# Support for Democracy in CEE countries: Microlevel Attributes in Politically Polarizing Societies

By

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#### Abstract

This thesis analyses the association between micro-level attributes and democratic support in the CEE region with focusing on the amplifying role that elite-induced polarization plays in diverting these associations. To test the different patterns of the more polarized CEE region compared to the classical democracies of Western countries, I perform multilevel model on the EVS database from 2017 on each region and on the pooled dataset as well. The results show consistency with the human development theory of Inglehart&Welzel (2010) and the decreasing democratic attitude of younger generations (Mounk, 2018) in both regions with only minor cases for variables being more relevant in CEE countries. However, the country-level examinations reveal high variation in the associations of the CEE region, while Western countries show more uniform pattern. Therefore, the CEE region follows Western countries in most of the variables. Nonetheless, this general paradigm is diverted oftentimes as a result of country-specific exceptions due to the higher variation in CEE countries, which I interpret in the thesis as originating from the severe polarization brought force by the discursive activity of political entrepreneurs.

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

Citizens' public opinion on democracy as a superior regime is widely acknowledged to be of key relevance for the development and consolidation of democratic systems. The democratic procedure is endowed with key intrinsic values of decision-making and could produce favourable outcomes regarding both human rights and economic development, nonetheless every regime risk falling into insignificance or failing without justifying its status quo and beneficial effects to the broad masses of citizens. Moreover, as democracy became the ideal regime type after the Cold War, the enquiry of separating the wheat from the chaff, i.e. the well-functioning democracies from the corrupted fake democracies came to the fore of comparative political science. One aspect to recognize full democracies is to measure the voter's regime preference and their support for democracy based on public opinion.

Therefore, categorizing the regimes based on their disposition on the scale ranging from the idealistic perfect democracy to perfect autocracy as a well-established field within political science contextualizes any research in the democratic support of voters. According to the assessment of V-Dem (Lührmann et al, 2020), the worldwide regime dynamic putatively showed a third wave of autocratization amid increasing repression of civil society in recent years, while pro-democracy resistance and mass protests led to democratization in other cases. This empirical statement may evoke at best mixed emotions among the advocators of democracy. However, it is the public opinion on democratic support that renders significance to pro-democracy supporters and the democratic regime.

The regime experience of post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe envisages a singularly amplified role for democratic support among citizens, since autocracy is not a historical abstraction to these countries. And the past risks reviving as the Nations in Transit (Csaky&Schenkka, 2018) portrays an illiberal threat to have spread in the region, which provides state-barriers to independent institutions and hostile environment to oppositional activity and media pluralism. The democratic backsliding characterized mainly Poland and Hungary, while a continued deterioration in Serbia's democracy have been also pertinent. Consequently, the citizens of the region experienced both democratization processes and authoritarian tendencies, which makes their opinion about democracy particularly relevant.

Support for democracy is hence an empirical measure of public opinion as a distinguished concept compared to the autocracy-democracy system type. But it differs from the simple evaluation of democracy as well. Voters might disagree whether a particular regime is democratic, autocratic, or it is a kind of hybrid regime in between. Nevertheless, they set up a normative preference too for democracy or autocracy in parallel. As my research deals with democratic support in Central and Eastern Europe, the public opinion approach allows to involve citizens both from autocratic and democratic political systems and vaguely characterizable hybrid regimes in between. The range is wide with Belarus and Russia to Slovenia and Latvia on the two edges (Csaky&Schenkka, 2018). Obviously, the interaction of system type and democratic support is expected to to have consequences on political behaviour. Supporting democracy in a democracy is just rejoicing the status quo, while such an incline in an autocracy could rather culminate in participating a resistance movement.

The practical and theoretical importance of CEE countries' democratic support were not left unnoticed in political science. Instead, their posttransitional regime trajectory inspired a revived scientific interest in citizen's democratic support. The experience of the 1990's hectic transformation and the citizen's learning process in the new democratic system paved the way for a new type of explanatory variables after the classical modernization accounts of the 1960's. Besides these economic accounts, scholars of public opinion concluded that the existing political institutions and citizen's former experience with democratic rules have considerable impact on citizens democratic support as well. An illustrating example is the statistical analysis of Evans&Whitefield (1995) with testing both economic and political factors of individual commitment to democracy in 8 CEE countries after the transition. On the other hand, the research about micro-attributes were largely overlooked in the region or presented as control variables. The global spread of polarizing tendencies (Carothers&O'Donohue, 2019), and the regional process of learning the democracy through acquiring attitudes based on individual experience points to the need of a focused research of micro-level attributes in the Central and Eastern European region.

The aim of this thesis is to provide a thorough analysis of previously underresearched variables of micro-level attributes in CEE countries. Demographic characteristics, political attitudes and life satisfaction have not yet been comprehensively applied to the posttransitional CEE developments and could explain citizen's democratic support based on their existential and

individual circumstances as micro-level attributes. The main contribution of the thesis is the confirmation that theories that were used to describe democratic support in classical democracies of the West, such as the human development theory of Inglehart et al. (2003) and the less democratic younger generations (Mounk, 2018) are pertinent in the CEE region, too. Besides that, I analyse the key differences between the two regions. I also argue that the higher variation between CEE countries is a special characteristic of the region in close connection with polarization tendencies.

Political polarization as new global political trend accentuates the antagonism within a political community and intensifies the differences between citizens of a single polity. As escalating the existing variations in the experience and perception, the polarization of societies leads to distinct groups among voters with little comprehension between the blocks. What is a distinctive feature for one group could be entirely different in another and there is few reason to postulate that support for democracy is an exception. Thus, societies entrenched with polarized voting groups are subject to generate differing support for democracy along microlevel attributes. As the societies of Central and Eastern Europe showed the political tendency of getting polarized, my first hypothesis is that the micro-level attributes explain the democratic support of citizens to a greater extent in CEE countries compared to Western countries.

Hypothesis 1: Micro-level attributes as autonomous factors are more important in explaining democratic support in polarized societies, such as the CEE countries compared to Western countries.

The set of micro-level attributes as an explanatory framework involves demographic characteristics, political attitudes and life satisfaction of citizens in this thesis. These variables characterize a polity's elemental members, the citizens, however micro-level processes cannot be separated completely from the macro-level political events, either. The polarizing trend highlights that societies does not produce centrifugal movement of ideologies due to a bottom-up logic. The initial differences are rather deepened by political entrepreneurs (McCoy& Somer, 2019), who exploit and strengthen the societal grievances for their opportunistic aim.

Therefore, the micro-level attributes are, to varying degrees, endogenous factors to all outcomes of the political community and governance. In this paper, I analyse the effect of micro-level attributes on democratic support. However, those attributes could be modified by political



- 1. Direct effect of micro-level attributes
- 2. Indirect effects of political leaders and political community
- 3. Community-level effects

1. Figure The framework of the thesis. Own configuration with including political entrepreneurs-leaders (McCoy& Somer, 2019) and micro-level attributes to reflect to political polarization of societies.

leaders. Leaders who are not impartial in the trajectory of democratic support if they would like to facilitate democratization in a country or undermine democracy for autocratic aims. As figure 1 shows, the direct effect of micro-level attributes on democratic support is influenced by the indirect effect of political leaders, too<sup>1</sup>. Substantial indirect effects could lead to inaccurate estimation of direct effects, but this is not a conceptual problem. As a theoretical example, if someone is poor and, in connection with his or her material misery, does not support democracy, it does not matter whether the government impoverished this citizen or his or her bad decisions, perchance pure fate. Nor it is a concern whether the alleged governmental act was of a malicious intention to undermine democracy. This citizen remains not to support democracy in connection with his or her poverty in either way. The implication is that the potential indirect effects are to be under scrutiny to evaluate the political behaviour and narrative behind the interconnections for each explanatory variable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> And other external factors, such as political community could shape it as well. Moreover, the direct effect of the political community is e.g. economic modernization accounts and political institution accounts as these polity-level processes conceptually explain democratic support without mediating effects. The arrow pointing to political leaders from democratic support means the perception of the degree of democratic support by leadership, that leaders might exploit to modify micro-level attributes of citizens as the indirect effect implicates. The figure is not complete as both citizens and political leaders are in a reciprocal interrelationship with the political community and other indirect effects, which are not indicated in the figure, are possible.

Accordingly, the three types of micro-level attributes could also differ in their exposure to external effects and this difference can underlie disparate political narratives in the context of political polarization. The political leadership could affect demographic attributes and life satisfaction of citizens by policies on the longer term, but political attitudes are more contingent so that political elite can shape it more smoothly by using public discourse. Thus, my second hypothesis reflects the possibility that political attitudes modified by political leaders could more naturally become the boundaries along which citizens with different degree of democratic support diverge:

Hypothesis 2: Political attitudes are more important in explaining democratic support compared to demographic and life satisfaction variables due to the political polarization process induced by the political elite.

To test whether these micro-level attributes are appropriate explanations of democratic support in CEE context, I utilize a quantitative approach in this thesis based on survey data. As the main novelty of the statistical aspect, I will analyse the 5<sup>th</sup> wave of the European Values Study from 2017. This dataset contains 14 countries from the region of Central and Eastern Europe with different country-specificity, that might generate country-specific understanding of the attitude questions between countries. To that end, I will use multilevel modelling as prevalent methodology in the field to overcome this problem. 13 Western European countries are also investigated as a comparison to shed light on the role of polarization in CEE countries regarding democratic support.

In the following chapters, first I explicate the general theoretical foundations of the variables and argue that micro-level attributes are more important factors amid polarization processes. Afterwards I show the dataset, perform preliminary analysis, briefly present the methodology and describe the result of the statistical analysis. Then I discuss the political implications behind the results and conclude the thesis.

# 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Variables: Democratic Support and Micro-level Explanatory Variables

In this section, I present the theories related to the response and explanatory variables. First, I justify the very notion of support for democracy instead of rival concepts. Afterwards I describe the theoretical connections between the explanatory variables and democratic support. Explanatory variables are micro-level attributes in three groups: life satisfaction (state of health, control over life, life satisfaction), demographics (sex, age, educational level, employment, income, settlement size), political attributes (marriage attitude, left-right attitude, immigration attitude, environment attitude, government-opposition attitude). All three set of explanatory variables involves components from the human development theory of Inglehart et al. (2003), which states that socioeconomic, emancipatory and democratic progress tend to occur as mutually reinforcing processes based on cultural framework. Besides the focus on these self-expression values, there appears to be other theories as giving alternative explanations or describing associations outside the scope of the cross-cultural differences.

#### Why Democratic Support?

The framework that I use for the dependent variable in this thesis is the political support of Easton (1975), which is a seminal work dealing with democratic support. Political support is a broad category, which includes both potential behavioural consequences for advocating democracy and positive or negative attitudes towards the democratic regime. The concept distinguishes between specific support directed towards the political leaders or the satisfaction with the governance and diffuse support that is more general and characterize the attitude towards the underlying elements of the political system, such as the democratic regime. The connection between specific support and diffuse support can happen through experiencing the political system, however diffuse support is more durable and could originate from childhood and early adulthood experience as well. It operates as a dynamic process: the initial socialization can be overwritten by the connection with the real-world politics. Diffuse support can be formulated through two major constituents, general trust towards the system gained in experiencing it and the belief that the current regime is legitimate.

But the field has its alternative concepts as well. One influential rival is reflected in the title of the monography How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy. Ferrín&Kriesi (2016)

conceptualized *view* as the meaning and expectations that citizens attribute to democracy compared to the concept of *evaluation*, which is the assessment and satisfaction with the operation of democracy. These concepts resemble the diffuse and specific support of Easton (1975), however they are more constrained and neutral. According to Diamond&Plattner (2008), the concept of view originates from the increase of public opinion area studies in Journal of Democracy from 1997. The title of the series is How People View Democracy and the Eastern European variant (Rose, 2001) uses consequently view for regime instead of support, however the Latin-American (Lagos, 2001) prefers democratic support and view. In few cases there is a third version: citizens simply have an attitude towards democracy, which was already an ingredient in Easton's approach. Using attitude is more common in one-country studies, which deals with democratic support only as a reasoning, as Christensen&Lægreid (2003) did for analysing primary trust in government and public sector in Norway. Neither the view, nor the attitude could overcome the influence of Easton's concept.

Overall, democratic support cannot be ignored as a broad concept deriving from complex theory regarding the formation and consequences of support for democracy. The evaluative, stochastic nature is particularly relevant for the posttransitional CEE countries. Fuchs et al (1995) points to another important aspect of the concept, which makes it suitable for the micro-level attribute explanatory framework. So, citizens can evaluate the regime in different ways, perceiving it from expressive, moral or instrumental perspective, which may generate cultural and subjective heterogeneity of democratic support pointing to the importance of micro-level attributes. Although the concept of Easton (1975) suffers from an empirical indeterminateness in distinguishing between specific and diffuse support, Fuchs et al (1995) chose democratic support as a concept for the analysis of the erosion of legitimacy.

### Life Satisfaction

There are positive association between life satisfaction and democratic support based on the cross-cultural study of Inglehart (1990), which analyses nine developed democracies between 1976-1988. According to the study, life satisfaction and happiness follow distinct trajectories by different countries leading to different attitudes towards democracy.<sup>2</sup> These broader life

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> And different timing of democratization leading to political institutional consequences, which is not described here as the state of democracy is the motivation but not the focus of the thesis.

satisfaction measures correlated highly with each other in every country, which reflects to general attitudes towards life in a particular country, which can be traced back to different historical experiences. These variables are influenced mainly by preadult socialization and everyday life experience on the individual level. Life satisfaction had notable positive impact on the political satisfaction variable, which is a general attitude towards the political system. As an all-encompassing attitude, political satisfaction fluctuates with governmental terms partly as a measure of popularity. On the other hand, life satisfaction had interrelation with the permanent component of political satisfaction, which indicates more abstract values about democracy. Note that the specific and generic support, presented at the previous chapter, is confounded here, however the association with the long-term component of political satisfaction contributes higher democratic support too, and it is mainly at the country-level.

#### Demographics

The age and gender of citizens are relevant factors for explaining democratic support with regional differences. Age is more significant in Western European countries, while gender is more relevant in CEE countries. As for age, Mounk (2018) found that citizens belonging to younger generations support democracy significantly less compared to older generations based on 2014 World Value Survey data. Those who stated that democracy is essential are up to 60% fewer in numbers among the generation born in the 1980's compared to those born in the 1930's in Finland and Great Britain. The generational decrease in support for democracy characterized almost all the countries, but in varying degree. The shrink is only moderate in CEE countries with Poland's 30% loss as the highest. Many classical democracies faced the burden of growing young antidemocrats. Those who had very bad attitudes towards democracy more than doubled in Slovenia, Spain, Germany and Sweden in 50 years. On the other hand, the gender gap in democratic support is presented as a particular characteristic of former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe based in the 1990's (Oakes, 2002). Women supported democracy less in most countries, however the gender deficit was substantially higher in CEE countries being the second-best predictor after education in Poland, where the gap was especially high.

Socioeconomic attributes have a positive impact on attitudes towards democracy. The modernization accounts provide early explanations for this association. Lipset (1959) investigated the difference between more and less democratic countries. Education was a

substantial explanation for variation in citizens' democratic response. Economic development also mattered as the increasing wealth of citizens contributed to respecting democratic norms. Lower classes come to more deliberate political decisions with sufficient material conditions and have the chance to become middle class with moderate policy aims that respects a democratic system. Lerner (1958) lists other factors as urbanization and mass media's availability to every layer contributing to a political version of empathy to contemplate about other citizen's life and public policies. These psychological stages assist to an emergence of political participation and a democratic culture. The positive effect of socioeconomic attributes on democratic support is further specified in the framework of the human development theory (Inglehart et al., 2003), which describes higher socioeconomic states of citizens as allowing more choices through more abundant material resources. These wider options in life endow citizens with less constraints to pursue self-expression, leading to a modern, emancipated political culture that goes hand in hand with higher support for democracy.

The positive association between higher levels of income-education and support for democracy is not disputed, however Ceka&Magalhães (2016) states that the association is a conditional, context specific relation that holds only in democracies. The association is derived in this study from the social dominance theory, in which privileged classes tend to support the status quo, while lower classes rather oppose society's main values. Based on 29 countries from European Social Survey, there is a positive interrelation between the excess support of privileged individuals towards the liberal concept of democracy compared to lower classes and the years passed since the country became liberal democracy. In new democracies or flawed democracies, higher classes attribute only slightly more importance to liberal democracy compared lower classes, moreover, relatively higher education in a democracy younger than 30 years leads to less support for liberal democracy compared to lower level-education. Meanwhile, the positive impact of education and income plays substantial role only in Western democracies.

#### **Political Attitudes**

According to Inglehart&Welzel (2010), political attributes are conducive for developing positive attitudes towards democracy if a cultural shift happens on two major axes: from traditional values to secular-rational values and from the survival values to self-expression values. In line with this framework, environment protection attitude is a primary example of the self-expression values, which are positively associated with democracy. As a broader

conception, self-expression values incorporate tolerance for outgroups, which leads to the positive theoretical connection between positive attitudes about immigrants and democratic support. As for the traditional values, insisting on old traditions such as rejecting divorce corresponds with less support for democracy, however the attitude whether marriage is still relevant are less unequivocally represent the clash of traditional and secular-rational values. And there is alternative theory, which connects traditional communities with more social capital, which is beneficial for democracy (Blomkvist, 2004). Thus, the role of marriage attitude in democratic support is indeterminate. Left-right attitude had no significant impact on democracy less (Ceka&Magalhães, 2016).

The government-opposition dichotomy follows a different pattern, which is the winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy (Anderson&Guillory, 1997). Based on 11 Western European countries, citizens voting for the government had higher satisfaction with democracy compared to those voting for the opposition in every country as the 'winners' feel that they have more influence on political decisions than the 'losers'. This association is not independent from political institutions, electoral systems with majoritarian rule have higher gap between the two groups compared to consensual systems since the latter allows more option even for oppositional voters to influence political events. The gap in system support is attributed more to the increase of the winner side than the decrease of the loser side as long as the election system is free and fair, since the opposition voters may hope for an election win next time and the democratic procedure guarantees their equal treatment (Esaiasson, 2010). The dependent variables in both studies are the less abstract political satisfaction and support for the political system, thus, support for democracy is expected to have slighter connection with the governmental-opposition attitude since it is less prone to present governance.

### 2.2 The Effect of the Explanatory Variables in Polarizing-backsliding Democracies

I argue in this thesis that the role of micro-level attributes in explaining democratic support are more empathic in societies with polarized public opinion and backsliding democratic institutions. In this subchapter, I conceptualize political polarization as elite-induced process, then I provide empirics that the CEE region is outstandingly polarized and describe the potential modifying effect of political polarization on the association between micro-attributes and democratic support. I concentrate on Poland and Hungary as they were included among the 11 global case studies that the special edition Polarizing Polities: A Global Threat to Democracy (McCoy&Somer, 2019) devoted to the phenomenon.

Polarizing tendencies are more than distant ideologies or extreme views in the conceptualization of McCoy&Somer (2019). The political polarization in this interpretation becomes destructive to the democratic order as the separated opinion camps subordinate other societal realities and the multi-dimensional personality of the individuals as resulting from the antagonizing behaviour of political entrepreneurs. The citizens develop emotional affection to their political camp while excluding connections to the opposite camp, which spurs them to turn with sympathy to every in-group opinion and with malicious suspicion to every step of the adversary group. The structure of politics becomes a fight between 'Them and Us'.

The polarization of elite groups translates to their mass-supporters not only by influencing their opinion but changing their decision-making frameworks (Druckman et al, 2013). The reduced cognitive activity is what expands institutional and social polarization through the need of the blaming rhetoric, which eliminates the room for moderate voices and informal rules of the game not to use undemocratic tools to defeat political opponents, which, as a cumulative, self-enforcing process, evolves severe polarization into an autocracy (McCoy&Somer, 2019). According to the empirical summary of Carothers&O'Donohue (2019), political polarization spoiled democracies and deteriorated hybrid regimes or autocracies in both developing and developed regions as a global trend in the last two decades, which factor contributed to the halted and then reversed democratization process. Although well-functioning democracies involve moderate polarization as well to provide a political competition with distinct ideas and policies, after a certain threshold, political polarization becomes harmful and even severe in its excessive form.

The transition process itself in CEE countries was fertile ground for the polarization as the society was divided to those that commits to the new democratic regimes and those who oppose it (Rose&Mishler, 1994). The modern history of CEE countries is full in authoritarian regimes. Therefore, besides the majority that favoured the new regime, there were a lower fraction of reactionaries who would prefer the last authoritarian system or an authoritarian system different from the communist-type autocracy as a potential source for polarization in the region. On the other hand, the Polish and Hungarian polarization progressed decades later instead.

In Poland, the political polarization and democratic backsliding happened after PiS got elected with majority in 2015 (Tworzecki, 2019). The new governance meant sharp disconnection with the former status quo with seriously and antidemocratically interfering in the constitutional system, packing the constitutional court and introduce widespread transfers compared to the previous fiscal conservativism. These measures induced mixed responses from the society with many engaged in street protest against the arbitrary steps, but other layers approved their usefulness for a fair Polish society. The voting pattern for PiS concentrated on rural, low-income areas, but the election win was rather due winning the vote of those who felt to lose on the democratic-Western orientated order. In this sense, the Polish polarization is a stressed top-down process coming from elite conflicts of rivalling parties PiS and PO.

In Hungary, political polarization is the result of elite struggle and divergent political competition between parties in an institutionalized party system, which turned into 'populist polarization' after 2010 according to Enyedi (2016). The polarization of the elites and their supporters happened in line with gradual political processes along a cosmopolitan-left-wing and nationalistic division line from the coalition of the liberal and post-communist party in 1994 onwards. As the policy programs of the two camps are not fundamentally antagonistic, what is at stake at every election is a potential regime change with reshaping the majority of the state body. The populist switch of Fidesz in 2010 meant an excessive form of the polarization process, but not a novelty. Vegetti (2019) reinforces that the deeply polarized Hungarian polity originates from political processes and perceived ideological differences are enlarged by symbolical rhetorical disdain without large programmatic divide. The entrenched Left-Right divide could not have been overcome as it never occurred in Hungary that parties from different political sides formed a coalitional government.

I evaluate the entire set of countries based on the Polarization of Society indicator from the Digital Society Survey (Mechkova et al., 2019). This indicator measures the extent of plurality in an ordinal scale ranging from serious polarization (0 value) with substantial conflicting views to no polarization (4 value), which means that the citizens generally agree about the most important normative directions. I rescaled the range to 1-5 for better visualization in Figure 2. I took the average of the yearly scores between 2000 and 2019 and marked the 21 CEE countries with red and the 20 Western countries with blue. According to this indicator, Central and Eastern European countries were more polarized societies in line with the assumption as there were 10 CEE countries reaching beyond moderate polarization, while there were only 2

Western countries in the range below the score of 2. Bosnia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Hungary are seriously polarized societies with only France and Malta falling to this category in the Western group. Ukraine, Croatia, Slovenia, Belarus and Poland were beyond moderateness in the polarization from the CEE group. Overall, CEE countries are more polarized societies in line of the Western-European comparison group, moreover the dataset is consistent with the former description as Poland and Hungary are among the most polarized societies in Europe.



2. Figure Polarization in CEE (red) and Western (blue) countries, 2000-2019 average. Rescaled to 1-5 scale based on Mechkova et al. (2019)

Political polarization can settle on a classical cleavage or modern grievance, but the existing division line is not as important as the political entrepreneur who arouse and signify these tensions (McCoy&Somer, 2019). Severe polarization specifies the role of independent variables of my thesis as this societal process is the main channel that retains the modifying effects of political leaders on micro-level variables. So, the direct effect of micro-level variables and the indirect effect of political leaders are nor possible nor needed to be separated as the activity of political leaders have real political consequences on democratic support. Political leaders can most easily change political attitudes. However, elite-induced political polarization shows that the dividing line could be each societal variable that political entrepreneurs can build on with their discursive campaigns. Even state of health, educational level, employment, income and settlement size can be subject to issue politics beside the political attributes. But

the fact that political entrepreneurs affects the potential correlates of democratic support does not mean that they affect citizen's democratic support per se. Suppose for example a theoretical polarized society where there are two distinct political camps, one that supports democracy unequivocally, the other oppose it vehemently and no citizen has a thoughtful opinion on the issue environment protection. If the political leader of the antidemocratic group benefits from investments that enhance environmental protection, this leader has intention to turn his or her supporters to enthusiast environmentalists using public discourse. As a result, a negative association was created between democratic support and environmentalist ideas, which contradicts the theory of emancipative roles (Inglehart&Welzel, 2010). It just resulted from arbitrary, opportunistic political behaviour.

To rule out this outcome, I develop an argument based on the combination of pernicious polarization of McCoy&Somer (2019) and human development of Inglehart&Welzel (2010). The attitudes of the two theories contradict each other. A society that is affected by severe polarization consists of individuals who follow only a sperate political camp with ignoring other opinions as a result of emotional affection and selective cognitive mechanism, which eventually undermines democratic regimes. On the other hand, the emancipative values of the human development theory foster self-expression and rational values, enhance tolerance for outgroups, diversity and interpersonal trust and are beneficial to democratic attitudes. One simply cannot push close-minded groups to fulfil values closely tied to openness to others. Therefore, the political leader above either cannot expect successful spread of environmental protection ideas among his or her supporters or the group is not an antidemocratic one subject to severe polarization (anymore). An important conclusion of the example is that the influence of political entrepreneurs is expected to be not overwhelming, they only amplify already existing connections through the modification of micro-level attributes leading to more emphasized relations between democratic support and the explanatory variables in polarized societies.

#### 2.3 Previous empirical research

The empirical research in democratic support of the region was most influential in the 1990's. Evans&Whitefield (1995) analysed both the economic and political factors of individual commitment to democracy in 8 CEE countries as the most notable study. They used citizen's economic conditions and support for various political institutions and the latter induced larger coefficients with more significant effects. Fuchs&Roller (2006) revisited the case of 13

transitioning countries with examining the support for democracy and the democratic system's constitutive elements according to the meaning of democracy and types of attitudes. Both the studies utilized collected survey data for the empirical analysis, however the individual data was assessed mostly in aggregate forms, except for the regression of Evans&Whitefield (1995) that resulted in evaluation of the contemporary democracy as the most important explanation for democratic support. As opposed to the earlier studies, Reumers (2015) provided sophisticated large-n study with quantitative analysis in the form of multi-level regression for 23 CEE countries. In this Master thesis, the time period individuals spent in a democracy, the perception of governmental performance and socialization factors are tested with both macro-and micro-level independent variables. On the other hand, the research design of this study does not highlight any systematic principle in selecting the variables. As for the control variables, Reumers (2015) used two demographic variables that are included in my analysis as well, age and sex. Only the latter proved to be significant as female citizens showed slightly less support for democracy.

## 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

### 3.1 Data and Preliminary Analysis

I present the dataset in this section, which is from the fifth wave of European Value Studies 2017 (EVS, 2020). The fieldwork of the survey was conducted between September and December 2017. According to accessibility considerations, I work with the second pre-release, which involves 14 Central and Eastern European Countries and 13 Western European countries (see Table 1 below) and contains 56.368 individual responses. I concentrate on the 2017 CEE data. However, I refer to Western countries as a comparison whenever it is necessary to facilitate understanding.

#### Response variable: Support for democracy

The response variable of the quantitative analysis is the democratic support, which is a theoretical positive attitude towards the democratic system with behavioural implications as well (see chapter 2.1-Why democratic support?). In the survey of EVS, democratic support can be approximated with Question 40, which asks whether it is important to the respondent to live in a democratically governed country with a rating system ranging from 1 ('not at all important') to 10 ('absolutely important'). I present the survey result on Figure 3 separately for CEE and Western countries.



*3. Figure* Distribution of importance of democracy in CEE and Western countries, n=20.208 for CEE and n=27.083 for Western countries, 'don't know' and no response observations removed. Source: EVS (2020)

The distribution of the dataset is extremely skewed with leaning to the right as relative majority of respondents answered in both set of countries that democracy is absolutely important with score 10. Less than 3% of respondents in CEE (only 465 respondents) and less than 1% in Western European countries (176) indicated that they prefer autocracy with the score 1, showing that democracy is not at all important to these citizens. These shares are similarly low up until score five, while the share of those who prefer democracy with some reservation between score 6-9 is 47% in CEE and 30% in Western countries, which equals with the open advocators of democracy in the CEE case while scepticism lags behind the open supporters, 68% of the citizens in the latter case. Thus, the distribution is similar, but the extent is not. There is a higher proportion of respondents in Western countries to claim without hesitation that democracy is important.

Albania	9.7
Poland	9.2
Hungary	8.9
Estonia	8.7
Lithuania	8.6
Croatia	8.5
Romania	8.3
Bulgaria	8.2
Czech Republic	8.2
Slovenia	8.1
Belarus	8.0
Slovak Republic	7.8
Russia	7.4
Serbia	7.3
Total	8.3

Denmark	9.6
Norway	9.5
Germany	9.4
Iceland	9.4
Sweden	9.3
Switzerland	9.3
Finland	9.2
Italy	9.2
Austria	9.1
Netherlands	8.9
Spain	8.9
Great Britain	8.8
France	8.7
Total	9.2

1. Table The mean of importance of democracy in 14 CEE and 13 Western countries, n=20.208 for CEE and n=27.083 for Western countries, 'don't know' and no response observations removed. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020)

The importance of democracy differs not on only between CEE and Western countries but there is a heterogeneity between the countries as well. I took the average of the country-subsamples to describe the order of the countries, which is displayed in Table 1. According to the results, the range of Western countries is substantially narrower and falls between 8.7 and 9.6 with an

average of 9.2 while the country averages of CEE countries are between 7.3 and 9.7 with an overall mean of 8.3. However, it is interesting to note that the country whose respondents state that the democracy is the most important is Albania in the Eastern and Central region. Poland and Hungary made to the Top 3 as well with scores that could be equated with middle or lower level scores in the Western group. The empirics about their support of democracy is in sharp contrast with the democratic backsliding regime trajectory of Poland and Hungary depicted in the introduction. I revise this discrepancy in chapter 4 as a special form of the winner-looser gap. The other CEE countries are worse compared to any Western counterparts. However, most of them are above the score 8. The three exceptions are the Slovak Republic, Russia and Serbia, and especially the latter two countries fall substantially behind the average of other European countries. There are no Western countries with low scores, nevertheless the democracy is relatively less important in the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain and Spain in a relative manner. Overall, the distinction between Western countries with equally high scores is not as decisive as between the CEE countries with extraordinary high and low averages.

Essentiality for	1. Women's rights	2. Free elections	3. Civil rights	4. Unemployment aid
ucinocracy	8.6	8.4	7.9	7.2
5. Redistribution	6. Income equalization	7. Obedience	8. Army rule	9. Religious authorities
6.2	5.8	4.7	3.9	3.2

2. Table The mean scores for the essential characters of democracy in CEE countries, n=16.801, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response to any of the 9 answers removed. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020)

The importance of democracy is in the focus of the empirical analysis of this thesis as this simple indicator can show the support of democracy in a single numeric variable. But the importance of democracy cannot depict a comprehensive picture of the complex characteristic what the individual citizens perceives from the democratic system. In order the discover more dimensions from this aspect, I analyse respondents' perceptions about the constituents of democracy, which concern question 39 in EVS (2020). Respondents were asked here to evaluate nine factors regarding their essentiality for democracy. According the average responses to every statement, I ranked the factors in Table 2. It is most important for CEE citizens that women should have the same rights as men, that the political leaders should be selected as a result of free elections, that civil rights are needed to safeguard citizens from the

excessive power of the state and that the state should provide unemployment benefit. It is also of some importance that the state should redistribute from the rich to the poor, that the state should equalize incomes and even the role that citizens must 'obey their rulers' is not negligible among the essential elements of democracy. On the other hand, citizens did not attach much importance to the 'essential elements' that an army should save the country from an incompetent government and that the interpretation of laws should rely on religious leaders. In this question, the scale ranges from 0 to 10 as the undirect option to declare that a characteristic is even against democracy was available coded as zero, and more than 1.000 respondents gave this definitive answer to the last two factors. Overall, the answers of CEE citizens describe liberal democracy with some welfare elements. The average score for the obedience might endow the Central and Eastern European type democracy with slight overemphasized authority<sup>3</sup>. The three welfare components depict very similar situations with slightly different emphasis, nonetheless the matching of redistribution and income equalization with average scores of 6.2 and 5.8 are appropriate enough to render that CEE respondents have some conception about liberal democracy and did not provide utterly inconsistent answers.

As most of the survey respondents expressed the claim that democracy is very important, I analyse the interaction of the importance of democracy and the four most relevant constituents of democracy from Table 2 (women's right as gender equality, free elections as electoral democracy, civil rights as liberal democracy and unemployment aid as welfare state) to understand the deeper perceptions of the most democratic citizens. I divided the citizens in the survey into two groups regarding their answer to the importance of democracy. The score of the 'democratic group' is either 10 or 9 and the 'sceptic-autocratic group' responded with lower scores. I grouped the critical respondents together with the ones with autocratic preference since the number of open autocrats was very low.

According to Figure 4, the results show that the democratic group attributed a more important role to the four most important elements of democracy<sup>4</sup> with the largest difference being gender

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the score for obedience is just slightly lower in the Western countries, 4.64 compared to the 4.66 CEE counterpart. The average scores for Western countries were not substiantially different from CEE countries with higher scores for liberal democracy constituents and welfare elements, except for the equalize income aspect, to which CEE respondents gave slightly higher scores. The elements of army rule and religious authorities were also higher in the CEE case.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The interaction is not strictly linear as it reverses in nearing the lower edge of 1. The open autocrats with score one attributes more essentiality to all the 4 factors as for example the scpetics with score 5, however this trend

equality and electoral democracy. Notwithstanding, the difference in liberal democracy and the welfare component of democracy is also substantial and the relative rankings are consistent with one another. As for the other 5 components not depicted in the figure, the score of the democratic group is also higher in the redistribution and slightly so in the state's role of income equalization too. Moreover, the sceptic-autocratic group's score is considerably higher in the army rule, and somewhat exceeds the democratic group in the religious authorities and obedience factors. Overall, there are many citizens who reckon the importance of democracy in CEE countries and these democrats are aware of some characteristics about the democratic system, even if there is large variance between the countries.



*4. Figure* The mean of essential characters in the groups of democrats and sceptics-autocrats in CEE countries. Democrats gave 9 or 10 score to the importance of democracy, while sceptics-autocrats less than 9. n=9.997 for the democratic group and n=6.804 to the sceptic-autocratic group. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020)

#### Explanatory variables

As a central focus of the thesis, I attempt to explain democratic support based on a set of microlevel variables. In this section, I present the 14 explanatory variables in three group: life satisfaction (3 variables), demographic (6 variables) and political attitude (5 variables)

is not remarkable as both groups' score is substantially lower than that of democrats and there are not many autocrats according to the responses.

attributes. I describe the attributes first for each group of variables and assess their interactions, afterwards I analyse their interconnections in a pooled framework and present my strategy to handle missing values.

Satisfaction with one's life as potential autonomous explanation of democratic support is represented with 3 variables in this analysis: state of health (Question 3), control over life (Question 9) and life satisfaction (Question 10). These attributes are not independent from each other, he highest correlation, 0.46 being between the control over life and life satisfaction. On the other hand, they are not identical<sup>5</sup> and so are worth being involved in the statistical modelling. The state of health is measured on a 5-point Likert scale, while the control over life and life satisfaction utilised a 10-point Likert scale. Moreover, the state of health was designed as ranging from 'very good' as the first option and 'very poor' as the last option, while the other two follow the opposite qualitative order proceeding from negative to positive. Thus, the correlation of state of health is intuitive but technically negative with control over life (-0.24) and life satisfaction (-0.38), respectively. Due to its distinct character, I describe state of health on Table 3 with simply listing the frequencies of each option. Most of the individuals responded with 'good' or 'fair', however there is variance with substantial 'very good' and 'poor' answers.

'very good'	'good'	'fair'	'poor'	'very poor'
3.321	8.166	6.524	1.991	360

*3. Table* The frequencies of state of health in CEE countries. n=20.362, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response removed. Source: EVS (2020)

Altough the control over life and life satisfaction had the highest correlations, they have differences in the distribution as well. I visualize their mixed connection with using the weights of the established state of health variable. That is to say, Figure 5 depicts the overall and the conditional distribution, and the grouping conditions are based on the categories of the different health conditions. As the health categories 'good' and 'fair' had the most respondents, the distribution is alike the total distribution in these categories, which is a moderately right-leaning one with scores 10 and 8 as the most answers given. As a slight distinction, life satisfaction is more concentrated and control over life has higher variation with more maximum and middle scores . However, the state of health can reverse this description as the life satisfaction shows

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Another potential life satisfaction variable, happiness (Question 2) was not involved since its correlation with life satisfaction was 0.51 and 64% of respondents answered that they are 'quite happy', the second-best option on the 4-point Likert scale.

left-skewed for 'very good' health values and right-skewed values for the 'very poor' health group, while the control over life varies less. The group 'very poor' indicates well that an objective loss, a very poor state of health clearly induce low life satisfaction, while the individual could maintain neutral control over life at the same time.

Overall, the health attribute can represent the positive or negative individual experiences, the control over life provides assessment of one's life with great variance and life satisfaction is sensitive to extreme gains or losses to involve different potential explanations for democratic support based on the merely apolitical life of the individual.



5. Figure Conditional distribution of control over life and life satisfaction based on the grouping of state of health in CEE countries. n=20.362, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response to any of the 3 life satisfaction variables removed. Source: EVS (2020)

Demographic variables are incorporated in the analyises as explanatory variables to connect the socioeconomic attributes of the respondents to the political variable of democratic support. Instead of simple control variables, this thesis utilizes them as part of the core explanation structure by using a comprehensive set of six variables to cover the most important societal characteristics of an individual. Out of the six variables, three variables takes the form of a binary variable and another three an ordinal scale, which I present separately. Nonetheless, I

remove the observations with 'don't know' or no response from all the six demographic variables, and analyse the subsample of 16.973 observations.

Three demograpich variables take the form of a binary variable: sex (Question 63), age (Question 64) and employment (Question 96). Age was defined as post-communist cohort binary variable to emphasize the transitional experience of citizens. So, the post-communist cohort variable takes the value zero if the respondent was born before 1972 and 1 otherwise in order to create groups for citizens who were adult before the transitions and those who experienced democracy as the primary political system. The analysis of transitional countries corroborates this choice, moreover it splits the individuals to groups turning 18 years old before or after the transition as a variable of post-communist cohort.

As for the description of the three variables, 9.673 respondents born before 1972 and there were 7.300 younger citizens so almost half of the respondents became adult after the transition. Regarding sex, there are more than 50%, 9.925 female answers (with value 2) compared to the 7.048 male answers (with value 1) in the subsample. Employment was defined in the questiannery as a longer term absence of unemployment, without 3 consecutive months being unemployed in the last 5 years. According to the dataset, only a small fraction, 23% of the respondents (3.873 person) were at least temporary unemployed, while 13.100 citizens had jobs most of the time. Unemployment is coded with value 1 while the employed with value 2. As for these three binary variables, only the interaction of the post-communist cohort and employment is substantial as only 17.5% citizens born before 1972 were unemployed but this share is as high as 30% for the younger citizens. To visualize this interrelation, the crosstab in Table 4. shows that not only the fraction but also the absolute number is higher for younger citizens, despite their smaller numbers.

		rounger than to	
Unemployed	1.692	2.181	3.873
Employed	7.981	5.119	13.100
	9.673	7.300	16.973

Older than 46 Younger than 46



The three binary type demographic variables have closer relations with the three ordinal type variables that describe respondents based on their socioeconomic situation. The education variable has 8 outcomes ranging from No formal or primary education with a value zero to Master's or higher level of value 7 (Question 81), the variable characterizing income of the household is based on the self-reported income deciles between 1 and 10 (Question 98), while the settlement type is measured on a 5-category scale starting from under 5.000 person with value 1 to more than 500.000 inhabitants with value 5 (Question Q106). As for their interrelations with the above mentioned binary variables, the households of women respondents earn slightly less based on the negative correlation of -0.11. The post-communist cohort and the employment dummy both have positive correlations with education and income, thus permanently employed younger respondents experienced higher level education and fall in higher income decile. Unsurprisingly, the highest correlation (0.27) is between age and income.

The three ordinal demographic variable have closer relations to each other as different aspects of socioeconomic attributes. Education and income have the highest correlation of 0.36 and respondents with higher educational degree and higher income status tend to live in larger



*6. Figure* Conditional distribution of level of education based on the grouping of settlement type in CEE countries. n=16.973, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response to any of the 6 demographic variables removed. Source: EVS (2020)

settlements, see e.g. the correlation of 0.27 between education and settlement type. According to the histograms of Figure 6 depicting education, the interrelation between settlement type and degree of education is linear, however the largest settlement above 500.000 inhabitants entails a leap as respondents with education Master' or higher level live in the largest, urban settlement (see the appendix for distribution of income with similar outlier share at 10<sup>th</sup> decile).

Political variables represent individual attitudes that are most dependent on external effects induced by political entrepreneurs, therefore they are expected to explain the importance of democracy as another political attitude with higher likelihood. There are five political variables utilized in this thesis. Four variables describe political values of the respondents: marriage attitude expressing its relevance in contemporary times (Question 24), left-right orientation (Question 31) attitudes towards immigrants regarding their impact on the respondent's home country (Question 51) and preferring environment protection over economic growth (Question 57). This set of variables also have the binary variable distinguishing between government-opposition stance, which is of central importance in this thesis. It is defined based on the political party preference (Question 49).

Three out of the five attitudes are binary variables. Marriage attitude have the score 1 if marriage is outdated according to the respondent and 2 if it is not. The overwhelming majority of respondents answered that marriage is not outdated and only 16.9% responded that it is. Environment protection attitude shows that slightly higher share, 55.2% of the respondents chose the environment (with score 1) over economic growth and the preservation of jobs (with score 2). As for the government-opposition dummy, 53.6% of respondents preferred an opposition party (coded as 0), over a governmental party (coded as 1). The government-opposition dummy was defined according to the party preference and the composition of government in August 2017. All coalition partners were coded as governmental, however, parties that supported the government externally were not. The option 'Other' and 'No other party appeals to me' were coded as opposition if available, except for Belarus, where both the options 'Other' and 'Supporters of the political policy' was coded as governmental. Belarus has the highest share of respondents preferring the government with 75.8% <sup>6</sup>, while Croatia the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The following de facto opposition parties was coded as opposition in Belarus: Belarusian Party "The Greens", Social-Democratic Party of Peoples, Conservative Christian Party – BNF, Party BNF, Belarusian Party of the Left 'Fair', United Civic Party, Belarusian Social-Democratic Assembly, Belarusian Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, only United Russia was coded as governmental.

lowest with 31.8%. In the dataset, supporters of the government have absolute majority in Belarus, Serbia (64.0%), Hungary (57.4%) and Russia (51.2%), while the share is close to 50% in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania.

The two other variables are ordinal. The left-right attitude is ranging from score 1 (left) to score 10 (right). 53.3% of respondents were rather leftist between score 1-5, however most of them, 27.5% only slightly so with score 5, closer to a neutral stance. Setting aside the moderate answers of 5 and 6, respondents with right-wing attitude have a share of 35.6% compared to the 25.8% of left-wing ones and the mean value of 5.7 shows slightly right-leaning political value in the dataset. The immigration attitude has a 5-point scale ranging from the stance that the impact of immigrants is very bad (with score 1) to very good (with score 5). 46.6% of respondents chose neither good, nor bad with score 3. Those with a less neutral stance have a robust majority in the negative attitudinal range with 31.1%, and the remaining respondents with positive attitudes were more cautious with only 4.8% of them answering that the impact of immigrants is very good.

The two ordinal variables from the political set have the correlation of -4.9%, which is the tightest relationship among the set of political variables and shows that the respondents with right-wing orientation have more negative views on immigration on average. On the other hand, the conditional boxplot in Figure 7 shows that this interrelation is confined to the very bad category. Respondents neutral on the impact of immigrants tended to be slightly right-wing on the left-right-scale, similar to those who answered that it is quite bad or quite good being almost identical to each other and to the boxplot of all the observations with slightly right-wing orientation as well. The very good answers belong to a wide range from left to right with only slightly left leaning. It is only those who gave the option very bad can be characterized with unequivocal (right-wing) partisanship. The interconnection between the other political variables are negligible.



7. Figure Conditional boxplot of left-right attitude based on the grouping of immigration attitude in CEE countries. n=10.124, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response to any of the 5 political variables removed. Source: EVS (2020)

The pooled interrelation of the explanatory variables points to few high degree correlations between the set of variables. Table 5 shows that from the 60 possible pair of correlation between different sets of variables<sup>7</sup>, there are only 9 pair whose correlation exceeds 10%. Cases with the highest correlation are between the life satisfaction and demographic variables in the top 8 interrelation, which is an intuitive reflection to the tendencies that citizens with better state of health, higher control over life and life satisfaction are on average younger, have higher level of education and higher household income. However, there are two cases between demographic and political variables as well. Thus, there are more younger citizens, 26.5% of them with an attitude that marriage is outdated compared to citizens born before 1971 (16.1% of them) and citizens with continuous employment have more negative attitude on the impact of immigrants. On the other hand, there are very limited correlations between political and life satisfaction variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> I.e. that do not contain the 31 possible in-group correlations already investigated earlier.

The correlation of explanatory variables in Table 5 and above in this chapter provides an oppurtunity to asses the relevance of the correlation between the explanatory variables and the response variable, which is an important aspect to evaluate the relevance of the modelling results in Chapter 3.2. Importance of democracy has a correlation higher than 0.05 in absolute value with life satisfaction (0.146), control over life (0.14), environment protection attitude (-0.1), immigration attitude (0.092), education (0.067), income (0.063), and left-right attitude (0.054). 3 correlations between importance of democracy and the explanatory variables would have a place in Table 5, however 11 pair of correlations would be tighter compared to the highest correlation with the response variable. Nevertheless, the correlations between importance of democracy and control over life are higher than any other correlations involving political variables. Overall, the response variable have sufficiently tight interrelation with the explanatory variables considering that it is a political variable.

Rank	Correlation	Variables		Type of variables
1	-0.384	State of Health	Post-communist cohort	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
2	-0.301	State of Health	Income	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
3	-0.238	State of Health	Education	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
4	0.203	Life Satisfaction	Income	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
5	0.141	Life Satisfaction	Post-communist cohort	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
6	0.135	Control over Life	Income	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
7	0.11	Control over Life	Education	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
8	-0.109	Immigration Attitude	Employment	Political-Demographic
9	0.106	Control over Life	Post-communist cohort	Life Satisfaction-Demographic
10	-0.094	Marriage Attitude	Post-communist cohort	Political-Demographic

*5. Table* Top 10 between-group correlations of explanatory variables in CEE countries. n=8.713, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response to any of the 14 explanatory variables removed. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020)

What is more, the number of observations, n=8.713 in Table 5 highlights that most respondents did not answer to most of the questions describing the explanatory variables as the n=20.912 number of all the observations indicate a response rate of 41.7% (it is 42% in Western countries<sup>8</sup>). Thus, observations that have at least one value with 'don't know' or no response answers are in a majority. Removing all the observations with at least one missing variable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> However the settlement type was not included in the case of the Netherlands and Great-Britain and only partially in Denmark. Without the 6175 missing values as a result of the selective data gathering, the response rate would have been 62.6% in the Western case.

would entail ignoring the bulk of information from the EVS (2020) dataset, therefore I implement a strategy for imputation.

My imputation strategy in this thesis is that if a variable has less than 500 respondents answered with 'don't know' or no response value, I remove the observations with these missing values and I keep the rest and impute in the case of observations belonging to variables above 500 not definitive answers. As a result, less than 500 missing values characterized eight variables: state of health, control over life, life statisfaction, sex, post-communist cohort, education, employment, settlement type. There were six variables which had more missing values and therefore proceeded to be imputed: income, marriage attitude, left-right attitude, immigration attitude, environment protection attitude and government-opposition dummy. So, there were substantially more missing values in the case of political variables and income. As Table 6 shows, there are only 1.285 observations which had to be removed belonging to the group of eight nonpolitical variables, while there are 10.527 observations that is to be imputed at least for one variable out of the six variables. I further removed 521 observations not giving a definitive answer to the response variable, importance of democracy.<sup>9</sup>

According to table 6, it is the left-right attitude and the government-opposition dummy with the most missing values, while income and environment attitude have also thousands of nondefinitive answers. The missing structure shows considerable overlaps, those who did not answer to one question tended not to answer to other questions either. The share of missing values for the six variables is 54%, however the share that did not answer to only one question is considerably less, it is only 9% even in the highest nonrespondent case of the government-opposition dummy.

The imputation method is multivariate imputations by chained equations, which is a type of multiple imputation. Multiple imputation as a stochastic method is needed so that every imputed observation could reflect to the uncertainty of the estimation with setting the number of imputation for 5 in every missing data (Marchenko, 2010). In this way, every missing observation is imputed 5 times and the multilevel modelling in Chapter 3.2 would calculate the average scenario for every estimation. As for the estimation method, the ordinal and binary type of the variables does not allow the usage of the multivariate normal model, and the missing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> I removed the response variable-related missing observations after the imputation of the explanatory variables to have more information for the imputation process.

structure is not monotone as it is clear from table 6, so the monotone estimation cannot be used, either.

	Number of missing values (n=20.912)	Number of missing values to be imputed (n=19.627)	Share of missing values in the case of variables (n=19.627)
Eight variables without imputation	1.285	-	-
Six variables with imputation:	11.491	10.527	54%
Income	3.397	3.036	5%
Marriage attitude	881	758	>1%
Left-right attitude	5.631	5.071	8%
Immigration attitude	1.202	981	>1%
Environment attitude	2.837	2.440	4%
Government-opposition	6.465	4.908	9%

6. Table The missing structure of explanatory variables in CEE countries with all observations and after removing the 1.285 missing values that did not get imputed (dropped and imputed observations indicated with yellow). The share of missing values refers to cases with exlusive missing in the respective variables (e.g. 5% of respondents have missing values only at the income attribute, while 54% gave no response to any of the six variables). Source: EVS (2020)

Instead, I used chained equations for the imputation (Azur et al. 2011), which is a flexible method that fits to large datasets with different type of variables, as is the case in this thesis. The chained equations do not preassume a joint normal distribution, it is only required that the missingness pattern should be random, depending on the avalaible variables and not on unmeasured factors. It is also possible to set different function forms for the different variables, which I defined as logit for the government-opposition dummy and ordinal logit for the other five variables. All the information from the explanatory variables was used to estimate each other, however the nine variables not imputed in my strategy appeared only as right-hand side variables. The estimations was defined to run separately for each country so that the countryspecific connections should play a non-biased role during the imputation. The method of chained equations is an iterative estimation, and the complex dataset required some restrictions to be set. So, the six variables were assumed to be continuous when they were used to estimate the other missing variables, otherwise the process did not converge. The imputation resulted in the multiplication of the dataset due to the 5 variation for every missing values, so the analysis would have n=59.342 instead of 8.713, but it is only in accordance with the characteristic of multiple imputation.

All in all, life satisfaction variables showing individual experiences, demographic variables with special characteristic of the post-communist social life and the more unsteady political

variables with less definitive answers are the three set of explanatory variables in the analysis of the thesis. The former two set of variables correlate strongly with both in their respective group and between one another, while political variables do not corralate substantially with each other and the other variables. Political variables (and income) also have significantly more missing values, which I imputed with multiple chained imputation method.

#### Multilevel modelling and macro-level control variables

The estimation method is multilevel modelling in this thesis as the survey data is from 14 CEE countries, which would lead to country-specific bias otherwise in the case of attitudinal variables. That is why I apply the linear multilevel model or mixed model, which assumes that there is more than one level in the dataset, thus the response variable has a variation between the observations at level-1 (the CEE citizens) *and* between the groups at level-2 (the different countries). The level-2 effect could be estimated this way by identifying two different residuals, one for the level-1 and another for level-2.<sup>10</sup> The country-level effect can have the form of a random intercept with representing only a level difference between the countries, or it is possible to estimate whether the effect of the explanatory variables follow different trendlines in each countries, which is the random slope model (Goldstein, 1991). This means a potential modelling decision about each variable to estimate it as only fixed effect variable or even random effect variable (Snijders, 2005).

If all the variable is estimated as only fixed effect variable, the model is the random intercept and the effect of explanatory variables are the same in every country. Therefore, it is advantageous to estimate variables whose effects could potentially differ between countries as both fixed and random variables, which yields a variance for each variable showing the different effects of the variable in the different countries. Parsimony should be considered at deciding to estimate the random effect for many variables. That is why I define the macro-controls, which are identical for every observation in a given country, only as fixed effect variables. I present the macro control variables in this chapter due to their close connection to the country-specific aspect of multilevel modelling.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> A specific assumption of the multilevel model is that these two residuals should not correlate with each other. (Snijders, 2005).
As an additional condition of multilevel modelling, centering of each explanatory variable is a requirement. Centering extracts the mean from every observation. I concentrate on the interrelations of variables on the individual level instead of country level explanations: macro variables are only for controlling the institutional effects. Thus, centering should not be obtained in a pooled framework (grand mean centering) but as calculated within each country (group mean centering) as level-1 relations between the variables need group mean centering (Enders&Tofighi, 2007). Therefore, the macro control variables should not be centered as variables representing level-2 associations since their group mean centered version would yield zero for every observation.

Country-level macro controls in this thesis are three V-Dem indicators from 2017 (Coppedge et al., 2017): clean elections index, core civil society index, media bias, moreover the polarization index from Digital Society Survey (Mechkova et al., 2019). These control variables account for a portion of the political institutions that can cause the indirect effect of political community on importance of democracy as depicted in Figure 1, moreover they concentrate on the factors that can modify the perception about democracy among citizens. Clean elections and civil society are measured on a continuous range between 0 and 1 and the first shows how free and fair elections are without frauds and other irregularities, while the second characterize the robustness of the civil society regarding autonomy from the state in pursuing civic and political goals. Media bias measures whether the opposition faces unequal coverage compared to the government. It is technically continuous between 0 and 4 due to the recoding method, however it is interpreted as a 5-scale ordinal variable ranging from no mention of any opposition in official print or broadcast media (score 0) to a coverage that represent every political party more or less impartially, according to their relevance (score 4). Polarization is coded on a scale from score 1 to 5 with the higher values as less polarized as it was explicated in Chapter 2.2.

There is significant interrelation between the three V-Dem variables with the highest correlation, 0.92 between civil society and media bias and the lowest, 0.78 between civil society and clean elections. Figure 8 shows the tight interrelations as well. There are two linear regression as I depicted both clean elections and civil society on the x-axis. Belarus and Russia



*8. Figure* Scatter plot of clear election, civil society and media bias indeces in 14 CEE countries. X-axis: media bias. Y-axis: clean election and civil society (on identical scale). Linear regression trends: media bias and clean election, media bias and civil society. Source: Own calculations based on Coppedge et al. (2017)

have low values from every attribute, while Serbia is also below the other countries. Moreover, 5 other countries' media bias score are beyond the simple exaggeratedly positive picture of the government (score 3) with leaning to the negative coverage of at least one opposition party (score 2). There are only 5 countries out of 14 whose scores are high from every attribute. On the other hand, there are some outliers among the countries. Albania's elections are less free, Poland's elections are freer compared to the other two attributes. Civil society is less robust, elections are freer in Hungary compared to the trendline, while in Serbia the other way around: civil society does not lag behind the other countries as much as its elections are not free enough.

There is less correlation between polarization and the other indicators. Polarization has -0.15 correlation with clean elections and -0.14 with civil society and close to zero association with media bias, which means that more polarized societies have slightly freer elections and more robust civil society. Figure 9 depicts polarization index of the investigated countries in 2017 but the interrelation of Figure 2 in Chapter 2 that CEE countries are more polarized compared

but the interrelation of Figure 2 in Chapter 2 that CEE countries are more polarized compared to Western countries remains. The mean is 2.00 for CEE and 2.43 for Western countries in 2017.



*9. Figure* Polarization in CEE (red) and Western (blue) countries, 2017. Rescaled to 1-5 scale based on Mechkova et al. (2019)

# 3.2 Survey Analysis

In this chapter, I elaborate the result of the empirical analysis based on the dataset and multilevel model in chapter 3.1. First, I perform the analysis separately for CEE and Western countries with a comparison of the differences in the effects of the explanatory variables on importance of democracy. Afterwards, I estimate the multilevel model in the pooled dataset of both CEE and Western countries to test the statistical significance of the explanatory variable's differing effects.

# Importance of Democracy in CEE Countries

I present the analysis on the central topic of the thesis here: the micro-level factors in relation to the support for democracy in CEE countries. Support of democracy is captured as importance of democracy and the steps of the analysis are based on the aspects laid out in the last chapter. I performed the imputation for the eight explanatory variables with substantial missing values and dropped missing observations of the other independent variables and the response variable. After that I centered all the explanatory variables (but not the response variable). As for the model choice, I decided to run a random slope model since the potential variation of the effect among CEE countries is important and not known a priori. I involved all the 14 explanatory variables (plus the constant as default) as both fixed and random variables, while kept the macro-controls as only fixed variables. This leads to 19 fixed and 14 random variables, which the model estimation could handle. I interpret above the multilevel model and later I further explicate the country-differences based on country-level linear regressions.

The multilevel model yields significant results in the majority of variables in CEE countries according to Table 7. As for the fixed effects, the explanatory variables control over life, life satisfaction, post-communist cohort, educational level, income and environment attitude is significant at 0.1% level, while marriage attitude at 1% level and settlement size at 5% level.

Higher control over life and life satisfaction contributes to moderately higher importance to democracy. If a citizen became adult after the fall of communism (dummy outcome coded with 1 hence the negative coefficient), this citizen supports democracy expressively less compared to citizens born before. Individuals with higher level of education regard democracy as substantially more important and, with somewhat less relevance but still as robust interrelation, so do they with belonging to a household with higher income and living in a larger settlement. Attitude towards marriage matters in importance of democracy and citizen who contemplate that marriage is relevant in the modern times (coded with higher score hence the positive coefficient) supports democracy relatively more compared to those who do not. And those who think that preserving the environment is more important (coded with lower score hence the negative coefficient) consider democracy as substantially more important too compared to those prioritizing economy and jobs. The constant was significant with a coefficient close to the average of the dataset, while only media bias had statistical significance of level 5% from the

	Fixed Effects			
Importance of Democracy	Coefficients	Standard error	Z-statistics	P-value
State of Health	-0.01	0.03	-0.18	-85.5%
Control over Life	0.09***	0.02	5.71	0.0%
Life Satisfaction	0.06***	0.02	3.78	0.0%
Sex	0.06	0.04	1.51	13.0%
Post-communist cohort	-0.32***	0.09	-3.70	0.0%
Educational Level	0.11***	0.02	5.16	0.0%
Employment	0.05	0.04	1.34	18.0%
Income	0.04***	0.01	4.33	0.0%
Settlement Size	0.03*	0.02	2.13	3.3%
Marriage Attitude	0.23**	0.07	3.15	0.2%
Left-right Attitude	0.01	0.01	1.39	16.4%
Immigration Attitude	0.06	0.04	1.69	9.1%
Environment Attitude	-0.31***	0.04	-7.97	0.0%
<b>Government-opposition</b>	0.0	0.05	0.05	95.8%
<b>Clean elections</b>	-0.82	1.08	-0.76	44.7%
Core Civil Society	-3.4	1.88	-1.82	6.8%
Media Bias	1.28*	0.55	2.34	1.9%
Polarization	-0.22	0.16	-1.40	16.2%
Constant	8.25***	0.64	14.82	0.0%

Level of significance: \*5% \*\*1% \*\*\*0.1%

#### **Random-effects**

	Variance Estimation	Standard Error
State of Health	0.013	0.01
Control over Life	0.003	0.00
Life Satisfaction	0.003	0.00
Sex	0.017	0.01
Post-communist cohort	0.099	0.04
Educational Level	0.006	0.00
Employment	0.015	0.01
Income	0.001	0.00
Settlement Size	0.003	0.00
Marriage Attitude	0.068	0.03
Left-right Attitude	0.001	0.00
Immigration Attitude	0.018	0.01
Environment Attitude	0.016	0.01
<b>Government-opposition</b>	0.027	0.01
Constant	0.263	0.10
Residual	4.194	0.02

7. *Table* Random intercept and random slope multilevel model in 14 CEE countries with 14 explanatory variables as both fixed and random variables and 4 macro-controls as only fixed variables. n=59.342 (with imputation) at level-1 and the number of countries is 14 at level-2. Model diagnostics: Wald Chi<sup>2</sup> (20)=208.7, p(Chi<sup>2</sup>)=0.000. Source: Own calculations based on EVS(2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

macro-controls, indicating that individuals in a society with fair media coverage of all the parties have higher level of democratic support on average.

But, as a feature of the multilevel model with random slope, variation in some of the fixed effects' coefficients among the countries is revealed by the output table as well. The largest heterogeneity of the coefficient is found at variables post-communist cohort and marriage attitude, but the government-opposition dummy, immigration attitude, sex, environment attitude, employment and state of health also have noticeable variation among countries, while the other 6 variables are close to identical in all 14 CEE countries. The constant has moderate variation between the countries, but the residual variance is substantial, showing that there remained unexplained factors at the individual level.

To give examples for the differing coefficients among the countries, I ran linear regression for each country and visualized the direction for 5 variables with a substantial relevance in the variation.<sup>11</sup> I describe these variations with plus and minus signs indicating a significant direction and the blank spaces represent insignificant coefficient in Table 8. According to the tendencies, the high variance for post-communist cohort and marriage attitude is misleading and represent variation in the magnitude and not the direction due to the almost unidirectional trends. The exceptions are the Slovak Republic, where citizens becoming adult after the transition have higher support for democracy and Serbia, where considering the marriage as outdated imply higher support for democracy contrary to the bulk of countries. Immigration attitude shows significant result at the majority of the countries, however Hungary and Slovakia are divergent from the tendency of the attitudinal match of migrants with positive impact and higher importance of democracy, thus, citizens in these two neighbouring countries support democracy more if they regard migrants as rather negative in their countries. Being employed on the long term and preferring the government or the opposition has significant result in just some countries with employment contributing to the importance of democracy in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (with less support in Belarus as an exception) and with the uncertain pattern of the governmental-opposition dichotomy. Preferring the government commoves with higher support of democracy in Czech Republic and Russia, while citizens belonging to the opposition consider democracy as more important in Belarus and Serbia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> That is to say variables whose coefficients differed either in CEE countries or between the groups of CEE and Western countries, while e.g the coefficient of sex was positive in 4 CEE and 3 Western countries and environment atitude was only insignificant in 3 CEE and 2 Western countries with unanimous trend otherwise.

	AL	BG	BY	HR	CZ	EE	HU	LT	PL	RO	RU	RS	SK	SL
Post-communist cohort	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	-	-	+	-
Employment			-		+		+		+					
Marriage attitude		+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+		-	+	+
Immigration attitude		+			+	+	-			+		+	-	+
Government-opposition			-		+						+	-		
R-squared	3.0%	9.5%	4.7%	6.8%	4.9%	7.8%	7.5%	8.4%	5.5%	7.1%	6.4%	12.5%	15.2%	12.5%

8. Table The result of linear regressions in each of the 14 CEE countries for 5 explanatory variables. '+' and '-' indicates significant positive and negative result at level 5% and blank means insignificant result. R-squared is presented for all the regression model. n=59.342 (with imputation) splitted into 14 countries. Coefficients with opposite direction compared to the majority of countries indicated with yellow. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

#### Importance of Democracy in Western Countries

I present the result of the multilevel model for Western countries as a comparison with CEE countries. The modelling of Western countries should not involve settlement type as explanatory variable since it was missing entirely in two countries (see footnote 7). As for the fixed effect coefficients in Table 9, Western countries correspond with CEE countries in significance and direction in the variables control over life, life satisfaction, post 1971 cohort, educational level, income, marriage attitude and environment attitude, while state of health, sex and governmental-opposition dummy is incognisant in both region. For these 10 variables, only minor difference can be found so that the coefficient of control over life, life satisfaction, income, marriage attitude and environmental attitude is more substantial in CEE countries, and similarly, being born after 1971 is slightly more detrimental in Western countries regarding support of democracy. On the other hand, the model results point to some significant difference inasmuch as the Western citizens tend to support democracy more if they have permanent employment, if they slightly lean to left-wing attitude and if they regard immigration as having rather positive effects on their country. Therefore, the major difference between the regions is confined to 3 variables out of 13 after comparing the coefficients of the two models.

	Fixed Effects			
Importance of Democracy	Coefficients	Standard error	Z-statistics	P-value
State of Health	-0.02	0.02	-0.96	-33.9%
Control over Life	0.04**	0.01	2.98	0.3%
Life Satisfaction	0.03**	0.01	2.84	0.4%
Sex	0.03	0.03	1.08	27.9%
Post 1971 cohort	-0.38***	0.03	-12.61	0.0%
Educational Level	0.10***	0.01	8.27	0.0%
Employment	0.09*	0.05	2.06	4.0%
Income	0.02*	0.01	2.51	1.2%
Marriage Attitude	0.07*	0.03	2.24	2.5%
Left-right Attitude	-0.02*	0.01	-1.99	4.7%
Immigration Attitude	0.09**	0.03	3.07	0.2%
Environment Attitude	-0.23***	0.03	-7.87	0.0%
<b>Government-opposition</b>	0.06	0.04	1.55	12.0%
<b>Clean elections</b>	2.94	2.08	1.42	15.7%
Core Civil Society	2.40*	0.93	2.57	1.0%
Media Bias	-0.05	0.20	-0.24	81.0%
Polarization	0.18***	0.04	4.63	0.0%
Constant	3.83	2.09	1.83	6.7%

Level of significance: \*5% \*\*1% \*\*\*0.1%

## **Random-effects**

	Variance Estimation	Standard Error
State of Health	0.003	0.02
Control over Life	0.002	0.00
Life Satisfaction	0.001	0.00
Sex	0.007	0.00
Post 1971 cohort	0.009	0.00
Educational Level	0.001	0.00
Employment	0.023	0.01
Income	0.000	0.00
Marriage Attitude	0.008	0.01
Left-right Attitude	0.002	0.00
Immigration Attitude	0.010	0.00
Environment Attitude	0.008	0.00
<b>Government-opposition</b>	0.017	0.01
Constant	0.018	0.01
Residual	2.090	0.01

9. Table Random intercept and random slope multilevel model in 13 Western countries with 13 explanatory variables as both fixed and random variables and 4 macro-controls as only fixed variables. n=63.517 (with imputation) at level-1 and the number of countries is 13 at level-2. Model diagnostics: Wald Chi<sup>2</sup>(20)=383.60, p(Chi<sup>2</sup>)=0.000. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

There is lower variation in the fixed effects of Western countries compared to the CEE region. Only employment and the government-opposition dichotomy have notable variance between the countries. The other 11 variables can be seen as close to stable in Western countries. The variance of the constant, whose fixed effect was not significant, is also less in Western countries. Residual variance is about half the value of the model in CEE countries, which reinforces that the coefficients of variables are more settle in Western countries with less difference between them.

The analysis of the country level regressions in Table 10 unfolds that even the highest variation in the variable employment proves to be a relatively solid relationship with positive coefficients in 7 countries, which exceeds the CEE region's significant cases of 3 countries. Only Spain has the reverse association as an exception, where people experiencing unemployment support democracy more. The governmental-opposition variable is also significant in more, 5 countries in the Western region. As counterexamples again, individuals preferring the opposition regard democracy as more important in Spain and Switzerland similar to Serbia in CEE.<sup>12</sup> The other three variables have evanescent variance in the random slope model. The only reason to include them is the comparison with CEE countries. Post 1971 cohort is exclusively negative, thus citizens under the age 46 support democracy less in every Western country, while only in the majority of CEE countries. Regarding migrants with positive impacts entails higher support of democracy in more Western countries, however Spain has an opposite effect similar to the Slovak Republic and Hungary. On the other hand, seeing marriage as relevant in modern times have significantly less significance in Western countries and even an exception with Sweden. So, although CEE-Western difference in some variables occurs, the main difference is that CEE countries have more variation in the marginal effects of the explanatory variables among the countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In line with the winner-loser gap theory of Anderson&Guillory (1997), evaluation of democracy as dependent variable is significantly more important compared to the more abstract importance of with substantial attitudional difference between the regions. Losing the elections in CEE countries entails higher likelihood to conclude that the governance is not democratic, while supporters of the opposition question the importance of democracy more often after a lost election based on the separate and country-level models, however the joint model described in the next chapter does not show a significant difference between the regions. See the results in the appendix.

	AT	DK	FI	FR	DE	IS	IT	NL	NO	ES	SE	СН	GB
Post 1971 cohort	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employment	+	+	+		+	+		+	+	-			
Marriage attitude				+			+	+		+	-	+	
Immigration attitude		+	+	+	+	+					+	+	+
Government-opposition		+	+	+	+					-		-	+

**R-squared 5.5% 5.3% 11.1% 11.9% 5.2% 10.8% 5.8% 10.8% 10.6% 2.6% 4.8% 7.7% 9.8%** *10. Table* The result of linear regressions in each of the 13 Western countries for 5 explanatory variables. '+' and '-' indicates significant positive and negative result at level 5% and blank means insignificant result. R-squared is presented for all the regression model. n=63.517 (with imputation) splitted into 14 countries. Effects with opposite direction compared to the majority of countries indicated with yellow. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

#### Joint multilevel model of CEE and Western Countries

The separate model for the two regions allows to derive significant results in the distinct model, however it does not alone prove statistically significant difference between CEE and Western countries. A rigorous analysis of the differences requires joint model for all the countries, where the CEE region is represented with a dummy variable. Interaction terms for the CEE dummy and all explanatory variable whose significance is under scrutiny are also constructed. For parsimony concerns, the interaction terms to investigate the significance of the variables are estimated in separate models for each variable. I kept the fixed effect the same in Table 9, however only the variable was set as random variable whose significance was investigated (e.g. life satisfaction as both random as fixed if the model has interaction term Life SatisfactionxCEE dummy), otherwise the model did not converge. I estimated the model for explanatory variables with different level of significance between the regions regarding the 5, 1 and 0.1% cut-off probabilities. This meant 8 variables from the 13.

I involved CEE dummy, the interaction term and the original variable since not involving all possible constitutive term would lead to flawed results (Brambor et al, 2006), e.g. omitting the CEE dummy is equivalent to assume that there is no difference between the democratic support of CEE and Western countries when the interacting explanatory variable is zero, which is a useless condition in these multilevel models as the mostly ordinal variables either do not take the value zero or its concrete occurrence is arbitrary due to the centering of variables. At the interpretation of the variables, it is also important that the marginal effect of any of the three variables reflect to conditional statements and meaningless without the other coefficients

(Brambor et al, 2006), moreover the level of significance is only reliable at the interaction term (Braumoeller, 2004). So, the correct interpretation is that if e.g. Life SatisfactionxCEE dummy is significant, life satisfaction is significantly different in CEE countries compared to Western countries and its marginal effect in CEE countries is the sum of the coefficients Life Satisfaction and Life SatisfactionxCEE dummy.

The model results in Table 11 shows that few variables differ significantly between the 2 regions according to the joint model with interaction terms. There are only 3 variables with

Fixed Effects							
Importance of Democracy	Coefficients	Standard error	Z-statistics	P-value			
Control over Life	0.03	0.02	1.64	10.1%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
Control over LifexCEE dummy	0.08**	0.02	3.39	0.1%			
Life Satisfaction	0.01	0.02	0.83	40.6%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
Life SatisfactionxCEE dummy	0.07**	0.02	2.88	0.4%			
Income	0.01	0.1	0.97	33.3%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
IncomexCEE dummy	0.03	0.02	1.88	6.1%			
Employment	0.04	0.04	0.83	40.4%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
EmploymentxCEE dummy	0.05	0.06	0.91	36.2%			
Marriage Attitude	0.06	0.06	1.00	31.9%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
Marriage AttitudexCEE dummy	0.14	0.08	1.74	8.2%			
Left-right Attitude	-0.02*	0.01	-2.38	1.7%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
Left-right AttitudexCEE dummy	0.04**	0.01	3.23	0.1%			
Immigration Attitude	0.08*	0.03	2.41	1.6%			
CEE dummy	-0.60**	0.22	-2.68	0.7%			
Immigration AttitudexCEE dummy	0.01	0.05	0.17	86.2%			
Government-opposition	0.04	0.06	0.72	47.1%			
CEE dummy	-0.64**	0.23	-2.78	0.5%			
Government-oppositionx CEE dummy	-0.06	-0.08	-0.83	40.7%			
Level of significance: *5% **1% ***0.1							

11. Table 8 multilevel models with interaction terms of 8 variables and CEE dummy. 12 explanatory variables and 4 macro-controls as only fixed and only the variable with interaction term as random variable too. n=122.911 (with imputation) at level-1 and the number of countries is 27 at level-2. Only the interacting term and variables presented from the models. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

significant interaction term and so difference: control over life, life satisfaction and the leftright attitude. According to the interpretations, the marginal effect of control over life on democratic support is 0.08+0.03=0.11 in CEE region, while it is 0.08 for life satisfaction and 0.02 for left-right attitude. These coefficients are similar to the results of the only CEE model in table 7. Control over life and life satisfaction have significant positive coefficients in Western countries as well, thus, the implication is that citizens of the CEE region with higher life satisfaction and control over life have even higher democratic support compared to Western countries. As for the left-right attitude, individuals leaning slightly more to the right support democracy more in CEE countries, while this relationship works with the left-wing values in Western countries. The other variables are not significant, even if income and marriage attitude are close to it with p-values of 6.1% and 8.2%. The CEE dummy is very robust on the other hand, therefore, there could be other attributes not involved in the model which differ between the 2 regions' democratic support.



10. Figure Predictive margins for control over life based on the joint multilevel model of CEE and Western countries. 12 explanatory variables and 4 macro-controls as only fixed. Control over life is not centered, has 20 interaction terms with the CEE dummy and it is the only random variable. Margins estimated with delta method at 95% level of confidence. n=122.911 (with imputation) at level-1 and the number of countries is 27 at level-2. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

Even the three variables with significantly different coefficients in CEE countries have only partial dissimilarity in effecting importance of democracy. To visualize these minor differences, I present predictive margins, which gives conditional prediction for the dependent variable based on given values of the explanatory variables. Figure 10 shows that control over life differs at the lower values of CEE countries from the Western region. Therefore, those who feel less control over life have only slightly lower support for democracy in Western countries, but substantially lower support in CEE countries. It does not constitute general pattern since the difference is significant only at the scores 2 and 3, which represent 4.4% of the sample in CEE and 2.6% in Western countries. But it indicates that the citizens of CEE have higher inclination to lost faith in democracy when they lost control over their own lives. The predictive margins offer a similar picture for life satisfaction and almost identical curve for the left-right attitude in the two regions with support for democracy slightly increasing at the right-wing endpoint in CEE (see the figures in the appendix). The joint model reinforces that the associations between micro-attributes and support for democracy does not differ fundamentally in the two regions, however minor particular phenomenon arise in CEE countries.

# 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Analysing the associations of micro-level attributes and democratic support sheds light that CEE citizens do not differ from Western citizens in important theoretical implications. The findings reflect only to minor regional-level differences but at the same time, the variation of the associations was higher in different CEE countries with country-specific deviations, which I argue as a sign of increased polarization processes. As summarizing the results of the paper, first I assess the hypotheses in the face of the empirical evidence. Afterwards I list the theories of the field that were confirmed for the CEE region as similar to Western countries. Lastly, I attach the practical puzzle of Poland and Hungary as democratic backsliding countries with high support for democracy.

As for the second hypothesis, there is little evidence that political variables have higher explanatory power in more polarized societies like the countries of the CEE region. The set of life satisfaction and demographic variables have proportionally more significant coefficients. The robust positive association of environmental attitude only shares the universal pattern with the Western region, while the immigration attitude and the governmental-oppositional dichotomy had more occurrence to be relevant in Western countries and the petty gap in left-right attitude regarding democratic support is symmetrical between the regions. It is only marriage attitude that is exceptionally different in the CEE region with 10 out of 14 countries with a significant positive association being almost twice as more frequent among the countries compared to Western countries. But the low relevance of other political variables refutes the second hypothesis.

The first hypothesis of micro-attributes being more relevant in the more polarized CEE countries showed multilayer evidences due to the more heterogenous association in the CEE region. The simple juxtaposition of the separate models reveals 10 significant variables in Western and 8 of them in CEE countries, while the joint model showed only minor attitudinal differences with low life satisfaction and control over life as negatively, right-wing attitude as positively affecting democratic support. Nevertheless, I interpret the fixed effect differences as they do not show that micro-attributes are better explanations in the Western region. Instead, the effects in the Western region are simply more uniform between the separate countries. The random effect analyses showed that the variables follow substantially different trendlines among the countries of CEE region. The country-level regressions at Table 8 and 10 confirmed

the more deviation among CEE countries, however the average share of explained variance was similar in both regions' countries (the R-squared was highest overall in the Slovak Republic with 15.2%). Therefore, the sole fixed effect significances show the difference of the Western region as a unit and the CEE region as a unit, however the CEE region does not follow unitary patterns. The illustrating example for the country-specificity is the exceptional positive effect of anti-migrant stance on democratic support in Slovak Republic and Hungary and the positive contribution of employment to democratic attitude only in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary in the region (with also a negative coefficient in Belarus). The argumentation of the thesis is that the more variation in the CEE region is resulting from elite-induced polarizing process<sup>13</sup>: the country-specific cases that contradicts to other countries could be traced back to emphasized political discourse in each country.<sup>14</sup> In line with the discursive polarization, the micro-level attributes are more important in the CEE region in explaining the differences between the diverging countries as a confirmation of the hypothesis, however the CEE region as a whole is not fundamentally different from Western countries.

Despite the higher variation between the countries in CEE, my thesis shows the utter similarities of CEE and Western countries in universal patterns as the main contribution to the scientific literature of democratic support. The important role of life satisfaction variables, the positive associations of socioeconomic variables and the wide relevance of environmental attitude depicts citizens according to the emancipative role of the human development theory (Inglehart&Welzel, 2010). The deficit in the democratic attitude of younger generations is just as pertinent in CEE countries as in Western countries (Mounk, 2018). This is a far-reaching conclusion as the variable was coded to differentiate citizens experiencing autocracy from those who became adult in democracy. As an implication, the theory is independent from previous regime context in Europe and is a more general pattern with depending only on year of birth. Contrary, the gender gap in democratic support was not significant in either regions, thus, my thesis does not confirm that woman support democracy less and logically the higher effect cannot be peculiar in the CEE region contrary to Oakes (2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> An alternative explanation for the higher CEE variance among the countries is that they are new democracies with more uncertain values, however the adaptation to Western countries in the association of environmental attitudes and recognizing the essential characters of democracy relatively well elaborated in Chapter 3.1 show that the citizens of these countries had the capacity and time to learn the democratic values.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Without providing a detailed discourse analysis, the aforementioned five exceptions had reflections in the political discourse as the migration policy in the Slovak Republic and Hungary and the labour market policy in the three V4 countries are subject to political campaigns.

Using the models for practical explanation yields only partial account for the high democratic support of the deteriorating democracies and polarizing societies in Poland and Hungary. Some significant country specificity was already discussed. Employment in both countries, considering marriage as still relevant in Poland, and having negative attitudes about migrants in Hungary (characterizing 49.8% of respondents contrary to 7.8% of them with a positive attitude) contributes to support for democracy. Besides these relations, it is only state of health in Hungary which is significant as exceptional interrelation and the negative coefficient means higher support for democracy for citizens with better health conditions. These are important findings to assess the impact of political entrepreneurs, however they can provide only limited explanation for the outstandingly high support for democracy in the countries, which is shown by the moderate explained variances of 5.5% and 7.5% in the country regressions.

As a conclusion, I proposed in this thesis that elite-induced polarization has modifying effect on the relation of micro-attributes and support for democracy in the more polarized CEE countries. I obtained that the modification means amplifying the existing associations by creating symbolically distant political groups. The description of the variables revealed that CEE citizens support democracy less than Western citizens and that the political variables are more uncertain with less interrelations with other attributes compared to the two other set of variables. The modelling showed that CEE citizens shares universal pattern at some variables in line with the emancipative roles of Inglehart&Welzel (2010) and younger generation's decreasing democratic support (Mounk, 2018). The modifying effect of political entrepreneurs' polarization is the larger variation of associations in CEE countries compared to Western countries and the more country-level specificity as a result of local discursive elements strengthening the gap between distinct societal groups. As the findings are derived from largen study multilevel model, their strength is identifying the general interrelations and countrylevel variation, however their disadvantage is that the underlying mechanism is not directly revealed. Further research therefore can concentrate on the discursive investigation of political campaigns that divert the general associations in many CEE countries. The substantial positive effect of the marriage attitude in CEE countries is also worth further investigation since the role of marriage is dubious in the theory. And alternative explanations could reveal more about the contradiction of the high support for democracy in the backsliding-polarizing Poland and Hungary.

# Appendices

# 1. Figures

# 1.1 Distribution of income

Conditional distribution of income decile based on the grouping of settlement type in CEE countries. n=16.973, respondents that gave 'don't know' or no response to any of the 6 demographic variables removed. Source: EVS (2020)



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# 1.2 Govermental-opposition dummy results for political evaluation

Evaluation of democracy (Question 41) asks how democratically the country of the respondent is governed. It is measured on a 10-point Likert scale similar to importance of democracy, ranging from 'not at all' to 'completely democratic'. I estimated multilevel model for both regions with evolution of democracy as response variable. I kept the fixed effect the same as in Table 7 and 9, however only government-opposition dummy was set as random variable as well, otherwise the model did not converge. Citizens preferring the government regard the political system more democratic in both CEE and Western countries. But the coefficient is almost twice in CEE, indicating that citizens whose party wins and loose the elections think considerably differently about the state of democracy in their countries here. At importance of democracy, the governmental-opposition dummy is significant in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and Great Britain in Western countries but only is so in Czech Republic and Russia in the CEE region according to Table 8 and 10. Coefficient of the governmental-opposition dummy in four different models are below. Different respondent variables: importance and evaluation of democracy both in CEE and Western countries. n=56.515 in CEE and n=62.085 in the Western case for evaluation of democracy, importance of democracy is the same as in Table 7 and 9. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).



Although the difference was substantial for the separate models, the winner-looser gap difference is not significant for the evaluation of democracy with p value 10.7%. Multilevel model with interaction term for government-opposition dummy and evaluation of democracy as dependent variable. 4 explanatory variables as only fixed and only government-opposition dummy as random variable too. n=125.264 (with imputation) at level-1 and the number of countries is 27 at level-2. Only the interacting term and variables presented from the model. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).

Evaluation of Democracy	Coefficients	Standard error	Z- statistics	P-value
Government-opposition	0.46**	0.15	3.07	0.2%
CEE dummy	-1.51***	0.31	-4.88	0.0%
Government-oppositionx CEE dummy	0.34	0.21	1.61	10.7%

Level of significance: \*5% \*\*1% \*\*\*0.1%

# 1.3 Predictive margins for life satisfaction and the left-right attitude in the two regions

Predictive margins for life satisfaction and the left-right attitude based on the joint multilevel model of CEE and Western countries. 12 explanatory variables and 4 macro-controls as only fixed. The two variables are not centered, have 20 interaction terms with the CEE dummy and they are the only random variable. Margins estimated with delta method at 95% level of confidence. n=122.911 (with imputation) at level-1 and the number of countries is 27 at level-2. Source: Own calculations based on EVS (2020), Coppedge et al. (2017) and Mechkova et al. (2019).



Life satisfaction estimations (The score of CEE is 1 for East\_West\_dummy):



Left-right attitude estimates (The score of CEE is 1 for East\_West\_dummy):

# 2. Stata codes

1. Importance of democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries

```
drop if v142<1
drop if country==31
drop if country==40
drop if country==208
drop if country==208
drop if country==246
drop if country==250
drop if country==268
drop if country==276
drop if country==352
drop if country==380
```

drop if country==578
drop if country==724
drop if country==752
drop if country==756
drop if country==826

```
histogram v142, width(1) blcolor(black) bfcolor(blue) fintensity(70)
percent ytitle("%", size(large)) xtitle ("Importance of Democracy in CEE
Countries", size(large)) ylabel(0(20)80) yscale(range(0 80))
```

```
tabstat v142, by(country)
```

#### 2. Importance of democracy in Western European Countries

```
drop if v142<1
drop if country==8
drop if country==616
drop if country==348
drop if country==233
drop if country==440
drop if country==191
drop if country==642
drop if country==100
drop if country==203
drop if country==705
drop if country==112
drop if country==703
drop if country==643
drop if country==688
drop if country==31
drop if country==51
drop if country==268
```

```
histogram v142, width(1) blcolor(black) bfcolor(red) fintensity(70) percent
ytitle("%", size(large)) xtitle ("Importance of Democracy in Western
Countries", size(large))
```

tabstat v142, by(country)

#### 3. Essential characteristics for democracy

```
drop if country==31
drop if country==40
drop if country==51
drop if country==208
drop if country==246
drop if country==250
drop if country==268
drop if country==276
drop if country==352
drop if country==380
drop if country==528
drop if country==578
drop if country==724
drop if country==752
drop if country==756
drop if country==826
drop if v133<0
drop if v134<0
drop if v135<0
drop if v136<0
drop if v137<0
drop if v138<0
```

- drop if v139<0
- drop if v140<0
- drop if v141<0

tabstat v133 v134 v135 v136 v137 v138 v139 v140 v141

drop if v142<1

mean v135 v136 v138 v141 if v142>=9
mean v135 v136 v138 v141 if v142<9</pre>

graph bar v135 v136 v138 v141, over(v142)

# 4. Life satisfaction variables

- drop if country==31
- drop if country==40
- drop if country==51
- drop if country==208
- drop if country==246
- drop if country==250
- drop if country==268
- drop if country==276
- drop if country==352
- drop if country==380
- drop if country==528
- drop if country==578
- drop if country==724
- drop if country==752
- drop if country==756
- drop if country==826

drop if v8<1

drop if v38<1 drop if v39<1

twoway (hist v38, lcolor(blue) fcolor(blue) percent bin(10)) (hist v39, fcolor(none) lcolor(red) percent bin(10)), legend(order(1 "Control over Life" 2 "Life Satisfaction")) by(v8, total)

corr v8 v38 v39 drop if v7<1 corr v7 v8 v38 v39

#### 5. Demographic variables

- drop if country==31
- drop if country==40
- drop if country==51
- drop if country==208
- drop if country==246
- drop if country==250
- drop if country==268
- drop if country==276
- drop if country==352
- drop if country==380
- drop if country==528
- drop if country==578
- drop if country==724
- drop if country==752
- drop if country==756
- drop if country==826

drop if v226<1
generate v226\_dummy=0
replace v226\_dummy=1 if v226>1971
drop if v243\_EISCED <0
drop if v243\_EISCED>7
drop if v259<1
drop if v261<1
drop if v276<1</pre>

corr v225 v226\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259 v261 v276

tab v259 v226\_dummy

tabstat v243 EISCED v261, by(v276 r)

histogram v243\_EISCED, bin(8) blcolor(black) bfcolor(blue) fintensity(70)
percent ytitle("%", size(large)) xtitle ("Level of education",
size(large)) by(v276, total)

histogram v261, bin(10) blcolor(black) bfcolor(blue) fintensity(70) percent
ytitle("%", size(large)) xtitle ("Income decile", size(large)) by(v276,
total)

# 6. Political variables

```
drop if country==31
drop if country==40
drop if country==51
drop if country==208
drop if country==246
drop if country==250
drop if country==268
drop if country==276
drop if country==352
drop if country==380
drop if country==528
drop if country==578
drop if country==724
drop if country==752
drop if country==756
drop if country==826
drop if v8<1
drop if v38<1
drop if v39<1
drop if v71<1
drop if v102<1
drop if v184<1
drop if v204<1
drop if v204>2
drop if v174 cs<1
generate gov_oppos_dummy=0
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==34802
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==34803
```

replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==802
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==10001
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==10004
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==10007
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	country==112
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11203
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11204
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11207
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11208
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11210
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11211
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11213
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11214
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==19102
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==19103
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==19105
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20301
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20302
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==23302
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==23303
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==23304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==44006
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==44007
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==61601
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64201
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64206
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68801
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68807
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68810
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68813
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70308
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70310
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70501

```
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==70503
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==70504
corr v71 v102 v184 v204 gov_oppos_dummy
tabstat gov_oppos_dummy, by(country)
tab v204 gov_oppos_dummy
graph box v102, by(v184, total) ytitle("From left (1) to right (10)")
```

#### 7. Imputation, centering and multilevel model for CEE countries

```
drop if country==31
drop if country==40
drop if country==51
drop if country==208
drop if country==246
drop if country==250
drop if country==268
drop if country==276
drop if country==352
drop if country==380
drop if country==528
drop if country==578
drop if country==724
drop if country==752
drop if country==756
drop if country==826
drop if v8<1
drop if v38<1
drop if v39<1
drop if v226<1
generate age dummy=0
replace age dummy=1 if v226>1971
drop if v243 EISCED <0
```

drop if v243 EISCED>7 drop if v259<1 replace v261=. if v261<1 drop if v276 r<1 replace v71=. if v71<1 replace v102=. if v102<1 replace v184=. if v184<1 replace v204=. if v204<1 replace v204=. if v204>2 replace v174 cs=. if v174 cs<1 generate gov\_oppos\_dummy=0 replace gov oppos dummy=. if v174 cs==. replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==34802 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==34803 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==802 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==10001 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==10004 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==10007 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if country==112 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11203 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11204 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11207 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11208 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11210 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11211 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11213 replace gov oppos dummy=0 if v174 cs==11214 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==19102 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==19103 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==19105 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==20301 replace gov\_oppos\_dummy=1 if v174 cs==20302 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==23302 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==23303 replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==23304

replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==44006
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==44007
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==61601
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64201
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64206
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68801
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68807
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68810
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68813
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70308
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70310
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70501
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70503
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70504

mi set mlong mi register imputed v261 mi register imputed v71 mi register imputed v102 mi register imputed v184 mi register imputed v204 mi register imputed gov\_oppos\_dummy mi impute chain (ologit, ascontinuous) v71 v102 v184 v204 v261 (logit, ascontinuous) gov\_oppos\_dummy= v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259 v276 r, by(country) add (5) rseed(123)

misstable summarize

mi describe

mi misstable patterns

#### drop if v142<1

foreach var of varlist v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259 v261 v276 v71 v102 v184 v204 gov oppos dummy {

```
egen double `var'_gmean = mean(`var'), by(country)
gen `var'_centered = (`var'-`var'_gmean)
```

}

```
generate clean_elections=0
replace clean_elections=0.52 if country==8
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==616
replace clean_elections=0.77 if country==348
replace clean_elections=0.97 if country==233
replace clean_elections=0.91 if country==440
replace clean_elections=0.91 if country==191
replace clean_elections=0.85 if country==191
replace clean_elections=0.75 if country==100
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==203
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==705
replace clean_elections=0.95 if country==112
replace clean_elections=0.95 if country==703
replace clean_elections=0.32 if country==643
replace clean_elections=0.41 if country==688
```

```
generate civilsoc =0
replace civilsoc=0.79 if country==8
replace civilsoc =0.68 if country==616
replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==348
replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==233
replace civilsoc =0.79 if country==440
replace civilsoc =0.77 if country==191
replace civilsoc =0.75 if country==642
replace civilsoc =0.84 if country==100
replace civilsoc =0.91 if country==203
replace civilsoc =0.89 if country==705
replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==12
replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==643
replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==643
replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==643
replace civilsoc =0.66 if country==688
```

```
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```

```
generate mediabias =0
replace mediabias =3.28 if country==8
replace mediabias =2.56 if country==616
replace mediabias =2.4 if country==348
replace mediabias =3.83 if country==233
replace mediabias =3.48 if country==440
replace mediabias =2.86 if country==191
replace mediabias =2.65 if country==642
replace mediabias =3.48 if country==100
replace mediabias =3.48 if country==203
replace mediabias =3.32 if country==705
replace mediabias =1.01 if country==112
replace mediabias =3.51 if country==643
replace mediabias =1.18 if country==643
replace mediabias =1.83 if country==688
```

generate polarization =0

```
replace polarization = 2 if country==8
replace polarization = 1 if country==616
replace polarization = 1 if country==348
replace polarization = 3 if country==233
replace polarization = 4 if country==440
replace polarization = 1 if country==191
replace polarization = 2 if country==642
replace polarization = 2 if country==642
replace polarization = 2 if country==100
replace polarization = 1 if country==203
replace polarization = 1 if country==705
replace polarization = 2 if country==705
replace polarization = 2 if country==703
replace polarization = 4 if country==643
replace polarization = 1 if country==643
```

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v276\_r\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections || country: v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v276\_r\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered

bysort country: regress v142 v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259 v261 v276\_r v71 v102 v184 v204 gov\_oppos\_dummy

drop if v143<1

mixed v143 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered
age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered
v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered
gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization ||
country: gov\_oppos\_dummy

#### 8. Imputation, centering and multilevel model for Western countries

```
drop if country==8
drop if country==616
drop if country==348
drop if country==233
drop if country==440
drop if country==191
drop if country==642
drop if country==100
drop if country==203
drop if country==705
drop if country==112
drop if country==703
drop if country==643
drop if country==688
drop if country==31
drop if country==51
drop if country==268
```

```
drop if v8<1
drop if v38<1
drop if v39<1
drop if v226<1
generate age dummy=0
replace age dummy=1 if v226>1971
drop if v243 EISCED <0
drop if v243 EISCED>7
drop if v259<1
replace v261=. if v261<1
replace v71=. if v71<1
replace v102=. if v102<1
replace v184=. if v184<1
replace v204=. if v204<1
replace v204=. if v204>2
replace v174 cs=. if v174 cs<1
generate gov oppos dummy=0
replace gov oppos dummy=. if v174 cs==.
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==4001
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==4002
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==20803
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==20807
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==20808
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==24601
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==24602
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==25008
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==25009
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==27601
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==27602
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==35201
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==35205
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==35207
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==38005
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==57803
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==57804
```

```
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```

```
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==72402
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75201
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75207
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75601
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75602
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75603
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75604
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75605
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==75608
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==52801
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==52801
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==52807
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174_cs==82601
```

mi set mlong

- mi register imputed v261  $\,$
- mi register imputed v71  $\,$
- mi register imputed v102
- mi register imputed v184
- mi register imputed v204
- mi register imputed gov\_oppos\_dummy

mi impute chain (ologit, ascontinuous) v71 v102 v184 v204 v261 (logit, ascontinuous) gov\_oppos\_dummy= v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259, by(country) add (5) rseed(123)

misstable summarize

mi describe

mi misstable patterns

drop if v142<1

foreach var of varlist v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259 v261 v71 v102 v184 v204 gov\_oppos\_dummy {

egen double `var'\_gmean = mean(`var'), by(country)

gen `var' centered = (`var'-`var' gmean)

}

# generate clean\_elections=0 replace clean\_elections=0.9 if country==40 replace clean\_elections= 0.96 if country==208 replace clean\_elections=0.96 if country==246 replace clean\_elections=0.94 if country==250 replace clean\_elections=0.96 if country==276 replace clean\_elections=0.96 if country==352 replace clean\_elections=0.95 if country==380 replace clean\_elections= 0.97 if country==528 replace clean\_elections= 0.96 if country==578 replace clean\_elections= 0.96 if country==724 replace clean\_elections= 0.98 if country==752 replace clean\_elections= 0.95 if country==756 replace clean\_elections= 0.93 if country==826

```
generate civilsoc =0
replace civilsoc = 0.92 if country==40
replace civilsoc =0.96 if country==208
replace civilsoc =0.87 if country==246
replace civilsoc =0.94 if country==250
replace civilsoc =0.94 if country==276
replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==352
replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==380
replace civilsoc =0.96 if country==380
replace civilsoc =0.97 if country==528
replace civilsoc =0.97 if country==578
replace civilsoc =0.91 if country==752
replace civilsoc =0.96 if country==756
replace civilsoc =0.91 if country==826
```

#### generate mediabias =0

replace mediabias =3.31 if country==40 replace mediabias =3.88 if country==208 replace mediabias =3.49 if country==246 replace mediabias =3.83 if country==250

```
replace mediabias =3.69 if country==276
replace mediabias =3.33 if country==352
replace mediabias =3.36 if country==380
replace mediabias =3.66 if country==528
replace mediabias =3.86 if country==578
replace mediabias =3.31 if country==724
replace mediabias =3.62 if country==752
replace mediabias =3.75 if country==756
replace mediabias =3.64 if country==826
```

generate polarization =0

```
replace polarization =3 if country==40
replace polarization =4 if country==208
replace polarization =4 if country==246
replace polarization =1 if country==250
replace polarization =3 if country==276
replace polarization =4 if country==352
replace polarization =2 if country==380
replace polarization =2 if country==380
replace polarization =3 if country==528
replace polarization =3 if country==578
replace polarization =1 if country==724
replace polarization =3 if country==752
replace polarization =2 if country==756
replace polarization =2 if country==826
```

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization || country: v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered

#### drop if v143<1

mixed v143 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered
age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered
v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered
gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization ||
country: gov\_oppos\_dummy

bysort country: regress v142 v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259 v261 v71 v102 v184 v204 gov oppos dummy

9. Imputation, centering and multilevel model in the joint model

```
drop if country==31
drop if country==51
drop if country==268
drop if v8<1
drop if v38<1
drop if v39<1
drop if v226<1
generate age dummy=0
replace age dummy=1 if v226>1971
drop if v243 EISCED <0
drop if v243 EISCED>7
drop if v259<1
replace v261=. if v261<1
replace v71=. if v71<1
replace v102=. if v102<1
replace v184=. if v184<1
replace v204=. if v204<1
replace v204=. if v204>2
replace v174 cs=. if v174 cs<1
generate gov oppos dummy=0
replace gov oppos dummy=. if v174 cs==.
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==34802
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==34803
replace gov_oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==802
replace gov_oppos_dummy=1 if v174 cs==10001
replace gov oppos dummy=1 if v174 cs==10004
```

replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==10007
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	country==112
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11203
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11204
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11207
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11208
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11210
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11211
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11213
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=0	if	v174_cs==11214
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==19102
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==19103
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==19105
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20301
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20302
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==23302
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==23303
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==23304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==44006
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==44007
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==61601
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64201
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64206
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==64304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68801
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68807
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68810
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==68813
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70304
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70308
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70310
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70501
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70503
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==70504
replace	gov_oppos dummy=1	if	v174_cs==4001

replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==4002
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20803
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20807
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==20808
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==24601
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==24602
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==25008
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==25009
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==27601
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==27602
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==35201
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==35205
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==35207
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==38005
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==57803
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==57804
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==72402
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75201
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75207
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75601
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75602
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75603
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75604
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75605
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==75608
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==52801
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs==52807
replace	gov_oppos_dummy=1	if	v174_cs== 82601

mi set mlong
mi register imputed v261
mi register imputed v71
mi register imputed v102
mi register imputed v184
mi register imputed v204

mi register imputed gov oppos dummy

mi impute chain (ologit, ascontinuous) v71 v102 v184 v204 v261 (logit, ascontinuous) gov\_oppos\_dummy= v8 v38 v39 v225 age\_dummy v243\_EISCED v259, by(country) add (5) rseed(123)

misstable summarize

mi describe

mi misstable patterns

generate clean\_elections=0
replace clean\_elections=0.9 if country==40
replace clean\_elections= 0.96 if country==208
replace clean\_elections=0.96 if country==246
replace clean\_elections=0.94 if country==250
replace clean\_elections=0.96 if country==276
replace clean\_elections=0.96 if country==352
replace clean\_elections=0.95 if country==380
replace clean\_elections= 0.97 if country==528
replace clean\_elections= 0.96 if country==578
replace clean\_elections= 0.96 if country==724
replace clean\_elections= 0.98 if country==752
replace clean\_elections= 0.95 if country==756
replace clean\_elections= 0.93 if country==826

```
generate civilsoc =0
```

```
replace civilsoc = 0.92 if country==40
replace civilsoc =0.96 if country==208
replace civilsoc =0.87 if country==246
replace civilsoc =0.94 if country==250
replace civilsoc =0.87 if country==276
replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==352
replace civilsoc =0.96 if country==380
replace civilsoc =0.83 if country==528
replace civilsoc =0.97 if country==578
replace civilsoc =0.9 if country==724
```

```
replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==752
replace civilsoc =0.96 if country==756
replace civilsoc =0.91 if country==826
```

```
generate mediabias =0
```

```
replace mediabias =3.31 if country==40
replace mediabias =3.88 if country==208
replace mediabias =3.49 if country==246
replace mediabias =3.83 if country==250
replace mediabias =3.69 if country==276
replace mediabias =3.33 if country==352
replace mediabias =3.36 if country==380
replace mediabias =3.66 if country==528
replace mediabias =3.86 if country==578
replace mediabias =3.86 if country==578
replace mediabias =3.61 if country==724
replace mediabias =3.62 if country==752
replace mediabias =3.75 if country==756
replace mediabias =3.64 if country==826
```

```
generate polarization =0
replace polarization =3 if country==40
replace polarization =4 if country==208
replace polarization =4 if country==246
replace polarization =1 if country==250
replace polarization =3 if country==276
replace polarization =4 if country==352
replace polarization =2 if country==380
replace polarization =2 if country==528
replace polarization =1 if country==578
replace polarization =1 if country==724
replace polarization =2 if country==752
replace polarization =2 if country==752
replace polarization =2 if country==752
replace polarization =2 if country==756
replace polarization =2 if country==826
```

```
replace clean_elections=0.52 if country==8
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==616
replace clean_elections=0.77 if country==348
replace clean_elections=0.97 if country==233
replace clean_elections=0.91 if country==440
replace clean_elections=0.91 if country==191
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==642
replace clean_elections=0.75 if country==100
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==203
replace clean_elections=0.94 if country==705
replace clean_elections=0.95 if country==112
replace clean_elections=0.95 if country==703
replace clean_elections=0.32 if country==643
replace clean_elections=0.41 if country==688
```

replace civilsoc=0.79 if country==8 replace civilsoc =0.68 if country==616 replace civilsoc =0.5 if country==348 replace civilsoc =0.95 if country==233 replace civilsoc =0.79 if country==440 replace civilsoc =0.77 if country==191 replace civilsoc =0.75 if country==642 replace civilsoc =0.84 if country==100 replace civilsoc =0.91 if country==203 replace civilsoc =0.89 if country==705 replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==112 replace civilsoc =0.76 if country==703 replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==643 replace civilsoc =0.28 if country==643

replace mediabias =3.28 if country==8 replace mediabias =2.56 if country==616 replace mediabias =2.4 if country==348 replace mediabias =3.83 if country==233 replace mediabias =3.48 if country==440 replace mediabias =2.86 if country==191 replace mediabias =2.65 if country==642 replace mediabias =2.91 if country==100 replace mediabias =3.48 if country==203 replace mediabias =3.32 if country==705 replace mediabias =1.01 if country==112 replace mediabias =3.51 if country==703 replace mediabias =1.18 if country==643 replace mediabias =1.83 if country==688

```
replace polarization = 2 if country==8
replace polarization = 1 if country==616
replace polarization = 1 if country==348
replace polarization = 3 if country==233
replace polarization = 4 if country==440
replace polarization = 1 if country==191
replace polarization = 2 if country==642
replace polarization = 2 if country==642
replace polarization = 2 if country==100
replace polarization = 1 if country==203
replace polarization = 1 if country==705
replace polarization = 2 if country==705
replace polarization = 2 if country==703
replace polarization = 4 if country==643
replace polarization = 1 if country==643
```

```
generate East_West_dummy=0
```

replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==8
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==616
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==348
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==233
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==440
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==191
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==642
replace	East_West_dummy	=1	if	country==100

```
replace East_West_dummy =1 if country==203
replace East_West_dummy =1 if country==705
replace East_West_dummy =1 if country==112
replace East_West_dummy =1 if country==703
replace East_West_dummy =1 if country==643
replace East_West_dummy =1 if country==688
```

```
drop if v142<1
```

```
foreach var of varlist v8 v38 v39 v225 age_dummy v243_EISCED v259 v261 v71
v102 v184 v204 gov_oppos_dummy {
```

```
egen double `var'_gmean = mean(`var'), by(country)
```

```
gen `var' centered = (`var'-`var' gmean)
```

```
}
```

```
gen EmploymentxEast_West_dummy = v259*East_West_dummy
gen MarriagexEast_West_dummy = v71*East_West_dummy
gen Left_RightxEast_West_dummy = v102* East_West_dummy
gen ImmigrationxEast_West_dummy = v184* East_West_dummy
gen Gov_OpposxEast_West_dummy = gov_oppos_dummy* East_West_dummy
gen ControlxEast_West_dummy = v38* East_West_dummy
gen LifexEast_West_dummy = v39* East_West_dummy
gen IncomexEast West_dummy = v261* East West_dummy
```

foreach var of varlist EmploymentxEast\_West\_dummy MarriagexEast\_West\_dummy
Left\_RightxEast\_West\_dummy ImmigrationxEast\_West\_dummy
Gov\_OpposxEast\_West\_dummy ControlxEast\_West\_dummy LifexEast\_West\_dummy
IncomexEast\_West\_dummy {

egen double `var'\_gm = mean(`var'), by(country)
gen `var'\_cent = (`var'-`var'\_gm)

```
}
```

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered ControlxEast\_West\_dummy\_cent v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East West dummy || country: v38 centered mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered LifexEast\_West\_dummy\_cent v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East West dummy || country: v39 centered

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered IncomexEast\_West\_dummy\_cent v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East\_West\_dummy || country: v261\_centered

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered
age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered
EmploymentxEast\_West\_dummy\_cent v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered
v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections
civilsoc mediabias polarization East West dummy || country: v259 centered

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered MarriagexEast\_West\_dummy\_cent v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East\_West\_dummy || country: v71\_centered

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered Left\_RightxEast\_West\_dummy\_cent v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East West\_dummy|| country: v102\_centered

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered
age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered
v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered ImmigrationxEast\_West\_dummy\_cent
v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias
polarization East\_West\_dummy || country: v184\_centered

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered Gov\_OpposxEast\_West\_dummy\_cent clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East West dummy || country: gov oppos\_dummy

mixed v142 v8\_centered v39\_centered v38#East\_West\_dummy v225\_centered
age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered
v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered
gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization ||
country: v38

margins v38#East\_West\_dummy

## marginsplot

mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39#East\_West\_dummy v225\_centered age dummy centered v243 EISCED centered v259 centered v261 centered

v71\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization || country: v39 margins v39#East\_West\_dummy marginsplot mixed v142 v8\_centered v38\_centered v39\_centered v102#East\_West\_dummy v225\_centered age\_dummy\_centered v243\_EISCED\_centered v259\_centered v261\_centered v71\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization || country: v102 margins v102#East\_West\_dummy marginsplot

mixed v143 v38\_centered v39\_centered v102\_centered v184\_centered v204\_centered gov\_oppos\_dummy\_centered Gov\_OpposxEast\_West\_dummy\_cent clean\_elections civilsoc mediabias polarization East\_West\_dummy || country: gov oppos dummy

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