

Petra Vručina

**THE ROLE OF TRUST IN ADMINISTERING THE INCOMES OF
THE ZAGREB CHAPTER (1466-1499)**

MA Thesis in Late Antique, Medieval and Early Modern Studies

Central European University

Budapest

June 2020

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(Croatia)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies,
Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU.

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I, the undersigned, **Petra Vručina**, candidate for the MA degree in Late Antique, Medieval and Early Modern Studies, declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

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Abstract

In Medieval Slavonia, one of the most prominent Church institutions was the Zagreb chapter. It established a complex economic system around its three land estates and other incomes such as the tithe. This thesis deals with the question of the efficiency of the administration of the incomes of the Zagreb chapter focusing on the episcopate of Bishop Oswald Túz (1466-1499) because this was the period when the bishopric was on the peak of its economic development in the Middle Ages. The research is conducted by applying the interdisciplinary method—using the concept of trust. Besides researching how the trust-relation between Oswald and King Matthias Corvinus influenced the economic system, the thesis also examines in what way the collection was impacted by the trust-relation created with the subjects, that is the tenant peasants as well as those who considered the Zagreb chapter as their religious authority. The main argument is that creating trust relations is a prerequisite for ensuring the profitability of the pre-modern economic system and that the distribution of trust and distrust can tell us much about its functioning. This latter is researched through the question of the relation between the corporate identity of the chapter and the administration of incomes; through the question of the lease of tithes; and finally, the relation of the landholding system towards the market towns.

Acknowledgements

There is a long way from transforming an idea into reality—into a thesis. Had it not been for Katalin Szende and Balázs Nagy who put their trust in me and supervised it, it would not have been possible. They were the kindest, the most helpful and critical supervisors I could have asked for, even against all odds of having the coronavirus crisis and the transfer of the University to Vienna. This thesis would also not have looked the same without Zsuzsa Reed's help in improving my English as well as the opportunity to learn the skill of making maps in GIS, for which I am grateful to Viktor Lagutov. For the moral support, I am most thankful both to the new friends I made in Budapest, and to those I have in Croatia.

My CEU adventure would also not have been possible without Mladen Ančić who encouraged me to apply in the first place, and whose work is my greatest inspiration in pursuing (medieval) history. His most special lectures, hardly explicable with words, prompted me much into thinking about the purpose of history at all, which would be, in my understanding and a simplified one, creating valid fictions that keep together the society/ies. A cause worth enough to participate in. In this place, I also have to thank my former professor Tomislav Popić, who convinced me that every good history requires good theory. Last, but not least, I am grateful to Marko Jerković, who introduced me to the history of the Zagreb chapter. This institution has a special meaning for me since for the most of my life I was living in Nova Ves street, that was in the past one of the chapter's market towns situated close to the Zagreb cathedral.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents who believed in me even in times I very much doubted myself. Thank you for all your sacrifice and support.

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Introduction

Even a cursory look at the fifteenth-century map of Slavonia depicting land estates (Fig. 1), reveals important facts related to the economic history of this region. The first fact is that this medieval region consisted of numerous landed properties. The second is that, in this mosaic, one institution nevertheless prevails as an owner—the Church. Further on, among those Church estates colored in purple, the two most prominent ecclesiastical owners were the bishop of Zagreb and the Zagreb chapter.

The Bishopric of Zagreb was founded at the end of the eleventh century, at a time riddled with political power-struggles. Since the Croatian kingdom at that time did not manage to elect a new king, the Hungarian king, Ladislaus I, seized the opportunity and founded this bishopric as a means of enforcing political influence. Ultimately, this was a successful enterprise for him because it led to the formation of the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom. Even though there is no foundation charter preserved, it is assumed that the chapter existed alongside the bishop from the beginning of the foundation of the bishopric. What is known, though, is that in the formative period, the bishop and the chapter acted as one body and had communal incomes.¹ This changed in the second part of the twelfth century when the chapter and the bishop divided their *mensa*, or the overall incomes.² From that period the Zagreb cathedral chapter governed its possessions autonomously, and by the middle of the fourteenth century created three more or less homogenous property units—around Zagreb, around Sisak, and

¹ About the beginnings of Zagreb cathedral chapter: Marko Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću: institucionalna i društvena povijest katedralne zajednice* [The canons of Zagreb in the 14th century: institutional and social history of the cathedral community] (Zagreb: Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb, 2018), 27-30.

² Marko Jerković, “Uprava Zagrebačkog kaptola nad sisačkim vlastelinstvom od 1215. godine do sredine 14. stoljeća” [The management of the Zagreb chapter over Sisak estate from 1215 until the middle of the 14th century], in *Antiquam fidem – Radovi sa znanstvenoga skupa. Sisak, 3.-5. prosinca 2010.*, ed. Spomenka Jurić and Darko Tepert (Zagreb: Glas koncila, 2011), 152-154.




Figure 1. Land estates in Medieval Slavonia³




Figure 2. Estates of the Zagreb chapter in the second half of the fifteenth century

³ All the maps in the thesis I made in QGIS program with the help of Pál Engel's map: *Magyarország a középkor végén: Digitális térkép és adatbázis a középkori Magyar Királyság településeiről* [Hungary in the Late Middle Ages: Digital vector map and attaching database about the settlements and landowners of medieval Hungary]. CD-ROM. Budapest, 2001.

around Varaždinske Toplice. Apart from the incomes stemming from these estates, Zagreb chapter also had a right to levy the tithes from a broader part of Slavonia. Thus, the chapter's three estates (Fig. 2) and the area from which it exacted the tithes, present the geographical scope of this thesis.

The tendency towards a more uniform administration over the above-mentioned estates is best attested in the Chapter Statutes that were compiled and written in the span of twenty years, more precisely in 1334-1354 by one of the members of the chapter, Archdeacon John of Gorica.⁴ The Statutes remain the most valuable source for reconstructing the economic system of the chapter. Consisting of four parts, the Statutes describe the structure of the estates, the collection of the incomes, its privileges, the internal hierarchy of the chapter; as well as its religious practices, and many other things.

While in the Statutes the three main estates are denoted as *comitates*, in the fifteenth-century charters they are usually known as *provinciae*, which leads us more to the temporal scope of the thesis—the period of Bishop Oswald Túz (1466-1499).⁵ His authority over the bishopric proved as a beneficial one, which consequently, had a beneficial impact for the Zagreb chapter as well. In the second half of the fifteenth century the economic system that the chapter administered, functioned neatly. This is proven by the rich collection of expensive liturgical objects from that period, and the architecture as well.⁶ However, the influence of the episcopal government on the efficiency of chapter's economy is only one part of the answer. In order to answer one of the research questions of this thesis, which is how the chapter

⁴ The Statutes were transcribed and published by Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić at the end of the nineteenth century: Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić, ed., *Povijesni spomenici Zagrebačke biskupije: Monumenta historica episcopatus Zagrabienensis*, vol. 2 (Zagreb: Car. Albrecht, 1874) [Henceforth: MHEZ 2].

⁵ Although the analysis will exceed this periodization when needed. For the terms *comitatus* and *provincia* see e.g. pt 1, ch 33 in MHEZ 2, 31; and nos 1 and 23 in Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," [The 15th century charters of Zagreb chapter from the red book] *Starine JAZU* XI (1879): 23, 39.

⁶ Lelja Dobronić, *Renesansa u Zagrebu* [Renaissance in Zagreb] (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 1994).

managed to administer its incomes in an efficient way, the present thesis applies the concept of trust.

Among the historians dealing in theory and in practice with this concept, the most prominent one is the British historian Geoffrey Hosking. According to him, trust is defined as an attachment to a certain person, persons or institution. Moreover, Hosking maintains that this attachment qualifies as a belief that the person, persons or institutions would work in the future in the benefit of the one who is attached.⁷ Besides Hosking's definition, another useful theoretical explanation of this concept, more precisely of the vocabulary related to it, is explained by Australian sociologist Jack Barbalet. Barbalet distinguishes "trust" from "confidence". Thus, according to him, trust is formed primarily between people, while the confidence entails a "feeling or belief about a state of affairs or an event". Also, while the first works in terms of dyadic relations, the second one works in terms of triadic relations, such as reputation.⁸

The application of the concept of trust is justified by the fact that the former researches related to the economic system of Zagreb chapter in Croatian historiography have not yielded satisfying conclusions about the functioning of the chapter's economic system. Recently, Marko Jerković dealt extensively with the estates and incomes of the Zagreb chapter but he did not question more thoroughly the relationship between the chapter and the tenant peasants as well as the process of the monetization of the estates.⁹ Also, even though he applied the concept

⁷ Geoffrey Hosking, *Trust: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 28.

⁸ Jack Barbalet, "The Experience of Trust: Its Content and Basis", in *Trust in Contemporary Society*, ed. Masamichi Sasaki (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2019), 20-23.

⁹ Marko Jerković, "Uprava Zagrebačkog kaptola nad sisačkim vlastelinstvom od 1215. godine do sredine 14. stoljeća"; "Rijeka Sava i Zagrebački kaptol u razvijenome srednjem vijeku" [River Sava and the Zagreb chapter in the high Middle Ages], in *Rijeka Sava u povijesti – Zbornik radova znanstvenog skupa održanog u Slavonskom Brodu 18-19. listopada 2013.*, ed. Branko Ostajmer (Slavonski brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2015), 143-157; "Kaptolski Sisak u srednjem vijeku: Društvo, gospodarstvo, posjedi" [Chapter's Sisak in the Middle Ages: Society, economy and estates], in *Kaptolski Sisak 1215.-2015.: Zbornik radova sa skupa Kaptolski Sisak 1215.-2015. održanoga u Sisku 19. rujna 2015. godine*, ed. Hrvoje Kekez and Stipica Grgić (Zagreb; Sisak: Sisačka biskupija, Stolni kaptol Svetog križa u Sisku, Hrvatsko katoličko sveučilište, Hrvatski studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2017), 9-27.

of corporativism in his research of the canons of Zagreb chapter in the fourteenth century, he did not entirely explain all the impacts that corporativism had on the economic system.¹⁰ Another valuable reconstruction of the Zagreb chapter estate that Radovan Gajer made, has a flaw that it is based almost completely on a normative source—on the Chapter Statutes, which renders the image of the estates and their administration rather static although in reality, it was flexible.¹¹ The only historian in Croatian historiography who dealt with the subject of the operation of the seigneuries and the relations between the tenant peasants and their landlords in a comprehensive way is Josip Adamček. However, his Marxist approach assumed a negative stance towards “feudal lords”. Adamček presented them more or less as “exploiters” of their subjects, the peasants or so-called serfs.¹² The aim of this thesis is to thus to re-examine the question of the relations between the Zagreb chapter and its subjects, the question of the organization and the monetized practices in the economic system of the Zagreb chapter by introducing an anthropological and sociological approach.

This approach in researching the relations between landlords and their subjects has already been introduced in historiography. Independently of one another, the American anthropologist James C. Scott and the Austrian historian Otto Brunner both argued that the relations between the lord and his subjects were founded on reciprocity. On the one hand, the lords extracted incomes from their subjects, but, on the other, the subjects had expectations of protection, especially in time of crises.¹³ Besides the above-mentioned seigneurial reciprocity or the “moral economy”, to use Scott’s terminology, another type of trust that needs to be

¹⁰ Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću*.

¹¹ Radovan Gajer, “Posjedi zagrebačkog kaptola oko Zagreba u prvoj polovici 14. st.” [The estates of Zagreb chapter in the first half of the 14th century], *Radovi Instituta za hrvatsku povijest Sveučilišta u Zagrebu* 11 (1978): 5-102;

¹² Josip Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi u Hrvatskoj od sredine XV do kraja XVII stoljeća* [The agrarian relations in Croatia from the middle of the 15th until the end of the 17th century] (Zagreb, Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1980).

¹³ Otto Brunner, *'Land' and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria*, trans. by. Howard Kaminsky and James Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 341-364; James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1976).

considered in the case of the Zagreb chapter is the so-called “sacred trust”. One of the questions what some previous church historians raised was how the Church, which propagated humility and obedience, poverty, and modesty, acted in complete contrast to these values and owned the most property in the Middle Ages? One of the answers that were extracted from the resolutions of church councils is that this was possible due to “sacred trust”—people believed that money and material assets were needed by the Church to maintain its activities.¹⁴ More recently, a group of economists applied the public choice theory in order to answer this question. The public choice theory postulates that behind almost every human choice, an economic motivation can be ascertained. Therefore, they argue that in the Middle Ages the Church was also driven by profit motivation.¹⁵ The fact that the Church monopolized the position of a mediator between God and the people, but also provided an administrative framework for the secular government explains how the practice of donating money and other movable or immovable property to the Church became customary in the Middle Ages.¹⁶

In this sense, a rather impalpable and ambiguous concept like trust, defined by Hosking as a feeling, motivation and relationship, can be utilized for the study of the administration of the incomes of the Zagreb chapter.¹⁷ The main argument of this thesis is that trust is an essential part of efficient economic systems, but also that certain types of trust and distrust can tell us much about its functioning.¹⁸ The argument of the thesis is developed through researching, in the first chapter, the trust relations with the external power—the state. Thus, this chapter

¹⁴ John Thomas Gilchrist, *The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 1-10.

¹⁵ Robert B. Ekelund et al., *Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm*, Oxford University Press (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-6.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, 5.

¹⁷ Hosking, *Trust: A History*, 27-28. For a very successful application of this concept see: Katalin Szende, *Trust, Authority, and the Written Word in the Royal Towns of Medieval Hungary* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018).

¹⁸ Which is basically a narrowed argument of what Hosking stated. According to him “the manner in which trust works in any given society is vital to the understanding of most social phenomena”. In his article Hosking e.g. gives an example how the concept of trust can help in understanding the Russian inability to conform with the Western modern national state, which is according to Hosking due to the so-called “joint responsibility”—specific way of functioning of the local communities. Geoffrey Hosking, “Trust and distrust: a suitable theme for historians?,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 16 (2006): 95-115.

revolves around the question of the imposition of the tithes, which was possible only with the help of the political forces. It also provides an insight into the context in which the Zagreb chapter acted in the period of Oswald Túz and Matthias Corvinus. The next chapter tackles the problem of creating trust relations on the level of organization of the collection of incomes. It examines the role of corporativism, and the question of increasing confidence in the efficiency of agricultural production via compiling inventories. Lastly, it researches the introduction of the concept of urban autonomies into the landholding economy in the case of the chapter's market towns. The third chapter introduces the above-mentioned concept of reciprocity in researching the question of how the Zagreb chapter built its trust relationship with its subjects as well as what consequences this had on its economic system.

Besides analyzing the above-mentioned Chapter Statutes, other sources include the inventories of tithes,¹⁹ and the so-called Red Book (*Liber Rubeus*) which was a kind of appendix to the Statutes, compiled throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and partly in the seventeenth century.²⁰ Along with these sources, the documents analyzed in the thesis are administrative charters issued either by the very chapter or by the king and the regional officials.²¹ From the methodological point of view, the goal of this thesis is to approach the case study of the economic system of the Zagreb chapter in an interdisciplinary way—by applying the concept of trust. By examining one case study, my intention is to construct a more general image of the operation of medieval economic systems. As has already been raised in historiography, generalizations and theory can often be misleading.²² However, I still believe

¹⁹ The Archive of the Zagreb Chapter, fond Acta Capituli Antiqua [Henceforth KAZ, ACA].

²⁰ Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić transcribed only part of this codex which has altogether more than 260 folios. See: “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola”. The codex is kept in the Archive of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts under signature II-c-49 [Henceforth AHZU II-c-49]. The numeration of the folios in this codex has not been unified, thus it is not possible to refer to it. Another aggravating issue is that it is not compiled in a chronological order which is why it is difficult to use it.

²¹ Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić, ed., *Povijesni spomenici slobodnog i kraljevskog grada Zagreba: Monumenta historica liberae et regiae civitatis Zagrabensis*, vols 2-3 (Zagreb: Car. Albrecht, 1894-1896) [Henceforth: MCZ].

²² John Hatcher, and Mark Bailey, *Modelling the Middle Ages: The History and Theory of England's Economic Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9.

that only these can bring new questions and new perspectives in researching and understanding the past (as much as the present) societies. Also, as Hatcher and Bailey affirmed, whether the theory is helpful is not so much up to the theory as it is up to the historian.²³ Another methodological particularity of this thesis is applying the geographic information system (GIS) in the second chapter in order to visualize the statistical data extrapolated from two inventories of tithes from the Glavnica tithe district. Among several possible choices, this district enabled more thorough analysis.

Even though it is possible to ask new questions from the past using theory, it is still important not to fall into a loophole of projecting modern categories into it. As the mentioned authors, Hatcher and Bailey remind us—history is a “foreign country”.²⁴ Thus, it is necessary to start from the fact that the category of “economy” in the Middle Ages did not exist in the sense that it does today. Medieval people did not calculate their gross domestic product, nor did they perceive the economy as a separate factor in managing the government over their estates.²⁵ This can be seen, for example, in the way in which the Chapter Statutes are compiled, and how the canons united and carried out various functions—liturgical, judicial, and administrative—which would then be related to the economy.²⁶ Starting from this point, starting from perceiving history as it was perceived by its contemporaries, it may be possible to arrive at informed conclusions about past economic systems.

²³ Ibid, 10.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Cf. József Laszlovszky, Balázs Nagy, Péter Szabó, and András Vadas, “Introduction: Hungarian Medieval Economic History: Sources, Research and Methodology,” in *The Economy of Medieval Hungary*, ed. József Laszlovszky, et al. (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2018), 1-3.

²⁶ Illustratively see the table of contents of the Statutes: MHEZ 2, 8-12.

Chapter 1. HOW TO RESTORE THE TITHES? THE CASE OF TRUST-RELATIONS BETWEEN MATTHIAS CORVINUS AND OSWALD TÚZ

1.1. The nomination of Oswald Túz as Zagreb bishop

From 1433 the revenues of Zagreb bishopric were gravely disrupted, which can be explained by the weak royal government in the period preceding Oswald Túz. More precisely, from the year 1433, the pope, the king, the regent Elizabeth, John Hunyadi, and the Cillei family were all trying to install their own candidates as the bishop of Zagreb. Even when a candidate was nominated by the pope, he could not administer the diocese fully because of the confrontations between the above-mentioned parties who imposed their right of patronage.²⁷ This chapter will examine in which way Matthias established again the influence of the Hungarian-Croatian king in the Zagreb diocese, and consequently impacted the processes related to the collection of the revenues, in this specific case—the tithes. The office of the Zagreb bishop was not a small honor because the bishopric of Zagreb was large and wealthy, therefore, the new bishop had to be carefully chosen.²⁸

When choosing state and ecclesiastic administrative dignitaries, one of Matthias Corvinus's strategies for establishing a stable government relied on his kinship and supporters.²⁹ In this regard, Matthias was almost an “absolutist” ruler since even the pope could not influence much the installment of bishops and archbishops in the Hungarian-Croatian

²⁷ Péter E. Kovács, “Hungary, the Ottomans and the Holy See (1437-1490),” in *A Thousand Years of Christianity in Hungary: Hungariae Christianae Millenium*, ed. István Zombori, Pál Cséfalvay, and Maria Antonietta de Angelis (Budapest: Hungarian Catholic Episcopal Conference, 2001), 71-72; Andrija Lukinović, “Benedikt de Zolio”; “Toma de Debrenthe”; “Demetrije Čupor”, in *Zagrebački biskupi i nadbiskupi*, ed. Franko Mirošević et al. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1995), 189-205.

²⁸ Cf. the annual income of the Zagreb bishopric in the comparison with the other Hungarian bishoprics in E. Fügedi, “Hungarian Bishops in the Fifteenth Century: (Some Statistical Observations),” *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 11, no. 1/4 (1965): 390.

²⁹ Pál Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary 895-1526* (London – New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 311-312; András Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex* (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2008), 7-22.

Kingdom under his rule.³⁰ The nomination of the Zagreb bishop, Oswald Túz, in 1466 is no exception.

Although even before he tried to take action, King Matthias became more involved in the Zagreb bishopric and exercised his *ius patronatus* over the bishopric in 1465, probably because a year before he had fought the Ottomans in Bosnia and established two banates there. Thus, since it was situated at a strategically delicate position in the south, near the new frontier with the Ottomans, it was crucial for Matthias to reinstate the order in the bishopric. In a 1465 letter to Pope Paul II concerning the investiture of the bishop of Zagreb, King Matthias explicitly refers to the Ottoman incursions.³¹ Another reason to concentrate his attention in the nomination of the new Zagreb bishop precisely at this moment was that after his coronation in 1464 Matthias wanted to get more involved in the West where his political ambitions lay, and for this he needed a stable hinterland.³²

The last stage of the electoral process of a new Zagreb bishop lasted from May 5, 1465, until April 1466. From the above-mentioned letter, we find out that by May 5, 1465, out of the three possible candidates two withdrew from the race for the bishop's office.³³ Just to show

³⁰ Matthias inherited this position concerning the pope's influence from Sigismund of Luxembourg. After the so-called Great Schism, Sigismund began to lead a more independent policy towards the pope. In 1406 he issued *Placetum regium*, according to which the papal bulls could not be applied without the consent of the Hungarian-Croatian king. Moreover, in 1417, in the Council of Constance, he issued a bull that proclaimed the utmost superiority of the right of patronage by the Hungarian-Croatian king. Even though the bull was later revoked by the popes, it gave Matthias a formal justification for using the right of the patronage. Péter Erdő, "The Papacy and the Kingdom of Hungary during the reign of Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387-1437)," in *A Thousand Years of Christianity in Hungary: Hungariae Christianae Millenium*, ed. István Zombori, Pál Cséfalvay, and Maria Antonietta de Angelis (Budapest: Hungarian Catholic Episcopal Conference, 2001), 63-68. In the case of Sigismund of Luxembourg, Bishop Eberhard played practically the same role as Oswald did at the time of King Matthias. See: Monika Đurak, *Zagrebački biskup Eberhard (1397.-1406.; 1410.-1419.): crkveno i političko djelovanje u vrijeme kralja Sigismunda Luksemburškoga* [Zagreb Bishop Eberhard (1397-1406; 1410-1419): The ecclesiastic and political agency in the time of King Sigismund of Luxembourg] (MA thesis, University of Zagreb, 2016). About the practice of nominating ecclesiastic dignitaries in the time of Matthias Corvinus: Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen*, 313.

³¹ "[...] *tum quia castra ipsa insultibus Turcorum vicina sunt, tum vero, quod multis adhucurbationibus manent obnoxia* [...]." No. 23 in Guilelmi Fraknoi (ed.). *Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia: Vatikáni magyar okirattár*, vol. 6 (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat nyomdája, 1891) [Henceforth: MVH 6]. 43. See about Matthias's military actions in Bosnia against the Ottomans: Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen*, 301.

³² Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen*, 302-304.

³³ No. 23 in MVH 6, 42, 43.

how complex the situation was, I will name them here. The first candidate was John Vitéz whom for some time Matthias had considered for the see of Zagreb but installed him rather as the archbishop of Esztergom.³⁴ The second candidate was Thomas of Döbrente, who himself gave up the race for the office even though he was appointed as Zagreb bishop between 1455 and 1461. He accepted to be transferred to the bishopric of Nitra.³⁵

The third candidate was the most problematic one. Demeter Csupor was for more than twenty years trying to obtain the position, but the Zagreb cathedral chapter opposed his claim. This is not surprising in the light of the fact that Demeter's family was known for violating the chapter estate Sisak and the fact that Demeter himself litigated with Zagreb cathedral's canons.³⁶ Even though Demeter was not accepted by the Zagreb cathedral chapter, he nevertheless acted as the Zagreb bishop including the period when he was not yet formally appointed. He had the support of the Hunyadi family, and John Vitéz, too, once he became the archbishop of Esztergom.³⁷

It seems that Matthias was not at all content with Demeter. He asked the pope in the above-mentioned letter to leave Demeter the title and the spiritual jurisdiction over the Zagreb bishopric as well as the possession of the castle of Garić and its estate, and an annual benefice of 1000 florins from the revenues of the bishopric of Zagreb. On the other hand, the control of the temporal sphere in the diocese, that is the revenues and assets, would be given to a

³⁴ As early as in 1462, Matthias wrote a letter to the pope suggesting that John Vitéz transfers to Zagreb diocese. No. 14 in MVH 6, 20.

³⁵ "[...] *Thomas etiam de Debrenthe, qui ipsius ecclesie Zagrabiensis titulum iure obtinuerat, de ecclesia Nitriensi, et de provisione secundum dispositionem quondam reverend domini Pii predecessoris sanctitatis vestre iam facta contentus maneat [...]*" No. 23 in MVH 6, 43. About Thomas's officeholding as Zagreb bishop see in Norbert C. Tóth, et al., *Magyarország világi archontológiája*, 55.

³⁶ Andrija Lukinović, "Demetrije Čupor", 193, 203; More about the family of Čupor: Zrinka Nikolić Jakus, "Obitelj Čupor Moslavački," [The Family Čupor of Moslavina] *Radovi zavoda za znanstvenoistraživački i umjetnički rad u Bjelovaru*, no. 4(2011): 288-291. For the chapter's discontent see also no. 5 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 26-27.

³⁷ Zrinka Nikolić Jakus, "Obitelj Čupor Moslavački," 290. Demeter's officeholding is attested from March 7, 1464, to November 7, 1465. Norbert C. Tóth, et al., *Magyarország világi archontológiája*, 55.

completely new person, unrelated to everything that was happening in the bishopric thus far—Oswald Túz, a cleric from Veszprém.³⁸

Oswald Túz was a relative of John Túz, a person who acted briefly as Matthias's first state treasurer (*thesaurarius*) in 1458. Further on, from 1465 John Túz acted as the Master of the Doorkeepers (*magister ianitorum regalium*), which was the time when Matthias searched for a person whom he could install as the Zagreb bishop.³⁹ Due to the fact that Matthias was familiar with John's work and loyalty, he probably chose John's relative as Zagreb bishop for those reasons. Additionally, it also seems that John Túz was familiar with the circumstances in Zagreb because one of his retainers, nobleman John Marathy, is attested as a person who was trying to enforce the paying of the tax *tricesima* in Gradec in August 1465. This tax was in the ownership of the king.⁴⁰

The pope, though, rejected this proposition and nominated Demeter as the Zagreb bishop in June 1465, likely because it was rather delicate matter to deprive Demeter of the office for which he had fought so long.⁴¹ From the next letter, we find out that Matthias pursued his will further: he accepted Demeter's request for some new benefices, after which Demeter withdrew from the position of Zagreb bishop. In the same letter, Matthias presented to the pope Oswald Túz as the new bishop of Zagreb, emphasizing that Oswald was his trusted man.⁴² Finally, the

³⁸ No. 23 in MVH 6, 43.

³⁹ John Túz was the Master of Doorkeepers from 1465 until 1470. For his offices see: Norbert C. Tóth, Richárd Horváth, Tibor Neumann, and Tamás Pálosfalvi, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 1458-1526*, vol 1, *Főpapok és bárók* [The secular archontology of Hungary, 1458-1526, vol 1, Prelates and barons] (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016), 108, 128.

⁴⁰ "[...] *quomodo nobilis vir Johannes Marathy, familiaris magnifici Johannis Thwzy de Laak, janitorum regalium magistri, per eundem Johannem Thwzy iuxta litteratorium mandatum regie serenitatis, qui ipsam civitatem [civitas montis Grecensis] ad manus regias occupasset, in eadem civitate ad exigendam tricesimam constitutes* [...]" No. 247 in MCZ 2, 305.

⁴¹ See note 12.

⁴² "[...] *sed ut legitimus patronus, nomino et presento beatitudini vestre ad prefatam ecclesiam promovendum venerabilem Osvaldum de Szentlaszlo clericum Veszprimiensis diocesis, virum Deo et hominibus gratum ac mihi fidelem* [...]" No. 52 in MVH 6, 73. My emphasis. Matthias's trust in Oswald may have developed also due to their small age difference. Matthias was born in February 1443, and Oswald in June 1438 (Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex*, 7; Stjepan Razum, "Oswald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," 208. Matthias's opinion of Demeter is the best illustrated by his own words: "[...] *si dominus Demetrius, homo fortassis probus, sed minus sufficiens et mihi ob multa merito suspectus* [...]" No. 52 in MVH 6, 72.

pope confirmed Oswald as a bishop of Zagreb on April 28, 1466, even though he did not reach the minimum age stipulated by canon law, i.e. 35 years.⁴³

The next document related to Oswald and the Zagreb bishopric is the one written in March 1467, in which Oswald invites all the clerics with distinguished positions in the Zagreb bishopric, including the members of the Zagreb chapter, to participate in the church synod (*synodalis congregatio*) at the end of April, in order to restore the conditions in the bishopric (*status ecclesiarum et persone ecclesiastice reformatur*).⁴⁴ The fact that Oswald convoked this synod from Buda and almost a year after he was appointed as a bishop indicates that he was probably informed in advance about what was happening in the bishopric. There is no evidence to support this, but Oswald was probably advised about the actions to be taken in order to restore the conditions in the Zagreb bishopric by the king or members of the royal council, in which he was a member; and most of all, by his relative, John Túz, who became the ban of Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia in 1466.⁴⁵

Another reason why it seems justifiable to argue that this takeover was carefully planned is that organizing synods was not common practice in the Zagreb bishopric.⁴⁶ Moreover, that this event was intended to have an impact on the bishopric is indicated also by the fact that clerics were threatened by excommunication (*sub exommunicacionis pena*) if they do not attend, which is raised in the second letter. This letter Oswald sent to the clerics of Zagreb in April 1467 postponing the synod due to his obligation to attend the royal council.⁴⁷ In addition, in this second letter he especially refers to the rectors of the parishes to participate in the synod,

⁴³ Stjepan Razum, "Oswald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," in *Zagrebački biskupi i nadbiskupi*, ed. Franko Mirošević et al. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1995), 209.

⁴⁴ No. 253 in MCZ 2, 310-312.

⁴⁵ John Túz was ban of Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia from 1466 until 1468. Norbert C. Tóth, et al., *Magyarország világi archontológiája*, 108.

⁴⁶ There are only assumptions, and no certifiable evidence about synods being organized during the episcopate of Augustin Kažotić (1303-1323). See: Janko Barle, *Naše diecezanske sinode* [Our diocesan synods] (Zagreb: Hrvatsko katoličko tiskovno društvo, 1913), 157-164.

⁴⁷ Oswald justifies the delay with the words: "[...] *tamen pluribus et arduis negociis nunc occurrentibus despensandis apud maiestatem regiam de suo mandato longiori quam sperabimus tempore nessesse habuimus occupari* [...]." The whole letter see in no. 254 in MCZ 2, 312-313.

which were not mentioned in the first letter. Since this group of clerics was the most problematic one, as will be shown below, the threat of excommunication was a guarantee that they would participate. This also raises the question if Oswald postponed the synod on purpose if he maybe deemed that the synod would not have been as effective if it occurred after the first invitation.

The synod that lasted for a few days and which Tkalčić called the “bloody synod” due to its violent circumstances took place at the beginning of May 1467, probably May 9, as Oswald’s second letter suggests. Immediately after it finished, the rectors of the parishes who participated in the synod, calling themselves “poor and oppressed” (*nos pauperes et oppressi plebani*) at one point, sent a letter to Pope Paul II about it. According to the rectors, Oswald was absent and appointed Stephen, bishop of Győr, to lead the synod. It seems also that he instructed laymen to supervise it, whom the rectors name as oppressors (*non tyrones sed tyranos in villipendium ac oppressionem tocius cleri in medium nostril destinavit*). The focus of the letter was mostly on the misdeeds that those nobles and dignitaries, among them the vice ban, made.

Once again, according to the rectors, the above-mentioned nobles and dignitaries sent their retainers in search for the priests who did not participate in the synod, and while doing so, they pillaged the vacant houses of those priests who were participating. On the last day the laymen attacked the clerics when they wanted to lock the doors of the cathedral where the synod was taking place, and some people were killed. And finally, the rectors complain about the “caritative fund” (*caritativum subsidium*) that the vice ban and the vicar of the temporal goods (*vicarius temporalis*) of the Zagreb bishopric allegedly tried to create for those rectors who

suffered the most in the attacks. The rectors were, among other things, requested to merge their tithes with the bishop's *mensa*, in other words, to give up their tithes.⁴⁸

Stjepan Razum found documents showing that the dispute concerning these tithes continued for several years after the synod, and the Cardinal of Spoleto was adjudicating it. There is no information about its outcome. However, even without that, it can be presumed that the synod was organized in such a way by Oswald himself. Oswald's absence only underpins this assumption since confronting the rectors directly would probably not have been as efficient. And, as Razum maintains, what indicated Oswald's involvement in this event, is the participation of the dignitaries, and the fact that only the rectors and no other clerics sent the letter to the pope.⁴⁹

If the main point of the synod was to restore the collection of the tithes, the next question is why the tithe was so important? In order to answer this, one needs to start from the beginning. Tithe (*decima*) is a peculiar tax. In general terms, it entailed a tenth of the agricultural and other products collected by the Church, that is, different religious institutions such as parishes, monasteries, chapters and bishops. The history of how it was imposed and distributed in the Middle Ages is a long and complex story and falls outside the purview of the present thesis.⁵⁰ What needs to be mentioned, though, is that in this period the tithe was an obligatory tax, and almost completely lost its initially voluntary character, which was the case when the tithes were first introduced in the Christian world. This was also the case in the Kingdom of Hungary-

⁴⁸ "*Decimas insuper colonorum et inquilinorum nostrorum nobis de iure et approbata antiqua consuetudine provenientes, abstrahentes, mense ipsius domini Oswaldi episcopi occupantes appropriaverunt, aliasque novitates, proprie tamen abusiones, invenientes, nos et universos clericos gravant et turbant [...]*". No. 256 in MCZ 2, 314-317. The letter of the rectors is paraphrased also by Stjepan Razum, and Tkalčić: Stjepan Razum, "Osvald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," 210-212; MCZ 2, cliv-clv.

⁴⁹ Stjepan Razum, "Osvald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," 212.

⁵⁰ More about this see in Catherine E. Boyd, *Tithes and Parishes in Medieval Italy: The Historical Roots of a Modern Problem* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), 26-46; John Eldevik, *Episcopal Power and Ecclesiastical Reform in the German Empire: Tithes, Lordship, and Community, 950-1150* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35-61.

Croatia.⁵¹ Additionally, the obligation is stressed by the fact that the peasants perceived them probably the same way as any other seignorial tax. Unlike the nobility that was excommunicated for not paying it, the peasants were given a fine for not telling the truth about the exact amount of their agricultural production.⁵² Despite being an obligatory tax, in the background of its imposition and collection there also stood something else—trust.

The imposition depended much on the political power. From the beginning, i.e. from the time when the bishopric was founded, it was the king who allocated the right to exact the tithes from the state revenues to the Zagreb bishop, who then bestowed part of it to the Zagreb chapter. Later, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the king of Hungary-Croatia was once again responsible for introducing the collection of the so-called “full tithe” (*decima plenaria* or *decima ex integro*). According to Lujo Margetić, until the first quarter of the fourteenth century, the church institutions in Slavonia collected the tithe only from certain agricultural products and the amount they collected, in reality, consisted only in 1/20 of the crops. From 1327, the Zagreb bishop, on the initiative and with the help of the Angevins, enforced—not without difficulties—the right to collect the full tithe in Slavonia from all agricultural products.⁵³

Besides the Zagreb bishop, the person who was the most involved in enforcing the exaction of the full tithes in Slavonia was Ban Mikac (1325-1343).⁵⁴ His charter of 1328 was the basis for regulating the collection of the tithe in Slavonia in general, which is why it was

⁵¹ The collection and paying the tithes was regularly discussed at every diet in the time of Matthias Corvinus. See: János M. Bak, Leslie S. Domonkos, Paul B. Harvey, Jr, Kathleen Garay, eds, *Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary (Decreta Regni Medievalis Hungariae) 1458–1490*, vol. 3 [Henceforth DRM3] (Los Angeles: Charles Schlacks, Jr., 1996), 1-68.

⁵² See pp. 19-20 of this thesis. In Italy the confusion whether the tithes were of spiritual or dominical character even led to a long legal dispute in the nineteenth century. See Boyd, *Tithes and Parishes in Medieval Italy*, 9-24.

⁵³ Lujo Margetić, “Pravna osnova crkvene desetine na hrvatskim pravnim područjima” [The legal basis of the church tithe in the different Croatian legal areas], in *Hrvatska i Crkva u srednjem vijeku*, ed. Lujo Margetić (Rijeka: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta, 2000), 31-42.

⁵⁴ About Ban Mikac and the way in which he helped King Charles Robert to impose his authority: Antun Nekić, *Oligarchs, King and Local Society: Medieval Slavonia 1301-1343* (MA thesis, Central European University, 2015), 26-27, 40-45, 50-59, 61-69.

confirmed by Louis I in 1346 and incorporated in the fourth part of the Chapter Statutes, the compilation of the most important privileges of the chapter. This charter defines in detail which agricultural products were to be tithed, and the monetary worth of the tithed products. For example, one tithed stack of wheat, rye, oats, barley, millet and spelt had to be payed until the feast of St Martin (November 11) in the monetary value of six ban's denars, where each denar has a worth of twelve bagatins. The price for a barrel (*cubulus*) of wine was determined according to the prices on the local market as well as the price of the tithed pork.⁵⁵

The Church, in this case, the Zagreb bishop and the chapter were given so much trust and authority regarding the collection of the tithes because the Church, in general, provided organizational and administrative support for the state.⁵⁶ Thus, for Matthias, relying on Oswald as the head of the Zagreb church was an indispensable element in governing the kingdom, which is why, as indicated, Oswald was a well-chosen candidate for the position of the bishop and the "bloody synod" was probably prepared with the knowledge of King Matthias and his state dignitaries.

Regarding the very tithes, the control over their exaction was important in the restoration of authority since besides being a considerable financial source, the tithes were also a visible sign of the authority as insightfully put forward by John Eldevik. And just because of this, according to Eldevik, the tithes were often the reason for disputes and continuous negotiations in society, or more specifically in the framework of a diocese.⁵⁷ Unlike in other states in

⁵⁵ "[...] *ut videlicet de singulis capeciis frumenti, siliginis, ordeï, avene, milli et alterius milli borkules wlgariter dicti, ac surgonis, usque festum beati Martini confessoris persolvantur sex denarii boni banales, quorum singuli valeant duodecim parvulos bagatinos, et pro singulis cubulis vini decimalibus denarii iidem, prout vinum in novo in villis maioribus communiter valebit [...]. Decimas autem porcorum annualim et infra, qui videlicet alias decimati non fuerunt, in specie vel cum denariis, secundum quod tempore dicacionis valet, decrevit persolvendas [...].*" Pt 4, ch. 1 in MHEZ 2, 100-103.

⁵⁶ Cf. Ekelund et al., *Sacred Trust*, 3, 25-26. The support the Zagreb bishop could offer was in the first place of a military nature since the bishop had a right and a duty to gather a *banderium* (Stjepan Razum, "Oswald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," 217. As for the chapter, it acted as an important administrative institution—as a place of authentication (*locus credibilis*) Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću*, 275-348.

⁵⁷ Eldevik, *Episcopal Power and Ecclesiastical Reform*, 15-17, 28.

Medieval Europe, in Slavonia, the rectors of the parishes did not have the right to collect tithes, except for the parishes that were in the secular ownership or holding a special privilege. According once again to Margetić who quoted Schmid's research, the rectors had the right of a tax in kind or in money, which was independent of the tithe.⁵⁸ It is, therefore, not surprising that Oswald wanted to restore the appropriated tithes and it is questionable how really old was the tradition that the rectors refer to: "*de iure et approbata antiqua consuetudine provenientes*".⁵⁹ Except for his efforts to return the right of the collection of tithes from the rectors to the bishop, Oswald was trying to subject the nobility to admit him this right as well.

As conveyed by Adamček, already at the Slavonian diet of 1466, King Matthias adjudicated the dispute between the bishop and the Slavonian nobility concerning the mode of paying the tithe, most of all the commutation and the monetary amounts of different tithes. According to Adamček, negotiations regarding this continued throughout the whole period of Oswald's episcopate. Oswald usually managed to regulate the collection of the tithe in his favor, but it all changed when Wladislaus II was chosen as a new king in 1490.⁶⁰ More problematic than the mode of the payment was, though, the nobles who refused to pay the tithes altogether. Once again, according to Adamček, such was the situation with the counts and the

⁵⁸ Lujó Margetić refers to Schmid's study "Die Grundzüge und Grundlagen der Entwicklung des kirchliche Zehnrrechts auf kroatischem Boden während des Mittelalters," [The basics and foundations of the development of the Church's right to tithe on the area of Croatia during the Middle Ages] *Šišićev zbornik* (Zagreb: Tiskara C. Albrecht, 1929) in "Pravna osnova crkvene desetine na hrvatskim pravnim područjima", 23. The charter that purports their argument is taken from no. 383 in ed. Tadija Smičiklas et al., *Codex diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, vol. 13 (Zagreb: JAZU/HAZU, 1905–1990, vol. 1: 1967) [Henceforth: CD], 528-530: "[...] *facti et usque ad hec tempora in dicta ecclesia et diocese Zagrabiensi inviolabiter observati, in quo continetur, quod ecclesia parochialis centum cubulos seu saponos blade uel eciam parochianos populos habens deberet contentari [...]*." On the other hand, according to Neven Budak who quoted Zlatko Herkov, the parishes in Zagorje had a right to keep only 1/16 or 1/8 of the collected tithe. Budak, *Gradovi Varaždinske županije u srednjem vijeku* [The towns in the County of Varaždin] (Zagreb – Koprivnica: Dr. Feletar, 1994), 67. That the parishes certainly did not collect most of the tithe for themselves is also purported by the inventories of tithes where we often come across the subjects of the rectors who gave the tithes directly to the chapter. See e.g.: KAZ, ACA, fasc. 78, no. 8 (Glavnica, 1474). The exception is the parishes that were given a special status, for instance, Nova Ves. When the parish Nova Ves was founded in 1347, the chapter bestowed a certain plot of land to it as well as the grain tithe that came from this land. See no. 293 in CD XI, 387. About collecting the tithes in other European countries that was attached with the parishes: Ekelund et al., *Sacred Trust*, 29-30.

⁵⁹ No. 256 in MCZ 2, 314-317.

⁶⁰ Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 76-79.

nobility from Zagorje, the counts from Blagaj, the nobility and the citizens from the county of Varaždin, the counts of Zrin, and magnate Nicholas Újlaki. Whether with the help of the excommunication threat or legal disputes, all of them, in the end, succumbed to paying the tithes.⁶¹

1.2. The Zagreb chapter and the tithe in the period of Oswald Túz

The Zagreb bishop and the chapter did not share their incomes and acted more or less as independent institutions.⁶² The restored authority in the bishopric, nevertheless, had a significant impact on the collection of the incomes, especially exacting the tithes in the Zagreb chapter. This was due to the fact that the bishop had a kind of symbolic power as the head of the Zagreb church, that is his weakened authority would have encouraged the nobility even more to appropriate the Church property—both the bishop's and the chapter's, which happened in the period 1433-1466.

Thus, what is noticeable during Oswald's strong episcopal government is that the collection of the tithes was improved which is testified by the new regulations that were then stipulated. The regulations are not directly related to Oswald, meaning that he did not confirm them, nor is there any evidence that he initiated them. However, the overall context was favorable for the chapter to introduce changes, or to put into writing already existing innovations in the organization of the collection of the tithes. These stipulations were the first innovations since the Chapter Statutes were compiled in 1334/1354.

The first important charter mentioning the tithes, more precisely the collection of the wine tithe and the pork tithe was issued in 1470, and it describes the privileges of the chapter

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² The institution of the Zagreb bishop and the chapter was connected inasmuch as the bishop's vicars were sometimes the canons of Zagreb chapter. Cf. Stjepan Razum, "Oswald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," 215-216. However, the tithe districts were completely divided. Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 80-87.

estate Sisak.⁶³ Regarding the tithes, the focus was on fines, more precisely, the charter prohibited the sale of more than four pigs before the collection of the tithes without the knowledge of the chapter official.⁶⁴ The Statutes (1334/1354) also addressed the issue of fines, but it was concerning the case when the tenants concealed the number of their pigs.⁶⁵ The fact that the canons felt the need to incorporate these statements suggests that the tenants sometimes tried to avoid losing their agricultural products to tithing.⁶⁶ The passage cited above also tells us that pigs were highly marketable, and that the chapter was trying to control—it seems—the growing sales of the tenants' pigs on the Sisak estate. The same is evident with the wine since this stipulation regulates also the period when the tenants were allowed to sell their wine, which was during Lent. Otherwise, the wine would be confiscated.⁶⁷

Further on, in 1475 the Chapter issued a detailed charter on how the collection of the tithes from its tithe district Zagorje should be conducted.⁶⁸ This is a rather important stipulation because this is the only example for the collection of a tithe in the district that was not situated on the chapter estate. Additionally, this stipulation probably relates to an undated letter that the Chapter sent to Matthias Corvinus, complaining about, among other things, some noblemen from Zagorje who appropriated the tithes.⁶⁹ This letter was probably written later (soon after 1486) than the stipulation was issued but it can be assumed that the appropriation in the tithe district Zagorje was happening already at the time when the charter of 1475 was compiled: at

⁶³ No. 23 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 42-44.

⁶⁴ "Item, volumus, quod nullus ex dictis iobagionibus nostris usque ad dicacionem porcorum, preter scitum et voluntatem comitis nostri aut wayuode, ultra quatuor porcos in fraudem domini nostri sub ammissione omnium porcorum suorum etiam in qualicumque necessitate vendere valeat." No. 23 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 42.

⁶⁵ [...] *negantes autem porcos, vel res alias decimales, puniuntur in novem partibus negatorum [...]*." Pt 1, ch. 53 in MHEZ 2, 46-47.

⁶⁶ Cf. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Joseph Goy, *Tithe and Agrarian History from the Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Comparative History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 26-27.

⁶⁷ "Ubi vero aliquis sub huiusmodi deputato tempore occulte vel manifeste et in contrarium premissorum aliqua vina propinaret, extunc talia vina in fraudem premissorum propinata occupentur per spanum et vayvodam aut villicum [...]" No. 23 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 43.

⁶⁸ No. 29 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 47-51.

⁶⁹ The noblemen were *comes Bernardinus* and certain *Andreas Kreygar*. No. 319 in MCZ 2, 401. The letter could not have been written before 1473. See the note 83 of this thesis.

the very beginning this charter states who was obliged to pay the tithes and who was exempted. The exempted ones were the hereditary counts, the nobles termed as *universi nobiles*, certain officials named *valpoti*, an official known as *banovec*, and the heralds (*precones*) from some of the villages. The listed officials were exempted because they also participated in the collection of the tithes, that is, they monitored if the chapter's tithe collectors (*decimatores*) appropriated something. Thus, for instance before the *decimator* started to collect, that is to tap the tithed wine, he had to deposit one golden florin to the *banovec*, and another to the community.⁷⁰ On the other hand, the job of the *valpot*, usually a nobleman, was to supervise the tithing process.⁷¹

Concerning the tithe district Zagorje, there was another case needing regulation. In 1494 the Chapter and the parish rector in Krapina (*plebanus de Crapina*) made a deal concerning the lease of tithes in this parish.⁷² This was an unusual situation since as previously shown, the parish priests did not have a right to collect the tithe, or at least not the full tithe.⁷³ The somewhat special position of this parish goes all the way to the beginning of the fourteenth century (1311) when the chapter litigated with the rector of Krapina because he appropriated the tithe. The verdict went in the chapter's favor, but the very fact that the compiler of the Statutes put it there probably means that the Chapter was having troubles with this rector from time to time.⁷⁴ This is not so strange since Krapina in the Middle Ages was for most of the time not subjugated to the landholders but had more independent status of a royal market town.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ "*Item statuimus; quod antequam incipiat distrahere aut educillare decimator, deponat unum florenum ad manus banowecz, tamquam ad manus communes, quo facto si distraxerit aut educillaverit et plus invenerit quam is cuius foret assererit, extunc superfluum libere recipiet decimator, et banowecz florenum apud se depositum eidem decimatori sine difficultate aliquali restituat.*" No. 29 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 48.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² No. 69 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 73. A similar deal was made also in 1451: no. 199 in MHEZ VII, 207.

⁷³ See note 58 of this thesis.

⁷⁴ Pt 1, ch. 59 in MHEZ 2, 58-59.

⁷⁵ See more: Budak, *Gradovi Varaždinske županije u srednjem vijeku*, 32-33, 49-51, 142.

Finally, the chapter stipulated a number of regulations concerning the lease of the tithes in the period of Oswald Túz. The first one of 1478 defines the monetary currencies in which the tithe can be leased: golden florin, and if not that, then a type of money called *moneta nigra* in the value of 6 and a half *pensarum*. If neither, then in the regal money (*moneta regali*) in the amount of one hundred. If in *solidis*, then the amount should be 96, and if in the money called *merculini*, its worth should be 6 *pensarum* and 8 *merkethorum*, which is 25 *grossorum*.⁷⁶

Further on, the stipulation of 1483 states which canon has the right to get a lease of the chapter estate Toplica first for that year: the priority went to the canon who deposited 400 florins.⁷⁷ The next regulation of 1487 stipulates the date of presenting the inventories of the tithes in the sacristy for the previous year, which is a week after the chapter's annual assembly (August 10).⁷⁸ This was, however, changed in 1490 when the chapter concluded that the inventories should be presented every time on the feast of St George (April 23) in the sacristy in front of the curator. If they failed to do so, they were liable to be punished by the confiscation of all the revenues from the lease.⁷⁹ In 1487 the chapter also stipulated that no other canon could deposit the money instead of the canon who promised to pay the lease.⁸⁰

The practice of the lease is discussed further in the next chapter. In this place, it suffices to say that Oswald's government of the bishopric had a positive effect on the collection of the tithes. That the whole political context was favorable for the "financial centralization" and the

⁷⁶ "[...] *hii qui locaverunt decimas, solvant in florenis, sin autem in moneta nigra sex pensas cum media, aut in moneta regali per centum, pro solidis autem antiquis nonaginta sex, in merculinis autem sicuti sex pense et viii merkethas, hoc est xxxv. grossos.*" No. 38 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 54. *Pensa* is not a real physical money but the computing money, in the worth of 40 denars. *Merculinus* is a type of a Venetian money. *Rječnik srednjovjekovnog latiniteta Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, [Dictionary of the medieval Latin in Yugoslavia] (Zagreb: JAZU/HAZU, 1978), 723, 831.

⁷⁷ No. 48 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 64.

⁷⁸ "*In vigilia beati Laurencii concluderim clomini de capitulo, quod omnes et singuli domini decimatores anni preteriti, qui decimas deduxerant, registra vera et non ficta usque octavum diem in sacristia presentare et assignare debeant et teneantur sub pena privacionis proventuum tocius anni.*" No. 57 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 67.

⁷⁹ No. 61 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 69.

⁸⁰ No. 58 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 67.

improvement of the collection of the tithes is demonstrated by the fact that their collection was regularly discussed at royal diets, which Oswald Túz himself sometimes participated.⁸¹

Even though the collection of the tithes improved, this type of tax was still difficult for the Zagreb chapter to control completely when it came to the estates that were not in the ownership of the chapter. One particular example concerns the tithes coming from the northernmost part of Slavonia—Međimurje. The chapter had a long history of unsuccessful struggle for the tithe from this area and it remained so in the period of Oswald Túz.⁸² From the above-mentioned undated chapter letter addressed to Matthias we find out that Sigismund, bishop of Pécs, appropriated the tithes in Međimurje. Since Sigismund was another of Matthias's trustees and a son of John Ernuszt, a former treasurer who helped Matthias in carrying out the financial reform, the case concerning Međimurje must have been delicate for Matthias to adjudicate.⁸³

Unfortunately, we do not know how this case was resolved, but even without knowing its outcome, it shows that once someone gained Matthias's trust, he could try to use it in his own interest. Oswald Túz, in fact, did the same thing. He occupied the castle of Medvedgrad, then the surrounding villages and a ferry at Kraljev brod that belonged to Gradec in 1472. Matthias had to intervene to stop the occupation.⁸⁴ Despite these events, Oswald proved

⁸¹ Stjepan Razum, "Oswald Thuz od Sv. Ladislava," 216-217. See especially the stipulations of July 15, 1481, when the collection of the tithes was more thoroughly discussed in the diet, including the leasing of the tithes. DRMH 3, 36-39. About the overall financial reforms in the kingdom: Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex*, 76-78.

⁸² In 1439 the papal court in Basel condemned Cillei family to pay the appropriated tithes from this area: No. 540 in Andrija Lukinović (ed.), *Povijesni spomenici Zagrebačke biskupije. Monumenta Historica Episcopatus Zagradiensis*, vol. 6, [Henceforth: MHEZ 6] (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, Hrvatski državni arhiv, 1994) 572-587. In 1467 the chapter still did not return those tithes: no. 21 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 36. Međimurje was part of the tithe district Bekšin, see p. 38 of this thesis.

⁸³ "*Item reverendus dominus Sigismundus episcopus Quinqueecclesiensis occupavit decimas capitula inter Muram et Dravam cum fratre suo Johanne et occupatas pro se dicat et exigit [...]*." No. 319 in MCZ 2, 401. Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex*, 76; Fedeles Tamás, *Püspökök, prépostok, kanonokok: Fejezetek Pécs középkori egyháztörténetéből* [Bishops, provosts, canons: Chapters from the medieval Church history of Pécs] (Szeged: Tudományegyetem Történeti Intézet, 2010), 105. Since Sigismund was a bishop from 1473 this is the earliest date when the letter could have been written but it was probably written after 1486 when the diet stipulated that all disputes concerning the tithes should be sent directly to the king, and not to other authorities, in the first place the Curia in Rome. See: DRMH 3, 59.

⁸⁴ No. 280, 287, and 297 in MCZ 2, 344-345, 347, 366.

himself to be a valuable trustee in constructing King Matthias's authority through securing the tithes in Slavonia.⁸⁵ Oswald's success of establishing his authority is perhaps best illustrated by his last will (1499), which mentions huge amounts of money that he donated to the Zagreb chapter and the other churches in the bishopric, as well as other lay individuals, including Matthias's successor—Wladislaus II.⁸⁶

To sum up, the case of Bishop Oswald and King Matthias showed that the organization of the collection of tithes as well as its imposition largely depended upon the well-established, loyal relations between the king and the bishop, and the bishop's ability to impose his authority in the diocese. After discussing how was the collection of tithes re-established in the second half of the fifteenth century in the Zagreb bishopric, the next chapter focuses on the administrative aspects of the collection of incomes.

⁸⁵ Matthias however had his period of doubt about Oswald which is testified by the occasion when he imprisoned Oswald: "[...] *aut si suspectem eum haberes, tenebimus eum hic apud nos in curia, ita ut neque tibi, neque regno tuo obesse possit.*" No. 144 in MVH 6, 192.

⁸⁶ Zoltán Czövek, "Some Crucial Points in Osvát Tüz, Bishop of Zagreb's Will," in *Matthias and his Legacy: Cultural and Political Encounters between East and West*, ed. Attila Bárány and Attila Györkös (Debrecen: The University of Debrecen, 2009), 315-322. See the last will in no. 394 in MCZ 2, 516-521.

Chapter 2. TRUST IN PRACTICE: THE COLLECTION OF INCOMES

2.1. Corporate identity, trust and economy

The collection of incomes was a painstaking and organizationally challenging endeavor. That is why the corporate “spirit”, present from the beginning of the foundation of the chapter, proved to be crucial in the decision-making and its implementation on the lowest levels of the chapter’s economic system. The idea of this institution acting as “one body” helped achieve a more uniform behavior and pursue more efficiently its goals.⁸⁷ Corporativism helped to create certain patterns of trust—habits—that although may seem repetitive, were in fact a basis for introducing innovations and quicker changing courses of action.⁸⁸ This subchapter, therefore, analyses in what way corporativism influenced the creation of trust relations, and consequently rendered the organization of the economic system more efficient.

The Chapter Statutes (1334/1354) in the second part emphasize that when a problem arises, the canons should gather and discuss it. This stipulation is intriguing because it describes the reaction of the canons in time of disturbance precisely. According to the statutes, the provost, or the dean in his absence, is given the authority to invite the canons to gather in the Cathedral for the discussion by ordering to ring the bells in the morning hours.⁸⁹ This was indeed followed in practice: a stipulation from 1474 mentions that the canons gathered upon the sign of the bells ringing (*domini capitulariter ad sonum maioris campane congregati*).⁹⁰

⁸⁷ About the corporativism of Zagreb chapter: Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 4-5, 25-27, 31. Cf. how Ekelund et al. define the corporativism of the Church in *Sacred Trust*, 20-22.

⁸⁸ Cf. Barbara A. Misztal, “Trust in Habit: A Way of Coping in Unsettled Times”, in *Trust in Contemporary Society*, ed. Masamichi Sasaki (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2019), 41-59.

⁸⁹ “[...] *quod quandocumque aliqua ponderosa in nostro expediendo capitulo imminebunt, campana ad hec consveta ad mandatum prepositi vel decani eciam, aut in eorum absencia, in ecclesia maiori pulsetur regulariter circa horam primam.*” Pt 1, ch. 2 in. MHEZ 2, 13.

⁹⁰ No. 28 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 46. See also: Nos 34, 35, 67, in *ibid*, 52, 53, and, 71.

The final decision was reached by voting. The full unanimity is mentioned on several occasions. For instance, when on January 7, 1477, the chapter was discussing the regulation of the lease of the incomes of their estate Toplica, at the beginning of the stipulation they stressed that this decision was unanimously reached: “*domini capitulariter congregati unanimiter concluderunt*”.⁹¹ However, a stipulation concerning the dean’s elections indicates that the decision could have been reached by the consent of the two-thirds of the chapter: “[...] *in quem maior et senior pars consentit ita, quod pars minor, visa intencione maioris, debet cum ea concordare* [...]”.⁹² The principle of the majority, or the two-thirds was introduced in the Third Council of the Lateran (1179). It replaced the former principle of the seniority according to which the opinions of some members of the ecclesiastic body had more importance than the opinions of others. In the formulation of the principle of majority, though, the former principle of the seniority was left, that is, the former was equated with the latter principle.⁹³ That is why both principles also appear in the quoted line from the Chapter Statutes.

The date when the dean and most of the officials related to the administrative and economic duties of the Zagreb chapter were elected was St Lawrence day on August 10. This date, therefore, can be considered as the annual date of an official assembly of the chapter. Marko Jerković convincingly argues that this day was chosen by Zagreb Bishop Augustin Kažotić (1302-1322), who was originally from Trogir where St Lawrence was celebrated as a local saint.⁹⁴

⁹¹ No. 32 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 51-52. See also: Nos 7 and 28, *ibid*, 29, 46.

⁹² Pt 1, ch. 26 in MHEZ 2, 27.

⁹³ Arthur P. Monahan, *Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy* (Leiden: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 140.

⁹⁴ Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 67-68. This is also purported by the very stipulation about the dean’s election, where Augustin is mentioned as the one who established the practice of the elections in the first place: “*Constitutionis autem domini Augustini episcopi, sancte memorie* [...]”. Pt 1, ch. 26 in MHEZ 2, 27.

The Statutes depict the process of dean's election in rather complicated terms. First of all, he could not be appointed four times in a row.⁹⁵ Any kind of "lobbying" two weeks before the elections was forbidden and punishable.⁹⁶ As already mentioned, the dean was elected either unanimously or by the vote of the majority. To make it sterner and more fearful of its obedience, the stipulation even evokes the fear of arrogance if the election of the dean is not done in the prescribed way.⁹⁷ The dean was the most important official related to the economy of the Zagreb chapter since he was responsible for the distribution of the incomes among canons of the chapter and he took care of conveying the decisions of the chapter to the lower levels of the chapter's administrative body.⁹⁸ The function of the dean, defined in this way, was it seems, the specificity of the Hungarian Church because not all chapters had a dean, or if they had one, he could have a completely different role.⁹⁹

Further on, the strictness that characterizes the process of the election of a new dean was probably related to the fact that the person who was appointed for this office made a

⁹⁵ Pt 1, ch. 28 in MHEZ 2, 28.

⁹⁶ "[...] *qui vero pro se dictum officium voluerit postulare, inhibemus, ne ante dies quindecim precedentes festum beati Laurencii, hoc acceptare presummat vel eciam ultra simplicem postulacionem sive a capitulo in comuni sive a canonicis in speciali promissionem, pactum seu obligacionem quamlibet debeat exigere.*" Pt 1, ch. 27 in MHEZ 2, 28.

⁹⁷ "[...] *ne Lucifer, caput et pater superbie, in nobis posset sibi habitaculum vendicare, a cuius potestate nos liberet Jhesus Christus.*" Pt 1, ch. 26 in MHEZ 2, 27.

⁹⁸ "[...] *ad eius autem pertinet officium procurare et promovere agenda et expedienda nostra et de nostro consilio si fuerint ardua ubicumque, nostrosque redditus et proventus [...] inter nos, prout habet consvetudo et dictat racio, fideliter, iuramento super hoc prestito, peragare et eciam dispensare.*" Pt 1, ch. 26 in MHEZ 2, 27. About the dean cf. Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 68.

⁹⁹ The chapter in Eger e.g. had the dean and he had similar duties as the dean in the Zagreb chapter. László Solymosi, "Az egeri káptalan dékánválasztási statútumai a XV. századból," [The statutes of the election of the dean of the Eger chapter in the 15th century] *Levéltári Közlemények* 87 (2016): 147-154. The case of the French chapter in Verdun where the dean was obliged for the spiritual care and the discipline of the canons, while the treasurer for the economic administration of the chapter, testifies that the office of the dean did not have to be necessarily related to the economic duties. Michaël George, *Le chapitre cathédral de Verdun à la fin du Moyen Âge (fin XIIe - début XVIe siècle): étude d'une communauté ecclésiastique séculière* [The cathedral chapter of Verdun at the end of the Middle Ages (late 12th – early 16th century): study of a secular ecclesiastical community] (Doctoral thesis: Université de Lorraine, 2016), 85-86. Moreover, the chapters in Dalmatia e.g. did not have the dean at all. Cf. Ante Gulin, *Hrvatski srednjovjekovni kaptoli: loca credibilia Dalmacije, Hrvatskog primorja, Kvarnerskih otoka i Istre*, [Medieval Croatian chapters: loca credibilia of the Dalmatia, Croatian coast, the islands of Kvarner, and Istria] (Zagreb: HAZU, 2008). The difference between Dalmatian chapters and the chapters in the continental Croatia stemmed from different administrative origins—Dalmatia inherited the hierarchical structure from the period of early Christianity, while the chapters in the continental Croatia were closely related to the traditions of the Hungarian Church. See Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 53-55, who developed this idea based on the research of Robert Brentano.

considerable profit since his remuneration was rather large, but he was also in a position to appropriate revenues for himself as long as his mandate lasted. So, the election of the dean took several steps in order to make sure that they elect somebody who had the complete trust of the chapter. As an additional measure, the newly elected dean had a right to investigate the activities of his predecessor if it was suspected that he misappropriated something.¹⁰⁰

The severity, however, applied to the election of other officials too, since the stipulations repeat that the elections should run in the same way as the election of the dean. For example, the same rules applied to the election of the *comes servorum* (*kmetski župan*), who acted as the dean's right hand. *Comes servorum* oversaw the collection of the wine tithe in the Zagreb estate, ensuring that the subjects bring it to the chapter's wine and grain store.¹⁰¹ Based on the Statutes, it seems that the chapter did not choose a different *comes* for each of the estates (Zagreb, Sisak and Toplice), but that one *comes* administered them simultaneously.¹⁰² This would entail much travelling and work in one year since stipulations for both Sisak and Toplice state that the *župan* had to be present in time of the collection of the tithes. In this context the chapter added another regulation concerning this official. The regulation said that if a *comes* resigns, he was to be given two ban's denars and half a *cubulus* of oats as a compensation.¹⁰³ Since the other stipulations do not mention the resignation this would suggest that the "demission" of *comites* occurred regularly.

Further on, according to the Chapter Statutes, the lower-ranking officials elected annually were the two administrators.¹⁰⁴ Their duty was to inventory the incomes from the

¹⁰⁰ Pt 1, ch. 29 in MHEZ 2, 28-29. The stipulation describes in detail the dean's incomes.

¹⁰¹ "[...] *ad cuius pertinet officium et sollicitudinem vinum ad nostrum cellarium debitum, de quo supra, congregari facere fideliter et duci per servos eosdem ita, ut quilibet eorum quantitatem vini, ad quam solvendam obligatur, teneatur eciam deducere ad nostrum cellarium suis laboribus et expensis, ad quod per ipsum comitem, si neccesse fuerit, compellatur.*" Pt 1, ch. 25 in MHEZ 2, 26. Cf. Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 69.

¹⁰² See: Pt 1, ch. 42 and 64 in MHEZ 2, 60, 61.

¹⁰³ Pt 1, ch. 25 in MHEZ 2, 27.

¹⁰⁴ "[...] *conservatores rationum et quasi custodes reddituum ac proventuum nostre comunitatis consveverunt registratores vocari,*" pt. 1, ch. 32 in MHEZ 2, 30.

Zagreb district and to register the leases of the chapter's tithes and other incomes such as tributes from fairs and ferries. Their other important duty was to inspect the measurement of the wine barrels in the barn.¹⁰⁵ It seems, however, that in the period under scrutiny these officials were not elected necessarily on August 10 and not only two persons. There is a preserved note from the chapter's assembly held on July 20, 1487 when Canon John, Archdean of Komarnica, Curator Peter, and Canon Gallus were chosen as the chapter's administrators obliged for inspecting the inventories.¹⁰⁶ The inventories of the tithes reveal further on that the collectors of the tithe were either the canons themselves, or persons appointed by them.¹⁰⁷ Since some of the tithe districts were far from the center—the Cathedral—the participation of the canons in the collection of the tithes was important in order to attenuate the distance between the chapter and the peasants who were obliged to give the tithes. That is, the presence of the canons “on the ground”, and not only other persons appointed as the chapter's collectors must have contributed in maintaining the confidence between the tenants and the system of collection.

The mentioned administrators, together with the dean and the *župan* had certain privileges, including enjoying the hospitality by tenants known in the sources as *descensus* or *procuratio*. It means that the chapter's subjects had to treat the chapter's administrators, that is provide meals for them during the collection of the tithes, three times in a year. Since the Statute stipulation mentions complaints from the peasants, apparently this was not a preferred tenants' duty.¹⁰⁸ The *procuratio* was, however, important because it was a recognitory due—it ensured

¹⁰⁵ Pt 1, ch. 31 in MHEZ 2, 30-31. Cf. Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 69.

¹⁰⁶ No. 56 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 66.

¹⁰⁷ See e.g.: KAZ, ACA, fasc. 78, no. 8 (Glavnica, 1474); KAZ, ACA, fasc. 70, no. 10 (Toplica, 1483).

¹⁰⁸ “*Prohibemus autem sub pena denariorum qudraginta, quociens contingat singulos nostros, praeter officiales ville, ubi talis procuratio exhibetur, ne suas horrendas conmessaciones et potaciones, sicut experientia manifestat, de cetero habeant cum eisdem, sed suis agendis, facta contribucione, ad expensas huiusmodi, iusta et honesta insistant, nec clamor aliquorum in contribucione predicta attendatur, sed equitas rationis.*” Pt 1, ch. 62 in MHEZ 2, 60. My emphasis. See also: ch. 31 in MHEZ 2, 29-30, and no. 42 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 57.

the political and trust relations between the chapter and its subjects, which in the Middle Ages was achieved by means of personal contact. As suggested by a case from 1430, in which the *procuratio* was commuted into a money rent, this practice began slowly to erode in the fifteenth century.¹⁰⁹

On the day of St Lawrence not all the officials were elected, some were nominated directly by the chapter. These were the *veznici*. As the village representatives, their task was also to monitor the collection of the tithes and other taxes in the villages as well as to adjudicate in minor disputes.¹¹⁰ Ideally these officials were peasants who enjoyed both the trust of the chapter and the community in order to mediate. For villages that were part of the predials' estates, the predials had the right to nominate the village representatives by themselves.¹¹¹ Although the Statutes do not mention it, it is possible that the representatives chosen by predials were confirmed at the annual chapter assembly on August 10.

Later, the stipulation of 1483 mentions another chapter official involved in the economic system, the *iudex*, or *špan*. According to the said stipulation, his duty was to monitor the market tributes in Zagreb and he had the authority to imprison people for violence if any occurred.¹¹² Most probably this official was the same person that the Statutes refers to as *iudex*, whose duty was to adjudicate in weightier civil and criminal cases on the chapter estates. Furthermore, he acted as a kind of court of appeal on the estates.¹¹³ It also appears that the

¹⁰⁹ Petra Vručina, "Imposing Identity: The Case of Zagreb Chapter's and Bishop's Conditional Landholders in the Late Middle Ages", in *Institutional Aspects of the Church and Social History*, ed. Marko Jerković (forthcoming). About hospitality also: Brunner, *'Land' and Lordship*, 247.

¹¹⁰ Pt 1, ch. 35 in MHEZ 2, 33. Cf. Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 70.

¹¹¹ Pt 1, ch. 46 in MHEZ 2, 41. About predials see pp. 31-32 of this thesis.

¹¹² "*alicui vendenti vel ementi violentiam intulerit, habeat id spanus seu iudex noster ipsum detinendi et incarcerandi plenam facultatem et puniat eum iuxta arbitrium capituli.*" No. 47 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 62.

¹¹³ Pt 1, ch. 11 in MHEZ 2, 19.

iudex was neither a canon nor a cleric, but a secular person.¹¹⁴ The same *špan* administered the chapter estate Petrovina.¹¹⁵

The last official involved in the maintenance of the chapter economy was the chapter cellarer (*cellerarius*). He was commissioned by the chapter to supervise the distribution of the daily portions of the common supply—the Statutes do not specify what, but probably of grains and wine. His duty was to make the supply last for the whole year. The canons were supposed to check his incomes to see if he misappropriated anything. The Statutes do not mention if the *cellerarius* was appointed on August 10 like the rest of the officials.¹¹⁶ Before taking up the office all the mentioned administrators had to swear an oath whose purpose was augmenting the awareness of loyalty and just commission.¹¹⁷

Lastly, the division of the chapter incomes and estates is also closely related to the perception of the corporate identity.¹¹⁸ As Radovan Gajer extrapolates from the Statutes, the first type of chapter estate were the ones that belonged to the chapter communally, that is, the villages (*villae*) nearest to the cathedral town. The second type of estate comprises those that belonged to the canons individually, i.e. enjoyed as prebends. These estates were also situated around Zagreb, relatively close to the cathedral. The third type of estates were those that were given in beneficial ownership (*dominium utile*), to the predials (*praediales*). More precisely, predials were the chapter's subjects who were given land in heredity in return for other services—such as the administrative and judicial duties, military services. As Marko Jerković argues these conditional landholders were not a social but a legal category, meaning that the

¹¹⁴ See e.g. in charters: nos 34 and 61 in MHEZ 6, 35, 62; no. 332 in MHEZ 7, 352. On the contrary, Jerković claims that the *iudex* was also a canon. See: Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 69.

¹¹⁵ No. 43 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 58.

¹¹⁶ Pt 2, ch. 3 in MHEZ 2, 67. Cf. Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 69-70.

¹¹⁷ See the oath in no. 74 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 75. Cf. about oaths in medieval society: Reynolds, "Trust in Medieval Societies and Politics," in *The Middle Ages Without Feudalism: Essays in Criticism and Comparison on the Medieval West* (Farnham – Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 8-11.

¹¹⁸ In this place I will completely omit the labor services or the corvée that was also a part of peasant's obligations and that indirectly contributed to the revenues.

chapter's predials could have been either nobles or non-nobles.¹¹⁹ All the estates around Sisak and around Toplice were predial estates. The incomes that the chapter received from the predials, primarily the *census*, was enjoyed communally. Its exact amount was changing according to the size of the estate and the yields from it.¹²⁰

The revenues that belonged to the chapter communally can be further categorized whether the chapter collected them from its own estates or from other sources, which I shall refer to as internal and external, respectively. Internal revenues were the above-mentioned *census*; then *marturina*, which was basically a land tax, its amount was variable in time and on different estates.¹²¹ Communal incomes were also the tithes as well as tributes from the markets¹²² and ferries,¹²³ and lastly, the extraordinary taxes (*collecta extraordinaria*).¹²⁴ External incomes were the tithes collected from the noble estates in Slavonia. The external revenues may also include the various donations of lay and ecclesiastic persons. After collecting the described incomes either directly or by lease, the chapter distributed the portions among its members, according to their rank.¹²⁵

As for individual incomes, besides the revenues that the canons levied from the estates or the prebends, they also received revenues from the parish tax, the so-called *kathedraticus*. The Zagreb bishopric was divided into fourteen archdeaconries, however, only ten out of 32 canons were nominated as archdeacon.¹²⁶ Archdeacons had the right to collect the

¹¹⁹ Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 172. About predials see also: Martyn Rady, *Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval Hungary* (London – New York: Palgrave, 2000), 79-96; Vručina, "Imposing Identity: The Case of Zagreb Chapter's and Bishop's Conditional Landholders in the late Middle Ages" (forthcoming).

¹²⁰ Gajer, "Posjedi zagrebačkog kaptola oko Zagreba u prvoj polovici 14. st.," 56-79. See also: pt 1, ch. 48, and 63 in MHEZ 2, 43-45, 60-61. Cf. Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću*, 177.

¹²¹ In the Statutes its amount is 18 denars. Pt 1, ch. 15 in MHEZ 2, 22-23. However, for instance, a stipulation of 1493 regulating the obligations of the chapter village Kojenik mentions that it amounted for some time even 4 golden florins. No. 64, in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 70.

¹²² Pt 1, ch. 12 in MHEZ 2, 20-22.

¹²³ AHAZU II-c-49.

¹²⁴ See e.g. pt 1, ch. 64 in MHEZ 2, 62.

¹²⁵ See the third part of the Statutes: MHEZ 2, 74-99.

¹²⁶ Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici*, 56.

kathedraticus from every rector of each parish church in the archdeaconry. According to the Statutes the amount of one *kathedraticus* totaled 50 ban's denars for every parish.¹²⁷

To conclude, the specific economic organization which relied on corporativism enabled creating the trust relations that rendered economy efficient. First, those trust relations entailed different "control mechanisms" that prevented the appropriation of the revenues by the nominated officials and enabled a just distribution of the income. Secondly, the corporativism helped establish steady practices of the election of officials and enforcing new regulations, which in a way made the whole system rather flexible. And thirdly, the corporate identity determined the overall division of the incomes and estates. The following subchapter examines in more detail the process of the collection of the tithes and what has the trust to do with the practice of the lease of tithes.

2.2. The case of tithes as a steady source of incomes: inverse trust

Inspired by the Marxist and Malthusian paradigm, from the 1960s onwards historiography undertook the statistical analyses of tithes in order to trace the fluctuations in agricultural production, usually across a great length of time. Great Britain, parts of France, Italy and Germany are fortunate in the sense that they have relatively large number of sources preserved, making more or less precise statistical analyses possible even for the Middle Ages.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Pt 3, ch. 1 in MHEZ 2, 75.

¹²⁸ For examples of statistical analyses of tithes see Ben Dodds, "Demesne and Tithe: Peasant Agriculture in the Late Middle Ages," *The Agricultural History Review* 56, no. 2 (2008): 123-141; Christopher Dyer, "Peasant Farming in Late Medieval England: Evidence from the Tithe Estimations by Worcester Cathedral Priory," in *Peasants and Lords in the Medieval English Economy: Essays in Honour of Bruce M. S. Campbell*, ed. Maryanne Kowaleski, John Langdon, and Phillipp R. Schofield (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 83-109; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Joseph Goy, *Tithe and Agrarian History from the Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Comparative History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). In Croatian historiography besides Josip Adamček, the only historian who conducted more comprehensive statistical analysis of the inventories of tithes, for the tithe district Glavnica is Branimir Brgles, "Model obradbe protostatističkih vrela na primjeru analize najstarijih registara desetinskoga kotara Glavnice" [The model of the analysis of the protostatistical sources on the example of the oldest registers of the tithe district Glavnica], *Historijski zbornik* 69, no. 2 (2016): 293-333, and *Ljudi, prostor i mijene: Susedgradsko i donjostubičko vlastelinstvo 1450-1700* [People, space and changes: The seigneuries of Susedgrad and Donja Stubica 1450-1700] (Zagreb: Institut za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovlje,

The inventories of the Zagreb chapter for the last quarter of the fifteenth century do not enable analyses of this kind. In addition to being too short a period to make the curves, it does not allow a comparison of the overall amounts of income even for one year because the inventories are not preserved in continuity and are not written in a uniform way. For instance, while the inventory of the tithes of Glavnica of 1474 listed wine and grain tithes simultaneously, the inventory of 1494 of the same district used a different system: first listing the grain tithe, and then the wine tithe using different criteria.¹²⁹ Thus, in this place the mentioned case of Glavnica will be used to broaden the knowledge about the process of the collection of the tithes—of its organization and its lease, in the second half of the fifteenth century.

When the collection of the tithe of grain is listed, the inventories rarely specify which type of grain was that. This was also the case with the inventories of 1474 and 1494 from Glavnica. However, another document reveals this. The tithe district Glavnica was situated on the estates of Susedgrad and Donja Stubica. Dorothy Hening, who had the authority over Susedgrad and Stubica in the last quarter of the fifteenth century made a contract with the Zagreb chapter which specified that only the wheat and the rye will be tithed in the monetary equivalent of 8 denars.¹³⁰ Although it was known by custom and by the law what was tithed, it seems, though, from the stipulations regulating the collection of the tithes that what was exacted changed from tithe district to tithe district, depending on the agreement with the nobility from those districts, and also on geographical features since not all agricultural products were available in the same amount everywhere.¹³¹

2019). Neven Budak also used these sources for the analysis of the towns in the medieval County of Varaždin. *Gradovi Varaždinske županije u srednjem vijeku*.

¹²⁹ KAZ, ACA, fasc. 78, no. 8 (1474); KAZ, ACA, fasc. 38, no. 10 (1494).

¹³⁰ Brgles, *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*, 175. Dorothy Hening became the owner of Susedgrad and Stubica after her father and brothers died. Ibid, 147.

¹³¹ Cf. nos 23, 29, 42, and 64 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz *crvene knjige* zagrebačkog kaptola,” 42-44, 47-51, 55-57, 70. Cf. already mentioned Ban Mikac's stipulation in pt 4, ch. 1 in MHEZ 2, 100-103.

When the crops were tithed from the estates belonging to the Zagreb chapter, the Statutes reveal those were wheat, rye, barley, revel, millet, and oats. It seems that one measure (*cubulus*), comprised of the mixture of several types of grain. Out of every 10 *capetiarum* or stacks, one had to be given to the chapter and every *capetia* comprised of 60 bundles (*manipulorum*).¹³² In the case of pork, the process of collection was slightly more complex. First, the family chose one pig out of ten that they did not want to be tithed. Then, the chapter collector chose one pig out of the remaining nine.¹³³ In the case when the family had a lot of pigs and more than one was tithed, it was obliged to take from the chapter up to three pigs to feed them with the pannage. If there was no possibility to feed the pigs, that family had to pay additional 2 ban's denars for every tithed pig. In the case when the family had only one pig altogether, it need not pay the tithe.¹³⁴ On the other hand, where the family had less than 9 or 10 pigs, it had to pay 4 ban's denars for each.¹³⁵ Another stipulation shows that the lambs and young goats were tithed in the similar way as pigs.¹³⁶ When the wine was tithed the collector, together with the estate officials went into each cellar of the wine producers and determined the quantity of wine.¹³⁷

After reconstructing the process of making the inventories for the products to be tithed, the next important question is what happened after, that is whether the agricultural products were levied in kind or in the money equivalent, which is not so easy to answer. According to

¹³² Pt 1, ch. 50 in MHEZ 2, 45.

¹³³ Pt 1, ch. 53 in MHEZ 2, 46.

¹³⁴ *Quod si apud plures videlicet ad plus usque tres reperiuntur, decem porci, tempore tantum glandinum recipitur eodem modo unus et supra, ut cuius porcus recipietur, illi in hac parte contribuere tenentur socii, satisfaccionem inpendendo pro suo recepto, prout fuerit rationis, et hoc idem de porcis adductis undecumque. Si vero glandines non fuerint, sane intelligendo, decimator de singulis porcis plurimum huiusmodi debet singulis duobus denarii contentari, nec aliquis habens unum porcum, ante fores domus sue conservatum, quem pro festo nativitatis dominice nutrit, ratione ipsius ad solutionem aliquam astringatur.* Ibid. Cf. also 23 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 42, 44.

¹³⁵ "[...] *decimus aut nonus non fuerit, de singulis solventur singuli quatuor denarii viennenses aut duo markethii* [...]." Ibid, 44.

¹³⁶ Pt 1, ch. 51 in MHEZ 2, 45. Cf. no. 29 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 47.

¹³⁷ No. 29 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 47-48.

the inventories of tithes, the products were levied in kind, however, according to the statutory regulations, for most of the products there was defined the money equivalent that was interchangeable.¹³⁸ And as seen earlier, if the tenant peasant had e.g. less than 9 or 10 pigs, he paid in money for each of them. Then, according to the Chapter Statutes, the tithes could be collected either in money, or in kind: “*pro nostro comuni registrantur vel dicantur et tolluntur in denariis et interdum in specie, prout in progressu apparebit.*”¹³⁹

How much was tithed in money or in kind probably depended upon many factors, for instance, the prices on the market, the convenience, that is profitability of transporting the tithes from one place to another.¹⁴⁰ It also must have depended upon the possibilities of the peasant families to pay in money.¹⁴¹ My guess would, though, be that most of the tithes were indeed given in kind, and smaller part of it in money.

One of the indicators for such deduction are the numerous barns mentioned in the sources. The central barn of the Zagreb chapter is referred to in the Statutes as *nostrum cellarium* and it was probably situated somewhere close to the cathedral since the Statutes emphasize on several occasions that the subjects must bring the tithes to the cathedral.¹⁴² Besides this main *cellarium*, the sources reveal that every tithe district had its own barns.¹⁴³ Also, each canon probably had a barn within his house (*curia*).¹⁴⁴

¹³⁸ See: Cf. nos 23, 29, 42, and 64 in *ibid.*, 44, 48, 56, 70.

¹³⁹ Pt 1, ch. 55 in MHEZ 2, 47.

¹⁴⁰ That the tithes were transported proves a charter no. 63 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 70.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Witold Kula, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System* (London – New York: Verso, 1987), 57; Keith D. Lilley, *Urban Life in the Middle Ages, 1000-1450* (London: Palgrave, 2002), 110.

¹⁴² See e.g. Pt 1, ch. 16 in MHEZ 2, 23: “[...] *vinum recolligere et ducere Zagrabiam ad nostrum cellarium, iuxta nostri preceptum decani vel eiusdem, quantum ad hoc, alterius presidentis, suis laboribus et expensis* [...]”. See also: Pt 1, ch. 48, and 50 in *ibid.*, 44-45.

¹⁴³ Nos 29, 42, 43 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 47, 56, 58.

¹⁴⁴ See a document of 1422 that mentions the barns of the canons: “[...] *ausu temerario violare hostiliter descendendo curiasque et domos eorundem canonicorum, et signanter dominorum Ladislai de Dawoth predicti, Stephani Farcasii, archidiaconi de Bexyin, magistri Mychaelis, doctoris artis medicine ac Johannis, cantoris eiusdem ecclesie, immaniter invadendo et subintratando serasque et clausuras necnon hostia domorum et celariorum eorundem confrangendo* [...]” No. 72 in MHEZ 6, 83. My emphasis.

Further on, one more reason and the most important one why probably most of the products were tithed *in specie* in the second half of the fifteenth century, is the profitability that is connected to the practice of lease.¹⁴⁵ According to stipulation 33 in the Chapter Statutes, the lease was introduced in order to contribute to the development of the cathedral community: “*qui meliorem condicionem attulerit pro nostro comuni augmentando*”.¹⁴⁶ It seems that this practice entailed some kind of bidding since the stipulation says that the person, that is the canon, who offered 2 marks more than the others, got the right to lease the revenues.¹⁴⁷ Also, the lessee got the incomes he leased only after he paid the whole sum. The mitigating circumstance was that the lease had to be paid in three portions, and not at once.¹⁴⁸ Since in the second half of the fifteenth century, the chapter switched to this practice almost completely, it also proscribed new regulations concerning the lease.¹⁴⁹

In order to control the lease of the tithes more easily, the chapter divided the area from which it levied it into tithe districts (*cultelli*). Based on the Statutes (1334/1354), the inventories of leased tithes, and Adamček’s research, it can be established that this area was divided into approximately eight districts in the last quarter of the fifteenth century (Table 1). “Approximately” is the operative word here because the boundaries of the districts changed. It seems that at first the boundaries of the tithe districts overlapped with the archdeaconries since each archdeacon was entitled to the quarter of the tithes collected in his archdeaconry.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ According to Branimir Brgles the collection of crops and wine in kind in the tithe district Glavnica was related to the augmenting prices of agricultural products in the second half of the fifteenth century (Brgles, *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*, 36). However, even though the inventories were listing the products in kind, it does not have to mean that part of it was not given in monetary equivalent since according to the mentioned contract of Dorothy Hening and the Zagreb chapter it was agreed that every *capetia* of grain had value of 8 denars. See p. 34 of this thesis. Also, we do not dispose with the prices of agricultural products from this period in Slavonia.

¹⁴⁶ Pt 1, ch. 33 in MHEZ 2, 31.

¹⁴⁷ “[...] *videlicet saltem cum marcis duabus vel valore ipsarum quantitatem pecunie quam alter in conducendo huiusmodi redditus vel proventus offerebat* [...]” Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ See p. 22 of this thesis.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. the description of the tithe districts and archdeaconries in the Statutes: Pt 1, ch. 52-64; and Pt 3 in MHEZ 2, 46-62, 85-98.

Tithe district	The name of the tithe district given in the sources
Zagreb tithe district	<i>Campus Zagrabiensis</i>
Gorica tithe district	<i>Goricza</i>
Podgorja tithe district	<i>Podgorya</i>
Glavnica tithe district	<i>Glawnicza</i>
Bekšin tithe district	<i>Bexin</i>
Zagorje tithe district	<i>Zagorie</i>
Sisak tithe district	<i>Zyszek</i>
Toplica tithe district	<i>Toplicza</i>

Table 1 Tithe districts of the Zagreb chapter in the second half of the fifteenth century¹⁵¹

However, the monetized economy with which the canons began to be involved prompted the thinking about profit and rationalization. The canons naturally wanted to generate more money at the end of the lease than the amount they had paid for it, which explains why they started to draw up inventories in the first place. The inventories enabled them to keep track of the agricultural yield, modify to some extent the boundaries of the districts depending on profitability, and to organize the collection of the tithes more efficiently, depending as well on the local traditions and the agreements with the nobility from whose estate they were exacting the tithes.

The most prominent example for manipulating the boundaries is Glavnica. This tithe district was first a part of the so-called *magnus cultellus*, or the Zagreb tithe district.¹⁵² However, in the fifteenth-century inventories of leased tithes, it appears as an independent district. The canons most probably extricated it because it had high yields of wine tithe.¹⁵³ The boundaries changed slightly one more time in the second half of the fifteenth century. This

¹⁵¹ AHASU II-c-49; pt 3, ch. 52-64 in MHEZ 2, 46-62; Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 83-87.

¹⁵² Pt 1, ch. 54 in MHEZ 2, 47.

¹⁵³ According to Brgles's research in the sixteenth century, Glavnica produced the largest quantities of wine in Slavonia and was not far behind Srijem and Tokaj regions. Brgles, *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*, 263.

time they probably attached the small area across river back to the Zagreb district because it had much smaller yields than the rest of Glavnica district (See Fig. 3).¹⁵⁴

In later inventories of leased tithes, some of the districts are sometimes leased together, like for instance Podgorja and Gorica. Podgorja probably appears individually when the canons estimated that it would bring larger yields.¹⁵⁵ According to Adamček there existed one more district in the 1450s, “Zagreb tithe district beyond the Sava” (*Campus Zagradiensis ultra Savam*).¹⁵⁶ Since this particular district does not appear in later inventories of leased tithes, it can be assumed that at one point it was merged with the Zagreb district.




Figure 3. The changes in the borders of the tithe district Glavnica

¹⁵⁴ This change most probably took place in 1475 when the canons regulated the collection of the tithes in Glavnica. Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 89.

¹⁵⁵ AHAZU II-c-49.

¹⁵⁶ Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 85-86.

The question is to what extent the rationalizing process was possible considering the fact that the collection of the tithes depended upon fickle weather and environmental conditions in general. Therefore, even if the inventories were used to forecast trends, the profit ultimately depended upon how (un)successful agricultural production was. To have a glimpse at this question, I present the diachronical changes for one district—once again Glavnica—from 1474 to 1494:

	Number of grain tithe payers		Grain tithe collected (in <i>capetiis</i>)		Wine tithe collected (in <i>cubulis</i>)	
Year	1474	1494	1474	1494	1474	1494
<i>Villicatus</i> Stonevec	107	53	138.5	94	149.5	
<i>Villicatus</i> Brdovec	91	83	86.5	212.5	95	
<i>Villicatus</i> Pušća	117	69	116.5	106	131.5	
<i>Villicatus</i> Jablanovec	52	42	63	71	51.5	
<i>Villicatus</i> Stubica	359	415	356	648	1135.5	
In total	726	662	760.5	1131.5	1563	2911
Percentage of change	-9.2 %		+67.2 %		+53.69%	

Table 2 Comparison of grain and wine tithes collected in the subdistricts of Glavnica (1474 and 1494)¹⁵⁷

This table demonstrates that even though the number of the grain tithe payers was smaller in 1494 than in 1474, the overall amount of grain tithes was higher by 67.2 % (compare

¹⁵⁷ KAZ, ACA, fasc. 78, no. 8 (1474); KAZ, ACA, fasc. 38, no.10 (1494). Unlike the inventories from other districts, in the Glavnica inventory tithes were listed within the subdistricts (*villicatibus*), which makes it easier to trace changes closely. Only the categories that enable comparison are selected. Subdistrict (*villicatus*) Novaki is not included because it was listed only in the inventory of 1474. *Villicatus* was a smaller unit of a seignury and can be translated as a rural municipality. See Brgles, *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*, 10. Brgles published a transcription of the inventory of 1474 in *ibid*, 273-288. My transcription differs somewhat from his numerical values.

fig. 4) and that of wine tithes increased by 53.69%. Thus it follows from this case that the production on this area was steady, which was reflected also in the increase of the lease of this district.¹⁵⁸




Figure 4. Comparison of the amount of grain tithe in 1474 and 1494 for the tithe district Glavnica¹⁵⁹

The stable agricultural production corresponds to the climatic and environmental conditions that were favourable for viticulture and arable farming of this area in this period.¹⁶⁰ The peasants were also determined to apply the traditionally known techniques that minimized the risk of small agricultural returns.¹⁶¹ One of these practices, for instance, was sowing oats or legumes in order to fertilize the land.¹⁶² The Statutes reveal that peasants mixed grains and legumes, which suggests that they were familiar with this technique.¹⁶³ Also, if Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 are compared, it is visible that the largest amounts of wine were produced in the

¹⁵⁸ AHAZU II-c-49; Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 88.

¹⁵⁹ The absolute amounts for the grain tithe are given in the Table 2.

¹⁶⁰ Brgles, *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*, 62-63. Cf. József Laszlovszky, "Agriculture in Medieval Hungary," in *The Economy of Medieval Hungary*, ed. József Laszlovszky, et al. (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2018), 85.

¹⁶¹ Dodds, "Demesne and Tithe: Peasant Agriculture in the Late Middle Ages," 124; Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, 19.

¹⁶² Dodds, "Demesne and Tithe: Peasant Agriculture in the Late Middle Ages," 127.

¹⁶³ See e.g. pt. 1, ch. 65 in MHEZ 2, 61.

geographically most favorable, hilly areas. This shows that the peasants knew how to exploit land in the most efficient way. Importantly, however, the increase of the tithed yields was not brought on by the techniques of the agricultural production alone. Another reason for the increase was that in 1475 the chapter regulated the collection of the tithes in the districts of Zagorje and Glavnica.¹⁶⁴

To conclude, it seems that the development of the practice of the lease happened due to the increased confidence in the agricultural production. In addition, that was achieved by the more comprehensive following of the same productions by the means of compiling the inventories of the tithes. However, a noticeable peculiarity in the case of the Zagreb chapter is that the canons leased the districts only among themselves, whereas in other European countries the common practice was to lease tithes to people outside the cathedral community.¹⁶⁵ In this way the profit was “reserved” entirely only for the canons. This is informative about the chapter’s distrust to engage in monetary transactions with strangers, which would have been a prerequisite for further involvement in monetization.

¹⁶⁴ Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 89. The regulations for Zagorje were transcribed by Tkalčić (“Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” doc. XXIX, 47-51) from *Liber Rubeus*. Unfortunately, I did not find the regulations for the tithe district Glavnica.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. the case of Italy: Catherine E. Boyd, *Tithes and Parishes in Medieval Italy: The Historical Roots of a Modern Problem* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), 196-207. A judiciary case from Zadar, where a canon of Split gave half of his annual lease to another layperson, suggests that even in Dalmatia the practice of lease was not confined only to clergymen. See: Tomislav Popić, *Krojenje pravde: Zadarsko sudstvo u srednjem vijeku (1358-1458)* [Tailoring of justice: the Judiciary of Zadar in the Middle Ages (1358-1458)] (Zagreb: Plejada, 2014), 95-96.




Figure 5. Distribution of the wine tithe in 1474 in hectoliters in the tithe district Glavnica¹⁶⁶

2.3. *Liberæ villæ* and *oppida*: an example of distrust

Besides the example of distrust in leasing the tithes to people outside the chapter, in case of the economic system of the Zagreb chapter, there appears one more example of distrust, that towards the market towns. In 1344 the Zagreb chapter incorporated a new type of estate management: urban autonomy. It is attested for the first time in 1344, when the chapter gave a higher status to one of its villages known as Lepa ves, which then became known as Nova Ves. That is, from then on it became *libera villa*, which can be translated as a semi-market town or a semi-borough.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ In this map the *cubuli* were calculated into hectoliters. One *cubulus* in the Zagreb chapter estates comprised of 62.5 liters. Brgles, “Model obradbe protostatističkih vrela na primjeru analize najstarijih registara desetinskoga kotara Glavnice,” 316.

¹⁶⁷ About the foundation of Nova Ves see Marko Jerković, and Petra Vručina, “Upravni modeli katedralne zajednice i kreiranje društvene zajednice: slučaj osnaka Nove Vesi” [Administrative models of the cathedral community and the creation of a social community: A case study of the foundation of Nova Ves], *Kroatologija: časopis za hrvatsku kulturu* 8, no. 1-2 (2017): 229-268. While this article puts the foundation of Nova Ves in the context of the landholding system of Zagreb chapter, it lacks the precision of explaining what it meant in the context of the landholding economy and urbanization of Slavonia in general as well as what was the overall attitude towards monetization of the Zagreb chapter.

Until not so long ago, the market towns such as Nova Ves have been assessed in view of their positive or negative impact on commercialized economic development.¹⁶⁸ This impact is probably closely related to the concept of agrarian dualism according to which Eastern Europe began to “lag behind” from the Early Modern times onwards.¹⁶⁹ Since market towns are a prominent feature in the economies of East Central Europe, they were usually considered as negative phenomena.

However, this positivistic stance that views history as linear and progressive has slowly started to change, and market towns are now viewed from new perspectives and in broader contexts.¹⁷⁰ For instance, Neven Budak applies the concept of centrality, where the central larger town takes most important functions, which leaves less important functions for the towns situated around. One of the market towns he examined in Varaždin County was Varaždinske Toplice, a market town that pertained to the Zagreb chapter.¹⁷¹

Budak, though, in his study has not dealt so much with the question why do the settlements such as Varaždinske Toplice have a thoroughly agrarian character with minimal craft development and orientation towards more large-scale economy.¹⁷² In the following, therefore, I will place the analysis of the birth and development of market towns on the Zagreb chapter estates in the context of the estate or landlord economy. First of all, it seems that the economic system in which the Zagreb chapter’s market towns developed did not support the

¹⁶⁸ István Petrovics, “The Medieval Market Town and Its Economy,” in *The Economy of Medieval Hungary*, ed. József Laszlovszky, et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018), 359-360. Cf also Adamček’s analysis of the foundation of the market towns in Slavonia in *Agrarni odnosi*, 162-190.

¹⁶⁹ Markus Cerman deconstructs the concept of the agrarian dualism by arguing that the so-called second serfdom did not in fact exist. He suggests as well that one cannot generalize about the relations between the lord and his subjects in the Eastern pre-modern Europe, each seignior needs to be viewed in its own terms. Markus Cerman, *Villagers and Lords in Eastern Europe, 1300–1800* (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

¹⁷⁰ Peter Clark, ed., *Small Towns in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁷¹ Neven Budak, *Gradovi Varaždinske županije u srednjem vijeku*.

¹⁷² An analogy can maybe better explain what I mean by this. Some of the cities in Dalmatia, for instance, did not fulfill the conditions of centrality, but were still more oriented towards the long-distance trade and in general more monetized than the settlements in Slavonia, which was of course due to their geographical position by the sea. About the towns in Dalmatia: Tomislav Raukar, *Studije o Dalmaciji u srednjem vijeku* [Studies about Dalmatia in the Middle Ages] (Split: Književni krug, 2007).

development of larger, or maybe better to say market-oriented, towns. As Patricia Crone notices, towns “often have parasitical appearance” in pre-modern times because they were mainly places of consumption and trade.¹⁷³

Thus, when the Zagreb chapter granted market town privileges, it had a precise purpose, which did not include their independent development. Or as Keith Lilley affirms, for the landlords the foundation of a new town was a highly controlled “enterprise”, aimed mostly at increasing their revenues.¹⁷⁴ Considering the above-mentioned Nova Ves (1344), market towns appeared relatively late on the estates of Zagreb chapter, and when they did appear, it happened for three reasons: colonization, administrative role, and/or trade and revenue generation.

These factors can be inferred from the charters that the chapter issued. The foundation charters of Nova Ves (1344), and Opatovina (1478), for instance, state that the reason for their creation was to populate the areas in which they were situated. Nova Ves was situated right next to the place where the canons lived, so the chapter probably wanted to extend this area.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, Opatovina’s privileges, described as *liber vicus*, were supposed to attract new people after the building of the palisades around the cathedral area to ward off Ottoman attacks. Without people, no defense could have been organized if the need arose: “*considerata magnitudine et amplitudine eiusdem civitatis sive municionis nostre, ad quam deffendendam et custodiendam sine admoniculo laicorum et hominum popularium nequaquam nos ipsi sufficere possumus.*”¹⁷⁶ The latest village to be promoted in *libera villa* was Petrovina (1482). The charters state that this was also decided due to colonization that became necessary after the

¹⁷³ Patricia Crone, *Pre-industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015), 21. Another useful model in this case would be the one constructed by Van Bavel et al. They differ between the coercion-oriented and market-oriented cities. The coercion-oriented cities or towns would be those that extract all the required resources from their countryside, while the latter ones behave as real market centers. See in Julia Bruch et al., “Grand Narratives in Premodern Economic History”, in *Methods in Premodern Economic History: Case Studies from the Holy Roman Empire, c.1300-c.1600*, ed. by Ulla Kypta, Julia Bruch, and Tanja Skambraks (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 17.

¹⁷⁴ Keith D. Lilley, *Urban Life in the Middle Ages, 1000-1450* (London: Palgrave, 2002), 106-108.

¹⁷⁵ Pt 4, ch. 27 in MHEZ 2, 145-147.

¹⁷⁶ No. 309 in MCZ 2, 385-386.

Ottoman intrusion into the Petrovina estate: “*propter creberimas incursiones Turcorum populis et incolis destituta existat.*”¹⁷⁷ An additional reason to give it a higher status was that the borough of Petrovina was also the center of the Petrovina estate.¹⁷⁸

The chapter refers to both Sisak and Varaždinske Toplice as *oppida* in the fifteenth century.¹⁷⁹ From the existing sources, it is not possible to tell why exactly they were known under this term. They certainly served as administrative centers for the Sisak and Toplice estates, and as places where the peasants could sell their products and thus raise cash rents. They also served as the places where the landlords could sell the wine tithes they rented as shown by an undated charter regulating the selling of wine in the chapter’s estate Toplica that was probably written sometime in the first half of the fifteenth century.¹⁸⁰

The granting of charters can be used to show what the model of a market town on the Zagreb chapter estates precisely looked like and what its features were (see the comparison in Table 3). The comparative table shows that the canons maximally endeavored to adapt the concept of borough to their own needs, and as already stated, to control it completely. In this sense, in fact, it appears that they did not perceive boroughs any different from the other estates they managed: they perceived them as an additional type of estate. A brief look at what happened with the market towns in the course of the next centuries confirms this suggestion. Lelja Dobronić, examining the sources concerning Nova Ves, describes its history until the middle of the nineteenth century when Nova Ves was incorporated into the city of Zagreb.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ No. 43 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 57-58.

¹⁷⁸ See the preambulation of this estate in: No. 323 in MHEZ 5, 429-431. This was the westernmost chapter estate, separated by the estates of other nobles in between.

¹⁷⁹ For Varaždinske Toplice, see a charter of granting privileges: no. 1 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 23. *Oppidum* Sisak is only mentioned in one charter regulating the economic administration of the whole province Sisak no. 23 in *ibid*, 38-43). These urban settlements existed already in the ancient times: Jerković, “Kaptolski Sisak u srednjem vijeku: Društvo, gospodarstvo, posjedi” 15; Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić, *Sumporne Toplice kod Varaždina u Hrvatskoj* [Sulfur thermal spa near Varaždin in Croatia] (Zagreb: Pismeni Dragutina Albrechta, 1869), 1-25.

¹⁸⁰ No. 2 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 24.

¹⁸¹ Lelja Dobronić, “Nova Ves – povijesni dio Zagreba” [Nova Ves – the historical part of Zagreb], *Starine* 60 (1987): 1-43.

Features of the urban autonomy	Nova ves	Opatovina	Varaždinske Toplice	Sisak	Petrovina
Legal autonomy	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -
Simplified legal processes: fixed penalties	+	+	+	+	+
Urban tenure and rents paid in money	+	+	+ -	+ -	+ -
Exemption from seigneurial impositions	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -
Secured property	+	+	+	+	+
Self-government	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -	+ -

Table 3. Comparison of the legal elements of the market towns on the Zagreb chapter estates. Symbol “+” indicates the full extension of the certain right, “+ -” indicates the partial rights.¹⁸²

According to her analysis, the chapter considered Nova Ves as its own property even though the dwellers tried to legally fight for full autonomy on several occasions. The model of the market town created in 1344 therefore reproduced itself until modern times.¹⁸³ Such cases attest to the landlord system’s profound distrust towards the concept of urban autonomies, simply because they wanted to be the only ones controlling the circulation of the money.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² The model for the analysis was inspired by Lilley, *Urban life in the Middle Ages, 1000-1450*, 51. The charters that were compared: pt 4, ch. 27 in MHEZ 2, 145-147 (Nova Ves); no. 309 in MCZ 2, 385-386 (Opatovina); nos 1, 23, and 43 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 23, 38-43, 57-58 (Sisak, Varaždinske Toplice and Petrovina).

¹⁸³ Cf. the theoretical concepts of the reproduction of structured social systems: Mladen Ančić, “*Gradu kmeti or iobagiones castri* as an element of the social structure of Croatian Kingdom,” *Miscellanea Hadriatica et Mediterranea* 6 (2019): 40-45.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Lilley, *Urban life in the Middle Ages*, 110.



Figure 6. Market towns or boroughs on the Zagreb chapter estates

Chapter 3. MAKING OF THE ECONOMY

3.1. What has liturgy to do with the economy: the concept of “sacred trust”

Up to this point, the present study focused on the revenues related to agricultural production, which is only one side of the coin. This subchapter, in turn, will explore the donations that the Zagreb chapter acquired as a religious institution. The main goal is to explain the interconnectedness of religion, income, and trust. In this sense, a group of authors, all of them economic historians specializing in the topics related to the medieval Church—Robert B. Ekelund, Robert F. Hébert, Robert D. Tollison, Gary M. Anderson, and Audrey B. Davidson—constructed a research paradigm that connects these three elements.

They argue that the reason why the Church became so wealthy is that it applied a rationalized approach to the economy. They see “the Church as a corporation that marketed and *sold* a set of identifiable *products* in a rational, cost-conscious, *profit*-maximizing manner.”¹⁸⁵ So, according to Ekelund and his co-authors, what the church “sold” was a promise of spiritual salvation, and in return, it generated material profit. Of course, the authors warn that this exchange does not operate completely as a commercial exchange since the prices are not negotiated by the market. However, the Church had a monopolistic and credible position regarding the access to information about salvation in Medieval Europe.¹⁸⁶

The many aspects of the Church economy that the authors describe include the concept of Purgatory as well and the incomes that the Church gained from issuing indulgences.¹⁸⁷ The example of the Zagreb chapter provides an insight into another type of income that would belong to this category, although the Purgatory as such is not directly mentioned in the sources. More precisely, part of the Zagreb chapter’s income was generated by testamentary

¹⁸⁵ Ekelund et al., *Sacred Trust*, 6

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 4-10, 37.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 152-166. Cf. Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1990), 326-328, 356-357.

endowments and other donations that were made in return for the celebration of the mass for the “redemption of the soul”. Thus, in 1452 Elena, a cook of canons George and Stephen, gave up her salary for the period of five years to pay the prebendaries for prayers for the souls of her parents.¹⁸⁸ In 1475, the canon of Zagreb chapter, Elias de Soploncza, addressed a letter to the rectors of the parishes in Zagreb asking them to ensure that the prebendaries get hold of their donations from the testamentary legacies since the rectors were usually the testamentary executors.¹⁸⁹ According to the Chapter Statutes, receiving the legacies, besides donations or small gifts (*offertoria*) were the prebendaries’ prerogative. If the gift or the bequest exceeded 3 florins, it had to be paid to the dean.¹⁹⁰ In the above mentioned letter, Canon Elias lists the testamentary endowments: George, a citizen from Gradec donated 25 golden florins; a provider of the bishop’s palace, Martin, donated 4 florins; a shoemaker from the suburb of Gradec known as Vicus Latinorum bestowed 1 florin; a certain Anthony Thvrsinch donated 2 florins; the widow of shoemaker Paul, 1 florin. The testamentary legacies were not merely monetary as the following examples demonstrate: a certain Benedict donated a cloak (*unum palium*), Dionisius Wodopia and the widow of a certain Emeric bestowed to the dean and the prebendaries some goods in return for the perpetual prayers (“[...] *certis rebus et bonis pro perpetuis oracionibus in vim elemosine legatis obligarentur*”).¹⁹¹

The next example is not directly related to the Zagreb chapter but the Zagreb cathedral. In 1471, three members of the Zagreb chapter in Čakovec wrote an authenticated charter in which they demand Ulrick, Fliedrick, and Gaspar Lamberger, the brothers of the deceased

¹⁸⁸ No. 160 in MCZ 2, 218-219.

¹⁸⁹ No. 294 in MCZ 2, 362.

¹⁹⁰ “[...] *sicut ab antiquo tempore consensisse noscimus, ita et ex nunc concedamus generose totum offertorium nobis debitum, quod et cetero quandocumque et quocumque celebrante provenient in nostra ecclesia maiori ad altare quodcumque, et similiter legatum factum nobis a quocumque, nisi offertorium huiusmodi vel legatum excederet unam marcam, valentem tres florenos vel ducatos, in quo casu pro nobis per decanum debet occupari.*” Pt 1, ch. 43 in MHEZ 2, 39-40. About the salary: Pt. 1, ch. 41 in MHEZ 2, 38-39. See also: addenda A in MCZ 3, 3030-304.

¹⁹¹ No. 294 in MCZ 2, 362-364.

Friedrich Lamberger, to pay the Zagreb Cathedral 730 golden florins, which Heinrich Entzesdorf donated to restore Zagreb cathedral in his last will: “*de rebus et bonis per Henricum condam Entzesdorf in ultima sua voluntate ad fabricam ecclesie zagrabiensis [...]*.” Friedrich Lamberger was the executor of the will, and obviously, he had not executed Heinrich’s last will before he himself died, so the chapter was compelled to collect the donation by legal means.¹⁹² The charter does not specify the reasons for Heinrich’s donation, but they were probably related to the concern about his afterlife.

Besides testamentary donations, which were entirely voluntary, the donations could have been partly compulsory. An example for this is Martin Frankopan and his wife Dorothy. After litigating with the Zagreb chapter because they appropriated the tithe from the tithe district Gorica, Martin and Dorothy made a settlement in July 1464 with the chapter that included the donation of their Gradec castle near Hrastovica after they die.¹⁹³ This donation was related to the possibility of their excommunication that would both segregate them from the living society and pose a threat to their eternal salvation if they do not reconcile with the chapter.¹⁹⁴

Even though these are the only examples available for my research at this time, the liturgical practice which developed in the second half of the fifteenth century in the Zagreb bishopric confirms that there were many more cases. To understand better the context, I shall start with a charter compiled by Friedrich Cillei as Slavonian ban and the governor of Zagreb bishopric (*tutorque et advocatus ecclesie zagrabiensis*) in 1452, that is, in the period when the episcopal vacancy disrupted the collection of the incomes in Zagreb bishopric. According to

¹⁹² No. 262 in MCZ 2, 333-334.

¹⁹³ [...] *villas autem Goricza, Budrouczy et villam sanctae crucis in Bernovcz, cum earundem pertinentiis [...]* quae quidem villae etiam de pertinentiis dicti castelli Gradecz existunt et sub eisdem habentur et situantur.” No. 450 in MHEZ 7, 507-509.

¹⁹⁴ In March 1464, Sancius Romer, the papal judge notices King Matthias of Martin Frankopn’s excommunication because he was refusing to pay the tithe. No. 440 in MHEZ 7, 479-491. About the excommunication as an enforcing mechanism: Ekelund et al., *Sacred Trust*, 60-62.

the charter, Frederick granted permission and encouraged the nobility from the noble counties of Zagreb and Križevci to bestow possessions on the Zagreb chapter, upon the very chapter's demand, which shows that the chapter was well aware of being dependent on such donations in times of need.¹⁹⁵ This charter provides a possible explanation why liturgical activities expanded so much in the period of Oswald Túz.

First of all, the number of canons or prebendaries having usufruct over ecclesiastic endowments related to the altars began to increase suddenly in the second half of the fifteenth century. The altars were an additional endowment for the members of the Zagreb chapter already in the fourteenth century, but it seems that in the fifteenth century the usufruct of this ecclesiastic benefice gained a new religious meaning.¹⁹⁶ An 1481 charter concerning the litigation between bishop Oswald and the prebendaries reveals that there were at least nine altars (Table 4).

1. The altar of All Saints	4. The altar of St Mary Magdalene	7. The altar of St Katherine
2. The altar of St Jacob	5. The altar of St martyrs Fabian and Sebastian	8. The altar of St Jeronim
3. The altar of St John and St Matthew and St Ursula	6. The altar of St George	9. The altar of St Paul

Table 4. The altars in the Zagreb bishopric in the second half of the fifteenth century¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ “[...] *pro parte et in personis honorabilium virorum dominorum canonicorum* [...]”. No. 164 in MCZ 2, 227-228.

¹⁹⁶ About the usufruct of the altars in the fourteenth century in Zagreb chapter see in Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću*, 206-207.

¹⁹⁷ “[...] *item triginta dietas terre arabilis et unum fenile are sanctorum decem millia militum; item triginta octo dietas terre et tria fenilia ad falcastra quatuordecim are sancti Jacobi; item duodecim dietas terre et unum fenile are sanctorum Johannis et Mathie apostolorum et Vrsule virginis; item unum fenile are sancte Marie Magdalene ad falcastra duodecim; item viginti quinque dietas terre et unum fenile are sanctorum Fabiani et Sebastiani martirum ad falcastra duo; item septem dietas terre et tria fenilia parva are sancti Gerogii; item quindecim dietas terre et unum fenile ad falcastra octo are sancte Katherine; item viginti dietas terre et duo fenilia ad falcastra quindecim are sancti Jeronimi; item unum fenile ad falcastra duo are sancti Pauli* [...]”. No. 325 in MCZ 2, 409.

Besides these nine altars, the written sources mention at least two more. The Zagreb canon of Komarnica, Matthew Kelked, became the rector of the altar of St Cross in 1466.¹⁹⁸ Three years before Bishop Oswald died, in 1496, another canon of the Zagreb chapter, George of Topusko, consecrated a new altar in the cathedral, dedicated to the Virgin Mary.¹⁹⁹ Most probably all the above mentioned altars were side altars in the cathedral.²⁰⁰ Their endowment was always related to the usufruct of the income from the plot of land associated with it. Thus, when Matthew Kelked became the rector of the altar of St Cross, he also acquired the usufruct of the income from the land attached to it.²⁰¹ A source of 1495 shows that besides plots of land, an altar endowment could entail the usufruct of houses as well: the cathedral altars of St Paul and St Bernard, for example, commuted the houses (*domus*) they were associated with.²⁰²

The usufruct of this endowment was popular among the members of the Zagreb chapter because it presented an additional source of revenue for them.²⁰³ However, the increasing number of this particular type of endowment in the second half of the fifteenth century was mostly related to the increasing need for celebrating mass. This was the most important duty of the rector of an altar as demonstrated by the above-mentioned charter in which Prebendary Andrew, who became the new rector of the altar of St Bernard in 1495, was admonished not to neglect the celebration of a mass.²⁰⁴

At the same time, the sources reveal also a second trend, which is related to the widening of the activities of the prebendaries in this period. The prebendaries were a semi-dependent chapter's association or college founded in 1269. Their main task was to carry out

¹⁹⁸ No. 252 in MCZ 2, 310.

¹⁹⁹ No. 383 in MCZ 2, 507.

²⁰⁰ About side altars: Kees van der Ploeg, "How liturgical is a Medieval Altarpiece?" *Studies in the History of Art* 61 (2002): 106-107.

²⁰¹ "[...] *taxas et collectas autem annuales et consuetas pro se exiget idem rector.*" No. 252 in MCZ 2, 310.

²⁰² No. 375 in MCZ 2, 498.

²⁰³ That is why Oswald litigated with those who had the usufruct over the altars—he tried to appropriate the incomes from the altars to the bishop's *mensa*. See again the charter no. 325 in MCZ 2, 408-413.

²⁰⁴ "[...] *quod ipse dominus Andreas prebendarius et successores sui in qualibet ebdomada in ecclesia katedrali illam unam solitam missam perficere non negligent.*" No. 375 in MCZ 2, 498.

religious duties of the chapter.²⁰⁵ The reason why the canons needed help with religious duties is that they were largely occupied with administrative and economic obligations such as the collection of the tithes.²⁰⁶ The main difference between the canons and the prebendaries was that the canons had usufruct of the prebend and the office (*canonicatus*), while the prebendaries only had the income from the prebend.²⁰⁷

The Chapter Statutes already regulated the activities of the prebendaries, however, in the second half of the fifteenth century, their importance grew so much that the prebendaries compiled their own Statutes in 1466.²⁰⁸ Soon after this, in 1468, the chapter donated their tithe from Moravča to the prebendaries in order to increase the holy cult.²⁰⁹ Since this charter is also incorporated in the Statutes, and a few other charters that are dated later than 1466, this indicates that the Statutes were complemented through a longer period.²¹⁰

The Chapter Statutes reveal that at the time of writing the prebendaries were obliged to celebrate masses in honor of the Virgin Mary, masses in honor of the deceased, and other particular masses (*peculiares*).²¹¹ This remained the same for two centuries. What changed was the widening of the liturgical activities regarding these masses. Unlike the Chapter Statutes that regulated only the order of the prebendaries celebrating the mass, the prebendary Statutes regulated in detail the biblical texts that were to be read and sang, and the number of prebendaries serving as assistants.²¹²

²⁰⁵ About the prebendaries: Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću*, 64-66.

²⁰⁶ See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

²⁰⁷ Jerković, *Zagrebački kanonici u 14. stoljeću*, 65.

²⁰⁸ Stipulations in the Chapter Statutes: Pt. 1, ch. 36-44 in MHEZ 2, 33-40. See the Statutes of prebendaries in addenda A in MCZ 3, 291-321.

²⁰⁹ “[...] *que in augmentum cultus divini, ecclesiasque et salutis nostre auxilium dispone possunt* [...]” No. 262 in MCZ 2, 323-324.

²¹⁰ Addenda A in MCZ 3, 300. The first charter related to the tithe from Moravča is, though, the charter granted by Bishop Eberhard in 1440, in which he confirms one-third of this tithe to the prebendaries. Thus, the prebendaries gradually acquired the possession of it. Ibid, 299-300.

²¹¹ Pt 1, ch. 38 in MHEZ 2, 36-37.

²¹² Addenda A in MCZ 3, 308-311, 312-313.

Apart from being an auxiliary body to the chapter, the prebendaries were at the same time a confraternity dedicated to the Virgin Mary (*confraternitas seu Calendinum matris Marie*).²¹³ The membership in the confraternity was not restricted only to the prebendaries, the laypeople could participate as well. According to the Prebendary Statutes, a confraternity had an enrollment list of its memberships (*liber seu matricula confraternitatis*).²¹⁴

Furthermore, for the medieval people living in the Zagreb diocese expressing piety was not confined only to the Zagreb chapter. From the 1470s, clergymen and laypeople from the bishopric of Zagreb, including the canons and prebendaries of the Zagreb chapter, are attested as members of the confraternity of Holy Spirit in Rome (*confraternitas Sancti Spiritus de Urbe*). Since some of the members from Zagreb bishopric signed themselves (*propria manu pro me subscriberet*) in the confraternity book, it means that they enrolled while they were personally in Rome.²¹⁵

As seen from the presented facts, the period of Oswald Túz was flourishing with the liturgical activities whose intention was enabling laypeople to take care of their salvation as well as to express their piety. Apart from having a religious character, the liturgical activities of the chapter are also related to the economy. However, while the bestowments were an important source of revenues for the Zagreb chapter, in this period the chapter no longer received extensive land donations. They are more characteristic for the earlier period in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Although not many examples are preserved, most of the donations were probably small testamentary legacies, which is why the chapter had to rely primarily on its landholding economy. The next subchapter, therefore, examines the construction of the chapter's authority as a feudal lord.

²¹³ Addenda A in MCZ 3, 291.

²¹⁴ Addenda A in MCZ 3, 310.

²¹⁵ Vincentii Bunyitay (ed.), *Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia*, vol. 5: *Liber confraternitatis sancti Spiritus de Urbe* (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat nyomdája, 1889), 4-7, 9-10, 15, 18, 32, 35, 38-40, 49, 54-57, 59-60, 66.

3.2. Zagreb Chapter as a “feudal lord”: Imposing authority or creating trust relations?

According to a chapter charter of 1482, close to the time of its compilation, seven tenant peasants from the village Sesvete (*Omnium sanctorum*; situated in the estate of the Zagreb chapter) submitted a complaint in front of the canons, namely, Thomas Zudecz, Gywre Pochezanovich, Jantol Nemchith, Lowrek Symmmowych, Iwanus Cherne, Laczk Sebek, and Pawel Rochycz in the name of the whole village. They were aggravated by the Ottoman incursions and by the constant passing of the army through their village which made their life and agricultural production difficult, and which is also why many tenants abandoned the village.²¹⁶ Because of this, the chapter decided to relax the taxation and duties in this village. Thus, from that point on the tenants from this village were obliged to pay an annual monetary rent in the amount of 1 golden florin in two installments—the first one on the feast of St Martin (November 11), and the second one on the feast of St George (April 23). On the other hand, tenants whose plots of land (*sessiones*) were deserted were not obliged to pay anything in the following three years. Besides this monetary rent, they were also obliged to give their customary tithe, then *munera* (gifts) and minor corvée or labor services such as transporting one wagon of hay at the same time as paying the monetary rent and helping the canons who lived in the village to fence their *curia*.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ “[...] *quomodo videlicet ipsi iam a quampluribus annis, tum per incursus Turcorum, tum vero per varios et continuos descensus exercituum nec non et alios quoslibet equites et pedites pretereuntes adeo in bonis et rebus nec non domorum, curiarum et ortorum edificiis dampnificati oppressique fuissent in diesque dampnificarentur et opprimerentur, quod id ibidem ulterius nequaquam tollerari possent, quodque occasione eadem pro maiori parte ipsa villa habitatoribus foret destituta.*” No. 45 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 59-60. See also: No. 44 in *ibid*, 59.

²¹⁷ No. 45 in *ibid*, 60-61. The charter does not state which were the previous obligations of the peasants. According to the Statutes the annual monetary rent or *marturina* as shown already totaled 18 denars but this probably changed later since, for instance, another stipulation of 1494 shows that the rent could total even 4 golden florins. No. 64 in *ibid*, 70.

This charter is a classic example of how the Zagreb chapter managed relations with its tenant peasants. It shows that creating authority was not a one-way process, that is that the chapter as a feudal lord did not just impose its will. The obligations of the tenants were the product of constant negotiations and consensus.²¹⁸ In this subchapter I argue that the relations between the Zagreb chapter and its tenants were created in the context of a specific trust relation that entailed reciprocity.²¹⁹ This approach sidesteps Josip Adamček's claim that the relations between the landlords and its tenant peasants were characterized only by the exploitation from the side of the landlords.²²⁰ Taking the surplus of the production was a way in which the pre-modern economy functioned but it happened in the context of reciprocal expectations.

American anthropologist James C. Scott presents a convincing study of the reciprocal relations in the landholding system. Although Scott, concentrating on nineteenth-century Vietnamese and Burmese economy, does not deal with the Middle Ages, his conclusions can be implemented here because the economy he describes highly resembles some medieval practices. Scott builds his case around the concept of "moral economy", which, to put simply,

²¹⁸ Cf. Katalin Szende, "Power and Identity. Royal Privileges to the Towns of Medieval Hungary in the Thirteenth Century," in Michel Pauly and Alexander Lee (ed.), *Urban liberties and citizenship from the Middle Ages up to now* (Trier: Porta Alba Verlag, 2015), 30.

²¹⁹ About reciprocity: Piotr Sztompka, "Trust in the Moral Space," in Masamichi Sasaki (ed.), *Trust in Contemporary Society* (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2019), 36.

²²⁰ Adamček in his study focuses mostly on the Early Modern Age, which is not the scope of my thesis. However, he extends his conclusions to the late Middle Ages, which is why it is important to re-examine his arguments. (Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi*, 51-225). Also, I believe that my approach is relevant as much to the late Middle Ages as to the Early Modern Age. Adamček's contentions related to the exploitation and "refeudalization" in the Early Modern Age are still, almost forty years after he wrote his study, strongly influencing the Croatian historiography. See, for instance, Neven Budak's synthesis of the Croatian Early Modern History: *Hrvatska povijest u ranome novom vijeku, sv. I: Hrvatska i Slavonija u ranome novom vijeku* [Croatian history in the Early Modern Ages, vol 1: Croatia and Slavonia in the Early Modern Age] (Zagreb: Leykam international, Barbat, 2007), 113-114, 147-154. Although he does not provide a new paradigm to this question, Branimir Brgles in his study acknowledges that the concept of serfdom and refeudalization do not have enough explanatory power to enlighten the question concerning the relations between feudal lords and peasants in the late Middle Ages and Early Modern Age in Slavonia (Brgles *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*). His study presents a kind of turning point in Croatian historiography also because he uses the terminology more cautiously than previous authors. The tradition in Croatian historiography is to use the term *kmet* for tenant peasants which could be translated as *serf*, has acquired a negative connotation. Instead Brgles uses the more neutral term *podložnik* which means subject. On this aspect of the negative connotation and changing of the meaning of the word *kmet* forewarned already Lujo Margetić in "Neke pojave društvene diferencijacije u prošlosti našega sela" [Some aspects of the social differentiation of our past villages], *Sociologija i prostor: časopis za istraživanje prostornoga i sociokulturnog razvoja* 67-68 (1980): 53-56.

entails that the tenants subject themselves to the landlord in return for the secure subsistence and protection. Scott's main argument is that the peasants' need of secure subsistence and protection stemmed from a particular subsistence ethic, whose primary concern is organizing agriculture and households in such a way that it reduces the risk of not fulfilling the sustenance needs to seek profit. Moreover, according to Scott, if the lord fails to meet the conditions of protection and subsistence, this may provoke tenant rebellions and uprisings.²²¹ Another aspect of protection, to which Otto Brunner draws attention, was physical protection, that is, one of the main prerogatives and obligations of the lord to defend his estates with arms.²²² Thus, another expectation of the tenants was to be protected from pillaging their houses and arable lands.

The reciprocity between the lords and the tenants is primarily attested to as a normative value. In the second part of the Chapter Statutes, where the incomes and duties of individual canons are described and the relations with their subjects are regulated on their prebendary estates, one of the stipulations says:

Lastly, it is known that the master of the tenants according to the custom, in the time of collecting new wine and crops, may ask for a certain quantity of summer wine and crops, the sum of **which does not exceed one-tenth**. Contrary to this, whosoever takes less than one-tenth does not sin, but **whosoever takes more, is a thief**, as is evident from the foregoing, everyone must be content with so much field jobs and collections, for **though they [the tenants] serve, they are men as well**. As once a wise poet said about the real slaves: even if they are servants, remember that they are men. The oppressors, therefore, before such righteous and due office, are not only judged by the divine but are also bound by the above-mentioned stipulation that says: "Ladislas, by the grace of God and Apostolic authority," etc.²²³

²²¹ Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. Cf. also E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past & Present* 50 (1971): 76-136.

²²² Brunner, *'Land' and Lordship*, 209-210, 218-220.

²²³ "*Ultimo est sciendum, quod dominus a colonis huiusmodi de more consveto, tempore novi vini et bladi, potest petere certum quantitatem de vino et blado estivali, que quantitas partem decimam non excedat, qui autem minus de decima recepit, non peccat, sed qui plus, predo est; nam sicut ex premissis apparet, debet quilibet contentari de tantis laboribus et solutionibus colonorum, qui, si servi sunt, tamen homines sunt; nam ille sapiens poeta de veris servis etiam dicit: si tibi sint servi, homines tamen esse memento. Oppressores ergo talium ultra iusta et debita servicia, non solum attendant examen divini iudicii, sed etiam perspiciant tenorem constitutionis supra, que incipit: „Ladizlaus dei et apostolice“ etc.*" Pt. 2, ch. 13 in MHEZ 2, 73. My translation and emphasis. The "wise man" to which Archdean John, who compiled the Statutes, refers to was Cato and his verse: "*Et famulos dicas, homines tamen esse memento.*" See: Gulielmus Ernestus Weber (ed.), *Corpus Poetarum Latinorum* (Frankfurt: Sumptibus et Typis H. L. Broenneri, 1831), 1197. I thank Katalin Szende for pointing this out.

As is seen from the paragraph quoted above, the canons were prohibited to legally overburden the tenants. The compiler of the Statutes, Archdean John, here refers to the 1336 charter of the bishop of Zagreb, Ladislaus (1326-1343), which said that if the canons “exploited” their tenants, they were liable to be punished according to the communal decision of the chapter.²²⁴ That providing for the tenants’ rights was a general stance of the elite towards the tenants is also testified by the laws stipulated in the royal council. According to a regulation of 1486, the tenant peasants had the right to leave their lord if they had a justifiable reason, and furthermore, the lord was prohibited to impose new levies upon his tenants. If he does this, he would be fined to 6 marks.²²⁵ Another stipulation, which also deals with the collection of the tithe, decreed that the tithe collectors should collect the tithes justly, that they were required to report what was tithed, and also that noblemen were supposed to supervise the collection.²²⁶ Although there are no preserved documents for the Zagreb chapter that would confirm that the canons and tithe collectors were indeed punished and admonished, there is an earlier example related to the estates of the Zagreb bishop that can be revealing in this case. In 1427 John Alben, who was at the time bishop of Zagreb, admonished the tithe collectors of his village Vugrovec to collect the tithe according to the customary episcopal measure, that was smaller than the measure the collectors were using.²²⁷

Another indicator of reciprocity visible from the normative source, i.e. the Chapter Statutes, is the recurring references to the customs and traditions throughout the Statutes. What this looks like is shown by an example concerning the transportation of the tithe: “[...] *at aliis decimis quibuscumque ad nostrum cellarium, sicut consvetum fuerit, alias deducendo* [...]”.²²⁸

²²⁴ “*Quicumque autem suum colonum de eodem predio iniuste oppresserit vel spoliaverit, bonis suis in toto vel in parte, et hoc per aliquos ex vobis vicario nostro innotuerit, ipse vicarius teneatur talem compellere ad restituendum ablata punire de vestro consilio, prout videbitur expedire.*” Pt 2, ch. 4 in MHEZ 2, 68.

²²⁵ DRMH 3, 58.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ No. 219 in MHEZ 6, 243-244.

²²⁸ Pt 1, ch. 24 in MHEZ 2, 26.

The Statutes refer to the verb *consuesco* in this way more than ninety times. This is indicative because the customs and relying on tradition provided the legitimation for exercising authority over the tenant peasants. For the peasants, this was an acceptable way of legitimation because tradition and customs referred to something that the peasants approved of and were a guarantee that the elite did not impose its authority violently but did so with the consent of their tenants. Or as Susan Reynolds maintains: “Trust and distrust have a lot to do with the perception of legitimacy or illegitimacy in the social order and in government. This means that they must relate to the norms of a particular society.”²²⁹

Besides the example given at the beginning of this subchapter, there are a few more that show in practice the concern of the Zagreb chapter in building trust relations with its peasants *via* reciprocity. In 1470 the Zagreb chapter issued a charter that regulated the privileges and the obligations of chapter estate Sisak. This charter was only putting into writing customs that had existed for some time (*iuxta modum et formam per nos iam ipsis traditam*). The element of the charter pertinent to the present discussion is the right to elect the *vojvoda*.²³⁰ While in the fourteenth century only the chapter official administered the chapter’s estate Sisak, in the fifteenth, at least from 1440 when he is attested the earliest, the chapter gave the right to one of the community’s representatives—the *vojvoda*—to do so.²³¹ Thus, the chapter gave more freedom to the very community to organize itself. The *vojvoda* was elected indirectly by the community in two stages. First, the community assembled in the village of Sela and elected six of their representatives called jurors (*iurati*) and after this, they chose the *vojvoda*. The elections took place a few days before St Lawrence’s day, which is likely to be related to the fact that the chapter had to approve his election at its assembly. That the elections were intended to have a ceremonial and solemn character is testified by the stipulation that imposed a fine of

²²⁹ Susan Reynolds, “Trust in Medieval Societies and Politics,” 3. Cf Brunner, *‘Land’ and Lordship*, 217, 229.

²³⁰ No. 23 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 38-43.

²³¹ No. 579 in MHEZ 6, 629. About *vojvoda* on Sisak estate cf. Cf. Jerković, “Kaptolski Sisak u srednjem vijeku: Društvo, gospodarstvo, posjedi,” 20.

fifty denars on anyone who started fights during the elections. The vojvoda had the power to judge all civil cases, and cases in the criminal court together with the chapter's *comes* and six jurors. These parties divided the collected fines among themselves, and in order to start the motion, the tenant peasant had to pay forty denars. The charter describes in detail the punishments for insults, physical violence, murder, thefts, and refusal of military duties. The vojvoda was also the one who helped to collect the tithes from Sisak estate.²³² Why exactly is this representative called *vojvoda* is not entirely clear, however, it fits into the context of other secular lordships in Slavonia that often had officials known by this name.²³³

Further on, another example of securing tenant peasants' rights comes from 1481 when the Zagreb chapter alleviated the duties of their tenant peasants from Brestje, a village that was at the time given as a canonical prebend to Canon Luke de Dombro. From then on, the tenants had to pay annually one florin, minor labor services, the usual gifts (*munera*), and a tithe of wheat and millet.²³⁴ Next year upon the humblest request (*ad humillime supplicacionis*) of their vojvoda, other *villici* and tenants of the chapter estate Sisak, the chapter decided to grant them a new regulation concerning viticulture and collection of the wine tithe. Thus, according to this charter, the current tenants were allowed to plant new vineyards; and if someone damaged the vineyards, old or newly planted, he would need to pay five ban's denars. A new fine in the amount of 10 marks was prescribed also for committing physical violence against other people in the vineyards, as well as a fine of five marks for thefts from cellars not exceeding three florins. Further on, even though the tenants were free to sell or donate their vineyards, the chapter forbade that they donate the vineyards to the Church ("*ecclesiis aut ad alia pia opera nemo possit vineam suam legare*") because, according to the charter, such vineyards usually stayed deserted. Concerning the tithe, the chapter stipulated that one bucket (*cubulus*) of wine

²³² No. 23 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 38-43.

²³³ Cf. Brgles, *Ljudi, prostor i mijene*, 34.

²³⁴ No. 40 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 55.

was worth of 8 ban's denars when sold, and twelve buckets of wine was 1 golden florin. The charter also regulated the process of the collection of the tithe. If the collector doubted the amount of wine, he could demand a tenant to take an oath or measure the wine himself but not before he deposited one florin to the vojvoda or *villicus*—if he was wrong, the vojvoda or *villicus* kept the one florin.²³⁵ Four years later, however, in 1485, the vojvoda, *villici* and other tenants from the chapter estate Sisak once again demanded to lower the price of wine. The chapter granted this and decided that the new price in the next sixteen years will be 7 denars.²³⁶ The chapter relaxed the duties in the event of natural disasters as well. In 1494 when the river Sava flooded the ploughlands around the chapter's village, Kojenik, the chapter reduced the monetary payment due from 4 to 2 florins.²³⁷

Another indicator of reciprocity and a reason why it is wrong to project our economic system and ideas of exploitation onto pre-modern societies is that medieval people had different ideas about exploitation. According to Scott, a medieval landholding system is perceived by medieval villains as less abusive if the tenants are left with enough agricultural return.²³⁸ Or, to put it differently, if more was taken from the peasants who had more, it was not considered as exploitation. That this was also the case with the Zagreb chapter is attested to, for instance, by a 1475 charter regulating the collection of tithes in tithe district Zagorje. The charter mentions that *inquilini*, that is the peasants who did not own any land, were required to contribute a hen instead of the tithe.²³⁹

²³⁵ No. 42 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 55-57.

²³⁶ "Ideo nos ad eorum supplicationem debitum habentes respectum potissimum autem id advertentes ut ipsi vineas successive augmentent et augmentare debeant, maturo super inde prehabito consilio id eis graciose annuimus et concedimus quatenus singulis sedecim dumtaxat annis a data presencium sese immediate sequentes pro quolibet cubulo vini decimali predictos septem solidos sive denarios regales modo et ordine superius specificatis solvere teneantur [...]." No. 52 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 64.

²³⁷ No. 64 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 70.

²³⁸ Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, 7.

²³⁹ "Inquilini vero, si terras sessionum iobagionalium non tenuerint, talium quilibet solum per unam gallinam pro usu ipsis decimatoribus dabit [...]." No. 19 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 47.

This practice is confirmed by the inventories of the tithe. For instance, out of 754 residents of the tithe district Glavnica the previously mentioned 1474 inventory lists five residents who handed in a hen, and two who did not contribute anything because they were poor (*pauper*).²⁴⁰ Out of 273 residents from the tithe district Toplica, the 1475 inventory lists 36 residents (13%) who did not contribute anything, justified by *nichil habet*.²⁴¹

Lastly, the landholding system of the Zagreb chapter was not characterized by reciprocal relations, such as making exemptions in return for the agricultural surplus, with tenant peasants only, but with tenants of higher status—the predials—as well. As previously explained, they were given land in return for a hereditary lease and obligations toward the given estate.²⁴² When someone became a predial, he received the confirmation of his status in the form of a written contract that always included a formula about disloyalty.²⁴³ The predials' contracts were written in a rather uniform way, however, in some cases, the chapter arranged its relations with their predials differently. So, for instance, in 1477 the Zagreb chapter gave some privileges to their predial Fabian, nephew of canon Paul de Milethyncz, who was given in hereditary lease a plot of land (*sessio*) in the borough of Sisak, which was deserted and needed restoration. Because of the condition of the land, the chapter exempted Fabian for nine years from all duties except for the gifts (*munera*) and the tithe of pork, the latter only applicable if he ever owned more than forty pigs.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ The number of dwellers who gave the tithes was smaller because the total number includes officials such as *iudex* and *preco* who did not give the tithes. KAZ, ACA, fasc. 78, no. 8.

²⁴¹ KAZ, ACA, fasc. 70, no. 9.

²⁴² See pp. 31-32 of this thesis.

²⁴³ In the example of 1458 it looks like this: "*Hoc etiam adiecto, quod annotati Blasius iudex et Lucas literatus et ipsorum haeredes se a nota infidelitatis et vitio ingratitude contra nos et ecclesiam nostrum praenotatam insontes praeservare studeant, alioquin a iure et proprietate ipsius praedii ipsorum Dobrodol cadant et destituantur, eiusque dispositio rursus et iterum ad nos et ecclesiam nostram devolvetur eo facto [...]*". No. 332 in MHEZ 7, 353. See other examples of predial contracts: No. 216 in *ibid*, 222 and no. 238 in *ibid*, 252-253.

²⁴⁴ "[...] *domini dederunt Fabiano nepoti magistri Pauli de Milethyncz libertatem novem annorum, eximentes eum ab omnibus daciis et proventibus demptis muneribus et eciam a solucione quadraginta porcorum decimalium, si tamen ultra XL porcos habebit, tunc solvet de illis, eciam infra eosdem IX annos*. No. 33 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 52.

On the other hand, predials could also “usurp” their position as it is demonstrated by the chapter’s charter from 1487. According to this source, the predials from the chapter’s estate Toplica were admonished for misappropriating one third of the rent *marturina*. This rent was entirely collected by the chapter.²⁴⁵ In the same charter the predials from an area called Domkovec in the Toplica estate were warned not to increase the duties of their tenants, otherwise, they would be deprived of their estate (*predium*). The regular duties of the tenant peasants were two ploughing services during a year and customary *munera*.²⁴⁶ This is also another indicator that the chapter in this period protected their tenants from being overburdened. In the next century, however, when the Ottoman threat was increasingly pressing, the tenants were required to provide military service as well. Moreover, the state became an additional claimant of taxes. Numerous tenants’ uprisings took place because they lost confidence in their lord—here, the Zagreb chapter failed to provide the physical protection and secure subsistence.²⁴⁷

In sum, this subchapter demonstrated that imposing authority, and concomitant taxes, services and obligations always demanded special justifications related to the protection and secure subsistence of the tenants as well as exemptions in those occasions when subsistence was at risk. In this sense, the reciprocal relations were the reason why the tenant peasants perceived the economic system probably less exploitative than is now thought, and, even placed their confidence in it.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ No. 54 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 65-66.

²⁴⁶ “*Servicia vero eorumdem colonorum, prout postea rescitum est, sunt ista: videlicet quodlibet aratrum duas araturas, unam in autumn aliam in vere ipsis predialibus facere et arare debet, et munera consveta.*” Ibid, 65.

²⁴⁷ Petra Vručina, “Pozadina Sisačke bitke ili kako je rat utjecao na *moralnu ekonomiju*,” [The background of the Battle of Sisak or how did the war affect *moral economy*] in Hrvoje Kekez, Stipica Grgić, and Valentina Janković (ed.), *Sisačka bitka 1593.-2018.: Zbornik radova sa znanstvenog kolokvija povodom 425te obljetnice Sisačke bitke održanoga u Sisku 20. lipnja 2018. godine*, Sisak – Zagreb 2019, 203-222.

²⁴⁸ Cf. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, 32.

3.3. The construction of an institutional image

After discussing what “sacred trust” had to do with the economy, and how reciprocal relations created the confidence in the economic system of the Zagreb chapter and rendered it more efficient, the last aspect to consider is reputation. As Ekelund and his co-authors state “the medieval Church relied on its reputation to assure the quality of its services.”²⁴⁹ Since the Zagreb chapter was not only a church institution but in a way a state institution as well, as indicated in the first chapter, it was all the more important for it to maintain its good image, and consequently the confidence in the institution.

The best place to look for evidence for consciously maintaining reputation is the assemblies of the Zagreb chapter and their decisions. For an institution to have a good image, its members needed to be impeccable. If a member’s behavior threatened the reputation of the institution, they were liable to lose their position in the chapter. In August 1472, for example, the chapter decided to deprive its prebendary, Andrew de Zelina, of his prebend because he inappropriately insulted his fellow canons.²⁵⁰ The same day the chapter reached a decision to deprive of their prebend anyone who would publicly insult or show disrespect to other canons.²⁵¹ A charter for verbal insults was already a part of the Chapter Statutes but it prescribed monetary fines only, and not the confiscation of the prebend.²⁵² The Statutes of prebendaries also contained a stipulation about insults—prebendaries who insulted their fellows would be deprived of their prebend for one year.²⁵³ The regulation was probably called

²⁴⁹ Ekelund et al., *Sacred Trust*, 27.

²⁵⁰ “[...] *in medium nostri veniens plures ex nobis et nostris irreverenter verbis impudicis, inhonestis et iniuriosis affecit [...]*.” No. 25 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 45.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Pt IV, ch, 26 in MHEZ 2, 144-145.

²⁵³ Addenda A in MCZ 3, 295.

for because gossip about verbal insults spread easily and compromised institutional reputation.²⁵⁴

Twelve years later, in 1484, a canon of the highest rank in the chapter—the provost—was excommunicated and his prebend and benefice suspended. According to the assembly report, Provost Robert ordered an attack on the *curia* of one of his fellow canons, Cantor Bartholomew. He also imprisoned several prebendaries and struck with his hand a Franciscan. In addition, he was accused of perjury.²⁵⁵ The next case happened in 1494, when the chapter temporarily deprived Canon Fabian de Zempche of his prebend because he was often seen in public with a widow, Dorothy, in the previous years, even while her husband was still alive. The chapter decided to return the prebend to him once the scandal subsides.²⁵⁶

Association with women, it seems, was problematic for the chapter as demonstrated in another case. In June 1484 the chapter decreed that all those canons who have inns within their curia shall be liable to have their annual income confiscated if they allow suspicious women in the inn and give them wine. Moreover, other prebendaries and clerics who do the same were to be punished by incarceration in the chapter tower for three days with only bread to eat and water to drink. Punished will be also those canons and other clerics who play (dice) at the table.²⁵⁷

The members of the Zagreb chapter were sometimes admonished for mingling with suspicious people as shows the case from August 1494. Two prebendaries of the Zagreb

²⁵⁴ Cf. Petra Vručina, “Uvreda i *fama publica* u kasnosrednjovjekovnim istočnojadranskim komunama,” [Insult and *fama publica* in Eastern Adriatic Communes during the Late Middle Ages] *Povijesni prilozi* 54 (2018): 39-64.

²⁵⁵ No. 50 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 62-63.

²⁵⁶ “[...] *consorcio nostro capitulari decernimus esse privandum et privamus in hiis scriptis, donec et quousque de scandalis suis se curaverit emendare et tandem emendatus gratiam meruerit obtinere* [...]”. No. 62 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 71-72.

²⁵⁷ “[...] *quod nequaquam permittat intiare mulieres suspectas et currentes ad vinum bibendum, neque ibidem noctantur, quicumque contra faciat sit privatus omnibus proventibus canonicalibus per integrum annum. Prebendarii vero et alii clerici ecclesie contra facientes ponantur ad turrin per triduum, ubi ieiunent in pane et aqua per eosdem tres dies* [...] *Eandem penam paciantur domini et alii clerici qui in tabernis de cetero ad tabulam luserint.*” No. 49 in Tkalčić, ed., “Izprave XV. vieka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola,” 62.

chapter, Francis and Martin, were compelled to promise that they would not take inside their house some suspicious men (*quasdam suspectas personas*), otherwise they would be deprived of their prebend.²⁵⁸ Finally, besides these examples for the chapter's efforts to maintain their image as an institution of high moral standards, other stipulations demonstrate that they were also trying to maintain their impeccable image as a religious institution. Thus, the chapter compiled stipulations in 1488 and 1489 concerning the punishment of those canons who did not attend the most important feasts celebrated in the Zagreb bishopric and the mass on Sunday.²⁵⁹ The Statutes of prebendaries also contained such stipulations.²⁶⁰

Although these examples may seem unrelated to the economy, they are indeed pertinent because good reputation inspired confidence, which was vital in attracting new revenues and maintaining the existing ones.

²⁵⁸ No. 374 in MCZ 2, 497.

²⁵⁹ No. 59 in Tkalčić, ed., "Izprave XV. veka iz crvene knjige zagrebačkog kaptola," 67.

²⁶⁰ Addenda A in MCZ 3, 300-302, 311. The prebendaries were also fined if they did not participate the funerals. Ibid, 304. See also in the Statutes: pt 1, ch. 37 in MHEZ 2, 36.

Conclusion

The present thesis looks at the ways in which trust influenced the administration of the incomes of the Zagreb chapter in the period of the episcopate of Bishop Oswald Túz (1466-1499). The evidence and analysis presented demonstrates that trust was an indispensable element in the efficient, that is profitable, functioning of the economic system of the Zagreb chapter. This was analyzed on several levels.

The first one was the relationship between the chapter and the state, i.e. the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia. Since the most important revenues of the chapter were the tithes, securing good relations between the bishop and the king was crucial. Even more so, considering that in the case of the Zagreb chapter, Hungarian-Croatian kings granted the tithe, which was allocated from their revenues. The same happened in other European countries, which is why the distinction between the tithe as an ecclesiastic and as state tax is rather blurred.²⁶¹ Furthermore, even though the revenues of the Zagreb chapter and Zagreb bishop were divided, in the sense that each of them collected their own tithes, strong trust relations between the bishop and the king nevertheless strongly impacted the collection of the chapter's tithes. More precisely, stable episcopal authority provided the chapter with the opportunity to exert more pressure on those nobles who opposed paying the tithes, and issuing regulations that made the collection more efficient, just as was shown in the case of Bishop Oswald.

The second level of the trust relations analyzed was that between the chapter and its subjects. Although the tithes and other seigneurial dues were obligatory and liable to fines if not paid, there was another reason why the peasants were willing to give up part of their surplus agricultural produce. In return for paying the dues and fulfilling other obligations, they expected exemptions in times of hardships to secure their subsistence—and evidence shows

²⁶¹ Cf. Eldevik, *Episcopal Power and Ecclesiastical Reform*, 37-38.

that the chapter granted those. Therefore, unlike Josip Adamček's suppositions, the majority of the tenant peasants most probably did not perceive the taking of their surplus as exploitation.

Besides the seigneurial dues, the Zagreb chapter's other income, were those revenues related to the religious activities of the chapter. Thus, the chapter received donations and testamentary bequests in return for celebrating masses for the salvation of the donors or their family members. Even though the surviving sources are too scarce for more thorough research, the evidence presented sufficed to demonstrate that the chapter went to great lengths to establish new liturgical practices that would attract the participation of laypeople, and to create and maintain the "sacred trust" in this way. New liturgical practices in this period are related to the more widespread practice of endowing altars and broadening the activities of the prebendaries. It remains to be analyzed what the situation was with other chapters with similar collegiate bodies in the medieval Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom. Since the Zagreb chapter acted as an institution in various capacities—as a state institution, as a religious one, and as a landlord, it was of crucial importance to preserve its good image. The sources show that the chapter was indeed consciously constructing and enforcing its image, which is why the members were liable to punishment, and in more severe cases expulsion, from the chapter.

The third level of the trust-relations that was examined, is related to the organizational practices of the Zagreb chapter. In order to efficiently administer its incomes, it was necessary to establish practices that would both be accepted by all members and enable the flexibility in decision making. In this respect, the chapter's corporate identity provided the tools for such an organization. From assemblies, elections and the officials' "control mechanisms" to the process of distribution of the income among the members of the Zagreb chapter, corporativism was the basis for creating confidence among the those involved. Regarding the administrative practices the Zagreb chapter, both followed the general patterns of Church practices and laws, and

developed its customs, such as the date for holding the assemblies and the decision to include an official elected by the very tenants on one of the estates, i.e. the “vojvoda.”

One of the administrative practices more thoroughly analyzed was the collection of the tithes. It was concluded that the majority of the tithes were collected in kind and that the reason for this was the practice of the lease of tithe. The lease prompted thinking about profit and maximization of the income. However, in order to rely on it, extensive tracking of agricultural production was necessary due to which today we have the inventories of tithes preserved from this period. More specifically, the inventories enabled following the amount and the type of the agricultural production as well as the number of tithe providers. Furthermore, the lease presents a specific custom of the Zagreb chapter since the canons leased the tithes usually only among themselves, while in other cases, the tithes could be leased to people outside the cathedral community.

Where there is trust, cases of distrust are also informative. A specific case of distrust, shared with other seignories, was that towards the market towns or boroughs. The market towns on the estates of the Zagreb chapter were not founded in order to develop themselves freely but to provide a center where trade and administration could take place under controlled conditions. Thus, despite their charters proclaiming autonomy and liberty, from the time of their foundation onwards, all the boroughs established on the estates of the Zagreb chapter—whose number was limited—more or less “stagnated” regarding their economic development, population, and the level of centrality.

Finally, and most importantly, this analysis has shown that the concept of trust has proven to be a useful tool in researching pre-industrial economy. Using this concept in a truly interdisciplinary way has shown that, albeit seemingly paradoxical, profit-oriented tendencies and striving to moral economy can coexist, thus challenging the idea of linear and “progressive” development in pre-industrial economies at large.

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