The Transmission of Ideology across Generations: A Comparative Analysis

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person unless otherwise noted.

Elena Cristina Mitrea
November 2020

To my family

Abstract

Although ideology has generated a considerable amount of research, many of the questions surrounding the role of the family in the development of the ideological position of the youth remain unanswered. Moreover, due to a paucity of suitable data, even less is known about the mechanisms of the family transmission of ideology across different cultural and political contexts. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by examining levels of intergenerational ideological congruence in Europe. It employs new multigenerational data on family socialization and political attitudes from nine EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and two associated countries (Switzerland and Turkey). The diversity of the countries included in the study in terms of their socioeconomic, cultural and political configuration makes the data a fertile ground for exploring the cross-national dimension of the family transmission of ideology. Taking advantage of this cultural and socioeconomic variation, this dissertation assesses the strength of the status inheritance and social learning models across different national contexts. The empirical chapters explore the conditions under which parents successfully exert an influence over the political attitudes of their children and the factors that facilitate intergenerational congruence in ideological position. Some of the key results of this dissertation are that young adults who perceive their parents as warm and autonomy supporting during adolescence have a higher likelihood of sharing their ideological position, especially in countries high in individualism. On the other hand, the likelihood of intergenerational congruence decreases for upwardly mobile young adults, who are more likely to lean rightward of their parents' position, especially in countries with high levels of youth unemployment and social spending. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to existing research in the fields of political socialization and political attitudes by enlarging the scope of previous studies and analyzing socialization mechanisms in scarcely researched European countries, different from established democracies in institutional and cultural configuration.

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Introduction

Ideology pervades daily lives in myriad ways, some more obvious than others, from the daily news to the choice of friends and even family. Given its consequences for individuals and political systems, interest in people's ideological position lies at the core of political science research. More recent developments, such as the deepening of ideologically inspired conflict and polarization (Abramowitz 2010; Shor and McCarty 2011; Brandt et al. 2014; Hare and Poole 2014; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 2015), and the surge in populism in the US, as well as in Europe (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Mudde 2017) warrants renewed efforts to elucidate the antecedents of attachments to liberal or conservative ideas.

Such an endeavor naturally takes its starting point in the family. Families remain the socializing environment where children first enter into contact with the political world, learning from their parents about parties, elections and government. Moreover, through observation, interaction, conversation and play, children take early political cues from their parents and are exposed to their views, attitudes, and behaviors. This results in levels of attitudinal and behavioral congruence between parents and their offspring which are far higher than what would be expected by chance, as decades of research in political socialization has shown (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings and Langton 1969; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009).

Levels of congruence between the outcomes of parents and children, be they in the form of educational level or, of interest here, political ideology, can be fairly easily ascertained. However, the driving factors behind such similarities, or the conditions that facilitate them, which Schönpflug (2001) terms "transmission belts," are far from clarified. Disentangling the mechanisms behind observed parent-child similarity can lead to significant insights. For example, the children of high socioeconomic status parents could be more interested in politics as a result of the social milieu their share with their parents or the latter's

particular preferences and parenting practices, likely different from those of low socioeconomic status parents. Hence, as social scientists and policy practitioners debated the declining influence of families and the generational conflicts such a process might bring about (Hooghe 2004), more attention was devoted to advancing the understanding of the mechanisms behind parent-child attitudinal congruence.

These transmission belts which facilitate parent-child ideological congruence, such as the transmission of social status from parent to child or parenting behavior, have been insufficiently explored especially across different cultural and political environments. Comparative studies of political socialization are still rare, since most of the literature is focused on single country analyses, especially in established democracies, looking particularly at the American or British context (Sapiro 2004). The key barrier to quality comparative research is the lack of cross-country multi-generational longitudinal data, due to the complexities and high costs entailed by such a data collection exercise. Available data, such as the Socio-Economic Panel in Germany (GSOEP) (Goebel et al. 2019), Belgian Parent-Child Socialization Study (Hooghe et al. 2013), Children of the Great Depression (Elder 1974), the Student-Parent Socialization Study (Jennings 1965) or the Longitudinal Study of Generations (Silverstein and Bengtson 2019) meets only two of the three criteria, namely it is multi-generational and longitudinal, yet mono-contextual. Moreover, it offers information about families in established democracies, mainly the United States and Western Europe, while significantly less is known about countries in Central and especially Eastern Europe.

This dissertation contributes towards filling this gap by taking a comparative approach and inquiring into cross-country differences in socialization mechanisms and pathways of parent-child ideological congruence. It employs data collected through a cross-national multigenerational (children and parents) survey conducted in 11 European countries, within the framework of an international research project focused on the formation of young adults' attitudes in the cultural context of the family.[1] By including information on left-right self-placement, as well as a number of other variables of theoretical interest, a data collection exercise of such scope provides an excellent opportunity for inquiring into a host of aspects surrounding the formation of political orientations in the context of the family.

[1] http://cupesse.eu/

The diversity of the countries included in the study in terms of their socioeconomic, cultural and political characteristics also makes them a fertile ground for exploring the cross-national dimension of the family transmission of ideology. Taking advantage of this cultural and socioeconomic variation, this dissertation aims to assess the strength of the status inheritance and social learning models of parental influence across different national contexts. It thereby contributes to existing research on political socialization and political attitudes by enlarging the scope of previous studies and analyzing socialization mechanisms in scarcely researched European countries, different in institutional and cultural configuration from established democracies.

1. Research aims and questions

This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of the role parents play in the development of their children's political attitudes across different national contexts. It examines three inter-related sets of questions regarding the transmission of political attitudes, specifically ideological position, across generations. These address the conditions under which parents successfully exert an influence over the ideological leaning of their children or the factors that facilitate intergenerational ideological congruence.

Parenting behavior

The first set of questions concerns the role of parenting practices and parent-child interaction quality in fostering intergenerational ideological congruence. Research in the area of value transmission indicates that the behaviors parents engage in towards their children and the quality of the home environment fosters parent-child value and habit congruence (Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Mohr and DiMaggio 1995; Grusec, Goodnow, and Kuczynski 2000; Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff 2011). This is due to the fact that children growing up in a warm and supportive home environment are more likely to correctly perceive (Whitbeck and Gecas 1988; Knafo and Schwartz 2003) and internalize their parents' values (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Knafo and Schwartz 2003).

When it comes to political attitudes, foundational studies of ideology such as those of Adorno et al. (1950) and Lane (1959) have highlighted the importance of parental upbringing, especially by the father figure, in the development of children's ideological leaning. More recently, Murray and Mulvaney (2012) and

Rico and Jennings (2016) reported that warm parent-child relationships and certain parenting style choices increase intergenerational ideological similarity. Nevertheless, the bulk of the political socialization research in this area is dated (McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Jennings and Langton 1969) and restricted to single country analyses, mainly of the United States or other Western countries (Tedin 1974; Fraley et al. 2012; Murray and Mulvaney 2012). This undermines the generalizability of these findings, since parenting behaviors and their effects on child outcomes were shown to vary across cultural contexts (Dwairy et al. 2003; Trommsdorff 2009; Olivari et al. 2015; Smetana 2017).

Authoritative parenting, which couples high levels of parental warmth with high levels of supervision or control, is the most popular and socially accepted parenting style in Western countries (Smetana 2017). This also appears to be the most conducive to parent-child value congruence. However, recent research has suggested that the effects of this parenting style might not travel equally well in other cultural contexts, which do not prize individualism as highly as the West (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Trommsdorff 2009; Sümer et al. 2019). These findings offer reasons to expect differences in the association of certain parenting behavior dimensions to parent-child ideological congruence between collectivistic and individualistic cultures.

Employing recent, cross-national European data, Chapter 2 addresses these gaps in the literature by analyzing how the quality of parenting behavior as perceived by children during the impressionable years relates to levels of intergenerational ideological congruence when children reach young adulthood. Based on previous research indicating a possible variation in the effects of parenting depending on parent and child gender (Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood 1995; McKinney and Renk 2008; Carlson and Knoester 2011), the chapter also pays attention to the gender composition of the dyads analyzed. Most importantly, this study inquires into the strength of this relationship across the countries studied depending on their level of individualism *vs* collectivism.

The chapter therefore addresses the following research questions: 1) how does the level of parent-child ideological congruence vary depending on the behaviors parents engage in towards their children? 2) is the association between parenting behavior and intergenerational ideological congruence conditioned by the gender composition of the parent-child dyads, and 3) does the strength of this association vary between collectivistic and individualistic cultures?

The challenge of intergenerational social mobility

The second set of questions addresses the relationship between intergenerational social mobility and parent-child ideological congruence. By sharing their parents' social class throughout their childhood, children undergo similar experiences and are exposed to the same social context, which can shape their attitudes and give rise to intergenerational similarities to their parents (Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). The transmission of social status from parent to child is therefore one of the main pathways of parental influence over their children's attitudes and behavior (Dalton 1982; Glass, Bengtson, and Chorn Dunham 1986; Bengtson, Biblarz, and Roberts 2002). In fact, most of the political socialization literature operates on the assumption that parents and children share the same social status, which serves to reinforce parents' influence over their children. However, to the extent that it is left unquestioned, this assumption may not reflect the reality of children's possible movement up or down the social ladder once they reach adulthood, especially in countries with high social mobility rates.

After reaching certain life-course milestones, such as completing education and leaving the parental home, young adults can share their parents' social class or move to a higher or lower one, depending on a number of factors. Among these are their aspirations, motivations, efforts, physical and mental ability, skills and qualifications. Western societies value upward mobility and are built on the expectation that, through hard work and personal responsibility, each generation will be better off in material terms than the one preceding it. However, as recent research has underlined, due to rising inequality and the diminishing returns of education (Lupton, Heath, and Salter 2009), young adults today are finding it harder to maintain the living standards of their parents and are at a higher risk of downward mobility (Urahn et al. 2012; Bukodi et al. 2015; Chetty et al. 2017). Moreover, they also have more pessimist expectations about the future and are more likely to expect downward mobility in the future (Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker 2015).

The experience, and even the expectation, of social mobility brings about a series of changes in people's daily lives and social connections which are consequential for their political attitudes and behaviors. *Socialization* theory holds that people are more likely to retain a greater similarity to the origin group in which they were born and socialized, due to the long-lasting effects of early formative experiences (Dalton 1980; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). In contrast, the *acculturation* or *resocialization* theory

suggests that mobile individuals gradually adjust their preferences and behaviors to align to those of the destination group, which can be higher or lower on the social class hierarchy, depending on the direction of mobility (Blau 1956; Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995; Piketty 1995; Daenekindt 2017). This is a result of associating and interacting with destination group members or giving in to group pressure. When there are significant differences in values and behaviors between social classes, the origin group can lose a part (or all) of its influence, as a consequence of the process of acculturation (Graaf and Ultee 1990).

Moreover, people's likelihood to retain or move away from their parents' ideological position is likely to vary across countries. Contextual social, political and economic factors, such as the level of youth unemployment, immigration rate or the extent of state social support, can have a bearing on people's ideological position. For instance, high unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996) and high immigration (Knigge 1998; Golder 2003) can move people rightward. The social and cultural context can therefore moderate the relationship between intergenerational social mobility and parent-child ideological congruence. However, the implications of moving up or down the social ladder for intergenerational congruence have not been closely scrutinized in a cross-national context so far.

Additionally, the strength of young adults' ties to their family can have a bearing on their likelihood of sliding away from the parents' position. People who have experienced or expect to be socially mobile, but who report strong ties to their parents are less likely to be exposed to the diverging influence of their destination group. The importance people assign to their family varies across cultural contexts, as Reher (1998) has shown. Weak-family systems, found in Central and Northern Europe, assign more importance to the individual, while in strong-family systems, found in Southern Europe, the family exerts a higher influence as socialization agent.

The questions that therefore arise are firstly, how do young adults' experience and expectations of intergenerational (upward or downward) mobility impact their level of ideological similarity with their parents? In other words, can parental influence over their children's ideological position resist the pressure of intergenerational mobility? Secondly, do the effects of intergenerational social mobility on parent-child ideological congruence vary across countries according to the level of youth unemployment, immigration rate and social spending? Thirdly, are socially mobile young adults who report stronger family ties more likely to retain a greater degree of ideological similarity to their parents?

Political discussion as mechanism of ideology transmission

The third set of questions delves deeper into the mechanisms of the family transmission of ideology, looking at parents' active socialization efforts through political discussion with their children. Political talk within the family offers children the possibility to expand their political knowledge, learn their parents' positions on political issues of the day and form and share their own opinions on these issues. This increases the accuracy of their perception of parental views, which contributes to higher levels of intergenerational similarity (Tedin 1980; Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Hooghe and Boonen 2015; Ojeda and Hatemi 2015; Oosterhoff and Metzger 2016).

Therefore, political discussion within the family not only facilitates value transmission, but can also potentially moderate the relationship between parenting behavior and parent-child value congruence. Specifically, political discussion can enhance the expected positive association of parental warmth and autonomy support to intergenerational congruence. Moreover, it can act as a possible break on the centrifugal effects of social mobility on intergenerational similarity. This expectation is derived from the social learning model, which holds that the family exerts a stronger influence over the political attitudes of individuals when parents make active and conscious efforts to transmit their attitudes and values to their children.

Furthermore, given the shortcomings associated to the use of left-right self-placement as a sole measure of ideological position, the chapter employs an additional multiple-item measure based on policy preferences. Although the left-right scale offers a widely recognized, succinct and internationally comparable indicator of ideology (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Sani and Sartori 1983), it is a sweeping measure which does not capture all of the nuances of people's ideological position (Jost 2006; Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; Feldman and Johnston 2014), especially in particular country contexts.

Chapter 4 therefore addresses the following questions: 1) does political discussion with parents mitigate the negative effects of parental behavior on parent-child ideological congruence or can it compensate for a less favorable family climate? 2) are socially mobile young adults who discuss politics with their parents more likely to share their ideological position? In other words, can parental political socialization put a break on the diverging effects of intergenerational mobility? and 3) are there any differences in the family transmission of left-right self-placement and ideological conservatism?

2. Structure of the dissertation

This dissertation is structured in four chapters, which explore different aspects of the family transmission of ideology. The *Introduction* presents the main aims, research questions, design, and data employed in this dissertation. The *Conclusion* offers a discussion of the results, an overview of the limitations associated with this study and avenues for future research.

Chapter 1 situates this dissertation in the political socialization field of research and outlines the theoretical background for the empirical chapters. It introduces the main concepts used throughout the dissertation, discussing their relevance, terminological uses and the important updates and revisions undertaken by previous studies. Secondly, it offers an overview of the political socialization literature and competing theories developed in socialization research, as well as relevant findings for the study of ideology transmission within the social context of the family.

Chapter 2 presents the results of a comparative analysis of perceived parenting behavior as a mechanism of parent-child ideology transmission inside families. The chapter begins with a discussion of the main approaches to the study of parenting behavior, arguing for the use of a dimensional approach, which disentangles parenting into three main dimensions (parental warmth, autonomy support and control). Compared to a typological approach, this allows for a more fine-grained analysis of the specific parenting components which facilitate parent-child ideological transmission. The chapter reviews next the state of art on parenting effects on child outcomes, especially political attitudes, arguing for the need to extend previous research in a cross-national context. The analysis explores the relationship between parenting behavior and intergenerational ideological congruence, taking advantage of the variation in the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in the countries studied. Results indicate that the inclusion of parenting behavior in the investigation of family transmission of ideology increases explanatory power and allows for a better prediction of parent-child ideological congruence.

Chapter 3 challenges a key assumption behind most previous research in political socialization, namely that parents transmit their socioeconomic status to their children. As the *status inheritance* theory posits, parents and their children have a higher likelihood of holding congruent political views by virtue of their shared socioeconomic status. However, the assumption of shared social

status does not hold for the young adults who move either up or down the social ladder compared to their parents. The experience of mobility raises interesting questions with regards to its effects on young adults' political attitudes and attitudinal congruence with their parents, which have not been previously closely investigated in a cross-national setting. Therefore, the chapter analyzes the relationship between intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, distinguishing between downward and upward mobility, and exploring this relationship across 11 European countries.

Chapter 4 contributes to the study of the family transmission of ideology in a two-fold manner. First, by connecting two strands of literature, on political socialization and intergenerational mobility respectively, this chapter offers a novel test of the social learning model in the context of intergenerational mobility. It thus investigates the association of intergenerational social mobility (both experienced and expected) to parent-child congruence in left-right self-placement and the extent to which social learning can mitigate any potential mobility effects. Secondly, the chapter aims to overcome the shortcomings of using left-right self-placement as a sole measure of ideological position by employing an additional measure in the form of the Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale.

3. Methodology and data

The analyses presented in Chapters 3 to 5 rely on recent two-generation survey data collected within the scope of a multi-disciplinary research project on intergenerational value transmission.[2] The survey was carried out early in 2016 (February-April) in 11 countries, 9 EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the UK) and 2 non-EU members (Switzerland and Turkey). The data was collected in two steps. In the first step, a probability sample of at least 1000 young adults (aged 18 to 35) was drawn in each country. The respondents of this survey were asked to provide the contact details of their mother or father figure. This could include not only biological parents, but also grandparents, step-parents or other people regarded as parental figures. The young adult respondents also offered demographic information about their parents, such as their level of education and employment status. Further details about the recruitment and selection procedures are detailed by Tosun et al. (2019).

[2] http://cupesse.eu/.

In the second step, one or both of the people indicated as parental figures were interviewed using a "parental" survey, which was an abridged version of the "youth" survey with identical or near-identical question wording. Although the goal was to reach a sample size of 500 youth-parent dyads, due to budget constraints, this could not be met in all the countries included in the survey (see Table 4.11 in the Appendix). The full data consists of observations for 20,008 young adults, of which 5620 include data for at least one of their parents.

A detailed description of the CUPESSE two-generation survey data is offered in Tosun et al. (2019). Due to country specific factors (e.g. diffusion of the internet or landline phones), the survey mode differed between countries in order to maximize response rates (Stoop et al. 2000, 1). Notwithstanding this inevitable drawback, questionnaires were still harmonized to the greatest extent possible. Most importantly, the similarity in questions across the youth and parental survey allow for comparisons across generations. The data comes with country-specific demographic weights according to gender, age, education, and NUTS2 region.

As this dissertation makes use of both young adult and parent data, analyses are restricted to full dyads. Table 4.11 shows the distribution of the respondents by generation and the gender of the parents and the young adults included in the sample. Most country samples reach the 500 dyad threshold, with the exception of Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK. The highest number of parents who took part in the study (and consequently the highest number of parent-child dyads) are found in Spain (854), while the lowest is in Switzerland (268). The number of mothers exceeds that of fathers in all countries with the exception of the UK, where there are nearly 3 times more fathers in the sample (337 to 115 mothers). In terms of gender composition, there are more same- than different-sex dyads. Specifically, the number of mother-daughter exceeds that of mother-son dyads in all the countries. Comparatively, in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, and Switzerland there are more father-daughter than father-son dyads. Although this was not the specific aim of the study, there are also a limited number of cases in which both parents took part in the survey. There are 133 such cases in Hungary, 123 in Denmark, 99 in the Czech Republic, and 44 in Switzerland. Since the sample size of such triads is very limited, the analyses are based on father-child dyads in these cases, since there are generally less fathers in the sample.

Chapter 1

The family transmission of ideology: state of the art

This chapter introduces the main concepts used throughout the dissertation, discussing their relevance, terminological uses and the important updates and revisions undertaken by previous studies. The literature review is organized in two main sections. The first presents the state of research on individual left-right orientations, while the second offers an overview of the main theories that have informed the study of political socialization, namely the direct transmission model and the social learning theory.

First, I define and discuss the development and use of the left-right dimension in the political realm, touching on aspects regarding its meaning, recognition, the extent and patterns of self-placement on the left-right scale, and its relevance at the individual level. Next, I present the three dimensions of the left-right scale (social, partisan and ideological) defined by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) and review the literature on the social determinants of left-right orientations.

The second part of the literature review presents the state of the art on political socialization inside the family. It discusses first the theoretical underpinnings of family socialization processes and offers next a summary of empirical studies on parent-child attitudinal similarities and the factors that influence the success of parental transmission, especially with regards to political attitudes.

1.1 The basics: ideology in mass publics

1.1.1 The left-right dimension: development and use

The political realm is suffused with the use of left-right vocabulary. This is used to describe the political leanings of a variety of political actors, from voters to candidates, parties, and media outlets. The distinction between "left" and "right" has gained a wide currency since its beginnings in 1789, during the French Revolution, when it was used as a shorthand for the seating of parties in the French National Constituent Assembly (Mair 2007). The left-right continuum now organizes a sizable part of the competition between parties and candidates, it summarizes broad positions for both parties and voters on a wide range of issues (Adams et al. 2004; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Benoit and Laver 2012) and it is used by people as a shortcut or heuristic device to reduce the costs of gathering political information, helping them simplify and navigate the complex world of politics (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009).

The classic eleven-point left-right self-placement scale[1] is widely used in large, cross-national surveys (Kroh 2007) and is, after party identification, one of the most important correlates of party choice (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Freire 2004) and vote (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Gunther and Gibert 2001; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009), depending on the characteristics of the party system. However, as will be discussed below, there are different positions regarding the nature of the information captured by the scale (its substantive meaning), due to possible differences in respondents' interpretation of the scale end-points, which could undermine its use for comparisons across countries and time.

The two labels have been mainly defined in opposition and have come in time to equate the difference between preferences for change versus stability, as well as the opposing preferences on the proper role of hierarchy, authority, obedience and inequality (Bobbio 1996). The left-right divide subsumes attitudes on a wide range of issues, from economic (related to the role of the state in the economy and the extent of redistribution), to social and cultural (on the role of tradition, solidarity, social and individual equality, environmental protection and

[1] With little variation, the most common left-right self-placement question reads: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?" (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European Social Survey, International Social Survey Programme).

attitudes towards immigration) (Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006). Thus, social progress and economic redistribution (welfare, social cohesion) have become associated with the left (Bobbio 1996; Corbetta, Cavazza, and Roccato 2017), while the right stands for the minimal interference of the state in the economy (economic liberalism), higher tolerance of social and economic inequality and a defense of tradition (Thorisdottir et al. 2007; Schmitt and Eijk 2009). Besides these relatively stable elements, which form their core, the two labels can incorporate additional meanings depending on changes in issue salience over the course of time, as will be discussed below.

In the aftermath of World War II, at the end of the struggle between fascism and communism, the relevance of constructs such as "left" and "right" was brought into question, as some claimed that ideology has reached an end (Shils 1955; Bell 1960). The supporters of the "end of ideology" thesis claimed that the abstract ideological appeals of liberalism and conservatism do not motivate people and have no effect on their behavior. Furthermore, it was argued that liberalism and conservatism do not differ substantively when it comes to their philosophical or ideological content and that proponents of these ideologies do not show fundamental psychological differences (Jost 2006).

Another criticism was formulated by Converse (1964), who argued that only a small percentage of the (American) public is capable of organizing their beliefs consistently according to the definitions of left and right. When asked about basic ideological concepts such as liberalism and conservatism, ordinary voters showed little understanding, prompting Converse to conclude that "the liberal-conservative continuum is rather an elegant high-order abstraction and such abstractions are not typical conceptual tools for the man in the street" (Converse 1964, 215). Morris Fiorina echoed Converse's ideas and argued that the latter's picture "still holds up pretty well" (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006, 19), given that the American electorate is moderate, still largely oblivious to the disputes of the political elites, poorly informed about politics and non-ideological. The thesis of the American public's centrism or "innocence" of ideology, in the sense of unstable and incoherent preferences on issues, has also been supported, among others, by Jacoby (2011), Federico (2012) and more recently Kinder and Kalmoe (2017). Additionally, people's ability to accurately recognize the position of political parties on the left-right scale was brought into question (Best and McDonald 2011).

Although far from unanimous, recognition and self-placement on the left-right scale has increased since Converse's bleak conclusions. Cross-national

surveys that include a measure of ideological self-placement show that most respondents can locate their political position on the left-right scale, both in old and new democracies, and can place the parties in their country on the same scale with a reasonable degree of accuracy (Mair 2007; Dalton and McAllister 2015). Moreover, their own self-placement on the scale is reasonably accurate, temporally stable, and internally reliable (Knight 1999; Feldman 2003). Using recent GSS (2008-2012) and ANES (2010) data, Gries (2017) reports that ideological self-reports in the US have a high internal reliability.

The degree to which respondents are willing or able to place themselves on the left-right scale varies with individual characteristics such as age, education level, political sophistication, degree of political engagement, partisanship, as well as system-level traits, such as the number of parties in the political system and the frequency of use of the left-right vocabulary in political discourse (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). The distribution on the scale also varies across countries and regions. While most average around the middle of the scale, countries of Southern and Eastern Europe lean leftward, while the US and Basque Country lean rightward (Dinas 2012; Rico and Jennings 2016). After the fall of communist regimes, citizens of post-communist countries have also adopted the left-right vocabulary and place themselves on the scale (McAllister and White 2007).

In addition to the spread of its use, polarization on the scale also varies by country and historical period, as well as people's level of engagement in politics. Contrary to Bell's claims of centrism in the American public, several studies have pointed to an increase in ideological divisions among the public (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Abramowitz 2010). For instance, a Pew Research Center survey (2014) reported that the number of Americans on the two ends of the left-right distribution has risen from 10% to 21% in course of the last 20 years, a rise that was much more pronounced within the most politically engaged group of citizens. Ideological polarization seems to be higher in developing countries (Dalton 2006). Similarly, in post-communist countries, more people placed themselves to the extremes of the scale than in established democracies (McAllister and White 2007). However, over time, the high levels of ideological polarization in post-communist countries appeared to subside. Using longitudinal data from the World Values Survey for 23 countries, Jou (2016) shows that ideological moderation is higher in countries with a longer uninterrupted experience of democracy, especially under conditions of low corruption, an impartial judiciary, effective administration, and when plurality rule is absent.

1.1.2 The issue basis of the left-right dimension

What do left-right self-placement scores indicate? The seminal work of Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1976) brought forward three components or dimensions: social, partisan and value or ideological (see also Feldman and Conover 1981; Thorisdottir et al. 2007; Ellis and Stimson 2012). These reflect the different factors that contribute to a person's left-right identification, namely (1) one's position in the social structure (through factors such as occupation, income or religion) and corresponding social identity; (2) the attachment or loyalty to a political party, interest group or individual political actors and (3) one's attitudes towards the main issues or value conflicts in the society.

In their original study, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) analyzed the relationship of the three components to left-right self-placement, in order to gauge their relative importance and variations across countries. Their analyses revealed the partisan component to be much stronger than the ideological one. Its correlations with left-right self-placement ranged from a low of .10 in Belgium to a high of .35 in France and were higher among the more politicized people. Later studies indicated that the strength of the partisan component varies with the number of parties in a political system and their distribution across the left-right continuum (Sani and Sartori 1983; Huber 1989).

More recent studies reported a stronger effect of the ideological component relative to the other two (Lesschaeve 2017), varying with the level of education of voters. This component includes a wide range of issues, economic, as well as social and cultural, which vary across countries and political systems depending on the relevant cleavages and value conflicts and the level of mobilization they enjoy from the part of parties. Historically, at the core of ideological conflict were religious (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Knutsen 2004b; Lachat 2007) and economic cleavages (Downs 1957), referring to the extent of state intervention in the economy. Both in established democracies (Knutsen 1995; Hellwig 2014) and post-communist countries (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011), economic issues still surpass social issues in importance for people's left-right position. However, modernization and socioeconomic progress have in time given rise to new controversies over postmaterial or libertarian issues (Inglehart 1990). In established democracies, relevant issues include multiculturalism, immigration, social and gender equality, or environmental protection, while in new democracies or developing countries issues that take center stage are pathways of liberalization, support for democracy or nationalism (Dalton 2006, Jou 2010).

Although most people still do not meet Converse's standard of ideological thinking, in the sense of a sophisticated understanding of ideological concepts, issue preferences show a high level of coherence and consistency. Ideological constraint, or the average correlation among people's issue positions is on the rise. Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) report that in the United States the average correlation among NES respondents' issue positions has increased from .20 in the 1980s to .32 in 2002–2004. By employing multiple measures of issue preferences, which reduces measurement error, Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) also find that American voters have stable policy preferences. High levels of ideological stability and consistency were also reported in the UK by Evans, Heath, and Lalljee (1996) in the areas of egalitarianism, with respect to income distribution, and support for traditional authorities versus social change. Among the factors believed to have driven such developments are increases in the level of education of the population and the level of sophistication of the political debates to which the public is exposed (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).

As previously mentioned, the meaning of "left" and "right" is by no means invariant or "airtight" across countries and time (Jost 2006; Zechmeister 2006; Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; Feldman and Johnston 2014). This varies to a certain extent between individuals (Lo, Proksch, and Gschwend 2014; Bauer et al. 2017; Zuell and Scholz 2019) and political systems, depending on their political culture and historical trajectories of modernization and liberalization (Caprara and Vecchione 2018). In time, new meanings were added to old ones associated to the left and the right (Benoit and Laver 2006; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). The scale is therefore considered a valid approximation of a *super issue* (Sani and Sartori 1983) that can incorporate many types of conflict and that summarizes ideological differences over "the most important issues of a given era" (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 244), such as inequality, economy, religion, and migration. For instance, empirical work undertaken by de Vries, Hakhverdian and Lancee (2013) shows that, since 1980, cultural issues, specifically immigration, have become more consequential than economic issues to people's left-right self-identification in the Netherlands, in a process they label "issue crowding-out". Their findings show that the issue basis of left-right self-placement is susceptible to changes, based on the level of mobilization and politicization enjoyed by certain issues in society. New elements are thus integrated in the substantive meaning of the "left" and "right" if they become salient, while others disappear.

To conclude, in addition to its relatively stable core elements discussed above, such as the extent of state intervention in the economy, the left-right dimension

also has a high power of absorption and an ability to adjust to societal changes and variations in issue agenda in a given era. This makes it a useful metric for summarizing the political positions of citizens, parties and other political actors, and facilitates cross-national comparisons. Consequently, left-right self-placement was included in most cross-national surveys since the 1970s and is one of the central variables employed in the study of political behavior.

1.1.3 Social determinants of ideological positions

Both the willingness to place oneself on the left-right scale and one's position vary with individual socioeconomic characteristics, such as age, gender, education, social class, financial circumstances (income, employment status) or religiosity (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Freire 2006b; Freire 2006a; Knutsen 1997). Additionally, depending on the partisan divisions in a certain country, differences can be observed along racial or ethnic lines.

Given acquisitions in political knowledge and interest over the life course, willingness to place oneself on the left-right scale increases with age (Freire 2006b). Older people are more conservative (Caughey, O'Grady, and Warshaw 2019) and less likely to hold extreme views, while the youth are easier to radicalize. Furthermore, with the late 1960s and 1970s shift to postmaterialist orientations, the younger generations became increasingly disconnected from economic problems, which gave rise to a generational divide (Inglehart, 1989). Older people are generally more likely to support the *status quo* and lean towards the right, while younger people challenge it and lean towards the left. However, this situation is reversed in the case of post-communist countries, where older cohorts, socialized under communism and more economically insecure than their Western counterparts, hold more leftist views than the youth (Jou 2010).

Well-educated citizens are more likely to identify with an ideological position (Abramowitz 2010) and to hold liberal or leftist preferences (Kaiser and Lilly 1975; Gerber et al. 2010). A recent study by the Pew Research Center (2016) reports that in the United States educated people are more liberal (only 24% of those with postgraduate experience hold mostly or consistently conservative values) and that ideological divisions along educational lines have grown in the last two decades. However, as education is often coupled with increases in income, other studies have reported a stronger effect for income than for education, arguing that higher educational attainment moves people rightward (Morton, Tyran, and Wengström 2011). Moreover, discrepancies have been

pointed out between people's self-identification and reported preferences. For instance, Rockey (2014) reports that better educated people are more likely to report a leftist identification, while actually favoring increased inequality, a discrepancy which could be explained by peer effects. Nevertheless, education seems to decrease extremism, as educated people on either end of the continuum consider themselves less extreme.

The gender gap in political preferences and attitudes also extends to the area of left-right orientations. Due to their greater religiosity and support for family values, the first generations of women who gained the right to vote leaned towards the right and supported parties that promoted a traditional view of women's role (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau 1983; Harvey 1998). However, as women's social roles have changed with the passing of time (e.g., with increased educational attainment and more labor participation), this traditional "gender gap" was reversed. Women are now on average more supportive of the left (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Giger 2009; Emmenegger and Manow 2014; Shorrocks 2018) and express more support for social spending (Howell and Day 2000; Campbell 2006). One explanation for this move towards the left of the political spectrum lays in the changes brought about by modernization in women's employment and patterns of family formation, especially the rise in non-marriage (Inglehart and Norris 1986; Edlund and Pande 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003), the drop in levels of religiosity (Shorrocks 2018), women's higher levels of compassion (Gilligan 1982) and their lower earning power and higher economic vulnerability, which makes them more dependent on the state (Erie and Rein 1988; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).

On the other hand, men are more conservative (Fraley et al. 2012) and display higher levels of support for the right, especially the populist radical right (Givens 2004; Norris 2005; Immerzeel, Coffó, and Lippe 2015). Wealthy men lean right-wing to protect their income from taxation, while blue collar and low skilled men are the most likely category to support the radical right due to higher levels of job insecurity and precarious employment in the face of globalization (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier and Kriesi 2013). Based on European data gathered between 1981 and 2016, Caughey, O'Grady, and Warshaw (2019) find higher levels of conservatism among men on economic, although not on immigration or social issues.

Despite the effects of secularization, religiosity and religious affiliation continue to exert a significant influence on people's political behavior and remain a strong predictor of party choice and ideological position (Lijphart 1979; Knutsen

2004a). Historically, anti-clerical positions and secular interests were linked to the left, while support for religious authority was connected to the right (Laponce 1981, 53). More recently, the two extremes have included projects of social democracy (left) and conservative and Christian-democrat platforms (right) (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knight 2006). Religious indicators, such as self-described level of religiosity, religious attendance, and religious values, are positively associated with left-right self-placement, especially in industrial and post-industrial societies (Norris and Inglehart 2004). In Europe, religious people are more right-wing than the non-religious, especially in countries with a large religious following, such as Greece, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Spain (Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011). Similarly, frequent churchgoers are more right-wing than non-practicing believers, regardless of religious denomination. Thus, the effect of church attendance on the left-right dimension outweighs the effect of belonging to a particular religious denomination (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976).

Leftist parties have traditionally promoted the interests of the working class, while the right has advanced those of the middle class and professionals. However, the link between social class and left-right orientations has eroded in time in most established democracies. More recently, feelings of economic insecurity have been associated with support for the right. According to Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016), far-right parties benefit from an increase in vote share of up to 30% in the aftermath of financial crises. Jackman and Volpert (1996) report a positive correlation between unemployment rates and electoral success for the far right. Other studies have qualified this finding, indicating that unemployment has an effect only under conditions of high immigration (Knigge 1998; Golder 2003). However, the new cleavage thesis states that the socially disadvantaged and economically insecure citizens are more susceptible to the appeals of the radical right. Norris finds that support for the radical right is stronger among people who are unemployed, less religious, and have low or moderate education (Norris 2005).

In addition to objective economic conditions, economic worries and perceptions of the socioeconomic context are also influential for people's political proclivities. Feelings of relative deprivation (as a result of comparing one's current economic well-being to that of a reference group, such as the parents, or one's expectations) can result in frustration. In turn, this can inflame anti-foreign sentiments and support for the far-right (Rydgren 2007). Moreover, fear of job loss (Geishecker and Siedler 2012) or fears of the future more generally (Betz

and Immerfall 1998) have been associated to right-wing support.

Social insecurity and expectations of downward mobility do not, however, necessarily move people to the right. Some studies have shown that lower income citizens are more left-wing and support government intervention in the economy and wealth redistribution (Gilens 2009; Flavin 2003). As Rodrik (2001) reports, in Latin America people who are more pessimistic about the future are more supportive of social security and lean more left-wing in terms of economic issue positions. This shows that another individual level response to expectations of future economic insecurity can be the support for the expansion of the social safety net provided by the state. This could explain the rise in support for left-wing populist parties following the economic crisis, such as the Spanish "Podemos" or the Greek "Syriza." However, according to Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer (2012), low income status has the reverse effect in a number of countries (Ireland, Portugal, Australia and Switzerland), where the poor hold rightist views.

1.2 The development of political attitudes in the family

Common wisdom aphorisms such as "The apple does not fall far from the tree," "Like father like son/Like mother like daughter" or "Chip off the old block" convey the idea that the family is highly influential to one's attitudes and behavior. This is due to the explicit role parents play in guiding the development of their children, the large amounts of time children spent under both the direct and indirect influence of their parents and the enduring legacy of this influence (Dinas 2014a). This results in levels of attitudinal agreement much higher than would be expected by chance, given the deliberative nature of some of the parental influences.

Parents are the one of the main actors in the process of socialization, through which an individual becomes part of a particular culture, appropriating its beliefs, values, and habits (Gardiner and Kosmitzki 2011). With respect to the political realm, socialization was defined by Langton as the "way how society transmits its political culture from generation to generation" (1969, 4). The primacy of the family as political socialization agent is supported by research finding that parental behavior and attitudes are a strong predictor of offspring behavior and attitudes (Dalton 1980; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and

Bowers 2009). Foundational studies in political socialization have highlighted the importance of the family for voting and partisanship (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). Although the 1960s and 1970s were the heyday of political science research on this topic, the family has maintained a key place among the socializing agents, as stated at the end of the 1950s (Hyman 1959). Parents serve as models for their children and play an indisputable role in the development of their political knowledge, attitudes and beliefs.

The term "transmission" captures the transfer of values, ideas, and practices from parents to children (Schönpflug 2008). Family transmission can be *explicit*, when parents actively encourage conformity with their own attitudes, beliefs and behaviors from the part of their children, and *implicit*, when children emulate the example of their parents without being actively encouraged to do so. Successful transmission results in attitudinal agreement or congruence between parents and their children, which early studies argued is a source of societal and institutional stability and continuity within families (Hyman 1959; Easton 1965; Miller and Glass 1989). As Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2009, 783) summarize:

> The standard transmission model [...] views parent-child similarity as an outcome of social influence and learning processes operating within the home. These processes are assumed to rest on observational learning and its variants of modeling, imitation, and identification, all of which work to heighten reproductive fidelity along political [or religious] lines.

Research on the family transmission of political attitudes has focused on three main areas, as aptly summarized by Tedin (1974): (1) the extent to which parents and children display similarities in attitudes (i.e., levels of intergenerational congruence), (2) the degree to which these similarities result from parental transmission (implicit or explicit) as opposed to other influences in the same direction (such as the broader societal and political context, influences of other socializing agents, etc.), and (3) the factors that influence the success of parental transmission. The following subsections of this chapter present the main theoretical models employed in political socialization literature, offer a review of empirical studies, with a special focus on political ideology, and highlight the main gaps in the research of the family transmission of political ideology.

1.2.1 Early models of family political socialization

The direct transmission model

The *direct transmission model*, prominent in the 1950s and 1960s, posited that parents are the primary influence in attitude formation and that parental characteristics are wittingly or unwittingly passed on to their children the majority of the time. Children were thus thought to be a passive recipient of parental influences and to mirror their attitudes, values and behavior. This view faced criticism for failing to acknowledge any agency on the part of the child and glossing over the quality of the interactions between parents and children.

In the realm of politics, the family was considered the main agent responsible for teaching children the norms of social order. Additionally, schools were seen as responsible for inculcating norms and practices in their citizens in order to ensure the stability and continuity of the political system. As Sigel (1970, xii) has noted,

> [...] a well-functioning citizen is one who internalizes society's political norms and who will then transmit them to future generations. For without a body politic so in harmony with the ongoing political values, the political system would have trouble functioning and perpetuating itself.

A high degree of attitude similarity or congruence between the different generations or trait-to-trait parent-child congruence was hence necessarily considered evidence of successful parental socialization, without an inquiry into causal mechanisms. A passage from Hyman (1959, 27) serves to illustrate this point: "When children and their parents are measured independently and agreements in political views are established, it supports the inference that the family transmits politics to the children."

While the correlation between the political attitudes of parents and their children is fairly easy to ascertain, Hyman's statement overestimates the direct influence of the parents and glosses over other potential explanations for high levels of attitudinal similarity. Consequently, this model was criticized for failing to distinguish between the parent-child attitudinal similarities that are due to *direct parental socialization* (the learning that takes place explicitly and implicitly within the family) on the one hand, and those that are due to *indirect family influence*, as a result of their social structural position (social class and political, ethnic and religious background) (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Connell 1972).

Early studies of parental influence over the political behavior and attitudes of their offspring also suffered from several methodological shortcomings. The degree of intergenerational similarity these studies reported was inflated by the particular sampling procedure, measurement and data collection methods employed. Most studies relied on convenience student samples and employed solely indirect measures of parent-child congruence, based on students' subjective perceptions of their parents' political attitudes. As later studies showed, such measures were imprecise and prone to "self-directed bias" (Westholm 1999), which inflated the level of agreement between parents and children, making them unreliable as a sole measure of intergenerational value similarity. The agreement with parental values perceived by children was higher than actual agreement, and could not be taken as an indication of parental influence over the position of the children.

For instance, Acock and Bengtson (1980) found that children were likely to report higher levels of conservatism for their parents. Other studies relied on students taking home a questionnaire for their parents to fill in, with an average parental response rate of about 30%. In this case, intergenerational agreement rates could have been inflated by parental self-selection, due to a better relationship between the children and the parents who took part in the studies (for a discussion, see Connell 1972).

These biases have consequently contributed to an overestimation of the extent of parental influence. When parents were approached directly, rather than through their offspring, levels of intergenerational agreement were indeed lower. Another criticism leveled against the model targeted its assumptions that children are passive recipients of parental influences, lack agency and cannot influence their parents in their turn (i.e. assumed a unidirectional relationship from parent to child). A final point to be made is that many of the early studies, especially in the American context, investigated white, urban, Christian, middle-class samples, making it unlikely that their findings would hold in other contexts and for other types of families (e.g., with a different family structure or ethnic and socioeconomic background). Moreover, early studies were primarily focused on father-child value similarity, based on an assumption of the father's primacy as political socialization agent in the family, as will be discussed below. Lastly, early studies were criticized as well for relying mostly on correlations as evidence of transmission (Connell 1972).

The status inheritance model

Independent of parental transmission, status inheritance and a shared environment or social milieu can also act as driving forces behind parent-child attitudinal congruence. By sharing the same social structural position, parents and their children (at least until the age of adulthood) undergo similar experiences which can shape their attitudes and give rise to similarities. Thus, the *status inheritance* or *status transmission* model holds that parent-child attitude similarity or congruence is explained by the transmission of socioeconomic status from parent to child (Dalton 1982; Glass, Bengtson, and Chorn Dunham 1986; Bengtson, Biblarz, and Roberts 2002).

Dalton (1982) made a distinction between two pathways of parental influence: the attitudinal pathway and the broader social milieu. As will be discussed below, parents exert an influence in the first pathway by "direct interpersonal transfer (through imitation, reinforcement, explicit education and similar processes)" (Dalton 1982, 140), while in the second they transmit to their children their socioeconomic status, including their class, race, educational attainment or religious affiliation. These traits influence social attitudes in and of themselves and can have a stronger influence on the attitudes of children than the values of the parents *per se*. Dalton argued that values transmitted through the attitudinal pathway (such as racial and partisan attitudes) were more stable over the life-course, whereas those acquired through social milieu (such as political efficacy and political knowledge) were more likely to suffer changes later in life (1982, 154). More recently, the effects of childhood economic environment on preferred levels of redistribution and amount and type of social spending have been investigated by Lown (2015). His study finds that children raised in wealthy families are more likely to support government jobs and identify as liberal compared to their peers raised in poor families.

However, although parents shape their children's opportunities to access education, obtain jobs and reach a certain level of income, the relationship between parent and offspring socioeconomic status is not perfect. The assumption that parents transmit their socioeconomic status to their children does not hold for the case of offspring who slide either up or down the social ladder. Upon reaching maturity and completing education, young adults can maintain the living standards of their parents, or fare worse (downward mobility) or better (upward mobility) compared to them. This movement from their parents' social class exposes them to new social networks, lifestyles and daily habits which can

have a bearing on their political behavior and attitudes, working to attenuate or even wipe off the early influences of their family.

While the effects of social mobility on political attitudes have been previously explored (Abramson and Books 1971; Thompson 1971b; Martinussen 1992; Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Mitrea, Mühlböck, and Warmuth 2020), less is known about how this process influences the level of parent-child ideological congruence and whether active primary socialization from the part of parents can withstand the cross-pressure of social mobility. This question is relevant in the current context of increased downward mobility and slowing down of upward mobility (Chetty et al. 2017; Bukodi et al. 2015; Urahn et al. 2012). Therefore, Chapter 3 explores differences in intergenerational ideological congruence between socially mobile and non-mobile young adults, while Chapter 4 tests whether mobile young adults who were exposed to direct and explicit socialization from the part of their parents through political discussion as teenagers are more likely to share their ideological views, regardless of their change in social status.

1.2.2 The social learning model

The *social learning theory* proposed by Bandura (1969; 1977) emphasizes that learning takes place within a social context and that humans learn through direct experience, as well as by observing those around them. Family socialization occurs through modeling and reinforcement from the part of the parents. Children internalize the attitudes and behavior of their parents through a process of observational learning, which includes the stages of *attention*, *retention*, *production* and *motivation*. Thus, the success of transmission varies for instance, with the strength of cue giving and reinforcement on the part of the socializer, in this case the parents (Dawson and Prewitt 1969), and the child's perceptual accuracy and willingness to adopt the cues (Acock and Bengtson 1978; Tedin 1980; Whitbeck and Gecas 1988; Westholm 1999; Ojeda and Hatemi 2015).

Studies on political attitudes showed that transmission varies depending on factors such as the type of political attitude (e.g., its content and how affect or value-laden it is), its clarity and salience for the parents and the children (Tedin 1974; Pinquart and Silbereisen 2004), the interest in politics and level of politicization of the family (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Thomas 1971; Dalhouse and Frideres 1996; Wolak 2009; Hooghe and Boonen 2015; Rico and Jennings 2016), the homogeneity of the parents' political views and of the cues

transmitted to children, which helps retention and internalization (McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Tedin 1980; Fitzgerald and Curtis 2012), communication patterns inside the family (Tims 1986; Valentino and Sears 1998; Kroh and Selb 2009), or the frequency, duration, rate, salience, multiplicity and complexity of modeling cues (Bandura 1969). Additionally, the transfer of attitudes and behaviors from parents to their children varies according to a series of characteristics pertaining to the household (family structure, earnings, etc.) and the external environment (Lochner 2008). Transmission is enhanced by family members sharing the same household or living in close proximity and interacting often, which increases exposure to the political views of the family (McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Niemi and Hepburn 1995).

Thus, political consonance between members of a family is higher in politically engaged families, in which cues are more frequent and salient and take precedence over cues from other socialization agents, such as peers, the media or the school. Moreover, transmission is most successful when the parents' crystallized and stable political views are passed on through consistent cues over long stretches of time. Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2009) reported significantly higher transmission rates for the most politicized parent-child pairs, as well as for pairs in which the parent had shown consistent political attitudes. High levels of political engagement and discussion lead to high consonance mostly for the case of core elements, such as party affiliation (Westholm and Niemi 1992) or the presidential candidate supported, or issues highly significant or controversial at a certain point in time. For the case of more peripheral matters, however, the effect disappears, the difference being made in this case by whether the parents hold clear and consistent views on a certain subject. Its visibility, widespread use and specific nature accounts for the higher success of the partisanship transmission. As Westholm and Niemi (1992, 30) argue:

> Because parties are concrete and visible, partisan feelings are easily communicated. The chances that party preferences will be aired in family conversations and that they will be correctly understood by the child are likely to be higher than for other political attitudes.

Critics of the studies carried out in the 1960s and 1970s (such as that of Jennings and Niemi), raised the question of whether their findings were cohort specific. As these studies were based on adolescents in the United States coming of age at the height of the civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam, there was a suspicion that the level of parent-child congruence was lower for

this cohort than for preceding or succeeding ones (Sears and Funk 1999). In order to test the congruence under different historical circumstances, Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2009) used samples of US children that came of age in the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, a period of relative calm bracketed by President Ronald Reagan's second term and Bill Clinton's first term. Based on the assumption that disruptive socio-political events work in the detriment of parent-child political congruence, more recent cohorts of youths were believed to exhibit a higher level of congruence with their parents. On the other hand, this generation was also subjected to a number of factors that would have worked to reduce the primacy of the family as a source of political socialization, among which an altered familial structure following a rise in divorce rates, blended families or single parent households, as well as a series of innovations in communications media.

Jennings, Stoker and Bowers reported that the more recent parent-child pairs resemble older ones in terms of the types of political attributes that are most likely to be matched. Thus, partisan attitudes and attitudes with a strong affective or moral component, such as school prayer attitudes, are most likely to be passed on from parent to child. However, although one would expect lower levels of similarity to their parents in newer cohorts, Jennings, Stoker and Bowers surprisingly do not find this to be the case. In fact, when significant differences are reported between the two cohorts, these show that the more recent pairs of adolescents and parents are more congruent that older pairs (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009, 786). Although the study does not confirm the expectation that parents are less important in shaping their children's partisan attachments, changing political contexts still influenced transmission levels. Attitudes concerning race, which have witnessed the greatest inter-generational discontinuity, are a prime example of this. The parent-child congruence on this issue for the newer cohorts is much lower and can be explained by the change that occurred in the political environment from one cohort to the other, which led racial issues to lose the center stage they held in the 1960s. Conversely, newer cohorts are more similar to their parents on issues that have been more salient in the 1980s and 1990s, such as evaluations of business versus labor or religiosity. Thus, as the researchers conclude, "the political selves that parents convey to their children appear to reflect the salient political issues of the time" (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009, 787).

An important focus of political socialization research is uncovering the boundaries of a particular period in life, termed as the "impressionable" or "formative"

years (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Krosnick and Alwin 1989), during which primary socialization occurs. This period is thought to be crucial for the formation of political behaviors and attitudes, due to the fact that children are more prone to the influence of external factors and highly susceptible to attitude change during this time. The impressionable years spread across late adolescence and early adulthood, between the ages of 17 and 25 (Jennings and Niemi 1974; 1981). However, more recent research brought evidence supporting a broader age range, both by lowering the age band as far as 7 (Deth, Abendschon, and Vollmar 2011; Bartels and Jackman 2014) and extending it well into adulthood (Smets 2016).

The social learning model also pays attention to the perceptual accuracy of children and the mechanisms of learning (Acock and Bengtson 1978; Tedin 1980; Whitbeck and Gecas 1988; Westholm 1999). For instance, Ojeda and Hatemi (2015) test a perception-adoption model in which children are active agents in their socialization and critically observe and model their parents' attitudes and behaviors. Thus, children first perceive and evaluate their parents' attitudes and behaviors and then determine whether to adopt or reject them. The results of the study suggest that taking into account measures of perception lowers the parent-child congruence to lower levels than previously believed.

Some studies have suggested that political socialization can in fact foster more intergenerational discontinuity, than congruence. For instance, Dinas (2014) shows that children from politicized homes at first follow their parents' party identification as teenagers, but are also more likely to change it in adulthood. This divergence of opinions is due to the fact that political discussions at home make children more receptive to stimuli which are likely to change their partisan affiliation later on in life. Similarly, Wolak (2009) shows that adolescents are active participants in their political socialization and those who are inquisitive and follow political news are more likely to challenge their parents' views.

Gender differences in parental socialization

Gender differences in parental socialization influences were explored since the early days of research into family socialization. Early studies have mainly focused on uncovering the dominant parental influence. Given the gender asymmetries in political involvement and gender expectations of the period, with politics being thought of as an appropriate pastime for men, the figure of the father has received considerable attention. Although its dominance was manifest especially for cohorts in which women lacked voting rights, it has decreased since (Beck

and Jennings 1975). The model of parental influence was later fine-tuned to account for child gender and the strength and quality of parent-child bonds. Social learning theory holds that children are more likely to imitate the same-sex parent (Bandura and Walters 1963). Parent-child agreement is indeed higher in same-sex dyads (Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood 1995; Carlson and Knoester 2011), especially for certain political attitudes, such as gender role attitudes (Filler and Jennings 2015). However, the effect of parental gender is trumped when children report a stronger relationship with one parent (Jennings and Langton 1969).

Overall, however, research has come to mixed conclusions regarding the effects of parental gender on political attitudes transmission success, with some studies suggesting that mothers might in general be more influential than fathers (Langton 1969; Thomas 1971; Acock and Bengtson 1978; Dalhouse and Frideres 1996; Castelli, Zogmaister, and Tomelleri 2009; Shulman and DeAndrea 2014), especially when they are highly politicized (Jennings and Langton 1969). Based on a sample of 430 American high-school students and both their parents, Beck and Jennings (1975) report that politically partisan mothers have a greater influence on child partisanship than fathers, whereas the latter are more influential in households with politically neutral mothers.

The mothers' primacy is attributed to the traditional gender division in childcare, which results in children spending more time with mothers than fathers (Beinstein Miller and Lane 1991) and developing stronger feelings of attachment towards the former as the most important attachment figure (Langton 1969; Acock and Bengtson 1978). However, combining these results with findings on the effect of marriage on women's political attitudes suggests that fathers still influence their offspring indirectly, through the political attitudes of the mother, even though their direct influence has declined over time. More recently, Boonen (2017) reported that both parents influence their adolescent children equally, based on results from a Belgian sample.

1.2.3 Alternative routes to parent-child congruence

Parent-child value similarity can also result from circumstances which are not due to either the direct or indirect influence of parents (what is usually referred to as "vertical socialization") or other influences at the micro level. This is the case of the contemporaneous societal context or ideological climate predominant in a culture at a certain point in time, which can shift both generations in the same direction (Boehnke 2001). Cronbach (1955) captures this shared cultural or

normative influence under the term *cultural stereotype*, while Boehnke, Hadjar, and Baier use the term *Zeitgeist*. While the particular ideological climate of a certain point in time can inflate the level of parent-child similarity observed, studies that compared value congruence in biologically related parent-child dyads on the one hand, and randomly assigned dyads on the other, reported a higher level of similarity in the first group (Boehnke 2001; Boehnke, Hadjar, and Baier 2007). This suggests that the observed similarities between parents and their biological children are due to more than the general ideological climate.

Children are also susceptible to "horizontal socialization," i.e., influences from the part of peers or local communities (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). The influence of childhood and adolescence peer groups can be observed in the transmission of social norms and common sets of values (Langton 1967; Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Tedin 1980; Harris 1995). Thus, regardless of the view of their parents, children growing up in certain environments may come, for instance, to sympathize parties that make appeals to their specific social group or adopt a certain ideological position that is favored by that group. Thus, one factor to be taken into account is the macro-political context, as the congruence between parents and children can be influenced by the wider political climate of the age. In order to avoid falling into the trap of overstating the effect of parental influence, studies have paid close attention to local political climates and have analyzed such alternative determinants of congruence as parent education, family income, school climate or school-level socioeconomic status. Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2009) found that by including these contextual variables, the transmission levels are diminished by about one third as compared to those in a bivariate analysis.

Levels of parent-child value similarity appear to decrease as children age (Schönpflug 2001). However, the relationship between age and value similarity with parents is not monotonous. As children mature, they are more likely to resemble their parents in terms of traits such as income or marital status and assume a host of similar roles (employee, spouse, parent) that generate similar life experiences to those of their parents. Thus, over the course of time, youth can gradually begin to resemble their parents as an indirect result of "stepping into their shoes," rather than primarily due to the latter's direct influence. Thus, as the social roles of parents and children converge with age, smaller attitude differences are to be expected in older generation dyads.

Furthermore, proponents of an *interactionist perspective* have pointed out bidirectional or mutual influences between parents and children, which challenge

the traditional view of children as "passive" receptors of parental influence. Children can not only witness or take part in their parents' political discussions, but also initiate them and question their parents on political issues of the day, motivating them to update or change their political views (Bloemraad and Trost 2008). These "trickle-up" effects occur especially as children mature, when the asymmetry between parents and children is reduced and their relations become more egalitarian (Glass, Bengtson, and Chorn Dunham 1986; Vollebergh, Iedema, and Raaijmakers 2001; McDevitt and Chaffee 2002; McDevitt 2006; Rodríguez-García and Wagner 2009; Lobet and Cavalcante 2014; Ojeda and Hatemi 2015; Miklikowska 2016). Therefore, parent-child value similarity can be due to the parents adapting to the values of their children.

Glass, Bengtson, and Chorn Dunham (1986) show that children's influence over the attitudes of their parents are stronger in realms that are affected more by social change, such as gender ideology (1986). For instance, McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) show that adolescents can change the patterns of family communication and increase the civic competence of their parents. By initiating political discussions, adolescents which took part in a civics curriculum stimulated increases in their parents' media consumption and opinion formation, especially among parents with low socioeconomic status. Hence, intergenerational influences are not only one-sided and top-down (from parent to child) as investigated in early studies. Reciprocal influence is also likely to occur, especially as children mature. This is most likely to be the case for middle-aged children and their elderly parents, as the latter are often on a trajectory of social decline, while the former reach the apex of their social power during midlife. Thus, elderly parents become increasingly reliant on their children for advice and support. Although such studies are acknowledged, this chapter will only focus on the direction of influence from parent to child.

Finally, it must be mentioned that, spurred by decades of findings in behavioral genetics showing a substantial heritable component for many social attitudes and behaviors (Hatemi and McDermott 2012), the past decade has seen a number of studies on the non-environmental influences on political attitudes. The classical socialization studies have thus been complemented more recently by a growing body of research that has made the first inroads in documenting the influences of heredity on left-right ideological stances. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) compared samples of identical and fraternal twins in the United States and Australia, finding that as much as 40% to 50% of the statistical variability in ideological opinions can be attributed to genetic factors. Suck kind of evidence is

increasingly showing that genetics plays an important role in explaining variation in human political behavior and that the biological underpinnings of ideology hold one of the most promising future research avenues in our understanding of political ideology.

1.2.4 Parental influence over the life course

While parents exert their influence most strongly in childhood and adolescence, the effects of socialization can wear off over time (Vollebergh, Iedema, and Raaijmakers 2001). As children mature and progress through life, various key adult experiences such as graduating from school, leaving home, joining the workforce, finding a partner, getting married, buying a house and becoming a parent, can influence their attitudes through the new social networks and social roles they are exposed to (Beck and Jennings 1975). This has raised questions about the longitudinal stability of the parent-child similarity which many studies report based on adolescent samples.

According to the *life course stages* model, such life events, which bring about changes in social roles and positions, expose young adults to new experiences, responsibilities, social networks and socializing contexts. These life course transitions, which are usually clustered together in a relatively short period of time in adulthood, can motivate changes in political attitudes and behaviors, that either increase or decrease the congruence with the attitudes of one's parents (Elder 1994). Although it is mostly agreed that the most drastic changes take place early in life and that preferences and attitudes formed early, under familial influence, are more likely to persist (Searing, Schwartz, and Lind 1973; Kroh and Selb 2009), there is evidence of attitudinal change following specific life course transitions. On the other hand, the *developmental* perspective holds that as children mature, their attitudes will converge to those of their parents, as the distance between them decreases (Glass, Bengtson, and Chorn Dunham 1986; Miller and Glass 1989).

Leaving the parental home, especially for pursuing higher education, is likely to expose young people to diverse opinions and attitudes from the part of their peers in the new environment they are entering (university, workplace, neighborhood) (Gidengil, Wass, and Valaste 2016). This typically leads to less frequent interactions and shared activities between young adults and their parents (Bucx et al. 2008; Leopold 2012; Bouchard 2017). Parent-child attitude congruence is consequently likely to decline, due to a drop in the frequency of

family cues and reinforcement of attitudes from the part of parents. Moreover, young adults can enter into cohabitation or marriage, which further decreases parental influence. At the same time, entering different life-course stages has an effect on the type of issues that gain salience. For instance, the experience of *employment* increases people's interest in matters of redistribution and social protection, such as income tax and pensions (Flanagan et al. 2012).

Marriage leads to changes in people's personal lives that influence their political life and gives rise to a long process of adjustment that generates high convergence between the spouses, surpassing the effects of assortative mating (Stoker and Jennings 1995). Spouses are often similar in many respects, such as educational attainment (Breen and Salazar 2011; Domingue et al. 2014) or political views, if politics is salient for both of them. However, similarity increases with shared experiences and activities (Niemi, Hedges, and Jennings 1977) and mutual influence and socialization, especially as the marriage survives the early years (Stoker and Jennings 2005). Early studies have pointed out the prevailing effect of husbands over the political orientation of the family and their wives' political preferences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; McClosky and Dahlgren 1959). Women who entered matrimony were thus more likely to change their views to align with those of their husbands (Beck and Jennings 1975).

Parenthood is another life course experience whose effect was studied, especially in connection to political participation. Unlike leaving the parental home, becoming a parent decreases the frequency of contact with friends and increases interactions with parents (Bucx et al. 2008). At the same time, it provides the basis for shared experiences between young adults and their parents, which increases their level of understanding and identification. The role of parent is accompanied by a new set of challenges and societal expectations, different from those of people who do not have children. These can therefore lead parents to advocate more strongly for issues that serve their interest or are congruent with their position, such as school funding. Jill Greenlee (2014) reports that American mothers display higher levels of support than non-mothers for issues that benefit their children, such as funding for child care and public schools. Mothers also offer more support for specific public programs connected to children and families and have more liberal stances on social-welfare, while being more conservative on issues of family and sexuality.

The political attitudes of men and women seem however to be influenced differently by parenthood. While mothers in America are distinctively liberal on

issues related to the role of government, such as health care, government provision of jobs, government spending and services, aid to the poor, and welfare, the attitudes of fathers are hardly affected by their parental status (Elder and Greene 2011). Recent findings from Europe are consistent with those from the United States, and show that mothers are more supportive of government provision of social welfare programs. Additionally, in countries that offer less generous parental leave policies, European mothers and fathers are more polarized on matters of government responsibility (Banducci et al. 2016). It thus seems that attitudes on public policy issues are more susceptible to change once an adult takes on the role of parent, especially in the case of women.

Conclusion

To summarize, this chapter has laid the theoretical foundations for this dissertation, beginning with a discussion of the development and use of left-right terminology, the state of research on left-right orientations and issue positions and their social determinants. It then reviewed the ways in which the family provides the formative experiences of political socialization during childhood and exercises its influence over children's political attitudes. Research regarding these formative influences has come a long way from the shortcomings suffered in the early days (issues of representativeness and generalizability, type of data collection, use of indirect measures of parental attitudes and over-reliance on correlations) and has shown that parent-child congruence levels are far higher than would be expected by chance alone. However, the driving factors behind this congruence, or transmission belts, to use Schönpflug's (2001) terminology, have been insufficiently explored. This is especially the case across different cultural and political environments, although there is evidence to suggest that the strength of these transmission mechanisms varies across countries. This dissertation will focus on three factors that facilitate intergenerational ideological congruence, namely parenting behavior, status inheritance, and political discussion in the family, looking in variations in their strength across 11 countries in Europe, different in cultural and institutional configuration.

Chapter 2

Parenting behavior: importance for intergenerational ideological congruence

2.1 Introduction

In support of social learning theory, evidence from developmental psychology has shown that children's motivation, receptiveness and degree of identification with their parents influence the extent to which they adopt the latter's messages. Thus, children are more receptive and likely to adopt parental values in a positive emotional climate and when they identify with and feel connected to their parents (Baker 1974; Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Mohr and DiMaggio 1995; Sulloway 1996; Grusec, Goodnow, and Kuczynski 2000; Schönpflug 2001). Additionally, the quality of parenting behaviors and child-rearing styles impact the value similarity between parents and their children. For instance, Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff (2011) report that adolescents who perceive their mothers as more accepting and less controlling are more likely to share their values.

Despite strong evidence to suggest that family climate and the quality of parent-child interactions facilitate the transmission of values and habits to offspring and increase parent-child attitudinal congruence, research in this area is still scarce for political attitudes. Moreover, most of the previous studies date back to the early days of political socialization research (Lane 1959; McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Jennings and Langton 1969). Additionally, little attention was

given to the ways in which cultural context moderates the relationship between perceived parenting behaviors and parent-child ideological congruence, although previous research indicates that both parenting behaviors and their effects on children outcomes and parent-child value similarity are context-dependent (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Olivari et al. 2015; Doepke and Zilibotti 2017; Smetana 2017).

Authoritative (defined by high levels of both parental warmth and control) and permissive (high levels of warmth and low control) parenting are more widespread in the West (Smetana 2017), while in other parts of the world authoritarian parenting, consisting of high supervision and low warmth, is more popular (Dwairy et al. 2003). This variation in the prevalence of certain parenting styles was associated with the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in a culture and its social and economic context. Cultures high in individualism favor authoritative parenting, where parental control is coupled with high levels of parental warmth, and children in these cultures have a lower approval of parental control (Rudy and Grusec 2001). On the other hand, levels of parental control are higher in countries which prize collectivism more (Smetana 2017) and its effects are less detrimental than in individualist countries (Yau and Smetana 1996).

Given this cross-cultural variation in parenting behaviors and their effects on children outcomes, this chapter aims to investigate the association of parenting behavior to parent-child ideological congruence across different cultural and institutional contexts. First, the strength of perceived parental warmth, psychological control and autonomy support as transmission belts for ideological orientations will be studied. Secondly, the chapter explores variations in the association between these three parenting dimensions and parent-child ideological congruence across the 11 countries analyzed. Thirdly, the chapter tests whether the relationship between perceptions of parenting behavior and intergenerational congruence is conditioned by the gender of the parent and child.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section introduces and outlines the differences between *typological* and *dimensional* approaches to parenting behaviors, highlighting the advantages of the latter and justifying its use in the present study. The second section reviews the main findings of previous research exploring the relationship between parent-child interactions and intergenerational political attitude transmission. The chapter continues with a section presenting the main expectations on the effects of parent-child relations on intergenerational ideological congruence, as well as the measures used. Results of the cross-country analysis are presented in the fourth section. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the main results and avenues for future research.

2.2 Parenting behavior: literature review

2.2.1 Theoretical framework

Dimensional approaches

Studies of parent-child relationships have employed various frameworks for capturing and classifying the attitudes and behaviors parents engage in towards their offspring (Barber et al. 2005). These largely fall into two categories, namely *typological* and *dimensional*. The first have disaggregated parental behavior into components, distinguishing central dimensions of parenting (Smetana 2017), while the latter consist of typologies of parenting behavior based on combinations of parental control (demandingness) and positive affectivity (responsiveness) present in the parent-child relational context. This chapter will focus on three such dimensions, namely parental warmth, psychological control, and autonomy support (Barber et al. 2005).

Parental warmth is understood as the open display of emotional affection, responsiveness, closeness and support from the part of parents towards their children (Maccoby and Martin 1983; Spera 2005). Parents high in warmth are perceived by their children as nurturing, sensitive and supportive. Parental warmth is linked to a series of positive developmental outcomes in children, as well as a higher likelihood of parent-child value congruence (Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff 2011; Min, Silverstein, and Lendon 2012; Pinquart 2017).This is due to the fact that it increases children's motivation to emulate and therefore internalize their parents' models (Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Grusec, Goodnow, and Kuczynski 2000). Some research indicates that its effects vary with the gender of the parent. For instance, Brody, Moore, and Glei (1994) report a positive relationship between parental warmth and parent-child value transmission only in the case of fathers. In their study, American adolescents who had a warm relationship with their fathers were more likely to share their views on a number of issues, such as welfare, sex roles, marriage and divorce.

Parental control, also referred to as parental demandingness (Maccoby and Martin 1983), is defined as "the degree of strictness, behavioral rules and expectations imposed on children by parents" (Carlo et al. 2011, 116). It thus refers to the degree to which parents monitor their children, and takes the form of behavioral and psychological control, which are independent of one another (Barber, Olsen, and Shagle 1994; Barber 1996; Soenens and Vansteenkiste

2010). Behavioral control refers to the communication of clear expectations regarding accepted child behavior and the use of external pressures to manage and regulate actual behavior, including supervision, setting and enforcing rules and limits, removal of privileges, rewards, and (threats of) physical punishment. Psychological control is used to achieve similar goals by manipulating the love relationship between parent and child and inducing feelings of guilt, shame, emotional insecurity and separation anxiety in children (Wesley 1964; Barber 1996; Walling, Mills, and Freeman 2007; Soenens and Vansteenkiste 2010; Soenens and Beyers 2012).

Barber (1996) has shown that the two parenting dimensions operate independently and have different effects on children outcomes. While moderate levels of behavioral control positively influence children, psychological control has the opposite effects and is considered a negative form of control. This is due to the fact that the parental behaviors that make it up (such as inducing guilt and withdrawing love) are regarded as intrusive and manipulative (Smetana 2017). Barber (1994) associated psychological control to internalizing problems in adolescents (disturbances in emotion or mood, such as anxiety, depression, sadness or guilt) and a lack of behavioral control with externalizing problems (such as delinquent and aggressive behaviors). Similarly, a meta-analysis conducted by Pinquart (2017) indicated that children of parents who employed strict behavioral or psychological control were more likely to show externalizing problems over time.

Parental control is also associated to the success of parental socialization. Attribution theory holds that the levels of behavioral and psychological control parents implement are consequential to the extent to which children internalize their values (Lepper 1981). To understand this better, an important distinction must be drawn between three processes of attitudinal change resulting from social influence, namely *compliance*, *identification* and *internalization* (Kelman 1958; Kelman 1961). In the case of compliance, an individual accepts a social influence on grounds of its instrumental value, which allows him to gain rewards (such as a favorable reaction from another person or group) or avoid punishments or disapproval. However, when a specific behavior or attitude are not seen as instrumental, the person is expected to forfeit them. In the case of identification, an individual is motivated by a desire "to establish and maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or group" (Kelman 1958, 53). The persistence of the social influence thus depends on the salience of its agent. In the case of parent-child relationships, the salience of the parents decreases

once the child moves away from home and interacts more rarely with them. Finally, internalized attitudes are independent of both the instrumental value of the behavior/attitude and the salience of the source. Instead, an individual accepts influence because he finds the content of the behavior/attitude rewarding, making it more likely to persist even in the absence of external forms of control. The socialization process aims to achieve attitudinal and behavioral changes of the latter type, which have a higher likelihood of persistence even in the absence of parents (Maccoby 1980).

Children are less likely to internalize values under conditions of parental control perceived as excessive or above the minimal level required to obtain compliance (Lewis 1981). Individuals who perform an action due to high levels of control are less likely to continue doing so in the absence of that control. Reactance theory also explains the adverse effects of parental control. The theory holds that restrictions of free will are associated with increased efforts at reasserting autonomy. Kakihara and Tilton-Weaver (2009) explored American adolescents' perceptions of parental behavioral and psychological control, reporting that high levels of control are perceived as more intrusive than moderate levels of control. Perceiving their parents as highly controlling decreases adolescents' odds of value congruence by making them less motivated to comply with parental wishes (Grusec and Goodnow 1994), and leading them to search for role models in other people (Grusec, Goodnow, and Kuczynski 2000). In a study of American and Romanian mother-adolescent dyads, Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff (2011) report the largest similarities in values for dyads in which children perceive their mothers as least controlling.

A third parenting dimension, *autonomy support* (or autonomy granting) can be observed when parents encourage their children's individual expression, initiative and decision making in solving problems and making choices for themselves (Grolnick 2003). Parents who support the autonomy of their children allow them to make choices about their behavior and activities. On the other hand, parents who prefer to keep their children close and encourage them to seek constant parental advice and support show low levels of autonomy support.

Although parental control and autonomy support may seem opposite ends of the same continuum, empirical evidence shows that they are distinct parenting constructs (Silk et al. 2003; Hauser Kunz and Grych 2013), since parents who do not control their children do not necessarily also support their autonomy. Parental autonomy support was shown to contribute to the development of autonomy in adolescents (Fousiani et al. 2014) and was linked to higher academic

achievement and other positive psychological (such as subjective well-being) and behavioral outcomes (Roth and Assor 2012; Ratelle, Simard, and Guay 2013).

Of particular interest for this study is that parental autonomy support facilitates children's internalization of norms and increases parent-child value congruence (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Knafo and Schwartz 2003). Drawing on self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci 2000), this effect is explained by the fact that parental autonomy support leads children to believe that values are self-generated, rather than imposed by the parents, giving them a greater sense of control over their compliance, which in turn facilitates their internalization of those values (Grolnick, Deci, and Ryan 1997).

Typological approaches

Baumrind (1971) and subsequently Maccoby and Martin (1983) have put forward one of the most widely used typologies of parenting styles in developmental psychology. This is based on combinations of parental control or demandingness (which refers to the extent to which parents demand that the child behaves responsibly) and positive affectivity (also termed as responsiveness/acceptance, namely the extent to which parents respond in a supportive manner to children's needs and wants) present in the parent-child relational context. Baumrind (1971) has classified parenting styles into three primary types: authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive, to which a fourth one (rejecting-neglecting) was later added (Baumrind 2012).

Authoritative parents display high levels of both positive affectivity and control or supervision. They direct the child's actions in a rational, issue-oriented manner, which is not overly controlling. Moreover, they are receptive to children's needs and questions, are more likely to nurture and forgive than punish when children fail to meet their demands, and to share with the child the reasoning behind their decisions. To sum up, authoritative parenting is characterized by higher levels of firm, but flexible control over children, positive affectivity, and an emphasis on autonomy promotion.

Authoritarian parents display high supervision, but low warmth and negative affectivity. They place high demands on their children, impose strict rules with little explanation, and punish disobedience, while at the same time limiting communication. They value conformity and obedience as a virtue and favor punitive measures for bringing the child back in line with what they consider a set standard of conduct, usually an absolute standard. Such parents believe that

children must accept rules without questioning them and pass to their children values such as the respect for authority, hard work and the preservation of order and traditional structure. The relational context in authoritarian parenting is characterized by higher levels of parental control, strict discipline, which limits children's autonomy, and negative affectivity.

Permissive parents display high warmth, but low supervision. Their behavior is non-punitive, accepting and affirmative towards the child, they impose and enforce few rules, make few demands and show low levels of control of children's behavior. However, they are responsive and communicative, allow children to decide their own activities and are more likely to consult with them about their decisions and to give explanations for family rules. Thus, they are more likely to take on the role of friend than parent and allow children the freedom to act as they desire.

The last combination of parental control and positive affectivity describes *rejecting-neglecting* or disengaged parents, which display both low warmth towards their children and low supervision. Parents that fit this typology make few demands, communicate rarely with their children and are generally uninvolved in their lives, potentially going to the extreme of neglecting their needs.

Authoritative parenting, consisting of displays of affection and consistent, yet not overly strict control, was linked to positive developmental outcomes (social, emotional and intellectual), across a variety of contexts and cultures and regardless of parents' race, social background or marital status (Steinberg 2001). These outcomes include children's behavior, academic performance, mental health, self-confidence and positive peer relations (Pinquart 2017). Studies indicate that children of authoritative parents are more self-reliant, self-controlled, autonomous and explorative, have higher levels of competence, higher self-esteem and fewer mental health problems (Maccoby and Martin 1983). This is due to the fact that authoritative parents stimulate their children by engaging in conversation and helping them understand the social world around them, which fosters cognitive and social competence. The effects of authoritative parenting seem to differ depending on the gender of the child. Baumrind showed that authoritative parenting behavior is associated with independent, purposive and dominant behavior only in girls (1971, 100). Authoritative parenting creates the most favorable environment for parental transmission, since the levels of parental nurturance it involves increases children's receptiveness to parental influence (Steinberg 2001).

In contrast, authoritarian and rejecting-neglecting parenting, consisting of

little or inconsistent monitoring, overly harsh punishment and lack of positive affectivity, are linked to worse developmental outcomes and higher levels of problem behaviors in children at various developmental stages (Baumrind 1978; Barber and Harmon 2002; Barber et al. 2005). For instance, Dornbusch et al. (1987) have reported a negative association of both authoritarian and permissive parenting styles to grades for a sample of high-school students, while authoritative parenting is positively associated with grades.

Parenting style is also associated to how accurately children perceive their parents' value systems (Whitbeck and Gecas 1988; Knafo and Schwartz 2003). According to a study of Israeli adolescents by Knafo and Schwartz (2003), children of warm and responsive parents are able to perceive their values more accurately, while those of autocratic parents are less accurate when prompted to estimate their parents' positions. The study also finds a same-sex effect, namely that daughters are more likely to correctly estimate the values of their authoritative mothers.

Despite their popularity in analyses of parenting behavior and practices, typological approaches suffer from several shortcomings. The most commonly employed typology (Baumrind 1971; Maccoby and Martin 1983) is based on combinations of only two parenting dimensions, namely warmth (or responsiveness) and control (or demandingness). However, as discussed above, parenting behavior was more finely disaggregated into several dimensions. Another shortcoming is that some parents do not fit within any of the four categories of parenting style (authoritative, authoritarian, permissive and laissez-faire).

Such an example is provided by a Demos report on *Building Character*, which analyzes the link between parenting style and child behavioral outcomes based on the Millennium Cohort Study data from the UK (Lexmond and Reeves 2009). The study employs a taxonomy of parenting style in four categories (tough-love, authoritarian, disengaged, and laissez-faire) which is similar to that of Baumrind, albeit slightly changed. The issue, as Jensen (2010) points out, is that the majority of parents in the study (close to two thirds) could not be placed in any of the four categories, which raises questions about the generalizability of the findings. In other studies that employed typological approaches to parenting, up to 40% of parents were excluded on similar grounds (Baumrind 1991b; Slicker 1998). To ensure that no significant percentages of parents are excluded from the analysis, this dissertation adopts the dimensional approach to the study of parenting behavior and uses the full range of values for parenting dimensions.

2.2.2 Variations in parenting behaviors

Individual variations in parenting behaviors

The behaviors parents engage in towards their children vary with a series of parental attributes, among which gender, age, socioeconomic and marital status. Early studies of parenting behavior focused on mothers as the main object of investigation (Forehand and Nousiainen 1993; Holden 1995), due to their primary caregiver role in the traditional male-breadwinner household model. Consequently, gender differences in parenting and fathers' parenting practices attracted scholarly attention relatively late. Despite changes in gender norms and family organization which led to an increase in dual-earner households, mothers still spend more time with children than fathers do, especially during the first years of children's lives. However, the gender gap in parenting time has narrowed, reflecting changes in parents' more egalitarian labor division and increasing societal expectations about parenting (Cabrera et al. 2000; Coltrane 2006; Gauthier et al. 2004; Craig 2006; Garcia Roman and Cortina 2016).

In terms of parenting behaviors, although there is little consistency in the findings on this subject[1] fathers seem to be more prone to use an authoritarian parenting style and exercise higher levels of control, while mothers an authoritative one (McKinney and Renk 2008). Fathers also have a higher likelihood to control, discipline and reprimand their sons more than their daughters (Maccoby 1998). A meta-analysis by Endendijk et al. (2016) revealed a tendency on the part of both mothers and fathers to be more controlling towards boys and no differences by parental gender in terms of autonomy support. Several theories have offered an explanation for these differences in parenting style. *Role theory* (Hosley and Montemayor 1997) holds that mothers' display of higher levels of warmth can be attributed to their traditional caregiver role, while fathers' higher level of control springs from their role as provider and disciplinarian. However, the parenting styles of the mother and father in a family are often quite similar (Baumrind 1991a), due to assortative mating effects, mutual influences over time and a higher likelihood of conflict when the two parents are in disagreement about raising their children.

Social class differences in parenting values and behaviors were also highlighted early on. Early studies reported that middle class parents value independence and self-direction more, while working class parents tend to emphasize obedience and

[1] For a review, see McKinney, Brown, and Malkin (2018).

conformity to rules (Kohn 1963). Parenting style is also a mechanism through which poverty is linked to negative child outcomes. Elder and his colleagues (1985) investigated the adverse effect of economic hardship on children's well being during the Great Depression, finding that income loss led to changes in parental behavior. Specifically, financially deprived fathers were more likely to display a rejecting behavior towards their girls, while economic decline did not affect the behavior of mothers.

Based on an analysis of UK data from the Millennium Cohort Study, Ermisch (2008) reports a positive association between household income and structured parenting style, a link which translates into better cognitive and behavioral outcomes for children of well-to-do parents, as well as a higher likelihood of economic success later in life. Following a welfare program trial in Minnesota, working poor mothers who benefited from increases in income through the welfare program scored higher on parental supervision, while their levels of parental warmth and harsh parenting were unaffected by the rise in income (Gennetian and Miller 2002).

Disadvantaged American parents also use punishments more often (Simons et al. 1991) and are less involved in the lives of their children due to the time constraints of working multiple jobs. On the other hand, affluent parents afford to allocate more of their time towards their children's needs, especially in the early, preschool years of life, as well as spend this time involved in higher quality, educational and stimulating activities (Hart and Risley 1995; Waldfogel and Washbrook 2011). Based on an investigation of low income African American mothers in the US, Kelley, Power, and Wimbush (1992) report a higher prevalence of authoritarian parenting style among younger, single mothers with a lower level of education.

More recently, Cobb-Clark, Salamanca, and Zhu (2019) tested the link between socioeconomic status and parenting style in a sample of Australian parents, finding that poorer parents monitor the behavior of their children less than richer parents do. Higher educated parents in Sweden, Italy and Greece were perceived as more authoritative than low educated parents (Olivari et al. 2015). Affluent and better educated parents are thus in a better position to transmit their values and behaviors to their children, due to their parenting choices, which are more conducive to parent-child value congruence.

Cross-country variations in parenting behaviors

The prevalence of different parenting styles varies across time and cultural context. Authoritarian parenting is more popular in non-Western cultures (Dwairy et al. 2003), while permissive and authoritative parenting have gained ground in the West (Smetana 2017). Olivari et al. (2015) explored differences in the retrospective perceptions of parenting style (authoritative, authoritarian and permissive) for a sample of adolescents in Sweden, Italy and Greece. While the authoritative parenting style was the most popular in all three countries, significant differences emerged regarding the authoritarian and permissive parenting styles. Swedish adolescents perceived their parents as being the least authoritarian, while those in Italy and Greece reported higher levels of authoritarian parenting, which the authors attribute to differences in country legislation on family matters. Additionally, Swedish and Greek parents were perceived as more permissive than Italian parents.

There are several explanations for these country differences in patterns of parenting behaviors. One line of research highlights a variation based on the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in a specific culture. This refers to the degree to which people consider themselves primarily autonomous or members of tightly knit communities (Hofstede 1980; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Although levels of collectivism vary across countries, recent work has shown a pattern of generational change between 1981 and 2014 toward more individualism (Beugelsdijk and Welzel 2018).

Higher levels of collectivism seem to be associated with more parental control (Smetana 2017), which could explain the large country variations observed in levels of parental control (Trommsdorff 2009). Moreover, children from countries high in collectivism and interdependence view controlling behavior less negatively and even potentially as a sign of parental love and interest (Yau and Smetana 1996), while those from cultures which prize individualism highly have a lower approval of parental control (Rudy and Grusec 2001). More importantly for this dissertation, high levels of collectivism favor the transmission of attitudes from parents to children, due to higher levels of cohesion and cooperation between generations (Phalet and Schönpflug 2001).

More recent research has suggested that country differences in the prevalence of parenting style can also be explained by economic environment. Bisin and Verdier (2001) argue that the loss in popularity of authoritarian parenting is due to the increased economic returns of independent decision-making, which

authoritarian parenting inhibits. Similarly, Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) report a correlation between the choice of parenting style and levels of income inequality, return to education, redistributive policies, and quality of institutions. Specifically, there are higher shares of permissive parents in countries with low inequality (such as Germany and the Scandinavian countries), more redistribution, low returns to education and good institutions, in which the independence promoted by permissive parents offers higher economic returns. Conversely, the authoritative and authoritarian parenting style are more popular in countries with high income inequality (such as the United States), high returns to education, less redistribution and weaker institutions, in which hard work and parental control are more consequential for children's future economic success.

Most importantly, not only the prevalence of certain parenting behaviors varies across cultural contexts, but also their association to child outcomes. As shown in this review, previous research has for the most part indicated that authoritarian parenting and high parental control decrease children's internalization of values. However, most of these studies have relied on samples from Western Europe or the United States. In these individualist societies, authoritative parenting is reportedly the most effective approach for ensuring value similarity between parents and children, while authoritarian parenting lowers the chances of value congruence.

However, the effectiveness of authoritative parenting does not travel equally well to collectivist societies, where compliance and respect for authority are valued more than independence and autonomy (Schwartz 1994). Rudy and Grusec (2001) argue that parents in collectivist cultures are more likely to apply authoritarian parenting as a conscious strategy, making it more flexible. In contrast, in individualist contexts authoritarian parenting is chosen as a last resort option and is associated with more negative parental affect and less warmth. Based on a study of Egyptian Canadian (collectivist) and Anglo-Canadian (individualist) parents, the two researchers report that higher levels of authoritarianism were not associated with lower levels of warmth for the case of Egyptian Canadian parents, making this group just as likely to transmit their values to their children as the Anglo-Canadians.

Authoritarian parenting and high levels of parental control appear to have a more detrimental effect for parent-child value congruence in individualist than in collectivist cultural contexts (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Trommsdorff 2009). For instance, Sümer et al. (2019) report a stronger effect of parental psychological control on parent-child work values transmission in the individualist Czech

Republic than in collectivist Spain and Turkey. This research offers strong grounds to expect a similar variation in the effects of parental behavior on parent-child ideological congruence with the levels of collectivism in the countries studied. Therefore, this chapter explores such a possible variation the sample of 11 European countries included in this study.

2.2.3 Parenting in political socialization studies

Several early political socialization studies have touched upon the effects of parent-child styles of interaction or relational context on the success of intergenerational attitude transmission. The results of these studies, focused nearly exclusively on the American context, suggest that a positive climate and affectionate family interactions decrease the likelihood of "rebellion" against parental attitudes. However, in most cases, results suffer from the shortcomings of relying on limited white, urban American samples and recall data. Another significant shortcoming of previous studies is the focus on a single context, leaving questions about the applicability of their findings in a comparative context.

Lane's foundational study of fifteen American men highlighted the importance of the father-son relationship for the men's level of political information, attitudes towards political leaders and outlook on the future of the social order (1959). McClosky and Dahlgren (1959) reported that respondents experiencing a high degree of family cohesion or solidarity and frequent exposure to their family (though close proximity) were more likely to share the family's party preferences. A later study by Tedin (1974) showed that the transmission of political attitudes is higher for adolescents who report feelings of closeness and admiration towards their parents. Moreover, when parents are not in agreement in terms of party identification, children are more likely to adopt the attitude of the parent whom they feel the closest to (Jennings and Langton 1969).

In the 1970s, Kraut and Lewis (1975) reported that the level of conflict with parents influenced the political ideology of American students, shifting it leftward. More specifically, rebellious leftist students from liberal homes moved further left, instead of rejecting their parents' ideology by turning conservative. In their study, parental political ideology and parent-student personal conflict explain 34% of the variance in student ideological position. The two researchers explained this finding through the particularly high social unrest of the period in which the study was conducted, which facilitated the translation of personal rebellion into political dissent. Additionally, Niemi and Jennings (1974) found that a positive

emotional family climate marked by cohesion, positive expressiveness, and low level of conflict enhances the transmission of political attitudes.

Thus, children experiencing a positive attachment towards their parents, defined by a trusting, openly communicative and non-alienated relationship, were more likely to share their political attitudes. Analyzing a sample of Catalan children aged 16–35 and living at home with a parent, Rico and Jennings (2016) also report that warmer parent-child relations increase intergenerational ideological similarity. However, the two researchers used a question on the child's satisfaction with the relationship with their parents as a measure of affective bonds. Similarly, autonomy support was linked to higher levels of political knowledge (Santolupo and Pratt 1994) and civic engagement (Smetana and Metzger 2005).

On the other hand, authoritarian parenting was associated to political alienation in adolescence. Analyzing a sample of East-German teenagers in 6th, 8th, and 10th grades, as well as their parents, Gniewosz, Noack, and Buhl (2009) report that children of authoritarian parents had higher levels of political alienation. Similarly, Miklikowska and Hurme (2011) find that upper-secondary school students in a Finish sample who report their parents as controlling and punitive show less support for democratic values than their peers who perceive their parents as warm and open to communication.

More recently, Murray and Mulvaney (2012) examined the effects of parenting style on the transmission of political ideology and partisan identification in the United States, using the typological approach to parenting. Based on a convenience sample of 161 mother-child dyads, they report that children are more likely to adopt the values of authoritative parents. Thus, authoritative mothers transmit their political ideology more effectively than authoritarian or permissive mothers. One explanation for these findings put forward by the two researchers is that authoritative parents are less likely to directly enforce their views upon their children, choosing instead to give them autonomy. Children are thus more likely to believe that the parents' views they are internalizing are actually self-generated, which in turn strengthens their reception of these views. Also, it may be that children have a greater affinity towards authoritative parents and that there is a higher level of bi-directional influence in such parent-child pairs. However, the generalizability of their results is limited by the predominantly white and female sample of college students with a median age of 19, and by the sole focus on mother-child relational contexts.

Research into the development and individual differences in political ideology

has looked early on at a possible link between upbringing and political orientation, specifically between authoritarian parenting (involving the use of punishments, obedience to authority, lack of tolerance for rule violation, etc.) and political conservatism (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981; Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt 2001). Results have suggested that being subjected to authoritarian parenting practices and attitudes as a child is associated with conservatism later in life. Adorno and his colleagues (1950) found that individuals with authoritarian personalities were more likely to have been raised by parents who enforced strict rules and did not tolerate disobedience, suggesting they ranked high on behavioral and psychological control.

Recent studies have employed a longitudinal design to test these expectations about the effects of authoritarian parenting behavior on children's conservatism. Fraley et al. (2012) analyzed longitudinal data from a sample of American parents and their children, looking at whether authoritarian parenting in early childhood (measured at 1 month old) predicts variations in children's political ideology at age 18. Results indicate that parents who are more authoritarian in their attitudes towards parenting have more conservative children. However, one limitation of this study is that it does not measure parents' political ideology. Therefore, it cannot ascertain whether the higher conservatism observed in children at age 18 is an emulation of the conservatism of their parents, or a reaction to their ideological position. Therefore, this study calls for further research on the possible mediating effects of child-rearing style on the transmission of conservatism from parents to children (Fraley et al. 2012, 1430).

Duckitt (2001) has formulated a dual process model which links two dimensions of socialization (punitive *vs* tolerant and unaffectionate *vs* affectionate) to social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism through a causal sequence involving personality dispositions, social worldviews, and motivational goals. According to the model, a punitive and strict upbringing (as opposed to a tolerant and permissive one) gives rise to a conforming personality. This is in turn associated with a greater tendency of seeing the world as dangerous, which activates the goal of social control and security, and is expressed in authoritarian and conservative attitudes. For the second dimension, an unaffectionate upbringing, as opposed to an affectionate one, gives rise to a tough-minded personality, more likely to see the social world as a competitive jungle, activating the motivational goal of superiority and dominance, and is expressed in social dominance attitudes.

Parenting and politics have also been linked by Lakoff (1996) in his *Strict*

Father and *Nurturant Parent* family-based models. According to Lakoff, the two metaphors underlie the worldview and understanding of the political world of conservatives and liberals respectively. The Strict Father metaphor is defined by authority, rules enforced through punishment, obedience, and protection, and is embraced to a greater extent by conservatives. Conversely, the Nurturant Parent metaphor, espoused by liberals, is characterized by empathy, love and nurturance. Lakoff (2002) later argued for an overlap between these two metaphors and authoritative and authoritarian parenting respectively.

Several empirical studies have tested the links which derive from Lakoff's work between parenting style and ideological orientation. Employing a longitudinal design for an American sample of 18-year olds and their mothers, Fraley et al. (2012) reported that exposure to authoritarian parenting increases the changes of political conservatism, while egalitarian parenting attitudes are associated with liberalism. Similarly, Janoff-Bulman, Carnes, and Sheikh (2014) reported a positive association between perceived parental restrictiveness of both mothers and fathers and political conservatism in a sample of American college students. On the other hand, their evidence did not support a relationship between parental nurturance and political liberalism. In addition to student reports of parental practices, the study also employed mothers' self-reports of their parenting, assessed using Rickel and Biasatti's (1982) Child Rearing Practices Report (CRPR). However, mothers' self-reported restrictiveness or nurturance was not significantly related to students' conservatism, possibly given the limited sample size consisting of 108 mothers and their predominantly nurturing parenting style.

2.3 Hypotheses, measures and data

On the basis of previous research reviewed above on the effects of parent-child relational context on the transmission of parental values and habits to children (Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Grusec, Goodnow, and Kuczynski 2000; Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff 2011), I expect parental warmth and autonomy support to be positively associated with parent-child ideological congruence, while psychological control to be negatively associated.

Previous studies have reported that children were more likely to assume their parents' general values as their own when they were raised by nurturing and responsive parents. Consequently, I expect a similar pattern in the case of political orientations, namely that parent-child ideological congruence will be

higher in dyads in which parents are perceived as warm or autonomy supporting. On the other hand, I expect that ideological congruence will be lower in dyads in which children report higher levels of parental psychological control, which I expect to foster the development of attitudes different from those of the parents. This reasoning leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2.1a. *Perceived parental warmth increases the odds of parent-child ideological congruence.*

Hypothesis 2.1b. *Perceived parental psychological control decreases the odds of parent-child ideological congruence.*

Hypothesis 2.1c. *Perceived parental autonomy support increases the odds of parent-child ideological congruence.*

I also expect that the effect of perceived parenting behavior on parent-child ideological congruence will differ between cultural contexts. To the best of my knowledge, such cross-country differences in the effects of parenting behavior on value congruence have not been explored so far with respect to the intergenerational transmission of ideology. However, the literature reviewed above has highlighted a considerable variation across different cultural contexts in the moderating role of parenting behavior on intergenerational value transmission.

I expect that the effect of perceived parenting behavior on parent-child ideological congruence will vary with the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in a cultural context. Specifically, I expect that the positive association of perceived parental warmth and autonomy support to parent-child congruence will be stronger in individualist countries. Similarly, perceived psychological control will have a more detrimental effect on parent-child congruence in countries high in individualism compared to those with higher levels of collectivism. This expectation is based on previous research which has shown that children in collectivist countries take a less negative view of high levels of parental control and can even perceive it as a sign of parental affection (Yau and Smetana 1996).

Hypothesis 2.2a. *The effect of perceived parental warmth on the odds of parent-child ideological congruence increases with the level of individualism in a country.*

Hypothesis 2.2b. *The effect of perceived parental psychological control on the odds of parent-child ideological congruence increases with the level of individualism in a country.*

Hypothesis 2.2c. *The effect of perceived parental autonomy support on the odds of parent-child ideological congruence increases with the level of individualism in a country.*

Based on previous research suggesting that mothers display higher levels of warmth than fathers (McKinney and Renk 2008) and that children feel more attached to their mothers than fathers (Beinstein Miller and Lane 1991), I expect that children are more likely to internalize the values of fathers who display high levels of warmth. In other words, I expect that increased levels of parental warmth will be associated with higher odds of congruence in the case of fathers than mothers. In contrast, I expect that high levels of perceived psychological control will have a more detrimental effect on the odds of intergenerational congruence in the case of mother-child than father-child dyads. Perceived control from the part of fathers will be associated with lower decreases in congruence compared to similar levels of control from the part of mothers. Finally, I expect that autonomy support will be more strongly associated to parent-child congruence in the case of mothers than fathers.

These expectations are based on role theory (Hosley and Montemayor 1997), which holds that mothers have taken on and are consequently expected to play a traditional caregiver role, while fathers have a role as provider and disciplinarian. Since low levels of maternal love and high levels of psychological control conflict with mothers' caregiver role, while high levels of paternal love are unexpected under fathers' disciplinarian role, I expect that these variations will have different consequences on parent-child value congruence depending on parental gender.

Hypothesis 2.3a. *Parental gender and perceived parental warmth interact such that for father-child dyads there is a greater increase in the odds of ideological congruence with the levels of perceived parental warmth compared to mother-child dyads.*

Hypothesis 2.3b. *Parental gender and perceived parental psychological control interact such that for mother-child dyads there is a greater decrease in the odds of ideological congruence with the levels of perceived psychological control compared to father-child dyads.*

Hypothesis 2.3c. *Parental gender and perceived parental autonomy support interact such that for mother-child dyads there is a greater increase in the odds of ideological congruence with the levels of perceived parental autonomy support compared to father-child dyads.*

Measures

Left-right self-placement for both parents and young adults is assessed directly and is measured using an 11-point scale. The question wording found in the questionnaire is as follows: *"In politics, people sometimes talk of "left" and "right." Where would you place yourself on the scale below, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?"*

Parent-child congruence refers to within-dyad similarity and is measured based on the distance between the responses of the parent and the young adult in a dyad, i.e., the smaller the distance, the higher the congruence. Congruence ranges from 0 (no congruence) to 1 (perfect congruence) and was recoded into a binary outcome variable, differentiating between agreement, when dyad members have identical or near identical scores, i.e. a difference of 0 or 1 (coded 1), and lack of agreement (coded 0).

Parenting behavior was assessed through young adults' retrospective reports regarding the behavior of their mother and father, usually only one of which was included in the study, as discussed in the *Methodology and data* section of the Introduction. While such retrospective reports may be affected by recall issues, according to research, children's perception of parental behaviors is more influential to various outcomes, such as school achievement, than actual parental behaviors or parents' reports of their behavior (Demo, Small, and Savin-Williams 1987; Paulson 1994; Aunola, Stattin, and Nurmi 2000).

Parental warmth was measured using three items from the English-translated EMBU scale, a short version of the widely used Swedish scale "My Memories of Upbringing," which measures memories of parental rearing behavior (Perris et al. 1980; Arrindell et al. 1999). The parental warmth measure sums scores for three indicators of: emotional warmth (I felt that warmth and tenderness existed between me and my mother/father), positive evaluation (I felt that my mother/father was proud when I succeeded in something I did) and emotional support (If things went bad for me, my mother/father tried to comfort and encourage me), each measured on a dichotomous (0=no, 1=yes) scale. The resulting variable takes values from 0 to 3, with higher scores indicating higher levels of parental warmth.

Parental psychological control sums two indicators from the Psychological Control Scale-Youth Self-Report (Barber 1996), namely "My mother/father always tried to change how I felt or thought about things" and "My mother/father blamed me for other family members' problems," which are measured on a

dichotomous scale (0=no, 1=yes). The parental psychological control index takes values from 0 to 2, with higher scores indicating greater psychological control.

Parental autonomy support is assessed using three indicators ("My mother/father emphasized that every family member should have some say in family decisions"; "My mother/father encouraged me to be independent"; "My mother/father encouraged me to choose my own direction in life") measured as well on a dichotomous scale (0=no, 1=yes). A summed score was created, with values ranging from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate more perceived parental autonomy support.

The analysis also includes a set of individual controls that were shown to influence parent-child attitudinal congruence at the individual level: young adults' gender (0=male and 1=female), age (as parent-child ideological congruence is expected to decrease with age), education (in three categories, where "low" indicates ISCED I+II, "medium" ISCED III+IV, and "high" ISCED V), religious denominational congruence with parent (based on the question "Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?" which was asked to both parents and young adults, a new variable was constructed to indicate whether neither reported a denominational affiliation, coded 0, only one of them had a denominational affiliation, coded 1, or both were affiliated with a religious denomination, coded 2), marital status (differentiates between people who were married or in a legally registered partnership and the rest) and working status (differentiates between respondents who were employed and those who were unemployed or not in the labor force) of the respondent, as well as for the gender (0=male and 1=female) and education of the parent (same classification as in the case of the young adults).

Contextual country characteristics are presented in Table 2.1. Scores for the individualism *vs* collectivism dimension were derived from Beugelsdijk and Welzel (2018) and are country averages based on the analysis of five items from the World Value Survey and European Value Survey (1981-2014) data. Higher scores indicate a higher level of individualism. Country averages show considerable variation and indicate that Denmark, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Germany have the highest level of individualism, whereas Turkey, Hungary, Greece, and Italy have the lowest.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the analyses in this chapter make use of the two-generation data collected in the CUPESSE research project on intergenerational value transmission (Tosun et al. 2019). The sample used for the analyses that follow was composed of 5,836 parent-young adults dyads. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis are provided in Table 4.15. The analyses for

Table 2.1: Individualism *vs* collectivism score by country

	Individualism *vs* collectivism
Austria	53.4
Czechia	63.0
Denmark	94.3
Germany	62.5
Greece	48.4
Hungary	44.2
Italy	48.5
Spain	50.1
Switzerland	67.2
Turkey	19.0
UK	56.6

Note: Beugelsdijk and Welzel (2018). Higher scores indicate a higher level of individualism.

this chapter were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2014). Figures were produced using the *ggplot2* package (Wickham 2016) and interaction effects plots using the *sjPlot* package (Lüdecke 2019). All missing cases were excluded from the analysis. The models include country fixed effects.

2.4 Results

2.4.1 Intergenerational congruence in left-right self-placement

Recognition, or the willingness and ability to place oneself on the scale varies widely across countries, and is the highest (to near unanimous) in central Europe (as reflected in Figure 2.1). As shown in Table 4.12, at the higher end, with response rates of over 90% are the youth in Switzerland (100%), Austria (91.7%), Spain (91.4%), and Denmark (90.4%), whereas at the lower end are respondents from the UK (70.4%), Turkey (72.7%), and the Czech Republic (74.3%). Overall, parents place themselves on the continuum in greater numbers than the youth (83.3% for mothers and 90% for mothers compared to 79.64% for youth). In addition to generation, self-placement varies by gender and level of education. A difference of around 8% is observed in the self-placement of young men and women (84.04% *vs* 75.75%). The self-placement percentage of young men surpasses that of young women in all countries, with the exception of Switzerland and Turkey. The highest gender difference in self-placement is recorded in the UK (of 15.53%) and the Czech Republic (14.75%), while the lowest is in Denmark (1.4%), Spain (1.7%), and Turkey (1.75%).

The same gender pattern is observed in the case of parents, as fathers

consistently answer the self-placement question in greater numbers than mothers do (see Figure 2.2), although the difference (6.7%) is smaller than in the case of the youth. Across the countries, the largest gender differences in response are recorded in Italy (14.35%), Austria (14.28%), and the Czech Republic (13.52%) and the lowest in the UK (2.77%) and Germany (5.23%). Less than 5% of the fathers in Austria (0%), Spain (1.69%), Denmark (3.62%), Germany (4.79%), and Switzerland (4.81%) failed to place themselves on the left-right scale, whereas more than 15% did so in Italy (15.54%), Hungary (16.27%) and the UK (19.28%). In the case of mothers, the percentages are higher, ranging from a low of 10% in Denmark and Germany, to a high of around 30% in Italy and 23.14% in Hungary.

As mentioned, familiarity with the left-right continuum varies with the level of education, both for the younger and older generation. For the youth, self-placement increases with education in most of the countries, with the exception of Austria, where it averages around 91-92% for each level, and Switzerland, where there is no missing data for the youth. The lowest self-placement rate for the lowest educated category is found in the UK, with only 57.5%. In the case of fathers, there is as well a clear increase in the self-placement rate with the level of education, with the exception of the UK. However, on average, even the least educated in this group still show greater recognition (86.49%) than youth (79.64%) or mothers (83.3%).

Average self-placement across countries

Although average values for both generations fall around the middle of the scale (see Table 4.13), clear differences can be observed for specific countries. Youth in Spain have the most leftward average self-placement (3.7), compared to youth in other countries, as well as mothers (4.3) and fathers (4.4) in Spain. As expected, daughters are more leftist than sons, the biggest difference being observed in Austria. Mothers are also on average more centrist than both fathers (especially in Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy) and young adults (Spain and the Czech Republic). Like recognition, average self-placement varies with education. For youth, increased educational attainment is coupled with a clear leftist trend in Austria, while in several other countries (Germany, Spain, Turkey, the UK) the relationship is U-shaped. In the case of mothers, there is a clear leftist trend with increased education in most countries, while in Spain and the Czech Republic the reverse can be observed. For fathers, the most striking results appear in Turkey, where middle educated fathers are on average the rightist group of all



Figure 2.1: Left-right self-placement (%) across countries



Figure 2.2: Left-right self-placement (%) across countries for youth, mothers and fathers

investigated (7.4), while the lowly (5.7) and highly (4.3) educated groups are more centrist.

To test the association between the self-placement of parents and their young adult children, correlations were calculated, shown in Table 4.14. The self-placement of parents is positively and moderately related to that of their children and ranges from a low of r=.31 for father-child dyads in Austria and Switzerland to a high of r=.77 for mother-child dyads in Italy. Overall, the relationship is slightly stronger for father-youth (r=.53) than mother-youth dyads (r=.5), although to a less extent than expected. In half of the countries included in the sample (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy and Switzerland) the strength of the mother-youth relationship exceeds that of father-youth, the biggest difference being found in Switzerland (r=.51 for mother-child and r=.31 for father-child dyads). The strongest correlations for father-youth dyads are those in Turkey (r=.78) and Italy (r=.75), while the weakest appear to be in Austria (r=.31), Switzerland (r=.31) and the Czech Republic (r=.33). In the case of mother-youth dyads, Turkey (r=.66) and Italy (r=.77) are still in the

lead, whereas all the rest of the countries show a moderate relationship ranging from r=.386 in Austria to r=.514 in Switzerland.

Breaking down the correlation by the gender of the youth reveals that the self-placement of sons is more strongly related to that of their fathers (r=.58) than of their mothers (r=.43), the strongest relationships being observed in Italy (r=.75) and Turkey (r=.81). However, an inverse relationship is observed for parent-youth dyads in Austria, Italy and Switzerland, where a son's self-placement is more strongly related to that of his mother. Conversely, a daughter's self-placement correlates more strongly to their mother's (r=.54), especially in Italy (r=.77), Turkey (r=.67) and Switzerland (r=.58). Exceptions to this are Germany, Hungary, Spain, and the UK, where daughters' self-placement is more strongly related to that of their fathers.

Correlations by the level of education of the youth reveal that the strongest parent-youth relationship is found in the medium educated group (r=0.53 for mothers and r=0.55 for fathers), whereas the weakest in the highly educated group (r=0.47 for mothers and r=0.49 for fathers). In Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK, the strength of the correlation decreases with the level of education, markedly so in the case of Denmark (e.g., from r=0.89 for lowly educated to r=0.40 for highly educated youth in mother-youth dyads). However, the reverse trend can also be observed. Interestingly, for both father and mother-youth dyads in Germany, the strength of the relationship increases with the level of education of the youth (the same holds for father-youth dyads in Austria, although the correlation coefficients are not significant), which could be explained by their left-leaning position. The correlational results reported in Table 2 clearly show that the self-placement of parents and their young adult children are positively related and statistically significant in most countries. These findings support the premise that parents are an important socialization agent of their children's ideological position.

2.4.2 Parenting dimensions ratings

Before continuing to regression analysis results, I present average ratings for each of the three parenting behavior dimensions (shown in Figure 2.3). Young adults rated both their mothers and their fathers in terms of the three dimensions (perceived warmth, psychological control and autonomy support). However, in the overwhelming majority of cases only one parent took part in the study. Consequently, averages shown in Figure 2.3 reflect young adults' perceptions

Figure 2.3: Average parenting dimension ratings by country

(a) Parental warmth



(b) Parental psychological control



(c) Parental autonomy support



Note: Post-stratification weights applied.

regarding the behavior of the parent included in the study (for which self-placement data is available).

Consistent with previous research (Trommsdorff 2009; Olivari et al. 2015), the largest variations in the ratings of the three dimensions can be observed in the case of parental psychologic control (Figure 2.3b). Levels of parental control are generally low, as expected in the case of European countries. Average country scores range from a low of 0.12 to a high of 0.63 (out of a maximum of 2). For this dimension, a north-south divide between the 11 countries can be observed. The youth in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy and Spain) report the highest levels of parental psychological control, whereas those in Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark report the lowest, with the Danish average (0.12) being a fifth of the Greek one (0.63).

These results are in line with Doepke and Zilibotti's (2017) findings on the higher prevalence of the authoritarian parenting style (which entails high levels of behavioral and psychological control) in countries with higher income inequality, less redistribution and weaker institutions, as is the case of these three Southern European countries. Interestingly, Germany appears to be closer to this group, although the two researchers offer it as an example of country with a higher share of permissive parents, given its low levels of income inequality.

Conversely, Doepke and Zilibotti's study suggests that higher levels of parental warmth and autonomy support are to be expected in countries with less income inequality, more redistribution and stronger institutions. However, no clear pattern of differences emerges based on the data investigated. Levels of parental warmth (Figure 2.3a) and autonomy support (Figure 2.3c) are high across the 11 countries included in the sample, despite differences in terms of inequality, redistribution and institutional setup, which indicates that parents in Europe value warmth and autonomy support highly.

In a next step, I investigate variations in the levels of parent-child ideological congruence by each parenting dimension (see Figure 2.4), beginning with parental warmth. Overall, close to two thirds (58%) of the young adults who report the highest level of parental warmth are ideologically congruent with their parents. This percentage diminishes gradually for lower levels of parental warmth to 43% for the lowest level (Figure 2.4a), which suggests a positive association between perceived parental warmth and parent-child ideological congruence. A similar trend can be observed in the majority of the 11 countries investigated (Figure 2.9), especially Denmark, where congruence increases nearly fivefold across the levels of parental warmth, from 11.7% to close to 50%, and the UK, where it

Figure 2.4: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by parenting dimension ratings

(a) Congruence (yes/no) by *warmth*



(b) Congruence (yes/no) by *psychological control*



(c) Congruence (yes/no) by *autonomy support*



triples, from close to 20% to 60%. The highest parent-child congruence levels are found in Italy (78.3%), Hungary (67.8%) and Turkey (67.2%), where more than two thirds of the young adults report the highest level of parental warmth share their parent's ideological position.

For the case of parental psychological control, no clear overall pattern of relationship with parent-child ideological congruence seems to emerge (Figure 2.4b). However, looking at the country data, the expected negative relationship between ideological congruence and parental control can be observed in four countries (see Figure 2.10). A higher share of the young adults who report low parental control are ideologically congruent with their parents compared to those who report high parental control. These differences reach 23% in Switzerland (from 34.5% to 57.6%), 16% in Italy (from 56.4% to 72%), 13% in Germany (from 53% to 66.2%), and 10% in Greece (from 46.5% to 56%).

Parental autonomy support also appears to be linked, as expected, to an increase in parent-child ideological congruence (Figure 2.4c). Young adults who report higher levels of autonomy support from the part of their parents share their ideological position to a greater extent. This trend can be observed especially in Austria, Italy and Spain (Figure 2.11).

2.4.3 Parental behavior effects on intergenerational congruence

The association between parenting dimensions and parent-child ideological congruence is further explored using logistic regression models, with parent-child ideological congruence as the dependent variable and young adults' perception of their parents' warmth, psychological control and autonomy support as main predictors.

Hypothesis H2.1a outlined the expectation that young adults' likelihood of ideological congruence with their parents increases with the level of perceived parental warmth. Logistic regression results shown in Models 1 and 2 (see Table 4.18) indeed suggest a positive association between parental warmth and parent-child congruence, supporting H2.1a. Young adults' odds of sharing the ideological views of their parents are 33% higher with each increasing level of perceived parental warmth (CI: 0.20, 0.36). This result remains significant to the inclusion in Model 2 of several relevant controls that were shown to affect parent-child value congruence.

Figure 2.5a plots the predicted probability of ideological congruence for

Figure 2.5: Parenting dimensions and parent-child ideological congruence, predicted probabilities

(a) Parental warmth



(b) Parental psychological control



(c) Parental autonomy support



Note: Predicted values of parent-child ideological congruence (binary) correspond to Models 2, 4 and 6 in Figure 4.18.

the levels of parental warmth, showing an increase with each level of warmth. Regression results for individual countries, shown in Table 4.19, indicate that parental warmth is positively associated to intergenerational congruence in the majority of countries. The largest effects are found in Denmark (135% higher odds of congruence which each level of perceived parental warmth), Italy (69% higher odds of congruence) and the UK (67% higher odds of congruence), while in the Czech Republic and Switzerland parental warmth is negatively associated to parent-child congruence.

Models 3 and 4 test the association between parental psychological control and parent-child ideological congruence. The two were expected to be negatively related (H2.1b), such that the likelihood of congruence decreases as the perceived level of psychological control increases. Regression results indicate that the coefficient for psychological control is negative (supporting hypothesis H2.1b) and significant, even after controlling for additional factors. However, the effect size is much smaller than in the case of parental warmth. Holding all else constant, there is an 12% decrease in the odds of congruence for each level of perceived psychological control (CI: -0.21, -0.02) (predicted probabilities are shown in Figure 2.5b).

As shown in Table 4.21, parental psychological control is negatively related to intergenerational congruence in most of the 11 individual countries studied. Exceptions are Austria, Switzerland and the UK, where increased control is associated with higher odds of congruence (8% in Austria, 10% in Switzerland and 24% in the UK), although the coefficients are not statistically significant. The strongest detrimental effects of control on parent-child ideological congruence are found in Denmark, Turkey and Italy. The odds of congruence to parents perceived as controlling are 72% lower for Danish young adults, 34% lower for Turkish and 30% for Italian. Given the country's high level of individualism, the strong negative effect observed in Denmark was expected. However, the results for Turkey and Italy are puzzling, since both countries have high levels of collectivism, which should mitigate the negative effect of parental control on children's internalization of parental values.

In line with expectations laid out in hypothesis H2.1c, like parental warmth, autonomy support is positively and significantly associated with parent-child congruence (Models 5 and 6 in Table 4.18). Holding all else constant, young adults have 27% higher odds of ideological congruence with their parents with each increasing level of perceived parental autonomy support. Therefore, young adults who report the highest levels of perceived parental autonomy have the

highest odds of sharing their parents' position on the left-right scale. Country results indicate that autonomy support is weakly and even negatively associated to parent-child congruence in the Czech Republic, Switzerland, and Turkey (see Table 4.20). Conversely, the strongest positive association between the two is found in Denmark (69% higher odds of congruence), Italy (50% higher odds), UK (38% higher odds), and Greece (37% higher odds).

2.4.4 Cross-national variations in parental behavior effects

The literature review presented above shows that the relationship between parenting behavior and the success of intergenerational value transmission has thus far been scarcely investigated across various cultural contexts (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Trommsdorff 2009). Nevertheless, previous studies offer reasons to expect differences in this relationship based on the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in a country, although previous analyses are limited to a small number of countries (e.g., Sümer et al. (2019) employ data from the Czech Republic, Spain, and Turkey). The second aim of this chapter is to explore the cross-national variation in the strength of perceived parenting behavior effects on parent-child ideological congruence depending on levels of individualism.

Table 2.2: Odds ratio of parent-child ideological congruence and country contextual characteristics, correlation coefficients

	Warmth	Psychological control	Autonomy support
Individualism	0.35	-0.44	0.43

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

In order to achieve this aim, I investigate the relationship between the odds ratio of parent-child congruence for each perceived parenting behavior dimension on the one hand and the levels of individualism on the other. Hypotheses H2.2a and H2.2c formulated the expectation that young adults who perceived their parents as warm or autonomy supportive have higher odds of sharing their ideological views in individualist than in collectivist countries.

In support of the first hypothesis, results shown in Table 2.2 suggest a positive association between the odds of congruence and level of individualism of a country, although the relationship is not statistically significant (r=0.35, p>.01 for parental warmth and r=0.43, p>.01 for autonomy support). However, given the restrictions in the number of cases investigated (11 countries), the

direction of the relationship is more suggestive than its level of statistical significance. As illustrated in Figure 2.6a, young adults who perceive their parents as warm are more likely to share their ideological views in countries higher in individualism, especially Denmark. Figure 2.6c shows a similar pattern for the case of parental autonomy support. Young adults who perceive their parents as autonomy supportive have a higher likelihood of sharing their ideological position in individualist than in collectivist countries.

Hypothesis H2.2b stated that higher levels of perceived parental psychological control have a more detrimental effect on the odds of parent-child congruence the higher the level of individualism in a country. In line with this hypothesis, results indicate a negative relationship between the odds of parent-child congruence for young adults who perceive their parents as controlling and the level of individualism in a country (r=0.43, p>.01). As shown in Figure 2.6b, young adults who perceived their parents as controlling have a higher chance of sharing their ideological views in collectivist than in individualist countries (e.g., Denmark). However, the relationship fails to reach statistical significance in this case as well.

The general picture resulting from these analyses supports the previous (limited) findings suggesting that the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in a country is consequential for the expected effects of parenting behavior on parent-child value congruence. Specifically, higher levels of parental psychological control seem to be more detrimental to parent-child ideological countries in individualist countries. However, further research is needed to elucidate the explanation behind this pattern.

2.4.5 The moderating effect of parent and child gender

Hypothesis H2.3a stated that the relationship between parental warmth and parent-child ideological congruence varies across parent gender. That is, perceived parental warmth from the part of the father will have a stronger effect on ideological congruence than parental warmth from the part of the mother. Regression results presented in Table 4.22 (Models 2 and 3) do not support this hypothesis, since the interaction term is not statistically significant. As shown in Figure 2.7a, the effect of perceived parental warmth on ideological congruence does not vary depending on parental gender. Perceptions of parental warmth from both mothers and fathers are associated with a higher likelihood of intergenerational congruence, albeit being slightly more marked for fathers.



(a) Parental warmth

(b) Parental psychological control



(c) Parental autonomy support

Figure 2.6: Odds of congruence to parent by individualism levels by country

A similar expectation of gender-differentiated effect was formulated for perceived psychological control (Hypothesis H2.3b). Specifically, that the negative association of psychological control to ideological congruence will be stronger in the case of mothers. This expectation was based on findings that showing that children and adolescents generally spend more time with their mothers than with their fathers (Coltrane 2006; Craig 2006; Garcia Roman and Cortina 2016), which increases their exposure to control from the part of mothers.

Model 5 results show that the interaction term is significant, even after the inclusion of additional controls ($p<.01$, CI: -0.36, 0.01). This indicates that the effect of psychological control on parent-child congruence is significantly different for the two parents. Controlling for all else, the odds of congruence are 17% lower for mothers compared to fathers for each one unit increase in perceived psychological control.

Figure 2.7b illustrates the predicted probabilities of parent-child congruence and confidence intervals for different levels of psychological control by parental gender. At the lowest level of perceived control, the predicted congruence levels for mother-child dyads are higher than those for father-child dyads. However, these decrease with each additional level of perceived control, such that for the highest levels, the predicted levels of congruence with mothers are nearly 8% lower than those of congruence with fathers.

Finally, hypothesis H2.3c stated that perceived autonomy support from the part of mothers will increase the likelihood of parent-child congruence more than in the case of fathers. Regression results presented in Models 7 and 8 (Table 4.22) show that the interaction term between parental autonomy support and parent gender does not reach statistical significance at the <0.1 level. Figure 2.7c shows that the predicted probability of ideological congruence increases similarly with each additional level of perceived autonomy support for both mothers and fathers.

Having found significant differences in the effect of psychological control on parent-child congruence depending on parent gender, the next step is to test whether this interaction is different for male and female young adults. To inquire into this, logistic regression models were fitted to the data to include a three-way interaction between parental behavior dimensions (warmth, autonomy support and psychological control), parental gender and young adult gender (see Table 4.23). Predicted probability plots for each parenting dimension are shown in Figure 2.8.

The three-way interaction term is not statistically significant for any of the



(a) Parental warmth



(b) Parental psychological control



(c) Parental autonomy support

Figure 2.7: Predicted congruence levels by parenting dimension and parental gender

three parenting dimensions. However, the predicted probability plots indicate some relevant differences in the interaction between parenting and parent gender depending on the gender of the youth. Higher levels of perceived parental warmth from the part of fathers seem to be associated with a higher probability of congruence in the case of sons, than in that of daughters, although, as mentioned, the differences are not statistically significant (see Figure 2.8a). This suggests that same-sex effects should be explored further in future studies.

In contrast, clearer differences based on young adult gender can be observed for psychological control. Figure 2.8b shows that increasing levels of psychological control from the part of mothers decreases the likelihood of congruence for both sons and daughters to approximately the same level. On the other hand, increased levels of control from the part of fathers slightly decrease congruence in the case of sons, while actually increasing it for the case of daughters.

Differences based on young adult gender can also be observed for the case of parental autonomy support (see Figure 2.8c). In this case, a same-sex effect can be observed for father-son dyads. In the case of sons, increasing levels of autonomy support from the part of fathers lead to a greater increase in the odds of congruence. On the other hand, more perceived autonomy support from the part of mothers is associated with a smaller increase in the odds of congruence for mother-son dyads. For the case of daughters, increasing levels of autonomy support from both mothers and fathers are associated with higher odds of ideological congruence to a similar extent.

2.5 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter has examined the relationship between perceived parenting behavior and parent-child ideological congruence in a sample of 18-35 year old young adults and their parents from 11 European countries. It first investigated the direct effects of children's perceptions of their parents' behavior on the likelihood of sharing their ideological views. Secondly, it investigated variations in this relationship across different national contexts depending on the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in the 11 countries. Thirdly, it explored how parent and child gender moderate the relationship between perceived parenting and intergenerational ideological congruence.

Regression analyses show that young adults who perceived their parents as warm and autonomy supporting during their adolescence have a higher likelihood



(a) Parental warmth



(b) Parental psychological control



(c) Parental autonomy support

Figure 2.8: Predicted congruence levels by parenting dimension, parental gender and youth gender on intergenerational congruence

of sharing their ideological position, when controlling for the effects of youth and parental gender and education, youth employment, age and congruence in religiosity with parent. Specifically, young adults' odds of congruence to their parents are 33% higher with each increasing level of perceived parental warmth and 27% higher with each level of perceived autonomy support. These findings confirm the results of previous studies which report that value transmission from parents to children is enhanced by a warm family climate (Tedin 1974; Mohr and DiMaggio 1995; Schönpflug 2001; Rico and Jennings 2016).

In contrast, as expected, higher levels of psychological control were associated with lower odds of intergenerational ideological congruence, although the effect size was smaller (12% decrease in the odds of congruence for each increasing level of perceived control). These results are in line with attribution theory, which holds that people are less likely to internalize values under conditions of high control, especially when the source of that control is absent, which usually occurs when children leave the parental home in young adulthood. Moreover, reactance theory also explains the adverse effects of parental control on parent-child ideological congruence, by holding that increased control triggers increased efforts at reasserting autonomy and rejecting the values of the person exercising that control.

Country analyses showed large variations, with the most detrimental effect of parental control found in Denmark (72% lower odds), Turkey (34%) and Italy (30%). These results are in line with Murray and Mulvaney's findings (2012) on the negative effect of parental control on intergenerational ideological congruence. However, while their study was limited to a small sample of American mother-child dyads, the results presented here are based on a larger, more diverse, European sample consisting of both mother and father-child dyads. This also allowed the exploration of cross-national variation in the effects of perceived parenting on ideological congruence, as well as the analysis of gender specific differences in these effects.

The strength of perceived parental warmth, psychological control and autonomy support as transmission belts for ideological orientations was expected to vary across cultural contexts depending on the level of individualism *vs* collectivism in a country. Specifically, hypotheses H2.2a and H2.2c stated the expectation of a stronger positive association between warmth and autonomy support on the one hand, and intergenerational congruence on the other in countries high in individualism. Conversely, hypothesis H2.2b stated that the negative association between psychological control and ideological congruence

will be weaker in countries high in collectivism. This expectation was based on previous research showing reduced negative effects of psychological control on child outcomes in collectivist countries (Yau and Smetana 1996; Rudy and Grusec 2001).

The cross-national analysis supported these expectations. Young adults who perceived their parents as warm or autonomy supporting have higher odds of congruence in countries high in individualism. Similarly, psychological control appears to have a stronger negative association to ideological congruence in countries high in individualism, such as Denmark. Young adults who perceive their parents as highly controlling have lower odds of sharing their parents' ideological position the more individualist the country in which they reside is. These results suggest a variation in the strength of the association between parents perceived behavior and intergenerational congruence depending on cultural context. This warrants a further exploration of this variation in a larger number of countries and outside of the European context.

Finding that high levels of parental warmth and autonomy support favor parent-child ideological congruence, while high levels of psychological control inhibit it, the next set of questions addressed potential differences in this relation based on the gender composition of the parent-child dyad. Hypotheses H2.3a and H2.3c stated that high levels of parental warmth and autonomy support will have a larger effect on ideological congruence in the case of father than mother-child dyads. Conversely, higher levels of psychological control were expected to have a more detrimental effect in mother-child dyads (H2.3b).

Regression results showed no significant difference in the association between parental warmth and ideological congruence based on parental gender. Although ideological congruence was higher in father-child dyads across all levels of parental warmth, the increase across levels of perceived warmth was not significantly different from that observed in the case of mother-child dyads. Similarly, hypothesis H2.3b stated the expectation that higher levels of perceived autonomy support from the part of fathers will be associated with a larger increase in ideological congruence. However, no significant parental gender-differentiated effect was found. In contrast, the effect of perceived psychological control on congruence was significantly different for mothers and fathers. Higher levels of paternal perceived control was associated with little to no decrease in the odds of ideological congruence. On the other hand, increasing levels of maternal control significantly reduced the odds of ideological congruence. This suggests that high levels of psychological control are particularly detrimental to mother-

child ideological congruence, while having little to no impact on father-child congruence.

The analyses presented in this chapter bring new empirical evidence in favor of the moderating effect of parenting behaviors on parent-child value transmission. High levels of parental warmth and autonomy support favor parent-child ideological congruence, while high levels of psychological control inhibit it. Although these analyses tested the relationship between perceived parental behavior and intergenerational congruence on a large, cross-national sample, future studies should examine this relationship in more detail, paying attention to the mechanisms behind this association, in order to better understand ideological transmission across different socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic groups.



Figure 2.9: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by parental *warmth* across countries



Figure 2.10: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by parental *psychological control* across countries



Figure 2.11: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by parental *autonomy support* across countries

Chapter 3

Parent-child ideological congruence in the context of intergenerational mobility

3.1 Introduction

The transmission of social status from parent to child (or status inheritance) is one of the main (indirect) pathways, in addition to social learning (direct pathway), through which parents exert an influence over the political attitudes of their children (Lane 1959; Dalton 1982). Proponents of the *status inheritance* or *status transmission* model hold that parent-child attitude similarity or reproduction is a product of successful intergenerational transmission of social structural position, including class, religious affiliation and marital status. This creates a similar social environment for both parents and their children, which results in similar life experiences and influences (Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005). Studies usually account for this route of parental influence by including children's (or their parents') current social status as control in regression models. This is based on the assumption of shared social position between parent and child. In most cases, parental attitudes continue to significantly predict the attitudes of their children, usually with lower coefficients, which is interpreted as both status transmission and social learning accounting for a part of the observed parent-child attitudinal similarity (see, for example, Rico and Jennings 2016).

While parents and children share the same social status during the early years of a child's life, the situation could change once children reach adulthood. Upon finishing education and entering employment, young adults can either maintain the social status of their parents or move up (upward mobility) or down (downward mobility) the social ladder in comparison to them. The assumption of upward social mobility, which holds that children will lead better lives and do better in material terms than previous generations, is deeply ingrained in liberal democracies (Newman 1999; Gilbert 2017). The generations growing up in a developed country after World War II were more likely to be better off than their parents and grandparents, fueled by booming economies, a growing labor market, and increasing enrollment in education (Thijssen and Wolbers 2016).

More recently, the expectation of upward intergenerational mobility has come under threat, as many young people have found it harder to maintain the social status and standards of living of their parents, while others fear that they will fail to do so in the future, thus facing the prospects of downward intergenerational mobility. On the background of rising unemployment, income inequality and slow economic growth, recent years have seen a decline in absolute mobility and an increase in downward mobility rates across Europe and the US (Corak 2004; Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007; Alm 2011; Li and Devine 2011; Thijssen and Wolbers 2016; Elliot Major and Machin 2018). Moreover, this trend risks being accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and cause an entrenchment of inequalities and long-lasting damages to young adults' prospects of social mobility.

On the other hand, upward mobility has become more limited, as the middle-classes face difficulties in maintaining their status and income (Urahn et al. 2012; Bukodi et al. 2015; Chetty et al. 2017). In this context, people lower on the income scale are seeing their aspirations dashed and fear a more precarious future for themselves than the one of their parents or grandparents. Furthermore, concerns regarding downward mobility now cut across all social classes (Schöneck, Mau, and Schupp 2011; Buchholz and Blossfeld 2012). Given how widespread the experience of mobility is in Western societies (Breen 2004b), an inquiry into its implications for parent-child attitudinal congruence is not only warranted, but also timely in the current context.

Previous research has shown a link between economic insecurity and support for the political extremes. The radical right enjoys higher support among the ranks of the poor, unemployed and financially insecure (Norris 2005; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011). Far right parties thus stand a better chance at winning

large shares of the votes in countries with a high unemployment rate (Jackman and Volpert 1996), especially under conditions of high immigration (Knigge 1998; Golder 2003). Conversely, economic insecurity and concerns about inequality drive support for the far left (Bowyer and Vail 2011).

Moreover, populist parties, which are becoming increasingly appealing to the electorate across Europe and the world, discursively mobilize the public's loss of confidence in, and fear of, the future, capitalizing on such anxieties for political gain. In a recent study of political communication during campaigns, Nai (2018) finds evidence that populist candidates use to a greater extent fear-arousing campaign messages that exploit people's uncertainty and insecurities (see also Ridout and Searles 2011; Mols and Jetten 2016). The increase in downward mobility and pessimism about future living standards should raise concerns in terms of their potential political implications at the individual level.

Social mobility theory holds that, in comparison to non-mobile individuals, the mobile are less likely to hold the same attitudes as the social origin group which they share with their parents (Blau 1956; Abramson and Books 1971; Jackman 1972; Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995; Piketty 1995; Daenekindt 2017). However, previous research in social mobility has equated origin effects (which result from the shared social position between parents and their children early in life) with socialization effects (see, for example, Tolsma, De Graaf, and Quillian 2009; Jaime-Castillo and Marques-Perales 2019). Thus, observed parent-child attitudinal similarity was considered to (necessarily) result from socialization processes, which conflates shared milieu and social learning effects. Given its potential for altering the level of parent-child congruence, political socialization studies need to examine the process of social mobility more closely.

Despite the importance of social mobility, only limited work has assessed its effects on political attitudes, especially cross-nationally. One recent exception is the study of Mitrea, Mühlböck, and Warmuth (2020), which shows that young adults in Europe who expect to do worse than their parents are more likely to place themselves to the extremes of the left-right scale, compared to young adults who expect no mobility in the future. However, the effects of expected and experienced intergenerational mobility on parent-child congruence in political attitudes have remained largely unexplored. Consequently, this chapter has a threefold purpose. First, it investigates the extent to which past and expected future intergenerational mobility has the potential to shift young adults away from the political orientations of their parents. Secondly, it explores the cross-national variations in intergenerational mobility effects across 11 European

countries, looking at differences based on unemployment rate, immigration rate, and social safety net. Thirdly, the chapter inquires into the extent to which the strength of family ties can mitigate potential mobility effects on parent-child attitudinal congruence.

This chapter investigates the effects of experienced (past) and expected (future) intergenerational social mobility (both upward and downward) over parent-child congruence in left-right self-placement and the extent to which the strength of family ties can mitigate these mobility effects. Mobility is estimated by comparing individuals' self-reports of their current economic status to the family status at the time when they were teenagers (age 14). Using recent survey data collected in the framework of an international and interdisciplinary research project on intergenerational value transmission, this chapter finds that the experience of upward mobility decreases parent-child ideological congruence and that its effects are not mitigated by the strength of family ties. These findings are consistent with the *resocialization* and *status maximization* theories, which hold that the destination group exerts a stronger influence over mobile individuals than their origin group (i.e. the family they grew up in), and have important implications for the study of the family transmission of attitudes. Moreover, they point to the importance of including intergenerational mobility in studies of political socialization and the persistence of family influence into adulthood.

The chapter is structured in five sections. The first section discusses the understanding and extent of experienced and expected intergenerational mobility in Europe. The second section presents the theories concerning attitudinal effects of intergenerational mobility, offers a review of previous research on the relationship between social mobility and political attitudes, and presents the mechanisms behind the hypothesized effect of mobility on people's political attitudes. The third section introduces the main expectations regarding the effects of intergenerational mobility on ideological self-placement and parent-child attitudinal congruence. The fourth section offers a description of the data and measures used in the analysis, as well as the analytical strategy employed. This is followed by an investigation of the levels of intergenerational mobility in the sample and the presentation of the main regression results. Finally, the last section concludes with a discussion of the results and potential avenues for future research of the consequences of intergenerational mobility for parent-child attitudinal congruence.

3.2 Intergenerational mobility: experiences and expectations

Social mobility theory distinguishes between individuals' social *origin* and *destination* group or class, which occur at different points over the course of one's lifetime (Glass 1954; Blau and Duncan 1967). The group of origin designates the social group to which one's parents belong and is experienced in childhood and adolescence. On the other hand, the destination group is experienced as a result of the process of social mobility, most often in young adulthood. During this time, most people leave the parental home or finish formal schooling, and enter full-time employment. Lipset and Bendix define social mobility as the "process by which individuals move from one stratum of society to another" (1959, 6). Upon reaching adulthood, stable or non-mobile people remain in the same social group as their parents, while mobile individuals experience a class position different from that of their parents (or deviate from their parents' class position). Given the hierarchical ordering of social classes or groups depending on a series of criteria, as will be discussed below, the mobile are classified as *upwardly mobile* when the class of destination occupies a higher position than that of the class of origin, and *downwardly mobile* when the reverse is true (Barber 1957).

The process of moving to a different social group than that of one's parents is referred to as *intergenerational* mobility, while changes in social group throughout an individual's life-course is termed *intragenerational* mobility. This chapter is solely concerned with mobility across generations, given the wider focus of this dissertation on the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes. A distinction can also be made between *vertical* and *horizontal* mobility, depending on whether there are significant differences in terms of wealth, prestige, and status between the groups. The *direction* of vertical mobility (upward or downward) results from differences in prestige and status associated with the groups that form the hierarchy of social classes, while the *extent* of mobility refers to the distance traveled or the difference between the origin and destination group. Short range mobility between adjacent or close groups seems to be more common than long-range mobility between groups at the extreme ends of the social class hierarchy (Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007).

Traditional criteria used to indicate an individual's social status or position in the social status hierarchy include education, occupation, or economic situation (Glass 1954). Intergenerational mobility was measured as the status difference

between parent and child, traditionally the distance between the occupation of the father and that of the child. However, more recent studies, both in sociology and economics, have used a variety of indicators, which range from occupational prestige, income, standards of living (Martinussen 1992), to subjective class identification or subjective perceptions of mobility (subjective mobility).

This chapter focuses on economic rather than other forms of mobility, such as occupational or educational. Specifically, it uses a measure of intergenerational mobility based on the difference between past and current financial situation (for experienced mobility) and people's expectations regarding their living standards in comparison to their parents' current living standards (for expected mobility). Given the notably high levels of youth unemployment across Europe at the time of data collection (February-April 2016), such a choice allows for the inclusion of more social groups in the analysis, compared to a measure based on occupational status. The sample includes homemakers and the unemployed, excluding however respondents who have not completed full-time education, since they are more likely to be relying on financial aid from their parents. Moreover, given the change in the expected economic returns of education, using an education-based indicator of mobility would not be ideal for capturing economic mobility.

An individual's likelihood of moving up or down the social class hierarchy is influenced by individual-level factors, such as people's aspirations, motivations, effort, ability (physical and mental), skills and qualifications, as well as by environmental and societal factors, like the family environment (disorganization, e.g., divorce or death of a parent), parental investment, social environment and institutions, which have made a long-standing object of sociological study (Blau and Duncan 1967; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Deary et al. 2005; Chetty et al. 2014). Additionally, mobility chances are impacted by structural forces, such as job opportunities, which reflect the occupational needs of an economy (structural mobility). Social mobility rates vary across different countries, over time, and between different groups in a country. Some countries are considered more mobile (or open) than others, which depends on the extent to which people in a society are free to move between unequal social classes, regardless of the social position of their origin group, or, in other words, the extent to which family socioeconomic status determines the status of children as adults. For instance, sociological studies describe Britain as a closed society, in which a person's origins strongly predict the social status achieved in adulthood (Glass 1954; Goldthorpe 1987; Breen 2004a). In contrast, social mobility is much higher in countries such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden.

Social mobility is linked to concepts such as equality of opportunity, fairness, social inclusion and inequality. In order to increase equality of opportunity and the chances of upward mobility, governments have made considerable investments in education. However, education has been recently lagging behind as an engine of upward mobility, as the rise in highly educated workers has diminished the returns it now offers (Lupton, Heath, and Salter 2009). Several studies now attest to an increase in intergenerational downward mobility (Corak 2004; Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007; Alm 2011; Li and Devine 2011). The downwardly mobile are more likely to be men (Thijssen and Wolbers 2016), suffer from physical or mental problems, have lower academic achievement (Arrow 1973; Ganzeboom and Luijkx 2004) and lower human capital, as well as less parental social resources which could facilitate access to better jobs and a better financial situation.

In political discourse, this situation is often conveyed in reference to the shrinking or disappearing middle class and the fading "American dream." Governments have recognized the extent and implications of this issue. For instance, the 2016 State of the Nation report on social mobility in Great Britain states: "The 20th-century expectation was that each generation would be better off than the one preceding it, but this social mobility aspiration is no longer being met." Following the 2008 economic crisis, which has affected young adults particularly hard, judging by youth unemployment levels, expectations of future downward mobility have soared (Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker 2015). Pessimism about the future varies across individuals with educational level, cultural resources, and personality traits (Thijssen and Wolbers 2016). Additionally, institutional features, such as social policy measures and labor market regulations, influence the level of pessimism, depending on the extent to which they can protect against the adverse effects of events such as sickness or unemployment (DiPrete 2002).

In addition to actual intergenerational mobility rates, people's perceptions of these also vary across countries. Moreover, these perceptions are not completely accurate. Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) compare data on intergenerational mobility rates to people's perceptions of mobility levels and show that Americans are overoptimistic, overestimating the chances of a poor child making it into the upper income quintile as an adult, while Europeans are too pessimistic about the chances of upward social mobility. Moreover, Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker (2015) find that Americans are divided along ideological lines in their perceptions of social mobility rates, with liberals more likely to underestimate the amount of mobility and exaggerate the extent of its decline over the past years, due their dissatisfaction with the status quo.

3.3 The political consequences of intergenerational mobility

Drawing on the seminal works of de Tocqueville, Weber, Marx, Pareto and Durkheim, early research on the nexus between social mobility and politics focused on the societal level and inquired into the development of class movements across political systems and the effects of social mobility rates on political stability and change (Davies 1962; Blau and Duncan 1967; Davies 1970; Thernstrom 1984). High mobility rates were seen as a main source of political stability, while low mobility rates were considered to generate frustration and discontent which can translate into political turmoil. Similarly, more recent country comparative research has shown that countries with low levels of social mobility are more prone to experiencing political instability, due to the fact that a larger proportion of the population in these countries will oppose the status quo (Houle 2019).

At the individual level, research on the political consequences of social mobility surveyed the political orientations and behavior of the mobile in comparison to the non-mobile from their origin and destination groups. A frequently asked question was whether upward mobility is associated with conservative political orientations and support for right-wing parties and downward mobility with a liberal orientation and support for left-wing parties. However, before offering a review of these studies, a discussion of the main theories and expectations regarding the effects of social mobility is in order.

3.3.1 Theoretical background

The socialization theory

Previous research has advanced different theories and hypotheses about the effect of the origin and destination group, as well as mobility *per se*, on individual attitudes. As previously mentioned, *socialization* theory holds that, through the process of early family socialization, the origin group has a larger influence over an individual's attitudes than the destination group, due to the fact that it precedes the latter temporally and includes early formative experiences, which are more likely to have a long-lasting effect. Parents serve as models for their children and play a complex role in the development of their political knowledge, attitudes and beliefs. Research has supported the particularly important role that socialization theory attributes to family socialization during childhood

and adolescence in the formation of attitudes, finding that parental attitudes are a strong predictor of offspring attitudes (Dalton 1980; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). Successful transmission results in attitudinal agreement or congruence between parents and their children, which was regarded for a long time as a source of continuity within families and societal stability (Hyman 1959; Miller and Glass 1989).

Research has also provided evidence of a relationship between the strength of family ties, or the importance an individual assigns to his family, and intergenerational transmission of attitudes (Alesina and Giuliano 2010; Ermish and Gambetta 2010). Reher (1998) has made the distinction between weak and strong family systems, depending on the strength of familial ties across different regions and cultures of Europe. Weak-family systems, located for the most part in the center and north of Europe (Scandinavia, the British Isles, the Low Countries, and much of Germany and Austria), place more importance on the individual. This pattern of individualism manifests itself in a lower age of leaving the parental home in order to seek employment, and is maintained throughout the life-course through less contact with parents and more independence in old age. Weak family systems therefore have a higher incidence of loneliness, divorce and extramarital pregnancy, among others. On the other hand, the family is the predominant socialization actor in strong family systems, prevalent in the southern regions of Europe. In these systems, children tend leave the parental home only upon marriage or even later, and use the family as a safety net against economic difficulties. These differences in patterns of co-residence, degree of independence and contact with one's family are consequential for the level of attitudinal congruence between parents and their young adult children, with a higher level of congruence expected in strong family systems.

Ensuing research has for the most part supported, albeit nuanced, Reher's classification of family regimes in Europe into a weak family North and a strong family South. Specifically, it has highlighted substantial differences within countries and regional deviations from the North-South divide (Karsten 2007; Micheli 2012; Aassve, Sironi, and Bassi 2013). Mönkediek and Bras (2014) have examined family structures in Europe at the NUTS2 regional level, looking at contact frequency and geographic proximity among network members, and reported more within-country variety than expected, especially in Austria, Greece, Spain, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands.

The acculturation theory

Partly in opposition to socialization theory, which emphasizes the defining and lasting character of parental influence, the *acculturation* or *resocialization* theory holds that mobile individuals gradually adjust their preferences and attitudes in the direction of their destination group. This is a result of associating and interacting with destination group members or giving in to group pressure (Blau 1956; Abramson and Books 1971; Jackman 1972; Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995; Piketty 1995; Lown 2015; Daenekindt 2017). As a consequence, the origin group loses part of its influence, or, according to Nieuwbeerta, Graaf, and Ultee's *strict economic model* (2000), is deprived of all influence. Therefore, in case of marked attitudinal differences between social classes, the attitudes of mobile individuals are expected to fall midway between those of the non-mobile members of their origin and destination group. The similarity to the destination group is, however, expected to increase with time, i.e., older adults are expected to resemble their destination group to a greater extent than young adults, by virtue of the longer period spent in the new social group (West 1953). For the specific case of political attitudes and vote, the resocialization hypothesis translates into expectations of lower support for left-wing parties and more conservatism from the part of the downwardly mobile compared to the non-mobile members of their destination class. Similarly, the upwardly mobile are expected to support right-wing parties to a less extent and to be less conservative than the non-mobile members of their destination group.

A variant of the acculturation theory, namely the *status maximization* theory, posits the existence of asymmetrical mobility effects, namely that a higher status class exercises a greater pull than a lower status class. This results from the hierarchical ordering of social positions which causes people to struggle to achieve or maintain a higher social status, associated with a higher prestige or, as Lipset and Bendix argue, from people's motivation "to protect their class positions in order to protect their egos, and to improve their class positions in order to enhance their egos" (1959, 61). Therefore, mobile individuals have a higher likelihood of resembling their destination group when the latter is higher in the social status hierarchy than the origin group. The upwardly mobile will hence be more likely to adopt the values and attitudes of their destination group, out of a desire to fit in, while the downwardly mobile will retain the attitudes and values of their origin group, out of a desire to rejoin it at some point in the future (Wilensky and Edwards 1959). Lipset and Bendix's findings support

this hypothesis and suggest that the downwardly mobile vote more conservative than the non-mobile members of their destination class. Alternatively, the *over-identification* hypothesis holds that the upwardly mobile will over-conform to the values of their destination group out of insecurity and fear of status rejection, as well as a desire to prove their new status (Blau 1956; Lipset and Zetterberg 1959). Therefore, the upwardly mobile are expected to be even more conservative than the non-mobile members of their destination group.

The mobility effects theory

If the acculturation theory does not account for any special effects of the mobility process per se on individual attitudes, a third class of theories highlights precisely the net effects of mobility, which remain after the influence of the social positions of origin and destination is accounted for. In this case, although part of the same group, the mobile are qualitatively different from the non-mobile. Mobility effects vary with the distance traveled from a social class to another and the direction of travel (upward or downward). In a study of Australian, British and American national surveys, Kelley (1992) reports limited mobility effects on party identification and conservative attitudes. The exception are the downwardly mobile in the United States, who are more left-wing in party identification, and those in Australia, who are more conservative on the issue of abortion.

3.3.2 Individual-level effects of intergenerational mobility

A sizable literature has inquired into the effects of intergenerational mobility on voting (Graaf and Ultee 1990; Weakliem 1992; Clifford and Heath 1993; Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995). In the 1950s, Daniel Bell (1955) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) explained the growth in right-wing support through the fear of status loss felt among the petite bourgeoisie in industrial societies, which led them to intolerant behavior in an attempt to safeguard their social position. More recently, far right vote was associated with fear of the future, under conditions of recession and a bad economy (Betz and Immerfall 1998), fears of job loss (Geishecker and Siedler 2012) and feelings of relative deprivation, which arise from disappointing comparisons in terms of economic well-being to one's expectations or to a social reference group (Rydgren 2007).

Research on the specific impact of intergenerational social mobility on political attitudes has for the most part been restricted to single country analyses, mainly of the United States or the UK. The downwardly mobile have attracted much

of the early scholarly attention, due to their expected tendency to radicalize and grow intolerant of out-groups (Lipset 1959; Wilensky and Edwards 1959; Wilensky 1966; Rush 1967). Such tendencies were expected on the basis of social and psychological problems (anxiety, insecurities and alienation) resulting from the status discrepancy brought about by the process of mobility, which exacts a toll on the well-being of individuals (Sorokin 1959). As Durkheim (1951) highlighted, upward and downward mobility are disruptive experiences which deprive individuals of firm ties to both the origin and the destination group.

Several early studies provided evidence that the experience of downward mobility places people in an intermediary position between the attitudes of their origin and destination groups, in accordance to the acculturation theory. In the United States, the downwardly mobile from the middle to the working class were more likely to support left-wing parties than members of their origin group, but less likely than members of their destination group (Lipset and Bendix 1959). Abramson (1972) reported a similar pattern for the case of the UK, where downward mobility was associated with an increase in Labour support, although to a lesser extent that for the case of the destination group. Explanations advanced for these results have included the denial of the failure of downward mobility (leading a part of the downwardly mobile individuals to erroneously self-identify with their origin group), an unwillingness to join the ranks of a lower status group (resulting in a lack of strong ties to this group), a desire to rejoin the higher status origin group, and a middle-class political socialization (Wilensky and Edwards 1959).

On the other hand, the upwardly mobile were reported to display more conservative political attitudes and to be more likely than the downwardly mobile to emulate the political behavior of members of their destination group, in line with the status maximization theory or asymmetrical effects hypothesis (Abramson and Books 1971; Thompson 1971b; Martinussen 1992; Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Giuliano 2009). Several early studies have indicated that, within the group of upwardly mobile individuals, Americans were more likely than Europeans to be more conservative than the stable members of the middle class (Lipset and Zetterberg 1959; Lopreato 1967). Therefore, a fairly consistent finding is that mobile individuals retain some of the attitudes of their origin group, while also adopting others from the group to which they have either fallen or risen and occupy an intermediate position between the two groups (Blau 1956; Thompson 1971b). This was hypothesized to diversify party bases in terms of class and reduce partisan conflict (Abramson and Books 1971).

Although many of the results presented so far are based on single-country data, there are also a few notable attempts to study the effects of social mobility on political attitudes in a country comparative perspective. In one of the earliest studies, Lipset and Zetterberg (1959) compared the political orientations of the upwardly mobile from the working class to the middle class immobile group in Europe and the US. They reported that the European upwardly mobile were less conservative than the middle class immobile, while the American upwardly mobile were more conservative, lending support for the asymmetric effects hypothesis in the case of the US. Using American, British, German, Finnish and Norwegian data, Thompson (1971) reported that in terms of party choice, the socially mobile are across the board in an intermediate position between their origin and destination group, i.e. in all countries investigated, the upwardly mobile support right-wing parties more than stable members of the working class, but less than those of the middle class. However, the Finish and German upwardly mobile were relatively closer to the party choice of their destination class, while the Norwegian, English and American were closer to their origin class party preference.

The relationship between social mobility and political attitudes differs according to a number of factors. The similarity between mobile individuals and their destination group reportedly increases with age (West 1953; Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995), as the influence of the latter increases with time. Similarly, women who are socially mobile on account of their husbands' mobility are less likely to adopt the views of their destination status (Thompson 1971b).

Although partisanship, voting preferences, and ideology have been the main focus of researchers' attention, other studies have investigated mobility effects on, among other topics, political efficacy, interest in politics, or attitudes towards democracy. Using data from the Latinobarometer and Afrobarometer, Houle and Miller (2019) find that upward social mobility increases support for democracy, while downward mobility decreases it. Generally, mobile individuals seem to show a higher interest in politics. For instance, Lopreato and Saltzman Chafets (1970) report higher levels of political interest for the case of the downwardly mobile. Similarly, Martinussen (1992) reports that highly mobile Norwegians are closer to the political system than their non-mobile counterparts. Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster (2018) report higher levels of political distrust for the Dutch downwardly mobile. Moreover, Day and Fiske (2016) present experimental evidence suggesting that people's perceptions of the levels of mobility in a society influence their willingness engage in system justification and maintain the societal

status quo. Thus, perceptions of a low level of social mobility significantly lowers system defense.

To conclude, many of the studies presented above acknowledge that mobile individuals are likely to come under cross-pressure and experience conflicting influences from the part of their origin and destination groups. However, results showing a greater similarity to the origin group are indiscriminately interpreted as evidence of early socialization influences, without actually testing for the existence and intensity of socialization experiences. Therefore, research on the implications of social mobility for political attitudes stands to benefit greatly from insights derived from the political socialization research field.

3.3.3 The role of economic self-interest

One of the key mechanisms behind the observed effects of social mobility on political attitudes, advanced especially in research on redistribution, is economic or material self-interest. Taking the form of both present and expected economic standing, economic self-interest received extensive attention, especially in connection to individual preferences for redistribution and welfare policies. This literature suggests that support for redistribution and the welfare state is explained by the economic wins and losses people expect based on their respective economic standing. Due to expected economic wins, support for redistribution is higher among people with lower (relative) present income (Romer 1975; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Page and Jacobs 2009; Shayo 2009), an experience of economic shocks, such as loss of employment, a substantial drop in household income or a subjective decrease in perceived employment security (Margalit 2013), and the downwardly mobile (Schuck and Shore 2019). The higher support for redistribution among the latter is attributed to their belief that their situation is caused by external sources or the so-called external attribution of failure (Gugushvili 2016).

Expectations of future economic outcomes also have a significant bearing on people's preferences. According to Bénabou and Ok's "prospect of upward mobility" (POUM) hypothesis (2001), support for redistribution is lower among the poor who expect to move up the income ladder in the future (see also Checchi and Filippin 2004). Thus, those who expect a higher income in the future, both over a short time horizon (Barfort 2017) and over the course of their lifetime (Rueda, Stegmueller, and Idema 2014) are less inclined to support redistribution. A similar effect occurs in the case of people who expect upward occupational

mobility (Rainer and Siedler 2008), even if they are currently on the lower end of the income distribution (Piketty 1995; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).

On the other hand, the expectation of downward mobility increases support for redistributive measures (Lee 2016). In the Latin American case, greater pessimism about the future is often coupled with a larger demand for social security and moves people to the left in terms of economic issue positions (Rodrik 2001). This indicates that another individual level response to expectations of future economic insecurity can be the support for the expansion of the social safety net provided by the state. This could explain the rise in support for left-wing populist parties following the economic crisis, such as the Spanish Podemos or the Greek Syriza. Testing the POUM hypothesis on UK data, Buscha (2012) finds that people who expect an improvement in their financial situation over the course of the next year are more right-wing than those who expect no change. Conversely, those to expect to do worse are more left-wing, with an effect size of more than double that of upward mobility expectations. Although Buscha's research focuses on intragenerational expected mobility,[1] it offers a valuable comparison material for an investigation into intergenerational mobility expectations.

3.4 Hypotheses

The research on the political implications of intergenerational mobility presented so far indicates an association between upward intergenerational mobility (both past and future) and political conservatism, in line with the acculturation and resocialization theories, which hold that conflicting political influences from the part of the origin and destination group with be resolved in favor of the latter. This suggests that the destination group exercises a greater influence than the social origin group and that the upwardly mobile are more likely to deviate from the views of their parents in the process of adjusting to the views and values of their destination group.

Accordingly, the first set of hypotheses (H3.1a, H3.1b, H3.1c, H3.1d) lays out expectations of decreased parent-child ideological congruence for people who have experienced intergenerational mobility or expect to do so in the future. The second set of hypotheses (H3.2a, H3.2b, H3.2c) presents expectations of cross-national differences in the effects of past and future mobility on parent-child

[1] The BHPS question asks respondents to rate how they think they will do financially a year from now (response options are "better off," "worse off" and "about the same").

ideological congruence, depending on the level of unemployment, immigration and social protection. Finally, the third set of hypotheses (H3.3a, H3.3b, H3.3c, H3.3d) addresses the expected mitigating effect of the strength of family ties on the relationship between past or future intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence.

Young adults who experience intergenerational mobility to a group higher in social and economic status than the one of their parents become exposed to new norms and values. This can lead to a process of attitudinal adjustment and change, out a desire to fit into the higher status group, which is expected to decrease attitudinal congruence with parents. Based on the literature review on the attitudinal correlates of social mobility, the upwardly mobile appear more inclined towards political conservatism. The first two hypotheses (H3.1a, H3.1b) formulate the expectation of decreased parent-child ideological congruence in the case of upwardly mobile young adults or those who expect to do better than their parents in the future.

Hypothesis 3.1a. *The experience of upward economic mobility decreases parent-child ideological congruence.*

Hypothesis 3.1b. *The expectation of future upward economic mobility decreases parent-child ideological congruence.*

Expectations regarding the effect of mobility on the political attitudes of the downwardly mobile are clashing. Based on the literature on economic self-interest, downward mobility is expected to induce a departure from parental views and a shift towards left and in favor of more redistribution and welfare policies. On the other hand, according to the asymmetrical effects hypothesis, the downwardly mobile are more likely to retain the views of their origin group in hopes of eventually rejoining it, which suggests that downward mobility has little or no effect on parent-child attitudinal congruence. Hypotheses are formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 3.1c. *The experience of downward economic mobility decreases parent-child ideological congruence.*

Hypothesis 3.1d. *The expectation of future downward economic mobility decreases parent-child ideological congruence.*

Cross-country differences in the effects of intergenerational mobility on parent-child ideological congruence have been little explored so far. However, previous

research (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998; Golder 2003) offers reason to expect significant country differences, based on institutional and social context, in the strength and direction of intergenerational mobility effects on parent-child ideological congruence. Specifically, I will examine cross-country variations based on levels of unemployment, immigration and extent of social protection.

I expect that young adults who have experienced or expect intergenerational downward mobility are more likely to position themselves leftward of their parents and demand greater social security in countries with higher levels of youth unemployment. This expectation is based on previous research showing that the experience of *employment* increases people's interest in matters of redistribution and social protection, such as income tax and pensions (Flanagan et al. 2012). Conversely, I expect that upwardly mobile young adults will lean rightwards of their parents under conditions of high unemployment, to protect their income from taxation (H3.2a).

Hypothesis 3.2a. *In countries with high youth unemployment rates, young adults who have experienced or expect downward mobility are more likely to place themselves leftward of their parents' position, while upwardly mobile young adults are more likely to lean rightwards of their parents.*

In countries with high immigration levels, I expect that the downwardly mobile are more likely to lean rightward of their parents, due to perceived competition on the labor market from the part of immigrants and in an attempt to safeguard their own position (H3.2b).

Hypothesis 3.2b. *In countries with high immigration rates, the experience or expectation of intergenerational mobility (both upward and downward) is more likely to move young adults rightward of their parents' position.*

Finally, I expect that the likelihood of upwardly mobile young adults to lean rightward increases with the level of social protection in the countries analyzed (H3.2c). This is derived from research which indicates that wealthy men lean rightward in order to reduce the effect of taxation on their income (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier and Kriesi 2013).

Hypothesis 3.2c. *In countries with high social protection, the experience or expectation of upward intergenerational mobility is more likely to move young adults rightward of their parents' position.*

While past mobility or expectations of future mobility, especially upward, are expected to shift people's ideological position, thereby increasing the attitudinal gap with their parents, I expect that the strength of family ties will have a bearing on these processes. Strong family ties serve to anchor people in the values and beliefs of their family, thus leaving mobile individuals less exposed and impressionable to the influence of their destination group. Therefore, I expect that mobile young adults who value close ties with their family are less likely to diverge from their parents' political orientation.

The following hypotheses capture the expectations that the potential effect of both upward and downward intergenerational mobility on ideological self-placement is conditional on the strength of family ties. Specifically, I expect a reduced or no effect of mobility when respondents report strong family ties during childhood. Conversely, mobility effects will be stronger when individuals report weak family ties.

Hypothesis 3.3a. *Intergenerational upward mobility, both experienced and expected, and the strength of family ties interact such that upwardly mobile young adults who report stronger family ties will be more ideologically congruent with their parents than upwardly mobile young adults who report weaker family ties.*

Hypothesis 3.3b. *Intergenerational downward mobility, both experienced and expected, and the strength of family ties interact such that downwardly mobile young adults who report stronger family ties will be more ideologically congruent with their parents than downwardly mobile young adults who report weaker family ties.*

3.5 Data, measures and methodology

The analyses in this chapter rely on the same two-generation survey data collected within the scope of the CUPESSE research project on intergenerational value transmission (Tosun et al. 2019). As previously mentioned, the class of destination is usually experienced after individuals complete formal education. Therefore, the sample used for the analyses presented here excludes respondents who are still in education. After excluding the young adults who have not completed education, the sample is made up of 4,163 parent-child dyads.

Measures

This chapter employs the same measure of *parent-child congruence* used in Chapter 2, based on the 11-point left-right self-placement scale. Congruence ranges from 0 (no congruence) to 1 (perfect congruence) and was recoded into a binary outcome variable, differentiating between agreement, when dyad members have identical or near identical scores, i.e. a difference of 0 or 1 (coded 1), and lack of agreement (coded 0).

The key explanatory variables used in the analyses presented in this chapter are *experienced* and *expected* intergenerational mobility. *Experienced* intergenerational mobility is measured as the change in economic situation from the time respondents (young adults aged 18-35) were 14 to the time of survey and taps into perceived economic self-sufficiency. Respondents were asked how often (never, sometimes, most times, always) was their family able to pay its bills, afford extras for themselves, afford to live in decent housing and put money into a savings account, and to what extent were respondents themselves able to do the same things over the past 6 months from the time of data collection. Responses were recoded to indicate *upward* (better situation than parents), *downward* (worse situation than parents) or *no mobility* (same situation as parents) compared to the time when the respondent was 14. Although this measure of mobility is based on self-reports of economic situation, it is appropriate for capturing perceived economic situation, and perceived mobility, which are expected to have a bearing on the political attitudes investigated in this chapter.

Expectations of future mobility are measured in terms of future living standards and are based on a survey question retrieved from the German Socio-Economic Panel 2011, worded as follows: *"Thinking about how your standard of living will be like in the future, how does it compare to how your parents are doing today?"* The item was measured on a 5-point scale with answer categories running from "much worse than my parents" to "much better than my parents." Responses were recoded into three categories, to indicate future expectations of *upward* (better or much better than parents), *downward* (worse or much worse than parents), or *no mobility* (about the same as parents).

The strength of *family ties* is measured using a version of the vertical collectivism scale (Singelis et al. 1995; Triandis 1996; Triandis and Gelfand 1998) which captures beliefs regarding the importance of family integrity, willingness to sacrifice personal goals, the duties of children towards their parents and the value of family support. Respondents were asked to express agreement on a

5-point scale with the following statements: "It is the duty of family members to take care of each other, even if they have to give up something they want themselves," "Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required," "It is important that children respect the decisions made by their parents, even if they disagree with these decisions," and "Even if the support of family is important, it is important that you stand up for yourself' (reverse coded). Responses for each question could take values from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 4 ("strongly agree"). The analyses employ the average of the 4 indicators, ranging from 1 to 4, with a higher value indicating stronger family ties.

The analyses further include a set of individual controls that were reported to influence parent-child attitudinal congruence at the individual level: young adults' *gender* (0=male and 1=female), *age* (as parent-child ideological congruence is expected to decrease with age), *education* (in three categories, where "low" indicates ISCED I+II, "medium" ISCED III+IV, and "high" ISCED V), *religious denominational congruence* with parent (based on the question "Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?" which was asked to both parents and young adults, a new variable was constructed to indicate whether neither reported a denominational affiliation, coded 0, only one of them had a denominational affiliation, coded 1, or both were affiliated with a religious denomination, coded 2), *marital status* (differentiates between people who were married or in a legally registered partnership and the rest) and *working status* (differentiates between respondents who were employed and those who were unemployed or not in the labour force) of the respondent, as well as for the *gender* (0=male and 1=female), and *education level* of the parent (same classification as in the case of the young adults). The models also include country fixed effects. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis are provided in Table 4.24 (Appendix 3).

Contextual country characteristics (unemployment rate, immigration rate and social expenditure as percentage of the GDP) are presented in Table 3.1. Figures for the rate of youth unemployment and immigration are based on 2016 Eurostat data. They show substantial differences between countries, with those most affected by the 2008 economic crisis, namely Greece, Spain and Italy, having much higher percentages of youth unemployment. Similarly, there are marked differences in the immigration rates of Western European countries such as Germany, Switzerland and the UK (with relatively high levels) and Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic (which

have lower levels). The figures for social expenditure as percentage of GDP based on 2015 OECD data.

Table 3.1: Contextual country characteristics (Chapter 3)

	Unemployment rate (% youth)	Immigration rate	Social expenditure (% of GDP)
Austria	11.2	18.2	27.7
Czechia	10.5	4.1	19.4
Denmark	12.0	11.2	29.0
Germany	7.0	13.3	24.9
Greece	47.3	11.3	25.7
Hungary	12.9	5.1	20.9
Italy	37.8	9.7	28.5
Spain	44.4	12.7	24.7
Switzerland	8.6	23.5	15.9
Turkey	19.6	5.6	11.6
United Kingdom	13.0	13.3	21.6

Note. Eurostat (2016) and OECD (2015) data.

In a first step, I present the distribution of intergenerational past and future mobility across the 11 countries in the sample. Then, I estimate logistic regression models using the pooled country data in order to answer the first research question on the effects of mobility on parent-child congruence in political attitudes. Next, I employ multinomial logistic regression to find out whether mobile individuals are more likely to shift leftwards or rightwards of their parent' ideological self-placement. In the second step, I investigate the cross-national variations in these effects across the countries in the sample, grouped in terms of level of unemployment, immigration rate and social safety net. Thirdly, I test the expectations laid out in the hypotheses section regarding the moderating effect of family ties on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and parent-child congruence.

3.6 Results

3.6.1 Experienced and expected intergenerational mobility rates

Table 3.2 presents the distribution of experienced and expected intergenerational mobility in the 11 countries included in the sample. Results show that the

majority of respondents have experienced some type of intergenerational mobility, either upward or downward. The percentage of downwardly mobile young adults surpasses that of the upwardly mobile in all the countries included in the sample, a finding that is in line with recent literature on intergenerational mobility (Urahn et al. 2012; Bukodi et al. 2015; Chetty et al. 2017). The notable exception is Turkey, which has the largest group of upwardly mobile young adults (42.4%). Out of the countries affected by the 2008 economic crisis, Greece tops the list with the highest share of young adults who have experienced downward mobility, at a staggering 62%. The share of downwardly mobile is also high in Austria (36%), the UK (34.4%), Germany (35%) and Denmark (34%), while countries that have enjoyed economic growth in recent years, such as Turkey (42%) and the Czech Republic (33%) boast high upward mobility rates.

Table 3.2: Intergenerational mobility (%) across countries

	Experienced mobility			*Expected* mobility		
	None	Downward	Upward	None	Downward	Upward
All countries	40.74	32.08	27.16	41.65	15.26	43.07
Austria	41.61	36.26	22.11	48.88	11.80	39.30
Czechia	37.56	32.77	29.65	43.04	9.58	47.37
Denmark	39.76	34.32	25.91	58.33	6.76	34.90
Germany	40.87	34.93	24.18	43.58	15.57	40.83
Greece	27.68	61.56	10.75	34.41	31.79	33.79
Hungary	48.78	27.02	24.18	47.88	5.59	46.52
Italy	41.47	29.62	28.90	38.64	24.34	37.01
Spain	40.73	30.40	28.85	36.40	24.46	39.13
Switzerland	47.25	28.33	24.41	47.98	12.11	39.89
Turkey	42.33	15.25	42.41	34.01	6.76	59.21
United Kingdom	39.93	35.42	24.64	41.38	18.71	39.89

Note: CUPESSE data. Post-stratification weights applied.

Although most of the mobile respondents have experienced downward mobility, their expectations for the future are optimistic. The majority of those who anticipate mobility in the future expect to do better than their parents in each of the countries studied. The most optimistic are the young adults in Turkey (59%), the Czech Republic (47.4%) and Hungary (46.5%). Unsurprisingly, the share of young adults who expect downward mobility is the highest in the countries that were hit the hardest by the 2008 economic crisis, namely Greece (32%), Italy (24%), and Spain (24%). The fourth place is surprisingly occupied by the UK (19%), which could be explained by recent economic developments such as the

drastic increase in housing prices, which could have contributed to increased expectations of declining (affordable) standards of living in the future.

Downward mobility is expected to a much smaller degree in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland and the Czech Republic (7% to 16%). The share of expected downward mobility is even lower in Hungary (5.5%) and Turkey (7%), where a large percentage of the youth believes that their standard of living will increase in comparison to that of their parents. Countries can thus be clearly grouped in two blocks depending on the level of pessimism about future living standards, with Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK showing relatively high levels of expected downward mobility (19% to 32%) and the rest of the countries showing lower levels (7% to 15%)). These descriptive results show that expected and experienced downward mobility is widespread particularly in countries that have faced economic difficulties in recent years.

Variations in parent-child ideological congruence by type of mobility

Overall, close to two thirds (57.6%) of the young adults who have experienced no mobility in the past share the ideological views of their parents. The countries with the highest parent-child congruence levels are Italy (73.2%) and Turkey (71.2%). This percentage is lower for respondents who have experienced some type of mobility, be it downward (54%) or upward (52.9%) (see Figure 3.2a). On average, the immobile young adults who do not share the ideological position of their parents are split quite evenly between leaning towards the left (21%) or the right of their parents (21.6%), with notable cross-country variations (see Figure 3.9). A higher share of immobile respondents lean towards the right in the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Turkey and the UK, whereas in Austria, Greece, Spain and Switzerland, immobile young adults position themselves to the left of their parents.

For the young adults who have experienced downward mobility, the percentage of left-leaners increases to 27.2%, while that of right-leaners drops to 18.8% (see Figure 3.2c). However, downward mobility is associated with increases in the percentage of right-leaners in Greece (from 19.2% to 23.7%), Hungary (from 24.4% to 27.4%) and Spain (from 15.6% to 16.6%) (see Figure 3.9). In comparison to immobile young adults, those who are doing better than their parents on average lean towards the right to a greater degree (23.2%). The highest increases are found in Austria (from 15.5% to 30.8%), the Czech Republic (39.5% to 50%), Hungary (from 24.4% to 26.5%) and Spain (from 15.6% to



(a) Experienced mobility



(b) Expected mobility

Figure 3.1: Upward (grey) and downward (yellow) intergenerational mobility by country

21.1%). On the other hand, upward mobility is associated with an increase in the percentage of young adults leaning left of their parents in Germany (from 18.3% to 26%), Turkey (from 10% to 21.4%) and the UK (from 18.9% to 34.4%).

Expectations of future mobility are also linked to a decrease in the level of parent-child ideological congruence, although to a less extent that past mobility. Young adults who expect different living standards than those of their parents share their ideological position to a less extent than those who expect to do the same. The share of young adults who lean towards the left of their parents is higher among the respondents who expect to do worse in the future (rising from 24.6% among people who expect to do the same as their parents to 28.6%), while the share of right-leaning respondents remains on average nearly the same. However, expected downward mobility is associated with an increase in the percentage of right-leaning respondents in Austria (from 10.4% to 20.6%), Hungary (from 23% to 36.7%), Italy (from 10.3% to 18%), Switzerland (from 22% to 51%), and Turkey (from 12% to 36%) (see Figure 3.10). On the other hand, expectations of upward mobility are on average associated with an increase in the share of people who place themselves to the right of their parents (from 18.9% among respondents who do not expect mobility to 24.2%). The only countries in which expected upward mobility is associated with an increase in the percentage of respondents who place themselves to the left of their parents are Germany (from 17.7% to 19.5%) and Hungary (from 11.8% to 20.5%) Interestingly, young adults who expect to do better than their parents are more likely to share their ideological position in Turkey (from 69% to 73%) and Switzerland (from 49% to 60.6%), compared to those who expect to do the same.

3.6.2 Mobility effects on parent-child ideological congruence

Turning to logistic regression analyses, Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.25 estimate the effects of past intergenerational mobility on parent-child ideological congruence. Results lend support to hypothesis H3.1a and indicate that the likelihood of parent-child ideological congruence is negatively related to the experience of upward mobility (β = -0.28, p<.05). According to Model 1, holding all other variables constant, respondents who report an improved financial situation have 25% lower odds of congruence to their parents than those who report a similar financial situation to their parents (CI: 0.59, 0.95). On the other hand, the association between downward mobility and ideological congruence does not



(a) Congruence (yes/no) by *past* mobility



(b) Congruence (yes/no) by *future* mobility



(c) Congruence by *past* mobility



(d) Congruence by *future* mobility

Figure 3.2: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by type of intergenerational mobility

reach statistical significance at the .05 level, although the direction of effect is negative as well.

Overall, past mobility explains a considerable amount (19%) of the variance in parent-child ideological congruence (Model 1). The explanatory power of Model 2 increases slightly by the addition of further controls and accounts for 22% of the variance in parent-child congruence. Only two of the additional variables included in Model 2 have a statistically significant relationship to ideological congruence, namely *employment status* and *religious denominational affiliation*. The odds of ideological congruence with the parent are 28% higher for employed respondents compared to young adults who are not in employment (CI: 1.07, 1.53). These results are in line with the life-course stages theory which holds that certain life-course transitions, among which entering full-time employment, increase the attitudinal congruence between young adults and their parents (Stoker and Jennings 1995; Flanagan et al. 2012). The odds of congruence are also 21% higher for dyads in which both the parent and the young adult report a denominational affiliation, compared to dyads in which neither of them indicates a religious belonging (CI: 0.98, 1.48). This is consistent with previous research indicating that religious congruence increases the level of parent-child value similarity (Knafo et al. 2012).

Regression results for individual countries in the sample indicate that past upward mobility is negatively related to parent-child congruence in most of the countries, but only reaches statistical significance in the Czech Republic (see Table 4.26). Expected upward mobility also has a negative effect on parent-child congruence in the majority of countries (see Table 4.27), but reaches statistical significance only in Greece and Hungary, while in Turkey it has the opposite effect of increasing the odds of congruence. Similarly, expected downward mobility increases the chances of parent-child congruence in the Czech Republic.

Models 3 and 4 (Table 4.25) test the relationship between expectations of future mobility and parent-child congruence, which were expected to be negatively related, according to the POUM hypothesis (Buscha 2012), as outlined in H3.1b and H3.1d. Although mobility expectations explain 35% of the variance in the outcome variable, the coefficients for expected mobility do not reach statistical significance at the .05 level. This suggests that respondents who expect to do either better or worse in the future are not significantly more likely to hold divergent views from those of their parents.

Upward mobility remains significantly related to parent-child congruence even after controlling for the effects of expected mobility, as shown in Models 5

Figure 3.3: Predicted congruence levels by type of past mobility



Note: Predicted probabilities of parent-child ideological congruence (binary) correspond to Model 6 (by type of past mobility). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

and 6. Predicted probabilities for past mobility are shown in Figure 3.3. These indicate that the likelihood of parent-child congruence is lower for people who report past upward mobility compared to the immobile group. The examination of the additional controls included in Model 6 reveals the same direction of effects. The odds of ideological congruence to one's parents are significantly higher for young adults who are in full-time employment (38% higher) and in dyads in which both the parent and the young adult belong to a religious denomination (28% higher).

Different, but in what way?

Having found that upwardly mobile young adults are less likely to share the ideological views of their parents, the question that arises is which direction are they more likely to lean towards. Does mobility increase the chances of leaning leftward or rightward of one's parents? To provide an answer to this question, multinomial logistic models with a dependent variable in three categories (distinguishing young adults who are *congruent* from those who lean *left* or *right* of their parents) were fitted to the data, using the *multinom* function from the package *nnet* in R (Venables and Ripley 2002). Unlike OLS models which

Figure 3.4: Predicted congruence levels by type of past and future mobility

(a) Experienced mobility



(b) Expected mobility



Note: Predicted probabilities of parent-child ideological congruence (congruence, leftward or rightward) correspond to Models 11 and 12 (by type of mobility). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

would reveal only unidirectional effects, multinomial models make it possible to distinguish between left and right, therefore offering information about the direction young adults take when they move away from their parents' position.

According to Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.28, downward mobility increases the likelihood of a young adult leaning leftward of their parent ($p<.05$), while upward mobility increases the odds of leaning rightward ($p<.05$). Compared to respondents who do not report intergenerational mobility, young adults who are doing worse than their parents are 25% more likely to place themselves to their left (CI: 1.00, 1.54). Conversely, respondents who are doing better than their parents are 34% more likely to lean rightward of their parents (CI: 1.01, 1.77).

Country results shown in Table 4.29 indicate that upwardly mobile young adults are more likely to place themselves to the right of their parents in Austria, Denmark, and the Czech Republic, but to the left in Turkey and the UK. The odds of upwardly mobile young adults leaning rightward (as opposed to being congruent with the parent) are 300% higher in Austria, 260% in Denmark and 100% in the Czech Republic compared to immobile young adults in each of these countries. On the other hand, upwardly mobile respondents have 300% higher odds of leaning leftward of their parents in the UK and 270% higher odds in Turkey. The downwardly mobile also have higher odds of placing themselves leftward of their parents in the UK (285% higher odds), Italy (230% higher odds) and Spain (150% higher odds).

These results are in line with the resocialization hypothesis and previous research indicating that upward mobility is associated with conservatism (Abramson 1972; Martinussen 1992; Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2018). The effects remain significant after additional controls are added to the models (see Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.28). Respondents with a medium level of education have higher odds of leaning leftward of their parents and lower odds of leaning rightward, employment lowers the odds of leaning rightward, while respondents in dyads in which both the parent and the young adult report a religious affiliation have lower odds of leaning leftward, which aligns with previous findings showing that religious congruence is associated with conservatism (Hayes 1995).

Expectations of future mobility also appear to be significantly related to parent-child ideological congruence. Holding all else constant, there is a 28% increase in the odds of placing oneself rightward of one's parents for respondents who expect to do better in the future compared to those who expect no mobility ($p<.05$, CI: 1.04, 1.59). On the other hand, the relationship between expected downward mobility and congruence does not reach statistical significance at the

.05 level for the pooled data. However, country results shown in Table 4.31 suggest that young adults who expect to do worse than their parents in the future are more likely to place themselves to their left in the UK (185% higher odds), Germany (130% higher odds), Italy (130% higher odds) and Spain (51% higher odds) than respondents who expect no intergenerational mobility in the future.

Models 11 and 12 (Table 4.28) include the effects of both past and future mobility, showing statistically significant effects for both experiences and expectations of upward mobility, with some notable changes. Figure 3.4a illustrates predicted probabilities for past mobility and shows that, controlling for expectations about the future, young adults who have experienced upward mobility are actually more likely to place themselves to the left of their parent. Specifically, there is a 35% increase in their odds of placing themselves to the left of their parents compared to immobile young adults. Predicted probabilities for future mobility are illustrated in Figure 3.4b. Compared to the group expecting no future mobility, there is a 25% increase in the odds of leaning right of their parent for young adults who expect to do better in the future.

3.6.3 Cross-national variations in mobility effects

As argued in the literature review section, only a handful of studies have explored cross-country differences in the political effects of intergenerational mobility (Lipset and Zetterberg 1959; Thompson 1971a; Mitrea, Mühlböck, and Warmuth 2020). On this background, the second aim of this chapter is to investigate country-level attributes that could explain the cross-national variation in the direction of intergenerational mobility effects on parent-child ideological congruence.

Given that the study sample includes only 11 European countries, the use of multilevel analysis is not feasible (Stegmueller 2013). Consequently, I analyze the relationship between the odds ratio of leaning leftward or rightward of one's parents for mobile (both downwardly and upwardly) young adults on the one hand and the levels of youth unemployment, immigration and social safety net across the 11 European countries on the other.

Hypothesis 3.2a formulated the expectation that youth unemployment rate is positively associated with the likelihood of downwardly mobile young adults (both past and future) to place themselves to the left of their parents, while upwardly mobile respondents were expected to be more likely to lean rightward

Table 3.3: Odds ratio of leaning leftward/rightward of one's parent and country contextual characteristics, correlation coefficients

	Past mobility				Future mobility			
	Downward		Upward		Downward		Upward	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
Unemployment	0.28	0.43	-0.37	-0.28	-0.15	-0.10	-0.11	0.62**
Immigration	-0.20	-0.18	-0.31	0.03	-0.18	0.16	-0.17	-0.25
Social expenditure	-0.06	0.09	-0.48	0.55*	0.19	0.43	-0.37	0.66*

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

of their parent's position. In line with this hypothesis, results show that youth unemployment levels are positively associated with the odds of young adults who expect upward mobility to lean rightward of their parents (r=0.62, p<.05, R^2=0.39) (see Table 3.3). As illustrated in Figure 3.5, in countries such as Italy, Greece or Spain, where youth unemployment levels are high, young adults who expect do to better than their parents have higher odds of positioning themselves to their right. Conversely, in countries with lower levels of unemployment (such as Switzerland or Germany), respondents who expect to be upwardly mobile in the future, have a lower likelihood of leaning rightward. Hence, the likelihood of upwardly mobile young adults leaning rightward appears to vary depending on the level of youth unemployment in a country.

Youth unemployment levels are also positively related to leaning rightward for those who have experienced upward mobility in the past. However, the relationship is not statistically significant (r=0.43, p>.05, R^2=0.19). Nevertheless, given the limited number of cases, the direction of the relationship is more informative than its significance. For the case of experienced downward mobility, higher levels of youth unemployment appear to be positively associated with the likelihood of leaning leftward (in accordance to H3.2a), however, the relationship does not reach statistical significance (r=0.28, p>.05, R^2=0.08).

Immigration levels (H3.2b) and the extent of the social safety net (H3.2c) were both expected to be positively related to the likelihood of mobile young adults leaning rightward, regardless of the direction of their mobility, although for different reasons. However, as shown in Table 3.3, correlations between immigration levels and the odds of leaning rightward are for the most part negative, if statistically insignificant.

On the other hand, the relationship between social expenditure and the odds of leaning rightward of one's parents is positive and significant for both expected

Figure 3.5: Odds of leaning rightward for individuals who expect upward mobility by youth unemployment levels by country



and experienced upward mobility. As shown in Figure 3.6a, in countries which allocate a large percentage of their GDP towards social expenditures, such as Denmark and Austria, young adults who have experienced upward mobility are more likely to place themselves rightward of their parents. Similarly, young adults who expect to be upwardly mobile in the future are also more likely to lean rightward in countries with higher social expenditure (r=0.66, p<.05, R^2=0.43). Greece appears to be an outlier, as young adults who expect upward mobility have a much higher likelihood of leaning rightward than young adults in other countries with high social expenditures, such as Austria or Italy (see Figure 3.6b).

3.6.4 The moderating effect of family ties

Having come to the result that young adults who are upwardly mobile are less likely to share their parents' ideological position, the third aim of this chapter is to test whether the strength of family ties mitigates the effects of intergenerational mobility on parent-child ideological congruence. The CUPESSE dataset includes a collectivism index which is employed as a measure of strength of family ties.



(a) Experienced mobility



(b) Expected mobility

Figure 3.6: Odds of leaning rightward for upwardly mobile individuals (past and future) by social expenditure by country

Figure 3.7: Average strength of family ties by country



Figure 3.7 shows the average strength of family ties by country as expressed in vertical collectivism ratings. In general, country variations are not large and seem to rather point towards a convergence. However, in accordance to previous findings, Southern European countries (Italy, Greece, as well as Turkey) display the highest average strength of family ties, while Central European countries (Austria, Czech Republic and Switzerland, with the exception of Hungary) have the lowest average.

Hypotheses H3.3a and H3.3b outlined the expectation that both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals respectively, who have strong family ties are more likely to be ideologically congruent to their parents than mobile individuals with weak family ties. To test these hypotheses, logistic regression models were fitted with intergenerational mobility and the strength of family ties as the main predictors.

Logistic regression results shown in Table 4.34 indicate that the strength of family ties is significantly related to parent-child ideological congruence (Model 1), even after the inclusion of additional controls in Model 2. Young adults who report strong ties to their families are more likely to be ideologically congruent to their parents. Specifically, there is a 24% increase in the odds of congruence for a one-unit increase in the strength of family ties ($p<.05$, CI: 0.74, 1.19). Similarly to results reported in the previous section, the experience of upward mobility reduces the likelihood of congruence, while expectations of future mobility do not have a statistically significant effect.

Figure 3.8: Predicted congruence levels by intergenerational mobility and strength of family ties

(a) Experienced mobility



(b) Expected mobility



Note: Predicted probabilities of parent-child ideological congruence (congruence, leftward or rightward) correspond to Models 3 and 7 in Table 4.34. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

However, the interaction between the strength of family ties and intergenerational mobility is not statistically significant at the $p<.05$ level, neither for experienced mobility (Model 3), expected mobility (Model 7) or the two combined (Model 11), regardless of the direction of mobility (upward or downward). This indicates that the effects of intergenerational mobility on parent-child ideological congruence are not significantly different at various levels of the strength of family ties. However, by including the interaction term, the coefficient for past upward mobility loses its statistical significance. Although the interaction term does not reach statistical significance, the predicted probabilities plot shown in Figure 3.8 indicate that effects occur in the expected direction.

As shown in Figure 3.8a, the probability of ideological congruence increases with the strength of family ties, both for downwardly and upwardly mobile young adults. However, the increase for mobile young adults is lower than in the case of the immobile (ca 8%) and is the smallest for the upwardly mobile (ca 4%). Results are similar when interacting mobility expectations with the strength of family ties, shown in Figure 3.8b. The most marked increase in congruence levels by the strength of family ties can be observed for the case of young adults who expect to be immobile (ca. 20%). Although the trend is similar for the respondents who expect future mobility, the increase is much smaller (ca. 6%).

3.7 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter has explored parent-child ideological congruence in the context of intergenerational mobility. Specifically, it has investigated (1) the association of intergenerational mobility (both experienced and expected) to the level of parent-child ideological congruence; (2) cross-national variations in the relationship between intergenerational mobility and ideological congruence in 11 European countries, as well as cross-country variations depending on the levels of youth unemployment, levels of immigration and social safety net; and (3) the extent to which the strength of family ties can mitigate the expected effects of these mobility experiences and expectations.

Results indicate that the majority (around two thirds) of young adults included in the sample have experienced intergenerational mobility. Specifically, most of the mobile young adults were doing worse than their parents at the time of data collection (2016). This result is in line with recent studies and reports which highlight an increase in the extent of downward mobility (Urahn

et al. 2012; Chetty et al. 2014; Bukodi et al. 2015). Moreover, this tendency may be aggravated as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has negatively impacted the labor market worldwide. Among the countries analyzed here, Greece tops the list with an astounding 61.5% of downwardly mobile young adults, although downward mobility exceeds 30% even in countries with a much less dire economic situation, such as Austria, Germany, Denmark and the UK.

Despite the extent of downward mobility, most young adults hold bright expectations of the future. The majority of those who expect mobility in the future report that they will exceed their parents' current living standards. Optimism is prevalent especially in Turkey, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where close to or more than half of young adults expect to be upwardly mobile in the future. On the other hand, the lowest levels of optimism are found in Greece, Spain and Italy, where a third of respondents expect a decrease in living standards.

Regression analyses indicate that the experience of mobility has a significant and stronger effect on parent-child ideological congruence than expectations about future mobility do. Young adults who have experienced upward mobility are less likely to share the ideological views of their parents. Specifically, their odds of congruence are 25% lower than those of immobile young adults. The results remain significant to the inclusion of expected mobility as control. Thus, upwardly mobile young adults are more likely to deviate from the ideological view of their parents, regardless of their expectations for future mobility.

These results vary however across the 11 countries. The likelihood of ideological congruence increases with expectations of downward mobility in the Czech Republic and upward mobility in Turkey. Overall, these results support the resocialization and status maximization hypotheses, which hold that upwardly mobile individuals have a higher likelihood of deviating from the views of their origin group and adjusting to those of their destination group.

After finding that upward mobility decreases the chances of parent-child ideological congruence, the next step was to establish the direction in which mobility moves young adults in comparison to their parents' ideological position. As expected, downward mobility increases the chances of leaning leftward of the parents' position, while conversely, upward mobility increases the chances of leaning rightward. Upward mobility appears to have a stronger effect, increasing the odds of leaning rightward of one's parents by 34% in comparison to immobile young adults. The strongest effects occur in Austria, where upwardly mobile young adults were 3 times more likely to lean rightward of their parents than

immobile respondents. In addition to past mobility, expectations of upward mobility also increase the odds of leaning rightward by 28%, while young adults who expect downward mobility were more likely to lean leftwards in the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain. These results are in line with previous research which indicate that upward mobility is associated with conservatism (Abramson 1972; Martinussen 1992; Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2018).

The second set of questions addressed in this chapter investigated cross-national variations in the effects of intergenerational mobility on intergenerational congruence based on levels of youth unemployment, immigration and social safety net. The cross-national analysis indicated a positive association between youth unemployment rate and the likelihood of young adults who expect upward mobility to lean rightward of their parents. Although limited by the small number of countries analyzed, the pattern observed hints to the political implications of a high (or increasing) rate of youth unemployment. When levels of youth unemployment are high, young adults who hope to do better in the future (which is actually the majority in all the countries analyzed) are more likely to turn rightward. Additionally, the likelihood of upwardly mobile young adults (both past and future) of leaning rightward also appears to be positively related to the level of social spending in a country.

The third set of expectations tested in this chapter concerned the moderating effect of the strength of family ties on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence. It was expected that strong family ties increase the likelihood of parent-child congruence and consequently act as a break on the centrifugal effect of intergenerational mobility. However, although the strength of family ties has a significant effect on congruence, the interaction with intergenerational mobility does not reach statistical significance. This indicates that the odds of congruence for upwardly or downwardly mobile young adults do not depend on the strength of family ties they report.

To conclude, this chapter shows that young adults who have either experienced or expect to be upwardly mobile in the future have a higher likelihood of diverging from their parents' ideological position compared to their immobile peers. Secondly, by investigating the direction of these effects, the chapter shows that upward mobility is associated with a right-leaning tendency, which is stronger in countries with high levels of youth unemployment and social spending. On the other hand, downward mobility appears to be associated with leaning leftward of one's parents' position, a result which is in line with previous research on the association of economic self-interest to ideological position and issue

preferences (Margalit 2013; Schuck and Shore 2019). The young adults who slide down the social scale and are doing worse than their parents have higher odds of leaning leftward of their parents. This could be explained by the economic wins (e.g. to benefit from redistribution measures) they expect such a position will grant them. Moreover, the divergence in ideological position that social mobility brings about cannot be mitigated by the strength of family ties between parent-child ideological congruence.

The results presented here suffer from several limitations, which could be addressed by future studies on this topic. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, this chapter could not control for *intragenerational* mobility, namely mobility across the life course. The young adults included in the sample are likely to experience future changes in income and employment which can affect their economic self-sufficiency positively or negatively. Therefore, their position relative to their parents is also likely to change. For a better understanding of the changes brought about by mobility to parent-offspring ideological congruence, future research should also include an analysis of intragenerational mobility. These results are all the more relevant in the current context, since the COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to significantly alter the intergenerational mobility prospects of young adults worldwide. Given the effects of the pandemic on jobs, wages and earning prospects, young adults will face higher economic and educational inequality, which is likely to damage their chances of upward intergenerational mobility.



Figure 3.9: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by experienced (past) mobility across countries



Figure 3.10: Parent-child ideological congruence (%) by expected (future) mobility across countries

Chapter 4

Parent-child ideological congruence. A case study of Hungary

4.1 Introduction

Chapters 2 and 3 brought new empirical evidence in support of *parenting behavior* and *status inheritance* as mechanisms for intergenerational ideological congruence. Results indicate that parents perceived as warm and supportive of their children's autonomy have a higher likelihood of passing on their ideological position. On the other hand, a high level of parental psychological control is associated with less intergenerational ideological congruence. Upon reaching young adulthood, social mobility is another factor that decreases children's odds of sharing their parents' ideological views. The analyses presented in the two chapters also suggest that the strength of these transmission belts is context dependent. In individualistic societies, all three dimensions of parenting behavior analyzed here (warmth, autonomy support, and psychological control) are more strongly associated to parent-child ideological congruence. In the case of intergenerational mobility, upwardly mobile young adults are more likely to lean rightward of their parents' position the higher the youth unemployment rate and the level of social spending are in a country. This chapter aims to extend these findings and explore further the mechanisms of the family transmission of ideology in a post-communist context. First, it focuses on the role of political discussion with parents as mediator of the relationship between parenting behavior and parent-child ideological congruence and possible break on the centrifugal effects of social mobility. Second, the chapter employs an additional measure of ideology based on issue positions, as will be discussed below.

Political discussion in the family

Political discussion is an essential tool in parents' active socialization efforts (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Dinas 2014b). Research is fairly unequivocal about the fact that children from families which discuss politics more often are more likely to share their parents' political views (Tedin 1980; Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Hooghe and Boonen 2015; Ojeda and Hatemi 2015; Oosterhoff and Metzger 2016). Through discussions on political matters, children can learn about their parents' political views and attitudes on salient issues of the day, grow their political knowledge and formulate opinions of their own. Dinas (2014) finds that political discussion with parents increases children's receptivity to political stimuli, thereby making them more likely to share their family's partisan affiliation in adolescence, but also change it later on in life.

Frequent discussion about political news, current events or civic issues also helps children and adolescents acquire basic democratic skills and prepares them for active citizenship (Mcleod and Shah 2009; McIntosh, Hart, and Youniss 2007). Political discussion is associated to a series of desirable political behaviors and attitudes in adolescents and young adults: those who discuss politics at home are more politically engaged in elections, as well as other forms of political participation, have higher levels of political knowledge (McDevitt 2006; Hutchens Hively and Eveland Jr. 2009), and score higher on a series of civic outcomes, such as volunteering or community service (Andolina et al. 2003; McIntosh, Hart, and Youniss 2007).

Based on these findings, I suggest that political discussion in the family moderates the relationship between perceived parental behavior and parent-child ideological congruence. Specifically, I expect that the positive association of parental warmth and autonomy support to parent-child ideological congruence is stronger in the absence of political discussion. Moreover, political discussion has the potential to limit the diverging effects of intergenerational mobility on parent-child attitudinal congruence.

To the best of my knowledge, little previous research was conducted on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and political attitudes in conjunction with the strength of political socialization during childhood. A recent PhD thesis on social mobility and social policy attitudes (Lown 2015) has analyzed the effects of childhood economic environment and controlled for parental social policy attitudes, but omitted any specific socialization variables,

such as parental active efforts towards influencing the attitudes of their children. However, a strong active early socialization from the part of the family can effectively act as a break on the centrifugal forces of upward intergenerational mobility, while at the same time limiting the chances of the downwardly mobile of sliding too far away from their parents' views.

The findings presented in Chapter 3 are consistent with the *resocialization* and *status maximization* theories, which hold that the destination group has a stronger pull on the political attitudes of mobile individuals than the origin group, especially if the former is higher on the social status hierarchy than the latter. However, the analyses presented in the previous chapter did not account for family political socialization. According to *socialization* theory (especially the social learning model), the origin group exerts a stronger influence on the political attitudes of individuals, especially if conscious and active efforts are made by parents towards transmitting their attitudes and values to their children. By connecting two strands of literature, on intergenerational social mobility and political socialization, this chapter aims to offer the first test of the social learning model in the context of intergenerational mobility for the particular case of Hungary (see Figure 4.1 for the conceptual model). It thus investigates the extent to which social learning can mitigate the effects of experienced and expected intergenerational social mobility (both upward and downward) over parent-child ideological congruence.

Ideological congruence beyond left-right self-placement

As discussed in Chapter 1, given the pervasiveness of left-right vocabulary in daily life as a cue in relation to parties, candidates, and voters, the left-right scale offers a widely recognized, parsimonious (single question) and internationally comparable indicator of ideological position at the individual level. In the words of Inglehart and Klingemann, left-right scale, or schema as they refer to it, captures "the most important issues of a given era" (1976, 244). The scale offers a simple way of navigating the complex political reality and is a strong predictor of political attitudes and behavior, making it widely used in large-scale international surveys. However, as a single forced-choice question, this measure is far from offering an ideal summary of citizen's policy preferences and may be unfit for fully capturing the complexity of ideology. Additionally, it is more likely to suffer from idiosyncratic interpretations in different contexts.

Problems of measurement can thus artificially create the impression of in-



Figure 4.1: Hypothesized socialization and mobility effects on political attitudes

stability in the public's political attitudes. Largely because of these limitations, certain studies discovered such low levels of temporal stability in peoples' ideological self-placement, that they questioned the very existence of well-formed attitudes in certain electorates, such as the British one (e.g., Butler and Stokes 1974). Comparatively, multiple-item scales of ideology offer a series of advantages over a single-item measure. Among these are a higher level of reliability, since random errors cancel out, the possibility to asses attitude consistency across a number of issues, and a higher level of discrimination.

This chapter therefore employs an additional measure of ideology based on issue positions, and tests whether the results presented in the previous two chapters, regarding the association of social mobility to intergenerational ideological congruence, hold when a different measure of ideology is used. To answer these questions, data from the Hungarian sub-sample of the CUPESSE dataset is employed.

The chapter opens with a discussion of the evolution and use of the left-right vocabulary and main cleavages and issues in the Hungarian society and politics. Next, the limited literature in political socialization focused on Hungary is reviewed. The analysis section comprises two parts. The first tests the expected moderating effect of political discussion with parents on the relationship between parent-child ideological congruence and parenting behavior on the one hand,

and intergenerational mobility on the other. The second part introduces the Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale and tests whether the levels of parent-child ideological congruence reported in the case of left-right self-placement hold for this alternative measure of ideology. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of results, including an analysis of the relation between left-right self-placement and issue positions in Hungary.

This chapter makes a threefold contribution to the line of research on the developmental antecedents of ideology. First, it provides insights on the family transmission of ideology in the context of a less studied post-communist country. Secondly, it employs an alternative measure of ideology based on issue positions (the Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale). Thirdly, it explores the effect of parental political discussion on parent-child ideological congruence in conjunction with parent-child relation and intergenerational mobility.

4.2 Literature review

4.2.1 Ideology in Hungarian society and politics

Writing on the trajectory of newly emerging post-communist party systems, Mair (1997) predicted lower participation, parties less grounded in civil society and a more uncertain and adversarial context of competition than in established party systems. Moreover, he emphasized a tendency for more volatile and uncertain electorates, due to the lack of a strong cleavage structure and a stable pattern of alignments (Mair 1997, 183). However, the political system in Hungary has shown a comparatively high level of stability and concentration after the fall of communism, more than was expected under its electoral system (Tóka and Henjak 2007). Party system fragmentation gradually declined after the first free election in 1990, from a six-party system (1990-1997) closer to a two-party system than most European countries (2002-2006), and ultimately led to the dissolution of competition with the concentration of the right and the demise of the centre/left (Tóka and Popa 2013). Politics were characterized by an alternation of power between left and right-wing blocs of parties until 2006 when the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was reelected.

The following parliamentary elections of 2010, 2014 and 2018 have been dominated by Fidesz, the main right-wing party. Taking advantage of a fragmented opposition, consisting mainly of MSZP and Jobbik, Fidesz and its satellite alliance, the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), garnered

a second two-thirds majority in 2014 despite facing criticism for authoritarian, conservative and nationalist tendencies. Starting up as the counter organization of the communist youth organization, Fidesz soon changed its ideological profile (Enyedi 2006). It first embraced a mainstream liberal identity and from 1994 moved towards a right-wing and conservative stance, at times radicalized (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). Especially since 2010, the Hungarian government has increasingly moved away from liberal values (Rupnik 2012; Krasztev and Til 2015).

The party system in Hungary has generated high levels of ideological polarization between the left and the right-wing blocs of parties. In 1990, pro-market *vs* social protection was one of the main divides in party competition, along radicalism *vs* gradual change and nationalist *vs* cosmopolitan. However, by 1992-1993, the economic divide became largely irrelevant, dominated by the socio-cultural divide (Tóka and Popa 2013, 302), which was an elite-driven phenomenon originating in a decision of the parties (Enyedi 2006). In the 2000s political alternatives were reduced to a single cleavage line (Tóka and Popa 2013, 309). The "right" was associated with a Christian-nationalist, morally conservative and anti-communist position, while the "left" with communist legacy and a libertarian-cosmopolitan position (Enyedi 2006, 181). This left-right dimension was based on anti-communism, nationalism and clericalism, and excluded economic, constitutional and foreign policy issues (Tóka and Popa 2013).

After the fall of communism, research showed that cultural issues such as citizenship, ethnicity, and nation building surpassed economic issues in importance as basis for party competition in Hungary (Evans and Whitefield 1995). Later studies also upheld the primacy of the cultural issue dimension over the economic one (Tóka 2004; Enyedi 2005). These findings supported the path dependency model of Kitschelt et al. (1999) which postulates that modes of communist rule are consequential for the mode of transition and the configuration of political-ideological issues after the fall of communism. Specifically, in the aftermath of national-accommodative communist regimes, like in Hungary, cultural issues have more chances of achieving primacy over economic issues, due to the fact that reformed communists accept the fundamentals of liberal market reform. This opens up the space for national, ethnic and sociocultural divides. Conversely, Evans and Whitefield (1993) predicted that in ethnically homogenous countries with a high probability of market success, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the party system will develop along a redistributive-market axis, which was the case for the first two countries, but not Hungary.

While the main parties in Hungary stand for social and cultural values consistent with their ideological identity, the picture is less clear in terms of their economic policies. Fidesz has developed into a supporter of a strong state and embraced more paternalistic socialist policies, while the left became a protector of free market, big business and implemented conservative austerity measures (Fowler 2004). Tavits and Letki (2009) argue that such a development has its roots in the dual transition to both democracy and market economy in post-communist countries. Left-wing parties embraced fiscal austerity measures to show they can operate in a market economy, disassociate themselves from socialism and because they could afford such a policy reversal due to their loyal electorates. At the beginning of the transition in Hungary, MSZP reoriented its economic policies and managed, despite their effects, to retain the loyalty of its relatively large base inherited from the former ruling party. On the other hand, the fragmented right, lacking a loyal base, pursued populist economic policies in an attempt to lure voters. The success of Fidesz could be seen in the spectacular growth in its membership and local organizations at a time when left-wing party branches were decreasing (Enyedi and Linek 2008).

Indeed, at the beginning of the 2000s, unlike in other Visegrad countries, people's left-right position in Hungary was mainly related to attitudes concerning the religious cleavage (religiosity and clericalism) and surprisingly unrelated to anything of its modern socioeconomic component (family values, women's liberation, social liberalism, economic individualism) (Tóka and Henjak 2007). This supports the previous line of thought on the nature of the cleavage line in Hungary. Another study of political attitudes reports that feelings of social alienation, egalitarianism, and a pro-communist alienation, labeled together as alienation-socialism, correlate with a leftist identification. On the other hand, nationalism, support for regime change and privatization, interpreted as nationalist antisocialism, are associated with right-wing identification (Todosijević 2008).

The alienation-socialism factor has a strong negative association with education level, social class, income and age, while the second factor is associated positively with religiosity and negatively with former membership in the Communist Party. Using 1998 data, Todosijević (2004) showed that voters' left-right self-placement is strongly correlated to their placement of the parties they vote for, suggesting that the left-right dimension is relevant for voting. However, their self-placement is only moderately related to their policy preferences. The Hungarian electorate and political elite (members of the Parliament) agree on the parties' positions on the left-right continuum, but favor similar policies only

to a modest degree. To sum up, the usage of the left-right currency appears to be widespread in the Hungarian political system and to subsume mainly issues connected to nationalism, anti-communism and clericalism.

4.2.2 Socialization research in Hungary

Political socialization processes are generally an under-researched area in post-communist countries. Under communism, political socialization in Hungary, as in all other communist countries, was monitored by the government in order to inculcate the regime agenda and serve the need for legitimacy of the system (Szabó 1987). Although the communist rule left its mark, ideological indoctrination was far from successful. The family became the most important agent for alternative political discourse, although the Kádár era saw a diminished interest in politics generally.

Hungary is one of the few countries in which the family retained its primacy as socialization agent and source of political knowledge and information even after the regime change. Before the EU accession, a Eurobarometer study (2003) in the candidate countries reported that 26% of the youth in Hungary chose family as the most important "channel or structure" that makes their social or political participation easier, followed closely by the educational system at 25%. Hungary was the only country of 13 surveyed in which young people ranked the family as their first choice, while the youth in the rest of the countries that acceded in 2004 named youth organizations and the education system as their first choice. Therefore, I expect that levels of parent-child ideological congruence in Hungary are higher than in the other European countries included in the sample.

A study of youth support for alternative and radical politics in Hungary found that the Hungarian youth discuss politics with their family more than with friends, classmates or teachers, due to the potential for conflict outside of the family. The same study showed stronger family socialization levels among right and radical right parent-youth pairs compared to the liberal-left. Nearly all Fidesz and Jobbik supporters interviewed shared their parents' political preference, while the majority of liberal, left and green youth supporters differed from their parents (Saltman 2014, 202).

Recent research on youth in Hungary focused on trends towards authoritarianism or profile of party supporters. For instance, age and gender are the two most important factors that predict support for Jobbik. The party is most popular

with males under the age of 30 and especially first time voters (Bíró Nagy, Boros, and Varga 2012; Domonkos 2015). An analysis of its Facebook base showed that 64% of Jobbik's fans are under 30 and 30% are younger than 20 (Bartlett et al. 2012).

4.3 Hypotheses, sample and measures

As discussed above, political socialization research is fairly unequivocal about the finding that children from politicized homes, where politics is discussed more frequently, are more likely to share their parents' political views (Tedin 1980; Grusec and Goodnow 1994; Hooghe and Boonen 2015; Ojeda and Hatemi 2015; Oosterhoff and Metzger 2016). Therefore, political discussion is likely to increase parent-child similarity to a greater extent under conditions shown to be hindering family transmission, i.e., when children perceive their parents as low in parental warmth and autonomy support and highly controlling, than under favorable conditions. However, previous research has not explored a possible moderating effect of political discussion on the relationship between perceived parental behavior and parent-child ideological congruence.

I expect that political discussion with parents and perceived parental behavior interact to produce different levels of parent-child congruence. Specifically, I expect that the association between parental warmth, autonomy support and psychological control is the strongest when political discussion is lacking and weaker when children discuss politics with their parents frequently. Conversely, I expect that the greatest increases in the odds of ideological congruence associated to more frequent political discussion occur among the children of less warm, autonomy inhibiting and controlling parents. Otherwise stated, I expect that the association between parental behavior dimensions (warmth, autonomy support and psychological control) and parent-child ideological congruence varies with the frequency of political discussion. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.1a. *Primary political socialization and perceived parental warmth interact such that the increase in the odds of parent-child congruence associated with parental warmth is greater for dyads in which politics is discussed less frequently.*

Hypothesis 4.1b. *Primary political socialization and perceived parental psychological control interact such that the decrease in the odds of parent-*

child congruence associated with parental control is lower for dyads in which politics is discussed more frequently.

Hypothesis 4.1c. *Primary political socialization and perceived parental autonomy support interact such that the increases in the odds of parent-child congruence associated with parental autonomy support are greater for dyads in which politics is discussed less frequently.*

While the results presented in Chapter 3 indicate that past mobility, especially upward, shifts young adults' ideological position, thereby decreasing the ideological congruence with their parents, I expect that primary socialization experiences will have a bearing on these processes. The experience of a strong family political socialization during childhood is likely to counter and mitigate the potential attitudinal effects of intergenerational mobility (both upward and downward), thereby reducing the discrepancy between the attitudes of parents and their children.

The following hypotheses capture the expectations that the potential effect of both upward and downward intergenerational mobility on ideological self-placement is conditional on primary family political socialization (see Figure 4.1 for the anticipated relationship between mobility, political socialization and parent-child congruence). Specifically, I expect a reduced or no effect of mobility when respondents report frequent political socialization experiences during childhood. Conversely, mobility effects will be stronger when individuals report limited or no exposure to political socialization experiences from the part of their parents.

Hypothesis 4.2a. *Intergenerational upward mobility, both experienced and expected, and political socialization interact such that upwardly mobile young adults who have experienced political socialization influences during childhood will be more ideologically congruent with their parents than upwardly mobile young adults who have not.*

Hypothesis 4.2b. *Intergenerational downward mobility, both experienced and expected, and political socialization interact such that downwardly mobile young adults who have experienced political socialization influences during childhood will be more ideologically congruent with their parents than downwardly mobile young adults who have not.*

Sample

Young adults. The Hungarian sample analyzed in this chapter consists of 1295 young adults between the ages of 18 and 35, with an average age of 26.87 years (SD=5.08) and 595 parents (which includes 49 cases in which both parents took part in the study). As shown in Table 4.1, the young adults whose parents were contacted have an average age of 25.61 years (SD=5.12). The majority are female (54.4%) and 8.1% belong to a national minority, of which 7.2% are Roma. In terms of living arrangements, 46.7% live with both parents, 28.7% live with their mother, 6.7% live with their father, while 17.8% do not live with their parents. In terms of employment status, 58.2% of the young adults reported being in paid work as an employee, 20.7% in education, 10.6% unemployed, not having a job or not in paid work, and 2% reported being self-employed. The highest level of education successfully completed is lower secondary for 16.7% of the sample, upper secondary for 50.1%, advanced vocational for 12.3%, BA degree for 12.4% and MA degree or higher for 8.6%.

Parents. As shown in Table 4.2, the parent sample includes 337 women (56.6% of the sample), with a mean age of 52.67 years (SD=7.97) and 258 men (43.3%), with a mean age of 55.05 (SD=7.68). Parents reported a wide range of education levels, 14.3% earning a lower secondary degree, 61.3% an upper secondary degree, 6.21% an advanced vocational degree, 5.7% an undergraduate degree and 6.7% a graduate degree. In terms of employment status, 60.5% of the parents reported being in paid work as an employee, 20% retired, 7.7% unemployed, not having a job or not in paid work, and 7.05% self-employed. A higher proportion of fathers than mothers reported being in paid employment (63.5% *vs* 58.1%).

Table 4.1: Young adults sample descriptives (M and SD)

Age	25.61 (5.13)
Educational attainment	3.74 (1.78)
Financial situation during childhood	2.36 (0.45)
Relationship with mother	4.52 (0.73)
Relationship with father	4.21 (0.01)
Relationship between parents	3.91 (1.10)
Married	24.63%
Has children	25.21%

Note. CUPESSE 2016, n=595

Table 4.2: Parent sample descriptives (M and SD)

	Mothers	Fathers
Age	52.68 (7.97)	55.06 (7.67)
Educational attainment	2.94 (1.49)	3.12 (1.49)
Income	3.96 (1.49)	4.54 (1.62)
Satisfaction with current financial situation	2.27 (0.75)	2.34 (0.75)
Number of children	2.34 (1.39)	2.57 (1.59)
Religiosity	4.05 (2.81)	3.26 (2.63)
In gainful employment	58.1%	63.5%

Note. CUPESSE 2016, n=595

Measures

As a measure of primary political socialization, this chapter uses *political discussion with parents* during adolescence. Respondents were asked to think back to the time when they were 14 and indicate their agreement a 4-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly disagree) with the following statement "I often talked about politics with my parents."

Respondents' conservatism was measured using a modified 40-item version of the Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale (Wilson and Patterson 1968; Joe 1984; Bouchard et al. 2003), designed to assess positions on a wide range of contemporary issues, including social, cultural and economic. The items were: patriotism, capitalism, privatization, nationalism, right wingers, free market, lower taxes, free trade, Church authority, private healthcare, nuclear energy, private pensions, small government, obedience, GMOs, consumer culture, tuition fees, chastity, abortion bans, conservatives, minority rights, market regulation, left wingers, unemployment benefits, globalization, socialism, labor unions, birth control, multiculturalism, gay marriage, labor strikes, luxury tax, environmentalism, corporate tax, renewable energy, gay adoption, wage equality, pollution control, decriminalized marijuana and liberals.

Respondents could indicate agreement ("yes"), uncertainty ("?"), or disagreement ("no") with the topic. The scale was balanced, thus, for half of the items (e.g., chastity, Church authority) conservatism is indicated by a "yes" response and for the other half (e.g., gay marriage, gay adoption) by a "no" response . For the purpose of this analysis, an index was constructed as an additive scale from the responses to the 40 issue questions (for the list of items and the coding, see Table 4.37). In this index, higher scores reflect more ideologically conservative attitudes. It has a theoretical range from 0 to 40 and is normally distributed.

The index has a high reliability, with a Cronbach's alpha of .94 and split-half correlation coefficient of .93 for the youth.

4.4 Political discussion effects on parent-child ideological congruence

4.4.1 Left-right scale recognition and self-placement

In the Hungarian sample, left-right scale recognition and self-placement is far from unanimous and lower than in more established democracies (see Table 4.3). As expected given their age, parents place themselves on the continuum in greater numbers (79.8%) than the youth (75.6%). However, while gender differences are minimal in the case of the latter (75% males and 76% females), they are more marked in the case of the parents, with a nearly 7% gap between fathers (83.7%) and mothers (76.8%). Mothers and daughters place themselves on the scale to a similar extent (around 76%), while a difference of more than 8% can be observed between sons and fathers.

Table 4.3: Self-placement (%) for youth and parents by gender and level of education

		Youth	Mothers	Fathers
Gender	Female	76.15	76.85	
	Male	75.08		83.72
Education	Low	74.47	75.70	82.60
	Medium	75.50	80.59	83.33
	High	79.82	78.26	92.59
Total		75.67	76.85	83.72

Education levels: low=less than high school diploma; medium=high school and post secondary diploma; high=BA and higher degree

As the use of the "left" and "right" terminology is connected with cognitive abilities, recognition is expected to vary with the level of education. The data reveal that there is a widespread familiarity with the left-right schema even at the lowest level of education. However, familiarity does vary with the level of education, as expected. Among the youth, there is a 5% gap between those that have some degree of university education (79.8%) and those that do not (74.7%). Although this gap doubles in the case of fathers (10%), the least educated in

Table 4.4: Descriptives (M and SD) of left-right self-placement for youth and parents by gender and level of education

		Youth	Mothers	Fathers
Gender	*Female*	5.45 (1.89)	5.16 (2.16)	
	Male	5.67 (1.96)		5.23 (2.22)
Education	*Low*	5.53 (1.92)	5.30 (1.93)	5.23 (2.14)
	Medium	5.57 (2.05)	4.61 (2.63)	4.50 (2.81)
	High	5.57 (1.85)	5.38 (2.70)	5.76 (2.14)

Note. CUPESSE 2016

this group still show greater recognition (82.6%) than the high educated youth or mothers.

The general self-placement percentage (76.8) is comparable to results from other surveys conducted in Hungary, such as the 2014 (83%) and the 2016 European Social Survey (80.8%). Another study using data collected in Hungary in 1998, reported 79% self-placement for the general population and 91.5% for political elites, members of the Hungarian Parliament (Todosijević 2004, 416). These percentages indicate that a considerable majority of respondents is acquainted with the left-right schema and that there is a considerable degree of familiarity with the terminology of left and right among the Hungarian public.

The average values are 5.8 for youth and 5.1 for parents. Generally, youth place themselves to the right of their parents, with the largest difference observed between sons (5.8) and their mothers (5.1), as can be seen in Figure 4.2. However, as in most of Europe, self-placement in Hungary gravitates around the center of the scale (see Table 4.4). Exceptions to this trend are regions such as Catalonia or the Basque Country, which show a pronounced leftward or rightward tilt respectively (Dinas 2012; Rico and Jennings 2016).

4.4.2 Intergenerational congruence in left-right self-placement

In terms of position on the left-right scale, around two thirds of the Hungarian youth either share the same category on the scale with their parents (35.3%) or are just 1 point away from them (27.5%). Young adults place themselves more often in exactly the same category as their fathers (37.2%), than as their mothers (33.8%). Correlations between young adults' and parents' left-right self-placement scores are shown in Table 4.5. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between the left-right self-placement of youth and their parents



Figure 4.2: Mean of left-right self-placement for youth and parents

stands at .39 for mother-child dyads, showing a moderate positive relation, and .49 for father-child dyads.

According to previous studies, across other countries, correlations range from a low of .08 in the United States to a high of .60, depending among other things on the type of party system and extent to which the left-right currency is used (Rico and Jennings 2016, 242). In comparison, parent-child correlations in party identification were generally found to be higher and range between .3 to .6 (Ojeda and Hatemi 2015). Going back in time, in the 1950s studies reported correlations of around .50 in American samples (Hyman 1959, 72), while in the late 1960s, Jennings and Niemi reported a markedly lower coefficient of association of .34 for issue positions (Jennings and Niemi 1968).

Breaking down the correlation by gender (see Table 4.5), reveals that the self-placement of sons is more strongly related to that of their fathers (r=.50), whereas the self-placement of daughters is roughly equally strongly related to that of either parent. As expected based on previous research, the weakest relation observed is that between sons and mothers. These results are in line with previous research reporting higher parent-child agreement in same-sex dyads (Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood 1995; Carlson and Knoester 2011).

Across age groups, the strongest relation between the self-placement of parents and that of their children is found between fathers and their 31-35

Table 4.5: Correlations between the left-right self-placement of youth and parents by gender and level of education of the youth

	Mothers	Fathers
All youth	0.39***	0.49***
Daughters	0.45***	0.49***
Sons	0.32**	0.50***
Low education	0.38***	0.65***
Medium education	0.16	0.21
High education	0.65***	0.35

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

year-old children (r=.69), while the weakest relation is that between fathers and their 18-20 year-old children (r=.26). This supports the hypothesis that as they mature, and possibly assume similar roles and duties, children tend to resemble their parents.

4.4.3 Political discussion as mechanism of ideology transmission

Parental warmth

Hypothesis H4.1a outlined the expectation that the association of perceived parental warmth to intergenerational ideological congruence varies with the frequency of political discussion with parents. In other words, the increase in the odds of ideological congruence for each additional level of parental warmth is higher in parent-child dyads where politics is discussed rarely or not at all.

To test this hypothesis, logistic regression models with political discussion with parents and perceived parental warmth as main predictors were fit to the Hungarian sample. Results (presented in Table 4.35) are consistent with previous studies which report that political discussions during adolescence facilitate parental ideological transmission. Controlling for the level of parental warmth, there is 30% increase in the odds of parent-child ideological similarity with each one-unit increase in the frequency of political discussion (p<.01, Model 1).

The interaction between political discussion and perceived parental warmth was examined in Models 2 and 4 (see Table 4.35). The coefficient for the interaction term is significant, even after the inclusion of additional controls in Model 4, which supports hypothesis H4.1a and indicates that the effect of political discussion on intergenerational congruence is significantly different for

the four levels of perceived parental warmth. As shown in Figure 4.3, in the absence of political discussion, the highest congruence is observed for the highest level of perceived parental warm, decreasing with lower levels of warmth. At higher levels of political discussion, higher congruence can be observed for each level of parental warmth. However, the increase is more marked in the case of lower levels of perceived parental warmth.

This suggests that young adults who did not discuss politics with their parents during adolescence are more likely to share their ideological views the warmer they perceived their parents to be. Higher levels of political discussion are also associated with a greater increase in the odds of congruence at the lowest the level of perceived warmth. Thus, the greatest increases in the odds of congruence for each additional level of political discussion can be observed for the young adults who perceive their parents as the least warm. Comparatively, these increases are much smaller for those who perceived the highest level of warmth from their parents. Although these young adults start off with highest odds of congruence, the increases associated with political discussion are much smaller compared to the groups who rated their parents as less warm.

Parental psychological control

For the case of psychological control, hypothesis H4.1b outlined the expectation that the association of parental control to intergenerational ideological congruence also varies with how frequently parents and children discussed politics. I expected that the detrimental effects of control on the odds of intergenerational congruence will be lower in dyads in which politics is discussed frequently.

Models 6 and 8 in Table 4.35 show that the interaction term between political discussion and perceived parental psychological control is statistically significant at $p<.01$, which indicates that the effect of political discussion on ideological congruence is significantly different for the various levels of perceived psychological control. Figure 4.3b shows that, as expected, and indicated by results presented above, in the absence of political discussion, the highest congruence can be observed for the young adults who perceive their parents as the least controlling. In contrast, those who perceive high levels of control from their parents have lower probabilities of congruence.

As in the case of parental warmth, the effect of political discussion on intergenerational congruence is more marked in the case of young adults who perceive their parents as moderately or highly controlling. Thus, the greatest



(a) Parental warmth



(b) Parental psychological control



(c) Parental autonomy support

Figure 4.3: Predicted congruence levels by parenting dimensions and political discussion

increase in congruence for each additional level of political discussion can be observed for the young adults who perceive their parents as highly controlling. Their predicted probabilities of congruence with their parents increase from the lowest (in the absence of political discussion) to the highest (for the highest level of political talk), surpassing those of young adults who perceive their parents as the least controlling. In contrast, increased levels of political discussion seem to be associated with little or no increase in the odds of congruence for young adults who perceive their parents as the least controlling. In their case, congruence levels are high across the different levels of political discussion.

These findings support the overall importance of political discussion for parent-child ideological congruence, as well as its particular importance for the case of young adults who perceive their parents as moderately or highly controlling. Young adults who grow up under the moderate or strict supervision of a parent are more likely to share his or her values when the parent discusses politics with them more frequently. In contrast, political discussion brings more limited returns in terms of ideological congruence for young adults perceive their parents as less controlling. This suggests that the lack of parental psychological control yields higher returns in terms of ideological congruence even in the absence of parents' active efforts to convey their political views. On the other hand, when young adults perceive their parents as moderately or highly controlling they are more likely to share their ideological views when parents actively pursue political discussion.

Parental autonomy support

In regards to autonomy support, it was expected that young adults who perceived their parents as autonomy supportive were more likely to share their ideological position the more often they discussed politics. However, the greatest increases in the odds of congruence associated to perceived autonomy support were expected among those who discussed politics rarely (Hypothesis 4.1b). This hypothesis was tested by including an interaction term between political discussion and perceived autonomy support as a predictor of parent-child ideological congruence, the results of which are presented in Table 4.35, Models 10 and 12.

The interaction term does not appear to reach statistical significance, which indicates that the effect of political discussion on parent-child congruence is not significantly different for various levels of perceived autonomy support. As Figure 4.3c shows, for each increasing level of perceived autonomy support,

there is an increase in the odds of congruence with higher levels of political discussion. However, this increase does not appear to be more marked (and is not significantly different) in the case of higher levels of autonomy support compared to lower levels.

Young adults who perceive the highest level of autonomy support from the part of their parents have the highest odds of congruence in the absence of political discussion. However, the increase associated with more political discussion is not statistically different from the increase observed for young adults who perceive their parents as less autonomy supporting. The cumulative effect of political discussion and autonomy support is thus not different across the levels of autonomy support. Although high levels of both autonomy support and political discussion are associated with the highest odds of ideological congruence, discussion increases congruence for every level of autonomy support similarly.

4.4.4 Political discussion as break on social mobility effects

The second line of inquiry of this chapter explores the effects of social learning on parent-child attitudinal congruence in the context of past and future social mobility. I expect that the effect of intergenerational mobility (both past and future) on parent-child ideological congruence varies depending on the level of political discussion that young adults had in adolescence with their parents. As specified in Hypotheses H4.2a and H4.2b, I expect that mobile young adults (both upwardly and downwardly) will have a higher likelihood of ideological congruence with their parents when they report strong family socialization experiences, than if they report weak or no experiences.

To test these hypotheses, logistic regression models were fit to the Hungarian sample in the CUPESSE data, with intergenerational mobility and family political socialization as main predictors. After removing 123 young adults who were still in education, the sample consists of 472 parent-child dyads. Logistic regression results presented in Table 4.36 show that political discussion with parents increases the likelihood of parent-child congruence. For each one-unit increase in the frequency of political discussion, there is a 68% increase in the odds of congruence ($p<.05$, CI: 1.18, 2.45, Model 2).

Past experiences of mobility do not seem to be significantly associated with ideological congruence. However, the odds of intergenerational congruence of young adults who expect upward mobility are 53% lower than those of young

adults who do not expect to be mobile in the future and the result is statistically significant ($p<.05$, CI: 0.36, 1.07, Model 6).

As in the case of family ties, it appears there is no significant interaction effect between intergenerational mobility and political discussion with parents. In other words, the effects of intergenerational mobility on parent-child ideological congruence do not vary across the different levels of political socialization experiences. However, while effects do not reach statistical significance, the predicted probabilities plot shown in Figure 4.4 indicate that they occur in the expected direction.

Figure 4.4a shows that the probability of ideological congruence increases with the level of political discussion, both for downwardly and upwardly mobile young adults, an increase which is slightly more marked in the case of the latter. Looking at the interaction between mobility expectations and political discussion in Figure 4.4b, a similar picture emerges. However, it must be pointed out that the most marked increase in the likelihood of intergenerational ideological congruence by the levels of political discussion is observed in the case of young adults who expect downward mobility in the future. The difference in predicted congruence levels between those downwardly mobile young adults who have not discussed politics with their parents and those who have done so often is of nearly 40%.

4.5 The intergenerational transmission of conservatism

The Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale was developed in 1968 with the aim to overcome the shortcomings of traditional scales of conservatism. In order to reduce social desirability effects arising as a result of rational judgment (Wilson and Patterson 1968), the scale was designed to capture the first and immediate affective, rather than cognitive, reaction to the items. Therefore, it replaced traditional statement-form items with "a list of brief labels or catch-phrases representing various familiar and controversial issues" (Wilson and Patterson 1968, 265). In addition to the innovation in item format, the response options were also designed with a view to minimize effort and confusion. Respondents were asked to indicate agreement ("Yes") or disagreement ("No") with each item in the list, and, if absolutely uncertain, to circle the "?" option. The instructions specified that "There are no right or wrong answers; do not discuss; just give

Figure 4.4: Predicted congruence levels: interaction effect of intergenerational mobility and political discussion with parents

(a) Experienced mobility



(b) Expected mobility



Note: Predicted probabilities of parent-child ideological congruence (congruence, leftward or rightward) correspond to Models 3 and 7 in Table 4.36. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

your first reaction" (Wilson and Patterson 1968).

The scale was balanced and included 40 items. For half of these, conservatism was indicated by a "yes" response (e.g. death penalty, learning Latin) and for the other half by a "no" response (e.g. modern art, suicide). The items were ordered alternatively (L-C-L-C) and covered 5 themes: realism-idealism; militarism-punitiveness; antihedonism; ethnocentrism and out-group hostility; and religion-puritanism. The scale was first administered in Christchurch, New Zealand and results showed that conservatism increased with age and was higher for women than for men. Later research confirmed the relation between conservatism and age in other populations (Glenn 1974; Truett 1993; Henningham 1996; Grant et al. 2001). Although answering the battery of questions takes considerably longer than answering a simple liberal-conservative or left-right self-placement question, the scale compensates for this shortcoming through its high reliability.

Although the initial scale was constructed with a view to maximize its cross-cultural applicability, one pitfall of the conservatism scale is that the items included can easily go out of fashion, as the values and customs of societies change. Older versions of the Wilson-Patterson scale hold examples of such time and society-bound items as chaperones, women judges or jazz. Moreover, items need to be sensitive to the cultural norms in a society and touch topical issues. Thus, Henningham (1996) argues that conservatism scales need a "use-by" date, or in other words, constant revision to ensure that they include items relevant to the social, cultural and political conflict lines in society. Since 1968, there have been multiple variants of the scale, which have updated and adapted the original items to the specific context and time period investigated (Joe 1984; Bouchard et al. 2003; Kurdi and Littvay 2015). Alternative propositions reduced, for instance, the size of the scale from 50 to 30 items (Kirton 1978), 16 items (Collins and Hayes 1993) or 12 items (Henningham 1996).

4.5.1 Conservatism in Hungarian families

Issue positions

Given the level of specificity of the issues included in the Hungarian CUPESSE questionnaire, the non-response rate for the Wilson-Patterson scale is far lower compared to left-right self-placement. As shown in Table 4.6, young adults failed to provide an answer for some of the items more often than parents did.

Like in the case of left-right self-placement, mothers and daughters show similar percentages (5% and 6% respectively) and gender differences are more marked in the case of parents (with a nearly 3% gap between fathers - 2.2% - and mothers - 5%) than of youth (6.1% women and 5% men). Non-response rates vary in this case as well with the level of education: for both generations non-response decreases at higher levels of education. The youth failed most often to offer an answer for the items on small government (8,2%), multiculturalism (8.1%), nationalism (7%) and right-wingers (7%). In addition to these items, mothers also answered less frequently the questions on decriminalized marijuana (9.8%), liberals (8.6%) and globalization (7.7%), issues which might be less salient in their daily lives than some of the other included in the scale.

Table 4.6: Nonresponse percentage for the Wilson-Patterson scale for youth and parents by gender and level of education

		Youth	Mothers	Fathers
Gender	Female	6.12	5.06	
	Male	5.05		2.20
Education	Low	7.63	6.17	2.43
	Medium	4.27	2.64	0.93
	High	2.29	0.07	1.66
Total		5.58	5.06	2.20

Note. CUPESSE 2016

The distribution of responses to each item is shown in Tables 4.38 and 4.39. The items the youth agreed with the most are environmentalism (82%), pollution control (82%), renewable energy (79%), lower taxes (78.8%), unemployment benefits (71.7%), patriotism (68.5%), luxury tax (68%), corporate tax (67%), free trade (60%) and free market (59.3%). On the other hand, the largest percentage of disagreement was registered for genetically modified foods (68.7%), tuition fees (62.9%), abortion bans (62.3%), gay adoption (56.2%), gay marriage (53.5%), Church authority (53.5%), chastity (51.2%), birth control (49.9%), decriminalized marijuana (42%) and nuclear energy (37.1%). On average, 24% of the youth were uncertain about the issues included in the scale and 4.44% refused to answer the questions.

Fathers expressed agreement with similar issues, such as environmentalism, lower taxes, unemployment benefits and patriotism. However, upon closer inspection, some generational differences can be observed. Unlike the youth, fathers agree in larger numbers with labor strikes (66.2%), labor unions (65.8%)

and disagree with private healthcare (45.7%), which might be indicative of their socialization under communism. Mothers seem to mirror fathers' hierarchy of issue positions remarkably well. They also support labor strikes (57.86%), labor unions (55.48%) and oppose private healthcare (38.57%), although generally in smaller numbers. Mothers are also more often uncertain (25.5%) and refuse to answer more questions (5%) than the younger generation, whereas fathers are less undecided (21.67%) and answer more questions (only 2.22% refused to answer) than both mothers and the youth.

The conservatism index

The conservatism index is constructed as an additive scale in which higher scores reflect a more ideologically conservative position (descriptives are shown in Table 4.7). A few notable differences can be observed in comparison to parents' and young adults' left-right self-placement. On average, male youth are the most conservative (M=18.73, SD=2.74), while female youth whose fathers took part in the survey are the least conservative (M=18.17, SD=2.96). Interestingly, both sons and daughters appear to be closer in conservatism to their mothers than to their fathers (see Figure 4.5).



Figure 4.5: Mean conservatism of youth and parents by gender

Dimensions of conservatism

Respondents' positions on the social, cultural and economic issues included in the Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale were analyzed for underlying factors using exploratory factor analysis, with the *psych* package in R (Revelle 2020). The EFA analyses were conducted using guidelines outlined in Preacher and MacCallum (2003). Bartlett's test of sphericity indicated correlation adequacy, $X^2(780) = 7696.606$, $p<.001$, and the KMO test indicated good sampling adequacy, MSA = 0.79. A parallel analysis and scree plot examination suggested three overall factors. Maximum likelihood estimation was used with varimax rotation and the factor loadings for a 3-factor model are presented in Table 4.43. This model had moderate to low fit: the RMSEA indicated moderate fit at .09, 90% CI [0.088 0.091], and RMSR with acceptable fit (.06), while the CFI (.61) and TLI (.54) indicated a quite poor fit.

The first factor included 18 items that measured social and environmental protectionism or economic socialism with items such as "labor unions", "labor strike", "unemployment benefits", "corporate tax", "market regularization", "renewable energy" or "environmentalism." A high score on the first factor indicates support for redistribution, workers' rights and a larger role of the state in the economy.

The second factor included 12 items that assessed cultural liberalism and anti-capitalism, including "gay marriage", "gay adoption", "multiculturalism", "minority rights", "privatization", "private healthcare" or "private pensions." A high score on the second factor indicates support for multiculturalism, a liberal outlook on gender and sexuality and opposition towards the privatization of key social services, such as healthcare.

Finally, the third factor included seven items that appeared to assess social

Table 4.7: Descriptives (M and SD) of conservatism for youth and parents by gender and level of education

		Youth	Mothers	Fathers
Gender	*Female*	18.50 (2.28)	18.41 (2.74)	
	Male	18.93 (2.24)		18.37 (2.88)
Education	*Low*	18.57 (2.82)	18.17 (2.98)	18.28 (2.72)
	Medium	18.58 (2.75)	19.15 (2.58)	17.72 (2.21)
	High	18.65 (2.21)	18.19 (2.49)	20.05 (2.89)

Note. CUPESSE 2016

Table 4.8: Correlations between the three dimensions of ideology

	Economic socialism	Cultural liberalism	Social conservatism
Economic socialism	1		
Cultural liberalism	-0.087	1	
Social conservatism	0.073	0.008	1

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

conservatism and libertarianism with items like "church-authority", "chastity", "birth-control" and "small government." A high score on the last factor is associated with support for traditional sexual morality and church authority. The reliability of all three factors was very high with .97, .93, and .79 for Factors 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The factors explain 14% (Factor 1), 9% (Factor 2) and 6% (Factor 3) of the variance. Correlations between the three factors are shown in Table 4.8 and indicate that the factors are uncorrelated, thus each capturing a different dimension of political ideology.

Descriptives (M and SD) for each dimension are shown in Table 4.40. On average, the Hungarian youth are more socially conservative than parents (both mothers and fathers). Moreover, their social conservatism increases with the level of education, the highly educated group having the highest average score (M=0.57, SD=0.17). The youth also show more support for economic socialism (M=0.50, SD=0.16) than their parents (mothers: M=0.41, SD=0.201 and fathers: M=0.40, SD=0.16). In terms of cultural liberalism, the youth and mothers have higher average scores than fathers. Moreover, young women (M=0.52, SD=0.17) are more liberal than young men (M=0.57, SD=0.16).

4.5.2 Intergenerational congruence in conservatism

Issue positions

To look more closely at the agreement in issue positions within mother-child and father-child dyads, the score of the parents was subtracted from the score of the child. Tables 4.41 and 4.42 show the percentages of *agreement* (when both the parent and the child gave the same answer to each item), *partial agreement* (when one either approved or disapproved and the other was not sure) and *disagreement* (when the two had completely different answers, i.e., one approved of the item, the other disapproved). On average, 54% of the father-child dyads agreed in their answers, slightly more than the mother-child dyads (50%). On the other

hand, the levels of disagreement are fairly similar: 14.62% for mother-child and 15.25% for father-child.

The highest levels of disagreement between fathers and their children are observed on issues with a strong affective or moral component. These include tuition fees (21.32%), private healthcare (20.54%), nuclear energy (20.16%), abortion bans (20.16%), wage equality (19.28%) and decriminalized marijuana (19.28%), while the lowest levels are seen for renewable energy (9.69%), left wingers (10.08%), pollution control (10.47%), environmentalism (10.85) and capitalism (11.24%). On the other hand, fathers and their children show high levels of agreement for the case of environmental issues, which could reflect the salience of these issues in the current national and global context. Looking at agreement levels by the gender of the child, it appears that the views of fathers are aligned to a larger degree with those of their sons than of their daughters (58.2% *vs* 54.72%), the largest difference in agreement level being on the subjects of gay marriage (0.48% for father-daughter dyads and 0.65% for father-son dyads) and church authority (0.45% for father-daughter dyads and 0.6% for father-son dyads).

The picture looks partly different when looking at mother-child dyads. The highest levels of disagreement are found on the issues of wage equality (21.96%), private pensions (21.66%), birth control (20.47%) and private healthcare (19.29%), while the lowest are found for patriotism (9.79%), minority rights (10.39%), multiculturalism (10.68%), conservatives (10.98%) and pollution control (11.57%). There is a slightly higher level of agreement between the views of mothers and their daughters (55.20%) than for mother-son dyads (54.1%), and the biggest difference in agreement level is observed on the issue of multiculturalism (0.60% for mother-daughter dyads and 0.46% for mother-son dyads). It is interesting to point out that some of the highest levels of disagreement are found on women's issues, such as birth control (20.5%) and abortion ban (18.7%), reflecting clashing generational views on reproductive rights and women's health.

Conservatism

The Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between the conservatism of youth and their parents is .28 for father-child dyads and .31 for mother-child dyads (see Table 4.9). The coefficients indicate a weaker relationship than the one observed between the left-right self-placement of the two generations. Moreover, the relationship seems to be slightly stronger in the case of mothers than of

fathers, which is the opposite of what was found in terms of self-placement. If one breaks the relationship down by the gender of the child, more surprising results are revealed. The strongest relationship is not that between fathers and their sons, as would be expected based on the results of the left-right self-placement analysis, but that between mothers and daughters ($r(99)$=.46, p<.001). Moreover, the relationship between mothers and sons appears to be very weak and insignificant ($r(83)$=.08, p=.4).

Although there are no similarly stark contrasts in the relationship between the conservatism of fathers and their children, there are some expected differences, i.e., stronger relationship with sons ($r(79)$=.39, p <.001). Across age groups, the strongest correlation is found between the attitudes of parents and their 26-30 year-old children (mothers: $r(40)$=.47, p<.01, fathers: $r(43)$=.46, p <.01), while the weakest is found between fathers and their children below the age of 21 ($r(36)$=.07, p=.66). After the young adults reach the age of 30, the strength of the correlation with the attitudes of both parents decreases. Across the levels of education of the youth the strongest relationship is found between youth with a medium level of education and their mothers($r(43)$=.44, p=.01), followed by that between lowly educated youth and their fathers ($r(93)$=.40, p=.01).

Bivariate regression results show a weaker relationship between the conservatism of parents and that of their children than in the case of left-right self-placement. In the case of conservatism, parental attitudes explain only 10% of the variance in their children's conservatism (Table 4.45). The differences in the relationship of mothers and fathers to their children are sharper, and the strongest relation is that between mothers and their daughters. As in the previous cross-country analyses, multiple regression models are estimated separately for mother and fathers, to take into account parental characteristics. Results in Table 4.45 show that the controls are not significant and suggest that the parents' influence is exerted directly. Overall, the conservatism of parents generally explains much less of the variance in their children's conservatism. However, there is a reversal of importance in the parents' influence, as the mothers' issue positions explain more of their children's positions.

Table 4.9: Correlations between the conservatism of youth and parents.

	Mothers	Fathers
All youth	0.31***	0.28***
Daughters	0.46***	0.24
Sons	0.08	0.39***
Age <21	0.20	0.07
Age 21-25	0.44**	0.33
Age 26-30	0.47**	0.46**
Age 31-35	0.20	0.38
Low education	0.26**	0.40***
Medium education	0.44**	0.13
High education	0.29	0.04

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Dimensions of conservatism

The strength of the relationship between the conservatism of parents and their children is moderate and varies slightly across the three factors. Overall, correlations are higher for father-child dyads (see Table 4.44) and range from a low of $r(231)$=.21 for cultural liberalism for mother-child dyads to a high of $r(198)$=.34 (p<.001) for economic socialism for father-child dyads. Across factors, the strength of the relationship varies with the gender composition of the parent-child dyad. The conservatism of parents is more strongly associated with that of their same-sex child, especially in the case of economic socialism and social conservatism. In the case of economic socialism, the strongest relationship is that between fathers and their sons ($r(99)$=.41, p<.001).

Across age groups, the strongest relationship is observed between the economic socialism of fathers and their 31-35 year-old children ($r(47)$=.57, p<.001) and the weakest between the cultural liberalism of mothers and their children below the age of 21 ($r(46)$=-.03, p<.001). Looking at a breakdown of the correlations by the level of education of the youth, it is interesting to note that across all factors, the conservatism of fathers is only significantly correlated to that of their children for the case of lowly educated youth (see Table 4.44). On the other hand, in the case of mother-child dyads the strongest correlations are observed for economic socialism ($r(46)$=.38, p<.01) and cultural conservatism ($r(46)$=.39, p<.01) in the high-educated youth group.

4.5.3 Intergenerational mobility effects on parent-child congruence

Variations in parent-child congruence by type of intergenerational mobility

Overall, only less than a half (45.2%) of the Hungarian young adults who share their parents' social class also share their level of conservatism (see Figure 4.6). This percentage decreases slightly for those who are downwardly mobile (to 41.6%), and, contrary to expectations, actually increases considerably for those who are upwardly mobile (to 61.6%). These results go partly against those of the cross-national analysis, which indicated that upwardly mobile young adults are less likely to share their parents' ideological position.

Among the downwardly mobile there is, as expected, a higher percentage of young adults who are more liberal than their parents (26.3% compared to 18.3% in the non-mobile group). However, for the upwardly mobile, there are less young adults who are more conservative than their parents (23.3%) than in the non-mobile category (38.5%). One explanation for these results might have to do with an overall higher level of conservatism in the parent sample in Hungary, than in the cross-national sample. In this case, the more conservative upwardly mobile young adults might actually be congruent to their parents, thereby explaining the high percentage of congruence in this category (61.6%).

The level of intergenerational congruence in conservatism also varies with the expectations young adults hold about their future. Those who expect to be mobile in the future are less likely to share their parents' level of conservatism, regardless of the direction of expected mobility. Compared to the non-mobile young adults (55.5% of which are congruent to their parents), only 43.4% of those who expect to do better than their parents and 46.3% of those who expect to do worse share their parents' level of conservatism. Those who expect to be downwardly mobile are more liberal than their non-mobile peers (their share more than doubling from 15.2% for those who expect to do the same as their parents to 40.8%). On the other hand, those who expect upward mobility are more conservative than their parents (rising from 29.2% to 35%).

Dimensions of conservatism

For a more in-depth look at the variation in parent-child ideological congruence by past and future mobility, I next look at differences over the three dimensions

of conservatism, namely economic socialism, cultural liberalism and social conservatism. Previous research has suggested that upwardly mobile young adults are less supportive of welfare state interventions than their downwardly mobile peers (Schuck and Shore 2019). Similarly, I expect that intergenerational mobility is more strongly associated to economic socialism than the other two dimensions of conservatism.

As shown in Figure 4.7, the distribution of intergenerational congruence across the types of mobility for each of the three factors is fairly similar to the ones presented above. For parent-child dyads which share the same social status, the highest levels of congruence are observed for the cultural liberalism factor (73%), followed by economic socialism (63%) and social conservatism (44.2%). This indicates that young adults are closer to their parents' positions on issues concerning the state intervention in the economy, such as taxes and unemployment benefits, than on multiculturalism, traditional sexual morality or support for church authority.

Contrary to expectations, young adults who have experienced downward mobility are not more liberal on the economic socialism factor than their non-mobile peers (Figure 4.7a). However, those who expect to do worse than their parents in the future are three times more liberal on this factor (34.1% compared to 10.6% among non-mobile young adults, see Figure 4.7b). Moreover, the downwardly mobile are also close to three times more liberal (rising from 11.5% to 32%) on the cultural liberalism factor (Figure 4.7c). Another striking, if expected, change associated to social mobility is that upwardly mobile young adults are more conservative (38.4%) than their non-mobile peers (28.2%) in regards to the social conservatism dimension (Figure 4.7e). Moreover, a similar distribution can be observed in the case of those who expect to be upwardly mobile in the future.

Mobility effects on intergenerational congruence in conservatism

The relationship between intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence in conservatism is explored next using logistic regression (see Table 4.46). Results indicate that the likelihood of parent-child congruence is positively related to the experience of upward mobility ($\beta = 0.61$, $p<.05$). According to Model 4, holding all other variables constant, respondents who are doing better than their parents have 75% higher odds of intergenerational congruence (CI: 0.99, 3.2) than those who report a similar financial situation to their parents (see



(a) Congruence (yes/no) by *past* mobility



(b) Congruence (yes/no) by *future* mobility



(c) Congruence by *past* mobility



(d) Congruence by *future* mobility

Figure 4.6: Parent-child congruence in conservatism by type of intergenerational mobility



(a) F1: Congruence (yes/no) by *past* mobility



(b) F1: Congruence (yes/no) by *future* mobility



(c) F2: Congruence by *past* mobility



(d) F2: Congruence by *future* mobility



(e) F3: Congruence by *past* mobility



(f) F3: Congruence by *future* mobility

Figure 4.7: Parent-child congruence in dimensions of conservatism by type of intergenerational mobility

Figure 4.8a). On the other hand, the association between downward mobility and ideological congruence does not reach statistical significance at the .05 level, although the direction of effect is negative, as expected. One of the additional variables included in Model 4 has statistically significant effects, namely the young adult's *education*. The odds of ideological congruence with the parent are 112% higher for young adults with a high level of education compared to those with a low level (CI: 1.03, 4.8).

Looking at the three conservatism dimensions separately offers some additional insight (see Table 4.47). While the coefficients for past mobility do not reach statistical significance for any of the three dimensions, it appears that young adults who expect to do worse than their parents in the future are less likely to share their level of conservatism (see Figure 4.8c). Specifically, their odds of congruence on the first factor (economic socialism) are 85% lower compared to those who do not expect to be mobile in future (see Models 2, CI: 0.04, 0.41). Similarly, those who expected to be upwardly mobile have 33% lower odds (Model 6, CI: 0.42, 1.06) of sharing their parents' conservatism on the second factor, namely cultural liberalism (see Figure 4.8d).

As in the case of left-right self-placement, the next question that arises is which direction are young adults who were or expect to be upwardly mobile more likely to take? Are they less conservative than their parents, or more? And, more importantly, is the effect of social mobility similar across the three dimensions of conservatism? In other words, are young adults equally susceptible to attitudinal change in the context of past or future mobility for every dimension of conservatism? To answer these questions, similarly to the analysis done in the case of left-right self-placement, multinomial regression models were fitted to the data, with a dependent variable in three categories (distinguishing young adults who are *congruent* from those who are more *liberal* or more *conservative* than their parents), using the *multinom* function from the package *nnet* in R.

Results shown in Table 4.48 indicate that upwardly mobile young adults have a lower likelihood of being more conservative than their parents. Compared to respondents who have not experienced intergenerational mobility, those who are doing better than their parents are 52% less likely to be more conservative than their parents (see Figure 4.9a, CI: 0.30, 1.56). Looking at conservatism dimensions, results in Table 4.49 indicate that young adults who have been downwardly mobile are 97% more likely to be more liberal than their parents on the cultural liberalism dimension (see Figure 4.9c, CI: 0.31, 1.47).

Figure 4.8: Predicted congruence levels in conservatism by type of mobility

(a) Conservatism



(b) Conservatism



(c) F1: economic socialism



(d) F2: cultural liberalism



Note: Predicted probabilities of parent-child ideological congruence (binary) in (a) and (b) correspond to Models 2 and 4 in Table 4.46 and in (c) and (d) to Models 2 and 6 in Table 4.47. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4.9: Predicted congruence levels in conservatism by type of mobility (multinomial models)

(a) Conservatism



(b) F1: economic socialism



(c) F2: cultural liberalism



(d) F2: cultural liberalism



Note: Predicted probabilities of parent-child ideological congruence (3 categories) in (a) correspond to Model 3 in Table 4.48, in (c) to model 8 in Table 4.49 and in (b) and (d) to Models 4 and 7 in Table 4.50. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Expectations about the future are also associated with changes in the odds of parent-child congruence in conservatism. For the general conservative orientation, young adults who expect downward mobility are 215% more likely to be more liberal than their parents (CI: 0.98, 10.14). Looking separately at the three dimensions of conservatism, a pattern emerges. Young adults who expect to be

upwardly mobile are more conservative than their parents on both the economic socialism (98% more likely, see Figure 4.9b) and the cultural liberalism dimension (105% more likely, see Figure 4.9c), but not the social conservatism dimension. Conversely, those who expect to be downwardly mobile are 294% more likely to be liberal on the first dimension (CI: 1.38, 11.29). This result is in line with the economic or material self-interest mechanism (described in section 3.3.3), which holds that people hold certain issue positions based on the economic and wins they expect.

4.5.4 The issue basis of left-right identification in Hungary

What could explain the differences in results found between left-right self-placement and conservatism? To answer, one must return to the work of Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.1.2. As the two show, and subsequent studies have confirmed (Sani and Sartori 1983; Huber 1989), attitudes towards the main issues in a society are just one of the three components entailed by left-right identification. In their original 9 country study, Inglehart and Klingemann report correlations between left-right self-placement and issue positions that range from a low of .10 in Belgium to a high of .35 in France, making them conclude that the partisan component of the left-right dimension is much stronger than the ideological one, although the latter becomes stronger among the more politicized group of respondents (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 259).

Table 4.10: Correlations between left-right self-placement and conservatism factors

	Conservatism	Economic socialism	Cultural liberalism	Social conservatism
All youth	0.25***	0.13***	0.21***	0.17***
Sons	0.22***	0.12**	0.18***	0.10*
Daughters	0.28***	0.14**	0.23***	0.24***
Mothers	0.21**	0.14	0.16	0.14
Fathers	0.24***	0.09	0.26***	0.25**

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

In the Hungarian sample, left-right self-placement appears at first to be only weakly related to issue positions (see Table 4.10). However, judging by the range of the correlations found in Inglehart and Klingemann's study, as well as later studies, the relationship between the two seems moderate. The coefficients stand at .25 for youth($p<.001$), .21 for mothers ($p=.003$) and .24 for fathers ($p<.001$). Breaking down the correlation by the gender of the youth shows that left-right self-placement and issue positions are most strongly correlated in the case of young women ($r=.37$, $p<.001$), while the relationship is not significant for young men. Salience could contribute an explanation to the strength of the relationship observed. This could have been stronger if the index had included only the most salient issues in the Hungarian society. Therefore, it is possible that party affiliations or social status contribute more to one's sense of belonging to the left or the right in Hungary than issue positions do, hence explaining the differences in the results presented here for the intergenerational transmission of left-right self-placement and conservatism.

Regression results estimating the effect of issue positions on left-right self-placement for youth, mothers and fathers are presented in Table 4.51. Issue positions explain a larger share of variance in the case of parents (adj. R^2=0.36 for mothers and adj. R^2=0.24 for fathers) than of youth (adj. R^2=0.17). The explained variance for parents is above the average (0.21) found by Knutsen (1997) in 13 European countries. In a second step, key socio-demographic factors (education, income and religiosity) were added to the model, which increased its explanatory power, especially in the case of youth (adj. R^2=0.29). Unfortunately, the partisan component of the left-right dimension could not be analyzed due to lack of data. However, one could hypothesize that this component would be the strongest one in the Hungarian sample.

4.6 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter had a two-fold aim. The first part analyzed the moderating effect of primary political socialization on the relationship between perceived parenting behavior/intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, while the second part explored the intergenerational transmission of conservatism in a sample of Hungarian parent-child dyads. Research has consistently shown that a politicized family environment, in which parents discuss politics with their children and make their political views known, fosters intergenerational political

similarity (Tims 1986; Valentino and Sears 1998; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Rico and Jennings 2016). The analyses presented here confirm the results of previous studies. Based on data from the CUPESSE Hungarian sub-sample, results indicate a 30% increase in the odds of ideological congruence for each one-unit increase in political discussion with parent.

Hypotheses H4.1a-c stated that the association of perceived parenting behavior to intergenerational congruence varies with the frequency of political discussion. Specifically, young adults who did not discuss politics with their parents were expected to be more likely to share their ideological views the warmer, more autonomy supporting and less controlling they perceived their parents to be. Regression analyses confirmed two of these hypotheses. The increase in the odds of parent-child congruence associated to political discussion was significantly higher the less warm the perception of parenting behavior was. In other words, young adults who perceived low levels of warmth from their parents were much more likely to share their ideological position the more often they discussed politics. In contrast, at higher levels of perceived parental warmth the increase in ideological congruence associated to more political discussion was significantly smaller. This suggests that the returns of political discussion in terms of ideological congruence are much larger at low levels of parental warmth, than at higher levels. On the other hand, the increases in parent-child congruence associated to political discussion were not significantly different across the levels of perceived autonomy support. This suggests that political discussion benefits young adults regardless of their parents' level of autonomy support.

The reverse pattern was observed in the case of psychological control, shown in Chapter 2 to be detrimental to ideological congruence. Young adults who perceived their parents as moderately or highly controlling were significantly more likely to share their ideological views the more they discussed politics with them. In comparison, for those who perceived a low level of parental control, the increase in the odds of congruence associated with more political discussion was significantly smaller. In this case as well, the returns of political discussion for parent-child ideological congruence were larger for those young adults who perceived higher levels of parental control.

To summarize, in the absence of political discussion, young adults who perceived the highest level of parental warmth and the lowest level of psychological control had the highest levels of similarity to their parents. Moreover, they also had the lowest increases in congruence with higher levels of political discussion. This suggests that a high level of parental warmth and a low level of psychological

control facilitate the internalization of parental values even in the absence of active socialization efforts through political discussion from the part of parents. Conversely, the highest increases in parent-child ideological congruence levels were observed the more frequently parents perceived as low in parental warmth of controlling discussed politics with their children.

Secondly, this chapter tested a cross-sectional model of how primary political socialization moderates the relationship between intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence. As shown in Chapter 3, intergenerational mobility, especially upward mobility, decreases the odds of parent-child ideological congruence. By facilitating the transmission of ideology within the family, political discussion with parents was therefore expected to act as a break on the centrifugal effect of intergenerational mobility. These expectations were tested using political discussion with parents as an indicator of the strength of primary socialization in the family. Results show that the moderating effect of political discussion on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and parent-child ideological congruence does not reach statistical significance. However, effects ran in the expected direction. The probability of ideological congruence with their parents increases for both upwardly and downwardly mobile young adults with the frequency of political discussion. These results suggest that political discussion within the family cannot put a significant break on the effect of mobility on parent-child ideological congruence.

Thirdly, the chapter analyzed intergenerational congruence in conservatism based on data from the CUPESSE Hungarian sub-sample. Conservatism was measured for both parents and young adults using a modified 40-item version of the Wilson-Patterson scale (see Table 4.37). The conservatism index was constructed as an additive scale in which higher scores reflect a more ideologically conservative position. Descriptive results indicate that 54% of the father-child dyads agreed in their answers, slightly more than the mother-child dyads (50%). The highest levels of disagreement between fathers and their children were observed on issues with a strong affective or moral component, such as tuition fees (21.32%), private healthcare (20.54%), nuclear energy (20.16%), abortion bans (20.16%), wage equality (19.28%) and decriminalized marijuana (19.28%). On the other hand, the lowest levels of disagreement were on less divisive issues such as renewable energy (9.69%), pollution control (10.47%), environmentalism (10.85) and capitalism (11.24%), which could reflect the salience of these issues in the current national and global context.

Factor analysis revealed three factors for the Wilson-Patterson conservatism

scale. The first, economic socialism, measured support for redistribution, workers' rights and more state intervention in the economy. The second factor, cultural liberalism, measured support for multiculturalism, opposition to gender norms, and to the privatization of key social services, such as healthcare. The third factor, social conservatism, measured support for traditional sexual morality and church authority. Correlations between the conservatism of parents and their children were lower than those for left-right self-placement, as expected (.28 versus .49 for father-child dyads and .31 versus .39 for mother-child dyads). Across the three factors, the strongest correlations between parent and child conservatism were those on the first factor, economic socialism.

Like in the case of left-right self-placement, the chapter also tested whether intergenerational mobility was associated with a decrease in the levels of parent-child congruence in conservatism, and whether this decrease varied with the direction of mobility (upward and downward) and over the three dimensions of conservatism. Employing the same analytical strategy as in Chapter 3, results indicate, contrary to expectations, that respondents who are doing better than their parents actually have 75% higher odds of intergenerational congruence than those who report a similar financial situation to their parents. Expectations of future mobility appear to reduce the odds of intergenerational congruence on the first two factors of conservatism, namely economic socialism and cultural liberalism. Specifically, young adults who expect to be downwardly mobile are 85% less likely to share their parent's level of conservatism on the economic socialism dimension and those who expect to be upwardly mobile are 33% less likely to do so on the cultural liberalism dimension.

Looking further into the direction of ideological change reveals a consistent pattern. Downward mobility, both past and future, increases the odds of leaning more liberal than one's parents. For the general conservative orientation, young adults who expect downward mobility are 215% more likely to be more liberal than their parents, while on the economic socialism dimension they are 294% more likely. Those who have been downwardly mobile are also more likely to be more liberal on the cultural liberalism dimension (97% higher odds). These results are in line with the economic or material self-interest mechanism (described in section 3.3.3), which holds that people hold certain issue positions based on the economic and wins they expect. On the other hand, expected upward mobility increases the odds of leaning more conservative than one's parents both for the economic socialism (98% higher odds) and the cultural liberalism dimension (105% higher odds).

Conclusion

For the past seventy years, a wealth of political socialization literature has investigated the ways in which the family, the school and other socialization actors shape the political attitudes of the young generation (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Tedin 1980; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). Out of these actors, the family has received a considerable amount of attention, due to the assumption of primacy of parental influence as a source of political learning, especially during the early years of life (Marsh 1971; Searing, Schwartz, and Lind 1973; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). Studies that have endeavored to elucidate the pathways for the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes have explained the high levels of attitudinal congruence between parents and their offspring in terms of social learning, social background, or other environmental influences.

This dissertation has focused on ideological congruence between parents and their young adult children. Its empirical chapters have investigated three inter-related sets of questions concerning the specific conditions that facilitate or hinder the family transmission of ideology (Chapters 2 to 4). Specifically, it has analyzed how three transmission belts, namely parenting behavior, status inheritance, and political discussion within the family explain variations in levels of intergenerational ideological congruence across 11 countries in Europe.

The analyses presented here are based on multigenerational European data, which offer some distinct advantages for an investigation of the cross-national variation of parent-child ideological congruence. This study made use of detailed information about the background and political attitudes of young adults aged 18-35, in line with evidence supporting a prolonged transition to adulthood (Jensen Arnett 2014). Data were structured in parent-young adult dyads, which allowed the direct study of transmission processes within families. The attitudes of both parents and young adults were measured directly and independently,

through self-reports, instead of an indirect measure, such as children's subjective perceptions of parental attitudes (see, for example, McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Middleton and Putney 1963). The latter are widely considered imprecise and unreliable due to projection effects, or what is known as "self-directed bias," which inadvertently inflates agreement rates (Westholm 1999).

While previous socialization studies have made limited attempts to analyze contextual factors, this dissertation has overcome this limitation by undertaking a cross-national analysis of the covariation between the ideology of parents and their young adult children. Moreover, the data employed allowed the exploration of this topic in the context of understudied European countries, such as Hungary. Additionally, this study has paid special attention to the gender composition of the parent-child dyads, which has received limited attention up to this point. In what follows, I present the main results and findings, discuss the implications and limitations of the study, and outline possible directions for future research.

1. Main findings and implications

1.1 Parent-child relational context

The first transmission path analyzed in this dissertation is *parenting behavior*. Chapter 2 investigated its direct effects on the likelihood of children sharing their parents' ideological views. While several other studies have inquired into the relationship between parenting behavior and children's ideological views (as discussed in Chapter 1, section 2.2.3), only one previous study attempted to analyze its implications for parent-child ideological congruence specifically. The study of Murray and Mulvaney (2012) employed a limited sample of American mother-child pairs and a typological, rather than dimensional, approach to parenting behavior, which greatly restricts the applicability of its findings to father-child dyads and other cultural (especially European) contexts.

The current study overcomes the shortcomings of previous research by using cross-country dyadic data from 11 European countries. The sample included both mother and father-child dyads, although only one parent was selected per family. Moreover, the analyses employed measures for three dimensions of parental behavior, namely parental warmth (open display of emotional affection and support towards children), psychological control (parental supervision or strictness) and autonomy support (the support of children's individual initiative and decision making). The data structure afforded the possibility to analyze variations in the

relationship between parenting behavior and parent-child ideological congruence across different national contexts. Chapter 2 thus offered an analysis of the cross-country variations in this relationship based on the levels of individualism *vs* collectivism in the countries studied, informed by previous research on the importance of individualism for the prevalence of certain parenting behaviors (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Trommsdorff 2009; Smetana 2017). Thirdly, the chapter explored the moderating effects of parent and child gender on the relationship between perceived parenting and intergenerational ideological congruence.

Results reveal that parenting behavior is a significant predictor of parent-child ideological congruence. Young adults who perceive their parents as warm and autonomy supporting have a higher likelihood of sharing their ideological position, while those who perceive them as controlling are less likely to share their ideological views. These results are in line with previous research suggesting that a warm family climate and good parent-child relationships enhance the transmission of values from parents to children (Tedin 1974; Mohr and DiMaggio 1995; Grolnick, Deci, and Ryan 1997; Schönpflug 2001; Rico and Jennings 2016). The greater similarity of ideological views in dyads where parents are perceived as warm and autonomy supporting could be explained by several factors.

Families in which children perceive their parents as warm and autonomy supporting provide a more favorable emotional context for political views to be exchanged and formed (Steinberg 2001). According to Grusec and Goodnow's model of internalization (1994), in such an environment, children can develop a more accurate perception of their parents' preferences, including their stances on political matters, and are more likely to see them as role models, accept their position and internalize it. This is supported by previous research showing that children of warm and responsive parents have a more accurate perception of their values (Whitbeck and Gecas 1988; Knafo and Schwartz 2003). Alternatively, in such a family climate, children might be more likely to believe that the parents' views they are internalizing are actually self-generated, which in turn strengthens their reception of these views. The results presented in Chapter 2 are in line with previous studies showing that parental autonomy support fosters children's internalization of norms (Rudy and Grusec 2001; Knafo and Schwartz 2003).

Chapter 2 also explored variations across different cultural contexts in perceived parental warmth, psychological control and autonomy support as transmission belts for ideological orientations. The detrimental effect of parental control on parent-child ideological congruence, and the beneficial effect of parental warmth and autonomy support is not equally strong across all the countries

analyzed. As expected, the strength of these effects varies with the level of individualism in the respective country. In countries high in individualism, such as Denmark, all three dimensions of parenting behavior analyzed have a stronger association to ideological congruence. This suggests that young adults who perceive their parents as warm or autonomy supporting have higher odds of congruence in countries high in individualism. Conversely, those who perceive their parents as highly controlling have lower odds of sharing their ideological position. These results contribute to and extend previous research in political socialization by showing that the strength of parenting behavior as transmission belt for ideological orientation varies across cultural contexts depending on the level of individualism *vs* collectivism. This is a promising finding which warrants further research of this relationship in more diverse country contexts.

Based on previous research which has shown gender differentiated effects of parenting on child outcomes (McKinney and Renk 2008), Chapter 2 also analyzed the possible role of parental gender as a mediator in the relation between parenting behavior and parent-child ideological congruence. Results indicate that the negative association of perceived psychological control to ideological congruence is indeed different for mothers and fathers. Controlling for all else, the odds of congruence are 17% lower for mothers compared to fathers for each one unit increase in perceived psychological control. High levels of psychological control from the part of mothers significantly reduce the odds of ideological congruence with their children, while the same amount of control from the part of fathers is associated with little to no decrease. Thus, mothers perceived as highly controlling have the lowest odds of parental congruence with their children. On the other hand, control from the part of fathers has a less detrimental effect on ideological congruence.

This gender-differentiated effect is only observed for the case of parental psychological control, while for parental warmth and autonomy support there are no significant differences in the association to intergenerational congruence for mothers and fathers. Role theory could offer an explanation for these results, since high levels of psychological control are more in line with fathers' role as provider for the family and disciplinarian. On the other hand, in the case of mothers, high levels of control clash with expectations of acceptance and positive affect as the primary caregiving and nurturing figure in the family. As mothers are generally expected to offer more warmth and have closer ties to their children than fathers, interactions that clash with these expectations have more detrimental effects on child outcomes than in the case of fathers.

1.2 The challenge of intergenerational mobility

The second transmission belt analyzed is the *transmission of social status*. Chapter 3 brought under scrutiny an assumption on which most of the political socialization literature is based, namely that parents transmit their socioeconomic status to their offspring, resulting in them sharing the same social class. This glosses over the instances when children move either up or down the social ladder compared to their parents. As a consequence of this assumption, the effects of social mobility on intergenerational congruence in political attitudes have so far not been thoroughly explored in socialization literature. This is an important aspect to investigate, given the increase in intergenerational mobility rates, especially downward mobility, in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis (Corak 2004; Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007; Alm 2011; Li and Devine 2011; Thijssen and Wolbers 2016; Elliot Major and Machin 2018). Chapter 3 contributes to filling this gap in political socialization research by analyzing differences in levels of parent-child congruence in the context of experienced and expected intergenerational mobility.

The analyses presented in Chapter 3 indicate that, compared to their non-mobile peers, upwardly mobile young adults have significantly lower odds (25%) of ideological congruence to their parents. Looking further into the direction of effects reveals that upward mobility is associated with higher odds of leaning rightward of one's parents' position (34% compared to immobile peers), while downward mobility increases young adults' chances of leaning leftward. Moreover, not only the experience of upward mobility, but also expectations of doing better than one's parents moves young adults rightward.

These results corroborate previous findings from research on the link between economic status and ideological leaning (Abramson 1972; Martinussen 1992; Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2018), advancing the knowledge on this topic in several ways. First, the chapter focused on the less studied political implications of intergenerational mobility, not only current economic status. Second, it approached this question from the perspective of political socialization, asking what does intergenerational mobility spell for the level of ideological similarity between parent and offspring. Third, it analyzed the cross-national variation in this relationship, based on the level of youth unemployment, immigration rate and level of social expenditure.

Based on previous research reporting an increase in far-right support under conditions of high unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998;

Golder 2003), I explored whether upwardly mobile young adults' likelihood of leaning rightward of their parents' ideological position increases in countries with higher levels of youth unemployment. Results showed that while there was no relationship in the case of young adults who have experienced upward mobility in the past, there was one for those who expect to do so in the future. Moreover, the odds increase with the level of social spending in a country, both for those who are socially mobile and those who expect to be so in the future.

1.3 Parental primary socialization

Chapter 4 explored *political discussion with parents* as a mechanism of primary political socialization and ideological transmission belt. The chapter focused primarily on the moderating effect of political discussion with parents on the relationship between parent-child ideological congruence and perceived parenting behavior on the one hand, and intergenerational mobility on the other. While political discussion was consistently shown to increase the success of political values transmission, attitudes and behaviors from parents to their children (Valentino and Sears 1998; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Rico and Jennings 2016), its effects have not been explored in conjunction with parental behavior and parent-child status congruence. Based on data from the CUPESSE Hungarian sub-sample, the analyses presented in Chapter 4 show that the association of perceived parenting behavior and intergenerational social mobility to parent-child ideological congruence varies with the frequency of political discussion.

Results suggest that the increase in the odds of parent-child congruence associated to political discussion was significantly lower the warmer the perception of parenting behavior was. This means that political discussion brings the largest increases in parent-child congruence in the case of young adults who perceive their parents as the least warm, whereas its benefits are more limited when parents are perceived as high in warmth. Although these young adults start off with the highest odds of congruence, the increases associated with political discussion are much smaller compared to the groups who rated their parents as less warm. In other words, young adults who do not discuss politics with their parents are more likely to share their ideological views the warmer they perceive their parents to be and those who perceived low levels of warmth from their parents are much more likely to share their ideological position the more often they discuss politics. On the other hand, political discussion benefits young adults similarly, regardless of their parents' level of autonomy support. The

returns of political discussion also vary with the level of parental psychological control. In this case, its greatest returns were observed in the case of moderately or highly controlling parents, which generally have lower odds of ideological congruence to their children. Thus, frequent political discussion with parents is associated with a higher increase in intergenerational congruence in the case of young adults who perceived moderate and high levels of parental control. The implications of these findings are that high levels of parental warmth and low levels of psychological control facilitate the internalization of parental values even when active socialization efforts through political discussion are absent from the part of parents.

Secondly, it was expected that the detrimental effects of social mobility for parent-child ideological congruence will be curbed by political discussion in the family. Thus, young adults who experienced active political socialization in the family through political discussion were expected to retain more ideological similarity to their parents, even when exposed to the diverging influence of a different destination group as a consequence of the process of social mobility. Results indicated that the odds of ideological congruence with parents increase for both upwardly and downwardly mobile young adults with the frequency of political discussion. However, results do not reach statistical significance, which suggests that political discussion in the family cannot put a strong enough break on the detrimental effect of social mobility on parent-child ideological congruence.

Finally, the chapter explored the intergenerational transmission of conservatism in the same sub-sample of Hungarian parents and their young adult children. Using a modified 40-item Wilson-Patterson conservatism scale, the chapter analyzed intergenerational congruence in issue positions, conservatism and three dimensions of conservatism (economic socialism, cultural liberalism and social conservatism). Moreover, like in the case of left-right self-placement, it analyzed the association of intergenerational mobility to parent-child congruence in conservatism, looking at differences across the three dimensions. Young adults who expect downward mobility have higher odds of being generally more liberal than their parents, and especially on the economic socialism dimension, which might reflect economic self-interest considerations and projected economic wins. On the other hand, those who expect to be upwardly mobile have higher odds of being more conservative on both the economic and cultural liberalism dimensions. Interestingly, neither past nor future mobility significantly decreases young adults' congruence with their parents on the social conservatism dimension,

which measures support for traditional sexual morality and church authority. These results suggest that certain facets of ideology are more resistant to the pressure of social mobility. However, given the limited sample size, more research is needed to explore the intergenerational transmission of conservatism.

To conclude, this dissertation has yielded some important insights. First, it shows that family context, particularly the behaviors parents engage in towards their children, are consequential for the ideological orientation of young adults and increase their odds of ideological congruence to their parents. These findings suggest that the quality of parent-child interactions is an important facilitator of value transmission and influences the degree to which children adopt their parents' values. Second, it sheds light on the implications of social mobility for the persistence of family influence over the ideological position of young adults. Third, it provides additional evidence that political discussion with parents increases the ideological similarity between parents and children, even under unfavorable conditions, such as low levels of parental warmth and high levels of psychological control. However, political discussion alone cannot put a break on the detrimental effect of social mobility on parent-child ideological congruence. This suggests that the destination group exerts a stronger influence over mobile young adults than the origin group does, even if the latter makes active political socialization efforts. A final remark on the implications of these findings should be made. Although this dissertation has focused on young adults' congruence to parental ideological position, the lack of such congruence is not always seen as a sign of unsuccessful political socialization. For instance, Goodnow (1994) argues that parents can overlook, accept or even encourage a certain degree of disagreement from the part of their children, termed "acceptable disagreement", in order to foster their autonomy and independent thinking.

2. Limitations

The present study is not without methodological limitations, which need to be addressed and discussed in terms of potential effects over the reported findings. First of all, the study suffers from the inherent shortcomings of a cross-sectional design. Therefore, it cannot establish whether the results reported are robust to changes over time or if there are any cohort effects, and could not infer causality. In order to offer more conclusive evidence about the hypothesized relationship between the variables analyzed, future studies would need to employ

a longitudinal design. This would provide a deeper understanding of young adults' social mobility trajectories across a longer period of time in their lives and their impact on the levels of ideological agreement their retain with their parents. Moreover, a longitudinal design enables the analysis of changes in family dynamics over time and of their effects on young adults' ideological position.

Additionally, the measures of parenting used in Chapter 2 reflect young adults' perception of the family as they recollect it from the time they were 14. These retrospective reports do not capture any potential variations in the emotional connection experienced over the entire course of respondents' socialization experience and can be subject to distortions. Consequently, the levels currently reported might not be an accurate reflection of those experienced throughout the young adults' childhood and adolescence, which could only be captured by examining the process of transmission using a longitudinal design.

Another limitation of this study is the sole focus on the classic, so-called "vertical" socialization processes, particularly from top to bottom, namely from parents to their children. However, additional research has explored "horizontal," intragenerational socialization by peer groups, including siblings and friends. Moreover, within "vertical" socialization processes, the current study does not capture reciprocal effects between parent and child, although studies have highlighted the existence of reciprocity and bidirectional influences between generations (Glass, Bengtson, and Chorn Dunham 1986; Vollebergh, Iedema, and Raaijmakers 2001; McDevitt and Chaffee 2002; Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Rodríguez-García and Wagner 2009; Lobet and Cavalcante 2014; Ojeda and Hatemi 2015; Miklikowska 2016), especially when the asymmetry between parents and children is reduced, as the latter reach adulthood (Dunn 1997).

McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) reported evidence of child-to-parent transmission of political knowledge in the case of a sample of American students who took part in an interactive civics instruction program. The strength of the vertical transmission process from child to parent appeared to vary with parents' socioeconomic status, the biggest gains in political knowledge being registered in the case of low status parents. Similarly, Wong and Tseng (2008) argue that in the United States, children of immigrants have more access to political information than their parents, thereby serving as an important sources of information on politics for the latter. These results have been confirmed by a more recent study of political learning, which found that American immigrant parents and parents with less education perceive their children as more influential on their process of learning about politics (Pedraza and Perry 2020). Consequently, the

levels of agreement found in this dissertation could potentially also be due to the influence of the young adults over their parents. However, given the lack of longitudinal data, these reciprocal relationships and the direction of influence could not be investigated in this study.

Additionally, due to a lack of triadic data, the present study could not disentangle the separate influence of mothers and fathers or control for value agreement between parents. Ideally, data should be triadic (both parents and the child), or include other members of the extended family (grandparents). Analyzing both parents jointly offers more predictive power in explaining parent-child congruence and allows for an understanding of the unique contribution of each parent-child dyad to the outcome investigated. Previous research has shown that in families where parents share the same political values and attitudes, the offspring has higher odds of congruence to their parents (Knafo and Schwartz 2003). Since the data analyzed here included information on the ideological position of only one of the parents, there was no way of testing for homogeneity in parents' ideological positions. Therefore, young adults who reported an ideological position different from their parent could be more similar in views to the other parent who did not take part in the study. Unfortunately, the data employed here offered no way of testing that.

Within these data constraints, this dissertation shows that the behaviors parents engage in towards their children and whether the latter retain their parents' social status or not, account for a significant proportion of the variance in intergenerational ideological congruence. These findings support the line of research in political psychology originating in the work of Adorno et al. (1950), which holds that the development of children's political attitudes is shaped by parental attitudes and behavior. Therefore, this study extends the knowledge on the predictors of parent-child ideological similarity and the developmental antecedents of political ideology.

3. Directions for future research

The results presented here indicate that parenting behavior is an important pathway for the transmission of ideology from parents to their children. Future studies should pursue this fruitful avenue of research further by looking into variations in parent-child congruence depending on the level of similarity in the parenting knowledge, attitudes and behavior of mothers and fathers, as well as

the parenting of other caregivers, such as grandparents. Dissimilarity between maternal and paternal parenting was shown to negatively impact a host of child outcomes (Dwairy 2000; Berkien et al. 2012) by decreasing children's ability to predict the behaviors of their parents. Consequently, such a dissimilarity is likely to inhibit the intergenerational transmission of political values and attitudes, and should be taken into account in future research. Moreover, looking jointly at the parenting behaviors of both parents allows one to identify the most influential of the two parents, should there be a difference in their ideological leaning.

Given the changes in social mobility rates over the last decade, and especially the recent developments which can damage young adults' chances of upward mobility, making them at the same time more prone to downward mobility, future studies should inquire further into the consequences of social mobility for young adults' ideological position and congruence to their parents. Using longitudinal data would allow the study of trajectories of social mobility at several points over the course of young adulthood (intragenerational mobility) and thus provide a better understanding of the causal effects of social mobility on parent-child ideological congruence. Moreover, on the basis of larger samples, future studies could also analyze the implications of the extent of mobility (which refers to the distance traveled or the difference between the origin and destination group, differentiating between short-range and long-range mobility) for parent-child ideological congruence. The expectation is that long-range mobility is more detrimental to intergenerational value congruence than short-range mobility. Finally, in order to capture the strength of destination group influence, such studies could employ a measure of ties to the destination group, investigating whether the socially mobile young adults who have stronger ties to their new group are more likely to deviate from the view of their origin group.

As previously mentioned, this study could not inquire into bidirectional effects within the family (not only from parent to child, but also from child to parent). This is a fruitful line of research, especially when it comes to analyzing young adults, who are developmentally in a better position than adolescents to influence their parents' position. Future studies should therefore pay closer attention to the mechanisms of bidirectional effects and analyze their variations depending on the gender composition of the dyad, the congruence in social status between parents and their children and the quality of their interactions. Especially in the case of upwardly mobile young adults, in line with the asymmetrical effects hypothesis (which holds that the higher status group exercises the largest influence), it would be worth investigating whether they attempt to change their parents'

ideological leaning in the direction of that of their destination group and what factors explain their possible success in doing so.

Appendices

1. Appendix to Introduction

Table 4.11: Description of the CUPESSE two-generation survey sample

	Youth			Parents			
	All	Female (%)	Male (%)	All	Female	Male	Both
Austria	1684	56	44	517	286	231	0
Czechia	1214	57	43	524	414	110	87
Denmark	1142	44	56	403	210	193	0
Germany	3279	51	49	444	313	131	36
Greece	1538	60	40	500	382	118	0
Hungary	1295	55	45	545	337	208	50
Italy	1008	49	51	529	291	238	0
Spain	1826	40	60	854	592	262	150
Switzerland	1002	50	50	268	185	83	0
Turkey	3016	49	51	537	418	119	0
UK	3004	47	53	499	136	363	0
Total	20,008	53	47	5620	3564	2056	325

Note. CUPESSE 2016, Tosun et al (2019, 518)

2. Appendix to Chapter 2

Table 4.12: Left-right scale recognition and self-placement (%) across countries by generation, gender and level of education

	All	Austria	Czechia	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	Turkey	UK
Youth											
All	79.64	91.43	75.38		88.84	72.44	77.24	92.31	100	74.07	70.09
Daughters	75.75	88.75	69.08	89.33	85.60	71.3	72.76	91.47	100	74.89	62.62
Sons	84.04	94.58	83.83	90.73	92.86	73.81	82.3	93.17	100	73.14	78.15
Low education	73.37	91.03	70.33	75.65	82.15	70.84	72.29	87.56	100	70.38	57.50
Medium education	81.1	92.73		87.87	89.57	70.90	83.00	92.54	100	65.76	67.92
High education	86.56	91.77	84.70	89.29	95.43	78.40		95.96	100	79.78	79.13
Mothers											
All	83.3	85.72	77.94	90.00	89.98	76.86	70.11	92.05	89.73	78.23	77.95
Low education	78.86	79.42	74.29	66.67	88.24	75.71	64.43	90.28	70.59	75.69	63.94
Medium education	90.16	100		91.18	94.74	80.60	84.34	95.77	93.75	85.11	93.11
High education	89.24	90.00	89.39	84.22	93.16	78.27		94.71	89.78	79.63	86.37
Fathers											
All	90.00	100	91.46	96.38	95.21	83.73	84.46	98.31	95.19	86.56	80.72
Low education	86.49	100	89.55	94.74	93.91	82.61	83.24	97.06	100	83.02	72.88
Medium education	92.59	100		94.45	94.88	83.34	88.58	100	93.55	87.50	91.53
High education	95.44	100	97.61	95.09	97.78	92.60		100	95.75	91.67	89.72

Note. CUPESSE 2016

Table 4.13: Descriptives for left-right self-placement (*M* and *SD*) across countries by generation, gender and level of education

	All	Austria	Czechia	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	Turkey	UK
Youth											
All	4.84 (2.48)	4.56 (2.42)	5.74 (2.18)	4.48 (2.69)	4.83 (1.98)	5.84 (1.93)	4.42 (2.81)	3.74 (2.64)	4.68 (2.37)	5.55 (2.72)	4.65 (2.40)
Sons	4.83 (2.58)	4.99 (2.52)	5.85 (2.24)	4.74 (2.70)	5.07(2.17)	5.67 (1.96)	4.59 (2.77)	3.76 (2.52)	5.06 (2.40)	5.72 (2.81)	5.05 (2.51)
Daughters	4.62 (2.55)	4.20 (2.40)	5.63 (2.04)	4.15 (2.64)	4.61 (2.07)	5.45 (1.89)	4.64 (2.79)	3.65 (2.65)	4.43 (2.31)	5.79 (2.87)	4.61 (2.42)
Low education	5.00 (2.51)	5.47 (2.20)	5.64 (2.24)	4.52 (3.17)	4.84 (2.39)	5.53 (1.92)	4.89 (2.74)	3.99 (2.64)	4.93 (2.30)	7.05 (3.17)	5.03 (2.46)
Medium education	4.21 (2.62)	4.31 (2.68)		4.52 (2.76)	4.71 (2.10)	5.57 (2.05)	4.33 (2.79)	3.43 (2.56)	5.30 (2.44)	4.87 (2.93)	4.50 (2.50)
High education	4.75 (2.48)	4.15 (2.29)	5.88 (1.95)	4.73 (2.72)	4.89 (1.84)	5.57 (1.85)		3.72 (2.55)	4.89 (2.40)	6.19 (2.74)	4.96 (2.46)
Mothers											
All	4.88 (2.44)	4.97 (2.16)	5.13 (2.57)	4.49 (2.85)	4.85 (1.75)	5.16 (2.16)	5.08 (2.60)	4.39 (2.50)	4.37 (1.93)	5.65 (2.59)	5.11 (2.25)
Low education	4.96 (2.44)	5.66 (1.64)	4.93 (2.59)	6.00 (3.42)	4.97 (1.63)	5.30 (1.93)	5.10 (2.71)	4.27 (2.58)	5.16 (2.32)	5.79 (2.62)	5.33 (2.00)
Medium education	4.86	4.58 (2.27)		5.03 (2.79)	4.52 (1.68)	4.61 (2.63)	5.04 (2.40)	4.54 (2.47)	4.86 (1.81)	5.77 (2.31)	5.25 (2.21)
High education	4.74	3.44 (2.69)	5.61 (2.40)	4.58 (3.07)	4.66 (2.09)	5.38 (2.70)		4.64 (2.28)	3.79 (1.82)	5.04 (2.85)	4.78(2.59)
Fathers											
All	4.95 (2.39)	4.87 (2.14)	4.79 (2.67)	5.09 (2.66)	5.16 (1.83)	5.23 (2.22)	4.72 (2.46)	4.42 (2.31)	4.70 (2.05)	5.92 (2.91)	5.26 (2.23)
Low education	4.86	5.70 (1.68)	4.43 (2.68)	5.61 (2.54)	4.98(1.84)	5.23 (2.14)	4.66 (2.39)	4.29 (2.31)	6.00(2.34)	5.79(3.09)	5.37 (2.16)
Medium education	5.07 (2.40)	3.60 (2.45)		5.88 (2.86)	5.54 (1.89)	4.50 (2.81)	4.87 (2.64)	4.25 (2.19)	4.27 (1.77)	7.47 (2.06)	5.64 (1.86)
High education	5.05 (2.38)	4.58 (2.15)	5.82 (2.32)	5.32 (1.65)	5.15 (1.79)	5.76 (2.14)		4.76 (2.35)	4.84 (2.15)	4.36 (2.93)	4.97 (2.50)

Note. CUPESSE 2016

Table 4.14: Correlations between young adults' and parents' left-right self-placement by gender and level of education of the youth

		All countries	Austria	Czechia	Denmark	Germany	Hungary	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	Turkey	UK
Mothers	All youth	0.50***	0.38**	0.41***	0.48***	0.40***	0.39***	0.77***	0.41***	0.51***	0.66***	0.42***
	Daughters	0.54***	0.51**	0.45***	0.54***	0.44***	0.45***	0.77***	0.45***	0.58***	0.67***	0.42**
	Sons	0.43***	0.32	0.34***	0.35**	0.29**	0.32**	0.83***	0.35***	0.40**	0.66***	0.47**
	Low education	0.508***	0.22	0.44***	0.89***	0.23	0.38***	0.78***	0.40***	0.67***	0.89***	0.67
	Medium education	0.53***	0.51		0.61**	0.44***	0.16	0.77***	0.45***	0.58***	0.79***	0.46
	High education	0.47***	0.237	0.34***	0.402	0.52***	0.65***		0.43***	0.52***	0.68***	0.27
Fathers	All youth	0.52***	0.31	0.33***	0.35***	0.53***	0.49***	0.75***	0.54***	0.31**	0.78***	0.5***
	Daughters	0.45***	0.36	0.24	0.30**	0.48***	0.49***	0.77***	0.54***	0.31	0.65***	0.53***
	Sons	0.58***	0.27	0.46	0.48***	0.56***	0.50***	0.75***	0.54***	0.29***	0.81***	0.49***
	Low education	0.53***	0.32	0.36***	0.25	0.31	0.65***	0.73***	0.60***	0.57*	0.89*	0.37*
	Medium education	0.55***	0.47		0.23	0.59***	0.21	0.78***	0.48***	0.37	0.89	0.61***
	High education	0.49***	0.50	0.27	-0.02	0.63**	0.35		0.56***	0.34	0.87***	0.50***

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

Table 4.15: Descriptive statistics (Chapter 2)

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Outcome variables					
Youth left-right self-placement	4.633	2.485	0	10	4,870
Parent-child ideological congruence (binary)	0.55	0.49	0	1	4,418
Parent-child ideological congruence (3 cat)	0.69	0.84	0	2	4,418
Predictor variables					
Parental left-right self-placement	4.86	2.37	0	10	4,991
Warmth mother	2.68	0.72	0	3	5,738
Warmth father	2.38	0.98	0	3	5,497
Warmth parents	1.46	0.73	0	2	5,442
Psych. control mother	0.48	0.65	0	2	5,756
Psych. control father	0.44	0.64	0	2	5,536
Psych. control parents	0.75	0.84	0	2	5,479
Autonomy support mother	2.23	0.89	0	3	5,661
Autonomy support father	2.14	0.94	0	3	5,459
Autonomy support parents	1.54	0.72	0	2	5,368
Relationship with mother	4.51	0.73	1	5	5,734
Relationship with father	4.25	0.94	1	5	5,410
Relationship with parents	4.38	0.71	1	5	5,321
Relationship between parents	3.95	1.07	1	5	5,635
Young adult					
Age	26.22	5.04	18	35	5,837
Female	0.55	0.49	0	1	5,838
Education	1.09	0.82	0	2	5,813
Married	0.22	0.41	0	1	5,401
Has children	0.19	0.39	0	1	5,825
Parent					
Age	55.08	7.22	33	92	5,794
Female	0.60	0.49	0	1	5,838
Education	0.68	0.82	0	2	5,807

Note. CUPESSE 2016

Table 4.16: Descriptive statistics (M & SD) for main explanatory variables by respondent parent (Chapter 2)

		Respondent parent		**Other parent**	
		Mother	*Father*	*Father*	*Mother*
Parental warmth	All	2.69 (0.72)	2.67 (0.73)	2.30 (1.04)	2.48 (0.88)
	Daughters	2.65 (0.76)	2.64 (0.78)	2.30 (1.05)	2.52 (0.86)
	Sons	2.74 (0.63)	2.69 (0.69)	2.30 (1.01)	2.45 (0.89)
Parental psych. control	All	0.47 (0.65)	0.50 (0.66)	0.44 (0.64)	0.45 (0.64)
	Daughters	0.46 (0.66)	0.44 (0.61)	0.43 (0.63)	0.36 (0.57)
	Sons	0.48 (0.64)	0.55 (0.68)	0.45 (0.64)	0.52 (0.68)
Parental autonomy support	All	2.24 (0.88)	2.26 (0.87)	2.06 (0.98)	2.21 (0.89)
	Daughters	2.24 (0.89)	2.27 (0.86)	2.04 (0.98)	2.22 (0.89)
	Sons	2.24 (0.87)	2.25 (0.88)	2.11 (0.96)	2.20 (0.89)
Relationship with parent	All	4.53 (0.70)	4.40 (0.78)	4.14 (1.03)	4.48 (0.77)
	Daughters	4.54 (0.71)	4.43 (0.79)	4.14 (1.05)	4.51 (0.80)
	Sons	4.52 (0.66)	4.37 (0.77)	4.15 (0.99)	4.46 (0.75)

Note. CUPESSE 2016

Table 4.17: Descriptive statistics (M & SD)

	Austria	Czechia	Denmark	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Spain	Switzerland	Turkey	UK
Warmth	2.57 (0.82)	2.52 (0.83)	2.69 (0.67)	2.51 (0.93)	2.59 (0.78)	2.75 (0.59)	2.32 (0.98)	2.66 (0.76)	2.81 (0.57)	2.82 (0.50)	2.45 (0.96)
Warmth M	2.72 (0.66)	2.57 (0.78)	2.77 (0.63)	2.60 (0.81)	2.66 (0.72)	2.76 (0.63)	2.45 (0.87)	2.73 (0.69)	2.87 (0.46)	2.84 (0.46)	2.66 (0.79)
Warmth F	2.33 (0.97)	2.14 (1.09)	2.48 (0.86)	2.06 (1.18)	2.29 (0.96)	2.57 (0.83)	2.13 (1.09)	2.48 (0.91)	2.69 (0.68)	2.74 (0.62)	2.37 (1.01)
Psych. control	0.38 (0.60)	0.44 (0.60)	0.12 (0.37)	0.50 (0.70)	0.63 (0.70)	0.41 (0.63)	0.59 (0.78)	0.54 (0.63)	0.25 (0.55)	0.49 (0.66)	0.47 (0.61)
Psych. control M	0.37 (0.59)	0.48 (0.62)	0.20 (0.46)	0.60 (0.75)	0.62 (0.70)	0.42 (0.61)	0.59 (0.78)	0.57 (0.64)	0.21 (0.51)	0.48 (0.65)	0.52 (0.62)
Psych. control F	0.39 (0.60)	0.36 (0.57)	0.11 (0.35)	0.49 (0.70)	0.60 (0.70)	0.44 (0.65)	0. 55 (0.76)	0.54 (0.63)	0.25 (0.54)	0.45 (0.63)	0.47 (0.62)
Autonomy support	2.21 (0.86)	2.07 (0.86)	2.26 (0.82)	2.23 (0.95)	2.27 (0.88)	2.41 (0.78)	2.24 (0.92)	2.09 (0.88)	2.54 (0.70)	2.47 (0.90)	2.31 (0.89)
Autonomy support M	2.20 (0.87)	2.04 (0.86)	2.23 (0.81)	2.19 (0.98)	2.23 (0.91)	2.40 (0.80)	2.20 (0.92)	2.06 (0.88)	2.55 (0.67)	2.50 (0..87)	2.33 (0.88)
Autonomy support F	2.12 (0.90)	1.96 (0.88)	2.19 (0.81)	1.94 (1.05)	2.09 (1.00)	2.38 (0.84)	2.18 (0.97)	2.04 (0.91)	2.53 (0.68)	2.36 (0.98)	2.29 (0.89)

Note. CUPESSE 2016

Table 4.18: Parenting dimensions and parent-child ideological congruence, logistic regression with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:									
	Parent-child congruence									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Warmth	0.282***	0.284***					0.275***	0.220***		0.210***
	(0.040)	(0.041)					(0.042)	(0.046)		(0.046)
Psychological control			−0.106**	−0.121**			−0.062		−0.098*	−0.065
			(0.048)	(0.049)			(0.051)		(0.050)	(0.051)
Autonomy support					0.242***	0.241***		0.153***	0.233***	0.151***
					(0.036)	(0.037)		(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Female		−0.117*		−0.122*		−0.133**	−0.126*	−0.131*	−0.144**	−0.139**
		(0.068)		(0.067)		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Education (ref: low)										
medium		−0.093		−0.093		−0.088	−0.097	−0.100	−0.095	−0.102
		(0.088)		(0.087)		(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)
high		0.020		0.033		0.055	0.014	0.028	0.044	0.023
		(0.087)		(0.087)		(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Age		−0.032		−0.048		−0.037	−0.034	−0.034	−0.041	−0.036
		(0.039)		(0.038)		(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Age (sq)		0.050		0.061*		0.054	0.045	0.048	0.053	0.044
		(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)										
Either P or C		−0.240***		−0.206**		−0.205**	−0.224***	−0.220***	−0.196**	−0.212**
		(0.083)		(0.082)		(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Both P and C		0.073		0.132		0.124	0.088	0.091	0.139	0.103
		(0.085)		(0.085)		(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Employment status (ref: in education)										
Employed		0.071		0.100		0.076	0.080	0.077	0.091	0.090
		(0.091)		(0.090)		(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Not in employment		−0.062		−0.060		−0.060	−0.052	−0.049	−0.045	−0.040
		(0.103)		(0.103)		(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Parent: female		−0.082		−0.024		−0.025	−0.077	−0.069	−0.019	−0.064
		(0.069)		(0.068)		(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Parent education (ref: low)										
medium		−0.007		−0.011		−0.019	−0.003	−0.007	−0.015	−0.004
		(0.087)		(0.086)		(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)
high		0.030		0.017		−0.002	0.026	0.010	−0.008	0.007
		(0.087)		(0.086)		(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Constant	−0.624***	−0.518***	0.137	0.164	−0.430***	−0.381**	−0.477**	−0.699***	−0.334*	−0.652***
	(0.146)	(0.189)	(0.105)	(0.164)	(0.130)	(0.182)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.185)	(0.199)
Observations	4,358	4,293	4,373	4,309	4,312	4,251	4,275	4,228	4,238	4,218
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,055.661	5,978.295	6,150.464	6,070.841	6,021.907	5,952.350	5,961.510	5,889.663	5,935.543	5,879.760

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.19: Parental warmth and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression by country

	Dependent variable:										
	Parent-child congruence										
	(AT)	(CZ)	(DK)	(DE)	(GR)	(HU)	(IT)	(ES)	(CH)	(TK)	(UK)
Parental warmth	0.235*	−0.079	0.857***	0.244**	0.352**	0.279	0.526***	0.104	−0.145	0.150	0.513***
	(0.136)	(0.128)	(0.211)	(0.120)	(0.159)	(0.190)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.245)	(0.315)	(0.148)
Female	0.093	0.061	−0.800***	0.148	−0.657**	−0.072	0.143	−0.154	0.563	0.114	−0.443
	(0.235)	(0.222)	(0.273)	(0.241)	(0.258)	(0.239)	(0.392)	(0.145)	(0.347)	(0.292)	(0.273)
Education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.291		−0.314	0.275	1.375***	−0.494	0.489	−0.630***	−0.054	−0.389	−0.033
	(0.295)		(0.362)	(0.277)	(0.455)	(0.313)	(0.310)	(0.192)	(0.532)	(0.362)	(0.378)
high	−0.307	0.064	0.599*	0.773**	1.286***	−0.264	0.025	−0.406**	0.107	0.224	0.210
	(0.323)	(0.251)	(0.353)	(0.327)	(0.437)	(0.348)	(0.375)	(0.182)	(0.584)	(0.371)	(0.374)
Age	−0.088	−0.159	−0.097	−0.147	0.285*	0.075	0.127	−0.063	−0.070	−0.177	−0.169
	(0.132)	(0.151)	(0.160)	(0.133)	(0.165)	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.086)	(0.238)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Age (sq)	−0.033	−0.035	0.100	0.052	0.014	−0.122	0.067	0.016	0.199	0.176	0.369**
	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.155)	(0.132)	(0.158)	(0.147)	(0.156)	(0.083)	(0.189)	(0.147)	(0.170)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)											
Either P or C	−0.151	−0.128	−0.808***	−0.235	0.678	−0.539**	0.233	−0.364**	0.226	−0.015	−0.342
	(0.277)	(0.285)	(0.307)	(0.281)	(0.474)	(0.275)	(0.316)	(0.164)	(0.461)	(0.930)	(0.330)
Both P and C	0.084	0.054	0.128	0.551**	0.191	−0.431	0.569*	0.126	0.258	−0.357	−0.084
	(0.278)	(0.333)	(0.295)	(0.267)	(0.453)	(0.286)	(0.291)	(0.189)	(0.449)	(0.777)	(0.366)
Employment status (ref: in education)											
Not in employment	−0.184	0.783*	0.014	−0.792*	−0.070	−0.983**	−0.163	−0.366*	−0.490	1.186***	0.860
	(0.355)	(0.429)	(0.384)	(0.444)	(0.422)	(0.465)	(0.339)	(0.212)	(0.631)	(0.437)	(0.574)
Employed	0.327	0.083	−0.117	−0.375	−0.094	−0.615	0.171	0.087	0.186	1.647***	−0.029
	(0.293)	(0.335)	(0.320)	(0.350)	(0.403)	(0.411)	(0.332)	(0.198)	(0.485)	(0.419)	(0.415)
Parent: female	−0.392*	0.313	−0.202	−0.319	−0.134	−0.081	−0.338	−0.127	−0.289	0.868***	−0.286
	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.252)	(0.256)	(0.298)	(0.238)	(0.391)	(0.145)	(0.371)	(0.308)	(0.317)
Parent education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.133		−0.509*	−0.189	0.012	−0.469	0.081	0.345*	−0.250	0.084	0.347
	(0.273)		(0.280)	(0.333)	(0.304)	(0.325)	(0.290)	(0.194)	(0.839)	(0.370)	(0.379)
low	0.275	−0.075	−0.755**	−0.332	−0.182	−0.407	−0.002	0.337*	0.018	−0.051	0.246
	(0.289)	(0.248)	(0.365)	(0.297)	(0.330)	(0.446)	(0.336)	(0.177)	(0.835)	(0.607)	(0.330)
Constant	−0.247	−0.328	−1.532**	0.020	−1.763**	1.264	−1.013**	0.093	−0.019	−1.399	−1.330**
	(0.499)	(0.461)	(0.682)	(0.556)	(0.805)	(0.791)	(0.498)	(0.330)	(1.251)	(1.278)	(0.672)
Observations	429	419	322	366	339	364	369	876	205	333	271
Akaike Inf. Crit.	587.686	640.712	499.128	521.623	510.579	513.483	413.653	1,309.383	237.391	397.312	388.050

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.20: Parental psychological control and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression by country

	Dependent variable:										
	Parent-child congruence										
	(AT)	(CZ)	(DK)	(DE)	(GR)	(HU)	(IT)	(ES)	(CH)	(TK)	(UK)
Parental psychological control	0.085	−0.107	−1.261***	−0.226	−0.106	−0.216	−0.354**	0.143	−0.026	−0.412**	0.213
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.394)	(0.159)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.146)	(0.109)	(0.276)	(0.199)	(0.215)
Female	0.082	0.059	−0.840***	0.084	−0.663***	0.045	−0.001	−0.162	0.530	0.076	−0.515*
	(0.234)	(0.223)	(0.274)	(0.240)	(0.255)	(0.234)	(0.387)	(0.145)	(0.327)	(0.293)	(0.266)
Education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.292		−0.140	0.212	1.526***	−0.618**	0.452	−0.602***	−0.278	−0.457	−0.088
	(0.295)		(0.355)	(0.283)	(0.445)	(0.308)	(0.301)	(0.193)	(0.488)	(0.364)	(0.373)
high	−0.268	0.045	0.695**	0.689**	1.413***	−0.367	0.175	−0.358**	−0.354	0.180	0.134
	(0.323)	(0.251)	(0.345)	(0.335)	(0.430)	(0.335)	(0.364)	(0.182)	(0.529)	(0.372)	(0.368)
Age	−0.123	−0.157	−0.085	−0.149	0.278*	0.065	0.153	−0.067	0.095	−0.179	−0.198
	(0.131)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.132)	(0.164)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.086)	(0.207)	(0.166)	(0.159)
Age (sq)	−0.013	−0.031	0.171	0.070	0.049	−0.145	0.039	0.012	0.244	0.193	0.355**
	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.131)	(0.155)	(0.142)	(0.154)	(0.083)	(0.175)	(0.148)	(0.165)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)											
Either P or C	−0.053	−0.122	−0.679**	−0.199	0.594	−0.478*	0.180	−0.352**	0.579	−0.008	−0.180
	(0.271)	(0.285)	(0.303)	(0.281)	(0.469)	(0.270)	(0.309)	(0.164)	(0.441)	(0.930)	(0.320)
Both P or C	0.164	0.073	0.206	0.626**	0.177	−0.341	0.576**	0.137	0.600	−0.277	−0.009
	(0.273)	(0.333)	(0.291)	(0.268)	(0.452)	(0.285)	(0.288)	(0.189)	(0.439)	(0.784)	(0.355)
Employment status (ref: in education)											
Not in employment	−0.202	0.786*	−0.068	−0.861*	−0.029	−1.027**	−0.095	−0.372*	−0.616	1.247***	0.788
	(0.353)	(0.429)	(0.377)	(0.440)	(0.419)	(0.453)	(0.329)	(0.212)	(0.614)	(0.440)	(0.562)
Employed	0.361	0.091	−0.157	−0.372	−0.059	−0.587	0.175	0.087	0.152	1.725***	−0.053
	(0.292)	(0.336)	(0.312)	(0.347)	(0.400)	(0.402)	(0.323)	(0.198)	(0.455)	(0.423)	(0.407)
Parent: female	−0.316	0.304	0.145	−0.289	−0.041	−0.049	−0.176	−0.112	−0.158	0.913***	−0.204
	(0.230)	(0.212)	(0.252)	(0.254)	(0.291)	(0.235)	(0.384)	(0.144)	(0.341)	(0.313)	(0.311)
Parent education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.076		−0.585**	−0.188	0.096	−0.588*	0.193	0.342*	−0.285	0.018	0.429
	(0.270)		(0.276)	(0.335)	(0.302)	(0.314)	(0.288)	(0.194)	(0.681)	(0.375)	(0.370)
high	0.344	−0.078	−0.799**	−0.339	−0.161	−0.477	−0.077	0.337*	−0.073	−0.169	0.436
	(0.286)	(0.248)	(0.358)	(0.297)	(0.328)	(0.431)	(0.328)	(0.177)	(0.688)	(0.616)	(0.320)
Constant	0.134	−0.481	0.625	0.774	−1.048	2.061***	0.308	0.263	−0.270	−0.901	−0.180
	(0.441)	(0.372)	(0.471)	(0.515)	(0.737)	(0.533)	(0.447)	(0.243)	(1.005)	(0.947)	(0.565)
Observations	429	419	322	366	339	370	369	876	217	331	271
Akaike Inf. Crit.	592.289	638.902	507.109	523.049	518.602	526.369	431.666	1,308.797	258.251	390.796	399.613

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.21: Parental autonomy support and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression by country

	Dependent variable:										
	Parent-child congruence										
	(AT)	(CZ)	(DK)	(DE)	(GR)	(HU)	(IT)	(ES)	(CH)	(TK)	(UK)
Parental autonomy support	0.298**	−0.003	0.528***	0.244**	0.318**	0.301**	0.405***	0.163**	0.071	0.036	0.325**
	(0.124)	(0.119)	(0.156)	(0.117)	(0.140)	(0.144)	(0.122)	(0.079)	(0.243)	(0.154)	(0.156)
Female	0.099	0.061	−0.848***	0.143	−0.674***	0.026	0.004	−0.171	0.255	0.075	−0.434
	(0.236)	(0.222)	(0.273)	(0.241)	(0.257)	(0.243)	(0.388)	(0.145)	(0.375)	(0.293)	(0.270)
Education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.246		0.063	0.257	1.522***	−0.628**	0.439	−0.633***	−0.430	−0.349	−0.121
	(0.297)		(0.356)	(0.278)	(0.450)	(0.320)	(0.302)	(0.192)	(0.551)	(0.367)	(0.373)
high	−0.289	0.051	0.877**	0.813**	1.420***	−0.428	0.011	−0.391**	0.018	0.265	0.104
	(0.323)	(0.251)	(0.343)	(0.327)	(0.434)	(0.358)	(0.370)	(0.181)	(0.586)	(0.371)	(0.369)
Age	−0.109	−0.147	−0.162	−0.155	0.321*	0.069	0.132	−0.061	0.111	−0.190	−0.154
	(0.132)	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.133)	(0.165)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.086)	(0.235)	(0.166)	(0.162)
Age (sq)	−0.029	−0.040	0.219	0.098	0.015	−0.183	0.010	0.019	0.075	0.209	0.366**
	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.153)	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.156)	(0.083)	(0.200)	(0.148)	(0.166)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)											
Either P or C	−0.083	−0.127	−0.623**	−0.201	0.644	−0.502*	0.216	−0.352**	0.244	−0.091	−0.225
	(0.273)	(0.285)	(0.304)	(0.281)	(0.474)	(0.277)	(0.310)	(0.164)	(0.506)	(0.929)	(0.323)
Both P and C	0.129	0.065	0.232	0.660**	0.224	−0.426	0.526*	0.151	0.245	−0.364	−0.035
	(0.276)	(0.333)	(0.291)	(0.269)	(0.455)	(0.290)	(0.287)	(0.189)	(0.503)	(0.777)	(0.358)
Employment status (ref: in education)											
Not in employment	−0.159	0.773*	0.007	−0.786*	−0.105	−1.093**	−0.155	−0.368*	−0.321	1.251***	0.712
	(0.356)	(0.428)	(0.379)	(0.442)	(0.420)	(0.471)	(0.332)	(0.212)	(0.650)	(0.447)	(0.564)
Employed	0.358	0.071	−0.085	−0.346	−0.075	−0.775*	0.177	0.072	0.496	1.711***	−0.102
	(0.294)	(0.334)	(0.315)	(0.348)	(0.400)	(0.412)	(0.324)	(0.199)	(0.536)	(0.428)	(0.409)
Parent: female	−0.353	0.291	−0.119	−0.241	−0.004	−0.115	−0.065	−0.086	−0.363	0.905***	−0.270
	(0.232)	(0.211)	(0.247)	(0.254)	(0.293)	(0.241)	(0.384)	(0.145)	(0.383)	(0.311)	(0.312)
Parent education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.121		−0.621**	−0.187	0.021	−0.550*	0.141	0.334*	−0.689	0.150	0.356
	(0.273)		(0.277)	(0.334)	(0.304)	(0.327)	(0.287)	(0.194)	(0.764)	(0.376)	(0.373)
high	0.326	−0.070	−0.935***	−0.384	−0.221	−0.368	−0.008	0.336*	−0.684	−0.043	0.309
	(0.287)	(0.248)	(0.360)	(0.297)	(0.330)	(0.446)	(0.330)	(0.177)	(0.762)	(0.608)	(0.325)
Constant	−0.429	−0.493	−0.793	−0.059	−1.794**	1.467**	−0.739	0.004	0.481	−1.184	−0.738
	(0.503)	(0.462)	(0.591)	(0.569)	(0.807)	(0.664)	(0.493)	(0.288)	(1.284)	(0.999)	(0.644)
Observations	429	419	322	366	339	357	369	876	175	328	271
Akaike Inf. Crit.	585.327	639.710	507.911	521.477	512.287	503.245	429.846	1,306.958	202.394	389.501	397.060

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.22: Parenting style dimensions and parent gender, logistic regression with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:								
	Parent-child congruence								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Warmth	0.280***	0.277***	0.216***			0.208***			0.210***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.059)			(0.046)			(0.046)
Psychological control			−0.066	0.014	−0.019	0.004			−0.065
			(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.076)			(0.051)
Autonomy support			0.151***			0.149***	0.255***	0.254***	0.159***
			(0.041)			(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Mother	−0.171	−0.123	−0.031	0.044	0.059	−0.007	−0.005	0.027	−0.032
	(0.217)	(0.220)	(0.223)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.182)
Warmth: mother	0.023	0.016	−0.013						
	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.082)						
Psychological control: mother				−0.209**	−0.177*	−0.122			
				(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.100)			
Autonomy support: mother							−0.025	−0.024	−0.014
							(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Female		−0.116*	−0.140**		−0.115*	−0.134*		−0.134**	−0.139**
		(0.068)	(0.069)		(0.067)	(0.069)		(0.068)	(0.069)
Education (ref: low)									
medium		−0.094	−0.101		−0.092	−0.100		−0.088	−0.101
		(0.088)	(0.089)		(0.087)	(0.089)		(0.088)	(0.089)
high		0.019	0.024		0.035	0.025		0.055	0.023
		(0.088)	(0.089)		(0.087)	(0.089)		(0.088)	(0.089)
Age		−0.032	−0.036		−0.047	−0.036		−0.037	−0.036
		(0.039)	(0.039)		(0.038)	(0.039)		(0.039)	(0.039)
Age (sq)		0.050	0.044		0.062*	0.044		0.054	0.044
		(0.037)	(0.037)		(0.037)	(0.037)		(0.037)	(0.037)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)									
Either P or C		−0.240***	−0.212**		−0.200**	−0.207**		−0.205**	−0.212**
		(0.083)	(0.084)		(0.082)	(0.084)		(0.083)	(0.084)
Both P and C		0.073	0.103		0.132	0.103		0.124	0.103
		(0.085)	(0.086)		(0.085)	(0.087)		(0.086)	(0.087)
Employment status (ref: in education)									
Not in employment		−0.062	−0.040		−0.064	−0.042		−0.060	−0.040
		(0.103)	(0.104)		(0.103)	(0.104)		(0.104)	(0.104)
Working		0.071	0.090		0.102	0.091		0.076	0.090
		(0.091)	(0.092)		(0.090)	(0.092)		(0.091)	(0.092)
Parent education (ref: low)									
medium		−0.008	−0.004		−0.014	−0.007		−0.019	−0.004
		(0.087)	(0.088)		(0.086)	(0.088)		(0.087)	(0.088)
high		0.030	0.006		0.014	0.005		−0.002	0.007
		(0.087)	(0.087)		(0.086)	(0.087)		(0.087)	(0.087)
Constant	−0.559***	−0.500**	−0.667***	0.113	0.112	−0.676***	−0.427***	−0.410**	−0.668***
	(0.173)	(0.210)	(0.219)	(0.113)	(0.167)	(0.200)	(0.162)	(0.204)	(0.217)
Observations	4,358	4,293	4,218	4,373	4,309	4,218	4,312	4,251	4,218
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,056.009	5,980.271	5,881.742	6,147.155	6,068.406	5,879.571	6,024.631	5,954.014	5,881.619

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.23: Parenting style dimensions and gender (parent and child), logistic regression with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:					
	Parent-child congruence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Warmth	0.243***	0.239***				
	(0.069)	(0.070)				
Psychological control			−0.080	−0.109		
			(0.089)	(0.090)		
Autonomy support					0.235***	0.238***
					(0.070)	(0.071)
Mother	−0.145	−0.177	−0.203*	−0.200*	0.101	0.097
	(0.350)	(0.351)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.249)	(0.251)
Daughter	−0.747**	−0.690**	−0.498***	−0.476***	−0.580**	−0.513*
	(0.310)	(0.313)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.279)	(0.283)
Warmth: mother	−0.058	−0.042				
	(0.127)	(0.128)				
Warmth: daughter	0.131	0.121				
	(0.116)	(0.117)				
Psychological control: mother			−0.110	−0.100		
			(0.137)	(0.138)		
Psychological control: daughter			0.213	0.236		
			(0.159)	(0.160)		
Autonomy support: mother					−0.159	−0.151
					(0.103)	(0.104)
Autonomy support: daughter					0.070	0.054
					(0.114)	(0.115)
Mother: daughter	0.374	0.384	0.566***	0.539***	0.074	0.043
	(0.476)	(0.478)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.366)	(0.370)
Warmth: mother: daughter	0.036	0.023				
	(0.173)	(0.174)				
Psychological control: mother: daughter			−0.214	−0.211		
			(0.206)	(0.207)		
Autonomy support: mother: daughter					0.182	0.183
					(0.150)	(0.152)
Education (ref: low)						
medium		−0.088		−0.087		−0.083
		(0.088)		(0.087)		(0.088)
high		0.019		0.036		0.046
		(0.088)		(0.087)		(0.088)
Age		−0.033		−0.048		−0.038
		(0.039)		(0.038)		(0.039)
Age (sq)		0.049		0.060		0.051
		(0.037)		(0.037)		(0.037)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)						
Either P or C		−0.230***		−0.197**		−0.196**
		(0.083)		(0.083)		(0.084)
Both P and C		0.073		0.133		0.122
		(0.086)		(0.085)		(0.086)
Employment status (ref: in education)						
Not in employment		−0.059		−0.064		−0.058
		(0.104)		(0.103)		(0.104)
hspace3mm Working		0.073		0.105		0.082
		(0.091)		(0.090)		(0.091)
Parent education (ref: low)						
medium		−0.013		−0.013		−0.026
		(0.087)		(0.086)		(0.087)
high		0.030		0.016		−0.003
		(0.087)		(0.086)		(0.087)
Constant	−0.309	−0.311	0.313**	0.250	−0.225	−0.281
	(0.204)	(0.235)	(0.124)	(0.172)	(0.194)	(0.227)
Observations	4,358	4,293	4,373	4,309	4,312	4,251
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,039.979	5,971.123	6,133.543	6,060.129	6,006.834	5,944.522

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3. Appendix to Chapter 3

Table 4.24: Descriptive statistics (Chapter 3)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Parent-child ideological congruence (binary)	3,096	0.56	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Parent-child ideological congruence (3 cat)	3,096	0.68	0.83	0.00	0.00	1.00	2.00
Young adult							
Experienced mobility	3,344	0.67	0.69	0.00	0.00	1.00	2.00
Expected mobility	3,841	0.99	0.91	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00
Female	4,163	0.55	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Education	4,147	1.09	0.85	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00
Age (st)	4,163	0.21	0.92	−1.74	−0.56	1.02	1.62
Age square	4,163	0.89	0.85	0.001	0.13	1.49	3.03
Working	4,163	0.71	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Denominational affiliation	4,122	0.98	0.86	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00
Strength of family ties	4,131	3.16	0.54	1.50	2.75	3.50	4.00
Parent							
Female	4,163	0.60	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Education	4,144	0.63	0.80	0.00	0.00	1.00	2.00

Table 4.25: Expected and experienced mobility and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:					
	Parent-child congruence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)						
downward	−0.074	−0.019			−0.079	−0.026
	(0.091)	(0.094)			(0.096)	(0.099)
upward	−0.236**	−0.282**			−0.217*	−0.253**
	(0.117)	(0.119)			(0.124)	(0.126)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)						
downward			−0.140	−0.072	−0.118	−0.067
			(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.125)	(0.127)
upward			−0.068	−0.053	−0.050	−0.021
			(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.098)
Female		0.030		0.025		0.089
		(0.088)		(0.083)		(0.092)
Education (ref: low)						
medium		−0.007		−0.106		−0.056
		(0.116)		(0.109)		(0.121)
high		0.006		−0.080		−0.079
		(0.110)		(0.103)		(0.114)
Age		0.004		−0.055		−0.010
		(0.051)		(0.046)		(0.054)
Age (sq)		0.053		0.119**		0.078
		(0.052)		(0.047)		(0.055)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)						
Either P or C		−0.294***		−0.200**		−0.228**
		(0.108)		(0.100)		(0.113)
Both P and C		0.243**		0.190*		0.249**
		(0.110)		(0.103)		(0.115)
Working		0.271***		0.253***		0.321***
		(0.100)		(0.092)		(0.105)
Parent: female		−0.114		−0.079		−0.112
		(0.088)		(0.083)		(0.092)
Parent: education (ref: low)						
medium		−0.137		0.062		−0.047
		(0.112)		(0.106)		(0.118)
high		−0.007		0.111		0.078
		(0.118)		(0.110)		(0.123)
Country dummies	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*
Constant	0.191	0.011	0.188	−0.075	0.221	−0.083
	(0.149)	(0.213)	(0.132)	(0.188)	(0.155)	(0.221)
Observations	2,560	2,531	2,861	2,831	2,364	2,341
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,768.676	3,722.729	4,181.912	4,141.279	3,447.421	3,415.749
McFadden	0.106	0.119	0.195	0.210	0.265	0.276
Cox and Snell (ML)	0.159	0.179	0.300	0.321	0.407	0.423
Nagelkerke (Cragg and Uhler)	0.198	0.221	0.358	0.381	0.473	0.4904
Chisq	495.25	557.88	910.49	978.43	1233.7	1287.4

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.26: Experienced mobility and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression by country

	Dependent variable:										
	Parent-child congruence										
	(AT)	(CZ)	(DK)	(DE)	(GR)	(HU)	(IT)	(ES)	(CH)	(TK)	(UK)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)											
downward	0.573*	−0.014	0.490	0.257	−0.005	0.128	−0.479	−0.274	0.272	0.237	−0.364
	(0.348)	(0.321)	(0.436)	(0.332)	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.332)	(0.211)	(0.562)	(0.436)	(0.375)
upward	−0.608	−0.726*	−0.790	−0.252	0.424	−0.047	−0.187	−0.034	0.879	−0.260	−0.658
	(0.503)	(0.374)	(0.519)	(0.371)	(0.871)	(0.407)	(0.413)	(0.295)	(0.661)	(0.417)	(0.484)
Female	0.302	0.194	−0.980**	0.178	−0.743**	0.104	−0.291	0.296	0.485	0.507	−0.360
	(0.335)	(0.311)	(0.395)	(0.291)	(0.320)	(0.290)	(0.531)	(0.202)	(0.490)	(0.414)	(0.346)
Education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.038		0.786	0.550	1.335***	−0.865**	0.666	−0.564**	−1.445*	−0.424	0.033
	(0.427)		(0.531)	(0.345)	(0.463)	(0.391)	(0.436)	(0.284)	(0.796)	(0.440)	(0.491)
high	0.069	−0.194	1.505***	0.947**	1.190***	−0.750*	0.124	−0.697***	−2.127**	−0.316	0.231
	(0.434)	(0.322)	(0.541)	(0.386)	(0.452)	(0.400)	(0.502)	(0.240)	(0.887)	(0.432)	(0.454)
Age	0.173	−0.093	−0.001	−0.033	0.473**	0.026	0.260	−0.076	0.486	−0.048	−0.168
	(0.191)	(0.202)	(0.216)	(0.188)	(0.221)	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.133)	(0.310)	(0.196)	(0.206)
Age (sq)	−0.302	−0.137	0.056	−0.146	0.074	−0.046	−0.057	0.091	0.382	0.332*	0.569**
	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.204)	(0.188)	(0.218)	(0.190)	(0.196)	(0.131)	(0.302)	(0.188)	(0.239)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)											
Either P or C	−0.162	−0.026	−0.856*	−0.092	−0.501	−0.732**	0.346	−0.680***	1.273*	−1.959	−0.196
	(0.395)	(0.400)	(0.456)	(0.355)	(0.633)	(0.330)	(0.398)	(0.235)	(0.772)	(1.870)	(0.392)
Both P and C	0.164	1.028**	0.439	0.215	−0.606	−0.345	0.707**	0.475*	1.594**	−1.397	−0.178
	(0.401)	(0.491)	(0.440)	(0.329)	(0.610)	(0.359)	(0.360)	(0.252)	(0.794)	(1.753)	(0.465)
Working	0.890**	−0.584	−0.242	0.610	−0.165	0.559	0.474	0.622***	1.492**	1.007**	−0.478
	(0.429)	(0.370)	(0.440)	(0.434)	(0.329)	(0.351)	(0.306)	(0.223)	(0.713)	(0.409)	(0.557)
Parent: female	−0.106	0.109	−0.237	−0.443	0.186	−0.203	0.069	−0.278	−0.633	1.178***	−0.085
	(0.328)	(0.291)	(0.371)	(0.314)	(0.342)	(0.286)	(0.527)	(0.198)	(0.489)	(0.391)	(0.408)
Parent: education (ref: low)											
medium	−0.053		−0.920**	−0.401	−0.143	−0.591	−0.291	0.187	0.768	−0.242	0.409
	(0.408)		(0.401)	(0.432)	(0.347)	(0.381)	(0.380)	(0.275)	(0.997)	(0.483)	(0.459)
high	0.113	−0.079	−1.205**	−0.647*	0.377	−0.477	−0.028	0.527**	0.364	−0.569	0.235
	(0.417)	(0.376)	(0.593)	(0.383)	(0.415)	(0.573)	(0.445)	(0.250)	(1.029)	(0.778)	(0.461)
Constant	−0.616	0.314	0.485	−0.067	−0.319	0.865*	0.180	−0.138	−1.854	0.731	0.278
	(0.608)	(0.525)	(0.710)	(0.558)	(0.849)	(0.489)	(0.530)	(0.308)	(1.778)	(1.811)	(0.736)
Observations	197	247	165	245	252	230	247	488	91	200	169
Akaike Inf. Crit.	311.936	381.569	273.980	361.891	377.612	368.098	281.540	725.515	155.736	259.761	262.733
McFadden	0.276	0.200	0.247	0.237	0.125	0.268	0.242	0.248	0.397	0.182	0.268
Cox and Snell (ML)	0.423	0.303	0.396	0.346	0.181	0.418	0.280	0.376	0.611	0.228	0.399
Nagelkerke (Cragg and Uhler)	0.490	0.363	0.455	0.415	0.227	0.482	0.377	0.442	0.673	0.301	0.470

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.27: Expected mobility and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression by country

	Dependent variable:									
	Parent-child congruence									
	(AT)	(CZ)	(DE)	(GR)	(HU)	(IT)	(ES)	(CH)	(TK)	(UK)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)										
downward	−0.400	1.245**	−0.584	0.208	−0.736	−0.464	−0.086	1.018	0.954	0.020
	(0.409)	(0.492)	(0.370)	(0.347)	(0.490)	(0.337)	(0.219)	(0.827)	(0.684)	(0.418)
upward	−0.202	0.267	−0.040	−0.704*	−0.487*	−0.202	0.134	0.209	0.773**	−0.409
	(0.311)	(0.266)	(0.282)	(0.367)	(0.269)	(0.308)	(0.196)	(0.420)	(0.377)	(0.342)
Female	0.133	0.263	0.071	−0.677**	0.081	−0.392	−0.135	0.468	0.285	−0.074
	(0.289)	(0.281)	(0.262)	(0.310)	(0.265)	(0.457)	(0.174)	(0.404)	(0.402)	(0.306)
Education (ref: low)										
medium	−0.154		0.339	1.327***	−0.805**	0.517	−0.391	−1.390**	−0.578	−0.129
	(0.359)		(0.310)	(0.469)	(0.364)	(0.384)	(0.249)	(0.700)	(0.445)	(0.407)
low	−0.166	−0.173	0.762**	1.171***	−0.487	0.077	−0.412**	−1.438*	−0.332	0.108
	(0.367)	(0.292)	(0.355)	(0.453)	(0.377)	(0.453)	(0.209)	(0.756)	(0.438)	(0.397)
Age	−0.068	−0.151	0.029	0.229	0.016	0.222	−0.094	0.100	−0.115	−0.269
	(0.148)	(0.176)	(0.147)	(0.204)	(0.142)	(0.152)	(0.107)	(0.231)	(0.199)	(0.172)
Age (sq)	−0.047	−0.018	−0.149	0.250	−0.102	−0.054	0.111	0.427*	0.574***	0.487**
	(0.154)	(0.180)	(0.150)	(0.207)	(0.157)	(0.167)	(0.107)	(0.227)	(0.199)	(0.196)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, nor C)										
Either P or C	−0.121	−0.049	−0.290	−0.625	−0.595**	0.210	−0.428**	0.986*	−1.609	−0.129
	(0.334)	(0.357)	(0.317)	(0.610)	(0.303)	(0.350)	(0.200)	(0.559)	(1.795)	(0.342)
Both P and C	0.159	0.874**	0.358	−0.759	−0.426	0.577*	0.411*	0.832	−1.743	0.012
	(0.339)	(0.436)	(0.296)	(0.590)	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.226)	(0.569)	(1.681)	(0.399)
Working	0.567*	−0.649**	0.227	0.128	0.603*	0.314	0.484***	0.776	0.792**	−0.614
	(0.335)	(0.330)	(0.360)	(0.313)	(0.316)	(0.275)	(0.185)	(0.577)	(0.396)	(0.457)
Parent: female	−0.222	0.147	−0.126	0.319	−0.144	0.295	−0.171	−0.483	1.279***	−0.275
	(0.284)	(0.266)	(0.285)	(0.334)	(0.266)	(0.452)	(0.174)	(0.418)	(0.409)	(0.355)
Parent: education (ref: low)										
medium	0.061		0.169	−0.127	−0.661*	−0.094	0.303	−0.267	−0.026	0.504
	(0.347)		(0.369)	(0.341)	(0.354)	(0.321)	(0.232)	(0.709)	(0.489)	(0.419)
high	0.105	0.073	−0.467	−0.043	−0.335	−0.028	0.426*	−0.300	−0.186	0.458
	(0.372)	(0.342)	(0.362)	(0.407)	(0.528)	(0.383)	(0.224)	(0.717)	(0.730)	(0.367)
Constant	−0.002	−0.078	0.207	−0.294	1.127***	0.280	−0.192	−0.230	0.406	0.339
	(0.520)	(0.481)	(0.476)	(0.813)	(0.435)	(0.502)	(0.258)	(1.281)	(1.781)	(0.555)
Observations	260	292	288	272	278	300	611	116	197	217
Akaike Inf. Crit.	405.377	449.765	442.163	394.972	427.344	349.848	921.389	204.890	256.326	326.370
McFadden	0.038	0.047	0.054	0.082	0.141	0.038	0.037	0.165	0.194	0.070
Cox and Snell (ML)	0.056	0.070	0.079	0.114	0.041	0.210	0.054	0.264	0.244	0.099
Nagelkerke (Cragg and Uhler)	0.071	0.089	0.101	0.148	0.258	0.062	0.070	0.313	0.320	0.128

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.28: Expected and experienced mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, multinomial regression with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:											
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	0.221**	−0.102	0.207*	−0.198					0.223*	−0.092	0.190	−0.161
	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.122)					(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.128)
upward	0.170	0.294**	0.244	0.311**					0.247	0.182	0.299*	0.194
	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.144)					(0.156)	(0.152)	(0.158)	(0.154)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward					0.172	0.080	0.104	0.012	0.093	0.133	0.040	0.086
					(0.129)	(0.147)	(0.132)	(0.149)	(0.146)	(0.166)	(0.149)	(0.168)
upward					−0.113	0.252**	−0.130	0.236**	−0.148	0.254**	−0.178	0.223*
					(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Female			0.064	−0.127			0.062	−0.119			−0.049	−0.129
			(0.108)	(0.111)			(0.102)	(0.105)			(0.113)	(0.117)
Education (ref: low)												
medium			0.286**	−0.300**			0.331**	−0.138			0.315**	−0.237
			(0.143)	(0.149)			(0.135)	(0.140)			(0.149)	(0.157)
high			0.160	−0.165			0.267**	−0.103			0.241*	−0.077
			(0.137)	(0.135)			(0.129)	(0.129)			(0.142)	(0.141)
Age			−0.028	0.017			0.027	0.082			−0.021	0.037
			(0.063)	(0.064)			(0.057)	(0.059)			(0.067)	(0.069)
Age (sq)			−0.007	−0.104			−0.090	−0.147**			−0.037	−0.118*
			(0.064)	(0.065)			(0.059)	(0.061)			(0.068)	(0.070)
Working			−0.168	−0.392***			−0.232**	−0.291**			−0.274**	−0.379***
			(0.123)	(0.125)			(0.113)	(0.116)			(0.129)	(0.132)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)												
Either P or C			0.405***	0.146			0.181	0.216*			0.236*	0.211
			(0.128)	(0.139)			(0.120)	(0.130)			(0.134)	(0.147)
Both P and C			−0.341**	−0.160			−0.364***	−0.015			−0.458***	−0.039
			(0.138)	(0.139)			(0.129)	(0.132)			(0.145)	(0.147)
Parent: female			0.077	0.151			0.031	0.132			0.114	0.112
			(0.107)	(0.110)			(0.103)	(0.106)			(0.114)	(0.116)
Parent: education (ref: low)												
medium			0.192	0.076			−0.043	−0.082			0.100	−0.011
			(0.135)	(0.143)			(0.129)	(0.138)			(0.144)	(0.153)
high			0.082	−0.080			−0.070	−0.169			−0.020	−0.151
			(0.142)	(0.152)			(0.132)	(0.144)			(0.147)	(0.160)
Constant	−0.646***	−1.232***	−0.837***	−0.657**	−0.552***	−1.325***	−0.451**	−0.891***	−0.622***	−1.326***	−0.529**	−0.806***
	(0.170)	(0.212)	(0.254)	(0.282)	(0.150)	(0.188)	(0.222)	(0.252)	(0.177)	(0.219)	(0.264)	(0.294)
Country dummies	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*	*included*
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,981.922	4,981.922	4,920.405	4,920.405	5,511.487	5,511.487	5,467.567	5,467.567	4,563.632	4,563.632	4,525.801	4,525.801
McFadden	0.199	0.199	0.216	0.216	0.113	0.113	0.127	0.127	0.268	0.268	0.281	0.281
Cox and Snell	0.383	0.383	0.411	0.411	0.216	0.216	0.242	0.242	0.505	0.505	0.524	0.524
Nagelkerke	0.421	0.421	0.450	0.450	0.245	0.245	0.273	0.273	0.545	0.545	0.565	0.565

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.29: Experienced mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, multinomial regression by country (AT, CZ, DK, DE, GR, HU)

	Austria		Czechia		Denmark		Germany		Greece		Hungary	
	Left (1)	Right (2)	Left (3)	Right (4)	Left (5)	Right (6)	Left (7)	Right (8)	Left (9)	Right (10)	Left (11)	Right (12)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	−0.526	−0.636	0.241	−0.110	−0.138	−0.935*	−0.001	−0.502	0.118	−0.147	−0.359	−0.010
	(0.392)	(0.557)	(0.458)	(0.362)	(0.574)	(0.568)	(0.432)	(0.433)	(0.417)	(0.400)	(0.513)	(0.381)
upward	0.038	1.385**	0.825	0.696*	−0.019	1.281**	0.837*	−0.205	0.054	−1.223	−0.104	0.108
	(0.597)	(0.665)	(0.508)	(0.403)	(0.666)	(0.581)	(0.484)	(0.480)	(0.975)	(1.461)	(0.578)	(0.464)
Female	0.023	−0.911*	−0.338	−0.125	1.911***	0.369	0.608	−0.950**	0.710*	0.772**	−0.023	−0.125
	(0.378)	(0.518)	(0.447)	(0.340)	(0.586)	(0.459)	(0.386)	(0.393)	(0.414)	(0.388)	(0.407)	(0.339)
Education (ref: low)												
medium	0.622	−0.906	0.000	0.000	−0.364	−1.221*	−0.683	−0.442	−1.114**	−1.549***	0.958*	0.820*
	(0.501)	(0.639)		(0.000)	(0.703)	(0.630)	(0.469)	(0.425)	(0.564)	(0.548)	(0.561)	(0.450)
high	0.714	−1.297*	0.144	0.229	−0.754	−2.046***	−1.209**	−0.735	−0.998*	−1.356**	0.783	0.680
	(0.530)	(0.662)	(0.461)	(0.352)	(0.712)	(0.672)	(0.519)	(0.497)	(0.547)	(0.532)	(0.605)	(0.447)
Age	−0.198	−0.252	0.533	0.029	0.034	0.089	0.068	0.108	−0.381	−0.572**	−0.192	0.171
	(0.215)	(0.266)	(0.419)	(0.213)	(0.303)	(0.254)	(0.234)	(0.263)	(0.282)	(0.259)	(0.220)	(0.216)
Age (sq)	0.421*	0.169	−0.768*	0.383*	0.289	−0.236	0.275	−0.061	−0.330	0.162	0.440*	−0.344
	(0.221)	(0.286)	(0.409)	(0.213)	(0.291)	(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.255)	(0.281)	(0.263)	(0.255)	(0.255)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)												
Either P or C	0.286	−0.282	−0.016	0.023	2.873***	−0.303	0.132	0.199	0.152	1.140	0.942**	0.631
	(0.460)	(0.559)	(0.567)	(0.438)	(0.738)	(0.554)	(0.429)	(0.481)	(0.735)	(0.999)	(0.442)	(0.393)
Both P or C	−0.204	−0.378	−1.245	−0.958*	1.369**	−1.468**	−1.153**	0.469	0.124	1.357	−0.182	0.657
	(0.479)	(0.554)	(0.762)	(0.556)	(0.689)	(0.583)	(0.501)	(0.408)	(0.703)	(0.976)	(0.553)	(0.416)
Working	−1.189**	−0.197	0.445	0.628	1.479**	−0.575	−0.447	−0.901*	0.757*	−0.311	−0.847*	−0.294
	(0.466)	(0.692)	(0.543)	(0.415)	(0.638)	(0.539)	(0.553)	(0.544)	(0.447)	(0.390)	(0.485)	(0.416)
PQ_female	0.275	−0.213	0.933*	−0.482	0.696	0.066	0.039	0.886**	−0.569	0.227	−0.042	0.431
	(0.366)	(0.527)	(0.476)	(0.315)	(0.507)	(0.445)	(0.409)	(0.414)	(0.422)	(0.432)	(0.399)	(0.340)
Parent: education (ref: low)												
medium	−0.362	0.796	0.000	0.000	0.902*	0.939*	0.956*	−0.300	−0.118	0.381	0.771	0.530
	(0.474)	(0.624)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.523)	(0.485)	(0.547)	(0.637)	(0.439)	(0.424)	(0.536)	(0.426)
high	−0.524	0.708	0.237	−0.029	1.134	1.431**	1.060**	0.263	−0.550	−0.138	1.219*	−0.191
	(0.478)	(0.663)	(0.519)	(0.418)	(0.760)	(0.713)	(0.488)	(0.505)	(0.516)	(0.518)	(0.731)	(0.730)
Constant	−0.247	−0.183	−1.746**	−0.675	−5.394***	0.882	−1.219*	−0.263	−0.142	−1.081	−1.931***	−1.427**
	(0.696)	(0.919)	(0.779)	(0.579)	(1.329)	(0.867)	(0.723)	(0.698)	(1.024)	(1.200)	(0.699)	(0.577)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	395.539	395.539	492.139	492.139	335.014	335.014	465.634	465.634	460.923	460.923	472.347	472.347
McFadden	0.311	0.311	0.209	0.209	0.352	0.352	0.286	0.286	0.148	0.148	0.313	0.313
Cox and Snell	0.547	0.547	0.396	0.396	0.590	0.590	0.493	0.493	0.274	0.274	0.468	0.468
Nagelkerke	0.594	0.594	0.435	0.435	0.641	0.641	0.544	0.544	0.309	0.309	0.540	0.540

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.30: Experienced mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, multinomial regression by country (IT, ES, CH, TK, UK)

	Italy		Spain		Switzerland		Turkey		United Kingdom	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)										
downward	0.831**	−0.203	0.413*	−0.046	−0.235	−0.304	0.523	−0.994*	1.048**	−0.569
	(0.405)	(0.520)	(0.232)	(0.299)	(0.676)	(0.675)	(0.624)	(0.604)	(0.462)	(0.517)
upward	−0.448	0.450	−0.077	0.221	−0.226	−1.435*	0.997*	−0.391	1.112*	0.207
	(0.689)	(0.539)	(0.336)	(0.388)	(0.827)	(0.863)	(0.568)	(0.578)	(0.577)	(0.620)
Female	0.508	−0.045	−0.416*	−0.068	−0.768	−0.257	0.030	−0.899*	0.528	0.125
	(0.683)	(0.754)	(0.223)	(0.279)	(0.631)	(0.583)	(0.592)	(0.544)	(0.410)	(0.459)
Education (ref: low)										
medium	14.961***	−1.863***	0.880***	−0.029	0.641	16.538***	0.803	0.018	−0.044	−0.009
	(0.310)	(0.570)	(0.314)	(0.401)	(0.863)	(0.683)	(0.557)	(0.638)	(0.556)	(0.694)
high	15.058***	−0.741	0.999***	0.146	1.556	17.027***	−0.247	0.497	−0.438	0.065
	(0.404)	(0.617)	(0.270)	(0.322)	(0.985)	(0.794)	(0.675)	(0.528)	(0.529)	(0.606)
Age	−0.282	−0.112	0.066	0.069	−0.646*	−0.301	−0.031	0.099	0.103	0.236
	(0.234)	(0.238)	(0.150)	(0.183)	(0.371)	(0.406)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.240)	(0.296)
Age (sq)	0.046	0.010	−0.062	−0.141	−0.264	−0.548	−0.469*	−0.283	−0.530*	−0.642*
	(0.283)	(0.256)	(0.146)	(0.180)	(0.358)	(0.413)	(0.270)	(0.247)	(0.288)	(0.332)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)										
Either P, not C	−0.262	−0.523	0.625**	0.780**	−1.798**	−0.839	14.442***	−0.093	−0.035	0.416
	(0.511)	(0.571)	(0.254)	(0.317)	(0.897)	(0.929)	(0.643)	(2.216)	(0.475)	(0.504)
Both P and C	−0.649	−1.003*	−0.619**	−0.217	−2.244**	−1.085	12.492***	1.170	0.270	0.097
	(0.466)	(0.517)	(0.291)	(0.354)	(0.926)	(0.951)	(0.387)	(1.778)	(0.556)	(0.606)
Working	−0.412	−0.556	−0.558**	−0.760**	−2.148***	−0.451	−0.174	−1.713***	0.310	0.871
	(0.414)	(0.427)	(0.246)	(0.300)	(0.816)	(1.002)	(0.597)	(0.542)	(0.628)	(0.891)
Parent: female	−0.874	0.933	0.234	0.406	0.529	0.733	−0.686	−1.588***	0.455	−0.424
	(0.693)	(0.763)	(0.218)	(0.279)	(0.612)	(0.611)	(0.552)	(0.509)	(0.477)	(0.580)
Parent: education (ref: low)										
medium	0.933*	−0.147	0.002	−0.644	−1.338	−0.433	−0.972	0.937	−0.374	−0.513
	(0.540)	(0.545)	(0.296)	(0.427)	(1.209)	(1.150)	(0.887)	(0.588)	(0.532)	(0.648)
high	0.903	−0.654	−0.374	−0.907**	−0.832	−0.062	1.215	0.049	−0.548	0.117
	(0.643)	(0.622)	(0.271)	(0.393)	(1.226)	(1.189)	(0.924)	(1.104)	(0.574)	(0.583)
Constant	−16.517***	−0.025	−0.514	−0.576	3.170	−15.366***	−14.011***	−0.132	−1.071	−1.214
	(0.500)	(0.670)	(0.348)	(0.410)	(2.078)	(1.345)	(0.595)	(1.884)	(0.854)	(1.099)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.605	400.605	1,010.250	1,010.250	240.762	240.762	339.117	339.117	356.425	356.425
McFadden	0.313	0.313	0.246	0.246	0.383	0.383	0.234	0.234	0.291	0.291
Cox and Snell	0.468	0.468	0.468	0.468	0.654	0.654	0.330	0.330	0.537	0.537
Nagelkerke	0.540	0.540	0.507	0.507	0.698	0.698	0.403	0.403	0.578	0.578

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.31: Expected mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, multinomial regression by country (AT, CZ, DE, GR, HU)

	Austria		Czechia		Germany		Greece		Hungary	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)										
downward	0.365	0.424	−0.480	−2.591***	0.835*	0.251	−0.236	−0.189	0.936	0.663
	(0.459)	(0.588)	(0.566)	(0.933)	(0.459)	(0.474)	(0.444)	(0.430)	(0.676)	(0.556)
upward	0.092	0.442	−1.144***	0.062	0.205	−0.151	0.451	0.933**	0.626	0.418
	(0.360)	(0.442)	(0.411)	(0.293)	(0.374)	(0.356)	(0.457)	(0.442)	(0.383)	(0.312)
Female	0.137	−0.610	−0.310	−0.267	0.630*	−0.737**	0.730*	0.648*	−0.055	−0.083
	(0.329)	(0.430)	(0.410)	(0.314)	(0.346)	(0.338)	(0.403)	(0.373)	(0.376)	(0.308)
Education (ref: low)										
medium	0.584	−0.463	0.000	0.000	−0.472	−0.258	−1.191**	−1.440***	1.079**	0.656
	(0.429)	(0.492)		(0.000)	(0.422)	(0.376)	(0.572)	(0.546)	(0.515)	(0.421)
high	0.893**	−1.089**	0.155	0.161	−0.771*	−0.721	−0.920*	−1.391***	0.624	0.412
	(0.441)	(0.550)	(0.438)	(0.323)	(0.468)	(0.453)	(0.541)	(0.534)	(0.572)	(0.425)
Age	0.027	0.112	0.587	0.132	−0.025	−0.007	−0.193	−0.270	−0.089	0.062
	(0.169)	(0.212)	(0.402)	(0.186)	(0.181)	(0.190)	(0.266)	(0.240)	(0.198)	(0.172)
Age (sq)	0.147	−0.100	−0.973**	0.278	0.318*	−0.024	−0.455*	−0.066	0.375*	−0.104
	(0.177)	(0.223)	(0.405)	(0.194)	(0.191)	(0.194)	(0.269)	(0.248)	(0.216)	(0.194)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)										
Either P, or C	0.159	0.030	0.073	0.070	0.144	0.508	0.299	1.092	0.759*	0.520
	(0.385)	(0.470)	(0.519)	(0.399)	(0.386)	(0.408)	(0.718)	(0.901)	(0.409)	(0.361)
Both P, and C	−0.238	−0.081	−0.845	−0.925*	−1.141***	0.276	0.259	1.400	−0.300	0.763**
	(0.396)	(0.476)	(0.667)	(0.499)	(0.431)	(0.368)	(0.696)	(0.877)	(0.519)	(0.367)
Working	−0.752**	−0.286	0.627	0.595	−0.225	−0.339	0.497	−0.629*	−0.837*	−0.451
	(0.372)	(0.494)	(0.516)	(0.370)	(0.450)	(0.455)	(0.423)	(0.370)	(0.445)	(0.366)
Parent: female	0.166	0.365	0.812*	−0.537*	−0.102	0.412	−0.648	0.007	−0.276	0.399
	(0.326)	(0.412)	(0.437)	(0.293)	(0.371)	(0.361)	(0.414)	(0.411)	(0.380)	(0.312)
Parent: education (ref: low)										
medium	−0.334	0.470	0.000	0.000	−0.021	−0.345	−0.226	0.430	0.722	0.638
	(0.398)	(0.509)		(0.000)	(0.470)	(0.497)	(0.430)	(0.417)	(0.497)	(0.400)
high	−0.385	0.569	−0.125	−0.113	0.720	0.177	−0.331	0.434	0.615	0.135
	(0.418)	(0.569)	(0.499)	(0.386)	(0.455)	(0.465)	(0.506)	(0.505)	(0.703)	(0.635)
Constant	−0.767	−0.819	−1.012	−0.345	−1.312**	−0.636	−0.010	−1.125	−2.135***	−1.654***
	(0.606)	(0.730)	(0.720)	(0.536)	(0.619)	(0.591)	(0.980)	(1.101)	(0.625)	(0.514)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	514.225	514.225	548.878	548.878	581.159	581.159	488.905	488.905	553.441	553.441
McFadden	0.070	0.070	0.108	0.108	0.085	0.085	0.089	0.089	0.141	0.141
Cox and Snell	0.131	0.131	0.199	0.199	0.151	0.151	0.164	0.164	0.246	0.246
Nagelkerke	0.151	0.151	0.228	0.228	0.176	0.176	0.189	0.189	0.285	0.285

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.32: Expected mobility and parent-child ideological congruence, multinomial regression by country (IT, ES, CH, TK, UK)

	Italy		Spain		Switzerland		Turkey		United Kingdom	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)										
downward	0.831**	−0.203	0.413*	−0.046	−0.235	−0.304	0.523	−0.994*	1.048**	−0.569
	(0.405)	(0.520)	(0.232)	(0.299)	(0.676)	(0.675)	(0.624)	(0.604)	(0.462)	(0.517)
upward	−0.448	0.450	−0.077	0.221	−0.226	−1.435*	0.997*	−0.391	1.112*	0.207
	(0.689)	(0.539)	(0.336)	(0.388)	(0.827)	(0.863)	(0.568)	(0.578)	(0.577)	(0.620)
Female	0.508	−0.045	−0.416*	−0.068	−0.768	−0.257	0.030	−0.899*	0.528	0.125
	(0.683)	(0.754)	(0.223)	(0.279)	(0.631)	(0.583)	(0.592)	(0.544)	(0.410)	(0.459)
Education (ref: low)										
medium	14.961***	−1.863***	0.880***	−0.029	0.641	16.538***	0.803	0.018	−0.044	−0.009
	(0.310)	(0.570)	(0.314)	(0.401)	(0.863)	(0.683)	(0.557)	(0.638)	(0.556)	(0.694)
high	15.058***	−0.741	0.999***	0.146	1.556	17.027***	−0.247	0.497	−0.438	0.065
	(0.404)	(0.617)	(0.270)	(0.322)	(0.985)	(0.794)	(0.675)	(0.528)	(0.529)	(0.606)
Age	−0.282	−0.112	0.066	0.069	−0.646*	−0.301	−0.031	0.099	0.103	0.236
	(0.234)	(0.238)	(0.150)	(0.183)	(0.371)	(0.406)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.240)	(0.296)
Age (sq)	0.046	0.010	−0.062	−0.141	−0.264	−0.548	−0.469*	−0.283	−0.530*	−0.642*
	(0.283)	(0.256)	(0.146)	(0.180)	(0.358)	(0.413)	(0.270)	(0.247)	(0.288)	(0.332)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)										
Either P, or C	−0.262	−0.523	0.625**	0.780**	−1.798**	−0.839	14.442***	−0.093	−0.035	0.416
	(0.511)	(0.571)	(0.254)	(0.317)	(0.897)	(0.929)	(0.643)	(2.216)	(0.475)	(0.504)
Both P and C	−0.649	−1.003*	−0.619**	−0.217	−2.244**	−1.085	12.492***	1.170	0.270	0.097
	(0.466)	(0.517)	(0.291)	(0.354)	(0.926)	(0.951)	(0.387)	(1.778)	(0.556)	(0.606)
Working	−0.412	−0.556	−0.558**	−0.760**	−2.148***	−0.451	−0.174	−1.713***	0.310	0.871
	(0.414)	(0.427)	(0.246)	(0.300)	(0.816)	(1.002)	(0.597)	(0.542)	(0.628)	(0.891)
Parent: female	−0.874	0.933	0.234	0.406	0.529	0.733	−0.686	−1.588***	0.455	−0.424
	(0.693)	(0.763)	(0.218)	(0.279)	(0.612)	(0.611)	(0.552)	(0.509)	(0.477)	(0.580)
Parent: education (ref: low)										
medium	0.933*	−0.147	0.002	−0.644	−1.338	−0.433	−0.972	0.937	−0.374	−0.513
	(0.540)	(0.545)	(0.296)	(0.427)	(1.209)	(1.150)	(0.887)	(0.588)	(0.532)	(0.648)
high	0.903	−0.654	−0.374	−0.907**	−0.832	−0.062	1.215	0.049	−0.548	0.117
	(0.643)	(0.622)	(0.271)	(0.393)	(1.226)	(1.189)	(0.924)	(1.104)	(0.574)	(0.583)
Constant	−16.517***	−0.025	−0.514	−0.576	3.170	−15.366***	−14.011***	−0.132	−1.071	−1.214
	(0.500)	(0.670)	(0.348)	(0.410)	(2.078)	(1.345)	(0.595)	(1.884)	(0.854)	(1.099)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.605	400.605	1,010.250	1,010.250	240.762	240.762	339.117	339.117	356.425	356.425
McFadden	0.313	0.313	0.246	0.246	0.383	0.383	0.234	0.234	0.291	0.291
Cox and Snell	0.468	0.468	0.468	0.468	0.654	0.654	0.330	0.330	0.537	0.537
Nagelkerke	0.540	0.540	0.507	0.507	0.698	0.698	0.403	0.403	0.578	0.578

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.33: Strength of family ties: descriptives by country

Country	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
All	4,131	2.750	0.430	1.00	2.50	3.00	4.00
Austria	319	2.623	0.466	1.00	2.50	3.00	3.75
Czechia	419	2.598	0.437	1.25	2.25	2.75	3.75
Denmark	234	2.661	0.407	1.00	2.50	3.00	3.75
Germany	342	2.697	0.438	1.00	2.50	3.00	4.00
Greece	405	2.764	0.430	1.50	2.50	3.00	4.00
Hungary	458	2.908	0.366	1.50	2.75	3.25	3.50
Italy	441	2.844	0.378	1.50	2.50	3.25	4.00
Spain	688	2.669	0.462	1.00	2.50	3.00	3.50
Switzerland	123	2.583	0.402	1.25	2.25	3.00	3.25
Turkey	336	3.025	0.323	1.75	2.93	3.25	3.50
United Kingdom	366	2.769	0.346	1.25	2.75	3.00	3.50

Table 4.34: Strength of family ties and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:											
	Parent-child congruence											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	−0.079	−0.026	−0.493	−0.418					−0.083	−0.033	−0.395	−0.290
	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.588)	(0.595)					(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.611)	(0.617)
upward	−0.237**	−0.284**	−0.566	−0.613					−0.223*	−0.259**	−0.367	−0.345
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.743)	(0.752)					(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.796)	(0.805)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward					−0.143	−0.082	0.215	0.237	−0.112	−0.067	−0.111	−0.066
					(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.685)	(0.689)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.127)
upward					−0.067	−0.054	0.486	0.487	−0.053	−0.025	−0.054	−0.026
					(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.553)	(0.560)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)
Strength of family ties	0.283***	0.213**	0.209	0.141	0.327***	0.276***	0.434***	0.378***	0.330***	0.265**	0.280*	0.226
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.148)	(0.150)
Downward experienced mob: strength of family ties			0.151	0.143							0.114	0.094
			(0.213)	(0.215)							(0.220)	(0.222)
Upward experienced mob: strength of family ties			0.120	0.120							0.052	0.032
			(0.267)	(0.270)							(0.284)	(0.287)
Downward expected mob: strength of family ties							−0.132	−0.117				
							(0.248)	(0.250)				
Upward expected mob: strength of family ties							−0.202	−0.197				
							(0.199)	(0.202)				
Female		0.029		0.028		0.025		0.025		0.086		0.085
		(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.083)		(0.083)		(0.092)		(0.092)
Education (ref: low)												
medium		0.012		0.011		−0.093		−0.092		−0.030		−0.030
		(0.117)		(0.117)		(0.110)		(0.110)		(0.122)		(0.122)
high		0.024		0.023		−0.056		−0.058		−0.054		−0.055
		(0.110)		(0.110)		(0.104)		(0.104)		(0.114)		(0.114)
Age		0.007		0.006		−0.053		−0.053		−0.008		−0.008
		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.054)		(0.054)
Age (sq)		0.044		0.045		0.109**		0.110**		0.068		0.068
		(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.056)		(0.056)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)												
Either P, or C		−0.285***		−0.288***		−0.197*		−0.194*		−0.218*		−0.219*
		(0.109)		(0.109)		(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.114)		(0.114)
Both P and C		0.227**		0.224**		0.159		0.160		0.224*		0.223*
		(0.111)		(0.111)		(0.105)		(0.105)		(0.116)		(0.117)
Working		0.266***		0.265***		0.250***		0.249***		0.315***		0.314***
		(0.101)		(0.101)		(0.092)		(0.092)		(0.106)		(0.106)
Parent: female		−0.090		−0.089		−0.059		−0.061		−0.087		−0.087
		(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.084)		(0.084)		(0.093)		(0.093)
Parent: education (ref: low)												
medium		−0.130		−0.131		0.087		0.087		−0.036		−0.037
		(0.112)		(0.112)		(0.107)		(0.107)		(0.119)		(0.119)
high		−0.024		−0.022		0.099		0.104		0.063		0.064
		(0.119)		(0.119)		(0.111)		(0.111)		(0.123)		(0.123)
Constant	−0.548*	−0.550	−0.348	−0.353	−0.662**	−0.796**	−0.950**	−1.072**	−0.638**	−0.780**	−0.502	−0.671
	(0.299)	(0.344)	(0.403)	(0.443)	(0.274)	(0.312)	(0.402)	(0.433)	(0.311)	(0.359)	(0.422)	(0.464)
Observations	2,545	2,516	2,545	2,516	2,844	2,814	2,844	2,814	2,352	2,329	2,352	2,329
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,739.906	3,698.761	3,743.723	3,702.656	4,146.979	4,110.974	4,149.687	4,113.950	3,419.646	3,393.227	3,423.609	3,397.287

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4. Appendix to Chapter 4

Table 4.35: Parenting behavior, political discussion with parents and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression for Hungarian data

	Dependent variable:											
	Parent-child congruence											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Warmth	0.460**	1.247**	0.431**	1.201**								
	(0.185)	(0.493)	(0.197)	(0.508)								
Psychological control					−0.373**	−1.094***	−0.342*	−1.066**				
					(0.171)	(0.416)	(0.182)	(0.438)				
Autonomy support									0.388***	0.293	0.351**	0.245
									(0.140)	(0.316)	(0.146)	(0.333)
Political discussion	0.251*	1.216**	0.334**	1.280**	0.228*	0.043	0.349**	0.155	0.189	0.080	0.313**	0.189
	(0.135)	(0.573)	(0.147)	(0.590)	(0.131)	(0.159)	(0.146)	(0.176)	(0.131)	(0.352)	(0.146)	(0.378)
Warmth: political discussion		−0.364*		−0.358*								
		(0.208)		(0.214)								
Psychological control: political discussion						0.383*		0.390*				
						(0.200)		(0.214)				
Autonomy support: political discussion										0.048		0.053
										(0.142)		(0.149)
Female			−0.013	0.036			0.124	0.156			0.082	0.080
			(0.247)	(0.250)			(0.242)	(0.244)			(0.251)	(0.251)
Education			−0.259	−0.275			−0.313*	−0.307*			−0.311*	−0.306*
			(0.178)	(0.178)			(0.172)	(0.172)			(0.181)	(0.182)
Age			0.102	0.088			0.097	0.091			0.080	0.083
			(0.139)	(0.140)			(0.138)	(0.139)			(0.137)	(0.137)
Age (sq)			−0.085	−0.098			−0.139	−0.162			−0.167	−0.167
			(0.150)	(0.151)			(0.144)	(0.145)			(0.147)	(0.147)
Employment status (ref: in education)												
Employed			−0.802*	−0.832**			−0.841**	−0.932**			−1.017**	−1.008**
			(0.422)	(0.424)			(0.413)	(0.417)			(0.426)	(0.427)
Not in employment			−1.139**	−1.178**			−1.141**	−1.204***			−1.173**	−1.174**
			(0.476)	(0.479)			(0.462)	(0.466)			(0.480)	(0.480)
Parent: female			−0.177	−0.230			−0.125	−0.186			−0.192	−0.196
			(0.239)	(0.243)			(0.236)	(0.240)			(0.241)	(0.242)
Parent education			−0.282	−0.252			−0.379*	−0.349*			−0.322	−0.323
			(0.214)	(0.216)			(0.209)	(0.209)			(0.213)	(0.213)
Constant	−1.039*	−3.185**	0.329	−1.733	0.376	0.683**	1.609***	2.025***	−0.668	−0.447	0.868	1.118
	(0.619)	(1.403)	(0.868)	(1.537)	(0.249)	(0.296)	(0.574)	(0.619)	(0.428)	(0.789)	(0.703)	(0.997)
Observations	353	353	349	349	358	358	354	354	348	348	344	344
Akaike Inf. Crit.	489.353	487.455	487.458	486.218	503.216	499.441	498.599	495.608	486.962	488.770	482.962	484.765

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.36: Intergenerational mobility, political discussion with parents and parent-child ideological congruence (binary), logistic regression for Hungarian data

	Dependent variable:							
	Parent-child congruence							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)								
downward	0.246	0.071	0.510	0.408				
	(0.314)	(0.342)	(0.731)	(0.783)				
upward	−0.159	−0.254	−0.527	−0.318				
	(0.384)	(0.429)	(0.894)	(0.999)				
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)								
downward					−0.847*	−0.720	−1.581	−1.256
					(0.466)	(0.500)	(1.114)	(1.173)
upward					−0.507*	−0.471*	−0.290	−0.227
					(0.259)	(0.278)	(0.574)	(0.612)
Political discussion	0.239	0.522***	0.238	0.564**	0.184	0.359**	0.209	0.395*
	(0.151)	(0.185)	(0.199)	(0.236)	(0.142)	(0.163)	(0.200)	(0.220)
Experienced downward mobility: political discussion			−0.150	−0.196				
			(0.376)	(0.409)				
Experienced upward mobility: political discussion			0.169	0.019				
			(0.393)	(0.439)				
Expected downward mobility: political discussion							0.449	0.334
							(0.609)	(0.648)
Expected upward mobility: political discussion							−0.127	−0.145
							(0.294)	(0.317)
Female		0.230		0.222		0.188		0.166
		(0.300)		(0.302)		(0.275)		(0.277)
Education (ref: low)								
medium		−1.077***		−1.082***		−0.882**		−0.882**
		(0.408)		(0.411)		(0.377)		(0.379)
high		−0.914**		−0.867**		−0.527		−0.557
		(0.416)		(0.427)		(0.388)		(0.390)
Age		−0.011		−0.020		−0.010		−0.010
		(0.171)		(0.172)		(0.148)		(0.148)
Age (sq)		−0.069		−0.072		−0.127		−0.124
		(0.198)		(0.198)		(0.162)		(0.162)
Denominational affiliation (ref: neither P, not C)								
Either P, or C		−0.693**		−0.699**		−0.608**		−0.582*
		(0.338)		(0.338)		(0.309)		(0.311)
Both P and C		−0.346		−0.350		−0.456		−0.428
		(0.369)		(0.370)		(0.337)		(0.339)
Working		0.477		0.485		0.599*		0.590*
		(0.365)		(0.365)		(0.324)		(0.325)
Parent: female		−0.018		−0.022		−0.156		−0.170
		(0.296)		(0.297)		(0.273)		(0.275)
Parent: education (ref: low)								
medium		−0.879**		−0.888**		−0.870**		−0.859**
		(0.401)		(0.403)		(0.370)		(0.373)
high		−0.685		−0.724		−0.420		−0.382
		(0.601)		(0.610)		(0.555)		(0.559)
Constant	−0.110	0.048	−0.108	−0.020	0.425	0.571	0.379	0.516
	(0.310)	(0.568)	(0.381)	(0.615)	(0.312)	(0.505)	(0.401)	(0.561)
Observations	229	225	229	225	273	269	273	269
Akaike Inf. Crit.	364.979	354.394	368.144	357.984	416.779	409.679	419.475	412.580

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.37: The Wilson-Patterson scale: coding for the conservatism index

	(Lib/Cons)	(Agree)	(Not sure)	(Disagree)
Patriotism	C	1	0.5	0
Capitalism	C	1	0.5	0
Privatisation	C	1	0.5	0
Nationalism	C	1	0.5	0
Right wingers	C	1	0.5	0
Free market	C	1	0.5	0
Lower taxes	C	1	0.5	0
Free trade	C	1	0.5	0
Church authority	C	1	0.5	0
Private healthcare	C	1	0.5	0
Nuclear energy	C	1	0.5	0
Private pensions	C	1	0.5	0
Small government	C	1	0.5	0
Obedience	C	1	0.5	0
GMOs	C	1	0.5	0
Consumer culture	C	1	0.5	0
Tuition fees	C	1	0.5	0
Chastity	C	1	0.5	0
Abortion bans	C	1	0.5	0
Conservatives	C	1	0.5	0
Minority rights	L	0	0.5	1
Market regulation	L	0	0.5	1
Left wingers	L	0	0.5	1
Unemployment benefits	L	0	0.5	1
Globalization	L	0	0.5	1
Socialism	L	0	0.5	1
Labor unions	L	0	0.5	1
Birth control	L	0	0.5	1
Multiculturalism	L	0	0.5	1
Gay marriage	L	0	0.5	1
Labor strikes	L	0	0.5	1
Luxury tax	L	0	0.5	1
Environmentalism	L	0	0.5	1
Corporate tax	L	0	0.5	1
Renewable energy	L	0	0.5	1
Gay adoption	L	0	0.5	1
Wage equality	L	0	0.5	1
Pollution control	L	0	0.5	1
Decriminalized marijuana	L	0	0.5	1
Liberals	L	0	0.5	1

Note: The conservatism scale was constructed as an additive scale from agree/disagree/not sure responses to 40 issue questions. Higher scores reflect more ideologically conservative issue attitudes.

Table 4.38: Conservative items: (%) of agreement (1), uncertainty (2), disagreement (3) and decline to answer (4).

	Youth				Mothers				Fathers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Patriotism	68.57	20.15	8.26	3.01	65.88	21.96	8.90	3.26	75.97	12.02	10.85	1.16
Capitalism	30.66	35.60	28.19	5.56	28.19	35.91	29.97	5.93	31.40	32.17	34.11	2.33
Privatisation	32.43	28.11	33.98	5.48	26.71	30.27	37.09	5.93	29.07	28.68	39.15	3.10
Nationalism	23.86	35.75	33.36	7.03	25.22	35.91	31.16	7.72	27.13	30.62	39.53	2.71
Right wingers	39.54	36.99	16.45	7.03	33.83	38.28	21.66	6.23	37.21	33.72	24.81	4.26
Free market	59.38	22.24	13.67	4.71	50.15	28.49	16.32	5.04	61.63	18.99	15.50	3.88
Lower taxes	78.84	10.58	8.80	1.78	73.29	13.35	10.98	2.37	81.01	8.91	9.30	0.78
Free trade	60.39	22.86	12.59	4.17	51.93	26.41	16.32	5.34	62.40	18.99	15.89	2.71
Church authority	18.15	24.32	53.59	3.94	21.36	25.82	49.26	3.56	17.05	25.97	55.43	1.55
Private healthcare	37.30	23.86	35.75	3.09	35.01	22.26	38.58	4.15	34.11	19.38	45.74	0.78
Nuclear energy	37.61	21.47	37.14	3.78	33.83	24.63	35.91	5.64	46.12	16.67	35.27	1.94
Private pensions	46.33	22.93	26.64	4.09	39.17	25.52	30.56	4.75	47.29	23.26	28.29	1.16
Small government	38.22	30.66	22.93	8.19	34.72	32.05	23.44	9.79	32.17	33.33	30.23	4.26
Obedience	45.41	27.64	23.24	3.71	44.81	29.08	21.36	4.75	50.00	26.74	20.93	2.33
GMO	12.59	14.90	68.73	3.78	13.95	17.51	62.61	5.93	14.73	12.79	72.09	0.39
Consumer culture	59.07	23.01	13.67	4.25	51.93	26.11	16.91	5.04	59.69	20.93	16.28	3.10
Tuition fees	20.69	13.98	62.93	2.39	20.18	13.65	64.09	2.08	18.99	12.40	67.83	0.78
Chastity	21.24	22.47	51.20	5.10	20.77	32.64	40.36	5.93	17.83	23.64	56.20	2.33
Abortion bans	18.84	16.06	62.39	2.70	25.22	14.54	57.27	2.97	18.99	16.28	63.95	0.78
Conservatives	30.73	37.99	25.17	6.10	33.23	36.80	20.47	9.50	35.66	33.33	27.91	3.10
Mean	3.99	24.57	31.93	4.49	36.46	26.57	31.66	5.29	39.92	22.44	35.46	2.17

Table 4.39: Liberal items: (%) of agreement (1), uncertainty (2), disagreement (3) and decline to answer (4).

	Youth				Mothers				Fathers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Minority rights	50.04	20.31	24.86	4.79	49.55	20.47	24.63	5.34	63.57	11.24	22.09	3.10
Market regulation	49.42	25.79	19.85	4.94	48.07	26.41	19.29	6.23	57.36	21.32	18.99	2.33
Left wingers	23.63	37.92	31.89	6.56	32.94	38.87	21.07	7.12	32.95	39.15	24.81	3.10
Unemployment benefits	71.74	13.44	13.13	1.70	67.66	18.10	12.46	1.78	74.81	10.47	13.18	1.55
Globalization	40.15	26.95	26.80	6.10	33.53	33.53	25.22	7.72	32.56	26.74	36.05	4.65
Socialism	19.85	38.84	34.52	6.80	33.83	35.61	25.82	4.75	31.40	36.82	29.84	1.94
Labor unions	52.59	24.40	18.84	4.17	55.49	25.82	15.13	3.56	65.89	17.05	15.12	1.94
Birth control	28.42	18.22	49.96	3.40	31.16	16.62	49.55	2.67	27.13	17.44	54.26	1.16
Multiculturalism	29.34	33.05	29.50	8.11	24.33	36.20	29.08	10.39	24.81	34.11	35.27	5.81
Gay marriage	22.39	19.77	55.14	2.70	22.26	17.21	57.86	2.67	18.99	13.18	66.67	1.16
Labor strikes	57.61	21.31	17.99	3.09	57.86	20.18	18.69	3.26	66.28	13.57	18.60	1.55
Luxury tax	68.42	14.29	15.06	2.24	68.55	11.87	17.21	2.37	69.77	12.79	16.28	1.16
Environmentalism	82.08	8.73	7.80	1.39	73.29	12.76	11.57	2.37	82.95	7.75	7.75	1.55
Corporate tax	67.18	17.30	12.51	3.01	64.99	17.21	13.65	4.15	68.60	15.89	13.57	1.94
Renewable energy	79.31	9.81	8.42	2.47	73.59	11.57	8.90	5.93	80.23	8.91	7.75	3.10
Gay adoption	21.31	19.31	56.22	3.17	20.18	18.99	57.86	2.97	16.28	15.89	66.67	1.16
Wage equality	51.74	17.30	28.11	2.86	47.18	21.36	27.60	3.86	43.80	15.50	39.15	1.55
Pollution control	82.08	7.80	8.96	1.16	75.67	13.35	9.79	1.19	80.23	10.85	8.53	0.39
Decriminalized marijuana	24.32	27.41	42.01	6.25	21.36	25.22	43.62	9.79	17.83	22.48	56.98	2.72
Liberals	33.28	37.22	23.24	6.25	28.19	37.69	25.52	8.61	28.68	38.76	29.46	3.10
Mean	47.74	21.95	26.23	4.05	46.48	22.95	25.72	4.83	49.20	19.49	29.05	2.24

Table 4.40: Descriptives (M and SD) for conservatism factors for youth and parents by gender and level of education

		Economic socialism	Cultural liberalism	Social conservatism
Youth	All	0.50 (0.16)	0.55 (0.17)	0.52 (0.19)
	Female	0.50 (0.17)	0.52 (0.17)	0.53 (0.17)
	Male	0.51 (0.16)	0.57 (0.16)	0.52 (0.21)
	Low education	0.51 (0.16)	0.55 (0.16)	0.49 (0.18)
	Medium education	0.52 (0.15)	0.52 (0.17)	0.53 (0.19)
	High education	0.47 (0.15)	0.54 (0.13)	0.57 (0.17)
Mothers	All	0.41 (0.20)	0.54 (0.16)	0.45 (0.16)
	Low education	0.40 (0.19)	0.53 (0.15)	0.45 (0.16)
	Medium education	0.44 (0.19)	0.56 (0.16)	0.47 (0.15)
	High education	0.40 (0.23)	0.51 (0.15)	0.39 (0.16)
Fathers	All	0.40 (0.16)	0.51 (0.20)	0.49 (0.17)
	Low education	0.40 (0.16)	0.50 (0.19)	0.49 (0.17)
	Medium education	0.37 (0.14)	0.52 (0.21)	0.42 (0.12)
	High education	0.42 (0.18)	0.54 (0.23)	0.56 (0.21)

Note. Data was normalized.

Table 4.41: Conservative items: intergenerational (%) agreement (1), partial agreement (2) and disagreement (3).

	Mother-child			Father-child		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Patriotism	59.94	22.55	9.79	59.30	25.97	11.63
Capitalism	45.70	28.78	13.95	45.74	36.82	11.24
Privatization	44.81	29.67	15.43	42.64	31.78	17.83
Nationalism	40.65	32.94	13.06	45.74	35.27	12.02
Right wingers	44.21	31.45	12.17	49.22	29.46	11.63
Free market	51.34	27.89	11.57	55.04	23.26	13.95
Lower taxes	65.58	17.21	13.65	67.83	15.50	13.95
Free trade	48.96	27.89	13.06	57.36	23.26	14.34
Church authority	47.18	31.45	13.65	50.78	29.84	15.89
Private healthcare	44.81	28.19	19.29	51.16	24.03	20.54
Nuclear energy	47.77	27.00	16.32	50.78	25.19	20.16
Private pensions	41.84	26.41	21.66	44.19	33.72	17.83
Small government	45.40	24.63	13.35	45.74	31.40	11.63
Obedience	46.88	30.56	15.73	50.39	29.84	15.50
GMOs	57.27	21.66	11.87	59.69	19.77	17.05
Consumer culture	54.90	23.15	13.06	50.00	26.74	16.67
Tuition fees	58.75	18.40	18.69	59.30	15.50	21.32
Chastity	47.18	26.71	14.24	56.20	22.87	16.28
Abortion bans	54.60	21.07	18.69	54.65	23.26	20.16
Conservatives	43.03	32.05	10.98	46.12	35.27	11.63

Table 4.42: Liberal items: intergenerational (%) agreement (1), partial agreement (2) and disagreement (3).

	Mother-child			Father-child		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Minority rights	56.38	24.04	10.39	55.81	22.87	15.12
Market regulation	48.37	27.60	13.35	46.90	29.84	17.83
Left wingers	45.70	29.67	13.65	50.00	31.78	10.08
Unemployment benefits	60.24	21.96	14.84	68.60	17.05	12.02
Globalization	41.25	30.86	15.43	41.47	33.72	12.79
Socialism	37.09	37.39	12.46	47.67	31.78	12.79
Labor unions	49.85	28.49	13.06	53.49	23.26	17.83
Birth control	49.55	24.33	20.47	49.22	31.78	15.12
Multiculturalism	44.51	26.41	10.68	48.84	26.36	14.34
Gay marriage	51.04	25.22	18.10	54.65	24.03	17.83
Labor strikes	49.55	28.78	13.95	57.75	22.48	15.50
Luxury tax	56.68	18.69	18.40	62.02	20.16	14.73
Environmentalism	65.28	16.91	13.35	75.58	11.24	10.85
Corporate tax	54.30	21.66	15.73	57.75	18.99	18.60
Renewable energy	61.13	17.21	12.76	72.87	13.18	9.69
Gay adoption	49.85	25.82	17.21	52.33	25.19	18.60
Wage equality	48.37	23.15	21.96	51.94	24.03	19.38
Pollution control	67.95	17.80	11.57	73.64	15.12	10.47
Decriminalized marijuana	42.14	27.89	15.43	50.78	22.09	19.38
Liberals	40.95	34.42	11.87	45.74	34.88	12.79

Table 4.43: Wilson-Patterson 3-factor model factor loadings

Item	Economic socialism	Cultural liberalism	Social conservatism
Environmentalism	**0.76**	-0.01	0.23
Renewable energy	**0.73**	-0.07	0.15
Pollution control	**0.67**	-0.06	0.18
Unemployment benefits	**0.56**	0.08	0.04
Genetically-modified foods	**0.51**	-0.39	0.36
Corporate tax	**0.50**	-0.06	0.01
Labor unions	**0.46**	0.07	-0.24
Luxury tax	**0.44**	-0.10	0.11
Tuition fees	**0.38**	-0.36	0.35
Abortion bans	**0.38**	0.06	0.51
Labor strikes	**0.36**	-0.03	-0.14
Market regulation	**0.33**	0.14	-0.10
Right-wingers	**-0.34**	0.04	0.17
Free trade	**-0.39**	-0.22	-0.15
Consumer culture	**-0.47**	-0.18	-0.04
Free market	**-0.48**	-0.29	-0.03
Patriotism	**-0.60**	0.13	-0.05
Lower taxes	**-0.67**	0.11	-0.25
Gay marriage	-0.25	**0.59**	-0.10
Gay adoption	-0.30	**0.54**	-0.19
Liberals	0.11	**0.54**	0.07
Multiculturalism	-0.14	**0.50**	-0.01
Left wingers	-0.06	**0.47**	-0.12
Minority rights	0.22	**0.46**	0.05
Globalization	0.01	**0.45**	0.17
Privatization	0.02	**-0.47**	0.13
Private healthcare	-0.07	**-0.44**	0.29
Private pension	-0.22	**-0.42**	0.15
Nuclear energy	-0.06	**-0.33**	0.19
Capitalism	-0.07	**-0.32**	0.28
Nationalism	-0.06	0.05	**0.50**
Conservatives	-0.19	0.02	**0.45**
Chastity	0.16	0.03	**0.42**
Church authority	0.33	-0.30	**0.36**
Small government	-0.29	-0.15	**0.32**
Socialism	-0.10	0.20	**-0.35**
Birth-control	-0.11	0.16	**-0.41**

Note. Factor loadings have been sorted and bolded for ease of reading.

Table 4.44: Youth and parent conservatism: correlations across conservatism factors

		Economic socialism	Cultural liberalism	Social conservatism
Mothers	All youth	0.23***	0.21**	0.23***
	Daughters	0.33***	0.19**	0.24***
	Sons	0.07	0.26**	0.23
	Age<21	0.30	-0.03	0.37**
	Age 21-25	0.29	0.37**	0.31
	Age 26-30	0.08	0.35**	0.25
	Age 31-35	0.29	0.10	0.21
	Low education	0.27**	0.17	0.23**
	Medium education	-0.03	0.45***	0.16
	High education	0.38**	0.01	0.39**
Fathers	All youth	0.34***	0.30***	0.30***
	Daughters	0.28**	0.24*	0.18
	Sons	0.41***	0.36***	0.43***
	Age<21	0.09	0.41**	0.52***
	Age 21-25	0.50***	0.17	0.36
	Age 26-30	0.24	0.40**	0.55***
	Age 31-35	0.57***	0.32	0.18
	Low education	0.41***	0.40***	0.44***
	Medium education	0.31	0.02	0.19
	High education	0.15	0.42	0.04

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

	Mothers		Fathers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	−0.12 (0.19)	−1.72 (0.99)	−0.01 (0.22)	−1.72 (0.99)
Parent's conservatism	0.29 (0.06)***	0.31 (0.08)***	0.32 (0.08)***	0.33 (0.10)**
Parent's education		−0.58 (0.65)		−0.15 (0.75)
Household income		0.09 (0.18)		0.16 (0.20)
Parent's satisfaction with financial situation		0.12 (0.36)		0.40 (0.41)
R^2	0.10	0.12	0.08	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.08
Num. obs.	186	132	163	126
RMSE	2.57	2.65	2.78	2.83

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 4.45: Transmission of conservatism: regression models for mother-child (Models 1 and 2) and father-child dyads (Model 3 and 4)

Table 4.46: Expected and experienced mobility and intergenerational congruence in conservatism (binary), logistic regression

	Dependent variable:					
	Parent-child congruence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)						
downward			−0.185	−0.200	−0.121	−0.162
			(0.316)	(0.329)	(0.326)	(0.340)
upward			0.611**	0.576*	0.707**	0.647**
			(0.288)	(0.298)	(0.303)	(0.317)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)						
downward	−0.531	−0.541			−0.705	−0.673
	(0.503)	(0.521)			(0.519)	(0.541)
upward	−0.255	−0.228			−0.313	−0.282
	(0.250)	(0.263)			(0.264)	(0.275)
Female		0.305		0.230		0.301
		(0.271)		(0.271)		(0.284)
Education (ref: low)						
medium		0.117		−0.188		−0.020
		(0.339)		(0.345)		(0.357)
high		1.038***		0.785**		0.798**
		(0.383)		(0.391)		(0.402)
Working		0.034		0.177		0.267
		(0.318)		(0.330)		(0.345)
Parent: female		−0.307		−0.363		−0.302
		(0.258)		(0.261)		(0.272)
Parent: education (ref: low)						
medium		−0.273		−0.074		−0.241
		(0.368)		(0.374)		(0.384)
high		−1.404***		−1.304**		−1.310**
		(0.537)		(0.541)		(0.547)
Constant	0.267	0.161	−0.144	−0.185	−0.031	−0.215
	(0.174)	(0.363)	(0.209)	(0.374)	(0.249)	(0.410)
Observations	264	264	261	261	250	250
Akaike Inf. Crit.	420.985	419.104	407.739	408.307	391.160	393.556

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.47: Expected and experienced mobility and intergenerational congruence in conservatism factors (binary), logistic regression

	F1: Economic socialism				*F2: Cultural liberalism*				*F3: Social conservatism*			
	Parent-child congruence											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward			0.251	0.208			−0.349	−0.435			0.288	0.220
			(0.276)	(0.282)			(0.282)	(0.292)			(0.273)	(0.281)
upward			−0.055	−0.063			−0.046	−0.044			−0.176	−0.219
			(0.257)	(0.260)			(0.262)	(0.268)			(0.255)	(0.261)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	−1.992***	−1.918***			−0.198	−0.261			0.498	0.573		
	(0.568)	(0.573)			(0.447)	(0.461)			(0.448)	(0.459)		
upward	−0.079	−0.067			−0.309	−0.389*			−0.101	−0.122		
	(0.225)	(0.228)			(0.227)	(0.233)			(0.221)	(0.226)		
Female		−0.007		0.061		−0.052		−0.080		−0.366		−0.321
		(0.233)		(0.230)		(0.238)		(0.240)		(0.230)		(0.230)
Education (ref: low)												
medium		−0.131		−0.061		0.458		0.385		0.031		−0.083
		(0.310)		(0.313)		(0.311)		(0.316)		(0.306)		(0.309)
high		0.118		0.049		0.288		0.044		0.600**		0.490
		(0.306)		(0.308)		(0.316)		(0.325)		(0.301)		(0.310)
Working		0.266		0.234		0.218		0.294		−0.043		−0.048
		(0.282)		(0.283)		(0.275)		(0.284)		(0.271)		(0.274)
Parent: female		−0.075		−0.004		0.383*		0.428*		−0.105		−0.082
		(0.227)		(0.224)		(0.228)		(0.229)		(0.221)		(0.221)
Parent: education (ref: low)												
medium		0.115		−0.037		−0.442		−0.480		−0.086		0.004
		(0.322)		(0.322)		(0.326)		(0.327)		(0.318)		(0.319)
high		−0.327		−0.400		−0.195		−0.037		−0.733		−0.596
		(0.448)		(0.437)		(0.465)		(0.458)		(0.468)		(0.470)
Constant	0.343**	0.177	0.110	−0.044	0.337**	−0.038	0.270	−0.120	−0.094	0.090	−0.153	0.058
	(0.156)	(0.318)	(0.185)	(0.324)	(0.157)	(0.316)	(0.193)	(0.337)	(0.150)	(0.311)	(0.184)	(0.314)
Observations	326	326	317	317	321	321	314	314	333	333	330	330
Akaike Inf. Crit.	513.831	523.811	513.180	524.626	510.497	519.306	501.372	508.586	536.747	541.411	528.118	535.073

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.48: Expected and experienced mobility and intergenerational congruence in conservatism: multinomial regression

	Dependent variable:											
	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	0.001	0.481	−0.067	0.665					−0.120	0.538	−0.147	0.782*
	(0.358)	(0.414)	(0.374)	(0.439)					(0.367)	(0.434)	(0.382)	(0.467)
upward	−0.719**	−0.421	−0.680**	−0.377					−0.780**	−0.547	−0.707**	−0.468
	(0.329)	(0.401)	(0.340)	(0.420)					(0.340)	(0.437)	(0.354)	(0.466)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward					−0.313	1.246**	−0.290	1.150*	−0.155	1.462**	−0.154	1.320**
					(0.716)	(0.567)	(0.733)	(0.596)	(0.728)	(0.593)	(0.747)	(0.634)
upward					0.249	0.268	0.229	0.233	0.319	0.304	0.296	0.223
					(0.285)	(0.351)	(0.297)	(0.370)	(0.296)	(0.369)	(0.307)	(0.391)
Female			−0.500	0.230			−0.469	−0.034			−0.492	0.056
			(0.311)	(0.369)			(0.311)	(0.371)			(0.322)	(0.394)
Education (ref: low)												
medium			0.269	0.015			0.025	−0.376			0.136	−0.286
			(0.383)	(0.480)			(0.375)	(0.486)			(0.392)	(0.518)
high			−0.850*	−0.738			−1.093**	−1.043**			−0.859*	−0.814
			(0.470)	(0.514)			(0.458)	(0.520)			(0.477)	(0.540)
Working			0.068	−0.533			0.251	−0.395			0.043	−0.694
			(0.391)	(0.431)			(0.383)	(0.418)			(0.407)	(0.457)
Parent: female			0.366	0.370			0.289	0.352			0.313	0.328
			(0.296)	(0.357)			(0.294)	(0.359)			(0.306)	(0.382)
Parent: education (ref: low)												
medium			−0.107	0.409			0.019	0.669			−0.013	0.691
			(0.436)	(0.496)			(0.432)	(0.496)			(0.445)	(0.517)
high			0.679	1.989***			0.735	2.115***			0.643	2.154***
			(0.652)	(0.620)			(0.648)	(0.628)			(0.656)	(0.652)
Constant	−0.253	−0.972***	−0.205	−1.083**	−0.703***	−1.308***	−0.684	−1.194**	−0.300	−1.229***	−0.204	−1.092*
	(0.232)	(0.293)	(0.429)	(0.508)	(0.199)	(0.248)	(0.427)	(0.488)	(0.274)	(0.362)	(0.467)	(0.566)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	558.868	558.868	561.066	561.066	560.418	560.418	562.094	562.094	531.553	531.553	535.477	535.477

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.49: Experienced (past) mobility and intergenerational congruence in conservatism factors: multinomial regression

	F1: Economic socialism				*F2: Cultural liberalism*				*F3: Social conservatism*			
	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Experienced mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	−0.027	−0.376	−0.086	−0.226	−0.076	1.149***	−0.137	1.156***	−0.132	−0.474	−0.164	−0.280
	(0.349)	(0.409)	(0.361)	(0.423)	(0.452)	(0.370)	(0.466)	(0.381)	(0.324)	(0.347)	(0.333)	(0.360)
upward	0.077	−0.388	0.027	−0.382	−0.149	0.433	−0.225	0.341	0.285	0.053	0.272	0.171
	(0.324)	(0.385)	(0.332)	(0.395)	(0.402)	(0.372)	(0.410)	(0.381)	(0.301)	(0.311)	(0.307)	(0.322)
Female			−0.685**	0.259			−0.390	0.158			−0.008	0.740**
			(0.300)	(0.351)			(0.387)	(0.310)			(0.272)	(0.292)
Education (ref: low)												
medium			0.024	0.075			−0.308	0.173			0.345	−0.253
			(0.412)	(0.470)			(0.535)	(0.392)			(0.353)	(0.398)
high			0.523	−0.337			0.473	0.462			−0.142	−0.972**
			(0.379)	(0.500)			(0.493)	(0.404)			(0.357)	(0.419)
Working			−0.405	−0.337			0.172	0.062			0.249	−0.119
			(0.351)	(0.424)			(0.463)	(0.379)			(0.340)	(0.326)
Parent: female			−0.022	0.067			0.141	−0.244			−0.108	0.333
			(0.282)	(0.344)			(0.364)	(0.295)			(0.260)	(0.281)
Parent education (ref: low)												
medium			−0.123	0.081			0.304	0.652*			0.120	−0.238
			(0.405)	(0.517)			(0.510)	(0.382)			(0.359)	(0.439)
high			−0.701	1.387**			0.194	−0.447			0.543	0.689
			(0.686)	(0.549)			(0.649)	(0.655)			(0.528)	(0.587)
Constant	−1.181***	−1.376***	−0.605	−1.459***	−1.704***	−1.777***	−1.820***	−1.991***	−0.538**	−0.542**	−0.767**	−0.883**
	(0.238)	(0.257)	(0.396)	(0.486)	(0.283)	(0.292)	(0.534)	(0.475)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.383)	(0.390)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	600.409	600.409	610.235	610.235	554.694	554.694	571.201	571.201	750.389	750.389	756.469	756.469

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.50: Expected (future) mobility and intergenerational congruence in conservatism factors: multinomial regression

	F1: Economic socialism				*F2: Cultural liberalism*				*F3: Social conservatism*			
	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.	Cons.	Lib.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Expected mobility (ref: no mobility)												
downward	0.878	1.555***	0.870	1.374**	0.620	0.304	0.619	0.501	−0.208	−0.985	−0.142	−1.228*
	(0.572)	(0.513)	(0.583)	(0.536)	(0.694)	(0.543)	(0.715)	(0.558)	(0.502)	(0.692)	(0.516)	(0.710)
upward	0.688**	−0.074	0.687**	−0.135	0.726**	0.079	0.722*	0.144	0.217	−0.052	0.232	−0.003
	(0.286)	(0.358)	(0.290)	(0.368)	(0.370)	(0.290)	(0.381)	(0.296)	(0.257)	(0.282)	(0.261)	(0.292)
Female			−0.616**	0.270			−0.414	0.071			0.073	0.778***
			(0.299)	(0.353)			(0.387)	(0.301)			(0.267)	(0.300)
Education (ref: low)												
medium			0.151	0.038			−0.452	0.081			0.193	−0.363
			(0.392)	(0.468)			(0.533)	(0.378)			(0.347)	(0.405)
high			0.236	−0.540			0.277	0.113			−0.287	−1.052**
			(0.375)	(0.503)			(0.472)	(0.398)			(0.345)	(0.414)
Working			−0.466	−0.237			0.241	0.315			0.195	−0.105
			(0.337)	(0.417)			(0.461)	(0.363)			(0.326)	(0.338)
Parent: female			0.049	0.138			0.074	−0.203			−0.128	0.433
			(0.283)	(0.348)			(0.370)	(0.288)			(0.256)	(0.289)
Parent: education (ref: low)												
medium			−0.200	−0.051			0.457	0.523			0.199	−0.101
			(0.408)	(0.516)			(0.509)	(0.382)			(0.355)	(0.441)
low			−0.714	1.339**			0.301	−0.405			0.620	0.930
			(0.683)	(0.558)			(0.649)	(0.657)			(0.524)	(0.589)
Constant	−1.556***	−1.744***	−0.977**	−1.779***	−2.195***	−1.309***	−2.325***	−1.638***	−0.532***	−0.671***	−0.712*	−1.007**
	(0.217)	(0.235)	(0.390)	(0.485)	(0.287)	(0.197)	(0.542)	(0.418)	(0.179)	(0.187)	(0.371)	(0.399)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	600.661	600.661	612.331	612.331	567.143	567.143	586.021	586.021	752.644	752.644	758.394	758.394

Note. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.51: The social and value component components of left-right self-placement in Hungary

	Youth	Mothers	Fathers
Intercept	0.02 (0.13)	0.21 (0.13)	0.15 (0.16)
Patriotism	0.03 (0.06)	0.12 (0.05)*	0.03 (0.06)
Capitalism	−0.06 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.08 (0.05)
Privatization	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Nationalism	0.08 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Right wingers	0.25 (0.05)***	0.18 (0.05)***	0.23 (0.04)***
Free market	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.11 (0.05)*	−0.02 (0.05)
Lower taxes	0.06 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.00 (0.07)
Free trade	0.09 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.06)
Church authority	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Private healthcare	−0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Nuclear energy	−0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Private pensions	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)
Small government	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.16 (0.05)***
Obedience	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.05)
GMOs	0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	−0.09 (0.05)
Consumer culture	0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Tuition fees	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)
Chastity	−0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.05)
Abortion bans	0.02 (0.05)	0.11 (0.04)*	0.05 (0.05)
Conservatives	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)
Minority rights	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Market regulation	0.03 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)
Left wingers	0.05 (0.05)	0.12 (0.04)**	0.11 (0.05)*
Unemployment benefits	0.00 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)
Globalization	0.06 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Socialism	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Labor unions	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.09 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)
Birth control	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Multiculturalism	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)
Gay marriage	−0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Labor strikes	0.10 (0.05)*	0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.05)
Luxury tax	0.01 (0.04)	−0.08 (0.04)	−0.09 (0.05)
Environmentalism	−0.01 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.06)	0.13 (0.09)
Corporate tax	0.00 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)
Renewable energy	0.11 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)
Gay adoption	−0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)
Wage equality	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Pollution control	0.08 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.09 (0.08)
Decriminalized marijuana	−0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Liberals	0.04 (0.05)	−0.08 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.05)
Education	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
Income	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Religiosity	−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*
Adj. R^2 (Step 1)	0.17	0.36	0.24
Adj. R^2 (Step 2)	0.29	0.43	0.29
Num. obs.	142	133	141
RMSE	0.17	0.17	0.17

$^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{*}p < .05$

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