

Reasons of Unsuccessful Implementation of Army Reforms in Germany in late 1990s – Early 2010s

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Submitted to
Central European University
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary
(2021)

Abstract

This research contributes to corpus of texts on the post-Cold War military reforms in the NATO states. The paper analyzes problems that Bundeswehr met after the reunification and explores reasons of inability of the German Federal Government to solve those problems through two waves of military reforms. Author uses the combination of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Multiple Streams Framework to study the causes of problems during the design and adoption of military procurement reforms. In addition, the research combines top-down and principal-agent approaches to explore the reasons for the failure of the reform implementation process. In order to explain what problems, the German Federal Government had to face, the paper utilizes content analysis of the Parliamentary Commissioner's for the Armed Forces reports from 1994 to 2019. Then, using the process tracing method, the author finds out why, both reforms had not achieved significant success in solving problems. As the result author finds out that even though the reforms were well prepared, they became hostages to the political situation. The 2000-2004 reform was not a priority and did not receive support from a key design maker in the conflict process. In addition, the frequent change of the main implementers of the reform led to the fact that the signals of the principal changed, creating difficulties for the agents in implementing the reforms. Defense ministers also changed frequently during the adoption and implementation of the 2010-2014 reform, giving rise to similar problems.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

While German federal government successfully implemented various policies in areas of the labor market (Bernhard, Gartner, and Stephan 2008; Bradley and Kuegler 2019), social welfare (Hering 2008; Bandelow et al. 2019) and federalism (Scharpf 2008; Kaiser and Vogel 2019) during 1990s – 2010s. Despite possible expectations some reforms that were supposed to be subject to “Joint decision trap” (Scharpf 1988; 2006), i.e., required strong cooperation between federal and sub-national governments, were successfully implemented. While situation with administrative and defence reforms was the opposite. Although both policies were unsuccessful, defence is an exclusive competence of the federal government. Therefore, policy implementation in defence should be more successful than in areas where national and sub-national interests cross. However, in German case policies which require compromise between sub-national and national levels were more successful, than defence, which belongs exclusively to the national level. That is why case of military reforms in Germany was chosen. Defence reforms consisted of several parts. However, this research will focus on provision of the army with modern vehicles and equipment, since logically provision requires the least number of changes in army structure, therefore it should had been most successful, but had not been. Thus, the research question would be: **Why the implementation of German army procurement reforms in late 1990s – early 2010s was unsuccessful?** Success is defined as the conformity of the implementation results to the stated goals.

Army procurement is understood as provision of Army (i.e., Heer, Luftwaffe, Marine) with material goods, required for successful completion of professional objectives and wellbeing of soldiers. Unsuccessful reform/failure of the reform is understood as inability of reform to cope with the problems it was developed for. Finally, implementation of the reform can be defined as the process of achieving the goals set by the reform.

Literature on reforms failure in Germany can be divided on the topic basis. First group focuses on administrative and New Public Management policies (Bach et al. 2017; Weiss 2019). The main idea of these policies was to implement New public management practices in German government (Bach et al. 2017; Weiss 2019). Authors identify the main reason of failure as deeply rooted traditions of German administrative culture, which prevent any significant changes in governance patterns (Bach et al. 2017, 778). Second group study defence reforms (Dyson 2005; 2014). These reforms were planned to increase efficiency, by changing structure, content and size of national army. Researchers separate the reform package adopted by “red-green” government (1998-2005) and the reform package adopted by “black-yellow” (2009-2013) from each other, and study them separately. Their explanations concentrate on actions of Defence Ministers as the main source of policies failure (Dyson 2005; 2014).

In addition, there are two approaches to explanation of failure of German military reform. The first one relies on cultural heritage of WWII, i.e., negative attitude to use of army as a tool of foreign policy, embedded in the German society. As author point out, it leads to a reluctance to use the army as a political tool, which can undermine reforms aimed at strengthening the army (Berger 1998). Second one relies on the crucial role of Minister of Defence in the implementation process (Dyson 2005). Thus, the reform failure can be explained through the failure of Defene Minister to control its implementation.

This research contributes to corpus of texts on the post-Cold War military reforms in the NATO states. The paper analyzes problems that Bundeswehr met after the reunification and explores reasons of inability of the German Federal Government to solve those problems through two waves of military reforms. The combination of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Multiple Streams Framework to study the causes of problems during the design and adoption of military procurement reforms. In addition, the research relies on top-down principal- agent approaches to explore the reasons for the failure of the reform implementation process. In order to explain what

the German Federal Government had to face, the paper utilizes the detailed description of the post-reunification Bundeswehr's procurement problems, based on content analysis of the Parliamentary Commissioner's for the Armed Forces reports from 1994 to 2019. Then, using the process tracing method, the author finds out why, although both reform packages in early 2000s and in early 2010s correctly identified procurement problems, neither of two has achieved significant success in solving them.

The further text of the study consists of the following parts. Chapter 2 is devoted to summary of current research on the topic of German reform implementation. Then briefly presents theories which are used in this paper. This part concludes with list of possible explanations of reform's failure in the form of causal graphs. Text continues with the chapter 3, where methods of data collection and data analysis of this paper are described as long as the rationale of their use. Then Chapter 4 starts the empirical part of the research with the content analysis of procurement problems of German army starting from 1994 and ending in 2019. Then Chapter 5 proceeds empirical part with the process tracing. It consists of analysis of the reform's implementation and ends up with the reasons of implementation unsuccess. Finally, paper ends with the conclusion in chapter 6.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

2.1 German Reforms in 21st Century

Military reforms were not the only changes in political policies that occurred during the period under consideration (late 1990s - early 2010s). For this reason, the question arises: "Is the unsuccessful implementation of military reforms a unique case?" Indeed, it is possible that during this period of time, German attempts to reform various subsystems (issue-oriented areas) were unsuccessful for some general reasons that were not specific to the military subsystem.

In order to answer this question, we need to look at the studies describing German reforms in various subsystems. The number of studies on the topic of German reforms in the period of interest to us is quite large, but they can be systematized into several groups according to policy issues: labor market and social welfare, federalism, administrative reforms and defence reforms.

The late 1990s in Germany were marked by a change in the structure of the labor market in the direction of part-time employment or "atypical" jobs, different from "regular" jobs in the public sector or in large-scale production (Palier and Thelen 2010). The "Bismarkian" or conservative-corporatist (Esping-Andersen, 1990) welfare system of social benefits in Germany was designed more for "typical" jobs. Under such a system, workers generally worked at the same workplace for a long time, but when they left its state, they were provided with long-term social benefits for unemployment. "Atypical" jobs are more often short-term jobs and more frequent periods of unemployment or part-time work. In the early 2000s, a change in the structure of the labor market was also supplemented by an increase in unemployment ("Germany: Unemployment rate from 1999 to 2020" 2021). In this regard, the German government initiated the Hartz reform package.

The Hartz reform package was 4 waves of change. Harts I-III are aimed at adjusting procedures and practices in connection with changes in the structure of the labor market in order to include "atypical" ones along with "typical" ones. Hartz IV is a change in the structure of unemployment benefits. Before this reform, the money that the unemployed received consisted of three benefits

(two related to the level of previous income and one with basic social support), then after the reform two benefits remained. One related to the level of previous income and lasting a shorter period than before. The second was basic social support, which, however, could now be received in addition to the salary if it is less than threshold (Palier and Thelen 2010). Hartz's plan was developed with the help of an expert committee. Hartz I-III began to operate in 2003-2004. Hartz IV entered into force in 2005.

All changes were successfully implemented, but in the research environment there is no consensus on their long-term effect. Bernhard et al. (2008) write about the great positive effect of reform for subsidy recipients. Adhikari et al. (2018) argue that Hartz I-IV contributed to the shortage of long-term unemployment. At the same time, Bradley and Kuegler (2019) note that the Hartz package, reducing the duration of unemployment on average, did not affect the percentage of unemployment in general, and also led to a decrease in salaries. Weskott (2020) also partially agrees with the last statement.

Other branch of reform was centered around family policy. In 2007-2008 German government changed parental leave social benefits from means-tested with the duration of 3 years towards income-tested 12 months' duration benefits. In other words, before such reform only mothers with income under the threshold received governmental payments, while after policy change all mothers started to receive payments based on their previous income, but for shorter period of time. In addition to that, government increased its funding for childcare places. Both new policies were successfully implemented. Evaluating results of these reforms Geyer, Haan and Wrohlich (2014) note, that they increased incentives for mothers from higher income group to more frequently stay home during first 12 months, however, they also increased incentives for all mothers to work after 1st year of childbirth. At the same time, Andronescu and Carnes (2015) note that the volumes of childcare facilities vary between regions and depend on the local culture of family traditions.

It is worth noting that, contrary to expectations, CDU / CSU became the main initiator of these policy changes. It seemed to be unexpected, since this party alliance is traditionally associated with the Catholic Church and the male-breadwinner family model. However, the CDU / CSU proposed reforms that contradict the traditional model. The rationale behind these reforms, successfully implemented by the Minister of the Family, Ursula von der Leyen, was the desire of the party alliance to win additional votes for the next elections, in order not to repeat the loss of 1998 (Fleckenstein 2011).

After the economic crisis of 2008, the German government developed a package of political changes in the health care system that were successfully implemented in 2009-2011. As a result of these changes, the financing of the health system at the expense of taxes was supposed to increase. Also, the financing of the system was supposed to shift towards the employee. (Bandelow et al. 2019). In general, the adoption of these reforms is characterized, on the one hand, by using the “window of opportunity” as a good time to carry out the necessary changes, on the other hand, there is a long process of “political learning” that lasted from the beginning of the 2000s and led in 2011 to a change in the political course. (Bandelow and Hartmann 2014; Bandelow et al. 2019)

Reforms of federalism of 2006 were designed to solve or at least mitigate the problem of the so-called “Politikverflechtung” or “Joint Decision Trap”. The essence of this phenomenon is the lack of autonomy in decision-making at different levels of the system in multi-level systems. Thus, to make a political decision, coordination of actions at several levels is necessary (Scharpf 1988, 2006). An example of such a decision-making method is Germany. The German parliament (Bundestag) is unicameral, but the federal states (Laender) have their own representative body of the Bundesrat. The adoption of legislation in the areas of joint jurisdiction of subnational and national governments requires the consent of both the Parliament (Bundestag) and the Bundesrat. Thus, sub-national governments are able to block a decision, which is potentially harmful for them through the Bundesrat. This leads to so-called “reforms traffic jams” (Reformstau), when existence

of big numbers of veto players “jams” adoptions of important reforms, through mutual interdependence (Scharpf 2008).

In 2003 special committee was establish, which included both politicians and experts in order to develop policy proposal for future reform. As the result of consultations and bargaining Laender received complete autonomy over education legislation and number of new competences in less significant areas. (Ibid.). The new law was successfully implemented in 2006. However, the evaluation of this reform is controversial. Kaiser and Vogel (2019) claim that these reforms were a step towards decentralization. At the same time, Scharpf notes that despite achieving some progress in solving problem of “joint decision-making” through granting more exclusive legislative competences to Laender and Federal Government, other side of this problem – concentration of federal parties on national wide rather than sub-national political solutions – was not solved (Scharpf 2008)

At the same time, not all reforms have been successfully implemented. Thus, administrative reforms were not as successful as, for instance, labor market reforms. The goals of administrative reform, which took place through the 1990s were to incorporate New Public Management practices into German administrative system in order to increase the overall effectiveness of state administration. However, the implementation of these practices was unsuccessful (Bach et al. 2017) or had limited success (Weiss 2019; Bulkeley and Kern 2006), because both at the local and federal levels they met resistance from the traditional corporate practices and did not take root. Separately, it is worth noting that the initial implementation of these practices was not mandatory, as it happens with some federal laws in Germany. It could predetermine an unsuccessful implementation outcome.

On the example of the reforms above, we can see that the German governments during late 1990s until early 2010s were capable of carrying out reforms. In addition, the bulk of their reforms was successful. Analyzing successful reforms, we can note the practice of using expert commissions

to develop a policy (reform of the labor market and partially health care), and the successful use of the window of opportunity for policy change (health care reform). At the same time, some reforms (maternal leave policies) became a product of the electoral struggle and were used to attract additional voters. Additionally, unsuccessful administrative reform shows that one of the important reasons for the failure of implementation can be a well-established tradition or culture that contradicts the proposed innovations.

The literature on German military reforms can be divided into two parts. The first part finds the reasons of German problematic attitude toward military reforms in culture (Duffield 1998; Longhurst 2004). The idea behind such an explanation is to highlight the "culture of antimilitarism" (Berger 1998). After the Second World War, with the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany, a rethinking of the use of the army took place. Until that moment, the army was an instrument of foreign policy, after which it became an instrument for ensuring territorial integrity and protecting the rights and freedoms of German citizens. This corresponds to the concept of a soldier as a "citizen in uniform."

According to the authors who adhere to the first approach, the unsuccessful implementation of the reforms could be connected precisely with "strategic culture", which excludes the use of the armed forces as a tool to promote interests on the world stage. There are several arguments in favor of this. Firstly, after the reunification of Germany in the 1990s, it was invited to participate in various international operations within the framework of NATO and the UN, including in Cambodia and Yugoslavia. However, it took Germany a long time during the 1990s to develop appropriate legislation to allow participation in operations. This process was accompanied by public debate reflected in the Bundestag Commissioner's Annual Reports on the Bundeswehr. In addition, Germany did not support the United States in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq, which can also be attributed to the German government's commitment to not using the armed forces as an instrument to uphold its interests. Thus, military reforms aimed at creating a small mobile crisis response

force for operations abroad were contrary to the strategic culture of Germany, involving the use of the army as self-defence.

The second line of the line of explanation is centered around political aspects. For example, Dyson (2005) in his work uses the concept of support coalitions and elements of the concept of multiple flows to show that the reason for the unsuccessful implementation of the military reforms of the Schroeder government (1998-2005) is the manipulation of reforms by defence ministers, as well as the defence subsystem politics is tightly connected with social, budgetary, and electoral. The latter narrowed the scope for reform in this subsystem, as ministers had to coordinate their actions with events taking place in other subsystems. Dyson (2014) comes to similar conclusions, tied to the domestic political context, analyzing reforms during the second chancellorship of Merkel (2009-2013).


In order to propose possible answers to our research question, it is first necessary to describe theories with which we will analyze our case.

2.2. Advocacy Coalition Framework

The core of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is the premise that the policy change takes place through to the joint actions of **actors** (people involved in the political process) within the **policy subsystem** - functionally and geographically limited area within which actors act (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998, 501-503; Sabatier and Weible 2007, 192). Such actions are determined by a belief system. In addition, on the basis of these beliefs, actors unite in groups, which are called **advocacy coalitions**. They do this in order to later formalize their beliefs in the form of a policy. In other words, the concept assumes that the policy is formed as a result of the competition of several groups, qualitatively different from each other on the basis of beliefs that the participants in the groups share. Coalitions in their composition should be heterogeneous and include both bureaucrats and politicians, as well as scientists, journalists, experts, and representatives of interest groups (Ibid.).

Each coalition member has **beliefs**. Often being normative, they lead to the fact that actors perceive the same information in different ways, forming the basis for conflict among them (Ibid., 194). At the same time, beliefs unite people within coalitions. These beliefs are divided into three groups (or levels). (1) The first - “**deep core beliefs**” - represents general normative and ontological assumptions about fundamental values and human nature. These include understanding of freedom, religion, ideology etc. What we call right / left political views and an understanding of how political decisions should be made also belong to this group (Ibid.). Such beliefs usually are formed in childhood in the process of socialization and are hard to change (Ibid.). (2) The second group – “**policy core beliefs**” - is the application of in-depth beliefs in relation to the policy subsystem. In other words, these are the strategies necessary to achieve deep core beliefs. That is, if the deep core belief is the position that wildlife should be preserved, then the policy core beliefs may be the position on the prohibition of the development of minerals in habitats of rare animals (Ibid., 194-195). Such beliefs are also difficult to change as they relate to fundamental decisions and relate to the entire subsystem. (3) The third and final group - “**secondary beliefs**” - represents the actor’s understanding of particular decisions that are necessary to implement more fundamental beliefs (Ibid., 196). For instance, if an actor claims that the state should support the growth birth rate, this is a policy core belief. Therefore, the thought “the best way to support the growth of the birth rate is to provide subsidies through maternal leave” will be a secondary belief.

It is worth noting that coalitions are formed, as a rule, around the second level (Ibid., 195). It is important that the actor’s belief systems should be **moderately stable**, that is, they allow consistent decisions, but remain open to additions and changes under appropriate incentives (Weible et al. 2012, 10). They should also be **internally coherent**, i.e., there should be no contradiction between the actor’s fundamental beliefs and what decisions he/she supports (Ibid.).



Graph 1. Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. From Sabatier and Weible 2007, 191.

According to the ACF there are four ways of policy change:

1) policy-oriented learning and. Policy-oriented learning is a relatively stable change in the belief system that occurs due to gaining experience or new information. These changes affect actor's attitude towards the policy (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1999, 123). Secondary beliefs are most vulnerable to such changes.

2) external perturbations or shocks. External shocks are important events or changes occurring outside the policy subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 198-199). This can be either a natural disaster, an economic crisis, or a change in the political regime in a country where the desired

subsystem functions. Accordingly, shocks open the possibility of redistributing resources and replacing one dominant coalition with another.

4) **internal shock**. That is, any event within the subsystem that leads to the strengthening of weak coalitions and the loss of positions by the dominant coalition. The internal shock can be combined with the external (Ibid., 204). In this case, they jointly draw public attention to the problem and may lead to a redistribution of resources (Ibid.). In addition, internal shock can confirm the deep convictions about the political course of one of the coalitions and arouse doubts among members of the other (Ibid., 205).

5) **negotiated agreements**. This is such a situation during which coalitions opposing each other for a long time come to a compromise agreement that changes the status quo in the political subsystem (Ibid., 205-207).


At some point, it became clear that although the ACF implied that the coalitions had resources, a typology and description of these resources were not carried out. Thus, thanks to the research of Sewell (2005), a description of the **coalition resources** appeared in the next revision of the concept. There were 6 types of resources (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 201,203): (1) formal legal authority to make policy decisions; (2) public opinion; (3) information; (4) mobilizable troops; (5) financial resources; (6) skillful leadership.

2.3. Multiple Streams Framework

The Multiple Streams Framework is based on three premises. (1) **Individual attention or processing is serial, systemic attention or processing is parallel** (Zahariadis 2007, 68). In other words, while each individual political actor can deal with a small number of issues, an organized government can simultaneously carry out several policies in different areas at once. (2) **Policy makers operate under significant time constraints** (Ibid.). This means that the number of issues that policy makers can focus on is strictly limited in time. (3) **The streams flowing through the**

system are independent (Ibid., 69). If we assume that the political system can deal with several issues in parallel, this means that all three streams (of problems, of policy and of politics) in it may not intersect with each other. Additionally, MSF claims, that policy making happens under ambiguity, which is “a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomenon” (Feldman 1989, 5).

The framework is based on the division of the political process into three parts. (1) **Problem stream**. The problem stream is a variety of issues that political actors consider as problems which should be addressed. A priori issues are not problems, but under the influence of certain circumstances they can be perceived as such. Circumstances means changes in the opinion of the actors under the influence of: (a) new scientific or statistical data (indicators), (b) focusing events, exposing issue as a problem and (c) feedback on an already implemented policy, promoting lack of such policy in other previously unrelated area as a problem (Zahariadis 2007, 70-72). (2) **Policy stream** is an unorganized set of solutions or ideas, without specific problems to which they are addressed. Such solutions are usually generated within political communities (or networks). For a solution to become the most noticeable among many other ideas, it must (a) comply with the beliefs of the policy makers for which it is developed, and (b) be as easily implemented as possible (Ibid., 72-73). (3) **Politics stream** is determined by three elements: (a) the national mood, which can change itself or be manipulated, (b) pressure-group campaigns that can, in case of consensus, force the government to policy change, and (c) administrative or legislative turnover. The latter is a process of changing both members of the legislative branch or key members of the executive branch, the replacement of which can have a serious impact on the change of political course (Ibid., 73).



Graph 2. Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework. From Zahariadis 2007, 71.

The streams intersection process is called coupling. Such an intersection can occur between two streams or between all three. Moreover, at the intersection of three streams, the chance for a successful policy change increase. Coupling usually occurs during the opening of the window of opportunity - such a moment when the actors have the opportunity to advance their solutions or to draw attention to a specific problem (Kingdon 1995, 195). For instance, a plane crash have high chances to bring attention of politicians to flight safety policy (Cobb and Primo 2003). Windows of opportunities, as a rule, remain open a short period of time. Some of these windows could be predicted.

Finally, policy entrepreneurs do seek all three streams to intersect. They are political actors who are constantly looking for solutions to important problems. In addition, they can pursue their own

selfish goals. The success of an entrepreneur depends on his (a) access to decision-makers (the closer he/she to decision maker – the bigger chance of success), (b) the amount of resources that he/she has (i.e., time, money etc.), as well as (c) the skills and strategies of manipulation that he/she uses to pursue decision-makers (Zahariadis 2007, 74). In the end, as the result of the actions of entrepreneurs policy change happens.

I believe that this theory will be useful in this study since the Multiple Streams Framework takes into account the importance of right timing for successful reforms. At the same time, the value of the opportunity window is partially ignored by the Advocacy Coalitions Framework, where the main emphasis is on the long-term opposition of organized, beliefs driven coalitions.

2.4. Top-down implementation approach

If the first two theories described by us laid the main emphasis on the policy change, then this theory describes the conditions for the successful implementation of such change. The top-down approach appeared as a development of the theory of the political cycle (Lasswell 1956), which began to be applied not only to the field of politics, but also to the field of policy. In this study, we will use a variant of the approach presented by Sabatier in 2005.

Sabatier offers 6 criteria, sufficient and necessary for the policy implementation (Sabatier 2005: 19-20):

- (1) Clear and consistent objectives;
- (2) Adequate causal theory;
- (3) Implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups;
- (4) Committed and skillful implementing officials;
- (5) Support of interest groups and sovereigns over time;

(6) Changes in socio-economic conditions which do not substantially undermine political support or causal theory.

(1) If policy consists of clear objectives, it makes implementation process easier, since actors better understand their objective. Additionally, when directives are clear it become easier to see discrepancies between what was proposed and the result in order to correct or develop a policy. Consistently here is also important since contradiction of policy objective's content makes them harder to implement. (2) Since behind each policy lies causal understanding of actions, it is important for policy to have clear understanding what must be changed in target group behaviors in order to achieve desired outcome. (3) "Borrowing again from Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), the authors pointed to a variety of legal mechanisms including the number of veto points involved in programme delivery, the sanctions and incentives available to overcome resistance, and the assignment of programmes to implementing agencies which would be supportive and give them high priority." (Sabatier 2005, 19) (4) In order for reform to be successfully implemented it is needed for implementing officials to have political and managerial skills. Political skills include being able to build good relationships with key actors in policy subsystem, mobilize support and create a good image in mass public, while managerial skills mean ability to organize implementation process in resource effective way. Moreover, high morale and commitment towards implementation process are also necessary. (5) Successful policy implementation in the long run requires continuous support in order to secure provision of resources. It can be secured through having continuous support of interest group, which would continue to lobby policy support at the legislative and administrative level and having a "fixer" – important legislative or executive official, who controls important resources and has possibility to constantly monitor implementation process. (6) Unexpected changes can lead to sudden lack of support of the program or the causal theory, which lies in the basis of the program.

As it can be seen, top-down approach provides criteria which can be applied to reform we would like to study in order to understand the reason of its' unsucccess.

2.5. Hypothesis formulation

From existing studies on German defence policy, we can conclude that beliefs in this subsystem play an important role, be it a "culture of anti-militarism" (Berger 1998) referring generally to the population of Germany, or a "strategic culture" (Longhurst 2004) referring to the armed forces and strategies for their application. The high importance of beliefs for German defence policy can also be drawn from the annual reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. They pay great attention to issues of civilian education of military personnel, the eradication of right-wing extremism and the logic of the use of the Bundeswehr abroad. Thus, we can expect advocacy coalitions with opposing beliefs about what defence reform should look like. And the reforms themselves could be the result of such a conflict.

In addition, various important events took place at that time, which could lead to windows of opportunity. For example, the Kosovo war, which drew attention of policymakers to state of Bundeswerth or the economic crisis of 2008-2009. However, incorrect perception and use of windows of opportunity can lead to failure in reform.

Thus, several approaches were used. A combination of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Multiple Streams Framework, the top-down approach and Principal-agent theory. The use of the ACF or MSF in conjunction with the top-down approach and Principle-agent theory is not a problem, since the first two theories place more emphasis on decision making, while the last two focuses on the implementation process. Thus, they do not contradict each other in their premises. At the same time, the use of the ACF and the MSF together is difficult due to a different understanding of the reform process itself. Nevertheless, there are successful examples of the application of the ACF and the MSFs together. For example, Dyson (2005), studying Germany's military reforms in 1998-2004, used together ACF and the types of leadership from MSF.


Bandelow et al. (2019) used these two theories together, taking the concept of coalitions from the ACF and the concept of windows of opportunity from the MSF to study health care reform in Germany. In my research, I use the combination of Bandelow et al. Thus, I assume that the advocacy coalitions formed in the German defence policy subsystem could use windows of opportunity to advance their reform project and defeat rivals. It is important to note that they could choose the window of opportunities wrong, which could lead to initial successes, however, then the implementation could come to naught. On the other hand, the implementation of the reform could be unsuccessful due to the inconsistency of the implementation process with the criteria described by Sabatier (2005).

The research question of this study is: **Why the implementation of German army procurement reforms in late 1990s – early 2010s was unsuccessful?**

Successful implementation in this study will be understood as the conformity of the results of the reform with the stated goals (in this case, the elimination of the problem of insufficient supply of the armed forces).

Thus, in this study it is possible to identify 3 causal mechanisms, which would show reasons of reform failure. Each was based on its own theory.

1. Top-down approach. Sabatier (2005, 19-20) claims that there are 6 necessary and sufficient criteria for successful implementation of the reform. These six criteria can be divided into 2 parts: initial step – preparation and design of reform and implementation step – criteria which appear after adoption., causal graph will look like this:




Graph 3. Causal graph of Top-down implementation approach

Lack of clear and consistent objectives	H1a
Lack of adequate causal theory	H1b
Implementation process is not legally structured to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups	H1c
Lack of committed and skillful implementing officials	H1d
Lack of support of interest groups and sovereigns over time	H1e
Changes in socio-economic conditions which substantially undermine political support or causal theory	H1f

Table 1. Table of codes for causal graph of Top-down implementation approach

According to this graph, the reform needs to fail on 1 of 6 criteria in order to fail in general.

2.ACF and MSF. Advocacy coalitions framework (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007) and Multiple streams framework (Zahariadis 2007) are two complex theories, which, were designed mostly for research of policy adoption. However, they do give some understanding about policy implementation. Here I employed combination of ACF and MSF proposed by Bandelow et al. (2019). In short, advocacy coalitions located in same policy subsystem propose different reform projects, based on their beliefs. They accumulate resources both material and contacts/influence and wait for window of opportunity to push for adoptions of their reform projects. The causal graph of such combination looks like this:



Graph 4. Causal graph of ACF+ MSF approach


Poor accumulation of resources	H2a
Wrong choice of window of opportunity	H2b

Table 2. Table of codes for causal graph of ACF+ MSF approach

According to the graph, political actors form advocacy coalitions on the base of their beliefs about how the reform supposed to look like. Then, they do accumulate resources and wait for window of opportunity, which will allow them to push for the adoption of their project. Here reason for poor reform implementation lies in inability to sustainably support the reform project after its implementation. Such situation could happen if coalition choose correct window of opportunity

for their reform project, but has no resources for its further support, because on the stage of resource gathering, they did not do well. Visa versa the coalition could gather enough resources to push the reform adoption in the situation, where there was no window of opportunity, but then this reform does not interest main decision-making political actors in subsystem or in whole political system. Thus, implementation of reform fails.

3.Principal-agent approach. Agency theory (Miller 2005) is one more approach, which gives an understanding about implementation of the reform. According to this approach there are principals and agents. In relation to reform implementation principals are the key decision-makers in policy subsystem, who send signals and directives to agents – bureaucrats (including street-level) who are in charge of reform implementation. Principals create incentives for agents to follow their signals and act accordingly. The causal graph based on this theory looks like this:



Graph 5. Causal graph of Agent approach

Principal is not interested in implementation	H3a
Principal is interested in implementation	H3b
Agents are not interested in implementation	H3c
Principal's signals are changing	H3d

Table 3. Table of codes for causal graph of Agent approach

According to the graph there are several reasons for poor reform implementation. First, principal can be interested or not in the implementation on reform. This determines his further behavior. Second, agents can be not interested in implementation of reform. In such scenario, reform will not be implemented or will be implemented only partially. Third, principal can change signals (directives), which he gives to agents. It creates information asymmetry, because agents either do not understand which signals to follow or forced to change their behavior during implementation stage. This leads to failure in reform implementation.

All three graphs are used in process-tracing as alternative explanations of why reforms of German military procurement had not succeeded.

Chapter 3. Methods of data collection and data analysis

This research employs two methods of data analysis. Both do have their own features and goals, which are important for answering the research question.

My research question relies on the fact that procurement of Bundeswehr had problems, which were not fixed by both reform attempts. Thus, it is important to identify these problems and show their sustainability to prove consistency of the research question. It was decided to use Annual reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces as the source for such data. There are several reasons for this:

- 1) The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces is the special body of Bundestag. Among the other purposes the Commissioner and his/her team identify different problems of the Bundeswehr through the petitions of servicemen/servicewomen and personal inspections. Thus, their reports can be a reliable source of data for identification of problems in German Army¹.
- 2) Reports are annual and had being published since 1959. It gives an opportunity to analyze military procurement at the prolonged time. This is vital for our approach to policy analysis.
- 3) The Commissioner and his team rely both on petitions and on their own research. Thus, they get both street-level at from-the-top-level evidence of problems. This makes the source itself more complex and more useful for this research.

Since reports consists mostly of text, it was decided to employ content analysis as the method of data analysis. It is designed for analysis of bodies of textual data and allows to: (1) trace the frequency of certain words of idioms appearance in the text and (2) trace the latent “between the lines” content, which could be embedded within the text. (Halperin and Heath 2020, 376). Thus,

¹ It is important to discuss reliability of this source. It could be that political parties would use the Commissioner in their rivalry between each other. What I mean is that if opposition party member gets this post, he/she can exaggerate certain problems to discredit policies of ruling party. However, in my opinion, the source is reliable because from 1994 to 2019 the post of the Commissioner was occupied by members of four different parties while the procurement problems, which they had described, were quite same.

it is used to trace which problems connected to procurement do appear in Annual reports of the Commissioner over the time. Moreover, it is used to analyze dynamic of the problems.

From the whole corpus of the text, I analyzed Annual reports from 1994 to 2019. There are several reasons for that:

1) 1994-1998 are the last four years period of Kohl's government. Next government of chancellor Schroeder adopted and implemented the 1st pack of military reforms. Thus, it is important to analyze military procurement situation both before the reform and under previous government to understand what reformers had to deal with and were new problems the continuation of old or appeared just in the process of reform implementation.

2) 1999-2009 consist of discussion on the reform its adoption and its implementation. According to ACF and Top-down implementation approach, which are applied to this research, it is important to analyze the process of reform adoption and implementation at the longer time frame of 8-10 years in order to understand impact of reform implementation and struggle between coalitions. Thus, 10-year period seems optimal for such purposes.

3) 2010-2019 is the period of 2nd reform adoption and implementation. The idea is the same as for the 2) is to analyze impact of reform on the longer timeframe.

As the result 24 texts were studied on the topic of problems with military procurements. Consequently, problems were summarized into 12 topics:

- 1) **Obsolescence of equipment/use of obsolete equipment.** Use of the old equipment, which do not meet modern requirements;
- 2) **Low operational readiness.** Equipment in possession of Bundeswehr's different brancher is not ready for operation because of breakdown, lack of spare parts or for other reasons;
- 3) **Lack of equipment for training.** Lack of different pieces of military equipment, needed for regular comprehensive training of troops;

- 4) **“Cannibalism”/”Borrowing”/”Common battalion pool of spare parts”/”qualified components extraction”/”dynamic availability management”**. Different practices, utilized by troops for keeping their units operational ready despite of lack of spare parts and/or equipment;
- 5) **Lack of spare parts**. Shortage of mechanical or electronical parts, which are needed for repairment of service support of vehicles;
- 6) **Lack of ammunition for training/in deployment**. Shortage of rounds and shells for firearms and/or artillery for training or combat purposes;
- 7) **Clothing problems**. Lack of different pieces of clothing including carrying/loading systems and body armor;
- 8) **The need to by equipment for personal funds**. Situation where servicemen/servicewomen are forced to buy equipment using their personal funds, because there are no other ways of obtaining equipment, required for operation;
- 9) **Lack of body armor**. Lack of armored systems which are designed to protect body of servicemen/women;
- 10) **Lack of funding**. Shortage of financial funding of Bundeswehr, which affects its capacity to buy new equipment, spare parts, vehicles, etc. ;
- 11) **Lack of equipment**. Shortage of different equipment starting firearms and night vision goggles and ending tanks, combat planes and missile launchers. This excludes clothing;
- 12) **Bureaucratization**. Appearance of lingering and tangled bureaucratic procedures, that slow down procurement pace.

These categories stand for different aspects of military procurement which were mentioned in the reports of the Commissioner.

Since texts were written by different authors and in two languages, German and English, it was decided to use a “theme” as a recording unit. In other words, each time the Commissioner writes about certain aspect of procurement problems, it is count as a mention of this problem. In addition, it was decided to use “open coding” since at the start of research it was not clear, what kind of problems would be found in reports.

The Second method of data analysis, which was employed for this research is the process-tracing. The process tracing is the theory driven method, designed for obtaining the causal inference in small-n studies (Ricks, Liu 2018, 842). It relies on consequential step-by-step analysis of primary and secondary sources of information in order to test rival hypothesis on the prolonged timeframe.

Since this research is centered around one case – German military procurement reforms – and based on the timeframe of 26 years in total, the process tracing seemed to be the best solution.

Timeline was chosen as follows: 1998-1999 is the phase, where it is possible to trace the development of the 1st pack of reforms – it is important for verifying/rejecting hypotheses based on the ACF and MSF. 2000 – 2008 is the phase, when 1st pack of reforms was implemented, thus it is important for verifying or rejecting hypotheses based on ACF and “Top-down implementation” approaches. In addition, it is time before 2nd pack of procurement reforms adoption, thus it is again important for ACF and MSF based hypotheses. At last, 2009–2019 is the period of second 2nd pack implementation, thus it is important for verifying/rejecting ACF-MSF and “Top-down implementation” based hypothesis.

Chapter 4. Procurement problems in Bundeswehr

For additional convenience information about Bundeswehr's procurement problems will be divided into three parts: 4.1. procurement problems before 1st reform, 4.2. procurement problems between 1st and 2nd reform, 4.3. procurement problems during and after 2nd reform.

Topic	Year																		
	AR 1994	AR 1995	AR 1996	AR 1997	AR 1998	AR 1999	AR 2000	AR 2001	AR 2002	AR 2003	AR 2004	AR 2005	AR 2006	AR 2007	AR 2008	AR 2009	AR 2010	AR 2011	AR 2012
Obsolescence of equipment / use of obsolete equipment	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Low operational readiness	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Lack of equipment for training	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
"Cannibalism"/ "Borrowing"/ "Common battalion pool of spare parts" / "qualified component extraction"/ "dynamic availability management"	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
Lack of spare parts	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Lack of ammunition for training / in deployment	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Clothing problems	*	*	***	*	1	***	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
The need to buy equipment for personal funds	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
Lack of body armor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lack of funding	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Lack of equipment	0	0	0	**	1	**	**	**	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bureaucratization	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Was mentioned in report 1998

** Was mentioned in report 2006

*** Was mentioned in report 2000

Table 4. Mentions of the problems in Annual reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces

4.1. Procurement problems in Bundeswehr in 1994-2000

In fact, there is not much space devoted to description of procurement problems in the Annual reports of The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (hereinafter the Commissioner). It could be because reports themselves in 1994 – 2000 were shorter than later. For instance, in 1994 report took only 52 pages, while in 2018 it was 123 pages. On the other hand, it could be that for some reason procurement problems were not on the agenda at that time.

Nonetheless, from the available information, it is still possible to draw conclusions about the procurement problems of the Bundeswehr before the military reforms of 2000-2003.

The first problem is the use of obsolete equipment. Obviously, the use of outdated equipment is common not only for German armed forces, but it does not make situation less problematic. Use of obsolete equipment has direct impact - the old vehicles, devices, equipment, and weapons may simply not meet the challenges of the time. For instance, the armor of older tanks is not capable of withstanding the hit of newer shells. Another example: modern combat planes have radars capable of detecting and, as a result, hitting a target earlier than older aircrafts. In addition, old equipment may not meet modern NATO standards, which makes it difficult to effectively interact with allies during joint operations such as, for example, operations in Afghanistan.

The abundance of old equipment in the troops also has indirect consequences. Soldiers involved in operations at foreign soil will enjoy most cutting-edge technology, while their colleagues back at home would train using previous generations of equipment and vehicles. This is contrary to one of the basic principles of the Bundeswehr, which is called "train as you fight". The principle suggests that for the most effective performance, servicemen should exercise with the equipment that they will have to use during operations, on the battlefield. In other words, train in conditions as close to real ones as possible. The use of different equipment in the process of training and service makes exercises ineffective, as it was mentioned in the Commissioner's 1998 (Marienfeld 1999, 15) and 1999 (Marienfeld 2000, 17) reports.

Another indirect consequence is the low operational readiness of vehicles. Operation of outdated vehicles means that a) due to the long service life, its components are subject to greater wear and tear and b) spare parts for such equipment are gradually being out of production. As a result, at first the equipment fails more often, then it spends more and more time in repairs due to a lack of

spare parts. At the same time both a) and b) lead to the “cannibalism”, a phenomenon when the piece of equipment (as a rule, this is relevant for vehicles) is disassembled into parts in order to use these parts to repair another device of the same model.

All aforementioned aspects of this problem find their place in the reports of the Commissioner from 1994 to 2000. The use of obsolete equipment was mentioned in 1996 (Marienfeld 1997,13), 1998 (Marienfeld 1999, 15) and 1999 (Marienfeld 2000, 17). In the latter case it was complicated by the difficulty of finding the necessary spare parts at the civilian market (Ibid.). The shortage of spare parts was also noted in 1996 (Marienfeld 1997, 16), and then in 1997 (Marienfeld 1998, 14). At that time, it was assumed that problem could be solved by 1999. It is important to note that “cannibalism” and “borrowing of spare parts from other military units” had appeared for the first time in the 1997 report. The “Cannibalism” as a way of maintaining operational readiness in the Bundeswehr units was also mentioned in 1998 (Marienfeld 1999, 15).

Lack of spare parts and obsolescence of equipment led to a situation when, according to the Commissioner, only 50% of planes, 15-20% of tanks and 50% of rifles were in operational readiness in 1997 in the whole Bundeswehr (Marienfeld 1998, 15). At the same time, in 1996, 140 out of 150 cars were not allowed to be sent to Yugoslavia, as they failed the readiness check (Marienfeld 1997, 16). The situation in 1998 was described in a similar way using the particular example of Truppendienst, where only about 30% of tracked vehicles were operationally ready (Marienfeld 1999, 15). The Commissioner mentioned the situation of 1999 as: “The soldiers often described the material situation as "catastrophic " (Marienfeld 2000, 17). It happened because of the long delivery times of some spare parts, in some cases exceeding a year (Ibid.). For instance, 3 WIESEL light armored fighting vehicles were under repair for 18 months due to the lack of gearboxes (Ibid). As a result of the lack of spare parts and "cannibalism" (by 1999 these problems

were not solved) in the Lufttransportgeschwader only 5 out of 23 aircraft could perform their functions, while in Heer (Army) in some positions the combat readiness was less than 1/3 (Ibid.).

The second problem, which is also related to the “train as you fight” principle, is the lack of ammunition for training. In order to learn how to effectively use firearms, one needs to practice shooting from it. However, this cannot be done if soldiers do not have an ammo at their disposal. Thus, they will be ineffective during fire contact due to insufficient combat training. This problem was described as a procurement rather than distribution problem in 1995 (Marienfeld 1996, 13). Mentions of it also appeared in 1996 (Marienfeld 1997, 13).

The third problem that manifested itself during that time period is clothing problem. Clothing is one of the basic items of equipment for soldiers and one of the most important. Correct clothing helps soldiers stay cool in hot weather and stay warm in cold weather, ensure comfort of the servicemen/women and, therefore, adds to efficiency in completing assignments. Comfortable footwear of the right size ensures the health of soldiers and their ability to move around, while uncomfortable footwear of the wrong size can damage the legs and disable the soldier.

That is why the complaints of soldiers in 1993, 1994, 1997 and 1998 about the lack of shoes of the right size for tropical conditions were referred in the Commissioner's 1998 report as a problem (Marienfeld 1999, 40). Moreover, in one of the cases, the officer had to buy the necessary equipment from his colleagues from the USA using his personal funds (Ibid.). In 1999 (Marienfeld 2000, 41) and 2000 (Penner 2001, 21) similar cases occurred. At the same time, as the Commissioner noted, the problem of the discrepancy between the uniforms of the Bundeswehr and tropical climatic conditions was identified back in 1993 (the year the mission in Cambodia had begun). However, the development of the necessary clothing began in 1994 but ended only in 2000 with a promise to equip the soldiers with tropical equipment in 2001 (Penner 2001, 21). In

other words, it took 7 years from identification of the problem to the implementation of its solution. At the same time, uniform is not a very sophisticated product from the point of view of development and production.

The fourth problem reflected in the Commissioner's reports from 1994 to 2000 is the insufficient funding of the Bundeswehr. In short, insufficient funding means that the Ministry of Defence may not have enough money to procure modern devices, equipment, and spare parts needed for repairs. That is, a reduction in the military spending can directly affect the quality and volume of the Bundeswehr's procurement. This is what the Commissioner noted in her 1996 report (Marienfeld 1997, 5), linking budget cuts to future problems of low material readiness. The lack of military budgets was noted in the 1996 (Ibid., 5), 1997 (Marienfeld 1998, 14), 1999 (Marienfeld 2000, 7,44) reports.

Meanwhile, along with the above-described problems, the Bundeswehr was implementing the concept of the "Rapid Reaction Force" (*find out the precise years of discussion on this topic*) The idea was to create highly mobile units capable of participating in military operations around the world. In compliance with this idea, priority in the procurement of equipment was given to the Rapid Reaction Force and units in the area of operations (Marienfeld 2000, 7). This decision led to a shortage of devices and equipment for training "at home" in Germany (Marienfeld 2000, 16; Penner 2001, 15). As one of the solutions to the problem, old equipment at storage was reactivated (Marienfeld 2000, 16) for training purposes. It could not positively affect the implementation of the "train as you fight" principle, and also aggravated the general trend of equipment obsolescence (Marienfeld 1999, 15).

To summarize, the biggest problems of the procurement in the Bundeswehr were obsolescence of equipment and, as a result, low operational readiness, a shortage of spare parts with long delivery

times, as well as a shortage of ammunition for training, a lack of uniforms or their inadequate quality and insufficient funding for the Bundeswehr. All this was accompanied by the equipping of military units in deployments to the detriment of military personnel stationed in Germany.

4.2. Procurement problems in Bundeswehr in 2001-2010

Starting the end of year 2000, the Bundeswehr had begun to implement a package of reforms aimed at increasing the efficiency of the Armed Forces, as well as at solving, among other things, procurement problems. Nevertheless, problems continued to appear both in the early stages of implementation and later, just before the appearance of the 2nd reform package (2010-2014).

First, the problem of obsolete equipment was mentioned again (Penner 2002, 16). The Commissioner wrote that the equipment was older than the operators who used it (Penner 2003, 27). Moreover, outdated equipment could be spotted not only in divisions located in Germany, but also in those located in foreign bases (Robbe 2009, 14,17).

The shortage of spare parts was also evident. Initially, 2001, the Commissioner reported on the improvement of the spare parts procurement by 1/3 (Penner 2002, 15). However, this was a temporary achievement as the gains were made by reducing storage stocks (Ibid.). Soon the problem arose again. Both in general in the Bundeswehr (Penner 2003, 27,31; Penner 2005, 27; Königshaus 2011, 15), and in foreign deployments in Kosovo (Robbe 2009, 14) and Afghanistan (Robbe 2007, 13; Robbe 2008, 13). In addition to the insufficient number of spare parts, long delivery times were added: up to 60 days in 2007 (Ibid., 16), with repair times up to 6-7 months (Ibid. 13, 16), in some cases (P3 ORION aircraft) up to 28 months instead of 15 (Königshaus 2011, 10). In a special case, although the high priority request for repairs was filed in 2003, work on it was scheduled at 2008 (Robbe 2008, 16). Also, the issue of the lack of spare parts was raised in the 2002 (Penner 2003, 17), 2009 (Robbe 2010, 16), 2010 (Königshaus 2011, 15) reports.

Due to what was mentioned before, soldiers and officers continued to look for situational solutions. To the already familiar “Cannibalism” (now also in the Navy) (Robbe 2008, 16; Robbe 2010, 17), a “common battalion pool of spare parts” was added. In other words, a common pool was formed from spare parts available to individual companies, which would be enough to fully equip at least 1 company (Penner 2003, 27). Such phenomena could not positively affect the operational readiness in the Army (Heer) (Penner 2002, 16) or transport aviation (in 2006 with the cancellation of 43% of flights) (Robbe 2007, 18).

However, the topic of low operational readiness was touched rarely, giving way to a simple lack of various equipment. This could be called a new major problem. The troops lacked heavy vehicles. For example, tanks: out of 44 tanks on the balance, according to the documents, only 6 were able for training (Penner 2004, 15). There was also a shortage of lighter armored vehicles of various classes for transporting personnel (Königshaus 2011, 15). DURO and DINGO in 2007 (Robbe 2008, 16). The lack was felt in foreign missions: various vehicles in Afghanistan in 2006 (Robbe 2007, 17), in 2009 (Robbe 2010, 16-17) and in 2010 (Königshaus 2011, 15). Especially shortage of WOLF-type cars for the needs of soldiers in Afghanistan in 2005 (Robbe 2006, 21) and 2009 (Robbe 2010, 16-17). Moreover, in 2005 (Robbe 2006, 9) and 2008 (Robbe 2009, 13) there were shortages of equipment for the NATO Response Force and other allied commitments. Same could be said about training: only 1 armored personnel carrier was available for one of the battalions (Penner 2004, 15; Robbe 2009, 15). In 2008, at some point, only 1 WOLF-type armored vehicle was available for training in Germany (Ibid.).

The lack of modern or necessary equipment, as well as lack of various modifications of equipment was mentioned in 2002 (Penner 2003, 31) 2006 (Robbe 2007, 17, 18), 2007 (Robbe 2008, 14, 16-17), 2008 (Robbe 2009, 15, 17, 18), 2009 (Robbe 2010, 18), 2010 (Königshaus 2011, 14 -17) reports.

In addition, there was the special case with the aviation. The Commissioner began to report on a decrease in the number of flight hours for budgetary reasons. (Penner 2003, 31; Königshaus 2011, 10). Including ones for helicopters (CH-53, UH-1D) (Robbe 2010, 23; Königshaus 2011, 10).

At the same time, efforts were made to stabilize the situation, with the procurement of DINGO cars in 2008 (Robbe 2009, 17), and especially in Afghanistan, in 2010 (Königshaus 2011,15). In 2003, an order was placed for the modernization of 74 MARDER 1A1 to MARDER 1A5 of which 45 were delivered in the same year (Penner 2004, 21) and the modernization of 15 LEOPARD tanks with the possibility of further modernization of 55 more vehicles (Ibid.). Also, additional purchases of various equipment were announced at the end of the 2000s (Königshaus 2011, 15).

The second major problem, mentioned in the previous section, which was lack of ammunition for training, appeared again (Robbe 2007, 13; Königshaus 2011, 14,16). It even expanded to the shortage of personal small arms both for training and in general (Penner 2004, 14 -15; Robbe 2009, 16; Robbe 2010, 17) including Afghanistan (Robbe 2007, 13).

Thirdly, the situation with the procurement of uniforms to soldiers had not undergone major improvements. The Commissioner continued to report shortages, incorrect sizes or inadequate quality of shoes in 2004 (Penner 2005, 27), 2005 (Robbe 2006, 21), 2006 (Robbe 2007, 14,17) and 2007 (Robbe 2008, 13). There was also shortage of other items of uniform and special clothing (Penner 2003, 28; Penner 2005, 27,42; Robbe 2007, 40; Robbe 2008, 13; Königshaus 2011, 14). This led to the fact that the soldiers were again forced to buy some items of equipment at their own expense (Penner 2005, 27; Robbe 2008, 16; Robbe 2009, 17; Königshaus 2011, 15). In some cases, soldiers bought holsters for personal weapons and carrying and storage systems for body armor at their own expense.

Fourth, the Commissioner again reported underfunding in 2001 (Penner 2002, 15), 2005 (Robbe 2006, 9, 10), 2006 (Robbe 2007, 9, 13, 17), 2007 (Robbe 2008, 16), 2008 (Robbe 2009, 12), 2009 (Robbe 2010, 17) and 2010 (Königshaus 2011, 10). Such frequent mentions indicate the seriousness of the problem of underfunding. This idea correlates with frequent reports of insufficient amount of equipment in troops. If one does not possess money, one can buy nothing. This is especially noticeable against the background of a general increase in the number of foreign operations in parallel with a reduction in the military budget.

In a situation when the lack of money and equipment is combined with the intensification of the involvement of the Bundeswehr in the international conflicts, the procurement bias in favor of deployments no longer seems surprising. Moreover, providing “frontline” units with the best equipment should guarantee the efficiency and safety of soldiers. However, this approach has its costs and often contradicts the principle of “train as you fight”, approved in the Bundeswehr. It creates what can be called “two armies” (Penner 2002, 16). The reports noted the use of different equipment during training and during operations, or simply lack of access to the equipment used in deployments (Penner 2005, 24; Robbe 2008, 16). This concerned body armor (Penner 2004, 15; Königshaus 2011, 14), special vehicles (Penner 2004, 15; Penner 2005, 25; Robbe 2007, 13,15; Robbe 2009, 14; Robbe 2010, 16-17; Königshaus 2011, 13-14), telecommunication equipment (Penner 2001, 15; Penner 2005, 25; Robbe 2010, 16; Königshaus 2011, 14), personal weapons (Robbe 2009, 16; Robbe 2010, 17; Königshaus 2011, 14). Such a discrepancy in the extreme case will mean that the operator who arrives at the deployment may see some equipment for the first time or have very little experience with it. This can lead, at best, to a temporary decrease in the efficiency of the soldier, and at worst to accidents (Robbe 2006, 21; Robbe 2010, 29). Including fatal ones (Robbe 2006, 21).

Summarizing the main problems of the period from 2001 to 2010, one can note their similarity: the use of outdated equipment, a shortage of spare parts and long repairment periods, the use of situational solutions to stabilize the situation (“cannibalism”), low operational readiness, lack of ammunition, personal equipment (incl. clothing), funding and procurement bias in favor of deployments. However, it is important to note that some problems were mentioned less often than before. For instance, commissioners rarely wrote about ad hoc solutions to procurement problems. There was little mention of operational readiness itself. However, the small number of mentions of operational readiness gave way to numerous reports of a shortage of various equipment from socks and night vision goggles to armored vehicles, as well as a serious shortage of spare parts.

The lack of various special vehicles for training and deployments stands out especially clearly. This can be explained by the fact that in the conditions of modern foreign operations, heavy weapons such as tanks are rarely used. While armored vehicles of various classes are used constantly and in large quantities. If we add information about the Bundeswehr's participation in foreign operations to the reports about the lack of cars, then it can be assumed that the Bundeswehr does not have enough resources to cope with the growing needs. Insufficient budgeting, mentioned in 7 out of 10 reports for this period, only reinforces this position. Finally, the idea that the Bundeswehr could not meet the growing demand is reinforced by frequent reports of insufficient number of devices and equipment for training, due to the latter being sent to the areas of operations. At the same time, it is important to note that during the described period, attempts were made to close the existing deficit.

4.3 Procurement problems in Bundeswehr in 2011-2019

In late 2010 the German government launched the second wave of military reforms aimed to improve effectiveness of Bundeswehr performance along with solving some old problems. It started with suspension of conscription and proceeded with other procedural and administrative changes, which will be described in the specific chapter.

In this time period, there were even fewer direct mentions of obsolescence (Königshaus 2014, 13; Königshaus 2015, 7; Bartels 2019, 42-43). However, a lot were written about the use of outdated equipment. For instance, infantry fighting vehicle MARDER (Königshaus 2013, 21; Königshaus 2015, 20; Bartels 2017, 25; Bartels 2018, 41; Bartels 2019, 41; Bartels 2020, 43), the very first versions of which entered service with the Bundeswehr in the 70s. Of course, the Bundeswehr in 2011 – 2019 was armed with later modifications. Nevertheless, the basic model was developed over 40 years ago from the described period (Bartels 2019, 41). Other examples were the TRANSALL C-160 aircraft, which had been in service since 1967 (Bartels 2016, 10; Bartels 2019, 41; Bartels 2020, 43), TORNADO aircraft in service since 1980 (Bartels 2019, 8,42,44; Bartels 2020, 43) with a plan for their use until 2035 (Ibid.). In addition, here one can include PATRIOT systems and ships of the F123 project (Ibid., 42).

In addition, according to reports the Bundeswehr had not succeed in coping with the problem of insufficient spare parts numbers. In general (Königshaus 2015, 8, 19; Bartels 2016, 5, 10; Bartels 2017, 24; Bartels 2018, 8, 41, 46; Bartels 2019, 8,42,43; Bartels 2020, 8, 43-44), at foreign operation sites (Bartels 2019, 71), such as Turkey (Bartels 2017, 45), Baltic states (Bartels 2019, 71; Bartels 2020, 74), Afghanistan and Iraq (Bartels 2020, 70). As it happened earlier, the situation was aggravated by the long delivery times (Königshaus 2015, 20; Bartels 2017, 45; Bartels 2018, 42; Bartels 2019, 8,42,71,74; Bartels 2020, 70,74-75). However, even when the parts finally arrived at their destination, the equipment was under repair for a long time (Bartels 2017, 7, 24; Bartels 2018, 41; Bartels 2019, 42; Bartels 2020, 44, 46, 74). For example, the ship was repaired from 2010 to 2016 (Bartels 2019, 15).

For these reasons, according to the Commissioner, soldiers and officers were again forced to find non-standard solutions to keep the equipment in good condition. "Cannibalism" was referred

again, sometimes under the term "qualified component extraction". It happened in the Marine, where at first, they rearranged large devices, but due to lack of budget, they began to rearrange small also (Ibid., 40, 42). It happened also in Bundeswehr in general (Bartels 2020, 43), where this method was used to maintain old equipment due to the lack of spare parts and operating materials (Königshaus 2015, 19). Another practice has come into use – the "dynamic availability management" - similar to the "common battalion pool of spare parts". The core idea was a reallocation of resources so units that lack equipment can get it for training purposes (Königshaus 2014, 13; Bartels 2016, 10; Bartels 2019, 40; Bartels 2020, 6). In addition, the practice of "borrowing" continued, whereby some military units lent or borrowed equipment from other units in order to be able to conduct training or complete a task (Bartels 2016, 5,11; Bartels 2018, 42, 62).

During this period, low or insufficient operational readiness in all branches of the armed forces was often mentioned (Bartels 2018, 41; Bartels 2019, 40; Bartels 2020, 5, 8). In Heer (Bartels 2017, 25; Bartels 2018, 42; Bartels 2019, 7-8, 40-41, 75; Bartels 2020, 46). The most "egregious" cases are periodically mentioned: as of November 2017, of the 244 LEOPARD 2 tanks on the Bundeswehr's balance sheet, only 95 were in operational readiness. This is 39% (Bartels 2018, 41).

In Luftwaffe (Bartels 2020, 43). Some individual cases were also described. For example, in 2015, out of 50 C160 TRANSALL transport aircraft, only 21 were operational (Bartels 2016, 10). The successor to TRANSALL, the AIRBUS A400, also experienced operational readiness issues: in 2016 only 45% (approximately 3 out of 7 aircraft) were operationally ready (Bartels 2017, 24). In 2017, periodically 0% of A400 were available (Bartels 2018, 8-9, 41). In 2018, this figure was less than 50% (Bartels 2019, 41).

A similar situation was with the EUROCOPTER TIGER helicopters: in 2015, on average, 7 out of 43 helicopters (approximately 16%) were operationally ready (Bartels 2016, 10). In 2016 it was 44% percent (Bartels 2017, 24). In 2017 - 12 out of 52 (about 23%) (Bartels 2019, 40). In 2019, there were also problems with the operational readiness of these helicopters (Bartels 2020, 43). Similar problems were observed with other helicopters (CH-53, NH-90 ²) (Königshaus 2013, 17; Königshaus 2015, 20; Bartels 2016, 10; Bartels 2017, 24; Bartels 2018, 41,43; Bartels 2019, 40,42-43; Bartels 2020, 43).

Among combat planes, low operational readiness also was a thing: PANAIA TORNADO: 29 out of 93 aircraft (approximately 31%) in 2015 (Bartels 2016, 10), less than 50% in 2018 (Bartels 2019, 8, 42), less than 25% in 2019 (Bartels 2020, 43). Same about EUROFIGHTER TYPHOON: in 2015 38 out of 114 machines (approximately 33%) were in operational readiness (Bartels 2016, 10), in 2016 approximately 50% (Bartels 2017, 24), in 2017 approximately 30% (Bartels 2019, 40), in 2018 already less than 50% (Ibid., 8, 42).

The Marine also experienced operational readiness problems. With marine helicopters in general (Bartels 2017, 7; Bartels 2020, 44) and with MK 88A SEA LYNX in particular: reached 0% in 2014 (Königshaus 2015, 23), ~ 22% in 2015 (Bartels 2016, 10), 23% in 2016 (Bartels 2017, 24). Same with SIKORSKY S-61 SEA KING: ~ 15-23% in 2015 (Bartels 2016, 10), 29% in 2016 (Bartels 2017, 24).

This problem was not spared by both the underwater (Bartels 2019, 8) and surface ships (Bartels 2018, 42; Bartels 2019, 8, 42; Bartels 2020, 43). For instance, at a certain point in 2017, there was

² At some points of time operational readiness on NH-90 was 0%.

not a single submarine in operational readiness. (Bartels 2018, 8, 42). The same situation was noted for March 2018 (Bartels 2019, 42).

During that period servicemen and women again did not have enough equipment. As Commissioner described it in 2015: “The Bundeswehr has too little of everything.” (Bartels 2016, 10). Same thesis was repeated in 2016 (Bartels 2017, 7) and in 2017 (Bartels 2018, 6). For instance, the Commissioner considered that despite the increase in the number of armored vehicles in 2010, its number in Afghanistan even 10 years after the start of the mission remained insufficient (Königshaus 2012, 17). In general, the shortage was felt in armored vehicles of various classes from light (Ibid., 15,17; Königshaus 2013, 16,19; Bartels 2016, 11; Bartels 2017, 25; Bartels 2018, 43,65) to heavy vehicles (Königshaus 2014, 13; Königshaus 2015, 20,28; Bartels 2016, 11; Bartels 2017, 7, 25,46; Bartels 2018, 41). There were shortages in transport aviation in 2012 (Königshaus 2013, 23), 2013 (Königshaus 2014, 21), 2014 (Königshaus 2015, 8), in 2015 (Bartels 2016, 10), 2016 (Bartels 2017, 24), 2017 (Bartels 2018, 41,61), 2018 (Bartels 2019, 41), 2019 (Bartels 2020, 43) and combat aviation (Königshaus 2015, 8). In Marine ships (Königshaus 2015, 8; Bartels 2017, 7,25; Bartels 2018, 42). In various helicopters (Königshaus 2011, 16; Königshaus 2012, 19, 32; Königshaus 2013, 17,19,22; Königshaus 2015, 8, 19-21 ,53; Bartels 2017, 7; Bartels 2018, 41, 62; Bartels 2019, 9,42,68). Moreover, in other areas in the reports for 2011 (Königshaus 2012, 18), 2012 (Königshaus 2013, 19-21, 25), 2013 (Königshaus 2014, 20, 23-24), 2014 (Königshaus 2015, 18-19, 22, 24, 31), 2015 (Bartels 2016, 5,11-13), 2016 (Bartels 2017, 5, 24-26, 44), 2017 (Bartels 2018, 8, 42-43, 74), 2018 (Bartels 2019, 74-76) and 2019 (Bartels 2020, 5, 8, 46, 70.77).

At the same time, various attempts were made to procure necessary equipment to the troops. Nevertheless, this did not lead to a solution to the problems with the insufficient amount of equipment in the troops.

As an example of usual way of things in Bundeswehr, I would like to write about lack of the night vision goggles. The problem was first mentioned in 2009 (Robbe 2010, 16). Then this issue was raised in 2010 (Königshaus 2011, 15) and in 2011 (Königshaus 2012, 17). After the announcement of the start of deliveries in 2011 (Königshaus 2011, 15), due to insufficient funding and delays in tenders, the process was delayed until 2016 (Bartels 2017, 24). However, this did not lead to a solution to the problem, as reports of shortages of night vision goggles continued to arrive in 2015 (Bartels 2016, 11), 2018 (Bartels 2019, 8) and 2019 (Bartels 2020, 46). This story, in my opinion, characterizes the situation as a whole: despite the identification and attempts to solve problems in the Bundeswehr, situation does not change over time.

In addition, due to low operational readiness, insufficient amount of equipment or reduction thereof (Königshaus 2012, 17; Königshaus 2015, 53) there was a shortage of flight hours for pilots of aircraft and helicopters of various types (Königshaus 2012, 17 19, 32; Königshaus 2015, 20,53; Bartels 2018, 43; Bartels 2019, 43). As a solution to the problem, it was decided to purchase flying hours from private suppliers (Bartels 2019, 43). In 2019, the number of flight hours for EUROFIGHTER has been increased (Bartels 2020, 43).

Compared to the lack of other equipment, the lack of ammunition was mentioned much less often (Königshaus 2012, 16; Königshaus 2013, 13, 16; Königshaus 2015, 20; Bartels 2017, 7; Bartels 2019, 8). In connection with this topic, two points should be noted. First, the lack of ammunition in the previous period was a more serious problem. There was a shortage of ammunition in the units. At the same time in 2011, in which due to inadequate storage conditions, part of the 227 million cartridges underwent corrosion. For this reason, about 30 employees were forced to sort them out manually for several months until special devices were delivered (Königshaus 2012, 16). Second, the reports contained conflicting messages. On the one hand, in 2017 (Bartels 2018, 42), the commissioner wrote about major improvements in the ammunition situation due to additional

funding. On the other hand, in 2018 (Bartels 2019, 8), he noted that the reserves on the stocks were minimized.

The problem of insufficient supplement of the uniform had not disappeared from the reports of the Commissioner. Questions about poor quality shoes or insufficient quantity of them remained (Bartels 2016, 12; Bartels 2017, 27; Bartels 2018, 67; Bartels 2019, 8), but seems to have been almost resolved by 2019 with the supply of new models to the army (Bartels 2019, 47; Bartels 2020, 49). In terms of the volume of complaints, boots gave way to a shortage of various types of body armor (Königshaus 2012, 18; Bartels 2017, 7, 37; Bartels 2018, 44; Bartels 2019, 8, 44, 46; Bartels 2020, 48, 75). For several years, female military personnel did not have access to female styles of body armor, considering their physiological characteristics (Königshaus 2015, 43; Bartels 2016, 64; Bartels 2017, 37). In addition, the soldiers complained that the Bundeswehr used an outdated storage and transfer system (Bartels 2016, 12, Bartels 2017, 27; Bartels 2019, 45; Bartels 2020, 48) which was developed in the 90s. Despite the availability of more modern and convenient systems on the market (Bartels 2016, 12; Bartels 2020, 48), old systems continued to be purchased (Bartels 2016, 12). In addition to the above problems, the soldiers lacked various equipment (Königshaus 2013, 21; Bartels 2016, 64; Bartels 2017, 7, 27, 37, 47; Bartels 2018, 44, 67; Bartels 2019, 8, 44, 46, 73; Bartels 2020, 48-49, 68), including winter clothing and thermal underwear (Bartels 2019, 8, 45-47; Bartels 2020, 50), uniform cotton t-shirts (Bartels 2019, 45) or the clothes were of inadequate quality (Königshaus 2012, 18; Bartels 2017, 67; Bartels 2019, 45) or size (Bartels 2018, 44; Bartels 2020, 68). As a result, soldiers continued to spend personal funds to purchase the necessary equipment, including storage and transfer systems and body armor (Königshaus 2012, 18; Bartels 2016, 12; Bartels 2017, 28; Bartels 2018, 44; Bartels 2019, 47, 74; Bartels 2020, 48-49). This was approved by superiors as a way to obtain the equipment needed to effectively conduct operations in the deployment (Königshaus 2012, 18). As the Commissioner

noted in 2019: “Why all this - modern clothing, not sixth generation combat planes - cannot be procured far faster remains unclear.” (Bartels 2020, 50).

At the same time, in the period under review, there was some change in funding trends. Lack of the funding was reported in 2012 (Königshaus 2013, 20), 2013 (Königshaus 2014, 6,13), 2015 (Bartels 2016, 5,17), 2016 (Bartels 2017, 9,26,28), 2017 (Bartels 2018, 42), 2019 (Bartels 2020, 7). Meanwhile after the Crimea crisis the Bundestag started to allocate additional funds to finance the Bundeswehr, which was also mentioned by the Commissioner (Bartels 2017, 5; Bartels 2019, 7; Bartels 2020, 7, 19).

Given the above, it is only logical that the lack of equipment extended to training. This is true for all types of troops. The soldiers lacked various equipment (Königshaus 2014, 13; Königshaus 2015, 22; Bartels 2016, 11-13; Bartels 2017, 25-26; Bartels 2018, 42; Bartels 2019, 15, 40, 44, 76; Bartels 2020, 43-44) from night vision goggles (Bartels 2020, 46) and personal weapons (Königshaus 2012, 16; Königshaus 2013, 13, 16; Königshaus 2014, 13; Bartels 2016, 13) to heavy self-propelled howitzers PzH 2000 (Bartels 2016, 11) and helicopter (Königshaus 2013, 17; Königshaus 2015, 53). To cope with this problem, in some cases, soldiers made independent modifications to equipment (Ibid., 19), in others, the missing armored vehicles were replaced (Königshaus 2012, 15; Königshaus 2013, 16; Königshaus 2014, 13; Königshaus 2015, 28) by cars (Ibid., 20) or, finally, they just did not train (Bartels 2019, 44). The latter is especially important, since soldiers did not always have the opportunity to train with the equipment used in deployments (Bartels 2019, 43, 77; Bartels 2020, 69), which is contrary to the principle of “train as you fight”. The return of equipment from Afghanistan helped to partially solve the problem (Königshaus 2014, 13), however, the number of deployments continued to increase, so this solution could not be long-term.

Summarizing the problems of this period, one can once again note the similarity with the previous periods. As the main problems, one again can see the continued use of outdated equipment, a significant shortage of spare parts, the use of various non-standard solutions to maintain equipment in operational readiness, as well as low operational readiness and a shortage of various equipment in all branches of the military, a lack of uniforms and training equipment. All these problems have been mentioned earlier in one way or another and have not been resolved for almost 20 years since the beginning of the reforms. At the same time, one can see an improvement in funding and the situation with ammunition, which by the end of the period began to suffice.

Chapter 5. Procurement reforms implementation

5.1. Procurement reforms implementation 2000-2008

After the Warsaw Pact Organization ceased to exist in 1991, circumstances have changed: on the one hand, NATO had no major opponents in Europe. On the other hand, local foci of instability and fragile states constantly appeared around the world. In order to adapt to the new environment some NATO countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany began to develop a new strategy for the use of military forces. The response to these changes was the transition from a large army with big numbers of heavy weapons to small, highly mobile units capable of quickly moving to any end of the world and deploying in a short time. The German military also came up with this idea (Biehle 1995, 4; Marienfeld 1996, 34).

Simultaneously along with the development of a new strategy for the armed forces, there was a discussion and development of legislation that would allow the German army to actively take part in military operations abroad, known as “Out-of-Area-Debatte”. This debate ended up with the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (das Bundesverfassungsgericht). According to this decision each new abroad deployment should be sanctioned by the Federal parliament (das Bundestag) by simple majority of votes³ (Statement by the Press Office 1994).

As the result of “Out-of-Area-Debatte” Bundeswehr increased its participation in international operations and took part in Kosovo war in 1999. The Kosovo war revealed problems in German Army and along with appointment of new Schroeder’s government in 1998 opened up a window of opportunity for new military reform. Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping created the Commission "on the Future of the Bundeswehr", also known as “Weizsäcker Commission”, after its head – former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker. Their policy core beliefs were based

³ Debate was concluded in 2005 by the Parliamentary Participation Act, which regulated parliamentary modalities for deployments abroad (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz 2005).

on the bunch of documents⁴ and could be described as creation of new, “crisis-management” type of the Bundeswehr. These beliefs could be traced in Weizsäcker’s Report (Die Zukunft Der Bundeswehr 2000), which was published on May 23rd, 2000. Even though this advocacy coalition included members from different professional areas (politicians, journalists, scientist, former military etc.), during the year of its operation, it did not manage to collect enough resources to promote its reform project. Most importantly it failed to gain support of the key decision-maker in Bundeswehr policy subsystem – Minister of Defence. Thus, on June 14th another policy project was adopted as the new Bundeswehr reformed. Realignment the Bundeswehr (Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr) was developed by Ministry of Defence and backed by Rudolf Schaping. Since he was the key decision-maker in subsystem, his support was crucial for the adoption of this project. It worth noting that he also was the member of SPD – the ruling party at that time.

The choice of window of opportunity for reform also was not very successful. In 1999 it seemed to be a coupling between problem stream (obsolete structure and procurement problems of the Bundeswehr) with politics stream (Kosovo war made some of problems obvious). In fact, military reform was not the first priority for new SDP government, which cared more about unemployment and other social issues (Interview, Finance ministry, Bonn 28 August 2002; Interview, Berlin 18 August 2002. Both cit. in. Dyson 2005). In addition, inside reform itself procurement issues were less of a priority than cost cutting and personnel cuts (H2b double decisive, H2a smoking gun).

Moreover, Scharpings coalition had not enough resources for further support of the reform. It was enough to be a key decision-maker in the policy subsystem and member of SPD to adopt the reform, but not enough to solve further problems, because he was not supported by Chancellor’s

⁴ NATO’s updated Strategic Concept and Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) (April 1999); The WEU Bremen Declaration (May 1999); The European Council Declaration on strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) (Cologne, June 1999); The conclusions of the Helsinki European Council on CESDP and the HHG, (December 1999).

office. The reason was that there was a conflict between Chancellor Schroeder and Sharping, thus he was perceived more as a rival (Schradi 2001) (H2a smoking gun, smoking gun for whole H2).

Reform plan was presented by Ministry of Defence in September 2000 as the result of around 4 months of planning (June-September). It assumed the end of the main stage of the reform in 2003, with the reduction of personnel to target figures by 2010. The very procurement reform consisted of several objectives:

1) Creation of the Armaments Council (Rüstungsrat). It consisted of 11 members (Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2000). Mostly these persons were inspectors, who were in charge of different parts and services of Bundeswehr. It was designed for interdepartmental coordination for the procurement of the Bundeswehr, and in addition was engaged in planning the provision of the Bundeswehr based on the need and available resources. While this goal sounds clear, Council's credentials and operating procedure were described less obvious. For instance, the process of Council's functioning and procedure were describing as: *"The Armaments Council, chaired by the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, aligns material and equipment planning with the necessary capabilities of the Bundeswehr. The proposals of the armed forces and the available resources form an important basis for decision-making."* (Ibid.). While one can understand that the main role of the Council is advisory one, it is still not clear how exactly it supposed to work.

2) Material provision. Authors of the document stated that change in structure of the Bundeswehr along with change of Germany's international obligations require new attitude towards material planning and procurement instead of development of the old one (Ibid.). Thus, instead of particular measures they announced new Material and equipment concept which would answer questions on what material and equipment is required to meet new Bundeswehr's capability profile and which and how equipment should be prioritized given limited financial resources (Ibid.). It was planned to publish this concept at the end of the year 2000. At the same time authors presented precise list

of priorities for military procurement. It included list of equipment which suited more for “territorial defence” purposes more than for “crisis-management” (Ibid.).

3) Customer Product Management. In addition, the procedure for the development and implementation of materials for defence purposes CPM was introduced, which replaced two other procedures AU 220 and AU 250. The difference compared to the previous procedure was in the reduction of the number of stages (3 instead of 5). It was assumed that this would help reduce the time required for the full implementation of the procurement project, and therefore its final cost (Ibid.). Despite not having precise steps of implementation of this new procedure, the causal logic behind it as the mechanism itself was presented in the precise manner (Ibid.).

Finally, GEBB was created - a division of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the purpose of which is to provide consulting services for the Bundeswehr. In particular, development and support in the implementation of privatization programs. GEBB was involved in programs in non-military tasks such as catering, clothing, and transportation (Ibid.). In addition, this organization was involved in a large number of privatization processes associated with the Ministry of Defence in the early and mid-2000s.

At least 2 out of 4 objectives were described quite precise, while still having some vague in it. Thus, we might say that it is sufficient proof for those objectives were described in consistent and precise manner (H1a straw-in-the-wind).

The procurement part of military reforms was planned out of idea to solve procurement problems through the privatization of areas not directly related to military activities and the centralization of all remaining parts of military logistics and supply. Considering financial constraints, under which reform supposed to be implemented and reduction of the personnel. The causal theory sounds adequate (H1b straw-in-the-wind).

Soon after the start implementation, the other part of Bundeswehr reform met an opposition. It was planned to get big part of funding of reform from closure of military bases (Szandar 2004).

However, Laender and Municipal governments were against it because it negatively affected their budgets. There is no information about was it expected or not, however, it shows that reform met either unexpected resistance or resistance which Minister of Defence could not cope with (H1c smoking gun; H1e double decisive) It led to closure of a smaller number of bases, than it was expected. In order to discuss this problem, the series of consultations with Laender governments were initiated in the February of 2001 (Scharping 2001, 9). As the result of this only DM 438.1 million instead of 1.8 billion planned was made by the 2002 (Dyson 2005, 369). Since it was problematic to raise money for the reform implementation, weapon projects budgets were cut (Dyson 2005, 370) (H1f smoking gun).

“The SPD was locked into a failing policy concept. Germany’s continuing commitment to territorial defence and purchase of immobile artillery had serious implications for the Bundeswehr’s ability to carry out crisis-management tasks, infuriating the British. Weapons projects such as the A-400-M transport aircraft ... were compromised and investment continued to lie well-beneath the target of 30 per cent, at 23 per cent of the defence budget.” (Dyson 2005, 370).

Rudolf Scharping, who was interested in the implementation of his reform project, however met some problems as the principal with agents – stuff of the Bundeswehr. Those in Ministry of Defence, who advocated abolishment of conscription and creation of crisis-management Bundeswehr, were not happy, when Scharpfings project preserved conscription and did not radically changed Bundeswehr structure (Dyson 2005, 367). The further reform implementation continued – the less support within Ministry and party Scharpfing had (Dyson 2005 ,369). Moreover, Ministerial officials actively thwarted Scharpfing by leaking information and slowing down the privatization process (Interview Jasper Wieck 16 August 2002. Cit. in Dyson 2005). *“Scharping also made unnecessary enemies within the Budgetary Committee, affecting support for weapons projects”* (Dyson 2005, 370). In addition, he limited the circle of persons influencing the decision by the Planning stuff, which made him lose even more influence among his colleagues in the party and the ministry (Dyson 2005, 369) (H1e double decisive; H3c double decisive). As a

result of a series of scandals that only worsened Scharpfing's reputation ("Scharping würde wieder plantschen 2003"), he was dismissed in July 2002.

Peter Struck, the former Parliamentary Party Chairman, became his successor. Unlike his predecessor, Peter Struck was a close ally of Schroeder, as they previously worked in Lower Saxony. He was appointed to this position by Schroeder for "damage control" purposes, as the person, who possessed needed skills and could be trusted (Dyson 2005,371).

Thus, Struck soon announced VPR (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien), which were presented in May 2003. The new document, unlike the old one, was more devoted to the doctrine of creating more mobile armed forces and the logic of the functioning of the Bundeswehr in connection with this doctrine. Quite little attention has been paid to the procurement (H1e smoking gun). However, from the document one can distinguish two areas of activity regarding security: the privatization of those spheres of activity that do not directly relate to basic tasks (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, 2003, 10) and the priority in financing international defence projects to the detriment of national ones (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, 2003, p. 13) (H1a hoops). In addition, because of scarcity of resources there were planned 26-billion-euro cuts in armament projects in all branches of military to fit in existing budget (Szandar 2004). Main subject of these cuts were projects designed for territorial defence (hence, old doctrine) (Ibid.). However, Struck saved budgets of such projects as EUROFIGHTER and A-400 from cuts, since they fitted in new doctrine of the Bundeswehr (Ibid.; "Luftwaffe verliert rund 500 Kampfflugzeuge" 2004; Weiland 2004) (H3d double decisive).

Unlike Scharping, Struck enjoyed more support of Chancellor office and bureaucrats from Ministry of Defence, thus despite critique ("Hü und Hott der Generalinspekteure" 2004; Weiland 2004), he was able to continue his reform.

It is important to note here that one of the main directions of the reform has become saving money. In other words, Peter Struck had to do what Scharpfing failed - to make the Bundeswehr less costly

and more cost-effective. If the plan of the 2000 reform envisaged broad actions related to procurement, listing a lot of weapon projects, then in the plan of 2003 there was no place for this. Sharping was unable to raise enough money to implement his procurement plans. Struck did not set such a task.

In the Scharping's reform, provision was not the main activity. These were changes in the size and structure of the Bundeswehr. In the Struck's addition of 2003, procurement was finally relegated to the low priority since the main task was to continue the adaptation of the Bundeswehr in connection with the changed concept of its application.

After the loss of SPD in 2005 election and creation of CDU/CSU and SPD Franz Josef Jung, a member of CDU had become a new Minister of Defence. During his term Ministry of Defence pushed new White paper in 2006. It was a continuation of Peter Struck's ideas, cementing three main theses: (1) The need to procurement within limited resources (White paper 2006, p. 62), (2) the need to reduce costs through privatization (Ibid.), (3) priority for long-term investment projects and projects for the new profile of the Bundeswehr to the detriment of basic tasks (Ibid. p.63, 68) (H1a hoops). The rest of while paper was in vein of Struck's VPR (H1e smoking gun;). Until 2009 Ministry of defence was mostly concentrated on foreign deployments, including the biggest one – Afghanistan, where German Armed Forces were forced by circumstances to expand their participation. In general, it can be stated that there were no changes in the procurement policy from that moment until the next reform.

To sum up, procurement reform of 2001-2004 despite of being well prepared in first (Scharping's) iteration excluding being structured to enhance implementation process, very soon met resistance from interest groups, i.e. Laender officials. Without support of Chancellor office Scharping was not able to win this conflict. Because of this conflict he was not able to raise enough funds to implement procurement plan. Moreover, he lost support in his own ministry, which was in charge for implementation of his reform project. His successor, as principal, had other opinion about

necessary procurement measures. Finally, the procurement part of reform was never the priority because Federal Government at that time was more interest into cutting of budget spending, labor-market reforms and reorganizing doctrine and structure of Bundeswehr.

5.2. Procurement reforms implementation 2009-2019

In 2009, Jung was replaced by Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (“Umfrage: Welches Ministerium für zu Guttenberg?” 2009). He proposed the continuation of the reforms of the Bundeswehr. As in the mid-2000s, the reduction in the size of the army is becoming the central object of the reform (Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr 2010, 22). In addition, zu Guttenberg decided on what his predecessors did not dare to do and what the Weizaker Commission proposed - the cancellation of the draft (Ibid., 28). As a result, at the end of 2010, the call was canceled. In addition, the Commission recommended to develop the procurement policy (Ibid. 36-37), to answer problems incl. ones of the Parliamentary Commissioner on the Armed Forces. However, there were very few precise measures. In early 2011, zu Guttenberg was accused of plagiarism in his dissertation (Preuß 2011). As a result of this scandal, zu Guttenberg left the post of Minister of Defence pending the end of the investigation (Kirschbaum 2011).

The reform was continued by his successor, de Maizière, ex Ministry of interior. proposed changes in terms of supply were in the spirit of White Paper 2006:

- 1) Review of the procurement and Equipment projects (Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr 2013, 17).
- 2) To create Federal Office for Equipment, Information Technology and use of the Bundeswehr (BAAINBw) (Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr 2013, 95) (which happened in October 2012).

The goal of this decision was to centralize all procurement efforts across the Bundeswehr.

Both procurement measures were written in clear and consistent manner, had solid causal theory and detailed implementation plan (H1a, H1b, H1c straw-in-the-wind).

As it can be seen, zu Guttenberg – de Maizièrè reform continues the line of previous attempt to centralize military procurement process by combining all existing structures into one common body. Along with this, in general, several administrative changes were envisaged. Since de Maizièrè was appointed more as the crisis-manager after zu Guttenberg to finish his reform, after start of the implementation and new Parliament elections he was assigned back to the post of Ministry of Interior. An additional stimulus was the scandal around EUROHAWK – the project of UAV, developed by EU and US. Despite investments in total of more than 680 million Euro, the project was canceled (Marx 2013) by German Defence Ministry. This case also influenced the decision to assign the new Minister of Defence (Interview Centre for Military History and Social Science of the Bundeswehr 2 December 2013. cit. in Dyson 2014).

His successor, ex-Minister of Family Affairs and Youth, Ursula von der Leyen, was appointed in 2013. In 2014, she proposed another reorganization of the Bundeswehr. However, it was aimed at increasing the popularity of the Bundeswehr as an employer and had little to do with procurement (H3b hoops, H3d double decisive). Thus, the supply reforms for zu Gutenberg - de Maizièrè were again pushed into the background and stalled. However, procurement problems, as can be seen from the reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, have not gone away.

In 2019, the new Defence Minister Annengret Kramp-Karrenbauer, in her inaugural speech, addressed procurement problems of the Bundeswehr. This leaves hope that a new wave of reforms is possible in the future, which will resolve the procurement problems.

To sum up, 2010-2013 procurement reform, started by zu Guttenberg and continued by de Maizièrè was a continuation of previous attempt. Despite its solid ground of being well-developed and written, after parliamentary elections of 2013, it was pushed to the background, while new social measures of von der Leyen were given a priority.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

German reforms in military procurement became largely hostage to the political and financial situation. After the reunification of Germany, the reformers were much attracted by the structural and numerical changes in Bundeswehr. The changes necessary for the effective use of the German army in the new political and technological conditions. It is for this reason that in the 2000-2003 reform, the change in the structure of the army was primary, and procurement was a secondary issue. When the internal political situation changed and it became clear that limited financial resources would not be enough to effectively implement the entire reform, procurement was largely abandoned. This can be seen in Peter Struck's "reform of reform". In it, the emphasis was entirely shifted to the structural and ideological changes of the Bundeswehr, and the procurement was mentioned in the framework of privatization and integration into the European arms market. Both serve to reduce financial supply costs. Struck's successor, Franz Josef Jung, continued this line, supporting the creation of pan-European defence projects and the privatization of procurement areas not related to the direct functions of the army. Thus, the initial reform of Rudolf Scharping stalled and was not completed.

After a lack of active procurement reform activities from 2005 to 2009, the reform was attempted to restart in 2010 under the leadership of the next Minister, zu Guttenberg. Nevertheless, in the 2010-2013 reform, the ideological and structural part once again had more weight than the procurement part. The additions proposed by his successor, de Maizière, finally paid much more attention to procurement. However, once again, an unfavorable political situation in the form of scandals and the failure of several joint investment projects ended with the fact that both ministers were removed from office and were unable to control the process of implementing changes in procurement. The new minister - Ursula von den Leyen - in 2014 focused on increasing the social attractiveness of the Bundeswehr as an employer, rather than on equipment. Thus, the implementation of procurement reform without proper supervision has stalled again.

As for the broader research perspective, this paper indicated that both cultural and one-actor-driven explanations from previous research are relevant, i.e. they did have influence on reform development or implementation. At the same time systemic factors such as described in top-down approach are also relevant. In addition, even though Defence was the sphere of exclusive Federal authority, sub-national units had found the way to influence defence reform implementation, where there they were against is. Are results generalizable or not – is the question of further discussion. On the one hand, German case was specific, on the other hand – Germany is example of both multilevel governance and federalism. Thus, we can expect similar interactions between different levels of governance in other cases.

At last, it is important to indicate that this research was limited to macrolevel of policy implementation. In other words, the very implementation was studied on the level of federal government. Thus, it does not let us to witness, if there were any problems at the “street-level”. This would be the next logical step for my research since it would let me to draw the full picture of reform implementation.

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