

# Social Movements in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Pashtun *Tahafuz* (protection) Movement of Pakistan (PTM)

By  
Muhammad Adil Zahoor

Submitted to  
Central European University  
Department of Nationalism Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (MA)  
in Nationalism Studies

Supervisor: Professor Daniel Bochsler

Budapest, Hungary  
2020

## Abstract

Regime type as a vital conditioning factor impacting mobilization patterns of social movements because of specific political opportunity structures present in different regimes has long evaded scholarly attention. Hybrid regime, as a regime type, and its relationship with contention is even more scantily researched. Another gap can be witnessed in the understanding of latent or unintended outcomes of social movements. As an attempt to fill this scholarly void, this research, with the empirical case of Pashtun *Tahafuz* (protection) Movement (PTM) of Pakistan, seeks to explore how social movements operate in peculiar hybrid regimes like Pakistan. The study employs 10 semi-structured qualitative Skype interviews with PTM and other smaller movements' activists to understand the relationship between mobilization and repression in Pakistan and discover movement's possible outcomes under such a regime type. The research finds that dual (emanating from both the military and political organs of the state) and haphazard repression by a hybrid regime, characterized by the dominance of military and limited political opportunity structure, can curtail the social movement mobilization in the short run, but fails to cease the movement. Instead, the movement becomes stronger in the long run and experiences increased mobilization against the state. A social movement operating under such a regime type may also have a spillover effect on other social movements as an unintended consequence of its mobilization and progress.

## **Acknowledgements**

I'm greatly thankful to my supervisor, Professor Daniel Bochsler for the organization of multiple thesis workshops and his extensive comments on my thesis drafts, helping me review and improve my scholarship. Professor's uplifting and supportive emails during the Covid-19 outbreak were also immensely helpful in boosting the spirits and concentration in these daunting times. Special thanks to my Brother, Bilal Zahoor, for his comments on my initial draft and his acute editing eye. I would also like to thank Muzamil Khan for his help in recruiting the interviewees for research.

## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Research aim .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Chapter 1: Theorizing social movements and regime types: enlarging the theoretical.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1.1 Social movements and contention in democracies .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1.2 Social movements and contention in authoritarian states .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1.3 Theoretical poverty: social movements and contention in hybrid regimes .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>1.4 Theoretical neglect: social movements outcomes in all regime types .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Conceptualizing hybrid regimes: Pakistan: a peculiar case .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>2.1 Genesis and formation of a praetorian structure.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>2.2 Contemporary hybrid existence of the state and its peculiarities.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>2.3 Contention under a hybrid system .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Chapter 3: Clash of a peculiar social movement with a peculiar hybrid regime.....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>3.1 Pashtun nationalism: a historical overview.....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3.2 PTM and the Pakistani hybrid state.....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>3.3 The revival of dormant Left: PTM's spillover effect and its unintended consequence?.....</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Research Findings .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>4.1 Research Methodology.....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>4.2 Research Findings.....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>4.2.1 Dual and novel repression in a hybrid regime.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>4.2.2 State repression and social movement's mobilization in a hybrid regime.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>4.2.3 Social movement's spillover effect or movement-movement influence in a hybrid regime .....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>64</b>

## Introduction

Social movements<sup>1</sup> as a subject has experienced theoretical rife in the twenty first century, especially with the rise of Arab Spring and the increasing interest of scholars to dissect the genesis, nature and potential of the movements to bring, if any, serious political and social change. Although this rise in interest and subsequent research produced have given rise to a substantial body of scholarly works, majority of this literature deals with contention<sup>2</sup> under democracies and takes little account of the varied nature of political opportunity in different types of regimes and its impact on social movements and contention. This dearth in political opportunity theory to take into account comparative analysis of different regimes while analyzing social movements, different set of political institutions present in these regimes, and “how the form of the state differentially affects the premises for oppositional collective action”<sup>3</sup>, moved some of the scholars<sup>4</sup> to research how social movements operate in non-democracies or

---

<sup>1</sup> This study would use the social movement definition provided by Charles Tilly, according to which, “A *social movement consists of a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness*”, See, Charles Tilly, ‘Social movements as historically specific clusters of political performances’, *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 38,1993, 7

<sup>2</sup> This study would use contention interchangeably with social movements. The definition of contention used would be the one prescribed by Doug McAdam Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, according which “*We have adopted the term "contentious politics" rather than the familiar triad "social movements, revolutions, and collective action," not simply for economy of language, but because each of these terms connects closely with a specific subfield representing only part of the scholarly terrain this article traverses. We include collective interaction in contentious politics in so far as: 1) it involves contention: the making of interest-entailing claims on others; and 2) at least one party to the interaction (including third parties) is a government: an organization controlling the principal concentrated means of coercion within a defined territory*”, see, Doug McAdam Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, ‘To map contentious politics’, *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 1, no. 1, 1996,17

<sup>3</sup> Maryjane Osa and Kurt Schock, ‘A Long, Hard Slog: Political Opportunities, Social Networks and the Mobilization of Dissent in Non-Democracies’, *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 27, 2007, 124

<sup>4</sup> Referring to the following studies and scholars: Maryjane Osa and Kurt Schock, A Long, Hard Slog; Celia Valiente, ‘Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies: The women’s movement in Franco’s Spain’, *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 38, 2015; Huci Corduneanu Cristina, and Maryjane Osa, Running uphill: political opportunity in non-democracies’ *Comparative Sociology* 2, no. 4, 2003; Kurt Schock, ‘People power and political opportunities: Social movement mobilization and outcomes in the Philippines and Burma’, *Social problems* 46, no. 3, 1999 ; Vincent Boudreau, *Resisting dictatorship: Repression and protest in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press, 2009 & Paul D, Almeida ‘Opportunity organizations and threat-induced contention: Protest waves in authoritarian settings’, *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 2, 2003

authoritarian regimes. The difference in the political opportunity is striking, as non-democracies, broadly, are typically characterized by curtailed level of constitutional protection, relatively closed political systems, fully or partially censored media, limited independence for judicial systems, and perceived high degree of repression. The interplay of these factors is likely to have implications for social movements' mobilization patterns and outcomes. But even as Valiente points out, most of the scholarship dealing with contention under non-democracies has "mainly studied transitions to democracy, policies and protests"<sup>5</sup>, with little attention paid to movements' mobilization patterns, forms and continuity. This ilk of scholarship also fails to take notice of social movements taking place within an important variant of non-democracies, the hybrid regimes. The unusual nature of hybrid regimes—comprising a mix of democratic and authoritarian tendencies<sup>6</sup>—and the complex set of institutions underpinning these regimes—which can make the patterns of contention far more convoluted than in democracies and authoritarian systems—demand that separate attention is given to understanding how contention takes place under these regimes and what we can learn from it.

Debate becomes even more interesting when hybrid regimes differ in character from each other. As Levitsky and Way argue, hybrids are many and there are multiple ways to be hybrid.<sup>7</sup> The problem with the small body of literature concerning the social movements in hybrid regimes is that it primarily deals with hybrid regimes which came to existence after the disintegration of Soviet Union, leaving out a sizeable set of hybrid regimes operating in other parts of the world. This makes the generalizability of these works questionable. These analyses

---

<sup>5</sup>Celia Valiente, Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies, 284

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Matthijs Bogaards, 'How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism', *Democratization* 16, no. 2, 2009

<sup>7</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, 2010

also fall short of analyzing contention under anomalous hybrid regimes deviating from the “paradigmatic case of [Russia]”<sup>8</sup>. Pakistan is one such anomalous case of a hybrid regime. The complex ways in which a contention may take place under the peculiar nature of Pakistan’s hybrid regime and the kind of outcomes, intended or unintended, that may emanate from such a contention is what makes this study novel. Besides the afore-mentioned gaps in social movements’ scholarship, another dearth lies in the realm of taking account of the multifarious outcomes social movements may engender. According to Giugni, scholarship dealing with the results primarily concerns the movements’ political and policy outcomes, ignoring the institutional and cultural impacts.<sup>9</sup> Broadly, it has been a case of seeing social movements through a normative lens of “success” and “failure”, disregarding the wide-ranging consequences movements may produce.<sup>10</sup> As Tilly, among others, rightly point out, social movements may not only produce pronounced impacts, but latent ones as well.<sup>11</sup> Sometimes it could just be a shift in public attitudes, certain changes in values, the formation of collective identity or a broader ideological synchronization, resulting in a movement-movement<sup>12</sup> influence.

Through the empirical case of Pashtun *Tahafuz* (protection) Movement (PTM), a Pashtun non-violent human rights movement of Pakistan, this study seeks to fill the theoretical gap on the question of contention under hybrid regimes and the resulting unintended consequences. *The task is twofold: to see, based on the case of PTM, how a hybrid regime like Pakistan impacts a movement’s patterns of mobilization through inconsistent and dual repression and coercion and*

---

<sup>8</sup> Graeme B Robertson, *The politics of protest in hybrid regimes: Managing dissent in post-communist Russia*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2

<sup>9</sup> Marco G Giugni, ‘Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements’, *Annual review of sociology* 24, no. 1, 1998, 371

<sup>10</sup> Sidney G Tarrow, *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 185

<sup>11</sup> Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds, *How social movements matter*. Vol. 10, University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

<sup>12</sup> David S Meyer and & Nancy Whittier, ‘Social movement spillover’, *Social problems* 41, no. 2, 1994, 277

*how the movement impacts state; and whether the movement, operating under such a scenario, leaves any socio-political and institutional impact or has any unintended consequences.*

The first chapter of the study lays out the theoretical framework by taking account of scholarship dealing with social movements and contention under different regime types—democracies, authoritarianism and hybrid regimes—eventually uncovering the theoretical poverty the intersection of hybrid regimes and social movements is marked with. The chapter would also shed light on the existing theory on movements and their possible outcomes and would unravel why the theory is not adequate to understand social movements' outcomes. The second chapter concerns the peculiar nature of Pakistani hybrid regime, explaining how such a regime deals with contention. Bringing in the empirical case, the third chapter describes the PTM, its historical link with Pashtun nationalism predating the partition of India in 1947, the interaction of the movement with the Pakistani state, its outcomes and the resurrection of other movements and dissenting voices in the country. The fourth chapter describes the research methodology and findings, followed by the conclusion.

## **Research aim**

The study argues that under a hybrid regime like Pakistan, a social movement like PTM experiences haphazard and truncated patterns of mobilization and demobilization because of irregular and dual form of oppression from the state, media censorship of the movement's activities and limited political opportunity, making the movement oscillate between periods of mobilization and immobilization. These asymmetrical patterns of coercion emanate from ill-defined power structures, unstable nature of the regime and limited space for civilian government, putting the political elite under continuous conundrum of action or inaction. In



other words, whether to make its interests identical with military for regime safety by stifling the movement or to let the movement proliferate in accordance with constitutional freedom is what keeps haunting the political elite. At the heart of this conundrum lies the complex institutional make-up of a peculiar hybrid regime, called Pakistan.

The study would argue that a movement operating under such ambiguous conditions with hybrid and dual nature of coercion, from both civilian and military institutions, experiences abeyance<sup>13</sup> and can likely be dormant for a period but is unlikely to be eradicated completely in the long run. Instead, the movement may experience greater mobilization and resistance against the state. The movement may also act as catalyst for other similar rights-based movements, causing a plausible spillover or movement-movement<sup>14</sup> effect. This may help us infer that social movements like PTM, operating under hybrid regimes like Pakistan, move and operate a lot more precariously than they would in a democracy with solidified and well-defined institutional make up (as “political leaders in democratic regimes are less likely to use repression in response to contentious challenges”<sup>15</sup>) or in an authoritarian state where oppression is far less calculated and more out-right<sup>16</sup>. The movement’s chances of backlashing and heralding movement-movement influence may also be higher in a hybrid regime than in a democracy or authoritarianism. This also makes correspondence between the state and the movement more difficult. The two hypotheses for this study, therefore, are:

---

<sup>13</sup> See for example, Celia Valiente, Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies

<sup>14</sup> David S Meyer, and Nancy Whittier, Social movement spillover, 277-298

<sup>15</sup> James C Franklin, ‘Contentious challenges and government responses in Latin America’, *Political Research Quarterly* 62, no. 4, 2009, 704

<sup>16</sup> Sabine C Carey, The dynamic relationship between protest and repression." *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 1, 2006, 4

*(H1) Haphazard and dual form of repression against a social movement in a hybrid regime like Pakistan causes greater mobilization and resistance against the state.*

*(H2) Social movements operating under such intricate patterns of repression in a hybrid regime do not cease easily; instead they serve as a catalyst for other movements and have a considerable spillover effect.*

# **Chapter 1: Theorizing social movements and regime types: enlarging the theoretical contours to study contention**

## **Introduction**

The scholarship on social movements is replete with resource mobilization theory which does not consider the importance of political opportunity structures existing in various regimes to study contention. The purpose of this chapter is to present existing literature on political opportunity under different regime types, which directly or indirectly takes under consideration the importance of regime type to study social movements and contention. It would also present the inadequacies in the existing literature to study contention under hybrid regimes and the movements' outcomes in such regimes. To simplify and to make the conceptual terrain less-confusing, as would likely be the case because of the presence of a huge number of definitions, we would use the following definition of political opportunity structures for our study. According to Eisinger, opportunity structures can be defined as “environmental variables that increase or decrease or lessen the probability of goal attainment of individuals (“chances of success”) if groups are politically active”<sup>17</sup>.

Section 1.1 would discuss social movements and contention in democracies, and section 1.2 would focus social movements and contention in authoritarian states. The purpose of these two sections are to analyze, based on the existing literature, how democratic and authoritarian states as regime types deal with contention, what we can learn about the role of repression and social movements' mobilization and their outcomes in these regime types, and how does it inform our hypotheses regarding contention in hybrid regimes.

---

<sup>17</sup> Cited in Karl-Dieter, Opp, *Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis*, Routledge, 2009, 167

Section 1.3 is about the theoretical poverty in the existing literature vis-à-vis studying social movements in hybrid regimes. We would also look at the ability of the studies to inform us about repression and mobilization patterns and movement outcomes in hybrid regime. This section will also identify the gaps in existing literature on the subject and document the inability of existing studies to be generalizable. Moreover, we would assess the importance of this study in terms of being contributory to the literature on contention under hybrid regimes.

Section 1.4 would discuss theoretical neglect to study social movements' outcomes in general and how here regime type as a conditioning factor to understand movement outcomes should be considered as well. We would also present the movement outcomes theory on different regime types and argue that movements' outcomes in hybrid regimes are not the same as in other regime types. Here, we would relate the discussion to our second theoretical contribution.

### **1.1 Social movements and contention in democracies**

Scholars who deem regime type as an important conditioning factor for social movements view democracies to be more accommodative of contention compared to its authoritarian and semi-authoritarian counterparts. This perceived leniency come from institutions less repressive in character. Democratic institutions are considered to encourage compromise and cooperation, and the chances of dissent being responded with repression are conceived to be less. Plethora of empirical studies measures this relationship of protest and repression in democracies. Davenport<sup>18</sup> and Rummel<sup>19</sup> find the chances of democracies reciprocating dissent and protest with repression to be less. Carey finds that, “democracies are more cooperative than other regime

---

<sup>18</sup> See, Christian Davenport, ‘Human rights and the democratic proposition’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 1, 1999

<sup>19</sup> See, Rudolph Rummel, *Power kills: Democracy as a method of nonviolence*, Transaction Publishers, 2002

types”<sup>20</sup>, however, increased dissent could force democracies to respond with negative sections. Others like Beetham<sup>21</sup>, think that the relationship between democracy, repression and dissent is incongruent to measure and repression is intrinsic to democracy. In another study, Davenport considers democratic principles of participation and contestation through the electioneering as an important obstruction for democratic leaders using repression to control dissent. Democratic values of “passivity, toleration, communication and deliberation” are thought to be at stake with the use of repression against contention here.<sup>22</sup> In one of his other works, the regulatory authority of democracy, according to Davenport depends on the rhetoric of contention. In simpler terms, the intensity of what and how it is being said matters. If a movement conforms to the prescribed limits of dissent in a democracy, the chances of it being rattled with coercion would be lower<sup>23</sup>. Also, because “democratic regimes are less responsive to bureaucratic inertia and less likely to be caught within the throngs of habitually applied repressive behavior”<sup>24</sup>. Some scholars regard ratification of international human rights agreements under democracies to be an external hindrance, making the use of repression to be costly for political leaders.<sup>25</sup> Increased opportunities for challengers in democracies through judicial protections, more than in authoritarian states is a pivotal difference for Osa and Schock regarding the ‘axis of variance’ in democracies and non-democracies, when it comes to use of repression against dissenters<sup>26</sup>. Keeping regime type as a contextual factor and its impact on important variables like concession, toleration, repression, Franklin found that in a democracy contentious challenge and

---

<sup>20</sup> Sabine C Carey, The dynamic relationship between protest and repression, 9

<sup>21</sup> David Beetham, *Democracy and human rights*. Vol. 249, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999

<sup>22</sup> Christian Davenport, ‘State repression and political order’, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 10, 2007, 10

<sup>23</sup> Christian Davenport, ‘Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 1995, 708

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 706

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, Oona A Hathaway, ‘Do human rights treaties make a difference?’, *The Yale Law Journal* 111, no. 8, 2002

<sup>26</sup> Maryjane Osa, and Kurt Schock, A Long, Hard Slog: Political Opportunities, 127

government's response would depend on executive support and the strength of the leader.<sup>27</sup> Sydney Tarrow in one of his pioneer works on social movements, while regarding opportunities and threats present under different regimes as an important factor shaping contention, found federalism being a democratic component favorable for dissenters<sup>28</sup>. Tarrow, however, warns us of this linear and celebratory conception of democracies when it comes to using repression against contenders, and provides us a laundry list of legal measures regarding protests and increased policing of the citizens taken by the American democratic state under Bush administration after 9/11.<sup>29</sup> Davenport and Soule backs this analysis showing through a multi-dimensional indicators how over the years, American state have become more aggressive when it comes to ill-treatment of protestors by the police.<sup>30</sup> We understood in this section with the help of various studies that democracy as a regime type fare generally well for the contenders. Some intrinsic democratic principles and elements of cooperation and tolerance discourage using repression against dissenters, however under extraordinary conditions democracies could become repressive as well. The next section shall analyze contention under authoritarian states.

## **1.2 Social movements and contention in authoritarian states**

Scholars who started studying social movements in authoritarian states had a problem with under-theorization and theoretical bias dominating the contention studies, where unevenly more attention has been given to studying social movements in democracies, and not enough consideration has been given to the differences in the political opportunity frameworks in democracies and non-democracies or authoritarian states. Even in few cases where effort has

---

<sup>27</sup> James C Franklin, Contentious challenges and government responses in Latin America, 708

<sup>28</sup> Sidney G Tarrow, Power in movement, 176

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 170

<sup>30</sup> Sarah Soule and Christian Davenport, 'Velvet glove, iron fist, or even hand? Protest policing in the United States, 1960-1990', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14, no. 1, 2009, 2,5

been made to study contention in repressive settings, scholars have tried to study repressive regimes' transition to democracies or periods of liberalization.<sup>31</sup> And in others, dismantling of an authoritarian regime through social movements has been perceived to be a sudden unexpected event<sup>32</sup>. In some nominal works in the studies of contention, high-risk activism has been studied through 'microstructural factors', not even vaguely taking into consideration the role of political opportunities in different regimes<sup>33</sup>. According to the scholars who studied contention in non-democratic settings, in order to have a holistic understanding of political opportunities, and how could institutional differences between democracies and authoritarian states influence social movements' mobilization and movement outcomes, a new approach needed to be taken regarding political opportunities. An approach, "which assumes that political opportunities may not be independent of each other and that political opportunities may have differential effects on dissent depending on the larger configuration of opportunities in which they occur".<sup>34</sup> Keeping these considerations under conceptual framework of analyses, Schock on his empirical study on social movements mobilization and outcomes under authoritarian settings in Philippines and Burma, finds out that accounting for political opportunity frameworks, 'configurations of opportunities', if examined, seriously impacts the end results of movements' mobilization and outcomes in authoritarian states. Restricted press freedom, closed nature of non-democracies in the mentioned regimes and keeping international context in mind, Schock found out that repression had a differential impact on mobilization than democracies<sup>35</sup>. In another study with Maryjane Osa, calling political opportunities in authoritarian settings, 'a long hard slog', Schock

---

<sup>31</sup> Celia Valiente, Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies, 262

<sup>32</sup> Maryjane Osa, and Kurt Schock, A Long Hard Slog, 126

<sup>33</sup> See, for example, Doug McAdam, 'Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer', *American journal of sociology* 92, no. 1, 1986

<sup>34</sup> Kurt Schock, 'People power and political opportunities: Social movement mobilization and outcomes in the Philippines and Burma', *Social problems* 46, no. 3, 1999, 355

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 370-371

finds that because of higher barriers to mobilize, political opportunities in non-democracies are mainly driven by the amalgamation of the following: “divided elites, influential allies, increasing/decreasing repression, media access/information flows, and social networks”.<sup>36</sup> These factors together shape the form and result of contention in authoritarian regimes. Studying women’s movement in Franco’s Spain, Valiente finds that not only social movements under authoritarian regimes “constitute hostile political environment par excellence”, these regimes seriously impact social movements with regard to location, goals and activities, making movements go in abeyance throughout the period of repression, however as situation becomes favorable for them; either through the end of dictatorial period or some increased human rights support internationally, they can rise again<sup>37</sup>. Studying political opportunities in non-democracies through a quantitative analysis, Osa and Huci found out that propensity of non-democratic regimes to be repressive against dissenters is very important, however, ironically, they found no correlation between mobilization and repression<sup>38</sup>. Deeming activism under authoritarian periods in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, ‘high-risk collective action’, Mara Loveman finds that activism under such conditions rely on social network ties and face-to-face networks. She however says that the common sensical understanding of demobilization which occurs in response to state oppression does not provides us a complete picture. It is also important to understand the role of ‘early risers’ in stimulating the collective action to follow, which paves way for others resonating with the cause.<sup>39</sup> An in-depth analyses of literature on contention in authoritarian settings tells us that compared to democracies, authoritarian regimes are more

---

<sup>36</sup> Maryjane Osa, and Kurt Schock, ‘A Long, Hard Slog: Political Opportunities’, 143

<sup>37</sup> Celia Valiente, Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies, 276 & 284

<sup>38</sup> Corduneanu Huci and Maryjane Osa, ‘Running uphill: political opportunity in non-democracies’ *Comparative Sociology* 2, no. 4, 2003, 622

<sup>39</sup> Mara Loveman, ‘High-risk collective action: Defending human rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina’, *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 2, 1998, 517



repressive to contention ,although repression in such settings could have variegated impact on contention and social movements mobilization and outcomes.

### **1.3 Theoretical poverty: social movements and contention in hybrid regimes**

What we regard here as theoretical poverty is the scarcity in scholarship to understand social movement and contention under hybrid regimes, which is also one of the main drivers of this study. The section would analyze the present literature and even the literature remotely related on the subject. As conveyed in the introduction previously, majority of the literature dealing with social movements in hybrid regimes, either does not consider the wide-ranging forms of hybrid as part of their analysis or does it cosmetically, sees it from top and does not completely unravels the intricacies entangling contention under different hybrid regimes. One of the first few to predict protest patterns in hybrid and closed political systems was Tocqueville who said that “protest is most likely in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors”<sup>40</sup>. Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow argue that contention in hybrid regimes produce “polarization and unpredictable results”<sup>41</sup> but does not throw much light on how and why this happens. Some suggest that “there is more murder in the middle”<sup>42</sup>. Moving beyond these statement-oriented analyses, Graeme Robertson’s nominal work on politics of protest in hybrid regimes is an interesting addition to the vacuum of analyses in the field. Robertson says that protest patterns in hybrid regimes “are likely to be driven by three key variables: organizational

---

<sup>40</sup> Cited in Peter K Eisinger, ‘The conditions of protest behavior in American cities’, *American political science review* 67, no. 1, 1973, 15

<sup>41</sup> Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *contentious politics*, Oxford University Press, 2015, 75

<sup>42</sup> Referring to the following studies: Helen, Fein, ‘More murder in the middle: Life-integrity violations and democracy in the world’, *Hum. Rts. Q.* 17,1995, 170; Patrick M Regan and Errol A. Henderson, ‘Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: are democracies internally less violent?’, *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1, 2002

ecology, state mobilization strategies, and elite competition”<sup>43</sup>. In one of his other works on understanding strike patterns and labor organizations in hybrid regimes, Robertson say that in hybrid regimes, “strike patterns will depend on political and economic resources of the region”<sup>44</sup>. But extending these analyses to other hybrid cases where Russia, does not serve as a *raison d’etre* for classifying hybrid regimes, could be a conceptual over-stretching. Through a post-colonial lens, dissecting the state-society conflict in hybrid regime of Hong-Kong, Brian Fong<sup>45</sup> levels governance crisis in the state to the incapability of the regime to assuage civil society grievances. No details however have been provided on mobilization patterns of civil society and tools of oppression, if any, used by the state in the hybrid regime of Hong Kong. Some other studies<sup>46</sup> which talk about anocracies and their higher probability of instilling civil war and contention could help us gauge the topography of literature showing some relevance with our anomalous hybrid case of Pakistan, but cannot be our conceptual holy grail, especially when we are looking for cases, where the “actor-based differences, such as the position of military in relation to the government”<sup>47</sup>, and their impact on social movements mobilization and outcomes matter. We excavated in this section few studies studying contention under hybrid regimes and questioned their generalizability because of their inability to take under the realm of their study, the expansive range of hybrid regimes and its peculiar existences. We also understood that the current literature on social movements and contention in hybrid regimes does not talk explicitly about patterns of repression from the state and its impact on social movements mobilization, let

---

<sup>43</sup> Graeme B Robertson, *The politics of protest in hybrid regimes: Managing dissent in post-communist Russia*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 6

<sup>44</sup> Graeme B Robertson, ‘Strikes and labor organization in hybrid regimes’, *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4, 2007, 783

<sup>45</sup> Brian Fong, ‘State-society conflicts under Hong Kong’s hybrid regime: governing coalition building and civil society challenges’, *Asian Survey* 53, no. 5, 2013

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, Patrick M Regan, and Sam R. Bell, ‘Changing lanes or stuck in the middle: Why are anocracies more prone to civil wars?’, *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 4, 2010 ; James Raymond Vreeland, ‘The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy’, *Journal of conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3, 2008

<sup>47</sup> Sabine C Carey, The dynamic relationship between protest and repression, 9

alone talks about social movements outcomes in these regimes. The chapter to follow analyzes one such peculiar case of Pakistan's hybrid regime and how does contention takes place in such a regime and what outcomes does it leave. The next section shall analyze social movements outcomes in different regime types.

#### **1.4 Theoretical neglect: social movements outcomes in all regime types**

Scholars have pointed out to the fact that movements outcomes and their consequences have been one of the most forgotten topics in the social movements literature.<sup>48</sup> One reason which usually comes out to be the factor behind little attention to movement outcomes and their consequences, is the empirical and methodological difficulties researchers face in measuring the outcomes of the movement<sup>49</sup>. Intra and extra movement outcomes have been even more difficult to measure.<sup>50</sup> Even in the existing literature most of the scholarship just tries to measure very pronounced outcomes of the movement like political outcomes, either their regime changing and regime dethroning capabilities or their role in democratization in a certain regime. Giugni warns us of this tendency in the literature to see social movements as 'homogenous identities' and proclivity to see them subjectively because it "overemphasizes the intention of movement participants in producing certain changes"<sup>51</sup>, which could make us shy away from studying their indirect or unintended consequences, not directly related to their demands. Charles Tilly, Marco Giugni and Doug McAdam came up with two phenomenal volumes<sup>52</sup> to fill this theoretical gap and bring our attention that how movements matter beyond the normative understanding of

---

<sup>48</sup> Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds, *How social movements matter*, xv

<sup>49</sup> Jennifer, Earl 'Methods, movements, and outcomes', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 22, 2000, 4

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>51</sup> Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds, *How social movements matter*, xxi

<sup>52</sup> Referring to the following volumes: Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds. *How social movements matter*, University of Minnesota Press, 1999; Marco G Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds. *From contention to democracy*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999

movements' victories and defeats. But here again we feel that regime type as a conditioning factor should be considered, which was not a major variable in this literature. As Tarrow argues that the shape of the movement outcomes would depend on the political opportunity structures operating in a regime<sup>53</sup>. Movements outcomes will depend on political opportunities present in a specific regime and hence must be carefully observed keeping the institutional and political structures of a regime in context. Also, we can say that outcomes in a hybrid regime do not necessarily be the same as in democracy or authoritarianism. As developed in section 1.1, with democracies overall providing a more inclusive environment with less repression on social movements, one could expect that social movements are less likely to trigger more mobilization and resistance against the state, compared to authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes where increased degrees of repression, could trigger more mobilization and resistance. We argue that in a hybrid regimes like Pakistan with inconsistent and dual repression and coercion, this could increase dissenting voices in a state<sup>54</sup>, and can have a movement-movement impact or spillover effect on other movements, which after the breakthrough done by an 'early riser'<sup>55</sup> on the political scene, could become active. This could be attributed as unintended outcomes of social movement in a hybrid regime, not directly related to their demands. We understood in this section that social movements' outcomes literature has huge insufficiency in general and even more scantiness when understanding social movements' outcomes in different regime types, especially hybrid regimes. Since a part of our study deals with social movements outcomes and their unintended outcomes in hybrid regimes, we would heed some attention to this latent and unintended side of movement outcomes through our case of PTM and try to fill this theoretical

---

<sup>53</sup> Sidney G Tarrow, *Power in movement*, 185

<sup>54</sup> Similar observations have been made by Karen. See, Rasler Karen, 'Concessions, repression, and political protest in the Iranian revolution', *American Sociological Review*, 1996, 134

<sup>55</sup> Mara Loveman, *High-risk collective action*, 517

neglect of understanding social movements outcomes in hybrid regimes. In detail in the chapter 3, we shall explore how PTM became that ‘early riser’ on the Pakistani political scene, heralding smaller movements which are active today.

## **Chapter 2: Conceptualizing hybrid regimes: Pakistan: a peculiar case**

### **Introduction**

As developed in the previous chapter, in order to understand how social movements operate beyond the myopic understanding of hybrid regimes, which few works done on the subject consider as their conceptual landscape, we must bring into our analysis some other cases. Regimes which are hybrid in nature but have peculiar institutional and power dynamics operating in them and use different repressive tools to stifle contention. Pakistan is an exemplar of one such regime. The purpose of this chapter is to unveil this anomalous nature of a Pakistani hybrid regime and tell about the institutional dynamics present in such a regime.

The first section describes the genesis and formation of the praetorian structure in the initial years of country's presence, which was disproportionately empowered by the military, and then would inform about its contemporary hybrid structure and its peculiarities. Thirdly, it would show how this continuing institutional imbalance present even in the contemporary existence of the state, could impact a social movement through haphazard, dual and novel coercion means through different state apparatuses, and impact social movements outcomes, especially when a movement like PTM is trying to tackle unbridled military power in the country, demanding, among others things, an investigation into human rights violations committed by the security forces during War on Terror(WOT) on ethnic Pashtuns.

### **2.1 Genesis and formation of a praetorian structure**

The culmination of cold war brought several new states into existence which were neither purely dictatorial nor completely democratic. Several scholars till date have been trying to make sense of these cases which fall in the middle. Some regard them as hybrid, competitive-

authoritarian<sup>56</sup>, semi-democracies<sup>57</sup> and others, as ambiguous regimes.<sup>58</sup> But the proliferation of these multiple sub-categories of non-democracies and even every-day coining of new terms to make sense of them, is still not adequate to give us an all-encompassing understanding of all the cases, especially if some post-colonial specificities<sup>59</sup> are not part of our conceptual terrain. In this section we shall talk about the genesis and formation of one such case. Created on the bases of Two-Nation theory<sup>60</sup>, the moth-eaten newly emerged Pakistani state in its early years of existence was from the start dominated by the military, as compared to its weak political elite at the time. Here the country's praetorian phenomenon shares some affiliation with other post-colonial or developing states of Latin America, Asia and Africa. Huntington also talks about the modernizing influence militaries had on some post-colonial states, and how militaries in these respective states became dominant power players.<sup>61</sup> According to some scholars, role of military in the Pakistani politics was inevitable because its army was already a formidable and well-developed institution even before the country's creation. This became possible because Punjab (one of its four provinces), which became the power-center of the newly created state, was a quasi-military state already.<sup>62</sup> Other factors for genesis of military's role in politics are regarded

---

<sup>56</sup> See for example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive authoritarianism*, 2010

<sup>57</sup> See for example, Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, 'Classifying political regimes in Latin', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36, no. 1, 2001

<sup>58</sup> Larry Diamond, 'Elections without democracy: Thinking about hybrid regimes', *Journal of democracy* 13, no. 2, 2002, 21

<sup>59</sup> By post-colonial specificities we mean what Hamza Alavi refers to as "historical specificity of post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from structural changes brought about by the colonial experience" and "the superstructures of political and administrative institutions", see, Hamza Alavi, 'The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review* 74, 1973, 344

<sup>60</sup> The Two-nation theory propagated by the Muslim League a political party, which at the time of the decolonization of United India was championing Muslims rights. The theory talked about religious, cultural and social differences between the two dominant communities living in India at the time, Hindus and Muslims, and hence based on these dissimilarities, Pakistan should be crafted as a separate state from the Muslim-majority provinces of India. See for example, Mushirul Hasan, 'Memories of a fragmented nation: rewriting the histories of India's partition', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1998

<sup>61</sup> See, Samuel P Huntington, *Political order in changing societies*, Yale University Press, 2006

<sup>62</sup> During the colonial period, Punjab used to be the biggest recruitment ground for almost half of the soldiers from India for the British. After partition of the sub-continent and creation of Pakistan, it was easy for the military to take

to the perceived ubiquitous threat from India due to the early war of Kashmir in 1947-48, which cultivated the need for the founding fathers of the state to have a strong military; US-led security aid which further strengthened the military power; “national security syndrome”<sup>63</sup> in the country; and the decay of political institutions in general because of the inability of the political elite to create solidified political system from the start. These inadequacies in its political system, coupled with delayed process of constitution making<sup>64</sup>, paved way for the role of military in politics for the years to come.

The first military coup came in 1958, which continued until 1969. The first democratic elections were held in 1970 which led to the creation of a civilian government which lasted until 1977. The period of 1971-77 under the leadership of Z.A Bhutto is regarded in Pakistan’s political history as the only time where a civilian government maintained its supremacy over military. Part of the reason here is given to the civil war in 1971 and separation of country’s East wing, which created Bangladesh, forcing military to go back to barracks for few years. But military’s role in politics was soon rejuvenated as another coup came in 1978, which aborted the democratic constitution and ushered a new wave of military-led Islamization in the country in the 80s, which ended in 1988. The 90s were marked with the toppling of one civilian government after the other under “corruption” charges, using some constitutional provisions, which enabled the President of the country to dismiss an elected civilian government<sup>65</sup>, under military

---

over the state apparatus of the fragile state. See for example, Tan Tai Yong, ‘Punjab and the making of Pakistan: The roots of a civil-military state’, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 18, no. 1, 1995, 181

<sup>63</sup> Muhammad Waseem talks about national security syndrome in Pakistan where army was regarded as a caretaker of the state’s ideological frontiers from the start and how the army used this “caretaker” doctrine to intervene in politics. Waseem compares this phenomenon in Pakistan to its presence in Turkey as well and how it creates a civilian-military rift in these countries. See, Mohammad Waseem. ‘Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan’, in Rajshree Jetly, ed, *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, Routledge India, 2012, 185

<sup>64</sup> The first constitution of Pakistan came in 1956, almost 9 years of the country’s existence, which seriously obstructed its democratic growth in the early years of the state’s existence.

<sup>65</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: inside Pakistan’s military economy*, Penguin Random House India, 2017, 36-37



supervision. Another coup came in 1999, which lasted until 2008. The next section shall talk about this nascent emerging democracy in the country from 2008 onwards, its contemporary existence in a hybrid form and the institutional intricacies present under such a system.

## **2.2 Contemporary hybrid existence of the state and its peculiarities**

As discussed in the previous section, the birth of the praetorian structure, which was laid down during the country's birth, went on to contrive its political institutions to grow under military surveillance, and paved way for institutionalized role of military in the years to come. In the seventy-two years of Pakistan's existence as a sovereign state so far, country has spent majority of its time under military dictatorships, with intermittent democratic rules under military tutelage. The latest election in the country marked the second successful completion of five years of democratic rule, without a military coup in the country and towards a democratic path, which started in 2008. To some this nascent emerging space for at least the electoral side of democracy in the country, has been possible due to military's declining interest in outright power, as long as its corporate interests<sup>66</sup>, and its "role in foreign policy, especially in regard to India and the United States"<sup>67</sup> remains intact. Ayesha Siddiqi takes a hexa-fold approach to understand civil-military relations in Pakistan over the years, "which includes three clusters and functions: civilian supremacy in democratic and authoritarian systems; domination of ruler, arbitrator or parent-guardian military; and finally, warlordism"<sup>68</sup>. We can say that in the current period military has acquired a parent-guardian role. It acquiesces elections but carefully maneuvers the electioneering towards its favorable party by confining opposition and remaining

---

<sup>66</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi talks in detail about Pakistan's military's economic power, and how why one of the major reasons behind military's continuous maintenance of power and intervention in civilian affairs, is its corporate interests, See Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy*

<sup>67</sup> Chaitram Singh and Michael Bailey, 'Praetorian Democracy, Illiberal but Enduring: Pakistan as Exemplar', *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 35, 2013, 117-118

<sup>68</sup> Cited in Mohammad Waseem, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 193

above the political fray. The recent election in 2018 brought a center-right populist party, *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf* (Pakistan Movement for Justice) (PTI) to power, led by an ex-cricketer, Imran Khan. Substantial evidence<sup>69</sup> suggests that PTI came to power at the behest of perceived military's support after a very controversial election, marred with limited electioneering space for opposition parties, and a dubious corruption scandal against ex-prime minister, Nawaz Sharif.<sup>70</sup>

The picture laid out so far about Pakistan's hybrid regime characteristics could confuse us to think that the regime is more tilting towards electoral authoritarianism. An intrinsically authoritarian regime with a democratic façade. Again, it's important, as Adeney and Mufti inform us that some hybrid regimes deserve separate consideration where we do not just see them as “diminished type of democracy or authoritarianism but they must be categorized along a multidimensional continuum to understand the dynamics of power within the political system”<sup>71</sup> or what Denk and Silander call “degree of institutional variation in political regimes”<sup>72</sup>. So, it is important to get rid of unidimensional or dichotomous measures to characterize a regime. In the Pakistani case, it is imperative that the two successful democratic transitions electorally have improved some democratic aspects, created some ‘democratic openings’, yet multidimensional institutional examination tells us that there are still some ‘reserved domains’ for the military

---

<sup>69</sup> See for example, Final Report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Pakistan, 26 October 2018. Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/electionobservation-missions/eom-pakistan-2018/52858/eu-eom-final-report-25-july-generalelections-pakistan\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/electionobservation-missions/eom-pakistan-2018/52858/eu-eom-final-report-25-july-generalelections-pakistan_en) and Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) Report on Pakistan Elections, 2018. Available at: <https://fafen.org/fafens-preliminary-election-observation-report/>

<sup>70</sup> Aqil Shah, ‘Pakistan: voting under military tutelage’, *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 1, 2019, 128

<sup>71</sup> See, Katharine Adeney, ‘How to understand Pakistan's hybrid regime: the importance of a multidimensional continuum’, *Democratization* 24, no. 1, 2017, 119 & Mariam Mufti, ‘What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship?’, *Politics and Governance* 6, no. 2, 2018, 112

<sup>72</sup> T Denk, & Silander, D, *Regime Heterogeneity: A Comparative Study on Institutional Variation in Political Regimes*, VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2011, 3

where civilians have limited control, and that is what makes the Pakistani case still a hybrid, although a peculiar one.

Military's ability to confine a civilian government as suggested by Alfred, among others, depends on military prerogatives and military contestation<sup>73</sup>. These prerogatives are those 'reserved domains' of policy where military has exceptional powers, "whether challenged or not military as an institution assumes they have acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control"<sup>74</sup>, and the contestation is the military's retaliation against a civilian authority which challenges its prerogatives. Adeney's multi-dimensional analysis on different parameters suggest that press freedom, freedom of association and internal security are all those 'reserved domains' of power, where Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies have near impunity<sup>75</sup>. The shrinking space for dissent and increasing self-censorship in both digital and print media in the country is a manifestation of these domains' dominance on different institutions. Domains which could seriously impact contention and the availability of political opportunities in a regime, especially movements like PTM, and any other oppositional forces trying to break free from these shackles and coming directly at loggerheads with those 'reserved domains' or prerogatives. PTM was majorly impacted by this censorship on how the movement experienced complete media blackout of its rallies and its mobilization activities, on both the mainstream and national media. The next section shall discuss how contention takes place under such a hybrid system.

---

<sup>73</sup> Alfred C Stepan, Constantin Năstăsescu, and F. Van Oystaeyen, *Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, 1988, 30-31

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 93

<sup>75</sup> Katharine Adeney, How to understand Pakistan's hybrid regime, 129- 130

## 2.3 Contention under a hybrid system

The democratic façade which we talked in the previous section and at the upfront of which lies a civilian government, faces a real test when contested by a contention or a social movement of public importance. But here the regime becomes novel and creative in its means to stifle contention. Here it must for a certain degree assuage the grievances of those contending the power structure because it cannot outrightly oppress a movement like a complete dictatorship, what we developed in the section 1.2, so it keeps some democratic aspects through some ‘democratic openings’ maintained, by letting the movement proliferate sporadically, while simultaneously being cognizant of the political realities that it does not transcend its prescribed boundaries, or on its way desanctify military’s ‘reserved domains’ or prerogatives. Transcending the prescribed boundaries could be costly for its unstable regime so it keeps buying time either through not interfering in the ‘reserved domains’, appeasing the military by allowing it space for political intervention and curbing the dissenting voices or making some institutional changes, which would help it prolong its nascent ‘democracy’<sup>76</sup>. But it goes into a conundrum on how to handle forms of contention which directly hit the ‘reserved domains. Something done by the PTM. A peculiar movement of its own. So, the state makes intermittent arrests and capturing of the dissenting forces and curtails press freedom to suppress the proliferation of contention.

The state oppression now emanates from both civilian forces and security forces because in this case the involvement of the military forces is inevitable because of the rhetoric of the movement itself, which is directly tackling military. The civilian government cracks down

---

<sup>76</sup> By buying more time, we mean the legislations and ministerial changes made by the government to appease the military. Pakistan’s current state hurriedly passed a legislation in January 2019 which empowered the government to extend the tenure of all major army positions, including the Army chief. The government’s all major federal positions are also headed by ex-Army men. See, for example, Aqil Shah, ‘How Pakistan’s Politicians help the military’, *New York Times*, January 23, 2019 & Imad Zafar, ‘Pakistan’s Hybrid Regime buying more time before its downfall’, *Asia Times*, 28 April 2020

against dissenters because it cannot let the movement flourish which could be harmful for its regime safety as established before. Such peculiarities of a regime, giving impetus to ambiguous and dual form of repression, makes contestation patterns of mobilization for a social movement in a hybrid regime, truncated and haphazard. But even this dual and hybrid form of repression does not eliminate a social movement easily, instead it galvanizes public attention on issues of public importance. The result comes out to be bigger mobilization and resistance against the state and resurrection of dormant groups, through a movement-movement influence in a hybrid system.

We argue that this form of dual oppression and coercion in a hybrid system, different from democracies and compete dictatorship, gives rise to peculiar outcomes. Something which the existing literature studying contention under hybrid systems, albeit with different institutional dynamics does not talk about. The chapter to come shall present the empirical case of PTM; how it is a peculiar movement itself in Pakistan's history; the repression and coercion the movement had to experience in a hybrid system; and how the movement instilled other movements by having a spillover effect; and in general increased consciousness around citizenship rights among the public.

## Chapter 3: Clash of a peculiar social movement with a peculiar hybrid regime

### Introduction

As conveyed sparsely previously we argue that rise of a movement like PTM on the political landscape of Pakistan has been an unforeseen event in Pakistan's seventy-two years of chequered democratic history. What makes the movement so distinctive is the undaunting rhetoric of the movement, which directly tackles unrestrained military power in the country. Something unprecedented in the country's history. Even the mainstream political parties which have been repeated victims of military intrusion into politics could not come up with a rhetoric and language to criticize the policies of the military, the way PTM has done. The previous episodes of Pashtun nationalism in the country's history could also be regarded as much less radical. And that is what also makes us deem the movement peculiar as well. Just like the peculiar hybrid state structure of the country as established in chapter 2. This also explains the resulting higher degrees of oppression on the movement. In order to understand the germination of PTM, we must also understand the historical roots of Pashtun nationalism, which predate partition of subcontinent. This chapter first traces the history of Pashtun nationalism, and its relationship with the Pakistani state since the partition<sup>77</sup>. The second section brings into our discussion the present-day existence of Pashtun nationalism through the case of PTM; its relationship with earlier forms of Pashtun resistance; the factors which led to its rise; how the Pakistani hybrid state has repressed the movement; and how the repression impacted the movement. The third section talks about the PTM's spillover effect and its unintended consequences.

---

<sup>77</sup> By partition we mean, the partition of India/subcontinent. In order to keep the verbal use succinct and less repetitive, this chapter shall use the word partition instead of "partition of India" every time.

### 3.1 Pashtun nationalism: a historical overview

Pashtun is an ethnic community which is present at both sides of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the population estimation in 2007, 12.5 million Pashtuns constitute the Afghanistan's population, and around 30 million are present in Pakistan, with a major concentration in one of its four provinces, *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*.<sup>78</sup> The rise of Pashtun ethnic identity as a unified entity in the Indian subcontinent was a response to the burgeoning oriental myths regarding the community present during the colonial period of the British in the region, which relegated them to unruly and "treacherous murderers"<sup>79</sup>. The initiation and proliferation of oriental discourse on Pashtuns according to some started, when in 1849 the British captured the Southern part of Afghanistan and brought it into its reign of Indian empire. The resulting Pashtun backlash and prolonged resistance against the British annexation, made the British stereotype the Pashtuns as savages and "martial race that would rather die for its *Pashtunwali*"<sup>80</sup> (Pashtun code of honor), than submit to the will of the alien power"<sup>81</sup>. Even some of the relatively contemporary literature on Pashtuns was deeply immersed in these stereotypes and hackneyed personification of Pashtuns.<sup>82</sup> To demystify the prejudices which saw Pashtun people as violent and tribal, Pashtun eulogized leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as Badshah Khan in 1929 formed a reformist movement in Pashtun-dominated regions by the name of *Khudai Khitmatgars* (servants of God or Red Shirts). A secular, non-violent, anti-colonial

---

<sup>78</sup> Amin Saikal, 'Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30, no. 1, 2010, 6

<sup>79</sup> Robert C. Johansen, 'Radical Islam and nonviolence: A case study of religious empowerment and constraint among Pashtuns', *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 1, 1997, 57

<sup>80</sup> Pashtunwali is a cultural code that defines Pashtuns' set of values, which regulate Pashtun societies. The code was deemed very important for Pashtuns living in tribal areas. See, for example, Jonathan Hawkins, 'The Pashtun cultural code: Pashtunwali', *Australian Defence Force Journal* 180, 2009

<sup>81</sup> Adeel Khan, 'Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism', *Asian Ethnicity* 4, no. 1, 2003, 70

<sup>82</sup> Referring to the following works here:

See, for example, Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans, 550 BC-AD 1957*, Macmillan, 1958 and Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*. Vol. 818, Princeton University Press, 1998

movement was an effort to debunk the prevailing myths about Pashtun society, while the movement simultaneously claimed to awaken Pashtuns by “reminding them of their glorious past and unite them against colonial rule”.<sup>83</sup> This could be regarded as the birth of Pashtun nationalism as a unified body in the subcontinent against the British rule.

The movement was highly aligned with Gandhian philosophy of non-violence and his political ideas, which made it a natural ally of Indian National Congress and which also earned Badshah Khan the name of *Frontier Gandhi* because of his visionary synonymity with Gandhi<sup>84</sup>. The movement influence grew rapidly among the Pashtun Muslims and soon it converted into a political party as a political ally of Congress, espousing for a United India, with the name of Frontier National Congress in competition with Muslim League, which espoused for a separate homeland for Muslims. The party came out to be the single largest party of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)<sup>85</sup>. But there seemed to be ambivalence engulfing the objectives of the party. According to Adeel Khan this confusion emanated because of Badshah Khan’s apolitical personality because he was not an erudite politician, but a social reformer, his complete reliance on the Congress for political ideas, and his incomprehension of some of the political developments shaping the region’s politics in the 1940s.<sup>86</sup> This confusion transformed to serious perplexity, when as the situation between Muslim League and the Congress worsened in the negotiations regarding the future of India, as partition came close.

As the plan of partition was being devised, seeing the creation of Pakistan becoming a reality and fearing the dominance of Punjabi-dominated elite in the newly emerging state,

---

<sup>83</sup> Adeel Khan, Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism, 74

<sup>84</sup> See, for example, Mukulika Banerjee, ‘Unarmed Pathans’, India *International Centre Quarterly* 35, no. 2, 2008

<sup>85</sup> North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was the former name of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, now one of the four provinces of Pakistan, bordering with Afghanistan.

<sup>86</sup> Adeel Khan, Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism, 70 & 77



Pashtun nationalists demanded an independent Pashtunistan in NWFP. But there were not given this option. Instead a plebiscite was announced in NWFP in which the residents of the NWFP had to choose between siding with India or Pakistan. It was then the disgruntled Badshah Khan said the famous line: “the Congress has thrown us [*Khudai Khitmatgars*] to wolves”.<sup>87</sup> *Khudai Khitmatgars* boycotted the elections. Despite Congress’ allegations of rigging in the elections, the result of the referendum came largely in favor of Pakistan and NWFP was adjoined with Pakistan.

After the creation of Pakistan, Pashtuns led by Badshah Khan accepted their faith and showed their allegiance with the Pakistani state but demanded provincial autonomy within Pakistan where Pashtuns could live freely, not fearing the Punjabi domination.<sup>88</sup> The ambivalence which we talked about previously in their political vision, especially when it comes to the issue of Pashtunistan, however, continued. Some factions from the Pashtun intelligentsia wanted it to become an independent state, others just wanted provincial autonomy.<sup>89</sup> Pakistani state on the other hand was laying ground for authoritarianism, which it saw itself deeply immersed in the years to come. Instead of accommodating Pashtun grievances regarding the provincial autonomy, the central government of Pakistan led by Muslim League dismissed the regional government and ushered a wave of autocratic and authoritarian rule in the country. It was also the time when NWFP was divided into Eastern and Western parts. While the Eastern part- NWFP came under the constitutional ambit of Pakistan and enjoyed citizenship rights given under the constitution of 1956(the first constitution of the country), the Western part- Federally

---

<sup>87</sup> Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, *India wins freedom, The complete version*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1998, 210

<sup>88</sup> Adeel Khan, *Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism*, 78

<sup>89</sup> Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question: The unresolved key to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan*. Hurst & Company Limited, 2014, 38

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), continued to be ruled centrally and being operated under the “black law”<sup>90</sup>- the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)<sup>91</sup>.

Created with “artificially demarcated frontiers”<sup>92</sup>, with no conception of territorial nationalism in its official imagination and what Rieffer<sup>93</sup> argues about the intrinsic shortcomings in the religious form of nationalism and its repercussions on a nation state, coupled with lack of electoral politics in premature years of its existence and military-led nature of the regime which we established in Chapter 2, Pakistan created a central-bureaucratic rule from the start, which inherited all the repressive tools from its colonial predecessors. This authoritarian mode of governance favored the Punjabi elite in the country while disproportionately under-representing its ethnic minorities. This could not only be seen through disproportionate and under-allocation of financial resources but also through state’s monolithic molds of Islamic-driven identity, which discouraged granting cultural and linguistic rights to its ethnic minorities. Pashtuns were one of the three<sup>94</sup> ethnic minorities hugely impacted by this disparity. Jailed numerous times while contesting against state’s centralized and egregious behavior, Badshah Khan finally went into exile in Afghanistan in 1964.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Harrison Akins, ‘FATA and the Frontier Crimes Regulation in Pakistan: The Enduring Legacy of British Colonialism’, *The Howard H. Baker Jr Center for Public Policy Brief* 5 ,2017, 3

<sup>91</sup> FCR was a colonial rule which continued to exist even under independent Pakistan in the FATA region. The law continued to operate in the region until 2018. According to the law “an innocent individual can be imprisoned for the crimes of their kin, the government can displace entire villages without compensation, explanation, or warning, and individuals can languish behind bars for up to three years without any charges being filed”. See, Harrison Akins, FATA and the Frontier Crimes Regulation in Pakistan, 3

<sup>92</sup> Ayesha Jalal, ‘Conjuring Pakistan: History as official imagining’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 1,1995, 74

<sup>93</sup> Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer argues that nationalism and religion have a complex relationship and this form of nationalism could give rise to a nation state immersed in contradictions. The analysis is very relevant for the Pakistani case which formed on the bases of religion could not coalesce sub-national identities into its state-driven fold of Islam, which according to it could be the only identity marker. See, Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer ‘Religion and nationalism: Understanding the consequences of a complex relationship’, *Ethnicities* 3, no. 2, 2003

<sup>94</sup> The other ethnic minorities were Sindhis, Balochis and Bangalis. Bangalis seceded in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh.

<sup>95</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan paradox: Instability and resilience*. Oxford University Press, 2015, 153

A less-radical version of Badshah Khan, his son Wali Khan held the reigns of Pashtun nationalism after his father. In the 1970 democratic elections, his Left-wing party National Awami Party (NAP), which was created by his father fared well in the elections and managed to make a collational government in NWFP. Wali Khan although was attributed as a conformist. This conformism in his personality as compared to his radical father and a penchant to move beyond Pashtun nationalism and be a national leader, was also manifested in his state-led promotion of Urdu language in his province<sup>96</sup>. The 70s was also the time when the state had lost East Pakistan with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, so not to repeat anything like that again, it came heavy on the nationalist movements under a populist-authoritarian<sup>97</sup> rule in a civilian government. According to Siddique it “employed a carrot and stick approach”<sup>98</sup>. It was belligerent towards nationalist movements and launched a military operation in NWFP and Baluchistan, while simultaneously appeasement through some cosmetic economic development projects in FATA continued. The military operation coupled with Pashtun leadership’s watering down of nationalist ambitions in general, due to conforming with state-narrative under Wali’s leadership and the Soviet-Afghan war, which started in 1979, seriously declined Pashtun irredentism and the call for Pashtunistan. The Soviet-Afghan war in the 80s could be deemed as the death of Pashtunistan and start of ‘Talibanization’ of Pashtun region.<sup>99</sup>

Pakistan’s state-led Islamization in the 80s under a military rule which was supporting Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union created huge swath of religious seminaries in Pashtun region which radicalized and militarized Pashtun homeland.<sup>100</sup> The global support from Islamist

---

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 154

<sup>97</sup> See for example, Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Progressive Publishers, 1989

<sup>98</sup> Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question*, 39

<sup>99</sup> See for example, Tahir Amin, ‘Rise and decline of ethno-national movements of Pakistan: domestic and international factors’, PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987

<sup>100</sup> Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question*, 41

radicals for jihad especially the financial backing from the Arab world, made NWFP the epicenter of Islamist radicalization in fight against the Soviets. The late 1980s saw Al-Qaeda penetrating in the region and by the 1990s with the collapse of Afghani state, US escape from Afghanistan and Taliban's ascent to power, radicalism and terrorism had structurally transformed the Pashtun society at both sides of the Durand line<sup>101</sup>. Pakistani state supported the newly emerged Taliban rule in Afghanistan under the presumption of achieving "strategic depth"<sup>102</sup>. But this policy backfired when Taliban developed sanctuaries in the Pakistani regions and began Islamizing the region "as part of a broader Islamist union of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia"<sup>103</sup>. By 2002, South Waziristan (one of the seven agencies/areas of FATA) had become the breeding ground and one of the biggest sanctuaries for terrorists, which were now inhabited by Pakistani Taliban<sup>104</sup>. After 9/11 and two-failed assassination attempts against the military dictator and Pakistan's President Musharraf, "War on Terror (WOT)" against the Taliban was lodged in 2004. By 2006, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have captured the region entirely and imposed shariah law<sup>105</sup>.

It then became a serious eye opener for Pakistani military which so far with its paradoxical role in the fight against terrorism was indulged in the appeasement of "good Taliban" and were fighting only against "bad Taliban", and launched multiple operations against terrorism since then.<sup>106</sup> Pashtuns were the biggest affectees of these operations with almost one

---

<sup>101</sup> Durand line is the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

<sup>102</sup> The strategic depth doctrine was a tool used by Pakistani military to support Taliban's pan-Islamism in Afghanistan after US' escape from the war to subdue Pashtun ethnic passions and simultaneously curtail regional rivals like India and regional powers like Russia and Iran for maintaining influence in Afghanistan.

<sup>103</sup> Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question*, 60

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 73

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 78

<sup>106</sup> The good Taliban/bad Taliban was a "strategy" employed by the Pakistani military which killed bad Taliban who attack Pakistan and was using good Taliban in Afghanistan for strategic depth. See, Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question*, 90

million of them lost their lives due to terrorism, drone attacks and the “collateral damage” in the counter-insurgency operations in their region<sup>107</sup>. The Pakistan’s military’s dual role in the war against terrorism furthered the Pashtun plight.

According to Saikal, the WOT in the Pashtun region helped the Pakistani state “with a potent means to shift the basis of Pashtun nationalism from ethnic and cultural solidarity to Islamism”<sup>108</sup>. The already undeveloped region of FATA due to state’s inadequate redistribution of resources in its peripheral regions, saw an insurmountable rise in human plight, visible through deteriorating indicators of human development due to warfare in the region.<sup>109</sup> Siddique considers this economic precariousness and political instability in the region as one of the main drivers behind rising Islamic radicalism in the Pashtun region.<sup>110</sup>

As we mentioned earlier that Pashtun irredentism had been on a decline and dormant since the Soviet-Afghan war and WOT in the region, however, with the democratic transition in the country in 2008, Pashtun nationalist party *Awami National Party*(ANP), previously known as NAP, got an electoral triumph in 2008 elections in the NWFP. This could be regarded as the retaliation of the Pashtuns towards Islamists who were previously ruling the region under a military dictatorship.<sup>111</sup> The party, however, failed to keep up the promises and instead aligned itself with the mainstream forces and army’s interests.<sup>112</sup> ANP however got one symbolic victory when NWFP was renamed to *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* in 2009<sup>113</sup>. The Federal democratic

---

<sup>107</sup> Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question*, 16

<sup>108</sup> Amin Saikal, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?*, 10

<sup>109</sup> Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtun question*, 3

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>111</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan paradox*, 159

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*,

government at the time also passed 18<sup>th</sup> amendment<sup>114</sup> to the constitution, which dissolved President's coercive powers over the legislature, added into the constitution through constitutional alterations made by the military dictators to prolong their rules. It also devolved the power at federal level and gave it back to the provinces. The amendment however did not yet aid in substantially ameliorating the regional inequalities which excessively impact minority provinces and peripheral areas like FATA<sup>115</sup>. Since then, the latest key event in Pashtun history and in their region has been the rise of PTM. The section to follow shall discuss that in detail.

### **3.2 PTM and the Pakistani hybrid state**

The paradoxical and controversial role of the military in WOT post- 9/11 which we talked about in the previous section and which proportionately impacted the local ethnic Pashtuns in the areas where the military operations were going on, was slowly building up Pashtun resistance against these atrocities. The continuation of colonial-era laws like FCR in the destitute region of FATA, which provided the security forces absolute impunity in the region and no rights for local population, was another rallying point for the resistance forces. Mehsud *Tahafuz*(protection) Movement (MTM) was the first movement started by a group of students who started to unveil the struggles of displaced people who had to leave their houses in South Waziristan due to the military operation.<sup>116</sup> Around that time, there were news that some 80 children were killed in landmines explosion in FATA, which made MTM protest in the capital, Islamabad.<sup>117</sup> Later, triggered by an extra-judicial killing of an aspiring Pashtun male model,

---

<sup>114</sup> See, for example, Katharine Adeney, 'A step towards inclusive federalism in Pakistan? The politics of the 18th amendment', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 42, no. 4, 2012 & Adil Zahoor, 'Significance of 18<sup>th</sup> amendment for a non-consociational federation of Pakistan', *Daily Times*, 3 January 2019

<sup>115</sup> See, Mohammad Waseem, 'The Post-18th Amendment Federalism in Pakistan.' *Development Advocate Pakistan* 2, no. 1, 2015

<sup>116</sup> 'Why is Pakistan's Pashtun under attack', *Aljazeera*, 28 January 2020

<sup>117</sup> Tayyaba Jiwani and Ayaz Mallick, 'Pashtun Tahafuz Movement: challenging the "War on Terror": an interview with Ismat Shahjahan on the origins, aims and trajectories of PTM', *Jamhoor.org*, 2 February 2020

Naqeeb Ullah Masood, in Karachi on January 13, 2018, made MTM morph into PTM and become a movement of national importance. The new movement PTM started marching from Pashtun regions to Islamabad, where they held a 10-day sit-in and demanded justice for Naqibullah and the people of FATA. The death of Naqibullah which became a tipping point for the movement also made it mainstream some of the other issues the people of FATA had to face, since the WOT in the region, which never got the public attention before. The movement then held multiple rallies and processions in multiple cities of the country. Following on the non-violent footsteps of Pashtun leader, Badshah Khan, some of the prominent demands of the movement are : an end to ethnic profiling of Pashtuns as “terrorists” which leads to their conflation with Taliban and their extra-judicial killings; end to enforced disappearances of Pashtuns and repatriation of “missing persons”; removal of land mines put by the military during WOT in the region, now becoming a hindrance in the mobility of local population; and a creation of a judicial commission which would investigate the human rights violations Pashtuns had to experience during WOT.<sup>118</sup>

Despite the movement’s synonymous relationship with earlier form of non-violent Pashtun nationalism, championed by Badshah Khan, the PTM shows some deviance with these earlier forms as well and embody some peculiar features. It is important to understand and highlight these peculiar features, which is also well-linked with PTM’s relationship with the other smaller movements in the country, which seem to have been galvanized by post-PTM appearance on the scene, and increased repression the movement had to face. According to Kakar, what is different about PTM than earlier episodes of Pashtun nationalism is, that most of the PTM’s top leadership belong to lower middle class and hail from area i.e. FATA, which have

---

<sup>118</sup> See, for example, Nazir Ahmad Mir, ‘Pashtun nationalism in search of political space and the state in Pakistan’, *Strategic Analysis* 42, no. 4, 2018, 446

been historically peripheral, ‘at margins’ and remote from the reach of Pashtun politics.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, unlike historical and even contemporary mainstream Pashtun ethnic entrepreneurs, PTM does not “dream of an imagined future homeland” or romanticize about a “golden past”, neither yet talks about seceding. Instead the movement’s resistance and contention are based on unveiling the appalling experiences of the people during the war, the experiences from which mainstream media and other investigative research organizations remained oblivious<sup>120</sup>. Enshrining all their demands within the constitution of Pakistan, the movement demands a better life for Pashtun people in their native areas, which have for long succumbed to the alienation of periphery and whose lives have been downgraded to “collateral damage” and other war-driven terminologies. Not relegating their struggle to separatism and other historical Pashtun nationalist slogans is also the reason why mainstream Pashtun entrepreneurs have been reluctant to embrace PTM fully. It is also the radical rhetoric of the movement which blames ‘securitization’ and ‘Talibanization’ of the Pashtun region to security forces’ ill-conceived policies during WOT, something never uttered with this veracity and outrightly by mainstream Pashtun nationalists, nor even in the recent decades by any political force in the country.

The unparalleled rhetoric of a peculiar movement tackling direct military’s unabated power in the country was tantamount to calling for unrestrained oppression as well. The historical birth of a praetorian structure in the country which we established in section 2.1 and which paved ground for further military’s intrusion into politics, maintained even in the contemporary hybrid state structure as stated in 2.2, which despite under a ‘democracy’, create ‘reserved domains’ or prerogatives for the military. These domains clashed with PTM, which indirectly tried to question these prerogatives for bringing into the public attention the security

---

<sup>119</sup> Rafiullah Kakar, ‘Politics: demystifying the PTM’, *Dawn News*, 23 February 2020

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.,



forces' hegemony in the Pashtun region, and questioned, especially in a long time in the state's history, military's continuing and unbridled hold on to the country's political affairs. As a result, on occasions, movement witnessed some unparalleled repression, from arrests and intimidation to assassinations and complete censorship of the movement's activities from the mainstream and national media of the country. Sometime repression came full-blown outrightly as witnessed in the incident in North Waziristan where military opened fire on protestors.<sup>121</sup> On other occasions, it has been sporadic where the top leadership of the movement and other activists have been captured under the charges like "criminal conspiracy and sedition"<sup>122</sup>, and "conspiracy to overthrow the government"<sup>123</sup>, and then released again after sometime. The laws used here are the colonial set of laws still being openly practiced in the county to stifle dissenting voices.<sup>124</sup> That has been the legacy of the praetorian state which historically used sedition laws against political active citizens of the country, declaring them "foreign agents" funded by India and other exogenesis forces working to derail country's peace<sup>125</sup>. PTM met a similar fate. The movement has been frequently declared by the intelligence agencies in the country and by the other propaganda media espousing on the state-narrative, that it is working on the payroll of foreign enemies.<sup>126</sup> Here Eric Voegelin's analyses of state using repression as a political weapon under the guise of threat of national security through otherizing of the dissenting voices comes handy<sup>127</sup>. PTM has been the that otherized enemy of the state on which violence has been justified by otherizing it as a foreign agent. However, on other occasions it has been allowed to

---

<sup>121</sup> 3 protestors were killed along with 15 injured after security forces opened fire on protestors protesting near the check post in North Waziristan. See, '3 people killed, 5 soldiers injured in exchange of fire at check post in North Waziristan', *Dawn News*, 26 May 2019

<sup>122</sup> 'Civil rights activist arrested in Pakistan on sedition charges', *The Guardian*, 27 January 2020

<sup>123</sup> Ammar Ali Jan, 'It is time for India and Pakistan to repeal their sedition laws', *Aljazeera*, 20 February 2020

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>125</sup> See for example, 'Who is a traitor?', *Dawn News*, 1 May 2019

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>127</sup> Eric Voegelin, *Race and state*. Vol. 2, University of Missouri Press, 1997

contend and protest even at the heartland or what we call the citadel of military's power which are the urban centers of Punjab.

This intermittent, sporadic and dual form of repression is according to us is the result of its regime type, which is hybrid in nature, and which gives rise to haphazard forms of mobilization for a movement. What is distinctive about this form of repression in a hybrid regime setting as we established in section 2.3 is that it is different from oppression under complete authoritarian states and democracies. Here the oppression is dual, which emanates from both civilian and military institutions. Mostly directly from the military because of the regime type and overruling capacity of the military to overrule power of civilian institution, and because the peculiar movement here is tackling the military directly, which directly falls under its 'reserved domains'. Civilian government on other hand plays the role of legitimizing this oppression under a democratic façade through colonial laws like 'sedition', among others, and because it cannot overrulingly stifle a movement. It must maintain its democratic façade, which allows some degree of contention. This dual form of oppression on a social movement we argue is worse than repression under dictatorships or in democracies, which makes the movement go dormant for some time, but it cannot eradicate the movement entirely. Instead, we see much bigger mobilization against the state through social movement's spillover effect and movement-movement influence, despite going through such intricate patterns of oppression from the state. The section to follow shall discuss PTM's role as a catalyst for smaller movements in the country.

### **3.3 The revival of dormant Left: PTM's spillover effect and its unintended consequence?**

Taking on from what we developed in the section 1.4 what we classified as a theoretical neglect in the social movements studies and literature to understand wide-ranging outcomes of

social movements. We also enlisted the difficulties and methodological problems researchers face in measuring movements outcomes, and how if we add regime type as a conditioning factor, the outcomes could be a lot more difficult to measure. We argued that different regime types could have different movements outcomes, keeping under consideration the variegated political opportunities (as seen in 1.1-1.3) these regimes provide. So, if we only start seeing movements as ‘homogenous’ identities capable of reaching a presumed end, or see them from a normative lens, as entities capable of altering the existing power structures or change the course of foundations of society<sup>128</sup>, we lose out on understanding those outcome of social movements which might not be directly related to their objectives or might not be pronounced or visible in short term. Those outcomes which are not aligned with a movement’s explicitly articulated goals, what we call as their unintended consequences, spillover effect or movement-movement influence. What we understood from the section 2.3 and the previous section 3.2, is that in a hybrid regime like Pakistan because of the confined political opportunities and the complex institutional make up of contemporary ‘democratic’ setting in the country, movement like PTM faces dual repression. Under such a scenario, it becomes difficult for a movement to achieve its objectives completely and immediately, especially when the objectives require altering the hegemonic power base of the country. We argue that in such conditions, as Davenport reminds us as well, movements cannot be killed that easily and their chances of inculcating unintended outcomes are also more.<sup>129</sup>

We laid out the picture of the Pakistani state structure through conceptualizing the regime in chapter 2, which provided us insights into the nature of the regime where military is the kingmaker of the political landscape. The resistance against such an institutional makeup, for any

---

<sup>128</sup> Marco G Giugni, Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements, 372

<sup>129</sup> Christian Davenport, *How social movements die*, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 39

alternative future, ideally should emerge from the political elite in the country, but as we saw in the chapter 2, and elsewhere that mainstream political parties mostly conform to the established norms or remain submissive to the establishment for regime safety, and in a way could be held responsible for the continuation of the fragile and under-nourished ‘democratic’ setting<sup>130</sup>. This vacuum and the weakness of the political parties according to Kriesi and Wisler are ideal conditions for social movements like PTM to influence political institutions and envision an institutional change.<sup>131</sup> PTM has been that alternative force in Pakistan, which in a way took advantage of this vacuum. The movement as we called it peculiar in its rhetoric has envisioned that alterative space for dissent in the country, which even just a few years ago looked undoable. Using WOT and military’s dubious role in the war as a rallying point, PTM acted as an ‘early riser’ on the political space in the country and opened space for other dissenting voices in the country. The movement broke fear around issues and mainstreamed some of the issues, which were ‘no-go’ zones to speak about, under a confined political opportunity structure of a hybrid regime. The question of “missing persons” was one of those issues. Started off as a military tactic and part of its counter-terrorism strategy against terrorists, enforced disappearances soon became a tool for the military to curb political dissent<sup>132</sup>. According to the estimated figures of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), around 4000 people have been “missing” under some kind of “terrorism” charges.<sup>133</sup> Previously, the journalists or any other organizations which talked about these “missing” people have been displaced themselves.<sup>134</sup>

---

<sup>130</sup> See, for example, Aqil Shah, ‘Getting the military out of Pakistani politics: How aiding the army undermines democracy’, *Foreign Affairs*, 2011

<sup>131</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi and Dominique Wisler, ‘The impact of social movements on political institutions: A comparison of the introduction of direct legislation in Switzerland and the United States’, in eds, Charles Tilly, Dough McAdam and Marco Giugni, *How social movements matter*, University of Minnesota press, 1999, 63-65

<sup>132</sup> Salman Hussain, ‘War on Terror to War on Dissent’, *Economic & Political Weekly* 53, no. 17, 2018, 19

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.,

The fear of being intimidated and displaced themselves obstructed some Left and even other civil society groups to say out these things loudly, partly also because of the polarized and dormant nature of Left opposition in the country. From the mainstream political scene, Pakistan's Peoples Party (PPP) is the only party which comes close to being called a Left-wing party, but even this party historically and even in the contemporary scene is sporadically scene acquiescing with the military establishment's doctrine<sup>135</sup>. Left's skeptical<sup>136</sup> take on WOT is another reason. As soon PTM brought these things into the mainstream, especially in the urban centers of the country where censorship and the threat of political dissent being met with oppression is even more as compared to the peripheries, it empowered smaller youth-led progressive groups in the country to talk not only about "missing" people and the curtailing nature of the dissent in the country, but also on the issues of women rights, restoration of student unions, labor unions, among others. In general, a right to protest and a demand for a functional democratic state<sup>137</sup>. It is important to note here that this spillover or movement-influence could not be attributed as an intended consequence of the movement, which started off just demanding rights for impoverished ethnic Pashtuns in the FATA region, severely impacted during WOT. The radical and peculiar rhetoric of the movement not only touched the Pashtun question but also touched some other very important questions facing the hybrid and 'non-coup coup' situation in the country. Here the PTM played the role of "dual dialectic movement"<sup>138</sup>, which despite the state repression, had an unintended spillover impact on the smaller progressive groups aiming to

---

<sup>135</sup> See, for example, Aqil Shah, 'How Pakistan's politicians help the military', *New York Times*, 23 January 2020

<sup>136</sup> The Left in the country was perceived to have a conflicting position on WOT and the military operation, especially related to the US drone attacks. See for example, Tayyaba Jiwani and Ayaz Mallick, 'Pashtun Tahafuz Movement: challenging the "War on Terror": an interview with Ismat Shahjahan on the origins, aims and trajectories of PTM', *Jamhoor.org*, 2 February 2020

<sup>137</sup> See, for example, Maria Bostos, 'The Pashtun protest movement is a test for Pakistan's democracy', *Open democracy*, 30 May 2018

<sup>138</sup> Hurmat Ali Shah, 'Redefining Citizenship in Pakistan', *Himal South Asia*, 28 April 2020

redefine the citizenship rights in the country, and in general demanding an end to this hybrid nature of the state.

## Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Research Findings

### 4.1 Research Methodology

Keeping up with the tradition and a common-strategy to use qualitative interviews which has also been the most widely used and reliable<sup>139</sup> methodology to research social movements, this thesis employed semi-structured interviews as its research methodology to seek vital information needed to answer the research questions for the study. The purpose to choose qualitative study over quantitative methods to study a social movement could also be attributed to the scarcity on reliable data-gathering sources for social movements, which makes the use of qualitative methods even more imperative<sup>140</sup>. This scarcity also becomes conspicuous while analyzing social movements like PTM, which are nascent, are on-going and have very limited information available on them, which could only be gathered through one-on-one interviews with the movement participants. The peculiar and sensitive nature of PTM which we thoroughly established in chapter 3 and which calls for higher degree of repression and censorship on the movement, is another reason for the limited information and scope of academic studies on the movement. Blee & Taylor also talk about the importance of interviews for secretive and repressed social movements like PTM to minimize the chances of bias in research<sup>141</sup>. The instrument of interviews for social movement research is also important when a researcher is

---

<sup>139</sup> See, for example, Donatella Della Porta, ed, *Methodological practices in social movement research*, Oxford University Press, 2014 & Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, eds, *Methods of Social Movement Research*, The University of Minnesota press, 2002

<sup>140</sup> Donatella Della Porta, 'In-depth interviews', in Donatella Della Porta, ed, *Methodological practices in social movement research*, Oxford University Press, 2014, 228

<sup>141</sup> Kathleen M Blee and Taylor, 'Semi-Structured Interviewing in Social Movement Research', in Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, eds, *Methods of Social Movement Research*, The University of Minnesota press, 2002, 93

trying to understand the micro-dynamics of the movement and have more personalized nature of questions from the movement participants about their activism, related to some internal dynamics about movement's pattern of mobilization and demobilization, and as in this case, its relationship with state repression and confined political opportunity structure of a hybrid regime, which could possibly be difficult to assess in other methods.

For this study, an overall of 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted on Skype during the time of May 1, 2020 to May 20, 2020, while staying at the Residence Centre of Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary. More interviewees could have been interviewed but the number was kept limited because of saturation of knowledge after certain interviews and diminishing returns due to redundancy in the information needed. The semi-structured online interviews were chosen because of the extraordinary and unprecedented situation caused by Covid-19 outbreak, and inability to travel because of travel restrictions during the research period. The interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling. An activist of PTM through a contact was first contacted who helped me in the recruitment of other interviewees. In choosing the interviewees, I followed the strategy suggested by Donatella Della Porta, one of the pioneers in social movements research. The strategy offers instructions on the recruitment of interviewees, comprising of informers and participants<sup>142</sup>. The interviewees were also deliberately chosen from these categories to have a holistic understanding of a social movement, and the ones which help me the most in answering the research questions and test the hypotheses.

Out of 10 interviewees, 6 were members of the PTM, including 2 of these 6 members were from the core leadership of the PTM. The two prominent members included Abdullah

---

<sup>142</sup> Donatella Della Porta, In-depth interviews, 240



Nangial and Dr Said Alam Mahsud. Other 4 activists included two 2 male members, Muzamil Khan and Khushal Khan, and 2 female activists, Wranga Luni and Mahrang Baloch. One interviewee, Ismat Shahjahan was recruited due to her dialectical role, with not only PTM but with the Left politics in the country. Being a staunch supporter and member of PTM, Ismat is currently the chairperson of Women Democratic Front (WDF) and the deputy general secretary of *Awami* (People) workers Party (AWP). I interviewed 3 other civil-society activists, members of student unions, labor unions, feminist groups who have gained impetus after the rise of PTM to know, if PTM had any impact on their resurrection. These interviewees included Dr. Nida Kirmani, Zahid Ali and a third female member who wanted her identity to be anonymous. Dr. Nida Kirmani is Professor of Sociology at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a progressive-feminist activist closely associated with *Aurat*(women) march arranged around the country since 2017. Zahid Ali and other anonymous interviewee are two of the founding members of *Haqooq e Khalq*(Rights of the People) Movement (HKM) and Progressive Students Collective(PSC), who have been organizing country-wide student and public marches for the restoration of student unions, labor unions, among other questions for public rights. These two have also been part of women marches.

While recruiting these members it was kept in mind and tried to the best under the circumstances, that the interviewees I recruited make the sample generalizable, representative and maximize diversity. Out of these 10 members, 5 were female. 5 of the total members belonged to remote regions like Baluchistan and FATA to avoid making research urban-centric and to get an expansive understanding of the movement activities in peripheral regions. Interviewees were also not from a similar age, but members were young, middle-aged and old activists. There were no structured questions for the interviews, but I followed an interview guide

for semi-structured interviews. It included some consistent set of questions to ensure that relevant information regarding research aims is extracted, but interviewees could digress from topics to explain their experiences, certain events and their interpretation of reality, which helped us form an informed and holistic opinion about an issue. Interlocution, however, wherever needed was used. The interview guide consisted of a set of questions with some probing questions in between. Some lighter questions were used to initiate the conversation to later come to more specific questions.

The firsts cohort of interviewees related to PTM were asked the following set of questions: *“What type of coercion and repression have you experienced so far?”*, *“Were you aware of it before, or did it come as a surprise?”*, *“What tools did the state employ to suppress the movement?”*, *“Where do you think this repression mostly emanates from: civilian institutions or directly military?”*, *“What role did repression play in movement’s mobilization?”* *“The movement’s mobilization has been a bit of a back and forth. Why so?”*, *“Was state oppression a reason behind these non-linear patterns of mobilization?”*, *“Can you tell us about reconciliation with the state? How successful the reconciliation activities have been?”*, *“The recent years have seen progressive movements emerging in the urban centers of Pakistan, with students vying for student unions, labor seeking greater rights and women organizing an annual Aurat (Women) March. How much do you think the PTM influence these groups?”*, *“Could these activities be attributed to PTM’s spillover effect?”*.

The second cohort comprising of people from smaller progressive groups were asked the following set of questions: *“What role according to you PTM has played on Pakistan’s political landscape?”*, *“What role did it play in your and your movement’s activism?”*, *“Could the rise of smaller progressive groups, including yours, could be attributed to PTM’s spillover effect?”*, *“Is*

*there a movement-movement influence here? ”, “ Women marches, rising feminist politics and radicality in their doctrine. Could this also be attributed to PTM’s influence?”.*

Contrary to the expectations, Skype interviews went smoothly, and I was able to gather the information on both the colloquial and formal matters<sup>143</sup>. This could also be regarded to the fact that interviewees felt safe talking online on issues generally deemed sensitive to talk about in a physical presence of the interviewer. It also made probing in a remote environment easy for me, which normally would have been difficult, especially interviewing activists who were not from mainland Pakistan but from the peripheral regions, with increased degrees of state surveillance and censorship in these areas. The average time of the interviews was 20 minutes although on specific occasions the interviews went longer.

Some of the pitfalls and limitation of the study were that although I tried to recruit interviewees which were most well-suited for my research aim, on occasions due to some unprecedented situation caused by Covid-19, I had to change some interviewees. On other occasions due to some unexpected event, especially the recent killing of one of the prominent leaders of PTM, I was not able to interview other prominent members from the movement’s leadership. I knew some of these activists personally and albeit to my best knowledge, I tried to minimize the bias in the research where I tried to get information most relevant for my research aim, unimpacted by my personal knowing of an activist, on occasions I might have been unsuccessful. The section to follow shall discuss major findings of the research.

---

<sup>143</sup> Szabolcs Pogonyi deems his experience of Skype interviews in a similar fashion. See, Szabolcs Pogonyi, *Extra-territorial ethnic politics, discourses and identities in Hungary*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 141

## 4.2 Research Findings

To reiterate, this study tried to understand how social movements like PTM operate under complex political opportunity structure of a hybrid regime with a peculiar institutional setting, disproportionately captured by the military. It argued that the haphazard, dual and novel repression on a social movement like PTM is the result of institutional make-up of a hybrid regime present in Pakistan, which is different from democracies, complete authoritarian states or even other hybrid regimes in the world. The study put forth two hypotheses in this regard: it argued this form of repression in a hybrid regime, which is dual, novel and intermittent because it comes from civilian as well as military institutions could curtail the movement for a while, could demobilize it, might put it in abeyance but cannot eradicate it. Instead the movement reorganizes with bigger mobilization against the state, and on its way instills other movements by having a spillover or a movement-movement influence on them. This section shall report the major research findings thematically to test the hypotheses from the semi-structured interview data, it would elaborate on some negative cases, and would also extrapolate on some other interesting findings which came across during the research. Instead of over-populating this section with information, we would try to be succinct and report the data most relevant and well-aligned with our research aims. Bleich and Pekannen<sup>144</sup> interview reporting guide was consulted for this section.

Before we start analyzing and reporting the results, it is important to mention that during my data collection while conducting the interviews, I came across a lot of information from the interviewees, which if put into context could help us contextualize the broader context in which why those certain things were said and the possible thoughts and reality behind those gestures.

---

<sup>144</sup> Erik Bleich and Robert Pekkanen, 'How to report interview data', *Interview research in political science* 1, 2013

As a researcher it is important to mention and extrapolate on that information<sup>145</sup>, which could not only be useful for us in comprehending the context, but also helps us transgress the myopic lens of sometimes going deep into our study and losing the broader picture. A common theme which emerged from some of my interviews was that some interviewees from peripheral regions and those who have a history of resistance against Pakistani monolithic state structure, which disproportionately impacts its ethnic minorities, showed some discomfort with my framing of Pakistani state as a hybrid regime. Here the context of their historical struggle and their disenchantment with the continuation of colonial power structure<sup>146</sup> in the country is important. Some of them do not necessarily agree with ‘democratic openings’, even the electoral democracy in the country, which according to them is merely a phenomenon benefiting mainland Pakistan. These ‘openings’ according to them did not in any way aid in lessening their plight in their regions. Instead the ‘reserved domains’ we established in chapter 2 and which provides military with absolute impunity on issues of “national security”, especially against the dissenting voices, have always been present in their respective regions. ISMAT SHAHJAHAN summarized this thought in the following way:

*We have never seen democracy. Apart from few intermittent periods, Pakistan have been a garrison, militaristic and a theocratic state. State has always been oppressive towards dissenting voices and military operations have been its instrument of oppression.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)

---

<sup>145</sup> Donatella Della Porta, In-depth interviews, 250

<sup>146</sup> See, for example, Hamza Alavi, The state in post-colonial societies Pakistan and Bangladesh & Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, ‘A call for revolutionary internationalism’, *Pak Left review*, 2020

#### 4.2.1 Dual and novel repression in a hybrid regime

PTM's peculiar narrative which directly tackled those 'reserved domains' of military power in the country, as we established in section 3.2 warranted repression on the movement. We developed that repression under such a system is novel, dual and sporadic because of its regime type. Through our interviewees, with various activists and leaders of PTM, we got some firsthand information on how repression operates in such a system. We understood that the role of civilian institutions in this form of repression is to legitimize repression through various legal tools, while military mostly stays at the back. Activists are sometimes arrested through civilian forces like police, First Investigation Report (FIR) which is a civilian instrument is lodged against them and they are trailed in civilian courts. In other cases, activists are just randomly picked up under various terrorism<sup>147</sup> charges, and other laws and no legal process is followed. The latter practice of repression is more common in the peripheral regions. We can say as compared to the mainland Pakistan with a perceived better degree of 'democratic openings' and presence of various active human rights organizations, the peripheral regions with history of state repression, need less legitimization from civilian forces. Here the military has the hegemony on repression, with increased degrees of media censorship. KHUSAL KHAN an activist of PTM explained this process as:

*Wherever FIRs have been lodged against PTM, it has been done by civilian forces. In some instances, military repression came directly like the Kharqamar<sup>148</sup> incident but on majority*

<sup>147</sup> Majority of PTM activists are trialed under Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), which was established by a civilian government for the speedy trial of terrorists. See, for example, 'ATC case against 37 PTM activists withdrawn', *Express Tribune*, 24 September 2018

<sup>148</sup> In *Kharqamar*, Waziristan PTM protestors were shot directly the military. See, for example, '3 people killed, 5 soldiers injured in exchange of fire at check post in North Waziristan', *Dawn News*, 26 May 2019

*occasions it was civilian institutions being used by military to crack down on PTM. FIRs are lodged under hate speech and cyber terrorism laws. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 10, 2020)*

One of the prominent leaders of PTM, Abdullah Nangiyal said:

*I have got arrested on several occasions and almost all these times I have been captured by civilian police, but military is of course behind giving orders to the police. This is because there's civil martial law in the country right now. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 10, 2020)*

Affirming that repression is dual and comes from both, civilian forces and military, ISMAT SHAHJHAN said:

*According to the law military cannot capture us or make arrests. Through Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) and anti-terrorism acts they can capture anyone without warrant. So, civilians arrest us through CTD and then give to the military. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)*

An activist from FATA, MUZMIL KHAN said:

*Sometimes repression is direct from military and sometimes they take help from civilian institutions. In my district, Assistant Commissioner was told that PTM should not flourish in your region. Here civilian bureaucracy is being used to stifle the movement. Military forces civilians to charge PTM activists. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 16, 2020)*

In the peripheral regions like Baluchistan, even civilian help is sometimes not taken. An activist from Baluchistan, WRANA LUNI said:

*Here the power is with the military. Even if the police arrests, it arrests because military gives them orders, but mostly military picks up activists directly.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 6, 2020)

Repression in this regime type could also be deemed novel because compared to other non-democracies or complete authoritarian states, what we established in section 1.2 with a higher belligerence towards contention, in a hybrid regime like Pakistan because of the complex institutional setting of the regime with some ‘democratic openings’ mainly concentrated around urban centers, but due to continuance of ‘reserved domains’ or military prerogatives in other areas what we saw in chapter 2, the regime goes beyond using just orthodox forms of repression. So apart from direct oppression on the movement to break it internally, it uses clandestine or conspiratorial tools to demonize a social movement in the public eyes.

Quoting ISMAT SHAHJHAN:

*State did not only use coercive tools, but it used “conspiratorial tools” too to kill the movement. The state not only oppressed us outrightly through arrests, torturers and intimidation, but through other means using “fifth generation warfare”. Our website was closed. My Twitter got closed for 5 times, and it is still on surveillance. It also tried to tarnish public image by repeatedly calling us “foreign agents”.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)

We find that repression in a hybrid regime on PTM comes from civilian forces and military both. In the urban centers the civilians try to legitimize repression through various legal charges against dissenters, but in the peripheries even the practice of this farcical legal legitimization is not needed. In the peripheries with the increased concentration of military personnel, and other laws which are tailor-made to intimidate dissenters, are instead used. Hybrid



regime not only uses traditional tools of oppression but its well-equipped to use contemporary conspiratorial tools to curb dissent.

#### **4.2.2 State repression and social movement's mobilization in a hybrid regime**

State repression in a hybrid regime and subsequent non-linear and bigger mobilization patterns of a social movement were one of other broader themes of the interview guide shared in the previous section, which is also linked to our first hypothesis for the study. We understood through the respondents' answers that although state repression at times curtailed PTM's mobilization and hindered movement to actively protest and gather<sup>149</sup>, it did not manage to totally eradicate movement activities. Here more repression instigated more mobilization and protest. Movement's dormancy has some relationship with state repression, but internal dynamics of the movement at times are also important to take into consideration. According to MUZAMIL KHAN:

*State repression certainly hinders mobilization. When a movement is dormant, it does not mean it has ended. Instead, it is usually making its structure and planning next event. Whenever a new event of repression takes place, people start mobilizing again. If state does not oppress, people do not mobilize that often.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 16, 2020)

Here ISMAT SHAHJAHAN said:

*When a wave of repression comes from the state, movement takes a step back. Internal dynamics and repression both play a role in the movements truncated mobilization. And at times, the capacity of the organization to sustain repression. Repression halted PTM but did not kill it.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)

---

<sup>149</sup> Carey reaches similar conclusions, although with different regime types. See, Sabine C Carey, The dynamic relationship between protest and repression

We found out that this relationship between repression leading to bigger mobilization is much more pronounced in the peripheral regions as compared to the mainland Pakistan, but it is less visible due to much rigorous censorship in the peripheries. Here, as conveyed earlier history of resistance plays important role. These regions with an already present ethnic nationalism and resistance against the centralized and one-province-dominates-all power dynamics of the state, seemed to have been revitalized with PTM's presence on the scene. WRANGA LUNI, a PTM activist from Baluchistan said:

*People are reacting increasingly to state repression, and state oppression cannot kill the movement here. People are sending their daughters for the protests, which was previously not that common in a conservative Baloch area. This is an example how people are participating in the movement more actively.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 6, 2020)

Another activist from Baluchistan, Mahrang Baloch said:

*What happened with PTM historically happened with Baluch nationalists. Here the movement was directly targeted through intimidation and tortures, and on other occasions through state's "fifth generation warfare" mechanisms. Even this "counter-propaganda" cannot halt the movement, instead it is providing more fuel to the movement, which is growing day by day.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 20, 2020)

We find that movement's haphazard patterns of mobilization and at times dormant nature is to a degree dependent on state repression, but movement's internal tactics and strategies are also important. Repression did not eradicate the movement, but it triggered more mobilization. The impact is more in peripheries as compared to urban centers, although less visible due to higher degrees of censorship in the peripheries.

#### 4.2.3 Social movement's spillover effect or movement-movement influence in a hybrid regime

Social movement's unintended outcomes through spillover effect or movement-movement influence, which we established in section 1.4 and later developing on that we talked about the revival of previously dormant Left-wing groups in the country in the section 3.3, which could be attributed to PTM's influence, was the third broad theme of our interview guide. This is also the second hypothesis of the study, which deems the rise of these smaller progressive groups as PTM's spillover effect emanating due to confined and oppressive political opportunity structure of a hybrid regime, where as an 'early riser', a peculiar social movement like PTM brings issues of public importance to daylight, heralding and catalyzing smaller movements along with it. On the question of what role PTM has played on Pakistan's political landscape and its relationship with the smaller movements, Dr NIDA KIRMANI, a progressive-feminist activist said:

*PTM has raised some very important questions which I think people were afraid to ask before PTM emerged. It broke a lot of taboos around the kinds of questions we can ask from our state, particularly the military. So, I think it has encouraged other individuals and smaller movements to raise similar and related questions to question the way state has been managing its relationship with its citizens.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)

ZAHID ALI, one of the founding members of *Haqooq e Khalq*(Rights of the People) Movement (HKM) and Progressive Students Collective(PSC) said:

*PTM broke the fear in Pakistan about certain institutions and at the same time it mainstreamed the discourse. Before PTM, you could see smaller groups in the peripheries and even within the Left talking about these things individually or in smaller groups. PTM helped*

*mainstreaming this discourse to urban centers and created a civil society network on social media. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)*

Another anonymous member of HKM and PSC said:

*PTM has opened- up questions which the Left has avoided for so long. With the rise of PTM, as a Leftist activist it provided us space that you could call out power. Left talked about these issues previously but the way it started after PTM's emergence on the scene is something new. The rally PTM conducted in Lahore, I have not seen something like this before. It was the evocation of things we have always been thinking and talking about, and now we could say them out loudly. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)*

ISMAT SHAHJAHAN termed PTM a “rainbow movement” because it has “socialist, nationalist and feminist elements”. She said:

*These movements have a dialectical relationship with PTM. Both helped each other. Because some of these smaller movements were active already, they came on the forefront after PTM, so in a way cross-fertilization happened. Historically, there has always been resistance from the peripheral regions like Baluchistan, but not in the power centre i.e Punjab. So, when Lahore Jalsa happened in 2018 it became a decisive moment, which broke fear. So, when PTM uttered their radical slogans at power's heartland, it broke fear which changed the political environment and instilled smaller movements to resist as well. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)*

Answering the question of PTM's role on their personal activism and their movements' parallel and increased activities after PTM's arrival on scene, ZAHID ALI said:

*Before PTM we were already doing activities on university campuses where political activities were banned so we invigorated those conversations. After 2015, we slowly started organizing but after PTM, we saw an Inter-ethnic alliance where nationalists joined progressive activism as well. Our Students Solidarity March was successful because a lot of nationalist student organizations became part of it. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 3, 2020)*

Here the anonymous activist said:

*I think this has happened in a parallel way. In 2014-15 Leftist activists were working already. A lot of developments were happening simultaneously, we were organizing study circles in Lahore in 2016 but we did not know much about the 'Pashtun Question'. We wanted to go beyond the "myopic" lens the old Left had. Our student politics was active already, but after PTM we were made to rethink the direction of our politics because of the perceived increased threat of oppression. Given this trajectory the way politics was unfolding itself in the country, I feel this was parallel. But certainly, the vibrancy which these small progressive groups like ours got after PTM could be attributed to its influence. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)*

She also said:

*After PTM, we were made to rethink that we need to stretch our own politics too, because we were not sure whether PTM would wither away soon or it would keep going. PTM certainly instilled our politics but PTM did not create our politics. PTM accelerated our politics because of the opening-up of the space. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)*

Dr. KIRMANI here said:

*I think yes. Haqooq e Khalq Movement (HKM) and Progressive Students Collective (PSC) have tried to make the most of this moment and the space created by PTM. Events like Shehri Tahafuz (Citizens Protection) March for citizen protection is kind of direct reference to PTM. So, these movements echo some of the strategies of PTM. I think there is an inter-relationship between PTM and other smaller movements. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)*

On the question of rising feminist debate, women marches and its relationship with PTM, Dr. KIRMANI said:

*I think some of the activists have been activists of both movements where they are part of feminist struggle and ally with PTM as well. But most people who come in Aurat (Woman) March in urban centers in Karachi and Lahore, I'm not sure how much consciously they feel some kind of direct connection with PTM. (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)*

The anonymous respondent, an organizer of Woman March said:

*Feminist question and national questions are different. Historically the classic Left tried to subsume these two under the large banner of class question, but we do not agree with that. PTM brought forth a discourse which feminists could talk about but did not contribute to it. I would rather say feminist movements have contributed to PTM's struggle. It has given courage to Pashtun women who historically we could say was not part of very patriarchal nationalism of Pashtuns. Now we see many more women being part of PTM. It also brought forth the question of women whose husbands went "missing", the status of their marriages and their means of earning. Now these questions were asked by Pashtun women. Here relationship could be*

*dialectical. In 2019 in the women march, question of enforced disappearances was included so we could see a remote influence.* (Skype Interview, Budapest, May 1, 2020)

Through the respondents' answers, we can analyze that PTM's role in rejuvenating and catalyzing these smaller movements have been due to its role as an 'early riser' on political landscape, which broke fear around issues previously deemed unutterable, especially for calling out military's unbridled power on political affairs. It is the peculiar discourse and narrative of the movement which we established in chapter 3, which has empowered smaller progressive groups to speak on the similar issues. It is also the all-encompassing nature of the movement too, which has nationalist, socialist and feminist elements which have attracted the smaller groups. We can say that the smaller groups were active before PTM but at much lower degree of activism, and even their discourse was not as radical as what it became after PTM's arrival on the political scene. Paraphrasing one of the PTM activists, PTM played important role in joining these smaller groups to each other and influencing them by removing communication barriers and making these people mindful of political realities around them by breaking the fear. So, there is certainly a spillover or movement-influence. The association of smaller Left-wing groups could also be seen through Left's correction of its discourse on WOT, which historically has been skeptical. After PTM unveiled the atrocities committed during WOT, it provided the Left a chance to rectify that dubious past, so it joined with PTM in large numbers. The feminist activism does not have any direct relationship with PTM due to different trajectories of political struggle and because feminist forums in the country has been much older than PTM. But we could see a dialectical role and cross-fertilization of discourse in the both the struggles. We can say an inter-movement influence. Here we can see feminist activists talking about Pashtun women rights, those particularly impacted during WOT, while simultaneously PTM has given a

platform to Pashtun women to voice their concerns, which is a break from earlier patriarchal forms of Pashtun nationalism. A much more progressive form of Pashtun nationalism which has risen through PTM is the reason for feminists' attraction for PTM.

## **Conclusion**

The existing research on social movements does not explore regime type as a conditioning factor when it comes to understanding how social movements operate in different regimes. Far less attention has been given to understanding the relationship between social movements and different kinds of hybrid regimes. This study aimed to fill this much-needed theoretical gap in the understanding of social movements and regime types. With the empirical case of Pashtun *Tahafuz* (protection) Movement (PTM), a Pashtun human rights movement that emerged from peripheral Pakistan, this study sought to understand how contention takes place under a hybrid regime like Pakistan—one that has an institutional and political opportunity structure different from the post-Soviet hybrid regimes that caught the scholarly attention of social movement researchers. How does a hybrid regime like Pakistan repress a social movement like PTM? Are the patterns of repression consistent or intricate and what effects do these patterns have on the mobilization and progress of the movement? Does a movement operating under such conditions manage to last? What effects, intended or unintended, do such movements have on other movements? These and other similar questions are what form the core of this study.

The study argued that political opportunity structure of a hybrid regime like Pakistan characterized by the dominance of military gives rise to haphazard and dual repression on a social movement. The dual part comes from the fact that the movement experiences repression coming from both civilian and military organs of the state.



The study found that the dual repression is likely to affect the mobilization of the movement in the short run, with abeyance being a possible consequence, but is unlikely to exterminate the movement. The movement may instead, in the long run, experience increased mobilization and resistance against the state. The movement may also act as a catalyst for other movements operating in parallel in different parts of the country as an unintended consequence of its mobilization and progress. The nascent resurrection of previously dormant Left-wing groups and rejuvenation of the progressive wing of student body can be attributed as phenomena likely linked to PTM's influence. Against the backdrop of Pakistan's chequered democratic history marred by the dominance of military, PTM became the 'early riser', paving way for smaller movements to follow suit and speak for their rights. The research also revealed that a hybrid regime like Pakistan not only employs traditional tools of repression to curb dissent, but also modern conspiratorial tools undermining the growth of social movements and maligning their public image.

The research offers insights for understanding how contention in hybrid regimes like Pakistan may not experience the same patterns of repression and mobilization as other hybrid regimes do. The difference is equally pronounced when compared with democratic or authoritarian states. The research has important implications for other hybrid and semi-democratic regimes having an overbearing military and political opportunity structure similar to that of Pakistan.

## Bibliography

- Adeney, Katharine, 'A step towards inclusive federalism in Pakistan? The politics of the 18th amendment', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 42, no. 4, 2012, 539-565
- Adeney, Katharine, 'How to understand Pakistan's hybrid regime: the importance of a multidimensional continuum', *Democratization* 24, no. 1, 2017, 119-137
- Akhtar, Aasim Sajjad, 'A call for revolutionary internationalism', *Pak Left review*, 2020
- Akins, Harrison, 'FATA and the Frontier Crimes Regulation in Pakistan: The Enduring Legacy of British Colonialism', *The Howard H. Baker Jr Center for Public Policy Brief* 5, 2017
- Almeida, Paul D, 'Opportunity organizations and threat-induced contention: Protest waves in authoritarian settings', *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 2, 2003, 345-400.
- Amin, Tahir, 'Rise and decline of ethno-national movements of Pakistan: domestic and international factors', PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987
- Azad, Maulana Abdul Kalam, *India wins freedom, The complete version*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1998
- Banerjee, Mukulika, 'Unarmed Pathans', *India International Centre Quarterly* 35, no. 2, 2008, 94-101
- Beetham, David, *Democracy and human rights*, Vol. 249, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999
- Bleich Erik and Robert Pekkanen, 'How to report interview data', *Interview research in political science* 1, 2013, 84-105
- Bogaards, Matthijs, 'How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism', *Democratization* 16, no. 2, 2009, 399-423
- Bostos Maria, 'The Pashtun protest movement is a test for Pakistan's democracy', *Open democracy*, 30 May 2018
- Boudreau, Vincent, *Resisting dictatorship: Repression and protest in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press, 2009
- Carey, Sabine C, 'The dynamic relationship between protest and repression', *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 1, 2006, 1-11
- Caroe, Olaf, *The Pathans, 550 BC-AD 1957*, Macmillan, 1958
- Corduneanu -Huci, Cristina, and Maryjane Osa, 'Running uphill: political opportunity in non-democracies' *Comparative Sociology* 2, no. 4, 2003, 605-629
- Davenport, Christian, 'Human rights and the democratic proposition', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 1, 1999, 92-116
- Davenport, Christian, 'Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions', *American Journal of Political Science*, 1995, 683-71
- Davenport, Christian, 'State repression and political order', *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 10, 2007, 1-23
- Davenport, Christian, *How social movements die*, Cambridge University Press, 2015
- Della Porta, Donatella, ed, *Methodological practices in social movement research*, Oxford University Press, 2014
- Diamond, Larry 'Elections without democracy: Thinking about hybrid regimes', *Journal of democracy* 13, no. 2, 2002, 21-35
- Dupree, Louis *Afghanistan*, Vol. 818, Princeton University Press, 1998
- Earl, Jennifer, 'Methods, movements, and outcomes', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 22, 2000, 3-25
- Eisinger, Peter K, 'The conditions of protest behavior in American cities', *American political science review* 67, no. 1, 1973, 11-28

- Fein, Helen, 'More murder in the middle: Life-integrity violations and democracy in the world', *Hum. Rts. Q.* 17, 1995
- Fong, Brian, 'State-society conflicts under Hong Kong's hybrid regime: governing coalition building and civil society challenges', *Asian Survey* 53, no. 5, 2013, 854-882
- Franklin, James C, 'Contentious challenges and government responses in Latin America', *Political Research Quarterly* 62, no. 4, 2009, 700-714
- Giugni, Marco G, 'Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements', *Annual review of sociology* 24, no. 1, 1998, 371- 393
- Giugni, Marco G, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds, *From contention to democracy*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998
- Giugni, Marco G, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds, *How social movements matter*, Vol. 10, University of Minnesota Press, 1999
- Hamza Alavi, 'The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review* 74, 1973
- Hasan, Mushirul, 'Memories of a fragmented nation: rewriting the histories of India's partition', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1998, 2662-2668
- Hathaway, Oona A, 'Do human rights treaties make a difference?', *The Yale Law Journal* 111, no. 8, 2002
- Hawkins, Jonathan, 'The Pashtun cultural code: Pashtunwali', *Australian Defence Force Journal* 180, 2009
- Huntington, Samuel P, *Political order in changing societies*, Yale University Press, 2006
- Hussain, Salman 'War on Terror to War on Dissent', *Economic & Political Weekly* 53, no. 17, 2018
- Jaffrelot, Christophe, *The Pakistan paradox: Instability and resilience*, Oxford University Press, 2015
- Jalal, Ayesha, 'Conjuring Pakistan: History as official imagining', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 1, 1995, 73-89
- Jan, Ammar Ali, 'It is time for India and Pakistan to repeal their sedition laws', *Aljazeera*, 20 February 2020
- Jetly, Rajshree ed, *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, Routledge India, 2012
- Jiwani, Tayyaba and Ayaz Mallick, 'Pashtun Tahafuz Movement: challenging the "War on Terror": an interview with Ismat Shahjahan on the origins, aims and trajectories of PTM', *Jamhoor.org*, 2 February 2020
- Johansen, Robert C, 'Radical Islam and nonviolence: A case study of religious empowerment and constraint among Pashtuns', *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 1, 1997, 53-71
- Kakar, Rafiullah 'Politics: demystifying the PTM', *Dawn News*, 23 February 2020
- Karen, Rasler, 'Concessions, repression, and political protest in the Iranian revolution', *American Sociological Review*, 1996, 132-152
- Khan, Adeel, 'Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to integrationism', *Asian Ethnicity* 4, no. 1, 2003, 67-83
- Klandermans, Bert and Suzanne Staggenborg, eds, *Methods of Social Movement Research*, The University of Minnesota press, 2002
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, 2010
- Mainwaring, Scott Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, 'Classifying political regimes in Latin', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36, no. 1, 2001, 37-65
- Mara Loveman, 'High-risk collective action: Defending human rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina', *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 2, 1998, 477-525

- Mariam Mufti, 'What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship?', *Politics and Governance* 6, no. 2, 2018, 112-119
- McAdam, Doug, 'Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer', *American journal of sociology* 92, no. 1, 1986, 64-90
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 'To map contentious politics', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 1, no. 1, 1996, 17-34
- Meyer, David S & Nancy Whittier, 'Social movement spillover', *Social problems* 41, no. 2, 1994, 277-298
- Mir, Nazir Ahmad, 'Pashtun nationalism in search of political space and the state in Pakistan', *Strategic Analysis* 42, no. 4, 2018, 443-450
- Opp, Karl-Dieter, *Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis*, Routledge, 2009
- Osa Maryjane, and Kurt Schock, 'A Long, Hard Slog: Political Opportunities, Social Networks and the Mobilization of Dissent in Non-Democracies', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 27, 2007, 123-153
- Pogonyi, Szabolcs, *Extra-territorial ethnic politics, discourses and identities in Hungary*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017
- Regan, Patrick M and Errol A. Henderson, 'Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: are democracies internally less violent?', *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 1, 2002, 119-136
- Regan, Patrick M, and Sam R. Bell, 'Changing lanes or stuck in the middle: Why are anocracies more prone to civil wars?', *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 4, 2010, 747-759
- Rieffer, Barbara-Ann J, 'Religion and nationalism: Understanding the consequences of a complex relationship', *Ethnicities* 3, no. 2, 2003, 215-242
- Robertson, Graeme B, 'Strikes and labor organization in hybrid regimes', *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4, 2007, 781-798
- Robertson, Graeme B, *The politics of protest in hybrid regimes: Managing dissent in post-communist Russia*, Cambridge University Press, 2010
- Rummel Rudolph, *Power kills: Democracy as a method of nonviolence*, Transaction Publishers, 2002
- Saikal, Amin 'Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30, no. 1, 2010, 5-17
- Schock, Kurt 'People power and political opportunities: Social movement mobilization and outcomes in the Philippines and Burma', *Social problems* 46, no. 3, 1999, 355-375
- Shah, Aqil, 'Pakistan: voting under military tutelage', *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 1, 2019, 128-142
- Shah, Aqil 'Getting the military out of Pakistani politics: How aiding the army undermines democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, 69-82
- Shah, Aqil, 'How Pakistan's Politicians help the military', *New York Times*, January 23, 2019
- Shah, Aqil, 'How Pakistan's politicians help the military', *New York Times*, 23 January 2020
- Shah, Hurmat Ali, 'Redefining Citizenship in Pakistan', *Himal South Asia*, 28 April 202
- Siddiq Ayesha, *Military Inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy*, Penguin Random House India, 2017
- Siddique, Abubakar, *The Pashtun question: The unresolved key to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan*, Hurst & Company Limited, 2014
- Singh, Chaitram and Michael Bailey, 'Praetorian Democracy, Illiberal but Enduring: Pakistan as Exemplar', *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 35, 2013
- Soule, Sarah and Christian Davenport, 'Velvet glove, iron fist, or even hand? Protest policing in the United States, 1960-1990', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 14, no. 1, 2009, 1-22

- Stepan, Alfred C, Constantin Năstăsescu, and F. Van Oystaeyen, *Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton University Press, 1988
- T Denk, & Silander, D, *Regime Heterogeneity: A Comparative Study on Institutional Variation in Political Regimes*, VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2011
- Tarrow Sidney G, *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2011
- Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly, *contentious politics*, Oxford University Press, 2015
- Tilly, Charles, 'Social movements as historically specific clusters of political performances', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 38,1993, 1-30
- Valiente, Celia, 'Social movements in abeyance in non-democracies: The women's movement in Franco's Spain', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 38, 2015, 259-290
- Voegelin, Eric, *Race and state*. Vol. 2, University of Missouri Press, 1997
- Vreeland, James Raymond 'The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy', *Journal of conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3, 2008, 401-425
- Waseem, Mohammad, 'The Post-18th Amendment Federalism in Pakistan', *Development Advocate Pakistan* 2, no. 1, 2015, 11-12
- Waseem, Mohammad, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Progressive Publishers, 1989
- Yong, Tan Tai, 'Punjab and the making of Pakistan: The roots of a civil-military state', *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 18, no. s1, 1995, 177-192
- Zafar, Imad 'Pakistan's Hybrid Regime buying more time before its downfall', *Asia Times*, 28 April 2020
- Zahoor, Adil, 'Significance of 18<sup>th</sup> amendment for a non-consociational federation of Pakistan', *Daily Times*, 3 January 2019