

**BETWEEN TEMPORARY PROTECTION AND  
INTEGRATION: MONOLINGUAL EDUCATION  
POLICIES FOR SYRIAN REFUGEE CHILDREN IN  
TURKEY**

by

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# Abstract

Since 2011 more than 3 million people from Syria have taken refuge in Turkey. As of January 2020, there are 1 million school-aged Syrian children out of which more than 600 thousand receive education. Until 2016, most students were enrolled in Temporary Education Centers (TECs), which provided education in Arabic and followed an altered Syrian curriculum. While some of these TECs remain open, the policy since 2016 is to enroll 1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup> graders into public schools, where medium of instruction is Turkish. Considering the controversial nature of linguistic diversity in the Turkish education system and the global and local political repercussions of the forced mobility from Syria, this research has aimed to analyze the discourse of the language policies in the education of refugee children to reveal their rationale and possible implications. A discourse-oriented analysis of policy texts and statements by policy actors has revealed that even though the discourse around temporariness which dominated the earlier policy making has later shifted into one of integration as a result of the changes in context, the underlying monolingual ideologies have remained constant and manifested themselves through both discourses. It has also been concluded that any policy decision not acknowledging the linguistic diversity in education will lead to linguistic and thus social inequality for the refugee children.

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# List of Abbreviations

MoNE: Ministry of National Education

TEC: Temporary Education Center

PIKTES: Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into Turkish Education System

LFIP: Law on Foreigners and International Protection

DEMA (AFAD): Disaster and Emergency Management Authority

FRIT: Facility for Refugees in Turkey

MEEM: Migration and Emergency Education Management

DGMM: Directorate General of Migration Management

# Introduction

The number of people who have taken refuge in Turkey since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 is over 3 million. More than 1 million of this population were school aged children in 2019 (Akyuz 2018). Certain political considerations have affected how the issue of schooling for these children have been handled. As a result of the geographical limitation Turkey maintains in the 1951 Geneva Convention, which allows it to grant refugee status only to those of European origin, Syrian population in Turkey was given the status of temporary protection (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2017). This status has determined the nature of policy making as well.

There have been roughly three phases regarding the policy decisions so far. In the first phase until 2016, education was provided with the initiatives of civil society organizations in Temporary Education Centers (TECs). They followed a slightly altered Syrian curriculum in Arabic and included Turkish classes. In the second phase, the government announced that TECs were to be closed down by 2020 and all students starting 1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, or 9<sup>th</sup> grade were to be registered in public schools, where medium of instruction is Turkish. This was followed by the EU-funded project called ‘Promoting the Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System’ in 2016. The following phase continues as TECs are in the process of being closed down and Integration Classes are being opened in all public schools with refugee students. As of 2018, there were 518,105 Syrian children in public schools (MoNE 2018). Considering the role of language in the nation building process in Turkey, it is worth looking into the language policies in the education of refugee children and the shifts thereof to understand their rationale.

Research on these education policies conclude that access to education is below country average (Bircan and Sunata 2015; Uyan-Semerici and Erdoğan 2018); however, even access to schooling does not lead to meaningful participation in education. Several studies, whether they

analyze the policies themselves or the opinions of teachers, principals and parents, show that factors such as lack of resources, inefficient teacher training, and language barrier as well as the public discourse on refugees and teachers' attitudes hinder children's equal access to the education provided (Arar, Örüçü, and Ak Küçükçayır 2020; Karsli-Calamak and Kilinc 2019; Taskin and Erdemli 2018; Karaman 2018; Sülükçü and Savaş 2018; Crul et al. 2019; McCarthy 2018; Balkar, Şahin, and Babahan 2016; Çelik and İçduygu 2019; Unutulmaz 2019). Most studies also highlight the fact that the policy making in education has been highly intertwined with the political context.

There is no study specifically analyzing the decisions related to language in the education of Syrian children even though language barrier is cited as an important factor impeding education in the abovementioned studies. The issue of diverse linguistic backgrounds in the monolingual Turkish education system is, in fact, not new. Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, whose ideological roots date back to the Ottoman modernization at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, language has been a tool in the nation-building efforts. Monolingual Turkish education and strict policies against other languages have worked to monolingualize the multilingual population. Only through its aspirations to be an EU-member state in the early 2000s, Turkish state introduced certain regulations that led to a recognition of multilingualism in the society and Ministry of National Education started offering classes for various languages spoken by Turkish citizens. However, this public recognition has not had much material consequences with regards to the linguistic status quo and particularly the monolingual ideology.

With this background, the case of refugee children whose first language is not Turkish is both familiar and at the same time unique. While some of the policies regarding language such as providing Arabic and Turkish language support are a diversion from the tradition of denying students' linguistic backgrounds, traces of familiar responses to bi/multilingualism could still

be found in the policy decisions. This tension between the monolingual tradition and the recognition of different linguistic backgrounds is worth analyzing since it might help to see whether these historically embedded language ideologies could again lead to linguistic inequalities in this new context and whether the subtleties of the context such as its embeddedness in the global politics influence the decision making.

This research does not take policy as a neutral device for problem solving but rather follows the critical approaches to policy. Therefore, the policy will be treated as a “practice of power” (Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009) and as a text and a discourse shaping how the reality is perceived. It is also embedded in not only the national/local but also the global context and feeds off various texts and discourses. Particularly language policy is a mechanism “determin[ing] who has access to political power and economic resources” (Tollefson 1991) through language use and thus (re)producing inequalities. Monolingual ideologies in language in education policies are one such area in which we can observe these power dynamics, and the language policies in migration contexts are the recent manifestations of this mechanism (see, for example, Duchêne, Moyer, and Roberts 2013; Panagiotopoulou and Rosen 2018).

Following this conceptual framework and to fill the gap in the critical studies on language policies in Turkey, this research will analyze the language-in-education policies for Syrian refugee children in Turkey between 2011 and 2019. Even though these children are not legally recognized as refugees but as children under temporary protection, the term refugee will be preferred when referring to them since the act of taking refuge describes their condition better than the power laden term of temporary protection. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it aims to reveal how the policy decisions as well as the policy discourse regarding the issue of language in the education for children from Syria in Turkey have been shaped by the global and national context. Then, it will analyze the policy discourse in this context to demonstrate



how the representations of people, events, and various phenomena such as human mobility, education, and integration could lead to linguistic and social inequalities.

The research will benefit from the principles of historical-structural, discourse-oriented, and interpretive policy analysis literatures; however, the primary method of analysis will be Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). As contextualization is a crucial part of this approach, the websites of and documents from EU commission and the EU Council as well as UNHCR, news reports from Turkey, and documents related to various policy areas such as migration and labor, and earlier policy documents related to language and education will be used.

As the primary data, various policy-related documents between 2011-2019 such as laws, regulations, circulars, and strategic plans from the Ministry of National Education, reports from the General Directorate of Migration Management and Migration and Emergency Education Management, and the website of the PIKTES project will be analyzed. These will be accessed through the legislation database of Turkey ([mevzuat.gov.tr](http://mevzuat.gov.tr)) as well as through the websites of relevant agencies. Data on the speeches, statements, and acts of policy relevant actors such as the President, Ministers of National Education, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Relations, and bureaucrats working in the General Directorate of Migration Management, Migration and Emergency Education Management, and the PIKTES project will be gathered from news reports and from previous research.

Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter will provide a conceptual framework on policy studies and language policy and planning and then outline the research on the education policies for Syrian refugee children in Turkey. The following chapter will summarize the key events related to the human mobility from Syria since the civil war began and present the timeline of policies regarding the education of the refugee children. This context chapter

will also briefly depict the language regime in Turkey starting from relevant events in the Late Ottoman Empire. After providing the historical background, the methodology chapter will both introduce the rationale behind the methods of analysis and describe the data to be analyzed. This will be followed by the detailed chronological and thematic analysis of the policies under the sections related to migration, integration, and monolingual ideologies. These sections will show the unfolding of the discourse in the policy related texts through various discursive strategies and also the shifts in the discourse. These thematic sections will also briefly comment on the implications of these policies. The conclusion chapter will summarize the important findings and make suggestions for future research.

# Chapter 1 – Literature Review

As briefly described in the introductory chapter, this research mainly aims to understand and analyze the power relations within the education policies aiming Syrian refugee children in Turkey and the role of language in those policies. Therefore, this chapter aims to outline the approaches to the study of policy and language policy in the literature to illuminate possible areas of analysis. The final section, which summarizes the research on the education policies for refugee children, will point to any gaps and questions untouched and thus will help to see how this research could possibly address them.

## 1.1 An overview of language policy and planning literature

The role of language in nation building projects and how these projects entailed a certain understanding of modernization is a core issue in the classic works of nationalism (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1992), and language policy and planning was one of the tools for managing the nation's language(s) and as a result a tool for the distribution of power and resources. Bauman and Briggs (2003) expose in their book *Voices of Modernity* how modern thinkers discursively shaped specific understandings of what language is and whose linguistic practices are legitimate and how this made modernity and modern thought flourish while at the same time creating all kinds of inequalities for those who did not fit the criteria set by such rational thought.

Even though these explicit and implicit ways of planning languages had existed as early as seventeenth century, the academic discipline of language policy and planning (LPP) appeared after 1960s (Tollefson and Pérez-Milans 2018). The early period of LPP aimed at finding solutions to practical problems in societies, particularly focusing on nation states and nation building processes. (Fishman 1973; 1991; Fishman, Ferguson, and Dasgupta 1968). Language

planning essentially included acquisition, corpus, and status planning, that is, how a language will be learnt, how the language structure should be, and what status should various languages have within a country (3). This traditional approach to LPP shares many similarities to the early period of policy studies in that it is also positivistic and problem-oriented.

As various approaches influenced by critical theory emerged in the policy literature, critical approaches to LPP also appeared in the 90s. Tollefson (1991) in his book *Planning language, planning inequality* defines language policy as a mechanism “determin[ing] who has access to political power and economic resources” and “by which dominant groups establish hegemony in language use” (16). The approach he proposes is historical-structural, which analyzes policies from a historical perspective and focuses on power and inequality. Another line of scholars has since focused on the effects of monolingual language policies, particularly in education, and their relevance for bilingualism/multilingualism (Baker 2011; Cummins 1984; 1986; Hornberger 1998; Skutnabb-Kangas et al. 2009). Skutnabb-Kangas (2000), for instance, uses the term ‘linguicism’ (akin to racism) leading to ‘linguicide’ to underline the effects of language policies for minority languages. These studies are relevant for the current study because they point out to the fact that language policies determine which languages could be used in social life and where. This creates linguistic hierarchies and puts people with a different language background at a disadvantage.

Discursive or discourse-oriented approach to LPP makes use of the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and is built on the interpretive and postpositivist approaches to policy analysis (Barakos and W. Unger 2016) that the previous section elaborated on. As those approaches also claim, the main premise of discursive approach to LPP is that “policy meaning is discursively constructed” and it does not only reside within the policy text but also “constructed in newspapers and TV reports, at public hearings, in academic papers, at protests,

on online media, and so on” (Barakos and W. Unger 2016, 63). The aim is to uncover how “language ideologies and discourses interact with LPP processes” (21).

Hult (2004; 2005), for instance, analyzes Swedish language policy documents from a historical perspective to map out main discourses about minority languages, and the position of Swedish in relation to English. He claims that “how relationships among different languages are reflected in policy documents [...] brings to light ideologies about those languages and their users” (Hult 2010, 5). Through Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2011) reveal how the language and multilingualism policies of EU were constructed under the influence of the macro-strategies of EU in the 2000-2010 period. Adopting the same approach, Wodak and Boukala (2015) look into EU policies on language and migration and how these influence the representation of migrants and their linguistic integration in Austria and Greece by functioning as gate-keepers. In terms of language in education policies, Chang-Bacon’s (2020) study provides useful insight by analyzing the discourse around English immersion programs in the US and how monolingual language ideologies are reproduced by “constructing monolingual pedagogies as the ‘norm’, even for multilingual students” (10).

Even though it is not necessarily a part of LPP literature, the concept of language ideologies is crucial for a discursive analysis of language policies as the study of Chang-Bacon (2020) also demonstrates. Research on language ideologies is a part of linguistic anthropology field and mainly adopts ethnographic methods while these could be complemented by discourse analysis. Language ideologies can be defined as beliefs about languages, language users and their linguistic practices, which function as a legitimation and rationalization of language hierarchies (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994; Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998; Kroskrity 2000). Language ideologies are highly relevant in language policy analysis since much of the discourse on languages is deeply rooted language ideologies.

Monolingual ideologies are probably the most well-known ones with one nation-one language equation being a *sine qua non* of nationalist thought. Not only nation states sculpted monolingual nations out of multilingual populations, but they have also instilled monolingualism as the norm in societies. Heller (1995) calls this the “monolingualizing tendencies” of states (374). Accordingly, Woolard and Schieffelin (1994) define language planning as “a discourse on language in civic and human life” and explain how seemingly neutral and scientific planning processes such as language standardization and orthography are ideological processes. While language standardization is linked to the ideology of purism, which was shaped through the ideas of rationality in modernist thought (Bauman and Briggs 2003), discussions on orthography are more often than not symbolic negotiations of nationhood. Such discussions on language, then, are rarely about language per se but are rather ways to “create and legitimize social hierarchies” (Blackledge 2000).

Along with these methodological and theoretical developments in the literature, certain thematic areas have also gained prominence since the 90s. The linguistic diversity related to human mobility is one such area, which is relevant for this study as well. One oft-cited concept has been ‘superdiversity’ (Vertovec 2007), which denotes the “diversification of diversity” among migrants. In this article in which he focuses on the British experience, Vertovec (2007) claims not only there are multitude of migrant groups in urban centers but they are also highly diversified in terms of migration experiences and statuses as well as, for instance, in languages and religions. Therefore, he argues, such superdiversity has implications for both academic research and policy making.

However, not all research on language policies and mobility is based on this concept. In their edited book *Language, migration and social inequalities* Duchêne et al. (2013) draw attention to the various ways language functions as a control and gatekeeping mechanism and a tool for

inclusion and exclusion for migrants. For instance, the chapter by Martín Rojo (2013) shows how pedagogical practices of teachers at schools in Madrid render migrant children's linguistic capabilities useless. Similar cases are reported from other migration contexts as well. The ethnographic study by Panagiotopoulou and Rosen (2018) analyzes the language policies in a preparatory class in Cologne, Germany where refugee children from several countries are given German as a second language classes. They find that the integration aim is realized through a German-only policy, which the teachers unquestioningly reproduce in their classes and deny their students the opportunities to use other languages. With a slightly different approach, Pujolar (2010) takes into account both the national level shifts in language policies and also the experiences of migrants in language education in Catalonia. He argues that the discourse of "language as national symbol" has lost its legitimacy with increasing immigration and turned into "language as a means to social cohesion" (230). Interestingly, he also finds out that many Catalan speakers promote the teaching of Spanish to immigrants rather than Catalan since Catalan-speaking immigrants would mean competition over resources for them. Despite reporting from different localities and contexts, these studies all show that language policies and practices in education are motivated by power struggles and lead to the (re)production of language hierarchies rather than aiming language learning and integration.

Inequality created through language policies, particularly through the monolingual ideologies deeply embedded in education policies even in multilingual settings, has been one of the research foci of critical LPP literature. Once mostly studied in minority language contexts, this issue is once more relevant in the education of migrant and refugee children. Instead of opting for a historical-structural, discourse-oriented, or ethnographic approach, more studies are now making use of more than one methodology. While this research will be based on a "close textual, contextual, and sociohistorical analysis of language policies" (Barakos and W. Unger 2016, 13), this will be complemented by ethnographic data from secondary sources as well.

## 1.2 An overview of approaches to policy

Following a theoretical framework on language policy underlining that it is important to critically think about LPP processes since they regulate the access to resources through language use and thus lead to linguistic and social injustices, this section will summarize different conceptualizations of policy in the literature by defining what policy is, what makes the policy, what policy does, and how to study policy. Through an overview of what it means to study policy critically, this section aims to show why such an approach to policy analysis is important.

In the last couple of decades, there have been different approaches to policy analysis as opposed to the traditional approach which adopts positivistic methods and treats policy as “value-neutral” (Regmi 2019, 60) and as a “linear process of 'problem identification', 'formulation of solutions', 'implementation' and 'evaluation'” (Wright and Shore 2003, 24). Therefore, at the end of this process policy is seen “as a finished object” (Clarke et al. 2015, 2). In this approach, the aim is to find generalizable outcomes about the best ways to solve problems and to access the objective reality. The following approaches which are defined as critical, interpretive, discursive, or anthropological oppose this neutrality and the objectivity claim. Policy processes are taken to be “expressive of meaning(s), including at times individual and collective identity” (Yanow 2000). Therefore, they are not one-size-fits-all solutions but rather highly context-dependent.

Critical approaches treat policies as a practice of power and are mainly influenced by Gramscian and Foucauldian concepts such as hegemony and governmentality (Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009). Policies are hegemonic discourses because they make normative claims which “present a particular way of defining a problem and its solution, as if these were the only ones possible” (Wright and Shore 2003, 15) and thus regulate social relations and



order. They are also related to the notion of governmentality because through their discourse they construct subjects, that is, they shape the agency of individuals and lead them to “construct themselves, their conduct and their social relations as free individuals” and “contribute, not necessarily consciously, to a government's model of social order” (Wright and Shore 2003, 17).

Policy is defined both as a text and a discourse (Ball 1993). It is a text, in the sense that it is composed of meanings reflecting its sociopolitical and historical context. It is also a discourse since through its language it produces a kind of knowledge which determines how an issue at hand is understood and talked about. Therefore, Wright et al (2003) claim that "policy language and discourse [...] provides a key to analysing the architecture of modern power relations" (22). Then, language is a particularly important element in analyzing policy because it is through language that the policy means and does something. For the policy could make use of a seemingly neutral and rational language to conceal its political nature (Wright and Shore 2003; Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009; Clarke et al. 2015), it presents certain actions as common sense and renders alternative ways of thinking and being unimaginable.

Particularly in education, a policy area that is highly related to the workings of the social order and through which social inequalities could be reproduced, how this common sense is presented matters even more (Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009). In contexts where education is strictly centralized, “educational policies” could “set discursive boundaries on what is considered educationally feasible or normal” (Johnson 2009) and how the policy frames certain phenomena could easily limit and shape how people, such as teachers, perceive the issue. Therefore, even when one makes use of other methodologies to understand the impact of a certain policy, the discourse of the policy would be an inseparable part of the analysis.

If these explanations of what policy is could help us see what policy does, then, we can say that it “classif[ies]” and “regulate[s]” (Shore, Wright, and Però 2011, 9) and thus “defines reality”,

“orders behavior”, and “allocates resources accordingly” (Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009, 770). It is clear that a certain policy does not only have an effect on the specific realm it is seemingly aimed for but rather has implications for various aspects of social life be it “economic, legal, cultural” or “moral” (Wright and Shore 2003, 18).

In their first book outlining the field of the anthropology of policy, Shore and Wright (2003) approach policies as “organizing principles of society” and “cultural texts”. Similar to any other cultural object, they carry certain meanings for the society because they “encapsulate the entire history and culture of the society that generated them” (Wright and Shore 2003, 18) and they also “reflect the rationality and assumptions prevalent at the time of their creation” (Shore, Wright, and Però 2011, 10). However, it is also crucial to take into consideration the influence of globalization and realize that the meanings and “discourses embedded in policy texts are no longer located simply in the national space” (Regmi 2019, 65). The concept of assemblage is commonly used in the literature to account for the multitude of elements, both local and global, that make up the policy such as different agents (e.g. politicians, practitioners, etc.), places (e.g. cities, schools, etc.), objects (e.g. a new technology, a building, etc.), and other texts and discourses (e.g. legal texts, policy texts, public discourses, scientific discourses, etc.) (Clarke et al. 2015). The policies, then, are embedded within the cultural worlds and historical trajectories of societies but are also increasingly a part of global network of meanings and discourses.

As policies are assembled from a variety of elements and processes covering a wide scope, Ball (1993) rejects the “possibility of successful single theory explanations” and suggests using “a toolbox of diverse concepts and theories” (11). As mentioned earlier, policy can be defined as meaning, discourse and a cultural text. Therefore, interpretive, discourse analytical, and anthropological approaches can all be used to uncover a different part of the policy.

For an interpretive analysis, as Yanow (2000) points out, one can look into “the words, symbolic objects, and acts of policy-relevant actors along with policy texts” (2). Within this ‘data’, the metaphoric language, the categories and labels, and the framing of the issue are the elements to look for and uncover (Yanow 2000). Along with the content of policy documents, Shore and Wright (2003) argue, the writing style should also be taken into account because it is through the style of argumentation that “policy creates affect and effect” (Wright and Shore 2003, 28). The embeddedness of policies in larger context requires the analysis of “documents from international agencies, governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), television, radio, newspaper articles, reports of meetings and verbatim records of parliamentary debates” as well since these would show how certain concepts and meanings within the policy issue relate to others elsewhere. While following these connections, Clarke et al (2015) warn against “methodological globalism” as well as “methodological nationalism”. For the latter, one should bear in mind the aspects of “space, scale and time” (5), that is, the issue in question should be tracked in other locations and at larger scales and traced back in time rather than analyzing it within national boundaries alone. To escape the former, one should not assume “the world as a uniform and borderless space across which objects flow uninterruptedly” (18) and be wary of the nuances of meaning things may acquire in various locations. In other words, when analyzing policy it is important to take into account how the policy is shaped by phenomena occurring in other places, for instance through global organizations, and by global events in history and also the fact that global phenomena are not directly adopted but might take different meanings in the local context.

To summarize, critical approaches to policy highlight the political nature of policy and its power not only to order social relations but also produce certain subjectivities. Policy language might seem neutral and rational but in fact through certain aspects of language it frames the issue in a particular way and thus shapes the way it is perceived. Therefore, the reason behind

a critical policy analysis is to uncover how policy is related to power relations by depicting a certain kind of reality and presenting ideas as common sense. By questioning such common sense, it is possible to see how social inequalities are implicitly reproduced. As a discourse, policy constitutes and is constituted by its social context while being connected to other texts and discourses from a wider scale, in space and time. These call for an analysis of policy which takes into account local and global elements as well as its discourse (not only of policy documents but of various elements that make up the policy), which is the approach this study will also be adopting.

### **1.3 Studies on the education policies for Syrian refugee children in Turkey**

Even though there is no study particularly analyzing the language policies in education, various studies focusing on different aspects of the education for Syrian refugee children in Turkey have been conducted in the last decade. These could be categorized into three groups in terms of their focus. The first group of studies comments on the policies and either explain their rationale or analyze their effectiveness through various frameworks. Others examine the practice on the ground by directing their attention to the experience and opinions of teachers, principals and parents in both types of schooling currently available for the Syrian refugee children in Turkey. Finally, there are a few studies which assess the schooling both in and out of the camps through statistics and investigate the factors behind being out of school and continuing one's studies in higher education.

Almost all studies analyzing the education policies highlight the significance of the shift in the approach towards the refugee education and either scrutinize the reasons behind such shift or analyze the effects of two types of schooling currently in practice. Arar (2020), McCarthy (2018), and Unutulmaz (2019) all claim that the evolution of these education policies reflects

the changes in politics in larger scales, both global and national. Rather than being motivated by any pedagogical concerns, they were designed under the influence of Turkey's immigration policy, through the assumptions of decision-makers regarding the nature of the mobility of the people, and with the purpose of realizing a certain political vision. One implication of the macro policies for the policies in education is ambiguity. In their article focusing particularly on this ambiguity, Baban et al. (2017) claim that the legal ambiguity induced by the temporary protection status leads to a framing of "Syrian refugees as humanitarian objects rather than political subjects" (85). This framing allows for rights such as education to be 'granted' in ways that suit the existing political considerations rather than demanded by the actors themselves. The uncertainty about the duration of stay of the refugees along with this temporary status have influenced the policy decisions in education as well (Arar, Örüçü, and Ak Küçükçayır 2020; McCarthy 2018). While the temporary status of the Syrian population in Turkey is a specific case with such repercussions, a comparative study of the education policies towards refugee children in Sweden, Germany, Greece, Lebanon and Turkey by Crul et al (2019) shows that education for immigrant children is still handled through temporary measures in most countries, and problems arise from the lack of institutional preparedness.

Since the political discourse and accordingly the policies towards the education of refugee children shifted from temporariness to integration, there are currently two types of schooling: temporary education centers (TECs) and public schools. For the students in the public schools, PICTES (Promoting the Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System) project has been implemented since 2016 as well. Studies investigate the effects of these two schooling options in terms of education, integration or social justice or analyze the implementation of the PICTES project. The TECs are found to foster positive experiences for both the students and their parents since both the teachers and the curriculum are from Syria. However, this does not allow students to "interact with Turkish society" (Çelik and İçduygu 2019, 263) and "might

hinder their further integration" (Arar, Özücü, and Ak Küçükçayır 2020, 20). While the students in public schools have the opportunity to socialize with their Turkish peers and acquire Turkish, they might also feel more excluded as a result of the monocultural and monolingual habitus of these schools. PICTES project is considered to be a potential aid for these obstacles (Karaman 2018). However, the implementation of this project is not without problems, most of which are related to language teaching. For instance, intensive Turkish classes replace some subject classes in TECs, children are directed to public schools without adequate language proficiency, most teachers have not been trained for teaching Turkish as a second language, the books for Turkish as SL are not suitable for the age group of the children, and the Turkish Proficiency Exam does not assess listening and speaking skills, which are crucial for in-class performance of the students (Karaman 2018; Sülükçü and Savaş 2018). The problems with quality second language instruction, particularly regarding teacher training and material development, arise in the other refugee receiving countries that Crul et al (2019a) have analyzed, among which Germany and Sweden are able to offer relatively better support. In short, insufficient Turkish teaching practices coupled with the impossibility of education in the mother tongue in the public schools could jeopardize the prospects of the refugee children and cause conflicts in the long term (Gezer 2019).

The studies focusing on the teachers mostly survey their experiences either in TECs or public schools (Aydin and Kaya 2019; Balkar, Şahin, and Babahan 2016; Taskin and Erdemli 2018) while one ethnographic study (Karsli-Calamak and Kilinc 2019) analyzes teachers' perspectives and teaching practices through social justice framework. Language barrier comes up as a common problem in public schools, which affects both the academic performance of the children and the involvement of parents in their children's education. Lack of relevant curriculum, teaching materials and sufficient teacher training are other obstacles for teachers. Some also mention challenges with intercultural communication and discipline (Taskin and

Erdemli 2018). One study (Balkar, Şahin, and Babahan 2016) which particularly analyzes Syrian teachers' experiences at TECs finds that while language does not pose any problems and the cooperation with parents is possible and even helpful, problems cited by teachers in public schools such as lack of resources and skills for teaching in this specific context are relevant for most teachers at TECs as well. The ethnography by Karsli-Calamak and Kilinc (2019) provides insight into such varying experiences and shows how different perspectives of teachers influence their practices in terms of redistribution of resources, recognition of students' backgrounds and diversity, and representation of the child's and the parents' voice. This research is able to critically analyze some of the issues which have come up in the abovementioned studies such as language barrier, involvement of parents, and culture and discipline related challenges. It is demonstrated through the narratives and in-class practices of the teachers that how each perceives the status of the refugee students determines whether they will allocate necessary resources for those in need of language support and recognize their differences, how they approach the lack of parent involvement and the challenges with student behavior.

While the students' experiences would provide valuable data about the teaching practices mentioned above, research in this area is limited. A few studies provide statistical information on the schooling of children in and out of the camps and on the reasons for being out of school (Bircan and Sunata 2015; Uyan-Semerci and Erdoğan 2018). While the 2015 study, which was conducted before the PICTES project, finds that education is not available for a significant number of children and relates this to the lack of financial resources in the country to develop education programs, a later study reports that one out of three children in Şanlıurfa and Hatay (cities by the Syrian border) is out of school. The factor that has the biggest influence is found to be the education level of the parents along with low income and the number of children in the family. There is one study which offers a glimpse of the experiences of refugee students in

Turkish education system by analyzing the narratives of those who continued higher education (Cin and Doğan 2020). Considering the significantly low number of refugee students at the university level, it would be illuminating to learn about the opportunity structures which allowed them to reach that point. However, the study mostly focuses on the experiences in higher education rather than elaborating on previous studies. The findings still might be useful in understanding earlier experiences since they show that the refugee youth in universities value the recognition and the opportunity to socialize with their local peers but are in need of “institutional support of language, tutorials and appropriate pedagogies” (13).

The overview of the literature on the education of Syrian refugee children so far shows that while access to education has not been secured for a significant number of children, even the access, by itself, does not lead to meaningful participation. The discourse on temporariness which characterized the first phase and the ambiguity of temporary status seem to have influenced most teachers’ and parents’ approaches towards education. While parents are hesitant about education in Turkish, some teachers are hesitant about the deservingness of the students in terms of resource allocation, recognition and representation. Despite the later discursive shift from temporary accommodation to integration into public education, the policies do not contribute to the participation of these children in the education system. As most studies highlight, language support, appropriate curriculum and pedagogies along with relevant teacher training are required for the current policy to function as it is expected to. However, as pointed out by most of the analyses of the education policies, such policy decisions so far have been influenced by political decisions at a larger scale, and the current obstacles might not be dealt with unless the wider sociopolitical context allows such changes.

This chapter has shown that policy is increasingly seen as a discourse and a cultural text rather than a neutral, straightforward process. Particularly, language ideologies reflected in language



policies and the role of language as a gate-keeping mechanism in migration contexts are highlighted. However, most studies dealing with the education policies for the refugee children outlined above do not focus on what the policy does through discourse and do not problematize linguistic hierarchies created through such discourse. This research aims to complete such a gap.

## Chapter 2 – Context

Following a critical and discursive approach to language policy, this research aims to show the historical and sociopolitical embeddedness of policy discourse and language ideologies reflected in such discourse. Therefore, this chapter will present the context in which the education policies for refugee children have been shaped. The first section will help to see the roots of the ideologies of language that informed policies in Turkey, particularly in education. This will be followed by the wider political context surrounding the forced migration from Syria and the timeline of education policies for refugee children which are the core of this study. This timeline is intended to be descriptive and it will be critically analyzed later throughout the analysis chapter.

### 2.1 Language policies in Turkey since the Late Ottoman Empire

When Geoffrey Lewis (1999) aptly named his book on Turkish language reform *Catastrophic Success*, he was only referring to the policies of the Early Republican period but the trajectory of language policies from the Late Ottoman Empire to the late 20<sup>th</sup> century Turkey is indeed a text-book example of how language planning can ‘successfully’ transform a multilingual empire into a monolingual nation at the expense of traumas and lost generations. An overview of these policies and the discourse around language and mother tongue, particularly in education, will be helpful in setting the context for the focus of this study.

The *millet* system (organization of the society as separate religious communities) in the Ottoman Empire had several implications for the languages of the empire both at the later stages and then in the early years of the Republic. Earlier intellectual roots of the nation building in Turkey are in the *Tanzimat* Era (Ottoman reforms period) starting in 1839, when issue of language planning first appeared in the public discourse. The *millet* system led the

Ottoman intellectuals to conceive nation building in terms of the Muslim and non-Muslim divide. Muslims, despite speaking various languages, were easier to assimilate into one nation speaking a single language. Namık Kemal – an Ottoman intellectual, for instance, thought it was “not possible to spread [our] language among the Rum (Greek) and the Bulgarian”; however, “definitely possible to spread it among the Albanian and the Laz, that is, the Muslim [...] The Laz and Albanian languages would be forgotten in twenty years time” (Sadoğlu 2003, 78). This did not mean the non-Muslim were not targeted in the language planning efforts however, and Turkish became an obligatory course for all schools in 1894 (91).

Even though the teaching of Turkish gained importance in the efforts of centralization and modernization, state language policy had not yet evolved into monolingualism. The first draft of *Kanun-i Esasi* (the first Ottoman constitution) indeed stated that “all peoples in the Ottoman country are free to teach and learn the language of their own” (97). This pluralist logic of the empire was later replaced with an emphasis on Turkishness under the influence of the Young Turks movement in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Sadoglu (2003) claims that Young Turks “realized the role of language in forming a national identity and focused more on the spreading of Turkish as well as the establishment of a common culture so as to keep the subjects unified under the Ottoman rule” (145). The role of education in the formation of this common identity was also acknowledged. For instance, Ziya Gökalp, a member of the *İttihat ve Terakki* (Committee of Union and Progress) and also an influential figure shaping Republic’s nationalist ideology, believed that “non-Turkish Muslim groups who lived together with Turks for hundreds of years could be Turkified through education” (169).

These ideas were solidified into various state policies after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Muslim and non-Muslim divide continued to have implications for the language policies. With the 40<sup>th</sup> article of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey allowed Armenian,

Greek, and Jewish communities to open schools and provide education in their own languages (Menz and Schroeder 2006). The 1924 Constitution stated that the official language of the country is Turkish, and the Law on the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) in March 1924 centralized the education system (Sadoğlu 2003, 289), which was to provide education in Turkish even though the population spoke around 21 different languages (Aslan et al. 2015). Probably the most symbolically significant policy for the nation building process came with the law on the new alphabet in November 1928, which adopted Latin-based alphabet instead of the Arabic script (226). This aimed a break from the Ottoman past and the literacy campaigns that the new alphabet required allowed for a widespread Turkification of the Muslim communities, particularly the Kurdish. The literature on the language policies of the Early Republican Era shows how various unrelated policies all targeted the linguistic diversity such as the literacy classes through People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) particularly in the Kurdish towns (Çolak 2004), the Settlement Law (*İskan Kanunu*) in 1934 which relocated Turkish speaking groups to Kurdish speaking areas (Sadoğlu 2003, 121), and the laws that banned non-Turkish surnames and renamed many towns and villages (Çolak 2004). Even though it was a civil initiative by university students, Citizen Speak Turkish! (*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!*) campaign in 1928 also transformed the public sphere into a monolingual space by targeting even the non-Muslim populations of the diverse Istanbul (Bayar 2011).

While the state continued to control how the citizens spoke, whether Turkish or any other language, even stricter policies on languages came with the 1982 Constitution written after the military coup of 1980. Article 42<sup>nd</sup> of the Constitution, for instance, stipulates that “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of teaching or education” (Minority Rights Group 2007). This was mainly aimed at the Kurdish speaking population and various laws were passed to ban the use of Kurdish in any way (Balçık 2009).

Even though some of the restrictions on languages were removed throughout 90s, more serious reforms were needed after Turkey became an EU candidate country in 1999 (Balçık 2009). As a result of this process, the “Regulation on the Learning of the Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives” was published in December 2003 and allowed the opening of private language courses to teach citizens different languages spoken in Turkey (175). While this regulation only allowed private language courses, a rather significant policy followed in 2012. Under the title of Living languages and dialects, several languages spoken in Turkey were introduced as elective courses in public schools (Sabah 2012). In 2017 the language options in these classes were Abaza language, Adyghe language in Cyrillic or Latin alphabet, Albanian, Bosnian, Georgian, Kurmanci (Kurdish), Lazuri and Zazaki. 85,000 students took these classes in 2015 (Hürriyet 2015). Arabic is also spoken in Turkey by a minority; however, their language was not included in these elective courses. Instead, Arabic as a foreign language class was introduced in 2016 from 2<sup>nd</sup> grade onwards (MoNE 2016a). Even though these classes are symbolically significant and transformed the discourse on languages in Turkey from denial to partial acceptance, their teaching hours are limited and they are only given from the 5<sup>th</sup> grade onwards. Under such conditions, children cannot develop full bilingualism and thus these do not function as mother tongue support classes. Any discussion on education provided in any of these languages is still not acceptable in the public discourse and one could be persecuted for demanding it (Gazeteduvar 2020). According to UNESCO, 15 languages are endangered at different levels in Turkey and 3 languages have recently been lost (Bianet 2009), which points to the fact that speakers of minority languages are not transmitting them to younger generations and thus more and more people are becoming monolingual in Turkish.

This brief summary shows that language policies in Turkey, which aimed to monolingualize the society by assimilating non-Turkish Muslim minorities into a Turkish speaking nation, have

slightly changed through the EU accession process. Acknowledging the diversity of languages in the society; however, did not translate into language policies in education which could foster bilingualism and better support children whose first language is different. With the increasing number of refugee students whose first language is not Turkish studying in public schools, this is once more a question policy makers will have to struggle with.

## **2.2 Migration from Syria to Turkey since 2011 – global and local political context**

The civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 caused many to flee the country and seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. The Turkish government at the time followed an ‘open-door policy’ and defined those seeking asylum as ‘guests’. One reason for such a term was the absence of a legal term to define them since non-Europeans are not able to claim refugee status in Turkey as a result of the geographical limitation Turkey maintains in the the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (İçduygu and Millet 2016). This limitation is maintained since Turkey states that due to its geographical position, it is under pressure to host refugees from neighboring countries and only agrees to lift such limitation if EU member countries “share the burden” (DGMM 2005). The other reason is that the guest metaphor fitted well with the Islamic rhetoric the government was using. This was apparent in the adoption of the Islamic terms ‘muhajir’ and ‘ansar’, which were used by the then Deputy Prime Minister Kurtulmuş (Anadolu Ajansı 2014) as well as President Erdoğan (Habertürk 2014). While the former term denotes the Muslim migrants from Mecca to Medina, the latter are those who hosted them in their homes. This was particularly relevant for the fact that those fleeing Syria were being represented by the government as Sunni brothers escaping the Alawite Assad regime.

Even though the guest metaphor remained in the public discourse for some time, a somewhat ambiguous but a legal term was adopted through a circular in March 2012 and the status of Syrians was defined as temporary protection (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2017). Since Turkey had not had a proper legislation regarding migration and asylum and this had been required during the EU accession process, a law had already been under way before the arrival of Syrians. This law titled Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was passed in April 2013 (DGMM 2013). This was followed by the Regulation on Temporary Protection in October 2014, which initiated the foundation of the Directorate General of Migration Management (İçduygu and Millet 2016) for the registration of the refugees as well as for overseeing all services related to foreigners (International Crisis Group 2016).

When not so favorable conditions in Turkey led many refugees to take the risks and leave the country for Europe in 2015, this turned into a ‘refugee crisis’ for many European countries. President Erdoğan visited Brussels that year to ask for EU support (İçduygu and Nimer 2020) and from his statements in which he was suggesting creating a no-fly zone for the resettlement of refugees it was clear that he still portrayed this as a temporary situation that could be solved through military operations. This meeting resulted in the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (European Commission 2015), which will later lead to the famous ‘EU-Turkey deal’. Through the end of the year, statements from public officials hinted that the long-term nature of the situation was acknowledged (International Crisis Group 2016) even though the concepts used such as ‘temporary permanence’ showed that the strategies were not entirely clear.

In January 2016 a step for permanence was taken by introducing the Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection (Ministry of Labor and Social Security 2016). This was followed by the EU-Turkey statement on March 18<sup>th</sup>, which entailed EU contributing 3 billion euros for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, and outlined the one-in

one-out agreement according to which “for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU” (European Council 2016). Despite the growing negative attitudes towards refugees among the general public, on July 2<sup>nd</sup> President Erdoğan announced at a Ramadan dinner hosted for refugees that they would be given the opportunity to acquire citizenship (TCBB 2016). He repeated this statement at his address at the UN General Assembly in September that year. Since then, more than 90 thousand Syrian refugees (adults and children), who are “qualified people such as teachers and engineers” according to Interior Minister Soylu, have acquired Turkish citizenship (Euronews 2019).

While projects on integration and initiatives for citizenship were on the agenda, the prospects of return have also been increasingly voiced by public figures. Public opinion about the refugees along with the deteriorating economy and the tensions between native populations and Syrians, the country's degrading economy and the upcoming election period are cited as possible causes for the return discourse (Içduygu and Nimer 2020). In 2017 and 2018 Turkey launched two military operations in Northern Syria, which -besides Turkey's other political considerations- aimed to create ‘safe zones’ where refugees could return to. However, in 2019, even Idlib which was being planned as the safe zone and which is the last area controlled by the Syrian opposition seemed to be “losing ground” (Içduygu and Nimer 2020).

As of April 9<sup>th</sup> 2020, there are 3,585,046 registered Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey (DGMM 2020b). This is slightly lower than 2018 since when around 100,000 have acquired Turkish citizenship and around 80,000 have returned to Syria (UNHCR 2019). The unfolding of events between 2011 and 2019 could be summarized as the following: The expectation of the war and the refugee situation to be short-lived determined the approaches by both the refugee hosting countries and the global actors, and the refugees have been



instrumentalized in various ways both in the political discourse in Turkey and as a result of the EU-Turkey deal. Even though a discourse on return occasionally appears, it seems crucial that policies geared towards permanence be considered and more ‘responsibility-sharing’ from EU countries instead of ‘responsibility-shifting’ take place.

### **2.3 Timeline of education policies for the refugee children in Turkey since 2011**

From May 2011 when the first temporary camp was set up by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) in the border city of Hatay until 2020, various changes have been made to the policies regarding the education of children from Syria almost each year and this was mostly due to the changes in the wider sociopolitical context as well as a side effect of the *ad hoc* policy making. This section will give a brief timeline of these policies including laws, regulations, projects as well as some important announcements by public figures.

The first education facilities for children were provided in the camps by Syrian volunteers and international organizations. There were also Syrian and Turkish NGOs outside the camps providing support as well as private Syrian schools for those who could afford them. The state was hardly involved in the education provision at first; however, the educational rights of the people taking refuge in the country was recognized under the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” in 2013 (“Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu” 2013). The first official document by the Ministry of National Education (MONE) regarding the education of Syrian refugee children was the circular titled “Precautions regarding the Syrian citizens hosted in our country outside camps” in 2013, and it focused on determining the possible physical spaces outside camps where education could be provided as well as those places where unofficial education facilities already existed. Later that year, the circular titled “Education services for Syrian citizens under temporary protection in our country” delineated the

framework of such education outside camps including the registration of children who had residency permits and opening of Temporary Education Centers (TEC). TECs provide primary and secondary education both in the camps and in 19 cities and teach the Syrian curriculum in Arabic. However, this curriculum was edited and parts related to Assad and the Syrian regime were taken out (BEKAM 2015). Not all of these children have Arabic as their first language; however, and it is reported that there are Kurdish, Turkish, Armenian, and Domari speaking children among them (ERG 2018). There are no statistics about them and no policy directed at this linguistic diversity.

In 2014, the requirement for residency permits in registration was removed with the circular titled “Education services for Foreigners” so as to increase schooling outside camps. This circular aimed to manage the variety of education facilities including temporary education centers in and outside camps, public schools outside camps, and private schools opened by Syrian citizens. In other words, the education services which were given by a variety of actors before this date were standardized and centralized.

After the EU-Turkey Statement and the disbursement of 3 billion euros to the Facility of Refugees in Turkey in March 2016, there were certain shifts in the approach towards the education of Syrian children. In May 2016, the Department of Migration and Emergency Education was established to manage the education policies regarding migration and in emergency situations (MoNE 2016b). In August, it was announced that students starting the 1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup> grades would be enrolled in public schools and TECs were to be closed down by 2020 (Akyuz 2018). Such developments were followed by the PIKTES (Promoting the integration of Syrian kids into Turkish education system) project in October 2016, which was funded by the EU as a result of the “Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT)” agreement. The project is currently active in 26 cities where Syrian refugee population is the highest, and

provides support in the form of Turkish and Arabic language classes, make-up and catch-up classes, stationery and transportation support for students, and various training activities for the staff (“PIKTES” 2017). The students follow regular public school classes but have extra classes given by teachers temporarily contracted for this project.

PIKTES was initially planned as a two-year project. Therefore, in December 2018 the second phase was initiated with an additional grant by FRIT and planned to continue until the end of 2021. In addition to the earlier PIKTES activities, this phase will include pre-school education, vocational training, social integration activities, and Turkish classes for adults (PIKTES 2018). The latest policy decision came in September 2019 with the MONE circular titled “Integration Classes for Foreign Students” (MoNE 2019). According to this document, those students in primary and secondary education whose Turkish language skills are insufficient are to be enrolled in these classes. When they succeed in the Turkish Proficiency Exam at the end of the semester (maximum two semesters), they are to continue regular classes.

As of January 2020, 684,919 out of 1,082,172 school-aged Syrian children receive education in Turkey (MEEM 2020). Even though the TECs have not been completely closed down, around 15% of these students are in the 215 remaining TECs. The rest are in the public schools or in open education (MEEM 2018). The education policies between 2011 and 2019 could be summarized as crisis management and ad hoc solutions until 2016 and hasty integration into Turkish education system from then on. Language skills in Turkish seem to be the most crucial issue for the students in this process as could be deduced from the PIKTES activities in 26 cities as well as the compliance classes in any school with Syrian students, a move made after the initial decision of full integration seems to have created problems. While it is hard to foresee the direction of future policies, the trajectory of the policies so far suggests that more additions and alterations are yet to come depending on the larger political context.

This chapter has pointed out two major contextual factors that could have possibly influenced the education policy decisions and discourse: the history of nation-building and assimilation through language in Turkey as a result of which the public discussion of linguistic diversity has been highly controversial, and the global and local political implications of the forced mobility from Syria which has been instrumentalized by various actors. Considering these factors as well as the basic presumptions of policy and LPP literature, then, the following research questions could be asked: How have the education policies for Syrian refugee children and their discourse been shaped by the global context as well as the language ideologies in Turkey? How could such policy discourse lead to linguistic and social inequalities for these children?

## Chapter 3 – Methodology

As the literature review on policy analysis has revealed, policy is a meaning making process and the analysis requires various tools and methods to uncover this process. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) provide such tools. Fairclough (2003) argues that how texts, practices and ideologies are related to social structures and processes are “modalities of power” (Hyatt 2013, 837), that is, studying this relationship will show us the power dynamics behind them. The purpose of such a study is to deconstruct how social reality, identities, and relationships are represented and shaped through a text. A text is not only a written document or a speech but any “semiotic representation(s) of social events” (ibid). Therefore, in a discourse-analytical approach to policy, various elements in the policy including documents, speeches, objects, places, and acts are all texts to be analyzed.

The current study focuses on the language-in-education policies for the Syrian refugee children in Turkey between 2011 and 2019 and aims to answer the research questions given at the end of the previous chapter. Therefore, the discourse analysis aims to unravel the linguistic inequalities created through these policies by approaching as ‘texts’ various policy documents, speeches or public statements by policy-relevant actors as well as acts related to the policy. The policy discourse, however, is not analyzed in and of itself. There are at least two steps to be taken: contextualization and deconstruction (Hyatt 2013, 838).

Contextualizing is a crucial part of DHA and Wodak (2008) proposes a multi-level understanding of context which includes the broader sociopolitical and historical context, the context of the situation, the interdiscursive and intertextual relationships, and finally the immediate language or the text (13). Taking into account multiple levels of context helps to trace the “influence of changing socio-political conditions (i.e. macro-level of context) on the dynamics of discursive practices (policy documents, etc.)” (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2011,

118). For this study, both the sociopolitical local and global context of the refugee situation and the historical context of language policies in Turkey were summarized in the previous chapters. During the analysis of the policy texts, the websites of and documents from EU commission and the EU Council, news reports from Turkey, and documents related to various policy areas such as migration and labor, and earlier policy documents related to language and education will be referred to for contextualization. This endeavor will provide insight about the policy rationale and goals as well as about the shifts in the policy. These sources might also reveal interdiscursive and intertextual connections to the policy texts being analyzed, thus show how various concepts are adopted from another location, field and/or time, and recontextualized in a new setting (Fairclough 1995, 181).

As mentioned above, the step to be taken after contextualizing the policy is to deconstruct the policy texts. In an interpretive policy analysis, Yanow (2000) suggests to treat as ‘data’ “the words, symbolic objects, and acts of policy-relevant actors along with policy texts” (2). Therefore, it is recommended to start with the analysis of documents such as “newspaper (and other media) coverage”, “various reports, legislation, or agency documents”, and supplement the analysis, if possible, with the interviews with or observation of key actors and events (5). These actors could be politicians, bureaucrats, linguists (in the case of language policy), and many others (Barakos and W. Unger 2016, 68). The primary documents gathered from the state database for legislation ([mevzuat.gov.tr](http://mevzuat.gov.tr)) as well as from the websites of the relevant agencies and to be used in the discourse analysis can be seen in Table 1 below.

<b>Title</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Issuing Institution</b>
<b>1.</b> Law on Foreigners and International Protection	2013	Presidency
<b>2.</b> Circular on Education Services for Foreigners	2014	MoNE
<b>3.</b> Regulation on Temporary Protection	2014	Presidency
<b>4.</b> EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan	2015	European Commission
<b>5.</b> 2015-2019 Strategic Plan	2015	MoNE
<b>6.</b> EU-Turkey Statement	2016	European Council
<b>7.</b> Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System Project	2016	EU Delegation to Turkey
<b>8.</b> News item titled “The roadmap for the education of Syrian children has been determined”	2016	MoNE
<b>9.</b> PIKTES project webpage – piktes.gov.tr	2017	MoNE
<b>10.</b> Circular on Integration Classes for Foreign Students	2019	MoNE

*Table 1 – Key documents used in discourse analysis*

While primary data through interviews and observations will be beyond the scope of this study, data on the speeches, statements, and acts of policy relevant actors such as the President, Ministers of National Education, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Relations, and bureaucrats working in the General Directorate of Migration Management, Migration and Emergency Education Management, and the PIKTES project will be gathered from news reports and from previous research. The relevant speeches and statements will be accessed through Turkish news websites through a keyword search between 2011-2019.

The next step of the analysis is to work closely with the texts themselves. In a critical approach, the aim is to reveal how language is used in a way that takes for granted various phenomena, naturalizes and rationalizes certain decisions and actions, and makes “normative assumptions”

(Hyatt 2013; Barakos and W. Unger 2016, 13). Analyzing the language for this purpose entails determining the discourse topics, looking for the discursive strategies and their linguistic realizations as well as the appearances of any other analytical category. The discourse topics within the texts to be analyzed for this research have been identified as migration, integration, and language in education. The discursive strategies in DHA are nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivation, and intensification/mitigation (Wodak and Meyer 2001). While this will be the main framework, concepts from other frameworks that are found to be relevant will be applied as well.

Nomination is how people, things, or events are referred to or labeled. Construction of categories and the use of metaphors are common linguistic realizations of this strategy. For an interpretive policy analysis, Yanow (2000), similarly, deems metaphor and category analysis crucial. Critically analyzing metaphoric language in the policy could help “discover[ing] the architecture of the policy argument” (3). Categories are also commonly created in public policies and “reflect a set of ideas about their subject matter” by assuming “samenesses and differences” within those categories (8-9). In addition, they might take on a specific meaning “at the particular time and place of their usage” (12). Another linguistic means for labeling could be the use of pronouns to “include or exclude groups (us and them) or indeed obscure the identity of the group constructed” (Hyatt 2013, 842). In this study, labeling and the categorization of the Syrian children the policies aim at, metaphoric language related to the event of taking refuge, and how education and language learning are referred to might be potential appearances of this discursive strategy.

Predication is the positive or negative evaluative language used for these labels. Hyatt (2013) argues that such evaluation could either be explicitly “displaying the attitudinal judgement of the text producer” through the use of certain words or only evoking such meaning by using



seemingly neutral language (841). Since policies often adopt neutral language, overt evaluative language about the categories mentioned above might not exist but the meanings evoked could be revealed through contextual or intertextual references.

Argumentation is the justification of decisions and actions, which could be exclusionary or discriminatory and could be achieved by referring to authority, rationality or morality as well as through the use of various lexical and grammatical items (840-842). Particularly for the policy analysis, Fairclough (1995) suggests focusing on how the relationship between problems and solutions are constructed since problem orientation is a distinct character of policies. In our case, the ‘problem’ areas that the policies were created for are migration and education, and the analysis will potentially focus on how the policy decisions at any point are justified in the texts.

Perspectivation is how an issue is framed in the text, and in the policy language for that matter. Highlighting the framing of the issue in the policy is important as it may “direct attention toward some elements while simultaneously diverting attention from other elements” (Yanow 2000, 9). Therefore, how the events, particularly the event of human mobility, is narrated and the elements or the lack of elements in such narration can tell us from which perspective the policy object is viewed and treated. Accordingly, linguistic devices could be used to intensify or mitigate the importance of such phenomena as human mobility and this could also function as a justification strategy.

Along with a holistic analysis of these discursive strategies, one specific analytical category to be investigated within each strategy will be language ideologies. Since language policies regulate the use of languages in various domains and thus contain traces of beliefs about languages, their analysis should include an examination of language ideologies (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2011; Lawton 2016). As these are defined as “cultural ideas, presumptions and

presuppositions with which different social groups name, frame and evaluate linguistic practices” (Gal 2006), how languages such as Turkish or Arabic, their use in education and their learning are named and framed in the texts will tell us about the language ideologies beneath.

While the critical discourse analysis method could include a detailed study of all the elements described above, the following analysis will not cover each discursive strategy step by step but rather will analyze documents holistically. Even though strategies such as categorization, labeling, framing and argumentation will be taken into account in each document, only those that are found relevant for the discourse topic at hand will be explained in detail.

## Chapter 4 – The Policy Analysis

Following the approach to policy as a power tool ordering social relations and shaping the perceptions of the issues it handles and the conception of language policy as a mechanism of allocating resources through language use, this chapter will analyze the ways through which language in education policy for Syrian refugee children have produced social and linguistic hierarchies. As pointed out in the methodology chapter, discursive strategies and topics salient in the policy texts have been analyzed and three significant areas have been found to stand out. These are temporariness, integration, and monolingual ideologies. The following three sections will explain and exemplify how these discourse areas have been shaped by both the global and the national context and have dominated the policy language through discursive strategies, particularly nomination and argumentation. Each section will also point to the possible implications of these for refugee children.

### **4.1 Creating categories: How does policy frame the people, mobility, and status?**

As discussed in the theoretical framework, how and why policies are generated or have shifted could not solely be understood in the national context but should be analyzed taking the global context into consideration as well. The national policies related to forced human mobility such as the one from Syria have clear connections to international or supranational texts and discourses. Most often than not these will impact how the phenomenon of human mobility and the people involved in it are classified and labelled. Therefore, this section aims to find out how the refugees, their mobility and status are represented in the policy language and how and why the language in education policies for Syrian refugee children have been shaped by such texts and discourses. This endeavor will help to understand how the power dynamics related to language in education in a migration context are shaped by policies and politics in a wider

context. For analytical purposes, this section will group policy decisions and related policy documents and statements into two distinct periods and trace the contextual influences and discursive connections in each period.

The first period from late 2011 to late 2014 is characterized by the discourse of temporariness. Even though this discourse was later mostly abandoned at the policy level, it has continued defining how the policies are understood and experienced. There seems to be two sources of this notion of temporariness that has come to dominate the public and policy discourse: the local public discourse and the discourse embedded in international legal texts.

The primary representations of the refugees as being temporary were painted by important political figures in Turkey through the use of strong metaphoric language. From May 2011 when the first group of people from Syria were settled in camps in Hatay, Turkey – or rather temporary sheltering centers as they are called (AFAD n.d.) – by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) until the Temporary Protection Regulation (2014) which defined their legal status, the official discourse on refugees was that they were guests and *muhajir*<sup>1</sup>. President Erdoğan’s speech from 2014 where he addressed the Syrian population staying in one of the camps (Habertürk 2014) is a fascinating example of this ‘nation state as home’ metaphor through which he framed the act of accepting refugees as an act of welcoming guests to your home and generosity rather than as a state policy:

“We, as Turkey, feel pleased, delighted and proud that we have hosted you here for four years. You were the ‘*muhajir*’. You were forced to leave your homeland. We were the ‘*ansar*’ and we used all means available to help you. No matter what anyone says you are never a burden for us. [...] In our civilization, in our culture, in our traditions, a guest means abundance and honor. You both made us the *ansar* and also brought abundance to our home, brought honor to our home, and brought joy to our home”

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<sup>1</sup> In the Islamic history, those who migrated from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet Mohammed are called the *muhajir* while those who hosted the migrants in their homes are called *ansar*

The ‘guest’ label was also used in policy documents and reports. One of the first circulars that the Ministry of National Education sent out in 2013, for instance, was titled “Measures regarding the Syrian citizens hosted [who are guests] outside camps in our country” (Emin 2016) and some of the reports that the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority prepared regarding camp facilities were also named as “Syrian Guests” (AFAD 2016). ‘Guests’ metaphor both refers to the Turkish nation state as home as pointed out above but also invokes the perception of a short stay and a return home. This perception determined the policy decisions as well and in an interview with a news agency the then Minister of National Education Dinçer indeed articulated this perception quite clearly:

“We sent our teachers who speak Arabic and who were raised in that region. [...] We didn’t put any effort in teaching the Syrian children any Turkish. We see them as *guests* [italics added] in our country and we expect that they will return to their own country after the situation in Syria improves” (Milliyet 2012)

The decision regarding the nature of the education provided for the children and the language to be used for such education was clearly influenced by the political vision of the period and Arabic was presented as the logical choice for the expectation that they would ‘return home’.

The use of such metaphoric language was not the only factor shaping the discourse around their status as mentioned above. The legal status of temporary protection has influenced – and still influences – the policy making and the policy discourse. To understand where this status originates and how its discourse has been recontextualized and found its way in national policy documents, one should look into the European Union’s directive on temporary protection of 2001. This was a document that aimed to set the “minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences” (European Commission 2001). In order to explain the rationale of such a policy it refers to the aftermath of the “conflict in the former Yugoslavia” and also to “displaced

persons from Kosovo” in which such ‘mass influx’ took place. Briefly, it allows the Members to attribute this temporary protection status to those displaced persons whose refugee status as specified by the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol could not be determined through a case-by-case process and also makes it possible to ‘share the burden’ the ‘mass influx’ might have placed on a country.

As also referred to on the website of the General Directorate of Migration Management (DGMM 2020a), the temporary protection status recognized for the Syrian refugees in Turkey was modeled after this perception and the documents outlining the status have direct discursive connections to this directive. The Temporary Protection Regulation (2014) defines this status as:

“Protection status granted to foreigners, who were forced to leave their countries and are unable to return to the countries they left and arrived at or crossed our borders in masses or individually during this mass influx to seek urgent and temporary protection and whose international protection requests cannot be taken under individual assessment”

and the concept of mass influx, which was also the term used in the Directive (European Commission 2001), is defined in the Regulation as:

“Situations in which a high number of people come from the same country or a geographical region and procedures related to international protection status cannot be individually followed because of the number of people”

Neither the European Council Directive nor the Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014 clarifies what “high number of people” entails other than through the topos of numbers (Wodak and Meyer 2001) which helps to justify an action or argue the necessity of an action through numbers. This discourse around mass influx, indeed, has substantial implications. While representation of masses are easily instrumentalized to instill fear in public through a perception of ‘threat’ or ‘invasion’ (Gerrard 2017; Tazzioli and Genova 2016), the concept of ‘mass influx’ could also function as an argument to justify policy decisions. This labeling of

mobility as ‘mass influx’ has been used in education policy documents as well. The circular on Education Services for Foreigners (2014), for instance, repeatedly uses this term not to define the mobility itself but as an adjective to label the students as “foreign students who came into our country in a *mass influx*” or to explain the policy decision that “temporary education centers will be founded [...] in cities/districts which were affected by the *mass influx*”. By narrating the phenomenon as if it was a natural disaster, this language invokes an ‘emergency’ or a ‘crisis’, which has also been increasingly used by governments to justify various policy decisions as in the notions of ‘state of emergency’ or ‘refugee crisis’ (Tazzioli and Genova 2016). It is also worth noting that the refugee arrivals were also treated with the emergency discourse with Disaster and Emergency Management Authority organizing the camps and even the education centers within the camps along with the Migration and Emergency Education Management agency under MoNE. Therefore, the emergency discourse could function as a legitimization of the temporary protection status and the temporary education policy for people who, contradictorily, have to be permanent in Turkey exactly because of this temporary protection status. As a result, the Arabic education policy that depended on the belief of actual temporariness had to be reversed when the context changed, which required a discursive shift as well.

The Regulation on Temporary Protection (2014) does not specify for how long a person could be attributed this status. Therefore, after almost nine years, children from Syria could still be categorized as SuTPs (Syrians under Temporary Protection) (see “Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System” n.d.) and this continues to define their reality. For example, not knowing whether they will be able to return or resettled in a third country, parents are reported in one study to be unwilling to have their children educated only in Turkish and prefer to send them to TECs as long as possible (Çelik and İçduygu 2019). However, as mentioned above, even though the limitations this status entails have remained, a policy aiming

‘permanence’ replaced the one of ‘temporariness’ as a result of the changing context. With the EU-Turkey joint action plan (2015) and the EU-Turkey Statement (2016) which is commonly referred to as EU-Turkey Deal, projects and policy moves aiming at teaching Turkish and providing education in Turkish were put forward as the only logical paths to follow. The contradiction that only three to four years ago, education in Arabic was put forward as the only logical alternative is just one example of this discursive shift.

It is not possible to speculate how Turkey would have proceeded in its policies regarding the education of refugee children if the agreement with EU had not taken place; however, the EU-Turkey Statement did indeed make it clear that a majority of the refugee population in Turkey would be permanent. Turkey agreed to take “any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU” while EU member states would “contribute on a *voluntary basis* [italics added] to this [Voluntary Humanitarian Admission] scheme” (European Council 2016). In return for Turkey to ‘host’ the majority of the refugees, visa liberalization for Turkish citizens would be considered, which was one element of this statement that caused this to be called ‘a deal’. The Facility for Refugees in Turkey would also be disbursed 6 billion Euros in two allotments which was to be used for, among other areas, projects for education.

The PIKTES (Promoting the Integration of Syrian Kids into Turkish Education System) project was the widest in scope among the education projects with a funding of 300 million Euros (EU Delegation to Turkey 2016) through which the ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’ entered the policy discourse and the schooling within public education instead of Temporary Education Centers came into the agenda. What the project did to promote the integration into Turkish education system, which is a notion to be analyzed in more detail in section 3 of this chapter, was to offer Turkish and Arabic language training along with catch-up and back-up classes



(EU Delegation to Turkey 2016). Whether the integration ‘succeeded’ through these activities could be evaluated by the recent policy decision that will be mentioned below. However, as this section tries to underline, we could see in various documents by MoNE that a large scale integration was not a pre-planned move but rather appeared after the ‘EU-Deal’. For instance, the 2015-2019 strategic plan by the Ministry only mentions “foreigners under temporary protection” twice and does not specify any plan for preparing them for education in Turkish in public schools but only states that efforts would be made to integrate them into the education system so that “they can receive education during the time they are in our country” (MoNE 2015). This item does not even appear among the primary action points for the 5-year plan and the main responsible unit for this item is designated as the General Directorate of European Union and Foreign Relations. The Migration and Emergency Education Management unit, which specifically manages activities related to refugee children is only established one year later in 2016 after the permanence of refugees as a result of the wider political context is acknowledged.

Even though these abrupt changes in policy and the discourse show that none of these moves are carefully planned pedagogically motivated decisions for the best interest of the students, policy language indeed presents these decisions as if they are. Such argumentation also, unintentionally, points to the *ad hoc* nature of the policy making. The circular regarding the integration classes, which were designed after the enrollment into public schools without an efficient transition period turned out to be not the best action, retrospectively argues that this decision had been taken “so that the foreign students in temporary education centers could benefit from education services better” (MoNE 2019). However, this document also acknowledges that the language barrier caused difficulties, which necessitated the opening of integration classes. Therefore, though not deliberately, it is accepted that that move did not help children “benefit from education services better” but instead caused them experience

difficulties. It is also worth noting that these classes are to be given by teachers employed in the PIKTES project (MoNE 2019), whose second phase started in 2018 after the Facility for Refugees in Turkey disbursed another 400 million Euros for the project (PIKTES 2018). These ‘integration classes’, then, might not have been possible without the EU funding. This is also significant in that while policy and project related documents repeatedly refer to “access to quality education” as its primary aim (EU Delegation to Turkey 2016; MoNE 2019), what it does is intensive Turkish teaching. This could help them ‘manage’ in Turkish curriculum but might not necessarily help children meaningfully participate in education in the languages they know best and improve their Turkish at the same time.

This brief analysis displayed how the categories and labels regarding the human mobility and thus the refugee students have been created through legal and policy documents and how decisions such as education in Arabic or Turkish have been motivated by developments in the wider context. It was also demonstrated that despite the use of highly positive phrases such as “quality education”, “benefit from education services”, and “promoting the integration” to depict the policy moves as the best or the most logical steps, they have been mainly taken as a result of political agreements elsewhere or earlier legal texts that have been recontextualized. The following section aims to illustrate how such categorization and argumentation coupled with the language ideologies already in place in Turkey influenced the language related policy decisions and what implications these have had for the students.

## **4.2 Language ideologies and linguistic inequality in education**

As stated before, Turkey does not have an established language policy for migration. Therefore, any language related decision within the education policies for refugees is shaped by the wider policy context as detailed in the previous chapter and also informed by the common language ideologies in Turkey. This section will, thus, scrutinize the language policy decisions and the

discourse in these policies to understand how the ideologies related to language use and languages in education have shaped the policies and how policies such as these could result in linguistic and social inequalities for the refugee children.

Until 2016 when MoNE decided that children starting the 1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and the 9<sup>th</sup> grade would be enrolled in the Turkish public schools and not the TECs, most of the Syrian students had received education in Arabic with the Syrian curriculum (some students in the remaining TECs still do). One of the first policy documents by MoNE which draws the framework of these centers defines the purpose of the education in these centers as:

“[...] to ensure the foreign students who have flooded into our country in masses to continue the education they were forced to leave in their country and to prevent grade repetition when they return to their country or if they would like to transfer to any education institution and continue their education in our country” (MoNE 2014)

The document does not specify the medium of education as Arabic and in a later press release by MoNE, the students are said to be receiving education “in their own language” (MoNE 2016c) but we learn from the statements by the then Minister of Education that “their own language” indeed refers to Arabic (Anadolu Ajansı 2012). The fact that this information is not clearly stated in the documents seems to show that it is believed to be common sense. While these children are citizens of Syria, Arabic is the official language of the country and not necessarily the first language of all the children coming from there. Among them there are Kurdish, Turkish, Armenian, and Domari speaking children (ERG 2018). However, Turkish state treats them as monolingual Arabic speakers since in the state discourse on languages in Turkey language is equated with nationality and the official language of one’s country is taken to be the ‘mother tongue’ of the citizens. That is, no individual bi/multilingualism is recognized and/or catered for.

After the policy shift from monolingual Arabic education in TECs to monolingual Turkish education in public schools, MoNE did not ignore Arabic all together and cited the possibility of “extracurricular education programs in their [students’] own language”; however, the purpose of such programs was framed as “keeping their language and culture alive” (MoNE 2016c). This reference to keeping the language alive is reminiscent of the discourse on the language classes for minoritized languages in Turkey offered in public schools since 2012 and are called ‘The Living Languages and Dialects classes’. They were carefully designed to keep the minoritized languages alive but not to serve as ‘mother tongue’ support classes. They are only given for 2 hours a week as elective courses and can only be elected from 5<sup>th</sup> grade onwards. Accordingly, when the Arabic language classes were initiated with the PIKTES project in 2016 (“PIKTES” 2017), they were not designed to function as first language support classes that would help the children learn the curriculum but rather as heritage classes to keep the language alive. Children whose first language may not be Arabic were, again, not taken into consideration.

While it was shown in the previous section that the decision to allow education in Arabic in the first phase was largely a result of the wider context, and despite Arabic not being the first language of all, it was still unique for the national education in Turkey to have students receiving education in their ‘mother tongue’ and not in Turkish. Even the minority schools operating as a result of the Lausanne Treaty cannot be argued to provide education in the ‘mother tongue’. Nevertheless, TECs were still monolingual schools, even though they provided Turkish language classes. Therefore, when the policy shift required transfer into monolingual Turkish schools, there was little support to ease the transition. This means the policy assumed a replacement of one monolingual context with the other while the reality was bilingual if not more diverse.

This is not so different from how Turkey treated the education of children speaking other languages in its history. Children who had no or little Turkish proficiency have always been required to follow classes in Turkish. This model of ‘submersion’ education in which subjects are taught only through the second language is common in a lot of contexts where language policies do not allow for linguistic diversity in public institutions and aims for monolingualism in the school language despite research pointing out that children learn academic content better on their first language and build proficiency in the second language based on their first language (Cummins 1984), which is explained in detail below. While still aiming for monolingualism, there are also transitional bilingual programs in which the first language of the student is used as a basis to later transition into the school language (Heller 2007). The TECs might have functioned as transition schools in theory; however, the analysis so far has shown that policy decisions were motivated by various political agendas rather than any pedagogical concern. This does not mean that transitional programs are any better for children than submersion programs. It is also not the purpose of this study to evaluate the ‘success’ of a particular policy decision. What matters is that the decision to enroll Syrian children in Turkish schools is in line with the long established language policies and the public discourse on languages in Turkey. That is, any form of bilingualism does not fit in the institutional repertoire of public education. For that reason, the lack of resources or methodology to teach children whose language is different than the school language is not necessarily a shortcoming of the policy or a detail not taken into account. On the contrary, it is possible to say that this is a well-established policy in the Turkish education system not to take these into account. A teacher that Çelik and İçduygu (2019) cite summarizes this perfectly:

“We lack perspective to think about them, lack material to use in the courses. We experience with the Syrians students what we have experienced with Kurdish students. [...] Anyway, Turkish education has a standard strategy ‘when it cannot cope; just pretend these students are not there.’” (262)

This example shows how the discourse of the unexpectedness and the magnitude of the human mobility legitimating certain policy decisions or ‘problems in practice’ only masks the fact that preparedness has already been rendered impossible through the language ideologies related to linguistic diversity embedded in public education. This is not exclusively a ‘Turkish’ phenomenon either. In their comparative study, Crul et al (2019) also conclude that what countries refer to as “refugee problem” in education is indeed “a problem of institutional arrangements ill prepared for immigrant children” since they do not recognize the reality of human mobility and diversity (26).

In the case of Turkey, this unpreparedness is particularly related to teacher training and resources. The circular on the Education Services for Foreign Students (2014) states that the Turkish classes in TECs could be given by Turkish language and literature teachers, primary school teachers, and foreign language teachers. Teachers in these same fields are also cited as the ones giving Turkish classes within the PIKTES project (MoNE n.d.). Besides the fact that the teacher education in these fields does not train teachers for teaching Turkish as a second language (Taskin and Erdemli 2018), the tradition of avoiding any public discussion on the linguistic diversity in the country has also prevented awareness in those training to be primary school or early childhood teachers let alone those teaching other subjects. The materials used in the language support classes are also not designed for children and for specific age groups (Karaman 2018) since Turkish as foreign language had mostly aimed adults before. As the context chapter also illustrated, the fact that Turkish is not the first language of all citizens has long been avoided in the public discourse and this impeded any pedagogical experience that Turkish institutions could have in teaching Turkish to children whose first language is different. Therefore, it is hard to say that this is a novel phenomenon that Turkey could not have been prepared for.

It is possible to see how the decision to enroll the students with little Turkish proficiency in Turkish-medium schools could not be for the best interest of the students both through examining the changing policy decisions for the refugee children only in a three year period and also by looking at the experience with Kurdish speaking children. When MoNE announced the policy to transition to public education in a press release (2016c), it stated that they would “pay attention to the number of students who have weak Turkish skills placed in each class so that they socialize with their peers and learn Turkish through experience”. The policy makers themselves in the Ministry of National Education would also know that learning a language for daily communication does not mean mastering the language enough to cope with academic content. The well-known theory by Cummins (1984) differentiates between BICS (Basic Interpersonal Communication Skills) and CALP (Cognitive Academic Language Proficiency) and points out that a pupil needs a minimum of 5 years to be able to start developing CALP in a language, which means children who have just started learning Turkish cannot be expected to perform in academic content as well as their Turkish-speaker classmates do. Therefore, the MoNE should have been aware that neither socializing with friends nor the limited amount of Turkish teaching in TECs or through the PIKTES project could have prepared these children to follow curriculum in Turkish in such a short time. Not surprisingly, through a circular titled “Integration classes <sup>2</sup> for foreign students” (MoNE 2019) in September 2019 MoNE acknowledged that “difficulties are experienced in the integration of foreign students into the education system because of Turkish language barrier” and thus “it has been deemed suitable that integration classes to be opened to increase the integration of these students into the Turkish education system”. Students would be enrolled in these classes for a maximum of two

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<sup>2</sup> *Uyum Siniflari* in Turkish. The translation MoNE provides for the name of these classes is Compliance Classes. However, this is not a good translation and the word *uyum* in this context could better be translated as Integration.

semesters and they would receive 24 hours of Turkish and 6 hours of various skills classes such as arts and sports a week. (MoNE 2019).

While this new policy might seem to be an improvement of the conditions after the hasty decision to enroll children into monolingual Turkish education, a look at how monolingual education has resulted in the case of Kurdish speaking children and what problems the current policy discourse for refugee children entail could point otherwise. Monolingual education not catering for the needs of Kurdish speaking children has been found to cause higher class repetition and dropout rates for them (Gökşen, Cemalcılar, and Gürlesel 2006). While it is already apparent that the refugee children will follow a similar path in academic performance (Aydin and Kaya 2019) for being denied equal access to academic resources as a result of the language barrier, the policy to teach them Turkish also adds to the inequality. One study points out the fact that by allocating more than half of the weekly classes to Turkish, the hours of other subjects are halved (Karaman 2018) and the Integration classes curriculum explained above also shows that students in those classes will not be taught any academic subjects for at least a semester. In the highly competitive education system of Turkey where mastering academic subjects is the only way to progress to secondary and tertiary education, this will clearly have serious implications as well.

Along with the obstacles to equal access to educational resources, the attitudes towards refugee students' academic experience and the discourse around achievement also show similarities to the case of Kurdish students and could have similar results. The internalized monolingual ideologies by most teachers, for instance, add to the disadvantages that the students experience. When the policies create one kind of reality that prioritizes education in Turkish over the needs of the children, teachers might not believe they should act otherwise:

“I don't feel the need to provide something extra for him [...] Our national education is in Turkish [...] If a child who does not know Turkish is in my



classroom, I don't feel obligated to provide something extra” (Karsli-Calamak and Kilinc 2019, 12).

Even when students’ struggle with Turkish curriculum is acknowledged, how this struggle is framed by the policies still aggravates the problem. The target group for the catch-up training that is provided as part of the PIKTES project, for instance, is defined as “3<sup>rd</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup> grader Syrian students, who are academically unsuccessful, repeating a grade level or in need of academic support [...]” (“PIKTES” 2017). By citing being ‘academically unsuccessful’ as the explanation of grade repetition, the cause of children’s struggle is attributed to their own capabilities rather than the policies which have created such conditions. The integration classes circular uses a similar language and defines the target group as those “whose Turkish language skills are insufficient” (MoNE 2019). Narrating a problem from this perspective puts the students at a position where they are substandard while it was even not realistic to expect any non-Turkish speaking student to master the language to follow academic content in such a short time. Therefore, while such problem statements in the policies might seem to be stating ‘facts’ and thus ‘objective’, such discourse of responsabilization (Newman and Clarke 2009), in fact, masks the actual responsibility of institutions and makes it possible to blame the disadvantaged for their own failure. The reflections of such approach are also apparent in teachers’ narration of refugee students’ academic experience. Some teachers interpret their students’ Turkish performances as “not want[ing] to learn Turkish” (Taskin and Erdemli 2018, 31) or “resist[ing] speaking Turkish” (Karsli-Calamak and Kilinc 2019, 15). A similar perspective is also taken to explain the parents’ role and they are believed to be “indifferent to the education of their children” (Arar, Örücü, and Ak Küçükçayir 2020, 16). Through the perception that the monolingual space of the school is the normal order of things, therefore, both the students and the parents are held responsible of their exclusion from meaningful participation in the education system.

If we are to summarize this, then, by tracing these outcomes back in the discourse, we could say that monolingual ideologies in the education policies have prevented any discussion of a multilingual pedagogy by presenting the course of action as the most logical. First, education in Arabic was deemed the most appropriate by referring to the country of origin and the probability of return. Then, the enrollment in Turkish education was shown as the best way forward to increase schooling and ‘integration’. And when students could not ‘succeed’, they were either provided with more Turkish input which has taken away from the academic content, or labeled as insufficient or unsuccessful without problematizing the fact that it is not the students who should do more to access resources in their second language but it is the system that should be responsive to the needs of bi/multilingual students.

### **4.3 ‘Integration’ and language**

The first section of this chapter showed that the discourse around ‘integration’ only became prominent in the education policy around 2016 when the impossibility of a ‘return home’ in the near future was realized. Such discourse was adopted mainly after the EU-Turkey statement (European Council 2016) and inspired by the EU-funded projects targeting integration. In that sense, the use of the notion of integration denoted permanence, the acknowledgement of coexistence. An exploration of what integration refers to in the immigration policy of Turkey in general is beyond the scope of this study. However, what the education policy for refugee children means when it refers to integration and what role language has in this perception of integration will be analyzed in this section. Answers to these questions might be able to shed light on possible understandings of integration with regards to refugees as well and thus could help clarify what it means to belong.

Before the announcement of the PIKTES project, the news item MoNE released on its website on August 2016 titled “The roadmap for the education of Syrian children has been determined”

(MoNE 2016c) refers to the Turkish word *uyum* a few times in different contexts. Since it does not directly correspond to the word *integration* and thus does not come with its discursive baggage, it might be worth looking closer. The Turkish Language Institution (TDK) dictionary offers the following meanings for *uyum*: “the compatibility among the parts of a whole, harmony” and “adapting to a social environment or a situation, *entegrasyon* [Turkified version of *integration*]” (“Türk Dil Kurumu | Sözlük” n.d.). Then, this text might be referring to the adaptation of children into their new situation as well as their social integration, a term which has been critically analyzed for its use in relation to language testing regimes (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero, and Stevenson 2009) and is found to be semantically vague in migration discourse at the EU level (Horner 2009) and used instead of assimilation in policy discourse while, in fact, assimilation is the long term aim (Avermaet 2009). However, before going into that specific discourse around integration, it would be helpful to see what meanings the word *uyum* connotes in the Turkish context. In the news item mentioned above, the word is mentioned in these instances:

“To ease the future transition and *uyum* (adaptation?) of the students who are currently receiving education in their own language in temporary education centers, they will be provided with intensive Turkish language instruction [...] For the purpose of ensuring the *uyum* (adaptation?) of students who are below grade level to their grade level [...] By taking into account the social and cultural *uyum* (adaptation / integration?) process, they will be encouraged to socialize” (MoNE 2016c).

In this earlier text outlining the policy, the first two uses seem to be pointing out that the students might struggle getting used to or adapting to their new schools and grade levels and the solution would be intensive Turkish courses. The last use is closer to the more common understanding of integration for being signified with ‘social’ and ‘cultural’. Yet, it does not specify what this integration entails so this might be referring to a kind of adaptation to the new environment as well. Later documents, those outlining the PIKTES project and the Integration Classes, however, make clearer assertions regarding what they mean by integration.

The webpage detailing the EU-funded project “Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System” in the EU delegation website provides the following main objectives for the project:

“The overall objective is to contribute to the access of Syrians under temporary protection to education in Turkey. The specific objective is to support the Ministry of National Education in its efforts to integrate Syrians under temporary protection into the Turkish education system” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2016).

The website for the project itself formulates the purpose slightly differently:

“The main purpose of PIKTES Project is to promote the access of children under temporary protection to education in Turkey and to support their social cohesion. In this scope, PIKTES also aims at supporting the efforts of Ministry of National Education on education and social cohesion of children under temporary protection in Turkey” (“PIKTES” 2017).

While the word *entegrasyon* is used in title of the project, the purpose statement prefers *uyum* in its Turkish version and “cohesion” in the English version. It seems that instead of adopting the word “to integrate” that the EU Delegation uses, the policy makers opted for a terminology used more commonly in Turkish. Thanks to this use, we understand that Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System means “promot[ing] the access” of these children to education while also “supporting [...] social cohesion”.

There are two questions worth analyzing in this: integration into what and what kind of integration. First of all, the ‘integration’ is supposed to be into the ‘Turkish education system’, that is, the access to education that the project promotes is an access to the centralized Turkish education system and not any kind of education that could be offered by independent organizations such as international NGOs or a kind of education specifically designed for the needs of these children. Since the Turkish education system only offers a centralized “monoethnic”, “monoreligious”, and “monolingual” curriculum which does not recognize diversity in the student body (Çelik and İçduygu 2019, 257), it is hard to imagine how the

students are expected to meaningfully access it and be a part of it. Pinson and Arnot (2007) claim that the integration process for the "refugee and asylum-seeking children" in education is some kind of "litmus test in terms of social inclusion" (406). That is, what is expected of them in terms of integration would show us what a society is ready and not ready to include and what role education has in this. PIKTES project tells us that education in Turkey aims at sameness and is ready to include those who make an effort to be the same. Accordingly, the social cohesion aspect among the project objectives also points to an effort from the refugee students' side to be a part of this homogenous whole rather than opening up a space where they can exist with their differences.

Proficiency in Turkish language stands out as the most crucial criterion for this later policy. The integration classes that the policy introduced in the 2019-2020 academic year spells this out clearly:

"It is imperative that the integration (*uyum*) of the foreign children currently in public schools to the society and the education system be improved. There are difficulties in the integration (*uyum*) of foreign students into the education system because of the Turkish language barrier. It has been deemed suitable that integration classes be opened in order to improve the integration (*uyum*) of these students into the Turkish education system" (MoNE 2019).

Similar to PIKTES, these classes also refer to the integration both to the society and the education system. This statement seems to argue that it is their level of Turkish which defines to what extent they have become a part of the society and the education system. The problem here is, however, not whether one is able to communicate with others in their new social environment but rather the fact that they are expected to master it. In many migrant receiving countries, it has been the dominant discourse that language proficiency is key to integration (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero, and Stevenson 2009; Duchêne, Moyer, and Roberts 2013) and more often than not "the distinct process of 'language learning' is conflated with that of 'language testing'" (Horner 2009, 124), that is how well a person has mastered a language has

been a criterion for ‘integration’. However, when those who have newly arrived are required to master the language to be able to benefit public services, particularly education, language functions more as a tool for exclusion and a gate-keeping mechanism than as a means to be ‘included’. The Integration Classes Circular (MoNE 2019) specifies that the classes are intended for those students receiving below 60 in the Turkish Proficiency Test. This will mean that, then, those who do not perform in these classes, which predominantly aims Turkish training, as well as the policy specifies will be labelled as ‘not integrated’.

Along with the implications of setting language proficiency as a threshold for a vague concept such as integration, this approach to ‘integration’ through language learning is also reproducing a monolingual ideology that the previous section has detailed. Since the norm is the monolingual education and monolingual schools, any policy move which seemingly aims to “improve the integration” (MoNE 2019) focuses on what the students do to “accommodate monolingual school contexts” rather than, for instance, what teachers could do “to extend their linguistic repertoires” (Chang-Bacon 2020, 11) or how they could be trained in the methods of teaching a multilingual class population. This specific understanding of integration is one-way and places the responsibility on the children.

As several policy documents and in general the discourse of the policy indicate, learning Turkish is seen as a prerequisite not only of being a part of the education system but of “social cohesion” (“PIKTES” 2017) as well. This also follows from a monolingual ideology or what Blommaert and Verschueren (1992) calls “the dogma of homogeneity”, that is, the belief that “the ideal model of society is mono-lingual, mono-ethnic, mono-religious, mono-ideological” (362). Even though this has been the ideal of the state in Turkey as well, it is also a fact that the society is not ‘mono’ and definitely not ‘monolingual’. At least 15 % of the population stated their first language was not Turkish in 2006 (KONDA 2006). Then, it is possible for

many refugees to socialize and participate in daily life using various other languages and not necessarily Turkish. In that sense, social cohesion for refugee children should not depend on how well they speak the national language. This understanding of integration through Turkish is also problematic since it strengthens the belief, as in the school context, that integration requires the “unilateral effort of the incoming minority” and it is almost never used to refer to the “integration *of* migrants and the indigenous population”, that is, to a mutual effort (Mar-Molinero and Stevenson 2006).

A final aspect related to integration, which is not directly related to the language and education policies but has implications for it, is the contradiction between the temporary status and *de facto* permanence. While policies have evolved in the last decade from a temporary accommodation to a large-scale integration, the legal status of those that the policies have targeted has not changed. Therefore, despite the impossibility of knowing the future prospects for one’s family because of the limitations that the temporary status presents, children were given no choice but to be ‘integrated’ into Turkish society. That is, refugee families and thus children were not allowed to have a voice in the decisions taken on their behalf. It is, for that reason, contradictory that learning the language is presented as the key to integration while their legal status prevents them from having a say in their own future or about the society they are expected to be a part of.

In short, the policy of integration entered the public agenda only after the EU-Turkey Deal, which ruled out the possibility for most Syrian refugees to seek a future elsewhere, and through the EU-funded projects such as PIKTES. By positing education in the monolingual Turkish education system as the only path for integration, the policies are, in fact, excluding the refugee children. Rather than supporting the children to learn the common language while allowing their linguistic diversity to be an asset for them to ‘access quality education’, this path presents

speaking the same language as the only way to receive education and be a legitimate member of the society. Quite similar to the approach to Muslim non-Turkish minorities in the history of Turkey, ‘integration’ through language is deemed to be achievable by the policy makers since the refugees are already approached as Muslim brothers by the government. However, considering their disadvantaged position in education analyzed in the previous section, it is hard to imagine whether ‘integration’ is ever possible.

#### **4.4 Conclusion of the Analysis**

The analysis of the policy discourse has demonstrated that even though the discourse around temporariness which dominated the earlier policy making has later shifted into one of integration as a result of the changes in context, the underlying monolingual ideologies have remained constant and manifested themselves through both discourses. While this shows that policies targeting refugees and their discourse have been highly influenced by the global developments and discourses, how the issue has been locally handled has much to do with the history and the sociopolitical context in Turkey. It can also be concluded that any policy targeting the education of refugee children will eventually lead to inequality as long as the monolingual ideologies in education policies are left unquestioned.



# Conclusion

In almost ten years since 2011 when the first group of refugees from Syria settled in camps in the border cities of Turkey, there have been various policy decisions and shifts in policy regarding the education of refugee children. This was mainly because Turkey had not experienced such a large-scale migration before and it did not have established education and language policies for newcomers. Therefore, this was a unique period to observe how education policies in a migration context were formulated and to critically analyze their possible effects. Against this background, this research aimed to understand how the education policies for Syrian refugee children have been shaped by both the global context and the monolingual ideologies in Turkey and whether the policy discourse could lead to linguistic and social inequalities for these children. The research was informed by a critical approach to policy and thus looked into the policies as texts and discourses framing issues in particular ways and having a role in the reproduction of inequalities. Particularly the language policy was taken as a reflection of language ideologies, that is, of beliefs about linguistic practices and the role of languages in public sphere. Therefore, the potential of language policy to (re)produce hierarchies was acknowledged. By approaching policy as a discourse on the issues it targets, the research made use of the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis and the Discourse Historical Approach, which are based on the notion of discourse as a social act and thus as a phenomenon to be analyzed for its possible effects on the social order.

The analysis, indeed, evidenced the basic premises of critical and discursive approaches to policy by showing how the policy language created categories and used argumentations related to temporariness, mass movement, and emergency at first and later to integration in order to justify policy moves. Most often, phrases referring to the right to education were used to mask the politically motivated and contextually embedded nature of the policies in question. Despite

the clear discursive shift from temporariness to integration and the contradictions in policy decisions from ‘no need to learn Turkish’ to ‘obliged to learn Turkish’ in a short period of time, the policy language proposed each step as the most logical way forward. One constant feature underlying all, however, was the monolingualism ideology even though how the refugee education is handled seems to have changed. The conviction that public services should only be provided in the national language informed both the earlier policy of education in Arabic for repatriation and the later policy of education in Turkish for integration. Even when Arabic and Turkish language support was given, these were never intended to be used together as a medium of instruction. Even though for the first time in the public education system in Turkey there are schools providing education in the first language of children<sup>3</sup>, these segregate rather than prepare children for a possible future in Turkey. Through references to the experiences of Kurdish-speaking children and to the studies conducted in schools refugee children attend, it was concluded that such an approach is putting children into a disadvantaged position in education while depicting the problem as one of academic performance rather than of policy. This alone shows that monolingualism is the common sense of the policy makers and assimilating into a single language is the only alternative proposed for ‘integration’.

The conclusions that this study has drawn have implications for studies of nationalism and migration as well. The case analyzed here has revealed that while national policies regarding human mobility are highly connected to global politics and discourses, fundamental rights of refugees and migrants are not truly protected by a global understanding of human rights but most often curtailed because of the state sovereignty principle in all international/supranational organizations and conventions, which allows for a basic right like right to education to be recontextualized and interpreted by each nation state.

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<sup>3</sup> The schools for Armenian, Greek, and Jewish communities operating as a result of the Lausanne Treaty are not public schools.

The scope of this research was limited to an analysis of the policy discourse and could not include an ethnographic study scrutinizing the reflections of such discourse in the school context among teachers, parents, and students. A further study exploring whether policy discourse dominates school and classroom practices or whether there is room for contestation could illustrate the role of the agency of such actors in how the policy is experienced. An ethnographic study problematizing policy discourse could also have an emancipatory effect for leading the actors to question the taken-for-grantedness of monolingual education policies.

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