FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO CLIMATE CRISIS: COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION FRAMES' TRANSFORMATIONS AT THE UN LEVEL

By Polina Popova

Submitted to

Central European University Department of International Relations

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Erin Kristin Jenne

Word Count: 12,159

Budapest, Hungary 2020

Abstract

A threat multiplier and a threat within itself, global in scope and affecting the ones most vulnerable the most, climate change, as one of the most significant challenges of our time, is in need of a global response. However, which factors are to define the format an international response to climate change is likely to take? This thesis aims to shed light on how the construction of the very idea of climate change and the threats it poses shapes collective climate action at the UN level. The study uses frame analysis methodology to trace the interplay of meanings and ideas across different UN bodies and to account for the ways in which *climate security-*, *climate justice-* and *climate emergency frames* transform the UN's approach to climate change. The thesis traces the transformations within the different climate (action) frames since the moment of climate change emergence as a UN agenda item. The study argues that the process of collective climate action frames' development within the UN frameworks is limited by state-centricity of the UN's architecture. However, it also notes that in parallel with the emergence of the *climate crisis* framework, the UN tends to seek greater involvement in human-based approaches to climate change.

Acknowledgements

I express my deepest gratitude to the IR department, to all the incredible people who have shared this challenging and life-changing journey with me. You made me feel like home wherever the road took us. I am deeply thankful to Professor Erin Kristin Jenne for her careful guidance of my research, openness to my ideas, constant support and encouragement, even in the very last moments. I am also grateful to Professor Erzsébet Strausz for her enormous support during the New York semester. I thank my family for always believing in me and supporting me. I wouldn't be where I am now without you. Maria Iliasova, Anastasia Nekrasova, this also applies to you! And my special gratitude goes to Freya Cumberlidge and Evita Swjagina for their tremendous help in finalizing the project.

Table of contents

Introduction

Climate change is a problem "global in scope and unprecedented in scale."[1] According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), "human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017."[2] Unless significant collective action is taken to keep the global temperature increase below 1.5°C above the preindustrial level, the world is to face a multifaceted climate catastrophe by 2030 taking such forms as droughts, floods, intensified extreme weather events, sea level rise, biodiversity loss, intensifying poverty and inequality.[3] Climate change is a complex problem, since different states have not contributed equally to the current levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere, and will not share the burden of the global temperature rise equally. Having no respect to artificially created national borders, climate change is a problem in need of a truly global response.

Climate change emerged as an issue of the United Nations' (UN) agenda in 1970s, primarily within the frameworks of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). However, within the following decades, climate change appeared as an agenda item at such UN bodies and programs as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and several other agencies. In addition to this, a special UN Climate Change body was created with the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), under the framework of which a sequence of climate treaties – the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord and the Paris Agreement – emerged. The problem of climate change

[1] United Nations, "Climate Change," accessed June 20, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/.
[2] The IPCC, *Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°* (2018), 31.
[3] Ibid., 53.

has, therefore, become one of the central issues of the international concern within the UN discourse.

Despite being offered a variety of cooperation opportunities within the UN frameworks, in the aftermath of twenty five rounds of the Conferences of Parties (COPs), also known as the UN Climate Talks, the world is lagging behind in addressing climate change at a pace compatible with science. While the IPCC is calling to "strengthen the response to the threat of climate change,"[4] governments have repeatedly demonstrated a lack of political willingness to cooperate on climate change – evident by such episodes as the US' withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and then the Paris Agreement, the "Copenhagen failure," as defined by the inability to negotiate a binding agreement at the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, and the widespread insufficiency of climate pledges[5] under the most recent and advanced climate treaty: the Paris Agreement, which provides countries with a long-term framework of GHG emissions' reduction. The slow pace of the world's responsiveness places the international community in continuous search for ways to address climate change effectively.

In fall 2019, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres introduced new platforms to pressure world leaders and other stakeholders to increase their climate commitments and engage in greater climate ambition. By holding the Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit and the Youth Climate Summit, he brought in the voices of youth climate activists into the UN frameworks. These events took place in the aftermath of the COP21 in Madrid – referred to by Guterres as a "lost opportunity to tackle the *climate crisis*."[6]

[4] The IPCC, *Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°* (2018), v.

[5] Robert Watson, et al., *The Truth Behind the Climate Pledges* (FEU-US, 2019), 1; "Climate Action Tracker," accessed July 1, 2020, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/.

[6] António Guterres, "Statement by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the Outcome of COP25," *UNFCCC*, December 15, 2019, accessed February 14, 2020, https://unfccc.int/news/statement-by-the-un-secretary-general-antonio-guterres-on-the-outcome-of-cop25.

The *crisis* understanding of the climate change problem has recently been on the rise. In particular, the mobilization of youth within transnational climate movements has contributed to the increased recognition of the implications of the changing climate as a crisis. The further manifestations of this paradigmatic shift can be found within the media, with *the Guardian*, updating its style guide with the preferability of such terms as "climate emergency, crisis or breakdown" over "global warming" or "climate change,"[7] and with the EU declaration of climate emergency.[8]

Recognizing the UN as the central intergovernmental body in charge of orchestrating a global policy response to climate change, I aim to shed light on the way this shift in understanding affected the UN's approach to climate change. I, therefore, take a broader look on the evolution of the existing approaches to climate change within the different UN structures from seeing climate change as an environmental issue towards an issue of political concern.

Prior to outlining the particular scope of the study and the research design strategy, I account for the previously conducted research, firstly, on the construction of climate change as a concept, and, secondly, on the formation of policy responses to climate change on the international scene, as both of these dimensions are connected to the research topic.

There is a wide body of literature exploring the agency of different actors in the construction of the climate change problem. For instance, as Allan argues, the emergence of climate change within the international realm as a geophysical, instead of a bioecological problem, occurred due to the involvement of both scientists and, most importantly, states, illustrated by such facts

[7] Damian Carrington, "Why the Guardian is changing the language it uses about the environment," *The Guardian*, May 17, 2019, accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/17/why-the-guardian-is-changing-the-language-it-uses-about-the-environment.
[8] Jennifer Rankin, "'Our house is on fire': EU parliament declares climate emergency," *The Guardian*, November 28, 2019 accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/28/eu-parliament-declares-climate-emergency.

as the geophysical sciences' benefitting from the US government support in the 1950s.[9] Other explanations of the power relations behind the construction of the climate change problem focus on the agency climate movements hold.[10] The existing literature also offers accounts on the role media representations[11] play in attaching certain meanings to climate change within the public discourse. Another cluster of literature specifically focuses on the dynamics of UN Climate Talks, accounting for the roles of single nation states,[12] negotiation settings,[13] and the formats of the UN climate treaties.[14]

Bearing the existing literature in mind, I take a different approach by conducting an analysis of the transformation of climate change as an agenda item across different UN bodies and agencies as a process of *frame transformation*.[15] In my analysis, I rely on frame theory,[16] within which particular understandings of the phenomena are generated with the help of certain frames as meaning-making tools, with each frame being built on certain pre-existing ideas or moral judgements and offering particular approaches to policy solutions.[17]

9 Bentley B. Allan, "Producing the Climate: States, Scientists, and the Constitution of Global Governance Objects," *International Organization* 71 (2017).

10 Donatella della Porta, Louisa Parks, "Framing Processes in the Climate Movement: From Climate Change to Climate Justice," in *Routledge Handbook of Climate Change Movements*, ed. Matthias Dietz, Heiko Garrelts (2013).

11 Adriana Bailey, et al. "How Grammatical Choice Shapes Media Representations of Climate (Un)certainty," *Environmental Communication-A Journal Of Nature And Culture*, 3 (2014).

12 Charles F. Parker, and Christer Karlsson, "The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the United States: Assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris," *Environmental Politics*, 27(3).

13 Daniel Bodansky, "The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem," *The American Journal of International Law*, 104, no. 2 (2010).

14 Daniel Bodansky, "The Paris climate change agreement: a new hope?" *The American Journal of International Law*, 110, no. 2 (2016).

15 David A. Snow, et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986), 467.

16 Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis, An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York: Northeastern University Press) (1974); Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000).

17 Robert M. Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11," *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2010): 417.

The research questions, guiding the current study, are formulated as follows. *How did climate change transform from an environmental into a political issue at the UN level? How did the reframing of climate change into climate crisis affect the UN's construction of its collective climate action frames?*

The research design is structured in accordance with the qualitative frame analysis methodology. Approaching frames as holders of meanings, I utilize an inductive hermeneutic approach to frame analysis.[18] In this way, the focus of the research is placed on interpretations of certain meanings and, subsequently, policy solutions embedded within the particular frames, allows me to gain a better understanding of the process of reconceptualization of the idea of climate change at the UN level.

The analyzed texts with the purpose of *climate* frames' identification include relevant UN documents, meetings records, climate treaties and speeches contributing to the formation of the UN climate discourse. I account for the emergence of different framings of climate change and collective climate action within the UN structures since the emergence of the climate issue on UN's radar until the most recent developments in fall 2019, when the new formats of the Climate Action Summit and the Youth Climate Summit were introduced. With the help of secondary sources and media, I also account for the actors and factors contributing to the dynamics of frames' interactions within the UN realm. It is also important to highlight the limitations of the research. As it is primarily focused on the frames' diffusions, transformations and contestations over a large period of time, it cannot account for all the details of each of the approaches identified. Instead, it shows how climate action frames get transformed within the

[18] Clarissa C. David, Christian Baden, "Frame Analysis," in *International Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods*, ed. Jörg Matthes (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) (2017), 10.

UN level against the background of a larger paradigmatic shift from climate change to climate crisis.

The study is structured as follows. In the first chapter, I introduce the context of the transformation of understanding of climate change from "global warming" into the "climate crisis." In the second chapter, I firstly extract the relevant analytical tools from frame theory and secondly, conceptually elaborate on the two major conceptual approaches to the phenomenon of climate change within the IR discourses: the climate security frame and the climate justice frame. The third chapter provides conceptual grounding for the nature of *actorness* of international organizations on the international stage and accounts for the other actors expected to have an impact on the decision-making process within intergovernmental organizations. In the fourth chapter, the empirical analysis of the relevant documents contributing to the evolution of the climate discourse at the UN level is conducted, followed by the conclusion.

Chapter 1: Climate science and politics nexus

"No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken world. The people had done it themselves."[19]

To understand the current state of international climate politics, one needs to trace the scientific, political and discursive developments of the concept of climate change, as it is only the recognition of its multidimensionality that enables fully grasping the complexity of the international consensus-building process on climate change matters. In this chapter, I show the interplay of different dimensions of the climate change problem, outline its discursive transformation from *global warming* into *climate change*, and account for the subsequent emergence of the *climate crisis* and *climate emergency* notions.

1.1. From global warming to climate change

The emergence of scientific knowledge on the topic of climatic variations linked to the presence of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere, dates back to the nineteenth century when the first research on what is currently known as the "greenhouse effect" was conducted.[20] Thus, the understanding of a warming world due to the emissions of GHG appeared within the scientific discourse. Further research led to the transformation of this concept into climate change, as the changes caused by the increased amounts of GHG in the atmosphere include not just the increase of temperatures, bringing in ocean warming and sea level rise, but also cause

[19] Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994).
[20] Bert Bolton, *A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

such catastrophic effects as intensified extreme weather events, longer and more intense droughts, increase in heaviness of rainfalls.[21]

The complexity of the climate change problem lies primarily in the role humanity plays in it. The increase in the atmospheric concentrations of carbon occurred in parallel with the industrialization process, showing the importance anthropogenic GHG emissions hold in affecting the planet's atmospheric composition. Carbon dioxide (CO_2) is recognized as one of the major anthropogenic GHG. As CO_2 emissions are primarily generated from burning fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and natural gas, the climate change problem appears to be tightly bound to human decision making.

The strategies of responding to climate change are therefore structured along the lines of climate change mitigation, defined as "limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs,"[22] and climate change adaptation, understood as "adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli."[23]

Historically inseparable from the process of industrialization, the phenomenon of climate change now challenges the capitalist embodiment of western modernity, taking into account the latter's high dependence on what Malm conceptualizes as the "fossil economy:"[24] an "economy of self-sustaining growth in emissions of carbon dioxide."[25] The understanding of

[21] The IPCC, *Special Report: Special Report On Climate Change And Land*, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/.

[22] United Nations, *The UNFCCC*, Art. 4, Accessed July 1, 2020, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.

[23] UNFCCC, "What do adaptation to climate change and climate resilience mean?" accessed May 9, 2020, https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-change-and-climate-resilience-mean.

[24] Andreas Malm, *Fossil capital: the rise of steam-power and the roots of global warming* (London, New York: Verso, 2016), 23-24.

[25] Ibid.

the devastating effects of anthropogenic climate change is a challenge to the vision of the Western model, the alleged universalization of which has been famously referred to by Fukuyama as the "End of History,"[26] meaning humanity's arrival to the final stage of its sociocultural evolution. Climate change is a continuous process, implying considerable changes of patterns of thinking, transformation of ideas and behaviors. Therefore, the climate change problem requires solutions capable of transforming the patterns of living towards greater climate resilience, and, therefore, transforming the pre-existing modes of "common sense."[27]

What further complicates the process of delivering a joint response to climate change is the severe disproportionality of vulnerabilities which lie at its core. Firstly, nation states' historical contributions to the problem of climate change are not equal. While according to data from 2017, the world's biggest polluters, measured in accordance to the overall levels of CO_2 emissions, include China, the US, Russia, Japan and India,[28] the US alone is responsible for generating 29% of global cumulative emissions measured in the period between 1850 and 2004.[29] Secondly, the effects of climate change will not affect nation states equally. Instead, those states, such as the small island nations, who have contributed least to climate change, are more vulnerable to it and will bear the hardest consequences.

Climate change is not an autonomous process, but a complex phenomenon, heavily dependent on human activities and, therefore, policy choices. Existing with no respect to the artificially created national borders, climate change presents a global challenge. Therefore, the intranational dimension of consensus-building on climate change is key to ensuring an

[26] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London Penguin Books, 1992).
[27] Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers), 348.
[28] International Energy Agency, "CO_2 Emissions from fuel combustion," Accessed March 31, 2020, http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/1378539487.
[29] Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, and David Wippman, *International Law. Norms, Actors, Process. A Problem-Oriented Approach* (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010): 758.

adequate response. However, despite the scientific certainty, the lack of political willingness to act on climate change continues to persist on the international scene.

1.2. From climate change to climate crisis

According to World Bank data, the overall amounts of CO_2 emissions worldwide have grown continuously since the 1960s with the latest available numbers from 2014 being the highest in history.[30] Given the devastating effects of climate change and its global nature, as discussed in the previous section, the policy realm of the climate change problem is crucial for ensuring the world's joint response to the threat of climate change.

Several studies have been held to examine the ways in which countries respond to climate change. For instance, the Climate Performance Index combines data on the GHG emissions, energy use, renewable energy usage, and climate policy in different countries[31] to assess their responsiveness to climate change. According to the 2020 ranking, 14 out of 58 countries assessed are rated as very low on their climate change performance.[32] These countries include high-emitting countries such as the US, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Iran, Canada, Russia and Japan.

Climate Action Tracker is used to trace a government's climate commitments compared to the Paris Agreement targets of keeping the global temperature rise below 2°C or, ideally, below 1.5°C.[33] According to the Climate Action Tracker, the current climate commitments of the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Ukraine fall into the "critically insufficient" category. The high insufficiency of climate pledges has been highlighted in Indonesia, South Africa, UAE,

30 The World Bank, "CO2 emissions (kt)," accessed May 25, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT.

31 Jan Burck, et al., *The Climate Change Performance Index: Background and Methodology* (Germanwatch, 2019), 5.

32 Jan Burck, et al. *The Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2020*, Germanwatch (NewClimate Institute & Climate Action Network, 2020), 9.

33 "Climate Action Tracker," "About," accessed March 28, 2020, https://climateactiontracker.org/about/.

South Africa, Singapore, Argentina, Chile, South Korea, Japan and China,[34] – which is today's largest GHG emitter, generating "approximately 27% of global GHG emissions" alone.[35]

Given the slow pace of the world's progress on climate change, another dimension of international climate politics recently emerged in the form of a new wave of transnational youth activism. Starting from 2018, the world witnessed an unprecedented level of youth activism in the form of global climate movements, demanding greater action on climate change from nation states and other stakeholders. Since August 2018 until May 2020, more than 80,000 strikes have been held in 214 countries under the auspices of the "Fridays for Future" movement,[36] making youth climate activism an integral part of the international political landscape on climate change. The manifestations of the Fridays for Future movement are built around the most ambitious goal provided by the UN's Paris Agreement with its call to keep the global temperature rise below 1.5°C.

The activities of the youth climate movement have been largely inspired by the Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg – one of the most prominent figures in constructing and maintaining the climate crisis/climate emergency narrative. In 2018, a then 15 year-old Greta Thunberg, protested in front of the Swedish parliament demanding greater climate commitments from the government with the poster reading "Skolstrejk för klimatet" – school strike for climate. Within less than two years, Greta Thunberg became one of the most prominent figures advocating for the *climate emergency* discourse,[37] and, interestingly, has

[34] "Climate Action Tracker," "About," accessed March 28, 2020, https://climateactiontracker.org/about/.
[35] "Climate Action Tracker," "China," accessed June 11, 2020, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/.
[36] "Fridays for Future," "Strike Statistics," accessed June 11, 2020, https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/strike-statistics/.
[37] Greta Thunberg, "This is an emergency': Greta Thunberg speaks at Guardian Live – video," April 23, 2019, accessed July 1, 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/video/2019/apr/23/this-is-an-emergency-greta-thunberg-speaks-at-guardian-live-video.

entered the realm of the conventional "adult" politics by giving a number of speeches at international political fora, including the UN Climate Talks.

While the reconceptualization of *global warming* into *climate change* illustrates the trajectory of scientific developments on the matter, the emergence of the notions of *climate crisis* and *climate emergency* signals the insufficiency of the world's response to the challenge of climate change. Lying at the crossroads of environmental, political, legal and social realms, with high levels of multidimensionality at the core of its complexity, climate change poses a difficult task for the international community, and in particular challenges the UN, as it is the primary international organization to ensure the orchestration of global response. In the next chapter, I turn to frame theory and address the ways climate change can be addressed and conceptualized beyond the environmental vision of the problem by framing it in certain ways.

Chapter 2: Constructing climate change

As put by Giddens, "dealing with climate change means coping with risk and uncertainty."[38] Despite the devastating effects climate change is already having on people's and nature's existence in the Asia-Pacific, despite the clarity of climate science and presence of the compelling evidence of the observed changes,[39] the issue of climate change is still addressed primarily in the future tense, relying on the language of likelihood of future risks found within the IPCC assessment reports. Just like the constructivist vision of anarchy, famously referred to by Wendt as being "what states make of it,"[40] the understanding of climate change and, therefore, the preferred policy response happens to be subject to social construction.

The absence of a single fixed meaning attached to the phenomenon of climate change and the threats it poses, enables the coexistence of multiple approaches to how it should be addressed. As previously argued by Humle, the major reason why we disagree on climate change is within the way how we frame it.[41] In this chapter, I introduce the concepts of frames and framing to be further utilized in the interpretation of coexistence, contestation and transformations of climate policy frames at the UN level.

[38] Anthony Giddens, *The Politics of Climate Change* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 7.
[39] The IPCC, "Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers," accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
[40] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992).
[41] Mike Hulme, *Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

2.1 Collective action frames' transformation and diffusion: theoretical framework

Campbell argues that the "existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside the language and our traditions of interpretation,"[42] as he theorizes the state practice of identity construction via articulation of threats. Frames and framing processes are useful tools to account for the meaning-making practices and for defining the trajectories of policy developments.[43] Firstly theorized by Goffman and receiving further reconceptualization in the studies of social movements and political processes, frames holds considerable explanatory power to account for various international dynamics.

Interestingly enough, Goffman's early conceptualization of the *primary frameworks* – used by individuals to "locate, perceive, identify, and label"[44] the natural and social world, – with the former defined as "purely physical" with no agency or sanctions for inaction involved, and the latter constituting the opposite, incorporating "will, aim, the controlling effort of an intelligence," is illustrated in the state of the weather report being an example of a natural framework. [45] Notably, the emergence of the understanding of *climate crisis* and its anthropogenic causes poses a challenge to this classification, since the weather patterns' changes are inseparable from the paradigm of the changing climate. Before turning to the transformation of the climate change paradigm within the UN framework, I provide more

[42] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 6.
[43] Robert M. Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11," *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2010); Robert D. Benford, "Frame disputes in the nuclear disarmament movement," *Social Forces* 71, no. (1993).
[44] Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: an Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston: Northwestern University Press) (1974): 21.
[45] Ibid., 22.

theoretical grounding for the notion of frame, such as *collective action frames*, *frame diffusion* and *alignment*.

Frames, though not being reduced to these objectives, are expected toperform the following functions:

1. Defining a problem, meaning "determining what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits"; [46]

2. Diagnosing the causes, or "identifying the forces creating the problem"; [47]

3. Making moral judgements, implying "evaluating casual agents and their effects"; [48]

4. Suggesting remedies, standing for "offering and justifying treatments for the problem and predicting their likely effects."[49]

These functions are performed by what Entman defines as processes involving selection and salience.[50] In this way, some "aspects of the perceived reality" are made more salient in the text "to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation […]."[51]

Within the conceptual framework, found in the works of Snow and Benford, frames appear as crucial tools of mobilization of social movements which generate collective action frames, defined as "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the

[46] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 52.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., 53.
[51] Ibid., 52.

activities."[52] The narrative of youth climate activists can, therefore, be understood through the prism of construction of a collective (climate) action frame, aimed at enhancing greater climate action in accordance with the Paris Agreement worldwide.

To understand the process of "travelling" of collective action frames from one actor to another, or, in other words, from the transmitter to the adopter, one can look at it from the perspective of the concept of *frame diffusion*. The notion of diffusion allows to account for the communication channels used and the degree of engagement of both the transmitting and adopting units, as well as their relation to the object of diffusion.[53] Snow and Benford offer a typology of diffusion to account for the cross-national movement of frames: reciprocation, defined by "mutual interest of transmitters and adopters in the object of diffusion;"[54] adaptation, in which the adopter takes the initiative to "borrow" certain ideas or frames;[55] accommodation, which includes "tailoring or fitting of the objects(s) of diffusion to the targeted sociocultural context."[56]

The study of frame diffusion allows one to trace the pace of ideas' emergence and development, and, most importantly for the current study, to account for shifts in understandings of certain ideas. The process of frames transmission and the transformative features it may imply have been theorized by Snow et al. as *frame alignment.*[57] This process takes the shape of *frame*

[52] Robert D. Benford, and David Snow, "Framing and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 614.
[53] Davis A. Snow, and Robert D. Benford, "Alternative Types of Cross-National Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena, cross-national diffusion," in *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, ed. Donatella della Porta (London, New York, 1999), 25.
[54] Ibid., 27.
[55] Ibid., 30.
[56] Ibid., 34.
[57] David A. Snow et al., "Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation," *American Sociological Review*, 51, no. 4 (1986): 467.

transformation, once something taken-for-granted starts being referred to as problematic, and the conventional paradigms get replaced by the means of "planting new values."

To account for the process of frame alignment, one has to distinguish between different types of this process, which include bridging, once "ideologically congruent" frames collide, frame application through the "clarification and invigoration" of a particular issue, or frame extension implying broadening of the existing frame to make it appealing to the adopter.

A distinct way to utilize frame analysis is by approaching frames as agenda-setting tools capable of influencing policy choices and policy dynamics, as different framings offer different readings of the problem and, therefore, policy solutions. For instance, Schön and Rein apply the framing dimensions to policy analysis, defining frame-critical policy analysis[58] as the identification of how the issue is named and subsequently resolved.

This section outlined elements of frame theory relatable to analyzing paradigmatic transformations in terms of collective action framing. It, surely, could not summarize all the existing theoretical knowledge on framing. Mainly, due to its wide dispersion across disciplines and, therefore certain lack of conceptual coherence, as to what Entman has famously referred to as "fractured paradigm."[59] Since the issue of climate change presents a transboundary challenge which is subject to international concern, with contesting policy frames' coexisting at the UN level, I find it promising to rely on frame theory in my analysis and approach the meaning-making on climate change and the orchestration of the global response to climate change through the prism of the transformation of the collective (climate) action frames, which define the shapes the policy responses take. In the next section, I turn specifically to the

[58] Donald Schön, and Martin Rein, "Frame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame-Reflective Policy Practice," *Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal or Knowledge Transfer and Utilization* 9, no. 1 (1996), 93.
[59] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993).

identification of the existing visions of climate change which go beyond the environmental reading of the problem and which could be useful to understand the framing processes on climate at the UN level.

2.2. Framing the climate

Frame analysis has been previously applied to the study of climate change, focusing on such issues as the media representations of climate change[60] and the effects of particular framings on the audience.[61] Climate diplomacy of countries[62] has been subject to frame analysis, as well as the activities of climate movements. In particular, in 2014 della Porta and Parks looked at the climate justice frame construction within the climate movements by studying the activities of the Climate Action Network.

Looking at climate change as a multidimensional concept with a multitude of possible frames applicable to it, in this section, I bring in two major trajectories of conceptual understanding of climate change within the scope of which climate frames are likely to be generated.

2.2.1. Climate crisis and climate security

The security dimension within IR holds great flexibility for the inclusion and study of non-traditional security threats. The transformation of an issue from the realm of politics into a security threat can be understood through the notion of *securitization*. This concept has been approached by various schools of security studies. The Copenhagen school, presented in the works of Buzan and Wæver, appears of particular interest for the current study, as its toolkit

60 Jeffrey Broadbent, et al., "Conflicting Climate Change Frames in a Global Field of Media Discourse," *Sociological Research for a Dynamic World*, 2 (2016).
61 Alexa Spence, and Nick Pidgeon, "Framing and communicating climate change: The effects of distance and outcome frame manipulations," *Global Environmental Change* 20, no. 4 (2010).
62 Anna Korppoo, "Domestic Frames on Russia's Role in International Climate Diplomacy," *Climate Policy* 20, no. 1 (2019).

operationalizes the linguistic dimension of the securitization process. As argued by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, nothing exists as a security threat per se, but needs to receive certain labelling in order to become one.[63] An issue can be framed as a security – meaning, existential, – threat by speech acts and certain wording. Therefore, securitizing actors can engage in framing and transform the understanding of certain concepts to generate the sense of urgency to find a solution to the problem.

The international climate narrative shift inevitably poses a question as to the implications the 'crisis paradigm' holds. As put by Gilbert, the crisis idea works "as a kind of semantic anchor, around which a plurality of political narratives [compete] for discursive space,"[64] what underlines the flexibility of the crisis concept, adjustable to various ideas beyond such rather conventional notions as the financial crisis, or crises associated with war. When applied to the chosen issue, the crisis paradigm can bring a sense of urgency to different ideas. In case of the climate crisis, the mobilizational power of the crisis paradigm is what makes it so applicable to the issue of climate change.

Distinguishing between the crisis- and non-crisis approaches to climate change, it is crucial to account for the power of framing in determining policy solutions. In this way, the "climate change" approach could allow a model in which the policy-makers are thinking in terms of trade-offs. Alternatively, once the "emergency" frame is applied, an urgent action is required, irrespective of the costs.

[63] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 24.
[64] Simon Gilbert, *The Crisis Paradigm* (Cham: Springer International Publishing: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), accessed July 1, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11060-4.

2.2.2. Climate change as an issue of international and intergenerational justice

Apart from the crisis-/non-crisis dichotomy of climate change understanding, two other angles of the climate change concept are particularly identifiable within the cluster of literature on environmental politics-international law nexus. The identified frames – of international and intergenerational justice – originate from the understanding of unequal contribution to climate change and unequal climate burden, highlighted in the first chapter. Further, I turn to the underlying ideas upon which climate justice frames can be built.

Firstly, the activities of polluting countries can affect other countries, irrespective of their geographical proximity to the emitter. Secondly, "a very particular temporality of the climate change politics"[65] is identifiable, since the experience of a climate-induced hazard is not only caused by a simultaneous disregard of emissions' reductions, but also by the historic accumulation of emissions. Therefore, when approaching climate change on the international level, one needs to account for how this phenomenon challenges the spatial-temporal dimensions within international relations, both as a discipline, and as a practice.

The significant disproportionality component embedded within the climate change problem, facilitated the emergence of the *justice* framework. Within this approach, the response to climate change is generated not purely as a matter of survival, as within the climate security frame, but rather as a "moral duty,"[66] as a link is drawn between the "lifestyle of some and the suffering of others."[67] While the climate justice rhetoric has been linked primarily to climate

[65] Andreas Malm, *Fossil capital: the rise of steam-power and the roots of global warming* (London, New York: Verso, 2016), 18.
[66] Dominic Roser, and Christian Seidel, translated by Ciaran Cronin, *Climate Justice. An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 3.
[67] Stephen Humphreys, "Competing claims: human rights and climate harms," in *Human Rights and Climate Change*, ed. Stephen Humphreys (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38.

movements, the generated understanding of climate change as an issue of justice pushed it towards the institutional frameworks of national governments and international organizations,[68] conceptually linking it to the discourses of international law.

As Knur highlights, the states' obligation to reduce their GHG emissions could be derived from their respective obligation to promote human rights internationally, according to international law.[69] However, bringing these ideas to life requires substantial developments within the international legal frameworks, in particular, within the work of international courts. A robust climate liability framework is not yet in place, with such ideas as the extension of the international criminal liability to ecocide remaining within the realm of academic debates.[70]

This chapter presented two domains of the broader conceptual frameworks encompassing the political, legal and societal dimensions related to climate change. Since the identification and interpretation of frames requires in-depth knowledge of the context within which these frames operate, it was necessary to highlight the conceptual implications of the concept of climate change to better understand its further transformations by the application of different frames within the UN realm. After looking at *how* climate change can be framed, I find it useful to account for *who* can be in charge of generating frames by looking at the specificity of power international organizations hold, how these powers can be utilized, challenged and influenced. All these processes subsequently may have an influence on the dynamics within the realm of frames, and, therefore, the policy solutions realm.

[68] Donatella della Porta, Louisa Parks, "Framing Processes in the Climate Movement: From Climate Change to Climate Justice," in *Routledge Handbook of Climate Change Movements*, ed. Matthias Dietz, Heiko Garrelts (New York: Routledge, 2014).

[69] Franziska Knur, "The United Nations Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change – Introducing a Human Dimension to International Climate Law," in *Climate Change as a Threat to Peace. Impacts on Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity*, ed. Sabine von Schorlemer, and Sylvia Maus (Frankfurt Am Main: Peter Lang AG, 2014): 44.

[70] Anthony Burke, et al. "Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2016): 515.

Chapter 3: The international (climate) scene

Previously, IR has been labelled as an "obvious home for considering how humanity […] deals with the challenges of sharing a singular and finite space."[71] Therefore, the study of climate change policy-making cannot ignore the setting in which the international-level decision-making on climate takes place. In this chapter, I revisit the IR literature on intergovernmental organizations and power relations in an attempt to position climate change as an international agenda item within the broader frameworks of the anarchical international system, putting authors from different schools of thought in dialogue and accounting for the powers international organizations hold within the international system. I, therefore, aim to sketch the limits of their capacities to steer greater climate-responsiveness on the international level.

3.1. Which power do international organizations have?

Functioning in the absence of an overarching authority, the international field is a complex network of interaction between various types of actors. These interactions are not reduced to the paradigm of solely inter-state relations. For instance, once facing a problem a sovereign state is not able to address alone, it is likely to turn to an international organization.[72] In this way, climate change as a global problem which cannot be solved within the borders of a single state, expectedly emerges as an agenda item within the UN framework. However, there is no single answer in the literature to respond to the question of the extent to which the UN has power to influence the decision-making processes on such matters.

[71] Olaf Corry, and Hayley Stevenson, "IR and the Earth: societal multiplicity and planetary singularity," *Traditions and trends in global environmental politics: International Relations and the Earth*, ed. Olaf Corry and Hayley Stevenson (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2018), 2.

[72] Susan Park, *International Organisations and Global Problems: Theories and Explanation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1.

Within the neorealist paradigm, the functioning of the international system is at best defined thorough the interactions of states and through the prism of their respective national interests. The agency of international institutions is, then, reduced to the realm of nation states' interests, with the agency of international organizations having "minimal influence on state behavior."[73]

In this way, the power to determine the fate of the climate and, therefore, of the planet, is concentrated within the nation states' realm. One could argue that, in accordance with the neorealist perspective, climate change should be of nation states' high concern due to the presence of the survival dimension[74] within the realist framework. However, the very unconventional nature of climate change as a security threat, as shown in the previous chapter, does not allow its full recognition as a threat to survival within the realist reading.[75] The realist scenario, therefore, gives little hope for a smooth consensus-building on climate change within the processes of inter-state negotiations, and suggests significant limitations to the powers international institutions may hold.

Alternatively, the neoliberal perspective offers a different scenario in which the anarchical vacuum is filled by international institutions, to which state actors are likely to turn due to the increased interdependence.[76] However, given the state-centricity of the neoliberal approach, it is the power of states which plays the decisive role, in both the realist zero-sum and the neoliberal positive-sum models. Keohane and Nye's elaboration on the international

[73] John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19, no. 3 (1994-1995), 7.
[74] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
[75] Mark J. Lacy, *Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits of Realism* (London: Routledge, 2005): 18.
[76] Joseph Nye, and Robert Keohane, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

organizations' power within transgovernmental relations highlights their political significance, yet still refers to them as arenas[77] for inter-state policy coordination.

A considerably different approach is found in the work of Barnett and Finnemore, as they extend the neoliberal perspective with constructivist implications, and develop the conceptual framework of the international organizations' constitutive power. [78] Understanding international organizations as "rational-legal authorities in their domain of action,"[79] Barnett and Finnemore specifically define the ability of international organizations to influence world politics by giving definitions to the new problems to be governed."[80] This vision gives recognition to the UN not just as a platform for states' interactions, but as an active knowledge-producing subject, engaged in the process of the social construction of reality particularly by *framing* new challenges in one way or another, and, therefore, defining the trajectory of the policy solutions' development. Therefore, international organizations' influence on states could be read differently, implying that they hold considerable agenda-setting power.

The demonstrated neorealist/neoliberal/constructivist scholarly debate is not that much about the architecture or the bureaucratic nature of international institutions, as it is about the power flows within the international field, and the specificity with which power circulates within international institutions. Recalling the definition of framing as an "active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction,"[81] one can approach the process of generating a response to the new challenge within an international

[77] Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," *World Politics*, 27, no. 1 (1974).
[78] Michael Barnett, and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).
[79] Ibid., 20.
[80] Michael Barnett, and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).
[81] Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: an Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26 (2000).

organization's setting as a process of different frames' diffusion, contestation and transformation.

As elaborated in the previous chapter, policy frames are rarely static, meaning that they can undergo various transformations, get extended, and diffuse, "travelling" from one actor to another. Therefore, the constitutive power of IOs cannot be examined in a vacuum. Instead, this process exists in no separation from the broader transnational frameworks of ideas and concepts' flows.

3.2. Beyond the power of international organizations

In this section, I specifically focus on the potential sources of influence on the processes of international policy construction at the UN level. The emergence of certain policy responses, as brought up in the frame theory, which was revisited in the previous chapter, is possible due to the conceptualization of particular understandings of the phenomena. Thus, in order to understand the patterns of prioritization of one policy option over another, one needs to look at the roots of the meanings' construction, and the actors involved.

Previously, scholars accounted for such legal/institutional frame transformations as the emergence of understanding of gender considerations within the Rome Statute due to the activism of women's groups.[82] Non-state actors may play significant roles in shaping the agenda of international courts and institutions. Activists, transnational advocacy networks, and epistemic communities can influence policy formations within the larger institutional settings.

[82] Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, "One small step for women: female friendly provisions in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court," *BYU Journal of Public Law*, 16, no. 2 (2002).

Epistemic communities, understood as networks of specialists holding power on influencing international policy responses in their respective issue areas,[83] are of special importance for understanding the policy framing processes on environmental matters, since special understanding of the respective issues needs to be generated. With the emergence of epistemic communities and their further institutionalization, the institutionalization of the ideas, concepts and knowledge occurs, likely to have considerable effects on the respective policy framings. The establishment of the IPCC clearly illustrates such a process. Equipped with scientific evidence on climate matters, it gives power to the UN to engage in shaping a global policy response.

Another source of influence can be recognized in such non-state entities as transnational advocacy networks (TANs). While functioning in accordance with a "common frame of meaning,"[84] they are likely to play the role of transmitters in frame diffusion processes. Similarly, activists can project their framings of the reality through performative strategies, which can also contribute to the frame formation and message delivery. In this way, the model of school strike for climate resonates with the narrative of the generational morality aspect of the climate change problem that the activists advocate for. "We are fighting for our future and for our children's future," says the Fridays for Future's website.[85]

When looking at the policy frames at the UN level, it is, however, not enough to account for the external sources of influence. The UN is primarily an intergovernmental organization, and its architecture and policy frames' formation is heavily dependent on nation states' policy

83 Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992), 2-3.

84 Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998): 7.

85 "Fridays for Future," "Reasons to Strike," accessed June 25, 2020, https://fridaysforfuture.org/take-action/reasons-to-strike/.

choices. Its global character makes its work inseparable from the geopolitical tensions. Therefore the inert-state power relations within the UN also need to be accounted for.

The emergence of climate change as an issue of international concern represents an interesting case to account for the UN exercising its constitutive power in generating a global policy response. Bearing in mind the theoretical patterns of power flows within the policy framing and formation processes, identified in this chapter, I now turn to the processes of construction and transformation of collective climate action frames at the UN level.

Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis

In this chapter, I analyze the transformations of collective climate action frames within the UN frameworks. Relying on frame theory, I account for such processes as frame diffusions and further alignments. I build my analysis on the Entman's classification of the functions of frames, previously presented in the second chapter of this study, and defined through the sequence of problems' definition, diagnosis of the causes', moral evaluation and solution presentation.[86] The analysis of the collective climate action frames is built on the analysis of landmark documents which help to account for the turning points on climate change understandings within the UN frameworks.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is aimed to showcase the overall dynamics of the UN's engagement with climate change matters as it is mirrored in the UNGA resolutions. In the second section, I examine the specificity of the environmental framing of climate change, found within the realms of WMO and UNEP. In the third section, I turn to climate justice frame and the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" (CDR) policy solution, central to the UNFCCC frameworks. The fourth section examines the frames' contestations within the realm of climate security at the UNSC. The fifth section is dedicated to the most recent developments within the UN climate discourse, such as the 2019 ad hoc climate summits. The final, discussion section, critically engages with all the identified frames and their respective policy solutions.

[86] Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 52.

4.1. The overall dynamics

In this section, I highlight the overall trends of the UN's engagements with the issue of climate change. As of June 2020, climate change appeared on the UNGA agenda 35 times as a central issue with precise regularity. In the UNGA resolutions, the issue of climate has been addressed primarily through the lens of "protection of global climate for present and future generations of (hu)mankind."[87]

The 1989 resolution (A/RES/44/228) defines climate change as an "environmental issue […] among those of major concern in maintaining the quality of the Earth's environment and especially in achieving environmentally sound and sustainable development in all countries."[88] The environment-centered approach to climate change, on the one hand, gives recognition to the seriousness of the problem by giving a reference to its global character, while, on the other hand, it significantly limits the scope of possible policy solutions applicable to climate change, due to the narrow scope of the problem's definition itself. The resolution, however, makes a reference to the casual agents of environmental damage in the face of industrialized countries, thus, giving recognition to the *differentiated* responsibilities of countries on environmental matters. Previously, the 1988 resolution (A/RES/45/53) provided a vision of climate as a "common concern of mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life on earth,"[89] putting the principle of *commonality* at the forefront. These early developments are crucial for understanding of the of the CDR-based approaches' functioning within the UN frameworks.

[87] United Nations, "General Assembly Resolutions," accessed June 25, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html.
[88] UNGA Resolution 44/228, accessed June 25, 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/44/228.
[89] UNGA Resolution 43/53, accessed June 25, 2020, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/02/UNGA43-53.pdf.

The subsequent UNGA resolutions, such as the 2013 resolution (A/RES/67/270) gave recognition to climate change being an "immediate and urgent global priority,"[90] illustrating the trajectory of frame extension as it started giving justifications for more urgent and, perhaps, more costly, actions. In line with that, the most recent UNGA resolution (A/RES/74/219) available up to date defines climate change as an "urgent priority and a global challenge faced by all countries, in particular developing countries."[91]

Therefore, the developments on the UN level, documented within the realm of UNGA could be defined in accordance with the notion of frame transformation: from the *environmental* frame towards the *justice* frame with the subsequent increase in the recognition of urgency to address climate change and the increase in the expected commitments, especially coming from the developed countries. In the next sections I address each of the frames which have been identified within the examined period in the current analysis separately.

4.2. The environmental frame

The solely environmental approach to the issue of climate change can be found within the early manifestations of climate change as a policy issue on the international level, and is linked to the activities of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), a UN specialized agency on the questions of weather and climate,[92] and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

[90] UNGA Resolution 67/210, accessed June 25, 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/67/210.
[91] UNGA Resolution 74/219, accessed July 1, 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/219.
[92] WMO, "About us," accessed July 1, 2020, https://public.wmo.int/en/about-us; WMO,"A history of climate activities," accessed July 1, 2020, https://public.wmo.int/en/bulletin/history-climate-activities.

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 addressed the issue of "climate," linking it to the problem of air pollution.[93] This is a rather narrow conceptualization, as opposed to its future framings through the prism of multidimensionality of both its causes and consequences. The further development of the environmental approach to climate receives little attention within the UN frameworks as the environmental frame gets extended to various dimensions, including the ones of climate justice and climate security, conceptually addressed in one of the previous chapters. Now, I turn to their respective applications within the UN realm.

4.3 The climate justice frame

Compared to the environmental frame, the climate justice frame implies more extensive remedies and policy solutions due to the underlying principle of a moral duty to commit to tackling climate change. In this section I trace the institutionalization of the justice-based CDR policy solution within the UN frameworks and showcase challenges the existing CDR model faces.

Important to note, the emergence of the climate justice dimension within the UN frameworks is linked to scientific knowledge on the subject and, specifically, to the work of the epistemic communities. One can note that the increase in the attention to climate matters at the UN level goes in parallel with the scientific developments in the field. Therefore, the subsequent 1988 establishment of the IPCC,[94] with WMO and UNEP being at the frontlines of its creation, can

[93] United Nations, *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment*, 1972, accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1&Lang=E, 20, recommendation 70.

[94] UNGA Resolution 43/53 "Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind" https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/02/UNGA43-53.pdf.

be seen as one of the first nodal points influencing the further collective climate policy framing at the UN level.

The UNFCCC exists on the basis of recognition of the fact that "the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries."[95] However, the orchestration of a global response within the principle of high commitment demands embedded within the climate justice frame is a complex task. As noted by Stone, while "the common" is well-linked to the human interconnectedness within the international system, it is the "differentiated," which is often problematic to define[96] and reach consensus on. The experience of climate negotiations under the UNFCCC architecture demonstrates it.

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol[97] entered into force in 2005, aimed at limiting GHG emissions among industrialized countries by establishing market mechanisms for emissions trading.[98] As a result, the US has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol,[99] and Canada withdrew from the treaty in 2011.[100] The simultaneous creation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP),[101] functioning in absence of binding targets, has contributed to decentralization of climate policy-making on the international level.

95 United Nations, *The UNFCCC*, accessed July 1, 2020, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
96 Christopher D. Stone, "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 2 (2004).
97 UNFCCC, "Kyoto Protocol - Targets for the first commitment period," accessed June 20, 2020, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/what-is-the-kyoto-protocol/kyoto-protocol-targets-for-the-first-commitment-period.
98 UNFCCC, *the Kyoto Protocol*, accessed May 4, 2020, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol.
99 United Nations Treaty Collection, "Kyoto Protocol," accessed June 19, 2020, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&lang=en.
100 Ian Austen, "Canada Announces Exit From Kyoto Climate Treaty," December 12, 2011, *New York Times*, accessed June 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/science/earth/canada-leaving-kyoto-protocol-on-climate-change.html.
101 Jonathan Pickering, et al., "The impact of the US retreat from the Paris Agreement: Kyoto revisited?" *Climate Policy*18, no. 7 (2018): 822.

The COP15 in 2009 resulted in no legal agreement to address the post-2012 period, when the first round of the Kyoto commitments was expected to finish,[102] but delivered the Copenhagen Accord: a nonbinding agreement. The Copenhagen Accord sets the goal of limiting the increase in global temperature below 2°C, giving recognition to particular vulnerabilities of developing countries,[103] but remains a document rather political than legal in nature. The commentary on Copenhagen Climate Talks primarily highlights states' opposition to enhancing the joint responsiveness to climate change within the process. For instance, the "inflexible attitudes"[104] of China and the US were particularly highlighted.

Unlike the Copenhagen Accord, the Paris Agreement, adopted at COP21 in 2015, set out an ambitious target of not only keeping the global temperature rise below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, but also of pursuing efforts to limit the respective temperature increase below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels[105] in a legally binding manner.

Along with the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement reflects the recognition of the CDR principle.[106] The Paris Agreement distinguishes between the developed and developing countries, expecting leadership in the form of economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets from the former, and continuation of the mitigation efforts from the latter with an encouragement to move towards "economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets" overtime.[107] This framework, as well as its Kyoto predecessor, has generated some backlashes

[102] Bodansky, Daniel. "The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem." The American Journal of International Law104, no. 2 (2010).
[103] UNFCCC, *The Copenhagen Accord*, Art. 2, accessed July 1, 2020,
[104] Lin Feng and Jason Buhi, "The Copenhagen Accord and the Silent Incorporation of the Polluter Pays Principle in International Climate Law: an Analysis of Sino-American Diplomacy at Copenhagen and Beyond," *Buffalo Environmental Law*, 18, no. 1 (2010-2011).
[105] UNFCCC, *The Paris Agreement*, Art. 2 (a). accessed July 1, 2020, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
[106] UNFCCC, *The Paris Agreement*, Art. 2. accessed July 1, 2020, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
[107] UNFCCC, *The Paris Agreement*, Art. 4 (4), accessed July 1, 2020, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

among states. For instance, the US' decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement has been articulated by the US President Trump has been framed in terms of the "draconian financial and economic burdens" that the Agreement imposes on the US citizens.[108]

According to the Paris Agreement framework, states are free to set up their individual emissions reduction targets under the Paris Agreement, and communicate their commitments by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. As of May 2020, five years since the submission of the first NDCs, only two countries have already submitted their second NDCs. Moreover, 13 countries have still not submitted their climate pledges under the Paris Agreement, and the overall level of ambition within the submitted pledges remains low as the majority of climate pledges (128) have been assessed as not insufficient.[109]

Built on the moral judgements in regards to the disproportionality of climate vulnerabilities, the climate justice frame in general and the CDR policy solution in particular imply considerable remedies and greater commitments, and, therefore, often get confronted by the states' lack of readiness to comply.

4.4. The security frame

Time is a decisive factor in finding a solution to the climate change problem. The political decisions on climate (in)action are taking place against the background of particular deadlines[110] stated by climate scientists. The security frame, as shown in the second chapter of the current study, is one of the solutions to generating a sense of urgency and mobilizing forces to address climate change, however, it has been unclear whether it is appropriate to address

[108] Donald Trump, "Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, June 1, 2017," accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
[109] Robert Watson, James McCarthy, et al., *The Truth Behind the Climate Pledges* (FEU-US, 2019), 1.
[110] The IPCC, *Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°*, 2018.

climate change at the UN level as a matter of international peace and security. In this section, I approach the climate security frame contestation at the UN level.

In 1988, the Toronto Conference (The World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security), held under the auspices of WMO and UNEP,[111] gave recognition to climate change as a threat to international security, which "could be second only to a global nuclear war."[112] The further rhetoric on the matter at the UNSC, however, got divided along the lines of favoring or rejecting the applicability of the climate security frame to the climate change problem.

The first Open Debate on the topic of climate change (S/PV.5663) was held at the UNSC in 2007.[113] While Norway stated that "Climate change, as part of the peace and security agenda, should and must be addressed by the Security Council," there was also a strong opposition to the security framework. In particular, Egypt and Sudan on behalf of the African group opposed the inclusion of climate change, arguing that would impose a risk for the climate security frame to trump the climate justice frame, and, therefore, the CDR approach.

Therefore, one can notice that climate justice frame, embedded with the UNFCCC,[114] and the proposed climate security frame at the UNSC, emerged as conflicting frames, with little space for the possibility of their potential alignment being left in the debate. It is only Namibia that brought up the "war" framing, stating that: "As developing countries, we are facing what I dare

111 WMO, "Conference proceedings - The Changing atmosphere, implications for global security," https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6014#.Xvdu2y2B1Z0.
112 Matthew Paterson, *Global Warming and Global Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 34.
113 UNSC, 5663rd meeting (S/PV.5663), accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf.
114 United Nations, *The UNFCCC*, Art. 3 (1), 4 (1), accessed July 1, 2020, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.

to call an unprovoked war being waged on us by developed countries,"[115] advocating for the alignment of climate security and climate justice frames.

The UNSC-based approach to climate change, has received recognition within the several rounds of Open Debates as an approach excluding or challenging the presence of coexisting frames. Given the fragility of consensus-building within the UNFCCC structures, the emergence of a contesting frame through which developed countries could manifest their alternative commitments and avoid reducing emissions in accordance with the UNFCCC-based pledges, was clearly recognized as threatening the further developments within the UNFCCC frameworks.

Another way in which one can make sense of the attempts to align the agendas of climate and security within the UNSC frameworks is to approach it as an application of a non-traditional security threat to a predominantly *national* security-based framework. The ways in which UNSC can invoke its powers through the traditional security means are not applicable to the threats posed by climate change. While the discussions at the UNSC level often draw links between climate change and violent conflict, the climate threats are not reduced to that, and their minimization primarily requires limiting GHG emissions which is only possible through an increase in political willingness to act on climate change.

4.5. Towards the crisis framework

The 2019 turn in the UN's approach to climate change represents a notable rhetorical and organizational shift with the holding of ad hoc climate events on the initiative of the UN Secretary-General. The declaration of the UN Climate Action Summit held in September 2019,

[115] UNSC, 5663rd meeting (S/PV.5663), accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf.

includes a reference to the urgency with which climate emergency should be addressed.[116] However, the strategy with which this was approached, differs from the conventional diplomatic approaches of the UNFCCC.

With the Paris Agreement framework in place, the Climate Action Summit and the Youth Climate Summit did not seek to negotiate new climate treaties or restructure the existing ones. Instead, the events were framed as calls to enhance climate commitments worldwide.

The prioritization of a cross-sectoral approach ensured the involvement of non-states actors. Within the Youth Climate Summit, children and youth were invited to "to showcase their solutions"[117] to climate crisis at the UN. Given the saddening dynamics of the last round of Climate Talks, this format appears to be of particular interest as an example of the UN exercising its constitutive power within the context of lack of political willingness to comply with its treaties.

Another distinct feature of these developments is the UN's open manifestation of climate emergency. In his speech at the Climate Action Summit, the Secretary-General Guterres referred to "apocalyptic" images, linked to the already existing effects of climate change.[118] He introduced the metaphor of a "race,"[119] which can be won or lost, depending on the international community's political willingness to act on climate change. Speaking at the 74th Session of the UNGA, he confirmed the frame transformation: "once was called "climate

116 United Nations, "UN Climate Action Summit 2019," accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/un-climate-summit-2019.shtml.
117 United Nations, "Youth Climate Summit, 21 September 2019," accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/youth-summit.shtml.
118 António Guterres, "Remarks at 2019 Climate Action Summit," September 23, 2019, accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit/.
119 Ibid.

change" is now truly a "climate crisis,""[120] highlighting the incompatibility of the neutral "change" framing with the dangerous implications of inaction.

This mirrors the rhetoric of Greta Thunberg, who has delivered a speech at the Climate Action Summit with a call for an immediate recognition of the severity of the climate crisis against the background of a "failing"[121] collective policy response, despite the given frameworks of the Paris Agreement. Thus, one can easily draw a link between UN's recent engagement in transforming its framing of climate change. However, it remains unclear whether the change in rhetoric will boost the states' responsiveness to the issue and increase their commitments within the Paris Agreement framework.

The Secretary-General's Report[122] on the outcomes of the Climate Action Summit mentions "commitments of 70 countries to deliver more ambitious NDCs in 2020"[123] as well as commitments of 75 countries to "deliver 2050 net zero emissions strategies by 2020."[124] However, given the overall preceding dynamics of countries' commitments to their climate pledges, there is no guarantee that this round of promises will be considerably different, and will eliminate the existing tensions over the CDR principle.

The Report, however, advocated for the further approaches to collective climate action to be people-centered.[125] Echoing the climate justice framework, it facilitates the emergence of

120 António Guterres, "Address to the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly," September 24, 2019, accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-24/address-74th-general-assembly.
121 United Nations, "Greta Thunberg tells world leaders 'you are failing us', as nations announce fresh climate action," *UN News*, September 23, 2019, accessed February 10, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047052.
122 United Nations, "Report Of The Secretary-General On The 2019 Climate Action Summit and the Way Forward in 2020," accessed June 15, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/cas_report_11_dec.pdf.
123 Ibid., 5.
124 Ibid.
125 United Nations, "Report Of The Secretary-General On The 2019 Climate Action Summit and the Way Forward in 2020," accessed June 15, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/cas_report_11_dec.pdf, 7.

"multi-stakeholder initiatives"[126] to generate improvements within the everyday lives of people and prevent the exacerbation of climate vulnerabilities. In this way, the recognition of the climate crisis framework at the UN level goes in parallel with the process of searching for ways to step away from state-centricity of the conventional UN frameworks.

The UN's prioritization of the people-centered approach particularly resonates the way it previously addressed the construction of the "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,"[127] when climate action got framed as one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The "goals" approach implies flexible networks allowing for various stakeholders' involvement within the processes of goals' implementations. Similarly, another UN's initiative – the #ActNow[128] digital communications campaign – focuses on the commitments of individuals towards such targets as the emissions' reductions by adjusting their "habits and routines"[129] towards greater sustainability. In the absence of substantial commitments from states, the UN's collective climate action frame, therefore, gets extended to the realm of individual responsibility, while its conventional negotiation settings get extended towards less formal and less state-centric structures.

4.6. Discussion

In the previous sections of this chapter, I approached the UN engagements with climate change matters across different UN structures and through the means of different collective climate action frames. Within the examined processes, several climate frames were particularly

126 Ibid.
127 UNGA Resolution 70/1, accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.
128 United Nations, "ActNow Climate Action Campaign," accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/actnow/.
129 United Nations, "ActNow Climate Action Campaign," accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/actnow/.

identifiable, generating policy solutions. In this section, I outline the specificity of each frame identified and critically reflect on the observed dynamics.

Defining climate change as an environmental issue, the **environmental frame** holds little space for broader political engagement on the matter, since it is usually articulated within the frameworks of highly-specific structures, such as the WMO. While being approached within the context of the environmental frame, the issue of climate did not receive considerable recognition on its own, but was rather linked to other concepts, such as, for instance, air pollution. The urgency dimension is hard to ensure within the environmental frame, unless the latter does get broadened by a frame extension, so that it could incorporate some of the urgency-generating leverages.

Within the **climate justice frame**, climate change is approached through the lens of generational morality. Climate change, therefore, receives recognition, firstly, as a threat multiplier of the existing inequalities and, secondly, as an outcome of the excessive emissions by the developed countries. The climate justice frame is to generate such policy options as the CDR approach, according to which greater climate commitments are demanded from the developed states. Therefore, the policy approach of the climate justice frame is primarily *climate change mitigation-focused*, as it seeks eliminating climate-induced inequalities and suffering.

The frame contestation process within the UNSC allows to account for the controversies associated with the **climate security frame** once it is evoked within the broader structures of geopolitical tensions, in which, particularly, the opposition towards the security framing emerges, advocating for greater climate justice approach. Unlike the latter, the security frame, as it is articulated within the UNSC structures, *is climate change adaptation-driven*, as it

incorporates such dimensions as dealing with climate-induced violent conflicts,[130] or highlights the importance of the "environmental factors" in conflict resolution.[131]

The diffusion of the climate crisis frame as it gets utilized within the UN frameworks, being previously predominantly articulated by youth activists, is a particularly interesting case as it, firstly, extends the institutional framework of climate justice, embedded within the UNFCCC structures, by adding more vocal demands to the content of the Paris Agreement. Secondly, the UN's engagement with more multi-stakeholders initiatives and focusing on the individual climate action, as opposed to the one state-driven, is another application of **the crisis frame**. It is not just the environmental crisis which affects the planet, but the crisis of the overall lack of political commitments to the problem of climate change. Therefore, the UN puts an increasing emphasis on the individual-based approaches to collective climate action bypassing the state level, while the existing UN-based institutional manifestations of both climate justice and climate security frames are in heavy dependence on nation states' policy choices.

130 The statement of France at the 2007 UNSC Open Debate (S/PV.5663), accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf.

131 The statement of Norway at the 2007 UNSC Open Debate (S/PV.5663), accessed July 01, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663_rev_1.pdf.

Conclusion

At the last session of the UN Climate Talks in Madrid, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) called for greater climate action and linked the notion of climate to an *existential threat*.[132] At the same time, the Russian government published a climate change adaptation plan, specifically highlighting its plans to utilize the "advantages" of climate change.[133] One can say that climate change affects everyone one the planet, and it will not be wrong. However, one also needs to account for the extreme disproportionality which lies at the core of the climate change problem, and, in turn, makes the delivery of a joint understanding of what climate change implies and how it may affect peoples' lives, particularly challenging.

Deriving my inspiration from Barnett and Finnemore's conceptualization of constitutive power of international organizations,[134] I've structured this work as an attempt to understand how the flow of different ideas and concepts affects the UN's work on climate change. I, therefore, applied the frame theory to look at the dynamics of the collective climate action frames contestations within different UN bodies.

As a result, I've linked certain conceptualizations of climate change to the particular collective policy responses' formation trajectories. In this way, the justice framework has been particularly linked to mitigation-favoring solutions. For instance, the UNFCCC apparatus, functioning in accordance with the CDR principle has ambitious emissions' reductions targets at the core of its Paris Agreement strategy. Alternatively, the UNSC, has been engaged in

[132] AOSIS (@AOSISChair) "Climate action is not a wish. It is a matter of survival…" *Twitter*, December 15, 2019, accessed February 23, 2020, https://twitter.com/AOSISChair/status/1206270245993926656.
[133] Agence France-Presse, "Russia announces plan to 'use the advantages' of climate change," The Guardian, January 5, 2020, accessed July 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/05/russia-announces-plan-to-use-the-advantages-of-climate-change.
[134] Michael Barnett, and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).

several attempts to construct an approach rooted in the climate-security nexus. Its focus on linking climate change to the traditional security threats, places its plausible policy solutions rather within the field of adaptation in which climate-induced threats are in need of responses, with no particular prioritization of mitigation.

As evident from the analyzed UNSC meeting records, by engaging in such debates, states hold considerable powers in defining how the international community should understand certain issues and which policy responses should be prioritized. Another way in which states affect the developments within the UN climate agenda is their own climate (in)action. The state-centricity of the international decision-making on climate within the UN , as demonstrated in my revision of the UNFCCC system's turbulent dynamics, often aggravates progress on climate. The state-centric architecture of the UN system, therefore holds certain limitations on the development of collective climate action frames within which considerable climate commitments are expected.

While the UN was confronted with high levels of state climate inaction, as opposed to the ambitious climate commitments expectations embedded in the Paris Agreement, the world has witnessed an actualization of the climate crisis framework. In this thesis, while tracing the transformations of climate change understandings at the UN level, I have also accounted for the way the UN has utilized the climate emergency framework. A change in rhetoric towards apocalyptic imageries and crisis manifestations was coupled with the procedural shift away from the conventional state-based climate action. The UN's growing interest in multistakeholder and human-based approaches to climate change could be linked to the advocacy of the youth climate activists, however it is not reduced to it.

The climate crisis within the UN frameworks reads as an understanding of a climate crisis coupled with the crisis of political willingness to act on climate change. Therefore, the UN's

response to both crises takes shape of greater involvement in human-based approaches. Apart from that, the changes in the UN's official rhetoric, demonstrated within the 2019 ad hoc climate summits, signify for UN structures' readiness to align their climate action frames with the ones proposed by youth climate activists.

As it was already highlighted in the current study, climate change is a multidimensional challenge holding many potential puzzles for the IR scholars. In the further research, one could specifically look at climate crisis rhetoric formation within the realm of activists or account for the reasons why some states and cities decide to declare climate emergency, while those in geographical proximity to them do not. The feminist IR theory is also a promising way to proceed with the future work on the topic by incorporating the gender dimension into the analysis of climate frames' transformations.

Bibliography

"Climate Action Tracker." Accessed July 1, 2020.. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/.

"Fridays for Future." "Strike Statistics." Accessed June 11, 2020. https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/strike-statistics/.

"The Guardian." "Russia announces plan to 'use the advantages' of climate change." January 5, 2020, accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/05/russia-announces-plan-to-use-the-advantages-of-climate-change.

Allan, Bentley B. "Producing the Climate: States, Scientists, and the Constitution of Global Governance Objects." *International Organization* 71 (2017): 31-162.

AOSIS (@AOSISChair) "Climate action is not a wish. It is a matter of survival…" *Twitter*. December 15, 2019. Accessed February 23, 2020. https://twitter.com/AOSISChair/status/1206270245993926656.

Austen, Ian. "Canada Announces Exit From Kyoto Climate Treaty." December 12, 2011. *New York Times*. Accessed June 30, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/science/earth/canada-leaving-kyoto-protocol-on-climate-change.html.

Bailey, Adriana, et al. "How Grammatical Choice Shapes Media Representations of Climate (Un)certainty," *Environmental Communication-A Journal Of Nature And Culture*. 3 (2014): 197-215.

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004.

Benford, Robert D. "Frame disputes in the nuclear disarmament movement." *Social Forces* 71 (1993): 677-701.

Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.

Bodansky, Daniel. "The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem," *The American Journal of International Law*, 104, no. 2 (2010): 230- 240.

Bodansky, Daniel. "The Paris climate change agreement: a new hope?" *The American Journal of International Law* 110, no. 2 (2016): 288-319.

Bolton, Bert. *A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Broadbent, Jeffrey, et al. “Conflicting Climate Change Frames in a Global Field of Media Discourse.” *Sociological Research for a Dynamic World* 2 (2016): 1-17.

Burck, Jan, et al. *The Climate Change Performance Index: Background and Methodology* Germanwatch, 2019.

Burke, Anthony, et al. “Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2016): 499-523.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

Carrington, Damian. “Why the Guardian is changing the language it uses about the environment.” *The Guardian*. May 17, 2019.
Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/17/why-the-guardian-is-changing-the-language-it-uses-about-the-environment.

Carson, Rachel. *Silent Spring.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994.

Corry, Olaf, and Hayley Stevenson. “IR and the Earth: societal multiplicity and planetary singularity.” *Traditions and trends in global environmental politics: International Relations and the Earth.* Ed. Olaf Corry and Hayley Stevenson. Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2018.

David, Clarissa C., and Christian Baden. “Frame Analysis.” In *International Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods*. Ed. Jörg Matthes, 1-22. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017.

della Porta, Donatella, and Louisa Parks. “Framing Processes in the Climate Movement: From Climate Change to Climate Justice.” In *Routledge Handbook of Climate Change Movements*. Ed. Matthias Dietz, Heiko Garrelts, 19-31. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

Entman, Robert M. “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11.” *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2010): 415-432.

Entman, Robert M. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58.

Feng, Lin and Jason Buhi. “The Copenhagen Accord and the Silent Incorporation of the Polluter Pays Principle in International Climate Law: an Analysis of Sino-American Diplomacy at Copenhagen and Beyond.” *Buffalo Environmental Law* 18, no. 1 (2010-2011).

Giddens, Anthony. *The Politics of Climate Change.* Cambridge: Polity, 2009.

Gilbert, Simon. *The Crisis Paradigm.* Cham: Springer International Publishing: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11060-4.

Goffman, Erving. *Frame Analysis, An Essay on the Organization of Experience.* New York: Northeastern University Press, 1974.

Guterres, António. "Address to the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly," September 24, 2019. Accessed July 01, 2020. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-24/address-74th-general-assembly.

Guterres, António. "Remarks at 2019 Climate Action Summit." September 23, 2019. Accessed July 01, 2020. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit/.

Guterres, António. "Statement by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the Outcome of COP25." *UNFCCC.* December 15, 2019. Accessed February 14, 2020. https://unfccc.int/news/statement-by-the-un-secretary-general-antonio-guterres-on-the-outcome-of-cop25.

Haas, Peter M. "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35.

Hulme, Mike. *Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Humphreys, Stephen. "Competing claims: human rights and climate harms." In *Human Rights and Climate Change*. Ed. Stephen Humphreys, 37-69. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations." *World Politics* 27, no. 1 (1974): 39-62.

Knur, Franziska. "The United Nations Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change – Introducing a Human Dimension to International Climate Law." In *Climate Change as a Threat to Peace. Impacts on Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity*. Ed. Sabine von Schorlemer, and Sylvia Maus, 37-60. Frankfurt Am Main: Peter Lang AG, 2014.

Korppoo, Anna. "Domestic Frames on Russia's Role in International Climate Diplomacy." *Climate Policy* 20, no. 1 (2019): 109-123.

Lacy, Mark J. *Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits of Realism* London: Routledge, 2005.

Lehr-Lehnardt, Rana. “One small step for women: female friendly provisions in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court.” *BYU Journal of Public Law* 16, no. 2 (2002): 317-354.

Malm Andreas. *Fossil capital: the rise of steam-power and the roots of global warming* London, New York: Verso, 2016.

Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994-1995): 5-49.

Nye, Joseph, and Robert Keohane. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

Park. Susan. *International Organisations and Global Problems: Theories and Explanation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Parker, Charles F., and Christer Karlsson. “The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the United States: Assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris.” *Environmental Politics*, 27, no. 3 (2018): 519-540.

Paterson, Matthew. *Global Warming and Global Politics*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Pickering, Jonathan, et al. “The impact of the US retreat from the Paris Agreement: Kyoto revisited?” *Climate Policy* 18, no. 7 (2018): 818-827.

Rankin, Jennifer. “'Our house is on fire': EU parliament declares climate emergency.” November 28, 2019 *The Guardian*. Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/28/eu-parliament-declares-climate-emergency.

Roser, Dominic, and Christian Seidel. Translated by Ciaran Cronin, *Climate Justice. An Introduction.* London and New York: Routledge, 2017.

Schön, Donald, and Martin Rein. “Frame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame-Reflective Policy Practice,” *Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal or Knowledge Transfer and Utilization* 9, no. 1 (1996): 85-104.

Snow, David A., et al. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464- 481.

Snow, Davis A., and Robert D. Benford. “Alternative Types of Cross-National Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena, cross-national diffusion.” In *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*. Ed. Donatella della Porta, 23-40. London, New York, 1999.

Spence, Alexa, and Nick Pidgeon. “Framing and communicating climate change: The effects of distance and outcome frame manipulations.” *Global Environmental Change* 20, no. 4 (2010): 656–667.

Stone, Christopher D. “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law.” *The American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 2 (2004): 276-301.

The IPCC. “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers.” Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.

The IPCC. *Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°.* 2018.

The IPCC. *Special Report: Special Report On Climate Change And Land*. Accessed May 20, 2020. https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/.

The World Bank. “CO2 emissions (kt).” Accessed May 25, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT.

Thunberg, Greta. “This is an emergency': Greta Thunberg speaks at Guardian Live – video.” *The Guardian*. April 23, 2019. Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/video/2019/apr/23/this-is-an-emergency-greta-thunberg-speaks-at-guardian-live-video

Trump, Donald. “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, June 1, 2017.” Accessed March 20, 2020. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.

UNFCCC. “Kyoto Protocol - Targets for the first commitment period.” Accessed June 20, 2020. https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/what-is-the-kyoto-protocol/kyoto-protocol-targets-for-the-first-commitment-period.

UNFCCC. “What do adaptation to climate change and climate resilience mean?” Accessed May 9, 2020. https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-change-and-climate-resilience-mean.

UNFCCC. *The Copenhagen Accord*. Accessed July 1, 2020. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf

UNGA Resolution 43/53 “Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind” https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/02/UNGA43-53.pdf.

UNGA Resolution 43/53. Accessed June 25, 2020. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/02/UNGA43-53.pdf.

UNGA Resolution 44/228. Accessed June 25, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/44/228.

UNGA Resolution 67/210. Accessed June 25, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/67/210.

UNGA Resolution 70/1. Accessed July 01, 2020. https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.

UNGA Resolution 74/219. Accessed July 1, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/219.

United Nations. “ActNow Climate Action Campaign.” Accessed July 01, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/actnow/.

United Nations. “Climate Change.” Accessed June 20, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/.

United Nations. “General Assembly Resolutions.” Accessed June 25, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html.

United Nations. “Greta Thunberg tells world leaders ‘you are failing us’, as nations announce fresh climate action.” *UN News*. September 23, 2019. Accessed February 10, 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047052.

United Nations. “Report Of The Secretary-General On The 2019 Climate Action Summit and the Way Forward in 2020,” accessed June 15, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/cas_report_11_dec.pdf.

United Nations. “The Way Forward in 2020.” Accessed June 15, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/cas_report_11_dec.pdf.

United Nations. “UN Climate Action Summit 2019.” Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/un-climate-summit-2019.shtml.

United Nations. “Youth Climate Summit, 21 September 2019.” Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/youth-summit.shtml.

United Nations. *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972*. Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1&Lang=E.

United Nations. *The Kyoto Protocol.* Accessed July 1, 2020. https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol.

United Nations. *The Paris Agreement.* Accessed July 1, 2020. https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf

United Nations. *The UNFCCC.* Accessed July 1, 2020. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.

UNSC Open Debate (S/PV.5663). Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf.

UNSC Open Debate (S/PV.5663). Resumption 1. Accessed July 1, 2020. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663_rev_1.pdf.

Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

Watson, Robert, et al., *The Truth Behind the Climate Pledges.* FEU-US. 2019.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

WMO. "A history of climate activities." Accessed July 1, 2020. https://public.wmo.int/en/bulletin/history-climate-activities.

WMO. "About us." Accessed July 1, 2020. https://public.wmo.int/en/about-us;

WMO. "Conference proceedings - The Changing atmosphere, implications for global security." Accessed July 1, 2020. https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6014#.Xvdu2y2B1Z0.