CEU eTD Collection (2021); Aleksiev, Damian: Explanatory Gaps against Physicalism and Panpsychism

CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2021
Author Aleksiev, Damian
Title Explanatory Gaps against Physicalism and Panpsychism
Summary How does consciousness fit within the physical world? I examine—and ultimately reject—two metaphysical theories with different answers to this question. The first theory is physicalism. It posits that the world is fundamentally only physical. The second theory is panpsychism. It posits that the physical world is fundamentally only conscious. I argue that both physicalism and panpsychism are false. Physicalism faces an explanatory gap between physical reality and human consciousness. Panpsychism faces an under-discussed explanatory gap between consciousness and the structure of physical reality. I conclude that physicalism cannot metaphysically explain human consciousness, while panpsychism cannot metaphysically explain the structure of physical reality.
The conclusion of my thesis is not entirely negative. I argue that although neither physicalism nor panpsychism can solve the problem of consciousness, the Russellian framework used by many panpsychists should not be rejected. I suggest that the Russellian framework, in conjunction with a non-panpsychist theory of fundamental reality, could be the way forward in solving the problem of consciousness.
In Chapter 1, I introduce the problem of consciousness and the metaphysical terminology I use throughout the thesis. In Chapter 2, I argue against physicalists who employ the ‘phenomenal concepts strategy.’ I show that the phenomenal concepts strategy rests on implausible assumptions about the nature of phenomenal concepts. In Chapter 3, I argue against Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. I show that human consciousness remains especially puzzling even if exploratory gaps are abundant. In Chapter 4, I argue against panpsychism. I show that the physical structure of spacetime would lack a metaphysical explanation if panpsychism were true. Finally, in Chapter 5, I evaluate several other theories of consciousness and speculate which one of them is the most promising.
Supervisor Crane, Tim; Goff, Philip
Department Philosophy PhD
Full texthttps://www.etd.ceu.edu/2021/aleksiev_damjan.pdf

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