What do you mean "Christian Democracy"?

An analysis of conflicting claim making of the Fidesz, Christian Democratic Union, and Austrian People's Party on Christian Democratic Ideology

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Abstract

The 2015 refugee reception crisis had profound impacts on the European Union. This thesis is an investigation of its effects on the growing rifts within the Christian Democratic party family. Specifically, it analyzes how three governing Christian Democratic parties responded to the crisis, what their response says about their claim making on the Christian Democratic ideology, and their interactions with one another. The response and claims being made by these parties will be historically, institutionally, and politically contextualized. In order to do so I will utilize the discourse historical approach of critical discourse analysis and process tracing. In light of this analysis, I argue that the Hungarian Fidesz party, with Orbán at its helm, has engaged in the social creativity strategy of identity management and created a new claim on Christian Democracy. This claim combines nationalism, populism, and civilizationism, wherein the "Christian" component of Christian Democracy is central. The German Christian Democratic Union, headed by Angela Merkel has made no such grand ideological claims but rather has been characterized by caution, pragmatism and centrism. Even while refusing to backdown rhetorically from a defense of the rights of asylum seekers and the responsibility of Germany, and the EU more broadly, to help, their policy making reflected collaboration, cooperation, and concession on these principles. The Austrian People's Party engages in both approaches, fluctuating between the two without overindulging in either. The approach this paper takes, and the examples put forth by these parties can be utilized to investigate trends in other Christian Democratic parties, or even other party families, in the wake of major events. The information obtained from the analysis of the claim making of these parties sets the stage for the future of the Christian Democratic party family and ideology.

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Introduction

The tragedy of seventy-one asylum seekers found dead in Nickelsdorf, Austria on August 28th and the March of Hope[1] towards Germany which began at Budapest Keleti the next day demonstrated the need for cooperation between Austria, Germany, and Hungary during the long summer of migration. Yet the events drove them apart. These events marked the start of continental rift between the core and periphery countries of the EU, in no case more prevalent than between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Yet despite their vast differences, making headlines across European and world media, the governing parties these two leaders represent belong to the same Europarty and lay claim on the same ideology: Christian democracy. Thus far, however, they are rarely analyzed in light of this.

Fidesz, with Orbán at its helm, is increasingly viewed and referenced as a far-right or radical right party, due to democratic backsliding and other events. It has also been argued to be an (authoritarian) kleptocracy[2]; "a tyranny of the majority; a clientelist decision making regime"[3]; a legally orchestrated "coup d'etat"[4]; an autocracy; a crony capitalist/accumulative state[5]; authoritarian (capitalism/neoliberalism)[6]; and many more. Ideology remains largely unimportant in these conceptualizations – just power and propaganda. Even when ideology is considered, the role Christian Democracy plays herein is minimal. At most Christianity or Christian identity is merely conceived as one aspect of Hungarian or European identity emphasized in nationalist, populist, and civilizationist arguments. Because of this focus, the Hungarian case is studied with other nationalist, populist, or even radical right cases.

This thesis is not engaged with whether Orbán believes his promulgated ideology or if it is merely a means to an end; it takes his statements and arguments at face value. Herein, the claims Orbán makes and the Europarty Fidesz belongs to – the European People's Party (EPP),

which is traditionally a Christian Democratic party (CDP) – put him/them in the Christian Democratic category. Due to these claims and this membership, Orbán and Fidesz– however different from CDPs – regularly interact with them as fellows. This necessitates a study of them as a CDP, without which, the historic base of the claims being made by Orbán and the contextual interactions of Fidesz with other CDPs remain a black hole across academic disciplines. Of course, the differences between Orbán and Merkel would be recognized by any scholar. Yet, not studying them as members of the same party family creates a gap in the current literature.

Christian Democracy has a long and variant past, rooted in Catholic social teaching. It became popular after World War II as Europe experienced a moral and cultural crisis, benefitting from discreditation of the political right and left. Yet secularization, socio-economic changes, and the fall of communism has left CDPs hurting in the last three decades. Looking to adapt, they have a few options: carrying on the Christian Democratic legacy while secularizing and liberalizing to attract young liberal voters; using Christian cultural identity to make nationalist and populist arguments and pulling right-wing voters; or trying to balance the two.[7] Pressures from the 2015 refugee reception crisis clarified and solidified parties' choices because it forced them to show their hands. The 'faceoff' between Orbán and Merkel, I argue, is an exhibition of the diverging trends amongst parties laying claim to the Christian Democratic ideology.

This thesis is not to be a normative judgement of which parties do or do not "accurately" or "properly" represent Christian democracy in its best or purest form. Nor is it a categorization of parties into ideological camps based on objective data. Rather, it is an exercise in the analysis of claim-making. My research seeks to understand the competition over the claim to Christian Democratic ideology, examine the parties and leaders making this claim, the conversations happening therein, and the convergence and divergence of policies both advocated for and

undergone by CDPs. To capture the dynamics of CDPs' interactions, it is important to identify actors exemplifying key aspects of variation, including both mainstream and radical right parties, with varying degrees of populist and nationalist ideology and rhetoric. Therefore, I have selected Hungarian Fidesz, German Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) (CDU), and Austrian Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Peoples Party) (ÖVP). Although these actors, particularly the CDU and Fidesz, represent extremes in the CDP party family, it is their policies and speeches that make most evident the diverging trends CDPs face. The ÖVP clarifies that these trends are often subtle, something which parties fluctuate between. Analysis of party dynamics within the CDU/CSU and ÖVP will demonstrate the same.

These three parties' politics mirror that of their geographic locations – Hungary is the farthest right, Germany center or 'left', and Austria in-between. The geographic proximity of these three countries further magnifies their interactions, as does the fact that in 2015 all three dealt with huge influxes of asylum seekers. As a result, migration was and is front and center on all their policy agendas, and dealings therein was and is inevitable. Moreover, all three parties have spent a significant amount of time in government, which allows for analysis not merely of party manifestos and election speeches, but of policies and governance actions. These are not oppositional or protest parties, they are not representing fringe issues, opinions or platforms, but rather the mainstream; their ideological stances have been actively used to govern. Also, all three parties are EPP members, which means they have signed on to an excarnation of Christian Democratic ideology. Because the EPP is one of the key arenas where party interaction takes place, looking at its members allows for better reginal analysis, rather than just domestic.

When it comes to the interaction of CDPs, I argue that the issue of irregular migration is central. When tracing the origins in the rise of the right many authors cite the role played by

migration[8], especially in Europe. In terms of Christian Democracy, the issue of migration is a key dividing point. On the one hand, a close read of the bible requires Christians to love thy neighbor, and Pope Francis, the leader of the Catholic Church (which most Christian Democratic Parties were historically deeply connected to) calls for helping migrants, and refugees in particular.[9] There are CDPs who have, largely, followed this line of thinking. However, many others have fixated on the cultural and religious "otherness" of incomers, most particularly their Islamic faith, and argued that Christendom is under threat. The role of migration, and the disputes therein, is apparent not only domestically, but also regionally, as it has been a key issue for the European Union and its neighbors.

With this in mind, I look to address the following questions: What are the different claims to Christian Democratic ideology, why did they develop, and how do they play out in competition with one another? What impact does this have domestically and regionally? Using the 2015 "crisis", its framing, and response as an analytical lens, how and why has claim-making to Christian Democratic ideology, the norms involved therein, and policy making under its umbrella, developed over the last five years?

Methodology and Research Design

To answer my research questions methodologically, I will use the discourse historical approach of critical discourse analysis, supplemented by process tracing. This approach uses two areas of discourse studies relevant to my research: "discourse and politics/policy/polity (e.g., politics of the past/political commemoration, nation-building, European Union, migration, asylum, multilingualism, language policy, populism) [and] discourse and identity (e.g., national and supranational/European identity, linguistic identity)".[10]

Keeping this in mind, I will analyze the direct and indirect claims being made on Christian Democracy by Fidesz, the CDU, and ÖVP, both overt and covert. Due to language and

source access limitations, and in order to ensure I do not miss anything significant and/or critical, much of this analysis will not be based in a direct analysis of primary sources. For the historic and contextual aspects of this study, analyzing every speech, political/parliamentary debate and policy made by these three parties would be an impossible task for a master's thesis. Instead my analysis is based in scholarly secondary literature. Although there are, of course, some limitations to this approach, due to the vast number of resources on these three countries and parties, it is relatively advantageous.

From 2015 onwards, although my source base will continue to take advantage of a vast scholarly literature, it will expand to include *Euractiv* and *The Economist* archives. These are, arguably, the most popular, comprehensive, and relatively unbiased English news sources on Europe. In the case of the former, this is largely a matter of traditional reporting, whereas with the latter extensive analytical and opinion pieces are also a part of the mix. Including news sources allows a more extensive and in the moment analysis of events, the claims parties and party leaders made/make, and the widespread interpretations of those claims. In order to be comprehensive, every article on any of the three nations, parties, or leaders, will be examined.

This approach will allow me to analyze, contextualize, and trace the claims being made on Christian Democratic ideology and approaches to Christian Democratic governance within discourse and policies, how and from where they develop, as well as points of differentiation and convergence between the various actors. This relies on process tracing as well, because it seeks to trace and understand the process by which the different claims have evolved.

Although the primary focus of this thesis is the developments related to the 2015 refugee reception crisis and its fallout, this will be contextualized with and conceptualized in the history leading up to these key moments. This historic contextualization will begin in 1945 for Austria

and Germany, as this is when Christian Democracy began playing a key role in the countries and when the CDU and ÖVP were founded. For Hungary, the contextualization will focus on the post-1989 era, but some history prior to this is quintessential to the claims and policies being analyzed and will be cited therein. By contextualizing and conceptualizing the events, policies, and rhetoric surrounding 2015 in prevailing realities, this thesis will also approach one of the many subjects outlined as important research objects in the discourse studies field, namely the "[c]hanging discourses on migration and asylum… national and supranational identities… and – not least – discourses on the various political pasts."[11] The analysis will extend beyond 2015, in order to allow study of the same processes after the height of the crisis, examining the drastic changes in approaches and rhetoric as Europe continued to manage its fallout. As this thesis is being written in spring 2020, no events past the 1st of March 2020 will be analyzed here.

When studying the CDU, ÖVP, and Fidesz parties comparatively it is important to pay heed to the fact that the party and country structures are incredibly different, especially between Hungary/Fidesz, on the one hand, and Germany/CDU and Austria/ÖVP, on the other. This is the result of contextual variances, different constraints, and – in the German and Hungarian cases, where the same individual holds leadership over this period – personal and leadership style differences between Merkel and Orbán. As a result, their claim making on Christian Democracy looks vastly different; where Orbán makes momentous speeches promulgating ideological claims, Merkel's mode of governance is almost entirely dependent on her not doing this. For much of her Chancellorship the policy changes themselves are the clearest evidence of the claims Merkel is making about Christian Democracy and Christian Democratic governance. Therefore, the sections of this thesis devoted to Germany/CDU will largely focus on policies and policy development, analyzing rhetoric where it is present and making claims on Christian Democracy.

The sections devoted to Hungary/Fidesz will be much more rhetorically focused, to reflect the reality that Orbán is much more focused on these big ideological claims. Austria/ÖVP operates between these two, using both depending on the situation; the analysis of Austria will reflect this.

It is important also to briefly outline some terminology important to this methodology; when it comes to the matter of migration and labeling therein, a vast debate exists over what terminology to use. The term refugee reception crisis, as I am using, reflects the fact that a growing number of scholars argue that the crisis in 2015 was not at its core the sole result of the number of people entering Europe. The argument here is that the sheer number of refugees could have been managed had the proper systems been in place and so on, but rather the crisis was on the receiving end, with the institutions and nations taking in refugees; this is epitomized with the suspension of both Schengen and Dublin, which will be analyzed later.[12] Furthermore this terminology utilizes the term refugees. I use this term with the full understanding that many governments also reference these groups of people as migrants, or even economic migrants:

> The categorization of "refugee", especially when referring to a humanitarian reason for leaving one's country, such as fleeing a war zone (for example, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq or Sudan), was much more likely to evoke empathy in public opinion (Fassin 2011). Conversely, when the designation of "economic migrant" was applied to those seeking better conditions for their lives, it was viewed less favourably as far as public opinion was concerned. Thus, the category of "refugee" tended to be associated with a "deserving migrant", while "economic migrant" was more often thought of as an "irregular" and "undeserving" migrant. The stakes of categorization are strictly political, in the sense that the choice between one term and the other not only determines people's access to certain rights but also affects the moral dimension of migration policy (Carens 2013).[13]

Of course there were/are individuals who do not fit the legal qualifications of refugees, but "[w]ith regard to the origins of the people… and the main reason for their exodus, it quickly became clear [in 2015] that the category of "refugee" was the most appropriate … and that the political response anticipated from the EU states was one of humanitarian action. Nevertheless, many media outlets, as well as official bodies like Frontex, described the asylum seekers as

illegal immigrants."[14] For the purposes of this thesis, the term asylum seeker will be used in most cases, as this is a way of mitigating the debate. Whether or not people met the qualifications of the term refugee they were all seeking asylum. When the term "migrant" is used, it is the reflection of terminology used by the governments, similarly with "refugee".

Theory, concept clarification, and the existing literature reviewed

This section aims to clarify the concepts and theories of Christian Democratic ideology as conceptualized previously, as well as what populism and nationalism, paired with aspects of civilizationism, are and how they intersect with Christian democracy, as least in the realm of claim making. It will then elaborate why and how the migration crisis fits into this picture, including concepts of securitization, the clash of civilizations, populism and nationalism.

Christian Democracy and Christian Democratic Ideology

Stathis N. Kalyvas and Kees van Kersbergen's works provide a foundation of Christian democratic studies – looking at the origin, concept, state, impact, versatility, and future of the ideology, demonstrating its crucial role in European politics, intersections of religion and politics therein, and relevancy beyond Europe.[15] CDPs' key feature is identified as their mobilizational capacity, despite differing interests and constituencies, and mediation-based politics which allows for versatility/adaptability when political, economic, and cultural environments change.[16] Historically, CDPs developed despite the Church and conservative parties being opposed to them.[17] Ideologically they are more progressive than the right, but their separation from Catholicism, led to a secularization of politics, paradoxically.[18] This argument necessitates a new history of Christian Democracy – rather than historical contingency the focus is the challenge Christian Democrats faced: reconciliation of Christianity and democracy, or at least making the latter safe for the former.[19] In achieving this Christian Democracy managed, historically, to be

the main alternative to communism while still providing for the people: Christian Democracy counter(s)(ed) the "materialism of both laissez-faires liberals and socialists".[20]

CDPs have a catch all nature, and have adapted to increasingly secular societies – by "redefin[ing] religion into a nebulous humanitarian and moral concept" –, which has resulted in accusations that they are opportunistic and not religiously-based.[21] A more particular definition of CDPs locates them at the center right, and argues that they consider society an "organic" whole made of units – most importantly the family –, wherein market and private property are important but in need of checks – to protect weak and vulnerable – by the lowest level of governance, and international cooperation as key.[22]

Today, CDPs are largely in decline. Explaining this decline, Kalyvas argues that it is not necessarily related to religiosity and secularism, but rather growing discontent with the mainstream[23] – this has been demonstrated quantitatively.[24] Therefore, it is not only CDPs that are experiencing decline but also their main competitors, the social democrats.

A key component of CDPs' decline and their contemporary challenge is internal friction, exacerbated by a number of issues. First there is voter base, the parties' traditional electorate is declining – both due to generational shift and increased voter volatility; the solutions are to either try to win back traditional groups such as the religious, farmers, and self-employed or to abandon the Christian association and open up to more secular voters.[25] Second, party competition has increased; more parties are on the ballot and more people are willing to vote fringe. Additionally, the space between mainstream parties' ideologies is shrinking, leaving little competition, which makes voters feel alienated and unrepresented. Furthermore, green parties have claimed green politics and powerful opponents have emerged on the right – crowding the ideological spaces, voters, and issues CDPs historically dominated.[26] This pairs with a change in issue context.

Immigration has become increasingly salient and economic pressures have forced CDPs away from traditional Catholic social policies towards deregulation –paired with economic hardships, this resulted in a loss of legitimacy and trust.[27] Different stances on and approaches to these matters have created internal friction and intra-party divergence, making the already broad based, factionalized CDP-structure more problematic.[28] With all these developments and parties' differentiated responses, it is increasingly difficult to define CDPs.[29]

Despite the vast literature on CDPs, much is missing. Substantive to the argument of this thesis is the failure to address/predict, the overarching split in Christian Democratic ideology. Today this is represented by Merkel (center, arguably even left) and Orbán's (radical right) engagement in a discursive battle laying claim to Christian Democracy. Despite massive differences both are, in their own ways, largely secular, and claim Christian morality, although on vastly different points. Studying CDP's origins and developments can and should inform and contextualize this split, and what it reveals about Christian Democracy's contemporary role.

Nationalism, Populism, and Tying it All Together

Nationalism can be defined any number of ways, from an everyday plebiscite[30], to a collective loyalty to a community based on primordial attachments[31], to the political principle that political and national units should be congruent[32]. This paper largely relies on Smith's conceptualization of nation building as elite-led but also having mass appeal[33] and Breuilly's understanding of nationalism as an ideology that legitimizes certain thoughts, actions, and regimes[34]. Also important is the contextualization of nations within international communities. Looking at this, Hannum addresses nationalism in an international context and the contradiction that although popular sovereignty is the legitimizing power behind the state, the state then has the authority to give up that sovereignty with international law and treaties.[35] In the EU setting, this contradiction is the basis of Euroscepticism.

Tied to nationalism, but expanding from it, is civilizationism, which Brubaker describes tas the idea that insurmountable differences exist between some cultures, largely based in religious identity.[36] This is quintessential in the current European populist movement and the perceived differences between European Christians and Muslim Others. Herein, civilizationism can be conceived as a pan-European nationalism, when understood in a broader sense, with a focus on shared history and vague, base aspects of identity. Although there are many differences between European nations, this is largely irrelevant in defining European civilizationism because the term is not focused on what is inside but rather constructed against the outgroup, the other.

Like nationalism, populism has a plethora of definitions[37] – but the key ideas are people centrism and popular sovereignty which is thought to be suppressed by a vaguely defined elite. Populism and nationalism are hot topics in academia today, mostly because both are increasingly prevalent globally. However, with the increased attention to these topics they are often conflated. This is understandable, as they are compatible, often paired together, and have many similarities. Furthermore, they are both utilized to mobilize groups of people and are relatively thin ideologies that can be layered. Populism places the group of good and pure people against that of an evil and corrupt elite[38] but defines neither. Often this group of pure people are articulated also as the true heart of the nation, and usually their enemy is contributed an "un"-national element which is also used to justify their supposed corruption. Even in left wing economic populist movements there are, often, enemies identified outside the nation – by putting international actors into the limelight, these movements utilize nationalist sentiments. Finally, right wing populism today is often nationalist. Nevertheless, there are key differences between them: they have completely different nodal points, with nationalism's being the nation and populism's the

people.[39] Consequently, nationalism is inherently connected to a specific territory or conception of a state, whereas populism can be international.

It is evident then that populism and nationalism are compatible, but what does this have to do with Christian democracy? The answer lies in the conceptualization of Europe as Christian. Christianity, largely as an identity, is tied to European culture in civilizationism, and in nations' cultures in nationalism. The history from which the nation was/is constructed and/or evolved according to the modernization and constructivist/institutionalist theorists of nationalism is a Christian history. As a result, nationalist, civilizationist, and populist actors often rely on Christian identity in their rhetoric, claims, and ideologies. Furthermore, as the various pressures on CDPs outlined above exacerbate the divisions and schisms therein, many actors look to emphasize the parties' Christian identity, and that of its voters, especially on the issue of migration, wherein the idea of a monocultured nation state, as opposed to one "filled" with migrants, is the most salient. The layering of these ideologies will become more evident in the analysis of Fidesz' claim making on Christian democratic ideology.

History

To understand the variant versions of Christian Democracy put forward by the CDU, OVP and Fidesz, their historical context is important. The origin, development, content, and strength of Christian Democracy in Austria, Germany, and Hungary look very different, most certainly between the former two and the latter.

Germany from Adenauer through Reunification

Following a trend in western Europe, Christian Democracy took hold of the West German political scene in the aftermath of World War II. Departing from that trend, however, it has been considerably more successful that its fellow parties in the contemporary era, beginning

in 1990. Although various differences led to this comparative advantage, in line with the goals of this thesis, the CDU stance on migration will be the most heavily analyzed here.

Under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the pre-War Catholic Centre Party was transformed to "a dominant centre-right political force in the emerging post-war western Federal Republic"[40], which still retained the old cross class appeal. The adapted model is termed Volkspartai[41]; the defining features of these parties are their class transcendence[42], relative majority[43], office holding[44], membership based[45] and catch-all nature[46]. The relatively un-politicized and mediation-based mode of politics practiced herein was advantageous in a society where social, political, and ideological polarization and conflict had no appeal.[47] Furthermore, the quest for morality in the post war society, made the religious affiliation of the party advantageous.[48] The party worked within the existing political culture of Germany: "party, state and society were socially conservative, pro-free market and strongly influenced by Catholic social theory".[49] As such the CDU had a perceived permanent advantage. From Adenauer's chancellorship on, a combination of structure and rule driven path dependence[50] has allotted the party systematic power.[51] Since 1945 CDU election results have ranged from 31 to 50 percent.[52] This advantage is intriguing considering the vast amount of change Germany has undergone since World War Two's end.[53] Indeed, a wide variety of issues have begun to impact CDPs' popularity more broadly, as discussed in the previous chapter, and the CDU in particular. Yet their impact looks much different than what one may predict, especially in Germany.

Compared to other CDPs, the CDU/CSU has been considerably more successful, chiefly since the 1990s. Explaining this difference is a positive effect of reunification, the lack of a strong radical right competitor, and different leadership, organization, and financing.[54] Also, many characteristics associated in the traditional CDP became significantly less distinct over this

time period, as the party adapted to its changing environment.[55] However even with these comparative "bonuses" evident in the early 90s, the CDU lost the Chancellorship in 1998. The wider trends suggest then, that the previous structural advantage of CDPs is much less significant today.[56] Some key issues contributing to the end of CDPs' structural advantage, were the fall of the Soviet Union[57], changing global economic conditions[58], gender[59], and immigration.

Particularly important for this research is the matter of migration. For CDPs more broadly, increased migration levels and the religious affiliation of these people (largely Islam) result in ideological problems for parties committed to society as an organic –and at least distantly religious– whole.[60] Historically for the CDU, migration was characterized by relatively restrictive policies and preferences.[61] Negative discourse began most clearly in the 1980s, when asylum seekers fleeing conflict outside Europe/Eurasia began entering Germany. "Terms like pseudo-applicants, asylum parasites, economic refugees and asylum cheaters" became the norm; "[s]tarting in the mid-1980s, the CDU-led government introduced a series of restrictions on asylum seekers, such as a residency obligation, a bar on working and the principle of "safe countries", making it easier for the German authorities to reject asylum applicants and the recognition rate dropped from almost 30 percent to less than 2.[62] This was paired EU asylum policy development and the Dublin system, the goal of which was/is to keep people out.[63]

Two key documents – the CDU's "2001 position paper on immigration and the 2002 campaign manifesto"[64] – demonstrate anti-immigrant discourse at this time. The key arguments here are as follows: "a) Germany and its common culture are Christian and European; b) the basic constitutional values of Germany are Christian; c) "Unsere deutsche Nation" (emphasis added), and d) the threat and competition topos". The document works largely through discursive framing, frequently using "first-person plural pronouns and possessive adjective "we," "us,"

"our," … twenty-two times in four brief paragraphs"; this is then paired with references to Germany which "creates a closed community sharply differentiated from "others" who, logically, do not share the enumerated features and values, namely Christianity and a common (German) cultural and linguistic past that had developed over the centuries."[65]

The threat and competition topos highlight foreigners, especially Muslims, as dangerous to German "identity: constitutional, national, cultural, and economic… Verstärkte Zuwanderung würde den inneren Frieden gefährden und radikalen Kräften Vorschub leisten[66]".[67] This discourse –extended to all of Europe– is rooted in tradition and identity, feeding xenophobia and connecting economic concerns, which –paired with the credibility of the CDU– increased the impact.[68] Discourse was also linked to multiculturalism, an approach said to have failed. The leader of the CSU, Horst Seehofer, even juxtaposed multiculturalism and German culture, saying "Wir als Union treten für die deutsche Leitkultur und gegen Multikulti ein, Multikulti ist tot[69]".[70]

At the turn of the 21st century then, the CDU had held power for most of the post-war era. However, in 1998 the party lost the elections and went into opposition. Taking a snapshot of their migration policy at this time, it is clear they presented a strong anti-immigrant discourse highlighting cultural differences and a threat and competition topos.

Austria

Similar to the CDU, Austria's Christian Democratic Party, Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) (Austrian People's Party), was established after World War II. For the rest of the 20th century it dominated the Austrian political landscape along with its chief competitor, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) (Social Democratic Party of Austria).[71] The ÖVP spent 49.3 percent of the post war years in government, and held the Prime Minister position 31.3% of the time.[72] Until the 90s the ÖVP won around 40% or more of the overall vote.[73] The post-1990 moment, however, was rather harsh for the party.

Duncan analyzes the 90s as "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline", arguing that not only did CDPs witness a substantive drop in support during this decade but, "the universality of this drop is impressive".[74] Investigating this, Duncan studies the changes in political and electoral environments, largely focusing on "shrinking core clientele, heightened party competition, altered issue context, and the 'hard choices' connected with these".[75] In terms of the latter, the discussion revolves around friction and factionalism within the parties and problematic leadership.[76] In reality all these trends are deeply intertwined, the appearance of more parties related to the increased salience of some issues, both of which helped in shrinking core clientele. These trends are common across Europe, but also had a particular Austrian flavor. In fact, Duncan takes the ÖVP as one of his case studies.[77]

Compared to the German CDU, the ÖVP's biggest issue was the threat from a legitimate competitor on the right, the FPÖ.[78] The FPÖ, despite the electorate's reservations because of its occasional neo-Nazism, was popular for capitalizing on populist and nationalist sentiments.[79] As such, the ÖVP could not move leftward to pick up more median voters, as the CDU had – particularly on the issues of immigration, EU skepticism, and economic liberalism[80]– because it would than risk losing its conservative voter base. Herein, migration was especially important. This is because collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the Yugoslav wars resulted in massive migrant and refugee influx for the EU. The rise in salience of migration contributed to the FPÖ's popularity.[81] As a result, the ÖVP changed its policies on prototypical "right" issues.[82] Despite these changes, the FPÖ beat the ÖVP in 1999[83], which resulted in a coalition between them.[84]

Other parties also had negative effects. The 1990s saw the SPÖ "absor[b] much of the ÖVP's policy rhetoric, …undermining the[ir] distinctiveness".[85] Simultaneously global circumstance obliged the ÖVP to adopt a "harder line on socio-economic policy [which] had

little popular resonance… and implement[t] budgetary austerity and welfare retrenchment [which] caused considerable problems".[86] This partly explains the ÖVP's electoral decline and some changes the party platform underwent, including more radical and market based economic policies and more traditional "family policy and law and order".[87] Additionally the Greens' ownership of environmentalism challenged previous claim-making on this issue by the ÖVP.[88]

These outside pressures aggravated an already fractionalized party, magnified by the fact that, to enter government, they either had to play junior partner to the SPÖ or risk affiliation with an occasionally xenophobic and even anti-Semitic FPÖ.[89] These internal issues were also reflected in leadership which could not possibly represent or even control the entire party.[90]

Transferring Christian Democracy to Post-Communist Space: The Origins of the Ideology in Hungary

This section will be focused on the role of CDPs, as Hungary sought to accede to the EU. Herein, Hungary is part of a wider context of East Central European (ECE) politics wherein Christian democratic ideology was embedded by the EPP. It is widely accepted that within ECE, Europarties – EU groupings of political parties – worked as "agents of Europeanization".[91] Of these parties, the EPP was the most involved[92], with help from the Christian Democratic International and European Union of Christian Democrats[93]. However, the EPP did not act in a vacuum. Its actions were part of a larger process of Europeanization[94] being undergone in ECE.

In spreading Christian democratic ideology, one key actor was the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS)[95] – a German foundation named after the founder of the CDU – which spread a Christian-infused politic by identifying and working with young political leaders and "opinion shapers"[96], including Viktor Orbán[97]. This helped create a logic of appropriateness[98] within the post-Soviet space, by socializing elites [99] and convincing them of Christian Democratic norms,

values, and way of doing things[100]. Again, this logic was not the sole result of KAS and others' actions, but rather a broader functioning of the "Return to Europe".[101]

To understand the EPP's role for Christian Democratic politics, their tie to Christianity is important. The EPP's manifesto linked Christianity inextricably to politics, undoing the theory of secularization and constriction of religion to the private sphere.[102] Given Christianity's central role within the EPP, any expansion they made had to maintain this religious foothold for internal homogeneity. Although this worked to limit potential partners in the region based on ideology[103], the fluidity and instability of ECE parties and ideologies[104] meant the EPP could influence a wide selection of parties, which is how Fidesz came into the running.

Initially Fidesz had been a liberal party, "before a sharp turn to the right in 1993".[105] *The Economist* contextualizes this change in direction with the EPP's own actions, having been so impressed with Orban that it "wooed [him] away from the liberal bloc – sending representatives to Budapest to persuade him to switch, which he did in 2000".[106] This aforementioned wooing, likely refers to the direct resource exchange and socialization[107] through which the EPP managed its influence. Such actions built on and worked with the KAS.[108]

In terms of specific policy positions, and ideology, the EU expected ECE parties to "engage in programmatic dialogue with the appropriate pan-European party associations and adapt their key principles and policy paradigms". For the EPP, Christianity infused politics is foundational to these key principles, which resulted in the large majority of ECE Christian Democratic and conservative parties basing their manifestos and programmes on the EPP's.[109] For example Fidesz's foreign policy strategy stated "for more than a millennium, Hungary has been inextricably linked to Western Christian culture and European values; we aim to defend these values" [110] and their founding manifesto committed to following "the traditions of Christian

democracy and social market economy"[111]. Socialization, noted to be epitomized by Fidesz[112], helped ensure lasting changes in ECE parties by convincing them of their validity, and was undergone by regular personal interaction, traineeships, mutual visits, conferences and conventions, as well as formal seminars.[113] Direct resource exchange centered around ECE parties accepting significant aspects of EPP ideology and policy, correlating to various stages of inclusion, leading up to full membership.[114]

The EPP then, crafted the liberal Fidesz of 1989 into a central conservative entity. Through socialization they worked to create in policies, including Orbán a logic of appropriateness concerning the Christian Democratic way of doing politics and through direct resource exchange they ensured hard changes.

Creating the Contemporary

Even before the 2015 crisis, the early 21st century saw drastic changes take place in all three parties being studied here. The CDU chose a female protestant chairwoman of East German origin and abandoned much of its traditional Christian Democratic stances as it sought after a new "center" in line with the German electorate. The ÖVP swung rightwards, entering government with the far right FPÖ, to much of the EU's dismay. Fidesz entered government in a landslide election and began to conceptualize a new self-proclaimed illiberal ideology. An analysis of these developments and innovations lays the groundwork for these parties' considerably diverse responses to the influx of asylum seekers in 2015.

Germany, The Merkel Era, and the "Center" Version of Christian Democracy

After losing the chancellorship in 1998, the CDU did not regain it until 2005, with a rather non-traditional candidate; even then, they could not govern without entering coalition with the other major German party, the SPD. Due both to this coalition and Angela Merkel herself, the CDU from 2005 forward looked different from its historic norm; the CDU has been willing

and able "to manipulate the parameters of political practice", parting from core CDP positions.[115] In many ways this has "further enhanced their strategic position but, paradoxically, the[ir] adaptive qualities may have blunted their Christian Democratic identity".[116] The position changes and erosion of the party's ideological particularity have been a key source of criticism for Merkel because it creates a vacuum on the political right and demand for a new party.[117] Yet Germany's history and ensuing aversion to the alt right meant the rise of a far right party was not probable.

Coalitions, particularly the grand coalitions with the SPD, are of key importance here. Although the CDU suffers in direct popularity, structurally speaking it holds significant coalition power, increasing its odds to be in government.[118] Yet the nature of consensus and compromise inherent to coalitions requires ideological sacrifices.[119] In the first grand coalition, Merkel moved to the ideological left, coopting many SPD policy positions, which increased electoral success for the CDU in 2009.[120] However, in 2013, electoral losses resulted in another grand coalition. Despite critiques and wariness from both sides this coalition was relatively successful.[121]

Outside of coalition restraints and other environmental factors, many commentators link the CDU's programmatic changes to Merkel herself –as both the first East German and female Chancellor– and her preemptive actions "to tap into new electoral segments and become compatible for a wider range of coalition partners.[122] The success of these changes is/was aided by Merkel's apparent lack of ideological drive and grand vision[123], pragmatism and lack of engagement in contentious public statements or party politics, as well as her flexibility, timeliness and attention to electoral popularity of policies, and "her ability to smooth out the less palatable edges of the Christian Democrat's manifesto".[124] "Merkel was valued, if often also criticised, for her caution[; h]er governing was a "politics of small steps", lampooned for endless hedging and "leading from behind".[125] Furthermore, even though Merkel heads a CDP and is

herself Christian she generally avoids a connection between faith and politics, avoiding any implications for the non-religious which could be interpreted therein.[126]

The Economist summarizes the key aspects of Merkel's personality and governance style, labeled Merkelism, as follows:

> Her Lutheran faith ("an inner compass", she calls it) expresses itself in her unflashy style and her instincts: debt is bad; helping the needy, good. She thinks ethically, not ideologically. "I'm a bit liberal, a bit Christian-social, a bit conservative," she said in 2009… [H]er distrust of ideology is [likely] rooted in her experience of East Germany: "She witnessed ideology collapse and believers turn into non-believers overnight."
> She is reactive rather than programmatic, managing events as they arise rather than hatching long-term plans. "She works like a scientist: she reads lots, assesses the facts and doesn't have preconceptions,"… monitors events and mood-shifts in a constant exchange of text messages with aides, officials and MPs…Merkel invites voters to endorse her temperament, not specific proposals. Her message: I will handle such dramas as cross my desk calmly, rationally and without anything so distracting as a project.
> A third crucial aspect to her character is detachment. She keeps her options open and strives never to rile or polarise. Her sentences are paper-chains of subclauses and qualifications. East Germany's paranoid and hyper-surveilled society and Helmut Kohl's patriarchal CDU taught her the virtues of ambiguity and patience…
> Ethical not ideological, reactive not programmatic and detached not engaged, Merkelism is the absence of political anchors. That suits modern Germany's political culture well. Comfortable circumstances suppress the appetite for change. Its hard-won economic success buoyed for the time being by a weak euro, low interest rates, an oil glut and the liberalising labour-market reforms of her SPD predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, the country wants an administrator, not a reformer.[127]

Merkelism then centers on caution and pragmatism, blending centrism with nonpartisanism, and explains why many voters outside the traditional CDU electorate find it so appealing; Germany is a very centrist country… Merkel suffices it".[128]

In government, Merkel often practices claim-making on the ideological center, sidelining the CDU's conservative wings, which gives her a calculated tactical advantage; this is possible because conservatives lack alternatives and would "ultimately stay loyal to the CDU".[129] This strategy, an "asymmetrical demobilization of voters", relies on ambiguity and elusiveness with Merkel's own political views, as well as a "balanced and carefully adapted [attention] to popular sentiment and public discourse".[130] These traits amount to a public image which, arguably, "by

2013… had become imbued with respect that in the words of Less (2014: 50) amounted to a 'cult of personality' which… no other contender for the chancellorship could rival".[131]

This move towards the center has resulted in significant criticism regarding how much the "C" in CDU really matters to the party; yet as Clemens points out the CDU "was never a solely religious party" and as such asking only about the 'C' independent of the 'D' was too narrow".[132] For Clemens, studying economics, the heart of Christian Democracy is "above all being a model of social integration based on a distinct welfare state model" and so "a more decisive question about the CDU's identity [is] whether it remained discernibly committed to the latter's distinguishing principles, solidarity and subsidiarity".[133]

Although Clemens'[134] argument solely relates to economics, the underlying point is more broadly transferable. If the defining features of CDPs are, in fact, their class transcendence, relative majority, office holding, membership based and catch-all nature, then this does not necessitate a strong tie to the "C". If we take Kalyvas and Kersbergen's[135] definition of CDPs', their key feature is their mobilizational capacity, despite differing interests and constituencies, and mediation based politics which allows for versatility/adaptability when political, economic, and cultural environments change; this means that Merkel's move towards the center is in line with CDP's nature. However, even if, as Kalyvas argues, religion has been redefined into a nebulous and humanitarian concept[136], the word Christian is still there, and present in the base concepts of the party[137], which is why Merkel's actions are often criticized.

To see how these two arguments work, it is important to know the various developments, largely in economic and gender/family policy, which reflect the CDU's break from Christian Democratic norms. In fact, because of the pragmatic nature of Merkel's politics and her

ambiguous personal views, these changes are the clearest insight into the CDU's contemporary claim making on Christian Democratic ideology.

When Merkel took office in 2005 the SPD had already made the most difficult economic reforms of the welfare system and held responsibility for them.[138] Although these reforms were arguably necessary because of global context, they are especially important domestically, because it "is hard to overstate just how unpopular [they] were and still are in context to German politics".[139] The SPD's popularity was, therefore, suffering tremendously, and any additional reforms under the Grand Coalition were minimal comparatively. Furthermore, because the SPD was already associated with such reforms, it was relatively easy for the CDU to take credit for successes in economic policy while blaming the SPD for more difficult decisions.[140] Essentially, there was significant confusion regarding responsibility, which the CDU was able to take advantage of.[141] In terms of traditional Christian Democratic ideology, the redefined solidarity concept was thriving[142] – enacted in policies such as the 2006 health deal –, but subsidiarity did not fare well – the same deal increased state power and centralization.[143]

In gender and family policy, changes in parental leave and work-family balance evidence shifting gender norms within the CDU.[144] Wage replacement was substituted for flat monthly payments, acknowledging the importance women's income; eligibility for extra paid leave was tied to the second parent taking time off, encouraging male involvement; and increased care for pre-kindergarten children encouraged women to return to work.[145] Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that both these policies were argued for, by CDU politicians, with mostly feminist arguments, "suggesting that feminist claim-making and policy adoption have a place in conservative parties and governments".[146] Collectively, these new laws marked a departure from the CDU's traditional male-breadwinner approach and "have been called a 'women's revolution

from above'".[147] Although the Catholic Church had previously expressed issues with these kinds of issues, Merkel's family affairs minister threatened their funding, which quieted discontent.[148] The changes have drastically increased female support for the party.[149]

Despite these drastic changes, religion and religious affiliation were still important for CDU politicians, even though the German political environment has been, for decades, increasingly secularized. Often CDPs avoid "placing value-driven issues on the agenda" in contemporary times, and "it has become common practice for secular parties to adopt the otherwise risky strategy of drawing attention to morality policy issues, precisely in order to increase the dilemma for Christian Democrats.[150] Yet although on the surface the CDU follows this trend, when single Christian Democratic MPs deal with conscience issues, where party discipline is suspended, "Christian Democratic MPs deviate from a strict 'unsecular approach' and instead engage actively in the politicisation of issues related to religion".[151]

For the first ten years of her tenure then, Merkel's governance mode was cautious, pragmatic, centrist and non-partisan. This approach however, especially in pair with two grand coalitions, meant a distancing from more traditional Christian democratic policies, especially in economic, gender and family policy. Although she made no big ideological claims regarding Christian democratic ideology, it is clear that in regard to the "options" for CDPs in the modern era, as outlined in the introduction, Merkel's choice was carrying on the Christian Democratic legacy while secularizing and liberalizing to attract young liberal voters.

Austria, the Black and Blue Coalition, and its Impacts

While the CDU became more liberal, Austria's ÖVP moved in the opposite direction by entering into coalition with the far right FPÖ in 2000 and embracing Islamophobia. Related to CDP's contemporary options this coalition in numerous ways outstripped even the more right-wing approach. Although they themselves refrained from using extremely nationalist and/or

populist arguments, the ÖVP partnered with a party that did, representing far-right voters in government. The introduction of Islamophobia furthers this correlation, because the Austrian identity being emphasized within it was Christianity.

Both domestically and internationally substantial pressure came out against the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition, because the FPÖ leader, Haider, had made comments sympathetic to, even supportive of, Nazism.[152] When the FPÖ entered government, "to assuage doubts at home and abroad, [both leaders] signed a special pledge that stated their respective parties' commitment to democracy and human rights… [and] specified and accepted Austria's responsibility for crimes committed by the Nazi regime during World War II".[153] Despite this pledge, immediate sanctions from the other EU nations followed the FPÖ's accession to government; this was followed by the Austrian government's announcement that they would hold a referendum regarding EU membership.[154] In response, the EU sent an observation team to Austria, who recommended lifting sanctions; the EU did so.[155] Two years later, the coalition collapsed, new elections were held, and despite decrease in electoral support for the latter, the ÖVP and FPÖ entered coalition again.[156]

It is at this point, in the early 2000s, that Islamophobia became a salient and relevant issue in Austria.[157] Although Islam had been historically managed in a consociational fashion, similar to other religious groups in Austria, this changed when it was "successfully introduced as a divisive political issue".[158] The actor behind this introduction was Haider, under whom the FPÖ expanded its electoral appeal by programmatically mixing "Austrian cultural parochialism, welfare chauvinism, and anti-internationalism".[159] They also began defending traditional Catholicism – despite being historically anti-clerical – co-opting issues like family policy which were traditionally held by the ÖVP and popular among their conservative electorate.[160]

> Increasingly, the FPÖ described itself as a defender of the Christian "Occident" and regarded Islam, by implication, as a cultural threat (terrorism was less of an issue at the

> time). In a clear departure from its long-standing anti-clerical tradition, the new Freedom Party Program of 1997 devoted extensive attention to Christianity as the "foundation of Europe" and the traditions of the "Abendland" ("Christian civilization"), which required a "Christianity that defends its values."[161]

This issue introduction, which, when capitalized on, allotted the FPÖ a seat in government for the first time, is extremely relevant to later developments in 2015. This is because, although the FPÖ put such discourse on the map, after 2006 politicians in the centrist parties began using this framing and terminology of security and culture – speaking of ""suppressed Muslim women," "hate preachers," "counter-societies" ("Gegengesellschaften"), and the threat of "sharia law as antithetical to the Austrian constitution"32—all typical FPÖ phraseology".[162]

Therefore, although ÖVP/FPÖ coalition fell apart in 2005 when Haider left and created the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bundnis Zukunft Österreich; BZÖ)[163], its impact – especially in terms of anti-Islamism – lasted much longer. The collapse led to the "FPÖ reconstitute[ing] itself under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache as a radical, rightwing, populist opposition party".[164] The 2006 elections, with the right wing vote split between these two parties[165], resulted in a grand coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, with the latter being junior partner, which collapsed two years later; the new elections resulted in the same coalition[166]. During this second grand coalition government the 2008-9 financial crisis occurred. Among other issues, including immigration, this decreased the popularity of the governing parties and contributed to a rise in support for the FPÖ; however, the SPÖ and ÖVP were able, marginally, to create another grand coalition with the 2013 parliamentary elections.[167] This was the government in charge when the 2015 crisis hit.

Orbán's Government and Illiberalism

Despite intense Christian Democratic socialization, Orbán and his Fidesz party are rarely analyzed as a CDP; this is because their turn towards conservativism has been accompanied more by nationalism, populism, and illiberalism than traditional Christian Democratic ideology.

However, as the case studies of Germany and Austria demonstrate, Christian democracy as understood historically has changed drastically in the contemporary era. Furthermore, however surface level the commitment to Christian Democratic ideology may be within Fidesz, the claim on the ideology is still there. Even in Orbán's famous 2014 speech on illiberal democracy, the importance of Christianity and Christian Democracy in his model is evident. The heart of his message is clearly expressed as follows: "We needed to state that a democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy".[168] He is telling the world that illiberal democracy is an option and, in fact, the better option. Yet how he conceptualizes illiberal democracy, leaves an important role for Christianity. This section will first expand on the role of Christianity within Orbán's conceptualization of illiberal democracy as presented in 2014 at the XXV. Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp, before analyzing why such developments occurred in Hungary, contextualizing Orbán's illiberal turn.

In Orbán's 2014 Bálványos speech, the role of Christianity is evidenced with his early explicit references to Fidesz as a Christian power and their alliance with the Christian Democratic People's party – used to establish his normative authority: "[with] this election… the governing civic, Christian and national power, Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party, gained a two-thirds majority".[169] He also highlights the success Fidesz has experienced within EP elections, specifically as a member of the EPP – which he highlights as a Christian Democratic Party. Furthermore, when he gets to the base ideas of this new form of governance – after critiquing the system as it stands now[170] – he suggests that his system will we based on two principles, the first of which is the Christian golden rule: "Instead the principle should be do not do to others what you would not do to yourself".[171] This golden rule expressed in Matthew chapter seven verse 12 says "In everything, then, do to others as you would have them do to

you." Shortly afterwards he lays out the key values this system will fulfil and respect, the first of which is Christianity. Much of the speech is about reconciling individual needs with community ones, which has hauntingly Christian overtones: "Hungarian voters expect from their leaders… a new form of state-organization that will make the community of Hungarians competitive once again after the era of liberal state and liberal democracy, one that will of course still respect values of Christianity, freedom and human rights".[172]

Thus, even at the height of Orbán's conceptualization of illiberal democracy, Christianity was clearly an important part of his vision. First as a source of authority and norms both nationally and internationally. Second, perhaps more importantly, as a foundational principle and value, with the Christian golden rule and, in case the reference was lost, with a guarantee that this system will fulfill/respect Christian values. Yet the criticism he received after this speech, paired with the 2015 refugee reception crisis in Europe, would drastically change his approach, and deepen the connection with and claim to Christian Democracy.

It is clear here that such an evident claim to illiberalism is unique to the Hungarian case, especially in Europe. The response to this speech would make it evident that such a claim was not welcome, so why did it occur?

The overarching trend at play here is a matter of social psychology, namely Social Identity Theory (SIT) which argues that people's identity comes from group membership such as "nation, ethnicity, religion".[173] People want their groups to have a comparatively better and distinct identity because group identity reflects oneself; if that is not the case, groups "pursue an identity management strategy – social mobility, social competition, or social creativity".[174]

This theory when applied to Hungary – and ECE more broadly – explains events after the fall of communism. The Western European countries worked as reference groups which ranked

higher (at least perceivably) in almost every criterion. As such, the "Return to Europe" and the strong drive to mimic the West to achieve their standard of living can be seen as choosing the identity management strategy of social mobility. Slowly but surely the humiliation at the inherent admittance of inferiority in choosing such a strategy, especially when paired with the harsh realities of fast democratization and economic neo-liberalization, began to wear on the society. This was most clear with the 2008/9 world financial crisis and its impacts on Hungary. It led to the national economy's near collapse, increasing negativity and disillusionment with the Western development model and the powerful foreign companies perceived to be taking advantage of Hungary.[175] This, in pair with a political legitimacy crisis with the ruling party, lead to the landslide victory of Fidesz in 2010.

In government, Orbán crafted a new strategy of identity management, social creativity. Rather than copying the West at the expense of Hungarian identity, social creativity meant "pursuing distinctive domestic policies together with an independent, multi-vectoral foreign policy … [to] enhance Hungary's status with the EU" and internationally.[176] As Orbán embarked on this different path, the illiberal nature of the ideas behind, and actual nature of, many of the reforms led to several conflicts with other EU nations and leadership. To understand the particulars of Orbán's social creativity and how it was possible, a few factors must be analyzed.

The first key component is the salience of cultural issues, because of Hungary's history. Herein, nationalism is vital because of historic experiences of national sovereignty being limited or eliminated.[177] This occurred through various means both in the 20th century and before – namely the Ottoman raids, the Habsburg Empire, the Treaty of Trianon, the Yalta conference, the Warsaw Pact, and the repression of the 1956 revolution retroactively justified by the Brezhnev Doctrine – , as well as with EU accession criterion in the 1990s and early 2000s.

> "There is an extensive literature suggesting that the widespread appeal of nationalism and nativism… is strongly connected to [ECE]'s long history of outside domination and restricted national sovereignty. This caused competing historical narratives, unfulfilled national aspirations while increasing the salience of ethnic or religious cleavages within these societies …historical grievances and imagined or genuine national traumas continue to serve as sociocultural sources of political contestation.[178]

Essentially, because Hungary has such a troubled history with national sovereignty, nationalism is a particularly important and galvanizing issue. Nationalism often even shows traits of collective narcissism, which speaks to the simultaneous strength and instability of national identity, the need to constantly defend it, and resultant increased hostility towards outgroups.[179]

The first major upsurge in nationalist sentiments after EU accession occurred in 2006, after a speech – wherein the then governing socialists admitted to lying about the economy, among other issues – was leaked.[180] Mass protests ensued, which – oddly enough – served as networking opportunity for far-right groups.[181] Working together these groups began normalizing nationalist and mythical symbols throughout Hungary, and work actively within civil society.[182] This demonstrates a bottom up, grass roots mobilization and normalization of nationalism.

Simultaneously, a growing number of intellectuals had begun looking for alternatives to liberalism, and conservativism became ideologically investigated and regularized.[183] However, conservatism in Hungary and ECE more broadly is distinct from its western counterpart, linked to "a wish to 'be taken care of' by a powerful authority on both sides of the political spectrum due to socialist nostalgia…more dispersed on the political spectrum, and strongly attached to a fear of change and norm-violating or culturally different out-groups".[184]

Given the above realities, it was only a matter of time before supply met the demand and a political party began to offer what these groups were looking for. The particular fluidity, malleability, and precariousness of parties and party position in Hungary means that mainstream

parties can and must respond to such changes in the electorate. If they do not, they either face increased and dangerous competition from the fringes or risk party fragmentation and splits.[185]

Orbán himself is also a unique politician because he was made famous by a single speech, at the reburial of Imre Nagy[186] in 1989.[187] Ever since, Orbán's speeches have always been a national event, even when his party was in opposition.[188] This is in part because of this fame, but also through the careful recreation of that momentous speech –through language, (we) framing, and "event" recreation –with big crowds, mass media attention, and live broadcasting.[189] This unique capacity to capture the nation's attention and create frames of reference back to his powerful role in a groundbreaking historic moment, when he did truly speak for majority of Hungarians[190], allowed him to capture and spearhead the sentiments of the late 2000s.

Cultural nationalism was not the only card he had to play, however. In the 2000s, promotion of foreign investment in Hungary at all costs disenfranchised and disadvantaged the national bourgeois; so, when Fidesz lost the elections in 2002 they reinvented their economic policy under the umbrella of economic nationalism.[191] The carefully crafted promotion of this policy which highlighted that it would entrench the national bourgeois in a series of economic wins, caused a shift away from a traditional leftward alliance.[192]

It was under these conditions that Orbán and his Fidesz party won the 2010 elections with a landslide and began promulgating illiberal democracy, with a Christian focus, as their mode of governance, as outlined above. The appetite for illiberalism, or at least the willingness to give it a shot, was because of the perceived failure of the western model and liberal consensus, as well as growing economic distances between Hungary and its neighbors.

To elaborate on this perceived failure, illiberalism was conceptualized in Hungary because of a questioning of "the validity and sustainability of the post-WWII (liberal) consensus

on human rights centered on political language and even certain sacred democratic institutions and neoliberal policies".[193] It counters what Orbán sees as an excessive focus on the individual rather than the nation manifest in liberalism today.[194] Although it has never been defined, it works as a vague normative power suggesting majority rule, unrestrained by the institutions and norms of the 'Western' liberal consensus.[195] The questioning of the norm which makes this possible, is somewhat present in other post-socialist states, but this illiberal regime and how it came about are very particular and unique to the historical experience of Hungary.

This is where economic distances come in. In the late 20th century, in a period rather fondly referred to as Goulash communism, Hungary experienced "relative freedom and economic prosperity… [wherein] the mixing of certain elements of the free market with a planned economy [a]llowed Hungary to have slightly higher living standards than its Iron Curtain neighbors".[196] This paired with and facilitated a disillusionment with liberalism when the transition did not bring the desired advances about. In fact, just prior to Orbán's landslide electoral success in 2010 almost three quarters of Hungarians said they had been better off, economically speaking, under communism.[197] Hungary experienced losses not only compared to its former-Eastern bloc neighbors, but also compared to Western Europe: "In 2010, Hungary's GDP was further from Austria's… then it was in 1990.[198] Also important is the fact that the democratic transition was not fully completed in Hungary constitutionally speaking; consequent of the peaceful negotiation based transition in Hungary, the constitution was merely amended rather than rewritten and became an easy target for a rhetoric of an unfinished transition.[199]

These pre-existing conditions paired with Orbán's personality, rhetoric, and style of politics. After he lost power in 2002, Orbán formulated a "political discourse centered on the phrase 'the nation cannot be in opposition'", a nationalist claim which refused to see the

legitimacy of his political opponents.[200] Furthermore, the general style of Orbán's politics embraces a "dark side of Hungarians values and orientation: populism, pessimism and conspiracy theories that blame all of the nation's problems on the hostile cooperation of foreign interests and a general disenchantment with democracy".[201] As he came into power in 2010, this dark-side orientation and self-proclaimed representation of the nation and the people manifested itself in a "revolutionary" style of governance.

Orbán saw the landslide electoral victory of his party as the Hungarian nation bringing "about another revolution in the voting booths".[202] Herein, his job was self-proclaimed to be the bringing about of the transition he argued did not happen in 1989-90, made clear by the lack of a new constitution.[203] The government program, submitted to parliament in 2010 emphasizes this:

> Through this declaration we acknowledge the will of the people… The social contract is the foundation which ensures that the country, in spite of the cyclical nature of the political-economic rotation develops along a stable path in the direction specified by the people. For lack of a social contract Hungary during the era of transition was controlled by elite agreements and invisible pacts; fruitless debates hampered the country's progress… The new social contract was created by national unity revolutionary in its power which expresses the common will of the Hungarian nation… [T]he united will of the people is the main source of power in Hungary… Therefore it represents and enforces those interests which are important to everyone, and thus unites, not separates us. Politics are necessary, therefore, which build and develop these common values, and strive to make these accessible to everyone.[204]

Herein Orbán sees Fidesz as a large governing party at the center of Hungary's political spectrum which was/is able to create policies and do politics by naturally representing the interests of the people rather than engaging in political debates, which he saw as cumbersome.[205]

When the Hungarian parliament passed the new constitution in 2011, its preamble characterized Hungary as a Christian nation and clearly stated that the Hungarian nation "recognize[d] the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood" not merely as a historical base "but also with respect to the present [and] expects everyone who wishes to identity with the constitution to also identify with its opening entreaty: God bless the Hungarians".[206] Despite this

heavy handed role of Christianity in the constitution, no such consensus was/is reflected in the Hungarian electorate, which Orbán claims to embody.

> In the 2011 national census, 16.7 percent of the population indicated no religious affiliation, 1.5 percent indicated they were atheists, and 27.2 percent offered no response to the question on religion… Over one decade, the number of persons who self-identified as Catholic dropped from 5.5 million to 3.9 million, while the number of those who belong to the Calvinist and Lutheran churches also fell, from 1.6 to 1.15 million and 304,000 to 214,000, respectively.[207]

Its clear, however, that Christianity was an important legitimizing force.

Within the next few years, Christianity would make the jump from being one aspect of illiberalism, albeit an important and legitimating one, to the key component of a new claim being made by Orbán on Christian Democracy. This change was the result of how Orbán's conceptualization of and claim to illiberalism fared. After his speech in 2014, it soon became clear that the term illiberalism had too much negative association and Orbán received extensive criticism internationally. In fact, after Orbán introduced and conceptualized it in 2014, it "was completely abandoned and never mentioned again after the first wave of publicity and media discourse setting subdued".[208] This paired with growing economic grievances from the negative impact of his nationalist economic policies on large sections of the non-bourgeois Hungarian population.[209] Leading up to the 2015 crisis then, things were not looking optimistic for Orbán. The "migrant" crisis, however, worked as a saving grace for him.

Migration and the 2015 Game Change

On the eve of the 2015 crisis, the CDU was the senior partner in a grand coalition with the SPD and held the chancellorship in Germany. The party had been experiencing rather extensive liberalization in line with a shift in the electorate as Merkel employed a pragmatic and mediating approach to the first decade of her chancellorship. In Austria, the ÖVP held the junior status in a grand coalition with the SPÖ because the far right FPÖ party had markedly decreased its electoral success. In Hungary a once liberal party had moved through the conservative right,

under a Christian Democratic umbrella, to an ownership of a new kind of governance where illiberalism was the name of the game. Given these circumstances, this section will analyze the impacts of the crisis on the three parties and – to some degree – their respective countries. It will begin with an analysis of Hungary, since this is where the asylum seekers began their EU journey before going on to Germany, their destination. Finally, the case of Austria will be analyzed, as its rhetoric and policies mark a middle ground between its two neighbors.

The Hungarian Fortress of Christianity

The Hungarian response to the 2015 crisis was to build fences, both literally and metaphorically, in order to protect the Hungarian and more broadly European cultures from the threat "migrants" presented. Billboard campaigns, referendums, and media coverage worked to convince the electorate of this approach, and laws became increasingly harsh to asylum seekers and aid organizations. Through these policies Orbán claimed to be spearheading the second option for CDP's in the modern era outlined in the introduction, "using Christian cultural identity to make nationalist and populist arguments". The asylum seekers became the rhetoric focal point of a culture war and clash of civilizations, where religious differences were/are paramount.

In spring 2015, Fidesz ran the first of many billboard campaigns[210] constructing social borders. Media coverage helped create the desired "migrant" image, by rarely showing asylum seekers and, when doing so, portraying crowds to avoid personalization and displaying them accompanied by police to reinforce the security threat narrative.[211] At the same time, questionnaires were sent to 8 million Hungarian citizens, with a letter from Orbán, which referenced terrorist acts, identified "migrants" as economic, lying about their asylum needs, blamed the failure of Brussels – a term that refers vaguely to EU elites –, and told the public "we must make a decision".[212] The goal was to legitimize anti-migrant government actions.

Despite relatively few papers being returned the "overwhelmingly positive response" was used to do exactly that.[213] Decree 1401/2015 allotted a Hungarian-Serbian border fence; 191/2015 made Serbia a safe third country and almost all asylum applications inadmissible[214]; CXXVII accelerated asylum claims procedures to 15 days; CXL created "mass migration crisis" status, gave police/soldiers special powers, and introduced transit zones; CXL amended criminal codes, made border crossing, damage, or obstruction illegal, with a possible 20 year sentence.[215] By November, each day, despite thousands of arrivals, only 10 people were processed.[216]

Simultaneously, the migration crisis' climax occurred in Budapest. In late August 2015, thousands of asylum seekers were camped out at Keleti[217] because authorities denied access to Austria-bound trains and asylum seekers refused to move to refugee centers. On September 3rd, thousands marched towards Austria on the M1 motorway.[218] Overwhelmed, Hungarian authorities provided busses to the border. Following this, for over 200,000 asylum seekers, Hungary enabled their journey to Austria, without registering them as outlined in the Dublin Convention.[219] However, when border fences were up, this abruptly ended.

In 2016, another government campaign was instigated[220] and a referendum asked "Do you want the [EU] to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?"[221] Though invalidated by voter turnout, an amendment was made based on people's "support".[222] Act XXXIX eliminated all integration assistance, XCIV returned "migrants" to transit zones if found within 8 km of the border – later extended to all Hungarian territory with act XX.[223] After these policies were implemented, Hungary's "recognition rate [was] the lowest in the EU… [with] 91% of applications from Syria rejected".[224] Simultaneously, "border hunters" were recruited to help Hungarian police.[225] Then, in December, Orbán moved to begin closing refugee camps in Hungary.[226]

A consultation in 2017, blamed Brussels, George Soros, various NGOs and IOs for the "migrant" crisis.[227] These actors were central to refugee aid because government provisions were minimal and, post-2016, essentially non-existent.[228] In January 2018 severe taxes were imposed on foreign donations to NGOs and extreme limitations placed on their activist and aid-provision actions.[229] Services, advice, and support to "immigrants" was criminalized.[230]

Although many consider Fidesz' anti-migrant campaigns to have been tremendously successful within Hungary, it was not universally so. During billboard campaigns, several were altered and/or destroyed. Private donations funded a counter billboard campaign run by the opposition.[231] Additionally, when media failed to portray refugees, volunteers took to Facebook[232] and, during the summer of 2015, thousands of Hungarian citizens provided clothing, food, and medical aid to the individuals stuck in limbo and marching to the Austrian border.[233]

So why does all this matter for Orbán's claim making on Christian Democracy? The answer is simple, the crisis was and continues to be paramount to that claim. The mass migration from the Balkan route resulted in the Hungarian government's focus on its Southern border. To understand the strength of the campaigns Fidesz ran, Hungarian historical memory is critical, especially the Southern border's role in the Ottoman Wars and the remembered heroism of Hungarian fortress soldiers against numerably superior Ottoman forces. This history contextualizes Orbán's insistence that he is protecting Christian[234] Hungary – and Europe – from the Muslim threat.[235] Namely that "Hungary has been the bastion of Europe for a thousand years".[236] Elite motivations are also crucial. The most common explanation is the desire to stay in power: after a downward trend in the polls preceding the summer of 2015, the crisis was a saving grace for the Fidesz party. Orbán capitalized on the migration issue to galvanize domestic support[237], and in doing so, he cemented his claim on a specifically "Christian" democracy.

Something New Under the Sun? The Cultural Version of Christian Democratic Ideology Promulgated

The 2015 migration crisis had a profound impact on the ideological promulgations of Orbán. As of 2018, he cited building a Christian democracy in Hungary to be '"the biggest mandate' since the switch from communism in 1990".[238] His claim to Christian democratic ideology is solidified and evidenced most clearly in his 2018 speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp. In the same place and at the same event where he had four year earlier conceptualized illiberal democracy, he embraced a fully developed Christian Democratic ideology, wherein the role of religion becomes even more important.

Making his speech, Orbán appears alongside a Bishop, and points it out in the second sentence he says, informing the audience that the Bishop is his compass. Following this, he references God's will and his and Fidesz' mandate, referring to his era of governance in terms of spiritual order: "Looking back over the past year, I can tell you that we have seen the successful stabilisation of a political system based on national and Christian foundations".[239]

The religious-cultural war between Christendom and Islam is emphasized, a powerful reference to the crisis that had enveloped Europe during and since 2015: "And, as I look around here, and knowing the local people here, I can confidently say that Székely Land will still exist when the whole of Europe has already submitted to Islam – of that we can be sure".[240] It is clear here, that even outside national borders, Orbán sees ethnic Hungarians as so innately Christian that they vaccinate against Islam as the rest of Europe "submits" to it.

Discussing Europe, religion is again at the forefront. He claims that central European countries offer something different from Western Europe, that must be accepted and respected. To build up the region he emphasizes a series of tenants. The first, and most important, of which is Christianity and the rejection of ideologies counter to that of a single, Christian-based culture.

He follows this with a second, largely Christian value, that of the traditional family model. When discussing Europe as a whole, Orbán reflects on the rejection of Christianity therein, and the resulting downfall of the region: "If now we look at our [declining European civilization], in terms of the spirit of religion we see that it has rejected its Christian foundations".[241] He then elaborates on how the migration crisis has shown the failure of "Brussels"[242], citing the fact that Europe has rejected its roots and rather than being institutionally and legally Christian it has, rather, built an open society. He then lays out the Christian framework he claims, before showing how the current framework is inferior to it. He argues that European liberalism fails to be a democracy, because it does not represent the people, as it means nothing to be European.

> "In Christian Europe there was honour in work, man had dignity, men and women were equal, the family was the basis of the nation, the nation was the basis of Europe, and states guaranteed security… [I]n liberal Europe being European means nothing at all… liberal democracy has been transformed into liberal non-democracy".[243]

In his action plan Orbán focuses on the 2019 EP elections, tying national and Christian interests together. Making this link more distinct he traces "two camps/forces" in Europe over the last 100 years, "Christian democracy and tradition" versus "left wing liberalism".[244] He again implies the left is not democratic, adding to his interest linking, essentially saying that those who support the nation, Christianity, tradition and/or democracy should vote for the right. He proceeds to seemingly compliment the left-right competition before bringing up the new problem, Islam, and outlining its threat to the current structure of European politics.

> "We can be sure that they will never vote for a Christian party. And when we add to this Muslim population those of European origin who are abandoning their Christian traditions, then it will no longer be possible to win elections on the basis of Christian foundations. Those groups preserving Christian traditions will be forced out of politics, and decisions about the future of Europe will be made without them".[245]

Although committing to Christian Democracy, Orbán does not leave his previous commitment to illiberal democracy behind: he claims that Christian Democracy is illiberal: "Let

us confidently declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal".[246] In clarifying this, Orbán fills the gap as he jumps from one ideology (illiberal democracy) to the next (Christian democracy). He explains that legally and institutionally Christian democratic politics is not a defense of Christianity itself but ways of life that have resulted from it. He does, however, include the protection and strengthening of Christian faith communities.

> "Christian democratic politics means that the ways of life springing from Christian culture must be protected…not to defend the articles of faith, but the forms of being that have grown from them[:]human dignity, the family and the nation… Other forms which must be protected and strengthened include our faith communities".[247]

He then highlights that by promoting Christian culture and a Christian Democratic model, one rejects multiculturalism, immigration, and adaptable family models, something which is illiberal.

> Liberal democracy is in favour of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-immigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more, this is an illiberal concept".[248]

As such Christian democracy becomes tied, inherently to his conceptualization of illiberal democracy, legitimating illiberalism through Christian democracy.

This speech evidences the strength of Orbán's claim on Christian Democracy. He asserts that institutionalizing and legally advantaging Christianity is necessary to protect the demos of Hungary, and of Europe. He outlines how Christianity is the political, social, and cultural foundation of Europe, but now more particularly powerful within Central Europe, especially Hungary. He focuses on how Christianity opposes both multicultural liberalism and Muslim immigration and is the key defense against them. He then highlights that although the Christian culture, not faith, needs to be protected, this still necessitates institutionalizing faith and protecting faith communities, because of the key role they play to create this culture.

Countless differences exist between mainstream Christian Democracy and Orbán's conceptualization of it. This is surprising, given that both party and leader were socialized by the mainstream CDPs of the EU – particularly Germany, who today is one of the most liberal CDPs in Europe. Although the 2015 crisis exemplifies Hungary's more radical version of Christian democracy, especially when compared to Germany, it does not explain why it occurred. After all, most asylum seekers were not looking to settle in Hungary, as was clear by their camping out at Keleti –wanting to go through Austria to Germany— and refusing to go to refugee camps in Hungary. So why was the response to the crisis so drastic and how did Orbán come to be the face of the civilizational, anti-immigrant argument in Europe? To understand this, it is important to pick up from the analysis of Orbán's claim to illiberalism in the previous chapter.

Already promoting a nationalist and populist ideology intimately attached to "the fear of the extinction of the nation"[249] Orbán was quickly able to mobilize this in opposition to asylum seekers. Although prior to 2015 migration had not been a politicized issue in Hungary, the threat caused to Hungarians and Hungarian national identity and sovereignty by hordes of people with a culture insurmountably different than their own was a ready-made rhetoric for Orbán. This was especially successful because "migrants" shared much in common with an historic threat to the Hungarian people, the Ottomans, both in terms of religious identification and entry point. Given that the underlying key difference between Hungarians and Muslim "migrants" was religious practice, "Christian" identity went from being the focus within a promulgation of –a rather fringe and internationally unacceptable – illiberal democracy to the quintessential component of – a claim to the much more mainstream – Christian Democracy.

> [W]e let go of the delusion of the multicultural society before it turned Hungary into a refugee camp, and we let go of a liberal social policy which does not acknowledge the common good and denies Christian culture as the natural foundation—and perhaps the only natural foundation – for the organization of European societies. Hungarian people

> are by nature politically incorrect – in other words, they have not yet lost their common sense… They do not want to see their country thronging with people from different cultures, with different customs, who are unable to integrate; people who would pose a threat to public order, their jobs and livelihoods.[250]

Yet Orbán's arguments, claims and impact goes well beyond the borders of Hungary to the EU as a whole, as is evidenced by his speech on Christian democracy.

This Christian claim making, already present in constitutional changes made in 2011, was solidified in 2018 with the passing of a constitutional amendment, the 7th amendment, which introduced Christianity as a form of constitutional identity.[251] This created a responsibility for every state institution to protect Christian culture as part of Hungary's constitutional identity.[252] In this same law it was declared that no foreign or alien population could be settled in Hungary, a measure taken against the EU schemes to redistribute refugees.[253] As such the constitutionalized protection of Christianity was and is innately tied to the 2015 crisis and immigration.

"Wilkommenskultur": Tried and Tested

Germany, with Merkel at its helm, took a drastically different approach. In 2015, Merkel suspended Dublin for Syrian asylum seekers, allowing the thousands marching towards Germany from Budapest to come, promoting a welcome culture and saying we can do this. Although eventual backlash from this decision and other events resulted the passing of rather strict immigration policies, Merkel did not back down rhetorically, and refused to put a cap on asylum seekers. Although Merkel did not make any big ideological proclamations, her actions, in pair with a few short ethical statements, have led many to label her a staunch defender of the asylum seekers, both in a negative and positive light.

Germany's approach can be predicted, to some degree, with Merkel's 2007 National Integration plan; this document is, arguably, the beginning of German Wilkommenskultur.[254] It is possibly even evidence for arguments that Merkel decided to "turn Germany into a land of immigration and integration" because of the demographic crisis – as will be elaborated below.[255]

However, Merkel herself made no such claims, likely because – as was analyzed above – her style of governance relies on obscurity. The document, to some degree, speaks for itself.

> [It] built on 10 core themes: integration courses; language acquisition; education and vocational training, labour market mobility; living conditions, opportunities for women and girls; local responsibility; intercultural competence in public and private sectors; integration through sports; media diversity; civic participation; and internationalising German research facilities. Conceptualising integration as a complex, multidimensional societal issue, Merkel's promotion of local, state and national dialogues at home mirrors a search for 'best practices' instituted at the EU level. The NIP's 'welcoming culture' approach gradually took root, reinforced by [Merkel's further] reforms.[256]

In policy then, migration was on the government's radar prior to the 2015 crisis.

As they planned for their four-year term together, however, immigration was not a key issue for the 2013-2017 grand coalition.[257] Nevertheless, about halfway through their term it was forced to the forefront of their attention. The 2015 crisis was unconventional from a political issue point of view because it was the result of "international developments and [was] particularly salient and controversial in the public's perception but rather uncontroversial among government and (at least parliamentary) opposition parties".[258]

Things came to a "T" in the late summer/early fall of 2015, when thousands of asylum seekers stuck in Hungary began to march towards Germany. On August 25th Merkel went against the Dublin requirement that asylum seekers apply in the state they enter the EU through, allowing applications in Germany.[259] Following this decision, the first weekend in September on its own saw 20,000 asylum seekers arrive via Austria.[260]

Merkel's decision, for many, called into question a decade worth of pragmatism, not getting involved in key contentious issues, and waiting for public opinion to be evident before acting.[261] It "was certainly the most controversial single step of her political career and is still contested today".[262] Earlier in 2015 the word "merkeln", quite literally as a verb meaning "to Merkel", came into German slang, in reference to the rather infamous way the Chancellor would

put off big decisions.[263] The decision not to send back Syrians according to the Dublin regime and to allow them to apply in Germany, followed by a refusal to "cap immigration", was quite the opposite of "merkeln", that is of her normal governance methods.

Nevertheless, it was not entirely a departure: two other moments in Merkel's tenure, at that time, featured similarly sudden and "abnormal" – given historic precedent – decisions. The first was the nuclear plant closures, agitating businesses, the second supporting three bail outs of Greece, which upset wide sections of the CDU's conservative electorate.[264] *Euractiv* explained Merkel's decision as following "her usual strategy of spontaneously following the will of her people."[265] Seen this way, her actions are not a departure at all.

Merkel herself, following her usual mode of governance, has made very few statements regarding the decision. In the absence of statements, and utilizing and interpreting those she has made in a multitude of ways, there are various explanations put forward to explain Merkel's decision; they will be explored below.

Supporters

Those supporting Merkel's 2015 decision see it as either an ad hoc and "humanitarian response to a crisis situation"[266] or as pre-planned and based in Merkel's personal convictions and/or Germany's labor and demographic needs[267]. What is debated here is, on the one hand, a matter of principle and, on the other, categorical and definitional labeling of the people involved. Consequentially, the decision was either made (1) in principle for moral reasons – because the people – categorized, defined and labeled refugees– were fleeing inhuman circumstances and needed Germany's help for a short(er) duration – or (2) in principle for utilitarian reasons— because the people – categorized, defined and labeled migrants – settling and integrating in Germany would be economically beneficial.[268]

With the first, it is argued that Merkel's decision was the only logical response given the unfolding events; when the Hungarian government was unable to care for the growing number of asylum seekers in Budapest, a march towards the Austrian border –with their destination goal being Germany— was instigated and only could have been stopped by violence.[269]

> The migrants were coming anyway: she acted to avert a humanitarian disaster. Fences will not hold back the flow. Mrs Merkel can neither stop the wars that drive people out of their homes nor set the policies of the countries they pass through. Her critics offer no plausible alternative. Short of overturning international and European law, and watching refugees drown or die of exposure, EU countries must process the claims of asylum-seekers. The question is: will the process be orderly or chaotic?[270]

There is also evidence to suggest Merkel was under pressure within Germany from the left: earlier that summer, "encounter[ing a]sixth-grader Reem Sahwil in Rostock, Merkel was criticised for being 'too coldhearted' for telling the Palestinian refugee that not everyone who wanted to come to Germany could stay".[271]

Regarding the second, Mushaben argues that Merkel's decision was "rooted in internally motivated demographic changes" and the turn towards pro-immigration and integration was a result of Merkel's own experience growing up in East Germany and predated the crisis.[272] This "pre-planned" and morality-based argument related to Merkel's personal convictions also cites the fact that her father was a Lutheran pastor.[273] The crisis is noted to be,

> is one of the few policy areas where this daughter of a Protestant pastor thinks in terms of non-negotiable principles. Others include the security of Israel, which she called part of Germany's raison d'état…, European harmony and the transatlantic alliance. She viscerally opposes Mr Putin's transgression across internationally agreed borders in Ukraine. And now she sees succour for people fleeing war as a categorical imperative.[274]

Herein, Merkel is reasoned to have made a clear and evident choice which although later characterized by some back-tracking was ultimately managed "by leveraging top-down, bottom-up, supranational and domestic reform currents, even in the face of ostensible opposition within her own party".[275] Partly in evidence of this are Merkel's 'Wir schaffen das' statements – she cited "Germany's 'orderly conditions', economic strength, developed civil society, demographic

needs, its capacity for 'flexibility' in tough times and constitutional imperatives affirming that 'asylum knows no upper limits'" – and her references to the EU crisis – she argued 'We were quick to save the banks, we can act immediately to help communities save human beings'.[276]

Notably, these statements do not refute or disprove the argument that Merkel's decision was spur of the moment. Rather than being evidence of a preplanned decision, they could also be a way to mitigate the aftermath of her decision, to rally support after she made a quick, in the moment decision, with little to no real alternative.

In all likelihood, Merkel's decision was the combination of many things, it cannot have happened in a vacuum apart from public opinion, demographic considerations, or her own personal experiences with East Germany and Christianity. Whatever the cause of her initial decision, it was clear by the end of 2015 that Merkel was not willing – at least publicly – to back away from or apologize for it, stating rather famously, "If we start having to apologise for showing a friendly face in emergencies… then this is not my country".[277]

It is also evident that religiosity plays a role, at the very least, in her discourse around the crisis – as she has openly stressed the Christian duty of generosity.[278] Therefore, the claim Merkel makes on Christian democracy, regardless of the actual reason she chose to not send back Syrian refugees under Dublin, is that the Christian aspect of the ideology necessitates helping those in need. This is something Pope Francis has also emphasized.[279]

Among the German electorate, initial support for asylum seekers was relatively high[280]; in fact, it has been argued that closing Germany's borders would have upset most citizens[281]. This can also be contextualized with both the growing need of labor and increasing portrayal of Germany's identity as an immigrant country in the preceding years.[282] All in all, the Eurobarometer surveys for 2015 through 2017 indicate more than 80 per cent of German

respondents said that they agreed with the statement 'our country should help refugees'".[283] Whether this was the result of Merkel's decision of the cause of it, it was the reality on the ground in Germany. Many Germans volunteered in line Angela Merkel's "Wir Schaffen Das" slogan; this was necessary because the sudden nature of the decision and influx meant that the traditional governance system was unprepared.[284]

Over time momentum slowed and this army of volunteers transitioned to a smaller group working on long-term goals.[285] The vast volunteer movement, though short lived, raised significant awareness of racism, cultural differences, and gaps in state provisions for refugees.[286] It positively impacted public opinion and migration attitudes because of personal encounters, and resulted in bottom up changes sparked by citizen engagement in public debate.[287]

These positive attitudes were expanded, if not partially caused, by positive media portrayals.[288] Dostal argues media attention equated to journalists being "activists in spreading a welcome culture that originated with Merkel's grand coalition government and civil society associations such as the Christian churches", and those opposed to were ignored or accused of xenophobia.[289] Dostal stresses this was not shared by the public, creating a disconnect wherein such positive attitudes would not and could not have lasted: "Initially… there was euphoria about the idea that Germany could and should help refugees. This turned into a pervasive fear that 'our' country is bound to become the site of major religious and value conflicts, bringing crime, large-scale disorder and, perhaps, the disappearance of German culture as we know it".[290]

Criticism, Opposition and the Rise of the AfD

By the end of 2015 close to one million people had applied for asylum in Germany. Many critics accused Merkel of incentivizing this.[291] Even within the Union (CDU/CSU), Merkel faced backlash.[292] Horst Seehofer, then leader of the CSU suggested "that 'the Chancellor has… decided for the vision of another republic' and stat[ed] that 'the population does not want this

country to become a different one', underlined that the CSU wanted to be seen as the stronghold of the traditionalists of the centre-right".[293]

Electoral support for the CDU dropped more than 10 percent in a few months.[294] In November, *The Economist* reported that despite initial support, "[t]here has since been a marked backlash against the August Wilkommenskultur whose spirit [M]erkel captured and encouraged."[295] Merkel herself was initially surprised by the turn in public opinion: '"Do you really think that hundreds of thousands leave their home and embark on this difficult journey only because of a selfie with the chancellor?' she asked… a television talk-show host".[296] A month later, however, she was became bold and defiant; *The Economist* reported that Merkel appeared to be "inspired by a clear moral purpose".[297]

Particularly important to the rise in anti-immigrant attitudes are the events that transpired on New Years Eve in Cologne, Hamburg and a few other German cities. Herein reports vary from over 500 sexual assaults perpetrated by 'North African looking men'[298] to an involvement of "1200 female victims and 2,000 foreign perpetrators, at least half of them believed to have been recent arrivals[299]. That December, 12 deaths in a terrorist attack on a German Christmas market increased sentiment further.[300] Authorities' responses to these events are also important, noted to have been "characterised by delays, poor communication with victims' families and even the manipulation of police files to cover up shortcomings in police work".[301] Following the attacks, 61% of respondents in an INSA poll "have become less happy about accepting refugees" and a mere 29% still agree with Merkel and the "we can handle this" slogan.[302]

In response to the events, political discourse changed drastically.[303] Merkel herself suggested deportation as a possibility, but legal realities made it unlikely.[304] The attacks damaged Merkel's reputation and even worked to undermine the gender changes she made in the CDU a

decade earlier. “Germany’s leading feminist, says that Germany is “naively importing male violence, sexism and anti-Semitism”’.[305] A bit ironically, however, the attacks have in fact liberalized gender-related policy, by expanding the definition of rape in Germany.[306]

In explaining why anti-immigrant arguments being put forward by the far right are so successful, Dostal offers a psychological explanation– based in globalization and winners and losers of modernization, as well as cultural fatalism: “The most important political success of the right-wing in 2016 was to place the movement of refugees in the everyday reasoning of large sectors of the population as a metaphor for the general loss of political control. This way, the demand for closed borders becomes a symbol for the restoration of popular sovereignty”.[307] This feeling was/is not created by the far right, but by the situation; the influx of foreigners increased these fears and insecurities, political actors just worked to ensure that Merkel’s initial decision and continued refusal to put an ceiling quota on migration numbers was to blame.[308]

Critiques of Merkel’s decision and the asylum seeker influx also resulted in physical actions including “lobbying, media campaigns and lawsuits… protests and violent attacks”.[309] These events “marks a significant shift in right-wing mobilization in Germany from a marginal and less visible phenomenon to a broader and more omnipresent development.”[310] In part, these attitudes already existed in the electorate, and although they had been on the decline, the events of 2015 reversed this trend.[311] Pre-existing attitudes were magnified by (1) the sheer amount of coverage the crisis and immigration as a political issue received and (2) the growth of the far right domestically and internationally.[312] Opposition was/is also incredibly diverse[313]. Many who mobilized “framed their protests as neither right-wing nor xenophobic by portraying themselves as apolitical, “concerned” citizens”, they emphasized “their opposition to Islam and the alleged danger it represents to European and German culture” and national identity loss.[314] This

mobilization has also impacted the debate around immigration issues – both in frequency and content— and directly impacted many policies.

Politically speaking, the most significant impact of the opposition to Wilkommenskultur was the rise of the AfD. Whereas both the CDU and SPD lost support, the AfD filled this representation gap.[315] In six months, the AfD's polls went from 2 to 13 percent, due to support for their strong anti-immigrant stance and general dissatisfaction with the mainstream.[316]

> Though fuelled by the refugee crisis, the party's success both predates it… and outlived its peak… At root the party is a protest against a right-of-centre politics that looks too indistinct and uncontested. It is the old right of Helmut Kohl's CDU in exile, joined in an often awkward marriage of convenience with genuine extremists concentrated in the former east. The AfD's leaders know this, which is why they rail against the doctrine of no alternatives and use provocation above all other techniques. They have succeeded by playing the dissenting force in a staid and under-differentiated political system.[317]

It is important here that some AfD leadership is from the CDU or draws support from ex-CDU politicians[318]: "One of the two current AfD leaders, Alexander Gauland, spent his previous political life between 1973 and 2013 in the CDU"[319]. Furthermore, the base on which the AfD critiques government immigration policies is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition[320] that CDPs represent. In fact, with the initial creation of the party, the goal was to fill the void the CDU left when moving to the center.[321] However, the party increasingly moved away from this space towards radical right populism, nativism and authoritarianism.[322]

Analyzing electoral results it is evident that the AfD took from all parties and although it may be popular among voters who criticize Merkel, the more religious voters are the less likely they will vote for the AfD.[323] The best account for AfD voting, statistically, is immigrant and refugee attitudes which supports the psychological elements of Dostal's argument[324] – those who see immigration as threatening German culture, are afraid of the refugee crisis, and/or are generally dissatisfied/modernization losers are much more likely to vote for the AfD.[325]

Continued Policy Making and the 2017 Elections

In terms of mainstream governance, simultaneously to the gains of the AfD and because of them the government attempted to drastically decrease migration.[326] Policies intended to reduce immigration and asylum applications will be elaborated below but included: an attempt to create more safe third country nations[327]; fast tracking processing to three weeks; increasing deportations[328]; restricting movement and residency to asylum seekers assigned districts; limiting family reunification[329] and protections for those with medical conditions, women and unaccompanied minors; and reducing financial benefits through integration fees.[330] Overall, domestically, the acceptance rate dropped from a high of almost 50 percent in 2015 to less than 20 three years later.[331] At the EU level Germany also pushed for the EU-Turkey deal to limit influx and push through the redistribution scheme.[332]

In September 2015, soon after the exception to Dublin was made, Germany signaled that they would begin to return to normal conditions. A week after Germany's borders opened the reintroduction of border controls effectively limited asylum seekers' entry options.[333] By mid-October, Merkel offered EU accession process support for Turkey if they helped stop continued influx.[334] She also agreed to transit zones on the German-Austrian border, where authorities could screen out those ineligible for asylum.[335] Simultaneously Germany expanded its list of safe third countries to all of former-Yugoslavia, which was stated to be necessary for them to "focus on war refugees from states such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan".[336]

In November, the first asylum package gave federal funding to the legally responsible local governments for asylum seekers' accommodation, food and health costs; state involvement and funding was expanded throughout the following months.[337] November also saw the proliferation of discussions between the EU and Turkey, with Germany at the helm. On these discussions *Euractiv* reported "This is the kind of situation that Merkel would ultimately prefer;

a solution to the crisis implemented on the external borders, with no need for more walls or fences on the continent itself".[338] Digging deeper the same article calls out Merkel for saying "What we in Germany cannot do is decide who can come and who cannot" while pursuing a deal with Turkey that would do just that, but outside their borders.[339] December saw Merkel "ma[k]e a joint speech [with Afghanistan's president] outlining their commitment to stopping illegal migration between Afghanistan and the EU", promising a stimulus package.[340]

In January 2016, *The Economist* cited additional plans "being drawn up inside the chancellery, including a sealing of the Greece-Macedonian border across which most refugees travel to reach Germany".[341] The year also saw the addition of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to Germany's designated safe countries because they only had unrest and not full blown conflict; this limited migration influx and was enforced through cutting of development aid to countries refusing to accept their citizens back[342]– a policy which Austria put in place as well[343]. Germany also asked for NATO intervention to observe and monitor the Aegean, to the same end.[344]

One of the government's most contentious moves was their deportations to Afghanistan. In July 2016 over half Afghani's asylum applications were denied in Germany and they were then deported back to Afghanistan.[345] An interview with Omid Nouripour a German politician with the Greens who travels to Afghanistan regularly unearthed the impacts of this policy:

> Around 3,500… returnees are left with little, even nothing, and have no social ties in the capital.…The tense security situation in the country is not denied by Berlin. However, Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) sees "islands of safety" to which people can continue to be returned…"The mood in Afghanistan is terrible…There are two cities which are relatively safe, but if we send all the rejected asylum seekers there, it's not going to stay that way," [Nouripour stated]… warning that "the Afghan security forces do not have the situation under control". NATO recently postponed its withdrawal of personnel from the country.[346]

Germany's peace institutes condemned this, as well as the EU-Turkey deal, saying the former bordered on cynicism and the later amounted to organized people trafficking.[347] The author of a

report on the matter, Hamburg University's Dr. Johannsen, emphasized that "[t]he "outsourcing" of the problem cannot be the solution [and] encouraged [the EU] to regain its sense of solidarity… "the refugee crisis is not actually that per se, it is a political crisis"'.[348]

Germany also began returning refugees to Greece in 2016, despite actively promoting the relocation scheme meant to take pressure off of them. Yet, this was not seen as a contradiction: "We have done a lot in Europe in order to improve the refugee situation in Greece… This must have consequences that will enable refugees to be sent back to Greece according to the Dublin regulations".[349] The European Commission accepted this logic as well.[350]

Two thousand and sixteen even saw Merkel debate a Burqa Ban to "preven[t] the development of "parallel societies" as Germany tries to assimilate its Muslim immigrants".[351]

In 2017 more policies were enacted. German officials submitted a proposal to the EU to relax safeguards related to human rights. This was so that pacts similar to the EU-Turkey deal could be negotiated also with Libya, Egypt and Tunisia; whereas EU law requires entire countries to meet human rights standards, this proposal would recognize certain regions as fit.[352] Analogous to the logic of EU-Turkey deal, the proposal argued that such action would help save lives and discourage human trafficking, and that the EU would fund participating nations to ensure certain standards.[353] Later in the year, Germany's pause in family reunification was questioned when "[a] group of mainly Syrian women and children… stranded in Greece pitched tents opposite parliament in Athens… in a protest against delays in reuniting with relatives in Germany… "Our family ties our stronger than your illegal agreements," read a banner held up by one woman, referring to deals on refugees between European Union nations".[354]

The goal of these actions was to decrease influx and although the recorded newcomers decreased, the sheer number of asylum seekers in Germany meant that the perception of the

problem was slow to change. Essentially, the enacted policies –though clear departures from the initial Wilkommenskultur approach– were considered too little too late. Dostal refers to these measures as "efforts at triangulation and compromise [which] failed".[355] This paired with Merkel's refusal to officially revoke her initial policy and her continued opposition to more restrictive policies[356], which can be explained as follows:

> [S]ome… ref[er] to her firm personal beliefs concerning the right to seek asylum; others point to her lack of interest in the emerging refugee crisis and… reserved statements on this issue in the months and years before… 2015, deducing that Merkel's position was rather driven by the migration- and refugee-friendly mood prevailing in the media.[357]

Regardless of the explanation, "Merkel insist[s] [t]here can be no cap on the number of refugees Germany accepts, and the constitution agrees with her. But increasingly, reality does not".[358]

The fall out of the refugee reception crisis was evident in the 2017 campaign. First, through Merkel's rhetoric, wherein speaking to party delegates on December 6th 2016, in preparation for the coming elections, she insisted that the events of 2015 "can, shall and must not be repeated", promoted her commitment to "European values of sexual equality and religious tolerance", going as far as to say that "the full veil is not appropriate for us, and should be banned wherever legally possible".[359] Yet despite these statements Merkel's personal ratings – which held so much power in 2013 – had dropped off significantly; wide sections of the population and the traditional conservative electorate of the CDU blamed her for the crisis.[360] This drop was also due to the influence of an active opponent to the right of the CDU for the first time, the AfD, which ran on an anti-immigrant campaign.[361] Contextualized with the SPD's losses, however, the CDU did comparatively well.[362]

In response to the success of the AfD, some CDU party members have suggested shifting rightward, but support for this idea is far from universal.[363] Dilling argues that "[s]ince a mainstream party's decision to [do so] depends on… electoral threat, assessing the extent to

which the AfD has threatened the CDU/CSU is key" and considering that the AfD's high internal factionalism, it is doubtful to remain an alternative and threat in the long run.[364]

After elections, the CDU's talks with the Greens and Free Democrats failed, so the SPD – despite its announcement for going into opposition to reflect and renew the party after losses – joined yet another grand coalition.[365] Analyzing this coalition deal, *The Economist* reports that it largely reflects the SPD party manifesto, with 70% being attributable therein, and only 30% the CDU/CSU, something which does not just reflect niceties but rather the fact that very little differences remain between the two: "Merkel has embraced the SPD's politics almost to the point of smothering it to death".[366] A new component of this government is a tri-annual questioning of the Chancellor in the Bundestag – "to make the German government more lively and make political differences clearer".[367] This is an evident response to the lack of clarity between the two parties and Merkel's aversion to confrontation in politics.

With this new government in place, 2018 saw Merkel make bilateral deals with the EU's border countries in order to send asylum seekers back to them – undermining her open-door policy –, to appease the more conservative parts of her coalition, specifically the CSU.[368] Greece and Spain agreed to such deals, but Italy – the reportedly largest source of secondary immigration for Germany – did not – with quite a bit of flare.[369] Also under the CDU's pressure

> [t]here will be a new regime on the German-Austrian border…"making sure that asylum-seekers for whose asylum procedures other EU states are responsible are prevented from entering the country" [and] transit centres… at which asylum-seekers will be held and from which [those] rejected will be promptly deported to their countries of arrival in the EU, under deals to be negotiated with those other countries. And where deals with the countries in question do not exist, the asylum-seekers will be turned back at the German-Austrian border under a[nother] deal.[370]

A change to family reunification policy occurred as well, promoted as a balance of "integration capacity, humanity and security"; yet the strict cap at 1000 people per month and lack of parameters led to much criticism from Christian organizations and the Greens, among others.[371]

In sum, after an initially humanitarian response to the crisis Merkel faced backlash and isolation both domestically and internationally. Although never rhetorically backing down from her claims that it is Germany, and Europe's duty to help refugees, enacted policies became increasingly harsh towards migrants. Merkel's claim-making is never profoundly ideological, yet she seems to be driven, at the very least, in an ethical sense. Perhaps this is because, as *The Economist* argues, "[f]or a woman who spent half her life behind the intra-German wall, a Europe of fences and barbed wire would be a failure. Keeping Germany open and tolerant inside an EU true to its humanitarian founding values is not her policy. It is her mission."[372]

Austria's Middle Ground

Studying the Austrian case, ÖVP officials make more claims and promulgations than Angela Merkel but never reach the level of rhetoric put forth by Viktor Orbán. As such, enacted policies play an important role in determining the claims being made by the ÖVP, but rhetoric is also key. Additionally, in terms of responding to the migration crisis, Austria represents a point between the German and Hungarian approaches. Although the "extremes" of the Hungarian response are avoided, the ÖVP take a harsh migration stance, and differentiates itself from the German humanitarian approach early on.

Prior to the migration crisis, the ÖVP had already taken a hard line on immigration. This began with a new discourse on Islam, which appeared in stark contrast to previous attitudes wherein, as late as 2006, ÖVP politician Andreas Khol, President of the National Council stated "Austria knows no clash of civilizations. … [O]ur Muslim citizens are an important part of our society. … Let's continue with the good Austrian tradition of different cultures and religions living together in peace. Austria is a model for many states in this regard and we can be proud of that"[373]. However, faced with lack of distinction in the Grand Coalition and powerful competition from the right, the ÖVP used migration and Islam, "to raise their profile vis-à-vis their unloved

coalition partner in an area that was not of core interest for the Social Democrats while appealing to a wider cross section of voters on the right".[374] Although the far right had brought the issue up, the ÖVP—as a partner in government— was in the best place to lead policy changes.[375]

This culminated in the 2015 Islam Act[376], in progress before the crisis transpired. The act was the ÖVP' doing, but originated in the FPÖ's platform; it was also thanks to the SPÖ who yielded the matter to the ÖVP in coalition.[377] The attitude changes towards Islam reflected transformation from a "tradition of pluralist inclusion of different religions… to viewing Islam through the prism of securitization and its cultural compatibility with Austrian values".[378] This attitude was prevailing when the 2015 crisis manifested.

The crisis in Austria was largely a matter of being a transit state between Hungary and Germany. At the height of the crisis, in August and September 2015, "the Austrian federal government (in accordance with the German federal government) decided to allow persons seeking asylum to enter federal territory" because of the precarity of matters in Budapest.[379] Here, Austria's actions demonstrate their self-conception as a transit state; in fact, Austrian authorities reportedly organized and aided the movement of asylum seekers on to Germany. [380]

Despite the transitory nature of most refugees' experience in Austria, the impact of their presence was still profound, considering that approximately 600,000 people crossed the territory in 2015.[381] Furthermore, 90,000[382] asylum seekers applied in Austria. The most substantive initial issue was a lack of reception facilities; as distribution of asylum seekers and housing was negotiated several conflicts occurred between local and national governments, which featured, in the end, a constitutional law[383] setting up non-negotiable admission quotas[384]. Government control over the initial phases of asylum seekers' experiences, manifested in the "creation of a

federal care agency responsible for the initial reception phase and for legal counselling [, has been argued to] poin[t] towards attempts to decrease the influence of NGOs in both areas".[385]

In terms of civil society, similar to Germany, the initial lack of reception facilities was met by citizen support: people took asylum seekers into their homes[386], over 100,000 joined demonstrations "welcoming asylum seekers, demanding solidarity and humane treatment for them from government institutions".[387] Paired with other citizen volunteer acts "in emergency camps, organized clothing, or established informal language courses", this provides evidence that there was a welcome culture in Austria, at least initially; however, it has deteriorated since 2015.[388] In fact, even in 2015 the "call for 'shutting down borders' grew steadily".[389]

Furthering parallels to Germany, the exceptions made for asylum seekers' entry, while extraordinary, were short lived. Austria returned to normal Dublin procedures[390] by August's end[391]. When Germany closed its Austrian border on September 13th, 2015 – Austria followed suit in three days with Hungary and Slovenia; this reinstallation of systematic border controls[392]

> ha[s] been continually extended with reference to deficiencies at the EU's external borders and "serious threats to public policy and internal security" … [T]he federal government also introduced a unilateral annual quota for the admission of persons to the asylum procedure in 2016[393]… For persons admitted… new restrictions on movement or residence have been introduced[394]… [R]ejected asylum seekers can now be ordered to move to newly created return centres. The maximum detention period has been extended from formerly 6 to 18[395] months and new grounds for administrative apprehension, such as the refusal to cooperate on return, were introduced. Returns have been fostered through financial incentives, the expansion of the list of safe third countries[396] and Joint Return Operations under FRONTEX[397].[398]

With many of these actions Austria went farther than their German brethren. In fact, some of these polices were argued to be in violation of the Geneva Convention and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' codified right to asylum, as well as other EU directives.[399]

Early 2016 saw even more extreme measures taken, including the erecting of a fence on their Slovenian border to establish "orderly, controlled entry into [the] country" and the hosting

of a conference –"Managing Migration Together"—with the Balkan countries.[400] The second of these, the Balkan Summit, saw Austria provide police officers and support in EU accession procedures to nations committed to stopping "migrants" prior to their arrival to the EU[401] and led to many countries closing their borders.[402] Herein, Austria warned Macedonia "to be ready to "completely stop" the flow of migrants across its southern border from Greece and said it would do the same on its own frontiers within months", offering support in terms of personnel and equipment.[403] In November, Austria sent troops to the Hungarian-Serbian border when the EU-Turkey deal seemed to be faltering.[404] Austria also suggested sending European soldiers and civilians to Greece to help control their border.[405] The goal was to find a new EU policy because as "one Austrian official ruefully note[d], Europe's current policy rewards refugees who are young, strong and mobile enough to reach its shores—precisely those in least need of help".[406]

The 2016 Austrian presidential election spoke to different trends in Austria. Although the position has little political power, the victory of the Greens over the FPÖ was taken by many as an exemplary case from which insights on fighting nativism, xenophobia, and populism, could be gained.[407] Although fears of the crisis and Islam existed in Austria and the FPÖ's Hofer ran on the message "Islam has no place in Austria", he did not win; the victory instead went to a man asking Austrians to "allow reason rather than extremism lead our decisions".[408] This signaled success in a "message of tolerance, inclusion, and rationality as eminently European values to be honored and protected, with a cautious eye to the past. In fact, one of Van der Bellen's campaign videos depicted a Holocaust survivor warning that "it is not the first time something like this has happened" and urging that Austrians embrace an open Austria".[409] This ran counter to much of the growing trends internationally towards far rightism and the success of running campaigns based in othering and even hatred.

Concurrently, however, the election had Austria avoid, by less than 1%, having "the first far right head of state in Western Europe since the end of the second world war"; as much of the world celebrated Van der Bellen's success, *The Economist* warned against Hofer's near victory and the inherent demonstration therein that extremism could sound reasonable and win votes.[410]

> Mr Hofer has shown that well-packaged extremism is a vote-winner. He sounds so reasonable. Austria must maintain border controls for as long as the European Union cannot enforce its external frontiers, he says. Of course he supports the EU, but only on the basis of subsidiarity ("national where possible, European where necessary"). It is easy to forget that his Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was partly founded by ex-Nazis, and that its manifesto—much of which Mr Hofer wrote—bangs on about Europe's Christian culture and the German ethno-linguistic Heimat. Or that his party demonises "fake" asylum-seekers and vows to outlaw the distribution of free copies of the Koran.[411]

The 2017 parliamentary elections saw the ÖVP shift farther right[412] with a change in leadership. The new party leader, Sebastian Kurz saw support for his party skyrocket with his takeover, so he dissolved the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, calling for early elections.[413] Herein he restyled the ÖVP: promoted openness and transparency, brought in outsiders, even changed the party's color.[414] In these elections the migration issue was particularly salient. The ÖVP coopted FPÖ stances by committing to an end of the Balkan and other routes into Europe utilized by "migrants" and restricting refugee and migrant benefits.[415] In fact, the 2017 elections saw the ÖVP and FPÖ competing over "who would be tougher on immigrants and refugees", evidenced by the "Vordenker Spätzünder" campaign – put forward by the FPÖ to remind the electorate that the anti-Islamic message was, in origin, theirs.[416]

Despite the clear coopting of the FPÖ message, Kurz's campaign was successful – with his party winning 31.5% of the vote[417]; most likely due to the ÖVP's proven competency on the issue[418]. As Austria's foreign minister during the initial crisis, Kurz headed the push to close the Balkan route and made his name with a hard line policy against migrants; later given the position of minister for integration he solidified this, promoting and passing measures such as the burqa

ban.[419] Outside immigration, the ÖVP had "repertoire [which] also included economic and social issues", going beyond the FPÖ's single issue focus and issues they traditionally owned.[420]

The ÖVP's success demonstrates that mainstream parties can be successful using populist radical right tactics[421], which "suggests that populist parties are not 'doomed to succeed' but have been… because they strategically exploit available opportunities. A mainstream party, the ÖVP, that is doing the same can successfully contain them".[422] The ÖVP also utilized an issue yield approach.[423] Issue yield, in this context meant focusing asymmetrically on issues which had support in its own voter base and in the electorate more broadly; "By emphasising immigration issues that were also encompassing issues like social welfare and terrorism, the ÖVP clearly focused on policy issues that had the highest yield for the party".[424]

Yet the co-opting of the far-right's message and the success of the ÖVP campaign did not prevent the FPÖ from winning a significant number of seats.[425] As a result, the ÖVP created a coalition government with the FPÖ.[426] Notably, the FPÖ had also been revamped – under Heinz-Christian Strache – and had become a model for the far right; he "gave the party a more youthful image, embraced social media before other politicians and rejected the FPÖ's erstwhile anti-Semitism (recognising Jerusalem as Israel's capital…) in favour of an anti-Islam credo".[427]

For the EU, the willingness of Kurz to work with the FPÖ caused much anxiety.[428] Yet, when they came to power together in December 2017 there was no fallout, a drastic change from the sanctions which followed the same event 17 years prior.[429] "Nigel Farage tweeted "It's now the same situation as in 2000 and no one says a word. Eurosceptic politics is [m]ainstream"'.[430] Still, there were warnings including the European Council president's subtle statement, "I trust that the Austrian government will continue to play a constructive and pro-European role".[431]

Under this new government, migration and asylum seeking was restricted further. One of the few remaining legal options for asylum seekers' employment, the apprenticeship, was revoked and "[r]ather than addressing concerns about labour market protection, here the rationale was eliminating a potential pull factor for immigration."[432] Critics cite this law as being unreasonable, because even if asylum seekers are to be deported, this training would still be useful and could even be considered aid.[433] Other integration measures, such as language courses, were also restricted[434], yet simultaneously the 2017 Integration Act (68/2017) made the State integration process – which included value and orientation courses – obligatory and banned the wearing of any facial coverings in public[435].

This act also marked a moment in politics. When passing it, the ÖVP leader said it reflected "his strategy of 'zero toleration for Islamism and extremism'".[436] With it, both the SPÖ and Greens could engage in anti-Islamism; by distinguishing between religious and political Islam they could now "raise the issues of "foreign" influences and immigrants without appearing racist, as ostensibly the debate did not hinge on skin color or country of origin but on "alien" cultural practices and the potential threats that emanated from clandestine immigrant circles".[437] The fact that such laws were only directed against Islam, is evident in the debate surrounding the veil ban. With this legal action,

> [t]he issue of crucifixes being displayed in schools and nurseries has also come under fire. Critics argue that if one religious symbol is going to be banned in public, then the same must apply to all religions, not just Islam. But Austria's Constitutional Court [quickly took] a clear position on the issue, insisting that "the cross, without doubt, has become a symbol of the West's intellectual history". Moreover, it is also included in an international treaty between the Republic of Austria and the Holy See.[438]

The Austrian government also continued/s to utilize soldiers on its Southern and Eastern borders; this has been "heavily criticized [because f]igures from the year 2018 issued by the Defence Ministry show that this operation led to a mere 673 apprehensions".[439] Slovenia has also

criticized Austria, for unnecessarily having controls on the nations' shared border when less than 100 people crossed it in a year, for using military personnel for said border management, and for reportedly building a fence on the border.[440] Treaties with Italy and Hungary worked to mitigate migration with external controls.[441]

Taken collectively, these post-2015 policies constitute an aim to discourage migration through the asylum system.[442] Although such changes to the system have technically followed EU law "considerable work overload … has been accompanied by multiple problems regarding the quality of first instance decisions… [and] refugee rights organizations heavily criticized deportations to Afghanistan as ethically unwarrantable".[443] Moreover, in cases where returns are ordered they often cannot be executed, which creates substantial irregularity; in fact, "[b]oth asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection expressed a sense of incomprehension regarding the legal criteria for asylum decisions [especially] among persons who had spent several years in Austria making considerable integration efforts and then had received a negative first instance decision".[444] In regard to international law and regimes, Austria's then interior minister noted several times that certain international conventions stood in the way of his plans to deport individuals – including "refugees and asylum seekers convicted of criminal offenses".[445] Kurz also admits to wanted to change EU rules, particularly in this arena.[446]

In 2019 a leaked video, featuring FPÖ leader Strache discussing deals with a woman claiming to be a Russian oligarch's daughter destroyed the party and the ruling coalition. The ÖVP responded with a political good riddance[447], distancing themselves and asserting

> that the video represented the final nail in the proverbial coffin for an alliance that had been strained since it was formed a year and a half earlier… Kurz said, "After yesterday's video I honestly have to say - enough is enough…These are shameful images and no one should be ashamed for Austria…For all these successes in the past two years I had to be ready to withstand a lot and also put up with a lot, from the rat poem to the proximity to

> radical right-wing groups and the isolated incidents that kept coming back. There were many situations in which I found it very difficult to swallow all that."[448]

The strategy appears to have worked. Following new elections, the ÖVP one again took the most votes, this time choosing the Greens as coalition partners. A drastic turnaround from having the FPÖ as junior partner, negotiating a coalition deal was very complex. In the end the document "is less a meeting of minds than a division of fiefs", with a continued harsh stance on migration and integration balanced out with top-notch climate change programs.[449]

Christianity and Immigration: The Church has its Say

Unlike Germany and Hungary, Christian churches in Austria routinely made their voices heard on the migration issue. In January 2016, when Austrian officials moved to place caps on asylum seekers, the Catholic Church spoke out harshly against these measures.[450] Cardinal Schönborn, a rather famous personality in Austria, and even more so at the Vatican, pleaded with Catholics and the government saying, "we cannot solve all the problems, but we can help, and we can help more than we realise".[451] "Michael Landau, of Catholic relief agency Caritas Austria" went as far as to "criticis[e] proposals for a limit on refugees as a "breach of law"'. In addition to speaking out against the asylum cap, officials also worked to encourage charity, from a Christian basis. Herein, Cardinal Schönborn recalled his own families experience as refugees because of their German ethnicity in Czechoslovakia after World War II, quoting his mother's summary of the experience that, "no one leaves their country willingly".[452]

In October that year, as the campaign between Van der Bellen and Hofer unfolded, the Austrian churches got involved again. This time they denounced one of Hofer's slogans for "instrumentalizing God" and abusing his name to put forward "a xenophobic agenda":

> "We consider that mentioning God… to indirectly attack other religions and cultures amounts to an abuse of his name and religion in general."
> They added that the Bible's God was universal and defended the weak, poor and vulnerable — "who today particularly include refugees and foreigners".

> The FPOe rejected the criticism, saying the phrase came "directly from the heart" of Hofer, a lapsed Catholic who joined the Protestant church.[453]

In both these incidents, Austrian church officials disagreed with government actions, or those running for government; furthermore, they felt the need and had the ability to speak out against them. By doing so, it is evident they thought their voices would have some influence over the Austrian electorate. This distinguishes the Austrian case from both Germany and Hungary. In Germany, it is likely these debates and statements did not occur because the German government did not take the step of placing a cap on asylum seekers and no far-right candidate came close to being elected to the Presidency. In Hungary, despite harsher migration measures than Austria, no such event has occurred; in fact, the Catholic Church has been accused of "selling out" and "providing Catholic cover for the 'illiberal democracy' of [Orbán]".[454]

In sum, although Austria initially has a humanitarian response in 2015, this approach was incredibly short lived. Migration policies were quickly and drastically enacted to discourage "migrant" entry. Such harsh policies were already being widely criticized when the ÖVP took an even sharper turn to the right, under Kurz, joined forces with the FPÖ, and passed even harsher laws. Unlike Merkel in Germany, Austrian officials (notably of all parties, but the focus here is on the ÖVP) have openly utilized anti-Islamism and embraced anti-migration politics. Although avoiding the Orbán's more radical and clearly ideological rhetoric, the ÖVP has embraced many of his ideas, as will be analyzed in the next chapter. The harsh policies and rhetoric are something the Austrian Christian churches have openly spoke out against.

The Interactions

As much as the 2015 crisis impacted nations individually – especially Hungary, Austria, and Germany – it was also an international crisis, and nowhere was this more evident than in the EU. The crisis exacerbated existing EU issues: "it is fraying relations between Germany and

eastern Europ[e] just when solidarity is vital to contain Russia's aggression; it is adding to [Greece's] burdens…; it is bringing Brexit… closer; and it is stoking populism everywhere".[455] The EU crisis response manifested itself in many ways. Some promoted humanitarianism, emphasizing Dublin revisions and international deals. Others focused on border management, closing migration routes, and creating systems to deter "migrants" from coming to Europe.

> Two visions of the eu competed during the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016, when more than 2m people flooded into the bloc. On one side stood the humanitarians, who viewed the eu as a normative power, a shining light on a hill. For them, the response was a moral question with a simple answer: Willkommenskultur. On the other side were the hardliners. Their argument for stiff, brutal measures at the border was based on practicality (a state can only feed and house so many refugees at once) and politics (voters will kick out anyone who allows too large and sudden an influx).[456]

At their core these measures are deeply connected with perceptions of asylum seekers and labels given to them. So-called humanitarians considered these people legitimate and deserving refugees, matching conditions put forward by the Geneva Convention and 1967 protocol. Deterrence minded states considered the same individuals to be largely economic migrants, even potential terrorists, so culturally dissimilar that they present a threat to "Christian" Europe. Statements from Hungary supporting such a policy, say those arriving "who claim Syria as their country of origin has fallen to 3rd, 4th or even 5th place, depending on the day – which clearly shows that people come from other regions of the world, and that Europe is not faced with a refugee crisis, but a mass migration issue".[457]

Orbán jumped on the latter narrative before most "migrants" arrived in 2015 and has since stuck to it. He makes overarching ideological comments and speeches, actively countering "Brussels" and Merkel directly. He went as far as accusing Merkel and Germany of moral imperialism.[458] The conflict started with Merkel's suspension of Dublin but grew well beyond it. Discussing Orbán's impact on the EU, *The Economist* argued the danger he presents is unique

> because he injects a far-right virus into the bloodstream of Europe's political centre. Fidesz's [EPP] membership… gives Mr Orban the ear of [Merkel] and other mainstream conservatives. Yet while he may spurn hard-right outfits like France's National Front or the [FPÖ], he borrows from their playbook. He lays charges of treason against those who seek to import "hundreds of thousands of people" from "groups outside European culture". Migrants have turned parts of cities like Berlin and Stockholm into "no-go zones", his government argues…. But it was Europe's failings that enabled Mr Orban's success. As Mrs Merkel struggled to maintain support for her refugee policy, in Germany and abroad, some of her supposed allies, such as Horst Seehofer, the premier of Bavaria, began to align themselves with Mr Orban instead. Apparent failures of integration, from sexual assaults in Cologne to terrorist attacks in France, seemed to vindicate Mr Orban's clash-of-civilisation warnings. Europe's leaders began to tighten asylum policy and to talk seriously about border protection, just as Mr Orban had said they should.[459]

Austria operates somewhere in the middle, between the humanitarian and border management approach. Although largely and increasingly focused on the latter, mainstream Austrian politicians, refrain from the divisive polemics of Orbán. Germany has, from the start, been considered one of the fiercest, if not – on occasion – the only, supporter of the humanitarian approach. Yet even within such an approach, things are not so black and white, as was evidenced in Germany's policy decisions discussed above and will be elaborated further below.

In November 2015, *The Economist* published on Merkel, labeling her "The Indispensable European". The article argues this title is appropriate because of Germany's importance, Merkel's status as the longest serving leader in the EU –her proven ability therein with crisis diplomacy– and per personal qualities.[460] She is argued to be effective because of her detached demeanor and knack for negotiations and research – which leaves her well informed;

> [s]he has defended German interests without losing sight of Europe's; she has risked German money to save the euro, while keeping sceptical Germans onside; and she has earned the respect of her fellow leaders even after bruising fights with them. Most impressively (and alone among centre-right leaders in Europe), she has done this without pandering to anti-EU and anti-immigrant populists. For all the EU's flaws, she does not treat it as a punchbag, but rather as a pillar of peace and prosperity.[461]

The article goes on to analyze Merkel's 2015 response and its impacts on her reputation; a few months after her decision was made, she was not only facing protests and dissent from within her own party, but also regionally.[462] This was because her actions were seen as an invitation to

"migrants" to come to Europe and the fact that her policy response was not just to accept refugees domestically but had strong regional and international components. Merkel policy relied on "shar[ing] the burden across Europe and beyond; strengthen[ing] controls and the processing of asylum-seekers at Europe's external borders; and negotiate[ing] with transit countries".[463]

Despite the harsh realities of Merkel's migration policy and plans, evident in the earlier analysis, rhetorically she continues to defend the same humanitarian message. By doing so she takes on a European opportunity: "she has presented herself as the champion of refugees on the continent".[464] This also allows Germany to rebrand with "an image of openness, generosity and solidarity, a total change from the egotistical and hard image the country acquired during the Greek crisis".[465] It is in this arena, that some of her most ideological and ethical statements are made: she argues that '"Germany is a country that welcomes refugees"[; she promises] not [to] participate in a "let us see who can be the most unfriendly toward refugees so they won't come here" contest"[466]; and insists that "Islam belongs in Germany"[467].

Merkel and Germany are not synonymous – neither are Orbán and Hungary. In Germany, the CSU's chairman, even invited Orbán to Bavaria, stating after that he is "indispensable" and deserves "support and not criticism".[468] In Hungary the opposition has ran billboards making fun of the government's anti-migrant campaigns and, in 2019, Budapest elected an incredibly liberal mayor who told Euractiv, "[t]he anti-migration rhetoric of [Orbán] intends to kill the humanity in humans".[469] It is important to this keep in mind, because while national leaders' decisions have profound impact, they do not speak for everyone, nor sometimes even the majority.

On a related note, the EU context does not feature a mere divide between Hungary and Germany, but rather the reality is increadibly multifaceted. Many EU member states and elites criticized Merkel and the relocation mechanism. Many more have criticized Orbán. The EU

opened multiple sanctions procedures against Hungary. Luxembourg's minister of foreign affairs accused Orbán of being "a man who was smashing European values such as solidarity and helpfulness", saying that "[o]ne has to feel ashamed of Viktor Orbán" and countered Orbán's claim making on Christian values: "Christian values dictated that all people in danger had a right to protection… "He (Orbán) says he only wants Christians. If Orbán is a Christian, then [K]im Il Sung is a Christian too"'.[470] France's foreign minister also spoke out: "Hungary's construction of a barrier to stop new arrivals "did not respect Europe's common values"'.[471] Even the UN got involved, insisting asylum seekers not be returned to Hungary because of conditions there.[472]

Others criticize the entire EU. Turkey's ambassador to the EU labeled the EU request for Turkey to open their borders, as they closed their own, "ironic".[473] Montenegro made similar comments regarding their border closures: "If the [EU] countries dealing with the consequences of the migrant crisis opt to close their borders, what else [can] a country like [us] to do".[474] Asylum seekers also criticize EU policies: '"We cannot go back. We will either die here or go on," said 20-year-old Afghan Mohamed Asif on the Greek side of the border. "We have paid so much money to get this far. Germany said it would accept refugees, what has changed now?"'[475]; '"Iraqis and Syrians are crossing, but not us, why? Aren't we also human beings?" said Afghan migrant Sayed Wahab Sadat... "I want to go to Germany to live and work in safety, where I come from my life is in danger"[476]. Amnesty International joined this chorus, calling the EU refugee response '"shameful"… [and] saying most EU countries had "simply decided that the protection of their borders is more important than the protection of the rights of refugees"'.[477]

Having noted such criticisms, and the various multifaceted divisions on migration and refugees, the goal here is to analyze the specific interactions of Germany, Hungary, and Austria.

The Things Which Divide

The action beginning the Orbán-Merkel conflict on migration was Merkel's decision to accept the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees that Hungary was responsible for registering under Dublin. Explaining this, an SPD official stated in support, "We had to give a strong signal of humanity to show that Europe's values are valid also in difficult times. Hungary's handling of the crisis is unbearable"; a popular newspaper reported "Merkel stops the shame of Budapest".[478] Although Brussels supported her decision [479], it set off conflict with Orbán and many others. Then president of the European Council even referred to her policy as dangerous[480], saying

> '"We can no longer allow solidarity to be equivalent to naïveté, openness to be equivalent to helplessness, freedom to be equivalent to chaos. And by that, I am of course referring to the situation on our borders" [and] that the leaders present must not "abdicate" their "primary duty" to protect their territory. "If you want to help others, you need to first be able to take care of yourself and your loved ones"'.[481]

Relocation Scheme

The biggest point of contention between the Orbán's Fidesz party and Merkel's CDU was the relocation scheme – a corrective allocation mechanism to the Dublin regime in the EU, because the system disproportionately impacts EU border states[482]. It set up a reference key based on nations' size and GDP – with each given 50% weight – to determine how many asylum applicants each nation could take in.[483] If one nation were to exceed 150% of the reference key, then the rest of applicants under their responsibility according to Dublin would be reallocated.[484] Nations could opt out by paying 250,000 euros per applicant who would have been allocated to them.[485] The scheme was put forward in a consequential way by the EU with the 2015 crisis, endorsed and backed by Germany. It became very problematic, especially for Orbán – who went so far as to hold a referendum and amend the Hungarian constitution against it.[486] The referendum, mentioned earlier, asked "Do you want the [EU] to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?"[487] and the amendment declared that no foreign or alien population be settled in

Hungary.[488] The referendum was a "challenge to the authority of Brussels and the leadership of Germany's Angela Merkel, who champions the relocation scheme".[489]

Orbán insisted the redistribution scheme would incentivize millions of "migrants" and emphasized – speaking in Brussels in 2015 – that many would be Muslims "and it was Hungary's prerogative to preserve its Christian roots".[490] He argued that "Multiculturalism means the coexistence of Islam, Asian religions and Christianity" and promised "[w]e will do everything to spare Hungary from that".[491] His statements emphasized migration as a threat to "Europe's Christian and democratic way of life"[492], speaking beyond his own national boundaries and making claims for the entire continent:

> "I am speaking about God[,] about culture and the everyday principles of life, such as sexual habits, freedom of expression, equality between men and woman and all those kind of values which I call Christianity. If we let the Muslims into the continent to compete with us, they will outnumber us. It's mathematics. And we don't like it," Orbán said in an interview published in several European newspapers, including The Times.[493]

He also insisted that such a scheme would be undemocratic: "When and who voted for admitting millions of people who entered illegally, and distributing them among EU member states?"[494]

In his hostility against a relocation scheme Orbán is far from alone. In fact, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic held several summits in opposition to such an idea.[495] This is because, "[i]n a region with recent memories of being ruled from Moscow, sovereignty remains a powerful rallying point. Talk of compulsory quotas for accepting asylum-seekers raises hackles."[496] Orbán, with sympathy from these three other nations, "wants the [EU] to be a trading bloc of sovereign countries that keeps out of matters like migration and human rights".[497]

In a 2015 speech to the EPP, Orbán criticized the EU left, "They are supportive to migration [and] import future leftist voters to Europe hiding behind humanism… They have a dream about the politically constructed world society without religious traditions, without borders, without nations. They attack core values of our European identity: family, nation,

subsidiarity, responsibility".[498] Outside the EPP, Orbán did not restrain his criticisms to the left, and the relocation scheme became one of the key points in which he opposed Merkel directly.

In September 2015 Orbán announced a conflict between he and Merkel because asylum seekers were taking her recent suspension of Dublin as an invitation[499]:

> "These errors in communication and invitations have created an impossible situation in Hungary"... They [Syrian refugees] call out the name of Germany and… Merkel and say that they will wait in Germany… If Germany has really invited them, then it should be Germany who should issue them with visas... Then they would be allowed to leave Hungary. If [not], then they must make that clear."[500]

Orbán's statements are somewhat supported by information from Slovenia, through which the route to Germany was re-routed when Hungary's fences were built. Slovenia dutifully tried to register and fingerprint those crossing its borders, as required by law but reported many incomers refusing, even destroying identity papers and fingerprints trying to reach Germany.[501]

Merkel responded to Orbán's accusations saying that she was doing only "what is morally and legally necessary" and that the EU as a whole should discuss the matter.[502] She admitted Hungary was right about its legal obligations "to protect Schengen's external borders and to register refugees" but argued this was not enough because the EU explicitly obliges its members "to help the vulnerable" and cited the Geneva Convention's applicability therein.[503] Interestingly enough, this claim Merkel makes about responsibility for helping the vulnerable was not based in Christianity; she did not compete with Orbán's ideological claims about Christianity or argue with him from a Christian Democratic standpoint. Although she had made such statements from a "Christian" perspective domestically, when facing Orbán Merkel instead cited international human rights standards and treaties Hungary had ratified. Given the opportunity to debate ideology with Orbán, she side-stepped it. Perhaps she thought that a reminder of treaties would be more powerful, yet it is also plausible she does/did not want to respond ideologically or even did not see the matter as ideological.

For his part, Orbán expanded his blaming of Germany to also include Greece[504]:

> If Greece protected its border with Turkey properly and registered arrivals as the law says it must, Hungary and other countries further up the trail would not have to deal with streams of migrants who only want to pass through. If Germany had a consistent approach rather than apparently opening its doors one day and tightening its borders the next, fewer migrants would make the journey in the first place, central Europe would avoid the domino effect of border controls... And yet Hungary is vilified while Greece merrily nods hundreds of thousands of refugees up to Europe without so much as a by-your-leave. Plenty of European officials quietly concur. Bafflement at Germany's vacillations is hardly confined to Budapest. And this week none other than Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, said she completely agreed with Mr Orban on the need to secure the EU's external borders.[505]

There seems, at least on the surface, to be confusion and frustration coming from the Hungarian government over the harshness with which they were being treated as they were merely caught in the cross hairs of others' "mistakes". Perhaps the clearest evidence of Orbán's argument that Germany's action had caused issues within his country are the events of September 3rd, 2015.

When Hungarian police allowed migrants and asylum seekers onto trains they believed they would be heading to Austria and onwards to Germany and climbed aboard; however, when the train stopped instead at a Hungarian reception center many resisted orders of riot police to get off the train.[506] A Syrian man quoted by *Euractiv* stated, in English, "Respect the humans in here; no respect for the humans. We want to go to Germany, not here".[507] "Citing the chaos at Budapest's main railway station, Orbán's chief of staff, Janos Lazar, told a news conference: "This is because Germany … more than a week ago told Syrians that Germany awaited them, inviting them to the laid table"'.[508]

During the 2016 commemoration of the 1956 revolution, Orbán criticized the whole EU. He passionately and actively compared Brussels to Moscow[509], claiming that "[p]eople who love their freedom must save Brussels from Sovietisation, from people who want to tell us who we should live with in our countries… As heirs to 1956 we cannot allow Europe to cut the roots that

made it great and helped us survive the Soviet suppression. There is no free Europe without nation states and thousands of years of wisdom from Christianity".[510] In 2018 Orbán's rhetoric became clearer and more powerful: On March 15th he "issued a rousing battle-cry to defend the Magyar homeland from waves of migrants; militant Islam; plans in Brussels for enforced migrant quotas; and a United States of Europe. In today's Europe… "it is forbidden to speak the truth": that immigration brings crime and terrorism and "endangers our way of life, our culture, our customs and our Christian traditions"'.[511]

Collectively, Orbán's statements are part of a '"cultural counter revolution' in Europe, based on a defense of nation, family and Christianity", working against refugee-friendly elites who he accused of "seek[ing] to destroy Europe's nations from within".[512] His statements present a broader claim within his version of Christian Democracy, which extends to Europe as a whole. By specifically combatting "Brussels" and claiming representation of the true European people against such "corrupt" or "undemocratic" leaders, Orbán engaged a pan European populism and created a situation where those responding to his accusations only fueled the fire.

When looking towards alternative methods, Orbán faces two key criticisms to his border management and deterrent focused approach: first, the right to asylum enshrined in international and EU law; second, EU solidarity. Speaking on refugees' rights, Orbán clarified that while human dignity and security rights are fundamental, the right to choose asylum states and the right to the Hungarian – or Austrian or German – way of life are not.[513] When defending harsh border controls against right to life arguments, Orbán blamed "migrants" for their own actions which risked their children's lives, saying they should not do that.[514] Asked about European values and solidarity, Hungarian officials counter that there is no singular definition of these terms, that "becoming a migrant country is not a European value", and that their financial support for

programs like the EU Trust Fund for Africa was/is solidarity.[515] Officials also drew attention to developments in Italy and Austria[516], arguing that Hungary is not alone.

It is important to note that the relocation scheme was rather unsuccessful even when enacted, because it was only able to be on a voluntary basis, rather than enforced. Nine months after the EU pledged to resettle refugees from its external borders less than 1% of those eligible had been moved.[517] So, although some countries may not have been opposed per se, few refugees were actually resettled. Summarizing this failure, *The Economist* explains: many countries want nothing to do with refugees, and refugees have no interest in most countries.[518]

Perhaps then, the whole disagreement between Orbán and Merkel is irrelevant when it comes to the redistribution scheme. Nevertheless, the argumentation put forth by both is still profoundly important: it makes clear that Merkel conceives a duty within the EU to share burdens and Orbán sees this as beyond EU purview and an attack on national sovereignty.

The Balkans and Border Management as an Alternative

Questions of border management and the Balkans are key contentious points. Hungary worked with the Balkans extensively to stop migrants before they reach the EU border; Germany argues this is a humanitarian corridor. Hungary fenced off its border to prevent migrants entering the Schengen zone; Germany considers this wrong. Herein, Austria sides with Hungary. They built fences and called the Balkan Summit, "want[ing] to close off the refugees' route through the Balkans from Greece, which they accuse of failing to protect the EU's borders";[519] whereas Merkel considered asylum seekers to be refugees, Austrian officials disagreed. The Balkan Summit saw the Germany-Austria disagreement become heated when the former critiqued the latter's daily limit on asylum seekers; the response was "Germany should decide which number is acceptable to it," Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann told reporters. A statement added that he wished for a "respectful treatment of Austria's political decisions"'.[520]

However, despite Merkel's clear position on the matter, not all German officials agreed. The then interior minister promoted Balkan controls, refusing to criticize Hungary's border fence and saying if Balkan countries followed the rules, it would not be necessary.[521] German officials also criticized Austria's border management; in 2015 Seehofer accused Austria of failing in refugee influx coordination at the Bavarian border, which would harm neighborly relations.[522]

Following this, when Austria began enacting border closures, they argued it was because of Germany's policies: "turning away [those] no longer being let into Germany"[523]. In 2016, when they set a refugee cap, the Dutch PM commented, "[Austria's] move illustrated… national action likely to multiply if the [EU] did not start implementing a commonly agreed strategy on asylum before… spring".[524] Outside of their early illustration of what might happen in the EU, Austria's actions created a direct domino of border closures throughout ECE and the Balkans –

> Skopje [said it] would coordinate all future steps with other[s] along the migrant corridor and would "reflect decisions taken in Germany, Austria and other European countries"[;] [l]ast month, fearing that Western countries will close their borders, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia started only letting refugees whose registration papers say that they will apply for asylum in Austria and Germany pass through… [;] Bulgarian [PM] made it plain that the countries on the Balkan route won't allow to be transformed into refugee camps "[i]f Germany, Austria and other[s] close their borders, we will not… become a buffer zone. We will be ready in the same way to close our borders".[525]

This occurred inside Schengen as well with border closures in 2015. Germany closed its Austrian border; three days later Austria closed its Hungarian border; the next day Slovenia and Hungary followed suit.[526] In November, after the Paris attacks, France, Norway, and Sweden closed their borders, joined, in 2016, by Denmark and Belgium. Borders have stayed closed to this day.[527] This same issue returned in 2018, when, under the CSU's pressure, Merkel set up transit centers to send back secondary movement immigrants arriving in Germany to their country of EU entry. Whereas bilateral deals were made with Greece and Spain for this, those coming from other EU

countries were to be returned to Austria under a bilateral deal. In reality however, Austria had no intention of taking in any extra "migrants":

> Vienna issued a terse statement: "Should this agreement become German[y's] policy we see it as our job to [take] actions to head off disadvantages for Austria and its people. The federal government is… prepared… to protect our southern border in particular". In other words: if Germany starts turning back migrants at the Austrian border, Austria will do the same on its borders with Italy and Slovenia. Austria has long threatened to impose new controls at the Brenner Pass, the main road link across the Alps.[528]

Although the border closures impacted the Balkans indirectly, there has also been direct dealings with them. Early on Hungary actively called for the EU "to speed up accession talks with the Western Balkans … [to] protect the bloc from a future in flux of migrants";[529] in Austria's 2018 EU presidency this was one of their key objectives. After working with the Balkan countries, Hungary noted that "[e]ngaging with Macedonia and Serbia was more effective than the whole EU approach".[530] These direct dealings, including but not limited to the Balkan summit, were heavily criticized and not just from Germany. Greece criticized Hungary – for sending Macedonia aid to build a fence on their Greek border[531] – and Austria – because the Austrian led Balkan summit excluded Greece and Austrian border closures created a domino effect which hit Greece the hardest, with a mini humanitarian crisis unfolding therein.[532] The summit also resulted in criticism from the European Commission, the EU migration commissioner, and the head of the UN Refugee Agency.[533]

In sum, the Balkan solution is an incredibly continuous point, not just amongst Germany, Austria, and Hungary but the EU as a whole. With the three countries being studied here Austria and Hungary promote border controls in the Balkans as a way to prevent people from reaching the EU. Without such protections, they themselves have built fences.

EPP and Suspension

It is clear in these critiques that the EU is strained; to understand the severity of these strains it is important to look at the EPP – the biggest Euro party, home to CDPs and the centrist conservative right – as it is the main arena in which the CDU, ÖVP, and Fidesz parties interact. Euro parties are entities within the European Parliament (EP) – a body with legislative, supervisory, and budgetary roles, whose main responsibilities are to prepare legislation in committees and to pass legislation in plenary sessions.[534] Each nation gets a number of seats in the EP, roughly based on their population, with Germany having the most at 96 and Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus having the least with 6 each.[535] Within the EP delegates sit in political rather than national associations, with each group having to consist of delegates from at least one quarter of the EU nations.[536] Largely, but not entirely, these political groups line up with Euro parties, which are "transnational, extra-parliamentary federations of national political parties from several EU Member States, united by political affinity".[537] Despite the kind of unity inherent in a body like a Euro party, the EPP seems to be coming apart at the seams. This is because several diverging ideas exist about the party's future.

On March 20th 2019, Fidesz was suspended from the EPP, 190 votes to three; even Fidesz voted to deny themselves the right to attend meetings or vote in the party.[538] The action was a direct response to an information campaign put on by Fidesz; differing from prior campaigns, it featured the EPP member European Commission president Jean Claude Junker.[539] Afterwards, Junker publicly stated that Fidesz "should leave the mainstream European center-right".[540]

Although many EPP party members called for expulsion, the suspension –pending investigation– was the result of CDU/CSU led negotiations and logic that keeping Fidesz in the EPP would moderate it, rather than pushing it into the open arms of the European far-right.[541] There was also the matter of Fidesz's domestic strength and the potential erosion of EPP power

without it.[542] Kurz supported suspension and EU Article 7 proceedings against Hungary: saying "[t]here is no compromise over [r]ule of law and democracy. Basic values must be protected".[543]

Hauntingly reminiscent of the EU response to Austria's 2000 ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, when suspending Fidesz the EPP selected three 'wise men' to oversee the implementation of their conditions deemed necessary to reverse the suspension.[544]

> The conditions are the immediate removal of "posters and other advertising materials used to run a fake news campaign against President Jean-Claude Juncker"; recognition by Fidesz that this campaign has caused considerable political damage; and clarification of pending legal issues regarding the Central European University. However, Orban said, there was "never any campaign against Juncker. What we have in Hungary is an information campaign." The comments were met with amusement in the press room. The Evaluation Committee will also assess the respect for the rule of law, and 'EPP values', as well as the implementation of the EPP emergency resolution on 'Protecting EU Values and Safeguarding Democracy', the proposal said.[545]

In the meantime, Orbán supports the compromise, saying without it he would have left the EPP, but has noted, "I would not change my policies, my political approach… We remain committed to EU values but also we don't want migration, we want to protect Christian values".[546]

Outside the EPP the agreement has been met with much criticism. The ALDE group leader commented, "[t]his stitch up shows the EPP will always put parliamentary numbers ahead of the collective European interest. The very narrow conditions of the agreement show th[ey do] not care about the rule of law, democratic checks and balances, an independent and impartial judiciary or a pluralist media – they only care about themselves"; the Socialist and Democratic Group tweeted "[t]he fact that EPP only reacted after Orbán attacked the European Commission President from his very own party does not undo the damage that has been caused already".[547] Explaining the suspension, *The Economist* argued, "[The EPP's] affection for the sunny Fidesz of 1989 clouds its judgment of the dark Fidesz of 2019."[548]

What is perhaps most intriguing with these events it that Fidesz, with Orbán at its helm, have remained in the EPP and continued to cast their lots with it; this is not for lack of options,

the far right has been looking for a while to recruit the party.[549] Furthermore, Orbán welcomed Steve Bannon, famous for his position in and claimed responsibility for the success of the Trump campaign, when he came to Europe in 2018 to establish an anti-EU Movement "to boost the nationalist, anti-immigrant vote for the European Parliament next year".[550] This was something Austria's far-right FPÖ would not even support – albeit not because they did not support the movement but rather because they wanted it to be independent of foreign powers.[551]

This support, however, is not without qualifications. In February 2020 Orbán released a memorandum on the state of the EPP, complimenting the party historically, but criticizing it today.[552] Herein he argues that the EPP has abandoned its traditional role:

> We fail to represent Christian inspirations openly and self-consciously, if there are any left. We gave up the family model based on the matrimony of one woman and one man, and fell into the game of gender ideology. Instead of supporting the birth of children, we see mass migration as the solution to our demographic problems. We indolently tolerate the disintegration of the Schengen Area and helplessly view the failure to involve the countries of the Balkans into the integration of Europe. We are not offering an attractive alternative to our political adversaries, and we regard their issues and their interpretations as points of reference. We have exposed our internal conflicts to the general public. The differences between the eastern and western, old and new member parties are not narrowed by widening. This is what we, the European People's Party, are today. We don't stand up for ourselves as old and great Europeans, and don't take the fight against left-liberal intellectual forces and the media they influence and control. We became a centrist party alliance, sliding from the Christian right wing towards the left. In the eyes of the voters, we are slowly becoming indistinguishable from the liberal, green, socialist left. We created an impression that the compromises necessary to secure our participation in government have become the core of our policy… We have created an impression that we are afraid to declare and openly accept who we are and what we want.[553]

It appears that Orbán's biggest problem, through all of this is that there are not discussions and debates going on about these issues, but merely a march towards a secularizing left: "In this situation, an internal debate on the future mission of the EPP is inevitable… Unfortunately, [it does] not take place… Unity is the most important thing, but in our situation today, unity, a new unity, can only be achieved through honest internal debates."[554] This stands

in stark contradiction the Merkel's avoidance of discussing such issues, highlighted earlier. Such avoidance by Merkel, among others, is likely what Orbán is critiquing here.

It is clear he has thought about such a debate, as he puts forward several recommendations. The key person here is the man who oversaw the process of EPP expansion into ECE, as highlighted in chapter three.

> We, the members of Fidesz… recommend returning to the heritage of Martens. Wilfried Martens successfully united centre-right and right-wing parties of various roots and geographic backgrounds… and managed to incorporate the Christian, right-wing, nation-oriented parties of the former communist countries into the EPP with an offensive enlargement policy. This helped us overtake the then strongest socialist left in the [EP].[555]

Wilfried's legacy here, is perceived not just to be about realities inside the EU but also relationships with other nations. Here the suggestions and actions taken by Orbán internationally – the many critiques of his dealings with Russia, Turkey, China, and the American right – are contextualized historically in EPP policy: "Wilfried sought alliances outside the Union as well, with the Turks, the Russians, and even the Chinese. He regarded American… Republicans [a]s our natural allies."[556] Also important here are Orbán's considerations about the far right: "We recommend supporting our member parties to cooperate and build coalitions not only with the left, but also with the right-wing in their countries."[557] Finally, he highlights that the centrist forces within the EPP – essentially those comparatively more left parties like the CDU – does not acknowledge or include parties like his own. Here he is criticizing the actions taken against his party as a lack of acknowledgement that Fidesz represents a legitimate Christian right wing that should "also be given a seat at the table."[558]

Discussing Orban's claim making and world view, a Fidesz member of the EP clarifies:

> The prime minister wants a Europe where Christian and national traditions—which he believes are under threat—are taken seriously. The assumption in the West that post-communist societies would seamlessly absorb Western liberal mores on immigration and multiculturalism was profoundly wrong… "These [ECE] countries are still defining their identities… They don't want to adopt the Western approach."[559]

The EPP therefore, is the one of, if not the singularly, the most important arenas in which the differences between the CDU, Fidesz and the ÖVP manifest and play out. There are clearly two competing ideas about what it is the Euro party stands for. At the one hand there is the calls to expel Fidesz for their actions in Hungary, on the other there is Orbán's calls to give parties like his own a "seat at the table" as a legitimate and historically rooted representation of the Christian right. For now, this has been somewhat mediated, with a suspension of Fidesz – but this action is merely a band-aid on a wound that needs a much bigger fix.

Austria: the middle, the right or a bridge and the impact of their EU Presidency

Although Hungary and Austria were/are hardly alone in their backlash against refugees – "[x]enophobic parties are at record levels in polls in Sweden and the Netherlands"[560] –, they have both been cited for a similar danger, bringing extremism into the mainstream especially related to migration. In Hungary this extremism this has largely been met with a complete reclassification of Orbán and his Fidesz party as far right, likely because of the fluidity, youth, and non-traditional nature of the party system in ECE. In Austria however, this is not the case; the ÖVP is a traditional party, having been Christian Democratic and mainstream since 1945. As such the ÖVP's adaptation of far-right migration policies and rhetoric means the injection of them into the mainstream. This section will investigate this adaptation and its impacts. Internationally this manifests itself both through the Austrian bridge-building strategy and the goals of their EU Presidency, both of which will be analyzed here.

The clearest manifestation of Austria injecting the far-right into the main stream is Kurz, whose hardline migration policies and rhetoric, although a winning strategy at home, created fear that he himself was a "rabble-rousing populist in centrist clothing… [who potentially] could join the leaders of Hungary and Poland in an axis of resistance to migration".[561] To attempt to

decipher if this is the case, or the potentiality of this 'danger' so to speak, it is necessary to analyze parallels between Kurz and Orbán. Since Christian nativism is a core tenant of Orbán's message, a key question here is how central this concept is to Kurz's message. Answering this, *The Economist* points out the limitations of Christian nativism in contemporary Austria considering that at its heart is the rather secular Vienna; knowing this reality, Kurz walks a fine line, emphasizing the importance of Austria's Christianity based value system or history, but not presenting a very pious image.[562] The true religious personality in Austria, with a relatively powerful reputation, is Cardinal Schönborn – yet he remains more influential at the Vatican than in Vienna.[563] Nevertheless, it was big news in 2016 when he questioned "Will there be an Islamic conquest of Europe? Many Muslims want that and say, Europe is at an end"; he later clarified this question regarded metaphysical ideas, considering that both faiths are evangelistic, not a physical contest[564] referenced in ideas like the replacement theory.

In light of these kinds of clear differences between Kurz and Orbán, *The Economist* emphasizes Kurz's critics' wariness is a matter of confusion between border management and xenophobia.[565] Furthermore, despite some concerns, many conservatives in Europe are "watching with interest" as Kurz's policy and rhetoric took the ÖVP from third place in the polls to victory.[566] Especially since a year on the government was widely supported, unlike Germany's grand coalition elected simultaneously.[567]

To briefly digress on German Austrian relations: the divide between them became, in a way, solidified with the election of Kurz in 2017. Reporting on Kurz's first visit to Berlin, *Euractiv* stated plainly that "their differences aren't going anywhere".[568] Despite their many disagreements, within the Union parties in Germany it is clear that for many, Kurz is "a role

model for a hoped-for rebound of the German Christian Democrats".[569] By June of 2018 the CSU invited Kurz instead of Merkel to the state election campaign in Bavaria.[570]

In government Kurz has both stood out against the far right – avoiding populist Eurosceptic rhetoric and Soros conspiracy theories – and acted like them by "meeting with the Bavarian government, which raised eyebrows in Berlin[,] calling for a European "axis of the willing" against illegal immigration[, using s]ome salty language.. in Austrian documents on the difficulties of integrating men from regions marked by "patriarchal…or backward-looking religious attitudes"[; as such, e]ven central European officials fear the Austrians sometimes go too far.[571] Despite these "far right" moments, Kurz's ideas – to take tough action on borders and to cut deals with third countries – are gaining ground.[572]

Kurz's increasingly popular argument is a kind of modified Fortress Europe, which although heavily guarded has a metaphorical gate wherein "genuine refugees may be selected for resettlement by EU countries via the UN's refugee agency…"It's much more humanitarian to help those really in need than those who are able to pay for a smuggler," says Mr Kurz. Even the central Europeans… might play along if they can choose them from outside".[573] With this plan and his actions Kurz has gone beyond merely making domestic changes. The goal herein is to bridge the rifts between East and West in Europe: "since the start of the migrant crisis (in 2015) tensions have grown in the [EU]… Our great aim in Austria is to be a bridge-builder in this respect between the Visegrad states and the countries in western Europe".[574] Meeting with Orbán in January, Kurz matched his tough talk on immigration, praising the actions the Hungarian government took in 2015 – particularly the border fence–, and agreed that the EU relocation scheme was not working.[575] This agreement came after Orbán's comments that "[t]he biggest

danger today to the hopeful future of central Europe is migration of peoples [and] [w]hen I say that the future needs to be protected I mean that we have a culture, a Christian culture".[576]

This bridge building and Kurz's migration strategy became more important as Austria assumed the EU presidency in 2018. The EU presidency rotates every six months; whilst holding the presidency a nation plans and chairs meetings at every level in the Council and represent it to other EU bodies.[577] The nation with the presidency holds substantial power over the EU agenda and goals. Pre-signaling the approach they would take with the EU Presidency, Austria's defense minister drafted – in 2017 – a plan reworking EU migration policy with a cap similar to that of his own country and a change in who could apply for asylum –only allowing applications from abroad, specifically in asylum centers located in countries like Jordan and Uzbekistan; '"We must admit to ourselves and be honest that the EU has limited capacity to absorb more migrants. We must stop illegal immigration," Bild quoted the minister as saying".[578] This was followed by discussions of banning full-face veils in an integration law – which labeled it as a symbol of counterculture – and required those receiving protection to contractually agree to such terms.[579]

Holding a news conference in March 2018 on the subject of the upcoming Austrian EU Presidency, Kurz explained "[o]ur aim is very clear – that in Europe there should not only be a dispute over redistribution (of refugees) but also, at last, a shift of focus towards securing external borders"; he endorsed a system to return migrants apprehended at sea to Africa and promised to end illegal migration.[580] His other key emphasis was EU accession for Balkan countries[581], which harks back to the 2016 Balkan summit. Discussing Africa returns, a key idea was Libyan cooperation – despite rather egregious migrant camp conditions there – arguing that: "If people are in distress 50 kilometres away from Libya then they should not be brought 500

kilometres to Italy, but rather brought back to Libya"'.[582] It is evident then, that "European values can be overridden when outsourcing the "refugee problem" on the EU's external borders".[583]

A document given to member states by the Austrian government about migration – seen by Le Monde in July 2018, while Austria held the EU presidency – stated that the migration situation is not under control in the EU.[584] The document looks to reform asylum policy and process applications outside the EU – an initially Hungarian idea –, to allow for selected asylum authorization for individuals respecting and sharing EU values.[585] *Euractiv* reports:

> The text as a whole presents a very ideological vision which is contrary to the existing right of asylum aiming to protect human rights. Austria believes that "because of their origin and lack of prospects, they (migrants) have repeatedly had big problems living in open societies, and even reject them. Among them are a large number of young men with little or no education. Many are especially susceptible to ideologies which are hostile to freedom or which advocate violence" ... "When it comes to integration of people coming from other civilisations, from outside Europe, from the Islamic culture, there are deficits…" [Strache] said…"due to the level of education… "patriarchal structures" and "values upheld in these cultures"... "[Many] are not able or willing to [integrate]; they don't find jobs and… deride benefits from our system of social welfare. This is something we cannot cope with in the long term," … "We can never generalise. On average, certain groups find it easier to integrate than others do," [Kurz] pointed out… "[Afghans and Chechens] import alongside their religion, and they reimport anti-Semitism which then we have to combat. It creates a major challenge".[586]

Kurz's ideas, before, during, and after Austria's EU presidency gained ground. Yet the Strache scandal caused immense doubt that co-opting the far right is the best way to manage them.[587] It seems the ÖVP's domestic lesson mirrors what the EPP is still learning at the EU level. The hug strategy, present in the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition and in the EPP's treatment of Orbán and Fidesz, seems to embolden the far right and toxify the mainstream; political scientists verify this reality: "Mainstream parties moving right… may legitimise extreme parties and push them into yet more extreme positions—creating a bidding war that mainstreamers cannot win".[588]

The EU migration split goes well beyond the Austrian presidency, or the supposed East-West divide. In 2019 diverging migration plans put forward by Italy and Germany to the EP

demonstrates this[589], summarize four years' worth of debates, and proved how little progress had been made herein. The base realities underlining these divergences are: first that some EU countries will not take in "migrants" who are not Christian and second that asylum seekers have preferred destinations.[590] Again, these conditions have existed for four years and still lack much discussion, let alone solutions. The first and the related apparent East West divide on the continent has been discussed and nuanced clearly throughout this paper. The second however is, in many ways, even more complex – asylum seekers do have preferences, which for many EU citizens seems absurd – this is something Orbán himself has commented on extensively and is foundational to his narrative. Yet, as *Euractiv* points out such a preference cannot be explained merely through language, community, or even economic realities but comes down to the EU's migration policies; statistics vary drastically in terms of asylum claims from country to country.[591] As straight forward as this may seem the resulting

> notion of migrants expressing preferences raises difficult ideas about asylum-seekers; should they simply be grateful for safe harbor wherever it is offered or should they be able to choose who offers them safety and hospitality? These are not easy questions and they have rarely been discussed in public. But the mass movement from safe southern Europ[e] of migrants determined to reach the UK or Germany reveals they exist.[592]

Other 2019 developments in the EU show that maybe the divides of the last four years are softening. The Commission's President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen – formerly quintessential to Merkel's early CDU, especially with family policy changes –, chose former Hungarian Justice Minister László Trócsányi to be the enlargement and neighborhood policy commissioner.[593] The decision was met with much criticism – as Trócsányi is a close confident of Orbán and involved in many contentious Hungarian policies as of late – and is interpreted as a move to smooth things over with Eastern Europe by Orbán – among others.[594]

In sum, the so-called Austrian injection of the far right into the mainstream is hardly a singular event. The split between the humanitarian and fortress Europe response to the 2015 crisis goes far beyond Austria or the traditional East-West divide, and it appears the EU as a whole is shifting towards the right. However, a divide still exists between the right – as represented by Austria and their tough border controls approach – and the far-right approach – based in xenophobia and Christian nativism represented by Hungary –, yet even this gap is becoming smaller and the differences fuzzy.

Semblances of Similarity

Austria is not alone in its friendliness with Orbán, his rhetoric and policies. Even Merkel, despite her continued criticism of it, has continued ties to him and Fidesz– particularly through the EPP –, which have been subject to criticism, most notably from French President Macron.[595]

> Macron stressed that Merkel… was a committed partner. But, he said, the EPP, the biggest bloc in the EU legislature, could not support Merkel and also Orbán... The EPP, of which Merkel's Christian Democratic Union is a pillar, has resisted calls – including from some of its own members – to expel Orbán's Fidesz party or to support a move to sanction Budapest that will be debated in the European Parliament next week. The EPP and Merkel say that it is vital to maintain links and dialogue with the Hungarians… "We have been too slow, too ready to compromise," Macron said. "We have to be much tougher on these issues."[596]

This is in part because as much as Merkel and others opposed Orbán and his policies, even early on it was clear he was pointing out the most difficult questions: with a relatively open border, how could Schengen be protected; was it right to require border states to manage so many asylum seekers, even with aid; and "[p]erhaps most awkwardly, how might the many voters who share Mr Orban's restrictive views be convinced that a few dark-skinned refugees will not irreparably alter the nature of their societies?".[597] Then EP vice president argued this:

> Nothing in life is black or white... I do not agree with all the measures [Orbán] took and, of course, he made mistakes. But at least he has the merit of having put on the political table the sensitive debate of defending Europe's external borders. If we don't do that, the situation with migrants in the EU could worsen and probably degenerate into chaos.[598]

Then EPP president, Joseph Daul, made similar remarks: "[Orbán] put[s] [p]roblems firmly on the table. For example, how many islamists are among the migrants that arrive? This is a tricky subject, but why shouldn't we start thinking about it?".[599] Discussing past disputes, Daul said he is the only leader who "always comes and explains himself to the [EP]… Orbán likes to provoke. He is the "enfant terrible" of the EPP family, but I like him and we always find solutions".[600]

This is largely why, even in early 2016 *The Economist* reported that the alternative model to xenophobia being put forward by Merkel against Orbán was dissipating:

> Now, after the chaos and trauma of the past six months, Mr Orban feels vindicated and the chancellor looks increasingly isolated. Germany has tried to lead in Europe, but others will not follow. To Mrs Merkel's immense frustration, other EU countries agree to policies like relocation and then ignore them. While German officials try to knit together the geopolitics of the crisis, from Iraq to Turkey and Russia, most other countries would prefer it simply to go away. As for the European Commission, which sometimes looks like the chancellor's last ally, it has gamely advanced common policies but is too weak to enforce them. "The European dream is vanishing," sighs one of its senior officials.[601]

Eighteen months later *Euractiv* reported likewise on Germany's election and a debate between Merkel and her SPD opponent which focused on Hungary and Turkey, rather than domestic issues. Hungarian officials considered this an honor; foreign minister Szijjártó stated:

> "I remember the last two and a half years during which my country, or at least the government, was considered as Nazi, as fascist, as dictatorial, as not respecting human rights"… nevertheless, the Hungarian authorities were consistent with pleading that the external borders of the Union should be protected. The consequence of the lack of action… was that Europe's security situation has never been worse, and the threat of terrorism has never been greater… European leaders [a]re now finally talking about the need to distinguish between migrants and asylum seekers. The biggest problem… is that nothing is being done. "The protection of Europe's external borders has not happened. We are still unable to make a decision on who can come from outside of Europe, and we are still suffering of hypocrisy and political correctness."

Perhaps the clearest sign of similarity in approaches to migration from Germany, Austria and Hungary is the EU-Turkey deal. Although Germany has spoken out continuously against closing the Balkan route, a deal with countries outside the European continent, specifically

Turkey, is something they have pursued since 2015. The end goal is essentially the same, to end the influx of "migrants" into Europe through managing the borders: "[i]t is important to name cause and effect in the right order and our problem at the moment is that we don't have in Europe a functioning border control, especially at the Greece-Turkey border," Schröder said.[602] Hungary and Austria have also promoted off continent agreements, as noted above. As such, it is a point of mutual support with the three governments and governing parties.

This kind of deal's appeal is its ability to be promulgated as humanitarian: if successful, it prevents thousands of deaths at sea when asylum seekers cross from the Africa to Europe. The problem with this humanitarian label is conditions in Turkey.[603] Although Turkey is party to the Geneva convention, they never acceded the 1967 protocol – this means that anyone coming from outside the European continent cannot be recognized as a refugee and is not guaranteed the protections accorded therein.[604] Nevertheless, the EU considers the funds it sends Turkey – in exchange for their increased border patrols and active efforts to prevent asylum seekers leaving the country – meant to be allocated to ensuring basic humanitarian conditions, as a fix for this.[605] The EU-Turkey deal not only works to prevent further migration but establishes procedures for sending Syrians back to Turkey from Greece: for each Syrian Turkey takes back another will be relocated to the EU.[606] This is why the document is often criticized as trading in lives: it allows the EU to choose migrants.[607] Governments, however, endorse this clause, saying it allows "real" asylum seekers to be resettled, not simply those young and strong enough to survive the trek to Germany or Sweden, labeled as precisely those least in need of protection.[608]

These ideas all sound very similar to Austria's argumentation on the necessity of tough border controls and closing the Balkan route; it even simulates that of Orbán, yet it was created

and deeply backed by Merkel. Perhaps this is why Orbán defends the deal, even stating that the EU needs "strategic cooperation with Turkey, at all costs".[609]

Beyond the criticisms presented above, the deal has even more problems. It has been criticized by various organizations, individuals, and media and a case was brought against it by refugees at the European Court of Justice.[610] The court's rejection of the case – based on a lack of authority over it[611] – brings up a foundational issue with the deal, a lack of responsibility.[612]

It has also created its many tensions and crises. Most recently, in October 2019, 40,000 people had arrived to Greece, fleeing conditions in Turkey –300,000 arrests of "undocumented refugees" and deportations of "tens of thousands of Afghans".[613] Although Turkey continued receiving funds from the EU, Erdoğan noted this was not enough and threatened to "open the gates to Europe".[614] In response Germany stepped in, promising more support and discussing the "security zone in Norther Syria" which Turkey had proposed previously.[615] The security zone idea was endorsed by Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer – who also has succeeded Angela Merkel as CDU chairwoman– to "stabilize the region so that civilians could rebuild and refugees could return on a voluntary basis.[616] Endorsing this plan marks "the first time [t]he German government has proposed a military expansion in the Middle East", and is domestically contentious.[617]

Of course, the EU-Turkey deal is not a complete failure and neither are the broader resettlement programs that it is a part of. As of March 2020, over 65,000 vulnerable refugees have found protection in Europe through the EU's resettlement schemes and at the 2019 Global Refugee Forum EU states pledged another 30,000 resettlements in 2020.[618] Yet considering that in 2015 refugees coming through the Balkans to Germany alone measured 1 million, it is clear such programs' impacts are comparatively minor, and that the justification for everything Europe has done to keep "migrants" out can hardly be an insignificant number of direct resettlements.[619]

Outside the EU-Turkey deal, its rhetoric, intentions, and accomplishments, there are more similarities among the three countries' migration policies. All three have had a highly centralized domestic response, which included drastically accelerating asylum claims processing, creating transit zones at their borders, putting up borders within Schengen, decreasing integration assistance, focusing on law and order, increasing their number of safe third country nations, and restricting refugee movement. In all three cases, this has drastically decreased acceptance rates. Externally, Germany, Hungary and Austria have all relaxed human rights standards – especially as related to deporting asylum seekers to countries considered unsafe –, offered countries EU accession support if they prevent "migrants" moving onward from – or even into – their territory, used development and other financial aid as a negotiating tool, created bilateral deals to prevent entry of asylum seekers into their countries, and acted outside the EU structure and institutions. Policies have largely been pursued, in all three cases, with a goal to limit "migrant" influx but have been explained under desires to prevent parallel societies –domestically – and stop human trafficking – internationally. Between Austria and Hungary there are more similarities, including initially enabling asylum seekers' journey onwards, building of border fences, using soldiers on the border, working with the Balkan nations, and aiming to discourage migration through drastic and systemic change to asylum procedures. Both countries also withdrew from the UN pact on migration because they found it dangerous and arguably encouraging people's movements.[620]

These similarities are not difficult to conceive since all three countries faced similar realities, especially in terms of the increased salience of immigration and backlash against it amongst their electorate, especially in cultural terms. They also all suffered from a lack of reception facilities, extensive confusion, irregularity and exceptional measures. All three have also, to varying degrees, played the blame game amongst themselves and beyond, focused on

cultural differences – including the association of Islam and immigrants with male violence and sexism –, and referenced Christianity in explaining their actions. On a more positive note all three featured –early on– massive unprecedented volunteer movements to help asylum seekers.

Looking at all the similarities amongst these three nations it is not difficult to imagine why *The Economist* concluded earlier this year that: "[a]fter five years of wrestling, the humanitarians have been routed. Now the hardliners reign supreme".[621] Arguing for this conclusion the article explains the following:

> Tactics that were once the demands of a nationalist fringe have been adopted by mainstream governments. NGO vessels operating in the Mediterranean have been impounded and their crews harassed. Those who help people making the trip to Europe, by organising food and water along migratory routes, face charges of people-smuggling. Mediterranean patrols have been scaled back lest they act as a pull factor, encouraging people to brave choppy waters in the hope of being rescued by the coastguard.
> Morality still sometimes rears its head. European leaders are not always comfortable with their choice. They grab policy figleaves to hide their shame whenever possible. Leaders from a handful of states this month cooked up a scheme to relocate minors abandoned in miserable camps on Greek islands. Legally, refugee status has nothing to do with virtue. Being a refugee is not about the content of your character but the misery of your circumstance. But politically it is far easier to move women and children than 25-year-old single blokes, even if all are in danger…
> In 2015 Jean-Claude Juncker, then president of the commission, declared that Europe was "the baker in [the Greek island of] Kos who gives away his bread to hungry and weary souls". In 2020 Europe is the Greek ship attempting to capsize a dinghy full of people. It is an ugly situation, which undermines the eu's pretensions to moral leadership. But to avoid another refugee crisis, this is a price the eu's leaders seem willing to pay.[622]

Conclusion

This thesis was not a normative judgement of which parties do or do not "accurately" or "properly" represent Christian democracy in its best or purest form or a categorization of parties into ideological camps based on objective data. Rather, it was an exercise in the analysis of claim-making, seeking to understand the competition over the claim to Christian Democratic ideology, examine the parties and leaders making this claim, the conversations happening therein, and the convergence and divergence of policies both advocated for and undergone by

CDPs. By doing so, it filled a gap in the literature related to the interaction of the CDU, ÖVP and Fidesz as fellows, as members of the same party family. The different claims to Christian Democratic ideology being put forward by the CDU, ÖVP, and Fidesz have developed out of aspects of the 'ideal' Christian Democratic parties of the post war era. Although diverging trends in the Christian Democratic party family were clearly under way prior to the 2015 crisis, these parties' framing of and responses to the influx of asylum seekers evidenced these differences for the world to see: as showcased by the "continental rift".

On the one hand, the historic capacity to unite different interests and constituencies and the promotion of mediation-based politics which allows for versatility and adaptability when political, economic, and cultural environments change[623] are well-represented by Merkel and the CDU. The CDU embodies a CDP which has adapted to increasingly secular societies – by "redefin[ing] religion into a nebulous humanitarian and moral concept" – and this has resulted in a view of them being opportunistic and not religiously-based, as Kalyvas[624] argued. The changes which have developed within the CDU reflect developments in the German electorate; the continued promotion of mediation-based politics adapted the party to this constituency. The nebulous humanitarian and moral conceptualization of religion is most evident in Merkel's rhetoric on the 2015 crisis: "Germany is a country that welcomes refugees"; "Islam belongs in Germany"[625]; "If we start having to apologise for showing a friendly face in emergencies… then this is not my country"[626]; "We were quick to save the banks, we can act immediately to help communities save human beings"[627]; and in the conclusion drawn by *The Economist* that Merkel appeared/s to be "inspired by a clear moral purpose".[628]

On the other hand, historically CDPs could be a powerful uniting force, mediation based, and catch all and still be Christian because the electorate identified as such. These parties had

their hay day in a post-war world that necessitated religious direction and held on to power as the key alternative to an atheist system of communism. Without these things, and in an increasingly secular world where religiosity must be translated into nebulous humanitarian and moral concepts, maybe parties keeping all these previous traits can no longer label themselves Christian. That is, after all, a key criticism of Angela Merkel and the CDU.

This critique lies also at the heart of Orbán's memorandum on the state of the EPP and the creativity in his cultural version of Christian Democracy: he argues that parties much choose between liberal democracy and Christian democracy, seeing them as opponents. In his conceptualization of Christian Democracy, Christian identity is key: it is the nodal point of populist, nationalist, and civilizationist claim, and must be protected at all costs. In a country where national sovereignty has been hard to come by, historically speaking, and where the liberal consensus was never agreed upon, this works well for Orbán.

Austria appears to have found a balance between its two neighbors, the big ideological claims and turn away from liberalism has been avoided, but the humanitarian and liberal consensus-related underpinnings of the German approach are also not present. This was demonstrated before, during, and after the crisis by who they were willing to work with domestically – when they entered into government with the far-right – and regionally – as they worked with Orbán and pursued many similar goals to him.

Domestically these different approaches resulted in incredibly divergent reactions to the crisis in its immediate aftermath, but over time many similarities evolved in their approaches – which Hungarian officials see as vindication that they were right all along. Regionally speaking, a rift has opened up between the German and Hungarian approach, with Austria attempting to bridge it. However, this has not resulted in major ideological debates, as Orbán insists it must.

The tragedy of seventy-one asylum seekers found dead in Nickelsdorf, Austria on August 28th 2015 was the result of the differences between the Hungarian and German approaches to the migration crisis. The people who died were so desperate to get to Germany, where they would have a better chance of being recognized as refugees and obtain the rights allotted therein, where they had heard of a much more welcoming culture and leader, that they risked their lives by climbing into the back of a trafficker's truck to cross the Austrian-Hungarian border irregularly, only to be abandoned, locked in until they ran out of oxygen. Rather than this tragedy shedding light on the necessity of regional cooperation, the events which followed it deepened the rift between a "humanitarian" Germany and "fortress" Hungary.

This rift, as it developed the next four years, puts forward two extremely different claims on Christian Democracy and its legacy. The approach this paper takes in analyzing this rift and the examples put forth by these parties can be utilized to investigate trends in other Christian Democratic parties, or even other party families, in the wake of major events. The information obtained from the analysis of the claim making of these parties sets the stage for the future of the Christian Democratic party family and ideology.

Perhaps a future avenue of research herein would be studying the impact of the COVID-19 global pandemic of 2020 on parties and claim-making. In the Hungarian case the response to this crisis featured an "enabling act" wherein the Parliament suspended themselves indefinitely[629] and already the government is launching a national consultation, similar to that which 'legitimized' the constitutional amendment against the settlement of an alien population, on the proposed EU recovery plan, tying in immigration and George Soros[630].

[1] Kallius, "Rupture and Continuity."
[2] "The EU Is Tolerating—and Enabling—Authoritarian Kleptocracy in Hungary"; Tóth and Hajdu, "How Does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary? A Research Note Based on Hungarian Public Procurement Data"; DemDigest, "Is EU 'enabling' Hungary's Authoritarian Kleptocracy?"
[3] Pap, *Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy*, 11.
[4] Vörös (2012) as cited in Pap, 18–19.
[5] "Hungary's 'Illiberal Democracy'"; Scheiring, "Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary."
[6] Scheiring, "Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary"; "Hungary's 'Illiberal Democracy'"; Beauchamp, "It Happened There"; Fabry, *The Political Economy of Hungary: From State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism*.
[7] Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, "Christian Democracy"; Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon"; Müller, "Towards a New History of Christian Democracy."
[8] Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, "What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe's New Nationalism?"; Mieriņa and Koroļeva, "Support for Far Right Ideology and Anti-Migrant Attitudes among Youth in Europe"; Astier and Errasti, "La Crisis Europea de La Política"; Benveniste, Campani, and Lazaridis, "Introduction"; Hutchins and Halikiopoulou, "Enemies of Liberty?"; "Mapping the European Far Right in the 21st Century_ A Meso-Level Analysis | Elsevier Enhanced Reader"; Spoon and Klüver, "Responding to Far Right Challengers"; "Centre Right and Radical Right Party Competition in Europe_ Strategic Emphasis on Immigration, Anti-Incumbency, and Economic Crisis | Elsevier Enhanced Reader"; Schmid, "Links Between Terrorism and Migration."
[9] Calamur, "Pope Calls on Parishes To Offers Shelter to Migrants - The Atlantic"; Dzhambazova and Horowitz, "Pope Francis Urges Bulgaria to Open Its Heart to Refugees"; Faiola and Birnbaum, "Pope Calls on Europe's Catholics to Take in Refugees"; Kirchgaessner, "Vatican to Take in Two Refugee Families as Pope Calls for 'every Religion' to Help"; "- Pope Francis Calls for a Practical Response to the Refugee Crisis in Europe"; "Pope Francis Decries World's Indifference to Global Migration, Refugee Crisis"; "Pope Calls for Every Parish to House a Refugee Family"; "Pope Takes Syrian Migrants to Vatican"; "Pope Francis Reminds Christians That Migrants and Refugees Should Be Welcomed around the World"; Kirchgaessner, "Vatican to Take in Two Refugee Families as Pope Calls for 'every Religion' to Help."
[10] Reisigl, "Discourse Historical Approach."
[11] Reisigl.
[12] For more detail see Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 16–19.
[13] Ambrosini et al., 14.
[14] Ambrosini et al., 15.
[15] Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, "Christian Democracy"; Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[16] Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, "Christian Democracy"; Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[17] Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[18] Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, "Christian Democracy"; Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[19] Müller, "Towards a New History of Christian Democracy."
[20] Baker, "The Birth of an American Christian Democratic Party"; Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon"; Müller, "Towards a New History of Christian Democracy."
[21] Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[22] Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out."
[23] Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[24] Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out"; Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[25] Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline."
[26] Duncan.
[27] Duncan.
[28] Duncan.
[29] "Classifying parties in the sense of constructing a container with a label into which a number of organisations in a number of countries can convincingly be made to fit is never as simple as it first appears.3 Even leaving aside notoriously 'hard cases' (the most obvious of which must surely be the populist radical right), there are plenty of

'party families' whose members – or some of them anyway – would appear to be pretty distant cousins rather than brothers and sisters.4 The Christian Democrats, notwithstanding the fact that they have a long history (going back at least thirty five years) of co-operation both outside and inside the European Parliament, are no different. At the time of writing (early 2013) the European People's Party website boasted that it had 'seventy-three member-parties from forty countries' and, while many of those parties are explicitly Christian Democratic, some call themselves something else, most obviously perhaps 'conservative'. As a result, the likelihood of a strong family resemblance – whether in the common or in the Wittgensteinian sense of that term – between each and every one of the EPP's members is low. Moreover, many of the parties that belong are tiny and including them in any comparison with Germany would be misleading." (Bale and Krouwell 2013, 18)

[30] Renan, *Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Nation?*

[31] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*.

[32] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.

[33] Smith, "Muslim-Christian Relations."

[34] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*.

[35] Hannum, "International Law."

[36] Brubaker, "New Language of European Populism."

[37] Broadly these definitions view the concept in one of four ways. First, as a discursive style which sees politics in moral terms as an ethical struggle and worships the people (see de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America; Ionescu and Gellner, Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics). Second, as policies of economic redistribution and nationalization of state resources (see Madrid, "The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America"). Third, as a political strategy of mass mobilization with a personalistic leader, often a strong paternalistic charismatic male, who has a large number of rather unorganized followers who's support is direct, unmediated, and institutionalized (see Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics"). Finally, as a thin centered ideology recognizable by its Manichean good versus evil conceptualization of the people and elite, both of which are empty signifiers, and is layered with other ideologies (see Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist").

[38] Mudde and Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*.

[39] De Cleen and Stavrakakis, "Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism."

[40] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?," 194.

[41] Kirchheimer, "The Change in the West German Party System."

[42] Cf. T. Nipperdey, Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1918 (Dusseldorf: Habiliationsschrift, 1961) as cited in Zolleis and Wertheimer 2013.

[43] G. Smith, 'Stages of European Development: Electoral Change and System Adaptation', in D. Urwin and W. Paterson (eds), Politics in Western Europe Today (London: Longman, 1990), pp. 251–69 as cited in Zolleis and Wertheimer 2013.

[44] R. Harmel and K. Janda, 'An Integrated Theory of Party Change', Journal of Theoretical Politics 6/3 (1994), pp. 259–87 as cited in Zolleis and Wertheimer 2013.

[45] Compare to the concept of a membership-based party in E. Wiesendahl, Mitgliederpartei am Ende? Eine Kritik der Niedergangsdiskussion (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2006) as cited in Zolleis and Wertheimer 2013.

[46] Kirchheimer, 'The Transformation of the Western European Party System' as cited in Zolleis and Wertheimer 2013.

[47] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?"

[48] Marc Clemens.

[49] Marc Clemens, 73.

[50] "Structure-driven path dependence exists where existing structures impact on the choice and evolution of subsequent structures; either for reasons of efficiency or because of rent seeking. Rule-driven path dependence, on the other hand, exists when the emergence of rules and practices is shaped by existing power relationships and their path dependence is grounded either in reasons of efficiency or because public-regarding decisions are thwarted by interest group politics" (Lees 2013, 74).

[51] Lees, "Christian Democracy Is Dead; Long Live the Union Parties."

[52] Blime, "Christian Democracy and Immigration," 28.

[53] Lees, "Christian Democracy Is Dead; Long Live the Union Parties," 64.
[54] Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out."
[55] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?," 75.
[56] Schmid and Steffen, 2003: 86 as cited in Duncan, "Preaching to the Converted?," 587.
[57] With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Berlin wall was torn down and West and East Germany were reunified. Because the CDU held the Chancellorship during reunification, the party had an electoral bonus directly thereafter (Hien 2013, 448). Furthermore, the CDU was willing to cooperate with and ignore the past of East German allies (Clemens 2013, 76). While this distanced it further from its Christian Democratic roots, it demonstrated an ability to adapt to changing circumstances and skewed the preferences of East Germans towards the CDU for almost a decade (Clemens 2013, 76). This advantage dissipated when the SPD relaunched itself in 1998 with a new platform which gave a clear alternative to Christian Democracy (Hien 2013, 448). A key aspect here is religion and secularization – cited for CDP decline across Europe (Duncan 2015, 578), with reunification and the inclusion of a new largely atheist electorate (Turner, Green, and Paterson 2013), it is logical this would be more profound in Germany.
[58] On economic and the welfare state policy, the CDU had been oscillating for years "between its own Christian Democratic welfare state model and either social democratic redistributive elements or more market liberal reforms [which] reflected [the party's] heterogeneity" but in the 1990s and early 2000s broad changes in economy and demography began to undermine this (Clemens 2013, 197). Without anti-Communism and with the addition of Eastern Germans into the traditional setup , inter and intra faction frictions began to undermine the party's cohesiveness (Clemens 2013, 198; Turner, Green, and Paterson 2013). In fact, this trend goes beyond economic policy to "encompass[s] energy , European policy, family policy and issues relating to questions of territorial solidarity, with growing tensions between Christian Democracy in the relatively prosperous south and other, less wealthy areas" (Turner, Green, and Paterson 2013, 9).
[59] Reunification also magnified the gender issue. This began in the 1960s when the party's traditional male breadwinner model began to negatively impact them among the female electorate (Hien 2013; Turner, Green, and Paterson 2013; Wiliarty 2013). Yet given the Catholic Church's position and impact on their core electorate, a break from this policy would be detrimental (Hien 2013, 448). However, lack of reform dropped female vote bonus from 10 to 3 percent in three years (Wiliarty 2010 as cited in Hien 2013). When reunification occurred, longer term decline already at play was exacerbated by the addition of East German women, atheist and used to working outside the home and having abortion be a legal option (Wiliarty 2013, 177; Turner, Green, and Paterson 2013). With reunification came a need to revisit work-family policy – yet it was not until the SPD offered an alternative that women's discontent was fully realized.
After losing the 1998 elections, the CDU began its gender reform. The resulting 1999 manifesto "Lust for family" recognizes "that the simultaneous occupation of both partners is nowadays a broadly desired lifestyle model choice" (Hien 2013, 449). However, when these new ideas were initially proposed for the party platform in the 2002 elections, the backlash from the Church resulted in the new stance being almost completely reversed and the party losing (Hien 2013).
[60] Turner, Green, and Paterson, "Introduction."
[61] Gould, "Rejection by Implication: Christian Parties, German Identity, and the Power of Discourse, 2001-2002."
[62] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 517.
[63] Mushaben, 524.
[64] Gould, "Rejection by Implication: Christian Parties, German Identity, and the Power of Discourse, 2001-2002," 398.
[65] Gould, 400.
[66] Increased immigration would jeopardize internal peace and encourage radical forces (Google translate: https://www.google.com/search?q=german+to+english&oq=german+to+english&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j0l7.2700j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8).
[67] Gould, "Rejection by Implication: Christian Parties, German Identity, and the Power of Discourse, 2001-2002," 406.
[68] Gould, 407.
[69] We as a Union stand for the leading German culture against multiculturalism, multiculturalism is dead (Google translate:

https://www.google.com/search?q=german+to+english&oq=german+to+english&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j0l7.2700j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8).

[70] Gould, "Rejection by Implication: Christian Parties, German Identity, and the Power of Discourse, 2001-2002," 408–9.

[71] "From 1947 until 1966, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) continued to govern, in coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ). The Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) governed from 1970 onward, sometimes alone; sometimes in coalition with the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP); and once in coalition with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) - from 1983 until 1986." (Report, 10).

[72] Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000 as cited in Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out," 27.

[73] Blime 2013, 50; Bale and Krouwel 2013, 16, 22;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Democratic_Party_of_Austria#Election_results

[74] Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline," 469.

[75] Duncan, 471; also see Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out".

[76] Duncan, 483–89.

[77] Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline."

[78] Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out," 17.

[79] "Austria Country Review," 11.

[80] Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline," 475.

[81] "Austria Country Review," 11; Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline," 479.

[82] Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline," 475.

[83] Duncan, 475.

[84] "Austria Country Review."

[85] Duncan, "A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline," 476; see also Hafez and Heinisch, 660

[86] Duncan, 483.

[87] Duncan, 476.

[88] Duncan, 477.

[89] Duncan, 484.

[90] Duncan, 486.

[91] von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties." They played an important role in developing party ideologies and advising on campaigning (Berge and Poguntke, 2012; Enyedi, 2007; Enyedi and Lewis, 2006; Ladrech, 2008; Pridham, 1999; Zaborowski, 2005). This process was undergone in order to help achieve stability in the region, grow their political families, and help integrate and enlarge the EU (Delsoldato, 2002).

[92] They had 18 members join between 1989 and 2008 (Gagatek, 2008 as cited in Berge and Poguntke, 2012), whereas one of the few other parties highly involved in the region, the PES, was found by Holmes and Lightfoot (2011) to have a very minor influence on ECE parties (Berge and Poguntke, 2012). The EPP opened its doors to accessing countries' parties at the 1995 Madrid Congress (Dakowska, 2002). The role played by the EPP in the integration of ECE and the enlargement of the EU is so fundamental to the party that it is emphasized in the preamble of their platform; it is the second and fifth statement made therein (EPP, 2012).

[93] These served as a kind of holding pool for parties seeking to join the EPP before they merged in 1999 (Delsoldato, 2002).

[94] Europeanization, as such, has various definitions. Dakowska (2002) defines it as "a) The adoption by the political party elites of fundamental values and network consultation mechanisms, compatible with the patterns embedded in the European party system; b) The perception by these individuals of European institutions as an interest representation arena".

[95] The KAS is a German agency, whose mission is Christian Democratic civic education (kas.de, 2019), which worked particularly with political parties and whose Christian component of KAS is evident. KAS, and other German political foundations, worked to connect Brussels and ECE with political contact provision (Dakowska, 2002) and had extensive influence in the educational sphere. It is important to note, however, that this education was not simply one of Christian Democratic party ideology. Rather, ECE parties were educated on how modern national democratic systems and the EU functioned – which there was a high demand for (Johansson, 2008 as cited in Berge and Poguntke, 2012) after decades of isolation in the communist system.

[96] Zaborowski, "Westernizing the East."

[97] Orbán, "Speech of Viktor Orbán at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation."
[98] Zaborowski, "Westernizing the East."
[99] von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties."
[100] Dakowska, "Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations."
[101] This functioned as the guiding principle of most post-communist transformations (Pridham, 2005), demonstrates perceptions and admiration held in ECE of western political systems' stability and economies' competitiveness (Zambrowski, 2005). Paired with an ideological void, there was a natural willingness to adapt and incorporate Western institutions (Zambrowski, 2005) and ideas. Mikulova (2014) supplies a semi-counterargument to this point, stating, rather, that ECE parties learned early on that international survival was dependent on adaptation of Western Europe's model. Other incentives to work with the EPP included financial and material resources (Dakowska, 2002; EPP, 1990, Spirova, 2008 and Stoychev, 2008 as cited in Berge and Poguntke, 2012; Mikulova, 2014) and legitimacy provision (Dakowska, 2002; Desoldato, 2002 and Day 2004 as cited in Berge and Poguntke, 2012). This legitimacy was imperative due to lack the of trust in government and parties post-communism. External recognition built internal image and trust (Delsoldato, 2002). It is important to note that despite everything the EPP had to offer, their interaction with ECE parties was still negotiation based and exchange oriented (Berge and Poguntke, 2012). This was because the (potential) partners had extensive potentiality; they were up and comers so to speak. If they assessed to the EU, these parties, particularly those in Poland, would have powerful voting reach. In their research, Berge and Poguntke (2012) distinguish between strong and weak parties in order to highlight this distinction, arguing that weaker parties are much more open, willing to change abruptly, and susceptible to direct pressures, whereas if change does happen with stronger parties, it is much more gradual and largely through socialization. Mikulova (2014) draws attention to the power held particularly by Polish political parties, because they held numerical strength through which they could potentially change the power balance in the EU parliament, and the resulting "little" they gained from their engagements with Europarties. Hence, there was both a supply of and demand for Western influence.
[102] In their own words, the core values of the party are as follows:"[T]he dignity of human life in every stage of its existence, freedom and responsibility, equality and justice, truth, solidarity and subsidiarity. The Christian image of Man is their point of departure. Achieving the Common Good is their final objective. For their implementation, a strong civil society is indispensable. In its pursuit we are guided by the use of reason and historical experience. Our political and societal choices are inspired by the constant need for change and the proper use of instruments to achieve this change, as well as a respect for history and for the way our values have been recognized and their interpretation developed" (EPP, 2012). It is evident, therefore, that the EPP sees religion, specifically Christianity, as perfectly in line with European tradition, and modern western civilization. In fact, the central place held by Christianity in the largest Europarty works to support ideas put forth by Asad (2003), Casanova (1994) and van der Veer (1996) that religion is still very present and potent in modern western society, it just looks different, disguised – so to say – in morals and the moral transcendence claimed by the "West". This is, in fact, hinted at in this EPP manifesto quote: the fact that the Christian component of the party ideology is seen as its core values, that so many aspects of modern western civilization – freedom, equality, and so on – are seen as stemming from the Christian image of Man, that the common Good is seen as the objective.
[103] Delsoldato, "Eastward Enlargement by the European Union and Transnational Parties"; Aguilera de Part, 2009, Bardi, 2004, Day, 2004, and Jansen, 1998 as cited in von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties."
[104] von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties."
[105] Pap, *Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy*, 58.
[106] "Time for Europe's Centre-Right Group to Kick out Viktor Orban."
[107] von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties"; Dakowska, "Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations."
[108] . Much of the educational work was done on civil society at large, the role of the state, the EU, national minority and human rights policies, democracy commitment, social market economy, party organization, roles, campaigning, merging (This list is an assemblage taken from arguments of Dakowska, 2002; EPP, 1995, Jansen, 2006, Johansson, 2008, and Pridham, 2005, as cited in Berge and Poguntke, 2012; Mikulova, 2014).

[109] Dakowska, "Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations."
[110] English-language translation of an earlier document released prior to eU accession. Fidesz, "Consistency in Foreign affairs: Hungary's Foreign affairs Strategy" (party document, 2008), http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Rovat=10036 as cited by Mikulova, 2014
[111] English-language translation of an earlier document released prior to EU accession. Fidesz, "Founding Manifesto" (party document, 2006), http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Rovat=10036. The dramatic turn from liberalism to Christian democracy that Fidesz orchestrated in the late 1990s clearly contributed to the programmatic change; nevertheless, Fidesz also took into account the prerequisites for accession in the EPP as cited in Mikulova, 2014.
[112] Mikulova, "'Potemkin Europeanisation'?"
[113]Dakowska, 2008, Jansen, 1998, 2006 and Spirova, 2008 as cited in von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties"; Delsoldato, "Eastward Enlargement by the European Union and Transnational Parties"; Dakowska, "Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations."
[114] EPP, 1992, 1996, Gagatek, 2008, Jansen, 1998, and Ohlen, 2008 as cited in von dem Berge and Poguntke, "The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties."
[115] Lees, "Christian Democracy Is Dead; Long Live the Union Parties," 77.
[116] Lees, 77.
[117] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 86 cites Michael Geiss, "Beschlossen und Beschwiegen," Die Zeit, 14 July 2011, 3; Heribert Prantl, "Kanzlerin des Ungefähren," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 2010, available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/cdu-parteitag-kanzlerin-des-ungefaehren-1.792349, accessed 11 March 2018; Volker Rensing, Die Kanzlermaschine. Wie die CDU funktioniert (Freiburg, 2013), 149.
[118] Lees, "Christian Democracy Is Dead; Long Live the Union Parties," 70.
[119] Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government"; Saalfeld, Bahr, and Seifert, "Contractual Arrangements, Formal Institutions and Personalised Crisis Management."; "Coalitions constitute a form of temporary cooperation between competing political parties. In the absence of a single-party majority, cooperation in a coalition will allow parties to benefit by delivering at least some benefits to voters and claim credit for them at the next elections. The costs a coalition involves for the participating parties depend on (a) the ideological proximity of all parties in the coalition (which is inversely related to the policy cost of cooperation); (b) the number of important offices (especially positions in the cabinet) the party can secure for its own nominees; (c) mutual expectations about the behaviour of the other coalition partners once a coalition has formed and (d) electoral penalties for government involvement, especially when governments are held responsible for unpopular outcomes." (372)
[120] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?"
[121] For SPD wariness see Saalfeld, Bahr, and Seifert 2019; for CDU/CSU wariness see Denkler 2013; success herein is measured by the coalition fulfiling either fully or partially about 80% of the policies guaranteed in its agreement (see Vehrkamp and Matthieß 2018 as cited in Saalfeld, Bahr, and Seifert 2019, 372).
[122]Decker, 2008; Schroeder and Neumann, 2010; Zolleis, 2009 as cited in Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 6.
[123] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis"; "The Indispensable European."
[124] Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 6–8.
[125] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[126] "German Politicians Are Both More and Less Religious than British Ones."
[127] "How Angela Merkel Is Changing, and Not Changing, Germany."
[128] "How Angela Merkel Is Changing, and Not Changing, Germany."
[129] Kessler and Michels, 2009; Kropp, 2010; Neurer, 2014 as cited in Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 6.
[130] Janker, 2017; Streeck, 2016; Ude, 2017 as cited in Schnee, 6.
[131] Schnee, 6.
[132] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?," 206.
[133] Marc Clemens, 206.
[134] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?"
[135] Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, "Christian Democracy."

[136] Kalyvas, "The Christian Democratic Phenomenon."
[137] Bale and Krouwel, "Down but Not Out."
[138] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?," 202.
[139] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 590.
[140] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?," 202.
[141] Marc Clemens, 202.
[142] As Franz Walter observed, while the CDU had begun moving away from its own 'social-catholic influenced social model' by adopting neo-liberal phrases that 'castigated the very state and welfare institutions it had essentially shaped', time, defeat and introspection had led Merkel's party 'instinctively back to its old, historically genuine direction'. (Walter, 2007 as cited in Clemens 2013, 204).
[143] Marc Clemens, "Beyond Christian Democracy?," 204.
[144] Elise Wiliarty, "Gender as a Modernising Force in the German CDU."
[145] Elise Wiliarty, 186.
[146] Och, "Conservative Feminists?," 354.
[147] Elise Wiliarty, "Gender as a Modernising Force in the German CDU," 187.
[148] Hien, "Unsecular Politics in a Secular Environment," 450–51.
[149] Hien, 452; Elise Wiliarty, "Gender as a Modernising Force in the German CDU," 188.
[150] Euchner and Preidel, "Politicisation Without Party Discipline. A New Perspective on Christian Democracy in Modern Times," 465.
[151] Euchner and Preidel, 467.
[152] "Austria Country Review," 12.
[153] "Austria Country Review," 12.
[154] "Austria Country Review," 12–13.
[155] "Austria Country Review," 13.
[156] "Austria Country Review," 14–15.
[157] Hafez and Heinisch, "Breaking with Austrian Consociationalism," 654.
[158] Hafez and Heinisch, 653.
[159] Hafez and Heinisch, 658.
[160] Hafez and Heinisch, 659.
[161] Hafez and Heinisch, 659. Footnotes included herein are as follows: The Freedom Party Program for 1997 and 1999 can be found at: http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/ Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_eng.pdf and https://manifestoproject.wzb. eu/uploads/attach/file/5244/42420_1999 (both Accessed on May 12, 2015); Literally translated, the word "Abendland" means "Occident," marking a geographical and cultural contrast to the Muslim "Orient." The term is often translated to mean "Western," which, I believe, would be a mistake here because of its clear ideological, especially Catholic, connotations; Interview with Michael Bunker, November 5, 2014.
[162] Hafez and Heinisch, 670–71.
[163] Hafez and Heinisch, 659.
[164] Hafez and Heinisch, 659.
[165] Hafez and Heinisch, 659.
[166] "Austria Country Review," 17–18.
[167] "Austria Country Review," 30–31.
[168] Tóth, "Full Text of Viktor Orbán's Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014."
[169] Tóth.
[170] Orbán both critiques the West and highlights some redeeming qualities of it, focusing on Christianity in both the criticisms and compliments. An example he uses is England's Christianity, however hidden and denied it is. He critiques the avoidance of Christianity in politics, saying Great Britain should be proud that despite multiculturalism its country-hood is Christian at heart: "[T]he English prime minister, who awkwardly avoids his party being identified as Christian Democratic, stands up before the public stating that Christianity is a core principle of British values, and despite multiculturalism, Great Britain is a Christian country at heart, and this is a fact to be proud of". As cited in Tóth.
[171] Tóth.
[172] Tóth.

[173] Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 2006; Brown and Haeger, 1999; Hogg and Abrams, 1988 as cited in Shevchenko, "From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War Identity and the West."
[174] Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 2006; Brown and Haeger, 1999; Hogg and Abrams, 1988 as cited in Shevchenko.
[175] Scheiring, "Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary"; Shevchenko, "From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War Identity and the West."
[176] Shevchenko, "From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War Identity and the West." This idea of leaders as "entrepreneurs of identity" is also associated with the conditions of conservatism in ECE broadly (Kende and Krekó, 2019).
[177] Kende and Krekó, "Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-Wing Populism in East-Central Europe."
[178] Henderson, 2008; Hlousek and Kopecek, 2008; Minkenberg, 2010, 2015 as cited in Heinisch et al., "The Effect of Radical Right Fringe Parties on Main Parties in Central and Eastern Europe."
[179] Kende and Krekó, "Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-Wing Populism in East-Central Europe."
[180] See Pap, *Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy*, 12.
[181] Molnár, "Civil Society, Radicalism and the Rediscovery of Mythic Nationalism."
[182] Molnár.
[183] Buzogány and Varga, "The Ideational Foundations of the Illiberal Backlash in Central and Eastern Europe."
[184] Kende and Krekó, "Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-Wing Populism in East-Central Europe."
[185] Heinisch et al., "The Effect of Radical Right Fringe Parties on Main Parties in Central and Eastern Europe."
[186] The famous reformed communist leader who was instilled (very briefly) by the 1956 Hungarian revolution.
[187] Szilágyi and Bozóki, "Playing It Again in Post-Communism."
[188] Szilágyi and Bozóki.
[189] Szilágyi and Bozóki.
[190] Szilágyi and Bozóki.
[191] Scheiring, "Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary"; Szilágyi and Bozóki, "Playing It Again in Post-Communism."
[192] Scheiring, "Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary."
[193] Pap, *Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy*, 2.
[194] Pap, 39.
[195] Pap, 56.
[196] Pap, 36.
[197] Pap, 40–41.
[198] Pap, 41.
[199] Pap, 38–39.
[200] Pap, 37.
[201] Pap, 37.
[202] Pap, 51.
[203] Pap, 39.
[204] Pap, 52–54.
[205] Pap, 39.
[206] As cited in Pap, 70.
[207] Pap, 72.
[208] Pap, 48.
[209] Scheiring, "Dependent Development and Authoritarian State Capitalism: Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of the Accumulative State in Hungary."
[210] Examples: "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take Hungarians' jobs", "If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture", "If you come to Hungary, you must respect our laws", "The Hungarians have decided: the country shall be defended", "The Hungarians have decided: they do not want illegal immigration" (Baurová, 2018; Gyollai, 2018; Juhász, 2016; Kiss, 2016; Pap and Remenyi, 2017). The messages were all displayed in Hungarian, an insight to the campaign's intended audience despite the framing towards migrants (Juhász, 2016).

[211] Kiss, "'The Hungarians Have Decided: They Do Not Want Illegal Migrants' Media Representation of the Hungarian Governmental Anti-Immigration Campaign."
[212] "National Consultation on Immigration to Begin."
[213] Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance"; Pap and Reményi, "Re-Bordering of the Hungarian South."
[214] Juhász, "Assessing Hungary's Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian Migration Strategies"; Kiss, "'The Hungarians Have Decided: They Do Not Want Illegal Migrants' Media Representation of the Hungarian Governmental Anti-Immigration Campaign"; Klaus, "Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 'Migration Crisis' on Border Management in Hungary and Poland"; Nagy, "Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016"; Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance."
[215] Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance"; Juhász, "Assessing Hungary's Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian Migration Strategies"; Klaus, "Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 'Migration Crisis' on Border Management in Hungary and Poland."
[216] Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance."
[217] Budapest's main train station
[218] Klaus, "Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 'Migration Crisis' on Border Management in Hungary and Poland."
[219] 1990 Dublin Convention – established determinations for asylum applications so that they would only by processed once. This is where the idea that the first country entered would be the application country was determined. The Amsterdam treaty of 1997 made this law. The Tampere meeting of 1999 began discussions on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), establishing minimum standards for policy across the EU (Klaus, 2017)
[220] This time with the "informative" theme of "did you know", which reinforced cultural and racial stereotypes particularly related to the threat of terrorism (Pap and Remenyi, 2017).
[221] Goździak, "Using Fear of the 'Other,' Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity."
[222] Bauerová, "Migration Policy of the V4 in the Context of Migration Crisis"; Juhász, "Assessing Hungary's Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian Migration Strategies."
[223] Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance"; Juhász, "Assessing Hungary's Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian Migration Strategies"; Klaus, "Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 'Migration Crisis' on Border Management in Hungary and Poland"; Nagy, "Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016."
[224] Klaus, "Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 'Migration Crisis' on Border Management in Hungary and Poland." Also confirmed by Nagy 2016 who contextualizes this fact with the 99% EU recognition rate for Syrian refugees.
[225] These individuals were lured by a salary of 200,000 HUF/month, free housing, clothing allowance, and government discounts (Goździak, 2019). Those who responded to the posters, were given six months training before being handed various weapons and sent off to their job, officially actors of policy enforcement, alongside police/military personnel.
[226] Goździak, "Using Fear of the 'Other,' Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity."
[227] Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance."
[228] Even from volunteers on the ground the fact that the Hungarian government could not cope with the influx of migrants and was instead relying on volunteers etcetera was noted. "'We are sort of an emergency exit for the government,' helping Hungary to cope" (Smale, 2015)
[229] Gyollai, "Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance"; Avenue, York, and t 1.212.290.4700, "World Report 2019"; Reuters, "Hungary Passes Anti-Immigrant 'Stop Soros' Laws."
[230] Avenue, York, and t 1.212.290.4700, "World Report 2019."
[231] Signs read "Sorry about our prime minister, he is trying to distract us from seeing the money stolen", "Come to Hungary, we've got jobs in London", and "I have survived the Hungarian anti-immigration campaign" (Kiss, 2016).
[232] Budapest Seen was a particularly well known photo blog, which captured images of refugees at Keleti, at the Hungarian-Serbian border, and elsewhere (Goździak 2019). This blog also captured many NGO workers and volunteers providing for migrants needs. A few groups of volunteers mentioned by Goździak (2019) were CEU university students (MigSzol), Menendek, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, etcetera – she also notes many of these groups as being non-operational as a result of the Stop Soros laws.

[233] Kallius, "Rupture and Continuity"; "Orban the Archetype."
[234] Here Christian is a cultural component of national identity rather than a religious one (Brubaker, 2017).
[235] Goździak, "Using Fear of the 'Other,' Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity"; Ivanova, "Hungarian Security Policy and the Migrant Crisis (2015–2017)"; Klaus, "Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 'Migration Crisis' on Border Management in Hungary and Poland."
[236] Phrase used by Pap and Remenyi (2017): 71% of Hungarians agreed with a similar statement in Gallup's surveys in 1993 and 2000. It also demonstrated belief that Europe has not been grateful for Hungary's role "even now".
[237] Pap and Remenyi (2017) take this argument farther, claiming that the issues taken up in securing the Hungarian-Serbian border "are merely used as political resources to achieve domestic political- and power-related goals".
[238] "New Hungary Protest as Orbán Installs 'Christian Democracy.'"
[239] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[240] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[241] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[242] This term is used to reference the EU, the European elite, and systems.
[243] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[244] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[245] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[246] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[247] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[248] "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp."
[249] Kende and Krekó, "Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-Wing Populism in East-Central Europe."
[250] Shevchenko, "From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War Identity and the West."
[251] "The Christian Culture of Hungary Is Now Enshrined in the Constitution."; Platform, "Hungary's 7-Year-Old Constitution Is Amended for the 7th Time," 7; "HCLU's Analysis of the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law."
[252] "The Christian Culture of Hungary Is Now Enshrined in the Constitution."; "HCLU's Analysis of the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law"; Platform, "Hungary's 7-Year-Old Constitution Is Amended for the 7th Time," 7; Bauerová, "Migration Policy of the V4 in the Context of Migration Crisis"; Juhász, "Assessing Hungary's Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian Migration Strategies."
[253] "The Christian Culture of Hungary Is Now Enshrined in the Constitution."; Platform, "Hungary's 7-Year-Old Constitution Is Amended for the 7th Time," 7; "HCLU's Analysis of the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law"; Gotev, "Hungary Approves 'STOP Soros' Law, Prohibits 'Resettlement of Alien Population.'"
[254] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 517.
[255] Mushaben, 526.
[256] Mushaben, 526.
[257] The 2013-2017 Grand "coalition agreement tended to be more extensive in areas where the parties agreed and more concise where they did not…When looking for a combination of high salience plus high ideological distance… immigration and the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers [stands out]" (Saalfeld, Bahr, and Seifert 2019, 379-80). This demonstrates that immigration was not something the government was focused on.
[258] Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 321.
[259] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 527; Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*; Dernbach, "Germany Suspends Dublin Agreement for Syrian Refugees."
[260] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[261] Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 9.
[262] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 590–91.
[263] "The Indispensable European"; "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[264] "How Angela Merkel Is Changing, and Not Changing, Germany"; Godin, "Why Angela Merkel Is so Generous to the Refugees."
[265] Godin, "Why Angela Merkel Is so Generous to the Refugees."
[266] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 591.
[267] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis"; Godin, "Why Angela Merkel Is so Generous to the Refugees."

[268] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017."
[269] Dostal, 591.
[270] "The Indispensable European."
[271] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 527.
[272] Mushaben, 516–26.
[273] "The Indispensable European"; "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[274] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[275] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 516.
[276] Mushaben, 527 cites the following: Sommer-Pressekonferenz der Kanzlerin zu aktuellen Themen, 31 Aug. 2015, available from https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=5eXc5Sc_rnY (accessed 10 July 2015); see further, 'Angela Merkel: Im Auge des Orkans', Die Zeit, available from http://www.zeit.de/2015/38/angela-merkel-fluechtlingekrisenkanzlerin/komplettansicht? (accessed 10 July 2015); Press conference, 7 Sept. 2015, available from https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/ Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/09/2015-09-07-merkel-gabriel.html (accessed 10 July 2015).
[277] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[278] "German Politicians Are Both More and Less Religious than British Ones."
[279] "Pope Francis Reminds Christians That Migrants and Refugees Should Be Welcomed around the World"; "Pope Francis Decries World's Indifference to Global Migration, Refugee Crisis"; Dzhambazova and Horowitz, "Pope Francis Urges Bulgaria to Open Its Heart to Refugees"; "- Pope Francis Calls for a Practical Response to the Refugee Crisis in Europe"; Calamur, "Pope Calls on Parishes To Offers Shelter to Migrants - The Atlantic"; Faiola and Birnbaum, "Pope Calls on Europe's Catholics to Take in Refugees"; "Pope Takes Syrian Migrants to Vatican"; Kirchgaessner, "Vatican to Take in Two Refugee Families as Pope Calls for 'every Religion' to Help"; "Pope Calls for Every Parish to House a Refugee Family"; "Pope Calls for Every Parish to House a Refugee Family."
[280] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[281] "How Angela Merkel Is Changing, and Not Changing, Germany"; Godin, "Why Angela Merkel Is so Generous to the Refugees."
[282] Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 62.
[283] Glorius 2018: 20 as cited in Ambrosini et al., 62.
[284] Initially then volunteers "largely focused on emergency help, such as the donation and distribution of food and clothes, support in dealing with official procedures, and translation" (Karakayali and Kleist 2016; IfD Allensbach 2016: 9; Zamponi and Daphi 2017 as cited in Hinger et al. 2019, 63). This extensive group of initial volunteers consisted of people with wide-ranging backgrounds, some were engaged prior to this crisis, and their goals largely included political demands: including "the suspension of the residency obligation and of accommodation in camps, the unconditional granting of the right to family reunification, equal social rights for all, the ending of deportations and, more generally, the right to remain and to travel" (Hinger et al. 2019, 65). Others had little to no background in politics or volunteering or experience with/ties to migrants and refugees, largely had a humanitarian goal and worked at a local level, having been moved by the crisis, and its portrayal in the media; herein, there is a partial connection with religiosity (Hinger et al. 2019, 63-5).
[285] Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 63.
[286] Ambrosini et al., 66.
[287] Rea et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis in Europe. Polarized Opinions and Mobilizations*, 66.
[288] Nohl 2017; Karakayali and Kleist 2016: 34; Jakob 2016: 10–11 as cited in Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 62; Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017."
[289] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 593.
[290] Dostal, 593.
[291] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 87; Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 592; Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 9.
[292] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 87; Saalfeld, Bahr, and Seifert, "Contractual Arrangements, Formal Institutions and Personalised Crisis Management," 386.
[293] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 594 cites R. Alexander, Die Getriebenen. Merkel und die Fl€uchtlingspolitik: Report aus dem Inneren der Macht, 2nd ed., Berlin, Siedler, 2017, pp. 141, 150, 159, 163
[294] Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 315.
[295] "The Chancellor's Crucible."

[296] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[297] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[298] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 528.
[299] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 592.
[300] Dostal, 592.
[301] Dostal, 592 cites 'Terror am Breitscheidplatz. Wie planlos agierte die Polizei nach dem Anschlag?', Berliner Zeitung, 15 September 2017; http:// www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/terror-am-bre itscheidplatz-wie-planlos-agierte-die-polizei-na ch-dem-anschlag–28419362 (accessed 2 October 2017).; see also "Cologne's Aftershocks"
[302] "Cologne's Aftershocks."
[303] "Cologne's Aftershocks."
[304] "[T]he legal hurdles to increased deportation are daunting. First, it is not clear how many of the Cologne offenders can be identified. Second, German judges typically cannot deport criminals with sentences of less than three years; the sexual offences in Cologne mainly fell short of rape, and would carry lighter penalties than that. On January 12th the interior minister, Thomas de Maizière, and the justice minister, Heiko Maas, said they would expand the definition of rape (currently, an assault does not count as rape unless the victim fights back). They also promised to lower the deportation threshold, making it an option even for those on probation. But even with these changes, the Geneva conventions forbid deporting people to a country where they might be executed, tortured or harmed. Finally, home countries must co-operate; many don't. Mr Gabriel is musing about cutting aid to such states" (The Economist, Cologne's Aftershocks 2016).
[305] "Cologne's Aftershocks."
[306] In July a new law, "[d]ubbed the "No means No" law by the media, … explicitly covers cases in which a victim withheld consent but did not physically fight back… upgrades groping to a sex crime" and makes room for the prosecution of "[a]nyone "who at least tacitly accepts that crimes are committed by a group they are a part of"'. This law replaced a scheme in which victims had to prove that they physically resisted their assailant and looks to improve the system wherein only 10% of rape victims file charges and a mere 10% of those result in convictions; it was therefore welcomed by liberals and feminists. Because it followed attacks on women by "migrants", it was welcomed by conservatives and traditionalists as well; however, from a migration standpoint the laws also make deportation easier, which could be problematic depending on enforcement. See "Cologne's Aftershocks"; "Germany to Bolster Rape Law after Cologne Mob Assaults."
[307] Opratko 2017 as cited in Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017."
[308] Dostal, 595.
[309] Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 67.
[310] Ambrosini et al., 66.
[311] Ambrosini et al., 68–69.
[312] Ambrosini et al., 69.
[313] "As various studies on anti-immigrant sentiment reveal, far-right worldviews as well as anti-migrant attitudes tend to be shared more often by men, by people with low educational backgrounds and – relatedly – people with low income or with experiences of socio-economic deprivation (Decker, Kiess and Brähler 2016; Zick, Küpper and Krause 2016). However, groups active in the anti-migration mobilization from 2015 onwards have had a more diverse socio-demographic profile, particularly within New Right and right-populist mobilization. In this vein, surveys among participants in the Pegida protests show that while – as in other far-right movements – more men than women participated, socio-economic deprivation was not a particularly prominent feature of the participants: employment in a regular, full-time job and educational level were above the population average (Vorländer, Herold and Schäller 2015; Geiges, Marg and Walter 2015; Daphi et al. 2015), while unemployment was below average.24 Similarly, a population survey in 2016 found that socio-economic deprivation, income and joblessness were not important predictors of whether or not people supported Pegida's goals (Yendell, Decker and Brähler 2016)." (Hinger, Daphni, and Stern 2019, 70).
[314] Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 71.
[315] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?"; Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 315; Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 529.
[316] Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 316–18.
[317] "German Politics Is in Revolt against the 'Merkel Method.'"
[318] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 85.

[319] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 594.
[320] Dostal, 594.
[321] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 87.
[322] Dilling, 88–89.
[323] Dilling, 97.
[324] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017."
[325] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 97.
[326] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 528–29.
[327] If asylum applicants have passed through a safe third country, they can be returned to that country to apply for asylum there, essentially then safe third countries null and void applications.
[328] Although deportation was implemented on a seemingly voluntary basis those not meeting its deadlines had benefits reduced.
[329] However the family reunification limitations largely just push the problem out a few years, leading to fears of a second wave of foreigners among many Germans (Dostal 2017, 594).
[330] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 528.
[331] Ambrosini et al., *The Refugee Reception Crisis.*, 59.
[332] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017"; Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 325.
[333] "Germany Imposes Border Controls"; "Europe Starts Putting up Walls"; "Merkel Calls for Summit on Refugee Crisis."
[334] "Merkel Says Ready to Support Turkey EU Accession Process."
[335] "Germany Will Filter Refugees in Camps at Borders."
[336] "Germany Will Filter Refugees in Camps at Borders."
[337] Mushaben, "Wir Schaffen Das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis," 527–28.
[338] Birnbaum, "Artful Wording to Allow Germany to Impose a Limit on Refugee Numbers."
[339] Birnbaum. Ultimately, the deal with Turkey was so important to Germany that it would support it even when Turkey made comparisons of contemporary Germany with the Third Reich (Euractiv, Refugee Deal Continues 2017).
[340] Sarmadi, "Merkel Urges Afghans to Stay at Home."
[341] "An Ill Wind."
[342] "Germany Seeks to Limit Migration from North Africa."
[343] Says, "Austria Seeks EU Aid Suspension for Countries Rejecting 'failed' Refugees."
[344] "Turkey, Germany to Involve NATO in Monitoring Syrian Refugee Exodus."
[345] Scheffer, "Germany Content to Return Afghan Asylum Seekers to 'Islands of Safety.'"
[346] Scheffer.
[347] Scheffer, "Germany's Refugee Policy."
[348] Scheffer.
[349] de Maizière interview with the Welt am Sonntag newspaper, as cited in Gotev, "Commission Accepts That Germany Sends Migrants Back to Greece."
[350] Gotev.
[351] As cited in "Angela Merkel's Promise to Ban the Niqab Is a Mistake."
[352] "Germany Proposes EU Rules Making Migrant Deportations Easier."
[353] "Germany Proposes EU Rules Making Migrant Deportations Easier."
[354] "Refugees in Greece Demand Transfer to Germany, Start Hunger Strike."
[355] Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 594.
[356] Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 326; Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 594.
[357] Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; Alexander 2017, 27 –44; Kepplinger 2018 as cited in Engler, Bauer-Blaschkowski, and Zohlnhöfer, "Disregarding the Voters?," 326.
[358] "An Ill Wind."
[359] "Angela Merkel's Promise to Ban the Niqab Is a Mistake."
[360] Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 7.
[361] Schnee, 7; Dostal, "The German Federal Election of 2017," 598–99.

[362] Schnee, "Exploring the Strategy of Government," 7.
[363] Dilling, "Two of the Same Kind?," 85.
[364] Dilling, 85–86.
[365] "A New Coalition in Germany."
[366] "German Politics Is in Revolt against the 'Merkel Method.'"
[367] "A New Coalition in Germany."
[368] Robert, "Migration Set to Overshadow Eurozone Reform Debate at EU Summit"; "Germany Optimistic about EU Lifeline for Merkel, Bilateral Deals on Migration."
[369] says, "Greece Starts Bailing out Germany on Refugees"; Rios, "Germany Seals Deal with Spain to Return Registered Asylum Seekers"; Stam, "Germany and Greece Reach Agreement to Repatriate Refugees"; "Salvini Threatens to Shut Airports over Migrant 'charter Flights' from Germany"; "Angela Merkel's European Negotiations Put Her on the Front Foot in Berlin."
[370] "Angela Merkel Reaches a Deal on Asylum-Seekers to Keep Her Government Together."
[371] "Germany Lifts Ban on Reunions for Refugees, Rekindles Integration Debate."
[372] "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[373] The National Assembly Speaker Andreas Khols speaks at the opening of the Conference of European Imams and Ministers in Vienna. Parliamentary correspondence Nr. 309 (April 7, 2006) can be found at: https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2006/PK0309/index.shtml (as cited in Hafez and Heinisch 2018, 670)
[374] Hafez and Heinisch, "Breaking with Austrian Consociationalism," 660.
[375] Hafez and Heinisch, 661.
[376] Hafez and Heinisch, "Breaking with Austrian Consociationalism."
[377] Hafez and Heinisch, 663.
[378] Hafez and Heinisch, 663.
[379] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 11.
[380] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, 11.
[381] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 43.
[382] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 40.
[383] This law was the Federal Constitutional Act for the Accommodation and Distribution of Foreigners in Need of Help and Protection (120/2015)
[384] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 43; Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Reception Policies, Practices and Responses," 8.
[385] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Reception Policies, Practices and Responses," 8.
[386] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 43; Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Reception Policies, Practices and Responses," 43.
[387] Renner et al., "Threat Perception and Modern Racism as Possible Predictors of Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers: Comparative Findings from Austria, Germany, and Slovakia," 11.
[388] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Reception Policies, Practices and Responses," 44–45.
[389] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 12.
[390] "Austria Country Review," 32.
[391] Gotev, "Austria Toughens Controls on Road Traffic from Hungary."
[392] See also Josipovic and Reeger 2019, 43
[393] The 2016 Amendment Act (No. 24/2016) was justified by the threat to public security caused by foreigners (Josipovic and Reeger 2019, 24; see also The Economist, Why Austria's Cap 2016; Euractiv, Austria Introduces Cap 2016).
[394] "The Aliens Law Amendment Act 2017 (No. 145/2017) expanded the group of persons that can be legally ordered to remain within Basic Welfare Support Accommodation. Initially confined to persons in the admissibility procedure, it now includes asylum seekers, where reasons of "public interests, public order or a fast proceeding of an application" (Section 15b AsylG) prevail… This Amendment Act also introduced the possibility of ordering rejected asylum seekers to move to a return centre (Section 57 FPG). Those are existing asylum accommodations of the federal government, which have been repurposed. They no longer accommodate people at the beginning of the asylum procedure, but those with a negative asylum decision who are obliged to return. Counselling and social benefits for these people are only available in the return facilities. Return centres are not detention centres. People can move freely, however, they are located in remote areas and there are territorial restrictions to remain

in the political district… According to the Interior Ministry's answer to a parliamentary interpellation, restrictions on the place of residence in accordance with Section 57 FPG have been ordered 1,226 times by January 6, 2019 (BMI-2483/AB, 2019)." (Josipovic and Reeger 2019, 28).

[395] The full extension – to 18 months – was a part of the 2017 Aliens Law Amendment Act (145/2017) (Josipovic and Reeger 2018, 44).

[396] "Currently the list encompasses 17 countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mongolia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ghana, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Benin, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. These countries are considered to be safe, based on the assumption that there will be no political persecution or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. Here, the suspensory effect of complaints against a rejected asylum application can be withdrawn. Also, as applicants from these countries largely do not pass the admissibility procedure, they are affected by the 2017 Amendment Act (No. 145/2017), which stipulates that violating a duty to return leads to a partial loss of social security benefits." (Josipovic and Reeger 2019, 35).

[397] "[A]ccording to ECRE (2018), Austria issued a total of 10,490 requests in 2017. Thus, only about 36 per cent of all requests were successful in that year" (as cited in Josipovic and Reeger 2019, 37).

[398] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 8; Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 44.

[399] "Why Austria's Asylum Cap Is so Controversial."

[400] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 43; Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 12–19.

[401] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 8; Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 44.

[402] "The Lady's Not for Turning"; "Hungary to Hold Referendum on Quotas, Austria Remains Defiant"; Gotev, "Austria Buries Hope for EU Response to Refugee Crisis."

[403] "Be Ready to Completely Stop the Migrant Flow, Austria Tells Macedonia."

[404] "Austria Sends Troops to Hungary-Serbia Border"; "A Year on, No Business as Usual at Austrian Border."

[405] "Austria Urges EU to Send Soldiers to Greece to Police Border."

[406] "Point Taken, Mr Orban."

[407] "Austria Country Review," 39; Renner et al., "Threat Perception and Modern Racism as Possible Predictors of Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers: Comparative Findings from Austria, Germany, and Slovakia," 11.

[408] "Austria Country Review," 39–40.

[409] "Austria Country Review," 39–40.

[410] "Disaster Averted—for Now."

[411] "Disaster Averted—for Now."

[412] "Austria Country Review," 41.

[413] Plescia and Eberl, "'Not My Government!' The Role of Norms and Populist Attitudes on Voter Preferences for Government Formation after the Election," 640.

[414] "The 31-Year-Old Who Looks Set to Be Austria's next Chancellor."

[415] "Austria Country Review," 41.

[416] Hafez and Heinisch, "Breaking with Austrian Consociationalism," 673.

[417] "Results of Austrian Parliamentary Election 2017."

[418] Plescia and Eberl, "'Not My Government!' The Role of Norms and Populist Attitudes on Voter Preferences for Government Formation after the Election," 658.

[419] "The 31-Year-Old Who Looks Set to Be Austria's next Chancellor."

[420] Plescia and Eberl, "'Not My Government!' The Role of Norms and Populist Attitudes on Voter Preferences for Government Formation after the Election," 654.

[421] By this they mean that mainstream parties can use existing issue opportunities to undermine populist parties – and are referring to the issue of controlling immigration, which was a valence issue in the election and something the ÖVP dedicated 24.3% of its tweets to, compared to other valence issues; in contrast the next most covered issue, providing social justice, only received 8.8% (Plescia, Kritzinger, and Oberluggauer 2020, 653).

[422] Plescia and Eberl, "'Not My Government!' The Role of Norms and Populist Attitudes on Voter Preferences for Government Formation after the Election," 641–42.

[423] Plescia and Eberl, "'Not My Government!' The Role of Norms and Populist Attitudes on Voter Preferences for Government Formation after the Election."

[424] Plescia and Eberl, 656.
[425] "Sebastian Kurz Is Flirting with the Far-Right Freedom Party."
[426] "Austria Country Review," 41.
[427] "A New Coalition in Austria Brings the Far Right in from the Cold."
[428] "Sebastian Kurz Is Flirting with the Far-Right Freedom Party."
[429] "A New Coalition in Austria Brings the Far Right in from the Cold"; Gotev, "EU Silently Accepts Far-Right in Austrian Cabinet."
[430] Gotev, "EU Silently Accepts Far-Right in Austrian Cabinet."
[431] "A New Coalition in Austria Brings the Far Right in from the Cold."
[432] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Reception Policies, Practices and Responses," 35.
[433] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, 36.
[434] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, 8.
[435] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance," 44–45.
[436] Austrian Press Agency 2017 as quoted in Hafez and Heinisch, "Breaking with Austrian Consociationalism," 665.
[437] Hafez and Heinisch, 665.
[438] Vytiska, "Austria's Planned Full-Face Veil Ban Provokes Debate on Crucifixes in Schools."
[439] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 12.
[440] Gotev, "Slovenia Says Austrian Border Controls 'Make No Sense.'"
[441] Josipovic, Ivan and Reeger, Ursula, "Border Management and Migration Controls in Austria," 18.
[442] Josipovic and Reeger, "Refugee Protection in Austria."
[443] Josipovic and Reeger, 46.
[444] Josipovic and Reeger, 46.
[445] says, "Austria's Far-Right Puts into Question International Rights Conventions."
[446] says.
[447] "Scandal Fells the Vice-Chancellor of Austria."
[448] "Austria Country Review," 42.
[449] "A New Right-Wing-Green Coalition Takes Office in Austria."
[450] Vytiska (Vienna), "Austrian Catholics Decry Lack of Refugee Charity."
[451] Vytiska (Vienna).
[452] Vytiska (Vienna).
[453] "Austrian Churches Slam Hofer for 'God' Slogan."
[454] "Hungarian Church Sells out to Extreme-Right Anti-Pope PM Viktor Orbán."
[455] "The Indispensable European."
[456] "Europe Hopes Brutality at the Border Will Keep Refugees Away."
[457] Gotev, "Hungary Says This Is Not a Refugee Crisis, but Mass Exodus."
[458] "Merkel Takes Centre Stage in EU's Year of Crises"; "Orbán's Bavarian Visit Widely Criticised"; Shevchenko, "From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War Identity and the West."
[459] "The Wizard of Budapest."
[460] "The Indispensable European"; "The Chancellor's Crucible."
[461] "The Indispensable European."
[462] "The Indispensable European."
[463] "The Indispensable European."
[464] Godin, "Why Angela Merkel Is so Generous to the Refugees."
[465] Godin.
[466] "Merkel to Hold Course on Refugee Policy."
[467] "Being Christian Needn't Make a Leader Hostile in Her View of Islam."
[468] "Orbán's Bavarian Visit Widely Criticised."
[469] Network, "Budapest Mayor."
[470] Gotev, "Luxembourg Wants Orbán Isolated for 'Smashing' EU Values."
[471] Gotev.
[472] "UN Urges EU to Stop Sending Migrants to Hungary."
[473] "Thousands of Afghans Stranded in Greece, Austria Calls Balkan Mini-Summit."
[474] "Thousands of Afghans Stranded in Greece, Austria Calls Balkan Mini-Summit."

[475] "Thousands of Afghans Stranded in Greece, Austria Calls Balkan Mini-Summit."
[476] "Austrian Restrictions Trigger Domino Effect across Balkan Refugee Route."
[477] Gotev, "Austria Buries Hope for EU Response to Refugee Crisis."
[478] "Merkel Accused of Sending 'totally Wrong Signal' to Europe on Refugees."
[479] Dernbach, "Germany Suspends Dublin Agreement for Syrian Refugees."
[480] "Merkel Takes Centre Stage in EU's Year of Crises."
[481] Gotev, "Tusk and Orbán on Collision Course with Merkel over Refugee Crisis."
[482] "The Dublin III Regulation has been in force as of 1 January 2014 and replaces the 2003 Dublin II Regulation and the original Dublin Convention signed ion 15 June 1990.
On 4 May 2016, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal for reform of the Dublin system. The proposal provides for: new applicants' relocation from countries receiving disproportionate numbers to other Member States; shorter time limits for sending transfer requests, receiving replies and carrying out transfers of asylum seekers between Member States, and removing shifts of responsibility; discouraging abuse/secondary movements - obliging asylum applicants to remain in the Member State responsible for their claim, geographic limits to the provision of material reception benefits and proportionate consequences in case of non-compliance; stronger guarantees for unaccompanied minors and a balanced extension of the definition of "family members".
On 19 October 2017, Parliament's LIBE Committee to which the proposal was assigned (rapporteur: Cecilia Wikström - ALDE, Sweden), adopted a report on the reform and voted to start interinstitutional negotiations and on 6 November 2017, the European Parliament confirmed a mandate for interinstitutional negotiations. The main suggested amendments in the report are: a reference key based on Member States' population size and economy serving as a reference point in corrective allocation mechanism's operation; no transfer of asylum applicants representing a security risk between Member States; no transfer between Member States of asylum applicants not needing specific procedural guarantees and considered to be manifestly unlikely to qualify as an international protection beneficiary; processing together of family applications for international protection without prejudice an applicant's right to lodge an application individually; individual guarantees for minor asylum applicants and assessment of their best interests; links to a particular country as the first relocation criteria;a clear system of incentives and disincentives for asylum applicants to avoid absconding and secondary movements and need to clearly define the meaning of absconding;
The Council endorsed in October 2016 the Slovak Presidency's three-track approach for examining CEAS reform (examining the Eurodac regulation and on the European Union Agency for Asylum regulation; discussing the Dublin regulation and the Asylum Procedures regulation, Reception Conditions directive and Qualification regulation; technical examination of the regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework). At the December 2016 Council meeting the Maltese Presidency announced CEAS and Dublin regulation reform as a major priority, following up on the implementation of measures which have already been agreed to.
In June 2017 the JHA Council meeting continued work on a compromise on the responsibility and solidarity principles' effective application and also examined articles of the Dublin Regulation relating to guardianship and limiting abuse and secondary movements. In December 2017 the Council pointed out that the Estonian Presidency had tried to consolidate agreement on the more consensual items in bilateral contacts with delegations and to find more common ground on issues where the compromise had not proved possible. It also added that it would further seek consensus during the first half of 2018.
In the meantime, in December 2017 the European Commission referred the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU for non-compliance with their legal obligations on relocation, after launching infringement procedures against them in June 2017.
The Bulgarian presidency (January-June 2018) aiming to achieve progress in CEAS reform, including on the Dublin Regulation stressed its aim to continue work on an expert level and prepare a political consensus (general approach) by June 2018, with a major priority on the Dublin Regulation. In search of this consensus the Presidency added that it would leave the question of refugee quotas for last, and instead focus on discussing individual articles of the proposal in search of consensus.
In the meantime, on 15 February 2018 the Hungarian government announced that it would propose alternative amendments to the Dublin Regulation based on a focus on security and a strict expulsion policy, and rejection of any kind of mandatory admittance quota.
The European Council Conclusions of 28-29 June 2018 focused further on the need for a consensus on Dublin Regulation reform, based on a balance of responsibility and solidarity.

The Austrian Presidency continued looking for a balance between solidarity and responsibility through bilateral meetings with all Member States, discussing the disembarkation element and different forms of solidarity potentially available to Member States under pressure.
Given the difficulties in making any major progress on Dublin reform in the short term, the Romanian presidency focused on advancing as much as possible the other asylum reform files during the time available before the upcoming European Parliament elections…[no major changes/advances have occurred since]" (Keller, Fabienne. Legislative Train Schedule: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – LIBE. JD – Revision of the Dublin Regulation).
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