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**Thesis title:**

**Same intentions and different outcomes: post-revolution anti-corruption reforms in Georgia and Ukraine between 2003 – 2012**

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Author:

Alina Bobkova

School of Public

Policy

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Thesis supervision:

Dr Simona Davidescu

Prof Agnes Batory

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## Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned, Alina Bobkova, hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where proper acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or any other language.

This is a true copy of the Thesis, including final revisions.

Date: 15 July 2021

Name: Alina Bobkova

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Alina Bobkova', written in a cursive style.

## Abstract

The thesis had the objective to investigate the relationship between political will and anti-corruption results in two post-communist countries: Georgia and Ukraine. Although Ukraine's post-revolution government promised to fight corruption, international corruption assessment ratings show that the country's anti-corruption program failed. Unlike in Georgia, where corruption has been reduced manifold. These cases were picked for the comparative analysis because they had similar political and institutional structures while having different outcomes in regard to anti-corruption. For the purpose of this research, two theoretical approaches were applied, namely the framework of Brinkerhoff (2010) on assessment of political will and the Rothsteins (2011) "big bang" theory, emphasising the importance of structural changes needed to ensure the long-term viability of anti-corruption efforts. The research argues that a high level of political will by top-level leadership to implement cross-sectoral sustainable reforms is key to anti-corruption success. The argument is supported by the data gathered from the analysis of interviews with key decision-makers and content analysis of the relevant literature, countries anti-corruption policies and communications through local newspapers. The study contributes to the literature by examining relationships between political will and effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms, which can be further developed in future research for analysing anti-corruption reforms successes and failures. The findings of this thesis can be used for the study of regimes in post-communist countries and the other geographical areas in the field of anti-corruption reforms and beyond.

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## Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis analyses the link between political leadership and corruption, testing whether there is a connection and how strong it influences the character and results of anti-corruption reforms. This work focuses on understanding and evaluating political will and its impact on anti-corruption reforms design and implementation. The quality of leadership is a component that is rarely discussed in studies on anti-corruption initiatives. There are a lot of studies on reform components, policy concepts, and implementation principles have been conducted (Fjeldstad, Isaksen, 2008, Jackson, 2020), but leadership remains elusive.

Corruption is one of the severe problems facing mostly but not exclusively the developing world (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme, 2002). According to estimates, corruption costs the world economy more than 5% of global GDP (Heywood and Rose, 2014). Post-Soviet countries are one of the world's most corrupt areas (Nasuti, 2016). The level of corruption is exceptionally high in the former Soviet Union. Many politicians have openly acknowledged their intention to fight endemic corruption. However, these claims are frequently not followed up by action.

The abuse of public power for private gains not only has an immediate detrimental impact on the government performance; it also causes state inefficiency of institutions over time. Moreover, even if an honest reformer tries to fight corruption, those benefitting from it have a solid reason to come together to decrease the danger to their well-being, maintaining the corrupt networks. As a result, the efforts of reforms in highly corrupt countries have mostly failed, and its governments have stayed corrupt over time.

To contribute to the research on anti-corruption in the post-Soviet states, this thesis raises the following research question: given similar starting points and aspirations, why did Georgia succeed and Ukraine failed to significantly lower corruption after the respective revolutions? This research is relevant because the lessons learned from comparing two cases can be applied to other countries from similar historical and institutional backgrounds and other countries with endemic corruption. Georgia and Ukraine have a lot in common because of their Soviet heritage. Moreover, they are on the same economic and political reform track on Europeanisation, as confirmed in their Association Agreements with the European Union (Mikhelidze, 2018).

The shift from a regime based on entirely corrupted governance to a system based on universalism does not happen overnight. Comparing the data across nations and time, both public opinion polls and expert surveys, Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2017) agree that few countries have made it. Even fewer appear to have succeeded on this route in recent times. Although in one of the most corrupt regions globally, there are few outliers throughout history, cases of a successful fight against endemic corruption. The majority of scholars focusing on the post-Soviet space note the success of anti-corruption reforms in the Baltic States, namely Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Compared to many other former communist nations, the Baltic States have made more progress toward democracy and a market economy (Dabla-Norris, 2006, Wadsworth, Swartz and Wheat, 2010).

This research focuses on another outlier in the region, Georgia, much less predictable due to the absence of the need to comply with the EU norms. The country was one of the most corrupt after the collapse of the Soviet Union and had a relatively low level of GDP. The Georgian Rose Revolution sparked anti-corruption measures at a critical moment, providing a window of opportunity for the new political elites. Similar revolutions in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, where new administrations generally failed to combat corruption, are not self-explanatory (Kupatadze, 2017). On the specific of the region and the characteristics of Georgian success, this thesis will expand in chapter 4.

Despite a considerable amount of scientific research and numerous international agreements aimed at anti-corruption universality, there is no definition of corruption accepted by everyone. The most widespread definition that Transparency International uses is to look at corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017). To put it differently, it is a behaviour of a government agent that is considered detrimental to the public interest while promoting their own personal and material well-being. Corruption remains the single most significant obstacle to successful growth, causing inefficiencies in the economy and deterring investment.

Following the approach of Brinkerhoff (2000), under the political will, this thesis understands both the political commitment to begin the fight against corruption and the intention to continue fighting before results are obtained. Despite being relevant to anti-corruption activities itself, political will in this area has received little research. Therefore, the study aims to better understand and assess



political will, as well as its impact on the design and execution of anti-corruption measures. The research focuses on the political will of the top-level political agents, namely prime ministers and cabinet, major political parties, presidents. Following the Rothsteins (2011) "big bang" theory, the second component emphasises the importance of structural changes needed to ensure the long-term viability of Georgia's anti-corruption efforts by establishing a solid system of checks and balances.

Acknowledging the significant trends influencing anti-corruption performance, such as democratisation and Europeanisation, religion, or communist past, this thesis controls these indicators while analysing anti-corruption reforms in the selected cases. However, the main focus is on the relationship between political will, the character of reforms and anti-corruption performance. This study adds to the literature by examining relationships between political will and effectiveness of anti-corruption actions, which can be developed in future research for analysing anti-corruption reforms successes and failures.

Chapter 2 of the thesis consists of the research methodology, concepts, and case selection. It includes a definition of corruption and its influence on the other spheres of life, ways to measure corruption, and approaches for anti-corruption. Different approaches to define and measure corruption are discussed, as well as general problems in describing this complex phenomenon. The "most similar systems" comparative research design will be applied to compare anti-corruption reforms in Georgia and Ukraine between 2003 and 2012.

Chapter 3 combines a brief literature review on the conceptual approaches to discuss the causes of corruption and strategies to combat it and discusses main trends in the post-Soviet region, such as Europeanisation and Democratisation. It then establishes a theoretical framework based on the "big bang" approach and formulates components to measure political will to implement such large-scale reforms. Chapter 4 focuses on the regional and countries specific contexts. It compares the pre-and post-revolution development of both countries and compares them on several relevant indicators, such as GDP level, regime type, religion etc. Chapter 5 applies collected data to the established framework from chapter 3. It assesses the levels of political will from political elites in both countries after respective revolutions. It also analyses the comprehensiveness and sustainability of reforms in both countries.

Finally, the conclusions reached at the end of the comparative study will point to potential avenues for further research into the similarities and differences among other regimes in post-communist countries and the other geographical areas in the field of anti-corruption reforms. Also, this research will discuss the sustainability of the reforms and draw the common patterns of the successful anti-corruption transformation for cases of endemic corruption.

## Chapter 2 Research Design

The thesis' architecture is outlined in this section. It begins with the operationalisation of the thesis' key concepts such as corruption and anti-corruption, followed by the methods used to test the theory and identify the critical factor in the success or failure of the reforms. It then discusses the data extraction sources, which include secondary interviews with the decision-makers at the time of reforms, legislation, reforms evaluations by the international organisations such as World Bank, OECD, Transparency International, and news items. It will finally discuss the case selection and conclude by describing some of the study's shortcomings.

### 2.1 Conceptualisation of corruption and its influence on the other spheres of life

Despite a considerable amount of scientific research and international agreements aimed at corruption universality (for example, United Nations Convention against Corruption, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions), there is no definition of corruption accepted by everyone.

The way corruption is defined differs as to the perspective it is viewed. Therefore, the literature on corruption is also diversified. Economics, political science, sociology and legal sources conceptualise corruption in their context. The most widespread definition that Transparency International (TI) uses is to look at corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017). Though the TI definition is widely used in corruption studies, it is also not taken for granted. The terms "abuse" and "entrusted" are ambiguous, and, to some extent, the origin and legitimacy of power are contested. It does not provide a clear explanation of who entrusted whom with which power relationship and what happens if there is a power grab or the endowed power is not legitimate.

Most scholars categorise corruption into "grand" and "petty" (Riaz and Cantner, 2020). Grand corruption involves the transaction of large sums of money and favours by those in positions of power. In contrast, petty corruption refers to the exchange of lesser sums of money and favours by those in positions of power. Conceptually, this categorisation might be viewed as ambiguous. First,

it is unclear what amount of money and what level of individuals need to be engaged in order to define it as "grand". Second, in the case of procurement, while the effect of corruption might be large-scale, the procurement process can be impacted illegally at any level of government administration, including the lowest. To put it another way, the above-described method that leads to procurement market favouritism can occur regardless of the range of the bribe, the actors engaged, or the positions of the people involved.

This study will focus on petty corruption. And hence, corrupt activity will be understood simply as petty bribes paid to government officials by citizens. This study is restricted to this form of corruption because it is the type of corrupt activities directly felt by the population and is measurable by public opinion and experts' surveys. Moreover, petty corruption is very likely to be highly correlated with grand corruption that is much harder to measure because it takes place at a higher level and is not directly felt by the population.

Although corruption exists in countries worldwide, many researchers conclude that democracies are less corrupt on average than non-democracies (Stockemer and Sundström, 2019, Warren, 2004). For example, fewer than ten nations classed as hybrid regimes or authoritarian regimes score above the CPI average, and no genuine democracies score below it (Pring and Vrushni, 2019). Generally, democratisation is connected to the process of becoming more transparent. Thus, corruption is at the core of both good governance and sustainable development policies. However, just because a system is democratic does not mean it is free of corruption. Andvig (2006) says that corruption thrives in environments undergoing "rapid change," such as developing economies, post-communist nations, and countries moving from authoritarian to democratic governments.

Some reformist regimes have come to power in many countries on the overt promise of addressing past violations and improving the quality of life, as it was in Georgia and Ukraine after revolutions. Brinkerhoff (2000) argued that corruption directly affects economic development. The unforeseen consequences of corruption, such as unclear land rights and variable contract compliance, are significant impediments to private investments needed for development.


## 2.2 Anti-corruption

The concept of the success of anti-corruption measures needs to be clarified. According to Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2017), a solidified prevailing norm of ethical universalism and public honesty can be defined as "success". Therefore, they argue that corrupt actions as exceptions will always exist, but a country cannot be considered successful in anti-corruption as long as the exceptions are numerous to render the norm nearly indistinguishable. A successful transition needs both the prevalence of the public integrity standard, meaning that the majority of actions and public officials are not corrupt and its durability against a future backslide, as some Eastern European countries experienced after joining the EU. Successful anti-corruption reforms are reforms that reduce corruption to the level of an exception in a long-term manner.

Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2017) describe two ways of combating corruption in governments. The first is a covert approach, where institutions are gradually changed until the free competition, meritocratic selection, and transparency become prevalent, albeit they were never the core goal but rather a side effect. The other way is when the rule of law and corruption control emerged as a result of collective action and investment, such as following long-term anti-corruption initiatives.

Concluding their study on the anti-corruption legislation effectiveness, the authors (2017) suggest that controlling corruption requires a balance of resources and limitations that cuts across the state and society (the inner circle in Fig.1) and the larger development context (the outer circle). The context is created by the combination of structural elements such as location, violence, and historical features linked to corruption, such as a communist past. The balance in Fig. 1 is off if there are too many resources, too few limits, or both. The scholars argue that without reaching balance, legal tools are ineffective. Conversely, if the equilibrium is close to being achieved, they believe that legal instruments will be effective (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2017).

Figure 1: The contextual balance that determines the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures



Source: Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2017

## 2.3 Research methods

In this section, we are to provide an overview of the research approaches employed in the study, discussing the most suitable methodology to guide the test of the conceptual framework, and thus, answer the research questions provided in the introduction. This thesis uses qualitative research methods for its analysis, namely case study, content analysis and process tracing.

Qualitative-based research considers complexity by including the real-world context and can bring various perspectives on board and concentrates on information that can't be appropriately expressed numerically, such as political will (Hancock, Elizabeth and Kate, 2009). In addition, this method is relevant for research questions that focus on discovering the where, why, and what experiences or events and gaining knowledge from the participants about poorly understood phenomena (Creswell, 2014).


Given that this thesis aims to test existing approaches developed in the anti-corruption literature, the examination of case studies is the most appropriate methodology. Specifically, the method of controlled comparison of difference is used in this study. Method of difference has two main features: two cases differ on the outcome and one cause and display invariant scores on all other factors. Cases should vary in the result; if there is one factor on which they differ, that is likely the

cause. Georgia and Ukraine are two countries with similar characteristics that have provided different results on anti-corruption success (Schrunk, 2006)

The qualitative comparative approach explains the central question that guides the study: why Georgia succeeded and Ukraine failed to significantly lower corruption. The chosen method investigates each case in depth by analysing it against the discussed parameters to assess political leadership. Finally, the evaluation will utilise the five features and indicators to determine the strength of political will after it has been identified (Brinkerhoff, 2000).

The case study compares the paths taken by Georgia and Ukraine following "Colour revolutions". In the early 2000s, both countries were on the list of the most corrupt in the world. The ramifications for fighting corruption, on the other hand, have been quite different. Georgia has made significant progress and improved on many anti-corruption and the rule of law indicators, but Ukraine has seen little, if any, improvement in this area (Nasuti, 2016, OECD, 2012, Bak, 2020). As demonstrated in figure 2, in the period between 2003 and 2014, the level of corruption control in Georgia increased from 25% in 2003 to almost 80% in 2014, while in Ukraine, it remained below 20%.

*Figure 2: Control of corruption in Georgia and Ukraine, comparison*



Source: Control of Corruption, World Governance Indicators 2003-2014

Georgia and Ukraine cases are selected because they had common political and institutional structures as former parts of the Soviet Union. Domination of one party, no separation between branches of government, planned economies, high level of centralisation all led to the condition in which the state was the sole player of political and economic decision-making (Nasuti, 2016).

Both countries have experienced revolutions with a difference of one year: Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004. Both revolutions resulted in some elite changes. The essential characteristic is that Georgia and Ukraine have comparable historical legacies and economic development levels, as well as their intentions for Europeanisation (Batory, 2018: 172).

Between 2003 and 2012, Georgia made the most significant gain in the TI rankings' history. Since 2004 Georgia's path in corruption control differs from Ukraine's in that it has reduced petty corruption, which appears to have remained essentially unchanged since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The Georgian government significantly reduced corruption in many state agencies, including the police force, educational system, and government bureaucracy (World Bank 2012). However, these achievements' significance should not be overstated since grand level corruption has remained a significant impediment to Georgia's socio-economic growth.

The most illustrative is the institution of the police. In 2011, just 17.4 per cent of Ukrainians trusted their police service, a considerable divergence from the great majority (88 per cent) of Georgians who did (Nasuti, 2016). So, according to the transformation index (carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation, Germany) in 2014 on the criterion of effective governance, Georgia took 41st place, which is significantly higher than Ukraine (87th place) among 129 countries participating in the ranking.

The limited scope of the case study technique is one of its drawbacks. Without considering the case-specific particularities, the theories produced cannot be applied to a larger context. There is also a risk that the obtained results will not be relevant outside of the specific country, group of countries or region. The method of "most similar" case comparison might also be problematic since the characteristics of paired cases are never exactly equal. However, since Georgia and Ukraine have very similar features, sharing historical past and the direction of development after the independence, as seen in the second chapter, this shortcoming would not invalidate the conclusions.



## 2.4 Data collection and analysis

Given that a qualitative study allows various methods to be deployed in collecting data, the current study used data from four main groups of sources, namely governmental and international reports, indices to measure corruption, online news outlets, and interviews.

The first group includes government reports focused on anti-corruption reforms, international organisations and local NGOs reports. It is collected to compare performances in terms of quality of democracy, transparency, and economic development by international agencies such as Transparency International, Freedom House, World Bank datasets, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, Index of Economic Freedom.

The second group of data was collected to compare levels of corruption control for both cases. Measurement of corruption, in any form, at any time or place, is a significant challenge since it is inherently illicit and takes place in secrecy (Buckley-Farlee, 2017: 48). This paper will mainly rely on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published annually by Transparency International (TI), a perception-based indicator. CPI is the first systemic effort to compare 'perceived levels of corruption, as assessed by expert reviews and opinion polls,' across various countries; it rates countries on a scale of 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Another way to assess corruption used in this paper is Daniel Kaufmann's World Governance Indicators (WGI) which, together with CPI, is one of the most popular indexes to measure corruption. The World Governance Indicators (WGI) project includes the Control of Corruption (CoC) indicator, an aggregate measure (scores are ranged from 1 to 10, with higher control of corruption 10) that consists of expert assessments and public opinion polls.

The lack of a systematic fact-based indicator to track corruption across nations and time is a key limitation of the anti-corruption policy assessment issue. There is, however, significant evidence that expert assessments from the World Bank and Transparency International CPI, as well as public opinion polls, are consistent (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov, 2017). Therefore, this thesis primarily uses the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (CCI) and TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to compare the development of corruption control between Georgia and Ukraine and change over time (Budsaratragoon and Jitmaneeroj, 2020).

While this research primarily relies on these indices to compare the levels of corruption in Georgia and Ukraine over time, it recognises the limitations of the indicators. The thesis is consistent with a substantial body of work in the area that accumulated survey-based corruption indices, such as the CPI and CCI, are the most valid estimates of overall corruption magnitude in many countries (Lučić, Radišić and Dobromirov, 2016).

The third group consists of leading online news outlets of Georgia and Ukraine and is used to analyse the perception of reforms by the public and the decision-making bodies reflected in leading online news outlets of Georgia and Ukraine. These are the online media outlets *ambebi.ge*, *News.On.ge*, *Netgazeti*, and *Civil.ge* in the case of Georgia, and *BBC Ukraine*, *Radio Svoboda*, and *Ukrainska Pravda*, which are used as additional sources for analysing the anti-corruption reforms and governmental actions undertaken in both cases.

The fourth group of data used for this study includes secondary sources on interviews with the key decision-makers at the times of reforms, such as Mikheil Saakashvili, Dr Tamara Kovziridze, Victor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko. The initial plan was to conduct expert interviews with academics, NGO experts, civil servants, and other relevant actors for reforms. However, the COVID-19 situation limited the travelling options, and it was no longer possible to conduct the interviews. Moreover, the arrangement of even remote meetings with high-profile politicians to assess political will would not have been feasible. Therefore, this research relies on conducting a content analysis of interviews.

For collecting empirical evidence supporting the thesis argument, we employed the established models, such as content analysis and process tracing. These methods provide a clear direction for testing theories. The use of content analysis minimises interpretive bias because it is based on an analytical reading of materials (White, Marsh, 2006). Content analysis is a method for extracting meaning from texts or any other sort of message. In the case of this research, these are interviews, newspaper articles and governmental documents. The qualitative content analysis focuses on semantic links rather than merely the existence of words in texts in general.

This study also uses an existing method of process tracing introduced by Betsill and Corell (2001) to study the influence of political will on the anti-corruption success and trace the complexity and coherence of reforms packages on the results. Although the approach was developed to examine international environmental policymaking, it may also be used to research corruption. Process tracing is a crucial method in qualitative research. Collier (2011) described it as a systematic assessment of evidence collected and examined in line with the study goals. In the case of this research, the sequence of anti-corruption reforms in Georgia and Ukraine will be analysed.

## Chapter 3 Literature Review and theoretical framework

This chapter combines the literature review and the theoretical framework used as the foundation for the study. To draw a bigger picture on the processes connected to anti-corruption and establish a framework for further analysis of the disparities in the outcomes of anti-corruption reforms in Georgia and Ukraine, this research started from the bigger picture of understanding the problem of corruption and reasons for corrupt behaviour. It considered the two most influential approaches to understanding corruption: The principal-agent and collective action models.

Various arguments exist in the corruption literature on the best way to assess the results of the reforms. The goal of this chapter is to pick out of the wide literature those approaches that may account for the key variables that have led to the different results of anti-corruption reforms in Georgia and Ukraine in a more comprehensive way. The chapter considers two main frameworks that are usually connected to the decrease in corruption, such as Europeanisation and Democratisation. For post-communist Eastern European countries, the political conditionality associated with EU membership was regarded as a panacea, assuring long-term democratic reforms and good governance (Mihaila, 2013). Also, there is a strand of anti-corruption research that focuses on the relationship between democracy and corruption. Moreover, some academics claim that post-communist countries are, on average, more corrupt (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005).

Acknowledging the significance of these approaches influencing anti-corruption performance, such as democratisation and Europeanisation, religion, or communist past, this thesis controls these indicators while analysing anti-corruption reforms in the selected cases. However, the main focus is on the relationship between political will, the character of reforms and anti-corruption performance. Although the processes of democratisation and Europeanisation, as well as political and cultural contexts, are crucial for both countries' development and transformations, they are not particularly relevant for the comparison and research question of this thesis because Ukraine and Georgia have and had during the researched period significant similarities in this regard, which will be further discussed in the next chapter.

### 3.1 Principal-agent model vs Collective action

One of the first approaches to explain corrupt behaviour used the economic context through the principal-agent model (Klitgaard, 1988). According to this approach, three groups of actors engage with one another while delivering a public good: a principal, client, and agent. In line with this theory, the agent's corrupt behaviour is possible because the principals are not fully informed about the progress of the delegated power (Rose–Ackerman, 2008). A client calculates the gains and expenses and agrees to pay a bribe if the benefits outweigh the costs. Corrupt practices are determined by a monopoly of power, discretionary by officials, and officials' accountability. To sum it up, the formula of corruption calculation proposed by Klitgaard (2000):  $\text{Corruption} = m$  (monopoly power) +  $d$  (discretion by officials) –  $a$  (accountability) (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010).

However, in practice, politicians' actions are far from those of an ideal principle who methodically monitors and punishes corruption (Johnston, 2005). Rather than disclosing and prosecuting unethical conduct, government officials and people unconsciously perpetuate the corrupt scheme, contrary to what the principal-agent paradigm suggests. Although most governments in the developing world have condemned their predecessors' wrongdoing and promised to change everything, studies show that many of these anti-corruption attempts have been embroiled in the same illicit networks that they were supposed to combat. Citizens are likewise a long way from the ideal clients envisioned in theoretical models. The electoral costs of corrupt politicians are minimal, contrary to what democracy theory predicts (Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas, 2012).

Therefore, this thesis argues that the principal-agent model is not perfectly applicable to countries with endemic corruption because it is impossible to find an honest principle in a completely corrupt institution. For example, under a corrupt system, political leaders typically benefit the most from rents and thus have little motivation to reform it (Nasuti, 2016).

Unlike the principal-agent model, the theory of collective action assumes that people's behaviour does not depend on the thoroughness of monitoring and the severity of the punishment imposed by the principal, but on what most people think about the most likely actions of others in society. All actors, including principals, are likely to partake in unethical behaviour because it is prevalent


among their community's members. Only when the vast majority believe that others "don't give" and "don't take" bribes a new low-corruption equilibrium can be achieved. It has been argued that anti-corruption reforms must be revolutionary and carried out in a reasonably short time to reach such a tipping point (Rothstein and Varraich, 2017).

### 3.2 Europeanisation and Democratisation

The Georgia-EU and Ukraine-EU relationships are mainly studied in terms of the Europeanisation theory, which developed around the turn of the century. Initially, studies of Europeanization were primarily restricted to the outcomes of EU member nations' governance and European integration. In the comprehensive study on Europeanisation, Schimmelfennig (2012) addressed Europeanisation Beyond Europe. He investigates the validity of conceptions and the consequences of Europeanisation on non-prospective members.

The majority of scholars under Europeanisation understand a process of creating and subsequently developing institutions at the European level that are accountable for resolving current difficulties in the country (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Despite the influence and contribution of the EU to the anti-corruption reforms in the neighbouring states, for Ukraine and Georgia, the level of EU aid in the considered period was relatively similar. However, the results on corruption control were the opposite, as illustrated in Figure 3 (the upper circle stands for Georgia and the lower one for Ukraine).

*Figure 3: WGI Control of corruption and EU aid*



Sources: WGI Control of Corruption and OECD - QWIDS Official Development Aid

The relationship between corruption and the political regime is a widely discussed issue. Some scientists believe that only countries with democratic political governments can establish an effective system to prevent and counteract corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston, 2017). The essential elements of such a system are anti-corruption legislation, codes of ethics for civil servants, an independent judiciary, political competition, and external control, which is carried out by the joint efforts of the political opposition, mass media and civil society organisations.

However, while the majority of countries with solid anti-corruption controls are democratic, the most recent wave of democratisation has not always resulted in anti-corruption progress. Moreover, while some authoritarian governments appear to succeed in combating corruption, it is important to note that this achievement is completely reliant on the will of a tiny group of top-level elites and are not part of the long-term political system (Kukutschka, 2018). For example, Qatar is the top performer in the Middle East and North Africa area in terms of anti-corruption, it is considered to be among the top 30 countries in the world (TI CPI, 2014). However, according to the Freedom House, the country is scored 25 out of 100 on the scale of global freedom statuses and is not free (Freedom House, 2014).

Thus, acknowledging the more significant trends influencing anti-corruption performance, such as democratisation and Europeanisation, this thesis focuses on the relationship between political will, the character of reforms and anti-corruption performance. Although the processes of democratisation and Europeanisation are crucial for both countries' development and transformations, they are not particularly relevant for this thesis's comparison and research question because Ukraine and Georgia have and had during the researched period significant similarities in this regard. Regarding democratisation, both Ukraine and Georgia are evaluated as partly free countries with the same score (60), according to the Freedom House annual Freedom in the World report (Freedom House, 2020).

Considering the relevance of these theories for the research in the field of institutional development and anti-corruption, this thesis does not base the analysis on them. The main focus is on the complexity of reforms and the level of political will. Democratisation and Europeanisation are not particularly relevant for this thesis's comparison and research question because both cases have

and had during the researched period significant similarities in this regard, which will be further discussed in the next chapter.

### 3.4 'Big bang' approach

Changing believes of people is a challenging task which sometimes requires changes of generations. This argument suggests that a piecemeal approach to anti-corruption initiatives will be less successful, a more comprehensive approach is needed.

Based on the perception of corruption as a collective action problem, researchers believe that a successful fight against corruption requires revolutionary institutional change (Carothers et al., 2007). As Rothstein (2011) stated in his article, in countries characterised by endemic corruption, the whole system should be reformed at the same time in a "big bang". In line with this logic, corruption is only one of many symptoms of the state's dysfunctionality, and therefore only a holistic approach should be implemented to change the status quo. Reforms should affect all major political and social "rules of the game". The reforms in Georgia were radical to dealing with corrupt institutions. Rather than being altered, some institutions were completely abolished. Another important feature was the discharge of all people in charge of the remaining institutions' informal and corrupt practices (Erikson, 2017).

While corrupt institutions should be reformed and stricter penalties should be introduced, behavioural changes in societies must be implemented to achieve significant changes. Batory (2018) suggests that the standards of behaviour must be altered in order for corruption to be significantly decreased. For example, in Georgia, the level of transparency was increased by introducing an online system of reporting corruption that was well advertised and easy to use. Similarly, according to Levin and Satarov's research on Russia, it is necessary to change societal standards such that corruption is no longer possible (Levin and Satarov, 2000). Discussing the failure of anti-corruption laws, Agnes Batory rightly points out that much of the literature considers corruption as one of many symptoms of the state's dysfunctionality. Hence, only a comprehensive approach involving different actors can make a change.



Thus, considering corruption as a collective action problem indicates that an indirect revolutionary approach is promising for tackling corruption. To date, however, the question of what circumstances must be met for such drastic changes to occur remains debatable. And further research on the causes for successful and unsuccessful transitions to low-corruption equilibrium is needed in the corruption literature. To contribute to this research area, this paper considers the influence of political will on the success of anti-corruption reforms.

### 3.5 Political will for anti-corruption

Despite its impact on anti-corruption activities itself, political will is not widely researched in this area. The focus of this work is on understanding and evaluating political will and its influence on the design and implementation of anti-corruption reforms. Political will is widely described as political actors' expressed reliable motive for actions. In other words, it is political leaders and bureaucrats' determination to take steps to accomplish goals and bear the costs of such activities over time (Malena, 2009).

Political will is a latent phenomenon that is not apparent until manifested through some kind of action, so it can only be measured indirectly. Brinkerhoff (2000) described it as actors' willingness to take steps to accomplish a series of objectives, namely anti-corruption initiatives, as well as to ensure the sustainability of results. In his study on the role of political will in combating corruption, Abdulai (2009) looks at the cases of Singapore, Hong Kong, and Ghana. This study finds that long-term management of corruption necessitates a constant responsibility on the top-level political actors to eradicate the threat. In the contexts where it is not the case, according to the author, anti-corruption policies are certain to fail (Abdulai, 2009).

Considering political will to be one of the critical conditions for anti-corruption reforms, Brinkerhoff (2010) proposed the conceptual framework by identifying political will as a group of variables that affect it. The characteristics of political will are the following:

1. Nature of initiative: where reforms come from (internal or external). Initiating from the inside anti-corruption campaign shows that reformers themselves see corruption as a severe problem, are responsible for addressing it, and are prepared to champion the efforts needed

to achieve results. Imported or forced initiative faces the persistent issue of having to establish dedication and possession, as well as the issue of whether or not aspiration to implement reforms is real. The measure is a scale from high to low, indicating the degree to which the reformer takes the lead on anti-corruption initiatives. Higher scores suggest a more robust political will for reform.

2. Analytical cogency is a measure of how rigorous analysis is. Anti-corruption initiatives that are decided or adopted based on evidence-based evaluations of the alternatives and their associated risks and advantages are most likely to demonstrate a commitment to respond and produce beneficial outcomes. Conversely, anti-corruption policies that are only cosmetic are likely to be adopted without regard for the country's meaning, demands, or costs, demonstrating a lack of attention to effective reform.
3. Mobilisation of support: efforts by state actors to involve other players, such as civil society organisations and the private sector, in the implementation of reforms are often seen as a symbol of high political will. Has the team created a compelling roadmap of progress and a participatory approach that considers the needs of key stakeholders?
4. The use of credible sanctions: corruption cannot be minimised without well-crafted sanctions. As a result, an efficient, proportionate, and applied sanctions policy demonstrates a serious commitment to fighting corruption as well as a higher level of political will. On the other side, symbolic and partial penalties indicate a lack of political will.
5. Long-term commitment and capital allocation: the amount of human and financial capital available to support the initiative and the reform's aims and priorities provide some insight into political will. For example, if new anti-corruption institutions are created but are underfunded and staffing lacks, this will suggest a lack of political will (Brinkerhoff, 2010).

This framework emphasises the role of top-level political will for successful anti-corruption reforms. Furthermore, it argues that it was the decisive aspect that allowed the swift implementation of a set of mutually reinforcing policies for corruption prevention, identification,

and regulation through a broad spectrum of government services. Given that in many parameters Georgia and Ukraine seem to be similar, the analytical structure discussed in this chapter is seen to help understand the disparities in the outcomes of anti-corruption reforms.

Based on the perception of corruption as a collective action problem, researchers believe that a successful fight against corruption and keeping it low requires revolutionary institutional change (Carothers et al., 2007). To date, however, the problem of how such drastic changes might be made remains unclear, and additional empirical studies on the causes for successful and unsuccessful transitions to low-corruption equilibrium is needed in the corruption literature. To contribute to this research area, this paper considers the influence of political will on the success of anti-corruption reforms. This thesis stresses the vital role of top-level political will. We argue that it was the decisive aspect that allowed the swift implementation of a set of mutually reinforcing reforms.

## Chapter 4 Regional context and reforms in Georgia and Ukraine

The Former Soviet Union countries have a wide range of political, sociological, and economic characteristics (Baimenov and Liebert, 2018). Not all of the states, after thirty years, have succeeded in building a system based on a free-market economy and providing a high standard of living for its citizens. The shift from a state-controlled command economy to market-driven capitalism was a highly complicated structural adjustment for many post-communist countries. The large-scale enrichment of a small circle of people has led to the emergence of ultra-rich and influential people, the oligarchs. Their influence is particularly strong in resource-rich countries, such as Ukraine or Kazakhstan.


The fall of the USSR opened up plenty of possibilities for corruption in the post-communist world. Simply put, the end of the Soviet system left a void that required reconstruction of its former members' economic and political rules (Vachudova 2009). The old game rules were destroyed, and the new ones were not set in stone. The current actors were obliged to seek alternative decision-making methods and promote their interests due to institutional uncertainty. One of the most common methods was to devise corrupt schemes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Georgia followed similar paths, moving away from Russian influence towards Europeanisation.

### 4.1 Colour revolutions: successes and failures

The term Colour Revolutions refers to successive revolutions against the government of transition countries at the turn of the twenty-first century, especially among autocratic post-Soviet regimes. Typically, Colour Revolutions are sparked by long-standing discontent among the public (Gerlach, 2014). They happened in nations that shared not just a socialist background but also political transition that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, failed to create significant movements toward full-fledged democracy and European integration.

In some post-socialist states, large-scale protests result in the overthrow of dictatorial regimes, while in some countries, they were not successful (Fig.4). These protests mainly were nonviolent, but they led to the overthrow of a number of autocratic leaders in several post-communist countries, including Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan (Gerlach, 2014). All countries that experienced Colour Revolutions shared a combination of characteristics, namely weak states with powerful informal networks in their political elites, incapable of performing essential tasks such as ensuring territorial integrity and basic services.

*Figure 4: Timeline of colour revolutions*



Source: Gerlach, 2014

Corruption is frequently mentioned in regional elections as a reason for electing 'new' leaders. It was the case in both countries since one of the opposition leaders' main intentions was to change current highly corrupt elites. The high degree of corruption in Ukraine, Georgia, in other post-Soviet countries, as well as in young countries in general, can be explained by the inadequacy of government institutions. Both Ukraine and Georgia did not gain independence for many years. Its establishment coincided with the emergence of market relations and the accumulation of money, while the rule of law and public morals were frequently ignored in the interest of profit (Mierzejewski-Voznyak, 2014).

As demonstrated in Table 1, Georgia and Ukraine shared similar characteristics at the beginning of reforms. It is important for this research that the countries are similar regarding regime type, GDP level, and religion because scholars most commonly use these parameters to investigate the causes of corruption (Table 1). In some parameters, such as GDP or Gini index, which correlates with the level of corruption, Ukraine was in a better position than Georgia. Regarding democratisation, both Ukraine and Georgia are rated as partly free countries with the same score (60), according to the Freedom House annual Freedom in the World report (Freedom House, 2020).

*Table 1: Characteristics of Georgia and Ukraine 2003*

Country	<i>Georgia</i>	<i>Ukraine</i>
Regime type <sup>1</sup>	Partly Free	Partly Free
European Integration	Resulted in Association Agreement	Resulted in Association Agreement
Ethnic homogeneity	84% Georgian	77,8% Ukrainian
Gini index (World Bank estimate)	36.2	28.9
GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)	5,545.293	6,521.6
Large reserves of natural resources	No	Yes
Religion	Christian Orthodox	Christian Orthodox

Table 2 shows corruption indices from Transparency International, Freedom House/Nations in Transit, and the World Bank for Georgia and Ukraine. As it is seen from table 2, after 2007, when the results of the reforms became tangible, Georgia became a clear outlier in the region, while Ukraine followed the path of the rest of the former Soviet Union (FSU), excluding the Baltic countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Freedom House, 2018

*Table 2: Levels of Corruption Control in Georgia and Ukraine (2003-2008)*

Country		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Georgia	CPI	1.80 (124 <sup>th</sup> )	2.00 (133 <sup>rd</sup> )	2.30 (130 <sup>th</sup> )	2.80 (99 <sup>th</sup> )	3.40 (79 <sup>th</sup> )	3.90 (67 <sup>th</sup> )
	NiT Corruption Score	5.75	6.0	5.75	5.50	5.00	5.00
	NiT Democracy Score	4.83	4.83	4.96	4.86	4.68	4.79
	WB Good Governance Indicator of Control of Corruption	-0.93	-0.63	-0.43	-0.26	-0.38	N/A
Ukraine	CPI	2.30 (106 <sup>th</sup> )	2.02 (122 <sup>nd</sup> )	2.60 (107 <sup>th</sup> )	2.80 (99 <sup>th</sup> )	2.70 (118 <sup>th</sup> )	2.50 (138 <sup>th</sup> )
	NiT Corruption Score	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
	NiT Democracy Score	4.71	4.88	4.50	4.21	4.25	4.25
	WB Good Governance Indicator of Control of Corruption	-0.90	-0.90	-0.59	-0.65	-0.73	N/A
Average for the non-Baltic FSU states	NiT Corruption Score	5.96	6.04	6.06	6.13	6.08	6.10
	NiT Democracy Score	5.57	5.66	5.74	5.78	5.79	5.84
	WB Good Governance Indicator of Control of Corruption	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.86	N/A

Source: Spirova, 2008

By 2003, Georgia's corruption had reached such high proportions that it had become a major impediment to political and economic growth (Nodia, 2003). In Ukraine, despite several anti-corruption steps publicly claimed by the government, corruption was pervasive during the early twenty-first century. As citizen dissatisfaction with these practices grew in both countries, the opposition leaders made anti-corruption a prominent theme in its public appeal and perhaps was able to gain a lot of support by promising to abolish corruption, patronage, and clientelism.

## Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis

This chapter presents and analyses the findings on the information collected from the data sources outlined in section 2.4. It starts with the analysis and comparison of Georgian and Ukrainian sets of reforms aiming to decrease corruption. The first part discusses the comprehensiveness of reforms relying on the framework of Rothstein (2011). As argued by Rothstein, only the sequence of a large spectrum needs to create positive change. Therefore, the first part of the chapter traces reforms and analyses how comprehensively corruption has been tackled by the measures of the new governments in the two countries. The second part constitutes a comparison of two cases on five criteria developed in accordance with the Brinkerhoffs (2010) framework. The purpose of the analysis of those features is to measure the level of political will, matching them with different outcomes can discover whether political will had an influence on the results of anti-corruption reforms.

### 5.1. Post-revolution context and reforms in Georgia and Ukraine

#### 5.1.1 Reforms in Georgia

The rapid development of Georgia and success in reducing corruption relatively fast became a famous case worldwide and a vivid example for its neighbours. The success of the Georgian reforms is based on powerful tools to strengthen the responsibility and accountability of the state, which make it possible to ensure the irreversibility of positive achievements on the path of reforms.

Since the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the country has made remarkable progress in reducing corruption (Erikson, 2017). In the post-Soviet area, Georgia pioneered in building effective, non-corrupt institutions. And in a region where political leaderships are often corrupt, that is a significant accomplishment.

Tamara Kovziridze<sup>2</sup> argued in the interview with Erikson (2017) that almost complete replacement of Georgia's political elites had enabled the country to fight corruption effectively. This is because old elite representatives who refused to change were replaced by newcomers to the system:

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<sup>2</sup> Deputy Minister of Economy between 2004–2008



younger people with no ties to corrupt chains. Kovziridze believes this condition to be the critical point in the fight against corruption. It is especially relevant for the post-Soviet context, where generations' mindset and educational gap are wide (Erikson, 2017).

Second, for the Georgian government, corruption was a goal that spanned across all reform sectors, including tax reforms, labour law, healthcare and education reforms, etc. So, Georgia's plan against corruption was multilateral rather than a stand-alone anti-corruption initiative separate from economic and social reforms. The most notable change implemented by the Saakashvili government was the police reform. As a result, almost 16,000 traffic police officers in one day in July 2004, while being replaced by the new organisation, the Patrol Police. The new institution was smaller, but employees were much better paid and strictly controlled not engage in any corrupt activities (Kharitonov, 2016).

Corruption has decreased in other sectors as well. For example, one of the reforms had a target to reduce the number of layers of administrative bureaucracy. It was done not just to streamline government functions but also to minimise the instances in which a government employee may ask for a bribe. As a result, the number of companies paying bribes to public servants significantly decreased in the first years of changes, indicating that the reform successfully achieved its anti-corruption objective (Nasuti, 2016). Another measure was to reform the educational system by changing university admission procedures, which contributed to a more meritocratic process of admitting candidates (WENR, 2017).

### 5.1.2 Reforms in Ukraine

Similarly to Georgia, Ukraine was plagued by widespread corruption in the early 2000s. The Orange Revolution erupted in 2004 as a result of common anger with the Kuchma's<sup>3</sup> administration; in the months that followed, new president Yushchenko<sup>4</sup> has attempted to adopt several changes similar to the ones in Georgia. Public servants associated with the Kuchma

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<sup>3</sup> Ukrainian engineer and politician who served as Prime Minister of Ukraine from 1992 to 1993 and as the country's second president from 1994 to 2005. Increased privatization, open trade, and stronger connections with Russia were all priorities for his government.

<sup>4</sup> Ukrainian politician who was the country's president from 2005 until 2010.

government were fired and charged with corruption. For example, the state has brought criminal charges against five former regional governors in the first months of reforms (Nasuti, 2016).

However, in Ukraine, the Orange Revolution's initial success in combating corruption was hampered by the Orange elites' political feud that allowed reform spoilers from the previous government to continue to have influence. As a result, there were no substantial anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine. Some analytics consider this inability to combat corruption as a cause of public dissatisfaction with the new government, which led to the restoration of Yanukovich<sup>5</sup> to power six years later (Nasuti, 2016).

The Ukrainian government has also initiated dramatic changes in the police sector, similar to those implemented in Georgia, but they were not finished. The police force, especially the traffic police, maintained a reputation for accepting bribes and not being efficient. For example, in 2011, just 17.4 per cent of people in Ukraine trusted their police, compared to 88 per cent of Georgians (Nasuti, 2016). Reforms in the educational sector have also experienced setbacks 15/07/2021 14:07:00

Another critical obstacle for anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine was the lack of government decisional autonomy from the inside. In the context of Ukraine, a country's decisional sovereignty was primarily based on its ability to act without being affected by oligarchic interests within the party. Georgia's situation differs from Ukraine's because the country elites were newcomers and were not significantly influenced by the strong economic interest groups.

Ukraine was and still largely controlled by a number of financial and industrial conglomerates. They nominate candidates for presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as executive, law enforcement, and judicial agencies. They also have influence over the majority of Ukraine's media (Project MUSE, 2016). Through the administration of lobbying legislation, public procurement, state aid through subsidies, and other privileges, oligarchs employ public powers for personal gains. The rise of corruption among public officials, in general, is also motivated by the governing elite's corruption. These mechanisms have constructed corruption pyramids when an official needs to pay money to her boss, and the boss transfers some of them up the chain. In contrast to Ukraine,

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<sup>5</sup> Ukrainian politician who served as prime minister (2002–05, 2006–07) and president (2010–14) of Ukraine.

oligarchs do not play a significant role in Georgia's legislative framework. Many oligarchs were arrested or imprisoned as a result of the government led by Saakashvili.

Thus, the reforms comprehensiveness was critical to creating simultaneous change of numerous sectors and, hence, a significant component in decreasing corruption. Cross-sectional reforms must all be considered as supporting the change. Choosing only one or a few would not have yielded the same results. The following steps helped Georgia ensuring reforms comprehensiveness. Firstly, almost complete replacement of the corrupt elites refusing to change by newcomers to the system: younger people with no ties to corrupt chains. Secondly, in line with the collective action approach, the Georgian government considered corruption as a cross-sectional goal and was motivated to reform most sectors. Another critical reason for Georgian anti-corruption reforms success was governmental decisional autonomy from the inside. Unlike in Ukraine, economic elites in Georgia did not have a significant influence over politics.

### 5.1.3 Indicators for successful anti-corruption reforms

Based on the theoretical foundation developed in the previous chapter and evidence on reforms in Georgia and Ukraine collected before, this section compares two cases on several indicators: GDP level, the nature of governments, the influence of economic elites in politics, and the motivation for investing in the fight against corruption.

According to some scholars, GDP remains the best predictor of corruption levels (Lučić, Radišić and Dobromirov, 2016, Treisman, 2000). However, the data from Georgia and Ukraine contradicts these assumptions (Figure 5). As demonstrated from the data on GDP per capita, in both countries in the relevant period between 2004 and 2012, especially in the first years after revolutions, Ukraine had a higher GDP per capita that would indicate that it had lower levels of corruption than Georgia. Furthermore, Ukraine's income was roughly double that of Georgia's between 2003 and 2008.

Figure 5: GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) - Georgia, Ukraine



Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank | Eurostat-OECD PPP Programme

Georgia's anti-corruption measures covered all economic and social life aspects rather than being a stand-alone anti-corruption initiative. Georgian reforms were founded on a radical approach to dealing with dysfunctional institutions. As a result, rather than being altered and improved, institutions and their functions were sometimes eliminated. Such radical steps were also possible because the revolutionary United National Movement party<sup>6</sup> in Georgia had control over 65% of the parliament. While in Ukraine, after the revolution, there was a rapid change of governments, each one has denounced the policies of the one before it. Furthermore, there has never been a pro-reform majority in the parliament, as it was in Georgia (Neutze and Karatnycky, 2007).

Reducing corruption results in good reputations and a favourable investment climate, so likely it helps to increase the flows of foreign aids and foreign direct investment (FDI). The Georgian leadership was well aware that the region, which lacked natural resources and large industrial enterprises, needed foreign investment to help the country's development. Thus, the Saakashvili government's main challenge was to attract investment. As a result, foreign direct investment grew significantly (340 million dollars in 2003 and 1.56 billion dollars in 2008 (Nasuti, 2016)).


In the context of constant geopolitical and internal tension, the implementation of reforms in Georgia was a challenging task (Fluri, Cole, 2005). However, the Georgian government used this political and economic challenge as an advantage to attract investments into the country's

<sup>6</sup> Mikheil Saakashvili's political party, which ascended to power after the Rose Revolution and was a majority in government.

development. Figure 6 illustrates the difference in foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP between Georgia and Ukraine between 2003 and 2012.

On the other hand, the oligarchs in Ukraine were active in blocking international investment by various illegal methods, for example, by introducing bureaucratic hurdles that discriminate against investments from the outside. The group of influential ultra-wealthy economic elites in Ukraine emerged because of a strong natural resource basis and strongly influenced government policies. In Georgia, where the economy is more impoverished, oligarchic wealth has played a minor part.

*Figure 6: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) - Ukraine, Georgia*



Source: International Monetary Fund

Some sceptics believed that these "big bang" anti-corruption reforms would only result in short-term success. The argument is that the reforms could only function under the leadership that devised the policy and implode with a change of administration. However, these hypotheses were incorrect for the cases since the changes have been generally sustained after the change of administration, and Georgia's corruption rankings have improved even more (Emerson, Hriptievschi, Kalitenko, Kovziridze, Prohnitchi, 2017).

Thus, this section discussed the comprehensiveness of reforms identifying the three main differences between Georgia and Ukraine that influenced the results of the outcomes. The first critical condition of Georgian relative success was the absence of corruption at the top. In Ukraine, a large part of the post-revolution parliament was coming from the old corrupt networks. Secondly,

for the Georgian government, corruption was a goal that spanned across all reform sectors. Conversely, Ukraine was fighting corruption as a separate phenomenon, a stand-alone anti-corruption initiative different from economic and social reforms. As a result, police or education reforms in Ukraine were not finished and did not achieve significant results. And finally, Georgia's virtually total turnover of the old political elites allowed for progress in combatting corruption, which was not the case in Ukraine.

## 5.2 Political will for anti-corruption reforms

This section applies the modified framework of Brinkerhoff (2010) and compares two cases against five criteria. The purpose of the analysis of those features is to assess and compare levels of political will in Georgia and Ukraine to develop and implement policies, matching them with different outcomes and underlining the influence of political will on reforms. Considering political will to be one of the critical conditions for anti-corruption reforms, Brinkerhoff (2010) proposed the conceptual framework by identifying political will as a group of variables that constitute it. When it comes to anti-corruption, reforms are much more political challenge than a technical ones. Therefore, this thesis considers the character of the leadership of reforms and the readiness of political elites for change to be one of the crucial requirements for successful reforms.

Table 3 summarises the analysis of the level of political will in Georgia and Ukraine on five criteria developed in the theoretical chapter: nature of the initiative, analytical cogency, mobilisation of support, the introduction of credible sanctions, and commitment for sustainable reforms. Each indicator of political will is rated on a three-point scale and classified as high, medium, or low: with a low score when the country performed poorly on this dimension and a high score when the indicator had a significant role while implementing reforms. The table collects evidence on both cases relevant to the assessment.

Table 3: Analysis of political will for Georgian and Ukrainian anti-corruption reforms

Indicators of political will (High-Medium-Low)	Georgia	Evidence	Ukraine	Evidence
Nature of initiative: internally vs externally	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Many home-grown initiatives, for example, Public Service Halls: One-Stop-Shop model of public service delivery.</li> <li>- New administration implemented far-reaching changes, with anti-corruption at the top of the priority list (Slade, 2011).</li> <li>- Georgia's top-down strategy to tackling corruption has been confirmed by the World Bank (2012) analysis.</li> </ul> <p>This factor receives a high score in the evaluation.</p>	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Started internally, but the majority of initiatives were blocked in the parliament on the stage of debates.</li> <li>- Strong opposition to reforms from the economic elites.</li> <li>- There was external pressure from foreign foundations and state organisations in Ukraine to pass anti-corruption laws, perhaps, that officials would be happy not to pass. Therefore, the quality of implementation was low.</li> </ul>
Analytical cogency: evidence-based vs cosmetic policies	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The use of foreign experience to meet local needs: in planning changes, the government drew on global expertise, adjusting foreign techniques to local conditions as appropriate.</li> </ul>	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- One of the main problems was the inefficiency of the civil service apparatus, which has hardly been reformed since Soviet times. Its staff was poorly trained and overloaded. Under</li> </ul>

		<p>- Example: Police reform was supported by the OSCE's Police Assistance Program and the Council of Europe's Police and Human Rights Program, among others (Slade, 2011).</p> <p>- Lessons acquired from best practices, for example, Lithuanian reforms, international experts assistance, were integrated into Georgia's new public register system. Foreign banks and other private sector firms were also considered prime examples by the reformers.</p> <p>- International expertise was also used by civil registry reformers. For example, the United States and the European Union-funded research visit to Baltic and European countries, where Georgian reformers learned about best practices (World Bank, 2012).</p> <p>Despite the extensive use of foreign experience for reforms, they were implemented quickly, which was insufficient for a complete analysis of corruption in all spheres.</p>		<p>such conditions, neither initiative nor productivity can be expected (Laff, Solonenko, 2016).</p> <p>- Unlike the Georgian case, there was no extensive consultation with international organisations in Ukraine.</p>
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Mobilisation of support: cooperation with other actors	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The turning point in the legal regulation of Georgia's anti-corruption policies was the adoption of Presidential Decree No. 550 of 24 June 2005 "On Approval of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy" and the Action Plan for its implementation.</li> <li>- Civil society had a significant role in the creation of anti-corruption policies. It was directly involved in the development of these legal acts, in particular by holding public consultations on any major anti-corruption measures planned.</li> <li>- International organisations based in Georgia (UNDP, World Bank) were also consulted while establishing new policies.</li> </ul>	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The dissolution of the "Orange Coalition" delayed progress on anti-corruption efforts.</li> <li>- As a result of political infighting among ambitious politicians inside the coalition, well-intentioned anti-corruption efforts either went nowhere or have not been followed through and have been ineffective.</li> <li>- Corrupt officials use considerable financial resources and personal influence to ensure that the conditions for further fraud are as favourable as possible.</li> <li>- Even while civil society organisations played an important role in combating corruption, it is not because of initiatives from the government but because of official inaction (Palyvoda, Vinnikov, 2016).</li> </ul>
Use of credible sanctions vs symbolic and	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Under the Patrol Police Law, 15,000 police officers, the entire staff of the Georgian Traffic Police, were dismissed in</li> </ul>	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Law on the Liability of Legal Entities for Corruption-Related Offenses establishes the legal</li> </ul>

partial penalties		<p>one day. This measure aimed at eliminating bribery among officers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Georgian government calculated that traffic police would be strictly punished until they stopped collecting bribes. Consequently, "The number of prisoners has quadrupled, from 5,000 to 20,000".</li> <li>- Raising civil servants' salaries is another way to reduce the incentive for corruption. This reform was also implemented in Georgia, where civil servants' wages increased 15-fold (World Bank, 2018).</li> </ul>		<p>entity's liability for corruption and the following types of sanctions: fines, prohibition from engaging in certain types of activities, asset confiscation, and the legal entity's liquidation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The salaries of officials have not been raised. And low wages only exacerbate opportunities for corruption.</li> </ul>
Long-term commitment vs one-time effort or a token gesture	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The score for the consistency of effort is high because there was a sustained emphasis on the reforms result and the allocation of appropriate resources.</li> <li>- The legal regulation of the institutional framework of anti-corruption policy was necessary for the fight against corruption. Before 2005, the coordinating role in the field of anti-corruption policy in Georgia was transferred</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Because of the lack of consistency and appropriate resources to carry out the policies against corruption, the continuity of effort aspect received a poor grade in the evaluation.</li> <li>- The Ukrainian government did not have a coherent plan for reforms.</li> <li>- While some anti-corruption legislation has been passed, nothing has</li> </ul>

		<p>several times from one institution to another.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In 2005, this activity was taken over by the Office of the State Minister for Reforms Coordination.</li> <li>- In 2008, a particular institution for coordinating anti-corruption policy: the Interagency Council on Fighting Corruption, was established.</li> <li>- As demonstrated by various indices on corruption measurement, after the change of the government in 2012 and up until now show that the reform's outcomes have stayed consistent and have resulted in other beneficial results.</li> </ul>		<p>been done to guarantee that it is put into practice (Spirova, 2008).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institutional reform initiatives, for example, restructuration of the police training academy, were absent.</li> </ul>
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Source: collected data summarised by the author

So, Georgia had a high degree of political will in its anti-corruption reforms, according to Brinkerhoff's five criteria of political will measurement. The anti-corruption program had a strong locus of initiative, as well as a long-term commitment to reforms, use of credible sanctions, and mobilisation components of political will. The criterium of use of international experience is medium due to the short time of the implementation of the reforms, which was insufficient for a complete analysis of corruption in all spheres. Overall, Georgia had a medium-high level of political will for anti-corruption reforms. While in Ukraine, the level of political will was medium-low. The nature of the initiative, the application of credible sanctions, and continuity of effort were scored as a medium. At the same time, analytical cogency and public commitment were poor.

Thus, starting in 2004, there was a comprehensive political will in Georgia for drastic and swift anti-corruption reforms, which have been maintained. Legislative regulation in Ukraine was steadily nearing international norms, but the execution was hampered by various problems that might be summed up as a lack of political will. World Bank conducted the analysis of Georgian anti-corruption reforms and explained "how" they succeed, focusing on evidence and interviews with the key players. The study concludes that strong political will was crucial for establishing credibility by reforming the most tangible for citizens areas of corruption, such as higher education and traffic police (World Bank, 2012).

According to the World Bank analysis, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was uniquely successful in Georgia because of his strong political commitment, backed by the reforms' comprehensiveness, speed, boldness, sequencing, and, most crucially, the role of the team involved in their implementation (World Bank, 2012). For Ukraine, political will is the missing element in the anti-corruption triangle – strong political will, mobilised civil society, and independent mass media. Even though it is widely recognised that Ukraine had an active civil society and developed independent media, the country was not able to successfully fight corruption in the absence of a high level of political will.

In terms of the leadership role, the anti-corruption measures in Georgia had prominent characteristics. First, the leadership coordinated by the top-down approach. Second, there was also no way for middle- or lower-level officials to obstruct critical changes due to unscrupulous motives. Furthermore, through encouraging reformers, the leadership aggressively promoted healthy competition among government members for reform proposals. Thus, leadership that is committed, persistent, and results-oriented is essential for anti-corruption reforms.

Discussing the reason for anti-corruption reforms failure, Persson et al. (2013) emphasise the role of political will for successful reforms. The authors point out that the weakness of recent anti-corruption legislation is primarily due to a lack of players able to serve as principals and implement current laws and policies. In brief, in most countries with widespread corruption, genuine political will is absent, without which anti-corruption efforts are doomed to fail (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2013).

## Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusion

This thesis aimed to analyse the outcomes of anti-corruption reforms in Georgia and Ukraine and identify the main differences that have led to Georgia's success and Ukraine's failure to improve control of corruption. Firstly, it argued that a comprehensive reform package that leaves no room for corruption in key institutions such as healthcare, police, education, etc., is necessary to reduce corruption at the country level substantially. It is not enough to establish anti-corruption bodies or commissions on corruption control, as it was in Ukraine, the complex package of reforms should be introduced.

Secondly, this thesis concludes that for the reforms to be successful, there is a need for a strong political will. After the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, political elites have changed. The new leaders and administrations in both countries expressed grand ambitions for combating corruption, but the process proved to be a challenge for them. The five measures of the political will were used to assess the strength of political will in Georgia and Ukraine to combat corruption.

For the analysis, two main theoretical approaches were applied, namely the framework of Brinkerhoff (2010) to use the concept of political will to the fight against corruption and the Rothsteins (2011) "big bang" theory, emphasising the importance of structural changes needed to ensure the long-term viability of anti-corruption efforts.

Acknowledging the significant trends influencing anti-corruption performance, such as democratisation and Europeanisation, religion, or communist past, this thesis controlled these indicators while analysing anti-corruption reforms in the selected cases. However, given the similarities of the cases chosen in this regard (summarised in chapter 4), the study focused on understanding and evaluation of political will and its impact on the design and implementation of anti-corruption reforms. Moreover, while some academics claim that post-communist countries are, on average, more corrupt (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005, Andvig, 2006, Treisman, 2003), this study argued that communist past was not the most powerful indicator for the outcome of anti-corruption reforms while comparing two cases with the similar institutional background.

The findings suggest that a complex package of political, economic and social reforms in a relatively short time leads to a reduction of corruption as one of the parts of state dysfunctionality. However, for the success of these complex reforms, a high level of political will is needed to implement and ensure the sustainability of anti-corruption reforms. Also, an additional argument of this thesis is the importance of autonomy from within for effective changes, even when a strong political will exists. Political elites should not be subject to serious pressure from economic elites, as was seen in Ukraine, where oligarchs influence political agenda and send their candidates to the parliament.

This comparative analysis teaches two key lessons. Firstly, this thesis argued that strong political leadership, commitment to sustainable reforms and effective communication to people about reforms, are the key components of successful anti-corruption policies implementation. And secondly, such a complex approach to anti-corruption policies would be impossible without the strong political will which was the main reason for the Georgian success and Ukrainian failure in this regard.

### **Implications:**

The results are useful for the understanding of the anti-corruption reforms specific in the post-communist countries. Even though Georgian anti-corruption development is unique, the strategy and mechanisms used for reform implementation can be used as good practice for other countries. After the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the anti-corruption agenda became extremely important. And, for example, while reforming Ukrainian Police Force in 2015, similar methods have been introduced, and the reform was implemented in cooperation with Georgian public servants (Bloomberg.Com, 2015). The election of a new President Zelensky in 2019 in Ukraine and the change of elites brought a new window of opportunity for successful anti-corruption initiatives. To achieve positive changes, Ukraine must in many ways follow Georgia's reform process after 2004.

Georgia's experience demonstrates that corruption may be considerably decreased in a short period of time. To conclude, based on the theoretical approaches used in the study, it identifies critical success factors which ensured the sustainability and effectiveness of reforms in Georgia. One of them was an extensive adaptation of international experience and best practices to local conditions.

Another factor was the comprehensiveness of reforms: in a short period of time, large-scale political, economic, and social changes were implemented. Another point is related to one of the indicators of political will: use of credible sanctions: anti-corruption measures that not only penalise but also decrease possibilities for wrongdoing are more successful (significant salary raise for civil servants). Finally, the Ukrainian example demonstrated that the lack of competent staff is an obstacle to the implementation of reforms. Georgia's political leadership has solved the staffing problem by bringing in people from outside, in particular those with private sector experience.

This study adds to the literature by examining relationships between political will and effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms, which can be further developed in future research for analysing anti-corruption measures successes and failures. The findings of this thesis can be used for the analysis of regimes in post-communist countries and the other geographical areas in the field of anti-corruption reforms and beyond. Finally, despite the success of Georgia in anti-corruption and the strong political will for reforms, there is still room for further discussion. For example, whether the relatively small size of the country and the substantial support from the international community were the reason for its rapid transformation toward good governance. There is still number of ways to expand the anti-corruption knowledge further. For example, similar studies selecting other countries from different regions with endemic corruption, such as Africa or South America, would help in determining if elements that work in Eastern Europe and Central Asia can be applied to other regions. Another way to expand the topic that this study has not been able to cover is to research how the main findings are related to grand corruption.

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## Appendix: Thesis report



Thesis Report  
Central European University/University of York

**Relationship between gender equality in politics and corruption.  
Examples of Germany and Russia**

*Alina Bobkova*

Erasmus Mundus Master's Program in Public Policy

**Thesis supervision:**

*Prof Agnes Batory*

Professor of Public Policy, Central European University

*Dr Simona Davidescu*

Director of Postgraduate Taught Programmes, Department of Politics, University of York

Student number: CEU 1900720, University of York 207001363

Address: Csengery ut. 62A, 1067 Budapest/Hungary

E-mail: Bobkova\_Alina@spp.ceu.edu

Telephone: +363015609662

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## 1. Introduction

It is widely recognised that development goals cannot be accomplished until corruption is actively tackled. Corruption is hindering businesses, investments, and hence, countries' economies, and as such, it is one of the biggest reasons for "bad governance". Political scientists, together with economists, argue that dysfunctional government institutions play a crucial role in many of today's most urgent economic and social issues.

So, both fighting against corruption and promoting gender equality in politics and beyond are the essential components of the "good governance" and priorities in the achievement of the United Nations' sustainable development goals<sup>7</sup>. That is why I believe that gender-related focus on corruption perception is relevant and innovative. The goal of this thesis will be to investigate relations between gender and corruption in different political settings, in Germany and Russia. The two countries have different levels of accountability which, among other things, is crucial for a stronger negative correlation between gender and corruption.

I hypothesise that there is a correlation between women's representation and levels of corruption and prove that female politicians produce significantly less suspicion for corruption. Although some recent studies suggest that this link is not suitable for every context, and the strength of the relationship between gender and corruption perception is also different in democratic and non-democratic regimes.<sup>8</sup> Notwithstanding a rising amount of literature on gender - corruption relationship, the role of different political contexts with different levels of accountability has not been fully studied in the literature on gender impact on corruption.

To contribute to the literature, which considers gender perspective on corruption perception level I am raising the following research question: does female participation in politics influence the perception of corruption, and how this relationship differs in different political contexts?

Thus, this thesis report analyses the link between female participation in politics and corruption; it suggests the hypothesis that the relationship between them is more robust in one political context but not in others. To test and support this hypothesis, empirical data from the countries with different political regimes and different levels of electoral accountability, Germany and Russia, will be used.

<sup>7</sup> "The 17 goals | Department of Economic and Social Affairs," accessed August 15, 2020, <https://sdgs.un.org/goals>.

<sup>8</sup> "Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional Context | Politics & Gender | Cambridge Core," accessed August 11, 2020, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/fairer-sex-or-purity-myth-corruption-gender-and-institutional-context/E33CD848226B8BE25F34E5291F1FB351>.

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Dollar, D., Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2001). Are women really the fairer sex? Corruption and women in government. *Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization*, 46, 423–429.



Many studies have shown convincing evidence that gender equality in politics has placed countries on the path to better governance<sup>9</sup>. That is why it is important to show the link between gender and corruption, as this might have consequences for women running for governmental office.

This thesis report primarily represents the theoretical foundation for the thesis, and it is divided into five parts. Firstly, the literature review specifies the key concepts used in this research and puts it into the context of the researches related to the gender perspective on corruption. It starts from the broader discussion on the gender equality influence of “good governance” and then narrows to the different approaches on the gender-corruption relationship, considering two cases with different levels of accountability. The following section summarizes the framework of the thesis and set hypotheses on gender-corruption interrelations and its context-specific character. The subsequent part is the outline of the research design, which consists of a structured literature review, case study, and interviews or survey for both cases. The report ends with the conclusion and presents the expected results of the thesis. The last section will represent the working schedule for the thesis with the specific deadlines for writing thesis parts.

Finally, in this thesis report, I will only discuss the influence of gender on corruption perception and do not consider whether more gender equality influences the actual level of corruption.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1 Key concepts

Since this thesis discusses the gender perspective on corruption, as the first step in the research, I will formulate and differentiate concepts and theoretical frameworks within which it will be examined. I consider this thesis report as a basis and preparation for the thesis next year. That is why I believe it will be helpful to clearly define theoretical concepts to compare and analyse empirical information in a meaningful way. Later, in the data operationalisation section, I will indicate how the main concepts are going to be measured and what indicators will be used.

#### *Gender and gender equality*

According to the WHO, gender refers to roles, behaviours, characteristics, and opportunities for girls, boys as well as women or men, which their society considers as appropriate for them. Gender and sex differ from each other, even though they operate with binary categories of biological sex<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, eds., *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, Political Corruption and Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1\\_P4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1_P4)

<sup>10</sup> “Gender,” accessed August 12, 2020, <https://www.who.int/health-topics/genader>.

Equality between men and women in politics means equal opportunities and fair access to resources, balanced participation in the decision-making processes, and economic activities, irrespective of gender.

### ***Corruption***

It is well established that the concept of corruption is far from being defined. Corruption on various scales takes countless forms with numerous causes and unintended consequences, some of which are extreme and irreversible. Since corruption takes place in secret, it is difficult to determine precisely how it works, and the number of unreported cases is high.

Taking into account the difficulty to define and to measure corruption, some scholars use a tool of describing the opposite of corruption<sup>11</sup>. They are considering phenomena that are contiguous with little or no corruption, such as “state capacity”, “good governance”<sup>12</sup>.

Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain<sup>13</sup>. Corruption has multifaceted adverse effects such as eroding trust, undermining government capacity, impeding economic growth, increasing inequality, violence, and social injustice. Although corruption exists in countries around the world, research has shown that “democracies are less corrupt on average than non-democracies”<sup>14</sup>.

### ***“Good governance”***

Eight main characteristics are found in most of the literature on “good governance”: inclusivity, fairness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, direction, performance, and capability<sup>15</sup>.

“Good governance” is defined by the United Nations Development Programme as a decision-making and implementation mechanism that guarantees that corruption is minimised ensures that the interests of minorities and marginalised social groups are taken into account and that decision-making is in line with societies’ present and future needs. Transparency, participation, and accountability are core aspects of “good governance”. Various international documents and

<sup>11</sup> Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” *Governance* 21, no. 2 (2008): 165–90, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x>.

<sup>12</sup> “Quality of Government: Toward a More Complex Definition,” ResearchGate, accessed August 15, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000191>.

<sup>13</sup> “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency.org, accessed August 19, 2020, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>.

<sup>14</sup> Daniel Stockemer and Aksel Sundström, “Corruption and Women in Cabinets: Informal Barriers to Recruitment in the Executive,” *Governance* 32, no. 1 (2019): 83–102, <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12352>.P.85

<sup>15</sup> Emily F. Pomeranz and Richard C. Stedman, “Measuring Good Governance: Piloting an Instrument for Evaluating Good Governance Principles,” *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning* 22, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 428–40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2020.1753181>.

declarations are defining “good governance” and human rights as necessary conditions for the reduction of poverty and increasing growth.

### ***Electoral accountability***

Electoral accountability in this work will be described as an opportunity for voters to identify corrupt cases and to punish corrupt officials at the election cycle. At least two components should be included in a theoretical framework on electoral accountability: voters, who choose whether or not to elect officials mainly based on their achievements, and the officials, who can respond to the electorate’s expectation influencing their decisions<sup>16</sup>.

The concept of electoral accountability is an essential factor influencing the strength of the link between gender and corruption. The stronger is electoral accountability, the stronger will be the link between increased female participation in politics and decreased corruption.

In line with the rational choice theory, corruption can also be considered in the realm of a principal-agent framework, which means that agents, *ceteris paribus*, tend to maximise costs and benefits to get the best advantages from their actions. In the circumstances with low levels of accountability, legislators have little or no motivation to serve honestly act or seek to represent the interest of the people. Since most voters condemn corruption, in the systems with a high level of accountability, they will punish corrupt candidates on elections. On the other hand, in countries, like Russia or Mexico, where corruption is pervasive, negative consequences for those involved in certain corruption cases rarely occur. Corruption in these settings is not especially risky and may even serve a way to move up the career ladder for political elites.

## **2.2 Gender equality and “good governance”. COVID-19 example**

Within the broader area exploring the consequences of women’s political representation, there is a field of research analysing the relationship between women's participation and “good governance”<sup>17</sup>. The literature includes different policy areas, but the outcome remains the same: more women within political structures positively contribute to less corrupt governments and

<sup>16</sup> “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work | Annual Review of Political Science,” accessed August 14, 2020, <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823>.

<sup>17</sup> Mauro Paoloni, Paola Paoloni, and Rosa Lombardi, “The Impact on the Governance of the Gender Quotas Legislation: The Italian Case,” *Measuring Business Excellence* 23, no. 3 (January 1, 2019): 317–34, <https://doi.org/10.1108/MBE-02-2019-0019>. Ennsner-Jedenastik, L., 2017. How women’s political representation affects spending on family benefits. *Journal of Social Policy*, 563–581.

Naila Kabeer and Luisa Natali, “Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Is There a Win-Win?,” *IDS Working Papers* 2013, no. 417 (2013): 1–58, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2013.00417.x>.

Anne Marie Goetz, “Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?,” *Development and Change* 38, no. 1 (2007): 87–105, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00404.x>.

better quality of institutions. Some scholars hypothesise that the relationship between more gender equality and changes toward “good governance” is explained by specific social roles, in which women are expected to minimise risks and to take care of others<sup>18</sup>.

Based on the explanation of how female participation in politics influences the improvement in the quality of governance, researchers refer to gender differences in the behaviour of women politicians. Previous studies have found women to be more risk-averse and favour an empathetic, science-based leadership style.

These characteristics have been recognized by many scholars as key in the relative success of female leaders in the fight against coronavirus. New studies have begun to emerge which shows that women leaders have managed the crisis caused by COVID-19 better than their male colleagues. For example, Garikipati and Kambhampati have constructed a dataset for 194 countries, using a variety of socio-demographic variables to match the most comparable female and male-led neighbours. Their findings demonstrate that in the female-led countries, the COVID results are systemically better, and the authors explain it in several ways by proactive and cooperative policy responses taken by women in charge<sup>19</sup>.

The authors use the nearest and the most similar in terms of characteristics neighbour comparing method, such as Germany with the United Kingdom, or Finland compared to neighbouring Sweden. They match women-led countries with countries in the control group that are as similar as possible in terms of characteristics, such as size, development level, and healthcare systems.

The factors that influence the consequences of the pandemic are likely to be diverse in different countries. Nonetheless, the gender perspective on leadership may have been a crucial factor that influenced the results, showing the importance of stereotypically female leadership qualities such as willingness to cooperate with multidisciplinary specialists, empathy, ability to communicate effectively and clearly.

Thus, the still underestimated characteristics female leaders bring to the decision-making process are now becoming more relevant and serve as an advantage for the leadership in the crisis period.

### **2.3 Main approaches to the relationship between gender and corruption**

A correlation cannot explain the question of causality. The critical dilemma arises: if it is a fairer society that lowers the corruption rate, or if it is a higher scope of corruption that hinders women from fully engaging in economics and political life? Both of these possible effects are discussed in the related literature while explaining the link between gender and corruption. This relationship

<sup>18</sup> Stensöta and Wängnerud, *Gender and Corruption*. P.40

<sup>19</sup> Supriya Garikipati and Uma Kambhampati, “Leading the Fight Against the Pandemic: Does Gender ‘Really’ Matter?,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, June 3, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617953>.

is most often considered from three respects, underlying different perspectives of the link between gender and corruption.

Firstly, gender is seen as an influential component in understanding corrupt behaviour. It demonstrates the differences between men and women in their ability to engage in corrupt activities and illicit relational networks. For example, some researchers found that women are more risk-averse than men, and, hence, the more female officials are in office, the less likely unethical or corrupt practices will occur out of fear of getting caught<sup>20</sup>.

Secondly, the reverse effect can also be observed, meaning the impact of corruption on the process of fostering gender equality. Gender policies can naturally be negatively influenced by corruption. So, one can claim that improving the corruption situation in a country may improve the efficacy of gender policies<sup>21</sup>.

Finally, the negative effect of corruption might be gender-dependent among the people affected by it. Taking into account that men and women experience corruption differently, this is important to recognise who is more susceptible to which facet of corruption. Moreover, some compensating policies can be implemented to smooth this effect<sup>22</sup>.

In the thesis, I am not going to focus on the sociological or psychological reasons for this relationship. The research will be based on the framework of the first approach to investigate the link between gender and corruption, considering how the first one influences the second. To be more precise, the question shall be how is the gender of an elected politician or government official affecting people's perception about him/her being involved in corruption, and to what extent voters are ready to punish an elected official depending on their gender.

### ***Why is there a negative correlation between women in politics and perceived corruption?***

Given that gender stereotypes present female politicians as more ethical and trustworthy than their male counterparts, there is a strong theoretical basis to claim that female participation in politics can mitigate perceptions of corruption<sup>23</sup>. It suggests that voters have a different view of the corruptibility of elected representatives among men and women and that female officials are less likely than men considered to be corrupt.

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<sup>20</sup> "Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and Expected Retirement Benefits: Financial Analysts Journal: Vol 63, No 4," accessed August 26, 2020, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2469/faj.v63.n4.4749>.

<sup>21</sup> Stockemer and Sundström, "Corruption and Women in Cabinets."

<sup>22</sup> Björn Frank, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, and Frédéric Boehm, "Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments," *The European Journal of Development Research* 23, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 59–71, <https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2010.47>. P. 60

<sup>23</sup> Barnes, T., & Beaulieu, E. (2014). Gender Stereotypes and Corruption: How Candidates Affect Perceptions of Election Fraud. *Politics & Gender*, 10(3), 365–391. DOI:10.1017/S1743923X14000221, p. 365.

There were several empirical studies conducted on the link of women in politics to the level of perception of corruption. For example, Barnes and Beaulieu examined the link between gender and corruption, focusing on the electoral process in the United States. Using the US national survey experiment, they came to the conclusion that the involvement of women in government has lowered fears of bribery and electoral fraud among the population<sup>24</sup>.

However, according to the authors, the most convincing explanations for this outcome was that people consider women as being more risk-averse than men and more likely to be outsiders in politics, hence, being less involved into corrupt operations.

Some studies suggest that women are more subjected to follow social standards, as systematic discrimination against them restricts their ability to maneuver<sup>25</sup>. As a consequence, male and female politicians are differently punished for corruption activities. Women have a greater self-interest as members of marginalized communities in upholding expectations of voters because they are likely to be punished more harshly for corruption.

### *Institutional argument*

Another condition, which according to the authors plays a vital role in the female representation in politics on corruption perception level is the institutional contexts. In the settings where corruption is not considered to be an institutional norm, this relationship is significantly more robust<sup>26</sup>. A similar position is shared by Esarey and Chirillo. In their research, the authors support the institutional argument regarding the nature of female politicians being less corrupt. Based on the previous literature assuming that “women are not necessarily more honest or less corrupt than men”, they claim that women’s attitudes and behaviours about corruption depend on cultural context and institutions<sup>27</sup>.

Even though this thesis report focuses on the perception-based measurement of corruption, it is interesting to emphasise how the inclusion of women in elected assemblies influences both grand and petit corruption. Using national non-perception-based corruption measures, Bauhr et al. found that while both men and women are experiencing less bribery, as women’s representation on local councils rises, the rate of bribe pay among females is decreasing the highest, especially in education and healthcare spheres<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Stensöta and Wängnerud, Gender and Corruption. P. 62

<sup>25</sup> Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo, “‘Fairer Sex’ or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional Context,” *Politics & Gender* 9, no. 04 (December 2013): 361–89, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X13000378>. P. 6

<sup>26</sup> Stensöta and Wängnerud, Gender and Corruption. P.661

<sup>27</sup> Esarey and Chirillo, “‘Fairer Sex’ or Purity Myth?” P. 2

<sup>28</sup> “Exclusion or Interests? Why Females in Elected Office Reduce Petty and Grand Corruption - BAUHR - 2019 - European Journal of Political Research - Wiley Online Library,” accessed August 23, 2020, <https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-6765.12300>.

In short, it is in contexts where there is room for women to manoeuvre and where norms allow for personal experiences to make an imprint that we most likely can expect the presence of women to curb corruption.

So, in the existing gender-related literature on corruption, there are four main approaches to explain why more women in politics lower the level of corruption. Firstly, woman politicians may have fewer chances to engage in corrupt activities, since they are not included in male-dominated networks. Secondly, some scholars consider women to be more risk-averse. Another argument is that women who enter politics due to a lower representation may generally have higher qualifications, or some studies suggest that women are more resistant to corruption<sup>29</sup>.

### 3. Gender and corruption in different political contexts

Some recent studies conclude that the effect of gender equality has on the level of corruption is not universal. Gender differences in terms of corruption perception are more evident in democracies than in authoritarian societies<sup>30</sup>. The argument is in line with the institutional explanation of the relationship between gender and corruption. In democratic environments where women have more space to take actions, it is more likely to expect the involvement of women to counter corruption.

One perspective to explain why gender and corruption have a weaker link in autocracies is that such phenomena as bribery, personal loyalty, and favourability are often characteristic of its governments' usual way of functioning and are not considered as corruption. In their study, Esarey and Chirillo came to a similar conclusion, they also found a weak or non-existent link between gender and corruption in the autocratic context. On the contrary, in democratic countries where corruption is more specified, they found closer ties<sup>31</sup>.

In their study, Justin Esarey and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer have also provided empirical evidence on a strong negative correlation between the representation of women in politics and the perceived level of corruption in democracies compared to autocracies, stressing the level of accountability (Appendix 1).<sup>32</sup>

In this thesis report, electoral accountability is considered as a crucial element, and the research will not only highlight how political regime affects the gender influence on corruption but also to consider different levels of accountability in the countries of research, particularly electoral accountability. The level of accountability is critically important for female representation and

<sup>29</sup> Andrew C. Eggers, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner, "Corruption, Accountability, and Gender: Do Female Politicians Face Higher Standards in Public Life?," *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (October 25, 2017): 321–26, <https://doi.org/10.1086/694649>.

<sup>30</sup> Goetz, "Political Cleaners."

<sup>31</sup> Esarey and Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth?" P.4

<sup>32</sup> Justin Esarey and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies", *British Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 2018): 659–90, p. 681 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000478>.

corruption relationship. If accountability is low or absent, public servants have no or little motivation to behave honestly or to prioritise the interest of people<sup>33</sup>.

In the formation of gender perceptions about corruption, social institutes and the political context may also play a crucial role. As women feel more pressure to comply with existing policy norms on corruption, they are less likely to tolerate corruption in a democratic context where corruption is condemned more than in autocratic contexts where corruption seems to be more widely accepted as a way of doing business.

### 3.1 Accountability and women in politics in German and Russian governments

Accountability does not only refer to the government's side, defining their duty to clarify and justify the usage of their authority<sup>34</sup>. More relevant for this work is to highlight its influence on the relationship between gender and corruption. In the high accountability contexts, the population is entitled to keep its authorities accountable mainly through elections and under certain circumstances. In the following section, this thesis report analyses the main characteristics of political regimes in Germany and Russia.

Germany has a high level of accountability. According to Freedom house data (2019), Germany is free and is scored 94/100. The country has a high level of media freedom (4/4). 2020 World Press Freedom Index ranks Germany as 11<sup>th</sup> country in the world<sup>35</sup>. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, Germany is the 9<sup>th</sup> cleanest country<sup>36</sup>.

On the contrary, Russia has significantly lower scores on all the dimensions. Freedom House (2019) characterised Russia as a not free country and give it a score of 20/100. For example, in the section "Are there free and independent media?" the country received 0 / 4. Similar to the Freedom House results, Russia is ranked as 149<sup>th</sup> in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index<sup>37</sup>. According to Polity IV, the regime in Russia is scored from 3 to 6 in different periods in the last ten years out of 10<sup>38</sup>. Corruption is perceived as an urgent problem in Russia, in the Corruption Perception Index 2019, published by Transparency International Russia is ranked 137<sup>th</sup><sup>39</sup>.

### 3.2 Female representation in German and Russian governments

<sup>33</sup> Amy C. Alexander, Andreas Bågenholm, and Nicholas Charron, "Are Women More Likely to Throw the Rascals out? The Mobilizing Effect of Social Service Spending on Female Voters," *Public Choice* 184, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 235–61, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00761-w>.

<sup>34</sup> Aitalina Azarova, "Democratic Accountability of Russian Regional Governments: Do Elections Matter?," *Policy Analyses*, January 1, 2005, <http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002522/>.

<sup>35</sup> 'The World Press Freedom Index | RSF', accessed 11 August 2020, <https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index>.

<sup>36</sup> 'Corruption Perceptions Index - Transparency.Org', accessed 10 August 2020, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>.

<sup>37</sup> 'The World Press Freedom Index | RSF.'

<sup>38</sup> 'Freedom House | Expanding Freedom and Democracy', accessed 10 August 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/>.

<sup>39</sup> 'Corruption Perceptions Index', Transparency.org, accessed 10 August 2020, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>.



Women are underrepresented in the Russian Parliament as well as in the local governments. Both chambers of Parliament, the State Duma, and the Federation Council have fewer than a fifth of its seats occupied by women. A similar situation in the executive branch: there are just 2 out of 29 women-led cabinets<sup>40</sup>. The political recruitment of women is conducted through informal channels, which makes it easy to demobilise them, ensuring loyalty with their male employers' demands on patriarchal and other agendas that are not in favour of women. Under these circumstances, female lawmakers may support a policy which damages woman and cannot be considered as promoters of women's interests.<sup>41</sup>

In Germany, even though Angela Merkel has been Chancellor for 15 years, the Bundestag has dramatically reduced the number of women after the 2017 federal elections. 218 of the 709 elected members of the parliament, or 31%, are women. Germany ranks 46th in the world female representation ranking<sup>42</sup>.

Another factor that affects the relationship between gender and corruption is the evidence that increasing female representation in politics does not work the same way in autocracies and democracies<sup>43</sup>. In the realm of a theoretical framework on using gender norms as a tool for international relations, it is argued that authoritarian leaders may increase the number of women in politics to legitimise their power, especially for the international audiences<sup>44</sup>.

For the domestic audience, the increased female political representation may also be used as a legitimising tool, meaning that the rising number of women in governmental positions will play a significant role in improving the prestige of government and increase the level of legitimacy inside a country.

Briefly, authoritarian governments ought to extend women's representation to create the appearance of equality, transparency, and accountability. Following the literature on electoral authoritarianism, in non-democratic countries, the essence of formal democratic institutions is undermined and used as a façade<sup>45</sup>. Hence, I will claim that the increased numbers of women in politics in non-democracies may have no or little effect on corruption and quality of government in general.

<sup>40</sup> 'Russia', Freedom House, accessed 13 August 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2020>.

<sup>41</sup> "Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia - Oxford Scholarship," accessed August 15, 2020, <https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199324347.001.0001/acprof-9780199324347>. P.191

<sup>42</sup> Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), "In German Politics, Women Still Have a Long Way to Go | DW | 12.11.2018," DW.COM, accessed August 15, 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/in-german-politics-women-still-have-a-long-way-to-go/a-46226146>.

<sup>43</sup> Marina Nistotskaya and Helena Stensöta, "Is Women's Political Representation Beneficial to Women's Interests in Autocracies? Theory and Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia," 2017, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1_8).

<sup>44</sup> "Electoral Quotas and Political Representation: Comparative Perspectives - Mona Lena Krook, Pär Zetterberg, 2014," accessed August 21, 2020, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512113508422>.

<sup>45</sup> Karin Aggestam and Ann Towns, "The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 21, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 9–28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1483206>.

<sup>45</sup> Nistotskaya and Stensöta, "Is Women's Political Representation Beneficial to Women's Interests in Autocracies?"

On the Russian example, according to Olga Kryshchanovskaya, a sociologist specialising in Russian political establishment, patriarchal culture and traditions in Russia are the reason for the small number of women involved in politics. She claims that male legislators “just let certain women enter politics who do not have their strong positions, look nice and are simply marionettes”<sup>46</sup>.

#### 4. Hypothesizes

*Hypothesis 1:* There is a correlation between women’s representation and levels of corruption. The presence of female politicians will reduce suspicions of corruption.

*Hypothesis 2:* This relationship will be different depending on the political context and the level of accountability.

As it was already mentioned, the positive effect of female representation in politics to lower corruption is context-dependent and has proved to be higher in democracies compared to non-democracies<sup>47</sup>. In authoritarian contexts with a low level of accountability, Stensöta and Wängnerud in line with the theory of differential treatment by gender identify that women and men as politicians can be viewed as similarly corrupt by the people. And hence there will be no difference in corruption perception regardless of the number of women in governmental offices<sup>48</sup>.

Since in the thesis the focus will be on corruption perception, I will suggest that the relationship between gender and corruption might also work the other way as it was suggested in most studies. The logic behind it is that the link actually can be stronger in autocracies than in democracies since women’s leadership in democracies is normalised and does not make a significant difference for the perception of corruption. While in autocracies, women in politics are rare, so gender stereotypes that female politicians are more honest or as newcomers are “cleaner” play a significant role. However, this assumption must be empirically tested.

### 5. Research design

#### 5.1. Methodology

The goal of this thesis is to show the negative correlation between increasing female participation in politics and the level of perceived corruption and to consider how this relationship functions in countries with different political contexts and levels of electoral accountability.

For this purpose, I will test hypotheses using two complementary qualitative methods:

<sup>46</sup> Yaroslava Kyrkhina and RBTH, “Gender Gap Still Wide in Russian Politics,” September 11, 2013, [https://www.rbth.com/politics/2013/09/11/gender\\_gap\\_still\\_wide\\_in\\_russian\\_politics\\_29719.html](https://www.rbth.com/politics/2013/09/11/gender_gap_still_wide_in_russian_politics_29719.html).

<sup>47</sup> Esarey and Chirillo, “‘Fairer Sex’ or Purity Myth?”

<sup>48</sup> Stensöta and Wängnerud, Gender and Corruption, 63.

- 1) Case study: a controlled comparison of the influence of female participation in politics on the level of perceived corruption in Russia and Germany.
- 2) Survey or interviews in both countries

For the moment, I consider two options for this method:

*Option A: expert interviews*

Interviews with experts in the anti-corruption research and practitioners (university professors, NGOs employees, activists).

*Option B: political science students survey*

Choosing this option, I will select groups with shared characteristics both in Germany and in Russia, such as age, level of education, controlling the gender balance of the groups. A questionnaire will contain simulation of the corrupt scenarios with female and male candidates. The expected results would be that female candidates produce less suspicion that corruption cases are very likely, with controlling differences in two countries with different political characteristics.

### **Cases selection:**

Regarding the method of the case selection, the thesis will consider two countries with different political characteristics and levels of accountability to analyse how the link between gender and corruption differs between democracies and autocracies, not on the example of a large number of countries, but a focused comparison with the use of the qualitative methods.

I consider also controlling the gender variable of respondents while evaluating the results of the survey/interview. Some recent research projects have started to incorporate class in research on abuse, which indicates gender disparities. In their research, Stensöta et al. found that women as voters tend to penalise corrupt officials and groups more than men<sup>49</sup>.

## **5.2 Data and data operationalisation**

Dependent variable: Level of the perceived corruption

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<sup>49</sup> Helena Olofsdotter Stensöta, Lena Wängnerud, and Mattias Agerberg, "Why Women in Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties," in *Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government*, ed. Carl Dahlström and Lena Wängnerud, Executive Politics and Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 245–62, [https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137556288\\_14](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137556288_14). Eggers, Vivyan, and Wagner, "Corruption, Accountability, and Gender."

Independent variable: Gender equality in politics

Conditional variable (influences the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable):

The political regime and the level of accountability

Given the high/low level of electoral accountability in the country, the relationship between gender and corruption will differ between the contexts.

### ***Data operationalization***

Below I will describe how this thesis will measure the main concepts used.

#### 1) Corruption perception

Indicator: Corruption perception index by Transparency International that ranked the countries according to the level of perceived corruption.

This ranking as other corruption measurement indices depends on specific common indicators of corruption, which are both focused on the rate of corruption viewed by entrepreneurs, typically international investors, and less often by local officials or journalists (Appendix 3).

#### 2) Female participation in politics

Indicator: women in national parliaments by Inter-Parliamentary Union<sup>50</sup>

Rank	Country	Lower or single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	% W	Elections	Seats*	Women	% W
47	Germany	24.09.2017	709	219	30.9%	NA.	69	27	39.1%
130	Russia	18.09.2016	450	71	15.8%	NA.	170	31	18.2%

#### 3) Political regime

Indicator: The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2019

<sup>50</sup> "Women in Parliaments: World Classification," accessed August 14, 2020, <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>.

Germany is ranked on the top of the list, being classified as a full democracy in the 13<sup>th</sup> place. Russia, on the contrary, is closer to the bottom of the ranking, taking 134<sup>th</sup> place, surrounded by Zimbabwe and Vietnam<sup>51</sup>.

#### 4) The level of accountability

In order to control the accountability level, the survey or interviews will include a few questions about how accountable and fair they consider their system to be. For example, evaluate if votes are counted fairly, if journalists can adequately cover the election process.

### 6. Conclusion and expected results

This thesis report is considered as the theoretical foundation for the Master's thesis which will be written in the next academic year. According to the research conducted for the report, an important factor in controlling corruption appears to be increasing gender equality. However, I hypothesise that this correlation between increasing gender equality in politics and a lower level of perceived corruption is dependent on the level of electoral accountability. On the example from Russia, I have demonstrated that women in politics might be used as “political cleaners”, rather than representatives of the interest of Russian women.

The thesis will add to the body of literature on the gender perspective on corruption by researching how the relationship between increasing gender equality in politics will contribute to the level of perceived corruption in different political contexts, analyzing the examples of Germany and Russia.

A potential policy recommendation would be to impose policies that are focusing on increasing female participation both in public and private sectors not only for a reason to achieve gender equality itself but also to reduce corruption.

Even though there is a positive link between more gender equality and less corruption, I do not consider increasing female participation as an instant cure-all for corruption. As was already mentioned, the level of accountability and the quality of political institutions also play an important role in strengthening the negative correlation between increasing gender equality in politics and decreasing the level of corruption.

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## 8. Appendix

### Appendix 1

TABLE 4 *How Does Separation of Powers (Accountability) Influence the Relationship Between Gender and Three Measures of Corruption?*


	(1)	(2)	(3)
	TI CPI	ICRG	WBG I
lag TI CPI	0.683*** (20.76)		
lag ICRG		0.855*** (68.99)	
lag WBG I			0.376*** (9.31)
% women in lower house	-0.0106** (-2.89)	-0.00749*** (-4.65)	-0.00992*** (-4.53)
Presidential system	-0.160 (-1.52)	-0.173*** (-3.94)	-0.165** (-2.60)
% women × presidentialism	0.0140* (2.50)	0.00844*** (3.50)	0.0106** (3.24)
FH freedom	-0.178*** (-4.37)	-0.0437** (-2.75)	-0.185*** (-7.07)
log GDP per capita	-0.315*** (-6.89)	-0.0377** (-2.63)	-0.262*** (-10.50)
% protestant	-0.00450*** (-3.79)	-0.000692 (-1.46)	-0.00308*** (-4.68)
Trade imbalance (% of GDP)	-0.000422 (-0.58)	0.000268 (0.91)	0.000177 (0.44)
Women's economic rights	-0.0618 (-1.31)	0.0465* (2.35)	-0.0436 (-1.66)
N	1,176	1,417	1,109

*Note:* the table reports the output of ordinary least squares regression models using three dependent variables: (1) the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TI CPI); (2) the International Country Risk Guide corruption rating (ICRG); and (3) the World Bank Governance Indicators Control of Corruption measure (WBG I). All three measures have been recoded so that higher values on each DV indicate more corruption. The data includes seventy-six democratic-leaning countries; the time dimension spans 1995–2010 for the TI CPI variable, 1996–2010 for the WBG I variable and 1991–2010 for the ICRG variable. Year and region dummies are included in the models, though not reported in this table. Estimates are based on multiple imputation into fifty datasets using chained equations.  $R^2$  for the models are: (1) 0.919, (2) 0.931, (3) 0.868.  $t$  statistics in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

Source: Justin Esarey and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, 'Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 2018): 659–90, p. 681 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000478>.

## Appendix 2


Summary of the literature on the gender equality/ corruption link



Source: Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, eds., *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, Political Corruption and Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 63, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70929-1>.


## Appendix 3

CPI score 2019: Russia



\*The confidence interval reflects the variance in the value of the source data that comprise the CPI score.

Germany



Source: "Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency.org, accessed August 19, 2020, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi>

## 9. Work plan and timetable for completion of the Master thesis

Due to	Workload
March 30, 2021	Coordination with the academic supervisors of the materials to be used in the empirical part of the research (interviews/survey questions etc.)
April 25, 2021	Completion of the field research: interviews or survey (online or offline)
May 20, 2021	Completion of the analytical and literature review parts of the thesis
June 16, 2021	Discuss with the supervisors the full draft of Master thesis
June 28, 2021	Revision and final modifications of the thesis according to the supervisors' feedback
July 5, 2021	Submission of the Master thesis
September 2021	Oral defense of the thesis

**10. Declaration of Authorship**

I, the undersigned Alina Bobkova hereby declare that I am the sole author of this Thesis Report. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made. This Thesis Report contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language. This is a true copy of the Thesis Report, including final revisions.

Date: 31<sup>st</sup> August 2020

Name: Alina Bobkova

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Alina Bobkova', written over a horizontal line.