

**“WE ARE FACING A GRAVE THREAT”: *FUJIMORISMO* AS A
CASE STUDY OF INCLUSIONARY AND EXCLUSIONARY
POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA**

By

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the populist discourses of Alberto Fujimori and Keiko Fujimori, in Peru, to assess whether the new generation of Latin American right-wing populist leaders, of which Keiko Fujimori is a representative, professes an inclusionary or exclusionary rhetoric. To answer this research question, the work examines the historic evolution of populism in Latin America and investigates the three-dimensional concept of inclusionary/exclusionary politics advanced by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) to propose an operationalization of the concepts. Using this operationalization, the research concludes that, unlike Alberto Fujimori, Keiko Fujimori has an exclusionary discourse but that, despite this distinction, her populist style bears more resemblance to inclusionary Latin American populisms than to exclusionary European populisms.

Keywords: *Populism, Inclusionary populism, Exclusionary populism, Fujimorismo, Peru*

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1 Introduction

Not all populists are populist in the same way. Although in the current age this resembles a platitude, for decades even the more attentive readers of the literature on populism might have been forgiven for thinking authors in Europe and in Latin America dealt with different political phenomena: while the former wrote about racism, exclusion, and border issues, the latter delved on workers' rights, class struggle, and interrupted presidential terms.

Part of the difference between European and Latin American populisms is to be found on the distinction between exclusionary and inclusionary forms of populisms. Whereas European populisms often revolve around the exclusion of outsiders from the fatherland, their Latin American counterparts concerned themselves with the expansion of rights and access to state resources as way to include the marginalized masses. But what happens when exclusionary populism tries its luck across the Atlantic?

This work is a case study on the evolution of *Fujimorismo*, from Alberto Fujimori to his daughter and political heiress, Keiko Fujimori. It seeks to answer the question of whether the current wave of Latin American right-wing populism (of which Keiko Fujimori is a key exponent) is inclusionary or exclusionary. To this question, there are two possible, binary, hypotheses:

- H0: The current wave of right-wing populism in Latin America, as represented by Keiko Fujimori, is inclusionary
- H1: The current wave of right-wing populism in Latin America, as represented by Keiko Fujimori, is not inclusionary (it is, therefore, exclusionary, given the binary relationship of the two concepts)

Once the main research question is answered, a subsequent consideration needs answering: does current right-wing populism in Latin America resemble more its European or Latin American counterparts? The answer to this question might have relevant consequences for future scholarship, given it helps integrate the study of European and Latin American populisms.

To answer these questions, it is first necessary to determine whether, indeed, there is a new wave of right-wing populism in Latin America – whether there are enough commonalities between its adherents and whether its causes are rooted in structural socioeconomic changes in the region and beyond. Furthermore, it is also necessary to research the concept of inclusionary/exclusionary populism itself, so that ambivalences relating to the operationalization of its dimensions are resolved and it can be rightly applied to the proposed cases.

The cases of Alberto and Keiko Fujimori were chosen in consideration of the research questions, their premises and the discussion they spawn. As these two political actors belong to the same political dynasty, there is a continuity of themes and of ideological outlook between them, which allows for a good assessment of how much current right-wing populists in Latin America differ from the last generation of right-wing populists in the region. In this sense, choosing two right-wing populists – let alone two right-wing populists of the same political group – makes for a most similar systems design, optimizing the investigation. Furthermore, Keiko Fujimori, as will be seen, is a typical representative of her political generation, which makes for a more ample scope of generalization

Alberto Fujimori ruled Peru from 1990 to 2000, and his presidency is widely regarded by the literature as representative of neoliberal right-wing populism (Weyland 1999; Roberts 2007). Fujimori managed to keep high levels of popularity for the most

part of his tenure, due to the double triumphs, in his first term, against economic instability and domestic terrorism. As a result of these two achievements, Peru went through a significant transformation, and many were socially and economically integrated, as streets and roads were safer and inflation was tamed. As literature shows, Alberto Fujimori was not a right-wing politician before reaching the presidency (Murakami 2012: 179-237; Mauceri 1995: 18-19) and his adoption of neoliberalism and of military confrontation against left-wing guerillas was circumstantial (Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñeres 2010). Most importantly for the purposes of this research, Alberto Fujimori maintained a rhetoric of defense of the masses and identification with those excluded by the criollo elite.

Keiko Fujimori, by her part, belongs to a new generation of Latin American leaders. They are mostly right-wing and can be labeled populists, following the ideational perspective (Mudde 2004; Hawkins 2009), due to their Manichean worldview, which opposes a morally superior, homogeneous, and exploited people versus an evil, profiteering elite; to their hyperbolic, cosmic, and teleological historical narrative; and to their majoritarian perspective on democracy (Mudde, Kalwasser 2015; Smith 2020). Some of these leaders, like Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and Nayib Bukele of El Salvador, have been elected as heads of government of their countries; others, such as Uruguay's Guido Manini Ríos and Chile's José Antonio Kast, occupy relevant legislative positions. Still others command important national political forces – and this is the case with Keiko Fujimori, who is the president of the Fuerza Popular party and who has competed in every second round of Peru's presidential elections since 2011 (2011, 2016 and 2021), always falling short of winning the House of Pizarro by straight margins (48.55% versus 51.45% against Ollanta Humala in 2011; 49.88% versus 50.12% against Pedro Pablo Kuczynski

in 2016; and, as of this writing, 49.89% versus 50.11% against Pedro Castillo in 2021¹). Keiko Fujimori has a markedly more conservative discourse as compared to her father's, adding a cultural dispute aspect to *Fujimorismo*, all the while demonizing the left for the country's and her personal woes².

The following chapters are organized as follows: to this introduction a literature review chapter will follow. It will define the ideational perspective of populism – to which this work adheres – and will include an analysis of the historical evolution of populism in Latin America. This historical analysis is of fundamental importance to assess whether there is currently a new wave of populism in the region – a discussion which closes the chapter.

The third chapter will center around the concept of inclusionary/exclusionary populism. It will open with a literature review, which will explore how the concept is operationalized by literature. To this a conceptual discussion will follow, which will investigate the conditions of necessity and sufficiency of the concept's dimensions. Finally, the chapter will close with a few remarks on the long tradition of exclusionary politics in Latin America.

The fourth chapter will present the case studies. The discourses of both Alberto and Keiko Fujimori will be investigated following the operationalization of the concept of inclusionary/exclusionary populism provided by literature. This chapter will provide answers to the question of whether Keiko Fujimori is an inclusive or exclusive populist.

This work concludes with a discussion of whether Keiko Fujimori's speech is more closely related to European or Latin American populists. The conclusion will also

¹ Data from the National Bureau of Electoral Processes. Available in: <https://www.resultadossep.eleccionesgenerales2021.pe/SEP2021/EleccionesPresidenciales/RePres/T>

² See, for instance: <https://elcomercio.pe/politica/keiko-fujimori-dice-que-enfrentara-a-la-izquierda-radical-que-hoy-ataca-con-todo-nndc-noticia/> ; [Elecciones 2021 | Keiko Fujimori: "Fuerza Popular se enfrenta también al populismo y a la izquierda radical" | RPP Noticias](#)

bring a few considerations on what the findings of this research mean for the study of populism in Latin America.

Despite all the advances in the literature on populism over the last decade, much research remains to be done on the matter. By analyzing the recent evolution of populism in Latin America, exploring the possibilities of the inclusivism/exclusivism typology, and potentially helping to bridge the gap between Latin American and European scholarship, this study can contribute to the progress of research on the topic.

2 Populism: a literature review

2.1 Defining populism: the ideational perspective

As highlighted by Kriesi (2018), four concepts of populism currently coexist in the literature: populism as an ideology, populism as a political strategy, populism as a project of political renewal and populism as a political communication strategy. Among these, currently, the most dominant concept in the field is the one which regards populism as an ideological expression. This research incorporates into this body of literature. More specifically, it follows the ideational perspective, which is delineated by Cas Mudde's minimal definition as

“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543).

Populism is, accordingly, interpreted as a “thin-centered ideology”, comprised of people-centrism, anti-elitism and majoritarianism. These core concepts are necessary and sufficient, and thus must all be present in order for populism to be defined in a given circumstance (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 151).

The thin-centered ideology of populism, furthermore, can attach itself to other “thick ideologies” across the political spectrum, and thus there can be populists from the far right (such as Sarah Palin) all the way to the far left (such as Hugo Chávez), and although Palin and Chávez share as much in the way of “thick ideologies” as conservative American nationalism and progressive Latin-American bolivarianism have in common, both nevertheless display the same populist “thin ideology”, each accommodating it to their own circumstance. Populism is thus quite flexible in its capacity to adapt, all the

while seldomly existing in its pure form. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser put it, “populism can be left-wing or right-wing, organized in top-down or bottom-up fashion, rely on strong leaders or be even leaderless” (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 153).

The advantages of the ideational perspective, for this research, are twofold. Firstly, given its widespread use and ease to apply to different cases – stemming from its minimalist character –, it makes for an easier comparison between different regional circumstances, such as those surrounding Latin American and European populisms. Secondly, the ideational perspective allows for an analysis of the supply and demand sides driving populism. Since populism is regarded as an ideology, it can be embraced by both political leaders and the electorate, and it depends on the existence of both – of the supply and the demand – to manifest itself in a political system, as the existence of a demand without a supply and of a supply without a demand will not result in a “market”, much like in microeconomic analysis. This research will avail itself of such an examination of supply and demand.

As Hawkins (2009) points out, populism as a thin ideology manifests itself through six sets of ideas: a Manichean – moral and dualistic – worldview which leaves little room for nuance; the attribution of cosmic, epic proportions to the political struggle; a romantic view of the “man in the street” as the personification of the nation; the demonization of an elite; the justification of radical change as the solution to overthrow the evil elite; and the use of uncivil, violent language against political opponents. This thesis is mainly concerned with the third of these assortments – i.e., that which defines who is included and excluded in the definition of “the real people”. The reasons for this have to do with the need to assess inclusivism and exclusivism in a given populist discourse, as the next sessions will expound.

2.2 Populism in Latin America

Latin America has a long historical experience with populism, dating back at least to the first decades of the 20th century. In fact, each historical era of 20th and early 21th century Latin American politics is accompanied by a distinct set of populist leaders. This has led the literature on the matter to refer to different waves of populism in the region, each corresponding to a specific historical period.

Literature on the issue agrees minimally in acknowledging at least three waves of populism in the region, corresponding to Classic populism, Neopopulism, and Radical populism (Burbano de Lara 2018, 437; de la Torre 2017). Even though this tripartite division is near unanimous, some authors build on top of it, to include further subdivisions. Freidenberg, for instance, proposes six waves of populism in the region, in a continual renewal of leaderships since the early 20th century, divided into Early populism, Classic populism, Late populism, New populisms (of the neoliberal kind), New populisms (of the anti-neoliberal kind), and contemporary populisms (Freidenberg 2007, 1063). As this work focuses on case studying, rather than on historical typology, it follows the minimally agreed upon tripartite classification, as the historical discussion on the definition of waves is only tangential to the goals of this study.

2.2.1 Classic Populism

Populism in Latin America traces its origins back to the early 20th century, when urbanization and industrialization entailed the rise of urban middle and proletariat classes, especially in the regions' largest economies – Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Most importantly, the growing complexity of these societies led to the downfall of oligarchic, patrimonial rule and the rise of demands for the expansion of democratic franchises (Burbano de Lara 2018, 435; de la Torre 2017, 196).

In these three countries, leaders with a similar ideological outlook rose to power in the 1930's and 1940's. As de la Torre explains, Argentina's Domingo Perón, Brazil's Getúlio Vargas, and Mexico's Lázaro Cárdenas were "populist presidents [who] pursued nationalist and redistributive social policies that coincided with the period of import substitution industrialization (ISI)" (de la Torre 2017, 196). Classic Populism is characterized by the attack on values identified with the elite and the glorification of workers as the "true people", which included the rhetorical transfiguration of negative stereotypes into symbols of inclusion and righteousness, as seen, for instance, in Perón's referring to its constituency as the "*cabecitas negras*" (black heads), by which this leader managed to turn a prejudiced term with strong racial undertones – often used by members of the elite to refer to the lower strata of the population – into a symbol of labor proud and of social inclusion (Milanesio 2010, 57 apud de la Torre 2017, 197).

Classic populists' calls for social inclusion often turned into real expansion of democratic franchises, which greatly benefitted their cause by incorporating formerly excluded parcels of the society into the political system – and into their constituency cohort. Thus, under Perón, voter turnout expanded from 18% to 50% of Argentinians, and the country became a pioneer in granting female suffrage (de la Torre 2017, 197). Similarly, under Vargas, female suffrage was attained in Brazil, greatly increasing overall representation (Hahner 1980, 101).

Despite this expansion of majoritarian features, Classic populism often repudiated liberal constitutionalism – strongly identified with the values and worldview of oligarchical elites – and the limitations of executive power it entails, frequently interpreting electoral triumphs as popular consent to radical institutional change (de la Torre 2017, 197-198). As a result, populist leaders such as Vargas and Perón ruled over periods of authoritarian government.

2.2.2 Neopopulism

Whereas Classical populists were the product of an era of state-led industrialization, economic growth, and urbanization, Neopopulists were catapulted to the forefront of Latin America's political scene by the crisis of the ISI model in the 1980's and 1990's, and by the lookout for alternative models which ensued (de la Torre 2017, 198).

In this context, neoliberal policies were pushed forward by international financial institutions as a solution for the economic crisis in the region, characterized by uncontrolled government deficits, high inflation, and economic stagnation. Often, the austerity measures associated with such policies were levied as conditionalities for accessing financial resources. Such policies were unpopular among voters overall and, unsurprisingly, two of the region's most prominent leaders of this generation – namely, Alberto Fujimori and Argentina's Carlos Menem – were elected on platforms which repudiated neoliberalism and adopted such measures shortly after taking office (Freidenberg 2007, 2580-2588).

Even though the scenario faced by neopopulists differed markedly from that presented to classic populists in that political representation had already been guaranteed for a great part of marginalized groups, the new leadership acted in a way similar to the old one, in that they converted traditional symbols of stigma against the poor and excluded into a symbol of proud and recognition of their struggle. Thus, Alberto and Fujimori and Ecuador's Abdalá Bucaram converted racial and socioeconomic insults – *chinitos* and *cholitos* (Chinese and poor mestizos) in the case of the former and a “bunch of prostitutes and thieves” for the latter (de la Torre 2017, 198) – into political slogans mobilized against a perceived elite.

The blend of populist politics and neoliberal policies often led to the rise of clientelism. Patron-client relationships are managed by the ruling parties, and the

exchange of *ad hoc* services and goods is used to guarantee political support, facilitated by a scenario of shrinking state social presence (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Consequently, many of these leaders have faced corruption charges. Some, like Collor de Mello and Abdalá Buraram, have been impeached as a result of these processes. Others, such as Alberto Fujimori and Carlos Menem, have been convicted by courts after finishing their terms.

Furthermore, similarly to their classic populist predecessors, neopopulists have had a troubled relationship with constitutional democracy and with the limits it imposes on constitutional power. Even if most leaders did not go as far as Fujimori in openly staging an armed coup and dismantling the institutional order, they often found ingenious – albeit institutionally questionable – means to circumvent the restrictions on their power. This can be seen, for instance, in Menem’s and Collor’s abusive use of emergency constitutional decrees, which allowed the executive power to bypass the legislative and implement policies which would otherwise be impossible to – such as, for instance, the Collor administration’s forceful ceasing of all savings deposits in the nation (Freidenberg 2007, 2632-2643, 3142-3145).

2.2.3 Radical Populism

Despite neopopulist’s inclusive rhetoric³, the neoliberal policies of the 1980’s and 1990’s, for the most part, resulted in increased exclusion in Latin America. As a result, there ensued a crisis of representation, coupled with popular resistance to austerity measures which reduced the social role of governments across the region (de la Torre 2017, 200). This reaction increased the perception that economic elites had stronger linkages to international institutions and governments than to their fellow citizens.

³ And despite notable exceptions in the neoliberal age of Latin American politics, such as, for instance, the Real Plan in Brazil, which increased the income of the lower strata in real terms (Rocha, 2000).

The institutional reaction to neoliberalism came in the form of a wave of left-wing governments elected across the region. Some of these governments were headed by moderate leaders such as Lula da Silva in Brazil and Michelle Bachelet in Chile – the so-called “pink tide” (Spronk 2014). In other countries, such as in Venezuela with Hugo Chávez, in Bolivia with Evo Moráles, and in Ecuador with Rafael Correa, this reaction came in the form of a third generation of Latin American populist leaders – the Radical populists.

Radical populism is characterized by constant campaigning in the form of recurrent elections; the defense of majoritarianism as an instrument to overcome the handicaps of liberal democracy in favor of better promotion of social justice (substantive democracy – once again, liberal democracy is often associated by these leaders with the values of traditional ruling elites); the drafting of new constitutions and the rhetoric of national re-founding; and state interventionism to promote a redistributivist agenda (de la Torre 2017, 201-202).

As with previous generations of popular leadership in Latin America, Radical populism resulted in authoritarian rule for some of the nations experiencing it. This is especially the case in Venezuela under *Chavismo* and in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega. The latter used his legislative majority to pass constitutional reforms allowing for unlimited reelection and the discretionary use of military force against threats the executive power discretionarily deems destabilizing (Thaler 2017, 160). In 2016, the government-controlled Supreme Electoral Council terminated the mandates of the opposition in the legislative (Thaler 2017, 161). In Venezuela under *Chavismo*, the government has resorted to rule-making and rule-bending in its own electoral benefit, has disregarded civil liberties, has violated the separation of powers, has used state resources

to favor itself, and has debilitated the rule of law by not enforcing the laws equally across society (Hawkins 2016, 314-316).

As with the other waves that preceded it, it is no easy task to determine well-defined temporal boundaries for Radical populism. In part, this difficulty is due to the overlapping nature of such waves: Both Neopopulists and Radical populists were for some time contemporaries of the predecessor wave. What changed is not the quantity of populist leadership emerging from the region in a given time period, but rather their distinct ideological outlook. Thus, while Mexico's Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 – 1994) inaugurated Neopopulism, Alán García and the APRA party (1985 – 1990) was still presiding Peru in classic populist style. Similarly, Alberto Fujimori was reelected in 2000 for a short-lived third term (he would resign seven months later amid a growing political crisis), while Hugo Chávez had had his first presidential election in 1998 and had won the campaign – and accompanying referendum – to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution in 1999.

To be sure, Radical populism is very much alive as of the writing of this research. After a brief period in which Bolivia was ruled by a conservative government following a coup against former president Evo Morales, the latter's party (*Movimiento Al Socialismo* – MAS) was conducted back to the *Casa Grande del Pueblo* presidential palace in La Paz following the 2020 general election, and the country is now presided by Morales' former ministry of the Economy and Public Finances, Luis Arce. In Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected in 2018 for a six-year term and his MORENA party coalition convincingly won the 2021 mid-terms, although falling short of winning the necessary majority to reform the constitution. In the Peruvian 2021 presidential election runoffs, Radical populist Pedro Castillo faced and defeated Keiko Fujimori. Keiko, however, is not a Neopopulist like her father. Across the region, the rise of leaders

such as Keiko Fujimori, Jair Bolsonaro and Nayib Bukele, is a sign that a new wave of populism is emerging, even though this does not necessarily mean the immediate demise of radical populists.

2.2.4 The 2010's right-wing populists: a fourth wave of populism?

Over the 2010's, Radical populists in Latin America were increasingly eclipsed by populists of a different kind. These new leaders are firmly placed on the right/conservative side of the political spectrum: they feature nationalistic and religious worldviews, they openly defend authoritarian positions based on majoritarianism – the perspective that the executive is the real embodiment of the people's will –, on tough-on-crime stances – according to which constitutional constraints set by the legislative and enforced by the judicial branches are favoring criminals and oppressing the common citizens (the “real people”) –, and a virulent anti-leftism – which leads these leaders and their vocal supporters to oppose everything they associate with the left, including human rights advocacy and gender equality. In fact, some of these leaders, such as Jair Bolsonaro, are on the furthest to the right one could get in their nation's political system (Almeida 2019).

To be sure, the rise of leaders with these characteristics is not a phenomenon circumscribed to Latin America. Events such as the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom have been widely perceived as a new global wave of right-wing populism and have been referred to, by commentators from across the political specter, as a “National populist revolution” (Girdusky and Hill 2020), a “Cultural Backlash” (Norris and Inglehart 2019), and a “Revolt against liberal democracy” (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). In light of this, the relevant question is to what extent the rise of these leaders represent a Latin American phenomenon or just the regional manifestation of a greater political movement. This research will answer this

question by comparing the populist style of Keiko Fujimori with those of prototypical European and Latin American populisms.

Regardless of the answer to this latter question, one should also notice that all previous waves of populism in Latin America were indissociable to worldwide phenomena: the Great Depression and the crisis of liberal capitalism led to a drop in the price of commodities and contributed to the toppling of oligarchical regimes across the region, all the while creating the conditions for the rise of interventionist governments such as those of Vargas, Perón and Cárdenas; the global crisis of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberalism was instrumental in providing the ideological justification for neopopulism, without which Fujimori, Collor de Mello and Menem would not have managed to move forward with their liberalizing agendas; and the post-Iraq War diffusion of global power and questioning of American hegemony was fundamental in creating a *Zeitgeist* in which Radical populism could be regarded as a legitimate ideology in voicing alternative perspectives to Western-centered liberal democracy, giving Chavez's, Moráles' or Correa's constitutional rewriting a veneer of respectability.

As with these previous waves, the emergence of Latin America's new right-wing populists is associated with broader socioeconomic issues, as illustrated in table 1. A growing body of literature deals with the causal relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and generational economic stagnation for specific sectors of the population in the developed world, such as white lower-middle classes (Hochschild 2018; Cramer 2016; Putnan 2020). According to this explanation, the growing despair among a significant portion of the electorate would have created the demand for populist leadership in these societies. If these new leaders differ from their predecessors not only ideologically, but also in professing a different kind of populism (exclusivist, rather than

inclusivist), and if their rise is associated with a distinct set of socioeconomic conditions, then they indeed make up a new, fourth wave of populism in Latin America.

Table 1

Wave	Timeframe	Representatives (non-exhaustive list)	Context
1st: Classical Populism	1930's – 1980's	Getúlio Vargas, Domingo Perón, Lázaro Cárdenas	Keynesianism, Import-substitution industrialization, Cold War
2nd: Neopopulism	1980's – 2000's	Alberto Fujimori, Collor de Mello, Carlos Menem	Crisis of the welfare state, Neoliberalism, “End of History”
3rd: Radical Populism	1990's – current	Hugo Chávez, Evo Moráles, Rafael Correa	Diffusion of global power, rise of powerful state-capitalist countries (China, Russia)
4th?	2000's – current	Jair Bolsonaro, Keiko Fujimori, Najib Bukele	Post-2008 Crisis, rise of global inequalities, global rise of right-wing populism (Trump, Brexit)

3 Populism: inclusionary and exclusionary

3.1 Literature review

The issue of whether populism is inclusionary or exclusionary in its nature has long featured in the literature (de la Torre 2010; Berezin 2009). As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser note, “the findings seem largely regionally determined, as most studies on Latin American populism emphasize its inclusive character (...), while almost all scholars of European populism stress its exclusive nature” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 147).

Filc (2015) provides a possible explanation as to why populism has developed different characteristics in Latin America and Europe. According to the author, much of the explanation is to be found in the historical evolution of the concept of “the people” in each of these regions. Colonialism plays a key role in this explanation, as the racialization of political colonial domination gave rise to two opposing perceptions on nativism: in European societies, it generated the need to define who the native group is by “drawing the line” in ways which excluded minorities from it (Filc 2015, 274, 277). In Latin America, on the other hand, the legacy of colonialism created the need to include the historically excluded racial groups, which often make up the majority of such countries’ population and thus can offer relevant political gains by originating large constituencies in a context of expanding suffrage (Filc 2015, 267-274).

In order to compare inclusionary and exclusionary forms of populism in different settings, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) build on previous work by Filc (2010) to propose a conceptual analytical framework which relies on three dimensions: the

material, the political and the symbolic. The material dimension concerns the access to the means of the state and its resources. While inclusionary populism concerns itself with distributivism and seeks political gain by readjusting the social structure to integrate excluded groups, as seen in Latin America, exclusionary populism focuses on denying access to state resources to certain groups, which are deemed as not belonging to the true people, as seen in the rhetoric of European populisms (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 159-160).

The political dimension concerns democratic participation and representation. Inclusionary populism focuses on extending these for previously excluded groups, as with Latin American populists, while exclusionary populists stress the need to bar certain groups from gaining access to the political life, as European populisms most often do (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 161-164). As seen, populism is not anti-democratic, however it does clash with liberal democratic principles given its strong majoritarian emphasis. This stress on the *volonté générale* is mostly discernible in the political dimension: inclusive and exclusive populisms disagree on who should benefit from democratic franchises, however both agree that the majority of the true people, however defined, should have access to political representation and that their will is the embodiment of the nation.

The symbolic dimension regards the rhetorical boundary between the people and the elite. Whereas inclusionary populism tends to praise the values, symbols and worth of the working people, as is the case with Latin American populist leadership, exclusionary populism denounces the minorities which are not deemed part of the true nation, as usually seen in European populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 164-166). In what regards the symbolic dimension, then, the main difference between inclusionary and exclusionary populisms lies in the manner each draws the line between

people and elite: while the former focuses on who is to be considered a part of the people, the latter stresses the members of the elite.

This thesis will apply the aforementioned three dimensions in analyzing the populist discourses of Alberto and Keiko Fujimori to classify each of them as inclusionary or exclusionary, according to how they regard the members of the people. Before this analysis, however, a few words on the operationalization of the concept of inclusionary/exclusionary populism are due.

3.2 A conceptual discussion

As seen, literature on the inclusive/exclusive nature of populism reached the conclusion that populisms can be either inclusivist – if a populist discourse is inclusivist in all three dimensions – or exclusivist – if it is exclusive in all three dimensions. This conclusion was reached based on evidence from historical populisms from Latin America and Europe: Latin American populisms are inclusivists in all three dimensions, while European populisms are exclusivists in all three dimensions⁴. As this research will show, however, Latin America is now watching the rise of a new style of populism which is inclusive in two of the three dimensions. This begs the question: is a “hybrid” form of populism inclusive or exclusive? To answer this question, one should first define the conditions of necessity and sufficiency surrounding the inclusivist/exclusivist dyad, as proposed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012).

The lack of hybrid cases – and the absence of a theoretical analysis of such possible cases – in the three-dimensional analytical framework developed by Mudde and Rovira

⁴ This raises the question of how to classify European left-wing populisms. As shown by Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) in their study of Syriza, these forms of populisms are inclusionary and mostly resemble their Latin-American counterparts in their focusing on socioeconomic issues from a distributivist outlook.

Kaltwasser (2012), allows one to infer that the three dimensions might relate to one another in the following eight possible ways, expressed in Boolean algebra:

1. $I = MPS$
2. $I = Mps + mPs + mpS + MPs + MpS + mPS + MPS$
3. $I = Mps + MPs + MpS + MPS$
4. $I = mPs + MPs + mPS + MPS$
5. $I = mpS + MpS + mPS + MPS$
6. $I = MPs + MPS$
7. $I = MpS + MPS$
8. $I = mPS + MPS$

Where “I” indicates the presence of inclusivism (exclusivism, therefore, is indicated as “i” – the absence of inclusivism); “M” indicates the fulfillment of the material dimension (“m”, therefore, expresses the non-fulfillment of this dimension); “P” indicates the fulfillment of the political dimension (“p” expresses the non-fulfillment of this dimension); and “S” indicates the fulfillment of the symbolic dimension (“s” expresses the non-fulfillment of this dimension).

Before continuing the analysis, a few words are due on why this work features inclusivism as the outcome of the Boolean analysis. Firstly, this is the result of inclusivism and exclusivism being understood as an antithetic conceptual dyad. Therefore, by definition, $I = e$ and $i = E$. Secondly, because both concepts are antithetic, it facilitates the analysis to choose one of them as the standard. Given that inclusivism has a semantic positive meaning, it seems logical to choose it, rather than exclusivism, as the standard for the analysis, in a way analogous to how it is the degree of democracy and not of autocracy which is measured and compared by most indexes on the quality of institutions.

The above eight expressions reflect the possibilities that only a conjunction of the three dimensions would result in inclusivism (1), that inclusivism might be present when at least one of the dimensions is fulfilled (2), and that only one dimension (3, 4, and 5) or conjunction of two dimensions (6, 7, and 8) are necessary and sufficient for inclusivism to be present. Possibilities 3 to 8 can be discarded forthwith, as they imply that one (6, 7, and 8) or two (3, 4, and 5) dimensions are not relevant for the outcome set, which is contradictory with the configuration of the three-dimensional concept itself as advanced by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser. This is because when both a condition and its negation are observed with the same outcome, as is the case from equations 3 to 8, then it ceases to be a condition, as it does not influence the result. Since this research has considered *a priori* that all three conditions affect the outcome, these six possibilities can be discarded.

The two possibilities left, therefore, are that either inclusivism is present with the fulfillment of conditions **M and P and S**, or that it is present under **M or P or S** (respectively A and B in figure 1). This thesis maintains that only the first one should be considered, for reasons of conceptual logic and normative consideration.




Figure 1

To understand why only a coexistence of the three dimensions can result in the presence of inclusivism, one should look no further than to the concept of populism itself. Both populism, as understood by the ideational perspective, and inclusivism, as advanced by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, feature set relational causation and both are attitudinal dispositions measured at the individual level. One can, therefore, draw on the arguments of Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen (Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen 2020) on their similar discussion on the conceptual components of populism.

As Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen expound, the dimensions for measurement of populist attitudes are non-compensatory, in that

“...when populist attitudes lie at the intersection of the concept components, individual populism scores cannot be high when anti-elitist orientations are low even when a person strongly supports the remaining components of populism. For instance, assuming a three-dimensional populism concept, understanding populist attitudes as an attitudinal syndrome suggests considering citizens as populists only if they exhibit anti-elitist orientations and a Manichean outlook and support popular sovereignty. Using a concept specification that treats the concept components as non-compensatory, that is, as jointly necessary for the presence of populism at the individual level, the concept of populist attitudes indeed would represent more than the sum of its parts.” (Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen 2020, 358).

Similarly, when measuring inclusivism, it would make little sense to compensate the lack of a component by the presence of another. In this work, we follow Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser in operationalizing the dimensions of inclusivism as binary components, qualitatively measured. This, however, does not prevent future works from operating it otherwise – in continuous, quantitative fashion. In either possibility, non-compensability stands: it would not be reasonable to consider as inclusivist a political actor who is inclusive in the material sense (say, because she favors ample redistributive policies, regardless of the recipients) but who is an exclusivist in the other two dimensions (say, because she deems certain groups incapable of participating in political life and

therefore favors their exclusion). In this sense, this work proposes that the best operationalization for the three-dimensional framework advanced by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, for a “hybrid” case, following the authors’ outlook as expressed in their article, is achieved in a configuration in which inclusivism requires the presence of material and political and symbolical dimensions, whereas exclusivism requires the presence of the material or the political or the symbolical dimensions. Inclusivism, thus, follows the representation featured by set A in figure 1 and exclusivism follows set B.

This logical argument, of course, has strong normative undertones. Indeed, the assumption of liberal democracy as the default “state of the world” is behind the asymmetric evaluation of institutional robustness and individual attitudes: as the debate over the “transition paradigm” shows (Carothers 2002), a faulty democracy can hardly be considered a democracy at all (unless this is supposed to be a transitional stage). In much the same way, an “incomplete” inclusivist is no inclusivist at all. This normative design, thus, also has the function of setting the bar high for democracy.

Inclusivism, therefore, fits Wuttke, Schimpf and Schoen’s definition of a “Sartorian concept structure” (Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen 2020, 360), in that it is dichotomous⁵ and non-compensatory.

⁵ As this work follows Mudde And Rovira Kaltwasser’s operationalization. Once again, it might be possible to operationalize the concept in a continuous fashion, in which case Inclusivism would also fit Wuttke, Schimpf and Schoen’s definition of a Goertzian concept structure.

3.3 Exclusionary politics in Latin America: a long tradition

Although exclusionary populism has historically not found roots in Latin America, the same cannot be said of exclusionary politics overall. Indeed, European-style exclusionary populism, relying heavily as it does on ethno-nationalism, would be all but impossible in Latin America, a region whose countries, for the most part, are not founded as homelands for national groups⁶, and in which ethnically distinct dominating groups (such as the white European *criollo* elite) have been historically too minoritarian for a US-style WASP nativism to take hold. However, exclusivism – the limitation of access to state resources and political rights from a political group – need not be accompanied by populism.

Latin American political systems have a long record of exclusionary politics, and the insurrection against the closed and oligarchic nature of early 20th century regimes throughout the region, as seen, was one of the chief motivators for the rise of populism. Throughout the 20th century, this exclusionary political tradition manifested itself chiefly against two growing threats. The first such menaces has been populism itself. To avoid the growth of populist political groups, traditional elites have relied on the ultimate exclusivist measure – an armed coup against a democratic regime – on numerous accounts, especially during the early post-war period, when democratic regimes were still fragile. Thus, coups or coup attempts against democratic regimes were recorded in Peru (1948), Costa Rica (1948-49), Colombia (1948-1953), and Brazil (1954-55) (Bethell 1997, 47).

The other perceived threat against ruling elites which justified exclusivist measures in 20th century Latin America has been communism. As a result, the right and the far-right have, throughout the 20th century and throughout Latin America, relied on

⁶ Arguable exceptions might include countries with strong presence of ancestral ethnic groups. Not surprisingly, some see in Moráles' Bolivia a case of "ethno-populism" (Madrid 2008, Madrid 2012).

anticommunist discourse and fifth-column fearmongering as justification for exclusivist policies, often obtaining external aid for propaganda warfare. In 1947, for instance, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was declared illegal even though Brazil was under a liberal democratic constitution, as it became clear that its growth threatened the oligarchic elites controlling the country's political system (Bethell 1997, 97). In 1973, the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende, in Chile, was ousted in a violent coup backed by traditional elites and US intelligence services (Bethell 1997, 182, 267).

The two threats were often conflated, and nationalist populists were more than once taken as communists. This was, for instance, the case with the coup against the democratically elected governments of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 Guatemala (Bethell 1997, 98), and of João Goulart, in 1964 Brazil (Bethell 1997, 235-236), both after long, destabilizing propaganda campaigns. This use of anticommunist discourse against political actors to the left of the political spectrum, regardless of their factual affiliation to historical materialism, survives to this day in the rhetoric of leaders such as Jair Bolsonaro and, as this research will show, also Keiko Fujimori.

This extreme use of exclusionary political measures has often been coupled with elitism, as technocracies such as the Pinochet regime or the Brazilian military regime replaced democracies. Elitism, as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser explain, is the monist opposite of populist, as

“elitists believe that ‘the people’ are dangerous, dishonest and vulgar, and that ‘the elite’ are superior not only in moral, but also in cultural and intellectual terms. Hence, elitists want politics to be exclusively or predominantly an elite affair, in which the people do not have a say; they either reject democracy altogether (e.g. Francisco Franco or Augusto Pinochet) or support a limited model of democracy (e.g. José Ortega y Gasset or Joseph Schumpeter)” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 29.8-31.8)

Elitism, however, is a losing strategy in a world of democracies (liberal or otherwise), as one cannot reasonably expect to win votes by deliberately berating voters, nor can one simply promote coups against democratically elected governments under an international order in which democracy is regarded as the only – or the most – legitimate kind of government. Although it is not surprising that elitism survived for so long in Latin America, given the region's remarkable socioeconomic inequalities, which structurally limit the political leverage of poorer voters, it is no longer a possible bearer to Latin America's long exclusionary political tradition. As this research will show, nevertheless, anticommunism has managed to square the circle of coupling exclusivism and populism in Latin America, rhetorically challenging as this integration can be.

4 Case studies

4.1 Alberto Fujimori: an inclusionary populist

Applying to Alberto Fujimori the three-dimensional analytic framework developed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser to investigate inclusionary/exclusionary populism, a clear picture of this leader emerges.

4.1.1 The Material dimension

Alberto Fujimori's populist discourse was clearly bent on expanding the access to state resources, to include marginalized groups. In the first speech he delivered after his resignation, in December 2000, Fujimori stated that

“In Peru, Peruvians will no longer understand democracy as the right they have to go voting, but rather they will understand it as the right their children have to go to school. And not to those shacks of schools that existed back in 1990, but to dignified schools, where teachers are better trained. And this, to us, is part of democracy, and also that there is access to school, and that all children have these possibilities. This is democracy and maybe it was because of this attention [that Fujimori deemed his government paid to increase the access to state resources] that... in which we were focused, it is that probably we did not accomplish some aspects of so-called democratic institutionalism. All governments have their shortcomings and... I recognize mine. I have said so publicly” (Murakami 2012, 502 – translated from Spanish by the author).

Fujimori's discourse, then, values expanding access to material resources of the state in the form of public goods.

This might come as a surprise and strike one as counterintuitive, given the neoliberal inclination of much of his government and the overall negative effects neoliberal policies have in a society's wealth and income distributions. To this, two caveats must be considered. Firstly, one should observe that this analysis falls under the

ideational perspective and therefore it considers populism a set of ideas – an ideology. Alberto Fujimori’s discourse, from this perspective, might be at odds with the empirically observed results of his government policies. The analysis of such results, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

The inclusive material dimension of Fujimori’s discourse, furthermore, becomes more credible when one considers the non-programmatic nature of his government’s social policies. These were conducted by governmental agencies which co-opted pre-existing organizations, resulting in the setting up of a clientelist network of support based on non-programmatic social policies (Burt 2004: 264). In such a setting of non-programmatic social policies, discourse plays an important role in signaling to clients and in highlighting the benefits of aligning with the government.

Fujimori, nevertheless, recognizes the hardships his economic program imposed on Peruvians. Yet, he does so in a way which emphasizes that the aims of his neoliberal policies were inclusive, as he claimed they focused on ending unjustified privileges and promoting “opportunities for all”, as he highlights in his July 28, 1993 discourse to congress:

“Today we are an orderly country, which begins to gain the admiration and respect of citizens from other countries with similar problems. We have gone in three years from international isolation to an exciting position, not only in Latin America, but in the world. Previously, the value for an investor of mining, hydrobiological, agro-industrial and touristic resources of a country as rich as Peru was zero, since investing here was madness. It is no longer so.

Preserving this position, which was conquered with the hardships of millions of Peruvians who accepted, consciously, a very severe economic program, is a moral imperative. We have to establish a very clear line here between the obsolete and the modern. There was always talk of indispensable reforms to make Peru a modern, viable country. Such reforms cannot result solely from theoretical musings, but from a contact with the reality of Peru and the world of today. It is not just about thinking about the problem or desiring a solution for it, but of acting, of changing reality.

In three years a set of reforms was applied with no other objective than to lay the groundwork for a new society. A society which is both

socially and economically democratic, for our aim is to banish privileges of all sorts and to instate efficiency and healthy competition, because we want opportunities for all”⁷

Similarly, in his second term inauguration speech, Fujimori highlighted his vision for the economic inclusion of the historically excluded poor – of small producers and consumers he collectively call “the small ones” (*los pequeños*):

“We have put in place in the country, without having yet named it, a never-before-seen revolution, which is daily and powerful, the fruits of which are already visible and will be even more so in the future. We could call it “the productive revolution of the small ones”. In the cities and in the countryside, the sleeping energies of a singularly industrious population are awakening.

Others have vainly tried before to share scarce resources, which is to say, poverty. This way led nowhere but to failure and frustration. But we are now making the pie of richness grow, so to say, and making the benefits of growth to be shared among all Peruvians”⁸

4.1.2 The Political dimension

Alberto Fujimori’s populist discourse is also inclusive in its political dimension. Once again, this might come as a surprise, considering that this leader staged a coup in 1992. Fujimori, however, justified his *autogolpe* in terms of expanding the true representation of the people, in a way that the corrupt institutions set by the constitution of 1979 did not allow for. In July, 1992, little over two months after the coup, Fujimori delivered the following words in a speech to the nation:

“For this reason, by interpreting the feeling of protest and rejection of the people for the blocking action against the reconstruction and the modernization of the country and its moralization, my government decided, on April 5th, to suspend, temporarily and partially, the working of some fundamental institutions and of some articles of the constitution, with the objective of undertaking a process of

⁷ Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/mensajes/mensaje-nacion-congreso-28-07-1993>

⁸⁸ Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/mensajes/mensaje-nacion-congreso-28-07-1995>

democratization and modernization which secures the authentic participation of citizens in the search for progress and national well-being”⁹

Therefore, although his *autogolpe* contradicted the principles of liberal democracy, Fujimori defended its legacy through an illiberal, yet democratic, majoritarian discourse, which claimed, in inclusive terms, that his actions were expanding democratic representation. This defense of the coup as an event which saved democracy, rather than having extinguished it, becomes clear in Fujimori’s opening remarks during his July 28, 1993 presentation to congress:

“My presentation before this illustrious assembly is a reencounter with the true democratic system, which I respect, and is the occasion for me to address the whole country with the objective of holding myself accountable for what has been achieved since then [referring to the 1992 coup] and establishing a much-needed contrast between the Peru we find [today] and the one which begins to be built with the efforts of Peruvians”¹⁰

The postulation of the *autogolpe* as a defense of true democracy against the vices of liberal democracy becomes clear in this speech. In it, the president argues that the 1979 constitutional order had become irreparably corrupt, and his coup resulted in the increased protection of society against the national emergency represented by terrorism:

“Before April 5th [1992 – referring to the coup], the state and its institutions, despite having been moderately reformed and modernized, was still losing prestige by showing to be incapable of ending the criminal wave of terrorism. Until before April 5th there was, therefore, a national government and a criminal force that challenged it, in an increasingly evident equilibrium of armed power, which we could not allow for. It is in this context that the former Judicial Power was unable to deliver justice to the terrorist criminals. The latter, after judicial processes which were a joke, would again find their way to the streets, in many cases to reintegrate death commandos. The prove of this is in the 10 years between 81 and 91, in which the total [number] of those convicted for terrorism crimes was only 575; by contrast, in the eleven

⁹ Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/mensajes/mensaje-nacion-congreso-28-07-1992>

¹⁰ Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/mensajes/mensaje-nacion-congreso-28-07-1993>

months between 1992 and 93, the number of those convicted for terrorism and treason to the fatherland is 589.

Ever since more than a decade, prisons had ceased to comply with their elemental function of confining criminals to protect society. In jail, terrorists enjoyed unbelievable ease which allowed not only the indoctrination of their ranks, but also the coordination, from inside, of terrorist acts and other criminal operations, counting on the passivity and inaction of authorities.”¹¹

The protection of society from the corrupt state, therefore, served as both a justification for the 1992 coup and a tool of discursive rhetoric.

Even though such discourse runs against liberal democratic ideas of political representation, it is not unusual for populist leaders to defend their attack on such institutions as an expansion of political representation, given their majoritarianism, whether this expansion is due to the inclusion of former unrepresented groups or to the exclusion of groups not deemed part of the national community.

In Fujimori’s case, his attack on liberal institutions is justified as a way to include the people, by giving it more control over the country’s future. His populist discourse is therefore inclusive in the political dimension.

4.1.3 The Symbolical dimension

The symbolical dimension of Alberto Fujimori’s populist discourse is also inclusive. Fujimori did not draw the boundary between the people and the elite by focusing on the latter or on excluding certain minorities from the national group. Rather, he focuses on the glorification of the common folk. His definition of the people is broad and includes all of those who suffered at the hands of the elite, loosely defined as the political establishment. In July 1993, Fujimori stated that

“It is in the context of this flagrant contradiction between what the constitution states and the daily realities of millions of Peruvians that

¹¹ Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/mensajes/mensaje-nacion-congreso-28-07-1993>

emerged the deadliest wave of criminal violence of the century, maybe of the republican history.

There is no room for blaming our ills on the Cold War or on the ideological war between capitalism and communism. If these totalitarian germs infected our country, it is because we were a debilitated social body. And we were so because of misgovernment, because of the irresponsibility of artificial economic policies, because of the indifference of the elites with respect to the rest of the country.

There was always talk of national agreement. This was a magical concept, a lock pick to open all doors. The same thing was demanded of all governments. But the desired national agreement never came. Why?”¹²

The “rest of the country”, for Fujimori, was infected by foreign ills because of the misgovernment of the elites. he, thus, defines the people inclusively as “the rest of the country” – as all those who are not part of the corrupt, incompetent elite and who were affected by its rule over the country.

Alberto Fujimori’s populist discourse, therefore, was broadly inclusive, in that it mostly highlighted those included, rather than pointing out those who should be excluded. This outlook becomes obvious, once again, in his second inaugural address, in which he developed the concept of the “new nationalism of non-exclusion”:

“The new nationalism of Peru is the nationalism of peace reconquered, of integration and of opportunities for all, and of the reckoning of one of the axes of nationhood, always forgotten: the Andean. It is to say, the nationalism of non-exclusion.

I do not understand economic development without social development and without human development. I am not willing to sow progress with feet of clay, that is to say, over the basis of injustice and marginalization. A solid modernization is one which reaches all members of a society. Only then will the model not risk breaking later.”¹³

¹² Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: [MENSAJE DEL PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DEL PERÚ, INGENIERO ALBERTO FUJIMORI, ANTE EL CONGRESO CONSTITUYENTE DEMOCRÁTICO, EL 28 DE JULIO DE 1993](#) (page 20)

¹³ Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in <https://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/mensajes/mensaje-nacion-congreso-28-07-1995>

4.2 Keiko Fujimori: an exclusionary populist

To understand the kind of populism espoused by Keiko Fujimori and compare it to Alberto's, the three-dimensional framework developed by Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde for the inclusionary/exclusionary dyad is instrumental.

This analysis shows that Keiko Fujimori's discourse, as featured during the 2021 presidential campaign, couples populism and exclusivism by way of anticommunism. As one of Keiko's 2021 campaign ads explicitly states¹⁴, "radical leftism" is regarded as an "anti-Peruvian ideology" (*ideologia antiperuana*), one which runs counter to the values and traditions of the real people, and which has infiltrated Peru to destroy it from within.

The real people are construed as threatened by an enemy within, one which disguises itself as a part of the people, but which, in reality, has a hidden agenda which is incompatible with the needs and perspectives of genuine Peruvians. Thus, Keiko Fujimori's campaign promoted the hashtag #NoAlComunismo (#NoToCommunism) as a show of support for the candidate.

Keiko Fujimori complements her exclusivist perspective with incursions into cultural wars. On the issue of gender identity and marriage equality, for instance, Keiko opposes same-sex marriage and sides with those who propose the existence of a "gender ideology" conspiracy theory, according to which the left advances a hidden agenda on identity politics with the purpose of destroying the people from within, by undermining families. As she puts it,

"Gender ideology proposes that people are not born men or women, but that one chooses, and this is dangerous. What we look for is [true] gender equality, which we see coming under camouflage and they want to instate it as gender ideology (...) What we defend is the equality which is [represented by] rights, and children must understand that

¹⁴ Available in: <https://twitter.com/PFuerzaPopular/status/1336777847860588547>

*there is equality between boys and girls, and this is a concept that since an early age they must understand*¹⁵.

Keiko's discourse did not emerge out of a vacuum. Decades of terrorist activities linked to leftist guerrilla groups have left a deep scar in the Peruvian society. As a result, the left is often accused of having connections with terrorist groups – The use of such accusations as a political weapon has in fact become so widespread as to originate a political neologism: *terruqueo*, or the claim that one is a *terruco* (slang term for terrorist) (Aguirre, 2011). Fueling her discourse is the fact that her rival in the 2021 election runoffs, Pedro Castillo, is a left-wing populist outsider, which suits well into the narrative of a continent-wide Marxist conspiracy – a narrative which led Keiko Fujimori to receive Venezuelan opposition leader Pedro Castillo in Peru and to publicly quarrel with the Bolivian ex-president Evo Moráles.

As the following analysis will show, however, the kind of exclusivism espoused by Keiko Fujimori – the continuation of Latin America's tradition of exclusivism in the service of the struggle for state resources – is very different from the exclusivism preached by the European right-wing populists – exclusivism in the service of ethno-politics –, in that it does not feature all three dimensions of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser's analytical framework.

4.2.1 The Material dimension

Keiko Fujimori's discourse is inclusive in the material dimension. Her anticommunist populist rhetoric and pro-market outlook are clearly mobilized, much like in her father's politics, to defend the economic integration of those with no market power. This defense

¹⁵ Available (in Spanish) in: <https://www.expreso.com.pe/elecciones-2021/keiko-fujimori-la-ideologia-de-genero-plantea-que-las-personas-no-nacen-hombre-o-mujer-sino-que-se-escoge-y-eso-es-peligroso/>
Translated by the author.

might even come to the detriment of state institutions, as in her speech chastising the country's national revenue service:

“...we also know that you, the small entrepreneurs, are persecuted by the state, and we have said that we have to change the way government works. [we should] (n)ot persecute the informal economy, by closing businesses and on top of that imposing them a fine. No. We have to build formality by capacitating, we have to make a series of changes in different institutions, beginning by SUNAT [the National Superintendence of Customs and Tax], which abusively persecutes small entrepreneurs”¹⁶

Keiko thus places herself as defending the “little man” in the struggle against the powerful state. Her 2021 campaign government plan, the opening statements of which were signed by Keiko Fujimori herself, defend the legacy of the 1993 constitution in inclusionary and liberal terms, highlighting that

“Evidence shows that the open and inclusive institutions of the 1993 Constitution rescued the country from poverty and from the generalized chaos of the statist model (...). The open economy, based on competition permitted and boosted the attraction of more investments, generating jobs and growth, which directly affected the reduction of monetary poverty, which was reduced from half of Peruvians in the late 1980's to 20.2% in 2019.” (Fuerza Popular 2021, 3)¹⁷

Keiko Fujimori's discourse, thus, is greatly focused on socioeconomic inclusion and is inclusive in the material dimension.

4.2.2 The Political dimension

Keiko Fujimori's discourse is unclear in the political dimension. To be sure, Keiko's defense of democratic values is fickle, and so is her commitment with the expansion of political rights. At times – especially during the early campaign – she adopted Alberto's outlook on majoritarianism and “hard democracy”, to the point of embracing her father's motto of *mano dura* (tough hand) as a campaign slogan:

¹⁶ Keiko Fujimori's campaign speech, June 4, 2021. Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in <https://twitter.com/KeikoFujimori/status/1400594014307561476>

¹⁷ Translated from the Spanish by the author

“There is no better example of an efficient government than that of a mother who makes their children progress with love and firmness. Because that which we love the most is what we care the most. Which is why it is inspired by you, hardworking mother, that I summarize my government proposal in two words: tough hand. Yes, tough hand to save our families. Tough hand against the pandemic, because the response has been very inefficient. We are not only going to defend ourselves from the virus: we are going to attack it. We are going to pursue and corner it. Tough hand against delinquency, against those who rob your business and you, against those who attack our children. Tough hand to generate jobs and to incentivize investment, to rescue your business and your family finances. Democracy cannot be debile. It must be sustained in a solid authority principle. What is needed is a strong democracy, which makes itself respected. Which is why my proposal for such a difficult moment is summarized in two words: tough hand. Tough hand to rescue Peru again.”¹⁸

Her use of the phrase “rescue Peru again” – reminiscent of Trump’s “make America great again” – might raise suspicions as to the meaning of “tough hand” – whether it means ruling over a dictatorship like her father did when he “rescued” Peru for the first time.

On the other hand, precisely because Keiko is a firm defender of the legacy of Alberto Fujimori, she is also a staunch supporter of the 1993 constitutional order. In this sense, she has affirmed that

“Tough hand is NOT dictatorship. It is a hard democracy to take the necessary decisions to rescue the country again. In a word, what I offer you is DEMODURA”¹⁹

Even though it remains unclear what “hard democracy” and “demodura” (which can be roughly translated as tough democracy) mean.

By the end of the campaign, given the vague nature of her commitment to democratic values and the promises of her adversary to draw a new constitution and dismiss the supreme court, Keiko Fujimori adopted a more inclusivist tone, even adding

¹⁸ Keiko Fujimori campaign ad. Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7mBkPfk1Jys&t=83s>

¹⁹ Keiko Fujimori’s official account tweet. Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in https://twitter.com/KeikoFujimori/status/1365040976037838850?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1365040976037838850%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_%2F%2Fgestion.pe%2Fperu%2Fpolitica%2Fkeiko-fujimori-mano-dura-no-es-dictadura-lo-que-ofrezco-es-una-demodura-elecciones-2021-nndc-noticia%2F

liberal tones to her discourse. Thus, in her speech during the Ibero-American Liberty Forum, she declared:

“We make a public declaration to keep a conduct which respects the essential elements of democracy and the strict respect for liberties. Today, I want to reaffirm this commitment before all the international community in this very important event. I, Keiko Sofía Fujimori Higuchi, commit myself before you and before all the international community to avoid that the communist threat reaches power in Peru. I commit myself to preserving and strengthening democracy and all institutions which defend it. I commit myself to respecting and guaranteeing the amplest freedom of press and expression. I commit myself to respecting the division of powers, the autonomy of the system of administration of justice. I commit myself to governing for five years, guaranteeing clean and transparent elections.”²⁰

Because she adopted conflicting positions during the course of the campaign, therefore, it is not possible to determine whether Keiko Fujimori’s discourse is inclusionary or exclusionary in the political dimension.

4.2.3 The Symbolical dimension

If Keiko Fujimori’s discourse is inclusionary in the material dimension and unclear in the political one, it is plainly exclusionary in the symbolical dimension. Here, Keiko draws the line between “the people” and “the elite” in terms which underscore the bedeviling and exclusion of the later, rather than the glorification and inclusion of the former.

For Keiko, the evil elite is represented by the “international left”, which is disguised among the population and has a “grand plan to obtain power”, as she explicitly remarked in her speech before the 2021 Ibero-American Liberty Forum:

“...let my first words be those to extend my sincere thankfulness for having been invited to join this important event, in the moment in which my country, Peru, has become the epicenter of a new battle against communism and its nefarious discourse. A rhetoric which, as you well know, only intends to confront my compatriots, dividing them between

²⁰ Keiko Fujimori’s speech in the Iberoamerican Liberty Forum, 23 May 2021. Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://twitter.com/AlvaroVargasLI/status/1396633766974664709>

rich and poor, with the perverse eagerness to promote class warfare, which allow it to conquer power and perpetuate itself in power indefinitely. Indeed, just like what has happened in Cuba and Venezuela, where Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, great demagogues, presented themselves as representatives of the people who promoted revolution in the benefit of the most necessitated. In my country they [communists] have disguised a radical communist [referring to Pedro Castillo], offering the people everything without revealing that, in reality, the future that they prophesize can only result in chaos, poverty, and misery. (...) Although, as in other latitudes, there is a grand plan to obtain power, which, little by little, starts to reveal itself, the candidate of the radical left and the leaders which accompany him have had no objections to openly expressing their deplorable goals with respect to the control of the means of communication. (...) A new threat is rising against our America. The international left, I have no doubts, is convinced that it will conquer power for many years in a geopolitically strategic country as Peru. But today many of us are convinced and committed to this not happening. And better yet, we are committed to demonstrating that the riches which can be generated in democracy and liberty reach overall those who most need it.”²¹

In this sense, even though Keiko Fujimori does not focus her discourse on the exclusion of alien ethnical groups, her rhetoric is reminiscent of European right-wing populists in that she draws the line between the true people and the elite – between good and evil – by focusing on the need to negate communists access to power, more than by extolling the virtues of the common man like her father did when he referred to the excluded “Chinitos y Cholitos”. Indeed, in her very first campaign ad for the 2021 elections, Keiko addressed voters with the following words:

“I deeply thank the opportunity to be with you amid different circumstances. A moment in which Peruvians are going through one of the biggest crises in our history. Once again, our country is facing an emergency. To the already well-known sanitary and economic emergencies, a new one is now added, one whose real magnitude not all Peruvians are seeing: the political threat. It is a threat which might end up condemning our country to disgrace, a threat which moves smoothly, camouflaging itself among the needs of the populace and romanticizing chaos and violence. These wolves, which promote destruction, are disguised as sheep and present themselves as the saviors, when in reality the only thing they want is to take us back to a statist past, which has already caused us so much damage. This

²¹ Keiko Fujimori’s speech in the Iberoamerican Liberty Forum, 23 May 2021. Translated from the Spanish by the author. Available in: <https://twitter.com/AlvaroVargasLI/status/1396633766974664709>

political threat can be devastating for Peru. I am not only referring the attack on and the destruction of private investments, but also, and above all, to its effects over the most humble Peruvians, which are going to lose their jobs and are going to be condemned to poverty."²²

Keiko Fujimori's discourse, therefore, is exclusivist in at least one of the three dimensions set forth by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser and should thus be considered exclusionary.

H0 is therefore rejected and H1 is proven correct.

²² Available (in Spanish) in: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QLKPLS43KZo> . Translated into English by the author.

5 Conclusion

If H1 is satisfied and Keiko Fujimori is indeed an exclusionary populist, does that mean she is ideologically closer to European populists than to her Latin American predecessors like Alberto Fujimori? Hardly. As seen, European exclusionary populism is based on ethno-nationalism, whereas Keiko's rhetoric is exclusionary because of its rabid anticommunism. In that sense, her worries are much closer to those of Latin American populists, left and center – which focus on socioeconomic issues –, than to European exclusionary populism and its ethno-nativist discourse.

This also answers the secondary research question, in that the rise of a new wave of Latin American populists, as represented by Keiko Fujimori, should not be understood merely as the regional expression of a global phenomenon. Keiko Fujimori should not be regarded as a “Peruvian Marine Le Pen”, as her discourse has more in common with its predecessors than with its contemporaries in Europe. The reason for this is ultimately related to structural socioeconomic conditions: inequalities in Latin America make for populism centered on socioeconomic issues; ethnonationalism and immigration in Europe make for populism centered on identity politics. However, the mere fact that one kind of populism focuses on economic ideological issues, rather than on issues such as race and immigration does not make one less of a danger for democratic institutions. Venezuela is by no means a lesser case of democratic backsliding than Hungary.

Neither do the conclusions of this work authorize one to suppose exclusionary populism Keiko Fujimori-style is less destructive than European-style exclusionary populism, since the latter is exclusionary in more dimensions than the former. There is simply no evidence that exclusivism based on three dimensions is necessarily more

exclusionary than exclusivism based on only one. This research does however invite, future comparative scholarship on this issue.

One might wonder how feasible it would be for a Latin American populist to be exclusivist in all three dimensions. This would be especially challenging in the material dimension: the massive inequalities of the region make distributive politics especially rewarding and austerity punishing – a conclusion made all the more evident considering how neoliberal populists such as Alberto Fujimori and Carlos Menem were not elected as neoliberals. Exclusionary politics in Latin America, therefore, will most likely comprise at least one inclusionary dimension – the material one.

In terms of the specific case researched, this work shows a transformation in *Fujimorismo*, from Alberto to Keiko, which goes much further than generational replacement. Indeed, the change from inclusivism to exclusivism indicates a growing polarization in Peruvian society, as the drawing of lines between friend and foe is increasingly focusing on denouncing the enemy, rather than on praising friend, as the change in the symbolic dimension towards exclusivism shows.

The merit of this research, above all else, is proving that there is in the political world such a thing as “hybrid” populism: that populists can be inclusionary and exclusionary in different dimensions – and that, when this is the case, this makes them, overall, exclusionary populists nevertheless. The challenge now is to understand what sorts of risks these new kind of populism poses to democracy. Is a “hybrid” populism perceived by political actors as a minor threat? Can these populists strategically switch between exclusionary and inclusionary dimensions for political gain? These future research possibilities depend, first and foremost, on the scope of generalization of the findings of this work. Are other contemporary Latin American right-wing populists exclusivists the same way Keiko Fujimori is?

Much work remains to be done on the issue. Now, however, there are a few more certainties: there are, indeed, populists who blend inclusionary and exclusionary features. What is more, Latin American populists can be of the exclusionary kind. This, however, does not make them any less Latin American, as the issues they focus on are those that have been mobilizing voters in the region for generations.

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