

CAN LANGUAGE CONSTRUCT A NATION?
The case of the Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine

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Abstract

This thesis investigates how the language policy contributes to the construction of the national identity in the case of the Russian linguistic minority in Ukraine. The Maidan revolution and the consequent conflict with Russia increased the political saliency of the Ukrainian language as the most important factor constituting the Ukrainian national identity. In 2019, the elites decided to implement the civic-nationalist language policy, which made the Ukrainian language dominant in the public sphere and at the same time weakened the position of the minority languages. This policy, designed to strengthen the Ukrainian national identity for its citizens, received an ambiguous reaction from the minorities. This thesis explores how the civic-nationalist language policy influences the Russian linguistic minority in Ukraine in terms of their language use and, consequently, their perception of the national identity. It discusses the factors that foster acceptance of the national language by the minority and analyses how the national identity is created through the language policy. This thesis uses nested analysis – a combination of quantitative (multivariate linear regressions) and qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews and theory-building process tracing) to offer a complex account of the impact of the civic-nationalist language policy. The key findings of this thesis are that the civic nationalist language policy has both positive and negative effects on the national identity depending on how it is reinterpreted by the members of the linguistic minority.

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INTRODUCTION

‘Army. Language. Faith’. These three words were the political campaign slogan of then-acting president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, with which he went for the re-election in 2019 (Surepin, 2018). It indicated that almost thirty years after Ukraine became independent, the so-called ‘language issue’ continues to be one of the major dividing lines of the Ukrainian society. The historical past of Ukraine conditioned that by the time of the independence in 1991, the Ukrainian language was not equally used across the country. It was also significantly challenged by the Russian language as the consequence of the Russification policies. Ever since, the state authorities were trying to regulate the national language to find the balance between increasing the usage of Ukrainian as the official state language and preserving the rights of the minority languages. The former aspect was important due to the proximity of Ukrainian and Russian cultures. Thus, the language often served as the main national identity marker and the distinctive feature of Ukraine. The latter concern was essential because of the interests and rights of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine who constituted the most populous group after the Ukrainian-speakers. The 2014 revolution, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the on-going conflict in the East of the country increased the saliency of the language as an essential factor of Ukraine’s integrity. Even though Poroshenko’s campaign was not successful, and he lost the elections, just before leaving the office, he fulfilled his promise and signed the law which made Ukrainian the primary language of public communication. It meant that in all public places, from schools and state institutions to cafes and shops, the national language replaced the minority languages.

The law received an ambiguous reaction which once again revealed the divide in the Ukrainian society. The supporters of the policy applauded it as another step towards Ukraine’s independent future and national integrity (lb.ua, 2019). The critics claimed it to be discriminatory and radically nationalist (rferl.org, 2019). In this sense, there is a risk that the law will not just fail to create the national identity for the minorities but alienate them even more. The contribution of this thesis is the analysis of the effects of the policy through the perspective of its targets – the Ukrainian citizens not using the Ukrainian language in the public life. This is important because the process of nation-building initiated by the policies goes through reinterpretation and renegotiation by its target groups (Polese, 2011: 37). Therefore, the content of the policy or the intentions of the authorities are insufficient to understand its full effects on the ground. Nevertheless, the linguistic minority groups are not homogenous and there is a high chance that the law is perceived differently by different people. Therefore, unlike previous prominent studies in this field (for example, Arel, 2002; Barrington and Faranda, 2009; Kulyk, 2010), this thesis analyses the effects of the policy on the level of individuals rather than a group. The first research question is, therefore, *What are the individual factors of members of a linguistic minority that foster acceptance of the national language?*

Moreover, the studies discussing the effects of the language policy tend to use either quantitative (for example, Kulyk, 2010) or qualitative analysis (Polese, 2010, 2011). While the former method increases the representativeness of the results, it is often unable to unpack the causation driving the identified relationships. The qualitative studies are more useful in understating the casual mechanism, but they tend to lack representativeness. The advantage of this research compared to the earlier scholarship is it that uses the nested analysis, which combines the large-N regression with the small-N qualitative study. The aim is to provide a comprehensive account of the formation of the national identity for the linguistic minority which unpacks the individual-level causal mechanism initiated by the adoption of the linguistic policy. Therefore, the more general research question addressed by the qualitative part of this study is *How does civic nationalist language policy create a national identity for a linguistic minority?*

The 2019 language law and its effect on the national identity for the Russian-speaking minority is chosen to be the case-study in this research. Even though the case of the Russian linguistic minority in Ukraine seems to be specific due to the dominance of Russian over other minority languages and its proximity to the Ukrainian language the findings can be extrapolated to other minorities as in Ukraine, so abroad. For instance, the Hungarian minority in Ukraine constitutes another group expressing similar reactions to the policy. Moreover, the study can be replicated for other states, most notably, the post-Soviet republics, which underwent the process of Russification, where civic nationalist policies are adopted to increase the national language use and strengthen the national identities. Thus, the theoretical and methodological frameworks of this research have sufficient external validity for explaining other cases.

The thesis consists of three chapters and the conclusion. Chapter 1 provides the overview of the literature and the theoretical background. It is organised around the two main concepts - national identity and language policy. Starting from the abstract concept of nation-building and national identity, the literature is narrowed down to the role of the language in nation-building. The chapter ends with the discussion of the literature about the case of Ukraine and the summary of the 2019 language law. Chapter 2 presents the research design. It starts from the discussion of two main research questions and explains why exactly the Russian minority is chosen as the case-study for this research. Then, the methodology is explained. This thesis is based on the nested analysis which combines quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches. The quantitative research is represented by two multivariate linear regressions, while the qualitative part consists of the theory-building process-tracing and the semi-structured interviews. Chapter 2 explains why this method is the most fitting for the purposes of this research and discusses in detail the dependent and independent variables used in both analyses. It ends with the discussion of the hypothesised casual mechanism which will be tested by the findings from the interviews. Chapter 3 is devoted to the empirical

analysis. It is divided on three parts based on the methodology. The first part discusses the outcomes of two multivariate regressions and outlines the key independent variables which are then tested in the interviews. The second part summarises the findings from the semi-structured interviews which serve as a validation of the casual mechanism elaborated in Chapter 2. The third part discusses the implications of the findings for the theorised casual mechanism. The conclusion summarises the findings and discusses the limitations of this research.

CHAPTER 1. Literature Review and Theoretical Background

1.1 Nation-building and national identity

The process of nation-building lies at the core of the modern nation-states. Kolstø (2004: 8) defines nation-building as ‘...an active process ... intended to instill in the state’s population a sense of being one common nation, to cultivate a sense of belonging to the particular state in which they live and no other’. He does not openly criticise nation-building of discrimination but notes that such policies often include ‘elements of cultural and linguistic homogenisation ’(Kolstø, 2004: 8). Kymlicka is much more critical of nation-building practices. For him, these policies are directed not only at the uniting the population around the common set of values but also at ‘suppressing any alternative identities ’(Kymlicka, 2007: 62).

However, nation-building has not only critics but also supporters. Mylonas (2013: 2) notes that legitimacy in modern states is ‘connected to popular rule, to majorities’. Nation-building is the way to create such majorities. Thus, it makes states more resistant towards foreign powers, which try to undermine the legitimacy of the domestic elites and thus destabilize the regime (Mylonas, 2013). Gellner (1983: 112) points out the material benefits of nation-building as the nationalist state acts as the protector ‘not ... only of a culture, but also of a new and often initially fragile economy’. Barry (2002: 80) claims that the national identity serves the interests of liberal democracies and ensures that ‘the interests of everyone must count equally, and there are no groups whose ... views are to be automatically discounted’. As a result, nation-building proves to be beneficial for minority groups since it provides the foundation for the representation of their interests. However, it is important to note, that Barry understands nation-building as producing civic nationality, which requires neither complete acculturation nor giving up other identities of minorities (Barry, 2002: 81).

As evident from these theoretical debates, there is no consensus regarding the effects of nation-building in the literature. The following section will discuss the concept of the national identity, the approaches to its definition, and the normative debates around it.

1.1.1 National Identity: definitions and debates

Nation-building has the primary purpose of constructing the national identity, which would unite (or as Kymlicka would say, homogenise (2007: 62)) the state’s population around the dominant set of values. However, as early as the end of the 18th century, there appeared a debate regarding which values should be at the core of the nation. The intellectual debate started between French rationalists and the German romanticists (Wiborg, 2000). The former group was arguing in favor of ‘a set of conscious choices made by individuals who believe it is in their best interest to participate in a larger political community ’(Janmaat, 2005: 21). They were supporting the voluntary acceptance of the national identity for people united by their citizenship and civic values. For one to accept a

national identity in these terms would mean a rational calculation and the acceptance of the obligations alongside the benefits. Individuals are at the center of this approach, while the nation and inseparable from its political institutions are ‘a constant battleground of conflicting interest groups’ (Janmaat, 2005). Such an approach to national identity is reflected in the more recent term of civic or state identity. For example, Kassianova (2001: 821) defines state identity as ‘a national collectivity represented by the state’. In this understanding, the definition of state identity goes beyond the state institutions and also encompasses the support of the liberal democratic principles of the state by its citizens. In a sense, states, as social constructs, exist only if their existence is acknowledged, accepted, and supported by the population that accepts the state’s identity as its own.

The German romanticists, on the contrary, emphasized ‘the emotional need of individuals to belong to a wider cultural community’ (Janmaat, 2005: 21). The nation is thus based on the shared history, culture, and language. This corresponds to the ethnic national identity. The more modern example of such definition is the work of Smith (1991). Smith (1991: 14) defines national identity as a sense of belonging to a nation which is characterized by ‘sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass ... culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members.’ Even though he later says that the national identity ‘comprises both a cultural and political identity’ (Smith, 1991: 99), it is still different from the state identity. In Smith’s terminology, state identity ‘refers exclusively to the public institutions’ (1991: 14). In ethnic-based identity-construction, a government would adopt and promote the culture of the dominant ethnic group and the national identity will be based, first of all, on the shared language and culture (Kolstø, 2002).


The civic-ethnic divide between the different understanding of national identities was given a regional aspect by Hans Kohn (1982). He argued that the civic national identities were prevalent in the states with the strong middle classes, which were mainly located in the West (Kohn, 1982). Other countries, including Eastern Europe, were based on the ethnic perception of national identities. Janmaat (2005: 22) argues that Kohn, apart from adding the regional dimension to the debate, also fostered the normative debate by clearly preferring the civic nation over the ethnic one. Kohn (2017: 13) claimed that blood and Volksgeist are ‘fictitious concepts’, which ‘offer no real explanation of the rise and the role of nationality’. He argued then that nationality instead ‘is formed by the decision to form a nationality’ (Kohn, 2017: 15). This view is also supported by Ignatieff (2006: 22) who argued that ‘common ethnicity by itself does not create ... community, and when it fails to do so, as it must, nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled toward maintaining unity by force rather than by consent.’ As a result, such states risk to become authoritarian.

However, Kohn’s theory was heavily criticized by the more recent scholarship on nationalism and national identities. So, Kuzio (2002) identifies six main problems with Kohn’s framework. They can be summarised as the West-centric selection bias and omission of the ethnic aspects and conflicts

of the Western nations, idealization of the Western nationalism as being always inclusive, and the ignoring of the positive development of civic nationalism in the East (Kuzio, 2002: 24-29). Kuzio (2002: 29) argues that all states encompass both civic and ethnic-cultural elements of national identity, just the proportion of them changes over time. Kymlicka (1996) argues that both Western and Eastern nation-building have cultural elements. This is supported by Polese (2011: 39) who argues that 'all measures targeting a whole population will be ethnic to a certain extent.' Moreover, some scholars (Miller, 2000; Canovan, 1996) argue that the symbiosis of civic and ethnic components is essential for the vitality of democratic states.

This thesis, therefore, adopts the understanding of the national identity as combining civic and ethnic elements, as summarised by Figure 1. It is necessary because the focus of this thesis is on the language policy as an instrument of nation-building. As the following paragraphs will illustrate, no matter the original goal of the language policy, it will necessarily contain an ethnic element. Thus, the outcome of the policy - national identity - can be constructed as through rational choice and the acceptance of the civic identity, so through emotions and the appeal to the shared culture with the rest of the nation.

Figure 1. The national identity and its components.



1.1.2 The agents of nation-building

It is important to discuss the agents of the nation-building process. In the literature reviewed, the nation-building process is represented as a top-down approach, in which the elites decide what values to choose for the national identity. However, Polese (2010) argues that the nation-building process is two-fold: not only the elites choose the policies to implement, but also people themselves renegotiate these policies at the local level. He claims that 'nation-building is ...not only the policies adopted at the national level, but also the way people react to them' (Polese, 2011: 40). Billig (1995: 6) came up with the term 'banal nationalism' which means 'the ideological habits which enable the

established nations of the West to be reproduced'. Even though banal nationalism can be seen as the political tool for the elites to hold nations together, it is only possible because of the direct participation of the citizens. One of the typical examples of banal nationalism is the national flags outside of buildings. This detail has become an ordinary part of the everyday routine in many countries and is not even perceived as a sign of nationalism, whereas the national flags are the obvious signs of the identification with a particular state.

1.2 Language as a Core of Nation-Building

1.2.1 Theoretical debates

There is no consensus in the academic literature on what role the language plays in creating the national identity. Wright (2000: 61-69) identifies three major schools of thought debating the role and the function of language in nation-building. The first school claims that language is essential for providing the capacity for communication and thus for building the community. The second school views the language as one of many factors contributing to the national identity (Armstrong, 1982). The third school claims that the language is relatively unimportant for the nation-building (Hobsbawm, 2000; Brass, 1994). This thesis adopts the theoretical framework of the first school of thought, which understands the language as a constitutive factor of the national identity, because it represents the developments in the post-Soviet area and in Ukraine in particular, which is used as a case study in this research. Thus, it is discussed in more detail.

Wright (2000: 64-65) makes the distinction within the first school of thought between these scholars, who advocate the language as the 'social glue' for the communities, and the ones, who perceive language as the by-product of modernity. The example of the former approach is Habermas (1994: 146) who argued that 'there are elementary social functions which can only be satisfied by means of communicative action'. These functions are fundamental for the cooperation between different members of the community. Another example is Bourdieu (1991) who looks at the process of language standardization as an expression of the political will to unification (Wright, 2000: 65). Joseph (2004) also claims that the language plays the key role in the 'production of individual identities' and 'defining characteristics of certain collectivities'.

The second approach considers modern language practices as a consequence of the nationalising policies. They also acknowledge that the language is the key element of the national identity but it was preceded by the industrialisation. For instance, Gellner (1983: 66) argues that the nations appear only 'when general social conditions make for standardised, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures'. These cultures are based, first of all, on the common education system which requires the common language. In line with that, Anderson (2006: 77) argues that the industrialisation and the development of commerce in the 19th century 'created powerful new impulses for vernacular

linguistic unification’. Most of these scholars agree that prior to industrialisation, the language played a little role in the association of citizens with their states. As Kohn (2017: 6) wrote in his famous *The Idea of Nationalism*, ‘before the age of nationalism, the masses very rarely became conscious of the fact that the same language was spoken over a large territory’. And that ‘before nationalism, the language was very rarely stressed as a fact on which the prestige and power of a group depended ’ (Kohn, 2017: 7).

However, this literature discusses the origins of national identities. For the purposes of this research which concern the change rather than emergence of the national identity, the typology proposed by Garcia (2014) may seem more relevant. In addition to the nation-building school, which concerns the symbolic and emotional value of language, Garcia (2014: 116) proposes to add the rationalist perspective. Therefore, it is used in this thesis to supplement Wright’s original typology. The rationalists use the game theory and analyse the economic benefits which are received by using one or another language (Garcia, 2014: 116). An example of such an approach is the work by De Swaan (2004). De Swaan (2004: 569) criticises linguistic sentimentalism and perceives the use of language as a calculated choice - people abandon one language because ‘they have higher expectations of a different language’. Another example is Laitin’s article (1994) on the political linguistics in Ghana, in which he applies a game theory to propose a new language planning strategy for the state. Such an approach proposes to set aside the emotional connections to the language and apply economic rationality. Therefore, to understand the effect of the language on national identity, one must analyse benefits and costs of its usage. This is an especially relevant approach to understand the attitude to the national language of the linguistic minorities since they have the positive duty to learn it. Table 1 summarises the theoretical approaches which consider the language as the key factor of the national identity. The following section discusses how the debates about the role of language in nation-building are reflected in the approaches to the language policies.

Table 1. The summary of the arguments of the first school of thought on the role of language in nation-building (based on Wright (2002) and Garcia (2014)).

School of Thought	Language as the key factor in nation-building	
	<i>Nation-building</i>	<i>Rational</i>
Approaches		
Main premises	Language as the pre-condition of the association	Use of language based on the cost-benefit rationale
Causality	National Language -> National Identity (emotional)	Modernity -> National Language -> National Identity (rational)

Outcome for national identity	Ethnic	Civic
Scholars	Habermas (1994, 1998), Bourdieu (1991), Edwards (1985), Joseph (2004)	Gellner (1983), Anderson (2006), Kohn (2017), De Swaan (2004), Laitin (1994)

1.2.2 Language policy and the Approaches to it: Civic Nationalism and Liberal Culturalism

There are very few monolingual countries today. Multilingual states require the policies regulating the use of languages for their populations. Language policy is, therefore, a very broad term ranging from the regulations of the particular pronunciations (Spolsky, 2009) to the laws regarding the use of one or another language on the state level. Haugen (1987) proposes to differentiate between language policies and language planning where the latter is defined as an intentional effort to change the linguistic behaviors of a speech community. However, this difference is not formalized and the two are often used interchangeably. For example, Weinstein (1983) defines language policy as a tool of leadership to change the linguistic landscape of the society. Cooper's (1989) definition considers the language policy as active efforts to influence human behaviors which are based on inherent language features like acquisition, structures, and functions. This thesis focuses on the macro-level language policy in line with Weinstein (1983) and researches its implications for the use of different languages rather than the details within one. Drawing on the political philosophy of multiculturalism developed by Kymlicka (1995, 2001), this thesis identifies two main approaches to regulate the use of national and minority languages - civic nationalism and liberal culturalism.

Civic nationalism, in theory, is the approach focusing on the construction of the civic identity. For example, Habermas (1998: 228) argues that the immigrants in a liberal democratic states must not be required to assimilate into the majority culture, but to 'assent to the principles of the constitution'. Therefore, immigrants and minorities have to 'integrate into a common "political culture"' (Stilz, 2009: 258). Barry (1993) claims that liberal democratic governments have to provide the equal opportunities for their citizens to make free choices and this should not be culturally conditioned. At the same time, Barry (1993: 78-79) acknowledges that liberal states must require their citizens to sometimes sacrifice their interests for the common good, but not to adopt the majority culture altogether. Overall, this approach is based on the belief that 'the state is not the property of any particular nation' (Stilz, 2009: 259).

The liberal culturalism approach is an alternative to civic nationalism. It argues that the state has to endorse the national cultures which have been historically associated with its territory (Stilz, 2009: 258). It is advocated by Kymlicka (2001) who claims that liberal culturalists support the group-specific rights and policies, which accept the differences between the state's ethnic groups. Liberal

culturalism further can be divided into liberal nationalism and liberal multiculturalism. Liberal nationalism does not impose a national identity on citizens who do not share it but requires the state institutions to be built on ‘a particular national character ’including the state language (Kymlicka, 2001: 39). However, liberal nationalism also provides the guidelines for the accommodation of the minorities’ interests. Liberal multiculturalism, on the other hand, not only accepts the rights of minorities to be recognised but also provides them the right to institutional representation, including education in their native languages (Kymlicka, 2001: 40).

As a result, the main divide between civic nationalism and liberal culturalism is the principle of neutrality advocated by the civic nationalists. It means that a state does not take any side in the case of multi-language conflict (Stilz, 2009: 264). While civic nationalism requires states to be blind to ethnicity and endorse policies following rational calculations, liberal nationalists advocate ethnic-specific rights with preference given to such groups, who historically inhabited the territory of the state. However, as Kymlicka (1995: 110-111) points out, ‘the idea that the government could be neutral with respect to the ethnic and national groups is patently false.’ This creates the paradox for civic nationalists, as the state in order to ensure the equality of its citizens must give the preference to one language over others. As a result, they advocate the assimilationist language policy meaning the promotion of one majority language (Stilz, 2009: 266). Barry (1993) supports this approach because it ensures the rights to economic opportunity and democratic participation while, in theory, not discriminating against any group since all of them equally have to comply with the law and use the majority language. Nevertheless, the situation when some ethnic groups already know and use the majority language as their mother tongue and other groups have to adapt is the evidence that civic nationalist position cannot be neutral in practice. Although all groups have to equally comply with the law, the law itself is the adopted by people, and thus it may be a product of ethnicity, language, or another type of dominance of one group over another.

To sum up, the approaches to language politics may overlap in some areas. Civic nationalism while focusing on building the identity formed around civic values, also contributes to the formation of the ethnic identity by imposing one common majority language. Liberal nationalism while promoting the minority languages also acknowledges the need for one state language. However, they differ in terms of the regulation of the minority languages. Table 2 summarises the approaches.

Table 2. The approaches to the language policies in liberal democracies (based on Stilz, 2009).

Approach	Civic Nationalism	Liberal Culturalism	
		Liberal Nationalism	Liberal Multiculturalism

Policy	Majority language	The official state language	The official state language	One of the official state languages
	Minority languages	Used only in the private sphere, with a few exceptions	Have the same status as the state language, but only on the regional level	Have the same status as the state language
Outcome for national identity		Civic, ethnic as a by-product	Civic as a by-product	Civic as a by-product

1.2.3 Language policies and minorities

As the previous sections illustrated, language and language policies can play a major role in the formation of the national identity. However, what if an individual or a group *already* have a national identity? What will be the implications of language policies then? For the purposes of this thesis, only the literature regarding the effects of civic nationalist language policies is discussed.

The literature discussing the effects of language policy on minorities focuses primarily on the normative aspects. There is a broad consensus that the promotion of the majority language as the only official one has numerous negative implications for the linguistic minorities. Safran (2004: 5) argues that languages are ‘means of political control’. They can be used not only for nation-building, but also for the oppression of minorities, ethnic homogenisation, and social control in general (Safran, 2004: 7). Wright (2000: 3) notes that ‘whether individuals have particular linguistic skills or not is always one of the factors of inclusion or exclusion in a number of spheres: access to knowledge; employability; participation in the democratic process; active citizenship’. Criticising the scholarship which considers language to be unimportant in nation-building, Wright (2000: 69) argues that ‘language has been used in a programmatic way to build national groups and for propagandist purposes of exclusion and inclusion’. Connor (1998: 42) while researching the relations between nationalism and patriotism referred to the German concept of ‘*Staatvolk*’ - ‘a people who are culturally, and politically pre-eminent in a state’ - an ethnic majority. He argues that majorities often equate a state to their homeland, which implies ethnic homogeneity (Connor, 1998: 42). The examples of this are Englishmen, using ‘England’ to describe the whole country, or the equation of the post-Soviet space to Russia and Russian culture. Such practices lead to alienation of minorities, who thus do not develop patriotism - ‘an emotional attachment to one’s state’ according to Connor (1998: 41). May (2012: 85) analysing Connor’s works also suggests that minorities and their languages can be excluded from the ‘national norms’ and forced to assimilate into the majority culture. Nevertheless, if the language policy is perceived in civic terms, it can benefit the minorities by integrating them into the state’s political community without giving up on their culture.

1.3 Language policy in practice: the case of Ukraine

The case of Ukraine provides a fruitful ground for the investigation of nation-building through the language in action. Brubaker (1996: 412) suggests that the post-Soviet states are perceived by their elites as nation-states - 'the states of and for particular nations', but yet as "incomplete" or "unrealized"... as insufficiently "national" in a variety of senses'. Therefore, the political elites engage in active nation-building which is seen as essential for the state functioning.

Ukraine became no exception in this sense. Kulyk (2006: 287) points out that the Soviet past is 'the only past common to all Ukrainian regions because it was only in the 1940s that they found themselves in one polity after many centuries of divided existence'. During the communist era, language policies in Ukraine, like in other Soviet republics, were influenced primarily by the Russification campaign in order to create a homogenous Soviet identity (Bureiko and Moga, 2019). This resulted in the dominance of the Russian language in many spheres as it was useful for 'social mobility and loyalty to the regime' (Kulyk, 2015: 287). Whereas the Ukrainian language was not prohibited, it was largely 'marginalised and denigrated relative to Russian' which served the purpose of integration and inter-national communication (Bilaniuk, 2009: 337). This resulted in that by the time Ukraine has become independent, it found itself in a 'considerably distorted language situation' which was characterised by the dominance of Russian and limitation of Ukrainian to the rural areas especially in the East and South of the country (Masenko, 2009: 101).

At the same time, the historical and cultural differences between different parts of Ukraine determined that the language management became the central element of the nation-building project (Maksimovtsova, 2017). However, as Maksimovtsova (2017) points out, it has never been stable and consistent. Since 1991, the periods of nationalization were substituted with partial denationalization and then again with Ukrainization. Kulyk (2009: 17) explains it by the fact that the issues regarding the state language are made salient and exploited by the Ukrainian political elites during the elections and political crises while otherwise the policies are not implemented consistently.

Ukrainian received the status of the national language in 1989, what became an important step towards the independence two years later (Polese, 2011). Its status as the sole state language was reinforced in the 1996 Constitution, while Russian received the status of minority language. Magocsi (2010: 738) characterises this development as the establishment of the civic national identity because the Ukrainians were defined by the Constitution as 'citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities'. The state language, thus, was chosen based on the numerically dominant nationality not because of the ethnic preferences. However, such view was not supported by everyone.

Bilaniuk (2009: 339) argues that it resulted in the increased tensions between the supporters of the increased use of Ukrainian and defenders of the privileged status of Russian.

The debate between the supporters of Ukrainian and Russian continued to be widely reflected in politics. An effective ‘one state – one language’ policy was viewed as an essential tool to revitalise Ukrainian across the country (Stepanenko, 2003: 109) and thus reinforce the Ukrainian identity. Moreover, it was also seen as an effective way to reduce Russia’s influence which was carried out primarily on the basis of the support of the Russian-speakers in Ukraine (Wilson, 2014). The Ukrainian language was, therefore, seen as ‘a legitimising symbol of ... independence from Russia’ (Arel, 2002: 239).

At the same time, politicians had to promote the all-inclusive civic policies (Kuzio, 2002) which would reinforce Ukraine’s liberal democracy. Such policies included the protection of the Russian language. Even though formally Russian had an equal status to other minority languages, in practice, it was much more spread than other languages. This created the incentives for the politicians to appeal to the Russian-speaking electorate by promising Russian a special status (Bureiko and Moga, 2019). As a consequence, in 2012, the pro-Russian president Yanukovich adopted the law ‘On the Principles of the State Language Policy’ (rada.gov.ua, 2020). This law granted the special status to any minority language in regions where at least 10% of the population identified it as native and it was widely criticised for favouring Russian and threatening the use of Ukrainian due to the low threshold (Kulyk, 2017).

The Maidan revolution, the annexation of Crimea, and the following war in the East of Ukraine resulted in the review of the language policy and the cancellation of 2012 Law on regional languages. Gaub and Popescu (2017) argue that Russia’s aggression resulted in the stronger sense of nationhood in the Ukrainian society. Zaharchenko (2015: 54) points out that the participants of the Maidan protests spoke both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages. Kulyk (2016: 90) argues that ‘the Euromaidan and the subsequent Russian aggression further detached language use from national identity, as many Russian speakers came to identify strongly with the inclusive Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire’. In line with these arguments, Bureiko and Moga (2019: 142) argue that Ukraine ‘is acquiring the features of a “civic-republican nation”’ where increasingly less emphasis is put on language.

However, Bureiko and Moga’s research (2019) does not discuss Ukraine’s latest language policy, the debates around which illustrated that the language continues to be one of the most salient issues in the Ukrainian politics. This thesis addresses this gap and analyses how Ukraine’s new language policy contributes to the nation-building for linguistic minorities.

1.3.1 The 2019 Language Policy in Ukraine

The theory is tested on the effects of the latest Ukraine's language legislation. The law 'On provision of the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language' was accepted in 2019 (Verkhovna Rada, 2019). It did not only reaffirm the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language but also made it the primary language of the public sphere. It means that all communication in public sphere, as in state institutions, so in privately-owned establishments must be by default carried out in Ukrainian. The law permits the use of other languages if all parties involved in the conversation find it appropriate. The important development became the language of education. The legislation reaffirmed the provisions of the 2017 law 'On education', which requires all higher educational institutions to conduct teaching in Ukrainian (Verkhovna Rada, 2017: Article 7.1). In terms of primary and secondary education, the teaching by default must be carried out in the state language, but the members of the indigenous nations of Ukraine have the right to receive the preschool and primary education in their native languages if there is enough demand for it (Pidkuimukha, 2020). However, Ukraine does not yet have the legislation on which groups are considered as indigenous people. The proposed project of the law on the indigenous people mentioned the Ukrainians as titular nation and three ethnicities living in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, namely, the Crimean Tatars, the Crimean Karaites, and the Krymchaks. However, it was not accepted (Verkhovna Rada, 2014).

According to the law, the minority languages can be taught as a separate subject in secondary education based on the demand. In addition to that, some subjects can be taught in the minority languages, however, it applies only to the official languages of the European Union (Verkhovna Rada, 2019: Article 21.5). This resulted in the critique by the Venice Commission (Bilkova et al, 2019: 16) that the law creates the hierarchy between the minority languages at the secondary school level. The law also lacks clarity regarding how much time is devoted to the minority languages and whether the state is going to provide funding for it (Bilkova et al, 2019: 16-17). The law reaffirmed the status of the Russian language as a minority language and thus it enjoys the same rights as other minority languages (Verkhovna Rada, 2019).

This thesis considers the 2019 Language law to be a civic nationalist language policy since it promotes one state language in the public sphere, which is chosen on the principle of the majority. It is also considered to be democratic since, at least in theory, it provides the support and the special rights to the minority languages.

CHAPTER 2. Research Design

2.1 Research Questions

The two main research questions of this thesis are:

- *What are the individual factors of members of a linguistic minority that foster the acceptance of the national language?*
- *How does the civic nationalist language policy create a national identity for a linguistic minority?*

The first question aims to identify the set of factors which encourage an individual, member of a linguistic minority, to welcome the increased amount of the national language in the public sphere. These factors are the personal characteristics, such as age, education, political orientation, and others, as well as the external conditions, such as the linguistic surrounding and the size of the locality where the respondent lives. Thus, the first question identifies the characteristics of a member of the linguistic minority who would approve the civic nationalist language policy. This question is addressed by the quantitative analysis. The outcomes of the quantitative analysis, therefore, help to identify the scope for selecting cases to address the second research question. The second research question, addressed through the qualitative analysis, aims to unpack the causal mechanism between the implementation of the policy and its influence on national identity for a linguistic minority. The casual mechanism is constructed with the reference to the outcomes of the quantitative analysis. The following sections discuss the methodology in more detail.

2.2 Case study: Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine

The empirical part of this research focuses on the case of the Russian linguistic minority in Ukraine and their reaction to the 2019 language law. The choice to focus on the language minority rather than ethnic or national one is deliberate. In Ukraine, there is no strict ethnic boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians. Moreover, due to the Russification policies in the Soviet republics, many non-ethnically Russian people consider Russian as their native language. Therefore, the term ‘linguistic minority’ is used to include all Russian-speakers affected by the policy, no matter their ethnic background.

In the academic literature, the term ‘Russophones’ is often used to characterise the Russian linguistic minority. Kolsto (1999: 23) defines Russophones as ‘all those members of society who regard Russian as their mother tongue or who use Russian as their daily language of communication, privately and professionally’. Arel (1995a) provides similar definition but also adds a cultural element. For him, Russophones are ‘a group that, irrespective of ethnic background, primarily identifies with the Russian language and culture’ (Arel, 1995a: 158). In this thesis, terms

Russophones, Russian linguistic minority, and Russian speakers will be used interchangeably to identify people who, irrespective of their ethnic background, consider Russian their native language.

The Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine is chosen because it is also the largest minority language group based on the population in the state. It must be acknowledged that the policy similarly affects other linguistic minorities, such as Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and others. However, these groups tend to concentrate in one region. The Russian-speaking minority, on contrary, even though more common in the South-East of Ukraine, can be found across the country to different extents. Moreover, due to the limitations of this thesis, Russophones are the easiest case to recruit the participants for the qualitative analysis.

From the theoretical perspective, the Russophones as a group constitute the least likely case (Rohlfing, 2012: 84), meaning that this case has a low probability of developing the Ukrainian national identity when the civic nationalist language policy is introduced. It is conditioned by the significant dominance of this linguistic minority in some areas, which may slow down the linguistic integration because in such conditions the Russian language is more likely to continue being used despite the regulations. However, this theoretical expectation has not yet been checked after the 2019 Law was implemented. This law is unprecedented in terms of the increase of the Ukrainian language in the public sphere and may lead to new outcomes, not expected by the literature. Moreover, Russophones are very important case empirically since they are the largest linguistic minority affected by the policy.

2.3 Methodology - Nested Analysis

This thesis uses the nested analysis approach (Lieberman, 2005), which combines quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis - the multivariate linear regression - addresses the first research question - *What are the individual conditions of members of a linguistic minority which foster acceptance of the national language?* Based on the representative sample of the respondents, it identifies the structural conditions favourable for the acceptance of the civic nationalist language policy on the individual level. Following Liberman's (2005) suggestions, the quantitative analysis serves as the basis for the case-selection in the qualitative part. The qualitative analysis is represented by the theory-building process-tracing and the semi-structured interviews. It is designed to answer the main research question of *how* the civic nationalist language policy affects the sense of national identity on the individual level.

The qualitative analysis is essential part of this research because the regression can only show the correlation between the variables but it does not explain the causation. Thus, the interviews are used to explain and test the causal mechanism between the introduction of the language policy and

the sense of national identity. They are designed to investigate how the civic nationalist language policy is actually perceived by the people. Polese (2011: 43) argues that Ukrainian nation-building policies pass ‘through informal renegotiations ... and ... reinterpretation’ on the level of individuals. Therefore, the effectiveness of the policy in fostering the sense of national identity to a big extent depends on the agency of its subjects. As a result, the interviews will trace how the Russophones react on the policy and how it affects their attitude to Ukraine. Moreover, the interviews allow for the check of the factors found significant by the regression analyses. The following sections discuss the methodology in more detail.

2.3.1 Quantitative analysis – Multivariate linear regressions

The quantitative analysis consists of two multivariate linear regressions. Using the most recent available data from the research by the University of St. Gallen (2017) on Ukrainian regionalism, the analysis determines the most important factors for the approval of the promotion of the Ukrainian language on the level of individual respondents. Therefore, the findings of the regression are the factors which would encourage individuals to approve the civic nationalist language policy. Even though the data was collected before the 2019 language law, it is addressed by using the indicators of the dependent variable, which serve as the proxies for the attitude of Russophones to the Ukrainian language. The latest questionnaire used in this thesis is from 2017, just two years before the law was accepted. Moreover, the findings of the regressions are checked by the qualitative analysis which covers the post-2019 law period.

Two surveys used in this research cover years 2013 and 2017 (University of St. Gallen, 2017). They were conducted in Ukrainian or Russian languages depending on the preferences of the respondents. Each questionnaire has a representative sample of 6000 respondents. From each sample, the individuals are chosen based on their native language preferences. The native language preferences corresponding to the interests of this thesis are a) Russian; b) Russian and Ukrainian; c) surzhyk¹; d) Russian and another language. The individuals who consider both Russian and Ukrainian as their native language are included because, as shown in the literature review, there is no strict ethnic division between Russian and Ukrainian-speakers. Since the language is highly politicized, there remains a chance that originally Russian-speaking people may choose bilingualism as a consequence of their political views. However, the native language will be introduced also as an

¹ Surzhyk is a term specific to Ukraine which identifies the mixed usage of Ukrainian and Russian. According to Bernsand (2001: 40), it ‘implies norm-breaking, non-obedience to or non-awareness of the rules of the Ukrainian and Russian standard languages’. Surzhyk is combined in the regression with the Russian & Ukrainian category as it also implies the potential indifference between the two options.

independent variable in order to differentiate between the opinions of the only-Russian speakers and the bilingual- and surzhyk-speakers.

Dependent Variable

In the quantitative part of the research, the dependent variable is the attitude to the Ukrainian language. It will be measured based on two indicators. The first indicator is the preferences of the Russophones regarding the use of the Ukrainian language in their region. It is operationalised through Question 58.1 from the 2013 survey (University of St. Gallen, 2017), which asks: ‘What should be the amount of the Ukrainian language in your region?’ with the answers ‘Less than now’, ‘The same as now’, ‘More than now’, and ‘Difficult to answer’. The last category is merged with ‘The same as now’ as it indicates the acceptance of the status quo. This indicator serves as a good proxy for the attitude of the Russophones to the 2019 language law which has significantly increased the Ukrainian language in the public sphere. If the respondent wants to see more Ukrainian in his region, he is very likely to then endorse the 2019 language policy.

Since the survey from 2017 does not contain such a question, an additional indicator is made in order to compare the results from both surveys. This comparison is important not just for the higher validity of the results, but also to determine whether the Maidan Revolution and the Russian aggression in 2014 had an effect on the language preferences of the Russian-speaking minority. It is measured according to Question 55.1 from the 2013 survey (Question 46.1 in 2017 survey) which asks ‘Do you agree that all residents of Ukraine must know the Ukrainian language?’ with the answers ‘Disagree’, ‘Rather disagree’, ‘Rather agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Difficult to answer’. The category ‘Difficult to answer’ is eliminated as there is no middle answer in this case. The limitation of this indicator is that it does not show whether the respondents support the active usage of Ukrainian or just its formal knowledge. Moreover, it does not show whether the respondents would like to see more Ukrainian language in their lives or they are satisfied with the status quo. However, this question is the closest to the focus of this thesis available in both surveys, therefore, it is used for the comparison between the two years.

As a result, two multivariate linear regression analyses are made in order to analyse which factors and their interactions influence the most the attitude of Russophones to the Ukrainian language. The following section discusses and puts into the context the independent variables of the quantitative analysis.

Independent Variables

The independent variables of this research are derived from the questionnaires and divided into four theoretical categories in order to cover the most important factors suggested by the literature.

These categories are socio-economic factors, socio-linguistics environment, native language, and political identity and ideology of the respondents. Where appropriate, the independent variables are re-coded to ensure the sufficient number of observations in all categories. The full list of independent variables and their coding for both surveys is available in Appendix B.

Socio-economic factors

This category includes nationality, sex, age, education, employment, and income. Nationality in the literature is often treated as equal to ethnicity (Pirie, 1996) or native language (Kulyk, 2018). However, the data used in this research shows the consistent and significant discrepancy² between the shares of those respondents who chose Ukrainian nationality and those who chose Ukrainian as their native language. Thus, the nationality cannot be simply equated to the native language because if it was so, we could expect the comparably high share of Ukrainian as native language observations. Moreover, Arel (2002: 238) argues that after the collapse of the USSR, where nationality was strongly associated with ethnicity, in modern Ukraine, nationality can be associated rather with the territory. In this thesis, the concept of nationality is open to the interpretation as an ethnic or civic notion rather than a strictly ethnic category. This is also permitted by the data since the respondents were not provided with the clarification what is meant by the nationality and interpreted it by themselves. The hypothesis regarding nationality suggests that the people identifying themselves as having Ukrainian nationality are more willing to accept the new language policy.

The other independent variables in this category - sex, age, education, employment, and income - are included in line with other research on language policies in Ukraine (Kulyk, 2010; Barrington and Faranda, 2009) and provide five hypotheses. Firstly, it is hypothesised that females are less supportive of the policy in line with Barrington and Faranda's (2009) hypothesis. Secondly, the age variable is divided into three categories in line with the survey data. It is expected that younger people are more supportive of the policy due to the findings that this group is generally more open to political changes (Waldron-Moore, 1999). Thirdly, education is also coded into three categories: school; unfinished high; and finished high education levels. It is expected that people with higher education are more willing to see more Ukrainian in their lives. This is because of the expectation that these people received their education in Ukraine, and they have been already for a while exposed to the Ukrainian language in the form of lectures, studying materials, and literature. Fourthly, employment is divided into four categories: employed; not working but receiving state funding (for example, pension); studying; unemployed or other. It is expected that employed people and students are more supportive of the policy because they are already required to use Ukrainian in their work or

² 82.9% versus 50.9% in 2013; 88.6% versus 59.8% in 2015; 88.5% versus 61% in 2017.

studies. Lastly, higher income levels are found to correlate with the higher support of the Ukrainian government in the past (Barrington, 2002). Thus, it is hypothesised that people with higher income are more supportive of the language policy.

Socio-linguistic environment

The second group of variables is designed to find out if and to what extent the external conditions shape the individual attitudes towards the language policy. It includes four independent variables: the size of the locality where the respondent lives, the spread of the Russian language in his region, and the language of everyday communication divided into private and public. The size of the locality is divided into three categories: big cities (over 500,000 inhabitants), cities (less than 500,000 inhabitants), and villages. There is evidence that there are more Russophones in urban areas while Ukrainian is more spread in rural areas (Barrington and Faranda, 2009: 241). Since this thesis considers only those respondents who speak Russian, it is assumed that bilingualism and surzhyk are more common in rural areas. Thus, it is hypothesised that in the rural area people are more willing to accept the policy.

The prevalence of the Russian language in the domestic region is included in this study as it has been used as an important predictor in many studies concerning the political attitudes of Ukrainians in general (Barrington and Faranda, 2009; Barrington and Herron, 2004; Bremmer, 1994) and the language practices in particular (Kulyk, 2010; Arel, 1998). There is no consensus on how to define Ukraine's regions. Some studies choose the four or five regions approach (Arel, 1992; Kubicek, 2000), which includes the conventional South, North, East, and West plus Crimea. Other studies go as far as to differentiate between eight or nine regions (Barrington and Faranda, 2009; Barrington, 1997). This thesis follows Kulyk (2010) and adopts the three-region framework. However, this framework is based on the linguistic distribution of the population rather than pure geography. The regions are divided into three categories according to the use of the Russian language. The usage of the Russian language is measured based on the question 'Language used with your children: Russian' because of the expectation that the respondents choose the language in this case by themselves rather than under the influence of the external factors. The three categories are low prevalence of Russian (0-20%), medium (21-49%), and high (50% and more). To ensure the reliability of the measure, the data from two years - 2013 and 2015 - is used (University of St Gallen, 2017). Generally, there is no big difference between 2013 and 2015 with the exception of two regions (Zaporizhzhya and Kyiv regions), which were assigned a score based on the more recent data. The findings, summarised in Appendix B, confirm Kulyk's (2010) framework of dividing Ukraine into West, Centre, and South-East regions. This thesis hypothesises that the spread of the Russian language in the region is an important predictor of the attitude of the linguistic minorities to the

language policy. The more Russian is spoken in the region, the less likely are the people to support the policy.

There is an argument that language practices are affected by ‘language embeddedness’ - ‘the influence of social environment’ which includes both close relatives and outside communication (Onuch and Hale, 2018: 90). The language of communication has proved to be an important factor in Kulyk’s (2010) analysis regarding the preferences of Ukrainians as to language policies. However, Kulyk treats the language of communication as a uniform category. This thesis divides it into two categories: private and public. The private category includes the communication with the family - parents, grandparents, and children. The public category is made up of the communication with colleagues, state officials, and sellers. This is done because of the expectation that the language practice and the attitude to language may differ depending on the external conditions. While in public communication, the language serves primarily as a tool, and the choice may be based on the rational calculations, private communication allows more freedom of expression of one’s preferences. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the language of private communication has bigger effect than the language of public communication and the people who speak some Ukrainian at home are more supportive of the policy.

Self-identified native language

The third category includes only one variable - the self-identified native language. As shown in the literature review on the language policy in Ukraine, the language plays a very important role for the national identity. Arel (1992; 1995b) argues that the political divides in Ukraine are mainly based on the issue of language. However, not many studies differentiate between the native language (the choice of which can be more symbolic than rational) and the language of the everyday use. One study which pays attention to this difference is the research done by Kulyk (2010). His findings reveal that the difference between the native language and the language of the everyday use matters and the native language serves as a better indicator of the political preferences of the Ukrainian population (Kulyk, 2010). In line with this finding, this thesis tests whether the same effect is observed if we separate Russian and bilingual speakers from the population sample. Thus, this variable also serves as the selection criteria in this research. As a result, there are no included observations who consider only Ukrainian as their native language. The remaining categories are divided into two groups combining two options each. The first one is those who consider Russian or Russian and another language (except Ukrainian) as their native language. The second group includes Russian and Ukrainian or surzhyk categories. The division is based on the assumption that for people who already symbolically consider Ukrainian as one of their native languages, it is easier to adopt the language

policy which promotes more Ukrainian. The general hypothesis is that the native language influences the attitude toward the policy.

Political identity and values: civic or ethnic

The fourth category concerns the political identity and the values of the respondents. These variables are designed to determine whether the respondents are influenced more by civic or ethnic considerations. Therefore, the questions point towards the prevalence of civic or ethnic identities. There are five independent variables in total in this category. The first two concern to what extent the respondents identify as a) Europeans and b) East Slav. These variables are associated with the ethnic part of the national identity (Shulman, 2005). The self-identification as European does not necessarily contradict the Eastern Slavic identity - in the questionnaire used for this research, the respondents had to answer both of the questions and identify strongly as Europeans and East Slavs at the same time. However, there is evidence from the literature that these two identities often oppose each other. Shulman (2004, 2005) discusses the ideological conflict between the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic identities, which are differentiated based on what constitutes the 'Other'. For the Ethnic Ukrainian identity, the Other is Russia and the Ukrainian culture is seen as 'a part and parcel of European culture - the Ukrainian "Our"' (Shulman, 2004: 40). For Eastern Slavic nationalists, the situation is the vice versa - they follow the discourse of the imperial Russia and the USSR which views Ukraine as a part of the greater Eastern Slavic entity. The West serves to contrast this identity. Therefore, this thesis hypothesises that people identifying as Europeans are more willing to adapt to the Ukrainization policy, while those who identify with the Eastern Slavic community, are more likely to resist it. This divide should intensify after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in the East of Ukraine.

To balance the ethnic-based variables in line with Shulman's (2004) research, the other two independent variables are added. They are designed to illustrate the respondents' attitude to civic values and are derived from the questions to what extent it is important to have Ukrainian citizenship and to respect Ukrainian political institutions and laws to be true Ukrainian. It is hypothesised that the higher support of the civic values leads to the higher support of the new policy.

The last independent variable reflects the general importance of the language for the national identity. It is based on the question to what extent it is important to speak Ukrainian to be true Ukrainian. At the first glance, this question points more towards the ethnic part of the national identity. It pre-supposes not just the knowledge of Ukrainian, but also its use. However, it does not indicate how much Ukrainian should be used or whether it should be given preference over other languages which respondents may speak. Therefore, it can be understood also as a civic identity. The

hypothesis is that respondents, for whom it is important to speak Ukrainian to be true Ukrainian, are more likely to support the new language policy.

2.3.2 Qualitative analysis – interviews and process-tracing

The qualitative part of this research is designed to answer the second research question of this thesis: *How does civic nationalist language policy create a national identity for a linguistic minority?* It is based on the semi-structured interviews (Gall, Gall, and Borg, 2003), which serve as the foundation for the theory-building process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). In the qualitative part, the dependent variable is the national identity. As discussed in section 1.1, the national identity is defined in this research as encompassing both civic and ethnic elements. The full definition is not provided to the interviewees, so they can explain their own interpretation of the term. However, certain probes are used in case the interviewee struggles with understanding the term.

The main independent variable is the introduction of the civic nationalist language policy. The factors found significant by the quantitative analysis are the favourable conditions to accept the policy. In addition to these factors, one more condition is tested as it was not possible to include it to the quantitative analysis. That is the extent to which the law is reinforced by the authorities and open to interpretation by the public. Polese (2011) makes an argument that the success of the nation-building depends on two factors: the capacity of the elites to adopt the right measures and the desire of common people to accept the policies. He also states that Ukraine is a specific case where the linguistics policies are not strictly reinforced and there is no formal punishment for breaking them (Polese, 2011). This means that the civic nationalist policy is more effective in the constructing national identity if it is not forced upon the minorities via fines and restrictions, but rather is incorporated into the everyday practices of the people. For instance, Polese (2011) uses examples of schools, where the official language of instruction is Ukrainian, but students are not penalized for answering in Russian. Thus, the hypothesis is that if the language policy does not have strict implementation, it is more likely to create the national identity.

Semi-structured interviews

Turner (2010: 754) argues that ‘interviews provide in-depth information pertaining to participants’ experiences and viewpoints of a particular topic’. Therefore, interviews are an important part of this research which allows to analyse the actual perceptions and opinions of the Russian-speaking minority on the ground. The questions for the interviews are designed according to the standardised open-ended interview approach (Patton, 2014). This approach assumes ‘carefully and fully wording each question before the interview’ (Patton, 2014: 644). It is done in order to ensure the comparability of the results. This approach fits the purposes of this thesis because the most

important factors are identified through the quantitative analysis. The main limitation of this approach is little flexibility regarding the scope of the respondents' answers (Patton, 2014). However, it is addressed through the open-ended structure of the questions and the follow-up questions. So, for example, respondents are offered to interpret the national identity by themselves.

As a result, the script is used as suggested by Jacob and Furgerson (2012) to ensure the uniformity of the procedure and the comparability of the content of the interviews. The script and the questions with the translations into Russian are available in Appendix D. The questions for the interviews are formulated following McNamara's (2009) suggestions. Firstly, the questions should be open-ended and the participants can use their own wording to answer them. Secondly, the questions should be neutral and do not imply morally correct or incorrect values. Thirdly, the questions should be worded clearly in order to minimise potential misinterpretation.

Sampling

The primary selection criteria for the interviews is the native language of the respondents - Russian, Russian and Ukrainian, or Russian and another language. In addition to that, the independent variables identified as statistically significant are utilised also as the selection criteria. The multivariate linear regression analysis has identified only one variable which can be determined before the interview - the employment status. The rest of the factors influencing the attitude to the language policy and, consequently, the national identity are about respondents' self-identification and attitudes and cannot be checked before the interviews. Therefore, the cases for the interviews are primarily chosen based on the native language and the employment status.

Limitations

The number of the interviews is limited by the scope of the research as well as time and space constraints. The interviews take place online, therefore, only those respondents who have the access to the Internet can participate³. This can influence the external validity of the results for all Russian-speakers in Ukraine. However, it should not become a big obstacle since the representativeness is ensured by the quantitative analysis which employs a large-N sample of the population. Moreover, the interviews serve primarily as evidence for testing of the casual mechanism.

Theory-building Process-tracing

The theory-building process-tracing is employed (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). As elaborated in the literature review, this thesis follows the theoretical framework of the nation-building and

³ The Internet was used by 62.5% Ukrainians in 2018 (World Bank, 2021).

rational approaches, which consider the language as the key factor in forming the national identity. The nation-building approach treats language as the key condition for the association within the community and thus appeals to the ethnic part of the national identity. The rational school treats the language as a choice based on the cost-benefit assumptions and appeals more to the civic part of the national identity. As it is shown by the regression analysis, the mixture of factors that relate to both civic and ethnic nation-building are identified to be important. Thus, the process-testing is used to clarify the causality between the language practices and the creation of the national identity based on the evidence provided by the interviews.

Hypothesised Casual Mechanism

The casual mechanism is defined as ‘casual processes that are triggered by causes and link them with outcomes in a productive relationship’ (Beach, 2020: 700). The cause in this research is the introduction of the civic nationalist language policy, while the outcome is the sense of the national identity. Beach and Pedersen (2019: 3) suggest that in process-tracing, the researcher should focus on the mechanistic explanation rather than variation. While this suggestion works well with the cause, it can be problematic in the case of the outcome. This is because of the assumption that the cases selected for the interviews already have some relation to the national identity. Therefore, the expected outcome of the policy would be the strengthening sense of the national identity rather than its creation from scratch. However, the variation within these categories is not considered, so the interest of this research is whether the national identity strengthened, did not change or weakened, but not the extent of these outcomes.


The casual mechanism tested in this research is the system-understanding mechanism which aims to ‘unpack explicitly the casual process [...] and trace each of its constituent parts empirically’ (Beach, 2020: 703). This mechanism follows the actor-centric approach and traces the choices made by the members of the linguistic minority. Figure 2 depicts the hypothesised casual mechanism which is tested by the qualitative research on the example of Ukraine. It is expected that the introduction of the policy is interpreted by the members of the linguistic minority either positively or negatively. There is a chance that the actors do not care about the policy or perceive it as a neutral development. In this case, this is also be considered as a positive interpretation as they do not purposefully resist the national language. The mode of the interpretation is hypothesised to be influenced by the factors identified by the regression analyses. In the case of the Russian linguistic minority in Ukraine, these are the employment status, the usage of the national language in private and public communication, the native language, the self-identification as European, and the perceived importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity. In addition to that, one more factor is added from the literature which is how rigidly the policy is perceived to be implemented.

It is expected that the positive interpretation of the policy encourages the members of the linguistic minority to increase the usage of Ukrainian. It can be done in two forms - active and passive. The examples of the active usage of Ukrainian can be the switch from Russian to Ukrainian in private and public communication, the learning of Ukrainian, the choice to consume information in Ukrainian, and others. The passive usage of Ukrainian is when a person is exposed to the language, but do not resist it. For example, many media sources switch to the national language and the minority member continues using them rather than changing his preferences to the media in his own language. It is hypothesised that the active usage of the national language leads to the strengthening sense of the national identity, while the passive one will not have much effect, at least in the short-run. In the long-run, the passive exposure to the national language can also play role in strengthening the sense of national identity, but the time limits of this research do not allow to test it.

The negative interpretation of the policy is expected to lead to the decrease in the usage of the national language. The active form of this can be using exclusively the minority language even if before the person could use the national language in certain situations, the denial to receive the information in the national language, asking where possible in the public sphere to switch to the minority language and others. The passive form can be the continuing use of the minority language but not resisting when others address the person in the national language. It is hypothesised that the passive form of the negative interpretation leads to no significant change in the sense of national identity, whereas the active form leads to the weakening of the national identity.

The potential reactions discussed in this section are just some of the examples and their list is not exhaustive. The casual mechanism is tested by the outcomes of the interviews conducted among the Russophones and can be altered depending on the findings from the interviews.

Figure 2. A theoretical casual mechanism of the civic nationalist language policy creating the national identity on the example of the Russian linguistic minority in Ukraine.



CHAPTER 3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Multivariate linear regressions

This part of the empirical analysis discusses the results of the multivariate linear regressions for 2013 and 2017 surveys. All statistically significant individual variables and interaction effects are analysed based on the theoretical expectations. The section concludes with the comparisons of the regressions and the discussion of the key variables chosen as the conditions for the process-tracing. Apart from two regressions discussed, the additional one is made for the 2013 data to compare the results with 2017. Its outcomes are summarised in Appendix C. Table 3 summaries all variables and their significance in all regressions.

Table 3. The summary of the independent variables used in the regression analyses and their outcomes in terms of statistical (+) and substantive significance (+*).

Independent Variables	2013 (1)	2013 (2)	2017
Nationality	-	+*	+
Sex	-	+	+
Age	+	+	-
Education	+	-	-
Income	-	-	+
Employment	-	+	+*
Size of the locality	-	-	-
Region	-	+	-
Private Communication	+*	-	+*
Public Communication	+	-	-
Native language	-	-	+*
European identity	-	+*	+*
East Slav identity	-	-	+
Ukrainian citizenship	-	-	+
Ukrainian laws	+*	+*	-
Speaking Ukrainian	+*	+*	+*

3.1.1 Multivariate linear regression 1 for the 2013 survey

Table 4 represents the results of the multivariate regression model for the data from 2013. The dependent variable of this model is operationalised through the first indicator - question ‘What should be the amount of the Ukrainian language in your region?’. The model includes only the observations which follow the selection criteria of native language - Russian, Russian and Ukrainian, Russian and another language, and surzhyk. In total, after the observations with a different native language were deleted, the number of respondents is 2796, out of which 644 were deleted due to missing data.

Table 4. The model of individual and interaction effects of the multivariate linear regression for the 2013 survey (the first indicator of the dependent variable).

Residuals:					
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max	
-1.3157	-0.2673	-0.1157	0.3888	1.0694	
Coefficients:					
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	1.968e+00	2.451e-01	8.030	1.60e-15	***
Law	9.877e-02	2.640e-02	3.742	0.000187	***
Speak Ukrainian	4.888e-02	9.538e-03	5.125	3.24e-07	***
Private Communication	-2.047e-01	6.343e-02	-3.227	0.001269	**
Public Communication	-1.108e-01	4.246e-02	-2.608	0.009158	**
Age	1.563e-01	4.980e-02	3.138	0.001726	**
Education	3.237e-02	1.384e-02	2.339	0.019452	*
Region	8.746e-02	5.195e-02	1.683	0.092430	.
Native language	1.132e-01	1.012e-01	1.118	0.263815	
Size	-5.671e-05	5.400e-02	-0.001	0.999162	
East Slav	2.460e-02	2.082e-02	1.182	0.237414	
Law:Age	-4.450e-02	1.240e-02	-3.587	0.000342	***
Region:Native language	-1.179e-01	3.003e-02	-3.926	8.92e-05	***
Private Comm:Native language	1.044e-01	3.405e-02	3.067	0.002190	**
Size:East Slav	-2.404e-02	1.051e-02	-2.287	0.022303	*
Size: Public Communication	4.571e-02	1.849e-02	2.473	0.013481	*


Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1					
Residual standard error: 0.454 on 2136 degrees of freedom					
(644 observations deleted due to missingness)					
Multiple R-squared: 0.1442, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1382					
F-statistic: 23.99 on 15 and 2136 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16					

The first regression analysis shows that out of sixteen independent variables, only six individual effects proved to be statistically significant at least at the conventional level of statistical significance (p value .05). These are the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws in order to be true Ukrainian, the importance of speaking Ukrainian in order to be true Ukrainian, the languages of private and public communication, age, and education. In addition to that, five interaction effects also appeared to be statistically significant at least at the p value of .05. These are the interactions between the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and age, region

and native language, language of private communication and native language, size of the locality and self-identification as East Slav, size of the locality and the language of public communication. The statistically significant variables and interaction effects are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. The model fit of this model is reasonably high, with the adjusted R-squared 13.8%, what means that 13.8% of the variance on the dependent variable can be explained by the model.

According to the theoretical expectations, the languages of private and public communication have a significant influence on the attitude of the Russophones to the Ukrainian language. Figure 3 illustrates their individual effects.

Figure 3. The effect of the languages of private and public communication on the desired amount of the Ukrainian language in the respondents' region (1 - less than now, 2 - the same as now, 3 - more than now).



The language of private communication is a compound variable made up from the language of communication with parents, grandparents, and children. Ukrainian language is assigned the value of 0, while Russian - 1. In cases the respondents chose both languages or surzhyk, these observations are assigned the value of 0.5. As a result, the value of 0 illustrates such respondents who speak only Ukrainian with their families, and the value of 3 - only Russian. The values in between illustrate the usages of both Russian and Ukrainian to different extents with family members. Based on the expectations, people who speak mostly Russian at home are less willing to see more Ukrainian language in their area. This effect is visible from the steady decrease between the values 1.5 (mixed use of Russian and Ukrainian in private communication) and 3 (only Russian). The difference in means between the respondents who use only Ukrainian and

those, who use only Russian is 0.31 which constitutes 15.5% of the scale. Therefore, the effect is substantively significant. The effect is somewhat contradictory on the values between 0.5 and 1.5, where more use of Russian language indicates the increased desire for more Ukrainian. However, this does not refute the theory as there are low numbers of observations at 0.5 (38 observations), and 1 (74 observations) which could explain such an outcome.

The similar effect is observed in the case of the language of public communication. This variable is also compound and made up from the language of the communication with colleagues, state officials, and sellers. It has the same values as the language of private communication ranging from 0 - only Ukrainian to 3 - only Russian. The difference in means between respondents speaking only Ukrainian publicly and those who speak only Russian is 0.36 which constitutes 18% of the scale. Thus, this variable also proves to be substantively significant. Similar to the language of private communication, there seems to be a contradictory effect on the low values (0.5). Nevertheless, this does not refute the theory as there is a low number of observations at the value of 0.5 (26 observations).


The importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws in order to be true Ukrainian has also proved to be significant and showed the effect as predicted by the theory. The people, who think that it is very important to respect Ukrainian laws, are also willing to have more Ukrainian language in their area. The mean of the observations who claim that it is not important at all to respects Ukrainian law is 2.05, whereas the mean of those who think it is very important is 2.29. The difference is thus 0.24 which is 12% of the scale and can be said to be substantively significant.

Similar trends are observed in the cases of the variables of age and education. According to the theoretical expectations, younger people tend to be more sympathetic towards Ukrainian. Although the effect is statistically significant at p value 0.01, the difference between the means of the groups is too small to claim that they are substantively significant. The difference between the means of the youngest and the oldest group is only 0.05 which is 2.5% of the scale. The same case is with the education which appeared to be statistically significant. Similarly, the effect of the education follows the expectation of the theory, but the effect does not seem to be substantively significant. People with the bachelor's degree or higher tend to be more sympathetic towards Ukrainian. However, the difference between the means of primary education and high education is 0.04 which is only 2% of the scale.

The independent variable of the importance of speaking Ukrainian in order to be true Ukrainian has proved to be statistically significant on a very low level of the p value (0.001). Figure 4 illustrates how the willingness to see more Ukrainian changes with the change in the respondents' opinion regarding the importance of speaking Ukrainian. As it is visible from the graph, the effect of this variable follows the theoretical expectations very consistently. The Russian-speakers who regard


speaking Ukrainian as important for the Ukrainian identity, are more sympathetic towards the Ukrainian language in their area.

Figure 4. The effect of the importance of speaking Ukrainian to be true Ukrainian on the desired amount of the Ukrainian language in the respondents' region.



The interaction effect between the importance of the Ukrainian law for the Ukrainian identity and age also appeared to be statistically significant. It is illustrated by Figure 5. As it is expected by theory, the higher perceived importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws for the Ukrainian identity is associated with the higher support for the Ukrainian language in all age groups. However, the importance of respecting the laws of Ukraine has much more significant effect on the age group 18-34, than on other age groups. In this age group, the difference in means between the extreme positions (respecting laws is not important and very important) is 0.44, what is 22% of the scale of the dependent variable. The difference in older cohorts of the sample is much lower, only 0.16 points (8% on the scale), which has only limited substantive significance. Moreover, in line with the theoretical expectations, younger people tend to have more sympathy towards Ukrainian than other groups. However, this is true only for those who think that the respect of Ukrainian laws is at least genuinely important (medium value). Young people who do not think that respect for Ukrainian laws matters also express less support for the Ukrainian language than the other two age groups.

Figure 5. The interaction effect of the importance of respecting Ukrainian laws and age on the desired amount of Ukrainian.




The second most statistically significant interaction effect is the interaction of the size of the locality and the self-identification as an East Slav. Overall, people who identify as East Slavs and live in larger cities are the least supportive of the increase of Ukrainian language in their areas with the mean of 2.05. The opposite is true for the respondents not identifying as East Slavs at all and living in rural areas (the mean is 2.42). This can be explained by the theoretical expectations of the prevalence of the Russophones in urban areas. Also, it can be expected that the Russophones rather than bilinguals will identify more with the East Slav identity. Therefore, they are less willing to see more Ukrainian.

The third statistically significant interaction effect is of the language of private communication and of native language. It is illustrated by Figure 6. As expected, the respondents, who speak only Ukrainian with their families, express more support for the increase of the Ukrainian language. Also, overall, people who consider both Russian and Ukrainian as their native language rather than only Russian have higher support of the Ukrainian language. The only counter-intuitive finding is that people whose native language is only Russian, and they speak only Ukrainian in their private life express more support for the increase of the Ukrainian language, then these bilinguals, who speak only Ukrainian at home. However, there are just 10 such observations and they can be explained by the different understandings of the terms 'native language' and 'language of communication'. For example, such a person may consider the Russian language as native only because it was the first language, which they learn, but they do not use it anymore. Or another explanation can be that these Russian-speakers deliberately choose to speak Ukrainian in their private


lives because of, for example, political considerations. Thus, even though they do not consider Ukrainian as native language, they overall support its increased use.

Figure 6. The interaction effect between the language of private communication and the native language on the desired amount of the Ukrainian language.



The fourth statistically significant interaction effect is of region and native language. As illustrated by Figure 7, the support for the increase of the Ukrainian language is lower in the regions where the Russian language is more spread. This follows the theoretical expectations. Moreover, as expected by the theory, the Russophones who consider also Ukrainian as their native language generally express more sympathy to the Ukrainian language than those who consider only Russian or Russian and another language as their native. The decrease in the support of the Ukrainian language in regions, where Russian is spread, is much more significant among these people, whose native languages are both Ukrainian and Russian. The difference in means between the Russian-speakers and bilinguals in regions with low use of Russian (<20%) is 0.26 points on the scale. Whereas in the regions with the high use of Russian (>50%) it is only 0.09 points on the scale. This difference seems to be substantively significant.

Figure 7. The interaction effect between the spread of the Russian language in the region and the native language on the desired amount of the Ukrainian language.



The last statistically significant interaction effect is between the size of the settlement and the language of public communication. As expected by the theory, citizens of the larger cities express less support for the increase of the Ukrainian language, however, the difference between different locality groups reduces as the use of Russian increases. Overall, the difference in means between a resident of the large city speaking only Russian in public sphere and a resident of a village using only Ukrainian in public life is 0.4 which is 20% of the scale and proves to have high substantive significance.

The surprising findings of this regression were that the independent variables which were expected to have a significant effect were not statistically significant. For example, the native language, which is seen as a major predictive factor in the literature, does not have an individual statistically significant effect. This can be explained by the fact that the sample of the observations was limited to the Russophones and bilinguals, therefore, there may be not major differences in the attitudes of these groups. Another important independent variable from the literature is the region and it also appeared to have little statistical significance on its own (p value < 0.1).

To sum up, this section discussed the results of the multivariate regression for the 2013 survey following the first indicator of the dependent variable. The analysis identified six individual effects and five interaction effects, all statistically significant at least at the level 0.05 of statistical significance. However, not all variables can be said to have substantive significance. The most substantively individual effects are the languages of private and public communication, the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian law, and the importance of speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity. The most substantively significant interaction effects appeared to be that of age

and the importance of the respect of Ukrainian political institutions and laws, of native language and region, and of the size of the locality and the language of public communication. As a result, even though native language appeared not to have the statistically significant effect by itself, it has an influence on the attitude to Ukrainian together with other variables. From the independent variables concerning the personal political preferences of the respondents, only two appeared to be statistically significant - the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws for Ukrainian identity, and the importance of speaking Ukrainian. This can be interpreted as the preference of the civic part of the national identity over ethnic one for Russophones.

3.1.2 Multivariate linear regression for the 2017 survey

In the regression of the 2017 data, ten independent variables appeared to be statistically significant at least at the level of .05 of statistical significance. They are the self-identification as European and East Slav, nationality, the importance of speaking Ukrainian to be true Ukrainian, income, the native language, the language of the private communication, employment, the importance of the Ukrainian citizenship for the Ukrainian identity, and sex. In addition to that, the following interaction effects appeared to be statistically significant, all at the p-value lower than .01. These are the interaction between self-identification as East Slav and region, European identity and the importance of speaking Ukrainian, the employment status and the importance of the respect the Ukrainian laws, the importance of the Ukrainian citizenship and East Slav identity, nationality and sex, nationality and income, employment and East Slav identity. The model fit of this model is reasonably high, with the adjusted R-squared 7.1%, what means that 7.1% of the variance on the dependent variable can be explained by the model. Table 6 summarises the statistically significant individual and interaction effects.

Table 5. The statistically significant results of individual and interaction effects of the multivariate regression for the 2017 Survey.

Residuals:					
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max	
-3.0323	-0.3711	0.2314	0.3659	0.9417	
Coefficients:					
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	2.364881	0.276274	8.560	< 2e-16	***
European	0.105060	0.025565	4.110	4.13e-05	***
East Slav	0.261837	0.048121	5.441	5.95e-08	***
Nationality	0.398491	0.110795	3.597	0.00033	***
Speak Ukrainian	0.113347	0.024765	4.577	5.01e-06	***
Income	0.071443	0.027193	2.627	0.00867	**
Native language	0.067048	0.033612	1.995	0.04621	*
Private communication	-0.042117	0.019214	-2.192	0.02849	*
Employment	-0.170686	0.079023	-2.160	0.03090	*
Citizenship	0.065121	0.027274	2.388	0.01705	*
Sex	0.137401	0.066309	2.072	0.03838	*
Region	0.084342	0.046466	1.815	0.06966	.
Law	-0.052454	0.031975	-1.640	0.10107	
Region:East Slav	-0.051172	0.014130	-3.622	0.00030	***
European:Speak Ukrainian	-0.025187	0.007916	-3.182	0.00149	**
Employment:Law	0.051198	0.016962	3.018	0.00257	**
Citizenship:East Slav	-0.023505	0.007921	-2.967	0.00304	**
Nationality:Sex	-0.126538	0.046144	-2.742	0.00616	**
Nationality:Income	-0.045839	0.018203	-2.518	0.01187	*
Employment:East Slav	-0.024621	0.010173	-2.420	0.01560	*

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1					
Residual standard error: 0.5971 on 1976 degrees of freedom					
(254 observations deleted due to missingness)					
Multiple R-squared: 0.07948, Adjusted R-squared: 0.07063					
F-statistic: 8.98 on 19 and 1976 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16					


Since the 2017 regression was made in order to trace any changes after the Maidan revolution and the dependent variable in it is operationalised through a more general question of the passive knowledge of Ukrainian, only substantively significant independent variables and interaction effects are discussed. These are such effects where the difference in means of the extreme values constitutes at least 5% of the scale. There are five such independent variables - self-identification as European, the importance of speaking Ukrainian, the native language, the language of the private communication, and employment.

The self-identification as European is also statically and substantively significant in 2013. In the 2017 regression analysis, this effect follows the same direction as before and corresponds to the theoretical expectations. People, who certainly identify as Europeans are more likely to support the universal knowledge of Ukrainian than those who do not identify as Europeans at all. The difference between means is 0.2 which constitutes 6.7% of the scale.

The importance of speaking Ukrainian is also consistently statistically and substantively significant in all three regressions and follows the same trend. People, who consider speaking Ukrainian as very important in order to be true Ukrainian, are more supportive of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian. The difference between the means of observations who do not consider speaking Ukrainian important at all and the ones, who consider it very important is 0.2 which is 6.7% of the scale and thus substantively significant. However, this difference became smaller in 2017 compared to the 2013 results where the difference in means between the extreme values was 0.48.

The third substantively significant independent variable is native language. This is the first time in the regressions, the native language is a statically significant variable. Its effect follows the theoretical expectations of the Russian-speakers being less supportive of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian. The difference in means between Russian-speakers and bilingual is 0.16 which is 5.3% of the scale.


Figure 8. The effect of the native language on the support of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian for the Ukrainian citizens.



The fourth statistically and substantively significant variable is the language of the private communication. As in the case of the first regression in 2013, it follows the theoretical expectations that people, speaking more Ukrainian in their private lives are more supportive of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian. The difference between the extreme values is 0.15 which constitutes 5% of the scale. However, this difference is smaller than in the 2013 where it constituted 15.5% of the scale. This is not surprising, since the 2013 regression focused on the desired amount of Ukrainian, and therefore, people speaking only Ukrainian had more incentive than those speaking only Russian. At the same time, the 2017 regression measures the opinion regarding only the passive knowledge of Ukrainian, therefore, this is a less polarising question.

Out of six statistically significant interaction effects, three can be considered as substantively significant. The first one is of region and the East Slav identity. In regions, where Russian is used by less than 50% of population, the respondents who identify strongly as East Slavs, are more likely to support the universal knowledge of Ukrainian. This effect is especially visible in the case of regions with the low spread of Russian. This finding contradicts the theory, which expects that the stronger East Slavic identity is associated with less support of the Ukrainian language. However, the theoretical expectation is followed in the regions where Russian is used by 50% of the population and more. It can be explained by the different understanding of the term ‘East Slav’. The regions where Russian is used the most are located in the South-East of Ukraine and historically have the close ties with Russia. Therefore, the East Slav identity can be associated with the Russian identity for them. At the same time, in the Western and Central regions, the term can be associated rather with Eastern Europe than Russia.


Figure 9. The interaction effect of the spread of the Russian language in the region and the self-identification as an East Slav on the support of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian for the Ukrainian citizens.



Another substantively significant interaction effect is of the self-identification as European and the importance of speaking Ukrainian. In average, as expected by the theory, people, who strongly identify as European and consider speaking Ukrainian as important for their Ukrainian identity, are more likely to support the universal knowledge of the Ukrainian language than these who do not identify as European. However, the difference between these groups is evident primarily among the respondents, who do not identify as European at all. The finding which contradicts the theory is that in the group which generally considers speaking Ukrainian important, this effect reduces with the

greater self-identification as European. This can be explained by the relatively low number of observations in this group⁴.


Figure 10. The interaction effect of the importance of speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity and the self-identification as a European on the support of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian for the Ukrainian citizens.



The final substantively significant interaction effect is between nationality and sex. However, it appears to be substantively significant only in the case of females. For them, the difference in means between Ukrainian and Russian nationalities is 0.16 which constitutes 5.3% of the scale/ For males, the difference between Ukrainian and Russian nationalities is absent. The surprising finding is that males of other nationalities are most likely to support the universal knowledge of Ukrainian. But this can be explained by the relatively low number of observations in this category - 77, whereas there are 791 males considering themselves Ukrainians, and 161 - Russians.

⁴ Certainly No - 58, Rather No - 55, Difficult to Say - 51, Rather Yes - 64, Certainly Yes - 63.

Figure 11. The interaction effect of sex and nationality on the support of the universal knowledge of Ukrainian for the Ukrainian citizens.



To sum up, out of ten statically significant variables in the regression of the 2017 data, five can be said to have substantive significance. These are the self-identification as European, the importance of speaking Ukrainian, the native language, the language of private communication, and employment. In addition to that, three interaction effects are both statically and substantively significant. These are the interactions between region and the East Slav identity, the European identity and the importance of speaking Ukrainian, and the nationality and sex. However, in the latter case, the effect is visible only in the case of females.

3.1.3 Summary of the regression analyses

The regression analyses were used to identify the conditions and factors influencing the most the attitude of the respondents to the Ukrainian language. Therefore, the substantively significant individual and interaction effects are the most important factors to be considered in the qualitative analysis. The dependent variable of the first regression of the 2013 is operationalised through the indicator which measures the desired amount of the Ukrainian language. This indicator best suits the purposes of this research which aims to identify factors of acceptance of the civic nationalist language policy. In this regressions, four independent variables appeared to be both statistically and substantively significant - the languages of private and public communications, the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws for the Ukrainian identity, and the importance of speaking Ukrainian. In addition to that, three interaction effects appeared to be substantively significant - the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and age, the region and the native language, and the size of the locality and the language of public communication. These variables are considered as important factors for the qualitative analysis.

The second regression of the 2013 data was made in order to compare it with the regression of the 2017 survey and trace any changes which may have happened due to the Maidan revolution and the Russian aggression in 2014. Only two variables appeared to be consistently statistically and substantively important in both analyses. They are the importance of speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity and the self-identification as European. The variable of the respect of the Ukrainian laws lost its statistical significance, as well as the spread of the Russian language in the region, and age. Instead, the new independent effects gained substantive significance. They are employment, the language of the private communication, and the native language. Moreover, the interaction effects of the 2017 data showed the importance of the East-Slav identity linked to region, and the European identity together with the importance of speaking Ukrainian. These findings suggest that the native language and the language of the everyday use became more salient for the Russian-speaking minority after 2014, whereas socio-demographic factors became less important. It can be connected to the broader political agenda which made the language to be a salient political issue once more.

Overall, the qualitative research focuses on the statically and substantively significant variables from the 2013 (1) and 2017 regressions as the former is made for the most suitable indicator, and the latter is made for the most recent data. These variables are employment, the languages of private and public communications, the native language, the self-identification as European, the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity.

3.2 Semi-structured Interviews

3.2.1 Sample

The sample of the interviewees consists of nine respondents who live in Ukraine and consider Russian as their native language. Only one respondent in the sample considers both Russian and Ukrainian as his native languages. Apart from the native language, these socio-demographic conditions were considered when choosing the respondents: sex, education level, employment status, and the region where the respondents reside. The sample is skewed towards females (seven out of nine), people with completed high education (eight respondents), and employed people (five). Moreover, the sample is also skewed towards the Odessa region. This can be seen as a limitation, but at the same time choosing the respondents with similar characteristics helps to control the potential intervening effects. The summary of socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents is available in Appendix E.

3.2.2 Interpretation of the national identity and the role of language

In every interview, the respondents were offered to explain their own interpretation of the term national identity and tell why they choose for themselves one or another option. Out of nine respondents, five claimed to have Russian national identity, while other four - Ukrainian or mixed. It is very important to note that 'Russian' is used in the meaning of 'russkii' - adjective from the word Rus' and refers to the broad Russian culture and language rather than Russia as a state. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply the association of the respondents to Russia. Firstly, the respondents identifying as Russian will be discussed.

The understanding of the national identity slightly differed among these respondents. However, main factors constituting the national identity were dominated by culture, mentality, and native language. At the same time, several respondents identifying as Russians noticed that they cannot make a meaningful distinction between the Russian and Ukrainian cultures. They were referring to the Soviet times, when, in their opinion, the question of the national identity was not important. In most of the cases, these respondents did not think about their national identity before the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, which most of them identify as a turning point. They felt that the following political changes made them to react and choose one or another national identity. One respondent even claimed that she started identifying as Russian only because of the inner protest against the political direction in Ukraine. This respondent was also referring to the common Slavic *duhovnost'* (a synonym to English words spirituality and moral) suggesting that she does not perceive Russian and Ukrainian cultures as competitive. Only one respondent claimed to be an *ethnic* Russian based on the ethnicity of her parents, whereas for the rest the Russian nationality meant the attachment to culture and language which can be seen as a middle-ground between the two components of the national identity proposed by this thesis - ethnic and civic.

Four respondents identified themselves as Ukrainians, despite considering Russian their native language. However, there was no unanimity in this case regarding what the Ukrainian national identity means. One respondent identified the national identity as depending on the ethnicities of his Ukrainian-Bulgarian parents. Thus, he identified himself as such. The same respondent was also the only respondent who identified Russian *and* Ukrainian as his native languages. Additionally, the Russian identity for him was synonymous to identification with Russia as a state, thus, he did not consider himself Russian at all. Another respondent, identifying as Ukrainian, emphasised the role of culture, history, literature, folklore, and other attributes which define her national identity. She noticed that even though her ethnicity is not Ukrainian, and her native language is Russian, she identifies mostly as a Ukrainian. The other two respondents, identifying as having Ukrainian national identity, emphasised the civic values. For one such respondent, the Ukrainian national identity became the conscious choice and reflected her civic stands. She claimed that after the Maidan

revolution in 2014, the self-identification as Ukrainian became the ‘choice of honesty’ which she made to ‘be in harmony with herself’. For her, the choice of the Ukrainian national identity is the manifestation of her values as a citizen. Another respondent claimed that she identifies as Ukrainian despite her parents being ethnic Russians because she ‘lives in this country, loves it, and does not separate herself from it’. For her, being Ukrainian is interpreted primarily through civic values such as respecting laws, culture, and the fellow citizens. Overall, in the case of people identifying as Ukrainians, the 2014 revolution played role only in the case of one respondent who perceives her national identity as the reflection of her civic stance. Otherwise, the Ukrainian national identity is interpreted as the mixture of ethnicity, culture, and civic values, such as respect of laws and patriotism.

3.2.3 Factors from the regression analyses

The interviews provided the chance to check the influence of the factors identified by the regression analyses as influencing the attitude to the Ukrainian language. The statistically and substantively significant factors appeared to be the employment status, the language of private and public communication, the self-identification as European, the importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity. In addition to that, the interpretation and perception of the policy was added as an important factor from the research on the language practices in Ukraine (Polese, 2010, 2011).

Out of these factors, the most important ones appeared to be the languages of public communication, the native language, the importance of speaking Ukrainian, and how the respondents interpret the policy. The employment status seems to be not important by itself but influencing the language of public communication. So, the most respondents claimed that they interact with the Ukrainian language primarily at work or at university whereas they use Russian at home. The language of the public communication was influential factor for those respondents, who identify as Ukrainians already. They claim that they try to practice Ukrainian in their public communication whereas they usually do not have such an opportunity in their private lives. On the other hand, several respondents, identifying as Russians, claimed that they carry on speaking Russian no matter what language they are approached to as long as they are understood. One respondent even claim that he does not mind an ‘ordinary people’ speaking Ukrainian with him, but he would ask the officials to switch to Russian since he ‘does not stand the pressure on himself’. This is also connected to his interpretation of the usage of the Ukrainian language as an attempt to influence him.

The language of private communication appeared to be not particularly important. Many respondents noted that even if in the public sphere they may have to use only Ukrainian, they will still use Russian with their families. The only exception was the respondent whose partner is a

Ukrainian-speaker, and this encourages her to speak Ukrainian at home. However, the full effect of the language of private communication is not possible to test since the rest of the respondents use Russian in their private lives. Similar case is with the native language. Out of nine respondents, only one identified both Russian and Ukrainian as his native languages. This respondent confirmed the theoretical expectation and had a positive perception of the policy.

An interesting finding became that all the respondents, no matter their national identities and the relation to Ukraine, claimed that all citizens of Ukraine must know the state language. This opinion was unanimous regardless of all factors. It suggests that the national language is seen the most fundamental form of the identification with the state, but not necessarily with the nation. At the same time, whereas the respecting laws was seen as important in general terms, it was not perceived as influencing the attitude to the language.

The self-identification as European or an East Slav appeared to be absolutely insignificant in term of the influence on the attitude to the language. Many of the respondents struggled to identify themselves as belonging to either of these groups or to arrange their identities in some sort of hierarchy. It can suggest that in the regression analysis, the variable of the European identity was influenced by a spurious variable which also influenced the dependent variable. For example, it can be the support of the Ukraine's political ideology dominating after 2014, which was both pro-European and emphasised the importance of the Ukrainian language.

The final factor - the interpretation of the policy - will be discussed in the following section on the example of the 2019 language law.

3.2.4 The 2019 language policy and its impact on the Ukrainian national identity

The interpretation of the policy appeared to be the crucial factor in the respondents' reactions. Overall, there were three types of the attitudes to the 2019 language policy: positive, negative, and neutral. The positive attitude was expressed by two respondents, one of whom identified as Ukrainian already and one who identified as Russian. The respondent who identified as Ukrainian, called the law 'reasonable and right' and said that she was expecting that it will be accepted. She claimed that the increase of the Ukrainian language has the instrumental importance. For example, it will be easier for children to get to universities where the education and exams are conducted in Ukrainian, when they already study in the same language at school. However, this respondent claimed that the increased usage of Ukrainian did not affect her attitude to Ukraine or her national identity.

Another respondent who approved the 2019 language law identified herself as Russian. From her words, she has been living in Ukraine only for the last ten years. She moved to Ukraine when she was in school age. At that time, her encounter with Ukrainian was very stressful since she did not learn the language before. However, this has changed after she went to university in Ukraine. Her

interpretation of the law was that it is ‘one of the serious steps’ that the state takes for the improvement. It is a positive change, and the respondent argued that she feels that when speaking more Ukrainian, she will eventually become a Ukrainian.

Two other respondents, both identifying as Ukrainians, claimed to have a neutral stance towards the law. They both perceive the law as one of many insignificant legislations and claim that their national identity is not influenced by it. However, both of them note that the law is the positive development for Ukraine as a whole.

Five of the respondents claimed to have the negative attitude to the policy. One of them identified as a Ukrainian, while the rest - as Russians. The respondent identifying as a Ukrainian characterised the law as ‘forceful implanting’ of the national language. Even though she admitted that in the public sphere it is still possible to use Russian, she claimed that the law ignores the historical presence of the Russian language in Ukraine. Moreover, she noted the law resulted in that people are more aggressive towards those, who do not support it. However, the law did not influence much her national identity as a Ukrainian. This view is supported by another respondent identifying as Russian, who did not approve the law, but claimed that it did not change much her attitude to Ukraine. She remained unlikely to develop the Ukrainian national identity.

The remaining three respondents shared the opinion that the law is an ‘aggressive Ukrainization’. They perceived it as an attack on the Russian language and culture. One respondent connected the language law with the cultural politics in general complaining about things like the prohibition of the use of the Soviet symbolics on the 9th of May⁵. In general, the law was discussed as one of many negative changes happened after the 2014 revolution. The respondents claimed that the law has changed their attitude to Ukraine from neutral or positive to negative. This resulted in that they started purposefully avoiding using the Ukrainian language and feeling alienated from the state.

3.3 The revised Casual Mechanism

The findings from the interviews prove the theoretical causal mechanism. As expected, all the participants consider their native language and the national language as important factors influencing their national identities. However, the policy regulating the use of language appeared to be insignificant in some cases. The most profound outcome of the policy - for four out of nine respondents - was negative, meaning that it reduced the chances that the respondents will develop the Ukrainian national identity. Their reaction was manifested in the conscious limitation of the Ukrainian language in their lives. The examples of this included the refusal to speak Ukrainian in

⁵ The 9th of May is the day of the celebration of the victory over fascism in several post-Soviet republics.


public sphere, to use information in Ukrainian, and to learn Ukrainian even if its knowledge is required for work.

Two respondents had a positive interpretation of the policy, but only for one of them the policy actually resulted in the strengthening of Ukrainian national identity. For this respondent, the law created the conditions of practicing Ukrainian not only at home with her partner, but also in the public sphere. Also, the law created the motivation for learning Ukrainian. It resulted in the respondent's belief that the increased usage of the Ukrainian language will strengthen her Ukrainian identity.

The remaining three respondents claimed that the law did not anyhow impact their sense of national identity. They have already identified themselves as Ukrainians. One of these respondents considered the law to be a negative change. However, she said that she does not actively resist it and uses Ukrainian where appropriate. For her, the sense of the national identity is rooted in the knowledge of culture and history and is not impacted by the external political factors. The other two respondents also claimed that their national identity was not impacted by the law even though they had more positive interpretation. One respondent argued for the ethnic understanding of the national identity, whereas for another one, the national identity is rooted in the civic values and stances. The language law, in their opinion, does not impact these factors.

The biggest changes in the theoretical casual mechanism are related to the conditions, which influence the perception of the policy and the reaction to it. Out of eight such conditions, four appeared to be the most important: the language of public communication, the interpretation of the policy as rigid or not, the perceived importance of speaking Ukrainian, and in one case - the language of private communication. In addition to them, in the cases where the policy was perceived negatively, the attitude to the broader political context can be added as some of the respondents were emphasising the worsening economic situation which contributed to their dissatisfaction with the language policy.

Figure 12. The revised casual mechanism of language policy influencing the national identity.



CONCLUSION

This thesis researched how the language policy influences the sense of national identity of the language minorities. The goal was to answer two main research questions. The first one discussed which conditions encourage the members of the linguistic minority to accept the national language. The second research question focused on the casual mechanism connecting the language policy and the potential change in the national identity. The national identity was defined in this thesis as encompassing two components - civic and ethnic. This allowed the most complex understanding of the effects of the language policy since it is civic by design but necessarily inherits the nationalist element as the language is associated with the specific culture.

Using the theoretical framework from political philosophy, this thesis researched the example of the civic nationalist language policy. Such policy means that there is only one national language used in the public sphere whereas the minority languages can be used in private life. This policy is nationalist as it gives the preference to the national language, but at the same time, it is civic as the choice of the national language is dictated by the rational rather than ethnic considerations. The use of one national language, in theory, ensures the equality of citizens in the state. The case-study of such policy in this research became the 2019 language law adopted in Ukraine. The effects of this law were discussed on the example of the Russian-speaking minority, which is the most numerous and the most affected minority group in the state. Even though from the theoretical perspective, this group constituted the least-likely case for the adoption of the Ukrainian national identity, this research proved that it is worth investigating as the 2019 law became unprecedented in terms of the increase of the Ukrainian language in the public sphere. In addition to that, the conflict with Russia contributed to the reactions which differ from the theoretical expectations.

The empirical research of this thesis was carried out in two steps. The first step was designed to identify the conditions which would encourage the members of the linguistic minority to increase usage of the national language. This part was based on the multivariate linear regression analysis of the data collected as a part of the University of St Gallen's research (2017) on Ukrainian regionalism. The data used for the analysis covered two years - 2013 and 2017. Three regression analyses were made with sixteen independent variables which covered different factors influencing the attitude to the national language. These factors were divided into four groups - socio-economic, socio-linguistic, native language, and political stances. The first regression analysis from 2013 had the most optimal operationalisation of the dependent variable - the question asking about the desired amount of the Ukrainian language in respondents' regions. The outcomes of this regression served as a proxy for

factors influencing the reaction to the 2019 language law which increased the amount of the Ukrainian language in the public sphere and by this encouraged its active usage.

However, since this question was not explored in the most recent data from 2017, two additional regressions were made to trace any changes which happened between 2013 and 2017. The dependent variable in these regressions was operationalised through the opinion of the respondents regarding the need for universal knowledge of Ukrainian in the country. The regression analysis of the 2017 data indicated some changes in factors influencing the respondents' opinion regarding this question. The most notable change was the increased importance of the linguistic surrounding and the native language. After the comparison of three regression analyses, the independent variables which appeared to be statically and substantively significant in the first regression analysis of 2013 and the regression analysis of 2017 were chosen as the most influential indicators of the respondents' opinion regarding the national language. In total there were eight such variables: the employment status, the usage of the national language in private and public communication, the native language, the self-identification as European, and the perceived importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity. They were then incorporated into the theoretical causal mechanism as conditions influencing the respondents' interpretation of the policy and their reaction to it.

The second step of the empirical analysis was designed to answer the research question of *How does the civic nationalist language policy create the national identity for a linguistic minority?* It was based on the qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews and the theory-building process-tracing. In addition to the variables identified as important by the regression analysis, one more variable from the literature was added. That is how rigidly implemented the policy is perceived to be by the linguistic minority. The interviews proved the existence of the casual mechanism which suggested two types of the reactions on the policy - positive and negative. The policy was perceived as positive development by four out of nine respondents. Three of them noted that it did not influence their national identity or their perception of the native language which continued to be Russian (Russian and Ukrainian in one case), but they consider it a positive development overall. Only one respondent out of four who perceived the policy as a positive development claimed that it encouraged her to increase the usage of the Ukrainian language which contributes to her national identity as Ukrainian. This is an interesting outcome because this respondent was not born in Ukraine and moved there in the oldest age compared to all other respondents who were either born in Ukraine or living there since childhood. Among five respondents who had a negative interpretation of the law, two reported no change in their national identity. The remaining three claimed that their attitude to Ukraine worsened as a consequence of the policy and they try to reduce the Ukrainian language in their lives as much as possible. In all three cases the language policy was interpreted in the context

of the broader political developments started after the Maidan revolution, which included the cultural politics and the worsening economic situation. Thus, it can be argued that their negative reaction was directed at the broader political situation rather than at the language policy specifically.

The biggest changes in the theorised casual mechanism made after the analysis of the interviews are related to the conditions influencing one or another interpretation of the policy. The most important factors appeared to be the language of the public communication - the respondents who were using some Ukrainian in their public communication had more positive interpretation of the law. Similarly, whether the policy was viewed as rigidly implemented also mattered. The respondents who noted that the law does not eliminate completely the use of the minority languages reacted to the policy more positively. The respondents with the negative reaction perceived the policy as forceful promotion of the national language at the expense of the minority languages. In addition to that, the language of private communication appeared to be an important in the case of one respondent, who claimed that the law increased her sense of the Ukrainian national identity. At the same time, all respondents, no matter their stance to policy, agreed that the citizens of Ukraine must know the Ukrainian language but that does not imply its active usage.

Overall, the findings of this research showed that the language policy has only marginal ability of creating or strengthening the sense of the national identity for the linguistic minority members. At the same time, if the policy is perceived as rigid and combined with the general dissatisfaction with the political situation in the country, it can have a negative effect and discourage the association with the national identity.

The largest limitation of this research is that the 2019 language policy is very recent and despite it has already started being implemented, it is too early to speak about its profound consequences. Nevertheless, all the respondents have noticed some of the effects of the law implementation. They pointed out the conversion of the places they usually attend, such as cafes, shops, and banks, into the Ukrainian language. Moreover, many respondents pointed out the changing of the language of teaching in schools. It can be argued that this policy affects mostly the school-age children who lost the possibility to study in their native languages. Stepanenko (1999: 44) argued that in Ukraine, school social and cultural practices influence the society as a whole. However, the school students were not targeted by this research due to the limitation of the quantitative data which covered the respondents only of the age of 18 and older. The avenue for the further research is, therefore, to investigate the effect of the policy on children who had to change the language of schooling from native to Ukrainian. Moreover, even though the regional effect was proved to be insignificant, it can influence other variables, such as the language of the public communication. Therefore, the further research should aim to cover the respondents from other parts of Ukraine.

Despite the limitations, this research has proved the connection between the language and national identity in general and the continuing importance of the language debate in Ukraine in particular. The findings indicate that further discussion of how the languages should be regulated in Ukraine is necessary if the state aims at the creation of the common national identity for its citizens.

Appendix A

Appendix A illustrates the operationalisation of the deponent variable - national identity - used in the quantitative part of this research.

1. What should be the volume of use in your area of Ukrainian language? (Q58.1)

<i>What should be the volume of use in your area of (Ukrainian language)?</i>	Original Coding	New Coding
Less than now	1	1
The same as now	2	2
More than now	3	3
Difficult to answer	4	2

2. Do you agree that all residents of Ukraine must know the Ukrainian language? (Q55.1; P46.1)

<i>Do you agree that all residents of Ukraine must know the Ukrainian language?</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Disagree	1	1	1	1
Rather disagree	2	2	2	2
Rather agree	3	3	3	3
Agree	4	4	4	4
Difficult to answer	5	NA	5	NA
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

Appendix B

Appendix B provides an overview of the independent variables used in the qualitative part of this research. The original coding from the data source and the new coding used by this research are included to avoid the ambiguity in the interpretation of the results. In the brackets there are provided the number of questions from the codebook for each variable. They follow chronological order starting from 2013 survey.

1) Socio-economic factors

1. Self-identified nationality (Q6; P7)

	2013	2017
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<i>What is your nationality?</i>	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Ukrainian	1	1	1	1
Russian	2	2	2	2
Lythvanian	3	3	3	-
Polish	4		4	3
Belorussian	5		5	
Jewish	6		6	
German	7		7	
Other	8		8	
Mixed	9		9	
Do not belong to any nationality	10		10	
Difficult to answer	11		11	
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

2. Sex (Q5; P6)

<i>Sex of the respondent</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Male	1	1	1	1
Female	2	2	2	2
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

3. Age (vik_grupy; P5_codes)

<i>Age of the respondent</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
18-34	1	1	1	1
35-54	2	2	2	2
55	3	3	3	3
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

4. Education (Q7; P8.1)

<i>What is your education level?</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Primary	1	1	1	1
Unfinished Secondary	2		2	
Secondary	3		3	
Specialized Secondary	4	2	4	2
Unfinished Bachelor's	5		5	
Bachelor's	6	3	6	3
Master's or above	7		7	
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

5. Income (Q9; P10)

<i>How do you assess your economic conditions?</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Very Good	1	1	1	1
Good	2	2	2	2
Quite Good	3	3	3	3
Neither Good Nor Bad	4	4	4	4
Not Very Good	5	5	5	5
Bad	6	6	6	6
Horrible	7	7	7	7
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

6. Employment (Q8.1; P9.1)

<i>What is your employment status?</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Employed	1	1	1	1
Retired	2	2	2	2
Disability pension	3		3	
Student	4	3	4	3

Unemployed	5	4	5	4
Childcare leave	6	2	6	2
Do not work	7	4	7	4
Other	8		8	

2) Socio-linguistic environment

1. The size of the locality - 'Size' (Q3; P4)

The size of the locality	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
City more than 1 million	1	1	1	1
City 500-999 thousand	2		2	
City 200-499 thousand	3	2	3	2
City 50-199 thousand	4		4	
City under 50 thousand	5		5	
Village	6	3	6	3
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

2. The prevalence of Russian language in the home region - 'Region' (oblast; P1)

Oblast' (administrative region)	2013		2017		Language used with your children: Russian (%)	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding	2013	2015
AKR	1	NA	-	-	-	-
Vinnits~ka	2	1	2	1	3,8	4,1
Volins~ka	3	1	3	1	1,6	0,5
Dnipropetrovs~ka	4	2	4	2	43,4	29,5
Donets~ka	5	3	5	3	78,3	-
Zhytomyrska	6	1	6	1	4,3	4,4
Zakarpats~ka	7	1	7	1	1,3	1,9
Zaporiz~ka	8	2	8	2	55,8	38,1
Ivano-Frankivs~ka	9	1	9	1	1,1	1,2

Kyivska	10	2	10	2	6,5	24,5
Kirovograds~ka	11	1	11	1	13,3	7,7
Lugans~ka	12	3	12	3	82,1	-
L~vivs~ka	13	1	13	1	1,6	2,2
Mikolaivs~ka	14	3	14	3	55,3	54,9
Odes~ka	15	3	15	3	55,7	62,8
Poltavs~ka	16	1	16	1	16,2	7,2
Rivnens~ka	17	1	17	1	0	2,3
Sums~ka	18	1	18	1	13	8,2
Ternopil~s~ka	19	1	19	1	0	0
Kharkivs~ka	20	3	20	3	68,5	69,4
Khersons~ka	21	2	21	2	38,3	25,2
Khmel~nits~ka	22	1	22	1	1,2	1,1
Cherkas~ka	23	1	23	1	8,8	5,9
Chernivets~ka	24	1	24	1	7,1	4,6
Chernigivs~ka	25	1	25	1	12,2	6
Kyiv	26	2	26	2	23.2	29.8
Sevastopol	27	NA	-	-	-	-
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA	-	-

3. Language of everyday communication - 'Private Communication' (Q59.1-3; P45.1-3)

<i>In what language do you speak with</i>		2013		2017	
		Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Parents	Ukrainian	1	0	1	0
	Russian	2	1	2	1
	Ukrainian and Russian	3	0.5	3	0.5
	Other	4	NA	4	NA
	Surzhyk	5	0.5	5	0.5

	Difficult to answer	6	NA	6	NA
	Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA
Grandparents	Ukrainian	1	0	1	0
	Russian	2	1	2	1
	Ukrainian and Russian	3	0.5	3	0.5
	Other	4	NA	4	NA
	Surzhyk	5	0.5	5	0.5
	Difficult to answer	6	NA	6	NA
	Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA
Children	Ukrainian	1	0	1	0
	Russian	2	1	2	1
	Ukrainian and Russian	3	0.5	3	0.5
	Other	4	NA	4	NA
	Surzhyk	5	0.5	5	0.5
	Difficult to answer	6	NA	6	NA
	Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

4. Language of everyday communication - 'Public Communication' (Q59.5-7; P45.5-7)

<i>In what language to you speak with</i>		2013		2017	
		Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Colleagues	Ukrainian	1	0	1	0
	Russian	2	1	2	1
	Ukrainian and Russian	3	0.5	3	0.5
	Other	4	NA	4	NA
	Surzhyk	5	0.5	5	0.5

	Difficult to answer	6	NA	6	NA
	Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA
State officials	Ukrainian	1	0	1	0
	Russian	2	1	2	1
	Ukrainian and Russian	3	0.5	3	0.5
	Other	4	NA	4	NA
	Surzhyk	5	0.5	5	0.5
	Difficult to answer	6	NA	6	NA
	Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA
Sellers	Ukrainian	1	0	1	0
	Russian	2	1	2	1
	Ukrainian and Russian	3	0.5	3	0.5
	Other	4	NA	4	NA
	Surzhyk	5	0.5	5	0.5
	Difficult to answer	6	NA	6	NA
	Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

3) *Native language*

1. Self-identified native language (Q53; P42)

<i>What language do you consider your native?</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Ukrainian	1	-	1	-
Russian	2	1	2	1
Ukrainian and Russian	3	2	3	2

Ukrainian and other	4	-	4	-
Russian and other	5	1	5	1
Other	6	-	6	-
Surzhyk	7	2	7	2
Difficult to answer	8	-	8	-
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

4) Political identity and values: civic or ethnic

1. Self-identification as a European - 'European' (Q16.7; Q; P15.7)

<i>Who am I, who do I feel? How do you feel? (European)</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Certainly no	1	1	1	1
Rather no	2	2	2	2
Difficult to say	3	3	3	3
Rather yes	4	4	4	4
Certainly yes	5	5	5	5
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

2. Self-identification as a member of Eastern Slavic community - 'East Slav' (Q16.6; P15.6)

<i>Who am I, who do I feel? How do you feel? (member of Eastern Slavic community)</i>	2013		2015		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Certainly no	1	1	1	1	1	1
Rather no	2	2	2	2	2	2
Difficult to say	3	3	3	3	3	3
Rather yes	4	4	4	4	4	4
Certainly yes	5	5	5	5	5	5
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA	-99	NA

3. To what extent it is important in order to be true Ukrainian to hold Ukrainian citizenship - ‘Citizenship’ (Q21.2; P23.2)

<i>There are things that are more or less important in order to be a real Ukrainian. In your opinion, how important are the following things (Hold Ukrainian citizenship)</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Not important at all	1	1	1	1
Not very important	2	2	2	2
Medium	3	3	3	3
Quite important	4	4	4	4
Very important	5	5	5	5
Difficult to say	6	3	6	3
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

4. To what extent it is important in order to be true Ukrainian to respect Ukrainian political institutions and laws - ‘Law’ (Q21.5; P23.5)

<i>There are things that are more or less important in order to be a real Ukrainian. In your opinion, how important are the following things (Respect Ukrainian political institutions and laws)</i>	2013		2017	
	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Not important at all	1	1	1	1
Not very important	2	2	2	2
Medium	3	3	3	3
Quite important	4	4	4	4
Very important	5	5	5	5
Difficult to say	6	3	6	3
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

5. To what extent it is important in order to be true Ukrainian to speak⁶ Ukrainian - ‘Speak Ukrainian’ (Q21.4; P23.4)

	2013	2017
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⁶ The survey question does not clarify whether it is the mere ability to speak Ukrainian matters or its actual usage.

<i>There are things that are more or less important in order to be a real Ukrainian. In your opinion, how important are the following things (Speak Ukrainian language)</i>	Original Coding	New Coding	Original Coding	New Coding
Not important at all	1	1	1	1
Not very important	2	2	2	2
Medium	3	3	3	3
Quite important	4	4	4	4
Very important	5	5	5	5
Difficult to say	6	3	6	3
Missings	-99	NA	-99	NA

Appendix C

Multivariate linear regression 2 for the 2013 survey

The second regression analysis of the 2013 survey is made in order to trace any changes in the attitude of Russophones to the Ukrainian language which would happen between 2013 and 2017. The dependent variable in this regression is measured following the second indicator - the question ‘Do you agree that all residents of Ukraine must know the Ukrainian language?’ that allows to make the comparison with the 2017 data.

Out of sixteen independent variables, eight appeared to be statistically significant: the importance of respecting Ukrainian laws for the Ukrainian identity, the importance of speaking Ukrainian for the Ukrainian identity, nationality, age, employment, the spread of the Russian language in the region, sex, and self-identification as European. In addition to that, five interaction effects appeared to be statistically significant: of age and the size of the locality, native language and self-identification as an East Slav, the spread of the Russian language in the region and the size of the locality, native language and the self-identification as an East Slav, self-identification as an East Slav and the size of the locality, employment and sex, and the spread of the Russian language in the region and the size of the locality. However, not all statistically significant variables have the substantive significance in this regression. Substantively significant variables are the self-identification as European, importance of the respect of the Ukrainian laws and political institutions for the Ukrainian identity, importance of speaking Ukrainian, and, arguably, nationality. The statistically significant independent variables and the interaction effects together with other outputs of the regression are summarised in Table 5. The model fit is satisfactory, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.10, what is somewhat lower than in the first regression, but is still quite high.

Table C1. The statistically significant results of individual and interaction effects of the multivariate regression for the 2013 Survey (second indicator).

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-3.0323	-0.3711	0.2314	0.3659	0.9417

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	2.364881	0.276274	8.560	< 2e-16	***
European	0.105060	0.025565	4.110	4.13e-05	***
East Slav	0.261837	0.048121	5.441	5.95e-08	***
Nationality	0.398491	0.110795	3.597	0.00033	***
Speak Ukrainian	0.113347	0.024765	4.577	5.01e-06	***
Income	0.071443	0.027193	2.627	0.00867	**
Native language	0.067048	0.033612	1.995	0.04621	*
Private communication	-0.042117	0.019214	-2.192	0.02849	*
Employment	-0.170686	0.079023	-2.160	0.03090	*
Citizenship	0.065121	0.027274	2.388	0.01705	*
Sex	0.137401	0.066309	2.072	0.03838	*
Region	0.084342	0.046466	1.815	0.06966	.
Law	-0.052454	0.031975	-1.640	0.10107	
Region:East Slav	-0.051172	0.014130	-3.622	0.00030	***
European:Speak Ukrainian	-0.025187	0.007916	-3.182	0.00149	**
Employment:Law	0.051198	0.016962	3.018	0.00257	**
Citizenship:East Slav	-0.023505	0.007921	-2.967	0.00304	**
Nationality:Sex	-0.126538	0.046144	-2.742	0.00616	**
Nationality:Income	-0.045839	0.018203	-2.518	0.01187	*
Employment:East Slav	-0.024621	0.010173	-2.420	0.01560	*

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.5971 on 1976 degrees of freedom

(254 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.07948, Adjusted R-squared: 0.07063

F-statistic: 8.98 on 19 and 1976 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Appendix D

Preparation for the Interview

Following suggestions by Turner (2010) and McNamara (2009), the following steps serve as the introduction to all interviews conducted for this research.

1. Ask the respondents about the preferred language of the interview;
2. State the purpose of the interview;
3. Address terms of confidentiality, explain how the recording will be made, where and how it will be stored, who will have access to it;
4. Explain the format of the interview;
5. Indicate how long approximately the interview will last;
6. Provide the contact information in case of the additional questions/ requirements;
7. Make sure everything is clear and the participants' questions are addressed;
8. Start the recording.

Questions

The questions are translated into Russian and Ukrainian to accommodate the potential desire of the participants to use Ukrainian rather than Russian. The prompts to some questions (italicised) are needed in case the participants will struggle to answer the question and will not necessarily be used.

If an interview is conducted in Russian, in the questions regarding the self-identification of the participants, the Eastern Slavic identity also may be referred as 'Russian'. This is because in Russian language, Russian can be translated in two way - as 'rossijskij' (Russia's) and 'russkij' (related to Rus'). The latter term has a broader meaning and is related to cultural and linguistic inheritance of Rus', encompassing Eastern Slavic nations, rather than Russia. It is also more commonly used in the Russian-speaking world than the notions of 'Eastern Slavs'. Thus, the term Russian will be used in case a participant will not understand what is mean by the Eastern Slavic identity.

English	Russian
Socio-demographic factors (filled by the respondent)	
Sex	Пол
Age group • 18-34 • 35-54 • 55+	Возрастная группа • 18-34 • 35-54 • 55+

<p>Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Secondary</i> • <i>Post-secondary/ Unfinished high</i> • <i>Bachelor's or higher</i> 	<p>Образование</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Школьное</i> • <i>Специализированное / Незаконченное высшее</i> • <i>Бакалавр или выше</i>
<p>Employment status</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Employed</i> • <i>Student</i> • <i>Unemployed</i> • <i>Getting benefits from state</i> 	<p>Статус занятости</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Работаю</i> • <i>Учусь</i> • <i>Временно не работаю</i> • <i>Не работаю, получаю пенсию/ пособие от государства</i>
<p>Region</p>	<p>Область</p>
<p>Background questions</p>	
<p>Native language</p>	<p>Родной язык</p>
<p>How long have you been living in Ukraine?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>since birth</i> • <i>since childhood</i> • <i>since adolescence</i> • <i>since adult age</i> 	<p>Как давно вы живете в Украине?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>с рождения</i> • <i>с детства</i> • <i>с юности</i> • <i>со взрослого возраста</i>
<p>When did you encounter Ukrainian language at first? Do you consider it a positive or negative or neutral experience? Why?</p>	<p>Когда вы впервые столкнулись с украинским языком? Считаете ли вы это положительным, отрицательным или нейтральным опытом? Почему?</p>
<p>How often do you use Ukrainian language?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>All the time</i> • <i>Often</i> • <i>Not too often</i> • <i>Never</i> 	<p>Как часто вы используете украинский язык?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Все время</i> • <i>Часто</i> • <i>Не слишком часто</i> • <i>Никогда</i>
<p>In what situations?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>At school/ university</i> • <i>At work</i> • <i>In state institutions/ dealing with the state authorities</i> • <i>In shops and cafes</i> 	<p>В каких ситуациях?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>В школе / университете</i> • <i>На работе</i> • <i>В государственных учреждениях / общении с государственными органами</i> • <i>В магазинах и кафе</i>
<p>National Identity</p>	
<p>What do you understand as national identity?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Sense of belonging to the particular nation or state or both?</i> 	<p>Как вы понимаете термин национальная идентичность?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Чувство принадлежности к определенной нации или государству или к обоим?</i>

<p>Do you feel Russian or Ukrainian or both?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>What does it mean to you to be Ukrainian?</i> • <i>What does it mean to you to be Russian?</i> • <i>Does the combination of both work for you productively and is it a burden?</i> 	<p>Вы чувствуете себя русским или украинцем или и тем, и другим?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Что для вас значит быть украинцем?</i> • <i>Что для вас значит быть русским?</i> • <i>Является ли обузой сочетание этих идентичностей или, наоборот, оно вам помогает?</i>
<p>What factors are important for you in identifying as [respondents' answer regarding national identity]?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>What about language?</i> • <i>Which language is more important: native or the everyday communication (public/private)?</i> 	<p>Какие факторы важны для вас при идентификации с [ответ респондентов о национальной идентичности]?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>А как насчет языка?</i> • <i>Какой язык важнее: родной или язык повседневного общения? (в личной жизни/ в публичной жизни)</i>
<p>Has your national identity changed? If yes, why?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Conflict with Russia</i> 	<p>Менялась ли ваша национальная принадлежность? Если да, то почему?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Конфликт с Россией</i>
<p>What do you think is important to identify as a Ukrainian?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Do you think it is essential in order to identify as Ukrainian to speak Ukrainian?</i> • <i>Would you say it is important to have Ukrainian citizenship to be Ukrainian?</i> • <i>What is more important in order to identify as Ukrainian: to speak the language or to respect the civic values (such as political institutions and laws) or both at the same time?</i> 	<p>Как вы думаете, что важно для того, чтобы идентифицировать себя как украинца?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Необходимо говорить по-украински?</i> • <i>Важно иметь украинское гражданство?</i> • <i>Что важнее: говорить на государственном языке или уважать гражданские ценности (такие как политические институты и законы) или и то, и другое одновременно?</i>
<p>Speaking about macro-identities, would you define yourself as European or Eastern Slav/ Russian, or maybe both or none?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Is that identity more important than national identity?</i> 	<p>Говоря о макро-идентичности, вы считаете себя скорее европейцем или восточным славянином/ русским, а может быть и тем и другим? Или ни тем, ни другим?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Эта идентичность является для вас более значимой, чем национальная идентичности?</i>
<p>Do you feel that there is a connection between your self-identification as a European or an Eastern Slav and your attitude to the Ukrainian language?</p>	<p>Считаете ли вы, что ваша самоидентификация как европейец или восточный славянин влияет на ваше отношение к украинскому языку?</p>
<p>What else influences your attitude to the Ukrainian language?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Political views (conflict with Russia?)</i> • <i>State regulation of the language</i> 	<p>Что еще влияет на ваше отношение к украинскому языку?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Политические взгляды (конфликт с Россией?)</i> • <i>Как государство регулирует язык</i>
Language policy and national identity	

<p>What role, if any, does Ukrainian language play for you?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Emotional value</i> • <i>Rational value (tool to have effective communication)</i> 	<p>Какую роль играет для вас украинский язык?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Эмоциональное значение</i> • <i>Материальное значение (инструмент достижения продуктивной коммуникации)</i>
<p>What role, if any, does Russian language play for you?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Emotional value</i> • <i>Rational value</i> 	<p>Какую роль для вас играет русский язык?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Эмоциональная ценность</i> • <i>Рациональная ценность</i>
<p>Have you heard about the 2019 language laws and/or observed any changes in the use of Ukrainian in your life?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>How did it influence/ not influence you and your family?</i> • <i>Do you view it as a positive/ negative change or no change for your life?</i> 	<p>Вы слышали о Законе о языке 2019 года и/или заметили какие-то изменения в использовании украинского языка?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Как это повлияло / не повлияло на вас и вашу семью?</i> • <i>Считаете ли вы это положительным / отрицательным изменением или отсутствием изменений в вашей жизни?</i>
<p>Do you feel that the 2019 law has impacted your relation to Ukraine? Why? What do you mean by 'Ukraine'?</p>	<p>Считаете ли вы, что закон 2019 года повлиял на ваше отношение к Украине? Почему? Что вы имеете в виду, говоря 'Украина'?</p>
<p>How, in your opinion, the Ukrainian authorities should regulate the usage of Russian and Ukrainian languages?</p>	<p>По вашему мнению, как украинские власти должны регулировать использование русского и украинского языков?</p>

Appendix E

The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

	Sex	Age group	Education	Employment	Region	Native language	How long live in Ukraine
Irina	Female	35-54	Bachelor's or higher	Employed	Odessa	Russian	Since birth
Vladimir	Male	55<	Bachelor's or higher	On pension	Mykolai v	Russian	Since birth
Natalia	Female	35-54	Bachelor's or higher	Employed	Odessa	Russian	Since childhood
Nina	Female	55<	Bachelor's or higher	On pension	Kharkiv	Russian	Since childhood
Andrii	Male	18-34	Bachelor's or higher	Studying-employed	Odessa - Kyiv	Russian and Ukrainian	Since birth
Elena	Female	35-54	Unfinished Bachelor's	Unemployed	Odessa	Russian	Since birth
Marina	Female	35-54	Bachelor's or higher	Employed	Odessa	Russian	Since birth
Julia	Female	18-34	Bachelor's or higher	Employed	Dnipro-Kyiv	Russian	Since birth
Viktoria	Female	18-34	Bachelor's or higher	Unemployed	Odessa	Russian	Since adolescence

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