## SOCIOECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENTS IN EUROPE: TEMPORAL AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS, 2002-2018

By

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### ABSTRACT

Previous studies on social status and anti-immigration attitudes have neglected Southern and Eastern Europe and did not focus on comparative research or longitudinal analysis. Therefore, in this thesis I examine the differing effect of socioeconomic status on anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe and how these effects have changed over time. Based on social dominance, group threat and group contact theory as well as literature on cultural and economic threat, I hypothesize that 1. socioeconomic status indicators have a higher effect on anti-immigrant prejudice in Northwestern than in Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as that the effect of socioeconomic position on anti-immigrant attitudes 2. increased after the Great Recession in 2008 and 3. decreased after the migration crisis in 2015. By constructing regression models based on data from five rounds of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2018, I find that all tendencies can be observed, with the exception of the declining relevance of socioeconomic status following the migration crisis in CEE and SE. Further research on the topic could look at the 'ideal types' of the trends described or study the outliers.

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### INTRODUCTION

Since the so-called 'migration crisis' in 2015, migration has been an increasingly highly politicized subject in Europe. In many Eastern and Southern European countries, it appeared on the list of prevalent public concerns only at this time, but quickly grew to become one of the most salient ones, with right-wing populist parties building their communication strategy around it.<sup>1</sup> Attitudes towards immigrants in these regions, which in most countries were more hostile than in Western Europe to begin with, have remained strongly negative, with some becoming more sharply rejecting. In the West on the other hand, societies seem to have developed towards being more open,<sup>2</sup> although radical right parties profited from taking up the issue in this region as well.

Accordingly, attitudes towards migration have received increasing scholarly interest, with many micro-theories aimed at explaining determinants of prejudice which the degree of politicization mentioned above is only an example of. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between contextual- (group-, mostly country-level) and individual-level explanations. Contextual-level explanations include factors such as the level of immigration, established social norms regarding prejudice,<sup>3</sup> characteristics of public discourse such as elements of political actors' statements<sup>4</sup> and the role of the media,<sup>5</sup> macro-economic conditions,<sup>6</sup> group contact<sup>7</sup> and group conflict.<sup>8</sup> Individual-level explanations focus on individual values and personality traits (e.g. authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and empathy),<sup>9</sup> economic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mudde, "Radical Right Parties in Europe: What, Who, Why?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Messing and Ságvári, "Still Divided, but More Open."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Zitek and Hebl, "The Role of Social Norm Clarity in the Influenced Expression of Prejudice Over Time."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Bohman and Hjerm, "In the Wake of Radical Right Electoral Success"; Hameleers et al., "Start Spreading the News"; Bohman, "Articulated Antipathies."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Meltzer et al., "Media Effects on Attitudes Toward Migration and Mobility in the EU"; Schmuck and Matthes, "How Anti-Immigrant Right-Wing Populist Advertisements Affect Young Voters."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, "Explaining Time Trends in Public Opinions."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Vallas et al., "Enemies of the State?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Esses et al., "Intergroup Competition and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Pettigrew et al., "Who Opposes Immigration?"; Miklikowska, "Empathy Trumps Prejudice."

and cultural threat perceptions (theories on relative deprivation and relative wealth can also be grouped here),<sup>10</sup> national identification,<sup>11</sup> as well as socioeconomic and demographic factors (e.g. age, gender, income, level of education and employment).<sup>12</sup>

Cross-national comparative analysis is a common approach used by researchers to assess the contextual factors or interactions between the two levels.<sup>13</sup> It can provide answers to questions such as how generalizable certain predictors of anti-immigrant prejudice are over cross-cultural contexts, how these attitudes are influenced differently by these settings or simply what the differences in the prevalence of prejudice are. If we look at Europe, studies have explained cross-national variation in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes with the effect of outgroup size and perceived ethnic threat,<sup>14</sup> ideological attitudes,<sup>15</sup> immigrant integration policies<sup>16</sup> and so on.

However, this literature mostly focuses on Western European countries, with individual attitudes in Eastern and Southern Europe rarely being examined in detail. Comparisons along broad regional lines are especially uncommon, some exceptions being Ceobanu and Escandell's study on civic and ethnic national attachments' connection to prejudice, challenging the East-West divide<sup>17</sup> and Schlueter and Wagner's paper on the regional size of immigrant population on the level of anti-immigrant sentiments (with the term *regions* referring to the sub-country-level).<sup>18</sup> This lack of attention can plausibly be explained by the fact that the majority of states in CEE and SE are not immigrant destination countries and therefore, attitudes in these regions are deemed less relevant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Meeusen and Kern, "The Effect of Contextual Factors on the Association Between Different Forms of Prejudice; Jetten et al., "Relative Deprivation and Relative Wealth Enhances Anti-Immigrant Sentiments."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Pehrson et al., "National Identification and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice"; Ceobanu and Escandell, "East is West?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Carvacho et al., "On the Relation Between Social Class and Prejudice."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See Wagner et al., "Anti-Immigration Bias"; Messing and Ságvári, "Looking Behind the Culture of Fear."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Schneider, "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Cohrs et al., "How Ideological Attitudes Predict Host Society Members' Attitudes Toward Immigrants."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Pichler, "Foundations of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ceobanu and Escandell, "East is West?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Schlueter and Wagner, "Regional Differences Matter."

Yet, this point of view does not take into account that the European integration process initiated strong interdependence between European states. Indeed, we can see that growing cleavages exist between the countries of the continent, leading to instances such as the Visegrad countries' veto of the EU's migration quota system, questioning the future of the organization. While there is a growing body of literature on disruptive leaders such as long-time Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán as well as former Polish prime minister, president of the governing party *Law and Justice* Jarosław Kaczyński and their tactics, little is known about the attitudes of the populations they are governing, especially in relation to Western Europe. For this reason, it is important to look at regional differences in determinants of individual attitudes.

Another topic which has received less attention in recent years is how social status influences anti-immigration attitudes. The reason for this is the ongoing debate between subjective and objective determinants of prejudice which has been leaning towards the former. Many studies have shown that factors such as perceived economic and cultural threat fare better in explaining intolerance than more 'objective' measures like immigration flow, income, education or occupational status. Nonetheless, existing studies have also determined that certain socioeconomic groups are more likely to be against immigration. These include manual laborers, the unemployed and those with lower education and lower income. However, relevant literature either does not rely on complex, theory-driven measures such as occupational class and employment status or only focuses on one category (either income or education etc.). Moreover, less interest in studying social status in greater detail is most likely why, even though it would be useful to establish the effect of major contextual changes and crises, there is no comparative research on how the impact of social structural variables has changed over time.

Therefore, in this thesis I would like to examine how socioeconomic status influences antiimmigration attitudes differently throughout the continent, by comparing the regions of Northwestern as well as Southern and Eastern Europe. By looking at trends over time I will also assess the effects of two major crisis events, the Great Recession (2007-2009) and the socalled 'migration crisis' (2015). Relying on literature on social dominance orientation theory, group threat and group contact, labor competition theories as well as cultural and economic threat, I will hypothesize that 1. social structural variables are more strongly related to antiimmigration attitudes in Northwestern than in Southern and Eastern Europe; 2. the relevance of social status grew after the economic crisis and finally, that 3. it declined following the migration crisis.

By addressing the issues outlines above and testing the hypotheses we can get closer to understanding what shaped and shapes anti-immigration sentiments in the regions of Europe, how subjective and objective factors interact in determining individual attitudes as well as how the contextual affects the individual level.

In Chapter 2 of the thesis I outline the theoretical framework and central concepts I used to formulate my research questions and hypotheses. First, I discuss the theories and factors which connect social status to anti-immigrant prejudice and can explain the variation between the regions in the strength of this relationship, including 1. the role of education and the differences between countries in this regard, 2. social dominance orientation theory, 3. attempting to synthesize the two conflicting approaches of group threat and contact, 4. labor competition theories and 5. cultural versus economic threat to explain variation over time. Finally, in the last section of the chapter, I will connect the European context with the theoretical approaches.

Chapter 3 includes the dataset and methods I used. It introduces the European Social Survey, describes what the differences between the five analyzed rounds are as well as how the anti-immigration attitude, education, income, occupation and employment status variables were constructed. It also discusses the models used to analyze the degree of polarization in the countries and regions: the descriptive statistics and the bivariate and multivariate linear regression models. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the data analysis process.

First, it focuses on how anti-immigration attitudes have evolved in Europe over time and across regions and how polarized each country is in terms of these sentiments. Differences between Northwestern, Eastern and Southern Europe will be addressed. Then, it moves on to show how social status is connected to attitude towards immigration in Europe, how education, income, occupational group, occupational class and employment status influence it both separately and together. Lastly, Chapter 5 sums up the results, reflects on the hypotheses once more, considers the limitations of the analysis and suggests some implications of the study for the field of ethnic prejudice research.

### **CHAPTER 1 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Research on anti-immigration attitudes most commonly views these sentiments as a form of prejudice as it involves assigning characteristics to and treating individuals negatively based on their group membership. Apart from this basic theoretical assumption, as already presented in the introduction, there is no overarching theory that can predict its prevalence on the individual and the societal level. Instead, there are many micro theories, some of them even contradicting each other. In the following subchapters, I will only outline those which I deemed useful in explaining the effect of social status and its changes over time. They constitute a fairly large segment of the overall literature and reference the big debates in the field, however, this overview does not claim to be exhaustive.

### 1.1 Schooling takes it all? The effect of education

The effect of education on ethnic prejudice in general and anti-immigrant sentiments in particular has universally been found to be positive. That is, the higher educated a person is, the more likely they are to be accepting of members of an outgroup. The mechanisms of this relationship are explained in different ways: some approaches emphasize that because schools are settings for secondary socialization processes, norms such as tolerance and democratic thinking are conveyed and that it results in psychological changes such as reducing dogmatic thinking.<sup>19</sup> As a consequence, education can have a moderating role when it comes to the effects of anti-immigrant mobilization tactics such as advertisements.<sup>20</sup> Looking at the process more in detail, exposure to teaching about xenophobia and racism, critical thinking and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Kunovich, "Social Structural Sources of Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Europe," 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Schmuck and Matthes, "How Anti-Immigrant Right-Wing Populist Advertisements Affect Young Voters."

multiculturalism are found to reduce prejudice.<sup>21</sup> Others focus on the fact that education is an indicator of social status<sup>22</sup> and because those in higher positions are less vulnerable and less in competition with immigrant groups for resources, the more educated someone is, the less opposed to immigration they will be.

Another important aspect is that this socializing effect does not seem to be universal: there is significant cross-national variation in the extent education influences prejudice.<sup>23</sup> Hello et al. explain this with two theoretical arguments, one of them being the *cultural perspective*: "[...] education can be considered to reflect the degree of exposure to the educational system. If we assume that in different countries different values may be transmitted through the educational system, then it is likely that there will be cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice."<sup>24</sup> The other is the *structural perspective*, referring to education as indicating social position and that if there is a difference between countries in the extent their citizens feel their position threatened and consequently, in their levels of prejudice, there will also be a difference in the effect of schooling.<sup>25</sup>

As we can see, education is often referred to as an indicator of social status. In fact, it is mostly measured to have the greatest influence on prejudice of all socioeconomic variables.<sup>26</sup> Some authors also suggest that there is no consistent effect of income or occupational status as the relationship loses its significance if schooling is also added to the statistical models.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Hjerm, Sevä and Werner, "How Critical Thinking, Multicultural Education and Teacher Qualification Affect Anti-Immigrant Attitudes."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Kunovich, "Social Structural Sources of Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Europe," 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts, "Education and Ethnic Prejudice in Europe," 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Chandler and Tsai, "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Carvacho et al., "On the Relation Between Social Class and Prejudice."

### 1.2 Status and legitimizing myths: social dominance theory

A significant branch of personality-based explanations of prejudice refer to social dominance theory. This states that social dominance orientation (SDO) is the "extent to which one desires that one's in-group dominate and be superior to outgroups,"<sup>28</sup> more precisely that "prejudice, beliefs, ideologies, and attributions [act] as *legitimizing myths* that serve to justify discrimination of members of low status groups and preferential treatment of members of high status groups with the aim of maintaining and enhancing group-based hierarchies."<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, "people who are more social-dominance oriented will tend to favor hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and policies, whereas those lower on SDO will tend to favor hierarchy-attenuating ideologies and policies."<sup>30</sup> It is commonly used to study what determines social and political attitudes connected to group relations.<sup>31</sup>

In the case of anti-immigrant attitudes, the theory suggests that people with higher SDO will be less accepting of immigrants and those with lower values will be more tolerant. Consequently, it has been used to explain anti-immigrant prejudice in general,<sup>32</sup> preferences for strict domestic immigration policies,<sup>33</sup> and connected to this, voting for anti-immigrant parties.<sup>34</sup> It has been found to reduce positive effects of intergroup contact<sup>35</sup> and increase the effects of perceived threat on negative evaluations of the outgroup as well.<sup>36</sup>

Social dominance theory can also prove useful when it comes to the effect of social status on anti-immigrant attitudes. More precisely, it has been proven that SDO is more prevalent among individuals with lower socioeconomic status, measured via income in a study

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Pratto et al. "Social Dominance Orientation," 742.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Küpper, Wolf and Zick, "Social Status and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Pratto et al. "Social Dominance Orientation," 742.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Kteily, Ho and Sidanius, "Hierarchy in the Mind."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Matić, Löw, and Bratko, "Personality and Ideological Bases of Anti-immigrant Prejudice Among Croatian Youth."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Craig and Richeson, "Not in My Backyard!"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Zandonella and Zeglovits, "Young Men and their Vote for the Radical Right in Austria."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Kauff et al, "Intergroup Contact Effects via Ingroup Distancing Among Majority and Minority Groups."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Costello and Hodson, "Social Dominance-Based Threat Reactions to Immigrants in Need of Assistance."

by Küpper at al.<sup>37</sup> Even though the authors find their results to be contradictory to social dominance theory, their reasoning being that SDO serves "to justify differential treatment of high and low status groups"<sup>38</sup> and "as hierarchies tend to serve the interests of high status groups, they are more likely to endorse them,"<sup>39</sup> this is not necessarily the case. The theory and the findings can be synthesized if we think about the fact that even if immigrants are mobile and integrate well into society, they mostly do so by disrupting the hierarchy and becoming equal to or of higher status than those in the lower classes. They compete with the higher status groups to a much smaller extent, therefore, from the perspective of those occupying more privileged positions, the existing hierarchy is not disrupted. These speculations point towards threat and competition theories described in the following subchapters.

### 1.3 Group threat, group size and group contact

Two influential theories explaining cross-regional and cross-national variation in levels of prejudice are group threat theory and the contact hypothesis. The first states that "individuals identify with one or more groups and that the diverse interests of different groups generate conflicts that in turn generate negative attitudes. This means, in terms of ethnicity and immigration, that one or more minority groups threaten the majority group, which elicits anti-immigrant attitudes amongst members of the latter."<sup>40</sup> A branch of these theories emphasizes the subjective dimension, saying that it is perceived threats that matter.<sup>41</sup> Another part of them, however, focuses on the objective factor of relative group size, that is, how many members of a minority group live in a country/region. Put simply, the larger the relative size of the outgroup is compared to the ingroup, the bigger the threat they pose and consequently, the more hostile

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Küpper, Wolf and Zick, "Social Status and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Küpper, Wolf and Zick, 208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Küpper, Wolf and Zick, 208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Hjerm, "Do Numbers Really Count?" 1254.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See section 1.5

the attitudes are towards them.<sup>42</sup> Even though there is controversy surrounding its effect<sup>43</sup> and it is assumed to be moderated and mediated by many other factors,<sup>44</sup> group size has been found to influence attitudes towards immigrants under some circumstances.<sup>45</sup>

In contrast to group threat theory, contact theory focuses on what makes people more tolerant towards outgroups. It describes how having more interactions with members of an outgroup fosters positive views on the group as a whole and accordingly, reduces prejudice.<sup>46</sup> Its consequence is especially strong in the affective dimension of the attitude.<sup>47</sup> Even extended contact (e.g. knowing that someone from the ingroup has a positive relationship with a member of the outgroup) has been shown to have a favorable effect on acceptance.<sup>48</sup> The theory has been specified to include the more detailed mechanisms and conditions through which the positive effect of contact operates (such as cooperation, intergroup anxiety and group salience).<sup>49</sup> Among others, it has been applied to explain differences in levels of prejudice between East and West Germany.<sup>50</sup>

Even based on these brief summaries, it is easy to see that the two approaches contradict each other. However, they can be synthesized if we think about them as being two separate effects, with each of them stronger under certain circumstances and for certain social groups. The next section on labor competition theory may provide an answer to this problem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Hjerm, "Do Numbers Really Count?" 1255.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes, "Does Size Really Matter?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Schlueter and Davidov, "Contextual Sources of Perceived Group Threat."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Kosic and Phalet, "Ethnic Categorization of Immigrants"; Fossett and Kiecolt, "The Relative Size of Minority Populations and White Racial Attitudes."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Pettigrew, "Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice"; Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact Theory."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Tropp, and Pettigrew, "Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Wright et al., "The Extended Contact Effect."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami, "Intergroup Contact"; Voci and Hewstone, "Intergroup Contact and Prejudice Toward Immigrants in Italy."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Wagner, "Ethnic Prejudice in East and West Germany."

### 1.4 Economic competition and economic threat theory

Concern over the economic effect of immigration is a further common explanation of hostility towards immigrants. This includes both subjective perceptions of threat and objective economic conditions. It has been shown that "individuals who are especially likely to see immigrants as competing with members of the host society for jobs and material resources—in other words, individuals who are especially likely to see the relation between immigrants and nonimmigrants as zero-sum—are particularly likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration."<sup>51</sup> The same has been found across a number of other studies as well.<sup>52</sup> Additionally, (perceived) economic competition can increase in times of contextual changes in levels of unemployment<sup>53</sup> or in times of general economic hardship (such as the Great Recession)<sup>54</sup> and thus, lead to increased levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast, under more favorable economic conditions, threat perceptions decrease.<sup>55</sup>

Referring back to the group threat versus contact hypothesis debate, socioeconomic groups can constitute an example of the synthesis of the two approaches with the help of economic competition theory. It can happen that on the cross-national level, attitudes towards immigrants are more favorable due to the size of the immigrant group being larger and therefore, more contact between in- and outgroup members. However, *within* the national context, for native lower status groups, group threat may override the contact effect as there is more direct competition between its members and immigrants who usually occupy lower socioeconomic positions as well. To put it simply, contact can have a more positive effect if there is less economic competition between the two groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Esses, Brochu and Dickson, "Economic Costs, Economic Benefits, and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, "Not Only Competitive Threat but Also Racial Prejudice."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Lancee and Pardos-Prado, "Group Conflict Theory in a Longitudinal Perspective"; Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, "Changing Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, 2002–2007."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Polavieja, "Labour-Market Competition, Recession and Anti-immigrant Sentiments in Europe."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> O'Connell, "Economic Forces and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Western Europe."

In addition, findings of studies describing the relationship between contextual-level economic conditions and hostility towards immigrants can be extended to include socioeconomic status as well. If economic vulnerability and hardship increases anti-immigrant prejudice, social status indicators have to be more closely connected to intolerance during (and closely after) times of recession.

### 1.5 Cultural threat

Literature on cultural threat is similar to that on economic threat in that it is also based on subjective perceptions. However, it has often been put into contrast with it, some authors suggesting that the two are both good predictors of hostility towards immigrants, but because of different underlying mechanisms.<sup>56</sup> While cultural threat is grounded in social identity theory and "refers to people's fear of risking the positive status of the country's symbolic establishments as well as its ethnic and cultural cohesiveness due to increases in populations of differing race, language, norms and values",<sup>57</sup> economic threat theory states that members of an outgroup (immigrants) are viewed by those belonging to the ingroup "as potential competitors over material resources, and increasing immigrant populations create a threat as they compete for scarce material resources."<sup>58</sup> Cultural threat is usually measured to have a bigger effect on prejudice,<sup>59</sup> but these impacts can vary across societies according to how the immigration issue is commonly framed.<sup>60</sup>

To reiterate what has been mentioned already in connection to economic threat, if there is an effect of prevalent framing processes on the level of different threat perceptions, we can

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Harell et al. "The Impact of Economic and Cultural Cues on Support for Immigration in Canada and the United States."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, "The Effect of Perceived Cultural and Material Threats on Ethnic Preferences in Immigration Attitudes," 1761.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan and Lahav, 1762.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Vala, Pereira and Ramos, "Racial Prejudice, Threat Perception and Opposition to Immigration."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Lahav and Courtemanche, "The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties"; Rychnovská, "Securitization and the Power of Threat Framing."

also expect to find changes over time in the impact of social status on attitudes towards immigrants. During periods where economic framings are more common and economic threat is higher, such as during recessions, socioeconomically vulnerable groups will be relatively more opposed to immigration than in periods without economic hardship. Additionally, cultural framings of the immigration issue reduce the effect of socioeconomic status as cultural threat is not connected to economic vulnerability.

### 1.6 Prejudice theories and the European context

After introducing the main theoretical considerations and how they can be connected to socioeconomic status, in this section, I will outline their implications for the European context and consequently, formulate my hypotheses based on them.

First of all, as previously stated, education has been found to have a positive effect on the level of acceptance of immigrants because of it transmitting social norms of tolerance and fostering critical thinking as well as being an indicator of social status. Additionally, other social status variables such as income, education, occupation and employment status have also been often shown to impact anti-immigrant attitudes, with those occupying lower positions being less tolerant. This can be explained with them scoring higher on social dominance orientation scales, experiencing higher levels of group threat and being more threatened by immigrants due to being in similar economic positions and therefore, in direct competition for material resources. Because this connection is well-established in the literature, with cross-national research finding roughly the same effect directions across societies, *Hypothesis 0a* can be formulated as follows: H0a: Across all regions, those in lower socioeconomic positions are more prone to antiimmigration attitudes than those in higher positions.

Secondly, the levels of anti-immigration attitudes vary significantly across regions. In a study by Green, Eastern and Southern Europeans are labelled as *strict gatekeepers* because of favoring all types of entry and expulsion criteria for immigrants.<sup>61</sup> Other studies have also proven this trend.<sup>62</sup> In addition, higher levels of social dominance orientation in Eastern and Southern Europe<sup>63</sup> and lower levels of group contact because of lower immigrant population size predict this to be the case as well. Therefore, the next hypothesis previously confirmed by the literature relates to the differences across regions:

# H0b: Anti-immigrant attitudes are higher in Eastern and Southern than in Northwestern Europe.

Thirdly, we can state that the educational system is not equally successful in or focused on transmitting social norms of tolerance across societies. In Northwestern Europe, values of multiculturalism and critical thinking are emphasized more strongly in schools than in Eastern and Southern Europe. Moreover, as mentioned above, the level of social dominance orientation in NWE is lower in the overall population, but comparatively higher among those of lower status. In SE and CEE, social status has a much smaller effect on the level of SDO.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, the size of the immigrant population is bigger in Northwestern European countries than in the other regions and therefore, group threat among those in closest contact with them (meaning those in similar, lower socioeconomic positions) can override the positive effect of group contact, as hypothesized above. Finally, because lower status groups in NWE have to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Green, "Guarding the Gates of Europe."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Sides and Citrin, "European Opinion About Immigration"; Messing and Ságvári, "Looking Behind the Culture of Fear."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Fischer, Hanke and Sibley, "Cultural and Institutional Determinants of Social Dominance Orientation."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Küpper, Wolf and Zick, "Social Status and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe," 214.

directly compete with more immigrants economically than lower status groups, perceived economic threat is most likely also higher in their case compared to those in less vulnerable economic positions, than in Eastern and Southern Europe, where economic threat is less the result of direct competition. Based on these observations, hypothesis number one can be formulated in the following way:

H1: Socioeconomic status indicators have a higher effect on anti-immigrant prejudice in Northwestern than in Eastern and Southern Europe.

In his studies in 2002 and 2004, Kunovich makes similar observations, although he does not consider longitudinal trends, only looks at the two regions of Eastern and Western Europe and does not provide a causal mechanism apart from the differences being correlated with the level of GDP.<sup>65</sup>

Another important consideration was that perceived economic threat varies according to the macroeconomic context and partly due to economic framings of social problems, partly because of an increase in economic vulnerability, it can lead to a greater impact of social status on antiimmigration attitudes. The biggest economic crisis event in recent years was the Great Recession in 2008, affecting the whole of Europe. Therefore, I hypothesize that

H2: Following the Great Recession in 2008, the effect of socioeconomic status on antiimmigrant attitude increased across all regions.

As in the case of economic threat, cultural threat theory can also be employed to look at the effects of threat framing. Based on the literature, it is very likely that if cultural framings of the danger of immigration become more widespread and therefore, cultural changes are not only threatening the less well-off, anti-immigrant attitudes become less connected to socioeconomic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Kunovich, "Social Structural Sources of Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe"; Kunovich, "Social Structural Position and Prejudice."

position. Recent trends in Europe show that radical right parties are framing issues in this way, especially the events during and after the so-called 'migration crisis' of 2015. Additionally, the favorable global economic climate of the last years reduced economic framing. For this reason, my final hypothesis states the following:

H3: Following the migration crisis in 2015, the effect of socioeconomic status on antiimmigrant attitudes increased across all regions.

### CHAPTER 2 – METHODS

Because of the large scope of the research questions, the cross-country comparison and the longitudinal aspect, the most suitable methodology to test the hypotheses was survey analysis. As the thesis project was limited in time, scope and financial resources, the only option was to analyze secondary data, from surveys which have already been conducted. When choosing what dataset I should draw data from, the main criteria included that it should have 1. representative samples from several countries in all regions of Europe, 2. a detailed question block on socioeconomic status (occupational status, type of occupation, income and education) as well as 3. on attitudes related to immigration, 4. longitudinal data from multiple points of time, from the past decades until today. The European Social Survey and the European Values Study fulfill all of these, however, the latter is only conducted every nine years, with the last round (from 2017) not having been fully published at the time of writing. Therefore, I chose to analyze the European Social Survey which will be presented in greater detail in the following subchapter.

All data transformation, analysis and visualization was conducted with the help of the R software environment. R is an open-source statistical computing project which is more flexible, can handle bigger databases and produces better graphics than "traditional" statistical software. Not least of all, it has a very handy extension package called *essurvey* which makes it possible to load data from the European Social Survey directly into the program and includes functions written specifically for the purpose of exploring the database.

This chapter will give an exhaustive description of the data selection, data transformations and steps of statistical analysis. Firstly, I will provide an overview of the data and the variables I used: basic information about the database of the European Social Survey, each of its rounds and the participating countries, weighting, data cleaning as well as the chosen variables and the indices which were constructed to be used in the models later on. The third

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subchapter deals with the methods of data analysis. It gives information on how descriptive statistics were used to give a sense of the structure of the data and the most basic regional differences and trends when it comes to anti-immigration attitudes. Then, it discusses the bivariate and multivariate regression models employed to determine 1. the degree of polarization in each country when it comes to socioeconomic groups and their attitudes towards migration and 2. trends in these relationships over time.

### 2.1 Data: the European Social Survey

The European Social Survey is a cross-national survey project with 38 participating countries. It was founded in 2001, with the first data collection period taking place in 2002. Including the first one, nine rounds have been conducted until 2020, one every two years. So far, between 22 and 30 countries took part in each wave, most of them European states, with a few exceptions (Israel, the Russian Federation and Turkey). The main headquarters are located at City, University of London, but there are also appointed national coordinators to supervise the procedure in each participating state. The central questionnaire is translated into national languages, with question blocks titled *Media and social trust*, *Politics*, *Subjective well-being*, *Gender and household*, *Socio-demographics* and *Human values* in each survey as well as a thematic block which differs from round to round (e.g. on immigration, asked in 2002 and 2014). The data files, questionnaires and documentation reports are all publicly accessible on the ESS website<sup>66</sup>.

Because I needed to compare data from multiple points in time, I chose to analyze five out of the nine rounds, one every four years: those from 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018. As the surveys are conducted with the facilitation of longitudinal research in mind, the questions as well as the answer categories are kept the same wherever possible. However, some

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Link to the ESS website: <u>https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/</u>

differences do exist, those of relevance to the project will be elaborated on in the next subchapter. The participating countries vary from round to round, *Table 1* presents an overview of them. With the focus being on Europe, I decided to exclude states situated outside of the region, this is why Israel and the Russian Federation are not included in the table. There are some countries which participated in Round 9, but their data has not been released yet at the time of writing. They are marked with a grey *x*. Unfortunately, these had to be left out of the analysis as well.

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
Austria	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Belgium	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Bulgaria		х	Х		Х
Croatia			Х		Х
Cyprus		Х	Х		Х
Czechia	Х		Х	Х	Х
Denmark	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Estonia		Х	Х	Х	Х
Finland	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
France	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Germany	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Greece	Х		Х		
Hungary	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Iceland					Х
Ireland	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Italy	Х				х
Latvia		х		X	Х
Lithuania			Х	Х	Х
Luxembourg	Х				
Montenegro					Х
Netherlands	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Norway	Х	х	X	х	х
Poland	Х	x	X	х	Х
Portugal	Х	х	Х	Х	X
Romania		х			

Table 1: ESS participating countries by round

Serbia					Х
Slovakia		х	Х		Х
Slovenia	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Spain	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Sweden	Х	х	Х	Х	Х
Switzerland	Х	х	Х	Х	х
Ukraine		х	Х		
United Kingdom	Х	х	Х	Х	х
Total	21	24	26	20	19

As we can see, there is data on countries from all parts of Europe, varying between 19 and 26 analyzed countries per round. Therefore, even if we cannot talk about representativity here, based on this it is possible to detect regional patterns in attitudes and their relationship with socioeconomic status and see how they have changed over time. However, it has to be noted here that there are only 12 countries which participated in every round and as only three of them are Eastern or Southern European states it is not possible to include these alone. Tracking changes in individual societies is not affected by this but it has to be kept in mind when analyzing regional patterns.

As I was aiming to assess the attitudes of majority populations, when conducting the analysis I decided to only include those who are not first-generation immigrants (operationalized by giving a 'no' answer to the question *Were you born in [country]?*). This selection is common among studies on attitudes related to migration. It is a choice which can be debated as citizens of a state are members of the political community and therefore, they shape the social climate and prevalent attitudes of the system they live in. However, as I was not mainly interested in the overall level of prejudice but its relationship with socioeconomic status, including them would have biased my results, especially as the percentage of immigrants living in Southern and Eastern Europe is much lower than in Northwestern Europe. In the preliminary data analysis phase, I did conduct the multivariate linear regressions for the whole population as well, but they were 1-2, in some cases even 3-4 percentage points lower in their

explanatory power (looking at adjusted  $R^2$  values). Additionally, not looking further beyond first-generation immigration background can be seen as a 'compromise' between the two approaches.

Lastly, an important issue which has to be addressed when analyzing integrated datasets is applying weights. The number of observations differs in each country, therefore, if we want to run a regression model or calculate the means of a variable for the whole of Europe, for example, we need to make sure that all countries weigh the same. Otherwise, the results will be skewed. The same is true for biases resulting from the sampling procedure inside each country (when individuals from certain parts of the population have a higher chance of being selected). The ESS provides a detailed guide on the weighting procedure.<sup>67</sup> Based on this, I used post-stratification weights in every case except in 2018 where only the design weight was available. Additionally, whenever data from more than one country was combined during the analysis, I applied population size weights as well. Here, it has to be noted that in Round 3, the datafile of Latvia and Romania was added to the website later on and it does not include design or post-stratification weights. Therefore, data from those two countries may be less reliable in that year.

### 2.2 Variables and indices

The operationalization of the theoretical concepts was based on existing literature and the available data in the surveys. The variables used in the models can be grouped into three categories: 1. those measuring attitudes related to migration and 2. socioeconomic status as well as 3. the control variables. *Table 3* at the end of the subchapter provides an overview of them. In the following, I will describe which questions I used and how I computed the indices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> "Weighting European Social Survey Data," European Social Survey, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS\_weighting\_data\_1.pdf.

### 2.2.1 The anti-immigration attitude index

As discussed in Chapter 2, anti-immigration attitudes can be measured in several ways depending on the type of research question the study aims to answer. In this project, one of the goals was to establish certain groups based on socioeconomic factors which had distinct attitudes when it comes to supporting or being against immigration. Most of the ESS surveys have 6 questions connected to this topic. Round 1 (2002) and 7 (2014) address the issue in the greatest detail as the special thematic block in those years was immigration. However, as the project was also seeking to determine trends over time, these could not be used.

One set of questions included in all examined rounds is about attitudes related to different immigrant groups: 1. To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here? 2. How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? 3. How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? The other is about opinions on the effect of migration: 4. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? 5. Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? 6. Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other from other countries?

As the project is only indirectly concerned with cultural and economic threat theory, I decided to only include the first three questions in the analyses which ask directly about support for immigration. The answer categories were recoded in the case of each variable so that the maximum, 4 had the label *Allow many to come here*, 3 meant *Allow some*, 2 *Allow a few* and 1 *Allow none*. As the next step, I constructed a simple additive index with the three items, a maximum value of 12 and a minimum value of 3. In order to make the models more easily interpretable later on, I standardized it to have a range of 0 to 1. Confirmatory factor analyses

(*Table 2*) show that the items of the index do load onto one factor consistently in all rounds which is in line with what previous literature suggests.<sup>68</sup>

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9	
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)	
Allow people from same ethnic group	0,84	0,81	0,81	0,83	0,8	_
Allow people from different ethnic group	0,97	0,98	0,99	0,98	0,98	
Allow people from poorer non-European countries	0,92	0,87	0,88	0,86	0,88	

Table 2: Factor loadings of immigrant rejection items per ESS round

### 2.2.2 Education variables

In the case of socioeconomic factors I relied as much as possible on variables based on international, well-established classification schemes or relative instead of absolute measures included in the ESS data files in order to assure comparability between the many different contexts. This was not always feasible as these schemes have evolved over time and more outdated ones were left out of later rounds.

There are a number of variables measuring education in the ESS data files. Some of them are very detailed such as *EDULVLB* with 26 different codes, however, they are too elaborate for the purposes of this study. Therefore, in Rounds 5, 7 and 9, where it was available, I decided to use the simpler *EISCED* which is the ESS equivalent of the ISCED-97, the *International Standard Classification of Education* developed specifically for international comparison purposes by UNESCO. The *EISCED* variable consists of seven categories: 1. *ES*-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Davidov, Meuleman and Schmidt, "Values and Support for Immigration"; Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet,

<sup>&</sup>quot;Changing Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, 2002-2007."

ISCED I, less than lower secondary; 2. ES-ISCED II, lower secondary; 3. ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary; 4. ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary; 5. ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree; 6. ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, BA level and 7. ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level.<sup>69</sup> The eighth category, made up of those whose educational attainment was not possible to harmonize into ES-ISCED, was left out of the analysis. Additionally, EISCED was renamed educ\_7. Other than these, no changes were made to the original variable.

However, in the case of Round 1 and 3, *EISCED* is not available for every country in the database. For this reason, when analyzing data from 2002 and 2006 I used the slightly differently constructed *EDULVLA* which was also based on ISCED-97. It is a variable with five answer categories: 1. *Less than lower secondary education* (ISCED 0-1); 2. *Lower secondary education completed* (ISCED 2); 3. *Upper secondary education completed* (ISCED 3); 4. *Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed* (ISCED 4) and 5. *Tertiary education completed* (ISCED 5-6).<sup>70</sup> Those observations which could not be harmonized into the scheme were left out here as well.

### 2.2.3 Income variables

There are important differences between rounds in the case of the household income variable as well. In 2010, 2014 and 2018, a decile approach was applied to measure income. This has the advantage of being a relative figure and thus, more informative when used for cross-country comparison. For example, a monthly gross household income per capita of 513 euros in 2018, an absolute measure, signals a completely different social status in Hungary where this was about the average value than in Germany where the average was around 2570 euros. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> "ESS9 Appendix A1: Education," European Social Survey, accessed May 7, 2020, <u>https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round9/survey/ESS9\_appendix\_a1\_e01\_1.pdf</u>, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> "Education Upgrade ESS1-ESS4 Documentation Report," European Social Survey, accessed May 7, 2020, <u>https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/education\_upgrade\_ESS1-4\_e01\_3.pdf</u>, 6.

variable *HINCTNTA* has 10 categories, representing the 10 income deciles, based on the household's monthly total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources.<sup>71</sup> The deciles were counted with the median income taken from other data sources being the reference point. High values refer to the higher and low values to the lower deciles. In order to make the models more easily interpretable it was renamed *hshold\_incm* but was not changed apart from that.

Before 2010, in 2006 and 2002, income was still measured in absolute terms, with respondents grouped into 12 categories, from 1 - Less than  $\ell 150$  to  $12 - \ell 10$  000 or more. Preliminary linear regression models involving multiple countries and the income variable *HINCTNT* did not show any significant relationship between income and attitudes towards immigration. This was most probably due to the fact that in a cross-national context, an absolute income measure loses all of its explanatory power. This methodological weakness has been criticized in the literature as well.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, I grouped the observations per country, based on the four-value income position variable which Schneider used in her study on anti-immigrant attitudes and perceived ethnic threat.<sup>73</sup> Following Schneider, I recoded the responses into the following categories: 1. *Relative poverty* (lower than 50% of the average equivalized income); 2. *Low income* (50-80% of the national average); 3. *Average income* (80-120%); 4. *High income* (above 120%).<sup>74</sup> Data on the average equivalized income in Euros per country for 2002 and 2006 was taken from Eurostat<sup>75</sup>. The equivalized income for each respondent's household was calculated by taking the median value of each income category in the *HINCTNT* variable (e.g. 75€ for the *under 150€* and 225€ for the *150€ to 300€* category) and dividing it by a weight

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> "Appendix A2: Income, ESS9," European Social Survey, accessed May 8, 2020, https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round9/survey/ESS9\_appendix\_a2\_e01\_0.pdf, 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Warner, "Methodological Discussion of the Income Measure in the European Social Survey Round 1."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Schneider, "Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Europe."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Schneider, "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe," 58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> "Mean and Median Income by Household Type - EU-SILC and ECHP Surveys," Eurostat, accessed May 9, 2020, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do.

calculated according to household size and household members' age. 1.0 was assigned to the first adult, 0.5 to all members above the age of 14 and 0.3 to children under the age of 14. This procedure is in accordance with the Eurostat equivalized income measure.<sup>76</sup>

The outcome is less reliable than the decile variable of later rounds for five reasons: 1. it did not use the median but the average equivalized income; 2. *HINCTNT* which it was based on is an ordinal rather than a numerical variable; 3. the resulting variable only has five categories, 4. in 2002, because of lack of data on the average equivalized income, data from 2005 or 2006 had to be used in the case of 12 states; 5. there were three countries (France, Hungary and Ireland) in 2002 and four in 2006 (Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine) which had no income variable in the dataset due to errors in the fieldwork process. For the countries with no income variable, the multivariate regression model was constructed without it.

### 2.2.4 Occupation and employment status variables

In line with the theories and already existing research, three types of occupation variables were included in the models: 1. occupation type, 2. employment status and 3. occupational class. To categorize occupation types, ESS uses the ISCO framework which is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupation of the ILO. In Rounds 1, 3 and 5, ISCO-88 was used, in Round 7 and 9 they used the updated ISCO-08 framework. In the frameworks, 4-digit coding was applied which is much too detailed for the purposes of this study. Therefore, in the variable *occup* I used in the models I recoded the observations into one of the nine major groups: 1. *Elementary occupations*, 2. *Plant and machine operators and assemblers*, 3. *Craft and related trades workers*, 4. *Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers*, 5. *Services and Sales* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> "Glossary: Equivalised Income," Eurostat, accessed May 9, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Equivalised\_income.

workers, 6. Clerical support workers, 7. Technicians and associate professionals, 8. Professionals, 9. Managers.

The employment status variable was based on literature on the political behavior of labor market insiders and outsiders. I used the three groups used by Rovny and Rovny in their analysis<sup>77</sup> which was based on Emmenegger's study:<sup>78</sup> 1. *Labor market outsiders*, 2. *Labor market insiders* and 3. *Upscales* (the self-employed and non-employed such as students are left out of this analysis). Insiders "are full-time employees under permanent contract who do not occupy a higher-grade professional, administrative or managerial position."<sup>79</sup> Outsiders are those who are either working part-time, have a temporary contract or are unemployed.<sup>80</sup> Here, I distinguished between these three categories. Lastly, upscales are those who have a higher-grade professional, administrative or managerial position and thus, are in a privileged situation where they do not have to be afraid of unemployment.<sup>81</sup>

Following Rovny and Rovny, I partly derived the categories from ESeC (*European Socio-economic Classification*), using the detailed recoding syntax provided on their website.<sup>82</sup> ESeC is created by using 1. information about occupation based on ISCO-88 and 2. information about employment status and size of the organization the respondent works for. In addition to this, I used the following questions from the survey: 1. *What are/were your total 'basic' or contracted hours each week (in your main job), excluding any paid and unpaid overtime?* 2. *Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)? In paid work / In education / Unemployed* 3. *Do/did you have a work contract of... Unlimited / Limited.* 

Overall, using Rovny and Rovny's operationalization method, the categories of the employment status variable look like this: 1. *Unemployed*; 2. *Working part-time* (less than 30

<sup>77</sup> Rovny and Rovny, "Outsiders at the Ballot Box."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Emmenegger, "Barriers to Entry."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Rovny and Rovny, "Outsiders at the Ballot Box," 164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Rovny and Rovny, 164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Rovny and Rovny, 164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> <u>https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/archives/esec/matrices-and-syntax</u>

hours per week); 3. *Limited work contract*; 4. *Insiders*: those in paid employment with unlimited contracts, but not in privileged positions (ESeC  $\neq$  1); 5. *Upscales*: the top ESeC category.<sup>83</sup>

The occupational class variable was fully based on ESeC which consists of nine classes, grouping occupational categorizations of the ISCO-88 framework: 1. *Large employers, higher grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations: 'the higher salariat'; 2. Lower grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations: higher grade technician and supervisory occupations: 'the lower salariat'; 3. Intermediate occupations: 'higher grade white collar workers'; 4 & 5. Small employers and self-employed in non-professional occupations: 'petit-bourgeoisie or independents'; 6. Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations: 'higher grade blue collar workers'; 7. Lower services, sales and clerical occupations: 'lower grade white collar workers'; 8. Lower technical occupations: 'skilled workers'; 9. Routine occupations: 'semi- and unskilled workers'. Because Rounds 7 and 9 only include the updated ISCO-08 categorization method, in these years I converted their values to ISCO-08, based on the correspondence tables available on the ILO's website.<sup>84</sup>* 

Finally, I included age and gender as control variables in the linear regression models. The original ESS variables were not modified for the analysis.

	Variable name	Variable label	Values and value labels	Rounds included
Control variables	agea	Age	Age in years	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
	gndr	Gender	1 – Male; 2 – Female	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Rovny and Rovny, "Outsiders at the Ballot Box", 173.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> ILO website, ISCO-08 Structure, index correspondence with ISCO-88, https://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/.

	same_etn	To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?	<ol> <li>Allow none</li> <li>Allow a few</li> <li>Allow some</li> <li>Allow many</li> </ol>	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
Anti- immigration index items	diff_etn	How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?	<ol> <li>Allow none</li> <li>Allow a few</li> <li>Allow some</li> <li>Allow many</li> </ol>	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
	poorer_ctnr	How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?	<ol> <li>Allow none</li> <li>Allow a few</li> <li>Allow some</li> <li>Allow many</li> </ol>	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
Anti- immigration index	allow	Anti-immigration index	Minimum: <b>0</b> (against immigration) Maximum: <b>1</b> (supports immigration)	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
Income	hshold_incm	Deciles by household's monthly total net income	<ol> <li>1 – First decile</li> <li>2 – Second decile</li> <li></li> <li>10 – Tenth decile</li> </ol>	Round 5, 7, 9
variables	income	Equivalized income groups	<ul> <li>1 - Relative poverty</li> <li>2 - Low income</li> <li>3 - Average income</li> <li>4 - High income</li> </ul>	Round 1, 3
			1 - Less than lower	

	educ_5	Highest level of education (5 categories)	<ul> <li>1 – Less than lower secondary education</li> <li>2 – Lower secondary education completed</li> <li>3 – Upper secondary education completed</li> <li>4 – Post-secondary nontertiary education completed</li> <li>5 – Tertiary education completed</li> </ul>	Round 1, 3
Occupation variables	оссир	Occupation group	<ol> <li>Elementary occupations</li> <li>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</li> <li>Craft and related trades workers</li> <li>Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers</li> <li>Services and sales workers</li> <li>Clerical support workers</li> <li>Technicians and associate professionals</li> <li>Professionals</li> <li>Managers</li> </ol>	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
	esec	European Socio-economic classification	<ol> <li>1 – EseC Class 9</li> <li>2 – EseC Class 8</li> <li></li> <li>9 – EseC Class 1</li> </ol>	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
	empl_stat	Employment status	<ol> <li>1 – Outsiders: unemployed</li> <li>2 – Outsiders: part-time</li> <li>3 – Outsiders: limited contract</li> <li>4 - Labor market insiders</li> <li>5 – Upscales</li> </ol>	Round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9

### 2.3 Models

### **2.3.1 Descriptive statistics**

In order to get an initial overview of the variables and the data I looked at some descriptive statistics. Firstly, with the help of factor analysis I tested if the items of the anti-immigration index are part of the same latent structure in each country. I only did so for one round (that of 2018) as the factor analysis for the whole of Europe shows the same factor scores through all rounds (see *Table 2*). Then, I examined changes in the mean of the anti-immigration attitude index over time. I did so for the whole of Europe, for the three regions of Southern, Northwestern and Eastern Europe and lastly, for each individual country. I considered *Southern Europe* to consist of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal; *Eastern Europe* of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Ukraine; and *Northwestern Europe* of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Additionally, as the mean does not tell us anything about how polarized societies are in terms of attitudes towards immigration I also looked at how values on the index are distributed among the respondents and how that has changed over time. Polarization in individual attitudes can be measured in a number of ways in the social sciences, depending on what we want to analyze.<sup>85</sup> For the purposes of this study, I chose to simply measure statistical dispersion (variation) which looks at the shape of how the data is distributed.<sup>86</sup> The measure I used is the *average absolute deviation around the mean* as it is a simple, widely accepted and informative way to express how close values are to the mean in a dataset. It is calculated by subtracting the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Bramson et al., "Understanding Polarization," 120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Bramson et al., 120.
mean from each value. It is also more robust than the other common measure, *standard deviation*, as it does not give more weight to outlier values by squaring them.

#### 2.3.2 Bivariate and multivariate linear regression models

The next step in the data analysis process was to construct bivariate regression models to see how each socioeconomic variable is related to the anti-immigration index. As the dependent variable is (more or less) numerical and continuous I used linear regression. I calculated these for Europe, the three regions and each country, with the standardized anti-immigration index being the dependent and either education, income, occupation group, ESeC class or employment status being the independent variable.

The multivariate regression models included all variables except for occupational class and served to determine the overall effect of the social status indicators on attitude towards immigration. Here, the dependent variable remained the anti-immigration index and income, education, occupation group as well as employment status were entered as the independent variables. Age and gender served as control variables. Every predictor apart from age was entered as an ordinal variable. R has a separate function for this which automatically codes every category of the predictor as a dummy variable in order to look at the effect of each of them separately. This yields better results in terms of explanatory value. Here, it was possible to look at country-level polarization in terms of attitudes, but also to look at the differences between the regions.

# CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

### 3.1 Anti-immigration attitudes in Europe over time

*Table 4* shows the results of the factor analysis using the three anti-immigration index items. The numbers represent the factor scores for each item in each country for Round 9 as well as the percentage of total variance explained, indicating how well the underlying factor does in holding information from all three variables.

	diff_etn	poorer_cntr	same_etn	Total variance explained (%)
Austria	1	0,9	0,82	0,82
Belgium	0,97	0,87	0,83	0,8
Bulgaria	0,96	0,88	0,73	0,74
Cyprus	0,97	0,86	0,61	0,69
Czechia	0,93	0,84	0,77	0,73
Estonia	1	0,79	0,61	0,66
Finland	0,94	0,85	0,79	0,74
France	0,99	0,89	0,87	0,84
Germany	1	0,82	0,75	0,74
Hungary	1	0,68	0,56	0,6
Ireland	0,99	0,91	0,87	0,85
Italy	1	0,89	0,89	0,86
Netherlands	0,98	0,86	0,91	0,84
Norway	0,96	0,89	0,88	0,83
Poland	0,93	0,86	0,77	0,74
Serbia	0,99	0,83	0,76	0,74
Slovenia	0,93	0,84	0,77	0,72
Switzerland	0,99	0,87	0,82	0,8
United Kingdom	0,99	0,9	0,92	0,87
Mean total	0,97	0,85	0,79	0,77

Table 4: Anti-immigration index item factor scores per country (ESS 2018)

As we can see, the *different ethnic group* item has the highest loading everywhere, with factor scores above 0,95. The *poorer countries* item also has very high scores. In most countries, *same ethnic group* fits the latent structure the least, especially so in Eastern Europe. There are three states in which it seems to be an outlier: Cyprus, Estonia and Hungary. This is most probably

because in these societies, ethnicity is an especially prevalent category, making the issue of same ethnicity immigrants more of a separate one. In Hungary, solidarity with transborder minorities is often connected to ethnic nationalism and the national trauma of loss of territories after WWI.<sup>87</sup> In Estonia, partly due to targeted policy encouraging it, return migration of ethnic Estonians is very high and politicized,<sup>88</sup> making up around half of the total immigration rate in the last few years.<sup>89</sup> Finally, Cyprus is a deeply divided state, with long-standing territorial conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, during which internal displacement of both ethnic groups has taken place, as well as migration from Turkey to the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, recent spikes in migration flow from non-EU countries have placed a heavy burden on the island which now has the highest number of asylum seekers per capita in the European Union.<sup>91</sup> These issues separate the two questions from each other.

However, despite these individual cases, on average, the underlying factor explains 77% of the total variance of the three variables which is very high, showing that they do measure the same attitude and thus, that the anti-immigration index is a good measure across all included countries. As the factor analysis for the whole of Europe showed very little variance in factor scores across rounds, I do not include data from other years.

*Table 5* shows the means of the anti-immigration index for every country in each ESS round. Because trends in these attitudes are not the main focus of this thesis, they will not be discussed in detail, I will only outline the major developments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Pogonyi, "Transborder Kin-Minority as Symbolic Resource in Hungary."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Kulu and Tammaru, "Ethnic Return Migration from the East and the West."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Tammaru, Tiit, Kristina Kallas and Raul Eamets, "Estonian Human Development Report 2016/2017."

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Psaltis, Loizides, LaPierre and Stefanovic, "Transitional Justice and Acceptance of Cohabitation in Cyprus."
 <sup>91</sup> Stevis-Gridneff, "Asylum Seekers Find a New Route to Europe, Flowing into a Divided Cyprus," *New York Times*, January 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/world/europe/cyprus-migrant-crisis.html.

Table 5: 1	Anti-immigrant	attitude ind	lex averages	per country
	0		0	1 /

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
Austria	0,46	0,5	0,49	0,51	0,49
Belgium	0,53	0,54	0,52	0,54	0,62
Bulgaria	-	0,57	0,63	-	0,39
Croatia	-	-	0,56	-	-
Cyprus	-	0,35	0,36	-	0,4
Czechia	0,49	-	0,41	0,37	0,32
Denmark	0,55	0,57	0,59	0,58	-
Estonia	-	0,44	0,49	0,49	0,5
Finland	0,49	0,49	0,46	0,51	0,55
France	0,51	0,51	0,52	0,55	0,59
Germany	0,56	0,52	0,59	0,67	0,68
Greece	0,34	-	0,34	-	-
Hungary	0,38	0,34	0,4	0,35	0,3
Ireland	0,6	0,6	0,49	0,49	0,62
Italy	0,59	-	-	-	0,52
Latvia	-	0,39	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	0,6	0,51	-
Luxembourg	0,5	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0,53	0,5	0,55	0,57	0,59
Norway	0,58	0,6	0,61	0,66	0,7
Poland	0,55	0,64	0,65	0,55	0,45
Portugal	0,42	0,38	0,41	0,5	-
Romania	-	0,59	-	-	-
Serbia	-	-	-	-	0,52
Slovakia	-	0,58	0,48	-	-
Slovenia	0,53	0,52	0,55	0,56	0,55
Spain	0,54	0,5	0,51	0,57	-
Sweden	0,71	0,73	0,75	0,78	-
Switzerland	0,62	0,59	0,59	0,59	0,63
Ukraine	-	0,59	0,58	-	-
United Kingdom	0,5	0,48	0,47	0,49	0,61
Mean total	0,52	0,52	0,52	0,54	0,53
Mean CEE, SE	0,48	0,49	0,50	0,49	0,44
Mean NWE	0,55	0,55	0,55	0,58	0,61

(range: 0 to 1, low values: more rejecting)

The index averages show the same trends as other studies on the subject have discussed: if we look at the whole of Europe, attitudes towards migration are relatively stable over time, with growing concerns regarding anti-immigrant sentiments not reflected in the data. This is so even in 2018, after the so-called "migration crisis" – on average, people have a value of 0,53 on the

index. Countries such as Belgium, Germany, Norway and even the UK have had remarkable growth in tolerance and many states (e.g. Switzerland, Slovenia and Austria) have around the same value over the years.

However, the picture is different if we look at the means calculated for the regions of Europe separately. While there has been an increase in Northwestern Europe, from 0,56 in 2002 to 0,61 in 2018, Eastern and Southern Europe have experienced a decline in willingness to accept immigrants. Here, the migration crisis seems to have constituted a turning point as the change took place between 2014 and 2018. As we can see, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are responsible for this, values for the other countries are lower than in the West but remained stable or have increased slightly. These figures are not surprising, they reflect the national governments' position on the issue.

All in all, the changes that have taken place in anti-immigration attitudes in Europe may not seem remarkable at first glance, but they do show a growing cleavage between the regions of Europe. Attitudes were always more favorable in Western than in Eastern/Southern European countries, but the difference was about the same in each of the first four analyzed rounds. In 2018, trends in Western Europe continued in the same direction, but reversed in CEE and SE, resulting in a 0,17 difference in the index values, almost twice as high as the 0,09 difference in 2002. Therefore, we can say that in this respect, 2015 can be considered a turning point in Europe as it led to increasing polarization between the regions.

Although by examining trends in the mean of the anti-immigrant attitude index it is possible to show polarization *between* states and regions, it does not show polarization *within* countries. Therefore, *Table 6* depicts the changes in standard deviation for each country over the rounds.

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
Austria	0,194	0,204	0,23	0,217	0,214
Belgium	0,201	0,2	0,21	0,198	0,176
Bulgaria	-	0,276	0,262	-	0,233
Croatia	-	-	0,282	-	-
Cyprus	-	0,148	0,166	-	0,142
Czechia	0,2	-	0,209	0,189	0,196
Denmark	0,178	0,172	0,175	0,176	-
Estonia	-	0,199	0,199	0,189	0,189
Finland	0,188	0,18	0,176	0,194	0,176
France	0,197	0,198	0,197	0,197	0,2
Germany	0,189	0,213	0,199	0,173	0,166
Greece	0,144	-	0,19	-	-
Hungary	0,155	0,188	0,195	0,181	0,179
Ireland	0,173	0,191	0,246	0,223	0,209
Italy	0,214	-	-	-	0,241
Latvia	-	0,269	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	0,235	0,226	-
Luxembourg	0,224	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0,187	0,212	0,197	0,192	0,191
Norway	0,176	0,181	0,175	0,155	0,167
Poland	0,184	0,196		0,21	0,2
Portugal	0,228	0,238	0,223	0,21	-
Romania	-	0,269	-	-	-
Serbia	-	-	-	-	0,258
Slovakia	-	0,231	0,243	-	-
Slovenia	0,191	0,205	0,193	0,203	0,182
Spain	0,233	0,244	0,248	0,249	-
Sweden	0,16	0,176	0,172	0,177	-
Switzerland	0,153	0,171	0,175	0,166	0,168
Ukraine	-	0,241	0,249	-	-
United Kingdom	0,205	0,212	0,223	0,213	0,191
Mean total	0,189	0,209	0,211	0,197	0,194
Mean CEE, SE	0,194	0,224	0,223	0,207	0,205
Mean NWE	0,188	0,194	0,198	0,190	0,186

Table 6: MAD (average absolute deviation around the mean) values per country and round

Overall, the level of polarization increased between 2002 and 2010 and has shown a decreasing tendency since then but is still higher than in 2002. Its values range from 0,142 (Cyprus, 2018) to 0,282 (Croatia, 2010).

If we look at the mean deviation calculated for the regions, we can see that not only are Southern and Eastern European countries less accepting of immigrants than those in Northwestern Europe, they are also more divided regarding the issue. In 2018, while the mean for the whole of Europe was 0,194, the average MAD was 0,186 for the West and 0,205 for the other two regions. Austria, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland experienced a large increase in polarization over the years while values in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Norway and the UK have sharply declined. Thus, changes over time do not show clear regional patterns, nor can we find a link between how the MAD and the anti-immigration index have evolved in recent years.

Based on the data in Table 5 and 6, we can group countries into four types: 1. those where people are 1. *universally accepting of immigrants* (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), 2. *universally rejecting* (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Greece), 3. *accepting but divided* (Croatia, France, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Ukraine), and finally, where they are 4. *rejecting but divided* (Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Serbia). We can see that most Western European states are in the first group and none of them are in the second. Only one country can be classified as rejecting: Austria. Eastern and Southern Europe are more diverse regarding their level of acceptance, but with the exception of Slovenia, countries which are relatively accepting are at the same time divided on the issue. This supports the argument that Northwestern Europe is moving towards increased acceptance of immigrants while Southern and Eastern Europe are still struggling with tolerance and internal divisions.

### 3.2 Bivariate regression models

Before moving on to discuss the overall effect of socioeconomic status on attitudes towards immigrants, I present the three types of indicators separately. I will do so by looking at the

effect sizes and directions for the countries and rounds, as well as compare the regions in these regards. This allows for a more detailed discussion of how much each variable contributes to the overall effect and if they show the same trends over time.

### 3.2.1 Education

As discussed, level of education has been found to have a large effect on ethnic prejudice in general and attitudes towards migration in particular as well, but only in Western European countries where schools place emphasis on conveying values like tolerance and empathy. In Eastern and Southern Europe, this effect is smaller. My findings confirm this and also shed light on how the connection has changed over the past years, especially after the migration crisis.

*Table 7* contains the  $\mathbb{R}^2$  (*R-squared*) values, depicting the proportion of variance in antiimmigration attitudes explained by the education variable per country and round. There are vast differences between states: values range from not significant (e.g. Bulgaria, 2018) to 0,133 (France, 2014). As expected, Eastern and Southern Europe fare worse in this regard, with the average explanatory power being between 3 and 4,7 percent and some countries, specifically Latvia and Ukraine not showing significant scores at all (non-significant effects marked with \*). Northwestern Europe has mean values that are almost twice as high, ranging from 0,063 to 0,076.

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
Austria	0,047	0,041	0,034	0,091	0,088
Belgium	0,081	0,073	0,081	0,054	0,074
Bulgaria	-	0,025	0,009	-	*0,000
Croatia	-	-	0,016	-	-
Cyprus	-	0,030	0,079	-	0,055

Table 7: R-squared values for education per country and round

Czechia	0,044	-	0,007	0,015	0,023
Denmark	0,051	0,089	0,062	0,082	-
Estonia	-	0,001	0,006	0,008	0,024
Finland	0,071	0,075	0,055	0,086	0,056
France	0,119	0,090	0,124	0,133	0,090
Germany	0,048	0,047	0,068	0,066	0,037
Greece	0,042	-	0,051	-	-
Hungary	0,045	0,033	0,058	0,032	0,023
Ireland	0,046	0,038	0,057	0,086	0,100
Italy	0,051	-	-	-	0,049
Latvia	-	*0,002	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	0,012	0,013	-
Luxembourg	0,045	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0,052	0,066	0,081	0,069	0,040
Norway	0,091	0,075	0,041	0,029	0,019
Poland	0,038	0,017	0,025	0,030	0,068
Portugal	0,034	0,058	0,055	0,086	-
Romania	-	0,004	-	-	-
Serbia	-	-	-	-	0,011
Slovakia	-	*0,011	0,037	-	-
Slovenia	0,032	0,070	0,055	0,118	0,085
Spain	0,035	0,100	0,075	0,074	-
Sweden	0,055	0,067	0,073	0,062	-
Switzerland	0,055	0,087	0,054	0,073	0,041
Ukraine	-	*0,007	*0,001	-	-
United Kingdom	0,083	0,064	0,098	0,078	0,077
Mean total	0,055	0,049	0,050	0,064	0,050
Mean CEE, SE	0,040	0,030	0,035	0,047	0,037
Mean NWE	0,065	0,068	0,069	0,076	0,062

The differences between regions stayed around the same over time, the most interesting development was the effect of 2015 on the explanatory power of education. Before Round 9, it had been increasing steadily, however, it suddenly dropped after the migration crisis, decreasing in 11 out of the 15 countries which participated in Round 7 as well. This change is most probably due to the fact that framings referring to cultural threat became more important in determining these attitudes.

The direction of the effects is the same across all countries and rounds: the better educated a person is, the more likely they are to support immigration. The effect is almost perfectly linear, as the regression tables depicting the no-intercept model for the three regions in 2018 show (*Table 8* and *9*). The most striking finding if we compare the coefficients in the two tables is that in Northwestern Europe, someone with less than lower secondary education has, on average, the same level of acceptance of immigrants as a person holding a Bachelor degree in Southern or Eastern Europe. This is also visible in the regression plot in *Graph 1*. The difference between the regions in the explanatory power of education shows in the aggregated models as well: in SE-CEE the adjusted R-squared is 0,032 while in NWE it is twice as high, 0,065 (the extremely high adjusted R-squared value visible in the tables has to be disregarded as it is inaccurate due to the no-intercept model forcing the regression line to go through zero).

Table 8: Regression table for anti-immigrant attitude and education in SE and CEE (2018)

Coeffici	ents:					
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )		
educ_71	0.405335	0.008122	49.91	<2e-16	* * *	
educ_72	0.442293	0.004034	109.64	<2e-16	* * *	
educ_73	0.400103	0.006524	61.33	<2e-16	***	
educ_74	0.474718	0.004036	117.62	<2e-16	***	
educ_75	0.447471	0.009334	47.94	<2e-16	***	
educ_76	0.534301	0.008849	60.38	<2e-16	* * *	
educ_77	0.570882	0.006486	88.02	<2e-16	* * *	
Signif.	codes:					
0 '***'	0.001 '**	' 0.01'*'	0.05 '.'	0.1''	1	
Residual	standard	error: 0.2	2288 on 1	L5468 degi	ees of fre	edorr
Multiple	R-square	d: 0.7475,	, Adjı	isted R-so	uared: 0.	7474
			_			
F-statis	tic: 654	3 on 7 and	15468 DF	=, p-valı	ie: < 2.2e-	16

Table 9: Regression table for anti-immigrant attitudes and education in Western Europe (2018)

Coeffici	ients:					
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )		
educ_71	0.518796	0.005887	88.13	<2e-16	***	
educ_72	0.605160	0.004969	121.78	<2e-16	***	
educ_73	0.570799	0.003510	162.60	<2e-16	***	
educ_74	0.637818	0.004789	133.19	<2e-16	***	
educ_75	0.645235	0.004177	154.49	<2e-16	***	
educ_76	0.703571	0.005171	136.06	<2e-16	***	
educ_77	0.719512	0.004373	164.53	<2e-16	***	
signif.	codes:					
0 '***'	0.001 '**	' 0.01'*'	0.05 '.	'0.1''	1	
					-	<i>c</i> .
Residua	l standard	error: 0.2	2554 on .	18676 degr	rees of	freedom
Multiple	e R-square	d: 0.8/94	, Adjı	isted R-so	quared:	0.8794
E stati	+ 1 04	60,01 on 7	and 196	76 DF D	value	< 2 20
F-Statis	SUIC: 1.94	6e+04 on 7	and 100	о DF, p-	-varue:	< 2.2e-
TO						





All in all, we can say that when it comes to the relationship between level of education and attitudes towards immigrants, the observable effect is much larger in NWE than in CEE and SE. Additionally, education seems to be a slightly less relevant factor since 2015, indicating the effect of the migration crisis. The effect of the Great Recession cannot be observed, but this is most probably due to the fact that it is not a direct indicator of economic vulnerability, which is the reason why socioeconomic status is hypothesized to have become more relevant.

### **3.2.2 Income**

As previous studies show, income has a smaller effect on anti-immigrant sentiments than education, with an average  $R^2$  value of around 0,02 if we look at the countries of Europe separately (*Table 10*). Negligible effects of under 0,01 are not uncommon, even though almost all of them are significant. Countries where no effect can be observed are Greece, Hungary and the Netherlands. Income seems to be a more meaningful predictor with values consistently above 0,02 in Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
Austria	0,007	*0,002	0,015	0,014	0,005
Belgium	0,020	0,024	0,040	0,029	0,030
Bulgaria	-	0,016	0,020	-	0,009
Croatia	-	-	0,012	-	-
Cyprus	-	0,005	0,053	-	0,011
Czechia	0,022	-	0,004	0,003	0,009
Denmark	0,024	0,015	0,022	0,017	-
Estonia	-	-	0,027	-	0,067
Finland	0,009	0,020	0,009	0,020	0,019
France	-	0,015	0,013	0,037	0,023
Germany	0,031	0,027	0,042	0,038	0,019
Greece	0,016	-	0,007	-	-
Hungary	-	-	0,016	*0,000	*0,000
Ireland	-	0,019	0,006	0,031	0,050
Italy	0,045	-	-	-	0,019
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	0,026	0,009	-
Luxembourg	0,008	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0,011	0,010	0,013	0,005	0,003
Norway	0,020	0,006	0,013	0,004	*0,001
Poland	0,016	0,007	0,046	0,022	0,042
Portugal	0,014	0,024	-	0,073	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	-
Serbia	-	-	-	-	0,011
Slovakia	-	0,005	0,013	-	-
Slovenia	0,027	0,074	0,050	0,082	0,043
Spain	0,017	0,042	0,055	0,050	-
Sweden	0,014	0,018	0,033	0,035	-
Switzerland	0,027	0,024	0,030	0,018	0,022
Ukraine	-	-	0,007	-	-
United Kingdom	0,039	0,026	0,030	0,024	0,016
Mean total	0,020	0,020	0,024	0,027	0,021
Mean CEE, SE	0,022	0,025	0,026	0,034	0,023
Mean NWE	0,019	0,017	0,022	0,023	0,019

Table 10: R-squared values for income per country and round

The *equivalized income groups* variable in 2002 and 2006 seems to be able to explain around the same amount as the *decimal income groups* variable of the later years. This is reassuring considering the very different methodology of its construction, however, it has to be noted that some trends over time may not be revealed this way.

The values do not form a regional pattern, although the effects are slightly higher in Southern and Eastern Europe in every year, the means ranging from 0,022 to 0,034 as opposed to 0,017 and 0,023 in Northwestern Europe. However, the longitudinal trend, showing similar tendencies in all regions, is the same as in the case of education: its effect increases over time until 2014 and decreases following the migration crisis.

Table 11: Linear regression for anti-immigrant attitude and income in SE and CEE (2018)

Coefficients:					
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )	
hshold_incm1	0.584249	0.006493	89.98	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm2	0.582192	0.005958	97.72	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm3	0.602382	0.006533	92.20	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm4	0.607549	0.006111	99.42	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm5	0.626719	0.005990	104.62	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm6	0.629521	0.005970	105.45	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm7	0.638379	0.005625	113.49	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm8	0.656137	0.005489	119.53	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm9	0.669047	0.005893	113.54	<2e-16	***
hshold_incm10	0.681013	0.005225	130.35	<2e-16	***
Signif. codes:	: 0 '***'	' 0.001'**'	0.01 ''	°'0.05'.	.'0.1''1
Residual stand	lard erron	r: 0.2597 or	n 16111 d	legrees of	F freedom
Multiple R-squ	uared: 0.	.8773, Ad	ljusted F	R-squared:	0.8772
F-statistic: 1	L.151e+04	on 10 and 1	L6111 DF,	, p-value	e: < 2.2e-16

Table 12: Linear regression for anti-immigrant attitude and education in Northwestern Europe (2018)

Coefficients:						
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )		
hshold_incm1	0.406517	0.008846	45.96	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm2	0.421735	0.007643	55.18	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm3	0.470567	0.007117	66.12	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm4	0.450515	0.007205	62.53	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm5	0.468719	0.007575	61.88	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm6	0.484928	0.007379	65.71	<2e-16	* * *	
hshold_incm7	0.501986	0.007424	67.62	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm8	0.468479	0.008651	54.16	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm9	0.500422	0.009867	50.72	<2e-16	***	
hshold_incm10	0.559558	0.010827	51.68	<2e-16	***	
Signif. codes:	0 '***	' 0.001'**'	0.01 '*	' 0.05'	.'0.1	''1
Residual stand	dard erro	r: 0.2109 or	n 11565 c	legrees of	f freed	lom
Multiple R-squ	uared: 0	.748, Ad	ljusted R	l-squared:	: 0.74	78
F-statistic:	3433 on 1	10 and 11565	5 DF. p-	value: <	2.2e-1	L6

The direction of the relationship is that the higher a person's income, the higher their score on the index, that is, the more likely they are to be accepting of new immigrants. If we look at the aggregated models for SE-CEE and Northwestern Europe for 2018 we find a consistent linear effect, with the lower income categories having lower scores on average (*Table 11* and *12*). Overall, the *adjusted R-squared* statistics show models that explain 0,018 (NWE) and 0,016 percent (SE-CEE) of the variation on the dependent variable, slightly less than in individual states. *Graph 2* shows the regression lines for the regions.



*Figure 2: Income and attitude towards immigrants in Europe (2018)* 

To sum up, the level of income has a positive, but a substantially smaller effect on the acceptance of immigrants than education, especially if we look at the country level. This effect was growing until 2014 but declined afterwards. It does not show regional patterns over time and the aggregated models show slightly smaller individual effects.

### **3.2.3 Occupation**

This subchapter deals with three variables, *occupation, employment status* and *occupational class* and compares them according to their explanatory power over time and across regions. Occupational groups differ according to the social status they indicate, therefore, the higher up a person's job is in the hierarchy, the more secure their social position is and consequently, the less likely they are to feel threatened by immigrants. After looking at the literature on the attitudes and political behavior of labor marker insiders and outsiders, I hypothesized that this is a meaningful category in the case of anti-immigrant attitudes as well because it focuses on economic vulnerability, something which occupational groupings do not do to this extent, and can therefore provide additional information. Finally, occupational class groups respondents according to their labor market position rather than only their job title and thus, it can be a better predictor of anti-immigrant attitude than simple occupation groups.

Firstly, the three tables (13, 14 and 15) depicting the effect sizes of each variable for the two regions over time are in line with the hypotheses and the trends observed in the other variables. All effects are significant, but they have differing explanatory value. Occupation group has the highest effect sizes (between 0,023 and 0,065) and employment status has the lowest (between 0,009 and 0,023), indicating that the insider-outsider divide is not so relevant. The ESeC groupings are in between. In the case of employment status, these numbers may be affected by the fact that in line with real-life values, respondents are very unequally distributed among the categories, most observations belong in the insider group and so, it is harder to find an effect. Overall, however, we can say that the ESeC scheme does not do a better job at explaining attitudes towards immigrants than the simple occupation groups provided by ESS, therefore, the latter will be included in the multivariate regression models along with the insider-outsider measurement.

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
NWE	0,06	0,059	0,069	0,072	0,062
SE-CEE	0,046	0,027	0,039	0,041	0,037

Table 13: Adjusted R-squared values for occupation group per region and round

Table 14: Adjusted R-squared values for <u>employment status</u> per region and round

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
NWE	0,011	0,017	0,025	0,024	0,013
SE-CEE	0,005	0,012	0,024	0,009	0,012

Table 15: Adjusted R-squared values for ESeC class per region and round

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
NWE	0,048	0,049	0,06	0,063	0,051
SE-CEE	0,031	0,023	0,036	0,029	0,034

Variance across the regions can be observed as previously presumed. NWE has higher values than SE-CEE across all rounds, with the difference in some years being almost 100% for the occupation variables and less relevant, but equally consistent for employment status.

Trends over time confirm all hypotheses as well. Despite the differences in absolute values, the regions moved together. Between 2002 and 2006, the explanatory values of the variables declined significantly, by 0,5-2 percentage points, especially in SE-CEE. Following the economic crisis and the growth of economic vulnerability, they increased to the same or even higher values (NWE) as in 2002. Finally, after the migration crisis, as cultural framings

of the migration threat became overpoweringly dominant, the relevance of occupational status declined again.

As the effect sizes do not tell us about the extent to which each occupational category is prejudiced, it is necessary to look at their mean index values and see which ones are the most and least accepting. *Tables 16* to *18* contain a lot of information, but in the following, I will give an overview of the main trends.

We can see that the overall direction of the effects is the same across the regions: the higher up someone is in the professional hierarchy and the less economically vulnerable they are, the more accepting they are of immigrants. The differences between the highest and lowest means are around 0,5-1,5. *Professionals* have by far the highest scores, significantly higher than all the other categories, including the top category *managers* (there are some outlier values for higher grade blue collar workers, but this is most likely because of the very low number of observations, around 100 per region and round). In the ESeC categorization it is the *higher salariat* which is the most accepting, with little difference between them and the *lower salariat*.

		Round	Round	Round	Round	Round
	Northwestern Europe	1	3	5	7	9
		(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
	1 – Elementary occupations	0,49	0,45	0,48	0,50	0,58
	2 – Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0,47	0,46	0,46	0,49	0,55
	3 - Craft and related trades workers	0,48	0,46	0,49	0,53	0,55
	4 – Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	0,48	0,46	0,46	0,47	0,53
	5 – Services and sales workers	0,52	0,51	0,50	0,55	0,60
	6 – Clerical support workers	0,53	0,51	0,54	0,60	0,64
	7 – Technicians and associate professionals	0,58	0,55	0,60	0,63	0,65
	8 – Professionals	0,65	0,63	0,66	0,68	0,70
	9 – Managers	0,54	0,53	0,54	0,62	0,65
		Round	Round	Round	Round	Round
	Southern and Eastern Europe	1	3	5	7	9
		(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
	1 - Elementary occupations	0,47	0,51	0,47	0,45	0,43
	2 – Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0,49	0,51	0,52	0,48	0,42
	3 - Craft and related trades workers	0,48	0,51	0,50	0,47	0,42
	4 – Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	0,47	0,50	0,43	0,43	0,39
	5 – Services and sales workers	0.52	0.53	0.54	0,53	0,46
	5 Services and sales workers	0,0 =	/	- ) -	/	
	6 - Clerical support workers	0,57	0,54	0,53	0,53	0,44
ction	<ul> <li>6 – Clerical support workers</li> <li>7 – Technicians and associate professionals</li> </ul>	0,57 0,59	0,54 0,60	0,53 0,58	0,53 0,56	0,44 0,50
Collection	<ul> <li>6 – Clerical support workers</li> <li>7 – Technicians and associate professionals</li> <li>8 – Professionals</li> </ul>	0,57 0,59 0,63	0,54 0,60 0,62	0,53 0,58 0,62	0,53 0,56 0,62	0,44 0,50 0,54

Table 16: Mean index values for <u>occupation groups</u> per region and round

Northwestern Europe	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
Northwestern Europe	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
1 - Outsiders: unemployed	0,51	0,49	0,51	0,54	0,60
2 - Outsiders: part-time	0,55	0,53	0,54	0,58	0,65
3 – Outsiders: limited contract	0,59	0,52	0,56	0,62	0,64
4 – Labor market insiders	0,55	0,53	0,56	0,59	0,62
<b>5</b> – Upscales	0,61	0,60	0,64	0,66	0,69
	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
Southern and Eastern Europe	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
1 - Outsiders: unemployed	0,51	0,53	0,50	0,54	0,49
2 - Outsiders: part-time	0,56	0,58	0,59	0,56	0,51
<b>3</b> – Outsiders: limited contract	0,54	0,60	0,58	0,55	0,51
<b>A T 1 1 1 1</b>	0.53	0.55	0,54	0,54	0,46
4 - Labor market insiders	0,55	0,00	/	,	

Table 17: Mean index values for employment status per region and round

# CEU eTD Collection

Northwestown	Round	Round	Round	Round	Round
	1	3	5	7	9
Europe	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
1 -  'Semi- and unskilled workers'	0,49	0,46	0,48	0,51	0,57
2 - 'Skilled workers'	0,48	0,46	0,49	0,53	0,56
3 -  'Lower grade white collar workers'	0,52	0,51	0,50	0,57	0,61
4 - 'Higher grade blue collar workers'	0,57	0,54	0,58	0,63	0,61
5 – 'Petit-bourgeoisie or independents', non-prof. occupations	0,48	0,46	0,45	0,49	0,54
<b>6</b> – 'Petit-bourgeoisie or independents', farmers etc.	0,53	0,50	0,50	0,52	0,62
7 – 'Higher grade white collar workers'	0,56	0,54	0,59	0,62	0,65
8 – 'The lower salariat'	0,60	0,58	0,61	0,65	0,68
<b>9</b> – 'The higher salariat'	0,61	0,60	0,64	0,67	0,69
	Round	Round	Round	Round	Round
Southern and Eastern Europe	1	3	5	7	9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
1 – 'Semi- and unskilled workers'	0,48	0,51	0,50	0,49	0,44
2 - 'Skilled workers'	0,48	0,51	0,50	0,49	0,41
3 -  'Lower grade white collar workers'	0,53	0,54	0,54	0,54	0,44
<b>4</b> – 'Higher grade blue collar workers'	0,56	0,62	0,56	0,64	0,40
5 – 'Petit-bourgeoisie or independents', non-prof. occupations	0,47	0,50	0,41	0,43	0,39
<b>6</b> – 'Petit-bourgeoisie or independents', farmers etc.	0,55	0,59	0,54	0,54	0,48
$\frac{5}{2}$ 7 – 'Higher grade white collar workers'	0,59	0,58	0,56	0,55	0,48
$\frac{3}{2}$ 8 – 'The lower salariat'	0,59	0,61	0,60	0,58	0,52
$\frac{3}{2}$ 9 – 'The higher salariat'	0,61	0,62	0,63	0,60	0,53
CEN					

Table 18: Mean index values for <u>ESeC classes</u> per region and round

The least accepting are the lower four occupational categories belonging to the working class, with a break between them and the higher ones. In the ESeC categorization this cleavage exists between 1. the group consisting of *semi- and unskilled workers*, *skilled workers* as well as the *petit-burgeoisie* and 2. the lower and higher grade white collar workers as well as the salariat. This reflects the same phenomenon of the working class being less tolerant. The employment status means show that *upscales* with the most secure position are indeed much more accepting of immigrants whereas the *unemployed* are less tolerant. The categories in between, however, do not show differences, signaling that those not in a privileged position but in employment are similar to each other.

Trends between 2002 and 2018 reflect the changes in the  $R^2$  values: the differences between the groups grew from 2006 to 2010 and declined after 2015. At the same time, the polarization process between the regions can be observed as well: in Northwestern Europe, all groups became more accepting over time while in Southern and Eastern Europe each of them became less tolerant.

Overall, we can say that based on the bivariate regression models, the hypotheses can be confirmed. Higher categories in all three variables have a positive effect on tolerance in each region, but the effect of the education, income and occupation on attitudes towards migration is larger in the case of Northwestern Europe. 2008 and 2015 can be considered as turning points, with effects increasing after the former and decreasing after the latter. As expected, this trend is not visible in the case of education after the economic crisis as it is less connected to economic vulnerability which became a source of worry for many during that time.

# 3.3 Multivariate regression models

As the final step in the data analysis process, I constructed the multivariate linear regression models for each country and each round. The variables were created according to the procedure explained in Chapter 3. The results are portrayed in *Table 19* which contains the  $R^2$  values, depicting the proportion of variance in anti-immigration attitudes explained by the social status variables in total. Unfortunately, Croatia, Latvia and Romania did not have data on more than one variable, so they had to be omitted from the analysis. The control variables age and gender are also included in these values but they do not have a significant effect in most cases and if yes, only to a small extent.

	Round 1	Round 3	Round 5	Round 7	Round 9
	(2002)	(2006)	(2010)	(2014)	(2018)
Austria	0,112	0,144	0,127	0,202	0,173
Belgium	0,095	0,109	0,146	0,147	0,162
Bulgaria	-	0,085	0,060	-	0,020
Croatia	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	0,070	0,092	-	-
Czechia	0,033	-	0,039	0,009	0,042
Denmark	0,078	0,118	0,124	0,089	-
Estonia	-	0,100	0,104	-	0,093
Finland	0,084	0,085	0,102	0,114	0,146
France	0,196	0,158	0,114	0,174	0,110
Germany	0,188	0,091	0,178	0,154	0,090
Greece	0,106	-	0,180	-	-
Hungary	0,060	0,065	0,068	0,092	0,075
Ireland	0,048	0,109	0,073	0,115	0,093
Italy	0,086	-	-	-	0,073
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	0,134	0,079	-
Luxembourg	0,054	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0,047	0,056	0,096	0,124	0,087
Norway	0,151	0,073	0,072	0,066	0,059
Poland	0,081	-	0,047	0,037	0,109
Portugal	0,041	0,086	-	0,144	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	-

Table 19: R-squared values for the multivariate regression models per country and round

Serbia	-	-	-	-	0,013
Slovakia	-	0,015	0,048	-	-
Slovenia	0,064	0,137	0,081	0,078	0,196
Spain	0,063	0,074	0,118	0,099	-
Sweden	0,081	0,082	0,127	0,126	-
Switzerland	0,093	0,154	0,118	0,108	0,066
Ukraine	-	0,065	0,046	-	-
United Kingdom	0,096	0,079	0,113	0,115	0,099
Mean total	0,088	0,093	0,100	0,109	0,095
Mean CEE, SE	0,067	0,077	0,085	0,077	0,078
Mean NWE	0,102	0,105	0,116	0,128	0,108
CEE, SE (without educ.)	0,061	0,037	0,042	0,036	0,045
NWE (without educ.)	0,079	0,085	0,093	0,090	0,072

It would not have been possible to include a detailed description of which effects are significant for countries individually, therefore, I will only describe them in general. As previous literature has found, a large part of the effect of the socioeconomic variables can be explained by differences in levels of education as occupation type and level of income are largely dependent on how educated a person is. For this reason, their explanatory value decreases if education is added to the model. The effect of occupation was significant in almost every case, but income and employment status were often not significant when I added them to the model as numerical variables. However, the other main advantage of adding predictors as ordinal variables, apart from increasing the effect size, is that it is possible to see separately which categories have a significant effect. This way, I found that in most cases, at least one of the occupation, income and employment status categories' effect can be proven.

The direction of the relationships remains the same as already described in the bivariate models. Regarding age, in the few instances where an effect can be observed, the older someone is, the less likely they are to be accepting of immigrants. Gender is even less important in this regard, but in some countries, women are more prejudiced than men. Finally, manual laborers, the unemployed and those with lower education (until lower secondary in the case of *educ\_5* 

and lower tier upper secondary in *educ\_7*) are less tolerant whereas professionals, those in a secure, privileged employment status (upscales) and those with tertiary education are more accepting than the average.

The R-squared values indicate great variation between countries, with states showing the highest values being mostly those with large immigrant populations (e.g. Austria, Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden), although there are some exceptions (such as Finland and Poland). Those with the consistently lowest values are in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechia and Ukraine. Norway is the only example from NWE. The means of the effects show the same trend: values for NWE are 3-5% higher in each round than those for SE-CEE, moving between 0,102–0,128 in the former and 0,067–0,085 in the latter regions. These findings support the group threat and economic competition theories – as immigrants are, on average, in the lower strata of the population, they come into direct contact and conflict with those in similar positions in the majority group. In addition, these groups are economically vulnerable and therefore, have a higher sense of threat to begin with.

Over time, Northwestern European countries seem to have polarized in their attitudes in terms of social status until 2014 but have become less divided since then. The effects of the economic and migration crisis are clearly visible, with an increase from 0,105 to 0,116 from 2006 to 2010 but a 2 percentage point (ca. 15%) decrease after 2014. The same cannot be said to the same extent in the case of Southern and Eastern Europe – there is an increase in 2010 (0,77 to 0,87), but no change after 2014. However, there are very few states which participated in both rounds, therefore, it is not possible to determine a clear trend, even if some evidence points towards an increase (see effect sizes without education included).

Because I found no clear influence of the Great Recession in the bivariate models in the case of the education variable (most likely because it does not directly indicate economic status), I looked at the effect sizes for models without education as well. This did not make the

effect of the economic crisis stronger but showed an increase for SE-CEE after 2014. Here, it is important to note that the absolute values must be interpreted with caution with regard to effect size as 1. the indirect effect of schooling is still included through the other variables and 2. only aggregate models were made which do not take into account that individuals are nested within their respective countries.

Finally, as comparing different countries each year can be considered methodologically questionable, I also calculated the changes by comparing the rounds pairwise, only taking into account those states which took part in the two consecutive rounds. The results are the same in terms of longitudinal changes.

All in all, based on the multivariate models, my hypotheses can be confirmed. *H1* as well as *H2* are fully supported by the data and *H3* can be partially proven. 1. There is a large difference between Northwestern and Southern/Eastern European countries when it comes to the strength of socioeconomic determinants of anti-immigration attitudes – they are much stronger in the former. 2. The relevance of social status grew after the economic crisis and 3. declined following the migration crisis. The only development which could not be proven is the decreasing relevance of socioeconomic factors after 2014 in the case of SE-CEE which shows differing trends depending on which variables are included in the model.

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

In this thesis I examined the differing effect of socioeconomic status on anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe and how these effects have changed over time. This analysis is of relevance to the field of prejudice research as it includes the underresearched regions of Southern and Eastern Europe and adds a regional comparative perspective to its repertoire. It is all the more necessary to look at the individual attitude level as well, as there is a growing cleavage between the countries of Europe when it comes to governmental stances on immigration. In addition, because of the debate over the relevance of objective and subjective predictors of antiimmigrant prejudice leaning towards the latter, research on social status as a determinant has been neglected, especially longitudinal studies and those using more theoretically driven variables.

Therefore, based on the available literature I formulated four hypotheses regarding the effect of socioeconomic position, the differences between the regions as well as changes over time. *Hypothesis 0a* and *0b* were the already established facts that those in lower socioeconomic positions are more prone to prejudice and that anti-immigrant attitudes are higher in Eastern and Southern than in Northwestern Europe. The first hypothesis (*H1*) assumed that social status indicators have a higher effect on anti-immigrant prejudice in Northwestern than in Eastern and Southern Europe because in the former region, 1. the educational system is more successful in (or focused on) transmitting social norms of tolerance; 2. the level of social dominance orientation is lower in the overall population and comparatively higher among those of lower status; 3. the size of the immigrant population is bigger and therefore, group threat among those in closest contact with them (those in similar, lower socioeconomic positions) overrides the positive effect of group contact; and finally, because 4. those of lower social status have to directly compete with more immigrants economically. Hypothesis two (*H2*) stated that

following the Great Recession in 2008, the effect of socioeconomic status on anti-immigrant attitude increased in the whole of Europe due to perceived economic threat becoming more prevalent among those in vulnerable positions as economic framings of social problems gained importance. Hypothesis three (H3) referred to cultural threat theory in stating that after the migration crisis, cultural framings of the dangers of immigration by radical right parties became more widespread and therefore, with cultural changes not only threatening the less well-off, anti-immigrant attitudes became less connected to socioeconomic position.

In order to test these hypotheses, I used longitudinal data from five rounds of the European Social Survey, between 2002 and 2018, with 19-26 participating countries in each round. Based on three variables (allow immigrants from 1. same ethnicity, 2. different ethnicity, 3. poorer countries outside of Europe) and following a confirmatory factor analysis to determine if it is internally valid, I constructed an anti-immigration attitude index. To measure education, I used a five- and a seven-category variable depending on which was available in each round. Where a relative income variable was missing, income was measured via constructing the equivalized household net income measure and grouping respondents into categories depending on its relative size. In later rounds, the household's total net income in deciles was used. Occupation was measured with a simple occupational grouping and ESeC's occupational class. Based on the insider-outsider literature and partly using the ESeC classes, partly data on work contracts, work hours and unemployment, an employment status variable was constructed as well. Factor analyses, descriptives and bivariate as well as multivariate linear regression models were employed to analyze the data.

The descriptive statistics showed that the anti-immigration index items are highly correlated with the underlying factor in every country, with *allow immigrants from same ethnicity* fitting the structure the least, especially so in some countries. Additionally, looking at the means for the anti-immigration index over time and across countries confirmed that people

living in Northwestern Europe are more accepting of immigrants than those in the other regions (*H0b*) as well as that anti-immigration attitudes are relatively stable over time, but have decreased in Northwestern and increased in Eastern and Southern Europe since the migration crisis, making the European regions more polarized. Finally, polarization regarding stances on immigration within each country has decreased, with Eastern and Southern Europe being more divided on the issue.

The divisions in Eastern and Southern Europe, however, are less along socioeconomic lines than in NWE. The bivariate regression models revealed separately for each variable that those in lower socioeconomic positions are more likely to be against immigrants (H0a) and that social status indicators have a bigger effect on attitudes towards migration in NWE than in CEE and SE (H1). The effect of *education* was almost twice as high in NWE than in the other regions and decreased after the migration crisis. Its effect did not change after the economic crisis as it is not a direct indicator of social status. *Income* has a lower explanatory power than schooling, additionally, no large differences can be observed between the regions in this regard. However, regarding the longitudinal trends, the hypotheses can be confirmed: it did increase in relevance after 2008 and decline following 2015. The occupation variables show the clearest changes, the effect of both major crisis events can be confirmed in the case of occupational group, ESeC class and employment status as well (H2, H3). The multivariate models confirm in a more robust way what I observed by looking at the variables separately. By combining all variables, it also aggravates the differences between the regions. The only hypothesis the results do not support is the declining relevance of socioeconomic status following the migration crisis in CEE and SE.

# 4.1 Limitations

Even though the thesis succeeded in constructing models which at least partially support all hypotheses formulated on the basis of the literature, the study also has some important limitations. In the following, I will address these in more detail.

First of all, a systematic comparison of the same countries over every round was not possible due to only very few Eastern and Southern European countries taking part in all of them. This can lead to skewed results, however, by using pairwise comparisons of countries participating in two consecutive rounds I have attempted to correct for this bias.

Secondly, not every variable was available for every country. This was not an issue in the bivariate models, they were simply left out of the analysis, but may have biased the trends in the multivariate regressions, showing lower effect sizes for some countries simply because either income or education was not included in their case. However, because the hypotheses could mostly be proven in the bivariate models as well, it most probably did not lead to a fundamental change in the results.

Thirdly, there are some problems arising from the fact that due to the large geographical and temporal scope, the analysis stayed very much on the macro-level. For example, several hundreds of regression models were constructed to prove the hypotheses, however, there was no direct testing of the theories involved and the causal mechanisms were not analyzed systematically. Additionally, the number of countries and contexts involved made it impossible to consider every possible explanation for the changes. Most importantly, the results only show one side of the argument, namely, what *is* important in NWE and what is *less* important in CEE and SE. It does not go into detail on what can explain the higher prevalence of anti-immigrant attitudes in the latter regions. Moreover, the theoretical propositions focus on individual-level explanations of differences in contexts, there are many more country-level factors ranging from democratic traditions to social norms etc. which can account for the divergences.

# 4.2 Implications for further research

Some of the limitations listed in the previous section can also serve as potential research directions for further studies on the topic. Based on the results, it would be important to explain the other side of the argument, that is, if socioeconomic status is less relevant, which factors are the major determinants of anti-immigrant prejudice in Eastern and Southern Europe. Furthermore, while the economic side of the argument was quite detailed, the cultural side was less elaborated. Thinking about the Eastern and Southern European context, this can most likely provide some answers to the former question. Finally, this thesis provides plenty of empirical material for studies which look at individual societies or a few countries more in detail and refine the large-scale trends outlined by this research. Potential topics include studying the outliers in the regions or, on the contrary, looking at 'ideal types', that is, the most straightforward examples of the trends described.

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