Ethnicity and Electoral Politics:
The Role of Contextual Factors in Voting and Citizen-Party Linkage

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Declaration

I, the undersigned Nemanja Batrićević candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy, and International Relations, declare herewith that the present thesis, apart from Chapter 3, is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. Chapter 3 is co-authored with Olivera Komar, associate professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Montenegro. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of work of others, and no part the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

August 31, 2021

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Signature

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Abstract

The question of whether (and how) ethnic divisions affect electoral competition has occupied the attention of comparative politics for decades. The main question addressed in this dissertation is under what conditions the supposed negative effects of ethnicity on electoral outcomes occur, and when they can be mitigated. In ontological terms, this dissertation diverges from the primordial theories that dominate the study of ethnicity in electoral politics. Instead, it assumes that democratic competition is not necessarily juxtaposed to ethnopolitics, as socially constructed ethnic identities are capable of producing dynamic electoral contestation. While variation in the outcomes of ethnopolitics stems from several sources, this dissertation focuses on the role of contextual factors. It sets out from the supposition that the ethnic effect varies across features that are multilevel in nature: individual membership, group's size, spatial distribution, internal structure, as well as overall ethnic composition of a polity.

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the thesis. Since the dissertation is developed as a paper-based thesis, composed of four entirely separate papers, each with their unique theoretical chapters, methodology and data, the purpose of this introduction is to emphasize the overarching theme and joint contribution. I also use the introduction for conceptualization and situating my research in the wider research agenda.

The empirical chapters start with Chapter 2, in which the effect of a country's ethnic composition on the strength of the programmatic linkage is investigated. The hypothesized effect of ethnic diversity on proximity voting is identified against a number of potentially confounding

demographic, political and socio-economic factors. The evidence suggests the presumed negative effect of ethnic diversity is overstated, since the programmatic linkage is hurt by diversity only under peculiar set of conditions, such as high intergroup discrimination and economic inequality.

Chapter 3 studies the most frequently observed alternative to the programmatic linkage – clientelistic exchange. More precisely, the study leverages a quasi-experimental design to show how the demographic composition of local settlements affects the targeting of ethnic minorities. The data reveals strategic targeting of minorities in settlements where they are demographically dominated by other ethnic groups, and thus less likely to weigh the material benefits against group norms in favor of the latter.

In Chapters 4 and Chapter 5, the thesis moves from the citizen-party linkage to studying the effect of ethnicity on party choice. Chapter 4 tackles one of the most critical issues in contemporary politics – the rise of anti-immigrant radical right-wing parties. More precisely, its studies the previously disregarded role of the spatial distribution of Muslim immigrants on electoral support for radical right-wing parties in Western Europe. The results show that an increase in the size of the Muslim immigrant population boosts support for the RRW only under condition of geographic segregation.

Chapter 5 studies the role of the internal divisions of ethnic groups on their political and electoral preferences. Specifically, the study examines the role of tribal identity in voting for the nation-building elites in post-communist Montenegro. The evidence suggests the significant role of tribal affiliations both in voting and categorization of political candidates.

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Chapter 1

Introduction:

Ethnicity and Electoral Politics

"Ethnicity has fought and bled and burned
its way into public and scholarly consciousness."

Donald L. Horowitz (1985)
Ethnic Groups in Conflict

1.1 Ethnopolitics Today

When, on June 24th of 2016, Britain shockingly voted to leave the European Union, only the greatest skeptics suspected this would not be the biggest political surprise of the year. On November 9th, defying the expectations of most political analysts, media pundits and the public at large, Donald J. Trump was elected as the forty-fifth President of the United States (Fukuyama, 2018). While nationalist leaders have already been established in parts of Europe and Eurasia, Trump's inauguration raised genuine concern among democratic allies. The highest executive office in the world was now held by a political novice, a reality TV star, a divisive and utterly undemocratic figure. In the four years of his presidency, Trump ruled with an unprecedented desire to undermine the integrity of federal institutions, ignore institutional checks and balances, spread distrust in the electoral process, and finally, resist the peaceful transition of power. During his term, the democratic backsliding of Orbán's Hungary, Erdoğan's Turkey, or Putin's Russia (Kreko and Enyedi, 2018; Yilmaz, 2020; Gill, 2015), ceased being merely topics of academic debate and became the sobering reality for millions of Americans who began fearing for their country's future.

The relationship between the electoral success of nationalist leaders and the erosion of democratic institutions is currently debated primarily within the confines of populism scholarship. The already vast literature on populism in contemporary democracies continues to grow, as more countries become deeply shaken by the toxic confrontation between "good people" and "dirty elites" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Pappas, 2019). However, situating this debate mainly within the framework of populism is somewhat misleading, since it draws attention away from a more corrosive feature of contemporary populists – the use ethnonationalism for the legitimization of authoritarian tendencies and the redefinition of "the people" in exclusionary ethnic terms. Their electoral appeal is grounded in an obsessive safeguarding of the nation's majority culture and keeping the country as homogeneous

as possible (Rydgren, 2007; Rydgren 2017; Arzheimer, 2009). Electoral mobilization based on such "census concerns" typically intertwines the defense of "the people" with the defense of an ethnicity. In the process, even policies that are not inherently tied to identity, such as economic ones, are endlessly ethnicized. The tendency to fabricate external enemies of the people, who conspire with internal ones, in order to advocate for liberal values and against the cultural core of the nation, remains the most troubling form of ethnopolitics in today's democratic regimes (Jenne, 2018; Vachudova, 2021).

The recent surge in interest in identity politics even in places where ethnicity has not been traditionally high on the agenda exposes the preconceptions that both academia and the general public have about the relationship between ethnicity and politics. Electoral arenas have always been places for people to express their "true identity" by treating the cross on the ballot as an implicit statement of their social identity (Harrop and Miller, 1987). However, ethnicity has become an integral part of contemporary mainstream politics in a form that leaves little space for an alternative understanding of its role (Eley and Suny, 1996). Today, the term "ethnopolitics" is innately tied to ethnic or sectarian conflicts, terrorism, racial prejudice, anti-foreigner sentiments, ingroup favoritism and the marginalization of ethnic minorities (Ratuva, 2019). Ethnic categories are seen as a form of overpowering phenomenon that inhibits human agency in the electoral arena and makes voters passive carriers of group preferences. Supposedly, the effect of ethnic mobilization has on whole polities is similar. While consolidated democracies may dislike the negative outcomes stemming from the ethnicization of politics, they are, nonetheless, powerless to stop them (Chatterjee, 2020). Such an approach clearly negates the fact that new identities emerge and become politically mobilized, older forms of identification reemerge, and previously activated ethnic sentiments disappear from the political arenas (Nagel & Olzak, 1982).

Despite the almost universal presence of identity in contemporary politics, as well as the widely accepted notion that ethnic identification is socially constructed, the literature on the electoral consequences of ethnicity has been primarily driven by the primordial assumption of trans-contextual stability (Chandra, 2012a). Most of the research on ethnicity and electoral preferences is designed, conceptually and methodologically, to reiterate the assumptions of intracommunal consensus and intercommunal conflict (Rabushka & Shlepse, 1972). However, the extensive literature on ethnic boundary making suggests that ethnic identification is not predetermined, and that voters are able to alter their group membership and the intensity with which that membership is experienced (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2008). Simply put, each individual carries a repertoire of ethnic identities, whose salience and meaning change contextually, depending on the nature of the "audience", and the political and socio-economic environment in which the elections occur.

This thesis departs from the logic that identities are continually constructed in reference to outer factors and are always susceptible to external validation. In particular, if political preferences and voter behavior in ethnically defined electoral arenas depend on group membership and boundaries, and if those boundaries are at least somewhat malleable, then it follows that the electoral outcomes of ethnicity also vary situationally. Only in this way can ethnic-based competition become compatible with democracy, since it can then produce shifting instead of permanent majorities and minorities. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the electoral outcomes associated with voting under the assumption that party choice and the nature of the citizen-party linkage are not inevitably tied to primordial ethnic differences. Instead, it seeks to identify the contextual conditions in which ethnicity-related factors affect both the behavior of voters and party strategies in a different manner. A more flexible approach that treats ethnicity as a relational variable allows us to ask questions: Under what conditions do ethnic differences produce electoral consequences? What are those consequences? In

what situations can the negative effects of ethnic diversity be mitigated? How does the salience of ethnic categories vary in response to internal and external factors?, and so on.

This thesis considers individual, group, and ethnic features of polities to be hierarchical concepts, whose interaction greatly determines the nature of the electoral outcomes we observe. Each of the chapters takes a unique perspective on the role of ethnicity in electoral competition. While the analyses include various ethnic characteristics, every chapter is centered around a different type of ethnic effect. Broadly taken, four different types of ethnic effect on the electoral behavior of individuals are considered in this dissertation: the ethnicity of the *ingroup*, the ethnicity of the *outgroup*, the ethnic *combination* of ingroup and outgroup, and finally, the *ethnic composition* of the locality in which individuals and groups are embedded (Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). Clearly, these are mutually embedded ethnic features that operate at different levels. With respect to that, the chapters proceed in a reverse order, starting with the effect of the country's level of ethnic diversity and closing with the role of the ingroup's internal structure.

This introduction continues with the conceptualization of ethnicity adopted in this dissertation. I situate my research agenda in the ontological debate over the nature of ethnic identification, with a focus on the dimensions of identity central to the content of this thesis. The second section of this chapter brings attention to the reasons for looking at the issue of ethnopolitics from a contextual perspective. After that, the topics, structure, and content of the four separate papers composing this dissertation are described in greater detail. The final section of the introduction lays out the reasoning behind the empirical strategy used to tackle the research questions posed in the dissertation.

1.2 Defining Ethnicity

1.2.1 What is Ethnic Identity?

The term "identity politics" has been present in the field of social sciences for decades. The term is broadly used to distinguish between "politics in general" and politics that makes the group principle central to issues of political competition. While it was initially used to refer to activism by people with disabilities (Anspach, 1979), today it is most frequently understood as an umbrella concept that includes civil, gender, LGBT, or ethnic movements. However, due to turbulent events that took place in the mid-1990s - when genocides against the Bosniaks in Yugoslavia and the Tutsis in Rwanda occurred - the meaning of identity politics has become intrinsically tied to violent ethnic conflict and nationalism more generally (Bernstein, 2005). Still, like almost all valuable concepts in social science, ethnicity remains contested (Collier et al., 2006). To date, there is no consensus on a single accepted definition of "ethnicity". In the narrowest sense, ethnicity refers to shared descent between members of the same ethnic group. Such "objective" definitions clearly exclude many collective identities, such as national, that claim no common ancestry among co-nationals. In the broadest meaning, ethnicity may refer to a community of people that share customs or culture. Overly "subjective" definitions, on the other hand, rarely specify which (and how much) of the cultural norms are crucially shared in order for a group to constitute an ethnicity (Wedeen, 2002).

Despite great variation in the definitions and understanding of ethnicity, since Horowitz's (1985, 52) seminal work, comparative politics literature has converged towards defining ethnicity as an overarching concept that includes any differentiation based on "some notion of ascription, however diluted". This would include any distinction between groups of people based on skin color, language, religion, tribe, nation, or caste. In this dissertation, I adopt the definition offered by Chandra (2006,

398) who argues that ethnic identity is **a subset of identity categories in which eligibility form membership is determined by attributes associated with or believed to be associated with - descent**. Clearly, the scope of the definition is contingent on the type of research being conducted. Given the comparative nature and the diverse list of ethnic identities in this thesis - tribal, national, religious, and racial – the advantage of this definition lies primarily in its inclusiveness.

While all definitions of ethnicity highlight the centrality of descent, its role is conceptualized differently. In that sense, two features of the adopted definition are especially important for the content of this dissertation. First, by focusing on the attributes that determine eligibility, this definition suggests a distinction between the categories of membership and the attributes that qualify people for membership of that category. Since some analyses in this dissertation assume nominal membership of an ethnic category is sufficient to produce electoral consequences, without actually modeling their activation, the emphasis on descent-based attributes is suitable. Second, the formulation "associated or believed to be associated with descent" allows this definition to include a wide range of identities around which a credible myth of common descent can be made, varying from ones obtained genetically (e.g., race), through cultural and historical inheritance (e.g., language, origin), or in the course of one's lifetime as markers of such inheritance (e.g., tribal markers) (Chandra, 2006, 400).

1.2.2 Fixed or Constructed?

The ontological debate over the definition of ethnicity is typically framed in dichotomous terms, between schools based around "essentialism" and "situationalism". The supporters of the essentialist, primordial, view highlight the trans-contextual stability of the grouping provided by ethnic cultures acquired through birth (Geertz, 1973; Rabushka and Shlepse, 1972). They see ethnic identification as a state of intense and comprehensive solidarity, closely tied to "tribalism, parochialism, communalism" (Geertz, 1967). Since ethnic groups hold distinctive features (culture, traditions or

language) the boundaries between them are unambiguous and persistent. The constructivist view of ethnicity, on the other hand, claims that ethnicities are a product of social factors and that they can be made and remade depending on the circumstances (Barth, 1969; Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2012a). Since ethnic groups are not relics of ancient times, boundaries between groups are constantly altered, allowing individuals to move from one side of an ethnic divide to the other (Posner, 2004; Wimmer, 2008).

Despite the substantive differences between approaches, the most prominent scholars in both camps agree on the fundamental principles: identities are constructed, their content can vary to some degree over time, and the intensity of group identification varies across group members (Hale, 2004). Even the most influential primordialists root their argument not in objective reality, but in perceptions. Van Evera (2001) explicitly states that "ethnic identities are socially constructed" since they are "not stamped on our genes", while Geertz (1973) argues that assumed blood ties are based on quasi-kinship that is not traceable, but rather "sociologically known" (Bayar, 2009). Connor (1993) argues that the sense of shared descent is not rooted in factual history, since nearly all nations are the offspring of numerous ethnic strains. Instead, the bonding power of a group comes from "felt history", the intuitive conviction in a group's separate origin and evolution. The main difference between the two ontological positions, however, lies in their distinct views on how durable and responsive identity constructs are. Seeing them as ancient relics, primordialist believe that once constructed, ethnic identities are hard to reconstruct and tend to overpower individual behavior, especially when solidified in the history of violent ethnic conflicts (Van Evera, 2001).

In contrast, Gellner (1983) argued that nations, for instance, are a modern phenomenon responsive to social factors. In his view, the forces of modernization and the behavior of the elite play a significant role in the construction and solidification if identity groups, especially where no group consciousness existed before. Still, while modernization theorists recognized the possibility of

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malleability, they also thought of identities as a rather stable and durable. The real shift in the paradigm came from the more radical situationalists, who maintained that individuals are always, at least to some extent, capable of altering their collective identification. According to them, the meaning and boundaries of an individual's ethnicity should be understood as constantly the evolving properties of both individuals and groups. An individual's ethnicity is, therefore, a social fact negotiated between what a person thinks of his/her ethnicity and what others think of it, as well as external social, economic, and political processes (Nagel and Olzak, 1982; Nagel, 2003; Okamura, 1981). Individuals possess a repertoire of ethnic identities, some of which are more salient in one situation, while some of them may be more salient in another. For this reason, the origin, content, and form of ethnicity reflects the creative choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic terms. In words of Zigmund Bauman (1996), while modernity "built in steel and concrete" in order to keep identities stable, postmodernity "built in biodegradable plastic", so it can avoid fixation and keep options open.

1.2.3 An Expression or an Instrument?

The debate on the ontological nature of ethnic identity is not in the main focus of this dissertation. Here, I am not interested in studying the historical development of ethnic structures or the factor that explain the trajectory of certain ethnicities. Nonetheless, the character and contextual stability of group boundaries is of paramount importance to studying the role of ethnicity in the electoral arena. The issue of the malleability of ethnic boundaries is essentially an issue of human agency, which has been one of the central issues of voting behavior literature since its inception.

Advancing from a constructivist stance, we are likely to adopt an instrumentalist view by which voters and elites rationally manipulate ethnic sentiments in a manner that suits their self-interests. The

competitive model of ethnic relations emphasizes the role of resource competition in both the formation and mobilization of ethnic groups (Barth, 1969). Since the root of group-based competition lies in the desire to control ways in which scarce resources are distributed, group boundaries are strategically altered to maximize material benefits (Sherif, 1961; Bates, 1974). This approach helps explain how political elites instrumentally increase the salience of a certain ethnic category to prioritize certain portions of the electorate and increase their coalition-building capacities (Posner, 2005). It also explains the motivation of voters, as they can strategically (de)emphasize certain dimensions of their identity repertoire in order to increase access to the government or signal membership of advantageous ethnic groups. Similarly, ethnicity often serves as an informational cue that reduces the cost of information exchange (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Voters tend to rely on their co-ethnics for information-gathering, since their history of repeated interaction produces the social trust needed to delegate part of the complex decision-making process to other group members (Birnir, 2006).

On the other hand, Social Identity Theory (SIT) suggests that the inherited tendency of people to differentiate between groups works as a means of introducing order to a complex social reality. Once group identity is established, individuals tend to emphasize differences and use them to discriminate against the outgroup (Tajfel, 1974; Turner et al., 1987). While discrimination between groups of different social status is likely to have economic manifestations, the process by which groups amplify group differences functions without any material incentives or self-interests (Kalin and Sambanis, 2018). As we might expect, primordialists endorsed the view that ethnic attachments are based in the non-rational foundations of personality that primarily provide an emotional appeal (Geertz, 1967). It is the emotional satisfaction stemming from the expression of ethnic belonging that ensures material motives are overridden by group considerations. This non-rational core of the nation, in their view, is triggered by national symbols that communicate unspoken dedication to the same

cause, which cannot be reached by rational means or explanations. Or as Connor (1993, 386) reiterated, following Chateaubriand's thought - "people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational".

1.2.4 The "Third Way": Constrained Change

Despite the stark differences, presenting these two approaches as mutually exclusive has significant shortcomings. Since there is no reason to pledge allegiance to one approach over another, the literature has converged towards an understanding of ethnicity as simultaneously holding both constraining primordial and constructed elements. If ethnic identities are even partially capable of change, then it makes sense to assume that the postulations of one school are more viable than the ones of the other, depending on the context and the particular domain under study.

While in principle ethnic identities are malleable, shifts in ethnic boundaries are often significantly constrained (Wimmer, 2013). The idea that ethnic categories are simply the personal choice of each individual runs the risk of emphasizing agency at the expense of structure. Instead, individual choices are limited to the socially and politically defined ethnic categories available at a particular time and in a particular situation. The two most frequently observed strategies that are available to individual voter - *reclassifying* and *switching* - stem from the multidimensionality of ethnic identification. For instance, when voters change their activated ethnic identity from "German" to "Christian", the ethnic attributes of nationality and religion are reclassified, while the underlying set of attributes remain the same (Chandra, 2012b). However, voters can also switch between categories of the same attribute. For example, if voter changes his national identification from "German" to "Austrian" he/she successfully switched the category of national identification. Clearly, under the assumption that group membership is of relevance to vote choice, alterations in group boundaries of this kind have a substantial effect on behavior in the electoral arena.

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However, the extent to which this is going to be the case depends on the intensity and pace at which any shifts in the nature of ethnic identification occur. Ethnic boundaries sometimes change quite rapidly, while sometimes they do so over long periods of time. An example of a short-term switch would be a temporary change in behavior that has an ethnic basis, such as an alteration of dialect that allows individuals to change linguistic boundaries or to emphasize (or hide) membership of a particular ethnic group. Long-term ethnic switching, on the other hand, requires more substantive changes in cultural markers and/or customs. Therefore, the social construction of identity is evidently limited by the external ascription and visibility ("stickiness") associated with descent-based identities. The more visual cues are available for others to impose a particular ethnic category on someone, the more constrained individual choices are with respect to altering those boundaries (Nagel & Olzak, 1982). Take for instance the identities covered in this dissertation. Since racial features are immediately displayed, they are much less malleable and typically require at least one generation to change into a more ambiguous ethnic category. On the other hand, nationalities as "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991) have no obvious visual cues and thus can be change quickly, as later demonstrated.

1.3 The Electoral Outcomes of Ethnicity

1.3.1 Why is Ethnicity (Still) Relevant in Contemporary Democracies?

Although Marxist theorists anticipated that social class and quality of life would become the central issues of modern politics, since the end of the Cold War, class has lacked the credibility to become the dominant line of division between human groups. This has opened up space for agendas centered around the issue of identity to become prevalent and even to define the whole era as 'the age of identity' (Guelke, 2010; Peleg, 2007). The agreement of traditional scholarship on political

competition in plural societies that the conflicting preferences of distinct ethnic groups represent a unique dilemma for democratic competition (Rabushka and Shlepse, 1972; Horowitz, 1985; Dahl, 1971) raises the very basic question of why ethnicity is still relevant in contemporary democracies. Here, I briefly describe three reasons that are of significance to the papers composing this dissertation and which are likely to keep ethnicity relevant to democratic competition for the foreseeable future.

First, democracies allow the free and equal participation of all individuals and groups. This means that de-emphasizing ethnicity is not seen as a necessary requirement for a stable and functioning polity. While authoritarian leaders may desire to rule with the unhidden intention of excluding other ethnic groups from government, democracy requires ruling elites to allow all groups, ethnic or non-ethnic, to freely participate, express their group preferences and, ideally, take part in governance (Birnir, 2006). While in any democratic regime alternative forms of mobilization are freely available, political parties are not only allowed, but often incentivized, to organize around the issue of ethnicity. Ethnic identification is created or maintained as a basis for collective action when there are clear competitive advantages attached to a particular ethnic identity, compared to alternatives (Nagel & Olzak, 1982). To the extent that the political recognition of ethnicity institutionalizes ethnic differences (e.g., quotas of minority seats in parliament, affirmative action or a special threshold for parliamentary representation), ethnic mobilization is increasingly likely. The emphasis on ethnicity in democratic regimes is also preserved by the state's explicit usage of ethnic categories in census-taking and by (often) acknowledging the ethnic composition of populations in constitutions (Horowitz, 1985).

Second, group differences are usually multidimensional, meaning that the problematization of any form of collective inequality is likely to also involve an ethnic dimension. Ironically, ethnicity often has very little to do with its supposed negative effects. Used as an accessible and intuitive explanation for almost all social worries, ethnicity has become a "usual suspect", a "cover story" for problems that frequently originated elsewhere, or to which ethnicity is merely a contributing factor. The

establishment of ethnic divisions of labor or persistent economic inequalities between ethnic groups are likely to produce ethnic mobilization and competition for resources along ethnic lines. Certainly, the fact that ethnicity has gained something of a poor reputation in this context did not happen without a reason, as is demonstrated by the papers comprising this dissertation. However, the fact that no account of ethnicity can go far enough without referring to a plethora of related factors suggests that ethnicity may not be inherently tied to those outcomes. Despite scholars often treating ethnicity as an overriding force that cancels out all human agency and contextual specificities, its effect is too often intermingled with other demographic, political and socio-economic factors.

Third, the fact that the question of ethnicity has become part of the political mainstream even in places where it has not traditionally been high on the agenda is also a result of recent global developments. Immigration represents a major engine for the production of group stigma and the fear of ethnic others. Today's immigrant groups may become tomorrow's ethnic groups. Immigrant populations, due to their visibly different cultural backgrounds, often tend to congregate in communities, form ethnic enclaves and neighborhoods, or even fill certain labor niches by specializing in particular commodity markets (Nagel, 1994). The issue of migration amidst the refugee crisis has triggered xenophobic narratives against those who are seen as a threat to the safety and economic well-being of the "true nation". The fact that economic performance and competition across the job market are a poor predictor of attitudes towards immigrants explains why radical anti-immigrant parties across the West have challenged established democratic institutions, primarily over national identity and multiculturalism concerns (Rydgren, 2018). As a result, their success has been traced to a number of group-related phenomena, as exposure to ethnic minorities is found to increase the salience of ethnic identity and the tendency to hierarchically organize ethnic group based on their cultural background (Knowles et al., 2014; Cichocka, 2016).

1.3.2 Constructed Identities – Fixed Assumptions

While studies on the formation of ethnic groups or nation-building have predominantly adopted the constructivist assumption that ethnic identities are responsive to human agency and social context, studies focusing on the electoral consequences of ethnicity are primarily driven by the primordialist assumption. Simply put, it is more convenient for researchers to conceptualize their research strategy with ethnicity as an independent variable under the assumption that ethnic categories are permanent, and not constantly changing (Chandra, 2012a). Furthermore, the restrictions of cross-sectional survey data have contributed to a failure to address the issues of ethnicity in a more flexible manner. As a result, the traditional literature on political competition in ethnically diverse societies makes several assumptions that are, intentionally or not, present in the majority of scholarly work and in the conventional thinking about ethnopolitics.

The first assumption concerns intracommunal consensus, which supposes that ethnic groups perceive and express preferences about political alternatives identically. With respect to elections, this means that each member of any given ethnic community ranks the available alternatives in an identical manner. The second assumption, that of intercommunal conflict, extends this logic. It posits that the political preferences of culturally distinct ethnic groups are also distinct. If ingroup homogeneity and distinct group preferences are assumed, then it follows that ethnic groups will be in conflict on all collective issues. The third assumption holds that members of distinct ethnic communities, especially elites, share perceptual agreement with respect to the available alternatives in ethnically defined electoral arenas. In other words, there is "definitional consensus" among all communities that politics is ethnic in character and that group-values are in conflict (Rabushka and Shlepse, 1972).

Even a brief overview of daily media reports and political speeches would be sufficient to grasp the extent to which these assumptions are deeply ingrained in our social psyche. These assumptions

are a prime reason why so many studies have seen ethnicity as being in opposition to functioning democracy. Under these assumptions, ethnic-based electoral competition produces a constant division between winners and losers, which is the very antithesis of what democracy needs in order to endure (Chandra, 2012a). To assume that the historical boundaries between groups are fixed is to overlook the contemporary demographic, political, social, and economic processes that affect ethnic boundaries and produce tensions along the borders of ethnic groups. The mere presence of ethnic differentiation provides the building blocks for group formation, but it does not guarantee ethnic mobilization in the electoral arena. The former simply provides for the potential for the latter. The fact that individuals become aware of their own ethnicity upon contact with others means that whether ethnic differences are going to be successfully translated into electoral mobilization is highly dependent on the circumstances in which groups interact (Nagel and Olzak, 1982).

1.3.3 Context Matters

To assert the social construction of identity is not to negate the historical rootedness of ethnic mobilization. However, to what extent a certain ethnic feature becomes salient and with what kind of effect depends on situational constraints and the strategic utility attached to that feature. The expression of ethnic membership in the electoral arena creates a tension between the individual's desire for membership and the availability of credible "proof" of such membership. What suffices as credible proof of group eligibility depends on the type of identity, the characteristics of those whose validation is sought, and the political and demographic environment. Depending on a complex interaction between these factors, individual voters are differently incentivized to express more primordial aspects of their identity or engage in situationally altering their group membership. As such, the result of these "unspoken negotiations" between internal and external processes depends on individual perceptions of the meaning of group membership to different audiences (Nagel, 1994).

Theoretically, a number of contextual factors can affect the electoral stability of group expression. There are at least four demography-related factors that I find important in determining the effect of ethnicity on electoral outcomes: the ethnicity of the *ingroup*, the ethnicity of the *outgroup*, the ethnic *combination* of the ingroup and the outgroup, and finally, the *ethnic composition* of the locality in which the groups are embedded (Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). The ethnicity of the ingroup and the outgroup in this dissertation refer to the characteristics of the ethnic group each voter belongs to, or the significant ethnic others whose features are likely to affect their vote choice. More precisely, the meaning and the effect of group designations vary based on relative group size, their internal structure and spatial distribution. While the list of theoretically relevant ethnic variables at group level is not exhausted by these three ethnic features, they are, nonetheless, central to determining the likelihood of successful collective action between members of the same group. In turn, the apparent likelihood of the ability of an ingroup or outgroup to act collectively on issues that are important to an ethnic group determines the level of perceived intergroup threat and the nature of intergroup contact, which is central to ethnic mobilization in the electoral arena. In addition to these issues, at the macro-level, the ethnic composition of the wider political entity (the country, district, municipality and so on) is operationalized primarily using the measure of ethnic diversity.

Therefore, besides each of these ethnic features being qualitatively different, there are also treated as mutually embedded and hierarchical in nature (Figure 1.1). Each of the feature operating at a lower level interacts with the ethnic features at a higher level. From the perspective of an individual voter, both characteristics of groups and polity are treated as the "context" which affects individual behavior. It is this complex interplay between ethnic features at various levels that provides the opportunity to break away from the prevalence of the previously described primordial assumptions.

Figure 1.1: Hierarchical Structure of Ethnic Features

Take, for example, electoral competition in Montenegro, explored in Chapters 3 and 5. The extensive literature on this country, situated in one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world, confirms that the salient ethnic cleavage represents the most defining characteristic of political life in the country (Vuković, 2015a; Komar and Živković, 2016; Džankić, 2013). However, each of the above listed assumption regarding political competition in plural societies is evidently violated. First, ethnic identification has varied dramatically over a short period of time. Without significant migration, the number of people defining as Montenegrins has been cut in half since the end of the Second World War. In only twelve years, between 1991 and 2003, the number of self-identified Montenegrins reduced by almost 20% (Jenne and Bieber, 2014; Vuković, 2015b). An even more dramatic shift occurred within the Muslim ethnic minority in the country whose numbers in the socialist era of Yugoslavia increased by a staggering 75% between 1961 and 1971 (Bringa, 1995). Second, ethnic groups in Montenegro are far from being internally homogeneous. As shown in Chapter 5, their political preferences vary greatly depending on the other ethnic identities in their repertoire. Instead, significant portions of nominal

ethnic categories hold political preferences that are much more similar to various ethnic outgroups than to their own ingroup. For instance, Montenegrin nationals belonging to certain tribes are, with respect to electoral preferences, more similar to their co-tribesmen of Serbian nationality than they are to their other fellow Montenegrins.

If the nature of ethnic group identification varies depending on circumstances, there is no reason to assume that the effect of ethnicity on electoral behavior does not change accordingly (Chandra and Boulet, 2012). Going back to the ontological discussion, in this dissertation I identify the domains where a more instrumental use of ethnicity takes primacy over its expressive value, and vice versa. For instance, the paper studying the role of local demography in vote-buying in Montenegro (Chapter 3) argues that parties strategically decide to target ethnic minorities in localities predominately inhabited by outgroups. The underlying logic assumes that adherence to ingroup norms is weighted differently against material incentives depending on the wider demographic context. Similarly, the chapter focusing on the role of tribal affiliations in nation-building and elections in contemporary Montenegro builds on the ambivalence of ethno-national identification. In a context of extremely volatile national identification, it is very common for individuals to instrumentally "switch" between the categories of nationality (in this case, Montenegrin or Serbian). However, the potential electoral effect will depend on how credible the "switch" is, based on the underlying tribal affiliation. Ambiguous identification at a higher level, I argue, is fostered by the creation of an informal hierarchy of tribes within national groups used to determine the credibility of membership of certain categories of nationality. This is a prime example of how "degrees of freedom" within one identity dimension are constrained by other dimensions of identity and group membership.

On the other hand, the paper studying the effect of the spatial distribution of Muslim immigrants on voting among native citizens in the 2015 Swiss Election underlines a less instrumental and more primordial dimension of identity. It assumes that, due to the visibly different cultural

background and social status, boundaries between groups are more "fixed", in the sense that members of both groups are highly unlikely to reclassify themselves. However, even in a situation like this, context matters greatly. I maintain that the tendency of the majoritarian group to discriminate against the outgroup by voting for anti-immigrant parties is affected by the geographical distribution of the Muslim outgroup. While I do not explicitly model such an identity shift, I imply this effect is likely to occur as a result of voters reclassifying within their ethnic identity repertoire. In particular, the heightened perception of group-threat stemming from the geographic clustering of Muslim immigrants may increase the salience of the religious dimension of identity and lead to voters seeing themselves more as "Christians" than "Swiss", or to simply conflate the two.

1.4 The Structure of the Thesis

In recent years, there has been a dramatic rise in interest in the electoral consequences of ethnicity, primarily with regards to immigration and right-wing politics (Arzheimer, 2009; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Shehaj et al., 2021). In addition to this, topics involving minority ethnic party mobilization and outbidding have received a fair amount of attention (e.g., Chandra, 2007a; Zuber, 2012). However, there has been only a limited amount of work suggesting that the possibility of ethnic competition is compatible with peaceful and functioning democratic systems (Birnir, 2006). While no single account can reasonably attempt to explain the majority of the political outcomes of ethnicity, this dissertation pays attention to some of these previously ignored topics. This dissertation is not constrained by a focus on a particular family of parties. In that sense, I assume the effect of ethnicity and ethnic mobilization on party choice and the nature of the citizen party linkage is not reserved merely for ethnic parties, since representation though civic or multiethnic parties may be, under certain conditions, a superior solution (Chandra, 2005).

Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between ethnicity and one of the most defining characteristics of durable democratic systems – the programmatic linkage. Reaching the appropriate level of accountability and responsiveness in democratic regimes obliges parties to develop distinctive policy programs and, if successful in gaining support, to distribute the outcomes of those policies without distinction, regardless of who a particular group of voters supported in the election (Kitschelt, 2000). On the demand side, ideology-based competition allows voters to become better informed, learn to navigate the party space based on the available policy solutions, and cast a ballot based on their preferences and calculated utility (Evans, 2004). Although spatial models of voting have been at the center of voting behavior literature (Downs, 1957; Merill et al., 1999), there is no single comparative empirical study assessing the relationship between ethnicity and the programmatic linkage. This chapter examines the notion that voters in ethnically heterogeneous countries are less likely to act rationally and vote for ideologically proximate parties, due to the inclination towards ethnic favouritism and intergroup conflict. A cross-national analysis is conducted using CSES Integrated Module (2002-2014) data, with 31975 individuals nested in 42 elections, and it is complemented by a within-country analysis of subnational ethno-racial variation in the 2010 general election in Brazil. Together, the results confirm that the supposed negative effects of ethnic diversity on the strength of the programmatic linkage are exaggarated. The data reveals that the effect is significantly moderated by the level of intergroup discrimination, economic inequality, and institutional setting.

Despite the importance of the programmatic linkage to normative democratic theory, it is an empirical fact that in the majority of modern-day countries, the programmatic linkage is not the primary mode of exchange between elites and voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2007; Corstange, 2016). Instead, universal distribution between voters and parties is substituted by clientelism – the practice of the selective and direct exchange of material benefits between parties (patrons) and voters (clients). This is the topic of Chapter 3, which studies the role of ethnicity in vote-

buying. This paper analyzes the presumed linkage between ethnic divisions and clientelism in unconsolidated democracies. More precisely, it investigates the largely ignored role of local demography in the persistence of vote-buying. We move beyond a simple model of ingroup favoritism in which politicians reward their co-ethnics in exchange for continued support. Instead, we focus on party strategies in imperfectly ethnically segmented political markets, where parties are unable to make credible programmatic promises to electorate as a whole, and thus become prone to establishing individual clientelist networks. We argue that the degree of vote-buying varies depending on the interaction between the ethnic composition of the settlement in which a voter resides and her/his own ethnic affiliation. Using original data collected after the 2018 local elections in Montenegro, we combine a list experiment with a multi-level modeling technique to provide evidence that voters embedded in localities dominated by outgroups have significantly higher chances of being targeted compared to their fellow co-ethnics living in settlements where they constitute the demographic majority.

While the first two studies describe how various ethnicity-related variables affect the type of linkage (the mode of exchange) between parties and voters, they neither differentiate between party types, nor focus on parties that are expected to exploit "census concerns" and engage in ethnonationalist mobilization. This is the topic of Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, I address one of the most debated issue in all Western politics – the relationship between the radical right-wing (RRW) and immigration. The success of radical right-wing (RRW) parties in contemporary Western Europe has been largely attributed to the increasingly important issue of immigration and the struggle for the preservation of cultural identity. Despite devoting a great amount of attention to it, the existing literature is yet to provide a conclusive answer to the puzzling association between the changing demographic composition and anti-immigrant electoral mobilization. The main goal of this chapter lies in expanding the list of variables making up the mechanism through which immigration is tied to

the rise of the RRW. I argue that the geographical segregation of immigrants has a reinforcing effect on the relationship between the size of the immigrant population and voting for the RRW. The study combines district-level demographic data with individual survey data to show that the geographical clustering of Muslim immigrants affected voting for the far-right in the 2015 Swiss Federal Election. Results suggest that increase in Muslim immigrant population in districts, taken independently, reduces support for the Swiss People's Party. However, the effect of the size of the immigrant population is moderate by their geographical segregation and level of urbanization. When larger immigrant populations are also geographically concentrated, the likelihood of voting for the SVP increases dramatically, especially in rural municipalities.

In Chapter 5, I move beyond assumption of internally homogeneous ethnic groups. More specifically, I study the electoral consequences of internally divided ethnic groups for nation-building elites. This issue is particularly relevant to large ethnic groups with nested structures, where further splintering can occur along other identity dimensions. Here, I test the effect of tribal affiliation nested within politically opposed national groups in Montenegro. This study is the first empirical study on the role tribal identity in contemporary Europe. It examines the electoral effect of revived tribal identity in contemporary Montenegro, while seeking to consolidate national identity. Using original data from the 2016 and 2020 elections, I show that contemporary tribalism in the Western Balkans is not merely a de-politicized folkloric occurrence, but a consequential political phenomenon. Voters actively use tribal membership to help determine their position on the nationhood cleavage and inform vote choice. The findings confirm that the politicization of tribal affiliations is detrimental to the predominant Democratic Party of Socialists, as it disproportionately fractionalizes Montenegrin ethnicity, from which the party draws support for its nation-building agenda. Furthermore, a conjoint experiment shows that the perceived tribal affiliation of candidates represents an important piece of information for voting and their categorization of candidates into ethnonational groups.

1.5 The Empirical Approach

The majority of the literature on ethnopolitics is based on cross-sectional data that has limited information on the group membership of individuals. In the absence of a detailed account of the existing identity repertoire and the relative salience of different identities, it is a difficult task to exploit the variation in the ethnic effect and move beyond assumption of homogeneity. While it is impossible to escape all such methodological concerns in a single study, this dissertation as a whole attempts to avoid the habits of treating ethnic group as homogeneous, defining the local environment and level of analysis in an overly narrow (or wide) manner, and assuming that the electoral outcomes of one ethnic identity are independent from other identities that are available to voters.

Although the case selection implies that ethnicity is a salient issue, I posit that the salience of ethnicity varies depending on the local environment in which voters are nested. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to determine the appropriate level of analysis. While there is no single correct answer here, researchers should adopt the definition of the local environment that best fits the environment, and that individuals typically use to think about group representation. In this dissertation, the definition of the local environment varies greatly between studies, starting from the smallest geographical units, such as localities in Montenegro or municipalities in Brazil, to larger political units, such as Swiss districts or entire countries. This is partially driven by need to combine the individual level with aggregate data, thus relying on the most narrowly identifiable geographic units for which relevant data is available. However, such variation in the level of analysis has its benefits. Since it has been shown that the effect of local demography increases as researchers move towards the micro-level (Dinesen et al., 2020), observing the effect of ethnicity at a higher level of analysis means taking a more conservative approach.

1.5.1 Multilevel Modeling

While there is a great variation in the types of ethnic identities and levels of analysis, the methodological strategy is probably the most consistent part of the dissertation. This consistency is a result of the theoretical proposition that individual behavior is influenced by context. Therefore, those characteristics and processes that occur at a higher level of analysis (a context or a group) also affect the characteristics or processes at a lower level (that of the individual). The fact that measurements are defined at different levels suggests that the constructs are hierarchical (multilevel) in nature. As such, it is only reasonable to test the effect of these hierarchical constructs using hierarchical methods. Failing to do so would bring a number of serious theoretical and methodological issues (Luke, 2004).

In terms of theory, it is of the utmost importance to consider the sociological distinction between the properties of collectives and their members. Failing to consider the different levels of analysis in the study of ethnopolitics produces major fallacies. For instance, under the assumption of group homogeneity, it is common to collect and analyze data on ethnic groups at the aggregate level. However, drawing conclusions about individual members of a group represents a clear case of the ecological fallacy, since the characteristics of groups are assumed to hold for each individual member of that group (Freedman, 1999). One further mistake which is perhaps even more common concerns the individualistic fallacy, which occurs when researchers aggregate information obtained at the individual level and use it to draw inferences at the group level (Hox, 2002).

In statistical terms, applying conventional regression tools to concepts and data operating at different level of analysis violates several important assumptions. First, using group-level data to infer at the individual level would lead to all the contextual information being treated the same. Under the assumption of independent observations, this may not be overly problematic. However, since the argument directly implies that individuals belonging to the same demographic context are more similar

to each other (clustering), this violates assumption of independent error terms (Luke, 2004). The second statistical argument in favor of multilevel modeling concerns the homogeneity of effect. In particular, without separating contextual from individual variables, it would be implied that the regression estimates apply equally across all contexts (Duncan et al. 1998), which is exactly the opposite of what is intended in this thesis. For these reasons, the most relevant approach to empirically test the theoretical propositions is nesting individual voters within ethnic groups or wider geographical units, thus accounting for the effect of clustering.

1.5.2 The Experimental Designs

While survey data represents the basis for the empirical studies in this dissertation, using only cross-sectional survey data to identify the causal effect of ethnicity is extremely difficult, and perhaps even impossible. For this reason, where possible, survey-based data has been complemented with experimental evidence. More precisely, the two studies conducted in Montenegro required collecting previously unavailable data on vote-buying and tribal affiliations. The original surveys conducted in 2016, 2018 and 2020 were therefore designed as survey-embedded experiments.

The study on clientelist targeting deals with rather sensitive and criminally prosecutable behavior which is why direct survey questions are likely to conceal actual behavior. Therefore, by relying only on the directly reported clientelist targeting, the overall effect of local demography could not be identified. Simply put, it would be impossible to claim that those who openly admitted having taken part in such practices are not systematically different from the rest of the sample with respect to other relevant, observable, or unobservable, characteristic. For this reason, a list experiment was designed and embedded in the representative survey of Montenegrin citizens participating in local elections. This experimental technique has become a common solution when studying sensitive political topics (Glynn, 2013). While the detailed experimental design is given in the corresponding

chapter, here it suffices to say that its non-intrusive estimation process is based on not actually requiring respondents to report any behavior, with the results being derived from the difference between experimental groups instead.

Similarly, ethnic categorization into ethnic identities of a higher order (in this case nationality) based on identification at a lower level (that of the tribe), as covered in Chapter 5, is unlikely to be causally estimated because ethnic membership is often bound up with a number of conflated variables. For this reason, conjoint analysis was conducted in order to randomize the categories of ethnic membership across all ethnic attributes. In this way, the effect of a candidate's membership in each ethnic category is causally estimated while controlling for all possible combinations of attributes.

Chapter 2

Does Diversity Hinder Rational Voting? The Role of Ethnicity in Programmatic Citizen-Party Linkage

> "Free institutions are next to impossible
> in a country made up of different nationalities.
> Among a people without fellow-feeling,
> especially if they read and speak different languages,
> the united public opinion necessary to the working
> of representative government cannot exist."
>
> **John Stuart Mill (1865)**
> *Considerations on Representative Government*

2.1 Introduction

The question of whether ethnic diversity hurts democracy has occupied the attention of political philosophers and social scientists for centuries. Since the writings of Plato and Aristotle, the simultaneous existence of a heterogenous demos and good political order was treated as an oxymoron (Merkel and Weiffen, 2012). In the 19th century, John Stuart Mill (1865) shared the same scepticism with regards to the ability of heterogeneous communities to achieve a desirable level of democratic development, due to the lack of solidarity and cohesive of public opinion. Donald Horowitz (1993, 19) voiced the same assertion when he recognized that democracy has progressed furthest in those East European countries that have the fewest serious ethnic cleavages (Hungary or the Czech Republic) and progressed more slowly or not at all in those that are deeply divided (such as Bulgaria or the former Yugoslavia). Thus, the traditional literature has left only a narrow space for debate over the degree to which diversity actually hurts democracy.

The reason why social scientists prematurely reached a consensus regarding the negative causal relationship between ethnic diversity and the variety of political outcomes lies in alleged incompatibility between ethnic expression and political compromise (Reilly, 2001). Empirical support for this claim primarily came from the literature on ethnic conflict, which holds that ethnic diversity poses a direct risk of intergroup violence and reduced economic growth (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Although ethnic fragmentation is typically seen as an intensifier of tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and minority protection, many diverse democracies have consolidated and produced stable polities (Beissinger, 2008; Pop-Eleches and Robertson, 2015). Moreover, a number of authors argued that ethnicity can actually aid democratic competition through the stabilization of party preferences and by inspiring party competition along ideological lines (Birnir, 2006; Rovny, 2015).

Even so, the existing literature has rarely paid attention to the more nuanced ways in which ethnic diversity can potentially undermine democracy. Democratic principles and the rules of competition stipulate norms that go beyond securing peaceful participation, free elections and basic respect for human rights. They also demand acceptable social and institutional norms with respect to modes of exchange between citizens and elected officials. Normative political theory envisages the universal distribution of policy outcomes and accountability to all voters, regardless of whom they supported in the election, as a strong argument in favor of democracy (Kitschelt, 2000). A strong programmatic linkage assumes a certain level of rationality and information-based decision-making by voters who are predominately motivated by policy concerns. In particular, the spatial theory of voting holds that the most straightforward method for rational voters to calculate the expected utility stemming from their vote choice is based on policy proximity.[1] According to the traditional spatial model of proximity, voters are expected to support the party closest to his/her own position (Downs, 1957).

This chapter tackles the question of the extent to which spatial voting depends on wider demographic and institutional conditions. To date, the answer to this question remains unknown, as there has been no systematic empirical investigation of the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and programmatic voting. The main difficulty seems to be the fact that group differences are often systematic and multidimensional. Since ethnic diversity overlaps with a number of other group-related phenomena, it is a rather daunting task to isolate the particular effect of ethnic diversity. However, the traditional literature holds the strong conviction that voters in heterogeneous countries are more likely to disregard ideological proximity due to ingroup favoritism, a lack of social trust, and higher levels of

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[1] In this paper, I define "rational voting" in a narrow sense that clearly does not encompass all the conditions laid down by the spatial model of voting (Downs, 1957, Merill et al., 1999). More precisely, I assume that a voter acted rationally if he/she supported the party closest to his own ideological position, as per "the least distance hypothesis". Therefore, I suppose the utility calculation is based solely on distance, without, for instance, taking into account the likelihood party forming the government.

perceived group threat. This chapter moves beyond the existing literature by distinguishing the effect of ethnic diversity on the nature of the citizen-party linkage separately from other associated phenomena, such as intergroup discrimination, the social status of the group, and institutional arrangement designed to recognize cultural specificity.

In order to test the supposed juxtaposition of ethnic heterogeneity and programmatic citizen-party linkage, I conduct two separate studies. The first is a cross-sectional study designed to test the effect of ethnic diversity on ideological proximity between voters and parties in 42 democracies, while the second is a within-country study that leverages the subnational variation in demographic composition and social inequality in Brazil. The results endorse the view that the independent effect of ethnic heterogeneity on programmatic linkage is greatly exaggerated. Ethnic diversity positively affects the programmatic linkage under conditions of low discrimination, low inequality and centralized institutions. Yet, its negative effect intensifies as a result of changes in related phenomena. These findings urge scholars to revise the deep-rooted view of ethnic and ideology-based competition as mutually exclusive and studying ethnicity in isolation from other entangled factors.

2.2 The Nature of Citizen-Party Linkages

Insofar as established and durable democracies are concerned, the programmatic linkage between voters and citizens matters profoundly in reaching acceptable levels of democratic accountability and responsiveness (Kitschelt, 2000). The elites' pursuit of policy programs is perceived as distinctively democratic because the costs and benefits are distributed to all citizens, regardless of whether they voted for the government or not. Indeed, program-based competition between parties represents a point of convergence between historical cleavage theorists and spatial theorists of democratic competition (Downs, 1957; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). On the one hand, durable

differences in the policy solutions offered by parties enable voters to identify clear interparty differences and constitute political cleavages. On the other, if parties develop even a small degree of programmatic coherence, voters can infer a party's position from the basic programmatic cues and choose between alternatives in an intelligent fashion (Kitschelt, 2000).

However, due to the immense complexity of the policy programs offered by parties, multi-layered issues are often turned into simple heuristic shortcuts by ideologies or party labels. For instance, a unidimensional left-right ideological scale collapses the n-dimensional political space into a single dimension by assuming equal salience amongst all the issue dimensions. While this is not always a meaningful assumption to make, research on democratic party competition in the spatial tradition of voting behavior has adopted the unidimensional ideological scale as a basis for developing proximity and directional models of voting.[2] According to Downs (1957) a party uses ideologies as informational shortcuts for uncertain voters who do not have the expertise to evaluate every single detail about the party programs. While different spatial models differ in the operationalization of the metric distance, the underlying assumption remains that variation in policy distance between voter and parties can be used to identify which party should be chosen, assuming each voter acts rationally (Evans, 2004). In the traditional spatial proximity model, the utility to the candidate/party is assumed to increase with the proximity to his ideal set of policy preferences (Merill et al., 1999), thus suggesting the "correct" choice is voting for the least distant party.

Despite its normative appeal, programmatic linkage fails to adequately describe the nature of the relationship between parties and constituencies in the majority of the world's polities (Kitschelt, 2000). In fragile and unconsolidated democracies, ideology-based ties between voters and parties are

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[2] The most frequently discussed alternative in the spatial theory of voting was offered by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) in the form of directional models. In essence, they argued that when individuals place themselves on a certain policy dimension, they are not summarizing a specific set of policies, but rather subconsciously make a two-step calculation in which they first decide on which side of the fence they are situated and then consider how strongly they feel about the particular issue. Under this model, voters will prefer parties which have clearer positions on the issue to those with more mixed positions (Evans, 2004).

simply not as widespread (Stokes, 2007). In such a context, the voter's utility to a party does not increase with proximity to his ideal point. Instead, while parties still occasionally use ideological content, citizens do not really expect politicians to be accountable and fulfil their campaign promises. As a result, voters heavily discount programmatic promises and turn to alternative linkage such as the direct exchange of material resources (the clientelist linkage) (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) or personal appeal (the charismatic linkage) (Carey and Shugart, 1995). While both programmatic ties and their alternatives rely on durable mutual expectations between voters and political elites, the main difference lies in the selectivity of the latter, allowing politicians to effectively deprive a certain proportion of the population from enjoying a particular good.

The existing literature has identified a number of factors that affect the strength of any given programmatic linkage. First, scholars have long held that higher socio-economic development is associated with reduced social conflict, greater sophistication, and broader support for popular rule (Przeworski, 2000; Teorell and Hadenius, 2007; Huntington, 1968). This improved socio-economic status makes voters less susceptible to material appeals and clientelist arrangements (Kitschelt et al. 1999). In addition, educated and affluent citizens are usually better equipped to assess distant policy rewards instead of short-term material benefits. A similar effect is assumed for the level of democratic development. Where professionalization preceded democratization, which is critical to the establishment of accountability (Shefter, 1993), ambitious politicians could not resort to state-based material incentives to build direct linkages with their electoral constituents (Kitschelt et al. 1999). The third macro-level factor around which consensus has emerged with regards to voters' ability to navigate ideological spaces is ethnic divisions, since salient ethnic loyalties lead voters to heavily discount the values of party programs and ideology in favor of maintaining group norms and putting co-ethnics into office.

2.3 Ethnicity and Spatial Voting

2.3.1 The Role of Ethnic Diversity

The existing literature has offered several answers to the question of why political competition in ethnically plural societies is usually not structured along ideological lines. The main argument holds that ethnic diversity inhibits the emergence of programmatic contestation by pushing both elites and voters towards the continued ethnicization of political competition. On the one hand, voters in ethnically plural polities are likely to lack faith in promises of fair and universal redistribution if an outgroup wins an election (Chandra, 2007b). This gives rise to ingroup favoritism - the idea that putting a fellow co-ethnic in a position of power is the only way to ensure the voter will be compensated fairly (Posner, 2005; Hale, 2007). Because voters may attach positive utility to the welfare of ingroup members but no utility to the welfare of an outgroup, individuals emphasize those identity dimensions that increase the perceived difference between the ingroup and the outgroup (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel et al. 1986).

Extensive work in a number of related social sciences has shown that exposure to a minority population increases the level of "group threat", heightens group prejudice, and leads to higher likelihood of politics being perceived as a zero-sum competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources, and (e.g., Craig and Richeson, 2014; Quillian, 1996). As a result of exposure to ethnic others that brings salience to one's own identity, diverse communities are on average less socially integrated and less likely to produce collective action (Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). As such, it is reasonable to assume that ethnic fragmentation negatively predicts the likelihood of voters' developing strong inclinations towards programmatic linkage. Geertz (1967, 119) contrasted the importance of ethnic identity to voters' self-perception with the notion of universal redistribution in an ethnically plural society in the following way: "[To] subordinate these specific and familiar identifications in favor of a

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generalized commitment to an overarching and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a loss of definition as an autonomous person, (…) through domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community".

When we consider the position of the elites, we also find that heterogeneity favours competing disproportionately for supporters within their ethnic groups rather than across groups, as mobilizing citizens around ideological lines could potentially split the existing ethnic constituency along alternative dimensions. This makes the cost of maintaining universal ideological ties with parties significantly higher in ethnically heterogeneous polities. Therefore, elites are also incentivized to reinforce perceptions of incompatible group values, since expressing ideology-based preferences may come at the cost of "betraying" alliances nurtured throughout history (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Sartori (1969) recognized that, unlike in the marketplace, in politics there is no way to protect yourself against demagogy, the manipulation of ethnic sentiments or promises without substance. Someone is always prepared to offer more through over-promising and outbidding, which is the "very negation of competitive politics" (Sartori, 1969,158). Based on these theoretical considerations, I formulate the first general hypothesis stating:

H1: *Ethnic diversity reduces the strength of programmatic linkage.*

2.3.2 The Role of Intergroup Discrimination

Thus far, the description of the effect of diversity on programmatic linkage has largely been predicated on the nature of the intergroup relations that diversity is believed to produce. However, such a view raises both methodological and theoretical issues. In particular, scholars should be able to separate the effect of ethnic diversity from other related phenomena.

The literature on intergroup relations has mostly drawn its strength from two social psychological theories of prejudice: the Group Contact Theory and the Group Threat Theory. To deal with the latter first, the Group Threat Theory assumes that competition for scarce resources between spatially proximate and inherently unequal groups fosters intergroup conflict and reduced the level of social trust (Blumer, 1958). Existing prejudices and stereotypes create intergroup anxiety in anticipation of negative intergroup interactions (Stephan and Stephan, 2013). In this view, ethnic diversity can be seen as a source of exposure that enhances both ingroup identification and outgroup threat, thus fostering support for particularistic group interests. However, ethnic diversity also offers plentiful opportunities for positive exposure to ethnic others. According to the Group Contact Theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), extended interpersonal contact focuses attention on the similarities between members of different groups, provides opportunities to learn about the ethnic other, reduces prejudice and makes individuals realize that ingroup norms are not the only standards by which to live (Verkuyten, Thijs and Bekhuis, 2010).

Regardless of the disagreement over the direction of the effect, ethnic diversity does not on its own determine the existence of "sharply defined" boundaries between ethnic groups. Therefore, it appears that the electoral consequences are driven by the nature of intergroup contact, and not ethnic diversity (Sherif, 1961). If exposed to non-threatening and equal-status groups, diversity is likely to have positive consequences for the citizen-party linkage, thus allowing voters to cast their ballot based on policies and expected utility. Instead, it is only when political issues are interpreted as part of an ethnically defined "us" vs. "them" narrative that policymaking in ethnically diverse societies becomes perceived as a zero-sum game among rent-seeking ethnic groups. For this reason, it is reasonable to expect that the development of programmatic linkages is inhibited only when any exposure to ethnic outgroups, provided by ethnic diversity, is also marked by negative intergroup contact. Hence, the second hypothesis holds that:

H2: *The effect of ethnic diversity on programmatic linkage is moderated by the level of intergroup discrimination.*

2.3.3 The Role of Institutional Herritage

The previously presented literature on the relationship between ethnicity and democratic performance considers its effect to be deeply detrimental, due to its orientation towards particularistic ethnic mobilization. Therefore, the ethnic principle is seen as antithetical to ideological issue competition, since ethnic divisions provide incentives for parties to highlight the non-economic, ethnic-based logic of the distribution of scarce resources (Kitschelt, 1995). This view is supported by perceived dominance of economic issues in consolidated democracies, that relegates other dimensions of political competition to second rank (Rovny, 2015). For this reason, it is believed that temporal precedence of center-periphery cleavage, that is central issue for so many ethnic and regional parties, has been substituted by an economic left-right divide (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

However, certain authors have argued that presenting ethnicity and ideology as inherently opposed is misleading, which inhibits systematic study of party responses to ethnic cleavages. They argue that ethnopolitics and ideology-based competition are not mutually exclusive, but complementary instead. Birnir (2006) indirectly recognized the ideological capacity of ethnicity by arguing that in democratic competition, ethnicity has a stabilizing effect on party loyalties and electoral support. She proposes that ethnicity serves as a "stable but flexible" informational cue for political choices, influencing party formation and the development in new maturing democracies. This puts emphasis on ethnic parties, as ethnic voters believe that they have more information on ethnic party positions or policies, compared to other voters. As a result, they are less prone to making "mistakes" and position themselves in proximity to the party's policy preferences. Yet, this apparent familiarity

with party program likely stems from a rather limited scope of issues they typically run on. For instance, Meguid (2005) featured regional parties a "niche" parties since they emerged on a basis of issues typically overlooked by the mainstream parties, such as environment, immigration, and territorial autonomy. As a result, they supposedly shun away from traditional ideological (left-right) contestation.

In contrast, Rovny (2014) suggested that the presence of ethnic minorities may not merely be compatible but might even inspire ideology-based competition. He argued that the formation of ideological preferences based on ethnic interest is apparent in the clear association between ethnic minorities and specific ideological camps. Namely, although issues of self-government and territorial autonomy are crucial for their appeal, ethnic and regional parties cannot be reduced to a single issue. Instead, they develop party positions on traditional general ideological issues (Rovny, 2015). However, in order to maintain ideological coherence on both issues they effectively collapse two-dimensional space into one (Massetti and Schakel, 2015). According to Rovny (2014), the formation of ideological preferences based on ethnic interest would depend on the institutional framework. More specifically, he argued that ideological content of ethnic and regional parties is determined by the form of federal heritage and the status of minority groups.

Indeed, territorial autonomy has been recognized as a major factor in determining the nature of minority participation and the overall stability of the political systems (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1999). In many plural democracies, brutal suppression of minorities' desire for self-government was replaced by multinational federalism designed to recognize cultural and political autonomy and mitigate collective grievances (Kymlicka, 2007). Yet, institutional recognition through regional self-government is likely to further reinforce adherence to group norms, since ethnic groups provided with territorial autonomy are less likely to assimilate. Such institutional arrangements are shown to have a lasting impact. While many former federal republics of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia have

become unitary states since the end of Cold War, legacy of territorial autonomy of former republic-bearing ethnic group remained consequential for contemporary ethnic competition in two ways.

First, many of former ethnic minorities become dominating majorities as soon as the new state has gained its independence. In such conditions, new state-bearing nations see the ethnic minorities that resisted independence as an impediment to national coherence. A history of territorial and political decision-making autonomy strengthens the new majority's claim to independence and their pursue of nation-building policies that takes an ethnonational character and treats minorities as an ethnic "other" (Roeder, 2012). Second, the former majoritarian groups, now turned minorities, are likely to become primarily concerned with strategies that mitigate attempts at cultural assimilation and secure their group rights (Laitin and Watkins, 1998). They see the former federal state as their actual homeland and support multinationalism which justifies their new minority position (Rovny, 2014, 680). Given the effect on nature of intergroup relation, I posit that maintaining ideological congruence between voters and parties is significantly harder under such institutional arrangements. For this reason, I hypothesize that:

H3: *Existence of institutional arrangements (current or historical) designed to provide cultural autonomy of distinct ethnic groups weakens the programmatic linkage.*

2.3.4 The Role of Group Inequality

When the relationship between ethnic diversity and intergroup discrimination and voters' ability to vote based on ideological considerations is established, another important question arises - to what extent does such an effect vary across ethnic groups? Authors focusing on social inequality suggests that indexes of ethnic diversity, when used in isolation, conceal fundamentally hierarchical relationships between ethnic groups (Abascal and Baldassarri, 2015). Group differences are systematic

and multidimensional, and often deeply rooted in institutionalized inequalities. Heterogeneous communities are, on average, less affluent, economically worse off, and generally less trusting of others (Dinesen et al. 2020). For a majoritarian group, more diversity means more outgroup members in their immediate surroundings, while, for the other group, heterogeneity means more ingroup neighbors. As a result, groups are likely to experience diversity in a very different fashion, depending on their relative social positions (Costa and Kahn, 2003).

Theories of group position (Blumer, 1958), arguing that the sense of group position in a society is tied to the collective idea about the relative group status, suggest that local economic conditions influence the relative degree to which threat and contact shape attitudes (Knowles and Tropp, 2018). Quillan (1995) found that ethnic diversity and economic conditions in interaction affect prejudice, as the large presence of immigrants in Europe was particularly triggering in low-income countries. Therefore, when economic inequality is high, ethnic diversity is likely to enhance group prejudice and weaken the programmatic linkage. On the other hand, under conditions of low economic inequality, ethnic heterogeneity offers an opportunity for positive contact and reduces the perceived level of group threat, which in turn strengthens the programmatic linkage. Moreover, not all groups would equally respond to conditions of high inequality and diversity.

Samson and Bobo (2014) argued that members of the dominant and more advantaged group are more likely to experience diversity-induced feelings of group threat, for a number of reasons. Beyond the general feeling of group superiority, entitlement and differentiation from the subordinate group, it is potential competition over scarce resources that leads members of the dominant ethnic group to protect their privileged position against intrusion by the disadvantaged.[3] From the perspective of economically disadvantaged ethnic group, two potential scenarios are possible. First, in face of

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[3] The term "disadvantaged" is used to merely to emphasize that the ethnic group is relatively deprived with respect to the social or economic dimension.

diversity and economic inequality members of lower class may identify more with their class and vote for higher level of redistribution, which clearly strenghtens programmatic linkage. Second possibility, however, suggests that members of disadvantaged groups are likely to interpret their economic status in ethnic turn, thus becoming less concerned with programmatic positions and more concerned with ethnic identity (Shayo, 2009). Either way, these considerations suggest that:

H4: *The effect of ethnic diversity is moderated by economic inequality and social status of ethnic group individual voter belongs to.*

2.4 Methodology

With the purpose of testing these hypotheses, two separate studies were conducted. Since there is no single dataset offering all the necessary information, I combined multiple data sources in order to compile suitable dataset(s). I departed from cross-national analysis, which represents the standard level of analysis for studying the political consequences of ethnic heterogeneity. The first study investigates the effects of ethnic diversity while simultaneously controlling for rigorous list individual- and country-level controls. Multilevel regression models with varying intercepts, consisting of 39715 voters nested in 42 countries, are designed as a robust test of the first three hypotheses. In order to make the cases as comparable as possible, analysis was conducted only on parliamentary elections. The individual-level data, as well as most of the country level control variables, was taken from the Integrated Modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Modules 2, 3, and 4) database (Quinlan et al., 2018). From the total available data, certain countries were excluded as crucial data was systematically missing, such as ideological position or vote choice.

However, this exclusive focus on the national level carries an important shortcoming, as it does not allow for the variation in group shares necessary to study any potential differences across groups.

The fact that disadvantaged groups rarely constitute local demographic majorities means that in order to truly identify the effect of heterogeneity we should compare diverse communities not only to homogeneous communities where the demographic majority is composed of the dominant group, but also to homogeneous communities where the demographic majority is represented by disadvantaged groups. However, this is rarely done, because heterogenous communities dominated by disadvantaged groups are both rare and data on them is lacking (Kustov and Pardeli, 2018). Demographic shifts of a magnitude that might change the established demographic dominance are rare, gradual and typically followed by a number of other related phenomena.

For this reason, I couple the cross-national study with a within-country analysis that leverages the variation in the demographic composition of Brazilian municipalities. The statistical model used is also a hierarchical regression model with varying intercepts, with individuals (n=656) nested in municipalities (j=48). This study leverages the largely unexplored case of Brazil, where the sizes of the socially advantaged white population and disadvantaged non-white groups are approximately equal. This is an appropriate context for extending the argument, given the fact that Brazil is a country with both above average levels of ethno-racial diversity and high levels of intergroup discrimination, previously explored in Study I.

2.4.1 Measurements

The data on the ethnic composition in the year of the election was obtained from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) dataset, calculated based on ethnic group shared from 1945 to 2013 (Drazanova, 2019). Ethnic diversity is operationalized using the typical ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF), reflecting the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a

population belong to different ethnic groups (Alesina et al., 2003).[4] As the measure of the nature of intergroup relations, I used the index of intergroup discrimination by inhabitants, calculated based on both geographic and ecological equations for the differentiation between "us" and "them" (Van de Vliert, 2020). The index measures the overall tendency of people to discriminate between ingroups and outgroups, therefore serving as a measure of the extent to which lines between ethnic groups are "sharply defined", as defined in the theory section. The measure for the institutional arrangement is a dummy variable coded "1" for countries that currently have arrangements of ethnic-based federal structure or territorial autonomy or had such heritage previously. Given that much of the theory relates to the literature on ethnic minorities it warrants including ethnic minority representation indicators. This could be achieved by studying minority voters separately from the rest of the voters. However, a significant proportion of the countries in the CSES database do not include an indicator of individual ethnic membership. For this reason, in order to control for the possibility that the larger size of the minority electorate increases the likelihood of voters disregarding programmatic proximity, I included the number of ethnic and regional parties in the election in the analysis.

The strength of the programmatic linkage is operationalized as the difference between the actual and the theoretically correct vote choice, based on the proximity spatial model. The dependent variable was constructed using three pieces of data. Respondents were asked to position themselves

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[4] A measure of diversity, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index is calculated as $ELF = 1 - \sum S^2_i$, where S is a share of the group i in the total population. Despite being the most widely used conceptualization of ethnic diversity, there are many recognized shortcomings of ELF. The main criticisms are directed towards the multidimensional nature of identity that is not adequately captured, the sources of raw data, the relevant classification of ethnic group, and the measure that summarizes the data (García Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). The most frequently used alternative measure is the ethnic polarization index, designed to capture the extent of the distribution of the ethnic groups from bipolar distribution. This type of reasoning is in the line with most of the literature on ethnic conflict, as the two-point symmetric distribution of population maximizes chances for conflict (Esteban and Ray, 1999). There are two main reasons why in this paper I remain focused on ethnic diversity instead of ethnic polarization. First, the major criticism of the ELF measure comes from the literature on intergroup conflict, which is not the focus of this section. On the contrary, the underlying assumption here is that these groups manage to peacefully coexist and compete in the electoral arena. Given that this study concerns rather the subtle political difference in the nature of the citizen-party linkage, a basic awareness of different ethnicities is a sufficient condition for the effect. Second, that diversity is not by itself a guarantee of the salience of "sharply defined" ethnic boundaries is explicitly recognized by including a measure of intergroup discrimination.

on a left-right scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right), as well as to report their vote choice.[5] Each voter's ideological position was then compared to the experts' evaluation of the party's ideological position. In this way, I escape the issue of post-hoc rationalization that occurs when voters assign locations to parties that reflect their projections, rather than actual position based on programs.[6] This gave the first part of the measure – the ideological distance between the voter and their party of choice. The second part of the equation represents the voter's distance from the ideologically most proximate party in the election – that is the theoretically rational choice according to the proximity voting model.[7] The larger the distance between the actual and the "correct" vote, the weaker the programmatic tie between the voter and the party is. If the voter is perfectly ideologically aligned with their party of choice, the distance between the correct and the actual vote is 0.

With respect to other theoretically relevant indicators, the level of economic development in Study I is measured using the country's GDP per capita in the election year, while the GINI coefficient is used to operationalize socio-economic conditions at the municipality level in Study II. The country's democratic performance is measured via the Polity IV index. Last, I control for the electoral system used in a particular political system, as this is likely to affect the type of citizen-party linkage for at least two reasons. First, electoral formulas which require voters to choose individually between candidates

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[5] To maintain the sample size, if respondents did not declare their vote choice, I used closeness to the party as a proxy measure.

[6] Using expert-based party evaluation raises important concerns. First, there is the obvious possibility that voter are not fully aware of the party's ideological position. This seems to be especially likely in the case of strong partisans who are more prone to misinterpret the ideological position of the party they are voting for. The left-right ideological scale is conceptually very complex, and it can mean many different things. Deviance, therefore, might also be a result of the experts and voters having different dimension of ideology in mind when positioning the parties. The most intuitive solution to this problem would be to use each voter's own perception of party position. However, given the design of the survey where these questions are asked subsequently, respondents have a strong incentive to avoid attitude dissonance and tend to over-estimate ideological proximity.

[7] Alternatively, we could just use the ideological distance between the voter and his vote choice, as a simpler and more intuitive interpretation of their ideological proximity. Indeed, the voter's personal position is exactly where the party of choice should be located if this spatial model is applied in an ideal sense (Evans, 2004). However, this theoretical point may not play out in reality if there is no party in the political system that occupies the voter's position. For this reason, I define "correct" as voting for the empirically closest party, which adjusts for this potential bias. The two measures are, however, exactly the same in situations where there is a party in the system that is located at the voter's preferred position.

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of the same party favor personal linkages rather than programmatic linkages (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Second, electoral formulas based on the plurality principle constrain voters' choice by favoring front-runners and two-party competition (Sartori, 1986). Finally, in each of the models I control for the size of the country's population.

At the individual level, I control for socio-economic status proxied by level of education (on a 9-point scale) and type of settlement (rural vs. urban), due to the fact that income measures are missing in many countries. Last, I control for partisanship strength due to its influence on a voter's propensity to vote to for an ideologically congruent party (Dalton and Weldon, 2007). This variable was operationalized using the question of how close the respondents feel to their party of choice, originally measured on a 4-point scale but introduced in this analysis as a dummy variable, where those who feel very or fairly close to the party are coded as "1".

The individual level data for Study II is taken from the Brazilian Electoral Panel Studies (BEPS) dataset, while the municipality-level data was obtained from the Statistical Office of Brazil and further complemented with data from Kustov and Pardelli (2018), including geographic controls identified by the literature as relevant local features for various dimensions of disadvantage in Brazil.

2.5 Results

2.5.1 Study I – Cross-national Analysis

The main independent variable of ethnic diversity is normally distributed with the mean value of 0.33 (skew=0.88, and kurtosis=-0.14). The most homogeneous country in the sample is Japan with an index value of 0.02, while the most ethnically diverse is South Africa at 0.86. I tested the hypotheses using a multilevel linear regression model with varying intercepts. The baseline model, examining how

much of the variance on the dependent variable can be attributed to variation between countries, suggests that there is clustering with regards to the dependent variable. This value of ICC (intra-class correlation) is satisfactory, as 18% of the variance in the response variable can be explained at the country-level. Given the negative binomial shape of the distribution of the response variable in the cross-national study, which is typical for count variables, the models were fitted using a generalized linear mixed model with zero inflated values.

Table 2.1 shows three models, each including an additional block of variables. Stepwise modelling allows us to better observe the changes in model fit, as well as shifts in the direction and intensity of the effects. Model 1 shows the effect of country-level variables. In Model 2, I include an additional set of individual-level variables and test the relationship between ethnic diversity and the strength of the programmatic linkage in a more rigorous manner. Model 3 introduces country-level interaction between ethnic diversity and intergroup discrimination and territorial autonomy. Models with separate interactions are available in the Appendix. The comparison between group of models shows that with the addition of each block of variables, the model fit significantly improved, as the AIC and Log Likelihood statistics steadily decrease as we move towards the more complex models (Burnham et al., 2011). In order to provide meaningful zeros and foster interpretation of the results, all the continuous predictors were centered. The individual-level continuous predictors are centered around group means, separately within each country, while the country-level variables are centered around the grand-mean.

The results in Table 2.1 show the strong statistically significant effect of ethnic diversity on ideological proximity between voters and their chosen parties, across all models. Based on the models without interaction terms (Model 1 and 2), we might conclude that a single standard deviation increases in ethnic diversity results in a 19% increase in likelihood of voting for ideologically incongruent party. Consistent with H1, the effect of the weakening of the programmatic linkage is significant at the level

of p<0.05 (95%). Furthermore, as predicted by the theory, the level of intergroup discrimination also significantly affects the strength of the programmatic linkage, with the size and the direction of effect being approximately equal to the one produced by ethnic diversity.

Table 2.1: Stepwise Models for Proximity Voting (CSES)

	Dependent variable: *Ideological Distance*		
	Model 1 $\text{Exp}(\beta)$	**Model 2** $\text{Exp}(\beta)$	**Model 3** $\text{Exp}(\beta)$
Intercept	1.51***	1.63***	1.45***
Ethnic Diversity	1.19*	1.19**	1.00
Int. Discrimination	1.20**	1.20**	1.15*
Terr. Autonomy	1.00	1.01	1.12
Ethnic parties	0.96	0.96	0.94
Polity IV	0.71	0.71	0.72
GDP	1.04	1.03	1.01
Electoral Formula	0.63**	0.63**	0.69**
Population	0.93	0.93	0.88*
Ethnic Diversity x Intergroup Discrimination			1.17***
Ethnic Diversity x Terr. Autonomy			1.26*
Controls		✓	✓
n	39,715	39,715	39,715
J	42	42	42
LogLik.	-58313	-58155	-58149
AIC	116651	116345	116336

 Note: The models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying across localities. The list of controls include: age, gender, education, type of settlement, and party identification. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Model 3, however, reveals an important dynamic between the two factors. The results suggest the negative effect of ethnic diversity is moderated by the levels of intergroup discrimination,

consistent with H2. In particular, with each standard deviation increase in a country's level of intergroup discrimination, the effect of diversity on the strength of the programmatic linkage increases by an additional 17% (p<0.001). Once interacted, the independent effect of diversity disappears. Figure 2.1 clearly shows that under the condition of a low level of intergroup differentiation, ethnic diversity strengthens the programmatic linkage. However, likelihood of incorrectly applying proximity model of voting in ethnically diverse countries increases significantly with rise in intergroup discrimination. Put simply, the non-discriminatory exposure provided by diversity benefits proximity voting, while it is hindered in the environment of high discrimination. These findings are in the line with expectations of the major social psychology theories of intergroup relations. The dashed line, describing effect of ethnic diversity under conditions of likely positive intergroup contact, shows strengthening of programmatic linkage. On the other hand, when intergroup contact is likely marked by negative experiences, then, in the line with Group Threat Theory, diversity weakens programmatic linkage and boosts adherence to the group norms.

Figure 2.1:The Effect of Ethnic Diversity and Intergroup Discrimination

Figure 2.2: The Effect of Ethnic Diversity and Territorial Autonomy

With respect to H3, suggesting that institutional arrangements that include territorial autonomy of ethnic group significantly affects probability of voters casting a ballot based on programmatic concerns, the results offer only a partial confirmation. Namely, the logic of the argument suggests that weaker programmatic linkage occurs as a result of mobilization from ethnic and regional parties. However, the number of ethnic and regional parties is consistently insignificant across all models. Yet, results show statistically significant interaction effect between ethnic diversity and territorial autonomy (Figure 2.2). In countries where institutional arrangements do not include territorial autonomy based on ethnicity or culture (centralized unitary regimes) level of ethnic diversity is insignificant. In contrast, if highly ethnically diverse countries also provide territorial autonomy, voters are, on average, 27% less likely to correctly apply proximity model of voting.

2.5.2 Study II – Within-country Analysis

Since the effects of diversity and discrimination have been established, I move to exploring the extent to which the negative effect of ethnic diversity varies across members of different ethnic groups. Focusing on subnational variations in this election allows me to test the interaction between ethno-racial diversity, individual group membership and group share. Given that the Brazilian case is marked by high levels of ethnic diversity, intergroup discrimination and a decentralized federal structure, which are all factors previously identified as significant predictors in a cross-national setting, makes it appropriate for a deeper analysis of within-country variance between ethnic groups of different social status. I put H4 to the empirical test using data from the 2010 Brazilian general election. In total, the analysis is conducted on 656 individuals, nested in 48 Brazilian municipalities. The baseline model showed a satisfactory level of clustering within municipalities with regards to differences in the applicability of the proximity model of voting (ICC = 14%). Same as earlier, Model 1 presents the

effect of municipality-level variables, while Model 2 adds individual-level variables. Model 3 introduces the three-way cross-level interaction that is at the heart of the third hypothesis.

Table 2.2: Stepwise Models for Proximity Voting (Brazil)

| | Dependent variable: *Ideological Distance* | | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	3.23***	3.36***	3.47***
Ethnic Diversity	−0.20	−0.20	−0.31*
White share %	−2.07*	−1.95*	−2.12*
GINI	0.03	0.04	0.11
Population	0.22	0.20	0.23
White vs. Non-White		−0.13	−0.10
Political Interest		−0.12	−0.22
Education		−0.04	−0.07
Age		0.06	0.04
Gender		−0.12	−0.13
Income		−0.06	−0.00
Ethnic Diversity x GINI x White			0.40**
Ethnic Diversity x White			0.56***
Ethnic Diversity x GINI			−0.06
GINI x White			−0.04
Geographic controls		✓	✓
n	656	656	656
J	48	48	48
LogLik.	-1,223	-1,293	-1,211
AIC	2,468	2,620	2,465

Note: The models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying across localities. All continuous variables are standardized. Geographic controls include: latitude, altitude, distance to coast, and rainfall. Significance levels:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Across all three models, the results show that ethno-racial diversity at the municipal level does not independently affect the strength of the programmatic linkage, when controlled for the size of the socially advantageous group. Furthermore, while voters in predominantly white municipalities, on average, tend to vote more for ideologically proximate parties, the effect of an individual's ethnicity has no bearing on the strength of the programmatic linkage. It is only when interacted with relevant demographic and economic conditions that individual ethnicity has a significant effect on ideological

proximity between voters and the parties of their choice. Figures 2.3 and 2.4, show the effects of ethnic diversity across ethnic groups, given the level of economic inequality.

Figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that the effect of ethnic diversity at the municipal level is highly dependent on socio-economic conditions. Ethnic diversity reduces the programmatic distance between voters and parties under conditions of low distribution inequality. The slope is effectively the same across both ethno-racial groups (Figure 2.3). On the other hand, under conditions of considerable inequality, the effect of diversity clearly reveals group differences. Thus, among non-white voters' although with a slightly higher intercept, the direction of the effect remains the same. At the same time, we observe a significant effect of diversity among white voters in the direction of the substantial weakening of the programmatic linkage. The difference between white voters in highly diverse and highly homogeneous communities reaches approximately 2 points.

Figure 2.3: Low GINI:
Ethno-Racial Diversity and Group Membership

Figure 2.4: High GINI:
Ethno-Racial Diversity and Group Membership

Broadly speaking, these results are compatible with findings reported in Study I, as absence of negative effect of diversity under conditions of economic equality can be explained by individuals lack

of desire underline ethnic basis of inequality. Although, such studies cannot be easily replicated cross-nationally, the results obtained at the sub-national level are important for a number of reasons. It allows the testing of the effect of diversity while controlling for the group shares in contexts where demographic dominance is not held only by one ethnic group, as is the case in cross-national settings. Moreover, it confirms that the multidimensionality of intergroup differences maps out onto electoral behavior, suggesting that the effect of diversity should not be studied without clear reference to other related phenomena. Taking these points into account allows researchers to flesh out the actual effect of diversity and its variation across groups.

2.6 Conclusion

The literature tying ethnic diversity to poor democratic functioning has a long tradition in social sciences. To this date, the vast majority of such studies have focused their attention on the effect of ethnic diversity on violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). However, ethnicity has been significantly more absent from the study of voting and political participation. Despite the recent rise in interest in the issue of migration, the scope of studies on ethnicity and voting remained rather limited. This chapter extends the current literature by focusing on the previously neglected topic of the relationship between ethnic diversity and programmatic voting, which lies at the center of the normative democratic and rational choice theories of voting. There have been no previous large-N studies systematically testing the effect of ethnic diversity on the strength of the programmatic linkage.

Thus here, I investigate empirically the ways in which ethnic heterogeneity undermines the programmatic linkage between voters and parties. I argue that ethnic diversity increases the spatial distance between voters and parties, thus weakening the programmatic linkage. The main reason lies in ingroup favoritism that disregards policy preferences. However, in order to identify the effect of

diversity beyond a number of conflated phenomena, I extend the argument by testing the degree to which the effect of diversity is moderated by intergroup discrimination, the institutional framework and the social status of a particular ethnic group. A number of conclusions can be drawn from these models that contribute to the current literature. While diversity plays an important role in determining the nature of the citizen-party linkage, the apparently negative of ethnic diversity is largely a by-product of other conflated phenomena. Such a result can, and probably should, be interpreted in a positive manner. While demographic shifts occur slowly over long periods of time, government policies and the institutional framework can be altered much more quickly. Low levels of intergroup discrimination and economic inequality are shown to effectively curb the negative consequences of ethnic fragmentation, hence producing favorable conditions for positive intergroup contact. Finding that ethnic diversity, under the right conditions, actually strengthen the programmatic linkage provides additional evidence that the often contrasted ethnic- and ideology-based competition are entangled much more than is usually believed.

On the other hand, the results showing the interaction effect between diversity and the institutional framework provide a cause for concern with respect to the protection of ethnic minority rights. In this context, territorial autonomy is the solution typically proposed to recognize cultural and political self-government for ethnic minorities, which in turn is intended to reduce separatist tendencies or direct conflict (Kymlicka, 2007). However, the results of this study show that while territorial autonomy may be beneficial in this way, it tends to push voters away from voting based on policies and makes them more likely to adhere to ethnicity-based norms. Moreover, since this measure includes both countries that have a long federal heritage, albeit now existing as unitary states, it is clear that the institutional framework has a lasting effect on patterns of voting. Finally, the significant effect of a number of group-related phenomena and the non-effect of the number of ethnic parties in the election is indicative in two ways. It supports the literature claiming that ethnic de-emphasize is not necessary

for peaceful political competition between ethnic groups. Ethnic representation and appeal do not occur distinctively or exclusively through ethnic parties. This is in line with Chandra's (2007a) claim that, for as long as their self-interest is recognized, the type of party may not play the determining role in the voting decision.

While I remain confident in the conclusions drawn from these results, careful interpretation is necessary. We should keep in mind the particular definitions and the nature of the operationalization of key concepts, such as ethnic diversity, rational voting and programmatic linkage. I maintain that the logic of the presented argument works equally for any situation where "us" vs. "them" is defined in ethnic terms, although we should remain cautious with respect to the demographic context in which voting is studied. Clearly, no single account can comprehensively explain the motivation behind the electoral behavior of ethnic groups and its effect on democratic performance. While such topics are beyond the scope of this section, future studies could also extend this line of work in number of different directions. They might consider taking into detailed account the geographical distribution of ethnic groups, the potential cross-cutting identities that could subdivide large ethnic groups, or perhaps extend the argument to three-level hierarchical setting (e.g., voter-party-country). Some of these questions, although applied on a different set of dependent variables, are tackled in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

The Right "Who" at the Right "Where": The Role of Local Demography in Vote-Buying in Montenegro

"Patronage is almost wicked word.
By itself it could well-nigh defeat democracy."

Dwight D. Eisenhower

3.1 Democracy and the Party-Citizen Linkage

To date, democracy remains the only political regime in which the institutional rules of the political game are crafted with the purpose of making elites accountable to all citizens. What makes a government uniquely democratic is precisely the obligation to indiscriminately distribute the costs and benefits of their policy programs, regardless of whether an individual supported those programs or not (Kitschelt, 2000). However, in most fragile and unconsolidated democracies, which outnumber consolidated democracies, this programmatic linkage is not so common. Instead, it is often substituted by clientelist accountability that heavily relies on extensive patronage and clientelist networks of personal dependence between elected officials and the electorate (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Chandra, 2007). Among many factors, the existence of ethnocultural cleavages in society is one of the most frequently cited explanation for the variation in clientelism across cultures. The notion that clientelism and ethnopolitics going hand in hand is so deeply rooted that, in some regions, it has been termed "an axiom of politics" (Posner, 2005). In terms of political competition, the existence of sharp ethnocultural boundaries and a strong tendency towards ingroup favoritism is believed to fragment the party system and incentivize parties to compete only for the support of members of their own group (Horowitz, 1985; Van de Walle, 2003).

The literature on party competition has extensively studied the effect of ethnic segmentation on party strategies, with a special focus on ethnic outbidding and the development of the cross-cutting dimensions of programs to bridge the ethnic divide (Zuber and Szöcsik, 2015; Dunning and Harisson, 2010). The first strategy, reserved for within-group contestation, pushes parties towards posing more radical ethnic claims than the competition. The second strategy, directed at widening their electoral appeal to non-ethnic groups, requires the de-emphasize of ethnicity in order to attract outgroup members around alternative issues. These strategies, however, do not exhaust all the empirically

observable approaches used by parties to compete for ethnic votes. For instance, large catch-all parties competing in an ethnically defined arena are strongly incentivized to diversify their political strategies to credibly appeal to multiple ethnic groups, but they are not able to successfully outbid ethnic parties, nor to singlehandedly de-emphasize the ethnic nature of competition.

This chapter bridges the research on ethnic clientelism in unconsolidated democracies and studies on ethnic party competition. Despite some initial enthusiasm, the research on competition in ethnically defined electoral arenas has surprisingly moved away from investigating the phenomenon of clientelism. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Cornstange, 2016; de Kadt and Larreguy, 2018), claims regarding ethnic clientelism have rarely been empirically tested. This is partially a result of the sensitive nature of the phenomenon, which has rarely allowed researchers to test their claims directly at the individual level. Instead, they have often settled for an indirect, aggregate measure of some sort of distributive politics, typically measuring resource allocation across large geographical units or whole ethnic groups. Surprisingly, despite being crucial to both the practices of clientelist targeting and monitoring, the existing literature on ethnic clientelism has not extensively studied its variation at the micro-local level. Here the question arises as to how the likelihood of cross-ethnic clientelist targeting is affected by the demographic composition of the micro-locality the voter resides in?

In this chapter, we argue that, when neither of the program-based strategies (outbidding and cross-cutting) offers a credible basis for obtaining support from the ethnic outgroup, parties are still left with the possibility of engaging into direct personal exchange with their members. We posit that the likelihood of the clientelist targeting of ethnic minority votes is significantly higher in settlements dominated by other ethnicities. We use a list experiment embedded in the 2018 Montenegrin local election survey to leverage a multilevel regression model, with individuals nested in localities, to estimate the likelihood of vote-buying. This empirical and conceptual approach contributes to the existing literature on the role of ethnicity in clientelist targeting, by not assuming homogeneity among

individuals belonging to the same ethnic group. Instead, it allows us to escape the ecological fallacy of treating various group-level distributive politics as a clientelist practice, and thus, exploring within-group variation in ethnic vote-buying.

The results show the significant presence of vote-buying in local election in Montenegro. The list experiment has shown that, on average, 23% of respondents in the sample have been offered money in exchange for their vote. At the same time, only 4% of voters have directly admitted to being targeted for vote-buying. With respect to the factors contributing to the likelihood of voters being targeted, the multivariate analysis suggests a significant interaction effect between individual ethnicity and the ethnic composition of the locality. In particular, the estimates in the final model show that individuals living in localities dominated by their own ethnic group are significantly less likely to be targeted compared to their co-ethnics in settlements inhabited predominantly by members of other groups. We contribute these results to voters being more likely to weight tradeoff between personal gain and group unity in favor of the former, when embedded in locality with less co-ethnics. Also, in such conditions party brokers are in a better position to identify and negotiate exchange with individual voters, instead of engaging in a "trade" with a group as a whole.

3.2 Party Strategies in Ethnically Defined Arenas

The literature on party competition in ethnically defined electoral arenas has identified the fragmentation of the party system as the main determinant of the political strategies chosen by party elites (Zuber and Szöcsik, 2015). Studies on perfectly ethnically segmented electoral markets have focused their attention on the outbidding model of ethnic politics, which outlines the logic behind the strategies available to parties in the context of bounded electoral competition. Thus, when electoral competition is defined as a contest among parties seeking to represent the same ethnic group, then the

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communitarian aspects of ethnicity push group members toward concentrated party loyalties that result in electoral volatility occurring without wider consequences for the structure of the party system (Horowitz, 1985; Sartori, 2005). The most likely political strategy for ethnic parties, emerging from exclusive within-group contestation, is outbidding established ethnic elites by pursuing more radical and exclusively ethnic demands (Boschler and Szocsik, 2013). As outlined by Horowitz (1985), would-be challengers are incentivized to appear 'more ethnic' and to favor contest over cooperation, which encourages further polarization and political extremism. In that sense, ethnic outbidding can be seen as potentially dangerous for a democratic polity because of the negative effect on inter-group relations, as moderate parties ready to collaborate with other ethnic groups are likely to be accused of 'ethnic neglect'.

Yet, despite the widespread perception that ethnic politics are conflict-prone, the literature has also shown that, instead of conflict, outbidding often produces stable voting patterns and stable party systems (Birnir, 2004, Mitchell et al., 2009). Moreover, in the majority of ethnically diverse societies, groups manage to negotiate relations with other groups via non-violent means. This is possible, to a large extent, due to the fact that ethnic groups rarely represent unified actors with homogeneous, radical preferences (Hale, 2008). Instead, it is often the case that significant portions of ethnic groups, as well as their representative parties, are willing to engage in the inter-ethnic arena (Zuber, 2012). As a result, many ethnically defined electoral arenas are not perfectly segmented and political strategies available to party elites include tactics beyond ethnic outbidding (Chandra, 2005; Wilkinson, 2006). In imperfectly segmented markets, where some parties decide to appeal across ethnic group divides, they do so by including an ethnically cross-cutting dimension of party competition into the party's program. While the issues that can be credibly perceived as ethnically cross-cutting depend on the given context, the diversification of a party's portfolio typically involves incorporating policies that politicize

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alternative cleavages (e.g., class or gender) that simultaneously appeals to members of multiple ethnic groups.

No matter how frequently they are employed, these two strategies do not exhaust all empirically observable tactics embraced by political parties in ethnically defined arenas. One particular instance concerns the example of catch-all parties that desire to appeal to a mass public and, thus, offer moderating claims that target the electorate as a whole. In this context, group size can significantly affect a party's ability to represent a credible alternative when competing for ethnic votes. Parties defined primarily in civic rather than ethnic terms may in fact wish to attract a significant share of minority votes, despite being disproportionally supported by members of another group. The fact that this mobilization is not predominantly based on ethnic appeal makes the strategy employed by such a party substantively different from the previous two described above. While Laver (2005) uses the term ethnic predating to describe civic party strategies that match positions emphasized by the ethnic parties, this label nicely depicts the non-programmatic strategies of parties that use the clientelist targeting of minority votes against their political competition. In this context, predating is fostered by the clear asymmetry in size, political power and access to resources, between catch-all parties and ethnic parties representing minorities. Still, a structural advantage of this kind does not mean that the predating of ethnic others occurs across the board and with no regard to both the individual and contextual conditions in which would-be clients are embedded.

3.2.1 Local Demography and Clientelist Targeting

The main reason why the literature on political competition tends to tie ethnic divisions to clientelism lies in the expectation of ingroup bias in the distribution of resources, as voters are likely to support political parties based on payoffs facilitated by shared ethnicity, as compared to the often non-credible, uninformative, or non-existing programmatic packages offered by parties. Corstange

(2016, 10) coupled the two by arguing that "ethnicity seems to be about how politicians define their constituencies, and clientelism is about how they service and maintain those constituencies". In contrast, the lack of differentiating markers attached to non-ethnic identities means that in any interaction with limited information, the classification of individuals will "amplify signals revealing the ethnic identities of the beneficiary and suppresses his non-ethnic identities" (Chandra, 2007a, 99). Furthermore, continuous interaction between co-ethnics over time reduces uncertainty as these groups then have abundant information about each other. As a result, information flows are much cheaper and faster within ethnic groups than across them, which allows patrons to monitor and target clients at a much more specific level than that of ethnic group.

Despite its intuitiveness, the basic model of ethnic favoritism in which politicians reward their own and do not bother to extend resources to their non-co-ethnics is overly simplistic. For one thing, clientelist resources are simply too scarce to be distributed evenly to all rent-seeking co-ethnics. Therefore, patrons must prioritize the distribution of goods "among their own" based on certain criteria. For this reason, patrons have to balance between favoritism and neglect, while still indicating the ethnic nature of the beneficiaries. If the major concern of patrons is to signal the ethnic underpinnings of the distribution, they are likely to soon realize that not all co-ethnics serve that purpose equally. Moreover, under certain conditions, targeting other ethnicities may in fact be an even more beneficial strategy. Even in the most ethnically divided societies, coalitions are negotiated with other groups, often through informal bargaining over the distribution of state resources among groups. The convenience offered by purchasing cross-ethnic endorsements lies primarily in the fact that, compared to ideology or party affiliation, the politics of ethnic clientelism is based on features not easily chose or changed by individuals (Fearon, 1999). This is especially likely under a proportional electoral formula which characterizes the majority of ethnically heterogeneous and some of the most clientelist systems in Europe (Kitschelt at al., 1999; Müller, 2007). The fact that every vote counts

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equally, regardless of its geographic location fosters "coalition-building" via the individualistic targeting of ethnic votes. Furthermore, as Arriola (2013) argues, the purchase of cross-ethnic endorsements is also more likely to occur whenever voters from a single ethnic group do not constitute the political majority in a competitive election.

3.2.2 The Instrumentalization of Ethnic Membership

The instrumental approach to ethnic clientelism, therefore, can explain the strategic channeling of resources towards particular members of ethnic groups, as not all of them are equally likely to become an object of clientelist targeting. We argue for the relevance of contextual factors, particularly the ethnic demography of the settlement, in determining the applicability of certain party strategies. By looking at the various demographic contexts, we are able to answer not only *what* group, but also *which* members of a particular group are more likely to be targeted by clientelist practices. Compared to higher levels of organization, at the micro-level of politics there is more uncertainty about the efficacy of the alternative networks around which we may organize clientelist exchange. As a result, the likelihood of eliciting the illegal activity of exchanging votes for material benefits must be highly dependent on the ethnic composition of a voter's immediate surroundings (Isaksson and Bigste, 2017).

While political dynamics at the settlement level have not yet been extensively studied, campaign coordinators are typically aware of the potential effect of demographic variation between different levels. Despite the fact that the majority of research on institutions and cleavages do not examine local variation, Van Cott (2005, 11) points out that geographic concertation should "interact with institutional rules to influence electoral outcomes." Stroschein (2011) shows that political strategies vary by local demography, as the relative size of groups makes voters weight differently the tradeoff between personal gain and group unity. She argues that a state minority living as a local majority,

compared to a state minority living as a local minority, is more intensely aware of a need for group unity and, therefore, more likely to react to strategies that would not result in group fragmentation. By the same token, depending on the local demography, certain minority voters seem to be more or less susceptible to targeting by civic parties or parties representing ethnic others. While the above-mentioned studies define local demography as the municipal level, at which local governments are formed and votes aggregated, we extend this logic to even smaller geographical units – the settlements in which voters reside.

3.2.3 Party and Voters Incentives

Clearly, demographic composition may take many different forms. In this paper we confront two demographic realities in which members of the same ethnic group are likely to be targeted through the use of different strategies – living in a settlement dominated by the ingroup or the outgroup. We argue there are multiple reasons why individuals living in settlements dominated by other ethnicities have a higher likelihood of being targeted by clientelist practices, compared to their fellow co-ethnics surrounded by their ingroup. Firstly, in homogeneous localities dominated by the same ethnic group, there are far fewer opportunities for brokers from civic parties or parties representing other ethnicities to contact voters of that particular group. On the other hand, when embedded in settlements dominated by members of other ethnic groups, the diversity of social networks makes intergroup contact more likely and less contentious. Put simply, a person is likely to be correctly identified as a potential client and contacted by outgroup neighbors who serve as party brokers. Brokers maintain regular contacts and are well informed both about the client's personal situation and their political allegiances. Otherwise, going to a locality dominated by particular group in order to first identify, and then approach potential clients with an offer to engage in illegal transaction, is likely to be less effective, credible and safe.

Second, the fact that ethnic minorities tend to be geographically concentrated intensifies the feeling of group solidarity among co-ethnics. In such circumstances, the tradeoff between personal gains and group unity is likely to favor the latter, as individuals are constantly reminded of the value of sticking with the group. Furthermore, demographic dominance in a small geographical unit such as a settlement typically allows ethnic groups to better monitor the behavior of its members and successfully constrain any behavior that could be detrimental to group interests. Social pressure of this kind puts a burden on any individual considering deflecting by trading his/her vote in exchange for material resources provided by non-ethnics. For this reason, their fellow co-ethnics living in settlements where they represent a minority are more likely to potentially break group norms and engage in cross-ethnic clientelism.

The third reason we expect individuals nested outside of settlements dominated by their own groups to be more likely to be targeted with clientelist practices lies in the decentralization of the group. In particular, as Kramon (2019) shows, where ethnic groups are centralized and organized hierarchically, they typically leverage group infrastructure to mobilize voters wholesale. In contrast, when less hierarchical and centralized leadership is present, politicians are more likely to forge linkages directly with voters, resulting in more individual electoral clientelism. While his argument primarily deals with the effect of ethnic group institutional structures in terms of hierarchical organization, the logic of this argument can easily be extended to geographic decentralization. The more concentrated an ethnic group is, the less likely it is for parties to be able to negotiate with individual voters for personal exchange, as opposed to a whole group for a collective benefit. Hence, members of ethnic group living outside of settlements concentrated by their ingroup are more likely to be targeted by vote-buying strategies. Based on this, we expect that:

H1: *Ethnic minority voters have a greater likelihood of being targeted for vote-buying.*

H2*: Ethnic minority voters inhabiting localities dominated by ethnic outgroups are significantly more likely to be targeted for vote-buying, compared to their co-ethnics living in ingroup-dominated settlements.*

3.3 Defining Clientelism

Following Stokes et al. (2013) seminal work, in this paper we use the concept of "clientelism" in a fairly narrow sense. More precisely, we use it to refer to the practices of predictable and monitored direct resource exchange, in which the reception of a benefit provided by a party/politician is contingent upon the individual's vote (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In order to qualify as a form of clientelism, the practice has to be directed at an individual voter, and not at a group of voters. While targeting at large falls under other types of distributive politics, in the narrow definition of clientelism, the politician's delivery of a benefit is contingent upon the personal actions of an individual voter. Second, at a minimum, politicians need to be able to predict whether those voters who receive the benefits will actually vote, otherwise the whole clientelist enterprise would be a complete waste of scarce resources. The third necessary criterium assumes that without the monitoring of voters, politicians run the risk of misallocating resources to voters who are likely to defect. However, in order to constitute clientelism, the monitoring does not have to be actualized. It suffices that voters have the impression that they are being monitored and that the secrecy of their ballot is violated (Chandra, 2007b; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

With regards to the actors involved, clientelist exchange typically includes *patrons*, parties or politicians who provide benefits; *clients*, voters who receive benefits and deliver votes; and *brokers*, party or state/local officials, who act as go-betweens (Mares and Young, 2016). In this paper, we study how the likelihood of being targeted by clientelist practices depends on the ethnic characteristic of both voters and their community. At the same time, in empirical terms, we disregard the role of mediators

in this process, as we are not explicitly interested in who the patron parties are. Clearly, clientelism can also take numerous forms, depending on the type of goods which are being exchanged for votes, and as such it may appear as the manipulation of public spaces, patronage, vote-buying, turnout buying or abstention buying (Stokes et al., 2013). Here, we focus on vote-buying - a practice of trading rewards – money, goods, or favors - for votes in a quid-pro-quo exchange. Unlike state patronage, vote-buying provides positive inducements based on private rather than public goods. Therefore, it can be practiced by an incumbent or by challengers. We define vote-buying as political parties offering voters cash in exchange for the recipient's vote.

3.4 Montenegro as a typical case

3.4.1 An Imperfectly Segmented Market

Its illegal nature means clientelism remains hidden at a very low-level of interpersonal communication and connections. We need to look very closely in order to see it and, moreover, to study it. This is one of the reasons why Montenegro's size, both in terms of its population and the closeness between the national, municipal and locality level, makes observing this phenomenon possible much easier. Regarding ethnic composition, according to the latest Census (2011), the largest population groups living in Montenegro were Montenegrins (44.9%), Serbs (28.7%), Bosniaks (8.6%), Muslims (3.3%) and Albanians (4.9%). In addition to the fact that no ethnic group constitutes an absolute demographic majority[8], electoral competition in Montenegro is not constrained by specific

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[8] Since no ethnic group constitutes absolute demographic majority, I use term "minority" in a reference to titular Montenegrin ethnicity. Clearly, there are important differences both in size, structure, and political organization between Serbs and Bosniaks, Muslims, or Albanians. I use term "ethno-religious" minorities to refer to the latter, while Serbs are considered an "ethno-national" group. Despite differences in size and cultural proximity to Montenegrins, each group's National Councils receives budged resources designated for ethnic minorities. Still, it should be noted that unlike ethno-religious minorities, most Serbs do not embrace minority status in Montenegro since they see themselves as a "constitutive people".

institutions, such as quotas or consociationalism, that may impose institutional constraints that abstruse the natural behavior of the majority (Lijphart, 1977). Instead, elections in Montenegro are organized on the principle of proportionality, with a medium threshold of 3%, suggesting that each vote is counted at large, regardless of where the vote was obtained.

Montenegro's ethnic structure, party system, and the nature of party competition make it an excellent case for testing the hypotheses about the interplay between ethnicity and the propensity of clientelist exchange. The three-decade-long lack of "alteration in power" on the national level, that ended only recently, emphasizes the extent of clientelist practices in the country. The puzzle of "invincible" ex-communist party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), has received some scholarly attention in the past. Most explanations provided by scholars for their extensive political dominance can be described as an interplay between the skillful management of ethnic divisions that got translated into the primary political cleavage (Džankić, 2013; Jenne and Bieber, 2014; Komar and Živković, 2016) and the monopolistic control of state resources, stretching back uninterruptedly to the Communist era. For three decades (1990-2020), the DPS continuously ruled Montenegro, consistently winning anywhere between 40% and 55% of the total vote share (Vuković, 2015a).[9] Despite the fact that the vast majority of its support came from ethnic Montenegrins (approx. 80%) (Kapidžić and Komar, 2021), due to the fact that no ethnic group in Montenegro constitutes an absolute demographic majority, its dominance had to be secured thanks to the support of members of various ethnic groups.

3.4.2 The DPS's Capacities for Clientelist Targeting

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[9] In August 2020, the DPS-led coalition lost power at the national level after being defeated by a heterogeneous three-part coalition mobilized around the Serbian Orthodox Church and the nationalist-conservative Democratic Front. This marked the first electoral overturn since the first multiparty election held in 1990.

In terms of its ability to attract ethnic votes, the DPS was unable to effectively utilize the strategies of ethnic outbidding and cross-cutting. Broadly speaking, the outgroup appeal in the case of the DPS is directed towards two groups of voters. One is of Serbian ethnicity, with whom Montenegrins share their Orthodox religious denomination, and the other belongs to the group of ethno-religious minorities who practice Islam - Bosniaks, Muslims and Albanians (hereafter BMA).[10] Each groups is represented by respective ethnic parties – New Serb Democracy, the Bosniak Party, and Albanian Alliance – that appeal to voters on the basis that they are the champions of the exclusive interests of their ethnic category and make such an appeal central to their mobilizing strategy (Chandra, 2005). In addition to these two parties, a number of smaller ethnic parties also claim to represent the "autochthonous interests" of those communities, but they typically have not managed to endanger the primacy of the two largest minority ethnic parties.

In such a constellation, the DPS has a hard time developing programmatic ties with those voters, for a number of reasons. In particular, while remaining devoted to a civic conception of Montenegro, a large segment of DPS's program is comprised of nation-building policies directed towards reducing the high ambiguity between Montenegrin and Serbian identity. Serb ethnic parties in Montenegro have generally interpreted the adoption of the state's symbols and Montenegrin as the official language as being directly opposed to the interests of Serbian people in Montenegro. In their view, policies aimed at the consolidation of Montenegrin national identity are nothing more than an attempt at national assimilation. While the same nation-building policies are not seen as being opposed to ethno-religious minorities, any potential outbidding on the part of the pro-Montenegrin DPS lacks reliability due to cultural differences stemming from the distinct religious backgrounds. Either way, under these conditions, outbidding ethnic parties seems not to be a viable electoral strategy. Moreover, the politicization of ethnically cross-cutting dimensions has proven to be futile in Montenegro, as the

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[10] Since the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, the term Muslims has represented not a religious, but a national group.

cleavage structure surrounding the nationhood-statehood issue has successfully inhibited the development of any potentially cross-cutting divides, such as left-right or the class divide (Krašovec and Batrićević, 2020). For instance, the most recent attempt by the Social Democratic Party to downplay issues relating to the nationhood cleavage in favor of economic issues has backfired in a way that has jeopardized the very existence of the party, one which have been a model of stability among the small traditional parties of Montenegro.

3.4.3 Politics at the Micro-Local Level

Given its size and population, it is not a surprise that Montenegro is organized as a centralized unitary state. Yet, the territory of Montenegro in divided into 24 municipalities, which represent the largest sub-national units. The number of municipalities has grown over time, largely due to the partition of already existing municipalities. These partitions typically occurred along ethnic lines. For instance, the Municipalities of Tuzi and Petnjica used to be part of Podgorica and Berane Municipalities, respectively. However, since they are inhabited predominantly by Albanians and Bosniak/Muslims, the ethnic elites leveraged political capital derived from being part of the ruling coalition at the national level to secure self-government at the local level. Each of the 24 municipalities is further divided into localities/settlements. In total there are 645 localities. The local elections in Montenegro are held under the same electoral law as the national elections. While the fact that votes from each locality are counted equally suggests that political organization and mobilization does not occur at the level of the settlement, studying political dynamics at the micro-level is important in several ways.

Although localities are not politically consequential with respect to political power and decision-making, they are nonetheless absolutely crucial to the targeting of voters. While resources and political power at the subnational level is concentrated at the level of the municipality, the distribution

of resources occurs predominantly through local committees. In particular party brokers are organized at the micro-level, with each settlement having its own designated "contact people". These are party members that are familiar both with the terrain and the local community. At the beginning of the election campaign the primary task of the local committees is to provide an estimation of the level of electoral support in a particular locality (*mjesna zajednica*). In the later stages of the campaign, they are tasked with targeting voters based on their own assessment of where available resources should be directed, since they are in the best position to make such a decision.

Another reason why localities are a consequential level for the study of clientelism is related to monitoring capacity. In particular, this related to the fact that each party is allowed to have designated observers at every polling station. These party observers are picked from the local committee, as they are able to recognize individual voters and keep track of the turnout among the targeted ones (Ravanilla et al., 2017). Given the crucial role played by the local committees in identifying, monitoring, and delivering clientelist goods, parties that lack strong infrastructure at that local level are at a great disadvantage. This is both implicitly and explicitly recognized by the opponents of the DPS in Montenegro. To be specific, given the fact that DPS has approximately 50.000 party members (according to DPS's officials)[11], which constitutes around 10% of all eligible voters in Montenegro, their ability to monitor at each polling station represents a significant comparative advantage. In order to compensate for this, their opponents often share party infrastructure by allowing their local committees to "cover" for other parties which do not have a developed party structure in that particular locality. Most frequently, this is the case in rural areas where newly established, predominantly urban, parties lack a party presence.

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[11]Available at: https://www.cdm.me/politika/nikolic-lesevi-miodraga-perovica/. Last accessed: August 29, 2021.

3.4.4 The Culture of "Doing Things"

Two particular elements deserve our attention with respect to why clientelist targeting is likely to occur as an alternative strategy in this context: the monopolistic control of public resources that enables spoils distribution and the ethnic diversity that sets the playing field for the practice. In 2013, "the recording" affair broke out when an audio from the DPS party meeting was leaked to the public. There, a senior party official uttered the following words: "Through these projects, we will try to employ only our people, members of the DPS. One employee is four votes. If we manage to hire our man, we have taken one of their votes and made it ours" (RSE, 2013).[12] International election observers have also noticed this monopoly on resources. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) used the term "institutional advantage" (OSCE, 2017, 12) as a consequence of "25 years in power" to describe the position of the DPS during 2016 parliamentary elections. This comment is very important because it highlights how this control of resources translates into voter perceptions. The original survey conducted for the purposes of this study corroborated the OSCE's evaluation. In particular, it showed evidence of a widespread lack of belief in voter secrecy after the local elections in 2018, when 31.7% of respondents said that they did not believe that their vote choice had remained a secret and 39.6% said that they believed that politicians or their job supervisors could have found out who they have voted for if they wanted to. Moreover, 39.8% of respondents reported being personally contacted by politicians or their representatives during the pre-election period.

The last important characteristic comes from the "demand side" of the vote-buying transaction. Having been politically socialized under the pre-dominant party monopoly voters have accepted the rules of the game. In a context where parties do not offer credible policy alternatives, they have learned to expect clientelist offers. This is even more true for a local election, where

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[12] Available at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/afera-snimak-ko-je-smjestio-milu-djukanovicu/25157499.html. Last accessed: August 29, 2021.

programmatic differences are less salient. Focusing on the national level politics only can sometimes cause us to lose sight of an important fact – even though between 1990 and 2020 the DPS never lost national elections, they did lose local ones. There is a vibrant political dynamic that happens at the subnational level, and which is directly connected to clientelist tendencies, as the longevity of the practice has translated into a culture of "doing things", affecting the expectations of both voters and parties.

That the issue of electoral clientelism has truly become a part of the "political culture" and not merely a specific tendency of a single party, is also evident from the practices that occurred in the first local election since the change in national government in 2020. Here, during the election campaign in Nikšić, the second largest city in Montenegro, held in March 2021, the new prime minister, Zdravko Krivokapić, publicly addressed voters with the following words: "If someone offers you money, take it, but then vote for the best" (Pobjeda, 2021).[13] This statement was followed by an investigation into vote-buying by the public prosecutor that was, unsurprisingly, futile. More importantly, the prime minister, himself a political novice and a politician without any party infrastructure or independent financial resources, signaled to voters that the political dynamics had changed. On the one hand, this suggested that the supposed monitoring capacities of the parties that formed the previous government had declined; and on the other, that the parties dominating the new majority were about to increase their own clientelist capacities. Indeed, in the weeks preceding the local election, an MP from the largest government coalition block, the Democratic Front, was detained together with number of individuals closely tied to the Serbian government, under the suspicion of smuggling money across border for vote-buying.[14]

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[13] Available at: https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/krivokapic-ako-vam-nude-pare-uzmite-a-glasajte-za-najbolje. Last accessed: August 29, 2021.
[14] Available at: https://rs.n1info.com/region/pobjeda-privedeno-devet-osoba-zbog-sumnje-da-unose-novac-za-kupovinu-glasova/. Last accessed: August 29, 2021.

3.5 Methodology

3.5.1 Design

The vast majority of empirical social science since the 1950s has relied on survey data. Consequently, the validity of the massive body of existing research essentially depends on the accuracy of self-reported individual behavior and attitudes (Blair and Imai, 2012). However, extracting truthful answers from an individual through survey questions has proved to be much more challenging than was initially thought. The problem of respondents concealing their genuine answers occurs even in relation to seemingly "innocent" political topics, such as voter turnout and media exposure (Burden, 2000; Zaller, 2002). As might be expected, the serious measurement problem is further elevated once scholars start investigating sensitive issues such as exchanging votes for money. The essence of the problem lies in the lack of the sense of anonymity that a respondent feels. Not only is there a natural tendency to opt out of openly discussing socially undesirable behavior, but there is also a tangible fear of being criminally pursued and punished by the law. Under these conditions, the need for self-censorship gets amplified, which in turn introduces a bias that can damage any attempt to study such topics systematically.

Since it was first conducted in political science by Sniderman et al. (1992), the list experiment has become the method most frequently used to produce seemingly truthful answers to sensitive questions (e.g., Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Glynn, 2013; Holbrook and Krosnik, 2010; Imai, 2011). The growth in popularity of this approach is, to a large extent, a result of evidence showing an increase in estimates of socially undesirable behaviors, relative to direct questioning (e.g., Kuklinski et al., 1997). As an aggregation technique, a list experiment derives its power from the specific way the sensitive question is formulated. Besides the wording of the survey question, the structure of the answers available in this quasi-experimental method is designed so as to earn the trust of respondents

by restoring the sense of confidentiality. Here, the sense of anonymity is established by not asking respondents directly to provide an answer to a sensitive question, but rather to report *how many* of the items in the list provided by the researcher apply to them personally. In this way, the respondent can rest assured that the interviewer cannot tie the reported number specifically to an answer to the sensitive question.

The efficacy of the list experiment appears to be highly dependent on the way list items are designed (the so-called "design effect," and "floor" and "ceiling effect"). In addition to these, in order to achieve a satisfactory level of precision, a list experiment often compels researchers to use relatively large samples. Furthermore, the typical difference-in-means test is conducted at the group (aggregate) level, failing to provide a measure of the sensitive item at the individual level (Blair and Imai, 2012). In the following section, I illustrate the specificities of the list experiment in greater details using the experiment design. Moreover, I explain the strategy to circumvent these limitations by combining hierarchical modeling with the list experiment. Such an approach allows researchers to derive individual-level estimates while introducing explanatory variables at the level of the locality.

3.5.2 Sample

In order to measure the extent to which vote-buying occurred, I embedded the list experiment into the original post-election survey in Montenegro, where on 27th May 2018 the elections were held in 12 out of 23 municipalities. I selected 7 municipalities based on their ethnic variation, electoral competitiveness, and the final election winner. The selection ensured that there was at least one municipality dominated by each of the ethnic groups, at least one where the opposition won the election and at least one where there was a turnover in power after the elections. Within these 7 municipalities, responses were collected from 97 localities, being approximately 15 for each

municipality. The list of municipalities, with their basic description, is presented in Table 3.1. The full description of the 97 localities is available in Appendix B.

Table 3.1: Description of the Municipalities Included in the Study

Municipality	Population	Localities	Ethnic Heterogeneity	Competitiveness	Ethnic Majority
Bar	42.029	77	High	Low	Montenegrins
Bijelo Polje	46.047	137	High	Governmental	Serbs
Kolašin	8367	68	Medium	Low	Montenegrins
Pljevlja	30.772	154	Low	Medium	Serbs
Plužine	3.235	42	Low	Low	Serbs
Podgorica	185.915	141	Medium	Medium	Montenegrins
Rožaje	22.964	26	Low	Low	Bosniaks

The sampling strategy was composed of choosing 97 localities out of the 645 located in these 7 municipalities. First, from the sampling frame, we dropped localities with less than 40 inhabitants as it would be almost impossible to survey at least 15 households. we then stratified the remaining localities (433) according to ethnic diversity. From these strata, we randomly selected 97 localities, and in each of these, surveyed close to 15 individuals. Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of the ethnic composition of the municipalities included in the sample. Before collecting the data, a pilot study with 180 respondents from the municipalities of Kolašin and Bijelo Polje was conducted, for the purposes of training interviewers in conducting the list experiment, and fine-tuning list items in order to avoid potential design effects. Data collection in all municipalities was completed within two months of the election.

Figure 3.1:
Ethnic Composition Across Sampled Municipalities

3.5.3 The list experiment

Each respondent in the survey was randomly assigned to one of the two experimental groups (treatment and control), and asked the following question:

*During the election campaign, people in Montenegro are exposed to a large number of events. Pull out the card which contains the number of events that people listed as frequent during the local election held in May 2018. Please read the whole list and tell me how many of these things apply to you. Please, do not tell me which events, just **how many** of them.*

The control group reads the list of three statements, which does not include a "sensitive" item:

(1) I watched TV almost every day to learn about the campaign.

(2) The voting place where I was registered to vote remained the same as during the previous election.

(3) I personally met all the party candidates and discussed the campaign with them.

How many of these happened during the last local election: _____.

In the treatment group, the interviewer asks an identical question, with an additional sensitive item:

(4) I was offered money by a party member.

As both the experimental and control groups read the same three non-sensitive items, the premise is that the difference in reported number between two group lies solely in the sensitive item. Under the assumption of successful randomization (the item order is also randomized), we can say that the two groups are equal in every observable and unobservable manner, and thus, the difference in the means between the control and treatment groups is a valid estimation of the particular sensitive behavior.

In order to evaluate the usefulness of the list experiment in eliciting truthful answers, at the very end of the survey questionnaire, participants were directly asked whether the respondent has been offered money in exchange for their vote.

3.5.4 Data

Whereas the reported number of items in the list experiment serves as the dependent variable, in our analysis we include an extensive list of theoretically relevant explanatory variables from both the individual and locality level, in order to test our hypotheses against rigorous controls.

The level of the locality

The main contextual variable of interest here is the demographic composition of the locality. While there are a number of potentially theoretically relevant demographic constellations, the primary

interest is in measuring which ethnic group is dominant in a particular locality. By dominant, we mean the ethnic group which constitutes the absolute majority in a given locality. Localities in which no ethnic group holds demographic majority serve as a reference category. This measure is introduced as three separate dummy variables, coded "1" when a particular group represents an absolute majority in the settlement. In addition to this, we control for the overall level of ethnic diversity, measured as the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index (Alesina et al., 2003).

As the clientelist exchange is likely to vary depending on the distribution of political support, we include several political control variables at the level of the locality. Political competitiveness is introduced as a dummy variable indicating whether the electoral results in the locality were tight, i.e. the difference in vote share between the winning party and the runner-up was less than 5%. Furthermore, given that we imply that clientelist linkage is maintained through the ruling parties' access to resources, our analysis includes interaction term measuring whether an election winner in a locality is the leader in the predominant party at the national level. As the size of the locality can affect the parties' ability to monitor clientelist transactions, we also control for the population size. In addition to these, the unemployment rate was included as a key locality-level economic variable, measuring the percentage of individuals currently not employed who were able and willing to work (0-100). Last, each model controls for the municipality in which the individual and settlement is nested, introduced as six dummy variables. The interval locality-level variables are centered around the grand mean, to facilitate easier interpretation.

The individual level

At the individual level, we incorporate the theoretically relevant ethnic, demographic, and socio-economic variables. With regards to ethnicity, the primary interest is in a person's ethnicity. We

operationalize this measure via two dichotomous variables indicating whether a person belongs to the Serbian national corpus or one of the minority groups (Albanians, Bosniaks, and Muslims). Montenegrins, as the largest ethnic group, serve as a reference category. In terms of socio-economic status, we consider the number of unemployed individuals in the household and the level of education (whether they have a university degree or not). Other demographic variables include the type of settlement (rural vs. urban), age, and gender. The main political control at the individual level measures whether an individual is close to a certain party or not, as this can significantly affect the likelihood of being targeted. The list of controls also include one psychological variable - the tendency towards reciprocity, measured using reciprocity scale (Perugini, 2003) with 9 items ranging from 1 to 5, merged into a single index. Finan and Schechter (2012) argue that vote-buying might be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity, as receiving money creates a feeling of obligation.

3.6 Results

3.6.1 Assumptions

As previously mentioned, in order to derive unbiased, precise estimates from the list experiment, a number of assumptions have to be made. First, biased estimates can result from the fact that respondents evaluate list items relative to one another. In other words, if answers to control items are affected by the inclusion of the sensitive item, the study suffers from the design effect. We use a test developed by Blair and Imai (2012) to test for such a possibility. Using a two-sided test, at the 95% level of confidence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no design effect (p-value= 1.00).

Second, the choice of control items can also affect the validity of the list experiment. In particular, the wrong choice of control items may lead to a ceiling and floor effect (Kuklinski et al., 1997). The ceiling effect occurs when each control items applies to a given person, as does the sensitive

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item. The floor effect, on the other hand, appears when the control items are barely applicable to anyone to the extent that we might easily expect negative answers to all of them. Either way, in designing the list experiment in this way, the researchers failed to induce the required sense of anonymity. The results in Graph 1 show mean values of 1.51 for vote-buying list, close to an ideal distance from 0 (the "floor") and 3 (the "ceiling"), suggesting this assumption is also met. Approximately 10% of the respondents in the control groups reported zero or three as their answer.

Last, Table 3.2 shows how the two experimental groups score with regards to a number of potentially confounding variables. The data offers clear evidence of successful randomization as we fail to reject a null hypothesis of no difference between the groups in the case of each variable included in the analysis.

Table 3.2: Balance Test

Variable	Control group	Treatment group	p-value
Education	0.17	0.18	0.60
Gender	0.60	0.61	0.78
Age	-0.01	0.01	0.45
Unemployed	0.83	0.80	0.59
Income	-0.03	0.02	0.07
Minority	0.28	0.28	0.95
Serb	0.33	0.33	0.90
Urban	0.09	0.07	0.30
Reciprocity	0.00	0.01	0.94
Party Close	0.42	0.41	0.91

Following Imai and Blair (2012), our analysis goes beyond the difference in means and employ a multilevel multivariate regression estimator. In this way, we overcome the crucial deficiency of typical list experiment difference-in-means design – the loss of information. The results of the list experiment are analyzed by interacting the variables of interest with an experimental group assignment. Through this specification, we can obtain the estimated difference between respondents assigned to the treatment list and the control list. Thus, the coefficients essentially represent the relationship between each independent variable and the sensitive item (vote-buying) (see also Mares and Young, 2019). The dependent variable in the models is the number of items reported in the answer to the list question.

3.6.2 Analysis

Table 3.3 shows the difference in means between the control and the treatment group, and the list experiment estimates with its confidence interval, together with the estimates derived from the direct question.

Table 3.3: Estimated Incidences of Vote-buying

Measure	N	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Estimate	p-value
List experiment	1367	1.40 (1.34-1.46)	1.63 (1.57-1.69)	23% (16% - 30%)	0.00
Direct	1196	-	-	4% (2%-6%)	-

The list experiment proved to be very successful, as 19% of respondents additionally "admitted" being offered money for their vote as compared to the typical self-reported measure. According to our results, during the 2018 local election in Montenegro, 23% of people were offered money by party members in exchange for their political support. Although this number may seem high, it is very much aligned with the findings of other studies on vote-buying, that use a similar methodology. For instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) estimated that 24% of registered voters in Nicaragua were offered clientelist goods, compared to 2% who reported such behavior directly; Carkoglu and Aytac (2015) estimated that one-third of the Turkish electorate was targeted with vote-buying, while Corstange (2010) reported that over half of the electorate in Lebanon had engaged in clientelist exchange. In addition to this, the estimated frequency of vote-buying is typically higher in local elections, where parties are even less likely to engage in a programmatic debate that might attract voter attention and more likely to approach voters with clientelist offers.

3.6.3 Multivariate analysis

The above theoretical argument assumes that the frequency of vote-buying is a function of both individual ethnic membership and the ethnic composition of the locality. For this reason, a

multilevel regression model which can accommodate observations clustered within localities, and thus produce unbiased standard errors and estimates, was selected. The data shows significant clustering at the locality level, measured via the intraclass correlation (ICC). In this case 16% of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained at the level of the locality in which individuals are embedded.

In Table 3.4, five models are estimated. The first model tests the relationship between the locality level variables and vote-buying. The second model expands this list of variables by adding individual-level variables. In Model 3-5, the hypothesized cross-level interaction between voters' ethnicity and the dominant group in the locality were added. In interest of space, only model with all interaction has been presented. Models with separate interactions are available in the Appendix A. We evaluate model fit relative to each based on the value of the AIC (Burham et al., 2011). A clear improvement in model fit is evident as we move from Model 1 to Model 5, indicating that with each additional block of variables, the model fits the data significantly better. Model 5 was selected as the final model, as it is preferred for both theoretical and statistical reasons.

With respect to the ethnic related variables, we argued that vote-buying instances would be predicted by the interaction between an individual's ethnicity and the ethnic composition of the locality. The first indication that demographic composition of locality affects frequency of vote-buying is provided by measure of ethnic diversity, which is significant across all models. Given the fact that in this analysis we are primarily interested in interaction between voter's ethnicity and demographic dominance of various ethnic groups, it is important to estimate effect of such dominance while controlling for the overall level of diversity. Results show that voters in homogeneous localities are more frequently targeted with vote-buying. However, the results in Model 2 show that, once we take into account locality level variables, as well as the municipality in which the settlement is embedded, individual level ethnic variables show no effect on vote-buying. This goes against H1, based on which we expected that minority voters will be, on average, targeted more frequently than the rest of the

population. On the other hand, we can see that individuals living in localities predominantly inhabited by Serbs and ethno-religious minorities experience significantly less instances of vote-buying compared to settlements which have no majority ethnicity. While this may appear to be evidence of ingroup bias on the part of the pro-Montenegrin ruling party, Models 3-5 reveals a different logic. Thus, based on the interaction effect between the individual-level and locality-level ethnic variables, it seems that cross-level interaction makes all the difference for vote-buying. The estimates in the final model show that individuals living in localities dominated by their own ethnic group are significantly less likely to be targeted compared to their co-ethnics in settlements inhabited predominantly by members of other groups. These findings support the claim made in the second hypothesis. In terms of the effect size, the interaction effect size in the final model is approximately stronger for ethno-religious minorities (Albanians, Bosniaks and Muslims) (0.64) compared to Serb nationals (0.38).

Figures 3.2 and 3.3, depict interaction between voter's ethnicity and locality's dominant group across experimental groups. For both Serbs (Figure 3.2) and Bosniaks, Muslims, or Albanians (Figure 3.3) it is quite evident that when embedded in ingroup dominated localities, there is not difference at all between experimental groups. This means that additional vote-buying item in the list experiment in the treatment group had not effect, i.e., instances of vote-buying were insignificant. However, among their co-ethnics residing in localities dominated by outgroups, there's significant difference in means between control and treatment group, suggesting frequent incidences of vote-buying have been reported.

In a more general sense, these results offer interesting theoretical insight into how parties chose to direct resources based on the ethnic characteristics of would-be clients. While the findings show that localities which are predominantly inhabited by non-titular ethnicities experience less vote-buying, this does not mean that members of their ethnic group are not being targeted. Indeed, they appear to be chosen for clientelist targeting based on the demographic composition of their locality. Together,

these results point to the limitations of the ingroup favoritism model at the micro-level. Although we did not seek to answer the question of which party engages the most in vote-buying practices (nor can we actually do this using list experiment data), this becomes important if we take from these findings the suggestion that parties use vote-buying as a vehicle for coalition building. An alternative explanation for our results would be that minorities are being targeted by ethnic minority parties, due to ingroup favoritism. However, this seems very unlikely for multiple reasons.

Table 3.4: Correlates of Vote-Buying in Montenegro

	Dependent variable: *Incidence of Vote-Buying*				
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Intercept	1.52***	1.34***	1.35***	1.34***	1.35***
Ethnic Diversity	−0.26*	−0.26*	−0.27*	−0.30*	−0.34**
Serb dominated	−0.33*	−0.33*	−0.14	−0.32*	−0.14
BMA dominated	−0.34*	−0.51**	−0.53**	−0.17	−0.26
Montenegrin dominated	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09
Competitiveness	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.16
Predominant Party	0.19	0.12	0.11	0.11	−0.70*
Municipality Gov.	−0.25	−0.17	−0.20	−0.16	−0.81**
Unemployment Rate	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02
Population	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12
Serb		0.09	0.28*	0.07	0.25*
BMA		0.20	0.28	0.45*	0.52*
Household Unemp.		0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Party Closeness		0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Reciprocity		−0.05	−0.06	−0.06	−0.07
Serb dominated × Serb			−0.42*		−0.38*
BMA dominated × BMA				−0.67*	−0.64*
Municipality Gov. × Predominant Party					1.32**
Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipalities	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
n	1,367	1,068	1,068	1,068	1,068
J	97	97	97	97	97
LogLik.	-1,290	-939	-936	-936	-929
AIC	2,649	1,982	1,980	1,981	1,975

Note: The models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying across localities. BMA: Bosniak, Muslim, and Albanian ethnicity. List of controls include: age, gender, type of settlement, and education. Full table available in Appendix A. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure 3.2: Incidences of Vote-Buying
Serbian Ethnicity

Figure 3.3: Incidences of Vote-Buying
BMA Ethnicity

First, the data shows that minorities are significantly more likely to become targets in localities where they do not constitute a majority, meaning where the infrastructure of ethnic parties is least developed and where their broker network is less dense. Second, if ingroup favoritism is the principle behind the approach by which parties organize vote-buying, then we see no reason why this should be reserved only for minorities. In that sense, although the DPS is predominantly supported by self-declared Montenegrins, we see that they are either statistically indistinguishable from other ethnicities or less likely to be offered money for their political support. Third, as previously discussed, with regards to access to resources, the DPS is clearly unmatched, both temporally and geographically. This is supported by our findings that more vote-buying occurred in settlements where the predominant party, i.e., the Democratic Party of Socialists, was also the settlement and municipal winner. In other words, by reading our results from an ingroup favoritism perspective, we then have to explain, for example, how ethnic minority parties buy votes where their infrastructure is least developed, why this logic does not translate to other groups, and how it is that small, geographically concentrated and resource-deficient parties manage to maintain such an extensive clientelist network.

3.7 Conclusion

Despite the fact that programmatic linkages between voters and elites, which guarantee the universal distribution of policy outcomes, are a unique characteristic of democratic societies, such ideal-typical ties are not as common as might be expected. Instead, in many political arenas, these programmatic linkages are either fully substituted, or complemented, by extensive clientelist networks in which continued political support is exchanged for selective material resources. Notwithstanding the initial interest in the role of ethnicity in clientelist exchanges, the empirical literature on this matter is still rather scarce. Studies on ethnic clientelism tend to overemphasize the issue of ingroup favoritism, which has been typically combined with both ethnic neglect and the cross-ethnic purchase of votes. This chapter joins more recent efforts to study ethnic vote-buying at the micro-level (e.g., Stroschein, 2011; Corstange, 2016; De Kadt and Larreguy, 2018). In moving beyond the model of ingroup favoritism, according to which politicians reward only members of their group, through the study of the targeting of ethnicities that are not traditional supporters of the predominant ruling party in Montenegro.

More precisely, what is of interest here is the role that contextual demographic conditions play in determining which party strategy is employed in a particular situation. We argue that, in ethnically imperfectly segmented markets, where some parties aim to compete for voters of multiple ethnic groups, parties unable to appeal to ethnic votes programmatically may still seek to target members of those groups individually, in a non-programmatic manner. This chapter focused on the demographic realities, in which voters are surrounded by their ingroup, compared to living in outgroup-dominated settlements. The main hypothesis holds that under the latter conditions, both political parties and voters are incentivized to reach across groups and target individuals with clientelist goods. Such an expectation is derived from the effect different demographic compositions have on the tradeoff

between personal and group interest. In short, we argued that the increased likelihood of individuals residing in outgroup-dominated being engaged in vote-buying is a function of increased inter-group contact, the inability of the ethnic group to adequately monitor its members and protect itself from defection, as well as from the fact that group wholesale is less likely to occur in a decentralized context.

Empirically, this chapter focused on the design of a study that allows us to simultaneously test both the effect of individual and locality-level variables, and most importantly, their interaction. The original data was gathered after the 2018 Montenegrin local elections in seven municipalities, which had a list experiment embedded in it. At the aggregate level, the list experiment estimated that 23% of voters had been offered money for their votes, while only 4% of such instances were reported directly. In terms of the results, they show consistent evidence that ingroup favoritism in vote-buying is overstated in the case of Montenegro. This is not to say that it does not exist, nor that it cannot take some other form. Rather, the analysis reveals that vote-buying is used strategically for cross-ethnic coalition building as well. Such cross-ethnic purchase, however, appears to be significantly affected by the micro-local demography. Compared to their fellow co-ethnics in ingroup-dominated settlements, parties tend to develop more clientelist linkage with individuals living surrounded by other ethnicities.

While we maintain confidence in robustness of our results, it is important to remain cautious in light of several directions in which future research might take this study. First of all, the focus here is only on vote-buying. In that sense, it is possible that different types of clientelist goods (public jobs or social welfare, for example) and inducements are being distributed in a distinctively different manner. Second, although in this section we focus on nationality as the most politically salient identity in Montenegro, an intriguing question remains whether parties use other identities in the repertoire in order to either boot clientelist ties, or to break them. Finally, we were primarily interested in studying the role of ethnicity in vote-buying, with a focus on *who* is being targeted and *where*. Future studies should take the issue further by studying *how*. Although this chapter has sought to explain the

motivation of both patrons and clients, it purposely set aside the role of brokers. Learning more about their role could provide valuable knowledge on how cross-ethnic coalitions are actually built, and to what extent they are still dependent on ingroup bias.

Chapter 4

Immigrant Segregation and the Rise of Radical Right-Wing in the Western Europe

> "The most serious riotous conditions have coincided with the immigration of large number of unfavored groups. (…) If minority groups would disperse themselves as individuals they would encounter less hostility. (…) But dispersion for many minorities is not easily achieved."
>
> **Gordon W. Allport (1954)**
> *The Nature of Prejudice*

4.1 Introduction

Over the last two decades, increasing support for radical right-wing (RRW) parties in Europe has transformed them from marginal political actors into key agents of societal change (Mudde, 2009). This shift has left both the academic community and the general public uncertain as to why voters in some of the most developed countries are willing to risk undermining institutions that have brought them nothing but prosperity (Hawkins et al. 2018). The European RRW parties are often referred to as populist parties, since they present social world as determined by the divide between "the good people" and "the evil elite", and rally primarily around the issues of immigration and the preservation of national identity (Arzheimer, 2018; Cools et al., 2021; Stanley, 2008; Mudde, 2010; Milačić and Vuković, 2018). However, more recent literature argued that it is misleading to label those parties 'populist parties', since populism is not the most pertinent feature of the RRW party family (Rydgren, 2017). Instead, the most defining feature of the RRW family of parties is their ethno-nationalism, manifested in the primary objective of safeguarding the nation's majority culture and keeping it as homogeneous as possible (Rydgren, 2007; Jenne, 2018). In their effort to mobilize the electorate around identity concerns, immigrants are blatantly stigmatized as the main threat to a nation's economy, culture, and security (Rydgren, 2008; Mudde, 2010; Green et al. 2016, Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; van Spanje, 2010).

Despite identifying "census grievances" as a common denominator of the electoral success of RRW parties, the existing literature is yet to provide a comprehensive and conclusive answer to the puzzling association between changing demography and anti-immigrant electoral mobilization in Europe. The list of variables used to operationalize the demographic context in the vast majority of studies consists of ethnic fragmentation or the size of immigrant population. While group size is an important variable in the study of group relations, its ability to produce political consequences is,

according to the classic literature in social psychology (Allport, 1954), conditioned by a number of contextual conditions that have been almost completely absent from the literature. This chapter expands the list of variables making up the mechanism through which immigration is tied to the rise of RRW. Following recent literature on social geography (Enos, 2017), I argue that the geographic segregation of Muslim immigrants moderates the widely reported effect of the size of the immigrant population on electoral support for the RRW parties in Europe. The argument is rooted in the most influential theories of prejudice holding that the size of the outgroup in interaction with geographic clustering increases the perceived level of group threat.

To test the effect of geographic distribution on voters for RRW parties, I combine district-level data on demographic composition with individual survey data from the 2015 Federal Election in Switzerland. I build a multilevel regression model with varying intercepts, with 4019 individuals nested in 136 districts (*bezirke*). The results reveal the previously neglected role of immigrant segregation on electoral support for one of the most successful RRW parties in Europe – the Swiss People's Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei* - SVP). Taken independently, an increase in the Muslim immigrant population in districts reduces support for the Swiss People's Party. However, the effect of the size of the immigrant population is moderated by their geographic segregation and level of urbanization. When larger immigrant populations are also geographically clustered, the likelihood of voting for the SVP increases significantly. Furthermore, results show that interaction effect of size of immigrant population and their geographic segregation is determined by the level of urbanization of the settlement in which voters reside. Namely, voters living in small rural municipalities, appear to be particularly affected by the spatial distribution of Muslim immigrants.

The findings presented here contribute to the existing literature in multiple ways. First, they show that the already established connection between social geography and group attitudes has a direct electoral consequence. To scholarship of RRW parties in Europe this study adds an important

contextual variable that illuminates the mechanism between emerging demographic concerns in Western Europe and the success of the RRW. Evidence suggests that the effect can be observed even with relatively small-sized outgroups, as the proportion of Muslim immigrants in Swiss districts needs to reach five percent of the total share of the population in order to produce strong effects on voting among native citizens.

These findings have wider social implications. Increasing migration to Europe, merged with the tendency among ethnic groups to live in homogeneous communities, is likely to increase the chances of electing elites who exploit group prejudices. While in the long run this may contribute to rising social disintegration and polarization, these results can be also interpreted in an optimistic fashion. Human evolutionary psychology is slow to change, but factors that seem to trigger negative tendencies and behaviors appear to be rather contextual. Hence, to the extent meaningful intergroup contact can be fostered by the political elites and the careful design of public policies, the negative effect of changing demographic composition can be alleviated.

4.2 Immigration and RRW parties

Immigration has become one of the most prominent explanations for the success of radical right-wing in Western democracies. The popularity of this explanation lies in the fact that the inflow of immigrants has coincided with an increasingly negative perception of foreigners and the rise of RRW parties (Shehaj et al., 2021). Economic and cultural grievances are known to increase negative attitudes towards immigrants, especially when social interaction between immigrants and native citizens is limited (Valdez, 2014). There is a widespread and increasing perception of outgroup threat in the Western world that RRW parties exploit and feed of. This family of parties, although internally diverse, are unified by their objective to keep the nation as ethnically homogeneous as possible. The

obsession with maintaining an ethnically homogeneous polity is the main driver of the xenophobia and exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants, which underlines the RRW's desire to restrict immigration to their country (Rydgren, 2007; Rydgren, 2017; Arzheimer, 2018).

Although there is broad agreement in the literature that immigrants do not pose a real threat to low-skilled native citizens in relation to the labor market (Peri and Sparber, 2009), the narrative of immigrants "stealing" jobs persists to this day. The misguided idea that immigration breeds unemployment appears to be driven by the inclination of native citizens to overestimate the number of immigrants, which provokes voter anxiety even in the absence of substantial immigration (Shehaj et al., 2021). The fact that economic performance and employment competition showed poor explanatory power has meant that researchers have shifted their focus towards cultural anxieties and the characteristics of immigrants, such as their country of origin. The cultural grievances of native citizens seem to be particularly reactive to the religious identity of immigrants. They are much more likely to be against the reception of immigrants from culturally dissimilar country (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013). For instance, an inflow of immigrants with an Islamic background is found to intensify cultural apprehension about immigration, create a form of cultural backslash and produce fertile ground for the rise of the radical right (Inglehart, 1997). Therefore, the discrepancy between the lack of substantive immigration and high levels of perceived group threat is "solved" by the RRW's strategic focus on the perception of particular immigrant groups, rather than on actual numbers.

Muslim immigrants are a likely target for RRW parties due to the evident lack of cultural resemblance between them and native citizens. This seeming cultural incompatibility reduces the likelihood of successful integration and heightens fears of ethnic others, since cultural assimilation is hindered by the groups' ethnic or religious identity (Bisin et al., 2008). The main explanation as to why cultural grievances are likely to benefit RRWs lies in the fact that the presence of ethnic others intensifies group entitativity, enhancing group boundaries and the perception of superiority over

culturally distinct groups (Tajfel et al. 1986). As a result, the inflow of immigrants, or even the credible threat of it, produces changes in how native citizens perceive the importance of group norms. The fear of (unwanted) cultural shift in a society creates a unique opportunity for RRW parties to gain electoral support. Traditionally well equipped with a nativist agenda, RRW parties underline cultural incongruity, accentuate voters' feelings of apprehension, and invoke xenophobic attitudes to boost ingroup cohesion (Shehaj et al., 2021).

This process was evident during a Swiss referendum in 2009, when a ban on minarets - a clear reminder of failed assimilation - was framed not as a matter of religious freedom but as a security issue (Kallis, 2018). The presence of immigrants with a visibly different ethnic and religious background enables RRW parties to politicize identity concerns and claim ownership of the immigration issue (Norris, 2005). Changes in the perceived group boundaries between the native and immigrant populations bring growing concern over party competence in relation to solving the problems associated with them (Petrocik, 1996). Although immigration is usually a contested issue, it nevertheless shows certain valence features. When mainstream parties tend to agree on the direction of immigration policy, competition can be expected to occur around which party is best suited to deliver certain policy goals (Odmalm, 2012). In that regard, the convergence of mainstream parties towards the center, by pursuing the universalists defense of multiculturalism (Rydgren, 2018; Meguid, 2005), benefits RRW parties, since they can show a long-standing commitment to an issue which has been placed high on their agenda for decades.

4.3 Geography and Intergroup Relations

One of the key reasons why an emphasis on the size of the immigrant population is so overwhelmingly present in the literature stems from the seemingly conflicting positions of the two major theories of inter-group relations.

Under Group Contact Theory (Allport, 1954), if two groups share a geographical location, the size of the local outgroup will increase opportunities for extended interpersonal contact, unveil hidden similarities between the groups, and reduce group prejudice. According to the basic principles of this theory, the positive effect is facilitated by cooperation, the sharing of common goals, and support for lawful authorities among groups of equal status. Under this view, extended interpersonal contact brings awareness of the similarities between groups, provides a learning opportunity and make individuals accept the idea that ingroup norms are not the only standard by which to live (Verkuyten et al., 2010). The process of the reduction of prejudice is, therefore, based on opportunities to learn about the other group, change personal behavior accordingly and generate affective ties with members of an outgroup (Pettigrew, 1998). A number of studies in the social sciences have found evidence which is supportive of the claim that diversity and a larger immigrant population, through positive contact, increases trust (Schmid et al.,2014) and decreases xenophobic attitudes (Jolly and DiGiusto, 2014). Voci and Hewstone (2003) state that contact with immigrants had a direct positive effect on perceived outgroup variability and outgroup attitude, and a direct effect on subtle prejudice, with the last two being mediated via intergroup anxiety.

In contrast, Group Threat Theory (Blumer, 1958) does not see social interaction between groups as a vehicle for eradicating prejudice and predicts exactly the opposite. Under the assumption of the superiority of the majoritarian group, and the sense of entitlement that goes with it, inter-group contact in fact promotes conflict. Since the interests of the ingroup and the outgroup are perceived as

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mutually exclusive, any increase in the size of an outgroup brings a rise in negative attitudes, intensifies the distance between groups of different social status, promotes social dominance tendencies (Pratto et al., 1994) and reinforces one's belief in greatness of his/her own group (Cichocka, 2016). Exposure to minority outgroups, fostered by the surge in migration, encourages ingroup identification and the saliency of ethnicity (Knowles and Tropp, 2018). By anchoring their findings in studies showing that a higher relative proportion of the subordinate group increases outgroup threat (Quillian, 1995), a number of recent studies have reported evidence suggesting that group size has a positive effect on electoral support for the radical right (Arzheimer, 2009; Green et al. 2016; Coffe et al., 2007). Cools et al. (2021) conduct meta-analysis of studies focusing on the share of immigrant population in a community and concluded that, once reporting bias is taken into account, the effect of local immigration on far-right voting is on average negligible. However, they point out that their analysis reveals a large heterogeneity in effects across contexts, suggesting that the effect of the immigrant population may be important to anti-immigration voting in certain settings.

Regardless of which side of the debate we subscribe to, both make exactly the same assumption - relative group size can serve as a proxy for interpersonal contact. Enos (2017) pointed out that, although many researchers took frequent conflict between ethnic groups in heterogeneous communities as proof that Contact Theory was wrong, the two theories are not as nearly divergent as is typically perceived. In particular, while his strongest critics remained ignorant of remarks he made regarding the spatial distribution of groups, Allport (1954) offered a much more nuanced understanding of the relationship between geography and interpersonal contact. For instance, he explicitly recognized the danger of oversimplification in believing that merely by "assembling people without regard for race, religion, or national origin, we can destroy stereotypes and develop friendly relationships" (1954, 261). Instead, he clearly conditioned his "law of peaceful progression" upon a number of variables. Among them, geographic segregation seems to have the most prominent place,

as it leads to segregation in various other spheres: children going to ethnically homogeneous schools, neighborhoods being not civic but ethnocentric in nature, friendships not being developed across group boundaries, and so on.

In recent years, the literature on social geography has pushed Allport' argument even further by claiming that space structures human perceptions of groups directly, and not only through interpersonal contact. Most notably, Enos (2017) argued that a "demagogue of space" is so intrinsically rooted in human psychology that, regardless of interpersonal contact, humans make judgements about people based on where they live. In other words, we all use space as a "mental shortcut" to organize our social world and decide what to think about other groups surrounding us. Enos and colleagues (Enos, 2014; Enos and Gidron 2016; Enos and Celaya, 2018) experimentally identified the causal effect of geographic segregation on intergroup contact, political attitudes and behavior. Using laboratory experiments, Enos and Celaya (2018) demonstrate that segregation affects the perception of other people and causes intergroup bias in costly decision-making. The effect of segregation, however, does not occur merely through the inhibition of intergroup contact, but by direct effect on human perceptions. Leveraging a natural experiment in public housing, Enos (2016) confirmed the behavioral consequences of changes in the size and proximity of the outgroup, particularly with respect to voting for conservative candidates.

Their findings point towards Allport's initial understanding of the nature of group contact – relative group size much less useful in the evaluation of the outgroup, outside of the defined context and particular spatial arrangement. The reason why segregation so profoundly affects group perceptions lies in its ability to markedly enhance the visibility of a group, by making it appear larger and more menacing than it actually is. Therefore, the relationship between outgroup size and segregation is multiplicative - the larger the group, the more effect segregation will have on group perception. Allport confidently expressed this opinion when he hypothesized that anti-Semitism in the

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United States would be greatly reduced under conditions of geographic dispersion (1954, 228). Here, he suggested that segregation makes larger groups more visible, homogeneous and potentially threatening to others. Enos (2017, 70) further expanded the argument regarding visibility by suggesting that "because proximity also affects accessibility, measures of size and segregation should also, ideally, be weighted by proximity, so that closer individuals or groups are weighted more heavily – this is known as a distance decay function."

While all ethnic identities are sufficiently visible to produce group-based prejudice, in the context of Western Europe, social geography seems particularly important and relevant to the increased level of negative attitudes against Muslim immigrants, for a number of reasons. First, ethno-religious minorities typically have greater visibility, which enhances the salience of group identity, maximizes comparative fit, and makes wrongful categorization less likely (Turner et al. 1987). Ethno-religious belonging, especially among groups that originate from different regions of the world, are much "stickier" and less likely to culturally assimilate into majoritarian population (Chandra, 2006). Second, unlike foreigners from other Western countries, groups with visibly different cultural backgrounds are significantly less likely to achieve equal geographic dispersion due to their own tendency to "huddle together" (Allport, 1954, 228). Third, immigration from Muslim countries has received a great amount of attention in the media, especially in the period following the Syrian refugee crisis.

4.4 The Current Study

This study aims to connect two related, but still separate, literatures, one on immigration and right-wing populism and the other on social geography. Given the effect of geography on outgroup attitudes, which are identified as an important factor in explaining the success of the nativist political

platforms of RRW parties, I expect segregation to contribute to changes in the electoral behavior of native citizens. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 depict this argument graphically with simulated examples of two distinct forms of demographic distributions shared between two groups. In both cases, the group size is the same, but they are not equally geographically dispersed. In Figure 4.2, members of both groups are clustered together to simulate complete segregation, while in Figure 4.1, groups are "reshuffled" to resemble spatial integration. To reiterate Allport's (1954) hypothesis, no identifiable attitudinal or behavioral pattern should emerge under the distribution of immigrants presented in Figure 4.1, as the outgroup is evenly distributed across space. On the other hand, as a result of native citizens being likely to overestimate the size, homogeneity, and threat-posing abilities of the immigrant's population, we should observe such a pattern emerging in areas marked by more geographic segregation (Figure 4.2). In localities closely resembling Figure 4.2, the spatial clustering of Muslim immigrants is associated with increase support for the SVP among native citizens, attracted by their promise to curb the further inflow of immigrants to Switzerland.

Figure 4.1: Simulated Example of
Spatial Integration

Figure 4.2: Simulated Example of
Spatial Segregation

For the purpose of this study, I define "Muslim immigrant" as permanent or non-permanent foreign residents of Switzerland whose reported country of origin is predominantly Islamic: Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Clearly, it is a strong assumption to claim that members of these groups compose a homogeneous outgroup. Nonetheless, the goal of this chapter is to examine the conditions under which native citizens change their

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perception of the immigrant others. Hence, with respect to the electoral consequences, it seems far more important that the native citizen perceive them as such, than whether they see themselves as forming part of a shared identity. Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) reported that immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia are for around 40% less desirable in Switzerland, compared to observably similar immigrants from Western-Europe. Indeed, the latter are unlikely targets of SVP, as they do not incite an obvious cultural discrepancy in comparison to domestic populations (Shehaj et al., 2021). With this in mind, it makes sense to narrow the definition of immigrant to what is likely to be used by RRWs in their election campaigns.

The fact that, unlike the majority of studies on social geography, this study does not focus specifically on residential areas of metropolitan cities, needs to be somehow accounted for. There are at least two reasons why level of urbanization is theoretically relevant. First, the contrast between rural and urban areas have been identified as the breeding ground of the radical right-wing movements due to systematic differences of two populations with the respect to outgroup attitudes (Fortner et al., 2021). In cultural terms, despite lagging far behind metropolitan cities with respect to immigration, rural context may feel the impact of diversification more acutely (Sharp and Lee, 2017). While highly urbanized environments are typically more diverse in population and more likely to be inhabited by people with cosmopolitan attitudes, voters living in a more rural and thinly populated areas are likely to react more intensely to the presence of Muslim immigrants, since they would have had much less previous exposure to culturally distinct ethnic groups. For this reason, at the center of the rural-urban contrast is not a divide between rich and poor, or secure and insecure, but the fact that voters in more rural areas have made issues of ethnic homogeneity and maintaining clear ethnic boundaries the center of their beliefs (Eversberg, 2018, in Fortner et al., 2021).

Second, as previously explained, proximity between groups matters greatly. Highly urbanized areas are much more densely populated, therefore providing more opportunity to be exposed to ethnic

outgroups. On the one hand, this can mean that stronger effect is expected in the urbanized environment. On the other hand, given that the spatial assimilation theory holds geographic dispersion to be a key factor for social mobility and acculturation experienced by the immigrant groups (Sharp and Lee, 2017; Hall, 2009), geographic clustering of minorities is likely to be more consequential in communities that are more concerned with ethnic heterogeneity and more eager to demand cultural assimilation of foreigners. Based on these theoretical considerations, I hypothesize the following:

H1: *Individuals located in districts with a high proportion of Muslim immigrants are more likely to vote for RRW parties.*

H2: *The effect of outgroup size on voting for RRW is reinforced by the degree of spatial segregation.*

H3: *The interaction effect between outgroup size and the degree of segregation is moderated by the degree of urbanization.*

4.4.1 Case Selection: The RRW in Switzerland

Switzerland, due to its historically liberal and democratic traditions, is not among the "usual suspects" to become yet another populist radical right paradise (Albertazzi, 2008). Nonetheless, a right-wing subculture has existed in Switzerland since 1945 (Skenderovic, 2009) and has brought success to forms of the radical right-wing earlier than elsewhere (Backes, 2018). Moreover, Swiss right-wing parties rallied behind the issue of immigration as the main threat to the country as early as the 1960s (Skenderovic, 2007). By far, the most successful right-wing party at a federal level, was the Swiss People's Party (SVP) founded in 1936. Ever since Christoph Blocher became the dominant figure in the 1990s, the SVP started pursuing a populist strategy predominantly focused on resistance to the process of integration into the European Union (Backes, 2018). Under his leadership, the SVP expanded from a somewhat geographically bound German-Swiss party to a Swiss party, which effectively mobilized even in French-speaking cantons (Kriesi et al. 2005). The party performed

successfully in referenda related to anti-immigration issues - against the building of minarets (2009), supporting the expulsion of foreign offenders (2010), the campaign against mass immigration (2014), and prepared the ground for the 2015 Federal election.

In the 2015 national election, which occurred in the midst of the refugee crisis, the SVP managed to recover from its 2011 loss and achieved the highest proportion (29.4%) of votes ever won in the parliamentary elections since 1919 (Backes, 2018). Acting as a defender of Swiss exceptionalism and indigenous culture against the danger of "foreignization" (Betz, 2001), the SVP fully embraced a cultural-differentialist discourse, and called for strict controls of immigration as a barrier to the erosion of ethnic identity. The party stood in clear opposition to Islam, arguing that Muslim immigrants are particularly incapable of integrating into Swiss society, due to the cultural distance between Swiss culture and the ideas spread by Islam (Skenderovic, 2007). The party itself credited its electoral success to having made immigration a main campaign issue (Kuenzi, 2015), thus revealing its populist narrative, while still maintaining their fundamental similarity with other parties with regards to other issues (Bernhard et al., 2015).

Although the number of studies exploring the relationship between demographic composition and the electoral success of the SVP has increased in recent years (e.g., Green et al. 2016; Charitopoulou and Garcia-Manglano, 2018), Switzerland still remains an understudied case. The history and nature of the support for the SVP closely resembles that of other mainstream populist movements rooted in anti-immigrant sentiments (Albertazzi, 2008). Moreover, the fact that Switzerland is not an EU member state, allows us to isolate genuine "census concerns" from the potentially conflating threat of diminished sovereignty. In particular, two issues have been seemingly conflated by the EU "forcing" member states to take in their fair share of refugees currently settled in Europe (Kanter, 2017). Finally, Switzerland's high level of decentralization allows for a breakdown of ethnic demography across nested territorial structures. The Swiss federal structures consist of 3 regions (German-, French- and Italian-

speaking), 26 cantons, 142 districts and 2222 municipalities. This allows us not only to test the effect of group size at the level of smaller units, but also examine how these proportions are mapped across larger geographical units and paired with individual survey data.

While there is no single "right" geographical unit of analysis, this discrepancy raises methodological concerns. As we cannot measure which geographical unit is psychologically salient for each individual when thinking of other groups, we ought to pick the one that minimizes the deviation from the average understanding of "the local environment" across different individuals (Enos, 2017, 20). With regards to attitudes towards immigrants and support for RRW parties in Switzerland, I maintain that the district is a good proxy for the operationalization of space in individuals' minds. Unlike in the metropolitan areas of the US, Switzerland has both less concentrated and less densely populated territory. This makes districts a likely choice as they contain diverse enough social groups while being small enough to maintain a broad understanding of where members of various groups are. The median size of the districts in the sample is approximately one hundred thousand citizens.

In addition to this, testing theory at the level of districts has advantages in terms of allowing a balance between the number of observations and the number of controlling variables, as the aggregate data gets scarce at the micro-level. Finally, as the presented theory is rooted in the nature of intergroup contact and group threat, it is expected that the effect intensifies as we move from higher to lower units of analysis (Dinesen et al., 2020). In that sense, although the definition of local environment in which people think of others may not perfectly correspond with administrative boundaries, testing the hypotheses at the level of the district represents a more conservative approach.

4.5 Data and Measurements

4.5.1 The Sample

Individual level data was gathered from the post-election Swiss Election Study (SELECT) 2015. From 5337 individuals initially included in the survey, I excluded those who belong to the immigrant Muslim population, as their voting intentions are not relevant to our analysis. Observation with missing values on important variables were likewise deleted. The final analysis was conducted using a sample of 4019 individuals nested in 136 districts, covering all the Swiss cantons.[15]

4.5.2 District level measures

The central variable in this study is the degree of segregation. This geographic condition is operationalized using the Index of Dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; White, 1983). This is the most commonly used and accepted method for measuring segregation, which in this situation compares how evenly Muslim immigrants are spread out geographically compared to native citizens. In other words, it measures to what extent the total population of a certain district is evenly distributed across different municipalities. The measure of segregation is calculated using municipal and district-level data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for the year of the election (2015). The value of the index (0-1) indicates the proportion of one group that would have to be moved to other districts in order to create an even distribution of both groups across the whole district. Thus, the value of

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[15] There are 99 districts in the German-speaking region, 27 in areas which were French-speaking, and 9 in the Italian-speaking region. Out of the 142 districts in Switzerland, 3 districts were removed due to missing data at the individual level, while 3 districts were removed from the analysis because they only consisted of one municipality which made it impossible to compose the measure of segregation. The final sample consisted of 51% male respondents, with an average age of 48.

segregation is at maximum (1) when each municipality within the district contains only one group, and it is at its minimum (0) when the proportion of each group in each municipality is the same as the proportion in the overall population of the district. The average value of segregation index of Muslim immigrants in Swiss districts is 0.30. Thus, an index value in this study would mean that 30% of the Muslim immigrants in one district would have to be moved from one municipality to another in order to make the proportion of immigrants and native citizens even across all municipalities.

Due to the importance of outgroup size, the models include the proportion of Muslim immigrants in the total population of the district. Expectedly, the distribution of this variable is skewed, as a large proportion of districts have a share of Muslim immigrants that is close to 0, with average being around 3%. To facilitate easier statistical analysis, districts are categorized into 5 different categories of size. The lowest category includes districts where the Muslim immigrant population makes up less than 1% of the total, while highest category includes those districts with a Muslim population that forms more than 10% of the total population.

At the district-level, controls include the size of the population and population density, measured in thousands of inhabitants per square meter. The net economic activity, measured as the proportion of the economically active population in the labor market, is introduced into the analysis as the main economic variable at the district level.

4.5.3 Individual level measures

At the individual level, the statistical analysis includes a wide array of socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. The dependent variable, electoral support for the RRW, is measured as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a person reported voting for the SVP.

Nativist attitudes are measured as the belief that Swiss people should not be treated equally to foreigners but should rather be privileged with better opportunities (on a five-point scale). The degree of urbanization is measured as a categorical variable indicating in what kind of settlement the individual lives: a rural municipality, an isolated town/city, or the central city in the region. The prominence of immigration issue to a voter is clearly an important factor in deciding whether or not to vote for a RRW party. This variable is included in the analysis as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the respondent named immigration as the most important current political issue. Given that during the period in which the survey was conducted terrorist attacks in neighboring France have been carried out, possibility of a spill-over effect should also be taken into account, since that unfortunate event was heavily covered by the Swiss media. To control for the media effect, I include a measure of attention to news measured by a self-reported evaluation of how attentive in recent time the respondent has been in terms of political news aired on TV or radio, ranging from "not attentive" to "very attentive".

In addition to this, I control for the level of religiosity measured as the frequency of attendance at religious services or other events in a religious community (a dummy). With respect to socio-economic status, the level of education (on a 9-point scale), employment status (a dummy), (rural vs. urban), age (interval) and gender (a dummy) were considered. In order to facilitate interpretation, all the interval district-level variables are centered around the grand mean, while the individual-level interval variables are centered around the group mean.

4.6 Results

The first step towards showing that district-level contextual variables are statistically relevant is showing that there is enough variation to be studied. In other words, this means checking to what extent individual observations are independent from each other. If two people from the same district

are more similar to each other, with regards to the dependent variable, compared to individuals from different district, then we can assume there is a clustering of observation. Following Luke (2004), I test this using the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) to show what proportion of the dependent variable can be explained using variables at the level of district. In this case, our initial expectation was proven accurate, as 10% of variance in the reported vote for the SVP can be explained at the level of the district. Consequently, the hypotheses are tested using a Generalized Linear Mixed-Effect Model (GLMM) which can accommodate observation nested within districts, and thus produce unbiased standard errors and estimates.

Table 4.1. shows the stepwise model-fitting procedure, with each subsequent model including an additional block of variable. Model 1 tests the relationship between individual-level variables and support for the SVP. Model 2 expands this list of variables by adding the district-level variables. In Model 3, I test the hypothesized interaction between the size of the immigrant population and segregation on the likelihood of voting for the SVP. Lastly, Model 4 tests the three-way interaction between the district-level predictors. The model fit is evaluated relative to each other based on the value of AIC and Log. likelihood (Burnham et al., 2011). Improvement in the model fit (i.e., lower AIC values) is evident as we move from Model 1 to Model 4, indicating that with each additional block of variables, the model fits the data significantly better. Model 4 has been chosen as the final model, as it is preferred for both theoretical and statistical reasons.

At the individual level, the results are consistent across all models and in the expected direction. The likelihood of voting for the SVP is significantly greater among voters with high level of nativism and who consider immigration the most important issue. Furthermore, individuals who pay more attention to the news in this period are also more likely to support the SVP. With respect to socio-demographic variables, male and older voters tend to have higher likelihoods of supporting the SVP, while increasing education decreases support for the SVP.

Table 4.1: Stepwise Models Explaining Support for the SVP

	Dependent variable: *Voted for the SVP*			
	Model 1 $Exp(\beta)$	**Model 2** $Exp(\beta)$	**Model 3** $Exp(\beta)$	**Model 4** $Exp(\beta)$
Intercept	0.002***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***
Issue Importance	2.70***	2.63***	2.62***	2.63***
Nativism	1.93***	1.94***	1.94***	1.94***
Religiosity	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.79
Media Attention	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***
Urbanization	1.15**	1.13*	1.13*	1.14
Immig. Parents	0.82	0.84	0.84	0.84
Segregation		1.00	0.80	1.11
Immigrant Population		0.85**	0.87*	0.85
Economic Activity		1.24*	1.22*	1.22*
Population Size		0.95	0.93	0.94
Population Density		1.01	1.03	1.00
Segregation x Immigrant Population			1.15*	0.90
Segregation x Urbanization x Immigrant Population				1.12*
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
n	4019	4019	4019	4019
J	136	136	136	136
Log Lik.	-1,614	-1,608	-1,606	-1,604
AIC	3,255	3,253	3,251	3,251

Note: The models are estimated using a GLMM with intercepts varying across districts. The list of controls include: education, age, gender, employment and income. Full table available in Appendix A. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

With respect to the effect of the district level variables, taken separately, the only demographic variable that significantly contributes to the probability of voting for the RRW is the proportion of Muslim immigrants in the district. Across all models, the data shows that an increase in the population is associated with lower support for the SVP. Model 2 shows that with each unit increase in size of the Muslim immigrant population, the likelihood of voting for the SVP decreases for approximately 15%. Such results go against H1 of this study and seem to provide support for the Group Contact Theory

claiming that exposure to the outgroup can help reduce levels of intergroup prejudice. Nevertheless, the change in effects between Model 2 and subsequent models reveal the complex interplay between outgroup size and their spatial distribution.

Consistent with H2, the Model 3 clearly shows that the effect of outgroup size is reinforced by the geographic distribution of the Muslim immigrants. With each standard deviation increase in the degree of segregation, the effect of the group on the likelihood of voting for the SVP increases by an additional 15% (Model 2). This effect is apparent after rigorously controlling for a large list of theoretically relevant variables, both at the individual and district levels. This finding is theoretically consistent, since the effect of segregation should not contribute to the support for the RRW independently, but through a multiplication of the outgroup size effect.

Figure 4.3: Low Outgroup Size (<1%)
Degree of Segreagation and Level of Urbanization

Figure 4.4: High Outgroup Size (>10%)
Degree of Segreagation and Level of Urbanization

To this point, I have only discussed the effect of district-level variable factors on individual choice. The final hypothesis, however, concerns cross-level interaction between the district-level predictors previously established as important contributors and the type of voter's settlement (Model

4). The hypothesis holds that outgroup size, and the geographical clustering of immigrants would particularly trigger voters who do live in rural, thinly, and more homogeneously populated areas. The findings depicted in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 confirm such expectations. The results show that when the group size is small (Figure 4.3), the geographical distribution of immigrants is not associated with changes in likelihood of voting for the SVP. This effect is consistent for both rural and urban areas, although in rural areas extremely weak negative slope is visible. However, when the immigrant group is larger (Figure 4.4), the effect of segregation at a district level disproportionately affects those living in rural areas. On average, the difference in the probability of voting for the SVP among voters in rural settlements that are highly integrated and those that are highly segregated is approximately 25%.

4.7 Towards Causality

The research strategy I have adopted here allows for a rather rigorous set of controls, both at the individual and the contextual level. However, notwithstanding their visual appeal, the fully integrated groups presented in Figure 4.1 are something we rarely encounter in reality. For this reason, it is hard to claim the relationship is causal. Ethnic groups are simply not randomly shuffled across geographical space. Instead, group members hold strong tendency towards self-selection into ethnically similar areas. This represents a serious methodological concern. Notably, without the ability to randomize the context, the effect of geography cannot be adequately identified. Simply put, researchers are not able to exclude the possibility that those who self-select into less or more segregated districts are not different in some other, unobservable manner.

Schelling (1971) showed that heterogeneous communities are hard to sustain in relatively liberal societies where people are free to move. Under the assumption that at least a proportion of one group does not prefer living as a minority in the settlement, it is possible that they relocate as a result of

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changing demography. With respect to this study, that could mean that with the increase of immigrant populations with distinct cultural backgrounds, a portion of the majority group might decide to move into the more homogeneous districts. If that is the case, the previously reported results of segregation are conflated. However, based on the available data on migration patterns within Switzerland, this seems very unlikely. Official data on intra-cantonal migration shows that there is no correlation (-0.05) between a district's degree of segregation and the proportion of the population leaving the district. The rate at which Swiss citizens leave highly segregated districts, as opposed to low ($p=0.28$) or moderately segregated ($p=0.25$) ones, is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the decision to move is not predominantly driven by immigration or pre-existing intergroup attitudes.

Despite remaining confident in these findings, future research should aim to provide additional, experimental evidence that might address these concerns in a more direct fashion. Given the complex relationship between geography, group threat, and voting, the form of the natural experiment seems to be of particular use. Here, I discuss two strategies that could leverage natural interventions in order to isolate the effects of geography and group threat on voting patterns.

One approach provides a natural de-segregation treatment that can be used to isolate the causal effect of segregation on voting patterns. Previous literature (Enos, 2016) has used the decisions of housing authorities across US metropolitan areas to relocate dozens of thousands of families due to the process of destroying or reconfiguring their massive systems of public housing. While such "demolition projects" have been directed are various types of localities, they often include whole neighborhoods where demographic composition overwhelmingly consists of low-income racial minorities (so-called "ghettos"). In places where such projects are not as frequent, one can look at the effect of relocation of the temporary immigration camps which, in spatial terms, also have characteristics of segregated homogeneous community. Unlike demolition projects that occur only in

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metropolitan residential areas, temporary immigrant camps are often located outside of the highly urbanized areas.

Given the fact that the decision process on demolition/relocation is exogeneous to the particular neighborhood/camp, such an intervention in social geography produces a natural treatment. Members of other ethnic groups in the surrounding residential areas, which previously bordered a large and segregated ethnic outgroup, experience a dramatic change in exposure to the outgroup as a result of geographical relocation. More precisely, in order to confirm the reported findings, we would need to show two things. First, a significant decrease in the vote share for right-wing candidates/parties running strongly on anti-immigrant agendas should be observed after the segregated community has been relocated. Second, the effect should be strongest in those neighborhoods directly bordering the previously segregated community and taper off as proximity to the demolished building decreases.

Another strategy may leverage exogenous events that induce group threat. A number of studies have attempted to identify the effect of terrorist attacks in Europe on attitudes towards immigrants (Castanho Silva, 2018; Ferrin et al., 2020; Legewie, 2013). In this context, terrorist attacks represent an exogeneous "shock" that is not reasonably correlated with the characteristics of individual voters in other areas of the country. If terrorist attack occurred during a period of time when a multi-staged survey is being conducted, we can reasonably assume that those interviews conducted after the attack can be treated as a separate experimental group, while earlier interviews might serve as a control group. Holding other things equal, not least the fact that the two groups are balanced across other observable and unobservable factors, we might argue that a causal effect is identified. According to the theory, such an external shock should produce a stronger effect among voters who live in localities with large and proximate segregated populations of Muslim immigrants.

4.8 Conclusion

With the proportion of citizens with an immigrant background at an all-time high, modern Europe is as diverse as it has ever been. However, this increased diversity has led to important changes in the nature of group solidarity, since the definition of citizenship and national group has become narrower in Western Europe, often seeking to exclude large portions of population based on religion or race. Under the credible expectation of the further diversification of European polities, nativist definitions of citizenship are likely to remain viable alternatives for those who are not ready to live with the undesirable consequences of immigration.

The literature on immigration and the rise of RRW parties in Europe is vast and diverse. Even so, the debate on immigration has been structured in a way which suggests that we have to choose between being a "well-intended" pro-immigration liberal or a "bigoted" anti-immigrant conservative. This misleading binary choice gives the impression of there being no middle ground and has driven European societies towards extreme polarization. The results shown in this chapter, alongside the efforts of the wider research agenda looking at the impact of social geography, suggest otherwise. By taking into account the wider context in which immigration plays out, we can ask *what* kind of immigration is likely to bring beneficiary results. Diversity, when resulting in segregation, can actually hurt those it seeks to protect. In particular, if segregation is likely to bring more power to illiberal political forces, then the immigration debate should also include the question of how to maximizes opportunities for meaningful interactions between groups. Space seems to be integral part of that discussion.

The results provided here unequivocally show a need to complement the current literature by combining the effect of group size with measures of its geographical distribution. Voters use space to

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structure their understanding of their social world and the various groups in it. Not only do they use spatial representation to make judgments about outgroup size, cohesion, and collective intentions, but they also use it to inform their own voting behavior. Such results can be seen in a negative light, since the tendency of groups to live in homogeneous communities leads to increased chances of electing political elites who are likely to further exploit those very tendencies. Still, it remains in the realm of careful policymaking to break such a predisposition through the designing of policies that extend opportunities for positive intergroup contact between culturally distinct elements of the population.

Chapter 5

Tribal Politics in the Balkans: Elections and Nation-Building in Montenegro

"For the nation to live, the tribe must die."

Samora Moisés Machel
President of Mozambique (1975-1986)

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5.1 Introduction

In many post-communist countries, the process of nation-building has remained a central political issue long after the formal introduction of democracy. For this reason, the classical literature on the democratic transition has carefully considered the effect of cultural homogenization on political stability and democratization (Huntington, 1996; Linz et al., 1996). While the development of broad-based popular allegiance to state apparatus may be critical for avoiding the violent breakdown of societies, the excessive focus on nation-building has limited the theoretical discussion by treating national identity as 'single and isolatable' (Schatz, 2000). As a result, in many post-communist countries research on identity politics misunderstood its underlying complexity and focused exclusively on layers of identities that can be more easily observed or officially categorized (Collins, 2006). Ronald Suny (2000) has criticized such approaches, arguing that the repertoire of identities used to explain political behavior has been too narrow, failing to recognize that group boundaries are continuously negotiated using the wide range of identities available in an individual's repertoire (Nagel, 1994; Chandra, 2012a).

The constructivist notion of identity leans on the idea of the multiplicity and malleability of identity which can be derived from various ethnic markers (e.g., ancestry, language, appearance). If sufficiently salient, they can be used to (re)define ethnic boundaries and distinguish between ethnic groups. Nation-building is a prime example of how groups divided along one identity can over time become unified along another. In that sense, the process of the political fusion of tribes into coherent nations is a clear example of the expansion of group boundaries. Boundary expansion through the politics of nation-building can take different forms – fusion, amalgamation or emphasis shifting - none of which assumes that lower-level identities are fixed or predetermined. For instance, one frequent variant of nation-building proceeds by emphasizing a higher level of ethno-national differentiation, thus superposing existing tribal or regional divisions (Wimmer, 2013). However, the lower-level

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identities in this process are not merely absorbed by the higher-level identities, but rather resume their independent life and continue to be shaped by social forces and political actors. For this reason, even though nation-building is typically seen as a natural process stemming from the modernizing forces that transform small-scale solidarities into more inclusive collective consciousness of a higher order (Gellner, 1983), unidirectionality should not be assumed. In particular, the politicization of any sufficiently salient sub-national affiliation can potentially reverse the process of nation-building by becoming a source of intragroup divisions (Oakes, 1987). The latter possibility, however, have been often neglected as institutionalist theories have stubbornly denied the importance of tribes and clans in modern politics, as they should have been wiped by the modernization forces and the rise of centralized state bureaucracies (Weber, 1958).

Nonetheless, it is obvious that such traditional social organizations are not confined to the pre-modern era. The tribes and clans of Africa, Middle East and Central Asia (e.g., de Kadt and Larreguy, 2018; Collins, 2006; Khoury et al., 1991) have shown an incredible capacity to persist and adapt to modern political systems and institutions. While these regions share several structural conditions that guaranteed the resilience of pre-national identities, European cases are thought of as substantially different. Since the process of nation formation started considerably earlier, tribal and clan organization in Europe declined, and practically disappeared, well before the XX century. The empirical fact that tribal loyalties are almost extinct, paired with the democratic nature of most European states, are likely reasons behind the lack of studies on tribal/clan politics in Europe (Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019). Despite both the historical and contemporary relevance of tribes in Montenegro and Albania, two NATO members and EU candidate states, the complete absence of academic interest in the role of tribal affiliations in the Western Balkans can also be seen as a direct product of the widespread assumption that tribes have either been fully marginalized by the central authorities or fully absorbed by the national identity. As a result, while the literature on ethnopolitics clearly demonstrating that the

strategic politicization of different identities has profound electoral consequences (Mozaffar et al., 2003; Posner, 2005), the effect of playing the tribal card in the electoral arena remains largely unknown even in places where this is regularly used by political parties/candidates.

This paper fills this gap by studying the contemporary political use of revived tribal identity in Montenegro amidst its struggle to consolidate its national identity. It argues that the resurgence of tribal life during the democratic transition should not be downplayed as largely de-politicized 'folkloristic gatherings' (Bieber, 2003b), but as an important political phenomenon that has profound electoral consequences. I argue that tribal labels are used by voters as a 'shortcut' for determining both voters' and candidates' positions with respect to national/statehood cleavage, which in turn strongly affects electoral behavior. In terms of the direction, this paper argues that tribal identity is politicized by political forces opposing the nation-building process pushed by ruling political elites, with the purpose of fractionalizing titular Montenegrin ethnicity along tribal lines and reducing electoral support for the predominant Democratic Party of Socialists (*Demokratska partija socijalista*) (DPS) running on a strong nation-building agenda. After three decades of uninterrupted ruling, in the election of August 2020, the DPS was defeated by a coalition of pro-Serbian parties. The landmark election that put an end to the most durable regime in post-communist Europe was marked by an outright attempt to redefine the boundaries between the two largest ethnic groups – Montenegrins and Serbs. This paper focuses on the previously disregarded but strategic use of tribal affiliations against efforts to consolidate titular ethnicity.

Using original survey and experimental data on Montenegrin tribes in the 2016 and 2020 parliamentary election, this paper refutes widespread assumptions about tribal identity in contemporary Montenegro and demonstrates both its resilience and profound political importance. Both the survey and experimental data clearly demonstrate the political potency of tribal affiliations in Montenegro, with respect to the nature of national identification and the likelihood of supporting the DPS. The

contemporary inter-tribal variation is accurately predicted by historical accounts, suggesting that traditional loyalties are politically consequential even when formal tribal institutions are lacking. To the literature on ethnopolitics in the Balkan region, saturated with evidence on the importance of ethno-national grouping, these findings problematize the current tendency to study them in isolation, as detached from other layers of an individual's identity.

5.2 The Tribes of Montenegro

5.2.1 The Tribal Groups and Centralized State

Prior to the XIX century, Montenegro was a community of embattled tribes presided over by the Metropolitans of Cetinje. Its territory consisted of small districts (*nahijė*) and was characterized by its segmentary social structure organized around blood-related groups called clans (*bratstvo*). The clan represents the most solid and complete social unit, so densely tied that almost the entire individual reputation was shared by the rest of the clan. Clans merged into larger units, tribes (*pleme*), which represented both military and corporate units: they occupied naturally defined territory, collectively owned mountain pastures and forests, and defended resources against other tribes or foreign invaders (Boehm, 1983). While these tribes maintained a close relationship with the central authorities in the royal capital of Cetinje, they had prerogatives with respect to economic and military affairs.[16]

In total, there were approximately 40 tribes associated with three tribal groups/confederations: Old Montenegro (*Stara Crna Gora*), the Hills (*Brda*) and New Montenegro (*Nova Crna Gora*).[17] With the

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[16] The Tribal Council was the main decision-making body within a tribe that decided on all important questions for the life of their members: military strategies against the Turks, potential alliances with other tribes, as well as mediating conflict within the tribe (Boehm, 1983).

[17] In terms of size, the tribes of Old Montenegro were significantly smaller compared to those in the Hills and in New Montenegro. These smaller tribes were traditionally clustered in permanent confederations called *nahias*, with *nahias* being structurally similar to Hill tribes (Boehm, 1983, 53). While this tribal group does not have official title, I use designation of 'New Montenegro' instead of 'Old Herzegovina' for two reasons. First, it clearly communicates that this territory was

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constant struggle against the Ottoman invader, the idea of a unified state was always present in their minds. While formal integration into a common state was more or less a smooth process occurring naturally as each subsequent tribal territory was liberated from the Ottoman Empire, many tribes reluctantly complied with the demands to transfer sovereignty and legitimacy to the centralized state. It should be noted that the historical process of state formation in the XIX and early XX centuries in Montenegro are of great relevance to the contemporary divisions and distribution of national identification across previously tribal territories. Notably, the territories of Old Montenegro served as a nucleus to which other tribal territories were attached over time. Out of the seven Hills tribes, majority of them (the *Piperi*, *Kuči*, *Bratonožići* and *Bjelopavlići*) were incorporated into Montenegro in 1796, with the *Rovci* and *Morača* tribes being incorporated only after the defeat of Turkish army at the *Morača River* in 1820. The *Vasojevići* tribe became part of Montenegro even later, in 1858. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Montenegro significantly expanded territory and integrated a group of eight tribes from New Montenegro, located in the Nikšić region (Morrison, 2009).

The most decisive actions against tribal particularism were taken during the rule of Danilo I (1851-1860), who sought to break Montenegro from the claws of traditionalism and defend its unity by erasing the last traces of tribal disobedience. To that end, he disbanded the most important inter-tribal political institution, imposed a draconian tax regime, and replaced theocracy with modern secularism (Roberts, 2007). However, these centralizing efforts provoked a strong reaction from certain clans among the Hill tribes, whose defiance was met by a fearsome reaction from the authorities in Cetinje against those who refused to obey, or who sought help from the Ottomans. Danilo I ordered 'punitive expeditions' in tribes of *Bjelopavlići*, *Piperi* and *Kuči* which resisted centralization and have been occasionally instrumentalized by the Ottomans to destabilize Montenegro. Effective suppression of

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integrated into the common Montenegrin state later. Second, it serves as a reminder of the dominant desire among tribesmen to become part of the Montenegrin state once more.

the uprising in the Hills tribes made it known that in Montenegro a functional state system has been established (Batrićević, 2018). In the process, however, the central authorities made many enemies among the alienated tribes. During the reign of Danilo's successor, King Nikola (ruled 1860-1918), the tribes uniformly lost their social and clan integrity, as well as the power to decide their own fate.

Despite the fact that the tribes of modern Montenegro are not organized as traditionally as they are in post-colonial Africa or in the Middle East, tribal loyalties as informal structures have re-emerged frequently and played an important role in the political turmoil of the 20th century. While this manifestation varied depending on the social, political, or military conditions at hand, their function remained strongly tied to the ability to generate strong feelings of solidarity among tribesmen. For instance, an underlying tribal divide resurfaced at the beginning of the XX century, when a large group of conspirators among the Hill tribes of *Vasojevići*, *Bratonožići* and *Kuči* planned an uprising against the Montenegrin dynasty (Banac, 1984, 279). This episode, and many others that followed, demonstrate an important shift that occurred with respect to the tribal structure in Montenegro at the turn of the two centuries - the conflicts between tribes, that were traditionally driven by a desire to increase resources and a tribe's economic presence, now gained strongly political and ideological dimensions and became intrinsically tied to a diverging understanding of Montenegrin nationhood.

5.2.2 Tribes and Nation-Building in Montenegro

The collapse of the great empires of the Central and Eastern Europe after World War I resulted in the creation of a number of new states which, despite the efforts to redraw borders along national lines, were often just as multinational as the former empires. Plebiscites organized after 1918 revealed that the "national idea", as understood by elites, did not necessarily coincide with national identification at a mass level, which often preferred membership of rival nation-states (Hobsbawn, 1992, 133-134).

This was definitely true of Montenegro in 1918, which turned into a political and military battlefield between proponents of unconditional unification with Serbia (the Whites) and proponents of a union of equal sovereign members (the Greens).[18] In the end, the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*Kraljevina Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca*) (KSHS) was carried out in a fashion that was destined to affect generations to come. Proponents of unconditional unification held the illegitimate Podgorica Assembly, whose main decisions were the abolishment of the Montenegrin state and the removal of the Montenegrin Petrović-Njegoš dynasty.[19] The magnitude of this event for group boundaries at the time, and intergroup relations in the following century, is best depicted by the Vice-president's famous remark, ending the Assembly in a dramatic fashion: "I urge you, gentleman, to set aside the history of Montenegro. Its political history, however, is divided in two parts: until yesterday, and since today. We are no longer Montenegrins, but Serbs" (Popović, 2010, 145).

Despite the growing sense of national solidarity in the Kingdom of Montenegro, and the later Kingdom of Yugoslavia, group loyalties were still significantly determined at the micro level. Their resilience was maintained, at least partially, by the fact that the collective designations of Montenegrin and Serb were rarely mutually exclusive categories of identification. When a particular Montenegrin tribesman described himself as a Serb this did not necessitate that he shows any actual cultural resemblance or sense of attachment to a peasant in Serbia (Pavlović, 2003). Instead, the co-existence of this native, intensely Montenegrin tradition of self-centeredness on the one hand, and the tradition

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[18] The Green-White divide refers to the Podgorica Assembly, where a vast majority of delegates supporting its decisions printed their agendas on white paper, while the few who opposed them printed theirs on green paper.

[19] While the Podgorica Assembly remains a highly controversial topic for contemporary historians with respect to the interpretation of its political consequences and the extent to which its conclusions reflected the will of the people, its procedural legitimacy represents a much less contested issue. Specifically, the legality and legitimacy of the Podgorica Assembly is objectively undermined in at least three ways. First, under the Montenegrin Constitution of 1905, decisions of this kind could have only been made by the elected representatives and existing political institutions. Second, the selection of delegates for the Podgorica Assembly was intentionally designed to disproportionally represent pro-Serbian sentiment. For this reason, the vast majority of delegates were selected from outside of Old Montenegro. In addition, the Assembly was organized outside of the royal capital of Cetinje, which represented the stronghold of Montenegrin loyalists and the home of the official state institutions. Third, delegates voted not in secrecy but by public acclamation, with a strong military presence (Vujović, 1989; Banac, 1984; Šuković and Pavićević, 2006).

allowing reciprocity with the Serbs on the other, was permitted by the identification of general order, typically attributed to shared language and religion (Banac, 1984, 274).

Although both orientations had their supporters in every tribe, Montenegrin national consciousness developed unevenly among the different tribal areas, as expected by the classical literature on nation formation (Hobsbawn, 1992; Weber, 1976). When Montenegrin loyalists rose to armed revolt against decisions of the Podgorica Assembly, this geographic-tribal imbalance was evident. Marko Daković, the leader of Montenegro's Serbophile youth, vividly described the political atmosphere in the aftermath of the unification as a "stage of bloody conflicts, rebellions, protests, bombs, executions, chains, persecutions, of explicit collision between Serbdom and Montenegritude" (Daković, 1926). While the Greens in Old Montenegro, holding their strong and unambiguously Montenegrin national identity, "nursed revenge against a burning shame", the proponents of the unification in the Hills and in New Montenegro celebrated Pan-Serbianism. The conflict between the two sides soon moved into the electoral arena. In the 1920 election, more than half of the eligible voters in two out of three electoral districts in Old Montenegro did not even participate. Electoral absenteeism was highest among the *Cetinje* tribe (50.38%), the *Ćeklići* and *Bjelice* (48.18%), and the *Cuce* (45.64%), which were the most active base of the Green insurgency throughout the interwar period (Banac, 1984).

During World War II, the Partisan and Chetnik movements in Montenegro drew their support disproportionately from certain tribal areas. Both movements in Montenegro were initially organized along tribal membership, in order to foster a sense of solidarity and cohesion within the units. For instance, approximately three quarters of the Chetnik movement in Montenegro was predominantly comprised on tribesmen from the Hills and New Montenegro, holding strongly pro-Serbian national sentiments (Pajović, 1977). The Partisan battalions were formed based on clans and tribes, thus allowing the Communists to capitalize upon the attachment of individuals to their tribes. They invoked

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tribal honor, military achievements and intentionally pointed to their already mobilized neighboring tribes. By recruiting tribal units, the Partisans in Montenegro also absorbed the internal tribal hierarchy (Ilić, 2019). However, due to their dependence on home supplies and a desire to remain in close proximity to tribal areas, this organizational principle was abandoned by the Partisans in 1942, in order to foster greater geographic mobility among their units.

With the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia, which recognized Montenegro as a constitutive republic, the tribal structure of Montenegrin society went through a dramatic transformation. Before the Yugoslav Constitution of 1946, Montenegro was a traditionalist and agrarian society, lacking the necessary institutional underpinnings for nationalism as a mass phenomenon (Malešević and Uzelac, 2007). Institutionalist theories of nationalism postulate that state institutions directly empower nationalist constituencies by re-shaping social networks, especially when those institutions are designed without regard to the traditional patterns of social interactions and loyalties (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Roeder, 1991; Suny, 1993; Gorenburg, 2001). Modernization, as a necessary condition for the conversion of kinship-based clans into successful nationalist movement, was provided in Montenegro by the Communist regime. Major cultural and educational institutions were established, including the Institute of History (1948), the National Theatre (1953), the Montenegrin Academy of Arts and Sciences (1973), and the first fully-fledged university (1974) (Rastoder, 2003). Literacy increased dramatically, while the industrial sector grew from 6% to 35%, and the process of urbanization moved the majority of Montenegro's population to the industrialized centers.

Even so, the trajectory of nation formation in Montenegro took a different path from what is envisioned by the classical literature. Although, in this view, Montenegrin national institutions should have consolidated Montenegrin national identity, we see a steady decline in Montenegrin national identification over the same period (Jenne and Bieber, 2014; Vuković, 2015a). The fact that the stability of national identification decreased during a period of increased institutional autonomy represents a

theoretical puzzle, which can, at least partially, be explained by the Communists' deliberate attempt at transcending traditional political splits by keeping the ethno-national categories of Serb and Montenegrin as ambiguous as possible. Morrison (2009) notes that Montenegrin communists, being the most ardent protagonist of the class struggle, were less nationally oriented than any other. They held equidistance from the "Montenegrin" and "Serb" nationalities and "imperatively searched for symmetry in the emergence of nationalism" (2009, 81). Accordingly, Montenegrin nationhood remained a vague and volatile concept which failed to fully transform the tribesmen into nationals. Instead of one, two competing forms of nationhood developed in Montenegro and remain relevant to this date (Malešević and Uzelac, 2007).

Therefore, if one is to provide a short overview of the dynamic processes of nationhood in the Montenegrin XX century, it would have to depart from the significant ambiguity between Montenegrin and Serbian nationhood during the rule of King Nikola I, largely stemming from their shared language and religion. However, Montenegrin grievances with respect to the manner in which their Kingdom has been dissolved at the Podgorica Assembly, as well as the violence that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the unconditional unification, highlighted lines of division between the two. In that sense, the decline of identification with Montenegrin nationhood during the Communist era can also be interpreted as a natural continuation of the process by which two national identities became more consolidated and mutually exclusive. This process of consolidation, however, could not be completed under the Communist elite which, for the most part, had a political stake in the blurred boundaries between the two identities. Therefore, it was the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia followed by an intra-elite split in the communist successor-party, the DPS, that finally provided favorable conditions for the consolidation of these two nationhoods as mutually exclusive categories of identification.

5.3 The Political Consequences of Tribal Identity in Contemporary Montenegro

5.3.1 The Role of Tribes in Ethno-National Identification and Categorization

Despite being deeply stigmatized during the Communist era, tribal loyalties were largely preserved. Christopher Boehm, an anthropologist who studied the tribe of Upper Morača in the mid-1960s, stressed that the influence of tribal society remained alive in rural Montenegro where 'the tribe – rather than the village, or settlement, or even the Yugoslav national legal system – remained the chief moral reference point, the social unit in which man's or woman's reputation as a good person was maintained or lost' (1983, 46). However, during this time, adherence to tribal identity was largely depoliticized and typically manifested in clientelist networks through which fellow tribesmen secured access to the scarce resources of the socialist state. While the surprising resilience of tribal identity can be explained by late state-formation, delayed nation-building and the absence of a market economy (Collins 2006), these fail to illuminate why tribalism gained political prominence during the democratic transition and why its resurgence in Montenegro had such a specific manifestation. Specifically, the "modernity of tradition", as coined by Rudolph and Rudolph (1967), became pervasive only after the collapse of Yugoslavia produced the widespread politicization of ethnicity and when the political atmosphere pressed political elites towards reducing the ambiguity of national attachments.

From 1990 to 2020, Montenegro was continuously ruled by the communist successor party – the Democratic Party of Socialists – whose longevity was often attributed to their successful management of identity politics (e.g., Bieber, 2013; Komar, 2013; Vuković, 2015b; Komar and Živković, 2018; Krašovec and Batrićević 2020; Stankov, 2020). In the early years of the transition, the DPS fully embraced a policy of 'national ambiguity' and left national question effectively unresolved.

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However, the party split in the ruling DPS in 1997 marked the beginning of Montenegro's "second transition", which dramatically restructured both the party system and the nature of intergroup relations in Montenegro (Pavićević et al., 2007). Open conflict escalated between the President and Milošević-loyalist, Momir Bulatović, and the "pro-Western reformist" Vice-president, Milo Đukanović. Once a faction loyal to Belgrade formed a new political party, political unity within the Orthodox population was a matter of the past and open clashes between Montenegrin and Serb nationhood began to emerge again. Still, the conflict properly intensified only after the ruling DPS declared the renewal of Montenegro's statehood as their main political objective. This shift towards adopting a nationalizing agenda, however, coincided with the decline of identification with titular ethnicity in Montenegro, as the number of self-declared Montenegrins fell a staggering 19% between 1991 and 2003, in favor of Serbian ethnicity.

The extreme polarization, which greatly resembled that of 1918 when the unification of Montenegro with Serbia was the central political issue (Pavlović, 2003), created a window of opportunity for elites to fix ethno-national attachments 'once and for all' by tying them directly to faith in the Montenegrin state (Džankić, 2013; Džankić, 2014). Attempts at redefining the very meaning of the volatile collective designations of "Montenegrin" and "Serb" opened space for other ethnic markers to play an increasingly important role. Among them, despite being consistently overlooked by the academic literature, tribal affiliation played a significant role. The main comparative advantage of tribal identity lay in its stability. Tribal organization and social structure are rooted in kinship bonds that are perceived as permanent and provide meaning and cultural context for the members of a particular tribe (Collins, 2006). For this reason, unlike national membership, tribal affiliations provide a steady basis for group solidarity while simultaneously offering rich identity substance suitable for navigating the complex relations between ethno-national groups. Indeed, Džankić (2013) notes that during the last years of the XX century, tribes became reinvented as an emblem of folk culture to

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generate a feeling of national belonging. Historically, through the ascription of individuals to a particular tribe, and tribes to a particular political movement, "the history and tradition of Montenegro became tools through which a political idea reached the population" (2013, 422).

While lacking formal leadership and decision-making powers, tribal labels continue to represent valuable cues in informing one's sense of group membership. Not only are tribesmen unevenly distributed among national groups (self-categorization), but they also use tribal labels to determine others' ethno-national membership (others-categorization). It is fairly common for individuals in Montenegro to "solve" their historically ambiguous national identity by assigning different probabilities of membership to a specific national group to tribal groups. In loose terms, we can say that there is an informal hierarchy of tribes within national groups, where individuals determine the extent to which one is more or less credibly Montenegrin or Serb, purely based on tribal origin. Although usually unspoken, the existence of such a hierarchy creates a situation where some individual feel required to legitimize their membership of an ethno-national group beyond what is asked of others. For instance, it is rather typical that once you learn that particular person identifies as Montenegrin, to follow up with – "Where from"? Outside of mere curiosity, the answer to this question helps determine to what extent the history of a particular tribe "legitimizes" the individual as a stereotypical representative of their national group.

Given the fact that this is the first empirical study on contemporary Montenegrin politics that focuses on tribal identity, the initial goal of this study is to identify the existence of inter-tribal variation with respect to national identification and voting preferences (H1), as well as to show that voters use tribal affiliation to determine the credibility of a candidate's reported ethno-national membership (H2).

5.3.2 The Electoral Effect of Tribal Membership

The second part of the theory involving the interaction between tribal and national identity concerns its effect on voting behavior. That this is a more demanding task than is commonly assumed is evident from the fact that, even in places where tribal histories are extensively utilized by political elites, the electoral consequences its politicization often remain unexplored (Sarsembayev, 1999). Based on the literature on nation-formation, achieving state independence usually serves as an initial step towards dramatic changes in the dynamics of intergroup relations. More often than not, previously subordinate groups suddenly turn into a state-bearing nation, while former titular ethnicities (such as Russians in Kazakhstan, Hungarians in Romania, or Serbs in Montenegro) rapidly become "objects" of the nationalizing policies (Suny, 2001). Roger Brubaker (1996) coins these two concepts a 'nationalizing' and 'homeland' nationalisms. While the latter claims an obligation to protect the interests of their ethno-national kin outside of the homeland against such policies, the former is focused on strengthening its cultural, economic, and demographic position within the state. With this goal, since the renewal of independence in 2006, the ruling DPS took on the role of the guardian of Montenegrin nationhood and actively pursued nation-building policies: adopting 'new' state symbols, proclaiming Montenegrin as the country's official language, and attempting to re-establish the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (Vuković and Batrićević, 2019).

The effectiveness of these policies, however, was rather limited. While the nominal total of self-identified Montenegrins in the 2011 census increased for the first time since 1948, approximately a quarter of respondents still hold ambiguous (pan-Serbian) national identities (CSES, 2016). In such a situation, where the decline of dual national consciousness is seen as a necessary condition for the consolidation of national identity, the tribal layer of identity is likely to gain more prominence. One way of reducing perceived levels of similarity between opposing groups is a strategic revival of identities

that predate the development of this dual identity and, thus, represent 'authentic' expressions of nationhood. For this reason, the new flags of the Central Asian states often contain carefully selected tribal symbols which precede the establishment of shared cultural markers of the Soviet era (Smith et al., 1998). The rationale is clear, the nested structure between national and tribal categories is expected to bring mutual reinforcement, as the former is seen as a natural continuation of the latter. When the manifestation of tribal affiliation implies the simultaneous enactment of nationhood, it complements the government's nation-building project and brings electoral benefits to parties running heavily on that platform (Schatz, 2000; Gullette, 2007).

However, the Montenegrin case shows theoretically valuable irregularity with respect to the pattern observed in other regions. Specifically, despite the fact that the DPS's ability to hold onto political power was causally linked to their ability to pursue unambiguous national policies, the politicization of tribal affiliation has been predominantly directed against them. Despite being aware that tribal identities can be used to "mobilize thousands and thousands of people" (Calhoun, 2000, 37), the government remained hesitant to use it and continuously criticized the reinterpretation of tribal history as an attempt to distort that history to achieving political goals (Džankić, 2013). That tribal identity too is a shifting element that can also be reshaped, merged or reinvented (Roy, 2007), became evident when a shift in the national narrative of tribes was effectively utilized by Milošević's supporters in Montenegro who, after two consecutive electoral defeats, cultivated the re-birth of tribes in order to "build some new, alternative, however false, source of legitimacy" (Popović, 2002, 23). Far from acting spontaneously, in the resurgence of tribalism at the end of the XX century, Montenegrin tribes were refabricated to serve a particular national ideology pushed by Milošević's regime. The most telling characteristic of revived tribal gatherings was their mono-nationality, which was secured by the selective inclusion of tribesmen of predominantly pro-Serbian persuasion (Popović, 2002).

Based on the new roles Montenegrin tribes gained, each significant nation-building policy since the renewal of Montenegrin statehood has warranted a political reaction that had its recognizable tribal dimension. For instance, immediately after the referendum vote, the Vasojevići Association's released a statement requesting autonomy from the government in Podgorica and asking for Serbian consular representation on their territory (MINA 2006, in Morrison, 2009. Similarly, members of the *Kuči* tribe attempted to prevent the re-building of a monument to a member of the Montenegrin Petrović-Njegoš dynasty, due to his involvement in alleged cruelties against their fellow tribesmen, arguing that such a monument would be more appropriately located in Cetinje than "on the territory of the Kuči tribe". Following their Party Congress in 2019, the DPS proclaimed their desire to pursue the last missing piece of the national identity puzzle – restoring the status of the once autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church (*Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva* - CPC). The CPC was dissolved by the Serbian Orthodox Church (*Srpska pravoslavna crkva* - SPC) in the 1920, following the Podgorica Assembly (Jovanović, 2014). Since then, the SPC has controlled almost all shrines and churches on Montenegrin territory. Because the SPC does not recognize the CPC as a legitimate religious institution, the CPC's leaders are not allowed even to enter most churches or provide religious services to their believers. In an attempt to tackle this issue, the government passed the Law on Religious Freedoms, which among other things requires the SPC to register in Montenegro, requires them to start paying taxes, and returns control over religious buildings owned by state prior to 1918 to the Montenegrin state. This would effectively allow both the CPC and the SPC to simultaneously use religious buildings under the control of the Montenegrin state. Unsurprisingly, the passing of the Law on Religious Freedoms was met by mass protests, organized by the SPC, that were clearly structured along tribal lines. Protest gatherings would begin in a particular tribe's territory, from where supporters would take "protest-walks" to a central rally, carrying banners with the tribe's name written over the Serbian flag. Once there, each tribe would be called for separately, thus projecting a false unity of the tribes in celebration of Serbian

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nationality. Most recently, amid the campaign for the 2020 election, hundreds of members of the *Kuči* tribe signed a petition declaring that the DPS's leader, Milo Đukanović, was not welcome in their tribal region.[20]

Why do we observe such a different use of tribal affiliations in Montenegro compared to, for example, Central Asian cases? The answer may lie in the different structural relationship between tribal and national identity in the two regions. The perfectly nested structure between the two layers of identity in Central Asia means that, for example, the Russian minority in Kazakhstan is unable to refer to tribal/clan belonging. As a result, any appeal to tribal confederations (*zhuz*) or clans (*ru*) would directly imply membership of the Kazakh national group (Suny, 2001). By contrast, the two layers of identity are not perfectly nested in Montenegro, in the sense that Montenegrins and Serbs in Montenegro can refer to their tribe (*pleme*) and the clan (*bratstvo*). Given the fact that both competing ethnicities can reference tribal belonging, their politicization, in theory, can reinforce one national idea and cut-across the other. There seem to be at least three reasons why tribal appeal in Montenegro is exclusively used against nationalizing elites and their efforts to consolidate titular Montenegrin ethnicity.

First, Montenegrin nationhood is significantly more divided across tribal groups than Serbian. Although data on tribal affiliation is not collected during the census, data obtained for this study shows that if we were to randomly draw two individuals of Serbian nationality, the likelihood of them being

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[20]Although one could easily conclude that such actions are indication of the re-institutionalization of tribes in contemporary Montenegro, I maintain these organizations are more tribe-related than tribal as such. Specifically, tribal associations formally exist as NGOs and they do not claim direct ties to traditional tribal leadership. They are substantively different in ways that are highly relevant to the study of their political consequence. Their "leaders" are self-proclaimed and not elected. Membership of these association is not assumed by birth nor is it exclusive. Furthermore, these organization do not have formal bodies that seek to represent all fellow tribesmen. They are merely organization dedicated to the preservation and celebration of tribal culture and history, as seen by their self-proclaimed leaders. This has strong repercussions for their political use. While they provide a valuable source of solidarity among fellow tribesmen, which is particularly useful for the dissemination of national ideology, the structure and organization needed for political action is provided by the creators of those national ideologies – the Church and the political parties. Hence, the revival of tribal gatherings and organizations can be best understood as a form of 'neo-patriarchy' (Popović, 2002), perfectly suited to reinforcing a particularly conservative notion of national ideology.

from the same tribal group is double that of two self-declared Montenegrins. This makes the politicization of tribe a significantly safer option for political parties opposing nationalizing policies. On the other hand, if the pro-Montenegrin DPS decides to play the tribal card it runs into the danger of breaking down national solidarity and reducing its electoral chances. Second, since the party split in 1997, the pro-Serbian opposition was effectively cut from the state resources needed to implement programs to promote ethnicity. As a result, in a manner visible in post-Soviet states (Roeder, 1991), instrumental mobilization within the pro-Serbian opposition in Montenegro was substituted by primordial mobilization much earlier, which is the reason why tribal gatherings were especially frequent and massive in the Hills and New Montenegro regions that became strongholds for the pro-Serbian opposition. Third, although supporters of an independent Montenegro organized tribal congregations in reaction to pro-Serbian tribal gatherings, unlike their northern counterparts they did not have a central association or clear political purpose, but usually took the shape of more informal folklore and sports gatherings (Džankić, 2013). The apolitical and folkloric nature of revived tribal gatherings in Old Montenegro, as well as their limited electoral effect, can be easily explained by the lack of organizational coherence and mobilization among the Old Montenegrin tribes.

However, the question remains as to why the DPS failed to play the tribal card among those who might clearly serve as a "vehicle" for its national-building agenda. I would argue that one additional reason why the DPS shunned using its strong party organization to politicize tribal gatherings lies in the fact that the nation-building policies of the DPS, aimed at reducing ambiguity between Montenegrin and Serb nationhood, were practiced with the political support of ethnic minorities who were an integral part of their coalition government (Albanians, Bosniaks, Muslims and Croats). Given that these ethno-religious groups predominantly inhabit regions lacking a tribal social structure, tying process of nation-building to tribal expressions might have significantly reduced the coalition capacities of the DPS and potentially hurt Montenegro's status as a civic state.

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Based on the historical and theoretical considerations outlined above, I hypothesize that the politicization of tribal identity in contemporary Montenegro has a negative effect on the probability of voter's casting a ballot for the nationalizing Democratic Party of Socialists (H3).

5.4 Methods

In order to test these hypotheses, two separate studies were conducted. Study I uses a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study designed to identify inter-tribal variation both with respect to national identity (H1) and voting patterns (H3). Study II, on the other hand, employs an experimental design to manipulate the identity characteristics of hypothetical candidates in order to causally estimate the effect of tribal labels on voting preferences (H3) and ethnic categorization (H2).

5.4.1 Study I: Cross-sectional Survey Data Following the 2016 Election

5.4.1.1 Sample

Original survey data on a large and nationally representative sample (n=1213) was collected after the 2016 Montenegrin parliamentary election, as an addition to the cross-national Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The survey was complemented by a range of country-specific items. The study was conducted as a face-to-face survey, representative of eligible Montenegrin citizens, aged 18 and or older, who were registered to vote. The sampling was conceptualized as a stratified multistage random sample. There were three stages in total, with regions (North, Centre and South) being the primary sampling unit. Inside the regions, polling stations were identified, as the second level of stratification divided based on their size. In the third and final stage, a random

procedure based on 'step-and-go' was employed to choose the relevant household. The last person to have their birthday within the household was interviewed. The survey was conducted from December 8, 2016, to January 16, 2017.

In the analysis, from the initial sample, I excluded individuals who did not provide information on their origin or who reported a foreign origin. This resulted in 742 observations in the final sample, with practically all tribes represented in the sample (39). The most widely represented tribe in the sample is the *Vasojevići* (100) while the least number of observations being collected for the *Podgor* tribe (3). The size of the tribal groups in the sample largely corresponds to the sizes reported in other ethnographical studies, with the Hills being the largest tribal group in the sample (333), followed by Old Montenegro (242), and the group tribes from New Montenegro (172).

5.4.1.2 Individual-Level Measurements

The dependent variable, electoral support for nationalizing elites, was measured using a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent voted for the ruling DPS in the 2016 election or not. With respect to national identity, given its ambiguous nature in Montenegro, I opted for an interval indicator measuring the respondent's position on a scale ranging from completely pro-Serbian (1) to completely pro-Montenegrin (10). In reference to tribal belonging, respondents were asked to select the tribe their family belongs to. As a follow up question, they were asked to name the village in Montenegro from which their father's family came. Together, these items served the purpose of tying respondents' origin to a specific tribal territory.

Attitudes towards statehood, as one of the main controlling variables, was measured via an item asking whether the respondent would vote for an independent Montenegro or not if a referendum was organized tomorrow. Since Orthodoxy is one of the most frequently cited sources of national

ambiguity, this analysis includes a variable indicating whether a person belongs to the Serbian Orthodox Church or not. I also controlled for overall satisfaction with democracy (on a 7-points scale), the perceived economic state of the country (on a 7-point scale), and the level of political interest (dichotomous). All models controlled for the following demographic variables: age (interval), sex (dichotomous), education (interval: 9-point scale), type of settlement (dichotomous), as well as the municipality the individual voter comes from.

5.4.1.3 Tribe-Level Measurements

The main explanatory variable at the tribal level is the tribal group to which an individual belongs. In accordance with historical accounts, this variable was introduced into the analysis as a dichotomous measurement indicating whether a voter belongs to the Old Montenegrin group of tribes or not. In addition, as numerous authors have indicated, differences with respect to political agendas and identity have been maintained across the geographical dimension (Calhoun, 2000, 35), I also controlled for the geographic proximity to Cetinje, in order to account for potential variation within tribal groups. Here specifically, John Allcock (1994) argued that, just like a half-focused photo, 'Montenegro proper' shades off from Cetinje into its subsequent territorial accretions, which have had a weaker identification with Montenegro than with Serbia. Clearly, depending on the direction, increasing the distance from Cetinje could also mean closer proximity to Serbia. For this reason, the analysis also includes the distance from the Serbian border as a controlling variable. Lastly, I controlled for the distance between an individual's place of residence and their reported tribal origin as a proxy measure of the density (salience) of the tribal network.

5.4.2 Study II: Experimental Data Following the 2020 Election

Although an extensive list of controlling variables included in the survey study produce robust results, based on them alone, we should not claim any causal effect of tribal affiliations on the dependent variable. While it is not reasonable to attempt to manipulate one's tribal origin due to its "fixed" nature, the manipulation of candidates' identity attributes can effectively exclude other, unobserved, but potentially confounding factors.

To avoid the causality issues inherent in the survey data, an original conjoint experiment was conducted, with each respondent being presented with five separate pairs of candidates' profiles. The candidates' profiles were composed of five randomly assigned identity attributes, covering all the important layers of identity in Montenegro: national, religious, tribal, gender and generational. Table 5.1 shows the possible values for each of the five identity attributes. With respect to tribal identity, each of the potential values represent one of the tribal groups, with the label 'no tribal belonging' serving as a reference category. The experiment was randomized, with the single exception of candidates of Serbian ethnicity belonging to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. This combination of attributes was restricted as prior research has shown that such candidates are deemed unrealistic. Following this (Orme, 2002) such a minor intervention in the experimental design has no effect on the reliability of the estimates. The order of the candidates' characteristics was also randomized across each respondent but kept constant over all five tasks. Concerning the dependent variable, respondents expressed their vote choice by choosing one of the two candidates and by evaluated each candidate on a national identity scale, from 1 (completely pro-Montenegrin) to 7 (completely pro-Serbian). The final sample included 707 respondents, who in total evaluated 7070 candidate profiles (3535 pairs). A visual representation of the conjoint experiment is available in the Appendix.

To obtain accurate estimates, standard errors were clustered within the respondent, as choice outcomes were not independent across the profiles rated by a single respondent. In this way, the estimation of the relative effect of each attribute is enabled, both independently and in interaction

(Hainmueller et al., 2014). The estimation of the treatment effect is straightforward on account of the randomization of each attribute with respect to every other one. The relative importance of a candidate's attribute is estimated via average marginal component effects (AMCE), which represent the average difference in the probability of being voted for when comparing two different attribute values.

Table 5.1: Attributes for Candidates' Profiles

Attributes	Values
Nationality	Montenegrin
	Serb
Religion	Atheist
	Montenegrin Orthodox Church
	Serbian Orthodox Church
Tribal Affiliation	No tribal belonging
	Njeguši tribe
	Kuči tribe
	Drobnjaci tribe
Gender	Male
	Female
Age	32
	45
	57
	64

The experiment was inserted in a survey representative of the population of the capital, Podgorica, six weeks following the 2020 parliamentary election. The survey was conducted face-to-face. The sampling was conceptualized as a stratified multistage random sample, with only two stages. In the primary sampling unit, all polling stations were identified, and divided into proportional groups based on their size. In the second stage, a 'random walk' procedure was employed to choose the household and the 'last birthday' method to determine the individual respondent was used. Podgorica represents an appropriate setting to conduct this experiment for several reasons. First, given that almost a third of Montenegro's population lives in the capital, Podgorica holds a diverse population with respect to tribal origin and national identification. Second, the municipality of Podgorica geographically spans a range of tribal territory in Old Montenegro, the Hills and areas that lack a tribal

social structure. Third, testing the hypotheses in the most urbanized part of Montenegro represents a more conservative approach, compared to studying more traditional, rural settlements.

5.5 Results

5.5.1 Study I: Survey Data

I proceed by presenting the descriptive statistics, which provide the first empirical evidence on the resilience of traditional loyalties in contemporary Montenegro and inter-tribal variation with respect to national identification and political preferences. From there, I move towards a more formal test of the hypotheses tacking the role tribal loyalties play in voting for the nationalizing party. In a multivariate analysis of the survey data, I apply a hierarchical regression model with individuals nested within the tribes. This allows for the simultaneous test of both an individual's and a tribe's characteristics on identity ambivalence, while recognizing the tribal clustering suggested by the existing historical and ethnographical literature.

5.5.1.1 Identifying Inter-tribal Variation

In terms of the general importance of tribes in Montenegro, the survey data show that 70% of the respondents in the sample find tribal identity important for their self-image. While, expectedly, national identity takes primacy, it is obvious that for the largest part of the Montenegrin population tribal identity is still relevant. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 shows the variation between tribal groups with respect to the nature of national identification and support for the DPS. Survey data confirms that in 2016, the variation between tribal groups largely corresponds to the accounts presented in the historical

overview. Respondents belonging to the tribes of Old Montenegro, on average, strongly lean towards holding a distinct Montenegrin national identity, while the Hills tribes and the tribes of New Montenegro either hold a dual national identity or fully embraced a Serbian national identity. In term of the strength of the effect, the bivariate regression of the average position on national identity scale onto the tribe's distance from Cetinje shows that with each additional 10 kilometers of distance, Montenegrin national identity is reduced by 0.36 points.

Similarly, with respect to party preferences, the data shows that the rating of the DPS varies according to tribal membership. Compared to voters without a tribal background, voters originating from the Old Montenegrin tribes evaluate the nationalizing party significantly better, while members of the New Montenegro tribes show significantly lower levels of support. In the middle, the Hills tribes, although leaning in a negative direction, are not statistically different from voters without tribal membership. Together, the descriptive evidence undoubtedly shows that, despite being stripped of political agency for a long time, strong political content still remains at the heart of tribal networks. Still, in order to show that party preferences are indeed affected by tribal affiliation, and not by some other confounding variable, we must account for a robust list of controlling variables.

Figure 5.1: Tribal Membership and National Identification in Montenegro

Figure 5.2: DPS Ratings Across Tribal Groups

5.5.1.2 The Electoral Effect of Tribal Membership

The central hypothesis of this paper focuses on the role of tribal identity and revived tribal councils in the nation-building process in Montenegro. The first step towards showing that these variables affect the nature of national identification is making sure that there is enough variation between the tribes. The degree of clustering of observation within the tribe was estimated using the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) (Luke, 2004), which measures the proportion of variation in ambiguity that can be explained at the higher level. In this particular case, 10% of the variance in likelihood of casting a ballot for the DPS can be explained at the level of the tribe. Accordingly, a formal hypothesis test was conducted using the Generalized Linear Mixed-Effect Model (GLMM).

Table 5.2 presents three models. Model 1 tests the relationship between individual level variables and the dichotomous outcome. Model 2. adds variables measured at the tribal level, while Model 3 expands this list by introducing two-way interaction between tribal and national identity. The model fit was evaluated in relative terms, based on the value of the AIC (Burnham et al., 2011). The third model was chosen for both theoretical and statistical reasons, as the value of AIC drops significantly with additional set of variables.

The results confirm the well-documented dominance of the statehood/nationhood cleavage in Montenegrin politics. In each model, each individuals' position on the national identity scale significantly affected the likelihood of voting for the DPS. This confirms that the dominance of the DPS was maintained primarily through that party's successful representation as the sole defender of the state's sovereignty and the nation's right to self-determination. However, the data clearly shows that national identity did not fully absorb tribal solidarities. Specifically, Model 2 shows the significant effect of tribal origin on the probability of voting for the DPS, after national identity and attitudes towards statehood have been accounted for. Other things being equal, individuals whose tribal origin

is in Old Montenegro are, on average, three and a half times more likely to vote for the DPS compared to others.

Table 5.2: Stepwise Models Explaining Support for the DPS

	Model 1 Exp(β)	Model 2 Exp(β)	Model 3 Exp(β)
	Dependent variable: Voted for the DPS		
Intercept	0.01***	0.002***	0.003***
National Identity	1.36***	1.33***	1.20*
Statehood	7.23***	7.23***	7.22***
Tribal Salience	0.99	0.99	1.00
Serbian Orthodox Church	1.32	1.27	1.28
Tribal Origin		3.60*	0.40
Tribe Size		0.73	0.75
Tribe's Proximity to Cetinje		1.01	0.82
Tribe's Proximity to Serbia		0.33	0.26
National Identity × Tribal Origin			1.33*
Political Interest	1.48*	1.49*	1.52*
Satisfaction with democracy	7.29***	7.70***	7.73***
Economic Conditions	2.17***	2.33***	2.30***
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Municipality	✓	✓	✓
n	594	594	594
J	40	40	40
Log Lik.	-200	-195	-192
AIC	460	458	455

Note: The models are estimated using a GLMM with intercepts varying across tribes. The list of controls include: education, age, and gender. Full table available in Appendix A. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

Nonetheless, based on the results in Model 3, we can see that the tribal origin effectively moderates the relationship between national identity and vote choice. The interaction between the two identities is significant after we control for an extensive list of controlling variables. As is visible from Figure 5.3, regardless of tribal affiliation, individuals holding a strong Serbian national identity maintain

an extremely low chance of supporting the DPS. On the other hand, the probability of voting for the

DPS among Montenegrin voters' is clearly diminished for those originating from outside Old

Montenegrin tribal territories. They are 33% more likely to cast a ballot for the DPS compared to their

fellow nationals from the Hills and New Montenegro tribes. Together, the findings of both bivariate

and multivariate analysis are consistent with the theoretical expectations laid down in H1 and H3,

claiming that inter-tribal variation exists and that the politicization of tribal affiliations in Montenegro

is used not in support of, but to detriment of, the nationalizing elites and nation-building agenda.

Figure 5.3: Effect of Tribal Affiliation and National Identity on Voting Preferences

5.5.2 Study II: Experimental Data

5.5.2.1 Ethnic Categorization

With respect to ethnic categorization, the results in Figure 5.4 show that irrespective of one's nationality or religion, the tribal label significantly affect each voter and their chance of categorizing candidates into national groups. As is expected, national and religious labels have a stronger effect, as they also hold the name of the ethnic groups. However, finding that voters use the tribal origin of a candidate to categorize them into Montenegrin or Serbian ethnicity, represents a valuable and novel discovery. As is consistent with the results obtained in the survey-based study, voters are more likely to categorize candidates belonging to the New Montenegro and Hill tribes as members of Serbian ethnicity, compared to candidates without obvious tribal ethnicity. On the other hand, candidates holding a tribal origin from the Old Montenegrin tribe are significantly more likely to be evaluated as Montenegrin. Finding that this effect exists independently of the fact that each candidate's nationality was already given, shows that voters actively use tribal affiliation to determine the credibility of a candidate's reported membership of national groups. Moreover, and consistent with results regarding voting, Figure 5.4 again shows ethnic categorization based on tribal belonging is a shortcut used by voters of the pro-Serbian opposition, while DPS voter perception of an individual identity seems unchanged by the applicable tribal label.

Figure 5.4: The Effect of Candidate's Attributes
on Perceived Ethnicity

Estimated AMCE

5.5.2.2 The Electoral Effect of Tribal Labels

To further corroborate the evidence collected in the survey-based study, Figure 5.5 presents the AMCE estimates for each value for all identity attributes obtained in the conjoint analysis. The results confirm the importance of tribes in determining voting preferences. Not only is it clear that voters' tribal affiliation affects their voting behavior, as shown in the previous study, but a candidate's tribal label also plays a significant role in determining whether individual voters choose to support him/her.

Figure 5.5: The Effect of Candidate's Attributes on Probability of Being a Preffered Vote Choice

Figure 5.5A shows the estimates obtained on the whole sample. It shows that membership of any tribal group gives a candidate a statistically higher chances of being voted for compared to candidates without tribal affiliation. In terms of the effect's size, it appears that certain tribal labels are equally as valuable for vote choice as nationality or religious categories. As was expected, the tribal label, as a cue, is especially valuable when the relevant national group is not available. As such, the results presented in Figure 5.5B suggest that the effect of the tribal label increases significantly in situations when the national category is the same for both candidates, and thus, cancel each other as a potential basis for choosing.

While this undoubtedly demonstrates the electoral importance of tribal membership, it does not yet prove that tribal card is mobilized predominantly against the DPS, as argued by this paper. Although the conjoint experiment was designed for respondents to cast a vote for hypothetical candidates that lack any party identification, this hypothesis can be indirectly tested by showing the average effect of tribal labels among voters who reported voting for DPS in recent parliamentary elections, and those who did not. The subgroup analysis in Figure 5.5C shows a clear separation between two groups of voters. Specifically, DPS voters clearly do not differentiate between candidates based on any tribal label. Instead, they continue to base their vote choice on ethno-national and, to a lesser extent, ethno-religious identities. By contrast, the effect of tribal grouping among voters opposing the DPS is significant for all tribal groups.

The fact that voters opposing the DPS prefer candidates even from the Old Montenegrin tribes, typically seen as a vehicle for the DPS's nation-building project, represents an interesting finding. We should remember that the reference category is a candidate without clear tribal origin. As voters eager to use tribal labels tend to have, by default, more nativist view of society and identity, it is reasonable to expect that any candidate with any tribal origin is preferred as a more stereotypical representative of both Montenegrin and Serb ethnicity. Together, evidence from the conjoint study

provides additional support for the findings shown in Study I, supporting H3 which assumes that the politicization of the tribal layer of identity is significantly stronger among opposition voters and that, in turn, this hurts the electoral prospects of the nationalizing party.

5.6 Conclusion

The literature on the Western Balkans has become increasingly saturated with studies looking at the role of ethno-nation identity in the electoral behavior of voters. While the turbulent history of the region since the collapse of Yugoslavia validates such an emphasis, the extreme ambiguity of national identification in Montenegro suggests that the ability of voters to use national categories as a cue in a political arena is more limited than is typically thought. In such a context, both political elites and voters are likely to seek ways to complement this process with additional, more stable, layers of identity available in their repertoire. Certainly, tribal or clan structures in Europe have adapted differently to modern states compared to other regions. This is evident from the fact that they did not persist until the XX century even in the vast majority of places where they had strong roots, due to the intense transformation pushed by the centralized state and rampant economic development (Collins, 2006). The empirical fact that traditionally organized groups are almost extinct in modern Europe, as well as that such institutions are more prevalent in non-democracies, has led to the implicit assumption that tribes are inconsequential for the contemporary politics of Europe. However, the networks of kinship persisted in at least two Western Balkan societies, where industrialization and the development of centralized states was significantly delayed. While the formal organization of tribes in Montenegro and Northern Albania disappeared, their usage in everyday life continues to be politically consequential, as they are informative of wider ethnic cleavages.

This study is the first attempt at providing empirical evidence that, more than a century and a half since they lost political agency, tribal solidarities significantly affect voting behavior in Montenegro. The politicization of tribal identity in Montenegro seems to have achieved its full electoral potential in 2020, when the predominant party, the DPS, experienced its first electoral defeat. Given the findings of this paper, as well as the fact that nation-building was never more openly at the center of electoral campaign, we might argue that the effect was strong enough to produce real-life electoral consequences and help shift minimal electoral advantages in favor of opponents of the nation-building process in Montenegro. These results debunk several assumptions made by the literature about nation-building in Montenegro, that typically study ethno-national mobilization independently from other dimensions of voter identity. However, these findings seem to be perfectly aligned with the wider literature on traditional authorities, pushing the idea that traditional political institutions are much more persistent and compatible with democracy than initially thought (e.g., Logan, 2013; de Kadt and Larreguy, 2018). Specifically, it has been shown that in many developing countries traditional and state authorities coexist and enjoy overlapping influence, as traditional authorities and leaders are found to exercise great influence in important domains (Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019). This paper contributes to this research agenda by showing that traditional loyalties are resilient and have a profound political effect even without traditional leadership and long after the political structure has been fully substituted by legal-rational authority (Weber, 1958).

In terms of direction, the role of tribal affiliations in nation-building have often been studied with the implicit assumption that the effect is unidirectional - reinforcing nation-building agendas (Gellner, 1983). While the shift in ethnic boundaries produced by processes of nation-building offer wider ranges of possibilities, it is typically understood as a process marked by a tendency to smooth off rough edges in the behavior of subgroups. Horowitz (1975) uses the term 'amalgamation' to describe the superimposition of a new layer of identity (nation) on the old (tribe) without necessary

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displacing the old levels. However, the case of Montenegro represents a valuable departure from these expectations. There, opponents of the nationalizing policies have been eager to play the tribal card in order to fight the nationalizing policies of the ruling party, which traditionally shied away from it. Consequently, I have argued that voters use tribal membership as a cue for determining positions on the nationhood-statehood divide and, through this, inform their vote choice. Both survey and experimental data show that the direction of inter-tribal variation with regards to national identity and voting behavior is accurately predicted by the historical divide between tribal groups. Furthermore, the results clearly demonstrate that playing the tribal card in the electoral arena fractionalizes titular Montenegrin ethnicity, reduces electoral support for the DPS and, thus, inhibits the further consolidation of Montenegrin national identity.

Clearly, future research on this topic should take into account the effect of the government change in August 2020, which created a significant shift in the relationship between groups and political elites. Most notably, with the uncertain trajectory of nation-building in Montenegro in the near future, we might envision a different role for tribal identities. Under the (unlikely) assumption that the distance between Montenegrin and Serbian identity is reduced with the DPS out of power, and that tribesmen outside of Old Montenegro become more accepting of the Montenegrin state, tribal identity might indeed be seized to undermine national identity. However, if the polarization between the two nationhoods continues, or even increases, under the new pro-Serbian government, tribal affiliations are likely to remain a valuable component of political life in Montenegro.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Full Regression Models

Table A.2.1: Full Stepwise Models for Proximity Voting (CSES)

	Model 1 Exp(β)	Model 2 Exp(β)	Model 3a Exp(β)	Model 3b Exp(β)	Model 3c Exp(β)
			Dependent variable: *Ideological Distance*		
Intercept	1.51***	1.63***	1.63***	1.53***	1.61***
Ethnic Diversity	1.19*	1.19**	1.11	1.11	1.00
Int. Discrimination	1.20**	1.20**	1.14*	1.21**	1.15*
Terr. Autonomy	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.07	1.12
Ethnic parties	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.93
Polity IV	0.71		0.71*	0.72	0.72
GDP	1.04	1.03	1.03	1.02	1.01
Electoral Formula	0.63**	0.63**	0.64**	0.64*	0.69**
Population	0.93	0.93	0.91	0.91	0.88*
Party Identification		0.91***	0.91***	1.63***	0.91***
Education		0.92***	0.92***	0.92***	0.92***
Age		0.92***	0.98**	0.98**	0.99**
Gender		0.96***	1.63***	0.96***	0.96***
Urban		0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Ethnic Diversity x Intergroup Discrimination			1.13**		1.17***
Ethnic Diversity x Terr. Autonomy				1.17[+]	1.26*
n	39,715	39,715	39,715	39,715	39,715
J	42	42	42	42	42
LogLik.	-58313	-58155	-58151	-58151	-58149
AIC	116651	116345	116338	116339	116336

Note: The models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying across localities (via glmmTMB package). All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels:[+]p<0.10;*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A.3.4: Full Correlates of Vote-Buying in Montenegro

	Dependent variable: *Incidence of Vote-Buying*				
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Intercept	1.52***	1.34***	1.35***	1.34***	1.35***
Ethnic Diversity	−0.26*	−0.26*	−0.27*	−0.30*	−0.34**
Serb dominated	−0.33*	−0.33*	−0.14	−0.32*	−0.14
BMA dominated	−0.34*	−0.51**	−0.53**	−0.17	−0.26
Montenegrin dominated	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09
Competitiveness	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.16
Predominant Party	0.19	0.12	0.11	0.11	−0.70*
Municipality Gov.	−0.25	−0.17	−0.20	−0.16	−0.81**
Unemployment Rate	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02
Population	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12
Serb		0.09	0.28*	0.07	0.25*
BMA		0.20	0.28	0.45*	0.52*
Household Unemp.		0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Party Closeness		0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Reciprocity		−0.05	−0.06	−0.06	−0.07
Gender		0.13	0.12	0.13	0.11
Age		−0.10	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09
Urban		0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05
Education		0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05
Municipality: BP	0.18	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.32
Municipality: KL	−0.46	−0.35	−0.36	−0.28	−0.35
Municipality: PV	0.01	0.05	−0.01	0.03	−0.05
Municipality: RO	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.03	0.57
Municipality: PG	−0.23	−0.16	−0.16	−0.13	−0.05
Municipality: BR	−0.16	−0.11	−0.10	−0.15	0.05
Serb dominated × Serb			−0.42*		−0.38*
BMA dominated × BMA				−0.67*	−0.64*
Municipality Gov. × *Predominant Party*					1.32**
n	1,367	1,068	1,068	1,068	1,068
J	97	97	97	97	97
LogLik.	-1,290	-939	-936	-936	-929
AIC	2,649	1,982	1,980	1,981	1,975

Note: The models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying across localities. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.4.1: Full Stepwise Models Explaining Support for the SVP

	Model 1 Exp(β)	Model 2 Exp(β)	Model 3 Exp(β)	Model 4 Exp(β)
	Dependent variable: Voted for the SVP			
Intercept	0.002***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***
Issue Importance	2.70***	2.63***	2.62***	2.63***
Nativism	1.93***	1.94***	1.94***	1.94***
Religiosity	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.79
Media Attention	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***
Urbanization	1.15**	1.13*	1.13*	1.14
Immig. Parents	0.82	0.84	0.84	0.84
Segregation		1.00	0.80	1.11
Immigrant Population		0.85**	0.87*	0.85
Economic Activity		1.24*	1.22*	1.22*
Population Size		0.95	0.93	0.94
Population Density		1.01	1.03	1.00
Segregation x Immigrant Population			1.15*	0.90
Segregation x Urbanization				0.87
Urbanization x Immigrant Population				1.00
Segregation x Urbanization x Immigrant Population				1.12*
Education	0.85**	0.85**	0.85**	0.86**
Age	1.15*	1.14*	1.14*	1.14*
Gender	1.54***	1.53***	1.54***	1.54***
Employment	1.12	1.11	1.10	1.10
Income	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94
n	4019	4019	4019	4019
J	136	136	136	136
Log Lik.	-1,614	-1,608	-1,606	-1,604
AIC	3,255	3,253	3,251	3,251

Note: The models are estimated using a GLMM with intercepts varying across districts. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.5.2: Full Models Explaining Support for the DPS

	Model 1 Exp(β)	Model 2 Exp(β)	Model 3 Exp(β)
	Dependent variable: *Voted for the DPS*		
Intercept	0.01***	0.002***	0.003***
National Identity	1.36***	1.33***	1.20*
Statehood	7.23***	7.23***	7.22***
Tribal Salience	0.99	0.99	1.00
Serbian Orthodox Church	1.32	1.27	1.28
Tribal Origin		3.60*	0.40
Tribe Size		0.73	0.75
Tribe's Proximity to Cetinje		1.01	0.82
Tribe's Proximity to Serbia		0.33	0.26
National Identity × Tribal Origin			1.33*
Political Interest	1.48*	1.49*	1.52*
Satisfaction with democracy	7.29***	7.70***	7.73***
Economic Conditions	2.17***	2.33***	2.30***
Education	0.89	0.86	0.89
Age	1.49***	1.55***	1.56**
Gender	0.54*	0.50*	0.50*
Municipality:BD	0.09	0.23	0.21
Municipality:BP	0.84	2.14	2.20
Municipality:BR	0.30	1.14	1.61
Municipality:CT	0.58	1.87	2.00
Municipality:DG	1.45*	5.08	5.69
Municipality:HN	0.07	0.17	0.16
Municipality:KL	0.91	0.77	0.78
Municipality:KO	0.85	4.34	6.86
Municipality:NK	1.87*	8.11*	9.70*
Municipality:PG	0.34	0.82	0.90
Municipality:PL	0.06	0.13	0.13
Municipality:PT	0.50	1.28	1.09
Municipality:PV	1.30	3.11	3.32
Municipality:PZ	1.04	1.28	1.28
Municipality:RO	0.03*	0.07	0.06
Municipality:TZ	0.27	0.68	0.61
Municipality:UL	0.07*	0.17	0.14
Municipality:ZB	0.84	0.57	0.55
n	594	594	594
J	40	40	40
Log Lik.	-200	-195	-192
AIC	460	458	455

Note: The models are estimated using a GLMM with intercepts varying across tribes. All continuous variables are standardized. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix B: Sampled Geographical Units

B.2.1: List of Countries in the Sample

Country	Election Year	EFL	Sample size
Albania	2005	0.12	722
Argentina	2015	0.16	620
Australia	2007	0.21	941
Austria	2008	0.22	738
Belgium	2003	0.63	495
Bulgaria	2014	0.29	464
Brazil	2010	0.56	380
Canada	2008	0.72	1251
Chile	2009	0.44	412
Croatia	2007	0.21	401
Czechia	2010	0.28	853
Denmark	2007	0.14	646
Estonia	2011	0.46	522
Finland	2007	0.14	886
France	2007	0.27	1702
Germany	2009	0.18	1216
Greece	2009	0.14	673
Hungary	2002	0.16	261
Israel	2006	0.35	630
Italy	2006	0.10	441
Japan	2007	0.02	741
Kenya	2013	0.83	403
Korea	2008	0.05	455
Lithuania	2010	0.56	467
Mexico	2009	0.58	1337
Netherlands	2010	0.31	575
Norway	2009	0.13	902
New Zealand	2008	0.45	510

Philippines	2010	0.81	172
Poland	2007	0.05	720
Portugal	2009	0.16	714
Romania	2012	0.21	644
Serbia	2012	0.4	714
Slovakia	2010	0.24	797
Slovenia	2008	0.24	174
Spain	2008	0.66	842
Sweden	2006	0.20	832
South Africa	2009	0.86	736
Switzerland	2007	0.35	1157
Turkey	2011	0.52	620
United Kingdom	2005	0.37	457
Uruguay	2009	0.18	457

B.2.2: List of Municipalities in the Sample

Municipality	State	EFL	Sample Size
Acopiara	Ceara	0.44	12
Aloandia	Goias	0.55	16
Belem	Para	0.41	52
Belo Horizonte	Minas Gerais	0.51	12
Blumenau	Santa Catarina	0.18	16
Branquinha	Alagoas	0.38	6
Capela	Sergipe	0.32	5
Coronel Ezequiel	Rio Grande de Norte	0.47	9
Cuiaba	Mato Grosso	0.47	12
Duque de Caxias	Rio de Janeiro	0.48	5
Embu-Guacu	Sao Paulo	0.50	5
Fortaleza	Ceara	0.48	52
Franca	Sao Paulo	0.43	7
Itagiba	Bahia	0.36	13

Itaguai	Rio de Janeiro	0.49	14
Itumbiara	Goias	0.51	5
Itupeva	Sao Paulo	0.47	12
Jaboatao dos Guararapes	Pernambuco	0.48	33
Jaciara	Mato Grosso	0.50	9
Jaragua do Sul	Santa Catarina	0.23	20
Ji Parana	Rondonia	0.51	9
Jijoca de Jericoacoara	Ceara	0.44	12
Joao del Rei	Minas Gerais	0.49	4
Jose dos Campos	Sao Paulo	0.41	20
Juazeiro	Ceara	0.46	12
Lontra	Minas Gerais	0.47	17
Lourenco	Minas Gerais	0.41	8
Marilia	Sao Paulo	0.48	7
Minacu	Goias	0.47	14
Mogi das Cruzes	Sao Paulo	0.51	6
Mossoro	Rio Grande de Norte	0.50	16
Narandiba	Sao Paulo	0.51	15
Passos	Minas Gerais	0.47	3
Pelotas	Rio Grande de Sul	0.3	31
Pocoes	Bahia	0.43	18
Ponta Grossa	Parana	0.34	17
Porecatu	Parana	0.50	2
Porto Esperidiao	Mato Grosso	0.45	8
Porto Velho	Rondonia	0.45	22
Progresso	Rio Grande de Sul	0.16	9
Rio Bonito	Rio de Janeiro	0.50	10
Rio Branco	Acre	0.41	26
Santa Maria	Rio Grande de Sul	0.26	8
Senador Guiomard	Acre	0.33	16
Timbauba	Pernambuco	0.49	10
Uaua	Bahia	0.45	7

| Vera Cruz | Sao Paulo | 0.49 | 11 |
| Vilhena | Rondonia | 0.51 | 3 |

B.3: List of Sampled Localities

Locality	Municipality	EFL	Dominant
Ckla	Bar	0	Albanians
Orahovo	Bar	0.38	Montenegrins
Gluhi Do	Bar	0.47	Montenegrins
Bartula	Bar	0.58	Montenegrins
Tomba	Bar	0.62	Montenegrins
Burtaisi	Bar	0.68	None
Papani	Bar	0.66	None
Godinje	Bar	0.56	Montenegrins
Livari	Bar	0.59	None
Sutomore	Bar	0.60	None
Bar City	Bar	0.61	Montenegrins
Ostrelj	Bijelo Polje	0.26	Serbs
Trubine	Bijelo Polje	0.36	Bosniaks/Muslims
Dobrakovo	Bijelo Polje	0.01	Bosniaks/Muslims
Banje Selo	Bijelo Polje	0.49	Serbs
Barice	Bijelo Polje	0.46	Serbs
Brzava	Bijelo Polje	0.5	Serbs
Gornji dio grada	Bijelo Polje	0.39	Bosniaks/Muslims
Ribarevine	Bijelo Polje	0.46	Serbs
Dupljaci	Bijelo Polje	0.52	Bosniaks/Muslims
Femica Krs	Bijelo Polje	0.38	Serbs
Muslici	Bijelo Polje	0.44	Serbs
Brestovik	Bijelo Polje	0.54	Bosniaks/Muslims
Medanovici	Bijelo Polje	0.54	Serbs
Ivanje	Bijelo Polje	0.57	Montenegrins
Vergasevici	Bijelo Polje	0.54	Serbs
Lipnica	Bijelo Polje	0.54	Bosniaks/Muslims
Majstorovina	Bijelo Polje	0.53	Montenegrins
Obrov	Bijelo Polje	0.64	Bosniaks/Muslims

Orahovica	Bijelo Polje	0.67	None
Nedakusi	Bijelo Polje	0.67	None
Strojtanica	Bijelo Polje	0.56	Serbs
Bijelo Polje City	Bijelo Polje	0.69	None
Selišta	Kolasin	0.44	Serbs
Donje Lipovo	Kolasin	0.46	Montenegrins
Bakovici	Kolasin	0.46	Montenegrins
Trebaljevo	Kolasin	0.40	Montenegrins
Plana	Kolasin	0.39	Montenegrins
Medjurijecje	Kolasin	0.61	None
Vojkovici	Kolasin	0.61	Montenegrins
Kolasin City	Kolasin	0.49	Montenegrins
Dragasi	Pljevlja	0.27	Serbs
Strahov Do	Pljevlja	0.13	Serbs
Gradina	Pljevlja	0.30	Serbs
Hocevina	Pljevlja	0.35	Serbs
Milakovici	Pljevlja	0.32	Serbs
Kalusici	Pljevlja	0.45	Serbs
Lijeska	Pljevlja	0.38	Serbs
Bobovo	Pljevlja	0.45	Serbs
Slatina	Pljevlja	0.39	Serbs
Crni Vrh	Pljevlja	0.45	Serbs
Trnovice	Pljevlja	0.41	Serbs
Crljenice	Pljevlja	0.43	Serbs
Otilovici	Pljevlja	0.52	Serbs
Rabitlje	Pljevlja	0.57	None
Krupice	Pljevlja	0.61	None
Pljevlja City	Pljevlja	0.65	Serbs
Prisojni Orah	Pluzine	0.30	Serbs
Smrijecno	Pluzine	0.18	Serbs
Mratinje	Pluzine	0.51	Serbs
Gornja Brezna	Pluzine	0.58	Serbs

Milosevici	Pluzine	0.59	Serbs
Pluzine City	Pluzine	0.52	Serbs
Gornji Kokoti	Podgorica	0.28	Montenegrins
Ponari	Podgorica	0.28	Montenegrins
Skorac	Podgorica	0	Albanians
Petrovici	Podgorica	0.36	Montenegrins
Omerbozovici	Podgorica	0.18	Albanians
Sukuruc	Podgorica	0.08	Albanians
Podhum	Podgorica	0.23	Albanians
Susunja	Podgorica	0.3	Montenegrins
Orahovo	Podgorica	0.5	Serbs
Brezine	Podgorica	0.49	Montenegrins
Krzanja	Podgorica	0.4	Serbs
Lijesnje	Podgorica	0.48	Serbs
Gostilj	Podgorica	0.51	Montenegrins
Crvena Paprat	Podgorica	0.51	Montenegrins
Velje Brdo	Podgorica	0.52	Montenegrins
Crnci	Podgorica	0.53	Montenegrins
Tuzi	Podgorica	0.63	Albanians
Golubovci	Podgorica	0.53	Montenegrins
Beri	Podgorica	0.52	Montenegrins
Vrbica	Podgorica	0.6	None
Rakica Kuce	Podgorica	0.68	Albanians
Podgorica City	Podgorica	0.57	Montenegrins
Kalace	Rozaje	0.01	Bosniaks/Muslims
Radetina	Rozaje	0.02	Bosniaks/Muslims
Bisevo	Rozaje	0.08	Bosniaks/Muslims
Besnik	Rozaje	0.02	Bosniaks/Muslims
Grahovo	Rozaje	0.01	Bosniaks/Muslims
Koljeno	Rozaje	0.21	Bosniaks/Muslims
Balotici	Rozaje	0.02	Bosniaks/Muslims
Bac	Rozaje	0.03	Bosniaks/Muslims

Bijela Crkva	Rozaje	0.32	Serbs
Dacici	Rozaje	0.01	Albanians
Seosnica	Rozaje	0.01	Bosniaks/Muslims
Rozaje City	Rozaje	0.15	Bosniaks/Muslims

B.4: List of Districts in the Sample

District	Canton	Segregation	Sample Size
Bezirk Affoltern	Zurich	0.34	14
Bezirk Andelfingen	Zurich	0.33	24
Bezirk Bulach	Zurich	0.21	22
Bezirk Dielsdorf	Zurich	0.23	22
Bezirk Hinwil	Zurich	0.24	11
Bezirk Horgen	Zurich	0.14	11
Bezirk Meilen	Zurich	0.17	11
Bezirk Pfaffikon	Zurich	0.2	10
Bezirk Uster	Zurich	0.2	10
Bezirk Winterthur	Zurich	0.19	19
Bezirk Dietikon	Zurich	0.3	11
Bezirk Zurich	Zurich	0.23	34
Arrondissement administratif Jura bernois	Bern	0.38	40
Verwaltungskreis Biel/Bienne	Bern	0.22	19
Verwaltungskreis Seeland	Bern	0.42	42
Verwaltungskreis Oberaargau	Bern	0.34	46
Verwaltungskreis Emmental	Bern	0.37	40
Verwaltungskreis Bern-Mittelland	Bern	0.26	80
Verwaltungskreis Thun	Bern	0.26	32
Verwaltungskreis Obersimmental-Saanen	Bern	0.28	7
Verwaltungskreis Frutigen-Niedersimmental	Bern	0.25	13
Verwaltungskreis Interlaken-Oberhasli	Bern	0.4	28
Wahlkreis Luzern-Land	Luzern	0.23	17
Wahlkreis Hochdorf	Luzern	0.32	14
Wahlkreis Sursee	Luzern	0.32	19
Wahlkreis Willisau	Luzern	0.26	23
Wahlkreis Entlebuch	Luzern	0.29	9
Kanton Uri	Uri	0.36	20
Bezirk Höfe	Schwyz	0.2	3

Bezirk March	Schwyz	0.28	9
Bezirk Schwyz	Schwyz	0.32	15
Kanton Obwalden	Obwalden	0.16	7
Kanton Nidwalden	Nidwalden	0.22	11
Kanton Glarus	Glarus	0.12	3
Kanton Zug	Zug	0.14	11
District de la Broye	Freiburg	0.38	19
District de la Glane	Freiburg	0.5	19
District de la Gruyere	Freiburg	0.44	25
District de la Sarine	Freiburg	0.33	30
Bezirk See / District du Lac	Freiburg	0.28	17
Bezirk Sense	Freiburg	0.33	17
District de la Veveyse	Freiburg	0.35	9
Bezirk Gau	Solothurn	0.35	8
Bezirk Thal	Solothurn	0.48	9
Bezirk Bucheggberg	Solothurn	0.48	8
Bezirk Dorneck	Solothurn	0.2	11
Bezirk Gösgen	Solothurn	0.37	11
Bezirk Wasseramt	Solothurn	0.36	19
Bezirk Lebern	Solothurn	0.35	15
Bezirk Olten	Solothurn	0.21	15
Bezirk Thierstein	Solothurn	0.5	12
Kanton Basel-Stadt	Basel-Stadt	0.1	3
Bezirk Arlesheim	Basel-Landschaft	0.14	15
Bezirk Laufen	Basel-Landschaft	0.3	13
Bezirk Liestal	Basel-Landschaft	0.24	14
Bezirk Sissach	Basel-Landschaft	0.28	29
Bezirk Waldenburg	Basel-Landschaft	0.34	15
Bezirk Oberklettgau	Schaffhausen	0.41	3
Bezirk Reiat	Schaffhausen	0.17	5
Bezirk Schaffhausen	Schaffhausen	0.14	7
Bezirk Schleitheim	Schaffhausen	0.42	3

Bezirk Stein	Schaffhausen	0.24	4
Bezirk Unterklettgau	Schaffhausen	0.19	4
Bezirk Hinterland	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0.26	7
Bezirk Mittelland	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0.32	5
Bezirk Vorderland	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0.18	8
Kanton Appenzell Innerrhoden	Appenzell Innerrhoden	0.44	6
Wahlkreis St. Gallen	St. Gallen	0.14	9
Wahlkreis Rorschach	St. Gallen	0.28	9
Wahlkreis Rheintal	St. Gallen	0.22	13
Wahlkreis Werdenberg	St. Gallen	0.19	6
Wahlkreis Sarganserland	St. Gallen	0.13	8
Wahlkreis See-Gaster	St. Gallen	0.2	10
Wahlkreis Toggenburg	St. Gallen	0.32	12
Wahlkreis Wil	St. Gallen	0.22	10
Region Albula	Graubunden	0.34	6
Region Bernina	Graubunden	0.24	2
Region Engiadina Bassa / Val Mustair	Graubunden	0.22	5
Region Imboden	Graubunden	0.3	7
Region Landquart	Graubunden	0.46	8
Region Maloja	Graubunden	0.42	12
Region Moesa	Graubunden	0.44	12
Region Plessur	Graubunden	0.12	6
Region Prattigau / Davos	Graubunden	0.34	11
Region Surselva	Graubunden	0.56	15
Region Viamala	Graubunden	0.49	24
Bezirk Aarau	Aargau	0.24	12
Bezirk Baden	Aargau	0.32	26
Bezirk Bremgarten	Aargau	0.34	22
Bezirk Brugg	Aargau	0.36	24
Bezirk Kulm	Aargau	0.36	17
Bezirk Laufenburg	Aargau	0.31	18
Bezirk Lenzburg	Aargau	0.21	20

Bezirk Muri	Aargau	0.29	19
Bezirk Rheinfelden	Aargau	0.22	14
Bezirk Zofingen	Aargau	0.32	18
Bezirk Zurzach	Aargau	0.34	22
Bezirk Arbon	Thurgau	0.28	12
Bezirk Frauenfeld	Thurgau	0.29	23
Bezirk Kreuzlingen	Thurgau	0.42	14
Bezirk Munchwilen	Thurgau	0.29	13
Bezirk Weinfelden	Thurgau	0.32	18
Distretto di Bellinzona	Ticino	0.04	6
Distretto di Blenio	Ticino	0.27	3
Distretto di Leventina	Ticino	0.39	10
Distretto di Locarno	Ticino	0.36	23
Distretto di Lugano	Ticino	0.36	52
Distretto di Mendrisio	Ticino	0.38	11
Distretto di Riviera	Ticino	0.25	2
Distretto di Vallemaggia	Ticino	0.46	8
District d'Aigle	Vaud	0.35	15
District de la Broye-Vully	Vaud	0.44	31
District du Gros-de-Vaud	Vaud	0.4	37
District du Jura-Nord vaudois	Vaud	0.35	73
District de Lausanne	Vaud	0.12	6
District de Lavaux-Oron	Vaud	0.22	17
District de Morges	Vaud	0.4	62
District de Nyon	Vaud	0.38	47
District de l'Ouest lausannois	Vaud	0.24	8
District de la Riviera-Pays-d'Enhaut	Vaud	0.35	13
Bezirk Brig	Valais	0.14	7
District de Conthey	Valais	0.31	5
District d'Entremont	Valais	0.19	6
Bezirk Goms	Valais	0.72	8
District d'Herens	Valais	0.64	6

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Bezirk Leuk	Valais	0.32	12
District de Martigny	Valais	0.4	11
District de Monthey	Valais	0.24	9
Bezirk Raron	Valais	0.56	17
District de Saint-Maurice	Valais	0.4	9
District de Sierre	Valais	0.39	12
District de Sion	Valais	0.27	5
Bezirk Visp	Valais	0.6	19
Canton de Neuchatel	Neuchatel	0.26	31
Canton de Geneve	Geneve	0.18	45
District de Delemont	Jura	0.48	21
District des Franches-Montagnes	Jura	0.39	13
District de Porrentruy	Jura	0.52	21

B.5: List of Tribes Included in the Analysis

Tribe	Tribal Group	National Identification	Sample Size
Banjani	New Montenegro	4.37	22
Bjelice	Old Montenegro	9.1	8
Bjelopavlici	Hills	6.47	57
Boljevici	Old Montenegro	4.87	6
Bratonozici	Hills	5.23	17
Brceli	Old Montenegro	6.43	5
Ceklici	Old Montenegro	8.09	5
Ceklin	Old Montenegro	7.16	10
Cetinje	Old Montenegro	8.13	17
Cuce	Old Montenegro	8.15	17
Dobrsko Selo	Old Montenegro	9.76	6
Drazevina	Old Montenegro	5.30	10
Drobnjaci	New Montenegro	3.33	41
Dupilo	Old Montenegro	6.47	5
Gluhi Do	Old Montenegro	7.31	12
Golija	New Montenegro	4.93	14
Gradac	Old Montenegro	6.58	8
Grahovo	New Montenegro	6.66	15
Kokoti	Old Montenegro	6.31	18
Komani	Old Montenegro	7.53	12
Kosijeri	Old Montenegro	8.45	5
Krivosije	New Montenegro	4.42	11
Kuci	Hills	4.45	87
Limljani	Old Montenegro	7.21	9
Ljubotinj	Old Montenegro	7.56	9
Moraca	Hills	6.35	38
Niksici	New Montenegro	3.81	21
Njegusi	Old Montenegro	8.15	17
Orasi	Old Montenegro	8.34	5

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Ozrinici	Old Montenegro	8.17	20
Piperi	Hills	6.16	18
Piva	New Montenegro	3.9	44
Pjesivci	Old Montenegro	9.00	7
Podgor	Old Montenegro	6.83	3
Rovci	Hills	6.39	16
Sotonici	Old Montenegro	8.12	4
Uskoci	New Montenegro	5.68	4
Vasojevici	Hills	4.56	100
Zagarac	Old Montenegro	8.19	19

Appendix C

Figure C.1: Spatial Distribution of Respondents in the Sample (Chapter 5)

Figure C.2: Visual Representation of Conjoint Experiment (Chapter 5)

Molimo Vas pažljivo pročitajte karakteristike oba kandidata i dajte što precizniji odgovor na pitanja koja slijede.

	Kandidat 1	**Kandidat 2**
Nacija	Crnogorska	Srpska
Pol	Muško	Muško
Godine	32 godine	45 godina
Plemensko porijeklo	Drobnjaci	Kuči
Vjerska pripadnost	Ateista	Srpska pravoslavna crkva

Ukoliko bi morali da birate između njih, za kojeg od dva kandidata glasali na izborima?

Kandidat 1

Kandidat 2

Često se govori o tome da je osnovni politički rascjep u Crnoj Gori podjela između "procrnogorske" i "prosrpske" strane. Gdje biste na skali od 1 do 7, pri čemu 1 znači potpuno "prosrpska", a 7 potpuno "procrnogorska", pozicionirali ove kandidate?

	Krajnje prosrpska (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	Krajnje procrnogorska (7)
Kandidat 1	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Kandidat 2	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Dalje