CARE MATTERS: THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY POLICY SYSTEMS ON WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science

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Vienna, Austria

(2021)

Abstract

Women's inclusion is lagging in the political sphere, whereas their academic and economic achievements have been steadily increasing. This research argues that failure of resolving how care work is distributed results in hampering women's political participation; and thus, family policy systems are major mechanisms that influence whether women engage in political activities. It is established by using qualitative comparative analysis that most OECD countries still do not invest in gender inclusive social policies to help in women's care work. The implication of this finding on political participation is probed by multilevel logistic regressions, where family policy systems are taken as the contextual factors that mitigate crucial individual resources and predictors. Findings suggest that family policy models that do not invest in gender equality measures contribute to the political participation of women on welfare, but they have negative effects on both working and domestic women. On the contrary, gender inclusive policy systems that invest in institutions to help with childcare and incentivize men to share care work attenuate most individual differences among women and increase their participation collectively.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Indicators of gender equality show that progress in the political sphere is the slowest in comparison to education, economic power, and wellbeing. It seems like women face specific barriers to equal political participation. This might be because political practice requires specific resources, such as economic power, civic skills, and social networks, that women might lack. Or, that political success is influenced by public attitudes on gender roles that did not disappear from society. However, it is more likely that there is a deeper connection between women's lack of success in political activity and how the political sphere is frequently distinguished in opposition to the private sphere. The private sphere is considered to be apolitical and autonomous. Yet, because – contrary to hopes of feminist movements – women still perform most of the care work and are regarded as the primary caregivers inside families, caretaking remains to be associated with women's role in society. Even though families are changing, they are still the main social institutions of care provision. Hence, for women, the private sphere is not autonomous from other areas of their social relations, including political activity.

This research approaches women as embedded subjects to understand why the political participation of women is so slow to adjust. It proposes that women's political participation is mediated both by their familial relations and the welfare policies of their country, because these directly affect how caretaking is distributed, recognized, and valued in a society. Consequently, it is also argued that welfare regimes that incentivize the sharing of care work (de-gender parental relations) and invest in state-managed institutions of care will have positive effects on women's political participation.

Focusing on the centrality of family policies and their approach to care work is slightly at odds with the position that women's inclusion will happen naturally by increasing their access

to economic resources. Of course, there is merit in emphasizing that many critical structural changes occurred after women joined the labor force in mass (Goldin 2006), including divorce, which grew with the prospect of individual resources, and influenced a more gender egalitarian division of labor inside families. Increased labor force participation also resulted in women's stable inclusion to the workforce. All these changes had implications for women's increasing political participation (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008).

However, there are limitations to the effect employment can bring to gender equality, as stagnation is shown in both economic and familial relations. Women are still disadvantaged in attaining formal and steady employment, and their wages are still below men's. The "feminization of labor" caused occupational devaluation of "feminine" jobs, and a resulting wage penalty for its workers, increasing insecure employment types and the informal market (Standing 1999). Additionally, although the prospect of employment changed family dynamics, and families moved towards a "transitional ideology" between traditionalism and egalitarianism (Hochschild and Machung 2012), these attitudinal changes inside families did not necessarily translate into more egalitarian praxis (ibid.). The initial positive effect of female labor force participation on more gender equal households is fading away as well, and giving ground to other, more decisive contextual and individual factors (Mandel and Lazarus 2021; Altintas and Sullivan 2016). Among them, institutional constraints are becoming an important component that determines preferences for how division of domestic labor is carried out (Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). Thus, although women's increasing labor force participation ignited structural changes, it stopped short of delivering more equal relations among men and women, both in the employment sphere and the family. It is also crucial that female labor force participation cannot explain why women suffer disproportionally in the politically sphere, because more inclusive labor economies do not directly translate to more inclusion in the political sphere (Mandel 2011). Consequently, prioritizing the analysis of care work in relation to women's political

activities is a more feasible research goal, because there is a more deep-seated connection between the social approach to care and women's inclusion into the public sphere.

This topic is also especially relevant as there are many ongoing, crucial changes happening now at the intersections of family life, welfare states and gender equality in developed countries. For instance, aging societies strain public caring institutions (Rouzet et al. 2019), and consequently there is more need for women's caring work inside families. Declining birth rates and emigration also affect women, as many countries are pursuing pro-natalist principles in policymaking in reaction to them (Ainsaar and Riisalu 2014). There is also an increasing number of countries that began to reaffirm the caring role of families by introducing generous social policies that incentivize caregiving inside of families instead of public institutions (called "familialism" in Szelewa 2017; Szikra and Szelewa 2010). Some conservative countries even focus on individual women as recipients and not families (Shelkova 2018). Consequently, it is crucial to uncover the relationship between these developments and the future of women's political participation from a truly gender sensitive approach.

This research will compensate for the unexplored relation and lack of consistent framework for connecting family policy environments and women's political participation. Comparative welfare state literature usually addresses women's employment as an indicator for gender equality. Whereas research on women's political participation does not include welfare states or specifically family policies as an important indicator. Therefore, there is a need to complement the two research traditions at their intersection and analyze the political consequences of welfare policies, especially in the field of women's integration.

To build a consistent framework, it is first addressed how women as a group could fit into the empirical research literature about social policies' effect on political participation. In section 2.1., the possible mechanisms connecting welfare state spending and design to women's political activity are introduced. Second, the feminist conception of citizenship will be

discussed in section 2.2. to explain why there is a deep-seated connection between specifically family policy changes and women's equality. It will be established that localizing care work is a crucial part of family policy systems that is politically consequential. Lastly, after summarizing the major positions of feminist social policy scholars on the desirable family policies, a gap in the research literature is established in section 2.3. on the relationship between political participation and measuring what role family policies can play in gender equality. Unfortunately, as mentioned, there is less research done on which family policy model is the most desirable from the perspective of political participation.

To assess the empirical feasibility of the effects of family policies on women's political participation, the paper first addresses how caretaking is approached presently in the OECD countries in section 3.3. It is argued that there are two directions of transformative policymaking – one connected to actively helping women's employment and de-gendering family life, and the other connected to valuing and compensating for their care work. Consequently, it is analyzed whether developed countries are moving towards either direction to help achieve gender equality in care work, or they disregard this topic in their policymaking. Subsequently, a cross-country analysis is performed on how women's political participation is affected by these different types of family systems. In section 3.5., hypotheses are built based on the interactions between the individual resources and factors that determine women's political participation, and the existent theory on how family policy systems can influence them. After conducting the analysis, findings are in presented on section 3.7.

Chapter 2 – Theory development and literature review

2.1. *The unexplored relation between welfare systems and political participation*

There are multiple channels that can mitigate the relation between women's political activity and welfare state constellations. One crucial connection stems from the fact that social policy institutions can both assign more care work to women or unburden them. For instance, increase in state-maintained childcare institutions have relieved women from some of the care work that comes with raising children, and it is known as a major determinant of women's employment. Because caring is still primarily performed by women, whether a welfare policy constellation leans to socialize the tasks of care by accessible institutions or strain families further by neglecting public investment in caring is of central importance. It is an additional dimension that in either the socializing or "familializing" dimension of policymaking, welfare states give or fail to give resources to women, which has obvious consequences for their economic situation. Lastly, welfare systems influence and incentivize certain types of beliefs and attitudes towards how families should be organized and how workplaces should approach women's caring duties. Social policies can reinforce or change social norms (Esping-Andersen 1990), among them, most specifically public attitudes about traditional or egalitarian gender roles which determine women's family life, prospects of employment, and political activities.

By surveying the effects of welfare program participation, it has been established that being a recipient can increase political activity, contrary to the common belief that welfare dependence causes demobilization. Activities are encouraged by increasing not just the resources of recipients, but also their level of understanding politics. For many people, experiences during involvement in a welfare program are associated with formal politics itself (Soss 1999), likely because they are more direct than those with representative democratic institutions. Thus their encounters also influence how they conceive of themselves as participatory citizens (*Ibid.*). Social policies contribute to decreasing the political inequality and

increase the political participation of marginalized groups, and especially poor people (Plutzer 2010). One research proposed that a possible individual mechanism is that partaking in such programs increase the political efficacy of recipients (Corman, Dave, and Reichman 2017). At the same time, stigmatization can cause citizens to withdraw from the political sphere, thus, the design and societal context of social policies matters a great deal to determine their outcomes. It is critical to revise the belief that welfare policies are demobilizing the public and understand welfare states as possible mechanism to create politically active constituencies, especially among previously marginalized groups.

When it comes to women as a group, there is an aspect of recognition, as well as a material dimension, to welfare support. Welfare spending embodies that the state recognizes and values women's difference as a group, which quality of governance, according to McDonagh, is needed to develop a more gender-inclusive political sphere (McDonagh 2009). She argues as the United States does not embody any caring functions, and thus, the political sphere is less attractive for women, which results in their decreased numbers in formal politics (*Ibid.*). Contrarily, formal political representation of women is better in countries who have more generous welfare states (Detraz and Peksen 2018; Rosenbluth, Salmond, and Thies 2006). There is also a possible feedback effect of higher welfare spending and gender inclusion in the political sphere, as women parliamentarians are more likely to vote for social policies (Hessami and Lopes da Fonseca 2020). Thus, welfare spending sets in a mechanism that reinforces women's inclusion into the formal public sphere, which then also has positive effects for women in mass. Whereas those social policy environments that do not provide any support for women can sideline women's concerns and social identity. From the perspective of formal politics, there seems to be a connection between how the state functions and who participates in its decision-making. By and large, more welfare spending is more beneficial for women's political inclusion.

Even though welfare spending contributes to women's political inclusion on average, women are a more heterogenous group than most other welfare recipients. Thus, it is a complicated task to evaluate specific policies that can disadvantage some women vis-à-vis women's equal political participation as a collective. For instance, social transfers are most likely to be directly beneficial for less educated or lower-class women in contrast to women with more economic or political power. Whereas more generous welfare spending may obstruct the advancement of highly educated women, as it came up in relation to the generous and comprehensive welfare states of Nordic countries. Some argue that these type of welfare systems are unfavorable for highly educated women because they cannot advance into more managerial positions (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). This finding is debated (cf. (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013)), and it is especially questionable whether there is a similar effect concerning political power. Still, research like these show that women are also affected by growing intra-group inequalities, therefore, analysis should differentiate based on class, ethnicity, and other socioeconomic aspects.

Another factor that complicates research is that similarly to other social policies, there is a possibility that welfare transfers for women are designed to coopt rather than empower them. Even if social policies were generous and without stigmatization, there is a fear that women develop "adaptive preferences" to traditional or conservative policies, which they would not support otherwise. The concept of adaptive preference was used by Elster to describe how oppressed people only show preference for their circumstances, because they have no experience with a feasible alternative (Elster 2016). As conservative welfare systems accentuate the family as the locus of care and community, women are encouraged to remain in the private sphere; thus, there is a fear that remunerating caring will reinforce women's belief that their exclusion from the political sphere is justified. This is a growing concern as many conservative regimes are above average spenders for family benefits (i.e., Hungary, France, and Germany).

Additionally, there is also a surge of very generous redistributive policies by conservative governments, some of them designed to address women individually (and not in relation to the family) (cf. on Maternal Capital in Russia (Shelkova 2018)). In light of these difficulties, how can contemporary research assess the consequences of these new changes?

The problem with adaptive preferences of conservative women should be approached empirically. It can happen that women become demobilized because they are reaffirmed in their role in the private sphere, and thus, these policies are probably contributing to their cooptation. It is a more complicated issue if women *do* become politically active but largely support the mentioned conservative parties. As Kováts and Grzebalska suggests, many women are genuinely backing two conservative but redistributive governing parties in Eastern Europe (Fidesz and PiS), but their stance is probably powered by socioeconomic interests (Kováts and Grzebalska 2018). The argumentation of this research also states that there is no feasible alternative as no other party has introduced social policies to protect women. To report more determine results, analysis should go beyond voting and party membership, and focus on non-conventional forms of participation. A good example is Quarante et al.'s research which showed that welfare spending contributes to the non-violent protest participation of women (although there is no disaggregation of welfare types in this research, (Quaranta 2014)). Such examples show that with good empirical measures on political activity, problems with interpretation can be overcome.

Of course, welfare states effect women not only through spending but policy design. Social policies determine the distribution of care work that influences how much available time women possess. There are limited and contradictory empirical papers on the connection between household duties and political activities. Work on the state-socialist countries suggested that working women are usually overburdened with responsibilities, and thus, lack the energy and time to partake in political endeavors (Einhorn 2000; É. Fodor 2002). In other

areas of research, it was more common that normative arguments were made for women's right to equal access of leisure (Philips 1991). Burns et al. is a notable exception; in their findings, they suggest that – contrary to popular belief – mothers who work full-time are more engaged in voluntary work than stay-at-home mothers, and that the amount of domestic work women need to do in a household has no effect on their political activity (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). However, this sample was relatively limited as it only used data from the U.S. The contradicting reports from these papers on whether more available time results in more or less political engagement for women come from very different policy environments, thus, this question is still open and worthy of pursuit.

Lastly, welfare regimes influence not only women, but the mass public as well, resulting in cross-country differences in gender ideology. Gender ideology should be understood as an average attitude in a country towards how gender roles should be performed. These beliefs can arise partly because policies incentivize certain type of behaviors inside families and on the labor market. According to the theory of policy feedback effect, public policies are "politically consequential" (Pierson 1993). Under certain circumstances, (through providing for resources, incentives, and information) they impact how citizens begin to act in the political sphere (Ibid.). Thus, welfare states can also indirectly determine how inclusive the political sphere is for women by affecting gender ideology. Of course, it would be naïve to propose that welfare systems determine gender ideologies, as they might partly be endogenous to them. However, there can be policy induced changes of gender ideology. One can conceive of state-socialist countries' egalitarian family models as a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. As women's employment was compulsory and childcare of toddlers was relegated to state institutions, family structures were fundamentally changed. It was a fiery topic after democratization in Eastern Europe, whether the liberation from this state-mandated way of life resulted in a "retraditionalization" of society (Watson 1993), whether families embraced again household

division to men being the sole earners and women the domestic wives. Retrospectively, however, it is more likely that it was not the case that women stopped working out of choice, but necessity (Pollert 2003; E. Fodor 2006), and the specific egalitarianism arising out of this historical legacy proved to be stable in the people's attitudes (cf. egalitarian familialism in (Grunow, Begall, and Buchler 2018)). Thus, even policies without cultural precedence can have lasting effects on gender ideology, which shows that social policies can influence how inclusive public attitudes are towards women's equal participation, and thus, mitigate political activity.

Given the above, it becomes clearer how women's political participation and social policy environments are connected, and what type of complicating factors arise in researching their connection. It can be proposed that more generous welfare systems are more advantageous for political participation, however, because women are a heterogenous group, its members might be differently affected by the same policy environment. Policies can also transform gender ideologies, and thus provide for a more inclusive public attitude. When it comes to the shared task of care work, it is proposed that welfare systems can exert an effect through unburdening women. Previous research was less certain that available time influences women's political participation but did not include cross-country analysis to account for the effect of policies. Additionally, where it can be already seen that redistributive policies had some effects on mobilization, such as the growing support of women for generous conservative policies, the question arises whether they are truly empowered by such policies. It was argued that well-designed research can provide for clearer interpretations of such tendencies.

2.2. Family policy systems as crucial mechanisms of women's (in)equality

Family policy systems are a specific subset of social policies that used to contribute to women's oppression, because for long they only allowed women to have derivative social rights. However, in developed countries, family policy systems adapted to the increase in women's employment by developing childcare institutions and individual entitlements to paid

leaves from work. Now, some of them can be mechanisms to enhance gender equality. This section will thematize why there is a deeply seated connection between family policies and the political citizenship of women, using the works of feminist social policy scholars. It will also present major trends in family policy systems as well as those questions about gender equality they elicited.

The interrelation of social and political citizenship is based on the critique of a narrow conception of citizenship. Citizenship, here, refers to the normative category of being a recognized member of a (democratic) community which engenders one with both rights and duties. According to feminist theories of Carol Pateman and Susan Moller Okin, the concept carries patriarchal values, because, on the one hand, it presupposes that all individuals should be equal and independent, while, on the other hand, it disregards how domestic work is part of the political reality (Leydet 2017). They argue that domestic work maintains the conditions of existence of the public sphere, and if citizenship omits to account for this reality, it renders relationships among people instrumental (ibid.). On the contrary, feminist theorists propose that citizens are interdependent (Daly 2011; Knijn and Kremer 1997), and that the public-private distinction between the sphere of domesticity and publicity is socially constructed (Pateman 1988). From this perspective, social policies concerning family life are politically consequential. They are a mechanism through which care work or the private sphere can become visible and (socially or economically) valued. They can create a citizenship ideal that is closer to the feminist notion and thus, more inclusive for women. Fortunately, in the historical development of family policies, there has been a move away or at least a weakening of the most exclusive form of family support.

Male breadwinner family models were a central ideal behind state policies in capitalist production that maintained the distinction between the feminine private sphere and the masculine public sphere. As it is known, it regarded the family unit as being composed of a

men sole earner and his dependents. Because it relied on the "family wage" enough for men to support the whole family, it also incentivized women to perform all the domestic work. Thus, women were indirectly compensated for care work, however, their opportunities to equally participate in the political sphere were hampered as they had neither economic independence nor access to the political sphere (Lewis 1992). This model lost its feasibility after women entered the labor force in mass, both because wages decreased and people's attitudes towards family life and such a distinct separation of gender roles have changed.

With the disappearance of the family wage, less gendered family policy models could replace the male breadwinner model, eliciting debates over the redistribution of care work. For instance, many feared that a new welfare paradigm was emerging that lacked a good resolution for who would perform care work and how it would be valued. This model was called the "the adult-worker model" (LEWIS 2001; Lewis and Giullari 2005), the initiative behind it was to rely on two-earner households that can afford commodified childcare that will be delivered by the market. Lewis and Giullari (2005) argued that this policy ideal cannot contribute to gender equality, because its approach to care is merely instrumental to women's employment, and thus it disregards how much value care contributes to society (Lewis and Giullari 2005, 87). They argue that women would only have a real choice and equal citizenship if caring was valued equally to work. Additionally, Daly (2011) argued that this model would result in maintaining the status quo in the division of care work (Daly 2011). Such indeterminacies in the changed policy environment elicited a debate among feminist scholars over how social policies should address care to best attain the goals of gender equality. Many women wanted access to paid work and a policy system that helped in its achievement (Orloff 1993), whereas others, as mentioned, emphasized the centrality of care work. These two important lines of argumentations are crucial to understand different perspectives on family policy systems, but will be only presented later, in section 1.6.

This debate developed further as - despite fears - states did not withdraw from the sphere of care provision. Most OECD countries are expanding their family policies (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015; Daly 2011), and care services – especially childcare services – are diversifying. Informal care is also not eradicated but reaffirmed in diverse manners (Sigrid Leitner 2003). Furthermore, it was even questioned whether male breadwinner models have truly disappeared given that the accessibility and affordability of care services is still underdeveloped in most countries (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014; Ciccia and Verloo 2012). It gives way to optimism that many "strong male breadwinner" countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany have expanded childcare services and introduced flexibility into their family policies, and thus, moved towards a more gender inclusive social policymaking. These countries have also changed a lot in terms of women's inclusion into the work force (Lewis et al. 2008). As mentioned, scarcity of care is a recognized social problem in developed countries, therefore, family policies are dynamically changing to mitigate newfound needs.

In certain cases, welfare systems are developing in the direction of reinforcing women's caregiving role. For instance, familialization has been distinguished as a new direction of policymaking in some Eastern European countries (Hašková and Saxonberg 2015; Szelewa 2012; 2017). Policies under this typology are supporting the caregiving function of the family. This direction might have evolved because the adult-worker model was less feasible originally. In many non-Western countries, labor markets fared worse in accommodating flexibility (for instance, in Turkey and Eastern Europe), there is less part-time work (Razzu 2017), which is an important employment type of women in the West. In terms of work-life balance, many countries in the region continued down the path of their pre-socialist and socialist developments (Javornik 2014; Rat and Szikra 2018), and the comprehensive reforms to accommodate women's employment were delayed compared to Western Europe. Although there is notable variation inside the region, and some policy systems are way more generous or even egalitarian

than others (Szikra and Győry 2014; Javornik 2014; É. Fodor and Glass 2018); there are some unique and region-specific policy types, such as long and generous maternal leaves (which is a familializing policy instrument, according to Leitner (Sigrid Leitner 2003)).

What makes familialization troubling is that in contrast to the more gender egalitarian Nordic countries, this region lacked strong women's movements, because they were assimilated into the institutions of the party (Wolchik 2015). Thus, although many social rights for women here predated those in Western Europe, they were not the consequences of women's activism, therefore, their contribution to their inclusion is more uncertain. There is a fear that without a strong social base, top-down policymaking will change directions. This is specifically troubling as many of these policies serve demographic goals because the region is affected by mass emigration and a declining fertility rate. Historical examples show that although women can take advantage of the political opportunity in pronatalist desires, which makes their position more valuable for the nation-state, their actions result only in limited success (King 1998). But as this process is still ongoing there can be no way to know that contemporary women's movements cannot be successful. The many factors at play make these significant ongoing changes underdetermined. What makes this process particularly salient to the literature on family policy and women's political participation is that it also raises the question whether women's access to the political sphere merely through their roles of caregivers has a better impact on participation than the lack of recognition for care work.

In conclusion, as feminist theorists argued, the social location of care is a crucial aspect of women's citizenship, and thus, family policies can be central mechanisms of women's political participation. After the male breadwinner model had weakened family policies in developed countries diverged, resulting in large cross-country variations. It was not the case that the state withdrew from dealing with caring functions. Among their family policies, some compensate and strengthen care work, others aim to strengthen women's connection to the labor

market. Due to the diversification of family policies, it can be proposed that different effects are present on women's political participation based on their positioning of care work.

As the male breadwinner model weakened research on the classification of developed welfare regimes became more crucial. In many cases, it has been shown that there is no clear mapping of classical welfare typology types to family policy systems (Sigrid Leitner 2003); therefore, it seems that family policy types are a relatively autonomous policy sphere. The proliferation of classificatory literature (Ciccia 2017; Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014; Sigrid Leitner 2003; Szikra and Szelewa 2010; Korpi 2000) show that, especially on the semi-periphery of the world economy, family policy changes are quite dynamic. This can make research harder, as problems with reproducibility issues needs to be corrected for, though, at the same time, this also contributes to a more vibrant research literature. In reviewing this research literature, it is important to know that normative considerations are frequently included in classificatory papers as well: family policies are changing, variations among them lead to renegotiations of the ideal policy environment for gender equality. The two research goals of uncovering underlying types and evaluating their impact are also fairly connected. Therefore, in the following section, the major differences between the normative engagements will be addressed first.

2.3. Different standpoints on the ideal family policy systems

The main normative questions in comparative family policy research concern which dimension of women's inequality should be addressed first, and what policies have the most positive outcomes for the biggest number of women. This is because family policies have various ramifications, which exert disparate effects on family life, the labor market and care work. Additionally, women cannot be analyzed as homogenous group, because inequality is increasing *among* them, and thus, empirical measures cannot tell the whole picture. Researchers usually prioritize success in one area over another without being able to resolve which

dimension of inequality is more important. Thus, there is a wide-ranging theoretical debate between feminist social theorists of disparate standpoints, which will be introduced in this section.

This section will also introduce a more pragmatic framework, to overcome the central debate of how to achieve gender equality by social policies. It is proposed that this framework can distinguish between progressive and acquiescent policies. A noteworthy gap is also recognized in the literature of comparative family policies. Few research takes the effect on political participation as an indicator for how a policy contributes to gender equality. Consequently, it is argued that measures for political participation should be part of welfare research.

Disagreements of which family policies should be pursued, boil down to two theoretical positions. These positions concern whether women should rely on their historically determined categories as 'women' or aim to overcome it in the struggle for equality. In the literature, *difference feminists* are used to refer to those who propagate the former, while *sameness feminists*, the latter.

Difference feminists take the emphasis on being women as a central means to attain gender justice (McAfee and Howard 2018). For instance, Kathleen B. Jones, a proponent of this view believes that the private qualities of women, such as care, emotions, and intimacy should be integrated into the public sphere, so that the democratic community can transform and take on the positive characteristics that all women historically share (Jones 1990). There is a utopic vision behind this position, according to which inclusive citizenship could only be attained if there was a profound cultural revolution in society. Against the background of this ideal, certain policies are judged to be more effective to achieve this state. For instance, policies that address equality in caregiving inside families are supported (Lewis and Giullari 2005), particularly, those policies that specifically address gender roles.

Supporters of the difference approach may be more inclined to see the merit in family policies that reaffirm women's caregiving role, if they compensate them enough to be equally respected in society. They would argue that (even with constraints) compensations for care are steps toward the recognition and legitimization of care work (Daly 2002), which also changes gender roles in that the subordination of caring is challenged. The problem with this view, however, is that in the short run, it fails to discern whether certain policies that compensate for care are contributing to women's integration or their oppression by maintaining the status quo. Compensating and mainstreaming care in social policies surely help women's equality in policy environments where there were no caring provisions before. But there are environments, where gendered caretaking and women's compensation for care work has a long history; thus, in these cases, one cannot be certain that such policies contribute to gender equality.

Sameness feminists argue that the road to gender equality is to discourage any public belief (or its institutional sedimentation) about the group characteristics of women. Thus, on the long run, an inclusive citizenship would be where caring is no longer associated with women's identity. They believe that solving issues where women face specific hardships (such as pregnancy as an incapacitating state) should be expressed by broadening the extant social rights (like disability pensions) instead of targeting women as a group (Capps 1996). Thus, many of its proponents support family policies that do not differentiate between parents, and focus on encouraging women's employment (similarly to the adult-worker family model). This view is equally utopic in the sense that it disregards the empirical fact of women performing most care work in households, which stands true regardless of whether social policies aim to overcome gender differences or not. If policies do not compensate for care, or even recognize care as something connected to women's identity (even if this connection is not a necessary but a contingent one), women will continue to deal with disadvantages in most areas of their life.

Both positions evaluate social policies from the perspective of how they contribute to gender equality in the long run. They would ideally overcome equality by erasing gender differences or promoting them in the sense that differences do not result in subordination. However, the normative foundations for an ideal family policy should contain tools for assessing whether policies are beneficial in the short or medium term. That is why Nancy Fraser's theory of justice is a valuable framework to overcome the difference-sameness debate. She argues that marginalized groups need social policies which provide for both recognition and redistribution to overcome social inequality (Fraser 1995). However, in both cases, policies are only helpful as longs as they are transformative in that redistribution results in changing economic power and recognition results in blurring group boundaries (i.e., changes in or even disappearance of gender roles). If social policies only compensate for the inequalities of social groups, their effects – even if temporarily positive for certain groups – maintain the status quo, thus, they are affirmative policies.

Distinguishing between affirmative and transformative policies is a step to resolve disagreements over which family policy systems are contributing to women's inclusion. For instance, Fraser proposes that liberal welfare policies cause group differentiation (i.e., gender), because of their residual character that does not actively transform extant power structures (Fraser 1995). However, some wonder whether market-oriented family policies are more advantageous as they allow for higher wages and better occupational levels for women than more women-friendly welfare states (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). But as these policies are not changing how women are perceived as a marginalized social group, they do not contribute to reforming gender roles, rather they merely allow for a minority of women to have access to authoritative positions. Consequently, they affirm the status quo, even though some women benefit from them. Swift and significant changes in policymaking can also fail to be transformative if the context is not accommodating

women's inclusion enough. For instance, Kılıç argues that Turkish women fared worse overall, when in the low gender equality environment, policies based on their special status were revoked (Kılıç 2008); thus a 'gender-neutralizing' (thus, progressive) policy turned out to be affirmative. It may have been because these policies failed to increase women's economic power.

Contrary to policies that reaffirm the status quo, transformative policies are successful in changing both economic power and gender relations. Examples for transformative policymaking and gender egalitarian outcomes usually note Scandinavian social policies (Sainsbury 2001; Leira 2008). The most successful and extensive social policies in the region are the comprehensive care facilities established and maintained by the state (Leira 2008). Although care facilities, maternity leaves and many gender egalitarian policies were the result (and not engine) of deep societal changes and women's activism (Sainsbury 2001; Borchorst and Siim 2002), they continue to reaffirm positive changes in including women into both the political sphere, and the labor market. Because social rights are universal and not family entitlements or employment-related, women are not made dependent on either family relations or employment. Universal entitlement and the widely accessible services also contribute to transforming the economic subordination of women, because their possible disadvantages on the labor market are corrected for.

Although it is known that the gender policy systems in Scandinavia cooccur with high political participation of women, there is a notable gap in comparative social policy literature about the effect of social policies on political participation (specially to measure gender equality outcomes). At the same time, the only way to assess whether, for instance, familializing social policies are beneficial for overcoming women's inequality is through analyzing their political activity. Measuring the effects of familialist policies on employment to understand gender (in)equality equates women's emancipation with the "sameness" ideal, which the affected

women may not endorse. Consequently, studying women's political participation as a research goal should have primacy over other indicators for gender equality. This can help in assessing policies that reaffirm caregiving as well. Whether a democratic community affirms the qualities of womanhood can only be positively known if women are visibly active in it. Thus, it can be endorsed, relying also on case studies on Scandinavian women, that welfare institutions that encourage participation of the recipients are most conducive to gender equality (Siim 1994). In making distinctions based on the difference between affirmative and transformative policies: the former can be conceptualized as hampering women's political participation, whereas the latter increase their activity.

However, there is one feasible argument against accepting political participation as an indicator for transformative policies. It is a feasible concern that even if women participate, they will partake in lower-stake decision-making in the NGO sector or volunteering, and thus, a segregated public sphere will persist. Einhorn expressed that the more women engage in civil society a social problem arises, which she calls the 'civil society gap' or 'trap' (Einhorn 2000). She argues that this type of participation is non-remunerative and politically insignificant, and thus, women's inclusion in it does not empower them. Rather, it means that they are taking on a new role of social reproduction but in the public sphere (ibid.).

There is merit to this criticism, as many women are in fact more socially oriented and prefer non-confrontational forms of political participation (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Dodson 2015). However, there is no insurmountable problem with a gendered political sphere if it is pluralistic (Dietz 1987; Sarvasy and Siim 1994). Even though research shows higher *gendered* activism in countries with low gender equality, it also shows that the overall political participation of women is still higher in more equal circumstances (Dodson 2015). Therefore, there is no conflict between conceptualizing political participation as the measure of transformative policies and the way political participation can become gendered. If scientific

research measures women's political participation on activities which are *both subversive and powerful*, and as such, have the potential of reforming the politic sphere (i.e., formal channels of participation, elite-challenging and confrontational social actions, as protests, petitions, and boycotts), gender differences in participation should not pose a problem for analyzing gender equality.

In conclusion, differentiating between affirmative and transformative policies is a useful first approximation for assessing the effect of family policy systems. Transformative family policies should address how care work is distributed, reform the gender roles associated with it, and help women in attaining economic power. Whereas affirmative policies are merely compensating for gender inequalities, and do not transform the social and economic relations that subsist them. Especially as there is clear direction in some countries to compensate women for their caregiving role, it is a salient topic to understand whether such policies are affirmative or transformative. It was argued that transformative policies need to be assessed by taking women's political participation as an outcome, because it is a more unbiased measure for equality. We should be interested in welfare states in terms of their contribution to women's political activity as well, not only on their impacts on fertility, employment, and wellbeing. Unfortunately, at the moment, there is still not enough research on this area, although there are few notable exceptions (Roth and Saunders 2019; and to a degree Quaranta 2014; Shore 2020). This research will contribute to filling this gap in the literature of comparative social policy systems.

Chapter 3 – Empirical analysis

3.1. Data

As the aim of this paper is to assess women's political participation considering different family policy systems, it is more feasible to use individualized data on political participation than country-level measures of women's legislative representation. The latter can be criticized because it takes an elite-centered measure, and it leaves it unanswered whether women politicians are contributing to more participation, activity, and inclusion for women in mass (Alexander, Bolzendahl, and Jalalzai 2018). Analyzing individualized data on the propensity to engage with political issues is more "democratic", it addresses the public and values small actions of political participation, and thus it is also more tailored to the activities of marginalized groups. Additionally, this approach allows for disaggregating women's political activity based on socioeconomic background, religiosity and other individual factors, which is important as family policies have distinct implications based on differences in class (Crompton 2006). Lastly, the number of countries available for the categorization of family policies is too small to warrant the reliability of most statistical methods.

There are huge differences among women in political participation, thus, using individual data creates a large variation on the personal level that should be controlled for. This problem creates a lot of opportunities in attaining a more nuanced picture of family policies' consequences. Welfare states can influence women's political activity through spending and the distribution of care work; however, they are also structuring mechanisms of political resources. As it will be elaborated later, family policies can reinforce certain identities or complement individual socio-economic assets, thus their effects implications are different for certain groups among women. Thus, it is beneficial to disaggregate women to understand the mediating effect of family policies. This also allows for considering the household composition of women as an important factor in the research. As it was argued, the distribution of care work

is a major mechanism through which family policies can influence women's political participation, but women are also embedded into families with different practices of the division of labor. One good indicator for the latter is household composition. Thus, the analysis will address the mediating effect of family policies on individual resources, meaning both macro- and micro-level effects are considered. Because this research builds on the theory that the distribution of care work is essential to understand women's political citizenship and their political participation, the analysis will only include women who are embedded in households[1].

The 'Citizenship' wave of the International Social Survey Panel (conducted in 2014) will be used to carry out the research. It consists of 32 countries,[2] among which non-OECD countries (6) were eliminated due to lack of comparable data on family policies. This data is ideal to compare both conceptions of citizenship between countries, and how contextual factors determine (mitigate) individual women's political participation. The sample size was reduced to only include women who have partners (N = 11296).[3]

3.2. Fraser's family model types

Nancy Fraser's typology of post-industrial family types is used to categorize the diversified family policy systems of developed countries. Her typology is widely used in cross-national comparisons (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014; Ciccia and Verloo 2012; Haas and Hartel 2010). Following her theory of justice, it takes both recognition and redistribution into consideration, and as such, the possible consequences of these models on leisure time, equality of respect, etc. are included in her analysis. Her more detailed analysis is in contrast to other conceptualization that center around one concept, such as (de)familialization (Sigrid Leitner 2003; S. Leitner and Lessenich 2007), which has been rightly criticized for its indeterminacy

[1] The care work of single women may be inconsequential.
[2] In the integrated, original file.
[3] Unfortunately, there was no available data of women's partnership status for women from Great Britain, thus that country had to be dropped.

concerning gender relations (Saxonberg 2013). Additionally, Fraser's typology – maybe due to its theoretical nature – does not rely on Western policy traditions as indicators like the differentiation between traditional-family models and dual-earner/dual-carer models (Korpi 2000; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013). Unfortunately, this categorization type does not work for Eastern European countries, because it differentiates based whether children under three-years-old have access to kindergartens; in this region, most kindergartens are fully accessible and widely used after children turn three. Thus, the conceptualization of Fraser is a better choice to analyze OECD countries.

Fraser proposes that *two ideal-typical family models* have been conceived to solve the problems of post-industrial families (Fraser 1994). Both, she argues, are constructed to prioritize one issue over another and are transformative in their aim. The *'universal breadwinner model'* is the social-democratic welfare response that emphasizes women's employment and formalizes care work through state institutions. She adds that such countries would also actively promote women's inclusion to employment, through overcoming stereotypes in the workplace, and gender wage gaps (ibid.). The ideal behind this model is that the state contributes to equalizing employment opportunities for women in the economy and unburdening their care load. Another approach is the *'caregiver parity'* model that aims to compensate women in their caring and childbearing tasks to the degree that neither is their economic security endangered while they are caring, nor is this work considered less socially valuable. She adds that employment policies of the caregiver parity model should also make transitions between (for instance, between work and caring) life stages for women easier (ibid.). This solution can be conceived as a reformed or neo-conservative approach to family policy.

Some research in typology includes the 'universal caregiver' model that she introduces (and endorses) as an ideal family policy type (Ciccia and Verloo 2012). This model is characterized by equality in care work as well, meaning, it will "make women's current life

pattern the norm" (Fraser 1994, 611). Contrary to scholars who operationalize this model, I do not believe it has an empirical feasibility, because even in the most gender equal countries, it is not the case that care work or women's role have more significance than paid work and/or men's role. Thus, this research will only include categorizations to the above-mentioned models.

Developed countries are likely to be classifiable to either of these models, but it should be left open whether they are still closer to the male breadwinner model. Both family model have some connections to normative ideals of OECD welfare states. Developed countries either historically, or/and contemporarily support families, and aim to converge to OECD and EU directives that incentivize gender equality policies. Still, it can happen that countries are not converging to either family policy type or provisions are almost non-existent. In that case, their system characteristics are closer to the male breadwinner model, because there are no steps towards changing the status quo.

3.3. Categorizing OECD countries into distinct family models

There is a debate over the use of deductive versus inductive approach to categorizing family models. A big problem with inductive methods is that they are sensitive to case selection, so even if there is some theoretical rationale in narrowing the scope of analysis to OECD or EU countries, the outcomes may be biased because of the specificities of the included countries (Ebbinghaus 2012). Additionally, if cases are too different, the fact that each case is equally contributing to model building means the outcomes based on this categorization will not be generalizable.

Many research leans to deductive methods, more specifically, the use of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to establish the welfare systems of countries (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014; Ciccia and Verloo 2012). Importantly, these researchers use a theory-motivated QCA following Kvist which does not aim to establish causal

relationships (Kvist 2007).[4] Such a configurational approach has many benefits over a purely inductive method: cases do not bias categorization, and if the research question concerns normative the commitments of family policies (as it does in this case), convergence can be meaningfully tested on the mutual constellation of many policies.

Based on the above, this research will rely on a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis to categorize the sample countries into Fraser's ideal-typical family models. Only expenditure data is measured to overcome the 'dependent variable problem' in welfare regime analysis (Saxonberg 2013). This problem relates to most analysts using outcomes, for instance, the percentage of children in formal education, to establish the policy structure or welfare regime in a country, which might not be the effect of policies but of cultural norms, employment relations, or preferences. Additionally, expenditures may represent the direction of family policy investment better than outcomes.

3.3.1. Calibrating dimensions

Partly relying on the calibration of (Ciccia 2017), three indicators will be used for determining membership of OECD countries[5] in Fraser's family policy systems: compensation of the parental leave (C), sharing parental leaves/introducing "daddy leaves" that are reserved for fathers (S), and investment in childcare (E).[6] (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014) and (Ciccia and Verloo 2012) disaggregate childcare services and parental leave policy types, however, I believe the overall results of those categorization make interpretations difficult on how to assess the general policy direction, especially in connection to gender equality.

[4] Using QCA is also frequently used for causal studies in comparative welfare state research.
[5] As mentioned, welfare state research is exposed to problems of which countries are selected. Understanding the critique of (Ebbinghaus 2012), this research takes all OECD countries under investigation.
[6] All data was obtained from the OECD Family Database and OECD Stat. Because the ISSP was conducted in 2014, all datapoints are from that year. I do not take responsibility for issues of adequacy in the data.

Based on Fraser's arguments, family model types would have the following values on these dimensions:

Table 1: Social policy dimensions of Fraser's family policy model types

	Compensation during parental leaves	**Sharing parental leave**	**Investment in childcare**
Caregiving parity model	C	s or S	e
Universal breadwinner model	c or C	S	E
Male breadwinner model	*c*	*s*	*e*

The usual notational method of set theory is used, where non-membership is indicated by a lowercase letter, and membership is indicated by an uppercase letter.

Whereas the caregiver parity model compensates for care through the higher replacement rate of parental leaves; the primary aim of the universal breadwinner model is to invest in childcare and share care work. Caregiver parity countries have compensation as a necessary condition, whereas universal breadwinner countries have both investment in childcare and sharing parental duties. And the male breadwinner model is included as a residual category.

The dimension of sharing parental duties is important to distinguish between the universal breadwinner model and the 'adult-worker model'. Universal breadwinner models are transformative social policies because they aim to transform gender relations by overcoming differences between genders, including those in the labor market and parenting. Whereas, for adult-worker models, even if there are employment-enabling policies, there are no attempts to encourage gender equality on the labor market (Lewis and Giullari 2005, 82). If countries only invest in childcare institutions, it is likely that they prioritize women's employment without introducing additional policies to even the playing field for them. For instance, Hook and Paek found that investing in childcare only influences lower-class and single women's employment

who are joining the workforce because of necessity (Hook and Paek 2020). And thus, it is not likely that these types of policies are contributing to the subversion of gender roles, and remain

Membership of compensating for parental leaves was calculated by taking the full rate equivalent of parental leaves in weeks and introducing a cutoff point. It is argued that the ideal length of parental leaves is around one year (between 1.2 and 1.9 years) (Misra, Budig, and Boeckmann 2011), because this way, women's employment prospects do not suffer. If women receive at least 50% of their wage until the lower threshold of this period, that gives the cut-off point of 31.2 weeks full rate equivalent of a parental leave. Countries, which were over that threshold were members of this group, as they compensated women relatively well.

Sharing parental leaves was measured by the weeks reserved for fathers. These policies are relatively underdeveloped everywhere. Recent EU directives proposed reserving ten working days, that is, two weeks for paternity leaves (CONSIL, EP 2019). OECD countries have the average period of eight weeks, but importantly few countries' measures are biasing this estimate upwards (Japan and South Korea have 52 weeks reserved for paternity leaves). Thus, a cut-off point was introduced to indicate whether the country is a better than average provider of paternity leaves, determined as the length of paternity leaves going over 3 weeks.

Lastly, the investment in childcare facilities was measured on the percentage GDP public expenditure for early education and childcare facilities. Here, the cut-off point was introduced to be over the average OECD spending which is 0.7%.

3.3.2. Findings of OECD members' categorizations

The truth table for the set relations and the categorizations of OECD countries is present in Table 7 in the Appendix. Surprisingly, there is no empty set among the configurations, which indicates that these dimensions capture the logical property space well.

South Korea, Iceland, France, and Belgium compose the ideal-typical 'universal breadwinner' model. Both France and Belgium are argued to have institutional arrangements that both reward caregiving and help the employment of women, therefore childcare and employment supporting policies are well-developed (Misra, Budig, and Moller 2007; Misra, Budig, and Boeckmann 2011). Although their family policies do not have high levels of compensation, they encourage that families share care work. Iceland is also frequently mentioned as having both generous family policies, as well as supportive policies for women's employment (Eydal and Ólafsson 2008). There is another cluster of countries whose members also share the necessary conditions of universal breadwinner models, but these countries are also compensating care work more by having generous parental leaves (Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Sweden). As expected, this group contains Scandinavian countries, except for Denmark, as well as Luxembourg and Lithuania. The latter has been categorized as having a more gender egalitarian family model among former state-socialist countries (Javornik 2014).

Countries in the 'caregiver parity model' category are more diverse in that they are composed of three separate groups; though, the cases do not diverge from expectations. Many among them are either conservative welfare states or former state-socialist countries. Eastern European countries, and among them those that have more developed family policy arrangements (Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008)) compose one cluster. These countries not only compensate for women's care work, but they also invest in childcare, which is why they are sometimes, especially Hungary and Estonia are differentiated from other Eastern European countries. Others would argue Slovenia should belong here (Javornik 2014). Another cluster is composed of conservative welfare regimes (Austria, Japan, and Germany): these countries compensated for caregiving and are incentivizing sharing caregiving, but they did not invest in childcare facilities. Although Germany may be the most

developed in terms of socializing care work (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015); all countries in this cluster have a history with familialism and prioritizing home care. Lastly, there is a cluster of countries that only compensate for women's care work, but do not invest in other family policies (Czechia, Slovak Republic, Poland, Slovenia). All its members are former state-socialist countries, and many among them are those with less developed family policies (on Poland, Szikra and Szelewa 2010) and more familialism (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Although there are important differences between groups (an even within them), all these OECD countries prioritize compensation for caregiving over either childcare services or sharing care work.

Two hybrid groupings emerged, one of them only comprised the Netherlands and Portugal, as countries who only incentivize sharing care work. The two countries have somewhat different family policies. While Portugal has relatively low family allowances and frequently argued to belong to the Southern variation of familialism; the formerly strong male breadwinner model in the Netherlands is argued to be weakening (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015). Research notes that (in contrast to the Netherlands) Portugal has a historically high level of female labor force participation and the highest level of public service provision in its region (Tavora 2012). Although the countries share some similarities, this findings points to the drawback of crisp-set QCA that hybrid welfare systems are harder to categorize (Ciccia 2017). As these countries do not belong to either ideal-typical model, another category was constructed for these cases, called the *'modified male breadwinner'*. These countries can be argued to belong to a modified version of the male breadwinner model as caring services are still either underdeveloped in the case of Portugal (Tavora 2012) or have low accessibility in the case of the Netherlands (Pfau-Effinger 2014).

The other hybrid category is composed of Greece, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland, Canada, and Denmark; these are the countries that only invest in childcare services. Greece is

also part of the Southern familialist family policy cluster (Tavora 2012), while New Zealand, Switzerland and Canada are argued to have a liberal, or market-oriented family policy (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013). However, Denmark is usually treated together with Nordic countries as a more service-oriented but still women-friendly state (Borchorst and Siim 2002). Thus, its inclusion signals a small error in the categorization itself. Still, most of the OECD countries are in line with previous research, thus, this inconsistency does not warrant recalibration. As most of these countries are only investing in childcare policies, they also belong to the 'modified male breadwinner' category as there they show no direct engagements in changing the gendered structure of caring.

The last, residual category composes all the countries that do not invest in either policy dimension, thus these countries are closest to the 'male breadwinner ideal'. This groups have the most diverse and the most numerous population (Australia, Chile, Italy, Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Ireland). As expected, Southern familialist countries are included (Italy, Spain, and Turkey), as well as some liberal or market-oriented countries (United Kingdom, United States, and Ireland). Notably, countries in the British Isles are becoming more generous than, for instance, the United States (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2015), but deep restructuring of family policy is still lacking. Additionally, it is only a recent phenomenon that family policies, especially parental leaves are becoming more gender egalitarian in Latin America (Hawley and Carnes 2021). As the United States is one of the most renowned laggards in family policy, it is also understandably part of this category. Consequently, there is no reason to question the membership of any OECD countries included in this set.

Table 2: Final categorization of OECD countries into Fraser's family model types

Male breadwinner models	**Modified male breadwinner models**	**Caregiving parity models**	**Universal breadwinner models**
Australia, Chile, Italy, Ireland, Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey	Canada, Denmark, Greece, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland	Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia	Belgium, Iceland, Finland, France, Norway, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Sweden, South Korea

This categorization adds two valuable contributions to the extant literature on family policy classifications in developed countries. It is in agreement with (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014) and suggests that the male breadwinner model is still present in a significant number of OECD countries. Almost half of the analyzed countries belongs to either the male breadwinner or modified male breadwinner category. Additionally, it also suggests that from the perspective of care, the familialist policymaking in Southern European countries and the Eastern European countries plus Japan is very different; in the case of the latter group, there is a positive revaluation of care, and there are more policies to support women's caregiving activities. Whereas in Southern Europe, familialist policymaking results in leaving most of the caring function to the family without compensation, which, in essence is closer to the male breadwinner model. Thus, it is also mistaken to be overly alarmed by familialist policymaking and connecting it to fears of re-traditionalization in Eastern Europe (Glass and Kawachi 2001), as these types of policies are manifold and can have multiple consequences.

3.4. Analyzing attitudes to citizenship under the family models

The ISSP data allows for the analysis of women's attitudes on citizenship under different family models. As a first approximation to uncover the possible effects of family policy models,

the average attitudes towards good citizenship are examined[7] (presented at Table 8 in the Appendix). In terms of citizenship duties, such as paying taxes and obeying the law, there is no difference between the average attitudes of women (they equally believe that they are relatively important). There was also no difference between the conception of a good citizen as one who is active in political or social associations (they equally placed relatively low importance for that aspect of citizenship). Women in all types of countries also believed that global solidarity is a somewhat important aspect of good citizenship.

There were a few interesting and anticipated differences between attitudes towards citizenship duties (all of them presented in Table 3). Women in male breadwinner societies are more likely than others to subscribe to the liberal understanding of civic engagement as exercising control over the government (Leydet 2017). Women in both male breadwinner and modified male breadwinner countries are also more likely to find solidarity towards their fellow citizens more important. Although it is prima facie counterintuitive, it is probable that more women see helping others as their duty in the male breadwinner policy environments, because there is no social support (these systems put more responsibility on the individual, or in this specific case, women). Whereas women in more comprehensive policy environments can expect the government to overtake solidarity functions, and thus, less of them see helping the less privileged as their own personal duty. Additionally, it is an interesting result that women in caregiving parity countries find it less important as a citizen to boycott products or to understand other's opinions.

[7] The ISSP provides a scale ranging from 1 = „Not at all important" to 7 = „Very important" for measuring attitudes on citizenship.

Table 3: Differences of attitudes to citizenship duties among women in different family policy models

	Caregiver parity	**Male breadwinner**	**Modified male breadwinner**	**Universal breadwinner**
Good citizen: keep watch on actions of government	0	+1	0	0
Good citizen: understand other opinions	-1	0	0	0
Good citizen: choose products for political or environmental reasons	-1	0	0	0
Good citizen: help less privileged people in own country	0	+1	+1	0

There is more divergence between women's opinion on the importance of democratic rights (measures on these variables are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix). It is equally important for women in all types of countries that minorities are protected and that the government respects citizen's democratic rights. Although, it is important than on average, women in all countries placed a much lower importance to the duties of participation than the right.

Differences between the importance of democratic rights are represented in Table 4 below. It is not surprising that women in male breadwinner countries are less likely to find universal health care important, as universal healthcare is not in line with their policy environment. However, it is more unexpected that, similarly to women under universal breadwinner models, they were more likely to believe that citizens should have rights to an

adequate standard of living (this aspect of citizenship rights was taken to be very important on average, however, women in these two countries placed an even higher importance on it). Therefore, it might not be the case that women in male breadwinner countries are more averse to social rights, or they believe that governments should not interfere with social life. Still, it is a notable difference that the right to an adequate standard of living for all requires that the state interferes so that the bare minimum of subsistence is achieved, while universal health care right would be a universalistic right. Thus, it seems that women in male breadwinner countries might be more supportive of social rights in the form of social securities but not as universal rights. Additionally, it is also notable that women in male breadwinner countries are less supportive of regarding civil disobedience a citizenship right, which is also partly in line with a liberal conception of citizenship that is less participatory.

Importantly, however, there are no conclusive differences between the average attitude towards citizenship, especially concerning participation. It can be noted that while women were equally noncommittal to regard participation as a duty of citizens, they equally considered it more important that their rights to participation are protected. Additionally, there was a small variation concerning social rights and duties of solidarity between women in male breadwinner models and other family policy models. Based on this, there are small hints that women in male breadwinner model countries have a less participatory view of democracy, but any conclusions based on these differences would be indeterminate. At the same time, these findings only present attitudinal differences between group averages, that, on the one hand might cancel out important differences between social groups among women; while one the other hand, do not directly signal whether women's attitude translates to more participation in political activities.

Table 4: Differences of attitudes to citizenship rights among women in different family policy models

	Caregiver parity	**Male breadwinner**	**Modified male breadwinner**	**Universal breadwinner**
Rights in democracy: adequate standard of living for all	0	+1	0	+1
Rights in democracy: acts of civil disobedience	0	-1	0	0
Rights in democracy: health care be provided for everyone	0	-1	0	0

3.5. Building the empirical hypotheses of contextual interactions

Women are a heterogenous group, and their political activities are determined by many individual factors. Differences among women have been recognized in analyzing the effects of family policies on employment (Misra, Budig, and Moller 2007; Misra, Budig, and Boeckmann 2011; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Mandel and Semyonov 2006), and there is a nascent literature on political activity (limited findings appear on differences on the welfare state effect among the participation of single mothers (Shore 2020), and among anti-austerity protesters (Roth and Saunders 2019)). Thus, the overall effect of family policies can be deciphered by how they mitigate, weaken, or strengthen individual resources and factors of participation. In the following, empirical hypotheses will be built by taking the most salient individual factors of the political participation of women and addressing how they can be influenced by family models, based on the research literature detailed in the above.

Socioeconomic background is one of the major determinants of political participation. Civic activities require time and resources, and people with high socioeconomic status are more likely to be in possession of them. However, this background also measures an underlying propensity to have accumulated civic skills (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995); meaning people who have higher socioeconomic background will have high level occupations, better education, more income, and many of these characteristics had previously contributed to forming their civic skills. In the case of women, there can be measurement errors in equating civic skills and socioeconomic background. Because there are more structural barriers to their advancement in the workplace (in terms of occupational upgrading, wage increase), they could have relevant civic skills but insufficient proof of this in terms of socioeconomic position. Additionally, the positive effect of gaining communication and leadership experience during employment are also attenuated for women in contrast to men (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999). Thus, the pretense that high socioeconomic status translates to high political participation might be less exact when it comes to women.

Nevertheless, it has been established that being active in the labor force has a positive effect on women's participation (Welch 1977; Desposato and Norrander 2009). Occupational level and class can still change the effect. For instance, there are findings that show that women working in higher occupations may lack time to engage, even if they have the resources (Stadelmann-Steffen and Koller 2014). Additionally, it can be that for working class women, being employed is a necessity, thus, they may experience it as less liberating. However, as there is less research which concerns the political participation of working-class women specifically, there is no room to truly explore this question here. In terms of employment, it can be assumed that labor market activity has a significant impact on women's participation, however, income does not have a positive linear relationship with it. Consequently, due to the indeterminacy of income and occupational level, education may be a better variable to measure civic skills and

thus political participation. It can thus be presumed that highly educated women are more likely to be politically active.

Family policies that encourage gender equality on the labor market, help women gain respectable jobs, and invest in childcare facilities are more likely to attenuate differences based on socioeconomic status. Firstly, because employment becomes more attainable for all women, and not only highly educated women, attaining civic skills through employment will be possible for most women. Investment in childcare facilities alone increases the employment of lower-class women (Hook and Paek 2020). Secondly, with the increasing availability of state-managed facilities differences of time availability between women who can afford childcare and those who cannot also disappear. Hence, it is more likely that lower educated women who previously could not afford childcare will also have available time for political activity. Thus, universal breadwinner family models are likely to have mediating effects, when measured in interaction with education. Conversely, because male breadwinner models are not intervening with the structural inequalities outside of the family, it is likely that these types of welfare systems do not influence the socioeconomic background of women. Highly educated women may still be more politically active, but women with lower socioeconomic background will not. While the caregiving parity model might contribute to women's marginalization in the labor force (meaning, it can increase gender segregation cf. Fraser 1994), it is unlikely that it will have an effect on socioeconomic background, because it does not include policies to counter class differences between women. While it is more likely, that under caregiving parity models, inactive women are more involved in politics, because – ideally – such system contribute to the equal recognition and respect or care work.

Beyond availability of time and socioeconomic resources, social capital can play an important part in mobilization and political activity, and one that is specifically relevant for women. Indeed, social capital is a type of socioeconomic resource, and can serve (or

complement) the same function. Namely, it contributes to information gathering, material resources, and civic skills as well. However, in contrast to other socioeconomic indicators, women are not specifically disadvantaged in terms of social capital formation. Though, it is not the lack of connections that could delimit women's political engagement, rather the differences between *how* women form social capital versus men; and which is more conducive to political participation.

It has been noted that women have stronger ties, and many of the organizations around which their networks are built are connected to the church or voluntary associations (Muñoz-Goy 2013; Harell 2009). Churches are usually important platforms for (religious) women to cultivate civic skills, especially in place of employment. It is a contested problem, however, that given that women's social capital can be based on close ties and informality, the gap between forms of participation among women and men is widening – and thus, women are being excluded from formal politics, and relegated to 'lesser' forms of politics. Women's social capital networks are usually more communitarian and based around self-help. Although, gender segregated connection formation is a possibility in this case as well, social capital is still a very powerful engine of mobilization. Furthermore, their effect on self-esteem (Lowndes 2004), or norm-dissemination (Harell 2009) should not be underestimated; especially in countries where the formal institutions of gender equality are lacking. Therefore, the presence of social capital can increase political participation, the only question is whether different family policies mitigate its effect.

It is likely that those welfare systems, that are incentivizing caregiving in the private sphere also increase the possibility that informal networks are formed around women. This was the case during socialism in Hungary, where long parental leaves was the social policy infrastructure allowing for social networks of care to be formed around mothers (Szalai 2003). Later, these networks proved to provide for some social and economic power for the women

involved. Consequently, caregiver parity models are more likely to contribute to the positive effect of social capital for women; whereas policy systems that formalize care are likely to contribute to women's participation through institutions (Knijn and Kremer 1997), and thus, they probably ease the individual contribution of social capital, similarly to other socioeconomic factors. So far, based on the discussed interactions between socioeconomic resources and political activity, the following hypotheses can be proposed:

H1: The individual effect of socioeconomic background and social capital on women's political participation is attenuated in countries with universal breadwinner models.

H2: The positive individual effect of high socioeconomic background is reinforced by male breadwinner models.

H3: The negative individual effect of inactivity on the labor force is attenuated in caregiver parity models.

H4: The positive individual effect of social capital is reinforced by caregiver parity models.

Time is also a resource that is frequently more limited for women, as it is heavily dependent on the amount of unpaid, domestic work they usually perform. Many research proposes that contextual effects, such as mean gender ideology or welfare states mitigate household bargaining processes of the division of labor. Fuwa et al. found in their survey that domestic labor sharing is determined by both individual and contextual factors (welfare state systems and country gender equality measures), and the former are mediated by the latter (Fuwa 2004). For instance, the effect of full-time employment for women increases the chance of equally distributed domestic work in liberal welfare states, but not (or only slightly) in post-socialist ones, because in the latter case, there was already a more egalitarian division. In the

case of socio-democratic countries, no interactions with the individual resources (income, employment, and individual gender ideology) had a significant effect. The study also showed that low-income women in high gender equality environments[8] live in households with more egalitarian division of labor than high income women in low equality environments (ibid.). A more recent research proposed that high gender equality contexts have a "spillover" effect between couples: it increases the likelihood of an egalitarian division of labor even for those women who have less resources (Mandel and Lazarus 2021). Therefore, gender inclusive social policies and attitudes can increase an egalitarian sharing of unpaid work in all households. Similar finding was shown in analyzing men's propensity to do domestic work. They were less likely to perform domestic work in countries with parental leaves that reinforce gender roles, whereas the opposite was true in countries with paternity leaves reserved for fathers (Hook 2006). Evidently, social policy environments influence the division of housework, and thus, they also determine women's free time. Yet, it is noteworthy that in liberal policy environments, women's employment (as well as income) had a bigger effect on bargaining processes. This suggests that residual social policies may reinforce differences among women.

In contrast to working women, for primarily caregivers, available time does not determine political activity, rather it is connected to social networks and connections. Stay-at-home women have been found to be less politically active in the U.S. (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Andersen 1975), even though they have more time. However, there seems to be a difference in the activity of caregiver women between "normal times" and "extraordinary politics", meaning there are episodes when women can strategically use the caretaker identity as a politically salient frame. Historical precedents to caregiver's (or maternal) activism involve such cases (Skocpol 1992; King 2001). Many of these mobilizations were based on circles of women's networks that became active to fight for social rights. However, even when measured

[8] In this case, measured by the UNDP Gender Empowerment Measure.

on cross-national data, it is a stable finding that on average, domesticity decreases women's participation in formal politics (Quaranta and Dotti Sani 2018). Still, it is an important research question whether this effect can be mediated by more inclusive family policies, especially those, that emphasize and compensate for caregiving.

Welfare systems have a visible effect on sharing domestic work and thus, they influence the time availability of (working) women. Women's available leisure time might not be directly consequential for political participation (for an older but important research on this, cf. (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 1997)), but perceived equality and mutual respect inside household does (ibid.). Based on the above, universal breadwinner models should contribute to more equality between couples (women are equally likely to attain more egalitarian arrangements even if they have less resources), and thus less differences in participation between diverse household compositions. Whereas male breadwinner models have more complicated ramifications. Since there are no interventions into family life, it can happen – as suggested by research – that employment has a bigger impact on sharing domestic work, and that it is also easier to come by as women might not face statistical discrimination present in more familialistic countries (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). But it is important to note, that without accessible and free childcare institutions or the socialization of care costs, this positive effect is limited to more affluent households who can afford private childcare. Therefore, one cannot know the effects of male breadwinner countries on women living in dual-earner household. In the case of caregiver parity family models, domestic or caregiving women might be more politically active, firstly, because they receive the most resources among these types of family policies. Secondly, because this model contributes to increasing the social value of caregiving by making it an alternative to employment. Thus, although there is no specific literature on this topic, it can be extrapolated that the participation of dependent women is increased in these environments. To the contrary, as research showed, domestic women are more apathic on average, which can be

especially true of those women who live in male breadwinner family policy environments. In the latter case, they do not receive resources and due to the stark separate of public and private sphere, they cannot use their caregiving identities as a politically salient frame for mobilization.

H5: Countries having universal breadwinner family models are most likely to attenuate differences between women's political participation based on household composition.

H6: The negative individual effect of living in a male-earner household is reinforced by male breadwinner policy systems.

Ideological commitments can also determine participations. It is frequently assumed that left-wing women participate more, and that left-wing political parties increase the formal participation of women (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Women's ideological shift to the left (from more conservative views) has been one of the most prevalent process of political cleavage restructuration (Edlund and Pande 2002). At the same, there is a renaissance of interest in why and how conservative women participate. Many research has shown that conservative women – especially in conservative countries - engage in political activism more when they feel they cannot perform the duties ascribed to them or they feel that their traditional roles are under attack (OSAWA 2015; Ghodsee 2020) . Thus, the motivation behind left-wing and conservative women for political participation is quite different. While left-wing women are more likely to participate than conservative women on average, conservative women are more likely to participate when they suffer losses in social rights connected to being a mother, a caregiver and so on. Because women are less likely to possess these types of rights in male breadwinner and modified male breadwinner countries, it is more likely that they are more active in these environments (as a protest).

H7: Conservative women are more likely to participate in modified male breadwinner and male breadwinner countries.

In conclusion, all major indicators of individual political participation, such as individual resources (both socio-economic and social capital), household composition and ideology are mitigated by family policies. Because women are embedded into family relations that constrain their resources and time availability, they are also more exposed to those factors, i.e., social policy constellations, that determine them. Based on the above introduced hypotheses, an ancillary assumption is that the net positive effect of universal breadwinner models is the largest because it can attenuate differences between women with different socio-economic background (and social capital) and between different household compositions. Whereas caregiver parity models can have oscillating consequences: they either impede women's political activity by the lack of policies to help them gain employment (which was seen to be an activating factor); or they increase the power of their social capital and help in their mobilization through politicizing the framework of caregiving. Lastly, for male breadwinner countries, it can happen that working women or highly educated women participate more, but this family policy probably contributes to increasing inequalities between women. Consequently, even in the medium and possibly in the long run, it is unlikely that women can unite and solve problems of gender inequality under these systems.

3.6. Methodology of contextual interactions

To test the contextual and mediating effects of family policies on individual characteristics, a multilevel logistic regression was used. It was chosen because the data is hierarchical, and because it allows for testing the effects of cross-level interactions that are specifically feasible for understanding how welfare systems influence individual resources. As mentioned, the sample was reduced to include only women participants who are not single (N = 11296); whereas the OECD countries retained provided for the contextual factors (N = 25).

3.6.1. Dependent variable

The dependent variable for political participation was measured as a binary variable coded '1' if the respondent ever signed a petition. It is known that women are more likely to participate in politics when the opportunity costs are lower and when it is in a form of "private" activism, as in signing petitions (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). At the same time, petitioning is both a protest and contesting activity (Contamin 2013), and an informal way of participation, which makes it unlikely that it measures the type of participation that expresses only the support for certain redistributive policies. Therefore, it can be a relatively unbiased measure for political participation.

3.6.2. Independent variables

The Level 1 individual variables consist of the usual predictors of political participation discussed above. These include socio-economic background (education and household income), household composition (dual-earner, male-earner, single-earner, or welfare dependent), employment related factor (working status), age, religiosity, and social capital. Religiosity was used as an indicator of conservativism instead of the left-right scale because it is argued that the latter's meaning in ambiguous to many people and it also varies greatly across countries (Freeden, Sargent, and Stears 2013). Social capital is a binary variable that is categorized as having a positive outcome if the respondent replied to the question of "How often do you discuss politics with friends?" with "Often" or "Sometimes" (knowing that social capital should have a broader meaning, this question was used as it is particularly salient for political participation).

The percentage of missing variables is presented in Table 10 in the Appendix. All missing data on these variables were imputed by Expectation-Maximization[9]. Because household income is a country-specific measure in the ISSP, it had to be coalesced into one

[9] Data preparation was performed mainly in SPSS, while the analysis was carried out in R.

variable, and unfortunately it also had a high level of non-response (NA = 29,6%). Missing data in this case was imputed by the country median.

The Level 2 country contextual effects are based on the previous categorization of family models in OECD countries. The twenty-five countries were recoded into male breadwinner, modified male breadwinner, caregiver parity and universal breadwinner models. Some researchers argue for larger group numbers in multilevel regressions (Ali et al. 2019); however, this sample is standard for social scientific research. Three controls for between country variance were introduced. CEDAW ratification signals whether the country aims to follow the basic goal of gender equality. GDP per capita can be used as a proxy for human development. Whereas a binary variable for post-socialist countries was introduced since they can have idiosyncratic features both in relation to gender equality and political participation. In prioritizing model parsimony, other country-level controls were not included. Additionally, many important country-level indicators on gender would be endogenous to the calculated model. Multilevel regressions are also a feasible method to control for unknown contextual factors that can bias results (Snijders and Bosker 1999). For instance, many countries in the male breadwinner models were more affluent, and thus the average income and average social capital were used to control large differences.

3.7. Findings

The empty (random intercept) model suggested that 25% of the chances of signing a petition are explained by within-country variance (ICC = 0.254) (Sommet and Morselli 2017), which can be considered as a very high proportion.

Individual level variables were tested at the beginning of model building following (Snijders and Bosker 1999), they include Model 1 and Model 2 presented in Table 5. Not

unexpectedly, many individual variables are not independent from each other.[10] Although multicollinearity was an issue, it did not affect the main variables of interest, which were the contextual variables and their cross-level interactions. As it will be seen as well, the coefficients of the individual variables did not vary, therefore, this problem was disregarded. Still, household composition and employment status are tested separately because their measures partially overlap (even though they have different meanings).

Findings show that following expectations, higher socio-economic status and social capital has a positive significant effect on political participation; however, age does not have any effect. Household composition also proved to be significant, which suggests that – in line with many normative arguments – the allocation of paid work inside households may matter for women's political participation. Religion, understood to be a measure of conservativism also proved to be significant. It seems that conservative women are less likely to be politically active on average. The intraclass correlation coefficient decreased only slightly in this model compared to the empty random intercept model, meaning that individual independent variables explained away only 4-5% of the between-group variance between signing the petition, and not signing it. Thus, it can be assumed that differences between countries are robust.

The effect of household composition was the most interesting finding, it showed that women in single-earner and dual-earner couples are (almost) equally likely to be active politically. After computing the odds ratios, the fixed effects show that being a single-earner in contrast to being in a non-working household means that the odds of political activity increase to 1.6 to 1 (being in a dual-earner household is a bit above this ratio); whereas for women in male breadwinner households, it merely amounted to 1.3. This finding can corroborate the

[10] Crosstabulations showed that for women, the composition of households is not independent from having a social network for political discussions or the level of education someone attained. While the latter two are also dependent of one another (Chi-square tests were all significant).

belief that household composition has an effect on political participation but that available leisure time is less influential for women's political participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), women in both single-earner and dual-earner couples were equally likely to participate even though some suggest that being a single-earner can significantly reduce one's available time. This is because unemployed men do not do housework (van der Lippe, Treas, and Norbutas 2018).

All other effects were expected. The biggest effect is shown by having a higher education, the odds of being politically active was 2.7 to 1 among those with higher education (in contrast to those with low education). Marginal effects of the first model are presented in the Appendix in Figure 2.

The same individual level model was executed with employment status instead of household composition (Model 2). It showed that in fact, stay-at-home women are even less likely to be politically active than those, who depend on welfare, showing that on average, it is not merely the lack of employment but domesticity that decreases political activity. This is also in line with the previously mentioned literature that argues against an increased activity of stay-at-home women (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). This model also proved to be a better fit for the data.

Table 5: Multilevel analysis of women' s political participation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	-0.921*** (0.200)	-0.728 *** (0.194)	-1.208***(0.277)	-1.060***(0.251)	-1.868 ***(0.692)
Age	-0.036 (0.029)	-0.079 *** (0.027)	-0.036 (0.028)	-0.081 *** (0.027)	-0.081*** (0.027)
Medium education	0.591*** (0.059)	0.593 *** (0.059)	0.590 ***(0.059)	0.589*** (0.058)	0.590*** (0.058)
High education *ref. low education*	1.001*** (0.063)	1.004 *** (0.064)	1.008*** (0.063)	1.000*** (0.063)	1.001***(0.063)
Household income (log)	0.099*** (0.027)	0.116*** (0.027)	0.094 ***(0.027)	0.109*** (0.027)	0.110***(0.027)
Female breadwinner household	0.473*** (0.049)		0.446 ***(0.095)		
Dual-earner household	0.451*** (0.070)		0.450 ***(0.070)		
Male-breadwinner household *ref. no earner*	0.244*** (0.078)		0.245*** (0.078)		
Domestic		-0.186 ** (0.080)		-0.187** (0.080)	-0.185** (0.080)
In education		0.537 *** (0.165)		0.528 *** (0.165)	0.530 ***(0.164)
In employment *ref. on welfare*		0.237 *** (0.063)		0.234*** (0.062)	0.234***(0.063)
Religious	-0.136 ** (0.056)	-0.132 ** (0.056)	-0.136 ***(0.056)	-0.132**(0.056)	-0.130** (0.056)

Continued

Note: logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Continued

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Social capital	0.692 *** (0.045)	0.689 *** (0.046)	0.690 (0.046)	0.687*** (0.045)	0.686*** (0.045)
Country level					
CEDAW ratification			-0.370 (0.398)		
Post-socialist country			-0.058 (0.414)		
GDP per capita (log)			0.627 (0.154)	0.314 (0.301)	0.447** (0.174)
Caregiver parity			0.391 (0.364)	0.418 (0.331)	0.427 (0.328)
Male breadwinner			0.649 (0.396)	0.640* (0.377)	0.715* (0.378)
Universal breadwinner *ref. modified male breadwinner*			0.491 (0.336)	0.458 (0.329)	0.478 (0.319)
Average household income				0.330 (0.318)	
Average social capital					1.654 (1.340)
AIC	12521.4	12519.2	12512.3	12514.1	12507.5
ICC	0.203	0.194	0.096	0.089	0.089

In the next step, country-level variables were introduced to test the main effects of different family policy constellations (Model 3, 4, 5 in Table 5). In the first such model (Model 3) neither the theoretically relevant nor most of the control variables were significant, except for per capita GDP. However, adding the country level indicators improved the model fit, and reduced the variance between countries by 10%, suggesting that they explained some of the between-group variance. As it can happen that countries with certain family policies are also more developed and, for instance, the higher average income in one country debilitates the main effects of family policies. Thus, using the advantages of multilevel modelling (Snijders and Bosker 1999), the country averages of household income and social capital were introduced to control for the individual level effects pertaining to their groupings. Non-significant control variables were dropped for these models. Both adding the average income of households and the average social capital as a control made the difference between male breadwinner countries and modified male breadwinner countries significant at the $p < .1$ level (Model 4 and 5). The odds of women to be politically active were two to one in contrast to the latter. Interestingly, these findings point to an increased political activity of women in countries with male breadwinner family policies (in contrast to modified male breadwinner countries), which is more prevalent if one controls for how informal resources are contributing to political activity. These findings are not conclusive as they stop short of suggesting a main effect of family policies, but still suggest that the null hypothesis could be rejected. They also suggest that overall women in male breadwinner countries might be more politically active. Importantly, both controls improved the model fit.

Cross-level interactions were tested based on the hypotheses constructed above. They did not improve the model fit, but they were added to the model due to their theoretical significance (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Similarly to the individual-level models, family composition and employment status were tested separately. When the interaction of family

policies and employment status was introduced (Model 5 in Table 6), the main effects of family policies (male breadwinner and universal breadwinner model) became significant, implying that women, and more specifically women who are dependent on welfare (as this was the reference category) are more likely to participate in countries with male breadwinner models and universal breadwinner models. The odds ratios show that women in the former are almost two times more likely to participate, whereas women in the latter amount to two and a half times more than those in modified male breadwinner countries.

The main effects are complicated by some interaction effects in the case of male breadwinner countries. There is a strong negative impact for stay-at-home women, suggesting that even though women on welfare fare better in male breadwinner households, there is no positive effect for women who are managing households, making their level of activity lower than those in other family policy environments (based on the predicted means of participation – representation of the marginal effects of the interaction can be found in the Appendix in Figure 3). Consequently, there is limited support for the sixth hypothesis: stay-at-home women in countries with male breadwinner models are less likely to be politically active. Additionally, there is a small negative effect of employment that is significant at the $p < .1$ level, which indicates that contrary to the hypothesis that employment has a better impact in male breadwinner countries, its effects are more attenuated there. This finding is in line with the above mentioned research conducted in Switzerland (a country with a strong history of male breadwinner family policies) which suggested that long working hours for employed women can negatively affect their participation (Stadelmann-Steffen and Koller 2014). The predicted means for the interactions show that employed women are more active in both universal breadwinner models and caregiver parity models. Although most interactions were not significant, this finding lays the foundation to question whether employed women fare better in male breadwinner models. The same results also show that the highest percentage of active

domestic women were in caregiver parity countries, but since the models did not have significant interactions, the third hypothesis also needed to be rejected.

Table 6: Cross-level interaction effects of employment status and socioeconomic background

	Model 5 (s.e.)	**Model 7 (s.e.)**
Intercept	-1.273*** (0.263)	-1.166*** (0.263)
Medium education	0.619*** (0.058)	0.605*** (0.119)
High education	1.041*** (0.063)	1.111*** (0.123)
ref. low education		
Household income (log)	0.110*** (0.027)	0.110*** (0.0273)
Domestic women	0.104 (0.156)	-0.103 (0.076)
In education	1.009*** (0.270)	0.682*** (0.157)
Employed	0.458*** (0.108)	0.325*** (0.055)
ref. on welfare		
Religious	-0.154*** (0.056)	-0.153*** (0.056)
Social capital	0.673*** (0.045)	0.670*** (0.045)
Country level		
GDP per capita (log)	0.593*** (0.122)	0.593 (0.122)
Caregiver parity	0.488 (0.351)	0.447 (0.349)
Male breadwinner	0.923** (0.405)	0.564 (0.400)
Universal breadwinner	0.683** (0.339)	0.575* (0.340)
ref. modified male breadwinner		
Domestic women x Caregiver parity	-0.122 (0.211)	
Domestic women x Male breadwinner	-0.519** (0.227)	
Domestic women x Universal breadwinner	-0.277 (0.216)	
In education x Caregiver parity	-0.582 (0.462)	
In education x Male breadwinner	-0.792 (0.572)	
In education x Universal breadwinner	-0.363 (0.367)	
Employed x caregiver parity	-0.155 (0.149)	
Employed x male breadwinner	-0.247* (0.197)	
Employed x universal breadwinner	-0.792 (0.572)	

continued

continued

	Model 5	Model 7
High education x Caregiver parity		-0.118 (0.180)
High education x Male breadwinner		0.113 (0.188)
High education x Universal breadwinner		-0.152 (0.156)
Medium education x Caregiver parity		-0.106 (0.159)
Medium education x Male breadwinner		0.120 (0.183)
Medium education x Universal breadwinner		0.072 (0.156)
AIC	12523.0	12519.4
ICC	0.0934	0.094

*Note: logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

An important effect was found when interactions were being tested between household composition and family policy models (Model 6, represented in Table 11 in the Appendix). The small positive effect of being in a male-earner households in contrast to being in welfare is strengthened in universal breadwinner countries. This suggests that stay-at-home women with a working husband are not less politically active than women in dual-earner households. Predicted means of the model suggest that the overall participation rate of dependent women is higher for universal breadwinner countries. Thus, there is some evidence of the fifth hypothesis, meaning that a more institutionalized welfare provision of care can contribute to more equality among women in different households. This finding may also suggest that family policies that approximate universal breadwinner models are more accommodative for the political activity of dependent women; contrary to the expectations that caregiver parity models would perform better in this aspect.

Figure 1: Plot of interaction effects between household composition and family policy models



Interactions between socio-economic background and family policies, although theoretically feasible did not prove to be significant (Model 7 in Table 6). However, they made the contribution of universal breadwinner models significant at the p <.1 level. This means that for the reference category for education, that is, low educated women, being in a universal breadwinner policy environment is more beneficial for political activity. Thus, there is some evidence that the first hypothesis is true in that universal breadwinner models attenuate the effects of individual resources. Probing the interactions between social capital and family policy (Model 8 in Table 11 in the Appendix) model proved to have very similar results. In that case, both the negative, attenuating effect of having social capital *given* that one is in a universal breadwinner environment was present, as well as the positive main effect of universal breadwinner models for those who do not have social capital. Thus, it seems likely that the effect of social capital on political participation can be smaller when there are established institutions of care for women. To the contrary, there was no interaction between caregiver

parity family policies and social capital. Thus, there is no evidence for the reinforcing effect of monetizing or informalizing care and strengthening social capital. There was also no positive effect for women with high socioeconomic background in male breadwinner models, therefore, the second hypothesis also had to be rejected. Lastly, the data does not support any interaction between the effects of conservative views and male breadwinner family policy environments. They only accentuated the main positive effect of male breadwinner family policies on non-religious women. This finding means that the seventh hypothesis needs to be rejected, because in fact, the opposite turned out to be true: non-conservative women participate more in male breadwinner policy environments.

In conclusion, by introducing both control variables on the country level and cross-level interactions, the contextual effects of universal breadwinner models and male breadwinner models became more exact. Both systems significantly improved women's political participation. However, findings in these empirical tests show how important it is to disaggregate groups of women to understand family policies' influence, because the effects of these two policy systems are very diverse, when different social groups among women are considered.

It was found that universal breadwinner models were more accommodative for both low educated and/or welfare-dependent women, thus, they attenuated differences between socio-economic background for political participation. The above findings suggest that women's dependence on their own resources for political participation is weakened in universal breadwinner models, which can either be because their policies contribute to a more egalitarian way of family life, or because women can depend on welfare institutions rather than the family. What is decipherable from this data is that there are wide-ranging consequences of universal breadwinner models that impact the importance of social capital, education, and household composition as well. From this aspect, this research does not contribute in terms of the direction

and magnitude of the effect of family policies, as many noted that more gender egalitarian welfare systems have a positive impact on women's participation overall (Borchorst and Siim 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). Instead, the added value of this research pertains to the reach of policymaking, because 'universal breadwinner' country cluster was much more populous than Scandinavian countries that are usually used to signal women-friendliness. Many reformed conservative countries, such as France and Belgium were also part of the cluster, as well as South Korea. Therefore, one can extrapolate that more gender inclusive policies on the area to share parental leave and extensive policies that aim to level the playing field for women in employment have positive consequences for their political participation.

Findings were more surprising and more complex in relation to male breadwinner models. Overall, women in this cluster showed a higher level of political participation. However, there was also proof that in comparison to other family policies, both employed and stay-at-home women were less active. In especially the case of domestic women, the data is in line with the argumentation of this research and many other papers (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Pateman 1988). However, it is more surprising that employed women did not fare well under this policy, even if some literature suggests that this is the case (Stadelmann-Steffen and Koller 2014). Based on the limited findings of this model, there is big difference between the activity of women in single-earner and dual-earner household under this model (Figure 1 above) – so, it would be understandable that the main negative effect comes from the lack of social policies for single working women. At the same time, it is interesting and puzzling that women on welfare had significantly increased their activity under the male breadwinner model. It is important to note that without social policy provisions, welfare dependent women are the most connected to public institutions in male breadwinner countries. It was also shown that it was non-conservative, likely left-wing women who were participating. So, these findings agree with how public institutions can elicit the political participation of the effected group (Soss

1999), but importantly there is no spillover effect to other groups, because of the lack of comprehensive social policy systems. Overall, one cannot conclude that male breadwinner family policy environments contribute to the political activity of women on average, but that there is likely a relationship there that needs to be analyzed further.

Based on the analysis, there is less to be said about modified male breadwinner and caregiver parity countries. No tests proved to be significant for the latter, and thus, no determinate conclusions can be drawn for its effects on political participation. Predicted means of the interaction between status show that this model would fare better in attenuating differences between the employment status of women, but because the standard errors are too large, this cannot be certain. Lastly, women in the male breadwinner model were the least active overall, and the inequalities between them were the biggest here (based on the predicted means). Although this is a predicted result, it is still troubling as many of the countries that make up this category are well developed and have long-standing democracies.

3.8. Limitations and prospects for future research

Some of the limitations of these findings stem from the difficulty in categorizing family policy systems. One likely explanation of why the caregiver parity cluster was inconclusive is that these countries are in themselves more diverse in terms of family policy (Javornik 2014; Rat and Szikra 2018; É. Fodor and Glass 2018), than this classification suggests. Additionally, as it was seen during the qualitative comparative analysis, many countries did not converge to more gender inclusive models, thus, an additional category had to be established for a variation of a male breadwinner family policy system. However, as the data has shown, these two clusters had very different characteristics of women's political participation: on average women in male breadwinner models were very active, whereas women in modified male breadwinner models were the least active. Both problems corroborate that crisp-set qualitative analysis has trouble dealing with hybrid family policy systems (Ciccia 2017), which is problematic, since, as argued,

family policy systems are very dynamically changing. In this research, there was no space to perform a more detailed and fine-grained analysis for categorization; however, it is advised that more exhaustive classificatory or comparative social policy literature also includes measures for political participation, so that new findings can overcome these limitations.

Another constraint in the research comes from measuring political participation only by petition signing. High level of political activity was argued to signal that a social policy is transformative towards women's rights because it is successful in mobilizing them. However, even though petitioning signals women's mobilization, there are some disadvantages to it. Contrary to their original functions, in a few cases, petitions can also be instances of conventional form of participation (it can be initiated by the state or governing parties, cf. (Leston-Bandeira 2019)). Thus, for further research, it would be more feasible to measure many types of political participation together, so that the effect on women's mobilization is more reliable.

Chapter 4 - Conclusion

In conclusion, this research supports that the political activity of women is determined not only by their individual resources, but also contextual factors, both on the level of household composition and, to a degree, family policy systems. Family policy systems can contribute to a more gender equal political sphere or reinforce bad practices by directly influencing many factors that contribute to women's mobilization. Unfortunately, many OECD countries still do not invest enough in more gender inclusive policies, they do not influence how care giving is arranged inside families, consequently, they also treat the family as a private matter. This research corroborates findings that the male breadwinner model did not disappear (Ciccia and Verloo 2012; Ciccia and Bleijenbergh 2014). It complements this finding by arguing that male breadwinner environments can increase the political participation of women on welfare, however, they have negative consequences for domestic women. Thus, on the global level, there is a preserved continuation of the public-private dichotomy that has implications for how women's political participation is lagging in comparison to other indicators for gender equality.

Even among those countries that invest in some directions of reforming family policy, the effects of these policies on political participation can vary. Those that invest in not only employment easing policies for women (including childcare), but also sharing care work, fare the best in solving political inequalities between women, and increasing women's political participation. Thus, this research is in line with previous literature on how more inclusive gender regimes contribute to dismantling barriers in political participation (Roth and Saunders 2019), especially for lower-class women (Shore 2020). These policies have attenuating effects on most inequalities that exist between women; thus, they can contribute to women gratifying their collective needs by their increased political power. In this research, there were no conclusive findings on the policies that informalize and monetize care, and it is suggested that the countries committed to such policies need to be analyzed separately.

Appendix

Table 7: Truth table of the qualitative comparative analysis and cases

	Compensation	Investment in childcare	Sharing	Cases
1	1	1	1	Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Sweden
2	1	0	1	Austria, Germany, Japan
3	1	1	0	Estonia, Hungary, Latvia
4	1	0	0	Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland, Slovenia
5	0	0	1	Netherlands, Portugal
6	0	1	0	Greece, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland, Canada, Denmark
7	0	1	1	South Korea, Iceland, France, Belgium
8	0	0	0	Australia, Chile, Italy, Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Ireland

Table 8: All values on the attitudes to citizenship duties in different family policy models

	Caregiver parity	**Male breadwinner**	**Modified male breadwinner**	**Universal breadwinner**
Good citizen: always vote in elections	6	6	6	6
Good citizen: never try to evade taxes	6	6	6	6
Good citizen: always obey laws	6	6	6	6
Good citizen: keep watch on actions of government	5	6	5	5
Good citizen: active in social or political associations	4	4	4	4
Good citizen: understand other opinions	5	6	6	6
Good citizen: choose products for political or environmental reasons	4	5	5	5
Good citizen: help less privileged people in own country	5	6	6	5
Good citizen: help less privileged people in the rest of world	5	5	5	5

Table 9: All values on the attitudes to citizenship rights in democracy in different family policy models

	Caregiver parity	Male breadwinner	Modified male breadwinner	Universal breadwinner
Rights in democracy: adequate standard of living for all	6	7	6	7
Rights in democracy: government authorities respect minorities	6	6	6	6
Rights in democracy: people participate in public decision-making	6	6	6	6
Rights in democracy: acts of civil disobedience	5	4	5	5
Rights in democracy: respect of democratic rights by government	6	6	6	6
Rights in democracy: people convicted of serious crimes lose citizen rights	5	5	5	5
Rights in democracy: long-term residents have right to vote at national elections	4	4	4	4
Rights in democracy: right for citizens NOT to vote	5	5	5	5
Rights in democracy: health care be provided for everyone	7	6	7	7

Table 10: Missing data of the individual indicators for the logistic regression

	Missing data
Household composition	NA = 8,6 %
Age	NA = 0,4 %
Education (highest degree obtained)	NA = 0,7 %
Religiosity	NA = 2,2 %
Status	NA = 1 %
Social capital	NA = 1,5 %

Figure 2: Marginal effects of individual factors on political participation



Figure 3: Interaction of the effects of family policy models and employment status



Table 11: Multilevel logistic regression on the interaction between family policy models and household composition, social capital, and religion

	Model 6 (s.e.)	Model 8 (s.e.)	Model 9 (s.e.)
Intercept	-0.841*** (0.266)	-1.334*** (0.262)	-1.095*** (0.273)
Medium education		0.593*** (0.059)	0.617*** (0.058)
High education		1.018*** (0.063)	1.040*** (0.062)
ref. low education			
Household income (log)	0.130*** (0.029)	0.093*** (0.027)	0.110*** (0.027)
Domestic women			-0.108 (0.076)
In education			0.680*** (0.157)
Employed			0.326*** (0.054)
ref. on welfare			
Female breadwinner household	0.692*** (0.179)	0.477*** (0.092)	
Dual-earner household	0.713*** (0.111)	0.499*** (0.059)	
Male-breadwinner household	0.242* (0.136)	0.293***(0.070)	
ref. no-earner			
Religious	-0.220*** (0.055)	-0.144** (0.056)	-0.213 (0.131)
Social capital	0.799*** (0.044)	0.733 (0.089)	0.670*** (0.045)
GDP per capita (log)	0.614*** (0.125)	0.617 (0.125)	0.590*** (0.122)
Caregiver parity	0.313 (0.358)	0.370 (0.345)	0.240 (0.358)
Male breadwinner	0.590 (0.412)	0.545 (0.397)	0.687* (0.416)
Universal breadwinner	0.360 (0.347)	0.679** (0.335)	0.498 (0.350)
ref. modified male breadwinner			
Female breadwinner household x caregiver parity	0.036 (0.262)		
Female breadwinner household x male breadwinner	-0.307 (0.273)		
Female breadwinner household x universal breadwinner	-0.076 (0.235)		
Dual-earner household x caregiver parity	-0.135 (0.151)		
Dual-earner household x male breadwinner	0.066 (0.178)		

continued

continued

	Model 6 (s.e.)	Model 8 (s.e.)	Model 9 (s.e.)
Dual-earner household x universal breadwinner	0.234 (0.145)		
Male-breadwinner household x caregiver parity	0.174 (0.186)		
Male-breadwinner household x male breadwinner	-0.017 (0.208)		
Male-breadwinner household x universal breadwinner	0.501*** (0.185)		
Social capital x caregiver parity		0.012 (0.125)	
Social capital x male breadwinner		0.220 (0.147)	
Social capital x universal breadwinner		-0.248** (0.117)	
Religion x caregiver parity			0.165 (0.163)
Religion x male breadwinner			-0.069 (0.193)
Religion x universal breadwinner			0.056 (0.162)
AIC	12514.2	12502.0	12517.2
ICC	0.101	0.098	0.094

*Note: logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

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