori, 1970).¹⁰ In fact, the concept of power-sharing was introduced by Lijphart (2007) to differentiate among types of consociationalism, namely pre- or self-determinate, or corporative or liberal, as reported by McGarry and O’Leary (2004).¹¹ Afterwards, being the debate focused more directly on constitutional engineering *for* plural societies (Reynolds, 2002; Choudhry, 2008), another theory was born in opposition to consociationalism, especially criticizing its corporate variations, though claiming to be still within the same *power-sharing approach*, albeit more focused on ethnic integration rather than segregation. Horowitz’s (1985) and Reilly’s (2001) so-called ‘incentives approach’ (also known as ‘centripetal power-sharing’), condemning the consociational principles based on the crystallization of ethnic groups, thus proposed three solutions for a stable democracy in plural societies: electoral incentives for politicians appealing outside their group (vote pooling), multiethnic arenas of

¹⁰ The initial part of the following conceptual reconstruction of power-sharing has been reported partly recovering from Panzano (2018).

¹¹ The difference is that there could be fixed or *a priori* designed safeguards for ethnic groups (corporate/pre-determinate), or somehow ethnically blind mechanisms implemented to preserve freedom to self-identify and vote for individuals (liberal/self-determinate; McCulloch, 2014).

bargaining and multiethnic, aggregating parties (Reilly, 2001: 11). Even though suggesting different institutions¹² and with diverse conditions of implementation (cf. McCulloch, 2014a), consociationalism and centripetalism ‘share’ the idea that some accommodation, or better power-sharing between ethnic groups is indispensable. To better grasp the sense of the term, we can accordingly describe a comprehensive ‘theory of power-sharing’ overarching the two schools of thought (Sisk, 1996; cf. Kettley, 2001), where power-sharing is defined as “any set of arrangements that prevent one agent, or organized collective agency, from being the ‘winner who hold all critical power’, whether temporarily or permanently” (O’Leary, 2013: 3). Using this meso-level of generality of the concept of power-sharing (being the micro-level overlapping with consociationalism), researches have been focused on democratic institutions, limiting or incentivizing political agency in ethnically divided countries.¹³ However, power-sharing was seldom adopted by these scholars to *categorize* political regimes as such, and this might have determined the following developments of the concept in academia.

In more recent years, in fact, following Lijphart’s approach with an even more general and macro-level understanding of power-sharing as any kind of common management of political power in post-conflict societies, large-N quantitative analyses inaugurated a new stream in the literature, focused on the relationship between power-sharing, democracy, peace and war.¹⁴ Based on data elaboration on horizontal inequalities and civil war (Cederman et al., 2011, 2013), these scholars introduced a new, and comprehensive measurement of power-sharing, applicable to the most diverse political, economic and military institutions: the ‘Inclusion,

¹² See the ground-breaking debate between Horowitz and Lijphart about the democratization of post-apartheid South Africa (Lijphart, 1985a; Horowitz, 1992; cf. note 8).

¹³ For instance, Norris (2008) found a positive association between ‘power-sharing institutions’, including parliamentarism, proportional representation and federalism, and the most diverse aspects of democratic quality in a worldwide analysis. However, Graham and colleagues (2017) present the problem of reverse causation of the putative correlation between power-sharing democracy and democratic performance in Norris’ analysis.

¹⁴ Following the pioneering work by Gurr (2000); cf. recently also Zürcher et al. (2013).

Dispersion and Constraints’ dataset, already mentioned in the introduction (Strøm et al., 2017). For many of these scholars, however, power-sharing is not implemented to categorize forms of political regime. According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2015), in fact, power-sharing is analyzed as a necessary characteristic of post-conflict societies, as the only variant of ‘Schumpeterian’¹⁵ democracy or ‘the art of the possible’ in these contexts – connecting the putative pitfalls of power-sharing (its intrinsic limitation to political competition) with the same potentialities of its success.

Afterwards, and more connected to my inquiry, Graham and colleagues qualify as power-sharing all those institutions limiting the “threats from unrestrained majoritarian rule” (2017: 686), again reframing power-sharing negatively. Therefore, they are focused on those guarantees regarding the access to power and fragmenting political authority. Elaborating the pioneering work by Strøm and others (2017), nonetheless, they do not introduce a classification of democratic types based on power-sharing, but rather a unilateral measure thereof globally, articulated in three domains resulted from a factor analysis of 19 institutional variables, namely ‘inclusive’, ‘dispersive’ and ‘constraining’ types of power-sharing, mixing governmental, territorial and military rule with judicial review.

Due to this methodological approach, the contributions by Graham et al. (2017) and Strøm and others (2017) are mostly focused on democratic survival in post-conflict countries, with a scarce consideration of democratic types and quality in plural societies. Nonetheless, the merit of this new literature on power-sharing is to have provided previous scholarship with empirical substance, thanks to their new measurement of power-sharing. However, their examinations seem to remain devoid of structured discussions on definitions, the underlining causal mechanisms in their analysis, and – most importantly perhaps – how these global researches

¹⁵ To be read, for them, just as a synonymy of ‘minimalist’ – overlooking the element of competitiveness in Schumpeter’s definition of democracy, cf. Sartori (1987).

interact with previous qualitative insights on plural societies. In other words, taking a concept elaborated for suggesting political institutions for ethnically divided places (power-sharing), they try to apply it globally, which nevertheless leads to fragmented and often inconclusive results. Moreover, as I shall illustrate in the second chapter, the empirical design of their variables is even more confused,¹⁶ and the low statistical significance of their correlations require them to be taken with a grain of salt.

More recently, and of interest here, this strand of the literature directly focuses on the differences between formal and informal power-sharing arrangements. Pospieszna and Schneider (2013), in fact, analyzing the application of power-sharing in post-conflict societies, found that *formal* proportional representation and federalism are not able to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict, while *informal* division of power in executive grand coalitions might prevent another civil war. Moreover, reversing some of the results by Graham and others (2017), Bormann and colleagues affirm that “inclusion increases the likelihood of infighting among power-sharing partners, while reducing the probability that an excluded group engages in a conflict. This finding to some extent probably explains some of the mixed results regarding the pacifying effects of power sharing. Finally, regional autonomy granted to groups excluded from central power sharing decreases in the likelihood of ethnic conflict in general and territorial conflict in particular, but the latter effect is not statistically significant” (2019: 98). In other words, for Pospieszna and Schneider (2013) and Bormann and others (2019), the *behavioral aspects more than the formal features of power-sharing* might reduce the probability of the onset of a civil war. This first assessment of the puzzle of the underlying causal mechanisms might help explaining previous inconsistent findings. These works are in fact

¹⁶ In fact, unsurprisingly, Graham and others conclude that “inclusive power-sharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict contexts. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism tend to destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining power-sharing consistently facilitates democratic survival regardless of recent conflict” (2017: 686). However, as ‘constraining power-sharing’ they consider many disparate indicators, such as military control and judicial review.

crucial for explaining the relevance of my theoretical framework in academia, particularly to combine institutions and *de facto* ethnic relations. However, as for previous authors, Pospieszna and Schneider (2013) and Bormann and others (2019) examine power-sharing in its singularity, neither theoretically nor empirically considering its presumable antithesis: majority rule.

1.3 Majoritarianism and ethnicity: theory of an uneasy relationship

For ‘consociationalists’, majoritarianism is almost a *bête noire*. However, neither scholars focused on consociational or consensus democracy nor their colleagues scrutinizing power-sharing have dedicated much of their endeavors to investigate majority rule and majoritarian democracy properly. In this paragraph, I shall analyze the theoretical insights about the difficult relation between ethnicity and majoritarianism, leaving the evaluation of some analytical categories to explain cases of plural societies without power-sharing to the next section.

According to Lijphart, majority rule has imposed itself as the normative paradigm for democracy in the world and this is a problem for heterogeneous societies (1991; Bogaards, 2000: 404). In contexts characterized by hardly mutable identities, in fact, the majority which wins the elections will theoretically resemble a *permanent* majority, then favoring the risks of passing from a majority democracy to a fully-fledged ethnic majority, or even plurality, thus endorsing minority oppression. These fears of majority rule, however, are not alien even to the ‘pure’ democratic theory. Among the most famous theoretical problems at the origin of contemporary democracy, in fact, there is exactly the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’, namely the assumption that a majority, although democratically elected, might oppress minorities and subvert the fundamental rules of the game. In a nutshell, democracy *per se*, intended as the rule of the majority of the people, contains the seeds of its destruction, namely domination.

In his comprehensive review of the perspectives elaborated by some democratic theorists, from James Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Calhoun to Robert Dahl and Lani Guinier, Beahm describes how the tyranny of the majority “begins with the people, but in a representative democracy, majority tyranny makes its way into the government – mostly into the legislature” (2002: 84). In other words, the intrinsic dangers of majority rule are crystallized into the institutional settlement, in particular through electoral systems prescribing winner-takes-all mechanisms and single-member districts, as noted by the most recent thinkers like Dahl and Guinier.¹⁷ The tyranny of the majority, Beahm continues (2002: 101), is embedded in ‘qualitative’, as related to the social sphere, but also in ‘quantitative’, or institutional, features. Therefore, these qualitative and quantitative aspects of the majority tyranny mutually reinforce each other, in those contexts characterized by intense social heterogeneity.

Accordingly, the assumption underlining power-sharing and consociational theories is that majority rule in deeply divided societies does *not* equate with democracy. Mentioning the work of Mann (2005), moreover, Conversi arrived to connect majoritarian democracy to extreme actions and crimes against minorities, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing (2012). Intertwined with globalization, the exclusivist nature of the nation-state more easily degenerates in the “seeds of extreme practices of ethnic discrimination” (2012: 791). Consequently, the “principle of majority rule would often need to be discarded in order to build non-majoritarian (consociational, federal, autonomous) institutions” (Conversi, 2012: 795).

However, together with the mentioned examinations by Mann (2005) and also Snyder (2000), these authors connect these tendencies to *democratization*. Nevertheless, as Merkel and Weiffen (2012) demonstrate in their comprehensive analysis on different dimensions of social heterogeneity (in terms of power, income inequality, gender inequality and ethnic

¹⁷ And even in the opening quotation by Giovanni Sartori (1987), all but an estimator of Lijphart’s theories of consociational and consensus democracy.

fractionalization), heterogeneity complicates democratic *consolidation*, rather than hindering democratic transition properly. Anyhow, none of these authors focus on forms of political regime in plural societies which adopt majoritarian institutions, a puzzle which remains to be explained.

As suggested by Shakir (2020), moreover, these fears of majority rule in plural societies presume another idea, namely group (and therefore majority) cohesion (cf. Chandra, 2012). However, especially in those cases where ethnic cleavages are multiple and overlapping, the boundaries of social entities might be mutable. For this reason, we need a clear, replicable measurement based on those countries where ethnicity is politicized and continuously manifested through *political organizations*, which I will advance in the first paragraph of the following empirical chapter. This might also contribute to redefine the tyranny of the majority not in terms of social groups, but referring to political organizations, e.g. parties, leaders. Supposing that such a group cohesion might limitedly exist to certain periods of time through political organizations, the argument of majority tyranny in plural societies persists. More in detail, according to Bochsler and Hänni, the problems with a strictly majoritarian conceptions of democracy is that majority rule is “widely understood as the rule by the median voter” (2017: 271), whose political position would be better represented by the (bare) majority of the voters. Indeed, it is especially the *absence* of a median voter – whose changing preferences are supposed to be the antidote to the tyranny of the majority, most notably through majority alternation – which is fundamental to take into consideration in societies characterized by strong cleavages and pervasive heterogeneity. Consequently, the exclusion of others, ‘non-medians’ – inevitable in the idea of the median voter – might undermine the equality and representation of large segments of the population (Bochsler & Hänni, 2017: 272). The institutional alternatives, also epitomized by super-majority rules or veto-rights for constitutional changes or specific legislation, are thus connected to power-sharing.

Thereby, reformulating what has been said by some comparative constitutional lawyers and political philosophers, we should avoid the ‘synecdoche paradox’ of seeing democracy where majority rule is (Martinico, 2019; Urbinati, 2019). And moreover, in plural societies – as mentioned in the introduction – Lijphart arrived at prescribing consociational, or *power-sharing democracy as the only possible democracy* (1977: 238). In fact, what we theoretically know is that where societal majorities/minorities, albeit artificially constructed, are not easily changeable, majority rule does not equate with democracy *per se*, but will rather restrict democratic electoral contestation and executive control, and also vitiate people inclusion, for the benefits of the majoritarian group (Conversi, 2012; cf. Lewis, 1965). However, some authors still advocate majoritarian institutions, deemed to avoid the drawbacks of power-sharing, such as the putative absence of an opposition, the encouragement of secession and also the danger of paralyses and deadlocks (Reynolds, 2000). However, how to assess this empirically, by jointly evaluating power-sharing and majority rule as forms of political regime in ethnically divided countries and comparatively examining these institutions and their performance, remains to be done. Therefore, this might be realized firstly through differentiating among types of democracy in relation to ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Before doing that in the empirical part of the thesis, and after having introduced some theoretical background about the tyranny of the majority, I shall now examine the most common concepts elaborated for ethnically divided places *without* power-sharing.

1.4 Previous categories on majority rule and ethnicity and their incompleteness

Contrariwise to the abundant literature I have reviewed on consociational democracy, the consensus/majoritarian distinction and power-sharing, only piecemeal contributions examine those deeply divided societies where ethnic groups do *not* share political power and elements of majoritarianism permeate the institutional arrangements. In this concluding paragraph, I shall

thus consider the most important categories developed for scrutinizing these contexts, in order to evaluate their problems and how they need to be integrated and modified.

Focusing on practices characterizing the predicament of the Arab minority of Israeli citizens, Lustick (1979) introduced the category of ‘control’, centered on majority dominance and minority acquiescence and co-optation (cf. O’Leary, 2019). Since Lustick, the case of the Arab citizens of Israel has been paramount in the literature, in order to scrutinize exclusivist types of democracy in plural societies. In fact, the only examinations specifically referring to political regimes are connected to the Israeli case and concern the categories of ‘ethnic democracy’ (Smootha, 2002) and ‘ethnocracy’ (Yiftachel, 2006). Ethnic democracy has been qualified by Smootha as “a system that combines the extension of civil and political rights to individuals and some collective rights to minorities, with institutionalization of [ethnic] majority control over the state” (Smootha, 2002). While Israel within the Green Line and in relation to its minority of Arab citizens has been conceived as the archetype of this category, Smootha thereafter added other cases in qualitative comparative analyses.¹⁸ Ethnic democracy is then described as neither a liberal democracy, since the state recognizes ethnic diversity by granting some collective rights to minorities (even not treating them equally), nor a consociational democracy, because the state does not have a pair consideration of different ethnicities, and finally nor an apartheid regime, because minorities benefit from citizenship and electoral democracy is formally not limited to the dominant group (Smootha, 1997: 200-269; cf. Peled, 2013). Also, majority control is in common with nondemocratic domination, for instance in the colonial rule, although in ethnic democracies it is more moderate, “subtle, manipulative, and hidden” (Smootha, 1997: 270). In other words, ethnic democracy merges majority rule and ethnic diversity in a defective type of democracy (Merkel, 2004). However, for Smootha and others, majoritarian institutions are not specifically the crux of the analysis, more focused on informal practices.

¹⁸ E.g. Estonia and Latvia, cf. Linz and Stepan (1996).

Specular to the concept of ethnic democracy, some scholars introduced the category of ethnocracy. Elaborated by Yiftachel (2006), ethnocracies are conceivable as hybrid regimes,¹⁹ with a ‘selective openness’ regulated by the dominant group (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004: 179). In a few words, ethnocracy is defined as “a particular regime type, which uses a ‘thin’ layer of (often distorted) democratic practices, but structurally facilitates – explicitly or implicitly – mechanisms of ethnic control and expansion over contested lands” (Yiftachel, 2016: 30). The definition, again, is tailored on the case of Israel within the Green Line and elaborated in direct opposition to Smooha’s category. In fact, the ethnocratic regime “facilitates the expansion, ethnicization and control of a contested territory and state by a dominant ethnic group” and encompasses partial “democratic features, most notably political competition, free media and significant civil rights, although they fail to be universal or comprehensive, and are typically stretched to the extent they do not interfere with the ethnicization project” (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004: 180).²⁰ The concept of ethnocracy has been luckier than its academic (and also political, we may argue) adversary, namely ethnic democracy. In fact, the former has been more generally adopted by sociological analyses concerning the most exclusivist aspects of the formation of Western nation-states (Conversi, 2012: 769; cf. Wimmer, 2002, 2004; Mylonas, 2013) or the consequent ‘non-democratic roots’ of contemporary democracies (Offe, 1998: 116), and also by party politics scholars describing the preferred regime-type by the populist radical right (Mudde, 2007: 142).

More generally, bridging the concepts of ethnocracy, ethnic democracy and control, the overarching category of ‘ethnic domination’ has been proposed by McGarry (2010), examining the discrepancies between democratic procedures and the maintenance of ethnic hierarchies in

¹⁹ Albeit the author never uses the term ‘electoral authoritarianism’ very clearly.

²⁰ For a more recent reappraisal of the Israeli case, see Rouhana (2018).

political practices, even in the most established democracies.²¹

In this conundrum of both too tailored and too slack concepts, I deem these endeavors to map deeply divided polities deprived of power-sharing mis-formulated and thus incomplete. Summing up, ethnic domination and control do not specify how these practices interact with political regimes, investigating democracies and nondemocracies equally. Control is even a stretched concept without ‘analytical sharpness’ (cf. Sartori, 1984), describing intra- and inter-ethnic dominance equally, for being referred to both coercive consociationalism (Mauzy, 1993) and hegemonial exchange (Wimmer, 2004). Ethnic democracy is similarly focused on informal practices more than on institutions and it is considered to encompass a too restricted definition of democracy (Ghanem, Rouhana & Yiftachel, 1998). Ethnocracy, on the other hand, is said not to be empirically distinguishable from the former, beyond label’s symbolism (Agarin, 2016). Moreover, none of these concepts takes into consideration the role of majoritarianism in plural democracies.

A comprehensive approach examining ethnic relations and political regimes and comparing majoritarianism and power-sharing in ethnically divided democracies is thence needed, in order to propose a generalizable analysis applicable beyond single-case studies and isolated theoretical ramifications, and also to measure ethnic exclusion in political regimes through the lens of democratic quality. This shall be the purpose of the next chapter.

²¹ Other studies of interest here focus on authoritarian configurations of power-sharing, although without considering the ethnic dimension in detail (Boix & Svolik, 2013; Bormann, 2017; with the partial exception of Pengl & Saliba, 2005). Since in this thesis I am examining ethnically divided *democracies*, I shall not investigate the authoritarian variant of ethnic power-sharing, which might be intended narrowly – such as a multiethnic governing elite in an authoritarian regime – or rather more broadly – e.g. in the division of political power between the government and the military following the logic of ethnic spoils. However, the concepts of authoritarian power-sharing, and its opposite when ethnic relations are concerned – remaining within nondemocratic regimes – namely ethnocracy, will be resystematized at the end of the third chapter.

CHAPTER II

CLASSIFYING INSTITUTIONS AND PERFORMANCE OF PLURAL DEMOCRACIES

2.0 Overview, relevance and preliminary results

In this second chapter, I shall describe the core of my empirical quantitative analysis. To square off the research questions presented previously, I shall propose a comparative multi-case and multi-method strategy (Collier & Gerring, 2009; Seawright, 2006; Gerring, 2001; Ragin, 1987), combining quantitative and qualitative techniques, articulated in three fundamental steps: namely, measurements and operationalizations, data analysis, and qualitative discussion.²²

In the first two paragraphs, I shall advance my own definition, operationalization and measurement of a ‘deeply divided country’. Afterwards, I will also re-define power-sharing and majoritarianism and operationalize the variables I will employ. Then, after having run factor analysis to detect two institutional dimensions, in the third paragraph I shall report the findings of this statistical analysis, displaying the selected countries on a classificatory map. In the fourth paragraph, I shall thence complexify my theoretical and empirical framework, in order to add a third dimension, straightforwardly tied to ethnicity and *de facto* ethnic inclusion and exclusion, and to be framed through the concept of democratic quality.

In short, this part of the thesis aims at redefining and operationalizing power-sharing and majoritarian democracy, to map out political regimes in plural societies and evaluate their performances related to ethnic inclusion and exclusion. The purpose of this chapter is thus to provide scholars with a new theoretical-empirical framework conceptualizing democratic regimes in plural societies, encompassing both formal institutions and informal practices. This is not an easy task, but nevertheless it is paramount for a better contextualization and understanding of these peculiar cases and for integrating what the literature has achieved so far. As in fact specified in the previous chapter, such a classification of political regimes in plural

²² With the latter in the third chapter.

societies is absent in academia, as well as a proper comprehension of the effects of majoritarian institutions when ethnicity is salient.

The first result of this classification is thence the following: despite with a low statistical significance, (i) *power-sharing in executive, legislative and electoral institutions and the territorial articulation of power is positively associated with de facto ethnic inclusion in plural societies*, in particular when the horizontal and vertical dimensions are combined. Secondly, however, this outcome cannot hide the large presence of democratic regimes in the majoritarian side of my map, both in the government, parliament and electoral system, and in the centralization of power throughout the territory. Within my set of cases, in fact, power-sharing might be considered ‘the exception rather than the rule’, since no less than *29 out of 47 democracies (61.7%) score majoritarian in both institutional dimensions* I have selected. Therefore, power-sharing is surely *not* the only democratic type achievable in these contexts (cf. Lijphart, 1977). These cases, moreover, when the third dimension on ethnic group relations is concerned, include examples of ethnically exclusive (17) *and* ethnically inclusive (12) political regimes. This illustrates that a much more blurred distinction *within* majoritarian democracy is necessary and that, counterintuitively, majoritarianism is *not always* at the antithesis of minority accommodation. Therefore, the second result of the quantitative analysis shall be: (ii) *majoritarian democracy occurs in plural societies and can coexist with ethnic inclusion*. The preoccupations on the effects of majoritarian democracy in plural societies thence need to be specified, re-adjusted and connected to specific factors and contexts.

2.1 Definition, operationalization and measurement of ethnically divided countries

Echoing the opening of the previous chapter, definitions and operationalizations also matter. In fact, the lack of consensus (Bogaards, 2012: 691) in defining basic concepts in social science is the center of academic contrasts, and consequently lack of cumulative findings. I shall thence

introduce three clear, simple and replicable definitions and operationalizations of an ethnically/deeply divided/plural society, power-sharing and majoritarianism.

The first definition might be obvious and perhaps useless. However, this is not the case for many academic contributions on ethnic politics. Lijphart himself, most remarkably, has never introduced a measurement of deeply divided societies, firstly qualitatively discussing consociational democracies (1977)²³ and then integrating his analysis with the ethnic fractionalization index (1984).²⁴ According to Bormann, in fact, this missing definition is also at the center of the theoretical discrepancies between consociational and consensus democracy: “surprisingly such a measurement [of plural societies] is missing for the application of consensus democracy to divided societies. Although consensus democracy is related to consociational democracy (Bogaards 2000: 412-13) it cannot be recommended to constitutional engineers, since there is no empirical evidence for its success in plural societies” (2010: 7). Similarly, the more recent contributions on power-sharing, democracy and civil war conduct their examinations *globally* (Norris, 2008; Graham et al., 2017: 690), sometimes introducing ethno-linguistic fractionalization measurements as control variables, nonetheless treating homogeneous and heterogeneous countries equally. Likewise, in more qualitative studies, authors have emphasized the importance of the political salience of ethnicity as the contextual condition of applicability of ethnic politics theories, e.g. – as already mentioned – consociationalism (Bogaards et al., 2019), but also the categories of ethnic democracy and ethnocracy (Smootha, 2002; Yiftachel, 2006). Nevertheless, these conditions remain porous and, consequently, cases have been chosen following either empirical or normative *ad-hoc* evaluations, without generalizable justifications.²⁵ Similarly, as specified, ‘classic’ comparative

²³ Of which some are indeed deemed *not* to be ethnically/deeply divided, cf. Barry (1975) and note 5.

²⁴ Though irrelevant in the quantitative investigation.

²⁵ Allegedly, *some* of these analyses might even replicate the common-sense (and ethnocentric?) assumptions of the peculiarity of plural societies, to be regarded as *locus specialis* for ‘niche’ categories, being them ethnic power-sharing as well as the impossibility of reaching a functioning, stable and Western-tailored model of democracy, as mentioned before (cf. Mill, 1861).

politics literature continues adopting measures of ‘ethnic diversity’, most remarkably the religious/linguistic fractionalization indexes (Lijphart, 2012), without considering that diversity *per se* does not mean politicization thereof (Chandra, 2012).

For these reasons, the thesis will henceforth propose a new quantifiable and replicable (and, of course, easily contestable and re-adjustable) definition and measurement of plural society. Accordingly, a ‘deeply/ethnically divided/plural society’ *is where a significative part of the population is recognized in politically salient ethnic groups, manifested in ethnically defined organizations, e.g. political parties* (Guelke, 2012). The question now becomes how to measure ‘ethnically defined organizations, e.g. political parties’. I will thence refer to scholarly contributions recognizing politically salient ethnicity. Building upon the paramount definition of ethnicity and ethnic groups adopted by Horowitz (1985), I have selected my sample of countries from the group-based version of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which codifies politically salient ethnic groups, their consistence and status as associated to the access to political power (Vogt et al., 2015).²⁶ First and foremost, I have adopted a double criterion. In short, a set of cases has been individuated selecting those countries inhabited by *at least two politically salient groups above the threshold of 6% and below the threshold of 91% of the population*.²⁷ Moreover, since we are analyzing democratic institutions, from this set I have extracted those countries stably located *above the threshold of 0.6 of the polyarchy, or electoral democracy index, elaborated by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), to include defective and embedded democracies* (Merkel, 2004), in other words regimes with *effective and fair* electoral competition (Teorell et al., 2016).²⁸ What does ‘stably’ mean? Since the EPR is based on timeseries and V-Dem on yearly observations, I have included those cases scoring above the

²⁶ <https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/>.

²⁷ This double criterion permitted to have heterogeneous societies inhabited by consistent ethnic groups, thus keeping homogeneous countries outside my sample and most importantly excluding countries fragmented in very tiny groups. For many scholars, in fact, this middle ground of social diversity is the most inhospitable for democracy (Lijphart, 2007).

²⁸ <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-10/>.

polyarchy 0.6 threshold for at least 4 *continuous years* – to avoid countries sporadically resulting above the threshold – in the timespan going from 1989 to 2010 (selected for better availability of data and to contain the magnitude of my dataset). The obtained list of 47 *countries* permits to individuate a sample of ethnically divided countries where identity is politicized and with a minimum level of democracy, through a functional and fungible measurement *not* directly connected to my empirical strategy. Table 1 (28-29) reports the cases of which I will map the political regimes.

Table 1. 47 Ethnically divided democracies, selected years and polyarchy index

Country	Acronym	Timespan	Electoral Democracy Index
Belgium	BEL	1989-2010	0.86
Benin	BEN	1992-2010	0.66
Bolivia	BOL	1989-2010	0.75
Bosnia-Herzegovina	BIH	1999-2010	0.67
Botswana	BWA	1989-2010	0.72
Brazil	BRA	1989-2010	0.86
Bulgaria	BGR	1989-2010	0.72
Canada	CAN	1989-2010	0.85
Chile	CHL	1990-2010	0.86
Costa Rica	CRI	1989-2010	0.89
Cyprus	CYP	1989-2010	0.81
Ecuador	ECU	1989-2009	0.72
Estonia	EST	1990-2010	0.84
Fiji	FJI	2002-2005	0.65
Ghana	GHA	1997-2010	0.70
Guyana	GUY	2001-2009 (no 2006)	0.61
India	IND	1989-2010	0.75
Indonesia	IDN	2000-2010	0.71
Israel	ISR	1989-2010	0.76
Latvia	LVA	1991-2010	0.79
Lithuania	LTU	1990-2010	0.82
Macedonia	MKD	2003-2007	0.63
Mali	MLI	2003-2010	0.62
Mauritius	MUS	1989-2010	0.80
Mexico	MEX	1999-2010	0.68
Namibia	NAM	1995-2010	0.67
New Zealand	NZL	1989-2010	0.89
Nicaragua	NIC	1991-2006	0.66
Niger	NER	2002-2006	0.61

Panama	PAN	1991-2010	0.75
Peru	PER	2001-2009	0.78
Romania	ROM	1997-2010	0.65
S. Africa	ZAF	1995-2010	0.74
Senegal	SEN	1993-2010	0.68
Serbia	YSR	2003-2010	0.66
Sierra Leone	SLE	2003-2006	0.60
Slovakia	SVK	1995-2010	0.82
Slovenia	SVN	1991-2010	0.84
Spain	ESP	1989-2010	0.90
Switzerland	CHE	1989-2010	0.87
Taiwan	TWN	1997-2010	0.74
Trinidad-Tobago	TTO	1989-2010	0.77
Turkey	TUR	2000-2010	0.67
United Kingdom	GBR	1989-2010	0.85
Uruguay	URY	1989-2010	0.87
USA	USA	1989-2010	0.87
Venezuela	VEN	1989-2000	0.73

*Countries are listed by alphabetic order; V-Dem data are the average values for the selected time period.
Source: author's elaboration from group-based EPR and V-Dem core dataset.*

The definition and operationalization of deeply divided democracies is paramount for defining the scope of application of my classification and to address the question of political regimes *in* these contexts. As notably specified also by Merkel and Weiffen, the definition of countries on the basis of politicization of ethnicity is crucial, since “heterogeneity of societies becomes particularly relevant when it is politicized, mobilized, and organized (...) [and transformed] into cleavages” (2012: 389) and because case selection inevitably influences the results of the empirical analysis. This approach is moreover useful to overcome some of the problems of the employment of the ethnic, linguistic or religious fractionalization indexes, built around (controversial) distinctions based on ‘membership’ only (Fish & Brooks, 2004).

2.2 Definition, operationalization and measurement of majoritarianism and power-sharing

The task of this paragraph is to conceptually delineate power-sharing and majoritarianism in plural societies. I shall therefore redefine power-sharing as well as majoritarianism in these

contexts, also considering that the latter has been less sufficiently systematized by scholars. As expressed, among others, by Bogaards, there is an urgent necessity to scrutinize cases of majoritarian democracy in deeply divided societies (2000: 404), to outline not only the questions of the opposite referents of power-sharing democracy, but also to empirically scrutinize whether and in which cases majoritarian democracy leads to ethnic dominance. Building upon the contributions reviewed in the previous chapter, and in order to present a more minimalistic conception of the underlining concepts of the thesis, ‘ethnic power-sharing’ in deeply divided societies shall be defined as the *institutional principle that ethnic groups shall govern by consent*. Antagonistically, ‘majoritarianism’ shall be conceived as the *institutional principle that the state shall be governed by majority rule*. As can be remarked, these concepts are not directly associated with the proper inclusion or exclusion of ethnic minorities, though generally being referred to institutions only. In the definition of power-sharing, the focus is on ethnic groups and their compromise – though it does *not* prescribe whether all groups shall be included – while in that of majoritarianism this emphasis is absent, since there is the explicit reference to the procedural aspect of majority rule. However, nothing prevents ethnic minorities from being included in a majoritarian arrangement of power. These two, *alternative and polar* (cf. Reynolds, 2000) concepts, namely government by consent and government by majority, will be used as a compass to compare within my set of cases – taking *de jure* political institutions first and then *de facto* articulations of political power among ethnic groups as the discriminating factors, along a two and then tri-dimensional space.

How to operationalize power-sharing and majoritarianism in ethnically divided countries? As anticipated, my focus will be on *de jure* institutions first, thus formalized in constitutions, laws, or any observable official and prescribing document. This approach, albeit profoundly inspired by previous research designs, is relatively innovative in the literature. In fact, previous academic efforts concerning ethnic power-sharing often (i) analyze deeply divided and homogeneous

countries equally and (ii) do not differentiate among practices and institutions, e.g. Bormann's examination on the formation of multiethnic coalitions (2019). Additionally, (iii) some of these contributions focus on democracy and nondemocracy equally, for instance Cederman and colleagues (2018).²⁹ More substantially, I will concentrate on *de jure* institutions – at least in the first step – in plural democracies.

Despite a focus on formal institutions is not a panacea for investigating political regimes (cf. Doorenspleet and Pellikaan, 2013: 238), this might nonetheless avoid many of the theoretical problematics Ganghof criticizes in Lijphart's formulation (2005: 3).³⁰ Ganghof in fact asked for more formal and substantive coherence in classifying democratic regimes according to political institutions. Moreover, my classification will be thus *partly* inspired by Ganghof (2005) and also by Doorenspleet and Pellikaan, in particular when they describe their typology on “three structural components: the electoral system (proportional representational versus majority rule), the political system (centralized versus decentralized) and the structure of the society (homogeneous versus heterogeneous)” (2013: 239). However, my research design will be different: summing up, (i) considering more broadly majoritarianism and power-sharing, not only in the electoral system (cf. Powell, 2000), and (ii) comparing within heterogeneous cases. When the operationalization of the two concepts is concerned, I have based my analysis on the most comprehensive dataset available measuring power-sharing in the world, the already mentioned Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraints dataset (IDC, Strøm et al., 2017).³¹ However,

²⁹ Investigating the correlation between transitions to democracy and, in particular, power-sharing in the territory.

³⁰ The Dutch scholar is said to have formulated majoritarian democracy in terms of formal rules and consensus democracy following more behavioral features.

³¹ In the first steps of the thesis, the ‘Constitutional Power-sharing dataset’ (CPSD) has been also used (Juon, 2020; https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/OBIFLV/WWJU_MK&version=1.0). However, since the CPSD first version is group-based, limited to the (executive and legislative) horizontal dimension of power-sharing and does not include many countries of my set, I have preferred to focus my analysis on the IDC. Nevertheless, the CPSD, in particular its codebook, has been extensively used in order to redefine some of the IDC variables I have selected, in order to have

I have re-designed some of the IDC indicators and added my own measurements, to follow better my understanding of power-sharing – more in line with the meso-level of generality delineated in the previous chapter, rather than with the macro-level embraced by the creators of the dataset – and majoritarianism, also including the electoral system.³² Integrating the literature presented in the first chapter, I thus argue that power-sharing or majoritarian institutions can be observed on a continuum, based on the comprehensive observation of the following features.

Rearranging – and necessarily simplifying – the research design elaborated by Lijphart (2012), Bochler & Kriesi (2013), and again Kriesi (2015), power-sharing or majoritarianism can be observed in a so-called ‘horizontal’ dimension (Juon, 2020), which includes executive, legislative and electoral institutions. Firstly, it goes without saying, distinguishing between *government by consent of ethnic groups* or *by majority rule* is fundamental in segmented places. Regarding government formation, we can thus observe whether a ‘liberal’ (McCulloch, 2014) grand coalition is prescribed by the constitution, establishing that the government should be formed or elected based on a certain agreement between parties in the parliament, e.g. (i) all the parties, (ii) the two largest parties or even investigating whether there is a coalition government containing simply an ‘excess party’. Alternatively, (iii) a more ‘corporate’ or ‘pre-determined’ (Lijphart, 2007) grand coalition might be mandated, explicitly reserving governmental seats for national minorities or ethnic groups. If none of these measures is prescribed for the election of the government, I assume that government formation, and therefore its internal functioning, will be articulated by the simplest of democratic procedures, namely majority rule.

Secondly, to scrutinize the parliament and its legislative power and thus directly accounting for political representation, I will analyze the eventuality of (iv) an ethnic party ban, therefore

much more precise indicators on political institutions in ethnically divided countries and a sharper analysis on ethnic power-sharing – which is indeed one of the merits of the CPSD.

³² Which is remarkably absent from the IDC design, including only one dummy variable on the presence/absence of proportional representation.

discouraging minority parties and representation (thus boosting majority rule) or – contrariwise – the enforcement of (v) minority vetoes for some particular legislation, and also the presence of (vi) reserved legislative seats for ethnic groups, sometimes essential for setting the basis of a power-sharing and, in case, a proper consociational agreement (Lijphart, 1977).

Finally, a measurement of power-sharing and majoritarianism in the executive and legislative should be completed by taking into consideration the principal ‘input’ into the political system (cf. Easton, 1981), namely the electoral system.³³ To that regard, the analysis should slightly depart from the simple consideration of *de jure* institutions, in order to scrutinize power-sharing or majoritarianism in the electoral system through the most accurate measurements available. Since the party system is often considered also an *independent* variable in evaluating the effects of a certain electoral system (Sartori, 1997), I shall adopt the (vii) electoral disproportionality (or Gallagher) index (Gallagher, 1991), measuring the differences between seats and votes (cf. Ganghof, 2005), and also the (viii) the average district magnitude, reporting the average electoral permissiveness of electoral districts and constituencies (cf. Lijphart & Aitkin, 1994). After a focus on executive, legislative and electoral institutions, I shall include in my operationalization a group of variables accounting for the ‘vertical’ division of the state, thus integrating the first cluster of indicators with a more articulated majoritarian and power-sharing distinction in the division of power throughout the territory. Therefore, differently from other classifications based on the federal-unitary dimension (most notably, Lijphart, 2012), I shall scrutinize not whether there is *generally* a second chamber (cf. Kriesi, 2015),³⁴ but rather whether (ix) regional constituencies are the majority of legislators in the upper house *and*, most

³³ Despite the electoral system has been originally used to distinguish majoritarian from *consensus*, rather than power-sharing, democracy (cf. Lijphart, 2012), its employment here is justifiable through (i) the presence of proportionality as one of the core principles of consociational, and thus – as the more general conceptual referent – power-sharing democracy (cf. chapter 1), and also by (ii) the fundamental relevance of the electoral system in the articulation of political power, being the former the first institution shaping power relations among political actors in parliament and secondly in government.

³⁴ Which is often not directly connected to the territorial dimension: see the literature on the so-called ‘Madisonian Paradox’, cf. Dehousse (1989) and Palermo (2018).

importantly perhaps, whether (x) state/provincial or (xi) municipal governments are locally elected, often the precondition for an effective political power. As also expressed by Ganghof, these factors should lead to form a “a sort of veto points index” (2005: 10; cf. Tsebelis, 2002), then distinguishing between the sharing of power throughout decentralized authorities and *vice versa* those majoritarian systems maintaining the power at the center.³⁵ These veto points are indeed important to scrutinize deeply divided societies, where ethnic groups are often secessionist and, for alleviating ethnic conflict, ‘territorial pluralism’ becomes the adaptation of power-sharing (cf. Basta et al., 2015).

Further indicators shall be the presence of autonomous competences by local authorities, most notably in the fields of (xii) taxes, (xiii) education and also (xiv) police. Finally, examining the presence of ‘asymmetrical’ relations between the federal or generally territorial units might be crucial, by therefore looking whether (xv) autonomous regions are present.

This second assortment of variables is useful to readdress the academic debate around the importance of federalism or decentralization to evaluate political regimes, a topic with even more mixed results for plural societies.³⁶ Having explained the theory underpinning my research design, I shall now directly turn to the empirical analysis.³⁷

³⁵ Moreover, I shall not mix this dimension with other constraints diverse from the territorial articulation of power, such as judicial review and constitutional rigidity – as usually common in the literature (cf. Lijphart, 2012).

³⁶ For instance, Norris emphasizes the importance of federalism and decentralization for enhancing democratic quality (Norris, 2008). More in detail, Doorenspleet & Pellikaan report that, while the electoral system always ‘matters in the same direction’, the territory is important, though under different circumstances: “centralization is best in homogeneous societies, while decentralization is best in heterogeneous societies” (2013: 237). Analyzing diverse and homogeneous countries at once, similarly, Bernauer and colleagues (2016) consider what they call ‘proportional-unitary’ or ‘centripetal’ (Gerring & Thacker, 2008; *not* in the sense mentioned in the first chapter) type of democracy as having the best record in terms of representation, then supposedly also related to minorities. Opposite results have been reported by Graham and others (2017), proving how in post-conflict societies institutions constraining political leadership – through judicial review and control of the army – enhance democratic stability, while territorial division is said to boost democratic breakthrough and hinder democratic survival.

³⁷ Despite I have re-designed many of the variables of the IDC, in particular in the horizontal dimension of power, the proposed bunch of indicators might (and perhaps should) be criticized, questioning in particular the presence of several indicators substantially measuring very similar properties. For instance, a regional authority having autonomous competences in education is often able to collect taxes,

2.3 Explanation of the dataset and descriptive statistics: a two-dimensional map of democratic regimes in deeply divided places

After having introduced and operationalized my own definitions of plural societies, majoritarianism and power-sharing in these contexts, I shall now present the results of the first statistical analysis: a two-dimensional map of democratic regimes in ethnically divided countries.

Before that, Table 2 (36-38) summarizes the research conducted to measure the variables I have presented in the previous paragraph, with their names and sources from existing datasets and my elaborations of data. As anticipated, I have used mostly the IDC, integrated with the Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset (Bormann & Golder, 2013)³⁸ and other sources (listed in Table 2). For the sake of clarity, I have also divided the variables into some conceptual domains – as underlined in the previous paragraph – overarched by two logical dimensions, namely the (i) *De jure executive-legislative-electoral horizontal institutions*, measuring power-sharing and majoritarianism in the government, parliament and electoral system, and the (ii) *De jure territorial-autonomous-federal vertical institutions*, summarizing my indicators concerning the spread or centralization of power throughout the territory. Accordingly, each variable has been observed in the selected countries, within the defined timespan presented in Table 1 (1989-2010). Moreover, as specified by Table 2, I have also calculated two ‘overall indexes’, accounting for all the variables measuring the executive-legislative-electoral institutions and others connected to the federal-autonomous-territorial dimension.

and so on. Albeit it is not required that the selected variables should be mutually exclusive, they should be at least not mutually substitutable or, in other words, clearly discernible or separately measurable. If this might be true from a theoretical perspective, this might not hold in practice, where some of my indicators may occur together. This problem might be solved integrating – and possible also aggregating some of – the IDC variables through different indicators. Unfortunately, this further data analysis was not possible during the preparation and then the drafting of the present thesis. However, I will delineate some concrete proposals to solve these issues in the last paragraph of the third chapter.

³⁸ <http://mattgolder.com/elections>.

Table 2. De jure power-sharing/majoritarian institutions: dimensions, variables, acronyms, explanations and sources

Dimension	Domain	Variable name	Long name	Variable explanation	Source and original names (when applicable)
I. De jure executive-legislative-electoral horizontal institutions	Executive	1_gc_lib	Liberal grand coalition (mandated or national unity government)	“1 if there is a constitutional provision (or a provision in a peace accord in the case of transitional governments) requiring representation by all major political parties (or relevant political organizations) in the cabinet; 0 otherwise.” <i>Or</i> “1 if members of opposition parties or groups are represented in the cabinet, but a grand coalition is not mandated in the constitution or a peace treaty; 0 otherwise.”	IDC ⁱ (gcman, unity; manually coupled)
		2_gc_lib2	Liberal grand coalition by seats (two largest parties in government or excess party in coalition)	“1 if all of the following three things are true: A: the two largest parties are both in government AND; B: the government is a majority government AND; C: the legislature is competitive (...); 0 otherwise.” <i>Or</i> “1 if all of the following three things are true: A: a government coalition contains an excess party – i.e. a member without which it would still represents a majority of the seats in the legislature; B: the government is a majority government AND; C: the legislature is competitive; 0 otherwise.”	IDC (gcseats1, gcseats2; average)
		3_gc_corp	Corporate grand coalition (reserved executive seats)	“1 if it is mandated that particular executive positions must be reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, caste, or religious minority groups; 0 otherwise.”	IDC (resman)
	Legislative	4_partynoethnic	Ethnic party ban	“1 if there is a law or constitutional amendment banning ethnically, religiously, or regionally based parties; 0 otherwise or if no evidence of such a policy is found” and <i>if no party or only 1 party is allowed (previously coded as -0.44)</i> .	IDC
		5_mveto	Minority veto	“1 if there is any provision for minority veto over a particular area of policy; e.g. if the approval of an ethnic minority is necessary for any change of language or cultural policy; 0 otherwise or if no evidence of such a policy is found.”	IDC
		6_resseats	Reserved legislative seats	“2 if greater at least 10% of the seats in the legislature are reserved for minority groups (...); 1 if reserved seats exist, but account for less than 10% of total seats (...); 0 if no seats are reserved for minority groups.” <i>Recalculated between 0 and 1</i>	IDC (resseats2)
	Electoral system	7_gallagher_index	Electoral (dis)proportionality	The lowest the least square index, the highest the equivalence between percentage of votes and percentage of seats: 29.95 maximum (maximally disproportional) and 0.26 minimum (minimally disproportional) in the sample. The Gallagher index has theoretically a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100 (minimum/maximum disproportionality). However, it hardly has a value of 100. Therefore, to better observe the variance among my sample, I have taken the	Gallagher ⁱⁱ

		8_avemag_es	Average district magnitude (electoral permissiveness)	<p>minimum extreme value of 0.26 as 1 and the maximum of 29.95 as 0 and then recalculated, reversed, between -1 (maximum disproportionality) and +1 (minimum disproportionality).</p> <p>The highest the index, the highest the permissiveness of the electoral districts, from a minimum of 1 for plurality systems (only one electable seat per district) to a maximum of the total number of electable seats in each district, with a single national constituency. However, since I have very outlier cases in the measurement (Slovakia and Israel), to better observe the variance among my sample, I have taken the minimum extreme value of 1 as 0 and the maximum of 150 as 1, and then recalculated, four-squared, between -1 (lowest district magnitude) and +1 (highest district magnitude).</p>	DES ⁱⁱⁱ
Overall I		9_ele_index	Original total from -1 to 7 (sum of 7 variables measuring horizontal power-sharing, minus 4_partynoethnic) rescaled with -2 as minimum observed value and +2 as maximum observed value.		
II. De jure territorial-autonomous-federal vertical institutions	Constitutional architecture	10_stconst	Regional constituencies in the upper house	“1 if the states/provinces are the constituencies of a majority of legislators in the upper (or only) house; 0 otherwise” (and 0 if no legislature, previously coded as -0.44).	IDC
		11_state	State/provincial governments locally elected	“0 if neither legislature or executive is elected at the local level; 1 if the legislature is locally elected but the executive appointed by the central government; 2 if both the legislature and executive are locally elected; *If executive is elected/appointed by a locally elected legislature, then score 2; If executive power is shared between a locally elected executive and a centrally appointed one, code 1; If no states/provinces, code 0.” Recalculated between 0 and 1	IDC
		12_muni	Municipal governments locally elected	“0 if neither legislature or executive is elected at the local level; 1 if the legislature is locally elected but the executive appointed; 2 if both the legislature and executive are locally elected; *If executive is elected/appointed by a locally elected legislature, then score 2; If executive power is shared between a locally elected executive and a centrally appointed one, code 1; If executive is locally elected but legislature is not, code 1.” Recalculated between 0 and 1	IDC
	Autonomous competences	13_subtax	Sub-national tax authority	“1 if state/provincial governments can levy their own taxes; 0 otherwise; 0 if no states/provinces or equivalent level of government; *For countries with autonomous regions, this variable is coded for states/provinces/regions other than the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region levies its own taxes and other regions do not, code 0.”	IDC
		14_subed	Sub-national education authority	<p>“1 if state/provincial governments have sole control of education policy; .5 if state/provincial governments and the national government share control of education policy; 0 otherwise.</p> <p>*Control of education policy is distinct from provision of education – if schools are run by the local government but curriculum and other policies are set by the central government, score 0.</p> <p>*Note: For countries with autonomous regions, this variable is coded for states/provinces/regions other than the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has the ability to control its own education policy and other regions do not, code 0.”</p>	IDC

	15_subpolice	Sub-national police authority	“1 if sub-national governments (municipal or state/regional) have control of local police/paramilitary forces in their area; .5 if sub-national governments and the central government share control of the local police/paramilitary forces in their area; 0 if the central government is in exclusive control of police/paramilitary forces. *For countries with autonomous regions, this is coded for states/provinces/regions other than the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has police/paramilitary forces and other regions don't, code 0.”	IDC
Asymmetry	16_auton	Asymmetric decentralization	“1 if there is one or more autonomous regions; 0 otherwise or if no information is available”	IDC
Overall II	17_taf_index	Original total from 0 to 7 (7 variables on vertical majoritarianism/power-sharing), recalculated from -2 to +2		

Sources and notes

ⁱ Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Power-sharing in the World's States, 1975-2010 (Strøm et al., 2017). When under quotation marks, variable explanations are taken from the IDC codebook (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3DK6JA/KFRFVC&version=1.1>); when in italics, they mean author's personal modifications of the coding.

ⁱⁱ In Gallagher's dataset, data of the index were missing for six countries (https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php).

Therefore, personally elaborating data from the Parline database (applying Gallagher formula $Lsq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2}$) I have calculated the Least Squares Index for the following countries and elections: Ghana (1996, 2000, 2004), Mauritius (2005, 2009), Niger (1999, 2004), Taiwan (2001, 2004), Uruguay (1989, 1994; see <http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>). Unfortunately, no data have been retrieved on the percentage of votes in the parliamentary elections in Ecuador (2002, 2006, 2009) and Mali (2002, 2007). For these two missing cases, the average value of all other cases for this variable have been considered. Please also note that the values are assigned starting with the referred election: for instance, Mauritius between 2005 and 2008 scores with the Gallagher index calculated for 2005 elections, while since 2009 onwards it scores with the index elaborated from 2009 elections.

ⁱⁱⁱ Democratic Electoral Systems dataset (DES, Bormann & Golder, 2013). Within the selected sample, the DES does not include the following countries: Benin, Bosnia, Botswana, Cyprus, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Senegal. I have therefore calculated the average district magnitude for the above reported cases (with data retrieved from Parline, calculated the formula proposed by the DES codebook, “the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier”; http://mattgolder.com/files/research/es_v3_codebook.pdf), with the exception of Guyana and Mali, for which no data on electoral districts have been found. As for the Gallagher index, average values automatically replace the missing.

However, such a clustering of different variables and indicators into two dimensions might seem quite arbitrary. In fact, why calculating an index for these two dimensions? And, most significantly, how to put a single variable in a specific dimension and not in another, also considering my own integrations to previous datasets? For this reason, following the research design developed by Lijphart (2012), but also Kriesi and Bochsler (2013) and Kriesi (2015), I have empirically verified the effective presence of two underlining ‘factors’ in my data. I have thus performed a factor analysis, in order to detect correlations within variables and to illustrate whether “there are one or more common underlying dimensions among several variables” (Lijphart, 2012: 240). Table 3 (40) presents the results of this factor analysis, which strongly confirms my *a priori* assumption to assemble the presented variables along two dimensions. The exception is represented by the indicator measuring whether there are municipal governments which are locally elected (12_muni). Nevertheless, it is still significant for the territorial dimension, so the fact that it is significant for both factors shall not distort my analysis. As Table 3 reveals, factor analysis illustrates a much greater importance of the territorial dimension, to pool the variables connected to federalism and decentralization which I have presented.³⁹ *Vice versa*, except for the variables connected to minority veto and reserved parliamentary seats, the executive-legislative-electoral dimensions appears much less significant. This might be imputable to a general imprecision in the design of the variables elaborated by the IDC, which I have nevertheless tried to improve in my reformulation presented by Table 2.⁴⁰ This furthermore explains the need of a clear rearrangement of the dataset, which I have attempted to do in my empirical analysis.

³⁹ See also the total variance explained and the scree plot in Appendix I (97).

⁴⁰ In fact, in previous trials of factor analyses performed on all the variables which Strøm and others (2017) include in their dataset and rerun limitedly for my sample of cases, I have found even *less* significance of the original dimensions of the IDC (inclusive, dispersive, constraining power-sharing), in particular for indicators on executive power-sharing. This might lead to even more caution in the evaluation of the IDC, which nevertheless remains the most comprehensive source so far available.


Table 3. Factor analysis for two dimensions - Rotated component matrix^a

Variable, short and long name	Component/dimension	
	1. Territorial-autonomous-federal dimension	2. Executive-legislative-electoral dimension
1_gc_lib <i>Liberal grand coalition</i> <i>(Mandated or national unity government)</i>	-0.141	0.279
2_gc_lib2 <i>Liberal grand coalition by seats</i> <i>(Two largest parties in government or excess party in coalition)</i>	0.103	0.211
3_gc_corp <i>Corporate grand coalition</i> <i>(Reserved executive seats)</i>	-0.176	0.813
4_partynoethnic <i>Ethnic party ban</i>	-0.136	-0.320
5_mveto <i>Minority veto</i>	0.186	0.748
6_resseats <i>Reserved legislative seats</i>	-0.004	0.783
7_gallagher_index <i>Electoral (dis)proportionality</i>	0.148	0.315
8_avemag_es <i>Average district magnitude</i> <i>(electoral permissiveness)</i>	-0.024	0.133
10_stconst <i>Regional constituencies in the upper house</i>	0.748	0.172
11_state <i>State/provincial governments locally elected</i>	0.702	-0.060
12_muni <i>Municipal governments locally elected</i>	0.173	0.273
13_subtax <i>Sub-national tax authority</i>	0.794	0.048
14_subed <i>Sub-national education authority</i>	0.701	0.094
15_subpolice <i>Sub-national police authority</i>	0.793	0.103
16_auton <i>Asymmetric federalism/decentralization</i>	0.262	-0.260
<i>Extraction method: principal component analysis; two components with eigenvalue above 2.</i>		
<i>Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization; rotation converged in 3 iterations.</i>		
<i>Source: author's elaboration on IDC, DES and own calculations.</i>		

Anyway, after having empirically confirmed the relevance of the two dimensions, I have plotted my set of cases using the two 'overall indexes', presented in Table 2. The 'executive-legislative-electoral majoritarianism/power-sharing index' ranges from -2 (maximum majoritarianism) to +2 (maximum power-sharing), as well as the 'territorial-autonomous-federal majoritarianism/

power-sharing index', with the same count. Figure 1 (41) presents the results. As easily observable, the first outcome of this large-N comparison of ethnically divided democracies is that *power-sharing, in particular in the horizontal dimension (executive-legislative-electoral institutions) appears to be the exception rather than the rule*, while the situation is more blurred when the vertical dimension is concerned. In fact, only Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999-2010), Belgium (1989-2010) and with the borderline (for the executive-legislative-electoral dimension) cases of South Africa (1995-2010) and Switzerland (1989-2010) are classified as power-sharing democracies both in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. When power-sharing is present in the executive-legislative-electoral dimension only, we can report the cases of North Macedonia (2003-2007) and also – *note that this dimension analyzes de jure institutions only* – Fiji (2002-2005) and Cyprus (1989-2010). The US (1989-2010), Spain

Figure 1. Power-sharing/majoritarian democracy in plural societies



Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Table 2

(1989-2010), Mexico (1999-2010), Canada (1989-2010), Brazil (1989-2010), Serbia (2003-2010), India (1989-2010), the UK (1989-2010), Venezuela (1989-2000) and finally Slovakia (1995-2010) figure as executive-legislative-electoral majoritarian and territorial-autonomous-federal power-sharing democracies, in line with considerations from previous scholarship. However, perhaps the most striking aspect of the figure is that *no less than 29 countries score negative on both my indexes, then being majoritarian democracies on the horizontal and vertical dimensions*, at least in their institutional arrangements. Although this result might be induced by the measurements I have used,⁴¹ the ‘majority’ of countries in that quadrant of my classification remains to be analyzed and explained. May this result lead to simply rebut Lijphart’s assumption on the impossibility of *other-than-power-sharing* democracy in plural societies? Not entirely and not so quickly. In fact, other variables should be added to scrutinize political regimes in deeply divided places. Being so far the focus on *de jure* and then formal institutions, another dimension on social relations ought to be computed.

2.4 *De facto* ethnic inclusion/exclusion: a three-dimensional map

When scrutinizing political regimes, in established and new democracies likewise, *de facto* institutions or informal social relations shape political regimes as extensively as formal institutions do. They can be complementary or accommodating when formal institutions are effective, or rather substitutive or competing when formal institutions are ineffective (Helmke, & Levitsky, 2004). Necessarily simplifying the theoretical and empirical framework proposed by Helmke & Levitsky, I shall add a third dimension to map democratic regimes in plural societies, based on the country-year version of the EPR dataset.⁴² A first combination of data from Strom et al. (2017) and the EPR has been in fact already attempted by Bormann and

⁴¹ In particular for the – supposedly too strict – measurement of horizontal power-sharing/majority rule.

⁴² Which was previously used in its group-based version, not for analyzing the articulation of political power among ethnic groups, though for reporting only their *relative dimension* compared to the population (for the definition of plural democracy and the first case selection).

colleagues (2019), although they focus on political practices to analyze whether power-sharing (for them, only mono-dimensional) is implemented. Here my approach is different: in fact, data from the EPR are used as a further dimension to scrutinize political regimes in plural societies, deepening an investigation otherwise centered on formal rules.

How to distinguish practices related to power relations among ethnic groups? For this part of the thesis, I will be also inspired by the team of scholars led by Cederman (2013, 2018), in their research on the relations between group inclusion and exclusion, and democracy.⁴³ However, they do *not* specify the democratic regime-*type* connected to either inclusion or, otherwise, exclusion of ethnic groups. This will be the added value of my research.

For this reason, being my definitions of ‘ethnic inclusion’ *the involvement of all ethnic groups in the sphere of political power*, and ‘ethnic exclusion’ *the rejection of one or more ethnic groups from political power*, Table 4 (44) reports the variables I will use to operationalize these concepts examining *de facto* ethnic relations. To put it simply, I have aggregated some of the variables coded by the EPR scrutinizing (i) ethnic exclusion, thus measuring the percentage of the population belonging to both openly discriminated and totally powerless ethnic groups, and also adding secessionist segments, which are permanently ousted from power.

The second variable I shall consider related to the ethnic dimension, logically, is centered on (ii) ethnic inclusion, thence reporting the percentage of the population composed by ethnic groups which share political power in practice, regardless any formality or what is enshrined in

⁴³ Cederman and colleagues, in their examination of regional trends of ethnic relations, arrive to “define ethnic inclusion at the state or country level based on whether power is shared between two or more ethnic groups. More specifically, a country with two or more groups sharing power (as either junior or senior partners) is considered to have inclusion. Likewise, a country is considered to have exclusion if the state is controlled by a single group. The measure is binary in that countries have either inclusion or exclusion” (2018: 1929). Accordingly, Cederman and others conclude that it “is straightforward to show that inclusion is not simply synonymous with political democracy. Inclusion is slightly more common than democracy over the whole period (45%) than democracy (36%). [Thus] exclusion is also common among nondemocracies” (2018: 1293). The definition of a binary measurement of ethnic inclusion and exclusion has been of inspiration for my thesis.

Table 4. De facto ethnic relations and ethnic inclusion/exclusion: dimensions, variables, acronyms, explanations and sources

Dimension	Domain	Variable name	Long name	Variable explanation	Source and original names (when applicable)
III. De facto ethnic relations-ethnic exclusion/inclusion	Ethnic power relations	18_exclu	Excluded population (from the central power or locally isolated; discriminated, powerless, secessionist)	Percentage of the population which is excluded from power coded as ‘Discriminated’: “Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, but always refers to the domain of public politics (excluding discrimination in the socio-economic sphere).” + Percentage of the population which is excluded from power coded as ‘Powerless’: “Elite representatives hold no political power (or do not have influence on decision making) at the national level of executive power - although without being explicitly discriminated against.” + Percentage of the population which is voluntarily ‘Self-excluded’, coded when groups “have excluded themselves from central state power, in the sense that they control a particular territory of the state which they have declared independent from the central government.”	EPR ^{iv} (discpop/ pwrpop/ olppop)
		19_inclu	Included population (sharing central and/or local power; senior/junior partner or regionally autonomous)	Percentage of the population which shares power coded as ‘Senior Partner’: “Representatives of the group participate as senior partners in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement. By power sharing, we mean any arrangement that divides executive power among leaders who claim to represent particular ethnic groups and who have real influence on political decision making.” + Percentage of the population which shares power coded as ‘Junior Partner’: “Representatives participate as junior partners in government.” + Percentage of the population which is coded as ‘Regionally autonomous’, when “(1) There is a meaningful and active regional executive organ of some type that operates below the state level (for example, the departmental, provincial, or district level) but above the local administrative level. (2) Group representation is not token: group members exert actual influence on the decisions of this entity and their representatives act in line with the group’s local interests.”	EPR (jppop/ sppop/ olppop)
		20_rulal	Ruling alone population (dominant or monopoly)	Percentage of the population which rules alone, coded as ‘Dominant’: “Elite members of the group hold dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of ‘token’ members of other groups who however do not have real influence on decision making.” + Percentage of the population which rules alone coded as ‘Monopoly’: “Elite members hold monopoly power in the executive to the exclusion of members of all other ethnic groups.”	EPR (dompop/ monpop)
	Overall III	21_der_index		Original total from -1 to +1 (-18_exclu + 19_inclu -20_rulal), recalculated from -2 to +2	

Sources and notes

^{iv} Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). As for Table 2, when under quotation marks, variable explanations are taken from the EPR codebook (https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/EPR_2019_Codebook_EPR.pdf). In the country-year-based version of the EPR, the following countries of the selected sample were missing: Cyprus, Mauritius, Serbia (and before 2007 Serbia and Montenegro), Guyana and Fiji. The values for these countries have been calculated from the group-based version of the EPR, which entails global observations.

the constitution or prescribed by international or domestic law. Finally, directly connected to ethnic exclusion, I shall also consider the percentage of the population of (iii) groups which rule alone, both in a dominant or with a more extreme, hegemonic monopoly of political power. The result of this operationalization shall be a third overall index of *de facto* ethnic relations, ranging from a minimum of -2 (the maximum of ethnic exclusion, i.e. all the population is part of excluded ethnic groups or dominant ethnic groups) to a maximum of +2 (all the population is part of ethnic groups which share power, centrally or locally). The result, however, is not exactly a dummy variable, since there are some cases in between, e.g. those countries with part of the population composed by ethnic groups which share power, while others are excluded from power, either discriminated or powerless.⁴⁴

Similarly to the second paragraph, I shall now integrate the factor analysis previously conducted with this other array of variables, to examine whether this dimension might be usefully considered in order to distinguish among political regimes, and whether *de facto* relations are empirically distinguishable from the horizontal and vertical dimensions of power-sharing and majoritarianism.

Table 5 (46) therefore illustrates the results of the factor analysis performed on more variables. As evident – though also unsurprising for such a large bunch of variables – the results are much *less* straightforward than in the previous factor analysis, conducted on a restricted set of variables. As the scree plot and total variance in Appendix II (98) confirm, the differences between the executive-legislative-electoral dimension and what I shall consequently call the ‘*de facto* ethnic relations-ethnic exclusion/inclusion’ dimension are less clearly discernable. However, the divergencies of the underlining components from, in turn, the territorial-autonomous-federal and the *de facto* ethnic relations factors are rather manifest. Consequently,

⁴⁴ In this index of ethnic inclusion and exclusion, group size is relevant insofar as it is connected to group power relations (cf. Table 4, 44). However, the outcome of an *almost* dichotomous or polarized measure might make the difference in between (cases with both included and excluded groups) less detectable (cf. note 46). The index is anyway useful since it considers minority and majority groups.

Table 5. Factor analysis for three dimensions - Rotated component matrix^a

Variable, short and long name	Component/dimension		
	1. Territorial-autonomous-federal dimension	2. Executive-legislative-electoral dimension	3. De facto ethnic relations ethnic inclusion/exclusion
1_gc_lib <i>Liberal grand coalition (Mandated or national unity government)</i>	-0.121	0.285	0.029
2_gc_lib2 <i>Liberal grand coalition by seats (two largest parties in government or excess party in coalition)</i>	0.144	0.209	0.043
3_gc_corp <i>Corporate grand coalition (Reserved executive seats)</i>	-0.114	0.793	0.213
4_partynoethnic <i>Ethnic party ban</i>	-0.149	-0.175	-0.517
5_mveto <i>Minority veto</i>	0.252	0.737	0.027
6_resseats <i>Reserved legislative seats</i>	0.077	0.807	-0.002
7_gallagher_index <i>Electoral (dis)proportionality</i>	0.182	0.196	0.478
8_avemag_es <i>Average district magnitude (electoral permissiveness)</i>	0.012	0.075	0.285
10_stconst <i>Regional constituencies in the upper house</i>	0.750	0.067	0.116
11_state <i>State/provincial governments locally elected</i>	0.717	-0.082	-0.158
12_muni <i>Municipal governments locally elected</i>	0.214	0.190	0.316
13_subtax <i>Sub-national tax authority</i>	0.783	-0.053	0.080
14_subed <i>Sub-national education authority</i>	0.697	0.025	-0.030
15_subpolice <i>Sub-national police authority</i>	0.784	0.012	0.024
16_auton <i>Asymmetric federalism/decentralization</i>	0.213	-0.321	0.090
18_exclu <i>Excluded population from the central power or locally isolated; discriminated, powerless, secessionist)</i>	-0.365	-0.285	0.447
19_inclu <i>Included population (sharing central and/or local power; senior/junior partner, regionally autonomous)</i>	0.319	0.348	-0.770
20_rulal <i>Ruling alone population (dominant or monopoly)</i>	-0.218	-0.220	0.766
Extraction method: Principal component analysis; two components with eigenvalue above 2.			
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.			
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.			
Source: author's elaboration on IDC, DES, EPR and own calculations.			

since the executive-legislative-electoral dimension has been previously confirmed as being separate from the territorial-autonomous-federal dimension, and the *de facto* ethnic relations

dimension is now discernible from the territorial-autonomous-federal dimension, I shall *assume* that this third dimension is also analyzable separately from the executive-legislative-electoral one.⁴⁵ To summarize the observations for the selected cases and the enunciated variables, Appendix III (99-100) reports all the data of the average values per country, which I have used for my figures. In fact, after having introduced a two-dimensional plot previously, I shall now present Figures 2 and 3 (48), respectively illustrating the horizontal dimension of power-sharing or majoritarianism and the vertical dimension thereof, and their associations with ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Taking two dimensions at a time, the figures illustrate how, despite a quite evident low statistical significance,⁴⁶ *both power-sharing in the executive-legislative-electoral dimension and in the federal-autonomous-territorial dimension are positively associated with ethnic inclusion*. As we will observe afterwards, power-sharing in both the horizontal and territorial dimensions shall be *more* associated with *de facto* ethnic inclusion (see Figure 4, 51). *Vice versa*, one could expect, majoritarianism in the articulation of central and local power might be seen as correlated with ethnic exclusion. However, the low significance of these correlations and the relevant presence of countries both in the majoritarian *and* in the ethnically inclusive angles of my figures should induce a significant amount of moderation in this conclusion. In a few words, my research shows that *plural democracies can be either ethnically exclusive or inclusive*. But why? I will leave these issues to the following chapter and the qualitative discussion. Now I shall locate the results so far achieved into the theoretical framework of democratic quality.

⁴⁵ Also considering that in the data problems arise only for variables concerning ethnic party ban and the electoral system.

⁴⁶ Anyway, this result might be led by the indicators I have chosen for scrutinizing power-sharing and majoritarian institutions and the architecture of the IDC itself, which reports institutional characteristics (of power-sharing) which might be very rare in practice. Moreover, defining ethnic inclusion and exclusion grouping EPR categories has resulted in an almost dichotomic variable, with few cases in between and an excessive polarization of my units of analysis, which might affect the observation of a correlated variable. Further adjustments of my bunch of indicators might solve these criticisms. However, for the aims of the thesis, what is relevant now is the *direction* of the positive relation between power-sharing and inclusion.

Figure 2. Horizontal power-sharing/majoritarian democracy and ethnic relations





Figure 3. Vertical power-sharing/majoritarian democracy and ethnic relations



*Confidence interval: 95%;
Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Tables 2-4*

2.5 Framing *de facto* ethnic relations through democratic quality: a comprehensive map of political institutions and social relations in plural democracies

Empirical results based on the IDC are divergent and controversial.⁴⁷ Despite having *started* my elaboration from the same array of data, I have thus proposed to address the question *in terms of democratic regimes*, then directly measuring also majoritarianism, in a particular set of ethnically divided democracies. Secondly, the *de facto* articulation of political power among ethnic groups has been used to add a fundamental differentiation, without leaving the analysis based on formal institutions only. In fact, for a more nuanced classification of political regimes in ethnically divided societies, it is essential to scrutinize the interplay among ethnic groups as part of the defining properties of the political regime itself. In fact, although ethnic groups are far from being internally homogeneous (cf. Brubaker, 2004) – though they are rather porous and subjected to ‘ethnic defection’ (Kalyvas, 2008) – sometimes their *organizations* are so, for remaining indeed utility-maximizing actors. I shall then propose to conceptualize this integration of the *de facto* articulations of political power to institutional structures in terms of democratic performance, or better democratic quality.

Democratic quality is a contested concept. From the very first formalization, Morlino and Diamond (2004, 2005) broadly discuss it in terms of freedom, the rule of law, vertical accountability, responsiveness, equality and then integrating with participation, competition, and horizontal accountability – summarizing everything not fitting the minimalist conception of democracy. In their analyses, however, the distinction among institutions and practices

⁴⁷ For instance, specifically for ethnically divided cases, the results of other analyses on power-sharing and *democratic survival* based on the IDC shows no significance of ‘inclusive power-sharing’ indicators (the IDC dimension from which most of my variables on the horizontal institutional dimension have been selected), a *negative* (again low significant) correlation between ‘dispersive power-sharing’ (my territorial-autonomous-federal dimension) and a *positive* correlation between what they call ‘constraining power-sharing’ and indeed democratic endurance (cf. Graham et al., 2017). Therefore, Graham and colleagues emblematically ‘conclude’ that “the connection between power-sharing and democracy is therefore complex and context-dependent” (2017: 702).


remains unclear. In fact, Morlino and Diamond include also institutional procedures in their framework, thus blurring the differentiation with the minimalist and *proceduralist* definition of democracy. I shall go ahead from here, adopting democratic performance/quality as an analysis on political practices, to integrate previous formalistic examinations (Munck, 2014).⁴⁸

Despite acknowledging how ‘multidimensional’ the concept of democratic quality can be (Bernauer et al., 2016), however, throughout this thesis I have decided to focus more limitedly on ethnic inclusion or exclusion. This is theoretically justifiable by several scholarly contributions outlining the importance of inclusion, especially when ethnic cleavages are politicized. In deeply divided societies, in fact, inclusion is often synonym of equality. This is paramount for all the democracies of my sample. In fact, in my classification of plural democracies, I have included established and less consolidated democracies equally. This has been decided to avoid what, in a more recent reconceptualization of democratic quality, Munck criticizes as “studying the quality of democracy only in countries deemed to be democracies [which] is associated with the tendency to use a higher standard to assess this subset of countries and hence to draw attention to certain ‘problems of democracies’” (2016: 10). For these reasons I have framed my examination accordingly, in order to go beyond a particular set of institutions, and then to see how these regime-types are related to performance, particularly in the sphere of political practices connected to ethnic inclusion and exclusion (Munck, 2016: 22; cf. Doorenspleet & Pellikaan, 2013).⁴⁹ This is why ethnic inclusion and exclusion, then related to democratic quality and performance, have been considered as a third classifying dimension. Being clarified the theoretical *rationale* behind this third dimension, Figure 4 (51) finally

⁴⁸ Even Bernauer et al. (2016) implement a similar approach, comparing institutions and democratic quality, such as participation or also satisfaction with democracy, to examine the empirical performance of specific democratic types, in terms of effectiveness and inclusiveness.

⁴⁹ For Doorenspleet and Pellikaan, who consider democratic quality as the blueprint to analyze the performance of democratic types, majoritarian democracies perform “better at policy formulation and implementation, and governing, while non-majoritarian democracies were better at integrating opponents, and representing minorities” (2013: 245).

Figure 4. Democratic regimes in plural societies: institutions and group relations



Confidence interval: 95%; Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Tables 2 and 4

visualizes the cumulative results of the average values for each case in the selected time span, on the combined horizontal and vertical dimension of power-sharing and majoritarianism *and* the *de facto* ethnic relations dimension. The map is thence a much more precise confirmation of *the positive association between power-sharing and ethnic inclusion*, with an increased statistical relevance. Moreover, the distinction amid ethnic exclusion and inclusion also permits to discriminate those cases where power-sharing was never implemented in practice (such as Cyprus or Fiji). Most importantly, however, the figure has the potentiality of being an informed starting point to discuss cases of *majoritarian democracy in plural societies*, which – as demonstrated by my empirical analysis – *might be either exclusive or inclusive towards ethnic minorities*. This shall be the task of the following, and last, chapter of the present thesis.

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: MAJORITARIANISM AND ETHNICITY

3.0 Majoritarian and plural democracies: the new object of study

This last chapter shall discuss the results of the theoretical-empirical framework previously introduced, to in-depth investigate cases of *majoritarian and plural democracy*. In fact, partly *contra* Lijphart (1977), I have demonstrated that in ethnically divided societies, majoritarian democracy is not only possible, but also not straightforwardly connected to practices of ethnic exclusion. In fact, out of my sample of 47 cases, 29 plural democracies (61.7%) score majoritarian and non-power-sharing in the two institutional dimensions considered. Among them, as Table 6 (53) reports, 17 countries can be categorized as *de facto* ethnically exclusive (58.6%) and 12 (41.38%) as ethnically inclusive. To explain the variance among majoritarian and plural democracies, I shall conclude the thesis through a structured and paired comparison of two cases, to illustrate how majority rule works, in particular in terms of ethnic relations, in a democratic settlement. In other words, my question will be why in some cases majoritarian institutions are associated with ethnic inclusion, while in others majoritarianism and ethnic inclusion can to a certain extent coexist.

Every case of Table 6 should be explored in detail. However, for the limits of the thesis, in the following two paragraphs I shall thence adopt a *most similar research design* (cf. Lijphart, 1971) to compare Turkey and Mali when they score(d) as electoral democracies in the selected periods of observation (Turkey 2000-2010 and Mali 2003-2010) and beyond. The two cases have been thus selected for having *comparable levels of majoritarianism in their institutional arrangements*, albeit encompassing opposite records concerning practices related to ethnic groups, namely *maximum exclusion* for Turkey and *maximum inclusion* for Mali (dependent variable). This shall be explained by searching for an explanatory independent variable in the two examples, which will be exogenous to political institutions and group relations. In detail,

Table 6. Majoritarian and plural democracies and ethnic relations

Country	Acronym	Timespan	Electoral democracy index	Executive- legislative- electoral majoritarianism/ power-sharing index	Territorial- autonomous- federal majoritarianism/ power-sharing index	Majoritarianism /power-sharing overall index	De facto ethnic relations (exclusion/ inclusion) index
Benin	BEN	1992-2010	0.66	-1.12	-0.86	-0.99	1.61
Bolivia	BOL	1989-2010	0.75	-0.94	-0.75	-0.85	-1.10
Botswana	BWA	1989-2010	0.72	-1.43	-0.86	-1.14	-0.04
Bulgaria	BGR	1989-2010	0.72	-1.58	-0.89	-1.23	1.56
Chile	CHL	1990-2010	0.86	-0.94	-0.61	-0.78	-1.92
Costa Rica	CRI	1989-2010	0.89	-1.05	-1.43	-1.24	-1.90
Ecuador	ECU	1989-2009	0.72	-0.99	-1.67	-1.33	-2.00
Estonia	EST	1990-2010	0.84	-0.93	-1.43	-1.18	-1.94
Ghana	GHA	1997-2010	0.70	-1.74	-0.57	-1.16	1.88
Guyana	GUY	2001-2009 (no 2006)	0.61	-0.90	-0.86	-0.88	-1.66
Israel	ISR	1989-2010	0.76	-0.54	-1.14	-0.84	0.17
Latvia	LVA	1991-2010	0.79	-0.74	-0.41	-0.57	-1.88
Lithuania	LTU	1990-2010	0.82	-0.96	-1.46	-1.21	-1.93
Mali	MLI	2003-2010	0.62	-0.64	-1.43	-1.03	2.00
Mauritius	MUS	1989-2010	0.80	-1.22	-0.86	-1.04	1.55
Namibia	NAM	1995-2010	0.67	-1.61	-0.86	-1.24	1.71
New Zealand	NZL	1989-2010	0.89	-0.80	-0.88	-0.84	2.00
Nicaragua	NIC	1991-2006	0.66	-0.94	-0.64	-0.79	-1.97
Niger	NER	2002-2006	0.61	-1.37	-2.00	-1.69	1.48
Panama	PAN	1991-2010	0.75	-1.77	-0.29	-1.03	-1.80
Peru	PER	2001-2009	0.78	-1.21	-0.57	-0.89	-1.75
Romania	ROM	1997-2010	0.65	-0.60	-0.57	-0.58	1.87
Senegal	SEN	1993-2010	0.68	-2.10	-1.71	-1.91	1.90
Sierra Leone	SLE	2003-2006	0.60	-1.91	-1.57	-1.74	-1.50
Slovenia	SVN	1991-2010	0.84	-0.30	-1.43	-0.86	-1.77
Taiwan	TWN	1997-2010	0.74	-0.68	-0.45	-0.57	1.92
Trinidad-Tobago	TTO	1989-2010	0.77	-1.35	-1.43	-1.39	-1.31
Turkey	TUR	2000-2010	0.67	-1.28	-0.86	-1.07	-2.00
Uruguay	URY	1989-2010	0.87	-0.68	-0.52	-0.60	-2.00

Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Tables 2 and 4. Majoritarian and inclusive democracies are highlighted in grey.

the role of political culture, party system, traditions and legacies of minority accommodation will be explored. However, the comparison between these two cases shall go *beyond* the selected timespan of the quantitative analysis, in order to describe the evolutions of Turkey and Mali. Despite their divergencies in ethnic relations, in fact, the sudden collapse of democracy in Mali and the democratic decay of Turkey could be similarly analyzed through the lens of autocratization and the politics of ethnicization, thus shedding new light on the role of majoritarian institutions in the long run, as I will explain in the concluding paragraph of this chapter. In brief, in addition to the institutional variables mentioned throughout chapter 2 on power-sharing and majoritarianism, I shall also qualitatively consider other indicators, to better delineate the features of these two examples. These indicators will be, in particular, Turkey and Mali's history of democratization and party system.

3.1 Majoritarian and exclusive democracy: the case of Turkey (2000-2010), from an exclusive and defective democracy to a closed ethnocracy

3.1.1 Overview: ethnicity and institutions

Turkey has a highly complex political history. The period of observation of the quantitative analysis (2000-2010), when the country scored above the selected electoral democracy threshold, coincides with the first stages of democratization and EU influence through the accession partnership (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012) and ends with the consolidation of Erdoğan's hegemony (Öniş, 2013). However, the democratic phase should not be considered as a parenthesis, but rather as a part of the tortuous evolution of Turkey's political system, with an alternation between periods of democratization, military *coups*, fragmentation and hegemony. In this conundrum, and despite the strong nationalizing pressures from the center, Turkey remains a plural society, encompassing a "vast ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity" (Kurban, 2007: 3). However, born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist state has continuously violated the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, and its minorities are victims of decades

of oppression, exclusion or, at best, forced assimilation. The mosaic of different ethnicities (Caucasians, Laz, Roma) and religions (Muslims, Shia Alevis, Armenians, and others; Grigoriadis, 2006)⁵⁰ is thus intertwined. In this paragraph, anyhow, I shall mostly consider the predicament of the Kurds of Turkey, the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in the country, as the acid test of ethnic relations. Predominantly of Sunni Islam, comprising around 15 million out of more 80 million inhabitants in Turkey (Updegraff, 2012: 119),⁵¹ and originated from the eastern and southeastern landlocked area bordering with Syria, Iraq and Iran, they are now more spread throughout the country than in the previous years.⁵² The politicization of Kurdish ethnicity went together with the gradual decay of the Ottoman rule (with first revolts in the 1870s), originating from the separatism of tribes and emirates against the rising centralist bureaucracy (Yeğen, 1996: 217).⁵³ The Kemalist state was then hostile to any form of decentralism and, to forge the new Turkish nation, undertook decades of violent actions against the ‘tribal politics’ of remote Kurdish regions, against local elites of *sheikhs* and *aghas* (religious and secular leaders), through policies of linguistic homogeneity and administrative control. Consequently, revolts took place in 1925 and throughout the 1930s, in particular after the abolishment of the Sultanate (1922) and Caliphate (1924; Lindemann, 2014), which, as Yeğen reports, “meant the substitution of this loose bond between the centre and periphery with

⁵⁰ During the period of EU influence, certain religious rights were granted to minorities. In particular, in 2006, “mandatory declaration of religion on ID cards was abolished. But the state continues to ask citizens to declare their religion” (Kurban, 2007: 3). However, as Kurban reports (2007: 7), these policies were still in line with the Kemalist approach, whereby “a separate legal regime was created for some non-Muslims (in practice only Armenians, Greeks and Jews), [while] all Muslims, categorized as ‘Turks’, became subject to homogenization policies”. For a comparison of religious minorities in France and Turkey, see also Kiliç (2019).

⁵¹ Exact numbers are contested. The EPR reports 18% of the total population (with 75% Turkish).

⁵² Spontaneous migrations to the industrializing cities took place since the 1950s. Afterwards, forced displacements after 1984 and until the 1990s of between 1 and 2 million people occurred during the insurgency war between the central state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

⁵³ Kurdish local tribes enjoyed a certain independence until the 16th century, when their militias acted on behalf of the Sunni Ottoman Empire against the Shia Iran.

the tyranny of the centre imposed on the (ethnic, cultural, economic, administrative, political) elements of the periphery” (1996: 221).

Although not explicitly defined in ethnic terms, the majoritarian articulation of political institutions in Turkey discriminates against citizens who declare themselves of different ethnic origins (Tezcür & Gurses, 2017). However, this is not explicitly revealed in official politics, where there is a “striking silence of the Turkish state as to the ‘Kurdishness’ of the Kurdish question” (Yeğen, 1996: 216). In fact, the Kurdish unrest is treated as “reactionary politics, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but never as ethno-political question” (*ibid.*). This denial means oppression, forced assimilation and compulsory settlements, validated by a majoritarian institutional system. The politicization of the Kurdish question is moreover a relatively recent phenomenon, appreciable through the terrorist actions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (KPP) since the 1980s and the radical repression which followed.⁵⁴ With the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, however, and the democratization of the country, there were some hopes for minority rights in the “new Turkey”, since the novel ruling elites opposed hard-liner interpretations of “Kemalism” as well as strict and homogenizing understandings of “secularism” and “Turkishness” (Öniş, 2013: 105). However, as I shall show, this did not lead to a transition towards a more pluralistic order, though rather enforced a system which hinders minority political participation (Grigoriadis, 2006). This can be imputed to the majoritarian institutions which structure Turkey’s political regime.

In fact, Lord (2012) accurately reported a pervasive persistence of a majoritarian system of government in the country. Despite the various shocks of the Turkish regimes (*coups*, different constitutions, fragmentation, one-party-dominance, liberalization and then recently

⁵⁴ In the 1960 a ‘Kurdish renaissance’ was observable on leftist magazines, firstly bringing the Kurdish question to the fore (Kaya, 2019: 801), within the ranks of the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP). The leftist mold permeated Kurdish elites, from the Marxism-Leninism and Stalinist cult of personality embraced by the PKK (Leezenberg, 2016) to the left-wing populism of more recent political parties, as I will analyze later.

autocratization), “the deeply majoritarian logic of the system has endured” (Lord, 2012: 299). Focusing only on the last years of the period examined by Lord (since 1982 military-backed constitution), which is of interest for the quantitative analysis conducted before, we can in fact report a total absence of power-sharing institutions, though rather the prevalence of majority rule and concentration of power at the center and in the executive. The authoritarian drift of the last decade contributed to exasperate this aspect. I shall now explore the horizontal and vertical institutional dimensions and evaluate their effects on ethnic relations.

3.1.2 *Horizontal majoritarianism*

Unfortunately, scholars analyzing the recent autocratization of Turkey’s political system (shifting from a defective still consolidating democracy to an electoral autocracy, and recently even to a closed autocracy, cf. Lührmann et al., 2017) speak about a ‘majoritarian drift’ in ideological, more than institutional, terms (Özbudun, 2014), particularly through the analysis of power structure, ideology, culture and organization of the AKP (Kubicek, 2016: 134). However, even previously, Yeğen (1996) examined the Turkish state *discourses* of ethnic exclusion (217) and not the institutions crystallizing those narratives. Combining different academic sources, I shall now try to connect the majoritarian articulation of power to the ethnic exclusion it produces.⁵⁵

Being the executive power devoid of any form of prescribed power-sharing, the country saw many periods of one-party rule (Lord, 2012: 232),⁵⁶ especially after the ascendancy of the AKP in 2002 “the most majoritarian [period] in Turkey’s history of multiparty politics” (235), even

⁵⁵ Despite with an ideological analysis based on Erdoğan’s discourses, Kubicek describes the majoritarian conception of democracy which the AKP has consolidated in Turkey, based on a tradition of state domination: “winning elections and representing what they take to be the views and interests of the majority, in their interpretation of democracy they are abiding by democratic principles” (2016: 124). Hegemony seems to be contestable only within AKP elites (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012).

⁵⁶ Firstly, in the 1950s and the 1960s with the Democratic Party, then between 1983 and 1991 with the Motherland Party, and finally with the AKP since 2002, with a brief coalition in 2015, though always centered on the AKP.

further exasperated by 2007 constitutional changes and the popular election of the presidency, now the hegemonic center of Turkish politics (Öniş, 2013: 113; cf. Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012). When looking at the variables proposed in Table 2 (36-38), there is no prescription in the 1982 constitution (nor in later and recent amendments, in 2007, 2010 and 2017) concerning a grand coalition among ethnic groups, in any of its forms (from liberal grand coalitions by parties or seats to a corporate reservation of executive posts). And in fact, this is shown, in the period of observation and beyond, by the prevalence of single-party cabinets.

When the legislative power is concerned, a combination of ethnic party ban, the absence of minority veto rights or reserved seats in parliament led to the marginalization of minority groups and parties, which – when they resulted elected – resemble a permanent opposition. In fact, there are no reserved seats for minorities in the (now) 600 seats (previously 550) of the General National Assembly, and the body remains largely deinstitutionalized and deconsolidated. For this reason, “recruiting attractive candidates in elections, maintaining the unity of their organizations, and playing an important role in the country’s political life” are some of the main challenges a permanent opposition has to face (Sayari, 2016: 167). In particular for ethnic minority parties, these difficulties are even more pronounced by the ‘towering’ political dominance of a single party (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012). Never having enjoyed governmental portfolios (Tezcür & Gurses, 2017), Kurdish minority parties did not have an official representation in the parliament between 1994 and 2007, for explicitly anti-minority legislations and majoritarian electoral rules.⁵⁷ In fact, the “LPP [Law on Political Parties] prohibits the ‘creation of minorities’, which precludes parties from claiming the existence of minorities, and the ‘aiming of and engaging in activities towards disturbing the unity of the nation by creating minorities on the territory of the Republic of Turkey through protecting,

⁵⁷ Party ban legislation in Turkey is not only related to minority parties but also involves Islamist parties. The same AKP originated from the Welfare Party (RP), banned in 1998 for violating the separation between religion and the state, and then at the origin of the very disputed decision of the European Court of Human Rights, *Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey* (2003; cf. Kubicek, 2016: 128).

advancing or spreading languages and cultures other than the Turkish language and culture'. The LPP also prohibits political parties from using minority languages at their meetings and in their statutes, programs and propaganda" (Kurban, 2007: 24). Similar measures are in force against minority associations, which are not allowed to conduct activities in the name of a particular region, religion, ethnic group or social class (Grigoriadis, 2006: 453). For instance, many Kurdish associations have been then dismantled for having organized events during the Newroz festivity (Updegraff, 2012: 122). Moreover, this legislation concerning political parties and associations should be read together with other laws. In fact, "under the Anti-Terror Law, the Penal Code, and various other arbitrarily administered statutes, anyone demonstrating, writing, or speaking in support of Kurdish-nationalist ideas can face prosecution and serious jail time" (Updegraff, 2012: 120). Entering the political sphere is possible, therefore, but not for promoting minority rights. With this strict legislation, even Turkey's Constitutional Court supported a strong anti-minority version of militant democracy (Selçuk, 2016: 575).

Despite the hostile institutional environment, the Kurdish arena in Turkey underwent a substantive process of *party* politicization in the last decades. In fact, in "1990, the People's Labor Party (HEP) became the first in a succession of Kurdish-nationalist parties (...) to run in parliamentary and municipal elections, be closed by the authorities, and then regroup under new names" (Updegraff, 2012: 123). This party politicization increased with the liberalization of the country and EU integration, after the 1997 'post-modern *coup*' by the army and together with the shift of PKK orientation to Turkey's democratization and Kurdish autonomy,⁵⁸ although with many difficulties. The People's Labor Party (HEP), in fact, formed in 1990 in the Assembly and obtained 21 deputies, until its ban in 1993. Its members then founded the new Democracy Party, which was nonetheless closed, and its deputies arrested and imprisoned in

⁵⁸ After the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (Kaya, 2019), the PKK abandoned its secessionist agenda to promote democratic confederalism for the Kurdish regions, embracing a so-called 'Mesopotamian multiculturalism' or civic nationalism, and trying to follow the example of the Northern Irish Sinn Féin (Leezenberg, 2016: 674).

1994 (Grigoriadis, 2006: 449). Since 1994 to 2007, because of this harsh legislation, no Kurdish representative entered the parliament. The series of banned and reformed parties continued even during the democratization of the country, with the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) closed in 2003 (Grigoriadis, 2006) and other bans in 2007 and 2009 (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012). Therefore, Kurdish representatives entered the Assembly only as independents, often allied with leftist parties, and then formed a single group in the Assembly. Finally, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), successor of the mentioned banned parties, obtained 35 independent members in 2011 (Updegraff, 2012: 121). The 2000s were in fact the years of the even more pronounced politicization of the Kurdish question, no longer considered as a 'security' issue by the public, though as a broader political contestation (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012: 96). The outcome of this process of truncated mobilization was the establishment of the feminist, environmentalist and pro-minority rights Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in 2012 (Kaya, 2019), as I shall analyze later.

Not only the party ban, but also the electoral system represents another majoritarian, and thus ethnically exclusivist element in the Turkish political system. Established since 1981, the electoral law of Turkey, albeit encompassing a proportional representation list-vote in 81 provinces, includes a 10% national threshold to enter the parliament (Kurban, 2007).⁵⁹ Considering the minority concentration in southeast of the country, the *national* threshold – as well as the redistricting and the d'Hondt method applied to these constituencies – has been reported to have extremely disproportional effects (Alkin, 2011; Lord, 2012: 238). This threshold is in fact the highest in Europe and presented a distorted political map of Turkey's party system (Grigoriadis, 2006).⁶⁰ As Lord states (2012: 241), the majoritarian logic of the

⁵⁹ Introduced by the junta leader to avoid party fragmentation and instabilities which characterized the 1970s.

⁶⁰ In 2002 parliamentary elections, for instance, 45% of voters have been disenfranchised (Alkin, 2011: 347) and the AKP could obtain 66% of seats with only 34% of valid votes.

regime is exasperated and extremely harmful for territorially concentrated minorities, in particular the Kurds, whose parties were often kept out of the parliament in this way.⁶¹ As for the party ban, the only way to circumvent the threshold is to run as independent. Examining the case of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the precursor of the BDP, Alkin (2011) analyzes the 2007 electoral campaigns, to stress the monetary restrictions and impossibility of campaigning on media that DTP independent candidates encountered. As reported, only after 13 years (1994-2007; Kaya, 2019) Kurdish representatives could return to the parliament not as independents. The very strong mechanical effects of the threshold (Sayari, 2016: 169), moreover, should be considered together with its psychological impacts on voters – e.g. Kurds deciding not to vote for Kurdish parties – and also political parties.⁶²

These electoral barriers against ethnic minorities also provided incentives for the consolidation of the AKP as a predominant party, enlarging its electoral basis beyond its original hardcore Islamist supporters to become an effective bastion of all right-wing, conservative forces in the country (Özbudun, 2014; Kubicek, 2016: 131; Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012: 90). In fact, since 2002 up to date, the AKP exploited the electoral system to win the countryside and the peripheries and erode the west coast enclaves of the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP). In other words, the institutional incentives for a one-party dominance led the way to the AKP rule in the society, with patronage and clientelist networks (Sayari, 2016: 171), especially concerning housing policies (Grigoriadis, 2006: 451).

Despite the threshold, however, in 2011 the HDP won 80 seats, and consolidated its position as the main opposition force in 2015 and 2018 parliamentary elections. In particular, the

⁶¹ E.g. in 2002 the DEHAP (Kurban, 2007), which brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights, ruling that the 10% threshold falls within the margin of appreciation of Turkey's application of the Convention (*Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey*, 2007; Alkin, 2011: 3).

⁶² For instance, in his campaign against the far-right Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in 2011 elections, Erdoğan endorsed a harder line against the Kurds, to erode MHP support under 10% and thus get more seats for his party.

unexpected rise of the HDP in 2015, unifying Kurdish movements and the left against Erdoğan, witnessed the change of the HDP from being a minority liberation movement and radical left party to encompass a broader, feminist, environmentalist and egalitarian agenda (Kaya, 2019).⁶³ With 13% and 80 seats, the HDP's 'populist moment' coincided with the war in Kobane in Syrian Kurdistan against the Islamic state. Albeit denying organic linkages with the PKK (and Kurdish militias in the Rojava), the two forces now appear ideologically close, with a more opportunistic division between HDP interested in party politics, and the PKK focused on the social and security sphere.⁶⁴ The resurgence of riots in Turkey, in fact, following the events in Syria (Leezenberg, 2016), with hostilities and terroristic attacks in Ankara against a HDP rally, and the importance gained by the HDP in the national arena, pushed the AKP to enter coalition talks with the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), after 13 years of ruling alone. However, this mobilization remained curtailed and majoritarianism of the country scarcely tarnished, also because of the lack of another political arena: the territorial power.

3.1.3 Vertical majoritarianism

As reported by Grigoriadis (2006), the ethnic cleavage to a certain extent resembles the center-periphery divide in Turkey. Similarly, according to Lord, "the centralized and unitary nature of government (...) reflects a strong majoritarian leaning to the federal-unitary dimension which has been a continuous feature under the Republic and a legacy of the strong state administration of the Ottoman Empire" (2012: 242).⁶⁵ Centralization, in fact, since the end of the Ottoman Empire and the first years of the Kemalist state, was conceived as the fight against the periphery,

⁶³ Kaya (2019) analyzes the HDP as a case of left-wing populist party, inspired by the writings of Ernesto Laclau (cf. De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017).

⁶⁴ The PKK was also recognized as official actor in rounds of talks between 2009-11 and 2013-14. Its position reinforced during the Syrian civil war, while its close militias of the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the pro-PKK Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party opposed the Islamic state.

⁶⁵ The traditional *millet* system does not equate with self-government: in fact, while religious and family law was devolved to community authorities, the administration of the Empire remained centralized, from tax collection to the army (Barkey & Gavrilis, 2016).

which therefore meant Turkification across the territory, and repression of ‘tribal resistance’ and minority groups (Grigoriadis, 2006). In fact, according to Yeğen, the “project of centralization was an articulation of repression on tribal politics, the peripheral economy, Kurdish ethno-political identity and so on. And eventually, tribal resistance to the practice of centralization gained an ethno-political content” (1996: 222) and moreover the “exclusion of Kurdish identity was one of the outcomes of a political project of building a modern, *central*, and secular nation-state, the necessary condition of which was the exclusion of religion, tradition and the periphery” (224; emphasis mine). In a few words, majority rule at the center, embodied in what we can call the ‘logic of the nation-state’, went together with the ‘logic of centralization’, which, in a plural and ethnically divided society, resulted in the oppression of a territorially homogeneous minority, rooted in religious entities and a pre-industrial economy.⁶⁶ In a centralized political system, the only way to participate, for the excluded minority, is often through co-optation. Integrating the local level with the central one, in fact, Tezcür and Gurses (2017) demonstrate how a “political system that discriminates against an ethnic minority but develops mechanisms of ethnic co-optation would hamper support for ethnic mobilization in localities with access to power” (212). Co-optation instead of inclusion and a tradition of tokenism in fact characterized the territorial-autonomous-federal dimension in Turkey. In addition to the lack of a second chamber (which was indeed present in the Ottoman Empire; cf. Lord, 2012: 244), and therefore any representation of (territorial) minorities in the parliament, the local governments were often backed by the state itself, without meaningful administrative competences. The presence of separatist forces moreover reinforced the hostility of the centre towards the sharing of political power throughout the territory, with the army being also the force of ethnic homogeneity, in its fight against the PKK. Not surprisingly, as empirically

⁶⁶ Interestingly enough, Turkish centralism is labelled by Öcalan with the term ‘Jacobinism’, including both Kemalists and Islamists (Leezenberg, 2016: 672).

illustrated by Lindemann (2014), ethnic exclusion from the horizontal and vertical dimension of power is combined with weak territorial control, indiscriminate repression and external sanctuaries, which make violent escalations more likely.

However, the elections in local municipalities now represent the only way for the HDP to reinforce its position within the system, consolidating its power in 2019 and recently assisting CHP candidates in Istanbul. The HDP thus gained more territorial power and support for Kurdish candidates especially in those provinces excluded from central power (Tezcür & Gurses, 2017). Nevertheless, to conclude the analysis on the variables contained in the vertical institutional dimension, there is no asymmetric autonomy for particular regions, which hindered the possibility of having minority rights in specific territorial subunits.

3.1.4 Recent autocratization

As I have quantitatively and qualitatively shown in the thesis, majoritarian institutions in Turkey, even in the period when it has been classified as a democracy, have consolidated, maintained and often contributed to practices of ethnic exclusion. The history of Turkish majoritarianism, which can be correctly defined as ‘monoethnic majoritarianism’, namely *ethnic majority rule*, even exasperated after the growing polarization following the 2013 Gezi Park manifestations, against the autocratization of AKP rule and with Kurdish supporters (Kaya, 2019). The 2016 consolidation of the ruling party, moreover, after the military ‘self-coup’ (*autogolpe*, Selçuk, 2016: 584),⁶⁷ went also together with the decrease of EU influence. Therefore, the ‘creeping authoritarianism’ (Kubicek, 2016: 123; Öniş, 2013: 104) of the country, based on a tradition of social exclusion and majoritarian institutions, evident in executive monopoly of power and administrative centralization, finds no external constraints.

⁶⁷ In particular, after 2016: “the military, the judiciary and other state institutions have witnessed massive purges, which aimed at eradicating all alternatives of social power and silencing all oppositional voices” (Leezenberg, 2016: 671).

Anyhow, Kubicek believes that ‘majoritarianism’ is a variant of illiberal democracy, mentioned as one of the defective democratic types elaborated by Merkel (2004), as the ‘democracy of the ballot box’. Albeit he never mentions power-sharing explicitly, it might seem to be the only way to foster what the author wishes for Turkey: namely, pluralism (Kubicek, 2016: 125; Öniş, 2013: 120). However, during the majoritarian and authoritarian drift of the country, a change occurred in “‘Kurdish peace process’ in the early months of 2013 (...) to engage directly with the non-civilian Kurdish actors and notably with Öcalan as a means of achieving a peaceful solution to the ongoing dispute” (Öniş, 2013: 115). Nevertheless, the partial ‘democratic opening’ under the AKP aiming at concluding a peace agreement with the PKK was short lived and conducted as a security issue, more than at the political level (Updegraff, 2012: 124). Despite broadcasting in Kurdish was firstly allowed in 2004, the rhetoric of ‘multicultural understanding of nationhood’ by Erdoğan remained void.⁶⁸ Afterwards, with the escalation of the conflict in Syria, the peace process between the PKK and Turkish army collapsed.

To again stress the importance of majoritarian institutions, the autocratization of the country increased when Erdoğan became the first elected president of the republic in 2014. However, the seeds of exclusionary politics were deeply rooted in the monoethnic and majoritarian articulation of power which, albeit combining some token inclusion, is still centered on *de facto* exclusion of minorities and dissenters – similarly to the model of ‘ethnocracy’ I have described in the first chapter (cf. Yiftachel, 2006). In a few words, majoritarian institutions made the political system easy prey of authoritarian leaders, and ethnic majorities. As I will show in the concluding part of this chapter, however, the political evolution in Turkey is far from extraordinary. In fact, it can be deemed as a part of larger trend, also manifested in the presidentialization of politics (Selçuk, 2016).⁶⁹ After the massive constitutional amendments

⁶⁸ In this frame, religion was used as a *façade* and a way to keep the support of the majority of the population, rather than a means to enforce respect for diversity and minority recognition.

⁶⁹ With a comparison between Turkey, Chavez’s Venezuela and Correa’s Ecuador (Selçuk, 2016).

and referendums of 2010 and 2017, the majoritarian and plebiscitary view of democracy supported by Erdoğan was finally institutionalized. The result of this process is that Kurds continue to feel alienated towards political institutions (Karakoç, 2013) and no prospects of democratization or minority empowerment are foreseeable in the short and medium term.

3.2 Majoritarian and inclusive democracy: the case of Mali (2003-2010), or the fragility of the poster child of African (majoritarian) democracy

3.2.1 Overview: background and democratization

What I have described for the case of Turkey is in line with what most of the literature on power-sharing has affirmed: majoritarian institutions in plural societies lead to ethnic exclusion. However, as I have illustrated in the quantitative analysis, there are still a substantial amount of cases of majoritarian, though *inclusive* democracy, which need to be explained. One of these is Mali, which after the democratization of the 1990s has been considered between 2003 and 2010 in the quantitative analysis. The Malian example is also relevant to be scrutinized because, despite the scholarly bias in favor of Anglophone Africa (Basedau & Stroh, 2009), it has been often described as the frontrunner of the African model of democracy, or even as a flagship for democracy (Van Vliet, 2014), for having one of the best records in terms of democratization in the continent (Pringle, 2006).⁷⁰ In the pair-comparison of two most similar cases of majoritarian democracy, Mali is then different from Turkey in its ethnic inclusivity, while sharing similar majoritarian institutions. This paragraph shall explain why.

However, Malian majoritarian institutions and ethnic inclusivity are not the only striking aspects of the country which are of interest here and in the literature. In fact, landlocked in West

⁷⁰ “It illustrates with crystal clarity the mutual dependence between democratization and interethnic tolerance. It shows that poor, illiterate countries can indeed achieve democracy and that Islam, far from being inherently problematic, can play a constructive role in this process” (Pringle, 2006: 7).

Africa, while being one of the world's poorest countries,⁷¹ Mali is, or was, still a democracy, against those sociological theories connecting democracy with economic development (Vengroff, 1993), manifestly showing that democracy might survive “in the absence of wealth” (Smith, 2001: 73; Moestrup, 1999). Anyhow, for my examination, Mali is the example that the uneasy relations between social diversity and democratization – which some authors have at length emphasized – is not to be taken for granted and, in particular for the case of Africa, it might be based on a primordial and essentialist notion of ethnicity (Basedau & Stroh, 2009), while the situation is much more blurred and articulated on the ground. Nevertheless, Mali is an ethnically divided country, with a highly relevant social dimension of ethnicity (Dunning & Harrison, 2010). In fact, there are 12 ethnically and linguistically diverse groups: among them, the Bambara are the most numerous, followed by the Senufo, Songhay, Fulani, Malinké, Soninké, Dogon, the Berber Tuaregs and others. The Bambara and their affiliated groups account for 50% of the population, while among other minority ethnicities, with among 5-9% of the population, the Tuareg or Berber tribes are the most politicized (Moestrup, 1999).⁷² Mali's society is more homogeneous concerning religion, with 90% Muslim and the rest of Christian animists. Despite this social diversity, the Bambara are usually said to be numerically dominant though in harmony with other groups (Moestrup, 1999), and ethnicity not very salient in politics (Dunning & Harrison, 2010). Nevertheless, the relatively small minority of Tuaregs in the north desert will be of interest here, as it represents the main challenge for democracy. The politicization of this group, similarly to the Turkish example, underwent many localized rebellions against Bamako, firstly throughout the 1960s, then in 1990s and in 2006 (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015), before the last wave in 2012.

⁷¹ After the decline of commercial roots throughout the Sahara and the Sahel and with an economy completely dependent on foreign aid, because of the poor territory, furtherly impoverished by the lack of interest and investments of French colonizers.

⁷² The EPR reports those groups including the Bambara and their culturally closed ones to be around 89.9% of the population, with Tuareg around 7% and then other small Arab groups.

The ethnic divide between the Tuaregs and the rest of the population thus resembles the deep territorial division of the country, namely between the so-called Mali *inutile* and deserted in the north and the southern Mali *utile*, where all economic and political activities are concentrated (Clark, 1995: 207). Also due to this territorial fragmentation, the country experienced a deep and complex political history after the independence,⁷³ with the consolidation of the rule of the first president Modibo Keita, and its state socialism in 1961 supported by the Soviet bloc (Smith, 2001), then a military coup in 1968 – after the very bad economic performance and Keita’s dictatorial behaviors – by Moussa Traoré, who established a corrupt regime under French support and his single party, the People’s Democratic Union (Moestrup, 1999).

Afterwards, since the democratic transition at the beginning of the 1990s, Mali has been considered one of the most successful cases of democratization in Africa, with a rapid transformation from a repressive and military autocracy to an electoral democracy (Clark, 1995), under the new presidency of Alpha Oumar Konaré in 1992 – although the period of examination of the quantitative analysis is limited to 2003-2010 – and then a full alternation at the government in 2002, as I shall describe. In a few words, Mali offered a model for how ending the post-colonial *status quo* in Africa, when most countries were stuck in the ‘autocratic paralysis’ of one-party state after the 1960s (Nzouankeu, 1993).⁷⁴

How did the country democratize? After many strikes in the south by students’ associations, human rights organizations, trade and labor unions, civil society, the power was obtained by the opposition forces gathered around Konaré’s *Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali* (ADEMA), a pro-democracy movement with strong grassroots bases, once the army led by

⁷³ With a first attempt of federalization with Senegal.

⁷⁴ The democratization of Mali during the 1990s is also connected to the end of the Cold War (Smith, 2001), although this aspect has been neglected by Western observers (Clark, 1995). In fact, after the 1990s Africa was no longer considered by the great powers as the arena of their foreign influence – and proxy wars. The continent thus underwent a wave of ‘second independences’ (Clark, 1995), with multiparty elections in Namibia, Ivory Coast and many other examples of democratization.

Amadou Toumani Touré (commonly known as ATT) arrested Traoré and sided with protesters (Smith, 2001; Wing, 2013).⁷⁵ As in many other West African country, an institutional instrument has been paramount for managing the transitional phase: the national conference. In fact, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Republic of Congo, Togo and Zaire experienced some forms of national conference or reconciliation forum, where exponents of the former regime and new social and political forces seated together for deciding the future architecture of the state (Nzouankeu, 1993). Although with mixed results for different countries,⁷⁶ the institutionalization of the transition, with an informal element of power-sharing, was crucial. In fact, the canalization of new forces, combining opposition leaders, the army, trade unions but also influent religious leaders (Pringle, 2004; Künkler & Leininger, 2009) consolidated the legitimacy of the new democratic institutions. In Mali, civilian parties and the army joined a Transition Committee for the Well Being of the People, with many associations and parties, for drafting a new constitution and a law on political parties. This original ‘power-sharing approach’ during the democratization process, including all groups of Mali’s society, should be taken into consideration, in the analysis of Mali’s majoritarian political institutions. Unfortunately, however, no sources have been found on the ethnic composition of the national conference.

3.2.2 *Horizontal majoritarianism*

As previously analyzed, institutions are fundamental to manage ethnic relations and provide incentives for accommodation (Bogaards, 2007: 168). Bearing this in mind, I shall describe the Malian government, in the horizontal and vertical dimension of its political institutions.

⁷⁵ Although the regime change was pacific, 100 people died during the pro-democracy demonstrations or ‘*événements*’.

⁷⁶ In particular, Nzouankeu (1993) reports a better record of national conferences with limited autonomy, because of the approval of the previous establishment – while fully autonomous conferences were unsuccessful (for instance, in Togo, Congo and Zaire).

In line with French tradition, the constitution of 1992 established a semi-presidential executive, with a powerful presidency (Wing, 2013). No evidence of a liberal grand coalition by votes or by seats, or of a corporate prescription of reserved seats for ethnic minorities can be found in the constitution or other official laws. Therefore, the monocratic presidency is to be intended as a strong majoritarian device, not affected by the national run-off, majority electoral system. Since the very first democratic elections in 1992, in fact, the presidency worked to reduce party fragmentation. ADEMA, strong in particular in the rural areas, was the most spread party throughout the territory, being other actors in more or less isolated enclaves formed by personal linkages (Vengroff, 1993). The popular mandate of the president and the possibility to appoint a first minister, despite the relatively openness and fairness of the elections in the 1990s (with one controversial case in 1997, as I will report later) and throughout the 2000s, then resulted in the domination of the president within the system, characterized by weak institutions and strong personalities (Smith, 2001). The situation did not change with the alternation at the presidency and the return of ATT, elected in 2002 as independent (and civilian). The centralization of the power to the presidency remained a constant of Mali's institutions, and eventually one of its main weaknesses (Wing, 2013: 478).⁷⁷

Together with the majoritarianism in executive institutions, the same pattern is observable in the weak institutionalization of the parliament, the relatively small National Assembly (147 members), even in the years when Mali scored best in terms of electoral democracy. In fact, no minority veto rights or reserved legislative seats have been prescribed for ethnic groups. Moreover, although religious parties are prohibited through article 128 of the constitution (Künkler & Leininger, 2009: 1074), no explicit ethnic party bans are reported by the constitution or official laws. Albeit the absence of a ban on particularistic parties is rather a

⁷⁷ Together with a tradition of very low turnout: “40% for the referendum [for the constitution], 34% for the municipal elections, and between 22 and 24% for the legislative and presidential elections” in the first democratic electoral run in 1992 (Moestrup, 1999: 178).

rarity in Africa (Bogaards, 2007), such a ban would have been unnecessary in Mali, since the party system – as I will describe – is not structured along ethnic belongings.

The electoral system is another element of majoritarianism in Mali. Ideated as a double ballot, the two-round electoral system is applied to single and also multimember districts, combining incentives for restriction and inclusion between the first and the second turn, but also encouraging multiethnic constituencies and party lists (Moestrup, 1999). Under this majoritarian logic, the party electoral list is entirely elected in the electoral *cercles*, thus forcing parties to balance diverse ethnic and local interests (Bogaards, 2007: 184). Anyhow, the aggregation function of the electoral system (cf. Bogaards, 2007) is more effective for heterogeneous districts, though maybe less relevant for the territorially concentrated groups in the north. In fact, the “juxtaposition of plurality elections or first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) loses much of its relevance when socio-cultural groups are geographically concentrated, as is the case in Africa” (Bogaards, 2007: 169). Accordingly, Tuareg groups in the north, in particular for their relatively small dimensions, geographical homogeneity and exclusion from the party system itself, have been discouraged to participate in party politics and elections.

However, in his enlightening examination of Malian party system, Vengroff (1993) considers how it operated consistently with democratic governance, being evolved from 43 original political parties, then reduced by the first round of parliamentary, local and presidential elections in 1992. In addition to ADEMA, since 1992 there were mainly programmatic or personalistic parties, such as the *Union soudanaise – Rassemblement démocratique africain* (USRDA) backed by former pro-Keita elites with countrywide support (Vengroff, 1993) and the *Congrès national d’initiative démocratique* (CNID). However, none of these parties had a very clear ethnic orientation. Also after 2002 elections, political parties in Mali continued to be structured with programmatic bases, such as the *Rassemblement pour le Mali* (RPM), formed

by splinters from ADEMA and CNID, which won elections in 2002 and in 2013 and the *Union pour la République et la Démocratie* (URD), with ADEMA in the winning coalition of 2007 and second-arrived in 2013 elections.

Nonetheless, since the 1992 parliamentary election, despite relevant alternations, the Malian tradition was one of overwhelming majority in the parliament, starting with the two-third, strong and stable majority for ADEMA in 1992 (Vengroff, 1993: 554). Vengroff also reports examples of ‘vote pooling’ among different ethnicities (Horowitz, 1985), through the “existence of so many multi-member districts (...) forced to build lists of candidates which bring diverse ethnic, familial and local interests together. Since the entire list in each *circonscription*, and most *cercles* are ethnically mixed, the result is a relative balance in the distribution of seats between various groups which might otherwise have felt the need to form their own political organizations” (1993: 556). However, as before analyzed, vote pooling regarded mainly ethnic groups in the south, with the absence of any kind of *territorial* requirement for supporting minority representation (common in Africa, e.g. in Kenya and Nigeria; Bogaards, 2007) in the north. The stability of the political system, in other words, was obtained at the cost of the effective exclusion from power for some sectors of the population and the representativity of the system itself (Moestrup, 1999: 183). Due to the combination of semi-presidentialism, majoritarianism in the assembly and in the electoral system, the opposition often remains with few seats, without neither blackmail nor coalition potential (Sartori, 1976; cf. Bogaards, 2004). Albeit not with a proper dominant party system,⁷⁸ considering frequent alternations, Mali’s institutions suffer problems of legitimacy and very low electoral turnout. In particular, during the ‘double elections’ in 1997, when the Collective of opposition political parties (COPPO) with former members of the UDPM boycotted the

⁷⁸ In an unstructured or feeble party system, namely without mass parties, Bogaards defines “dominant party (system) when one party has won a parliamentary majority plus the presidential elections, where present, in *three* consecutive multi-party elections” (2004: 175: emphasis mine).

second electoral run, after the first one was annulled because of electoral frauds, ADEMA could easily win a new massive majority and thus second term for Konaré (Moestrup, 1999: 180). The alternation in 2002, with ATT elected as independent and restructuring the political system around himself, did not alter the pervasive majoritarianism of the system.

Nevertheless, the effect of majoritarianism in executive, legislative and electoral institutions was somehow softened by the scarcely ethnicized party system (Basedau & Stroh, 2009), characterized by programmatic and nonethnic parties. In fact, in Mali, despite its inclusion among plural societies based on the evaluation of politically salient ethnic groups, ethnicity has been often deemed a poor determinant of party preference (Dunning & Harrison, 2010: 22), while either regional residence or personal networks work better in predicting voting behavior. In fact, it is reported that parliamentarians prioritize their constituency rather than the national interest, in particular in such a mutable party system, with networks of clients and supporters (Van Vliet, 2014: 56). The institutional weakness, permanence of informal ties among political actors, and exclusion of parts of the population increased the dissatisfaction of many people towards Mali's democratic framework. However, this was not openly manifested until 2012, and – within the selected timespan for the quantitative classification – Mali still remains, at least in the horizontal articulation of power, a successful example of majoritarian and inclusive plural democracy.

3.2.3 Vertical majoritarianism

The situation is more complicated when the territorial division of power is concerned. In fact, as I have analyzed, the ethnic divide to a certain extent coincides with the territorial one, and the Tuareg unrest animated the north of the country even after the democratization of the 1990s (Clark, 1995) and the protests for democracy in the south (Smith, 2001). Despite some informal *concertations regionales* in 1994, after a final agreement signed in Timbuktu in 1992 (Wing, 2013), the problems in the vast area of the Azawagh, including parts of Mali, Niger, Algeria,

and Libya (Wing, 2013), remained far from solved. In fact, decentralization was deemed at the center of Mali's democratization efforts by international observers (Pringle, 2006). However, also because of the lack of asymmetric approach to north's grievances, the conflict between nomads in the periphery and the central authority remained endemic, involving not only ethnic Tuaregs but also Songhay and Arabs (Pringle, 2006: 30). After another wave of rebellion, the Algiers Accord signed in 2006 – never fully implemented – in fact repeated the necessity of a meaningful decentralization. Moreover, to recover one of the variables for the vertical articulation of power (Table 2, 36-38), the absence of an upper house undermined the representation of ethnic diversity in parliament.

The only way to contrast majority rule at the center was and still is through getting some political power in the municipalities in which the Malian state is divided. In fact, the electoral system for the local government is proportional representation which, although producing very fragmented results, still permits more opportunities for different actors. However, the councils of *communes*/municipalities, as devoid of an intermediary – regional – level, suffer from endemic corruption, and lack of serious competences and responsibility (Wing, 2013). In short, the 'missed decentralization' constitutes one the most significant flaws of post-1990s Mali, in particular for the predicament of northern populations. However, why does the EPR, used in the quantitative analysis, categorize all ethnic groups in Mali, including the Tuareg, as politically included, and thus sharing political power? Arguably, this is the result of what many scholars have scrutinized as the pervasive system of 'co-optation' of Tuareg leaders (Wing, 2013). More substantially than in Turkey, the informal co-optation of "local hierarchies on the basis of highly exclusive personalized bonds (...) relied heavily on non-state militant factions to counter recurrent anti-state rebellions" (Van Vliet, 2014: 48), also dividing Tuareg and Arab

communities, often backing local mafias, militias and drug cartels.⁷⁹ The continuous separatism of Tuareg communities then increased in the years of ATT, when the decentralized efforts by Konaré were not repeated with the same enthusiasm (Dickovick, 2008; Pringle, 2006). The very limited autonomy for municipalities, although with a more permissive electoral system than the national one (Moestrup, 1999), the lack of an asymmetric approach to the north, and therefore the absence of a formalized settlement for stably including these communities in the feebly decentralized articulation of power constituted the weakest aspects of Mali's institutions. However, despite – or perhaps due to – a systemic and informal minority co-optation, the country has been accordingly categorized as ethnically inclusive, in the quantitative analysis.

3.2.3 Mali's exceptionalism and recent democratic collapse

In the institutional and historical description of Mali's road to democracy, I have explained how majoritarian institutions did not lead to ethnic exclusion in this context. Firstly, I have analyzed how, despite the majoritarian character, the national conference at the beginning of the 1990s was an embryonal aspect of power-sharing: in a few words, although it established institutions enforcing majority rule in a plural society, the constituent power was initially exercised jointly and inclusively (Moestrup, 1999). Additionally, there is another bunch of independent variables which might explain the divergent outcome of the Malian example, and which are somehow exogenous to political institutions.

Firstly, one should consider the high heterogeneity of Malian society, or in other words, its crisscrossing ethnicities. In fact, according to Smith, "Mali's 10 million people are divided by

⁷⁹ Being the inclusion of Tuareg leaders based on cooptation only, one can question Mali's consideration among ethnically inclusive cases of majoritarian and plural democracy. This is only one of the criticisms of EPR measurement and coding of ethnic groups. However, as a crucial difference with the example of Kurdish presence among the political elites in Turkey, it should be noted that in Mali Tuareg leaders' cooptation was not connected to the assimilation into the dominant group(s), although self-determination of the north was surely never considered. Nevertheless, EPR group-based categories need to be integrated with a more accurate examination of ethnic co-optation, and their country-level elaborations specified to better address cases of *partial* or limited inclusion of ethnic groups.

language, culture, and geography into nearly a dozen ethnic groups (...). This ethnic heterogeneity may actually be an asset, heading off the conflict that often occurs when a smaller number of major ethnic groups compete for state power, as in Nigeria, Rwanda, and Burundi” (2001: 75-76). Secondly, and connected to that, there is what scholars describe as the ‘unique political culture’ of Mali, establishing “tolerance, trust, pluralism, the separation of power and the accountability of the leader” (*ibid.*, 76) as the unwritten principles of every political and social relation. This political culture was deemed to be also the legacy of the *grands empires* of Sahel,⁸⁰ their ‘multicultural settlement’ (Pringle, 2006: 13) at the crossroad of African agricultural and commercial economy, and transnational cities (such as Timbuktu). This culture of tolerance persisted thanks to the everyday practice of the so-called *cousinage*, namely “joking and mockery expressions among ethnic groups” (Dunning & Harrison, 2010), or more specifically funny insults and referents to the historical alliances during the Empires era cross-cutting ethnic patronyms and surnames. In short, surnames are connected to social groups and families, which intersect ethnicities. *Cousinage* relations thus contribute in explaining voter behavior, and ethnicity matters more as an intermediary among family relations. This “source of interethnic understanding” (Dunning & Harrison, 2010: 23), as commonalities of frankness and jokes between strangers, give a reason for the lower political salience of ethnic groups.⁸¹ These informal, familiar relations are to be considered together with the scarcely ethnicized party system (Basedau & Stroh, 2009), and the syncretic nature of Islam, whose religious leaders supported democratization in the 1990s (Künkler & Leininger, 2009; Moestrup, 1999). Moreover, the emergence and endurance of democracy in Mali, in particular with its culture of tolerance, accommodation and compromise, has also been described through a path-

⁸⁰ Before the colonial period, in particular the Ghana Empire (from the eighth to the eleventh century), then the Mali Empire (from the eleventh to the fifteenth century) – epic center of Mali’s national imagination – and finally the Songhay Empire (from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century).

⁸¹ Posner (2004) introduced a different measurement of politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa, which is noteworthy to this regard and may be used in further researches on this point.

dependency argument, as one of the unintended and fortunate consequences of a ‘soft’ and heterodox variant of African socialism (Dickovick, 2008). In fact, according to Dickovick, ethnicity in Mali is in competition with other forms of social identity for mobilizing political support, though not because of the influence of empires of many centuries ago (2008, 1134). Yet, it is the legacy of the leftist regime of Modibo Keita, who, in the foundational period of the Malian political system (1960-1968), undermined the formation of an ethno-patrimonial coalition of power (Dickovick, 2008), and thus laid the foundation for the emergence of programmatic, nonethnic electoral forces. This has been in common with a few other African countries and encouraged by the occurrence of presidents originating from ethnic minorities.⁸² Therefore, the absence of proper ethnic elites blocked the detrimental effect of majoritarian institutions on ethnic relations. Being a legacy of either recent or remote times, Mali demonstrated how a majoritarian, though ethnically inclusive or at least neutral, democracy might be possible in plural societies. This is to be connected to the cross-cutting, fractionalized and multiple ethnic cleavages in the country, which hindered the formation of homogeneous ethnic coalitions.⁸³

However, as the crisis after 2012 has shown, when local and regional interests (re)emerge, despite a history of low salience of ethnicity and ethnic compromise, the majoritarian

⁸² Other examples reported by the author are Benin and Ghana. Where there are no leftist legacies or rather a strict militarist and orthodox version of state socialism, democratization suffered more the challenges of ethnic politicization (Dickovick, 2008). Dickovick’s argument is instrumental and not ideological: “first, leftist political elites attempted to mobilize masses using class ideology, and explicitly sought to structure support along lines other than ethnicity. Given the salience of ethnicity in most African polities, this helped create ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ that modernization theorists long ago argued make democracy likelier. Moreover, leftism’s ideological proclivity for party–state control, and the weakness of its patronage networks, may have generated more robust, programmatic and institutionalized opposition in the long run” (Dickovick, 2008: 1122). Concerning the ethnic origin of the presidents, Keita was part of the Malinké minority (culturally close to the Bambara).

⁸³ Mali confirms that, in contexts characterized by fractionalized ethnicities, homogeneous ethnic coalitions are rarer: this can be observed since the independence to the establishment of programmatic parties in the 1990s. However, as constructivist scholars argue (Chandra, 2012), a low intensity of ethnicity as a political divide, based on informal coalitions, might change under the influence of ethnic entrepreneurs and favorable conditions or opportunity windows for ethnic mobilization.

articulation of power, in particular in its vertical dimension, can be inadequate. In fact, Mali also illustrates that a strong territorial concentration of social difference cannot be addressed through majoritarian institutions (and political culture) only. As Dickovick reports, “Mali’s Tuaregs kept ethnic politics alive” (2008: 1132)⁸⁴ and the culture of dialogue, the “central aspect of Malian (...) conflict resolution” (Wing, 2013: 478), has been proved to be *not* inclusive for all. Moreover, executive dominance and weak legislatures explain the lack of popular preoccupation when the army ousted the civil government in 2012 (Van Vliet, 2014). In fact, the end of the ATT regime went together with the impossibility to repress another wave of Tuareg rebellions in the north at the beginning of 2012, this time allied with Islamist groups (Thurston, 2013): namely the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and two Islamist organizations, with the support of some defections of the Malian army (Wing, 2013). Governmental incapacity, a severe food crisis, poor rains (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015) and grievances against the center made the situation explosive (Thurston, 2013: 6). The army then took the power in 2012, five weeks before the presidential elections in March 2012 (Wing, 2013). With the instability at the center, the MNLA forces spread in the north and declared their independence. In turn, Islamic terrorists and Al Qaeda splinters then seized the northern territory from the MNLA, including the cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu (Thurston, 2013: 2). The conflict terminated after France’s military intervention in January 2013, with the support of Nigeria, Senegal and Guinea (Wing, 2013) and the rapid reconquest of the north. However, 400,000 people were reported as displaced (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015) and low-level hostilities continue up to date. Although the military retired, and the power returned to civilians – in particular after 2015 presidential election won by the former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta – the future of the country is still unsettled. In fact, what the country is now facing is a

⁸⁴ *Cousinage* is more present in the south rather than in the north. As Dunning and Harrison report, “Tuareg(s) (...) in northern Mali (...) do not appear to have extensive surname-based joking alliances with members of their own or other ethnic groups” (2010: 24), then showing more internal cohesiveness.

novel politicization of ethnicity, due to the missed centralization and the prevalence of majority rule. The consensus tradition embedded in Mali's political history, in other words, did not equate with political pluralism for all (Van Vliet, 2014: 53). A difficult way to structurally solve this difficulties is observable in the *power-sharing* agreement signed between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA, including the MNLA) and the government, namely the *Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger*, which sought to establish a new asymmetric autonomy for northern municipalities, "proportional representation, quotas in electoral lists, reserved seats, and the redrawing of boundaries for electoral jurisdictions" (Nyirabikali, 2015). Unfortunately, the implementation of this agreement remained uncertain.⁸⁵

3.3 Political institutions, ethnic relations, regime dynamics and change: limitations and new research directions

To substantiate the quantitative framework presented in the second chapter, throughout this last pages, I have conducted a *most similar* comparison between Turkey (majoritarian/ethnically exclusive) and Mali (majoritarian/ethnically inclusive), to empirically explain why (i) *majoritarian institutions in plural societies often lead to ethnic exclusion* (in particular in Turkey), albeit (ii) *this scenario can be avoided when exogenous factors are at play* (party system, political culture/tradition of accommodation and compromise). However, this chapter wanted to do more: as the diachronic analysis has confirmed, in fact, since these exogenous factors are contextual and precarious, (iii) *majoritarian institutions, in particular the centralization of power, are demonstrated to be ill-suited to deal with territorially concentrated*

⁸⁵ Some authors criticized the institutionalist approach to Mali's crisis, emphasizing the importance of the 'empirical' rather than 'juridical' state, in particular in new democracies, thus including state capacities, policies, and practical actions to take care of its citizens (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015). Bleck and Michelitch also report how, regardless of state institutions, state neglect and abandonment of the northern Mali and rural areas fostered rebellion and provoked democratic collapse. I personally share the opinion of these two authors. However, the overall institutional framework, or the macro-political architecture, is relevant, since often *politics determines policies* (cf. Lowi, 1972).

minorities. In fact, as the case of Mali clearly illustrates, despite the social background conditions, majoritarian (and especially vertical) institutions might perform poorly, when a re-ethnicization of the political system occurs, as evident in the Tuareg rebellion. This might be a partial recovery of Lijphart's statement about the '*power-sharing-or-nothing*' model of democracy in plural societies. One might argue, in other words, that power-sharing democracy might be more able to cope with new political challenges. However, this affirmation should require a solid examination of other cases of majoritarian and plural democracy, the 'new object of study' launched by the thesis.

Moreover, returning to the original classificatory aim of the work, to delineate a better understanding on how political institutions and ethnic relations interact with the political regime, further research directions, originating from the limitations of the present thesis, might be computed. In fact, the rest of this section will be devoted to delineate six methodological, theoretical and empirical points, which will be functional to sum up the outcomes of the research, harmonize the theoretical framework with the quantitative and qualitative analyses, and finally pave the way for further contributions to the literature. In other words, moreover, are some of the conclusions or patterns delineated for the two cases analyzed in the qualitative comparison applicable to other cases of majoritarian democracy identified by the classification of chapter 2? Which are the generalizable lessons of the thesis?

Firstly, as extensively explained in the second chapter, *a first methodological point* stems by the attempt of the quantitative analysis conducted previously. In fact, despite personal modifications and integrations, the research has been limited by the design of the variables and dimensions the IDC entails. In brief, there is the urgent need of new datasets on political institutions in plural societies (cf. Juon, 2020), to better compare across countries and regimes. *A second methodological point* concern the empirical analysis of the qualitative part. To provide an in-depth and structured examination of the two selected countries, I have relied on


academic and secondary sources. However, they should be integrated with primary sources, for instance expert interviews, to better explain how political institutions affect and is influenced by ethnicity, and how social actors consider institutional incentives or constraints.

Moreover, a *first theoretical point* not addressed by the thesis is the distinction within plural societies. In fact, in my first case selection for the classificatory framework, I have included democratic countries inhabited by at least two politically relevant ethnic groups above and below certain thresholds concerning their population. However, the fundamental distinctions in the articulation of ethnic cleavages *within* this set of countries remained to be analyzed. For instance, is majoritarian democracy more likely to occur with several ethnic groups? How are ethnic inclusion or exclusion connected to the number and the consistency of ethnic groups?

Also, a *second theoretical point* is to include the openness of the political system in the classificatory framework. In the thesis, I have in fact selected more or less established, though electoral democracies. But which are the configurations of majority rule or power-sharing and ethnic relations in authoritarian regimes? Therefore, the three-dimensional map proposed in the second chapter might become a four-dimensional classification, as shown by Figure 5 (82).

This might be essential to scrutinize the *proper* political regime, not only its democratic quality or institutions, but more directly how democracy and nondemocracy differently approach to ethnic relations. In particular, such a four-dimensional map might be useful to make clearly discernable cases of (or a transition from) a defective type of democracy such as ethnic democracy and (or to) a peculiar kind of electoral autocracy like ethnocracy (e.g. maintaining majority rule in the institutional settlement, ethnic exclusion in social relations, though closing up the electoral competition), or even the differences between democratic and non-democratic ethnic power-sharing – a distinction unaddressed by my analysis focused on plural *democracies*, though still crucial to explain the dynamics of many ethnically divided countries (e.g. Burundi, Malaysia, Lebanon).

Figure 5. Political regimes in plural societies: towards a four-dimensional classification



Furthermore, and explicitly connected to the last aspect, a *first empirical point* might be to connect forms of democratic regimes and their performances to regime change. For instance, there is a growing literature on autocratization and democratic decay, in particular concerning ‘non-electoral’ aspects of democracy, such as media freedom, freedom of expression, rule of law, but also group exclusion. In fact, as reported by V-Dem scholars, the observable global trend of autocratization is driven by a set of particularly populous countries (Lührmann et al., 2017). Among them, we can report many cases belonging to what I have defined as horizontally and vertically majoritarian plural democracies, for instance Turkey, Israel and other horizontally majoritarian plural democracies, most notably India, Brazil, and the United

States.⁸⁶ In a few words, are autocratization and majoritarian institutions associated? Which are the effects of systematically disadvantaged ethnic groups on the political regime? In short, connecting the analysis on institutional variance and performance in terms of social relations to regime change, such as autocratization (cf. Cassani & Tomini, 2018), might be one of the ways to go forward in the research. And this could also be done through other methodological techniques, for instance Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). More in detail, for instance, we can speculate on the application of the lessons learned in the qualitative comparison of chapter 3 (e.g. the dangers of majoritarian institutions in plural societies associated with ethnic exclusion, the importance of the party system or a certain tradition of interethnic elite accommodation as counter-factor to thwart this process, and finally the dangers of centralization in dealing with territorially concentrated minorities) to the larger set of cases identified by the quantitative examination of chapter 2. For instance, the trajectory of Benin, one of the most stable African democracies, with a tradition of informal accommodation of ethnic elites even more extensive than the example of Mali – also considering its more ethnicized party system – could be of interest for further researches. In fact, the very recent autocratization in the country, now scored only as ‘partly free’ by Freedom House, has been accompanied by the establishment of a new electoral threshold of 10% and the exclusion of the northern ethnic groups from decision-making (Freedom House, 2020). In particular, many of the conclusion advanced for Mali could indeed be applicable to Benin. Likewise, the outcomes

⁸⁶ Israel is one of those countries with proportional, albeit not properly power-sharing, institutions which discriminate along ethnic lines, with many similarities to Estonia and Latvia. Accordingly, in my polar classification between majority rule and power-sharing, despite the proportionality of their electoral systems, Israel and Estonia have been categorized as *majoritarian* and plural democracies. A further discussion of these cases, in particular on Israel’s recent autocratization as well as the exasperation of the majoritarian traits of its institutional settlement, shall be conducted in future researches. Nevertheless, the distinction introduced by this thesis among power-sharing as opposed to majoritarian institutions is functional to explain why power-sharing does not equate with ‘consensus democracy’ properly. In fact, following Lijphart (2012), Israel can be classified as a case of consensus democracy, albeit it is neither a power-sharing nor a consociational democracy, as based on (ethnic) majority rule. Concerning India as a ‘majoritarian state’, connecting the democratic decline in the subcontinent to the Hindu nationalism of the Indian People's Party (BJP), see Chatterji, Hansen & Jaffrelot (2019).

of the analysis concerning Turkey could be applied to some Latin American cases, for instance the predicament of indigenous communities in Nicaragua (Freedom House, 2020a) and elsewhere. As can be observed in Appendix IV (101-102), more generally, a trend towards democratic decay can be observed even in other examples of majoritarian and inclusive democracy. Moreover, the same backsliding trend could be detected in other majoritarian and exclusive democracies, or cases scoring majoritarian in the horizontal dimension only (such as Brazil, India, or the US, as already mentioned). However, the lack of evidence of autocratization in some examples of both exclusive and inclusive majoritarian democracy should illustrate the need to better examine other crucial factors – e.g. the effect of party system, political culture or the articulation of ethnic and cultural diversity – in the analysis of the interplay between ethnic cleavages and the political regime. To conclude here, further researches should thence expand these first speculations.

Moreover, and finally, a *second empirical point* could be to include, in the analysis of political institutions, other features, for instance elements of direct democracy and the judiciary, such as the role of constitutional or supreme courts. In fact, for a more comprehensive consideration of institutional variance among political regimes, focusing on the aspects of executive, legislative, electoral and territorial power might be not enough, and other constraints, be them either popular or juridical, to majority rule might thus be extremely relevant.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the present thesis was to classify cases of majoritarian and power-sharing democracy in plural societies and evaluate their performance in terms of ethnic relations. Through a mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis, I have thus answered the research questions presented in the introduction. In particular, after having redefined fundamental, through still contested concepts such as plural society, power-sharing and majoritarianism, for analyzing ‘*How are democratic regimes in plural societies articulated?*’ and ‘*Which dimensions can grasp the institutional varieties and practical performances of political regimes in ethnically divided democracies?*’, I have mapped 47 consolidated and semi-consolidated plural democracies through 18 variables along 2 institutional dimensions, namely (i) majoritarianism or power-sharing in the government, parliament and electoral system and (ii) the territorial articulation of power. Secondly, for scrutinizing ‘*What is the effect of majoritarian institutions in plural democracies, in terms of ethnic inclusion and exclusion?*’ I have then added another dimension on (iii) regime quality as related to group relations, namely ethnic inclusion or exclusion. This classificatory framework, articulated in *de jure* political institutions and *de facto* performances or political practices, has proved that: (i) *power-sharing democracy is associated with ethnic inclusion*; nonetheless (ii) *majoritarian democracy occurs in plural societies and can coexist with ethnic inclusion*. This framework is inductive and based on the selected bunch of cases to illustrate which institutional factors are the most significant in producing patterns of ethnic exclusion or inclusion. However, it can be enlarged and modified by including other examples and countries.

In the thesis, anyhow, I have tried to delineate a new object of study, so far neglected by scholars: majoritarian and plural democracies. In fact, out of 47 cases of plural democracies, 29 (61.7%) score as majoritarian and thus non-power-sharing in the two institutional – horizontal and vertical – dimensions considered. Among them, 17 can be categorized as *de facto* ethnically

exclusive (58.6%) and 12 (41.38%) as ethnically inclusive. To explain this pattern, I have thence conducted an in-depth *most similar* comparison of 2 majoritarian democracies within my set of cases – namely Turkey (majoritarian/ethnically exclusive) and Mali (majoritarian/ethnically inclusive), integrating the examination of the quantitative indicators introduced in the second chapter with other qualitative factors, such as the history of democratization and the party system of the two countries. This pair-comparison has corroborated that: (i) *majoritarian institutions in plural societies often lead to ethnic exclusion*, albeit (ii) *this scenario can be avoided when exogenous factors are at play*. In the case of Mali, this has been shown by underlining the importance of the non-ethnicized party system and the relevance of political culture based on compromise and accommodation. However, through the diachronic examination, I have shown how these conditions remain precarious, and (iii) *majoritarian institutions, in particular the centralization of power, are demonstrated to be ill-suited to deal with territorially concentrated minorities*.

A future accurate analysis of majoritarian and plural democracies is promising, to explain why the distribution of political power among social groups is still unequal among many countries, even within democracies (Lührmann et al., 2017). This examination might also connect the consideration of this structural inequalities with recent patterns of autocratization and exclusionary politics. In fact, novel phenomena of what has been called ‘ethnopolitism’ (Jenne, 2018; cf. Madrid, 2008) throughout the world have revealed that exclusivist populism is rising not only in party politics but also as a form of government, indeed based on unlimited majority rule and exclusion, and that systemic injustice permeates many aspects of our lives.

Moreover, as I have described in the first chapter, researches on power-sharing and democracy have shown mixed findings throughout the years. Many of them, however, were based on a single dimension of analysis (power-sharing), not directly examining the role of majoritarian institutions in ethnically divided societies. This research, coupling a theoretical and empirical

enquiry, confirms those results on the general positive implications of power-sharing in handling with ethnic heterogeneity, through a direct comparison with its alternative, namely majoritarianism. Nevertheless, I have demonstrated that majoritarian institutions might to a certain extent coexist with ethnic inclusion, where other variables are at play, in particular party system and political culture. This shall readdress and complexify scholarly debates on majoritarian democracy in deeply divided places, to be considered neither only nor inevitably identifiable with centrifugal or ethnic democracy. Nevertheless, since party system and political culture might change more rapidly than political institutions do, their role in mediating the detrimental effects of majority rule *vis-à-vis* ethnic minorities might be precarious and unpredictable. Accordingly, despite power-sharing cannot be the solution to all the problems in plural and contemporary societies, there is the empirical evidence that it can successfully promote group inclusion and deter ethnic exclusion – the inherent risk of an institutional framework entirely centered on majority rule.

“Consociational theory would need to demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the rival type of majoritarian democracy does not work in plural societies”, Bogaards suggested two decades ago (2000: 418). Being this thesis an attempt in that direction, this shall be the objective for further researches, in order to more strongly prove the capacity of power-sharing to foster not only conflict resolution, but also inclusion, equality and justice more than majority rule, when all other conditions are considered. In fact, being political inclusion “the ability of all individuals and groups to influence governing processes” (Lührmann et al., 2017: 1333), its relevance in contemporary times is of paramount importance, as illustrated in the spread of exclusionary and racialized politics all over the world.

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
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APPENDIX I - TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED AND SCREE PLOT - TABLE 3

Appendix I. Total Variance Explained									
Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.164	21.090	21.090	3.164	21.090	21.090	3.039	20.261	20.261
2	2.248	14.988	36.078	2.248	14.988	36.078	2.373	15.817	36.078
3	1.644	10.958	47.036						
4	1.296	8.638	55.673						
5	1.138	7.584	63.257						
6	.961	6.409	69.666						
7	.917	6.115	75.781						
8	.712	4.748	80.529						
9	.665	4.432	84.960						
10	.538	3.584	88.545						
11	.492	3.278	91.823						
12	.373	2.486	94.309						
13	.319	2.124	96.433						
14	.272	1.814	98.244						
15	.263	1.758	100.000						


Extraction method: principal component analysis; components with Eigenvalue above 2 selected for Table 3.

Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Tables 2 and 4.



APPENDIX II - TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED AND SCREE PLOT - TABLE 5

Appendix II. Total Variance Explained									
Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.580	19.887	19.887	3.580	19.887	19.887	3.338	18.544	18.544
2	2.259	12.548	32.436	2.259	12.548	32.436	2.428	13.487	32.031
3	2.085	11.586	44.021	2.085	11.586	44.021	2.158	11.991	44.021
4	1.610	8.946	52.968						
5	1.281	7.115	60.083						
6	1.170	6.499	66.582						
7	1.004	5.580	72.161						
8	.946	5.258	77.419						
9	.705	3.918	81.337						
10	.662	3.678	85.015						
11	.573	3.182	88.198						
12	.509	2.826	91.024						
13	.406	2.256	93.280						
14	.354	1.966	95.246						
15	.318	1.768	97.014						
16	.275	1.525	98.539						
17	.198	1.100	99.639						
18	.065	.361	100.000						



Extraction method: principal component analysis; components with Eigenvalue above 2 selected for Table 5.

Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Tables 2 and 4

APPENDIX III - POWER-SHARING/MAJORITARIANISM INDICATORS IN PLURAL DEMOCRACIES

Appendix III. Variables and indexes for 47 ethnically divided democracies, average values 1989-2010

Country	Acronym	year	1_gc_lib	2_gc_lib2	3_gc_corp	4_partynoethnic	5_mveto	6_reseats	7_gallagher_index	8_avemag_es	9_ele_index	10_stconst	11_state	12_muni	13_subtax	14_subed	15_subpolice	16_auton	17_taf_index	18_exclu	19_inclu	20_rulal	21_der_index
Belgium	BEL	1989-2010	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.75	0.88	0.50	0.66	0.77	0.89	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.23	0.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Benin	BEN	1992-2010	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.39	1.12	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.86	0.00	0.81	0.00	1.61
Bolivia	BOL	1989-2010	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.82	0.45	-0.94	1.00	0.02	0.98	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.75	0.50	0.22	0.27	-1.10
Bosnia-Herzegovina	BIH	1999-2010	0.00	0.40	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.84	0.40	1.50	1.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.14	0.01	0.98	0.00	1.95
Botswana	BWA	1989-2010	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.29	-1.43	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.86	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.04
Brazil	BRA	1989-2010	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.86	0.60	-0.56	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.43	0.07	0.00	0.54	-1.21
Bulgaria	BGR	1989-2010	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.95	0.00	0.00	0.77	0.47	-1.58	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.95	0.00	0.00	-0.89	0.06	0.88	0.04	1.56
Canada	CAN	1989-2010	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.58	0.29	-0.59	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.43	0.00	0.85	0.00	1.70
Chile	CHL	1990-2010	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.34	-0.94	1.00	0.00	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.61	0.04	0.00	0.92	-1.92
Costa Rica	CRI	1989-2010	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.48	-1.05	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.43	0.02	0.00	0.93	-1.90
Cyprus	CYP	1989-2010	0.00	0.45	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.94	0.50	1.69	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.43	0.00	0.18	0.80	-1.24
Ecuador	ECU	1989-2009	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.79	0.40	-0.99	0.00	0.02	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	-1.67	0.31	0.00	0.69	-2.00
Estonia	EST	1990-2010	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.83	0.49	-0.93	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.43	0.29	0.00	0.68	-1.94
Fiji	FJI	2002-2009	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.47	0.29	1.59	0.00	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.57	0.37	0.00	0.55	-1.84
Ghana	GHA	1997-2010	0.00	0.29	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.77	0.29	-1.74	0.00	0.50	.	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.57	0.00	0.94	0.00	1.88
Guyana	GUY	2001-2009 (no 2006)	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.96	0.43	-0.90	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.86	0.39	0.00	0.44	-1.66
India	IND	1989-2010	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.75	0.29	-0.39	1.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.86	0.00	0.97	0.00	1.93
Indonesia	IDN	2000-2010	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.85	0.56	-0.87	0.00	0.95	0.95	0.91	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.18	0.07	0.04	0.45	-0.97
Israel	ISR	1989-2010	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.93	0.95	-0.54	0.00	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.14	0.44	0.53	0.01	0.17

Latvia	LVA	1991-2010	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.83	0.60	-0.74	0.00	0.00	0.84	0.00	0.95	1.00	0.00	-0.41	0.35	0.00	0.59	-1.88
Lithuania	LTU	1990-2010	0.00	0.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.68	0.29	-0.96	0.00	0.00	0.95	0.00	.	0.00	0.00	-1.46	0.13	0.00	0.83	-1.93
Macedonia	MKD	2003-2007	1.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.75	0.60	1.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.86	0.06	0.89	0.00	1.66
Mali	MLI	2003-2010	0.00	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.43	-0.64	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.43	0.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Mauritius	MUS	1989-2010	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.37	-1.22	0.00	.	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	-0.86	0.10	0.87	0.00	1.55
Mexico	MEX	1999-2010	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.29	-1.17	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.43	0.00	0.11	0.85	-1.48
Namibia	NAM	1995-2010	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.97	0.46	-1.61	1.00	.	.	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.86	0.06	0.92	0.00	1.71
New Zealand	NZL	1989-2010	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.76	0.29	-0.80	0.00	0.95	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.88	0.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Nicaragua	NIC	1991-2006	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.89	0.46	-0.94	0.00	0.00	0.69	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.69	-0.64	0.14	0.00	0.85	-1.97
Niger	NER	2002-2006	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.53	-1.37	0.00	.	.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-2.00	0.09	0.83	0.00	1.48
Panama	PAN	1991-2010	0.00	0.38	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.61	0.33	-1.77	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.00	.	1.00	-0.29	0.09	0.04	0.85	-1.80
Peru	PER	2001-2009	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.62	0.42	-1.21	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	-0.57	0.45	0.00	0.43	-1.75
Romania	ROM	1997-2010	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.81	0.48	-0.60	1.00	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.57	0.03	0.96	0.00	1.87
S. Africa	ZAF	1995-2010	0.13	0.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.74	-0.01	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.88	0.00	0.00	0.79	0.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Senegal	SEN	1993-2010	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.35	-2.10	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.71	0.00	0.95	0.00	1.90
Serbia	YSR	2003-2010	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.86	0.29	-0.60	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.86	0.22	0.34	0.37	-0.52
Sierra Leone	SLE	2003-2006	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.83	0.29	-1.91	0.00	0.00	0.75	0.00	.	0.00	0.00	-1.57	0.45	0.00	0.30	-1.50
Slovakia	SVK	1995-2010	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.82	0.96	-0.56	0.00	0.56	1.00	0.56	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.36	0.09	0.50	0.40	0.02
Slovenia	SVN	1991-2010	0.00	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.87	0.52	-0.30	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.43	0.05	0.00	0.83	-1.77
Spain	ESP	1989-2010	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.46	-0.98	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	0.02	0.28	0.68	-0.83
Switzerland	CHE	1989-2010	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.90	0.48	-0.21	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.43	0.00	0.87	0.00	1.73
Taiwan	TWN	1997-2010	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.75	0.42	-0.68	0.00	0.07	0.64	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	-0.45	0.02	0.98	0.00	1.92
Trinidad-Tobago	TTO	1989-2010	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.54	0.29	-1.35	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.43	0.36	0.07	0.36	-1.31
Turkey	TUR	2000-2010	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.46	-1.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.86	0.31	0.00	0.69	-2.00
UK	GBR	1989-2010	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47	0.29	-1.43	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.55	0.60	0.06	0.94	0.00	1.77
Uruguay	URY	1989-2010	0.00	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.97	0.43	-0.68	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.59	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.52	0.08	0.00	0.92	-2.00
USA	USA	1989-2010	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.29	-1.12	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	0.29	0.07	0.63	-1.68
Venezuela	VEN	1989-2000	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.80	0.39	-1.08	1.00	0.75	1.00	0.00	0.17	1.00	0.42	0.48	0.03	0.00	0.86	-1.78

Source: personal elaborations from V-Dem, EPR, IDC, DES and other data mentioned in Tables 2 and 4. Variable acronyms in Tables 2 and 4.

APPENDIX IV - MAJORITARIAN AND PLURAL DEMOCRACIES AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY (A VERY FIRST ENQUIRY)

Figure IV.1 Majoritarian/inclusive democracy and democratic decay





Figure IV.2 Majoritarian/inclusive democracy and democratic stability



Notes (1)

In line with paragraph 3.3, the following figures are a very first connection between the classification advanced by this thesis and regime change, in particular between cases of majoritarian and plural democracy and their autocratization or democratic decay. As can be observed, reporting data from the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (which includes the Electoral Democracy Index previously used in the quantitative analysis, but also considering other indicators, such as freedom and fairness of elections, freedom of association and expression, equality before the law, individual liberties, judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, with a score ranging between 0 – least liberal-democratic – and 1 – most liberal-democratic). Cases of democratic decay can be observed in examples of majoritarian and inclusive democracy, such as the analyzed Mali, but also Benin, Bulgaria, Israel, Niger and Romania (Figure IV.1). However, the same trend is not detectable in other cases of majoritarian and inclusive democracy (such as New Zealand and others; Figure IV.2), nor in some examples of majoritarian and ethnically exclusive democracy (Figure IV.3, 102).

Source: V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (1989-2019)

Figure IV.3 Majoritarian/exclusive democracy and regime stability




Figure IV.5 Horizontal majoritarian democracy and democratic decay





Figure IV.4 Majoritarian/exclusive democracy and democratic decay



Notes (2)

Other manifest trends towards democratic decay and autocratization can be observed in other cases of majoritarian exclusive democracy, such as the widely examined Turkey, also similarly Nicaragua and some Latin American (e.g. Bolivia, Chile) and other cases (Figure IV.4). The same, and perhaps more evident according to the data, backsliding tendency could be observed among cases of plural democracies, scoring majoritarian in the horizontal dimension only (such as Brazil, India, the United States or even Serbia; Figure IV.5).

Source: V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (1989-2019)

A TENTATIVE DECALOGUE FOR THE ART OF INTER-ETHNIC TOGETHERNESS

Trento, 1 April 1994

- “1. A multi-ethnic co-habitation will be the norm rather than the exception; the alternative is between ethnic exclusion and living together (...).
2. Identity and living together: never the one without the other; neither forced inclusion nor forced exclusion (...).
3. To know each other, to talk among each other, to inform, to inter-act: ‘the more we have to do one with the other, the better we will understand each other’ (...).
4. “Ethnic is beautiful”? Why not? But not at only one dimension: territory, gender, social position, leisure time and many other common denominators may be important as well (...).
5. Define and delineate in the least rigid way possible one’s belonging, do not exclude multiple belongings and interferences (...).
6. Recognize and evidence the multi-ethnic dimension: rules, rights, languages, public signs, daily gestures, the right to feel at home (...).
7. Rights and guarantees are essential, but they are not enough; ethnocentric norms favour ethnocentric behavior (...).
8. The importance of mediators, bridge builders, wall vaulters and frontier crossers (...).
9. We need “betrayers of ethnic compactness”, but not “deserters”. And a vital condition: to ban all forms of violence (...).
10. The pioneer plants of a culture of togetherness: mixed inter-ethnic groups (...)

Alexander Langer