

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) IN SIERRA LEONE, LIBERIA AND THE IVORY COAST: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

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Author's declaration

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A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Joseph Kirchberger", written over a horizontal line.

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Abstract

Programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have received increasing importance for the support of peace processes in conflict countries. However, DDR programs have differed in between country cases. Hence, in some cases DDR was introduced at an early stage of conflict while for other cases these programs were only established after peace was achieved already. This thesis wants to explore the factors which determine the introduction of DDR in order to better understand the timing of these programs as well as the conditions under which DDR is rather likely. For this purpose, the thesis at first identifies different variables theoretically on the basis of qualitative research. In the next step, the research then conducts a logistical regression in order to identify relevant variables for a qualitative assessment and to look for statistical significance of these variables in the models. The assessment then explains and further analyzes these findings. The thesis finds evidence for the role of international actors and in particular the UN for DDR programs. On the other hand, the research shows little evidence for the role of domestic factors which seem to play a rather insignificant role for the DDR process. These findings generally imply that DDR is a entirely UN driven process which might partially explain why these programs are sometimes not implemented or effective. Hence, these programs are mainly established from the outside and might lack the acceptance or the participation of important stakeholders.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	III
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. LITERATURE REVIEW	3
1.1. OVERVIEW OF DDR.....	3
1.2 COUNTRY OVERVIEW.....	6
1.2.1 LIBERIA.....	7
1.2.1.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND	7
1.2.1.2 DDR IN LIBERIA.....	10
1.2.2 SIERRA LEONE.....	11
1.2.2.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND	11
1.2.2.2 DDR IN SIERRA LEONE	14
1.2.3 IVORY COAST	15
1.2.3.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND	15
1.2.3.2 DDR IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE	17
2. THEORY & METHODOLOGY	18
2.1. THEORY	18
2.2. RESEARCH DESIGN.....	21
2.2.1 SIMILARITY OF THE CASES.....	22
2.2.2 LOGISTICAL REGRESSION & MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES	24
3. FINDINGS.....	27
3.1 STATISTICAL ESTIMATION	27
3.1.1 BIVARIATE REGRESSION	27
3.1.2 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION.....	30
3.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS	34
4. CONCLUSION	37
REFERENCES	39
ANNEX.....	44

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abbreviation	Full Description
APC	All People's Congress
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CNDDR	National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FN	Force Nouvelles
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front
JIU	Joint Implementation Unit
LDF	Lola Defense Force
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MSSD	Most Similar Case Design
NCDDR	National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) has become an increasingly important tool to establish a secure environment after conflict. In fact, it is nowadays even regarded as a key pillar for multilateral and bilateral stabilization after conflict. (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015, 1) In this context, DDR generally allows for the disarmament and disengagement of former fighters but also provides support for their social and economic reintegration. (IOM 2017, 1-3) Since its origin, DDR has been excessively used by international organizations and in particular by the United Nations. In fact, the latter has used DDR nearly every time it has been involved in conflict stabilization. (Pietz 2007, 55) Nonetheless, the success of DDR varied greatly in between all of these programs. Hence, in countries such as Namibia and Mozambique, the process generally allowed for a positive impact during or after conflict, while in other cases such as Cambodia or Haiti, DDR turned out to be rather less successful. (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015, 3) In particular, complicated conflict contexts often stopped or prevented an effective implementation of DDR and hindered a successful conflict stabilization. (UN 2010, 4) This research wants to contribute to a better understanding of this particular problem by exploring factors which lead to the introduction of DDR processes. In this regard, the thesis conducts a logistical regression which tests if previously assessed variables matter for DDR. Hence, these variables were defined theoretically from theory and literature on the country cases. In the following, the research also provides a qualitative assessment of the quantitative findings. Furthermore, the research focuses mainly on Sierra Leone and Liberia for the comparative case study as both of these countries have shown to have many similarities but differences in regard to DDR introduction.

There are several key findings in the research. Firstly, the thesis shows that international actor are the most important factor for the introduction of DDR in post-conflict country settings. Secondly, different statistical models also stress that it is mainly the UN that matters for DDR

even though different other international actors were active in the country cases as well. Thirdly, war fatigue surprisingly seems to have played no role for the establishment of the DDR programs. Additionally, the research also finds some partial evidence for the role of conflict, sanctions and power sharing even though these variables lack statistical significance between models. Ultimately, these findings also emphasize the role of external actors in comparison to domestic actors. Hence, based on the strong findings for international involvement and the UN, DDR seems to be mainly the result of international engagement while domestic factors, such as the balance of power and power sharing seems to have had much less significance for the introduction of DDR. These findings might also contribute to a better understanding of unsuccessful DDR programs. Hence, as DDR has shown to be mainly UN driven, these processes might fail since they ignore the political country context as well as important stakeholders.

The thesis is structured as follows. At first the paper provides a literature overview of DDR in general as well as on the country cases. In regard to the latter, the thesis specifically looks at the political context and DDR programs of Sierra Leone and Liberia but also includes information on the Ivory Coast which serves as a benchmarking case. The second chapter of the thesis at first outlines the research question and different hypotheses which aim to test the impact of different variables on DDR. Afterwards, the paper generally describes the research approach which includes qualitative and quantitative elements. The third section of the paper, then provides the general findings of the logistical regression as well as a qualitative analysis of the most relevant variables.

1. Literature Review

1.1. Overview of DDR

The process of DDR was originally developed as a peacebuilding tool to end various civil wars in Africa and Latin America. (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015, 2) According to Colletta and Muggah (2009), DDR mainly evolved after the 1980's when multilateral and bilateral involvement in peace operations expanded. Before that, similar initiatives were usually solely focused on disarmament and demobilization alone and were heavily shaped by geo-political narratives of the Cold War. (427-428) Nevertheless, in the 1990's, DDR already played an important role for peacebuilding and gained particular relevance for the United Nations, World Bank and other bilateral aid agencies. (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015, 2) Consequently, DDR was used in multiple cases with quite different results. In Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea, DDR was largely successful but there were also other cases in which the reintegration of former combatants largely failed. (Lamb 2008, 3) Hence, proponents argue that DDR lowers the chance of conflict resumption and can also act as a platform for political, economic and social development. (Solomon and Ginifer 2008, 2) On the other hand, there are also different concerns that these processes might fall short of expectations or that they can potentially have a negative effect on host countries as well. (Colletta and Muggah 2009, 426)

According to Muggah and O'Donnell (2015), traditional DDR can be defined as a process in which former combatants are disarmed and demobilized in order to break their command and control structure. Moreover, after receiving specific benefits, combatants usually have to return to their home community as civilians or are integrated into the national military. (2-3) Hence, traditional DDR also seeks to support former fighters on their transition into civilian life by providing reinsertion and reintegration. During the former, fighters generally receive trainings, money payments and other essential services for a limited time which should allow them to

overcome immediate needs. During the latter, combatants start a sustainable employment as civilians in their local community which is usually an open-ended procedure. (IOM 2019, 1-2) Furthermore, DDR usually addresses inter-state or proxy wars and recognizes the different participating sides through a political transition process (Piedmont 2015, 6) All of this is usually referred to as traditional or as first generation DDR. In this regard, there are currently three generations of DDR processes – Type I, Type II and Type III – which are characterized by differences in their scope. According to McCandless (2010), this evolution within DDR mainly occurred since Type I DDR was considered too sequential and context sensitive and also required different preconditions such as a legal framework, consent from all conflict parties and a minimum amount of security. (8-9) Consequently, second generation DDR usually has a stronger focus on the community level and, therefore, also addresses proximate risk factors for further violence. (Colletta and Muggah 2009, 444) According to a report from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2010), second generation DDR usually refers to a wider security promotion effort since the focus goes beyond traditional military units. Consequently, the broader focus allows for the implementation of some aspects of second generation DDR even under circumstances which would prevent traditional DDR from taking place. In addition, second generation initiatives are usually implemented within communities and follow an evidence-based approach. (3)

Nonetheless, both approaches share the same strategic goal which is namely the support of peace processes and a more secure environment in the host country. (United Nations 2010, 3)

Ultimately, there is also third generation DDR – Type III – which was in particular designed for ongoing conflicts. In this regard, third generation DDR focuses more on the community level as well but more importantly it specifically addresses vulnerabilities of individuals which can lead to the recruitment by armed groups. (IOM 2017, 5) According to Piedmont (2015), the process involves strategies to counter violent extremism and is increasingly implemented in areas where extremism is effectively jeopardizing the peacebuilding process. Consequently,

while first and second generation DDR is mainly considered a post-conflict peacebuilding tool, third generation DDR is actively used as a conflict stabilization tool during active conflicts. (1-2) Besides, there are also some other key characteristics of third generation DDR. Firstly, these processes are increasingly diverse as a reaction to the changing conditions on the ground. Secondly, they can also involve robust peacekeeping and, therefore, military action against extremist groups or armed rebels. (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015, 4) Ultimately, Type III DDR was established within the United Nations in order to implement DDR in countries during an active conflict. This became increasingly important for the UN to adapt to a rising level of intra-state conflicts with multiple actors which frequently shift sides and use asymmetric strategies such as terrorism. (Cockayne and O'Neil 2015, 10-21)

When it comes to the overall purpose of DDR, the process generally aims to build a secure environment for further peacebuilding. (IOM 2017, 1) Therefore, DDR is usually introduced by governments and multilateral organizations in fragile and war-torn states as a mean for stability. (Colleta and Muggah 2009, 426) According to report from the UN Security Council (2000), DDR is often considered a necessary tool for peacebuilding as it reduces the likelihood of armed conflicts in a fragile environments. The document also mentions that DDR contributes to a transition from war to peace and might furthermore strengthen trust between opposing parties. (1) Nonetheless, the evolution of DDR has broadened the scope. As stated by Muggah and O'Donnell (2015), second and third generation DDR – with their increased focus on the community level – are more involved in stabilization and state-building and, thereby, also in social, economic and political engineering. Consequently, this new approach can contribute to a more effective peacebuilding process but it can also create contradictions about the role of these activities. (6) In this regard, Piedmont (2015) has proposed that DDR should be reclassified as a conflict-prevention tool rather than as a post-conflict tool. Besides, traditional DDR was originally established as a result of peace agreements between opposing forces in the past while third generation processes nowadays often lack this specific characteristic. (2)

Finally, there are also certain preconditions for a successful introduction of DDR in a conflict context. As can be derived from the last paragraph, one central precondition for traditional DDR is usually a peace agreement and the absence of further conflict. (Piedmont 2015, 2) A report from the Rufer (2005) also mentions the willingness for peace of all involved parties and the personal security of combatants as a major determining force for an effective DDR process. Moreover, the working paper also emphasized the role of spoilers – which are namely the groups within a conflict which want to undermine the process – as an important threat for the success and introduction of DDR (29-32) On the other hand, second generation processes are also heavily dependent on strong and decentralized local authorities and civil society organizations which receive community ownership of the process and serve as major partners for the implementation. (Coletta and Muggah 2009, 444-446) Nonetheless, Type II usually also follow a peace agreement similar to traditional DDR initiatives. (Piedmont 2015, 2) Ultimately, third generation DDR does not require the absence of conflict nor a peace agreement and actively challenges state sovereignty. (Piedmont 2015, 2) Depending on the country context, the international community is often also required in order to provide troops as well as financial and technical assistance. (Ball and Goor 2006, 11)

1.2 Country Overview

The next section of the paper will look at the political background and the specific DDR processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. The first two countries share many characteristics such as a similar ethnic composition, colonial heritage and geographical location which will be assessed in detail in the methodology section of the paper. On the other hand, Sierra Leone and Liberia introduced DDR processes at a different point of the conflict which makes them ideal cases for a comparative case study. More precisely, Sierra Leone introduced DDR in 1998 during active conflict but Liberia was only able to establish a similar process after

the conflict was concluded. On the contrary, the Ivory Coast only serves as a benchmark case which is also the reason why the literature review focuses on the other two country cases.

1.2.1 Liberia

1.2.1.1 Political Background

According to Jayne (2009), the civil war in Liberia took place from 1989 until 2003 and led to tremendous casualties and human suffering. Hence, in between 240,000-270,000 people died and around 800,000 Liberians had to flee to a neighboring country. (4-5)

According to literature, multiple factors contributed to the original outbreak of the civil war. In this sense, Liberia was governed by Samuel Doe prior to the civil war who aggravated mismanagement and increased political instability in the country (Tarr 1993, 74-75) Doe was himself member of the Krahn community and used the early years of his reign to change the ethnic composition of the army in favor of his own ethnic group. Consequently, the Liberian army became an effective tool to oppress other ethnic groups which also led to further tensions and a loss on the monopoly of force as other ethnicities started to arm themselves. (Ansorge and Ansorge 2011, 269) Ethnic tensions were in general a strong enabling force for the civil war. According to Howe (1997), the country has seventeen ethnic groups of which none represents more than 20% of the population. (147) Nonetheless, Doe himself came to power after a coup in 1980 which was supported by the majority of Liberians but only further undermined the political development of the country. (Ellis 1995, 174-176) As a result, Liberia was plagued by corruption, mismanagement, political oppression and ethnic tensions when the civil war started in 1989. (Howe 1997, 148-149)

According to Bøås and Utas (2014), the conflict in Liberia effectively started after the NPFL led by Charles Taylor invaded the country from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire in 1989. While his militia was weak in the beginning it received support from Gio and Mano communities which

allowed the NPFL to grow rapidly. (50-51) In this regard, the latter profited from ethnic tensions between those groups and the politically dominating Krahn and Mandingo communities. (Howe 1997, 149) According to Howe (1997), President Doe at first reacted by sending his army to the border region to counter Taylor which ultimately led to further attacks against the Gio and Mano. However, Taylor used this brutality for his own advantage since the increasing unpopularity of the government allowed him to spread through the rest of Liberia (149). In 1990, Taylor's NPFL already controlled most of the country but was not able to conquer the capital Monrovia since the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to intervene by deploying the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, (ECOMOG). (Hegre, Østby and Raleigh 2009, 608) According to Duyvesteyn (2005), the NPFL also splintered into two different groups during that year. Hence, Prince Johnson established the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL) which became even involved in open fights against the NPFL. More importantly, it was the INPFL which managed to capture, torture and kill President Doe in 1990. (26-30) The death of Samuel Doe did, however, not end the first phase of the war and fighting continued. However, ECOMOG managed to secure the Bamako Ceasefire Agreement after increasing pressure on the NPFL on November 28, 1990, which gave ECOMOG control over the capital and Taylor full control over the rest of the country. (Howe 1997, 155) According to Howe (1997), one driver for further violence was the formation of the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) in 1991, which was comprised of former soldiers of the Doe government and many Krahn and Mandingo refugees. By 1992, ULIMO moved from neighboring Sierra Leone into Liberia. (156) In the same year, Taylor started an offensive against the ECOMOG peacekeepers which marked the end of the Bamako Ceasefire Agreement. (Nowrojee 1995, 136) According to Duyvesteyn (2005), Taylor was at this point looking for a decisive battle to control the capital but was ultimately pushed back by combined forces of ECOMOG, ULIMO and the newly founded army of the interim government. As a result, the following months were characterized by a new offensive of ECOMOG and more

international involvement in the fight against the NPFL which effectively reduced the territory Taylor controlled to around 40 percent of the country. (32-33) The years which followed were characterized by multiple peace processes which all failed to produce lasting peace. These include the Yamoussoukro IV Agreement in 1991, the Cotonou Accord in 1993, the Akosombo Accord in 1994 and the Accra Clarification in 1994. (Sesay 1996, 397-398) Furthermore, ULIMO split into ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J in 1994. (Harris 1999, 435) Consequently the war was mainly characterized by conflict between the NPFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, LPC and ECOMOG until the Abuja accord in 1995. (Harris 1999, 435) According to Duyvesteyn (2005), the first Abuja accord gave Taylor a seat in the Council of State and, thereby, included his party in the government. After another series of violence, a second accord was signed which paved the road for Taylor to become President in 1997. Hence, the second accord marked the end of the first phase of the civil war in Liberia. (34)

The second phase of the civil war started after an armed attack of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in 1999. (Kieh 2009, 7) As stated by Hegre, Østby and Raleigh (2009), LURD was mainly composed of Mandingo combatants and attacked the Taylor government in the north-east of Liberia. On the other hand, the Krahn community established the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in the south-east to fight Taylor. (608) According to Kieh (2009), the new outbreak of violence came as little surprise since the government neglected important aspects of peacebuilding such as security sector reform, disarmament and reconciliation. As such, both of these militias were able to recruit among former enemies and disaffected members of Taylor. (7-8) Research from Bøås (2005) shows that UN sanctions on Liberia were another major problem for the Taylor government. These sanctions were the result of Liberia's support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and allowed LURD and MODEL to gain the upper hand in the conflict. (84-85) Consequently, these two militias managed to conquer the majority of Liberia which ultimately led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the defeat of Taylor in 2003. (Jaye 2009, 4)

1.2.1.2 DDR in Liberia

According to Jayne (2009), there were two major attempts for DDR in Liberia during the civil war. On the one hand, DDR was introduced after the Cotonou Agreement in 1993 and provided amnesty for combatants. On the other hand, DDR was also implemented as a result of the CPA in 2003. (6)

According to Aning (1999), the first DDR phase officially started after the Cotonou agreement but only became more effective after the Abuja II agreement. This was mainly based on continuous outbreaks of violence, political problems, logistical difficulties and economic problems (344-346). Consequently, in between 1996 and 1997 around 24,500 combatants have been disarmed (Jayne 2009, 6-8). However, the first DDR phase ended with the election of Taylor as President in 1997 and, therefore, before all combatants were participating in the process. (Kieh 2016, 211-212). As a result, the incomplete disarmament was a relevant factor that contributed towards the outbreak of the second phase of the civil war. (Kieh 2009, 7-8). According to Jayne (2009), the DDR process following Abuja II was characterized by three stages. At first, former combatants were registered, disarmed, and interviewed. In the following, participants received trainings or other forms of education which aimed at making them eligible for reintegration. (6-7). Finally, few reintegration programs were established which was strongly linked to difficulties on the ground. (Tanner 1998, 137)

The second DDR attempt took place between December 2003 and November 2004 and managed to disarm and demobilize around 100,000 fighters in Liberia. (Paes 2005, 253). The DDR process itself was designed by the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations and UNMIL who received the task of supporting the government to implement the CPA. (Von Dyck 2016, 45-46). In addition, a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) was established by UNDP and the national government and was directly responsible for the implementation of DDR: (Jayne 2009, 12). As stated by Paes (2005), the DDR process itself consisted of three

stages. Hence, former combatants were disarmed and then transported to another location for the demobilization process. In the second location, former combatants were registered and also received medical treatment, career counseling and a human rights training. (Paes 2005, 254) According to Jayne, the last part of the DDR process was reintegration and rehabilitation which. Hence, the aim of this process was to allow for the reintegration of these combatants into their own communities. (16) Overall the second DDR phase can be considered as a success. Nevertheless, there were also a series of other shortcomings of the DDR process. According to Paes (2005), reintegration of combatants was initially delayed and many former combatants did not manage to secure a job. (253-261)

1.2.2 Sierra Leone

1.2.2.1 Political Background

The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002 and was characterized by extreme brutality against civilians. During this conflict, around 70,000 people were killed and around half the population was displaced. (Kaldor and Vincent 2006, 4)

Sierra Leone already faced different problems on the state level before the war which strongly contributed to the initial uprising. Hence, the country was characterized by slow economic development and mismanagement in the public sector. (Bellows and Miguel 2006, 395) According to Davies, the latter was partly driven by a one-party government which was officially established in 1978 in Sierra Leone. (2000, 352) More precisely, the country was governed by the All People's Congress (APC) since 1968 which was led by Siaka Stevens and later on by his successor Joseph Momoh (Davies 2002, 2) Importantly, ethnicities also played a key role in this political development since political parties were closely associated with specific groups in Sierra Leone. Therefore, while Bellows and Miguel (2006) argue that ethnic

division cannot be directly linked to the outbreak of the civil war, the latter seems to have at least had an impact on the establishment of the autocratic government system. (395) Nonetheless, the APC became well known for corruption, nepotism and political oppression of opponents which ultimately led to the rather poor economic and political performance. (Asangna 2017, 106)

The civil war itself started after an initial attack by the Revolutionary United Front against the government in 1991. Importantly, these troops entered the country from neighboring Liberia and included fighters from Liberia and Burkina Faso. (Binningsbø and Duputy 2009, 89) On the other hand, the government of Sierra Leone received support from Nigeria and Guinea but was still unable to push back the RUF. Consequently, the RUF kept moving toward the capital Freetown and seized important diamond mines which led to massive pressure against Momoh by his own military. (Anyu 2001, 94-95)

In the following, Momoh was ultimately overthrown by a military coup in 1992 which led to the establishment of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). (Davies 2002, 2) According to Binningsbø, Malmin and Duputy (2009), the new government then hired South African mercenaries to defeat the RUF. However, the latter could not prevent the RUF from controlling large parts of Sierra Leone. (90) Soon after, the NPRC leadership was overthrown as well and elections were held in 1996. At this point, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) won the elections and became the governing party for the first time since 1968. (Anyu 2001, 96) According to Gberie (2002), the Abidjan Peace Accords were then signed between the newly elected President Tejan Kabbah and the RUF. Nevertheless, this approach turned out to be unsuccessful since the government of Kabbah was once again overthrown by elements of the army and RUF which formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). (3) According to Anyu (2001), Sierra Leone then faced a total state collapse which led to the introduction of various conflict management efforts by the UN, the Organization for African Unity and ECOWAS. Firstly, the UN created the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

(UNOMSIL). Secondly, the Security Council imposed an oil, arms and travel embargo on Sierra Leone with the aim of increasing pressure on the AFRC. (96-97) Thirdly, an intervention force of ECOWAS was able to push back the AFRC from the capital Freetown and consequently reinstalled President Kabbah in 1998. (Davies 2002, 2) Nevertheless, the RUF was still posing a major threat to the government, which became clearly visible when they managed to ravage the capital Freetown in 1999. (Gberie 2002, 3-4) In the following, peace negotiations took place and were ultimately concluded with the signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. (Binningsbø and Duputy 2009, 90-91) The latter effectively made the RUF part of the government by giving it different political positions. (Gberie 2002, 4) On the other hand, the agreement also included a DDR process. (Kaldor and Vincent 2006, 7) Additionally, the United Nations decided to deploy the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) after the peace agreement. (Kaldor and Vincent 2006, 7) However, the Lomé Peace Agreement came to an end shortly after when the RUF kidnapped 500 UN peacekeepers and attacked protestors. (Binningsbø and Duputy 2009, 91) As a consequence, important members of the RUF were arrested while the international community further strengthened its commitment in Sierra Leone. (Binningsbø and Duputy 2009, 91) In this regard, British troops ultimately intervened and were supported by a more robust UN peacekeeping mission which managed to push back the RUF. (Davies, 2002 16-17) As stated by Sesay and Suma (2009), the former leader of the RUF Sankoh was then replaced by Issa Sesay who started further peace negotiations that ultimately led to the Abuja protocols. Among other things, these protocols enabled a ceasefire, a broader deployment of peacekeepers and the resumption of DDR. (11-12) Ultimately, the war ended in 2002 with a joint declaration between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone. (Keen 2005, 84)

1.2.2.2 DDR in Sierra Leone

According to Sesay and Suma (2009), three different DDR processes were introduced during the civil war. In this regard, DDR was originally introduced in 1998 by President Kabbah, UNDP and ECOMOG and without the support of the RUF. The aim was to incentivize individual combatants to leave their respective faction. (12) Nevertheless, reluctance of the international community to provide funds and the lack of security led to a fast disintegration of this DDR process. (Solomon, and Ginifer, 2008, 8-9) Importantly, the government also introduced the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) during that time to support the DDR process. (Sesay and Suma, 2009, 12) DDR was also introduced as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. (Gbla, 2006, 85) At this point, DDR was mainly conducted by the NCDDR and UNAMSIL which effectively replaced ECOMOG (Sesay, and Suma, 2009, 12) Nevertheless, the RUF kept tormenting the civilian population and continuously violated the ceasefire, which led to the end of the DDR program. (Solomon, and Ginifer 2008, 9) Ultimately, the third DDR process was a result of the Abuja agreement and was marked by a very weak position of the RUF. (Sesay and Suma 2009, 12) According to Dorman (2007), the RUF received increasing pressure from the British intervention and UN forces. The former also supported the reconstitution of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces which helped the government to receive the upper hand in the conflict. (185-191) There was also support from the US, Britain and the United Nations for DDR since they perceived security as a relevant factor for the democratic process. (Von Dyck 2016, 31) On the other hand, the support of the UN gave the government the necessary capacities to disarm the civilian population which was clearly in the interest of the latter. (Von Dyck 2016, 30) In this context, the third phase lasted from May 2001 until January 2002 and managed to disarm and demobilize 72,500 combatants (Bradley, Maughan and Fusato 2002, §1).

1.2.3 Ivory Coast

1.2.3.1 Political Background

The civil war in Côte d'Ivoire started in September 2002 and was at first concluded with the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in March 2007. (Mitchell 2012, 178-183) Nonetheless, fighting continued after the Presidential elections in 2010 and was only concluded after President Gbagbo was arrested in 2011. (Banegas 2011, 462-465) The war was mainly fought between the government of President Gbagbo and the Force Nouvelles (FN) which was comprised of different smaller militias. (Bah 2010, 604)

So far, literature has identified different factors which contributed towards the outbreak of the conflict. According to Woods (2003), the Ivory Coast experienced economic decline, overexploitation of important resources, and a scarcity of agricultural land. While the country was traditionally shaped by migration and different ethnicities, this problem specifically increased ethnic tensions. (642-643) In this regard, the Ivory Coast has more than 60 different ethnic groups which can be broadly categorized in five linguistic families. (Chirot 2006, 65-66) According to Bah (2010), tensions arose between ethnicities in the South who regarded themselves as true citizens and ethnicities with a migrant background. These tensions were then institutionalized by the government which led to an increasing political exclusion of mainly northern based ethnicities. (601-602)

As stated by Mitchell (2012), the civil war itself started as a result of a mutiny in the military which managed to capture the northern part of the Ivory Coast in 2002. The coup was planned by army officers from the North and was a direct result of increased marginalization of northern ethnicities. As a result, further conflict was imminent but ultimately prevented by a quickly deployed French intervention force. (178) The latter was also supported by ECOMOG and the United Nations. (Chirot 2006, 71-72) The French intervention effectively split the country into

two parts which contributed greatly to the formation of the FN as a political representative of the northern part of the country. (Charbonneau 2012, 513) According to Chirot (2006), France mediated a power-sharing agreement in 2003, but the agreement failed immediately as violence continued. (72) In this regard, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement which was proposed by France was not capable of producing long-lasting peace even though it was supposed to provide for power-sharing and a DDR process. (Mitchell 2012, 179-180) According to Bah (2010), the following years were then shaped by multiple different peace attempts – Accra II, Accra III and the Praetoria Agreement – which also failed in producing lasting peace. The situation only became better in 2007 after the Ouagadougou agreement was signed by the government and FN. (607-609) Importantly, participating parties designed and agreed on the final Ouagadougou agreement without international involvement. (Bah 2010, 598-600) In the following, the country stabilized to some extent after 2007 and the agreement ultimately allowed for elections in 2010. (Mitchell 2012, 183)

Nonetheless, precisely these elections led to new conflict since both candidates – Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara – declared themselves winners which left the country effectively with two Presidents. (Mitchell 2012, 183) According to Banegas (2011), Ouattara received major support from a large part of the international community - including military support from France and UN - and was considered to be the actual winner of the election. Nonetheless, Gbagbo tried to secure his position through a strategy of intimidation and state violence for which he used his influence in the military. However, international sanctions and public support for Ouattara shifted the balance of power in early 2011 and, as a result, Gbagbo forces were pushed back to the Presidential Palace where the latter was arrested in April of the same year. (462-465)

1.2.3.2 DDR in Côte d'Ivoire

According to Oussou (2014), DDR was already emphasized as part of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Consequently, the government of Côte d'Ivoire established the National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (CNDDR) in 2003 which received the task of preparing a plan for the future provision of the agreement. (104) Nonetheless, the agreement never led to the full disarmament of combatants based on further tensions between the government and FN. As a result, plans for DDR were terminated together with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and Accra III in 2004. (Novosseloff 2018, 10) In 2007 new plans were made for DDR as a result of the Ouagadougou Agreement. (Talentino and Pearson 2020, 166) However, deadlines for DDR were continuously ignored by all including parties which blocked an effective implementation until 2012. (Novosseloff 2018, 31) Nonetheless, after the defeat of Laurent Gbagbo and the conclusion of the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire a final DDR process ultimately became more effective. In this regard, the government established the so called Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Authority which was responsible for the process in 2012. (Nangorgo 2019, 85) Afterwards, 69,000 former combatants enrolled in a final DDR process which was implemented in between 2013 and 2015. (Novosseloff 2018, 31)

2. Theory & Methodology

2.1. Theory

The overall aim of the thesis is to conduct a comparative case study for Liberia and Sierra Leone with the Ivory Coast as a benchmark case in order to explain why the implementation of DDR is varying depending on the country context. Hence, previous DDR processes were partly implemented at different stages of conflicts depending on the country context and the research aims to better understand relevant factors which determine this specific variation. Consequently the research question of the thesis is as follows:

When are DDR processes likely to be introduced and what factors explain their timing?

In this context, DDR will serve as the dependent variable of the research. On the other hand, the independent variables were defined based on a qualitative assessment of the country context for Sierra Leone and Liberia. According to theory, traditional DDR is expected to require certain preconditions in order to be successfully implemented. Hence, literature emphasizes the willingness of conflict parties, the end of conflict, a minimum guarantee of security and a negotiated peace agreement. (Muggah and O'Donnell 2015; IOM 2017; UN 2010) Nonetheless, qualitative research on Sierra Leone and Liberia has also emphasized the role of multiple other factors which have affected the DDR process such as international involvement, the balance of power between factions and ethnicities or the existence of power sharing agreements. Consequently, the research has identified a set of variables of the country cases which have been considered as relevant for the timing of DDR through an assessment of qualitative literature and theory.

Firstly, the involvement of the UN, other organizations such as ECOWAS, or bilateral actors seems to have played a central role for the DDR process. On the one hand, the UN is regarded as a key actor for the promotion of DDR and was involved in the DDR process of all three countries. On the other hand, different other international actors were also active in all three country cases which makes it rather likely that their presence might have influenced the introduction of DDR in general. Consequently, the first hypothesis of the thesis is:

H1: International involvement is positively related to the introduction of DDR.

Moreover, the absence or existence of conflict itself was also identified as a relevant variable within the research. In this regard, one central element of variation between the country cases was in the first place that DDR was mainly introduced after conflict in Liberia and during conflict in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the research wants to understand if the existence of conflict has a preventive effect on the introduction of DDR processes. In this context, the next hypothesis which will be tested is

H2: The existence of conflict has a negative effect on the introduction of DDR.

One important feature of all three conflicts was a strong variation in conflict intensity. For instance, both Sierra Leone and Liberia had longer periods of low conflict levels and certain years in which violence rather escalated and tripled. (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2018) In addition, literature has mentioned different DDR processes which were interrupted by fighting such as the first DDR approach in Sierra Leone (Solomon, and Ginifer, 2008, 8-9). Consequently, the questions arises to which extent the intensity of fighting – next to the existence of conflict per se – can influence the introduction of DDR. Therefore, the next hypothesis wants to test the following:

H3: An increase in conflict intensity is negatively related to the introduction of DDR.

Next, while literature has stressed the importance of peace agreements for DDR in general, little attention has been given to power sharing agreements and their potential influence on the introduction of DDR. However, power sharing allowed for an end of conflict for some of the country cases which makes it an interesting variable for the research. More importantly, power sharing agreements in some cases formally included the DDR process as was the case for the Lomé Peace Agreement in Sierra Leone in 1999. (Sesay and Suma 2009, 10-12) As power sharing agreements are generally linked to peace, the theoretical expectation would be that they positively relate to the DDR process. Hence, the third hypothesis is:

H4: Power sharing agreements positively relate to the introduction of DDR.

Importantly, Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as the Ivory Coast which serves as a benchmark case, have been also affected by embargos and/or sanctions during the conflict. (Banegas 2011; Bøås 2005) In particular, literature has emphasized the role of sanctions in Liberia in order to bring peace to the country as well as to Sierra Leone (Bøås 2005). Consequently, the thesis also tests the following hypothesis:

H5: Sanctions/Embargos have a positive effect on the introduction of DDR.

In addition, the thesis also includes the balance of power between government forces and the opposition.. Both country cases experienced multiple changes in the balance of power between the government forces and the opposition. In the case of Sierra Leone, such changes actually led to the temporary halt of the DDR process. (Solomon, and Ginifer, 2008, 8-9) Therefore, the

research also includes the balance of power between government forces and opposition as a variable in order to test, if the introduction is more likely if the government has the upper hand in a conflict. Consequently, the hypothesis which will be tested is:

H6: A strong position of the government positively relates to the introduction of DDR.

Ultimately, different sources also emphasize the role of war fatigue for the conclusion of conflict and introduction of DDR in Sierra Leone and Liberia. (Kieh 2009; Davies 2002) Consequently, the research also wants to test, if the duration of the conflict can ultimately influence the introduction of DDR programs. In order to test this idea, one hypothesis of the thesis is:


H7: There is a positive relationship between war fatigue and the introduction of DDR.

2.2. Research Design

In order to test the hypothesizes which were stated above, the paper will at first apply the Most Similar Case Design (MSSD) as a comparative research approach which generally requires two very similar country cases that mainly differ in regard to the introduction of DDR during or after the end of conflict. (Anckar 2008, 390) More precisely, MSSD generally compares characteristics and effects of similar cases. Hence, if the effect – which is in this case the timing of DDR – differs between these two cases, then the different characteristics are assumed to be the cause for that variation. (Mills, Durepos and Wiebe 2012, 2) In this context, the thesis will focus on Sierra Leone and Liberia as major cases for the comparative case study as both of these countries share various similarities which will be explained further below. Nonetheless, Sierra Leone implemented DDR already during an ongoing conflict while Liberia only did so after the conflict was concluded in 2003. Hence, both cases have a different outcome for the

independent variable of this thesis. Besides, the research also includes the Ivory Coast as a benchmark case.

Table 1: Conflict Intensity in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Ivory Coast. Source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2018)



2.2.1 Similarity of the Cases

There are multiple similarities between Liberia and Sierra Leone which serve as major cases for the MSSD. Firstly, there is geographic proximity as both countries border each other. In addition, Sierra Leone and Liberia both share the same language and a similar historical past as both countries were colonized by former slaves which mainly came from the US in the case of Liberia and from the UK in the case of Sierra Leone. (Hargreaves 1962) According to the Minority Rights Group International (2020), the West African Forrest Belt, which includes large parts of both countries, was historically populated by multiple ethnicities which is another important similarity. Consequently, both countries have a large amount of ethnic communities which partly overlap. In this regard, ethnic groups such as the Mende, Vai and Kissi are located in both countries even though their relative demographic size differs. (Liberia; Sierra Leone)

More important, both countries do not have a dominant ethnic group and were previously characterized by ethnic tensions.

In addition, both country cases were characterized by autocratic rule before the conflict started. Consequently, both countries also had similar economic and political problems. In this regard, literature identified nepotism, corruption, and political oppression as relevant causes for the outbreak of violence for both countries. (Asangna 2017; Bøås and Utas 2014; Ellis 1995) Another major similarity between those countries are natural resources. Hence, Liberia is in particular rich in timber, iron ore and rubber, while Sierra Leone has significant diamond reserves. More important, these resources were actively used to fuel the conflict in both countries. (Beevers 2015, 229) Hence, while the kind of resources differed they had a similar effect on the conflict as they allowed for easy access to additional funding. Next to these historic similarities, both countries also have distinct similarities when it comes to economic and demographic factors. In this regard, data from Penns World Table (2015) have shown that GDP per capita has been similar between Liberia and Sierra Leone until the outbreak of war which started earlier in Liberia. Nonetheless, from 1995 until 1999 Sierra Leone also experienced a decrease of GDP per capita and ultimately reached a similar level as Liberia. Additionally, while the population of Sierra Leone is slightly larger than Liberia, population growth has been similar and the general gap between population size is comparably small in comparison to other neighboring countries such as the Ivory Coast. (World Bank, 2021) Infant mortality has also been similar for both countries in between 1980 and the start of the conflict. (World Bank 2021) Ultimately, total GDP has been nearly identical from 1980 until the outbreaks of violence for both countries.

However, when it comes to DDR there were differences in regard to timing. Hence, in Liberia the only uninterrupted and complete DDR process took place after the second Liberian civil war in 2003. Formally, DDR was also introduced in 1994 but the implementation of the program was further delayed until the end of the first phase of conflict. (Aning 1999; Jaye 2009,

6) In the case of Sierra Leone, all three DDR processes – which are generally regarded as a single interrupted DDR process by literature - were implemented before peace was reached in 2002.

2.2.2 Logistical Regression & Measurement of Variables

The research also conducts a logistical regression for a robust analysis and to quantitatively assess the variables that influence the dependent variable, namely the introduction of DDR. Hence, the research conducts a logistical bivariate and multivariate regression with the following independent variables: 1) conflict; 2) conflict intensity; 3) international involvement; 4) power sharing agreements; and 5) the balance of power;

In order to determine the factors that influence the timing of DDR, the research has identified these variables theoretically based on literature and theory . Furthermore, these variables were coded into a time series chart with the help of qualitative research and data inputs from the World Bank (2021), Penns World Table (2015), and data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2018). The range of the time series includes the whole duration of the respective conflicts and the first year after conflict was concluded. The only exception for the three cases is the Ivory Coast since the DDR process only became more effective during this time. These inputs were then used for a logistic regression. The section below will elaborate on all of these variables and will show in more detail how they were measured and used within the research process.

DDR: data for DDR processes was mainly collected through the assessment of qualitative research for the country cases. In the following, the research has included a time series for the three cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast which indicates the years in which DDR has been used within the country. Hence, if a DDR program was actively implemented in

a specific year, it was coded as one (1) while a year without any DDR activity was coded as zero (0). In regard to the research, the paper is in particular interested in what variables can ultimately lead to the introduction of DDR and, therefore, in the years which show a variation from 0 to 1 for the DDR variable.

Conflict: Similar to DDR, conflict was also mainly assessed on the basis of qualitative research for the cross-country time series. In this regard, if there was any active conflict for a specific year in the series, it was coded as a 1. On the other hand, only years without any sort of active conflict were coded as 0.

Conflict Intensity: In order to measure conflict intensity, data on deaths from conflict and terrorism was gathered from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2018). These numbers were then directly used for the regression.

International Involvement: The information on the international involvement in the country cases was mainly gathered from qualitative research. In order to measure the involvement of the UN, ECOWAS and bilateral actors, the research used a scale which ranges from 1 to 3. Without any international involvement, a specific year in the time series was coded as a 0. If only the United Nations were active during a certain year, it was coded as 1. On the other hand, if another actor than the UN was active it was coded as a 2 while multiple actors were marked with a 3. The regression later on separates between UN involvement, multiple actors and other actors. Hence, the existing data was split on a binary basis in which each year which showed one of these characteristics was coded as 1.

Power Sharing Agreements: The thesis mainly collected information on power sharing agreements in Liberia and Sierra Leone from various qualitative journals and reports. In the

following, every year in which a power sharing agreement was at least formally existent was coded with a 1. On the contrary, years in which no power sharing agreement was existent were marked with a 0.

Sanctions: Similar to other variables, information on sanctions were mainly coded on the basis of qualitative research. Moreover, the research did not distinguish between embargos and sanctions. Similar to other variables in the cross country time series, every year with active sanctions or embargos was given a 1 while every other year received a 0.

Length of Conflict: Data on the years of conflict was gathered from official reports and journals. For the logistic regression and the time series, the duration of conflict was simply indicated numerically. Importantly, whenever there was a short time of peace in a country context the conflict count was started again. For example, the conflict in Liberia was not considered as one single conflict but rather as a cycle of different phases of conflict of which some lasted longer and others were rather short.

3. Findings

3.1 Statistical Estimation

3.1.1 Bivariate Regression

Table 2: Bivariate logistical regression of all individual variables with DDR

	(1) DDR	(2) DDR	(3) DDR	(4) DDR	(5) DDR	(6) DDR	(7) DDR	(8) DDR
conflict	-1.992*							
	(-2.51)							
Conflict Intensity		0.000176						
		(0.77)						
International Involvement			1.673*					
			(2.51)					
Power Sharing				0.797*				
				(2.01)				
Sanctions					1.866*			
					(2.18)			
Length						0.101		
						(0.93)		
Balance of Power							0.941	
							(1.90)	
_cons	0.981	-0.612	-4.442*	-1.005*	-1.792*	-0.739	-1.412*	
	(1.45)	(-1.45)	(-2.53)	(-2.26)	(-2.35)	(-1.62)	(-2.24)	
N	41	40	41	41	41	41	41	

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2. shows the bivariate logistical regression of all the previously defined variables with DDR. Therefore, each of this variables was individually tested against DDR. In this model, four variables have shown to have a significant impact on DDR which are namely the existence of conflict, international involvement, power sharing agreements and sanctions. Consequently, the bivariate regression shows that the existence of conflict has a strong negative effect on the introduction of DDR which supports the second hypothesis (H2). The latter states that the existence of conflict has a negative effect on the introduction of DDR. The second variable which shows significance is international involvement. This variable has a coefficient of 1.673 even though it was measured on a scale from 0 to 3. Hence, there is a very strong effect of international involvement on DDR which supports the first hypothesis (H1). Thirdly, in the

bivariate regression sanctions have also shown to have a statistical significance and a strong coefficient of 1.866 even though they were measured on a scale from 0 to 1 only. These findings show that the existence of sanctions has a strong positive effect on the introduction of DDR which supports H5. Ultimately, power sharing is the last variable in the bivariate regression that shows both, a statistical significance and a positive coefficient. In this regard, according to the table, the existence of power sharing agreement has a coefficient of 0.797 which is relevant but lower than other previously mentioned variables. Importantly, these findings still support the fourth hypothesis. On the contrary, all the other variables have not shown statistical significance. In this regard, while the balance of power received a coefficient of 0.941, the p-value does not allow us to prove the relevance for this variable. The same is true for conflict intensity which has a relevant coefficient based on the measurement of large conflict numbers but no statistical significance. Ultimately, length seems to have no effect on the DDR process at all since the regression only shows a rather small coefficient and lacks the necessary p-value of 0.05. Therefore, the findings of the bivariate regression suggest that H7, H3 and H6 have no effect on the introduction of DDR. In order to check for correlations between independent variables, the research has also created a correlation matrix which is attached to the annex of the paper. The matrix shows that conflict and conflict intensity are highly correlated which was taken into account in the baseline multivariate model below. In this regard, the research also used different multivariate models in order to assess the results that are statistically significant across country models.

Table 3: Bivariate logistical regression of different international actors

	(1) DDR	(2) DDR	(3) DDR
DDR			
UN Involv.	3.653** (3.25)		
Multipl. Actors		2.411** (3.09)	
Other Actor Inv.			1.001 (1.14)
_cons	-2.890** (-2.81)	-1.792** (-2.87)	-1.253 (-1.56)
N	41	41	41

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3. shows a bivariate logistical regression of different international actors. In this regard, the research divides the UN and other bilateral or multilateral actors in order to explore the relevance of each of these actors. As can be seen, the UN has a very strong and significant ($p<0.01$) effect on DDR. Multiple actors also show statistical significance even though the coefficient is lower than for the UN. In this context, it is important to highlight that the UN was most of the time involved if multiple actors intervened in one of the country cases at the same time. Ultimately, other actors show no significance for the introduction of DDR. Hence, the findings of the bivariate regression emphasize that the effect of international involvement on the DDR process is mainly UN driven.

3.1.2 Multivariate Regression

Table 4: Multivariate regression of different international actors

	(1) DDR
DDR	
UN Involvement	3.803** (3.07)
Other Actor Inv.	-0.451 (-0.34)
_cons	-2.627* (-2.10)
N	41

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4 shows a multivariate logistical regression which also looks at the effect of different international actors which were active in the conflict. Importantly, the research shows similar findings as table 3, namely that international involvement is UN driven and that there is no significant effect on DDR from other actors. In fact, the regression shows an even lower coefficient for other actors and a larger coefficient for UN involvement in comparison to the bivariate regression model. Hence, there is significant evidence which shows the importance of the UN as an international actor for the DDR process.

Table 5: Multivariate regression with UN involvement instead of intern. involvement

	(1) DDR	(2) DDR	(3) DDR	(4) DDR	(5) DDR
DDR					
UN Inv.	3.653** (3.25)	3.341** (2.89)	3.286** (2.75)	3.203** (2.60)	91.45 (0.43)
Conflict		-0.938 (-1.01)	-0.912 (-0.97)	-0.253 (-0.23)	-131.3 (-0.41)
Power Sharing			0.0878 (0.18)	0.591 (0.92)	-4.487 (-0.27)
Balance of Power				1.182 (1.49)	-1.092 (-0.76)
Conflict Intensity					0.00693 (0.56)
Sanctions					-65.31 (-0.39)
Length					23.02 (0.39)
_cons	-2.890** (-2.81)	-2.026 (-1.53)	-2.071 (-1.53)	-4.035 (-1.91)	-15.52 (-0.27)
N	41	41	41	41	40

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Next, Table 5 shows a multivariate logistical regression which tests specifically UN involvement with all other variables of Table 2. Therefore, international involvement was replaced with a more specific variable on UN involvement. The findings, once more, show a very strong significance of the United Nations for the DDR process in all of the regressions except for the last one. Nonetheless, the loss of significance for the last model can eventually be explained based on the loss of degrees of freedom, with rather few observations and multiple independent variables. Besides, the multivariate model does not show any significance for any other variable.

Table 6: Multivariate regression with multiple actors instead of intern. involv.

	(1) DDR	(2) DDR	(3) DDR	(4) DDR	(5) DDR
ddr					
Multiple Actors Inv.	2.411** (3.09)	2.060* (2.53)	1.968* (2.38)	1.991* (2.18)	2.681* (2.09)
Conflict		-1.378 (-1.57)	-1.206 (-1.34)	-0.532 (-0.49)	-6.105* (-1.98)
Power Sharing			0.476 (1.01)	0.893 (1.50)	0.229 (0.33)
Balance of Power				1.208 (1.67)	0.785 (0.81)
Conflict Intensity					0.00135 (1.84)
Sanctions					0.246 (0.13)
Length					0.678 (1.47)
_cons	-1.792** (-2.87)	-0.607 (-0.63)	-1.009 (-0.96)	-3.075 (-1.65)	-2.722 (-0.91)
N	41	41	41	41	40

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6, which is the last table of the research, takes a similar approach as Table 5 except for that it switches the variable which measures UN involvement with another variable which measures multiple international actors that were active at the same time. These findings, further emphasize the significance of international involvement in general and in particular the role of multiple actors. However, as was mentioned before, also this process was mainly UN driven. Firstly, the UN was active in all of the cases together with a second organization, which will also be assessed in more detail in the qualitative part, but also previous models have shown that it is the UN that actually matters for DDR. Furthermore, the model also finds more partial

evidence in the 5th model of Table 6 for the role of conflict similar to the first bivariate regression.

Overall, the different models have shown significant and robust findings for the role of international actors for the introduction of DDR. Consequently, the research can accept H1, which states that international involvement is positively related to the introduction of DDR. Nonetheless, these findings specifically highlight the role of the UN while other actors play a rather insignificant role. In addition, these findings also show partial evidence for the negative effect of conflict, power sharing and ultimately sanctions. These findings are not robust in multiple models but will be further assessed in the qualitative analysis. On the other hand, the statistical models also show that there is no significance between conflict length and DDR which is relevant as it shows that war fatigue seems to have no importance for the introduction of DDR. Similarly, the balance of power between the government and opposition has not shown any significance in any of the models. Hence, the statistical model also finds partial evidence that conflict length and the balance of power have no influence on the establishment of DDR programs which rather leads to reject the two hypotheses which state that 1) there is a positive relationship between conflict length and the introduction of DDR and 2) that a strong position of the government positively relates to the introduction of DDR.

The models also emphasize some important findings for the comparison of domestic and international factors. Hence, the output of the models emphasize that it is the UN that matters for the introduction of conflict while domestic factors such as the balance of power and power-sharing only show little significance. This might have a direct implication for the success of DDR as crucial domestic stakeholders are not involved in the process. Besides, these DDR programs might also fail to take the political context into account since they are implemented mainly from the outside.

3.2 Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative part of the analysis mainly focuses on the variables which have shown to play a role for DDR in at least one of the regression models. In this regard, when looking at international involvement, both country cases show clear differences in regard to the involvement of the United Nations as well as on DDR introduction. Hence, Liberia introduced DDR in 1993 for the first time which was also the first year in which the UN got involved in the country. Moreover, this process was ultimately stopped in 1997 after the election of Taylor and the end of the UN mission. (Jaye 2009, 8) During the second phase of the conflict, the UN was only able to establish another mission in 2003 after conflict has ended which was precisely the year in which DDR started again in Liberia. (Jaye 2009, 9-12) Nonetheless, ECOMOG was the first international actor in the country and intervened much earlier which goes hand in hand with the findings of the regressions which show little significance for other actors than the UN. (Sesay 1996, 395) On the contrary, Sierra Leone implemented DDR in 1998 for the first time. (Sesay and Suma 2009, 12) This timing also correlates with the introduction of the UN mission which only followed one year later even though the original DDR process started officially earlier. More precisely, DDR was established after President Kabbah came to power who was also strongly in favor of UN involvement. (Sesay and Suma 2009, 7) Similar to Liberia, ECOMOG was also already active in the conflict since 1993. Nonetheless, from a qualitative perspective, ECOMOG did play a role for the establishment of the Kabbah government as they allowed for a minimum level of security in the country which in the first place allowed for the elections to take place. (Davies 2002, 2) Since the very first DDR process in the country started without UN involvement, it seems as if ECOMOG generally contributed to the introduction of DDR. While this action is still in line with the hypothesis – which broadly focuses on international involvement - it does show some relevance for another actor than the UN. In this context, by comparing both of the country cases it becomes clear that the timing of

UN involvement had a very relevant impact on the introduction of DDR in both countries. Consequently, such differences in the timing for UN missions can explain why DDR was implemented during or active conflict in the country. Consequently, the research accepts the first hypothesis since the regression and qualitative analysis can confirm the relevance of international involvement for both country cases.

In addition, the bivariate regression also shows some evidence for the relevance of conflict for the introduction of DDR. In the case of Liberia, this is generally true except for an interrupted DDR process which was formally started in 1993. During this time the conflict was still active even though the DDR process was generally perceived as a failure. (Kieh 2009, 11-16) The second process followed after the end of conflict in 2003 which generally supports the second hypothesis, namely that the existence of conflict has a negative effect on the introduction of DDR. On the other hand, Sierra Leone originally introduced DDR in the middle of the war in 1998. Hence, during that time the security situation in the country even decreased in the following year as can be seen in Table 1. In this regard, the first process was established during active conflict and was continued – after an interruption – one year later, which was precisely the year in which the RUF attacked Freetown. (Gberie 2002, 3-4) Hence, while violence actively interrupted DDR - as was the case in 1998 - there is no significant evidence that conflict prevents the introduction of DDR in the first place. Consequently, the thesis does neither reject nor accept the second hypothesis.

Next, power sharing also shows some evidence for the introduction of DDR. In the case of Liberia, effective power-sharing only took place in 1995 after the Abuja agreement which paved the way for the election in 1997 as the NPFL refused to sign such an agreement before. (Tarr 1993, 75; Sesay 1996, 15) In this specific case, the power sharing agreement managed to revive the DDR process that originally started in 1993 already but did not actively influence the original decision for the respective program (Jaye 2009, 6). In other words, the agreement allowed for a security situation which generally enables DDR but did not decide for a new

program. Nonetheless, another power sharing agreement was established together with DDR in 2003 between the winning factions – LURD and MODEL – and some former members of the previous government. (Jaye 2009, 9) Therefore, power sharing seems to have played a role for the final DDR process but findings are not consistent over the whole period of the conflict since the first power sharing agreement came after DDR. In the case of Sierra Leone, there was only one effective power sharing agreement which was established in 1999 and gave a lot of political power to the RUF. (Davies 2002, 2) In regard to DDR, the power sharing agreement formally included DDR and, therefore, allowed for the continuation of an already existent DDR process which originally started in 1998. However, this process was interrupted again and only became more effective after the end of the power sharing agreement in 2001 as can be seen in Table 1. Hence, power sharing agreements seem to have had no significant effect on the introduction of DDR in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the research only finds minor evidence for the effect of power sharing agreements on the introduction of DDR as both cases show variation for the effect of the respective agreements.

Ultimately, sanctions seem to have played some role for DDR as well even though there was not enough statistical significance in the multivariate regression. In this regard, both country cases became the target of embargos in a relatively early stage of the conflict. Moreover, these embargos and sanctions persisted over the whole period of the two conflicts. Hence, Liberia effectively became the target of an embargo in 1995 which was a year in which DDR was actually interrupted in the country. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016, §2) On the contrary, Sierra Leone received international sanctions in 1997 which was also one year before the DDR process started. As a result, the research finds only partial evidence for the effect of sanctions on DDR. (Anyu 2001, 97)

4. Conclusion

Overall, the thesis finds robust and significant findings for the role of international actors and in particular the United Nations for the introduction of DDR. This comes as little surprise, since DDR has been actively promoted by the United Nations and was used as a tool in most of the peacekeeping operations. (UN 2010, 9) Hence, the UN is generally perceived as a driving force behind DDR programs but the research allows for the validation of this argument based on a comparative case study. Consequently, the thesis finds that international actors matter to a much higher extent than domestic factors for the establishment of DDR programs. This argument is mainly based on the strong effect of UN involvement even though sanctions show some effect in one of the models as well. However, the latter lacks significance to confirm the hypothesis. In regard to domestic factors, the bivariate regression shows some evidence for the effect of power sharing but these findings show great variation as was seen in the qualitative assessment. Hence, while the thesis cannot reject that domestic factors might also play some role for the introduction of DDR in the form of power sharing between different conflict parties, the models have at least not shown any significant effect. Ultimately, conflict which was a central variable for the choice of the country cases has shown significance in two regression models – the bivariate regression as well as the 5th model of the multivariate regression - but the qualitative assessment has shown that conflict did not really prevent the introduction of DDR in all of the cases. In this regard, two of four processes were introduced even though there was still an ongoing conflict in the country. Hence, even though literature perceives a minimum security for the host country as a precondition for DDR, the two country cases have shown no significant effect of conflict on the introduction of DDR in general. There is also another important non-finding in the research. Hence, the duration of the conflict is insignificant in all of the statistical models and the variable even received a low coefficient in the bivariate regression. Consequently, war fatigue seems to have played no role for the introduction of DDR. This is

especially interesting since literature has stressed the importance of this variable for the success of DDR. (Ansorge and Antwi-Ansorge 2011, 273)

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Annex

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
Year	Conflict	Conflict Intensity	DOR	m_liv	oth_liv	un_liv	Int_liv	PS	Sanctions	length	Bop
1989	1			0	0	0		0	0	1	2
1990	1	3.684		0	0	0		2	1	0	1
1991	1	272		0	0	0		2	1	0	1
1992	1	435		0	0	0		2	0	0	1
1993	1	2.565		1	1	1		3	0	0	1
1994	1	3.770		1	1	1		3	1	0	1
1995	1	2.196		0	1	1		3	2	1	0
1996	0	1.097		1	1	1		3	2	1	0
1997	0	13		1	1	1		3	2	1	0
1998	0	14		0	0	0		2	0	1	0
1999	1	191		0	0	0		0	0	1	1
2000	1	101		0	0	0		0	0	1	1
2001	1	482		0	0	0		0	0	1	1
2002	1	2.286		0	0	0		0	0	1	1
2003	1	3.217		1	0	1		1	2	1	0
2004	0	18		1	0	1		1	2	1	2
1991	1	1.344		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
1992	1	551		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
1993	1	640		0	0	0		2	0	0	0
1994	1	2.296		0	0	0		2	0	0	0
1995	1	3.194		0	0	0		2	0	0	1
1996	1	999		0	0	0		2	1	0	1
1997	1	1.249		0	0	0		2	1	1	1
1998	1	5.413		1	0	0		2	0	1	2
1999	1	4.621		1	1	1		3	2	1	0
2000	1	916		1	1	1		3	1	1	2
2001	1	73		1	1	1		3	0	1	2
2002	0	3		1	1	1		3	0	1	2
2003	1	1.323		0	0	0		2	0	0	1
2004	1	1.051		0	0	0		2	1	0	1
2005	1	515		0	0	0		3	0	1	1
2006	1	154		0	0	0		3	0	1	1
2007	1	46		0	0	0		3	0	1	1
2008	1	4		1	1	1		3	2	1	1
2009	0	14		1	1	1		3	2	1	1
2010	0	2		0	1	1		3	2	1	1
2011	0	49		0	1	1		3	2	1	2
2012	1	1.072		0	1	1		3	0	1	0
2013	0	28		1	1	1		3	0	1	2
2014	0	22		1	1	1		3	0	1	2
2014	0	29		1	1	1		3	0	1	2

	ddr	conflict	conflictinv	int_inv	ps	sanctions	bop	length
ddr	1.0000							
conflict	-0.4114	1.0000						
conflictinv	0.1235	0.4490	1.0000					
int_inv	0.4594	-0.3876	-0.0575	1.0000				
ps	0.3129	-0.3020	0.0706	0.3829	1.0000			
sanctions	0.3487	-0.4274	-0.2713	0.2755	0.2376	1.0000		
bop	0.3473	-0.2818	-0.2057	0.2202	-0.1525	0.2535	1.0000	
length	0.1368	0.5932	0.4382	0.0809	0.0037	0.0961	0.0683	1.0000