

CAN WE VOTE OUT CORRUPTION?

The levels of Party Patronage and Regulation of Party Funding in Pakistan

By

Jasir Shahbaz

Submitted to

Central European University

School of Public Policy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Public Policy

Supervisor: Dr. Agnes Batory

Budapest, Hungary


June, 2020

Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned Jasir Shahbaz hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language. This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

Date: June 14, 2020

Name (printed letters): JASIR SHAHBAZ

Signature: 

Abstract

This thesis looks at the relationship between electoral change and accountability. It tests the theory that voters punish the corrupt incumbent party by voting them out. However, in case of Pakistan the voters kept voting the corrupt party (parties) out but the levels of corruption remained the same. It investigates the outside the public office corruption in Pakistan by measuring the levels of patronage in 12 key Policy Areas at the level of ministries, regulatory authorities and executing institutions and evaluating the laws on party funding in 29 areas. The study finds out high levels of party patronage in all key policy areas except judiciary, all state owned enterprises are under administration of current or retired military officials, and Prime Minister has the complete discretion to make appointments except for chairperson of Election commission and National Accountability Bureau. There is weak regulation of party financing, with no limit or ban on taking donations from corporations and trade unions. Only donation from foreign interests is banned. The study used content analysis technique and extracted information from Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Prime Minister Office, Elections Act, 2017, PRA Ordinance 2002, Public Procurement Rules, 2004 and Public Procurement Regulations.

Acknowledgements

“What is essential, therefore, is not that you no longer believe, but that God continues to believe in you.”

-Gabriel Garcia Marquez

It would be unfair to start acknowledging the people, events and forces which made this thesis possible without expressing my love for words. The power God has put in words is unmatched and I'm truly grateful for each kind word, which kept me going through the tough experience of completing a thesis during a pandemic.

I want to thank my late father, who was always watching news on the television, the unwanted experience of consuming news at a young age, really helped me in understanding the way government operates in Pakistan. I also want to acknowledge the prayers of my *Khala Jaan*, *Naani* and *Dada Abu*, which continue to protect and bless me in unimaginable ways. Infinitely grateful for support and love of my brother, who always celebrates my achievements as his own. To my friends in Budapest, Pakistan and US for their unconditional love, conversations, support and for always believing in me, especially on the days, when I didn't do it myself.

This would not have been possible without ultimate love, dedication and kindness of every teacher who taught me till day. Would like to thank Dr. Gorana Misic, Caitilin Brown and Tiziana Centofenti, for not only teaching with great dedication and clarity but for inspiring me throughout my master's experience. Dr. Ghazal Zulfiqar for being my mentor, for being immensely kind and recommending me for the masters program. My supervisor Dr. Agnes Batory, for being patient with clearly not the best supervisee and providing guidance.

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, who not only gave me the gift of life, but taught me how to be kind in pain, to be patient in tragedy and to be strong in all the trials. For letting me chart out my own path in life, without putting a pressure of expectations, but with a relief that you will be always there to hold me.

Table of contents

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of contents	iv
List of Figures, Tables or Illustrations	vi
List of Abbreviations	vii
Chapter 1- Introduction	1
Chapter 2- Literature Review	5
Discussions on Corruption	5
Corruption outside Public Office	6
Corruption and Electoral Change	7
Studies of Corruption in Pakistan	9
Chapter 3- Theoretical Framework	11
Hypothesis I:	11
To measure Patronage	11
To evaluate Party Financing Legislation	12
Chapter 4- Research Design	15
Concepts	15
Hypothesis I	16

Measuring Patronage	17
To evaluate Party Financing Regulation.....	19
Content Analysis	19
Case Selection.....	20
Limitations	21
Chapter 5- Findings.....	23
Testing the Theory	23
Measuring Patronage	25
Evaluating Party Funding	30
Chapter 6- Discussion and Conclusion	33
Are Pakistanis voting the corruption out?.....	33
Patronage in Pakistan.....	34
Reference List	36

List of Figures, Tables or Illustrations

No table of figures entries found.

Table 1Results of Elections	24
Table 2 Patronage in Economy	25
Table 3Patronage in Finance.....	25
Table 4Patronage in SOEs	26
Table 5Patronage in Foreign Services	26
Table 6 Patronage in Climate Change	26
Table 7Patronage in Education	27
Table 8Patronage in Judiciary.....	27
Table 9 Patronage in Media	28
Table 10 Patronage in Police	28
Table 11Patronage in Energy.....	28
Table 12Patronage in Military	29
Table 13Patronage in Health.....	29
Table 14Evaluation of Party Funding	30

List of Abbreviations

SOE	State Owned Enterprises
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Itehad
NA	National Assembly
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
FIA	Federal Investigation Authority
NDAC	Non-departmental agencies and commissions
ECC	Economic Coordination Committee
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
PM	Prime Minister
PIDE	Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
FBR	Federal Board of Revenue
FIA	Federal Investigation Authority

SMEDA	Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
USC	Utility Stores Corporation
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Authority
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority

Chapter 1- Introduction

In August of 2018, Imran Khan, the founder of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) took oath as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan. The newspapers were quick to notice the coincidental relevance of the number 22. As it was after 22 years of long political struggle that the cricket team captain, who won Pakistan its first World Cup was elected as its 22nd Prime Minister. Khan rose to political fame in 2011, when in a Jalsa (a political gathering), he surprised everyone by attracting one of the largest crowds the country has seen. His political slogan was simple- Accountability. His all political speeches were filled with the mention of *corruption, accountability and political elite*. He termed his political campaign as Tabdeeli (Change). Pakistan has witnessed sporadic periods of democracy and long periods of military dictatorship. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has remained under direct military rule for thirty three years. The current constitution of the country was passed in 1973 and ever since its passage, the country has witnessed twenty nine years of democracy under fragmented rules. Corruption has been an important rallying point for general elections in Pakistan. In the 1990s three successive governments were dismissed on charges of corruption, nepotism and causing threat to the national security to Pakistan. There has been no dearth of high profile corruption cases in Pakistan. The most recent one was in 2018, when the accountability court sentenced Nawaz Shairf, the thrice elected Prime Minister of Pakistan to imprisonment for ten years and Maryam Nawaz, his daughter was sentenced to jail for seven years (Dawn 2018). The organisation instrumental in pursuing the case of the former Prime Minister was National Accountability Bureau and Federal Investigation Agency.

It is an established observation that corruption is bad for society. It can cause poverty and higher income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonse-Terme 2002; Mo2001). It also slows down economic growth (Glaeser and Saks 2006; Wei 2000). It corrodes interpersonal trust

(Seligson 2006) and diminishes voters' confidence in democracy (Pharr and Putnam 2000). This becomes especially detrimental for a developing country like Pakistan. Corruption has remained one of the key issues in Pakistan. The country has consistently ranked high in terms of perception of corruption (transparency international). The citizens desire honest and accountable governments (Bratton et al., 2005) and free, transparent and fair elections enable citizens to punish or reward the politicians in a periodic manner (Vriez and Solaz 2017). The theory of Vriez and Solaz (2017) holds true in the case of Pakistan. In the seven elections examined in this thesis, the incumbent party was voted out at the national level. If the people are voting out the corrupt party and the accountability agencies have the power to investigate and convict a sitting prime minister than why Pakistan has been unable to reduce the levels of corruption, let alone eliminate it.

This question will be the guiding parameter of this thesis. Generally, the research on corruption in Pakistan has looked at it as an issue that can have far reaching consequences in economic, diplomatic, security, and governance areas. The studies which have worked on the accountability agencies have measured their performance as the performance of any other public sector organization (Javaid 2010; Islam 2004, Fair et al. 2010; Boquérat et. al 2012, Maryam et al., 2012, Chêne 2008). Javid (2012) looks at the patronage and clientele networks in the historical perspective of land distribution under the British rule. To the best of my knowledge there has been no work to study the corruption outside the public office in Pakistan. Under the traditional definition corruption has been "the abuse of public office for private gain" (Harrison 2007). This thesis looks at party patronage as an organisational resource and regulation of party financing to map the environment, which can't be termed as abuse of public office but provide a conducive environment of corruption.

This thesis will use the model developed by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova (2008) to measure patronage in democracies. Patronage can be defined as a “particularistic exchange between the party on the one hand, and a supporter or a group of supporters on the other hand, in which state resources, or privileged access to those who control state resources, are traded for political support within the wider society” (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 2012). The study will focus on “patronage as organizational resource” i.e. measured in terms of official appointments (Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova 2012). Party patronage was measured in 12 key policy areas Economy, Finance, State Owned Enterprises, Police, Military, Judiciary, Media, Education, Health, Climate Change, Energy and Foreign Service. It is measured at three administrative levels: Ministries, NDACs and executing institutions. Pakistan has high levels of party patronage at all administrative levels in all key policy areas. Prime Minister has the discretion to make all appointments except in Judiciary, Election Commission and National Accountability Bureau. There is no criteria for making appointments of ministers, most heads of regulatory authorities are appointed without any merit or criteria. The executing institutions heads are usually appointed against a set criteria, but Prime Minister is free to make the choice.

The thesis evaluates the regulation of party funding in Pakistan developed by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). It looks at the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Elections Act, 2017, PRA Ordinance 2002, Public Procurement Rules, 2004, Public Procurement Regulations. Pakistan has quite weak regulation of party funding. Except funding from foreign interests, there is no ban on receiving funds. The political parties and candidates are allowed to receive funds from anyone including, corporations, trade unions, corporations which have partial ownership by the government. There is no ban or limit to in kind donations to the parties or the candidates. The candidates do not have to declare the names of their donors. Money in Politics is only looked from the perspective of kickbacks, bribery and corruption in public procurement. It is equally important to look at the money

which elects politicians to the public office. Spending too much money on election campaigns do not only give one party advantage over the others, it also gives rich businessmen the power to steer the policymaking in their favour, once their party is elected to the office.

The structure of this thesis as follows: The Chapter 2 reviews the literature on Corruption. It covers the definition of corruption, the link between electoral change and corruption, the corruption outside public office and the existing research on corruption in Pakistan. The Chapter 3 looks at theoretical framework for the thesis. Chapter 4 looks at the Research Design in detail, including the research methodology, concepts, case selection and limitations of the study. Chapter 5 presents the findings, the results of hypothesis I, the details of party patronage in each key policy area and the regulation of party funding. Chapter 6 outlines the discussions on the Findings, how they can be placed in context of Pakistan and what is the way forward.

Chapter 2- Literature Review

This chapter will review the literature on corruption, the corruption beyond public office, the connection between electoral change and corruption, and the studies which have already taken place in the context of corruption in Pakistan. The chapter first looks at the academic discussions on corruption, the different detrimental effects of it and how the conceptualisation of corruption has evolved over time. Then it proceeds to discuss corruption outside the realms of public office. The discussion then focuses on the link between corruption and electoral change. How perception of corruption affects voter behaviour and their belief in the electoral system. Lastly, it will analyse the studies which have already been conducted to study corruption in Pakistan. The studies have been mostly focused on the economic costs of corruption and the performance of anti-corruption agencies. There has been no research to study the party patronage, clientelism and legislation & enforcement in party financing in Pakistan and how it facilitates corruption and hampers the process of accountability.

Discussions on Corruption

The most researched area in corruption literature has been the adverse consequences of corruption in society. Corruption can cause poverty and higher income inequality as it hampers the process of redistribution of funds (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonse-Terme 2002; Mo2001). It also slows down economic growth as it recedes investor confidence and increases costs of the development projects (Glaeser and Saks 2006; Wei 2000). It corrodes interpersonal trust (Seligson 2006) and diminishes voters' confidence in democracy (Pharr and Putnam 2000). Especially the prevalence of bribery affects the effectiveness of economic transactions. When the projects are given to the highest bribe payer rather than given to the lower bribe paying best quality provider (Podobnik et al., 2008). The discussions on corruption have become more relevant in the recent years as numerous "independent" anticorruption agencies (ACAs) have

emerged across the globe (Batory 2012). Different scholars have defined corruption from different perspectives. Historically, corruption has been defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Harrison 2007). The use of public office has been usually restricted to the role of bureaucracy. In the typical Weberian framework of society, the bureaucracy was placed at the centre of administration (Evans and Rauch 2004). The economic studies on corruption have been largely limited in scope. Focusing on early works in corruption by Becker and Stigler (1974) (for an overview also see (Banfield 1975; Rose-Ackerman 1975; 1978; and Klitgaard 1988; 1991), it talks about principal-agent model of corruption. The model puts emphasis on the relationship between the principal, i.e., the highest level of government, and the agent, i.e., any officer employed by the government, who receives bribes from the individuals who are interested in procuring or using any good or service produced by government (Shelfer and Vishny 1993). As systems of governance became more complex and more countries adopted democratic system of governance. The definitions of political corruption have evolved beyond the “the abuse of public office for public gain” (Warren 2006). Even though the traditional definition still provides the fundamental understanding of corruption it is extremely limiting. It institutionalizes the corruption and keeps it to only administrative domain. Therefore, the accountability mechanisms have been largely designed around regulating the “use of office” (Warren 2006). Lately, there has been a lot of discussion on the forms of corruption, which don’t directly fall under abuse of power while being in office.

Corruption outside Public Office

The recent scholarship in corruption has looked at ways in which corruption aids political parties in assuming and maintaining control. One of the major work has been the examination of party patronage in societies. Patronage is an old concept and can be defined as a “particularistic exchange between the party on the one hand, and a supporter or a group of

supporters on the other hand, in which state resources, or privileged access to those who control state resources, are traded for political support within the wider society” (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 2012). Party patronage can be distinguished from political patronage in the sense that instead of one political leader the whole political party is the ‘collective’ patron in the exchange (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 2012). Political patronage is closely linked with clientelism (see e.g. Robinson and Verdier 2003; Lemarchand 1977; Landé 1977). Clientelism can be defined as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” (Stokes 2011). For political parties to operate and utilise the networks of clientelism they need sources of funding, which leads to unregulated party financing. There has been a lot of research in studying the sources of party financing and how undue influence of business groups leads to corruption. The high frequency of legislation to control party financing and campaign funding is an evidence of the failure of current systems to control corruption (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). It is hard to trace and control corruption happening outside the public office and that explains the focus of anti-corruption agencies to regulate only the actions of public officials while in office.

Corruption and Electoral Change

Even though a lot has been written about corruption in general, historically there has been little work on the connection between corruption and voter turn-out. Recently, there has been a surge in work on studying elections as a tool of accountability. Free, transparent and fair elections enable citizens to punish or reward the politicians in a periodic manner (Vriez and Solaz 2017). A considerable amount of evidence suggests that incidence of corruption does affect the chances of incumbents being reelected (e.g. Fackler and Lin 1995; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Krause and Mendez 2009; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Klasnja 2016). Though, evidence also suggest deviation from this claim as at times voters end up voting the same corrupt

politicians back to power (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Kunicova 2006; Golden & Mahdavi 2015). The political scientists working in the field of corruption have also came up with possible explanations for voters' decision to not punish (vote out) a corrupt party in elections (Vriez and Solaz 2017). The main reasons can be the access to asymmetrical information by voters (e.g., Ferraz & Finan 2008, Chang et al. 2010), the influence of partisan and other group based loyalties (e.g., Anduiza et al. 2013; Solaz et al. 2017), payments or subsidies through clientele networks (e.g., Manzetti & Wilson 2007). Researchers also suggest that high rate of economic growth (e.g., Klasnja and Tucker 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013) might motivate voters to not punish corrupt politicians in elections. Literature has provided conflicting evidence on the effect corruption on voter turn out (see e.g. Kostadinova, 2003, 2009; McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Simpser, 2005). One branch of literature argues that corruption leads to higher voter turnout. They have given two conflicting explanations for it. Firstly, candidates can bring out voters in large numbers by offering them money, or other incentives (Karahan et al. 2006). Secondly, they argue that citizens desire honest and accountable governments (Bratton et al., 2005). When they feel that system is rigged due to weakening of institutions, ineffective accountability mechanisms and no transparency, then they turn out in large numbers to throw out the corrupt parties (Inman and Andrews 2010). The positive correlation between corruption and voter turnout is a minority view (Stockemer, LaMontagne and Scruggs 2011). The majority of scholars believe that corruption leads to decrease in voter turnout. Kostadinova (2009) finds out that voters did come out in large numbers initially to throw out the corrupt regimes in post-communist countries. However, as corruption in society took a permanent place and weakened the interpersonal and institutional trust, the voter turnout decreased leading to "distrust in political process and alienation from politics." A similar observation was made by McCann and Dominguez (1998) while studying the elections in Mexico. They argued that corruption in society has far reaching impact on

citizens' perception of electoral process. If there are successive corrupt regimes then citizens eventually get tired of "fraudulent elections" and would prefer to stay home on the day of Election. This view is not confined to only democracies, in the study of autocracies the negative relation between corruption and voter turnout was confirmed as majority of voters didn't believe in fraudulent elections (Simpser 2005).

Studies of Corruption in Pakistan

In Pakistan corruption has remained a fairly important topic in the scholarship on governance, development, democracy and foreign relations. Javaid (2010) looks at Pakistan's ranking in international corruption indices and attempts to rank the public offices on the basis of their perception of being corrupt in public. The study ranks police as the most corrupt institution followed by Power sector. Chêne (2008) did a comprehensive study on the anticorruption efforts in Pakistan. They have only included corruption in public procurement and petty bribery. Another dimension of corruption studies have been through the lens of US foreign policy. Post 9/11 Pakistan has been an important member of war against terrorism, which has earned the country a lot of resources in form of military and humanitarian aid from US. The studies have looked at corruption in disbursement of aid programs and in the channels which are used to finance terrorist organisations through corruption money. There have been studies under the ambit of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and linkage between corruption and international security (see e.g. Fair et al. 2010; Boquérat et. al 2012, Maryam et.al 2012). Others have looked at corruption from perspective of property rights and how high incidence of corruption leads to low foreign direct investment in Pakistan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014; Jenkins 2018). Ali et.al (2016) have looked at performance of anti-corruption agencies. They have studied the legal structure of National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the high profile cases which they investigated and their success rate in recovering

money from the offenders (also see Islam 2004). The case studies on Pakistan have largely focused on the economic costs of corruption, evaluation of performance of the anticorruption agencies. Generally, the research on corruption in Pakistan has looked at it as an issue that can have far reaching consequences in economic, diplomatic, security, and governance areas. The studies which have worked on the accountability agencies have measured their performance as the performance of any other public sector organization. To the best of author's knowledge there have been no attempts to look at political corruption beyond the public office. The studies which have looked at networks of patronage (Javaid 2010) have either looked at it as a historical event, and have put it as a consequence of land distribution under British rule or others (Javid 2012) have looked at it from a sociological lens. They have looked at patronage as an informal structure of power, which has persisted for too long in absence of strong institutions. There has been no attempt to look at the linkage between corruption and patronage, or to trace the corruption scandals in public office to the unregulated party financing and clientelism. Thus, this will be the first attempt to study the phenomenon of electoral change and accountability in Pakistan and to trace party patronage, clientele networks and lags in legislation of party and campaign financing. This will initiate a new scope of study in corruption literature in the discipline of public policy in Pakistan. To not view corruption only as a public bad but to look at the structures which provide a conducive environment for it and thwart any attempts of accountability.

Chapter 3- Theoretical Framework

This chapter will provide the theoretical framework that will be used as the foundation for the study. The purpose of this research is two-fold. First is to test whether the theory that free and fair elections act as an accountability mechanism (Vriez and Solaz 2017) holds true for the case of Pakistan. The theories on corruption and electoral change are discussed in detail in the *Corruption and Electoral Change* section of the literature review. The second purpose of the research is to map the corruption beyond public office in Pakistan. To measure the party patronage and to evaluate the legislation on the party financing in Pakistan.

Hypothesis I:

Electoral Change leads to accountability. Voters vote out the corrupt politicians in each successive election.

To measure Patronage

This thesis will use the model developed by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova (2008) to measure patronage in democracies. The conceptualization of patronage as defined in Chapter 2, will be further narrowed to “patronage as organizational resource” i.e. measured in terms of official appointments (Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova 2012). They have divided the public administration into nine policy areas: Judiciary, Economy, Media, Finance, Military & Policy, Culture and Education, Foreign Service, Health Care and Regional and Local Administration. Though the list is not exhaustive, it still covers the main policy areas of a modern state. It also provides a criteria for cross comparison between different countries. After making required adjustments, the final policy areas are following:

1. Economy
2. Finance
3. State Owned Enterprises
4. Police
5. Military
6. Judiciary
7. Media
8. Education
9. Health
10. Climate Change
11. Energy
12. Foreign Service

The explanations for making changes to the theoretical framework are explained in detail in Chapter 4.

Furthermore, each policy area is divided into three administrative divisions (Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova 2012).

1. Ministerial departments
2. Non-departmental agencies and commissions (NDACs) (i.e. regulatory and policy advising and devising agencies.)
3. Executing institutions (i.e. institutions involved in delivering services and provisions, or in production).

To evaluate Party Financing Legislation

Party funding is still an understudied subject in Pakistan. Due to long periods of dictatorship and bans on political activity the political parties are not well established in Pakistan. There has been no study so far on evaluating the party financing domain in Pakistan. For the purpose of thesis we will use the model developed by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Their work is mostly based on producing comparative knowledge, helping countries in democratic reform, and advocate for democratic policies and politics. Their primary focus is in three main areas: electoral processes, constitution-building, political participation and representation (IDEA). They have a list of following 29 questions to evaluate the party financing in different countries. This study will use those questions to analyse the party funding in Pakistan.

1. Is there a ban on donations from foreign interests to political parties?
2. Is there a ban on donations from foreign interests to candidates?
3. Is there a ban on corporate donations to political parties?
4. Is there a ban on corporate donations to candidates?
5. Is there a ban on donations from Trade Unions to political parties?
6. Is there a ban on donations from Trade Unions to candidates?
7. Is there a ban on anonymous donations to political parties?
8. Is there a ban on anonymous donations to candidates?
9. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with government contracts to political parties?
10. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with government contracts to candidates?
11. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to political parties?
12. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to candidates?
13. Is there a ban on donations from any other source?
14. Are there bans on state resources being used in favour or against a political party or candidate?
15. Is there a ban on state resources being given to or received by political parties or candidates (excluding regulated public funding)?
16. Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party over a time period (not election specific)?
17. If there is a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party over a time period (not election specific), what is the limit?

18. Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party in relation to an election?
19. If there is a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party in relation to an election, what is the limit?
20. Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a candidate?
21. If there is a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a candidate, what is the limit?
22. Is there a limit on the amount a candidate can contribute to their own election campaign?
23. Is there a limit on in-kind donations to political parties?
24. Is there a limit on in-kind donations to candidates?
25. Are there provisions regarding political parties engaging in commercial enterprises?
26. Are there restrictions regarding political parties taking loans in relation to election campaigns?
27. Are there restrictions regarding candidates taking loans in relation to election campaigns?
28. Are donors to political parties/candidates subsequently restricted from participating in public tender/public procurement processes?
29. Are there provisions requiring donations to go through the banking system?¹

¹ The questions are taken from IDEAS website. <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/241/55>
The text of questions is not changed to maintain their original clarity and to keep the results comparable to other countries.

Chapter 4- Research Design

This chapter outlines the research design of the thesis. It starts with the operationalisation of the key concepts discussed in the thesis, followed by the methodology applied in testing the hypothesis and charting out the corruption outside public office in Pakistan. It then outlines the sources used to extract data, ranging from election results, Constitution, Organisational charts of ministries, and Election Acts passed by parliament and News articles. This will be followed by a discussion on the analytical tools/methods used to analyse the extracted information. It will then justify the case selection and will be concluded by detailing some of the limitations of this study.

Concepts

All researches agree on the conclusion that there is no comprehensive definition of corruption. The definition of corruption and a brief history of its evolution has been discussed in Chapter 2. For the purposes of this thesis corruption is taken as defined by Transparency International; “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” For the sake of consistency in measurement of corruption at any time in the country, the rankings made by Transparency International will be used. Corruption can take many forms. Such as petty bribery to big kickbacks in public procurement, to direct payments for vote buying and etc. By Corruption outside Public office, it means abusing power in a manner that cannot be directly counted as a “corrupt” action but it provides an enabling environment for corruption.² Whenever, the word elections is used, it

² For example if a minister has the discretion to appoint Secretary in his ministry, and instead of appointing one bureaucrat, he appoints the other one, who is a party loyalist. The action cannot be deemed “corrupt” as it falls under the ambit of legal right of the minister but the appointment will create an environment, where it will be

refers to the elections for National Assembly.³ For clarity and consistency only elections for the National Assembly will be included. Patronage as defined in Chapter 2 is a “particularistic exchange between the party on the one hand, and a supporter or a group of supporters on the other hand, in which state resources, or privileged access to those who control state resources, are traded for political support within the wider society” (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 2012). For the sake of this study the primary focus will be on “patronage as organizational resource” i.e. measured in terms of official appointments. This study will only look at the appointments made in the key policy areas identified in Chapter 3. Patronage as “electoral resource” is also a significant topic for understanding corruption. It can be defined as “groups of voters are offered particular benefits in exchange for political support or endorsement at a coming election, or when loyal party members gain en masse preference when it comes to filling positions in the public sector” (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 2012). However, for the scope of this study it is hard to measure patronage as electoral resource. The money or in kind incentives used by politicians to buy support are not documented. Moreover, they can include anything from small gifts, meager amounts, to offering public contracts or tenders. Patronage as organisational resource is used because it is relatively easier to measure.

Hypothesis I

Building on the conclusion made by Vriez and Solaz (2017) that free, transparent and fair elections enable citizens to punish or reward the politicians in a periodic manner. We will look at the results of the Elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2008, 2013 and 2018 will be included. For these were the only successive elections under democratic regimes. Though it is debateable

easier for the political party to exert its control over the public office or be engaged in abuse of power. This becomes especially dangerous when party loyalists are appointed at high positions in regulator authority.

³ Pakistan is a federation, with a federal government and four provincial governments. The National Assembly has representation from each province proportional to its population. The country holds elections for National Assembly and Provincial assemblies on same day. Before 2010 the power was fairly consolidated with the federal government. After passing 18th Amendment in 2010, around 15 ministries were devolved to the provinces. However, the devolution is still not complete and the ministries are not comparable.

that whether they fulfil the requirement of “free, transparent and fair”, they follow the requirement of being successive and allowing citizens the opportunity to punish the corrupt politicians in next election. We used the data from Election Commission of Pakistan to consolidate Table 1.

Measuring Patronage

As explained in Chapter 3 we will be using the model developed by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova (2008). The changes to the list of Policy Areas was made because of following reasons.

- Regional and Local administration is not a well-defined policy area in Pakistan due to consolidation of power at federal and provincial levels. Pakistan is still going through the process of devolution of powers. 18th constitutional amendment was passed in April 2010, and in the last decade several portfolios which were previously held by federal government have been transferred to the provinces. However, in terms of administration the transfer is still not complete, the ministries are being run in a hybrid manner.⁴ Similarly, there is no specified ministry for culture.
- State owned enterprises (SOEs) are added as a category because Pakistan spends 22% of its budget in Public Spending (World in Data). The three main SOEs: Pakistan International Airlines, Pakistan Steel Mills and Pakistan Railways have been reporting losses for more than a decade (State Bank of Pakistan).⁵

⁴ A classic example of it is from the health sector. The portfolio has been transferred to the provinces under 18th amendment but there's a federal Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination, which administers drug control, vaccination programs, infectious disease control and population programs. This has created particular issues for the successful eradication of polio, and tackling COVID in Pakistan.

⁵ It is important to look at political patronage in SOEs because one of the main reasons for their economic performance have been massive job provisions in them to party loyalists and as vote buying mechanism, and hiring incompetent people without professional competencies at the top level management.

- Climate Change is added separately as it is becoming an increasingly important ministry of government. Specially, the National Disaster Management Authority, which is at the forefront of relief activities in case of national disaster and epidemics.
- Police and Military are treated as two separate policy areas. Pakistan spends around 3% of its budget on defense (Annual Budget Statements). Similarly, due to poor law and order situation, there is great emphasis on surveillance, patrolling and law enforcement. Police will include Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Narcotics Control and Ministry of Communications.
- Energy is included as a separate Policy Area because in Pakistan the sector is still heavily under state control. Specially, production and regulation of tariffs.

Following the key areas of policy analysis, administrative apparatus of Pakistan was mapped along the lines of Ministerial departments, Non-departmental agencies and commissions (NDACs) and Executing institutions. We looked at the Constitution of Pakistan and Organisational Charts of all the ministries. The ministries were then put under their relevant Policy Area. Then relevant authorities were put under the three administrative categories. The information was coded in the following manner:

1. In case of Ministries. Is the minister appointed on basis of his specialized qualification or experience or only basis of party loyalty?
2. Who has the discretion to appoint the top tier management in NDAC and executing agencies?

Possible Answers: Political Party in Power, Party in Power and Leading Opposition Party, Only Opposition Party, or the departmental committee.

3. Is there a criteria for appointments which outlines the required qualifications, years of experience or any professional specialization?

Patronage is not a fixed quantity that can be measured at one point in time. One aspect of patronage that remains fixed is the legal aspect that who has the discretion to appoint the head of ministry and agencies, but the choices keep on fluctuating between elected representative, party loyalists, career diplomats, and specialists. Using the criteria described above we will make a qualitative assessment⁶ of the level of patronage in each key policy area and if it has increased, decreased or stayed the same over time.

To evaluate Party Financing Regulation

As delineated in Chapter 3 we will be following the questions developed by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance to construct Table 2. To find answers for the 29 questions we used the Constitution of Pakistan, The laws of Election Commission and the Election Acts passed in the Parliament.

Content Analysis

For the thesis we have used the models developed and already used for collecting empirical evidence. This provides a clear guidance while testing theory and also gives certainty for robustness of the method. Content analysis is based on analytical reading of documents, which makes the conclusion free of any bias of interpretation. Political Patronage is difficult to measure and it will be hard to gauge the level of patronage in government ministries through surveys or interviews because of vague interpretation of “patronage as organisational resource” and the varied level of it in different ministries. The model used in the study is fairly straightforward and the responses to the questions are in certain terms instead of on a scale. Similarly, for evaluating the regulation of party financing. It is hard to come up with a holistic

⁶ Even in the model developed by by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova (2008). The score allocated to each policy area is based on the subjective judgment of the expert interviews.

measure of regulation for party financing. The process is fairly simple and reliable. We took each question and then looked for relevant section in the Constitution and Election Commission.

Case Selection

The case study method is used either to test validity of an existing theory or to develop a new hypotheses (Bennet 2004). The purpose for this thesis has been to build upon the theories already developed and test their validity on Pakistan. According to literature on case study method, it is important to identify the purpose of case selection. Is the case selected because it can be generalized to other contexts or is the case selected to only study that context with special interest (Bennet 2004; Gerring 2004). The purpose of selecting Pakistan has been both. I have lived in Pakistan for twenty four years, have voted in two elections and have observed four elections in my informed memory. This gives me a benefit and access to understand the networks of corruption which exist beyond public office. Pakistan also fits the criteria for testing theory because it's a relatively new democracy. The last period of military dictatorship ended in 2007. In 2013 for the first time a democratic government completed its term in office and a new government was elected. 64% population is of young people (Population welfare department), which has gained right to vote under a democratic regime and haven't yet developed "distrust in political process and alienation from politics" which was noticed by Kostadinova (2009), while studying post-communist countries. In a country like Pakistan where formal institutions are not quite strong, there have been negligible land reforms and landed elite still hold large areas of fertile land, a majority of people live in rural areas and there is inequality and poverty. This provides a classic case of patronage and clientelism (Stokes 2011; Javid 2012). The case of Pakistan also provides a restricted generalisibility for other postcolonial developing countries, where old structures of power, poverty and inequality

are still prevalent. Moreover, the focus of democratization studies have been majorly on European Countries (see Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova 2008; Callier 2010; Stokes 2011; Greskovits 2015; McMenamin 2019; Casas-Zamora 2008). In recent years one of the reasons for rise of populist leaders have been their agenda of accountability⁷ (Curini 2018). Corruption has been presented as a trait concentrated in parties in power. This thesis is an attempt to see that whether corruption is confined to one party or whether it is in the structures and networks which exist outside public office.

Limitations

One limitation of using case study method is its narrow scope. The hypotheses developed cannot be generalized to a wider context without taking the case specific peculiarities in account. To test the Vriez and Solaz (2017) theory of electoral change and accountability, we only look at the national elections. Which restricts our analysis to the patronage networks at the national level, whereas, the patterns can exist in a similar or even stronger manner at provincial level. The model of measuring patronage developed by Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova 2008 uses expert interviews. The initial plan was to conduct expert interviews following the similar sample pool Academics, Civil servants, NGO experts, Journalists, Party officials and Others. However, the COVID-19 situation limited the travelling options and it was no longer possible to conduct the interviews. Therefore, we had to rely on doing content analysis, which provides an unbiased analysis but would not include the nuances of mapping patronage. The model used for evaluating party financing is taken from The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, which does provide a holistic framework for evaluating the regulations for party financing, but the framework is still developed from a euro

⁷ Rise of Modi in India, after mass protests against corruption during Congress government. Imran Khan's rise in Pakistan, his protest for resignation of Prime Minister after his name appeared in Panama Papers.

centric perspective and there might be some missing aspect in party financing which can be critical in case of Pakistan.⁸ Due to COVID 19 it was impossible to conduct any survey to measure the reach, scale and scope of clientelism in Pakistan. Clientelism which can also be seen as patronage as electoral resource, is an important part of corruption outside public office. However, given its nature, it can't be fully accessed by content analysis or any other tools using secondary sources of information.⁹

⁸ This concern is addressed in the Chapter on Discussion on Findings.

⁹ A reference to the scale of clientelism in Pakistan is made in the Discussion on Findings. News reports are used to look at individual cases of clientelism.

Chapter 5- Findings

This chapter will outline the main findings of the study. The Hypothesis I holds true in case of Pakistan. In each successive elections, voters voted out the incumbent party. There are high levels of patronage in all three administrative categories. There is no criteria for appointing ministers and it is purely based on discretion of Prime Minister. Only Judiciary, has its independent procedure of appointing, promoting and nominating, Chief Justice. Only chiefs of Election Commission and National Accountability Bureau are nominated after consultation between the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition. In most regulatory authorities and executing institutions the Prime Minister has the discretion to nominate the heads without following any criteria for selection. In all three state owned enterprises, the executing institutions are under administration of retired army officers. Pakistan has a really weak legislation framework to regulate party financing. There are no checks on donations made to the political party, trade unions and corporations are allowed to give donations to the political parties without any limit or acknowledgement, which is a clear violation of the principle of “conflict of interest”.

Testing the Theory

First, we will test the theory of Vriez and Solaz (2017) that free, transparent and fair elections enable citizens to punish or reward the politicians in a periodic manner. Table 1 presents the summary of seven successive elections.

Table 1 Results of Elections

Year of Election	Party to win Majority Seats	Was there any reported case of political corruption
1988	PPP	N/A ¹⁰
1990	IJI	Yes
1993	PPP	Yes
1996	PML N	Yes
2008	PPP	N/A ¹¹
2013	PML N	Yes
2018	PTI	Yes

(Source: Election Commission of Pakistan)

In case of Pakistan the theory holds true. In each successive elections people voted out the incumbent party. The result also follows the majority view that reporting of corruption scandals affects the chances of reelection of incumbent party (e.g. Fackler and Lin 1995; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Krause and Mendez 2009; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Klasnja 2016).

¹⁰ 1988 was the first election held after the military rule of General Zia ul haq (1979-1988) ended.

¹¹ 2008 was the first election held after military rule of General Musharraf (2001-2008) ended.

Measuring Patronage¹²

Policy Area: Economy

Table 2 Patronage in Economy

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Planning & Development Minister appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist Housing and Works Minister appointed by PM. Usually elected representative from a smaller political party in coalition	Planning Commission Headed by Deputy Chairman. Appointed by PM. Usually P&D minister, or other elected or nonelected party loyalist. Rarely, Career Bureaucrat. Pakistan Housing Authority Headed by Minister. Followed by an Independent external hiring through open merit.	PIDE¹³ Headed by Vice Chancellor. Nominated by PM. Always a specialist. No fixed criteria for selection. Public Works Department Headed by Director General. Career Bureaucrat. Appointed by Minister.
Privatisation Minister has been usually elected representative from a smaller political party in coalition. Appointed by PM. Industries and Production Minister appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist	Privatization Commission Headed by Minister. Followed by Federal Secretary. Career Bureaucrat. Appointed by Minister. Industrial Development Corporation Headed by Minister. Followed by Federal Secretary. Career Bureaucrat. Appointed by Minister.	N/A SMEDA, USC Independent Corporations. Party Loyalists appointed as CEO, and Board of Directors. No Merit

Policy Area: Finance

Table 3 Patronage in Finance

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs Appointed by PM. Usually, an elected or non-elected member of party, or a non-partisan technocrat.	Auditor General of Pakistan Appointed by President. Set Criteria for Selection. Qualified or/and Bureaucrat.	Federal Board of Revenue Headed by Chairman. Appointed by PM. Usually, a Career Bureaucrat or an outsider Specialist. No Merit. Governor State Bank. Appointed by PM. Usually, a technocrat.

¹² Appointed is used in terms of who makes the decision. Under the Parliamentary system, appointments are made by President on recommendation of PM. President is signatory authority, the decision is made by PM.

¹³ Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. Patron or Chancellor is the President but it is a symbolic authority.

Policy Area: State Owned Enterprises

Table 4 Patronage in SOEs

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Railways Minister Appointed by PM. Always an elected party loyalist.	Railway Board Chairman of Pakistan Railways. Appointed by PM. Senior Bureaucrat.	Pakistan Locomotive Factory Headed by Senior Bureaucrat from Railways Department.
Cabinet Secretariat Headed by Cabinet Secretary. A career bureaucrat. Appointed by PM.	Civil Aviation Authority Chairman CAA Board Appointed by PM. Senior Bureaucrat. Usually, someone who has served in Army.	Pakistan International Airlines CEO. Appointed by President. Either Party Loyalists or Retired Officers from Army. No Merit.
Industries and Production Minister appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.		Pakistan Steel Mills CEO. Appointed by President. Either Party Loyalists or Retired Officers from Army. No Merit.

Policy Area: Foreign Services

Table 5 Patronage in Foreign Services

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Foreign Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist, at times portfolio kept by PM	Foreign Service Academy Headed by Senior Bureaucrat from Foreign Services Cadre.	Ambassadors Usually, Career Diplomats. In some cases, technocrats, party loyalists and in others retired officers from army.

Policy Area: Climate Change

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Climate Change Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency Appointed by PM. Usually a technocrat. No Merit	National Disaster Management Always Retired officers from army.
Maritime Affairs Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist. Or elected member from coalition party.		Port Authorities Chairman(s) Appointed by PM. Always officers from Naval force.

Table 6 Patronage in Climate Change

Policy Area: Education

Table 7 Patronage in Education

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Federal Education and Professional Training Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	Higher Education Commission Chairperson, appointed by PM. Usually technocrat. There is a criteria in place. Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary education Chairperson, appointed by PM. Usually technocrat. There is a criteria in place. National Education Foundation Chairperson, appointed by PM. Usually technocrat. There is a criteria in place.	Textbook Board Technocrats. Usually party loyalists, specialists. Appointed by PM.

Policy Area: Judiciary

Table 8 Patronage in Judiciary

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Law and Justice Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist with a degree in law (not always)	Attorney General Appointed by PM. Usually technocrat, at times party loyalist. Federal Ombudsman Appointed by PM. Usually Party loyalists, ex bureaucrats, ex judges.	Supreme Court Judges have their independent selection, promotion and nomination for Chief Justice. Election Commission Chief election commissioner appointed by mutual decision of PM and Opposition Leader. NAB Chairperson appointed by mutual decision of PM and Opposition Leader. ¹⁴

¹⁴ In case of disagreement between PM and Leader of the opposition. Supreme Court decides the final name.

Policy Area: Media

Table 9 Patronage in Media

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	PEMRA Chairperson appointed by PM. Usually technocrats with some link to party. No Merit Central Board of Film Censors Chairperson appointed by PM. Usually technocrats with some link to party. No Merit.	Pakistan Television Chairperson nominated by PM. Usually party loyalist, with some technical knowledge. No Merit. Pakistan Radio Chairperson nominated by PM. Usually party loyalist, with some technical knowledge. No Merit.

Policy Area: Police

Table 10 Patronage in Police

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Interior Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist, who is also close to military. Narcotics Control Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist. Communications Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	Capital Development Authority Director General appointed by PM. Usually, retired bureaucrats or retired army officers. National Highway Authority Director General, appointed by PM. Usually senior bureaucrat.	Anti-Narcotics Force Director General appointed by PM, usually serving senior army office. Federal Investigation Authority Director General appointed by PM, usually technocrat, party loyalist, retired bureaucrat, retired army officer. NADRA Chairperson appointed by PM, usually technocrat, at times retired army officer.

Policy Area: Energy

Table 11 Patronage in Energy

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Energy Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Chairperson appointed by PM. Usually party loyalist, at times technocrats. No Merit. National Electric Power Regulatory Authority Chairperson appointed by PM. Usually technocrats. No Merit.	Water and Power Development Authority Chairperson appointed by PM. Usually technocrats. No Merit.

Policy Area: Military

Table 12 Patronage in Military

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
Defence Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	Inter-Services Public Relations Director General appointed by Chief of Army Staff. Senior Army official. No Merit. Cantonment and Military Lands Chairperson, usually a senior bureaucrat from the cadre.	Army Chief of Army Staff. Appointed by PM. Selected from the senior most generals. No Merit. Navy Chief, Appointed by PM. Selected from the senior most generals. No Merit. Airforce Chief, Appointed by PM. Selected from the senior most generals. No Merit. Joint Forces Chief, Appointed by PM. Selected from the senior most generals. No Merit.

Policy Area: Health

Table 13 Patronage in Health

Ministries	NDAC	Executing Institution
National Health Services Regulation and Coordination Appointed by PM. Usually elected or non-elected party loyalist.	Drug Regulatory Authority Chairperson, appointed by PM. Usually technocrat. There is a criteria in place. National Institute of Health Chairperson, appointed by PM. Usually technocrat. There is a criteria in place.	

Evaluating Party Funding

Table 14 Evaluation of Party Funding

1. Is there a ban on donations from foreign interests to political parties?	Yes
2. Is there a ban on donations from foreign interests to candidates?	Yes
3. Is there a ban on corporate donations to political parties?	No
4. Is there a ban on corporate donations to candidates?	No
5. Is there a ban on donations from Trade Unions to political parties?	No
6. Is there a ban on donations from Trade Unions to candidates?	No
7. Is there a ban on anonymous donations to political parties?	Yes
8. Is there a ban on anonymous donations to candidates?	No
9. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with government contracts to political parties?	No
10. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with government contracts to candidates?	No
11. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to political parties?	No
12. Is there a ban on donations from corporations with partial government ownership to candidates?	No
13. Is there a ban on donations from any other source?	No
14. Are there bans on state resources being used in favour or against a political party or candidate?	Yes

15. Is there a ban on state resources being given to or received by political parties or candidates (excluding regulated public funding)?	No
16. Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party over a time period (not election specific)?	No
17. If there is a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party over a time period (not election specific), what is the limit?	No
18. Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party in relation to an election?	No
19. If there is a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party in relation to an election, what is the limit?	No
20. Is there a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a candidate?	No
21. If there is a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a candidate, what is the limit?	No
22. Is there a limit on the amount a candidate can contribute to their own election campaign?	Yes
23. Is there a limit on in-kind donations to political parties?	No
24. Is there a limit on in-kind donations to candidates?	No
25. Are there provisions regarding political parties engaging in commercial enterprises?	No
26. Are there restrictions regarding political parties taking loans in relation to election campaigns?	No
27. Are there restrictions regarding candidates taking loans in relation to election campaigns?	No

28. Are donors to political parties/candidates subsequently restricted from participating in public tender/public procurement processes?	No
29. Are there provisions requiring donations to go through the banking system?	No

Table 2 Source: Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Elections Act, 2017, PRA Ordinance 2002, Public Procurement Rules, 2004, Public Procurement Regulations.

Chapter 6- Discussion and Conclusion

Are Pakistanis voting the corruption out?

The history of successive elections suggest that no political party was voted again to power at national level for two elections. One interpretation for this result can be that voters desire transparent governments and following the reporting of corruption scandals, voted the corrupt party out of power (Fackler and Lin 1995; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Krause and Mendez 2009; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Klasnja 2016). However, it is important to discuss that elections of 1990, 1993 and 1996 are of particular importance because all three governments were dismissed by a presidential order on the charges of corruption. There is a difference in reporting of corruption scandals in media and dismissal of government on basis of corruption. The latter forms the national narrative that incumbent government was corrupt. However, it is important to note that during all these year the levels of corruption have not altered drastically (Transparency International). This shows that corruption was not confined to one party and it cannot be eradicated by just voting the incumbent party out. The analysis is also limited because provincial elections were not considered. The same trend does not hold true at provincial level. The trend of voting at provincial needs to be studied separately to understand this disparity. This is for scope of a separate study into looking at voter preferences, asymmetry of information, or how the networks of loyalty and clientelism work at provincial level.

Patronage in Pakistan

It is no surprise that there are high levels of party patronage in Pakistan. The sociological research by Javaid (2010) and Javid (2012) both point out towards the land distribution by the British and how it created a landed elite, which holds most of the power in the political landscape. However, this study finds out how the legal apparatus of Pakistan allows political parties to exercise patronage. It gives complete discretion to the prime minister to make almost all key appointments. In case of Pakistan, it is also important to review the patronage of military in the civilian administration. Since the country has remained under direct military rule for thirty three years and even during the fragmented periods of democracy the military was still a critical partner in administration. It is also not adequate to look at patronage in terms legal requirements. Even in cases where senior bureaucrats are appointed on basis of a criteria, or a chairperson of regulatory authority is appointed after fulfilment of certain requirements, the choice of the person can still be influenced by patronage. This means that the patronage reported in this paper is still underreported. The bureaucrats are important players in parties' consolidation of power. It is also critical to look at the motivation behind patronage. There can be two motivations: to control, or to make money. In case of areas like media and education, the motive can be more to control the narrative. In Pakistan, the national television, does not give equal coverage to the political party in government and the opposition parties. Similarly, there is a great deal of censorship in state owned media. In areas like police it can be both to gain control and to make money.

Party Funding

Pakistan has quite weak party funding regulation. However, it is to be seen in the political perspective of Pakistan. Due to long periods of military dictatorship, there was ban on political organization. The political parties in Pakistan are not strongly established and lack an

organisational structure or funding. The politics is based more around the candidates than around the political party. It is for scope of another study but if all the cabinets are scrutinized, a considerable number of ministers would have served in different governments being member of different political parties. In absence of own source of funding, the parties rely on rich businessmen or wealthy politicians to finance the election campaigns. This study only focuses on the rules of party financing, the enforcement for the few limitations that do exist is another discussion. One of the major limitation in party financing is of spending on election campaign by a candidate. Till date there has been no case of spending in elections beyond limit, whereas it is common knowledge that candidates spend way above the limit (Shahbaz 2020).

Way Forward

This thesis initiates a new discussion on viewing corruption as not only an act of individual or a political party but as a system. In recent years, the rise of populism has led to popularity of the slogan of accountability. However, it is important to see that corruption can't be fixed by only voting the corrupt party out or the corrupt politician out. It can be only eliminated by fixing the structure of power. By reducing discretion of political leaders to appoint people in key authorities and by making the appointments more transparent. By limiting the use of money in politics. The unregulated party financing has far reaching effects on democracy. It restricts the entry to politics and allows only those who can afford expensive election campaigns. The money taken from corporations, businessmen, groups binds the political parties to give favours back to them once elected to power. These are often in form of appointments to key positions. If money in politics is not restrained then democracy will only be an oligarchy of the rich. For countries like Pakistan to be a functioning democracy and to eradicate corruption, they have to look at the apparatus of government. They have to make amendments to legislation and reduce party patronage and increase regulation in party financing.

Reference List

Mariam, Mufti. 2012. "THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS ON THE MAKING OF US–PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY." In *Pakistan: The US, Geopolitics and Grand Strategies*, edited by Butt Usama and Schofield Julian, 64-86. London: Pluto Press.

Ahmed, Samina, Muhammad Amir Rana, Gilles Boquérat, Stephen P. Cohen, Ijaz Shafi Gilani, Maleeha Lodhi, and Polly Nayak. 2012. Report. Edited by Peral Luis. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07083.

Working Group on Corruption and Security. 2014. Report. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13073.

Jenkins, Matthew, and Roberto Kukutschka. 2018. Report. Transparency International.

Ali, Asif, Muhammad Jehangir Khan, and Saif Ullah Khalid. 2016. "Theory and Practice of Understanding Corruption in Pakistan: Case Study of National Accountability Bureau, KPK." *The Pakistan Development Review*, 361-77. www.jstor.org/stable/44986493.

Shabbir, Ghulam, Mumtaz Anwar, and Shahid Adil. 2016. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth." *The Pakistan Development Review* 55, no. 4: 689-702. www.jstor.org/stable/44986010.

Warren, Mark E. 2006. "Political Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39, no. 4: 803-07. www.jstor.org/stable/20451821.

Hartnell, Helen E., John K.M. Ohnesorge, and Claire Moore Dickerson. 1999. "Political Corruption in Market Democracies." *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* 93: 229-32. www.jstor.org/stable/25659304

Balachandrudu, K. 2006. "UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL CORRUPTION." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 67, no. 4: 809-16. www.jstor.org/stable/41856265.

Euben, J. Peter. 1978. "On Political Corruption." *The Antioch Review* 36, no. 1: 103-18.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. "Corruption." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108, no. 3: 599-617. www.jstor.org/stable/2118402.

Batory, Agnes. 2012. Political Cycles and Organizational Life Cycles: Delegation to Anticorruption Agencies in Central Europe. Governance.

Alesina, Alberto, and George-Marios Angeletos. 2003. "Fairness and Redistribution: U.S. versus Europe,"

Kopecký, P., Mair, P. and Spirova, M., 2014. *Party Patronage And Party Government In European Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Idea.int. 2020. Pakistan | International IDEA. [online] Available at: <<https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/241/55>> [Accessed 14 May 2020].

Pakistan.gov.pk. 2020. The Official Web Gateway To Pakistan. [online] Available at: <<http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/index.html>> [Accessed 6 May 2020].

Asad, M., 2020. Avenfield Verdict: Nawaz To Serve 10 Years In Jail For Owning Assets Beyond Income, Maryam 7 For Abetment. [online] DAWN.COM. Available at: <<https://www.dawn.com/news/1418326>> [Accessed 6 June 2020].

Stokes, S., 2013. *Brokers, Voters, And Clientelism*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Robinson, J. and Verdier, T. 2003. *The political economy of clientelism*. Typescript. University of California, Berkeley

Eisenstadt, S. N. and R. Lemarchand (eds.) (1981). *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development*. London: Sage.

CURINI, L., 2019. *CORRUPTION, IDEOLOGY, AND POPULISM*. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.

Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. *Electoral Studies*, 27, 621-632

Elin, F., Jones, S., & Ohman, M. (Eds.). (2014). *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns A Handbook on Political Finance*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

McMenamin, I. (2019). Party Identification, the Policy Space and Business Donations to Political Parties. *Political Studies*, 0032321719841243.

Anduiza, E., A. Gallego, and J. Muñoz (2013) Turning a Blind Eye: Experimental Evidence of Partisan Bias in Attitudes Toward Corruption. *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (12): 1664–1692.

Bauhr, M., & Charron, N. (2018). Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(4), 415–446.

Chong, A., De La O, A. L., Karlan, D., & Wantchekon, L. (2014). Does corruption information inspire the fight or quash the hope? A field experiment in Mexico on voter turnout, choice, and party identification. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1), 55-71.

Stockemer, D., LaMontagne, B., & Scruggs, L. (2013). Bribes and ballots: The impact of corruption on voter turnout in democracies. *International Political Science Review*, 34, 74-90.

Sundström, A., & Stockemer, D. (2015). Regional variation in voter turnout in Europe: The impact of corruption perceptions. *Electoral Studies*, 40, 158-169.

Winters, M. S., & Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2013). Lacking information or condoning corruption: When do voters support corrupt politicians? *Comparative Politics*, 45, 418-436.

Pakistan Election. 2020. *ECP / Election Commission Of Pakistan / Www.Ecp.Gov.Pk*. [online] Available at: <<https://election.pakistantimes.com/ecp/>> [Accessed 14 May 2020].

Transparency.org. 2020. *Home*. [online] Available at: <<https://www.transparency.org/en/>> [Accessed 27 May 2020].

Haider, A., Musleh ud Din, M. and Ghani, E., 2011. Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and Growth: The Case of Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 50(4II), pp.773-807.

ADENEY, K and WYATT, A 2004 'Democracy in South Asia: Getting Beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy', in *Political Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp.1-18

ALI I 2002 'Past and Present: The Making of the State in Pakistan', in Imran Ali, Jean-Luc Racine, and Soofia Mumtaz (eds.) *Pakistan: Contours of State and Society*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.