CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020
| Author | Radomskii, Maksim |
|---|---|
| Title | Effect of regional elite turnover on procurement corruption in Russia |
| Summary | In this paper, I research the effect of regional elite turnover on procurement corruption during 2000 – 2005 in Russia. I use tunneling to fly-by-night firms as a proxy of fraud and political corruption. With fixed effect design, I investigate the governor and head of police change as treatment effects on the level of tunneling. Firstly, I found that the governor's turn decreases the frequency and amount of tunneling near the election. Secondly, tunneling declines regardless of the political party affiliation of a new governor. Thirdly, political competition in a region might be an instrument that helps to decrease tunneling by increasing uncertainty for the firm’s corruption behavior. |
| Supervisor | Muco, Arieda |
| Department | Economics MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2020/radomskii_maksim.pdf |
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