

**Language choices and education. Prestige of Hungarian language as a key  
to the European Union citizenship and education. Case study of  
Transcarpathia, Ukraine.**

**By Krisztina Policsko**

Submitted to  
Central European University  
Nationalism Studies Program

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

Advisor: Prof. Szabolics Pogonyi

Vienna, Austria

2021

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the motivations of ethnically Ukrainian and mixed families for enrolling their children into Hungarian-language education in Transcarpathia. The case is analyzed in the context of Hungarian-Ukrainian bilateral relations using the triadic nexus and clientelism framework. The field data have been obtained by conducting semi-structured interviews with eight parents, whose children are enrolled in a Hungarian-language school. Qualitative research methods have been used to analyze the obtained data. The interviews point to economic factors as the major motivation in parents' school choice. The interviewed parents primarily see Hungarian language skills as an instrument of economic mobility. Partial influence on parents' motivations has also been identified for factors related to personal identity.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Table of contents .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>I. Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II. Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1. The triadic nexus and minority identity .....	3
2.2. Assimilation theories. The “melting pot model” .....	8
2.3. Banal nationalism and everyday nationhood .....	9
2.4. Theories of clientelism.....	11
<b>III. Historical and Political Context .....</b>	<b>14</b>
3.1. Clash of nationalisms .....	14
3.2. Hungarian language and education in Transcarpathia .....	25
3.3. Performing the Nation. Hungarian traditions as an essential part of festive life in Transcarpathia .....	32
3.4. Current research. This study .....	34
<b>IV. Data Collection and Background .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>V. Analysis .....</b>	<b>42</b>
5.1. Risks and shortcomings of Hungarian-medium schools .....	43
5.2. Economic factors .....	46
5.3. Other factors.....	54
<b>VI. Conclusions.....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>64</b>

## **I. Introduction**

On the surface, it seems counterintuitive that majority-language families would give preference to minority-language schools. Nevertheless, that exact scenario has become increasingly common in Transcarpathia, Ukraine's westernmost region on its border with Hungary.

Hungary's opening of dual citizenship to Transcarpathia's Hungarian-speaking population, a policy of Viktor Orbán's right-wing cabinet, has attracted considerable interest in the region. Apart from Hungarian-speakers availing of the offer, the majority Ukrainian-speakers have been drawn to learning Hungarian in order to benefit from it themselves.

Ukraine's delayed negative reaction to the citizenship program has raised tensions between the two countries. As the citizenship issue forms a part of the Hungarian-Ukrainian symbolic struggle in Transcarpathia, those acquiring Hungarian citizenship may face accusations of national disloyalty or even criminal behavior.

It is in this context that Transcarpathia's school system makes an interesting case in nationalism and kin-state politics. School choice is transformed from a matter of convenience to a choice between loyalties to competing states.

In the second chapter of the thesis, I will discuss previous works in nationalism theory, namely the triadic nexus theory, theories of assimilation and clientelism,

and everyday ethnicity. These works will provide the theoretic basis for the current research.

The third chapter describes the background of the specific case studied in the thesis, namely the political and cultural context of Hungarian-Ukrainian relations in Transcarpathia. First, I provide the historical background for Hungary's activities in the region and discuss its specific kin-state policies, most notably the citizenship program adopted in 2010. This is followed by an outline of Hungarian-language education in Ukraine, a particularly contested area in the two states' bilateral relations. The third section of this chapter provides context on Hungarian culture's prominent position in Transcarpathia. The fourth section introduces previous research on the issue of school choice in Transcarpathia and formulates the aims and hypotheses of the present study.

The fourth chapter describes the methodological part of the study, providing details on the respondents' profile (individually and as family units), the interview procedure (dates, questions).

The results of the analysis are reported in the fifth chapter, divided into three thematic sections. First, the possible negative outcomes for Ukrainian-speaking students are discussed in order to provide a background for the parents' choices. The second section deals with economic motivations such as the desire to ensure children's labor mobility. Finally, alternative motivations are compared against the hypothesis. The findings are discussed in the sixth and concluding chapter.

## **II. Theoretical Framework**

This thesis will investigate a case in interstate and interethnic relations, aiming to contribute to the current scholarship in nationalism studies. It will draw upon different theories in this field in its analysis, most prominently the triadic nexus theory, theories of assimilation and clientelism, and everyday ethnicity. This chapter will introduce previous research in these areas and their relevance for the present study.

### **2.1. The triadic nexus and minority identity**

The collapse of the Soviet bloc brought nationalist conflicts to Eastern Europe, which had seemed pacified after World War Two. If the Balkans experienced the most intense nationalist mobilization and full-scale warfare, relations among the former Soviet satellites became estranged at best. Compared to its neighbors to the west, many areas of the 1990s Soviet Union seemed relatively peaceful. Social scientists struggled to find an explanation and a workable model to explain the ethnic conflicts and reemergence of nationalism as the leading force in Central and Eastern Europe.

Rogers Brubaker provides the model of triadic relations<sup>1</sup> that aims to explain the dynamics of ethnically driven conflicts between two neighboring states and a

---

<sup>1</sup> Rogers Brubaker, "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands in the New Europe," *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (Spring, 1995): 108.

national minority living in one of these countries (nationalizing state) but sharing a national affinity with another (kin-state), as in the case of ongoing tensions between Ukraine and Hungary centered at the Transcarpathian Region. Similar situations were widespread all over the former Soviet bloc but produced different results. Brubaker's studies include various cases from violence and war in the Balkan countries to the tensions surrounding the Russian question in the former Soviet republics, which all contribute to the comparative and heterogeneous perspective on the region. The triadic model is open to various scholarly applications; however, a detailed explanation of its concepts is required.

Brubaker argues against static schemes, instead focusing on fluid relations between the fields in the triad.<sup>2</sup> The kin-state, nationalizing state, and national minority are not actors per se but three areas where different actors, whether individuals or social groups, push for their agendas. This analytical perspective, referred to as relational, stresses the stability of the triad elements, and the dynamics of the contested fields, or arenas of political struggle.

Two factors shape the relationship between the "homeland" kin-state and its co-ethnics abroad: 1) elites in the "homeland" admit that they have co-ethnics abroad, and 2) the state takes action (monitoring, aiding, protecting) in favor of the co-ethnic diaspora<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the agency is on the side of the elites who form the

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 117-118.

boundaries of the relations as well as project their vision on the co-ethnics abroad. This means that kin-state elites could initiate conflict by merely recognizing and supporting their co-ethnics abroad, as in the case of the Hungarian government with respect to ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine.

The nationalizing state represents another extreme of the triad that can possibly create a conflict. However, its definition is more complicated than that of the kin-state. On the one hand, the nationalizing state is defined by the state elites framing their actions in terms of creating a fully-realized nation-state, aiming to assimilate the heterogenous population within its borders. On the other hand, Brubaker admits that minorities and kin-states can also apply the nationalizing state label. The interpretation alone establishes triadic relations and places the elites of the supposed nationalizing state in that respective role.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, assimilatory practices are a matter of interpretation of all the actors involved in a given context. Nevertheless, the counter-reaction of the nationalizing state remains essential in the development of conflict.

The minority finds itself in the crossfire between the two states; however, it is not merely a passive object of nationalist aspirations. Its boundaries and markers shift under the influence of local groups. The limits of the minority community are always at stake here, making the minority an arena for constant internal fighting,

---

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 114-115.



as well as external influences from the kin-state and the nationalizing state. A scholar should always account for the multiplicity of minority membership experience, keeping in mind the possibility of alternative interpretations. At the same time, an individual's position is related to wider political cleavages and interests.<sup>5</sup> In brief, this study focuses on individuals' positioning in the minority field as a product of internal dynamics and external nationalist conflicts.

As a frequently shifting scheme with few constants, the triadic nexus model creates its own analytical challenges. These challenges can be addressed by reference to a well-developed set of clear analytical tools. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper address the deteriorating analytical quality of the term "identity" in social sciences. In their criticism, the authors note that social scientists have often failed to distinguish the scholarly and political understandings of identity, introducing the political implications of the term into their analysis. Brubaker and Cooper also address what they called "clichéd constructivism", whereby identity is always described as constructed and unstable, which is at odds with the complex perceptions of identity found in everyday life. Among the first steps to overcome such clichés, the authors propose to distinguish categories of practice (how "lay" people perceive their

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 112-114.

identity) and categories of analysis (how these perceptions are interpreted by scholars).<sup>6</sup>

Brubaker and Cooper propose three analytical concepts that dissect the idea of identity, making it more applicable and informative for this study. The first concept is identification or defining oneself vis-a-vis known others depending on the context. Aside from personal self-identification, this term includes situational categorization by others. In comparison, self-understanding presupposes a much stronger and more persistent sense of one's location, unlike identification which is highly context-dependent. This term connotes the cognitive understanding of individual identity combined with the affective dimension, allowing for a certain level of variability. Finally, groupness describes the feeling of commonality shared by members of a group. An individual can associate oneself with various collectives to a different degree, which the concept of groupness attempts to capture.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the variability of identity can be specified in three dimensions: identification, self-understanding, and groupness.

Coming back to the Hungarian identity in Transcarpathia, in this thesis I will attempt to uncover all three dimensions mentioned above as part of the triadic nexus. Both the nationalizing Ukrainian state and the Hungarian government could affect the sense of Hungarianness among Transcarpathians. Alternatively,

---

<sup>6</sup> Rogers Brubaker, and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity'," *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 4-5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-21.

local actors could resist external influences, staying relatively autonomous from the struggle in the triadic nexus.

## **2.2. Assimilation theories. The “melting pot” model**

The Transcarpathian case is a remarkable example of the regional identity being superior to the national one without significant intentions for separatism (unlike cases such as Catalonia or Basque Country). Based on the observations made in this study, the intervening Hungarian and Ukrainian government policies seem to have made Transcarpathians careful in navigating political issues, rather than aggressively nationalistic. Transcarpathia’s multicultural regional identity can be analyzed through the lens of assimilation theories.

Sociologists Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess define assimilation as “a process of interpretation and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life”.<sup>8</sup>

The process of ethnic group assimilation in Transcarpathia could be described using the so-called “Melting Pot” model of assimilation. Milton M. Gordon explains the “Melting Pot” model as the mixing of identifying features (culture,

---

<sup>8</sup> Robert E. Park, and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1921).

sentiments, traditions, language etc.) of different groups and creating a new common diffused identity containing a number of features from each group.<sup>9</sup>

In the context of this study, the Melting Pot model could be referred to in order to explain the blurred lines defining the membership in the ethnic Hungarian community. As the following sections will demonstrate, aside from the “core” self-described ethnic Hungarians, there is a wider population, either ethnically mixed or belonging to the majority ethnic community, but aligned with a multicultural regional identity, that can participate in Hungarian cultural institutions. This wider population stands to consume the benefits intended for Hungarians as a national minority, going against Ukraine’s nationalizing policies. At the same time, “core” members of the Hungarian community may support Ukraine’s policies and agree with the importance they place on acquiring the official language.

### **2.3. Banal nationalism and everyday nationhood**

The Hungarian language and culture are ubiquitous in the public space in Transcarpathia, and as such are perceived as an essential part of the region’s everyday life. Theories of banal nationalism and everyday nationhood, which set to examine how ordinary people consume a nation on a daily basis would form

---

<sup>9</sup> Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976): 60-83, 115-159.

an appropriate instrument to explore the Transcarpathian case from a bottom-up perspective.

Michael Billig explains how nationalism becomes invisible in being perceived as patriotism using an allegory of “waved” and “unwaved flags”. In everyday life, national symbols such as flags (historical monuments, memorials, coats of arms etc.) become a natural part of the landscape. They are invisible and only assume their symbolic role again on special occasions: national holidays, protests, armed conflicts and so on.<sup>10</sup> Billig also links the emergence of nation-states and languages. He claims that people have always spoken, but it is only after the creation of nation-states that they began to speak languages, which became an instrument of political propaganda and construction of national myths/ideas.<sup>11</sup> As later sections will discuss, Hungarian national symbols can be commonly seen in Transcarpathia. In the context of this study, it is worth taking Billig’s theory into account when considering how Hungarian-language education is perceived on the ground.

Rogers Brubaker’s famous case study of the town Cluj in Romania uncovers the bilinguals’ practice of code-switching between two languages and the influence of national identity on everyday life.<sup>12</sup> Brubaker also discusses the phenomenon

---

<sup>10</sup> Michael Billig, “Remembering Banal Nationalism,” in *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995): 37-59.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006): 1-23, 357-73.

of linguistic asymmetry: most ethnic Hungarians in Cluj speak both Hungarian and Romanian, while ethnic Romanians usually only speak the Romanian language.<sup>13</sup> This is relevant to my project, conducted in a Transcarpathian town with a Ukrainian ethnic majority and a Hungarian minority. The ethnic Ukrainian majority only uses their native Ukrainian in their day-to-day life, while ethnic Hungarians and bilinguals of mixed ethnic background balance between two languages, Ukrainian and Hungarian.

Jon E. Fox and Cynthia Miller Idriss name four categories of practice through which ordinary people produce the nation: talking the nation, choosing the nation, performing the nation, and consuming the nation.<sup>14</sup> All four categories are relevant for the present study. Choosing the nation is the most controversial in this case, as this study attempts to understand whether ethnic Ukrainian parents try to choose another nation for their children by enrolling them in Hungarian-language schools.

## **2.4. Theories of clientelism**

In modern scholarship, clientelism and party patronage are used as synonyms or closely related terms. In their study on the relationship between government ethnic parties and national minorities, Petr Kopecky and Gerardo Scherlis define party patronage as “the power of a party to appoint people to positions in public

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> John E. Fox, and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Everyday Nationhood,” *Ethnicities* 8, no. 4 (2008): 536-563.

and semi-public life, considering the scope of patronage to be the range of positions so distributed. In other words, we understand party patronage in terms of appointments to positions in the state. These positions may, for example, include posts in the civil service, public sector companies and their governing boards, universities, advisory committees and commissions, quangos and other regulatory bodies”.<sup>15</sup>

According to Kopecky and Scherlis, the main difference between clientelism and party patronage lays in the hierarchical and direct character of a client-politician relationship. While in the case of party patronage clients could be contacted indirectly and both sides could benefit in a relatively equal way, in a clientelistic relationship one side (politician) is always superior to the other (electorate).

Kopecky and Scherlis define political pork or pork barrel politics, normally subsumed as a subtype of either clientelism or patronage<sup>16</sup>, as political parties or actors directly channelling public funds and state resources to a specific territory.<sup>17</sup>

This description is accurate for the Fidesz government in Hungary, which provides significant funds for ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia. The benefits do not only reach the party’s voters, but everyone living in the respective electoral

---

<sup>15</sup> Petr Kopecky, and Gerardo Scherlis, “Party Patronage in Contemporary Europe,” *European Review* 16, no. 3 (2008): 355-371.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 357-360.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 360-363.

district, whether they voted for the party or not<sup>18</sup>, meaning that it is not only ethnic Hungarians who are able to enjoy the benefits granted by the elites in Budapest.

Kanchan Chandra argues that the clientelist operation of ethnic parties requires certain well-specified conditions, namely patronage democracies.<sup>19</sup> Following this argument, both Ukrainian and Hungarian party systems could be characterized by their particularistic political behavior.<sup>20</sup> Tamás Kiss and István Gergő Székely define the political theory of particularism as each political group having a right to promote its own interests and especially independence without paying regard to the interests of larger groups.<sup>21</sup> Thus, patronage democracy is a political system that encourages patronage and clientelistic links, which in reality produce corruption and unequal sharing of state resources. These characteristics are indicative for both Ukrainian and Hungarian political systems, making clientelistic theories relevant for the present study. Clientelistic theories provide a tool to analyze and explain the pragmatic reasons that could in part motivate ethnic Ukrainian and mixed families in Transcarpathia to choose Hungarian-medium schools for their children.

---

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 355–371

<sup>19</sup> Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>20</sup> Tamás Kiss, and István Gergő Székely, “Shifting linkages in ethnic mobilization: the case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania,” *Nationalities Papers* 44:4 (2016): 591-610.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



### III. Historical and Political Context

#### 3.1. Clash of nationalisms

This study will investigate a case in Hungarian-Ukrainian state relations involving Ukraine's region of Transcarpathia (Hungarian: Kárpátalja) on the border with Hungary. Transcarpathia is separated from the rest of Ukraine by the Carpathian Mountains, and has been a part of various Hungarian state formations since the Middle Ages until 1919, when the region came under the control of Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of World War I. The Treaty of Trianon, signed in 1920, confirmed Hungary's territorial losses - nearly three quarters of its prewar territory, including Transcarpathia. Large number of ethnic Hungarians found themselves outside Hungary's new borders. Transcarpathia briefly returned under Hungarian control during World War II, lasting from 1939 to 1944, when it became part of Soviet Ukraine. The newly acquired Ukrainian territory was and remains highly multiethnic, with a sizeable ethnic Hungarian minority. According to the latest Ukrainian census, conducted in 2001, ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia number over 150 thousand, comprising 12% of the region's population<sup>22</sup>.

The Treaty of Trianon immediately became a political issue in Hungary and remains a factor in the country's foreign relations to this day. While the Socialist

---

<sup>22</sup> State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *Distribution of the population by nationality and native language, Zakarpatska oblast (2)*, [http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree\\_en.asp](http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_en.asp).

Hungarian government attempted to evade the issue of the post-Trianon Hungarian diaspora, it regained attention after Hungary's democratic transition in 1989. Hungarian political powers chose different policies towards their Hungarian co-ethnics living abroad. Left-wing political parties stressed the legal aspect of national minority protections, mostly based on the European Union's legislation,<sup>23</sup> while right-wing parties referred to nationalistic discourse<sup>24</sup>. The victory of the Fidesz/KDNP coalition at Hungary's parliamentary elections in 2010 ushered in a new era for the ethnic Hungarian community of Transcarpathia. Initially, Hungary's provisions for its ethnic diasporas did not include dual citizenship programs. In 2004, a referendum was held on a proposal to offer dual citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad, failing due to low voter turnout<sup>25</sup>. The return of Viktor Orbán (who supported the 2004 proposal) as Hungary's prime minister after 2010 brought crucial changes to Hungary's citizenship policy. The same year, the Act on Hungarian Nationality was amended, simplifying the naturalization procedure<sup>26</sup>. The new legislation formulated two eligibility criteria for the naturalization procedure: descent from citizens of Hungary and knowledge of the Hungarian language<sup>27</sup>. As the first criterion is understood in historic terms,

<sup>23</sup> Ivan Medynskyi, and Bence Kapcsos, *Foreign policy audit: Ukraine-Hungary* (Kyiv, 2016).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Michael A. Weinstein, "Hungary's Referendum on Dual Citizenship," Global Policy Forum, December 13, 2004, <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/nations/emerging/2004/1213hungaryref.htm>.

<sup>26</sup> Judit Tóth, "UPDATE: Changes in the Hungarian Citizenship Law and adopted on 26 May 2010," *European Union Democracy Observation Citizenship*, July 2010, <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19616/Hungary.pdf?sequence=1>.

<sup>27</sup> Országgyűlés, *Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship*, Legislationline, [https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary\\_Citizenship\\_act\\_2012\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary_Citizenship_act_2012_en.pdf).

all Hungarian speakers descending from Hungary's pre-1920 territories are deemed eligible. Thus, the policy is seen as primarily directed at ethnic Hungarians in cross-border territories in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine etc. From a Hungarian nationalist perspective, the new law does justice to the Hungarian nation, uniting it under one state. Analysts have pointed to other motivations of the Orbán government, namely securing votes from new citizens and countering Hungary's population decline<sup>28</sup>.

Hungary's new citizenship policies caused negative reactions from some neighboring states. Most prominently, Slovakia amended its law in response to ban dual citizenship<sup>29</sup>. The offer of citizenship also became issue for Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. In a meeting with the President of Hungary Pál Schmitt, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Lytvyn stressed that Ukraine's law does not recognize dual citizenship<sup>30</sup>. Despite differing theoretical interpretations of Ukrainian law, the practice of dual citizenship remained unsanctioned<sup>31</sup>. From January 2011 to July 2016, 150,620 persons in Ukraine obtained Hungarian citizenship<sup>32</sup>. This number corresponds to about 96% of ethnic Hungarians in the

<sup>28</sup> Yossi Harpaz, *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019): 43.

<sup>29</sup> Rainer Bauböck, "Dual citizenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat," EUDO Citizenship Observatory 75 (2010).

<sup>30</sup> "Navishcho hromadianam Ukrainy uhors'ki pasporty," UNIAN, November 24, 2010, <https://www.unian.ua/society/429049-navishcho-gromadyanam-ukrajini-ugorski-pasporti.html>.

<sup>31</sup> Csilla Fedinec, "Some Aspects of Hungarian-Ukrainian Relations in Our Time," in *A jubilee collection: essays in honor of professor Paul Robert Magocsi on his 70th Birthday*, ed. By Valerii Padiak and Patricia A. Krafcik (Uzhhorod; Prešov; New York: Valerii Padiak Publishers, 2015), 185-194.

<sup>32</sup> Szabolcs Pogonyi, *Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 170.

country. Considering that the number of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine is estimated to have decreased by about 20 thousand since the 2001 census<sup>33</sup>, as well as the fact that citizenship acquisitions have continued to this day, it is highly likely that at least some applicants come from the ethnic Ukrainian majority in Transcarpathia. A similar result was observed in Serbia, where ethnic Serbs in Vojvodina (formerly part of Hungary) were attracted by the practical benefits offered by Hungarian citizenship<sup>34</sup>.

For inhabitants of former Hungarian territories in non-EU member states such as Serbia and Ukraine, Hungarian citizenship guarantees easy access to all member states of the European Union, the United Kingdom and even the United States, as well as the legal right to reside and work in the European Union for an indefinite period of time. Transcarpathia in particular has long been a source of labor migration to Central and Western Europe. The average gross income in the region is 230 euros, several times less than in any member state of the European Union<sup>35</sup>.

The Hungarian government has also attempted to mobilize national feelings and sentiments in its citizenship program. The documents confirming the acquisition of citizenship feature Hungary's national symbols such as the coat of arms.

---

<sup>33</sup> Patrik Tátrai, József Molnár, Katalin Kovály, and Ágnes Erőss, "A kárpátaljai magyarok lélekszáma és a népesedésüket befolyásoló tényezők a SUMMA 2017 felmérés alapján," *Kisebbségi Szemle* 3, no. 2 (2018): 7-31.

<sup>34</sup> Yossi Harpaz, *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019): 47.

<sup>35</sup> Rossen Koroutchev, "Economic Situation and Migration Trends of Eastern Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine," *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs* 5, no. 3 (2020): 9-26.

Similarly, the folder provided with the documents is decorated with the image of Saint Stephen of Hungary wearing the Holy Crown<sup>36</sup>. This visual design represents Hungary as a European Christian nation, in line with the Hungarian right wing's use of Christianity in constructing an ethno-national idea<sup>37</sup>. The law required newly naturalized citizens to take an oath, or pledge of allegiance to Hungary. As to the political benefits the new citizenship procedures brought to the Fidesz/KDNP coalition, those materialized with the new Act on Electoral Procedure adopted in 2012. The new legislation provided non-resident Hungarian citizens with the right to vote in the Hungarian parliamentary elections, specifically for the party lists in the nationwide constituency (excluding the first-past-the-post single-member constituencies)<sup>38</sup>. In the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary election, Fidesz/KDNP received over 95% of the votes cast outside Hungary<sup>39</sup>.

In addition to the naturalization program, the Hungarian government provides extensive financial support to the ethnic Hungarian community in Transcarpathia. Examples include refurbishment of schools, kindergartens and small healthcare units in Hungarian-inhabited areas, salary supplements for the staff of Hungarian-

<sup>36</sup> Richárd Tarnai, "Kettős állampolgárság - Egyszerűsített honosítás; Adja le kérelmét a Kormányablakokban!," *Kormányhivatalok*, March 2, 2012, <https://www.kormanyhivatal.hu/hu/pest/hirek/kettos-allampolgarsag-egyszerusített-honositas-adja-le-kerelmet-a-kormanyablakokban>.

<sup>37</sup> Andras Bozóki, and Zoltan Ádám, "State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary," *Intersections* 2, no. 1 (2016): 98-122.

<sup>38</sup> Országgyűlés, *Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure*, Nemzeti Választási Iroda, [https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary\\_Citizenship\\_act\\_2012\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary_Citizenship_act_2012_en.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> Nemzeti Választási Iroda, *ORSZÁGGYŰLÉSI KÉPVISELŐK VÁLASZTÁSA*, April 6, 2015, <https://static.valasztas.hu/dyn/pv14/szavossz/hu/orszlist.html>.

medium schools, financial aid for doctors, nurses, and art teachers who visibly indicate offering services in the Hungarian language and so on. The Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, the only higher education institution in Ukraine offering all courses in the Hungarian language, was founded and receives support from an organization funded entirely by the Hungarian state<sup>40</sup>.

Apart from direct financial aid, Hungary engages in external demonstration of its co-ethnic integration policies. Hungarian gesture politics aim to win the sympathies of the local population by covering tasks which would generally fall under the responsibility of the Ukrainian government. As an example, the Hungarian state financed the installation of a statue to the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko in Berehove (Hungarian: Beregszász), the cultural center of Transcarpathian Hungarians<sup>41</sup>. Berehove is often visited by the Hungarian politicians – nearly every month, the town's residents have an opportunity to see Anikó Lévai, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's wife, who often brings humanitarian aid to Ukraine<sup>42</sup>. Jobbik's Member of the European Parliament Béla Kovács has his own office in town, where he holds regular meetings with the local voters<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> Ágnes Erőss, Katalin Kovály, and Patrik Tátrai, "Effects of the Ukrainian crisis in Transcarpathia: The Hungarian perspective," *CMR Working Papers* 92, no. 150 (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Centre of Migration Research, 2016).

<sup>41</sup> Ágnes Erőss, Katalin Kovály, and Patrik Tátrai, "Kin-state politics stirred by a geopolitical conflict: Hungary's growing activity in post-Euromaidan Transcarpathia, Ukraine," *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66, no. 3 (2017): 203-218.

<sup>42</sup> Adél Gál, "Kárpátalján járt a Magyar Ökumenikus Segélyszervezet," *Kárpátalja.ma*, October 9, 2014, <https://karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/kozelet/karpataljan-jart-a-magyar-okumenikus-segelyszervezet>.

<sup>43</sup> Ivan Medynskyi, and Bence Kapcsos, *Foreign policy audit: Ukraine-Hungary* (Kyiv, 2016).

The Hungarian national symbols form a part of the town's landscape. The town's administrative buildings commonly fly the Ukrainian and Hungarian national flags together. During a far-right march in 2017, the Hungarian flag was removed from Berehove's town hall, provoking a negative reaction from Hungary's Foreign Minister<sup>44</sup>. The practice of flying the Hungarian national flag in Ukraine's Hungarian-inhabited settlements has come under criticism in the Ukrainian media, as did the performing of the Hungarian national anthem at local government sessions in Berehove. In response, the representatives of the Transcarpathian Hungarian community argue that the Hungarian national flag is used to represent the Hungarian national (ethnic) community instead of the Hungarian state<sup>45</sup>. In either case, the Hungarian national symbols can already be qualified as an acceptable part of the Transcarpathian public space, considering the largely neutral opinion of the region's public on the matter (see Section 2.3).

Another peculiar visual practice is the installation of settlement name plates in rovásírás or Hungarian runic writing. Rovásírás is not used as a practical writing system, but is essentially a nationalist symbol, associated with the revisionist circles in Hungary<sup>46</sup>. Starting in 2010, rovásírás name plates began to appear

<sup>44</sup> "U Berehovi znaly z merii prapor Uhorschyny, Budapesht vymahaie rozsliduvannia," *Ievropeis'ka Pravda*, November 13, 2017, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2017/11/13/7073600/>.

<sup>45</sup> "Chy perehodyt' mezhi ukrains'koho zakonodavstva uhors'ka natsmenshyna Zakarpattia?," *Zakarpattia Onlain*, September 1, 2011, <https://zakarpattia.net.ua/News/86810-Chy-perekhodyt-mezhi-ukrainskoho-zakonodavstva-uhorska-natsmenshyna-Zakarpattia>.

<sup>46</sup> Alexander Maxwell, "Contemporary Hungarian Rune-Writing: Ideological Linguistic Nationalism within a Homogenous Nation," *Anthropos* 99 (2004): 161-175.

outside Hungarian-inhabited settlements in Transcarpathia alongside the official bilingual Ukrainian-Hungarian plates. The rovásírás plates are not mandated by local authorities or the Ukraine's State Road Agency. Instead, they are usually gifted by Jobbik or Hungarian NGOs and erected by one of the Hungarian cultural associations in Transcarpathia. In effect, as the official name plates are bilingual, with the Hungarian-language version accompanied by a Ukrainian one, rovásírás serves to definitively mark the territory as ethnically Hungarian<sup>47</sup>.

Finally, monuments and sculptures can be seen as a third example of external manifestations of Hungarian nationalism in Transcarpathia. According to the Hungarian mythological tradition, Turul is a bird that led Hungarians under Attila the Great across the Carpathians to the Pannonian Plain. Turul has long served as a symbol of Hungarian nationalism<sup>48</sup>. In 2008, a Turul sculpture was installed in the Mukachevo Castle. The installation met some criticism on political grounds, and it was rumored 2018 that the Turul would be replaced with a Ukrainian symbol, the trident from Ukraine's coat of arms<sup>49</sup>. Turul sculptures can now be found in some other Hungarian-inhabited settlements in the region (Tyachiv, Vylok, Vyshkovo). Another prominent monument is located at the Vereckyi Pass in the Carpathian Mountains, unveiled in May 2008. According to the traditional

<sup>47</sup> István Csernicskó, "Accounting for changes in the linguistic landscape: The example of Transcarpathia," *Magyar Nyelv* 112, no. 1 (2016): 50-62.

<sup>48</sup> Bertold Varga, "A turulmadár, mint a magyarság oltalmazója és védelmezője (A turulmadár, mint a magyarság múltja, jelene és jövője)," *Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia* 26, no. 2 (2011): 190-206.

<sup>49</sup> "Turul na Mukachiv's'komu zamku zaminiať na herb Ukrainy," Zakarpattia Onlain, October 12, 2018, <https://zakarpattia.net.ua/News/185996-Turul-na-Mukachivskomu-zamku-zaminiať-na-herb-Ukrainy>.



historical narrative, this is where Hungarians crossed the Carpathian Mountains, reaching and settling the Pannonian Plain in the final part of the so-called “conquest of the homeland” (Hungarian: honfoglalás). Just a few months later, in July 2008, another monument was installed just three hundred meters away, this time honoring an element of the Ukrainian national narrative, namely the soldiers of the Carpathian Sich, executed at the same mountain pass following Hungary’s occupation of the region in 1939<sup>50</sup>. In this case, the Ukrainian-Hungarian memory politics exchange in the Carpathian Mountains finished in a tie.

To summarize, one of the key vectors of Hungary’s external policy is the integration of Hungarian ethnic minorities in the neighboring countries into the common Hungarian cultural-historical space. This is achieved by providing legal and social benefits, as well as with the display of Hungarian national symbols in public space.

The effects of the Hungarian ethno-nationalist practices in Transcarpathia did not remain unnoticed by the Ukrainian political elite. The rise of Ukraine’s own nationalist sentiments in the course and following the 2013-2014 protests, the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine have brought real and purported separatism to the forefront of the Ukrainian political discourse.

---

<sup>50</sup> Nadiia Petriv, “Ukrains’kyi ta uhors’kyi pamiatnyky vidkryly na Verets’komu perevali Karpat,” *Radio Svoboda: Ukraina*, July 21, 2008, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/1185215.html>.

The relations between Hungary and Ukraine reached their first critical point following Ukraine's adoption of a new education law in 2017 (see Section 3.2). Tensions erupted in 2018, after a leaked video showed a naturalization ceremony in the Hungarian consulate in Berehove, complete with the oath of allegiance to Hungary and the singing of Hungary's national anthem. The Hungarian consul was declared *persona non grata* in Ukraine, followed by a Ukrainian diplomat of equal rank being expelled from Hungary. Ukraine's foreign minister stated in his response to the incident: "We will engage systematically with this issue. There will be more Ukraine [in Transcarpathia], more each year. We will definitely achieve that."<sup>51</sup> Clearly, the Ukrainian political elite deemed open manifestations of loyalty to another state on its territory, whether symbolic or not, politically unacceptable.

Note that the data analyzed in this study are situated in the same political context as the diplomatic row referred to above, as they were collected in the end of Petro Poroshenko's presidential term in Ukraine (2014-2019). This time period can be seen as the active phase of the dual citizenship issue, marked by scandals involving Ukrainian state officials holding dual citizenship<sup>52</sup> and threats of sanctions from the Ukrainian government, such as President Poroshenko's 2017

<sup>51</sup> Aleksei Arunyan, "How Hungary and Ukraine fell out over a passport scandal," *Open Democracy*, October 11, 2018, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyiv-and-budapest-fell-out-over-zakarpattia/>.

<sup>52</sup> Volodymyr Pyrih, "Chynovnykiv i deputativ Zakarpattia pereviriat' na naiavnist' podviynoho hromadianstva," *Zaxid.net*, October 9, 2018, <https://zaxid.net/chinovnikiv-i-deputativ-zakarpattia-pereviryat-na-nayavnist-podviynogo-gromadyanstva-n1467304>.

draft bill proposing to revoke dual citizens' Ukrainian citizenship<sup>53</sup>. Ukraine's current president Volodymyr Zelensky has since moved in the opposite direction. Poroshenko's draft bill was scrapped in May 2019, and work on a new bill that would legalize and regulate multiple citizenship commenced in early 2021<sup>54</sup>.

The ongoing political situation in Transcarpathia can be described as a clash of nationalisms. In terms of Roger Brubaker's triadic nexus model, Hungary represents the kin-state side, with Ukraine as the nationalizing state, and the Hungarian national minority, or even the entire population of the region, caught in the crossfire. While Hungary has long occupied the protective position vis-à-vis the ethnic Hungarian communities abroad, Ukraine can be considered a latecomer to the triad, having assumed an active role only recently.

At the same time, the Ukrainian state prior to 2014 can hardly be called nationalizing with respect to ethnic Hungarians. As the following section will discuss, even as recently as 2012, Ukraine's newly adopted language law was favorable towards minority languages. The previous attempts to apply the nationalizing state label to Ukraine were criticized by Volodymyr Kulyk, who claimed that it risked reducing the concept's analytical strength, if applied to any

<sup>53</sup> "Poroshenko podav zakonoproektpro zaborony podviinoho hromadianstva," *Livyi bereh*, March 13, 2017, [https://lb.ua/news/2017/03/13/361055\\_poroshenko\\_podal\\_zakonoproekt.html](https://lb.ua/news/2017/03/13/361055_poroshenko_podal_zakonoproekt.html).

<sup>54</sup> "Ukraina dozvolyt' podviine hromadianstvo z druzhnimy krainamy – Kuleba," Deutsche Welle: Ukraina, March 5, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/uk/ukraina-dozvolyt-podviine-hromadianstvo-z-krainamy-yes-kuleba/a-56779480>.

nation-building attempts in post-Soviet countries<sup>55</sup>. This view stands in opposition to Brubaker's idea that a triad can be initiated by the kin-state, while the host state's national policies will be interpreted as nationalizing in any case. Until 2014, Transcarpathian Hungarians were not negatively engaged by the nationalizing state end of the triad. Therefore, in the 2010-2013 period, the relations established between the Hungarian government and the population of Transcarpathia were rather bilateral.

### **3.2. Hungarian language and education in Transcarpathia**

Ukraine's language policies have been largely informed by the presence of a sizeable Russian-speaking community. Successive attempts to modify the country's linguistic rights legislation have aimed to balance the interests of Ukrainian speakers against the speakers of Russian and other minority languages. As Csernicškó and Fedinec conclude in their analysis of Ukraine's language laws, these attempts have been unsuccessful, as the current demands of Ukrainian and minority language speakers are incompatible<sup>56</sup>.

The language law of 1989 is considered to have constituted a compromise between the continuing presence of the Russian language in many domains of life, and the increasing drive towards Ukrainization<sup>57</sup>. The law defined the choice

---

<sup>55</sup> Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Beyond Brubaker," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 26, no. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 2001): 197-221.

<sup>56</sup> Csilla Fedinec, and István Csernicškó, "Four Language Laws of Ukraine," *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 23 (2016): 560-582.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 562-3.

of language in education as an inalienable right. To accommodate the needs of national (ethnic) minorities, provisions were made to create minority language educational facilities, as well as minority language groups in Ukrainian-medium facilities<sup>58</sup>.

The 1992 Law on National Minorities in Ukraine declared the right for education in minority languages or studying minority languages in state educational facilities<sup>59</sup>.

In 1999, Ukraine ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages for the first time. Due to a number of issues, the Charter only entered into force in Ukraine in 2006. Prerequisite to Ukraine's accession to the Council of Europe, the Charter protected the languages of 13 national minorities, including Hungarians. Although Ukraine has adopted relatively modest commitments to promote education in the recognized minority languages, it does not currently comply with these obligations<sup>60</sup>.

The 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy provisioned wide-ranging rights for practicing minority languages. It guaranteed education in

<sup>58</sup> Verkhovna Rada Ukrain's'koi Radians'koi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliki, *Pro movy v Ukrain's'kii RSR*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/8312-11/ed19891028#Text>.

<sup>59</sup> Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Pro natsional'ni menshyny Ukrainy*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12/ed19920625#Text>.

<sup>60</sup> István Cserniczkó, and Anita Márku, "Minority language rights in Ukraine from the point of view of application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages," *Alkalmazott Nyelvtudomány* 20, no. 2 (2020): 1-18.

minority languages at all levels of from preschool to higher education<sup>61</sup>. The law also defined a regional language status for use in administrative units where over 10% of the population were native speakers of a minority language. One of the main issues identified with the law is that no material subsidies were allocated for its implementation<sup>62</sup>.

The 2017 Education Law has significantly narrowed the previous provisions for minority language use in education. The new law only guarantees the right to education in minority languages at the pre-school and elementary level. At the same time, educational facilities are allowed to teach “one or several subjects” in official languages of the European Union (which include Hungarian). For speakers of the same languages, a transitional period has subsequently been implemented, ending in 2023<sup>63</sup>. The same provisions on education have been reiterated in the 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language<sup>64</sup>.

Finally, the 2020 Law on Complete General Secondary Education provides the right to education in minority languages at the secondary level, alongside with the state language (Ukrainian). Again, special conditions are formulated for

---

<sup>61</sup> Csilla Fedinec, and István Csernicskó, “Four Language Laws of Ukraine,” *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 23 (2016): 572

<sup>62</sup> Viktória Ferenc, “Transition in language policy of Ukraine (1989–2014),” in *Sociolinguistic Transition in Former Eastern Bloc Countries: Two Decades after the Regime Change*, ed. by M. Sloboda, P. Laihonon and A. Zabrodskaja (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016).

<sup>63</sup> Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Pro osvitu*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2145-19/ed20210423#Text>.

<sup>64</sup> Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrains'koi movy iak dezhavnoi*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-19/ed20190425#Text>.

minority speakers of official languages of the European Union (e.g. Hungarian). In this case, Ukrainian is required to be used as the teaching language for at least 20% of the school curriculum in the first year with a gradual yearly increase up to 60%<sup>65</sup>.

As the above overview demonstrates, for the past 30 years Ukraine's language policy has effectively oscillated between introducing and restricting minority rights. Most recently, a significant restriction in the scope of minority language use rights has occurred beginning with the 2017 Education Law. The law evoked harsh criticism from several countries, most notably Hungary, which has begun impeding Ukraine's cooperation with NATO in response<sup>66</sup>. The Hungarian and Ukrainian governments have attempted to work out a resolution. With talks still ongoing, the Hungarian-language education continues functioning as normal<sup>67</sup>.

At present, there are 176 schools in Transcarpathia using Hungarian as the language of instruction. Hungarian-language and bilingual higher education is offered by the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute in Berehove, as well as select departments at the Uzhhorod National University,

<sup>65</sup> Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, *Pro povnu zahal'nu seredniu osvitu*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/463-20/ed20200116#Text>.

<sup>66</sup> Andrzej Sadecki, and Tadeusz Iwański, "Ukraine–Hungary: the intensifying dispute over the Hungarian minority's rights," *OSW Commentary* 280 (2018): 1-7.

<sup>67</sup> Mykhailo Hlukhovskyi, "Posol Uhorshchyny v Ukraini Ishtvan Ildiartto: Dyskusii navkolo Avtonomii na Zakarpatti maiut' duzhe vysoku temperaturu," June 18, 2021, <https://glavcom.ua/interviews/posol-ugorshchini-v-ukrajini-ishtvan-iydyarto-diskusiji-navkolo-avtonomiji-na-zakarpatti-mayut-duzhe-visoku-temperaturu-763565.html>.

Mukachevo State University, and some local medical and pedagogical colleges<sup>68</sup>.

Most Hungarian educational institutes and organizations in the region function with the financial support of the Hungarian government (see Section 3.1).

Perhaps the single event that most affected Hungarian-language education in Ukraine was the Ministry of Education decree from December 2008, which established uniform central examinations for applicants to tertiary education. While the national average failure rate for the Ukrainian language and literature test fell in the range of 8-9%, the failure rate for Hungarian-language school graduates was 30% in 2008, 44% in 2009, and 63% in 2015. The consequences were especially far-reaching in 2015, as that year, the Ukrainian language and literature test was compulsory for all school-leavers. Hungarian-medium schools could not effectively prepare students for an examination designed with native speakers of Ukrainian in mind, pushing Hungarian-speaking families to majority language education<sup>69</sup>. In 1996, 35.4% of ethnic Hungarian students in Transcarpathia were enrolled in Ukrainian-language educational facilities. This figure reached 45.1% in 2011 – an increase of nearly 10%, higher than in any other Hungarian minority group<sup>70</sup>.

<sup>68</sup> The Department of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration, *ZZSO, v jakykh učni navčajutsja uhors'koju movoju*, 2020, <https://deponms.carpathia.gov.ua/uploads/uploads/Zakladi-z-ugorskou-movou-navcanna-za-stupenami.pdf>.

<sup>69</sup> István Cserniczkó, "Bilingual Education of Minorities: Always the Best Solution?" *Manins'ki iazytsy u obrazovanii i učenii iazyka* 7 (2017):87-103.

<sup>70</sup> Anita Nánási-Molnár, and Magdolna Séra, "Óvodai és iskolaválasztási motivációk Kárpátalján," in *Szülőföldön Magyarul: Iskolák és diákok a határon túl*, ed. by Gabriella Pusztai and Zsuzsanna Márkus (Debrecen: Debrecen University Press, 2017): 241.



The 2011 Hungarian citizenship program has created a high demand for learning the Hungarian language, as for most non-Hungarian-speakers in Transcarpathia language skills form the only obstacle in the citizenship acquisition process. Private Hungarian language courses are reported to be opening all around the region. In the 2015/2016 school year, free-of-charge language courses were organized by Hungary, with a thousand students enrolled at 105 sites across Transcarpathia<sup>71</sup>.

Ukraine's nationalizing policies in the education sphere ended the previous period of non-interference, jeopardizing the country's relations with Hungary as well as other neighboring states. This situation established triadic relationships similar to the Central European cases observed since the 1990s. The attempts to restrict or abolish the Hungarian-language education, most notably at the secondary and higher levels, placed Ukraine into an active role in its relations with ethnic minorities. These changes also affect the status of the Hungarian language itself, potentially excluding it from certain levels of education. The threat to the previous autonomy of the ethnic Hungarian community in Transcarpathia drives it towards revisioning its relations with their kin-state (Hungary) and nationalizing place of residence (Ukraine).

---

<sup>71</sup> Ágnes Erőss, Katalin Kovály, and Patrik Tátrai, "Kin-state politics stirred by a geopolitical conflict: Hungary's growing activity in post-Euromaidan Transcarpathia, Ukraine," *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66, no. 3 (2017): 211-212.

On the macro level, the recently established triad demonstrates the clash of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalisms over the national affiliation of Transcarpathian Hungarians. Such a model works on the basis of patronage or clientelistic character of the connection between the Transcarpathian electorate with both the Hungarian and Ukrainian political elites. As the Ukrainian and Hungarian political party systems could both be characterized as patronage democracies, the Transcarpathian electorate supports those political actors, who can provide them with more resources and benefits from the capital, whether Kyiv or Budapest.

At the same time, the triadic relationship puts this pragmatic orientation under pressure, creating an opportunity to mobilize Hungarian national sentiments. Previous decades of Hungarians' peaceful residence in Transcarpathia are replaced with the uncertainty of the new language law that endangers Hungarian educational institutions in Ukraine. If Ukrainian nationalizing policy is not reversed, the normal life of Hungarians in Transcarpathia will be disrupted. In that case, the potential for Hungarian self-understanding and groupness is open for mobilization, and relations between the Hungarian government and the Transcarpathian Hungarian ethnic community cease to be merely clientelistic.

### **3.3. Performing the Nation. Hungarian traditions as an essential part of festive life in Transcarpathia**

Among the possible motivations for ethnically Ukrainian and mixed families in Transcarpathia to enroll their children in Hungarian-medium schools is the lack of perception of Hungarian as a foreign language. Even non-speakers may often encounter the language in the region's public space, increasing the sense of familiarity and association with the Hungarian language. To better understand this argument, it is worth to closer investigate the linguistic environment where the parents make the decision under consideration of the present study. In other words, to define the place of the Hungarian language and culture in Transcarpathian public space.

Celebrations, commemorations, and festivals inspired by the Hungarian culture and history form an important part of everyday ethnic practices in Transcarpathia. The region's cultural life includes festivities, where Hungarian national symbols, folk costumes, dances and songs can be seen. Each year, students of Hungarian-language schools and the Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute attend a Christmas Vienna-style ball, a Hungarian tradition going back to the Austro-Hungarian period. Regional Hungarian cultural associations regularly organize commemorations of famous Hungarians and the key events in Hungarian history (both national and local). By the way of the region's blend of cultures, the Hungarian culture has also imbued the culture and celebrations of the ethnic

Ukrainian majority, with influences in cuisine as a prime example. Consequently, Hungarian cultural attributes form an essential part of the cultural life in Transcarpathia.

It is interesting to consider the way Hungarian culture is exploited by the Transcarpathian tourist business. For outside tourists, Transcarpathia is advertised as “Ukrainian little Europe” or “Ukrainian Hungary”<sup>72</sup>. Numerous towns and villages in the region hold wine and gastronomical festivals, serving local wines “not worse than the wines in Hungary”<sup>73</sup> and Hungarian-influenced traditional Transcarpathian dishes. Many of the festivals involving traditional Hungarian food products (lekvár, palinka, “bogrács soup”) were established to attract tourists to Hungarian-inhabited settlements. The thermal baths in Berehove and Kosyno were recently redesigned in a traditional Hungarian rural style and are advertised as “thermal baths as useful and healthy as the famous Széchenyi Baths in Budapest”<sup>74</sup>. This exemplifies, that both the local and international touristic image of Transcarpathia adapts Hungarian cultural traits. Being Hungarian means being European. Cultivating Transcarpathia’s Hungarian cultural stereotypes provides the region with an image that is more international, more European, and thus more attractive and prestigious for locals and tourists

<sup>72</sup> “Zakarpats'kyi drayv,” *Charivnyi svit podorozhi*, <http://svitpodorogy.com/ekskursijni-programi-po-ukraini/zakarpatskij-drajv>.

<sup>73</sup> “Yuvileynyi festyval’ vyna u Berehovi vzhe rozpochavs’a. Svyatkuvatymut’ azh 4 dni (FOTO),” *Mukachevo.net*, March 8, 2018, <http://www.mukachevo.net/ua/news/view/314331>.

<sup>74</sup> “Zakarpats'kyi drayv,” *Charivnyi svit podorozhi*, <http://svitpodorogy.com/ekskursijni-programi-po-ukraini/zakarpatskij-drajv>.

alike. This is not merely a consequence of Transcarpathia's historical ties to Hungary, but is also driven by close ties currently, as well as Hungary's prestige on the international arena. Cultural traditions also bring pragmatic benefits like tourism development and wealth generation.

These observations can serve as examples illustrating that the Hungarian culture forms a part of everyday ethnicity in Transcarpathia and has effectively become a part of an ethnically non-specific regional sense of culture.

### **3.4. Current research. This study**

In the recent years, studies on the Hungarian-language education outside Hungary have paid increased attention to parents' choices of kindergartens and schools for their children.

Interviews conducted by Viktória Ferenc and Magdolna Séra in the Transcarpathian Hungarian minority community have identified the language of instruction as one of the primary factors in school choices, along with the distance from one's home, the teachers' personality, and the ratio of Roma pupils in classes. At the Hungarian-language school in Mukachevo, a city where ethnic Hungarians are a minority, the authors observed a large group of students from

ethnically mixed families who chose the school specifically to improve their knowledge of Hungarian<sup>75</sup>.

Viktória Ferenc and Anita Nánási-Molnár used survey methods to examine the reasons for choosing Hungarian-language kindergartens in Transcarpathian families of different ethnic backgrounds. 407 questionnaires were collected in a representative sample of 29 kindergartens (20 in rural and 9 in urban areas). Of the surveyed parent couples, 68.4% identified as ethnically Hungarian, 12.1% as ethnically Ukrainian, and 19.1% were mixed with one parent each identifying as Hungarian and Ukrainian. For ethnically Ukrainian and mixed families, the opportunity for the children to learn Hungarian was identified as an important factor in choosing a Hungarian-language kindergarten. For Ukrainian families, this factor was identified as the most important. Among families with several children, ethnically Ukrainian and mixed parent couples often chose Hungarian-language education for their younger children, even if their older children had attended a Ukrainian-language kindergarten. According to the authors, this reflects the general rise in popularity of Hungarian-language education in Transcarpathia, motivated by the perceived economic benefits available to Hungarian-speaking children<sup>76</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> Viktória Ferenc, and Magdolna Séra, "Iskolaválasztás Kárpátalján," *Kisebbségkutatás* 21, no. 3 (2012): 473-513.

<sup>76</sup> Viktória Ferenc, and Anita Nánási-Molnár, "Kik választják a magyar óvodákat Kárpátalján? Szülői motivációk kárpátaljai ukránok és magyarok körében a 2013-14-es forradalmi események után," *Kisebbségi Szemle* 3, no. 2 (2018): 87-111.

Based on her interviews with ethnic Ukrainian students of the Transcarpathian Hungarian College, Hannah Erkelens, too, pointed to economic factors, namely the opportunity to acquire citizenship of the European Union, as a primary reason for students choosing to study at a Hungarian-language institution. Another section of the study analyzes an interview with the Budapest-based Rákóczi Association as a more direct example of kin-state actors attempting to influence education choices in the ethnic diaspora<sup>77</sup>.

As pointed out by Ferenc and Nánási-Molnár, since rural settlements tend to only have one kindergarten or school, it is primarily parents in urban areas who can choose between different educational institutions<sup>78</sup>. In view of this fact, this study was conducted in an urban settlement in Transcarpathia, the town of Vynohradiv.

Vynohradiv (Hungarian: Nagyszőlős) is a former district town of about 25,000 people in Ukraine's Transcarpathia Region, less than 20 kilometers from the nearest border crossing to Hungary (Vylok-Tiszabecs). At the last population census in Ukraine conducted in 2001, 82.1% of Vynohradiv's inhabitants declared Ukrainian as their native language, while 13.5% responded with

---

<sup>77</sup> Hannah Erkelens, *Hungarian Kin-State Politics. A Blessing or Curse?* (Radboud University Human Geography Master Thesis, 2020).

<sup>78</sup> Viktória Ferenc, and Anita Nánási-Molnár, "Kik választják a magyar óvodákat Kárpátalján? Szülői motivációk kárpátaljai ukránok és magyarok körében a 2013-14-es forradalmi események után," *Kisebbségi Szemle* 3, no. 2 (2018): 90-91.

Hungarian. These figures closely resembled the ethnicity data for the town, where 80.8% declared Ukrainian, and 14.3% declared Hungarian ethnicity<sup>79</sup>.

Vynohradiv has one kindergarten (St. Joseph Pre-School) and one school (Zsigmond Perényi Comprehensive School No. 3) where Hungarian is used as the medium of instruction. On an average year, the school's size is about 300 students<sup>80</sup>. Traditionally, Hungarian-language schools in Transcarpathia have primarily attracted families in the ethnic Hungarian community. For Transcarpathian Hungarians, schools, among other cultural institutions, were a means to support their group identity. However, Hungarian-language education has now gained in popularity among Ukrainian-speaking families. This has come with its challenges, as the introduction of the majority language into Hungarian-language institutions caused some concerns as to the efficacy of their teaching<sup>81</sup>. The educational institutions attempt to adapt to the new circumstances by introducing new policies. In Vynohradiv, a scandal broke out as recently as April 2021, when St. Joseph Pre-School allegedly refused a place to a family where Hungarian was not spoken in the household<sup>82</sup>. In 2017, the Hungarian-language

<sup>79</sup> State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *Distribution of the population by nationality and native language, Zakarpatska oblast (2)*, [http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree\\_en.asp](http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_en.asp).

<sup>80</sup> The Department of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration, *ZZSO, v jakykh učni navčajúťsja uhors'koju movoju*, 2020, <https://deponms.carpathia.gov.ua/uploads/uploads/Zakladi-z-ugorskou-movou-navcanna-za-stupenami.pdf>.

<sup>81</sup> Viktória Ferenc, and Anita Nánási-Molnár, "Kik választják a magyar óvodákat Kárpátalján? Szülői motivációk kárpátaljai ukránok és magyarok körében a 2013-14-es forradalmi események után," *Kisebbségi Szemle* 3, no. 2 (2018): 94-95.

<sup>82</sup> "Skandal na Zakarpatti," *TSN*, 14 April 2021, <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/skandal-na-zakarpatti-ditnu-vidmovilis-brati-u-ditsadok-bo-yiji-batki-ne-znayut-ugorskoyi-movi-1765555.html>.



Zsigmond Perényi Comprehensive for the first time in its history separated its first-year students into two groups: one for Hungarian, and one for Ukrainian speakers. According to the headmaster, most Ukrainian-speaking students come from ethnically mixed (Hungarian-Ukrainian) households. As indicated by the research participants, the school now interviews prospective students to establish whether they possess at least minimal conversational skills in the Hungarian language.

The main objective of this study was to examine the relationship between ethnically Ukrainian and mixed families' motivations for educating their children in the Hungarian language, and Hungary's kin-state politics in Transcarpathia.

The study addresses the following research question: Why do parents in ethnic Ukrainian and mixed households choose Hungarian-language schools for their children? In addition, what effect, if any, do Hungary's kin-state politics in Transcarpathia have on these choices? I hypothesize that to a large extent, ethnic Ukrainian and mixed families see Hungarian-language education as a means to guarantee economic success to their children. That success is to be found outside Ukraine's borders in the European Union.

#### **IV. Data Collection and Background**

The data for the present study were obtained through in-depth interviews conducted with parents in ethnically Ukrainian and mixed households with children attending a Hungarian-language school.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted beginning in October 2018 (pilot interview) up to March and April 2019. The 8 interview participants (7 women and 1 man) were recruited in Vynohradiv, Ukraine. One participant was a personal contact, two were recruited via an acquaintance. The remaining five participants were recruited with the help of the headmaster of the Hungarian school in Vynohradiv. Of these five, three were employed at the school when the interviews took place. In accordance with their multicultural social environment, some respondents gave complex descriptions of their family's ethnic background. However, the Ukrainian ethnicity featured in every description, often along with the Hungarian ethnicity. Of the eight respondents, six primarily identified as ethnic Ukrainians, two identified as ethnic Hungarians. Crucially, all the respondents stated they spoke Ukrainian either as the only language at home, or in combination with Hungarian. While the respondents' children were studying in the local Hungarian-language school, most had entered the education system with little to no knowledge of Hungarian. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in the Ukrainian language and lasted from 20 up to 90 minutes. Before the recording, the respondents were introduced to the interview topic and purpose,

informed about its procedure, and ensured their anonymity would be protected. A short interview was also conducted with the school headmaster in order to gather more information about the school's student profile and policies. All the interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis. Further information about the participants is provided in Table 1.

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Interview duration</b>	<b>Interview date</b>	<b>Notes</b>
1	1h 30m	March 2019	
2	40m	March 2019	
3	40m	March 2019	
4	20m	March 2019	
5	50m	April 2019	school employee
6	40m	April 2019	school employee
7	30m	April 2019	school employee
8	45m	October 2018	male respondent
Headmaster	20m	April 2019	

Table 1: Information on participants

The interview questions were selected, first, in order to gather the participants' personal information such as their self-described ethnicity, native language, as well as the languages spoken at home and in the extended family. Participants were asked whether they speak Hungarian or have any Hungarian ancestry, what their personal stance is on Hungary and the Hungarian culture. Additional questions focused on other aspects of personal identity, such as religion or

preferred time zone (the latter was drawn from the previous research on identity and “local time” in Transcarpathia<sup>83</sup>).

A second group of questions aimed to gather details about the participants’ children and the educational institutions they were attending at the time or, for any older children, had attended in the past. The participants were asked about their motives for choosing the Hungarian-language school, who in the family had made that decision and how the decision had been made. The parents were also asked whether they were planning for their children to continue their studies in Hungary or acquire Hungarian citizenship when choosing the school. Other questions assessed the parents’ level of satisfaction with the Hungarian-medium school, and the perceived difference with majority language schools. Finally, Hungarian kin-state politics and the Ukrainian-Hungarian diplomatic relations were assessed with questions about Hungary’s aid for the school, the participants’ views on dual citizenship and Ukraine’s new education law.

---

<sup>83</sup> Csilla Fedinec, and István Csernicskó, “The Informal Use of Time as a Component of Multicultural Regional Identity in Transcarpathia (Ukraine),” *East Central Europe* 48 (2021): 73-102.

## V. Analysis

Why do Ukrainian-speaking parents enroll children in Hungarian-language schools? I will begin to examine this question by addressing the potential risks and shortcomings associated with the option in consideration. This will help understand the value of the benefits respondents ascribe to their choice.

Following that, I will present the motivations voiced by the parents interviewed in Vynohradiv, organized in two groups. First, motivations related to economic benefits and mobility will be discussed, using the concepts of kin-state politics and the triadic nexus. According to this study's hypothesis, economic motivations are the primary factor in school choices of ethnic Ukrainian and mixed Ukrainian-Hungarian families. Then, an analysis of alternative motivations will attempt to establish whether they support or subvert the hypothesis.

When discussing school options in their area, the respondents have almost universally referred to Ukrainian- and Hungarian-medium schools as simply "Ukrainian schools" and "Hungarian schools". These designations are left unchanged in quotations. All quotations in this chapter come from interviews conducted by the researcher, unless attributed otherwise.

### 5.1. Risks and shortcomings of Hungarian-medium schools

Education in one's native language is considered to be a human right<sup>84</sup>.

According to a report to the UN Human Rights Council, minority language education leads to improved academic results and better outcomes in life<sup>85</sup>. As a signatory to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Ukraine assumes an obligation to support education in its minority languages, including Hungarian.

Nonetheless, many ethnic Hungarian parents in Ukraine have been compelled to forfeit their children's right to native language education and enroll them in Ukrainian-medium schools. This tendency has notably increased since the introduction of new university entrance exams in 2008. The high exam failure rate in Hungarian-medium schools caused increased concerns about their students' exclusion from the wider Ukrainian society (see Section 3.2).

The same concerns are expressed by Participant 7, whose child had studied at a Ukrainian-medium kindergarten prior to enrolment in the Hungarian-language Zsigmond Perényi Comprehensive:

I studied in Lviv [in Western Ukraine]. That's why my son went to a Ukrainian kindergarten - because for me [a Hungarian native speaker], it was hard to adapt. It's hard to study in a Hungarian school and then go to

<sup>84</sup> Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, "Mother Tongue Maintenance: The Debate. Linguistic Human Rights and Minority Education," *TESOL Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1994): 625-628.

<sup>85</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *Education, language and the human rights of minorities. Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues*, A/HRC/43/47, 24 February–20 March 2020, <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/43/47>.

a Ukrainian university. [...] He needed to learn Ukrainian well first, what comes after is up to him.

Participant 1 related how her ex-husband, an ethnic-Hungarian, had opposed her choice of Hungarian-language education for their children:

Really, everyone was against it. When I decided to send my two oldest children to the Hungarian kindergarten and school, my first husband said that if I go ahead and do it, he will never speak Hungarian to them at home. He did keep his word: he never spoke Hungarian to the kids and never helped them with homework. My first husband was a local [Transcarpathian] Hungarian and growing up he has always spoken Hungarian at home. Nonetheless, he and his entire Hungarian-speaking family were strongly opposed to my decision to get my children into a Hungarian school.

Ideally, Hungarian- and Ukrainian-speaking parents aim to create an additive bilingual environment<sup>86</sup> where their children could learn both Hungarian and Ukrainian. For instance, Ukrainian-speaking families with children studying in Hungarian-medium schools may attempt to use family and community resources to ensure their children's success in learning Ukrainian, or even combine schools with different languages of instruction like Participant 7. The efficacy of such strategies against the risk of children failing at university entrance exams is unclear.

Adaptation to teaching in Hungarian provides an additional obstacle, particularly in families where the child speaks limited or no Hungarian before

---

<sup>86</sup> W. E. Lambert, "Culture and language as factors in learning and education," in *Education of immigrant students*, edited by A. Worlfgang (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1975).

school age. This is corroborated by the following statement from Zsigmond

Perényi Comprehensive's headmaster:

Of course, those parents who have never dealt with the Hungarian language, who don't speak it, will not bring a child to this school. If there is no one for the child to speak to [in Hungarian], there is no sense in a [Hungarian-language] school like that.

The school headmaster may have good reasons to believe children would not learn Hungarian by only using it in school. Nonetheless, children from Ukrainian-speaking families do attend the Hungarian school in Vynohradiv, and their parents have to look for additional help with the language:

This year I got [my son] into extracurricular Hungarian classes, since it's more difficult for him, being from a Ukrainian family. He does not have [the Hungarian language] at home. (Participant 1)

The popularity of Hungarian-language schools among Ukrainian-speaking families means that it is not only monolingual Ukrainian students who may struggle to develop skills in Hungarian. Participant 2, whose husband speaks Hungarian at home, shared that all the children in her son's class are Ukrainian speakers. Because the children spoke Ukrainian to each other, her son was having adaptation issues at school, and the family was considering transferring him to a Ukrainian-medium school. In this case, the obstacles associated with enrolment in a Hungarian-medium school were proving to be overwhelming.

Although the extent of the issue in Transcarpathia is unclear, the respondents also pointed to their school's shortage of teachers:



The problem with the Hungarian school is that it's not good quality, because there's a shortage of teachers, since these days there are few people who can even speak Hungarian, much less teach in it. (Participant 1)

There are no teachers at all. Almost all the teachers moved abroad, in our class the teachers were changed three times. (Participant 2)

It is worth mentioning that the issues described above are certainly well known at Zsigmond Perényi Comprehensive. A number of its policies and measures serve to help children who may be struggling, in particular those who do not speak Hungarian natively. Students receive help with homework during extended day care hours, most beneficial to children of non-Hungarian-speaking parents (Participant 3 has confirmed that this is not practiced in Ukrainian-medium schools). Several respondents have also praised the teachers' general approach.

Although the Hungarian-medium school in Vyhohradiv tries to accommodate Ukrainian-speaking families in various ways, they still have to deal with issues specific to Hungarian-language schools such as a lack of teachers and difficulties with adapting to the Hungarian language. The analysis of parents' motivations will attempt to reveal why they nonetheless give their preference to Hungarian-language education.

## **5.2. Economic factors**

When asked directly about their motivations for choosing a Hungarian-medium school, most participants explained that they wanted their children to learn the Hungarian language - either to improve communication within the family, or

simply because “the more languages one knows, the better”. However, further discussions on the utility of Hungarian made it clear that it is also seen as a path to acquiring a Hungarian citizenship and increasing one’s economic mobility. This echoes the descriptions of interviews conducted in Berehove<sup>87</sup>, where respondents were initially hesitant to reveal economic motivations for learning Hungarian to the researcher. An excerpt from the interview with Participant 1 can be used as an example. First, the respondent denied that Hungary’s citizenship program or educational opportunities motivated her school choice for her youngest child:

Interviewer: When you were sending your youngest son to the Hungarian school in 2015, were you considering further education abroad or Hungarian citizenship?

Participant 1: No, no, I only wanted him to be able to talk to people. Mostly for his intellectual development – the more languages you know, the more of a person you are.

Later in the interview, the same respondent stated she would like her youngest child to follow his older brother, who had already acquired a Hungarian citizenship and moved to the Czech Republic:

My older son only attended the Hungarian school for the first four years, but he learnt the language and remembered it so well, that he went on to study in a Hungarian-language university. I want my youngest son to have a future like that, too. To get the [Hungarian] passport and have doors open for him, so that he’s able to go anywhere in the world to earn money.

---

<sup>87</sup> Hannah Erkelens, *Hungarian Kin-State Politics. A Blessing or Curse?* (Radboud University Human Geography Master Thesis, 2020): 56.

On a later date, Participant 1 mentioned she had given birth to her youngest child in Hungary in an attempt to secure his path towards Hungarian citizenship (this had happened before the current citizenship program was introduced).

Whether or not it was the sole motivation for Participant 1, there is little doubt that the chance for her child to become a Hungarian citizen had some influence on her school choice. Participant 3 was more explicit in connecting education abroad with economic opportunity:

The children [in Ukraine] have the potential to be successful, but it's not possible here. There are no jobs that pay well. So, if parents have the opportunity, they want to give their children a foreign education, which is valued everywhere, unlike the one in Ukraine.

Participant 8, an ethnic Hungarian, stated that his family had already become Hungarian citizens, but speaking the Hungarian language was important to be able to effectively benefit from it. In particular, he was planning for his children to study in Hungary after school graduation. This demonstrates an additional advantage of Hungarian-language school education. As school students have a higher chance to become fluent in Hungarian compared to adult learners, they may also be able to access a wider range of benefits available to Hungarian citizens.

It is certainly possible that the interviewed parents do believe the adage (known in Ukraine and Hungary, among other countries) “the more languages you know, the more of a person you are”. Still, in the eyes of a learner, not all languages are equal. Aside from the Hungarian language, the participants

expressed interest in their children learning English and Czech. The Czech Republic offers foreigners tuition-free university education in the Czech language and is a popular destination for Ukrainian student migrants<sup>88</sup>. However, learning Hungarian is more accessible and may provide more benefits, namely the citizenship of the European Union, as the following statements reveal:

I would like my children to speak other languages, too, but there are no teachers. There are no English or Czech schools. (Participant 3)

Interviewer: If there had been other schools [in Vynohradiv]: Slovak, Czech, which one would [your daughter] attend?

Participant 6: If there was an opportunity to move to Czechia after, I think my children would have attended a Czech school. But Czechia doesn't grant citizenships based on language.

Although Czech is currently offered as an additional subject in a few schools in Transcarpathia, the extent of Czech-language teaching in the region is very limited compared to the avenues for learning Hungarian. One of the Ukrainian-language schools in Vynohradiv (Comprehensive School no. 4) now offers Hungarian as an additional subject. Given that even the Hungarian-medium school introduces regular updates to their teaching procedures as to ensure that children from Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual families do not fall behind, Hungarian-medium education might seem like a safer path to the desired language proficiency. To ethnic Ukrainian and mixed families, Transcarpathia's

---

<sup>88</sup> "Study in Europe: Czech Republic," *European Commission*, [https://ec.europa.eu/education/study-in-europe/country-profiles/czech-republic\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/education/study-in-europe/country-profiles/czech-republic_en).

large Hungarian minority and its minority-language schools found in major urban areas effectively prove to be a readily available resource.

All the interviewed parents but one (Participant 7) stated they were considering the possibility for their children to move to Hungary or elsewhere in the European Union. Three respondents out of eight explicitly confirmed they were planning for that outcome. Participant 7, who identifies as an ethnic Hungarian, provided both ethnic and practical reasons (being able to provide more help with homework) for choosing a Hungarian-language school.

As a counterpoint to the potential risks associated with Hungarian-medium education discussed above, parents who do not expect their children to continue studying in Ukraine have fewer reasons to be worried about their Ukrainian university exams. In a 2018 interview, the headmaster of Zsigmond Perényi Comprehensive stated that in most cases, the school's graduates pursue further education abroad, sometimes in combination with enrolment in a Ukrainian university<sup>89</sup>.

It is worth to point out that the Hungarian language may bring some economic benefits in Ukraine. Participant 5 noted that her husband, an ethnic Hungarian, worked in a Hungarian-owned business in Vynohradiv, where his career could

---

<sup>89</sup> Habriella Homoki, "Vsi buli b radi, iak by ukrains'kyi uriad tak pikluvasia pro svoikh liudei, iak tse robliat' uhortsi – dyrektorka zakarpats'koi shkoly," interview by Marichka Brovdi, *Realist*, <https://realist.online/pub/tilda/vse-byli-rady-esli-ukrainskoe-pravitelstvo-tak-zabotilos-o-svoih-lyudyah-kak-eto-delayut-vengry-direktor-zakarpatskoj-shkoly/page2248376.html>.

benefit from Hungarian language skills. Still, the vast economic differences between Ukraine and Hungary (as well as other European countries) suggest that few people would plan for local Hungarian-language opportunities.

In 2018, the Hungarian government offered parents in Hungarian-medium schools in Transcarpathia refunds and aid for various school-related expenses, as well as yearly financial aid for schoolteachers<sup>90</sup>. These policies may be effective in attracting parents to Hungarian-medium schools. Still, it did not seem that direct financial aid was a major factor for this study's participants.

Participant 1 insisted she was not swayed by financial compensation:

Ukrainians always blame me that I chose my child's school for money. Nobody understands that you don't choose a school for 2000 hryvnias [yearly aid provided by the Hungarian government]. You actually do it so that your child becomes a better educated person.

In contrast, it seems that acquiring the Hungarian citizenship and being able to use the mobility it offers is more important to the interviewed parents than any other type of benefits (political pork) Hungary provides to Transcarpathia.

Although the respondents were often reluctant to discuss the contentious issues of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations, they expressed positive or accepting opinions on the practice of dual citizenship and the functioning of Hungarian-medium education. Participant 1 stressed that the demand for Hungarian citizenship is driven by economic factors, not separatism:

---

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

We are so tired of not having any social protection, we just really want to be treated with respect. That is why we need the Hungarian citizenship: not to join Hungary as a territory, but to have a somewhat equal status and treatment in Europe. [...] It's not because we want to be or are traitors to Ukraine, or because we are paid by the Hungarians.

It is important to consider that for minority language school students (and their parents), the schools' teaching languages may not have the same symbolic weight as they do in the nationalist lens. While in Ukrainian political discourse, Hungarian-language schools flying Hungarian national flags may be seen as foreign elements, Transcarpathian parents might instead treat them as apolitical cultural attributes (in terms of banal nationalism, the Hungarian flags would be "unwaved"). This can be seen in two interview quotations providing opposite perspectives (national Ukrainian and regional Transcarpathian) on the wide use of different languages in the region:

Participant 1: We have never been against the Hungarians here. We have always had Hungarian flags flying and nobody was bothered by it. All of a sudden, they started talking about it on the television, the radio, the newspapers, everywhere, discussing the topic and provoking people. Many people started asking questions: "Really, why do they speak Hungarian here, when there's no Ukrainian language in Hungary? Why do they have their street names and flags here? Let them go home to Hungary and speak Hungarian there! Why are there no Ukrainian schools in Hungary when we have Hungarian schools? Why do they learn Hungarian here for state funds, for our taxes, get the Hungarian passport and leave? Ukraine finances them, and they emigrate and give nothing back."

Interviewer: What do you think about the Ukrainization policy, when everything on TV and elsewhere is switching from Russian to Ukrainian? Do you find it positive, negative or neither?

Participant 2: I have a neutral opinion on that. It hasn't affected us yet. Maybe our people [Transcarpathians] will get used to it. Here in Transcarpathia, we have the Rusyn language, the Hungarian language,

Slovak, Romanian, and many others. Maybe there [in other parts of Ukraine] it's more relevant, but not here.

In accordance with the triadic nexus model, the national minority in

Transcarpathia finds itself in the crossfire between Hungary and Ukraine, where the latter casts doubt on its loyalty. However, the national minority in this scenario does not just stand for the ethnic Hungarian community, but all who seek to benefit from Hungary's kin-state policies in the region.

As Transcarpathians look for ways to sustain themselves between two clientelistic states in conflict, some may become disillusioned with the limited opportunities at home. When asked about the idea that Hungary harbors plans to annex Transcarpathia, Participant 5 responded: "If it was possible, why not, let them take us. Maybe we would live better then."

Until Ukraine can afford to create economic improvements in Transcarpathia, its best strategy may be to tolerate Hungarian-language education and dual citizenship practices in the region – a course that Ukraine's new president Volodymyr Zelensky seems to be considering.

It is interesting to put the ethnic Ukrainian families' rising interest in Hungarian-language schools following Hungary's 2011 citizenship law in the context of ethnic Hungarian families' increased preference for Ukrainian-language education after the changes in examination procedures from 2008. In terms of the triadic nexus model, Ukraine has created a pressure on its ethnic



minorities to move to Ukrainian-medium schools and thus conform with their nationalizing state. The same pressure is not exerted on the ethnic Ukrainian majority, whose members may feel freer in their choices. As the political and media discourse in Ukraine seems to treat Hungarian-medium schools as used exclusively by the Hungarian minority, the ethnic Ukrainians' interactions with Hungary's kin-state policies in education can remain invisible and not be seen as politically problematic.

### **5.3. Other factors**

The interview participants provided a number of reasons for choosing a Hungarian-language school that are not directly related to economic benefits. It is important to consider whether these reasons warrant a correction in the study's hypothesis.

Several respondents have recounted how the Hungarian language was not passed down to them by their parents, or their unsuccessful attempts to learn Hungarian:

When people come to visit us from Hungary, I always want to speak to them, but I can't. How is it that I can't speak the [Hungarian] language? I feel really self-conscious about it. I'm just really struggling with the language, but I thought that [my children] should be able speak it. (Participant 1)

My father spoke Hungarian, but not me. [...] When I first went abroad, I realised I could understand nothing. So, I don't want the same to happen to my children. (Participant 6)

My parents never spoke Hungarian to me when I was a child, so I now can't speak the language. I want my children to speak it, not necessarily Hungarian, but a foreign language in general. (Participant 2)

A feeling of missed opportunity of bilingualism has previously been identified as a motivating factor for enrolling one's children in bilingual education<sup>91</sup>.

A few respondents also referred to the connections between the various ethnic communities in Transcarpathia:

Let them mix together, let the Ukrainians be together with the Hungarians. We can't be separate, all of us here have family ties already, we are one. (Participant 1)

Interviewer: You wouldn't mind if your children moved to Hungary and married Hungarians?

Participant 5: Of course, I wouldn't mind, let them move. My husband is Hungarian, and he married me, why would they not do the same if they wanted to.

In the Transcarpathian case of a "melting pot", the lines between ethnic communities are easily crossed, as even those who define themselves as members of the ethnic majority could find ways to identify with the Transcarpathian Hungarian community and culture. Low perceived cultural distance between different ethnic communities in the region (in the words of Participant 2, "we are all mixed here in Transcarpathia") may make the re/introduction of the Hungarian language into one's family more comfortable. Research on ethnic Serbs applying for Hungarian citizenship found that they

---

<sup>91</sup> Kendall King, and Lyn Fogle, "Bilingual parenting as good parenting: Parents' perspectives on family language policy for additive bilingualism," *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 9, no. 6 (December 2006): 695-712.

developed emotional ties to Hungarian culture and grew more interested in one's family background in the application process<sup>92</sup>.

As formulated in the hypothesis, personal identity factors may work in combination with economic factors to inform parents' school choices, especially for ethnically mixed families. Notably, in this study's sample of eight respondents, only the two ethnic Hungarian parents explicitly cited their children's Hungarian identity as a reason for them to attend Hungarian-language education.

Participant 3 commented that the Hungarian-language school was closest to her family home:

Participant 3: For me, [the school choice] was not so crucial, but there is only a Hungarian school next to our place. If that were an English or other school, we would have gone with that, we took what we had.

Interviewer: So, you made your choice so that your children could speak other languages.

Participant 3: The more languages you know, the better.

It is possible that Participant 3 decided on the school that was closest to her home regardless of its teaching language. Distance to the school has been found to influence parents' choices in previous studies (see Section 3.4). The more plausible interpretation is that Participant 3 was specifically looking for the nearest school teaching in any foreign language. This is supported by her

---

<sup>92</sup> Yossi Harpaz, *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019): 53.

expressed preference for foreign education, as well as the fact that Zsigmond Perényi Comprehensive in Vynohradiv is only a five-minute walk away from a Ukrainian-language school. The role of availability in choosing Hungarian-medium schools is discussed in Section 3.4.

When asked to compare Hungarian- and Ukrainian-language schools, several participants pointed to perceived advantages such as better teaching methods, school trips to Hungary, and a friendlier environment. It is worth to examine to what extent the differences in operating minority and state language schools are related to kin-state aid (in this case, coming from Hungary).

Lastly, some participants indicated that it was their child who chose their own school, or at least was somewhat involved in the choice. For example, Participant 3 stated that her older son graduated from a Ukrainian-medium school, as he did not want to study in Hungarian. Previous research has largely focused on parents' motivations for choosing schools for their children. Moving the focus onto children's perspectives and their interactions with their parents' wishes may provide some new findings.

To conclude, the major non-economic factors in the respondents' school choice were Hungarian ethno-linguistic background and personal affinity towards the Hungarian community and culture. This study's hypothesis assumes that personal and instrumental factors work together in forming preference for Hungarian-medium education, particularly for ethnically mixed families. The

interviews reveal that these effects might also coexist and reinforce each other for ethnic Ukrainians. This is similar to the research conducted in Serbia, where ethnic Serbian applicants for a Hungarian citizenship often discovered personal ties to the Hungarian community and developed an increased sense of a multi-ethnic regional identity<sup>93</sup>.

---

<sup>93</sup> Yossi Harpaz, *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019): 55.

## VI. Conclusions

This study aimed to analyze field data on ethnically Ukrainian and mixed families' motivations for enrolling their children into minority (Hungarian) language education in Transcarpathia, Ukraine. As the education sphere forms a part of Hungary's kin-state politics in the region, I was interested in the interaction between education choices and politics in the case to hand.

In the first chapters, I analyze the theoretical models used in this study, most notably Roger Brubaker's triadic nexus model, and their application in the cultural-political context in consideration. The Hungary-Transcarpathia-Ukraine triad has significantly varied over the past 30 years. The field data used in this study fall in the period of 2014-2019, when Hungarian-Ukrainian tensions over each state's policies in Transcarpathia reached their highest point so far.

While Ukraine's new examination regulations adopted in 2008 made Hungarian-language schooling less attractive, Hungary's new citizenship procedure from 2010 had an opposite impact. Inhabitants of Transcarpathia can significantly benefit from the access to the European Union that the Hungarian citizenship provides – as long as they can speak Hungarian. Following these changes, a section of Hungarian- and Ukrainian-speaking students have effectively switched places in Ukraine's education system.

In-depth interviews were conducted with 8 parents in the town of Vynohradiv who had enrolled their children in the local Hungarian-medium school. The interview questions aimed to capture the motivations behind the participants' school choice, as well as their views on Hungarian-language schools, Hungary's kin-state politics, their own identity and language use at home.

When directly asked about their choice of Hungarian-medium education, the parents' initial statements related to family factors or general preference for bilingualism. Closer analysis revealed economic considerations to be a major motivating factor. This echoes previous studies conducted in Ukraine, where respondents were initially hesitant to reveal economic motivations for learning Hungarian. Research conducted in a similar case in Vojvodina, Serbia demonstrates how the question of political loyalty prevents applicants for Hungarian citizenship from openly discussing the process<sup>94</sup>.

All the interviewed parents but one were considering the possibility for their children to work or study in the European Union after graduation. This is not surprising, given how often the school's graduates continue their education abroad. For children from Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual families, a Hungarian-language school education would ensure relative fluency. In contrast

---

<sup>94</sup> Yossi Harpaz, *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019): 62-63.

to adult learners, school students may be able to access a wider range of benefits associated with dual citizenship.

While the research participants were hesitant to discuss the issues in Ukrainian-Hungarian bilateral relations, the interviews indicated that for parents in Transcarpathia, dual citizenship seems to be the only major economic factor among Hungary's kin-state policies. The various financial benefits provided by Hungary were not a significant feature of the interviewed parents' responses.

In effect, it is Transcarpathia's minority education system itself, designed to meet the needs of the ethnic Hungarian community, that becomes a valuable economic resource for the non-Hungarian majority. The triadic relationship between Hungary and the population of Transcarpathia is therefore essentially clientelistic in character. As long as Ukraine continues its policy of de facto tolerating the current state of affairs, the triad remains stable.

Besides economic motivations, identity factors have been found to influence parents' school choices. The two ethnic Hungarian respondents in particular were the only ones to explicitly refer to ethnic identity as a school choice factor. This conforms with the hypothesis, which expects identity factors to be present in families of full or partial Hungarian background.

Notably, the Hungarian culture forms an essential part of the "melting pot" in Transcarpathia. The resulting perception of low cultural distance makes the



Hungarian-language education an easier choice for ethnic Ukrainian families.

Current research supports the idea that access to ethnic-based benefits provided by a kin-state may also influence one's perceived identity.

This study demonstrates the shaky equilibrium of pragmatic Hungarian identification and emotionally strong self-understanding and groupness of Transcarpathian Hungarians. On the macro level, the recently established triad demonstrates the clash of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalisms over the national affiliation of Transcarpathian Hungarians. Such a model works on the basis of patronage or clientelistic character of the connection between the Transcarpathian electorate with both the Hungarian and Ukrainian political elites. As the Ukrainian and Hungarian political party systems could both be characterized as patronage democracies, the Transcarpathian electorate supports those political actors, who can provide them with more resources and benefits from the capital, whether Kyiv or Budapest.

At the same time, the triadic relationship puts this pragmatic orientation under pressure, creating an opportunity to mobilize Hungarian national sentiments.

Previous decades of Hungarians' peaceful residence in Transcarpathia are replaced with the uncertainty of the new language law that endangers Hungarian educational institutions in Ukraine. If Ukrainian nationalizing policy is not reversed, the normal life of Hungarians in Transcarpathia will be disrupted. In that case, the potential for Hungarian self-understanding and groupness is open

for mobilization, and relations between the Hungarian government and the Transcarpathian Hungarian ethnic community cease to be merely clientelistic.

The size and other characteristics of the sample limit the possibility to generalize the findings of this study. However, the findings may be used to inform research design for studies to be conducted on a larger scale. The results suggest some other possible directions for future research. First, it would be beneficial to investigate how the recent signs of improvement in Hungarian-Ukrainian bilateral relations influenced the situation on the ground. Second, more insights into the specificity of triadic relations involving Hungary and Ukraine could be obtained by conducting comparative studies in other countries with ethnic Hungarian communities (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia). Finally, the exploration provided here could be complemented by research on individual factors influencing one's stance in a triadic relationship context, such as successful or failed attempts to benefit from kin-state policies.

## Bibliography

Arunyan, Aleksei. "How Hungary and Ukraine fell out over a passport scandal." *Open Democracy*. October 11, 2018.

<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyiv-and-budapest-fell-out-over-zakarpattia/>.

Bauböck, Rainer. "Dual citizenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat." *EUDO Citizenship Observatory* 75 (2010).

Billig, Michael. "Remembering Banal Nationalism." In *Banal Nationalism*, 37-59. London: Sage, 1995.

Bozóki, Andras, and Zoltan Ádám. "State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary." *Intersections* 2, no. 1 (2016): 98-122.

Brubaker, Rogers. "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands in the New Europe." *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (Spring, 1995): 107-132.

Brubaker, Rogers, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea. *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. "Beyond 'Identity'," *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 1-47.

Chandra, Kanchan. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Csernicskó, István. "Accounting for changes in the linguistic landscape: The example of Transcarpathia." *Magyar Nyelv* 112, no. 1 (2016): 50-62.

—. "Bilingual Education of Minorities: Always the Best Solution?" *Manins'ki iazytsy u obrazovanii i uchenii iazyka* 7 (2017): 87-103.

Csernicskó, István, and Anita Márku. "Minority language rights in Ukraine from the point of view of application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages," *Alkalmazott Nyelvtudomány* 20, no. 2 (2020): 1-18.

"Chy perehodyt' mezhi ukrains'koho zakonodavstva uhors'ka natsmenshyna Zakarpattia?" *Zakarpattia Onlain*. September 1, 2011.

<https://zakarpattia.net.ua/News/86810-Chy-perekhodyt-mezhi-ukrainskoho-zakonodavstva-uhorska-natsmenshyna-Zakarpattia>.

Erkelens, Hannah. *Hungarian Kin-State Politics. A Blessing or Curse?* Radboud University Human Geography Master Thesis, 2020.

Erőss, Ágnes, Katalin Kovály, and Patrik Tátrai. "Effects of the Ukrainian crisis in Transcarpathia: The Hungarian perspective." *CMR Working Papers* 92, no. 150. Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Centre of Migration Research, 2016.

–. "Kin-state politics stirred by a geopolitical conflict: Hungary's growing activity in post-Euromaidan Transcarpathia, Ukraine." *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 66, no. 3 (2017): 203-218.

Fedinec, Csilla, and István Csernicskó. "Four Language Laws of Ukraine." *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 23 (2016): 560-582.

–. "The Informal Use of Time as a Component of Multicultural Regional Identity in Transcarpathia (Ukraine)." *East Central Europe* 48 (2021): 73-102.

Fedinec, Csilla. "Some Aspects of Hungarian-Ukrainian Relations in Our Time." In *A jubilee collection: essays in honor of professor Paul Robert Magocsi on his 70th Birthday*, ed. by Valerii Padiak and Patricia A. Krafcik, 185-194. Uzhhorod; Prešov; New York: Valerii Padiak Publishers, 2015.

Ferenc, Viktória. "Transition in language policy of Ukraine (1989–2014)." In *Sociolinguistic Transition in Former Eastern Bloc Countries: Two Decades after the Regime Change*, ed. by M. Sloboda, P. Laihonon and A. Zabrodszka. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016.

Ferenc, Viktória, and Anita Nánási-Molnár. "Kik választják a magyar óvodákat Kárpátalján? Szülői motivációk kárpátaljai ukránok és magyarok körében a 2013-14-es forradalmi események után." *Kisebbségi Szemle* 3, no. 2 (2018): 87-111.

Ferenc, Viktória, and Magdolna Séra. "Iskolaválasztás Kárpátalján" [Choice of school in Transcarpathia]. *Kisebbségkutatás* 21, no. 3 (2012): 473-513.

Fox, John E., and Cynthia Miller-Idriss. "Everyday Nationhood." *Ethnicities* 8, no. 4 (2008): 536-563.

Gál, Adél. "Kárpátalján járt a Magyar Ökumenikus Segélyszervezet." *Kárpátalja.ma*. October 9, 2014.

<https://karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/kozelet/karpataljan-jart-a-magyar-okumenikus-segelyszervezet>.

Gordon, Milton M., *Assimilation in American Life*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Harpaz, Yossi. *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Homoki, Habriella. “Vsi buly b radi, iak by ukrains’kyi uriad tak pikluvavsia pro svoikh liudei, iak tse robliat’ uhortsi – dyrektorka zakarpats’koi shkoly.” Interview by Marichka Brovdi. *Realist*. <https://realist.online/pub/tilda/vse-byli-rady-esli-ukrainskoe-pravitelstvo-tak-zabotilos-o-svoih-lyudyah-kak-eto-delayut-vengry-direktor-zakarpatskoj-shkoly/page2248376.html>.

Hlukhovs’kyi, Mykhailo. “Posol Uhorshchyny v Ukraini Ishtvan Ildiardto: Dyskusii navkolo Avtonomii na Zakarpatti maiut’ duzhe vysoku temperaturu.” June 18, 2021. <https://glavcom.ua/interviews/posol-ugorshchini-v-ukrajini-ishtvan-iydyarto-diskusiji-navkolo-avtonomiji-na-zakarpatti-mayut-duzhe-visoku-temperaturu-763565.html>.

King, Kendall, and Lyn Fogle. “Bilingual parenting as good parenting: Parents’ perspectives on family language policy for additive bilingualism.” *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 9, no. 6 (December 2006): 695-712.

Kiss, Tamás, and István Gergő Székely. “Shifting linkages in ethnic mobilization: the case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania.” *Nationalities Papers* 44:4 (2016): 591-610.

Kopecky, Petr, and Gerardo Scherlis. “Party Patronage in Contemporary Europe.” *European Review* 16, no. 3 (2008): 355-371.

Koroutchev, Rossen. “Economic Situation and Migration Trends of Eastern Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine.” *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs* 5, no. 3 (2020): 9-26.

Kulyk, Volodymyr. “The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Beyond Brubaker.” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 26, no. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 2001): 197-221.

Lambert, W. E. “Culture and language as factors in learning and education.” In

*Education of immigrant students*, edited by A. Worlfgang. Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1975.

Maxwell, Alexander. "Contemporary Hungarian Rune-Writing: Ideological Linguistic Nationalism within a Homogenous Nation." *Anthropos* 99 (2004): 161-175.

Medynskyi, Ivan, and Bence Kapcsos. *Foreign policy audit: Ukraine-Hungary* (Kyiv, 2016).

Nánási-Molnár, Anita, and Magdolna Séra. "Óvodai és iskolaválasztási motivációk Kárpátalján." In *Szülőföldön Magyarul: Iskolák és diákok a határon túl*, ed. by Gabriella Pusztai and Zsuzsanna Márkus, 239-253. Debrecen: Debrecen University Press, 2017.

"Navishcho hromadianam Ukrainy uhors'ki pasporty." *UNIAN*, November 24, 2010. <https://www.unian.ua/society/429049-navishcho-gromadyanam-ukrajini-ugorski-pasporti.html>.

Nemzeti Választási Iroda. *ORSZÁGGYŰLÉSI KÉPVISELŐK VÁLASZTÁSA*. April 6, 2015. <https://static.valasztas.hu/dyn/pv14/szavossz/hu/orszlist.html>.

Országgyűlés. *Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship*. Legislationline. [https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary\\_Citizenship\\_act\\_2012\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary_Citizenship_act_2012_en.pdf).

Országgyűlés. *Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure*. Nemzeti Választási Iroda. [https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary\\_Citizenship\\_act\\_2012\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5925/file/Hungary_Citizenship_act_2012_en.pdf).

Park, Robert E., and Ernest W. Burgess. *Introduction to the science of sociology*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1921.

Petriv, Nadiia. "Ukrains'kyi ta uhors'kyi pamiatnyky vidkryly na Verets'komu perevali Karpat." *Radio Svoboda: Ukraina*. July 21, 2008. <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/1185215.html>.

Pogonyi, Szabolcs. *Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

“Poroshenko podav zakonoproektpo zaborony podviinoho hromadianstva.” *Livyi bereh*. March 13, 2017.

[https://lb.ua/news/2017/03/13/361055\\_poroshenko\\_podal\\_zakonoproekt.html](https://lb.ua/news/2017/03/13/361055_poroshenko_podal_zakonoproekt.html).

Pusztai, Gabriella, and Zsuzsanna Márkus, eds. *Szülőföldön Magyarul: Iskolák és diákok a határon túl*. Debrecen: Debrecen University Press, 2017.

Pyrih, Volodymyr. “Chynovnykiv i deputativ Zakarpattia pereviriat’ na naiavnist’ podviinoho hromadianstva.” *Zaxid.net*. October 9, 2018.

[https://zaxid.net/chynovnykiv\\_i\\_deputativ\\_zakarpattya\\_pereviryat\\_na\\_nayavnist\\_podviynogo\\_gromadyanstva\\_n1467304](https://zaxid.net/chynovnykiv_i_deputativ_zakarpattya_pereviryat_na_nayavnist_podviynogo_gromadyanstva_n1467304).

Sadecki, Andrzej, and Tadeusz Iwański. “Ukraine–Hungary: the intensifying dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights.” *OSW Commentary* 280 (2018): 1-7.

“Skandal na Zakarpatti.” TSN. 14 April 2021. <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/skandal-na-zakarpatti-ditinu-vidmovilis-brati-u-ditsadok-bo-yiyi-batki-ne-znayut-ugorskoyi-movi-1765555.html>.

Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove. “Mother Tongue Maintenance: The Debate. Linguistic Human Rights and Minority Education.” *TESOL Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1994): 625-628.

State Statistics Service of Ukraine. *Distribution of the population by nationality and native language, Zakarpatska oblast* (2).

[http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree\\_en.asp](http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_en.asp).

“Study in Europe: Czech Republic.” *European Commission*.

[https://ec.europa.eu/education/study-in-europe/country-profiles/czech-republic\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/education/study-in-europe/country-profiles/czech-republic_en).

Tarnai, Richárd. “Kettős állampolgárság - Egyszerűsített honosítás; Adja le kérelmét a Kormányablakokban!” *Kormányhivatalok*, March 2, 2012.

<https://www.kormanyhivatal.hu/hu/pest/hirek/kettos-allampolgarsag-egyszerusített-honosítás-adja-le-kerelmet-a-kormanyablakokban>.

Tátrai, Patrik, József Molnár, Katalin Kovály, and Ágnes Eröss. “A kárpátaljai magyarok lélekszáma és a népesedésüket befolyásoló tényezők a SUMMA 2017 felmérés alapján.” *Kisebbségi Szemle* 3, no. 2 (2018): 7-31.

The Department of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration. *ZZSO, v jakykh učni navčajut'sja uhors'koju movoju*. 2020.  
<https://deponms.carpathia.gov.ua/uploads/uploads/Zakladi-z-ugorskou-movou-navcanna-za-stupenami.pdf>

Tóth, Judit. "UPDATE: Changes in the Hungarian Citizenship Law and adopted on 26 May 2010." *European Union Democracy Observation Citizenship*, July 2010.  
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19616/Hungary.pdf?sequence=1>.

"Turul na Mukachivs'komu zamku zaminiat' na herb Ukrainy." Zakarpattia Onlain. October 12, 2018. <https://zakarpattya.net.ua/News/185996-Turul-na-Mukachivskomu-zamku-zaminiat-na-herb-Ukrainy>.

"U Berehovi znialy z merii prapor Uhorshchyny, Budapesht vymahaie rozsliduvannia." *Ievropeis'ka Pravda*. November 13, 2017.  
<https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2017/11/13/7073600/>.

"Ukraina dozvolyt' podviine hromadianstvo z družnimy krainamy – Kuleba." Deutsche Welle: Ukraina. March 5, 2021. <https://www.dw.com/uk/ukraina-dozvolyt-podviine-hromadianstvo-z-krainamy-yes-kuleba/a-56779480>.

United Nations Human Rights Council. *Education, language and the human rights of minorities. Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues*. A/HRC/43/47. 24 February–20 March 2020. <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/43/47>.

Varga, Bertold. "A turulmadár, mint a magyarság oltalmazója és védelmezője (A turulmadár, mint a magyarság múltja, jelene és jövője)." *Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia* 26, no. 2 (2011): 190-206.

Verkhovna Rada Ukrain's'koi Radians'koi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky. *Pro movy v Ukrain's'kii RSR*. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/8312-11/ed19891028#Text>.

Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. *Pro natsional'ni menshyny Ukrainy*. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12/ed19920625#Text>.

Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. *Pro osvitu*. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2145-19/ed20210423#Text>.



Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. *Pro povnu zahal'nu seredniu osvitu.*  
<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/463-20/ed20200116#Text>.

Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy. *Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrains'koi movy iak dezhavnoi.* <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-19/ed20190425#Text>.

Weinstein, Michael A. "Hungary's Referendum on Dual Citizenship." *Global Policy Forum*, December 13, 2004.  
<https://archive.globalpolicy.org/nations/emerging/2004/1213hungaryref.htm>.

"Yuvileynyi festyval' vyna u Berehovi vzhe rozpochavs'a. Svyatkuvatymut' azh 4 dni (FOTO)." Mukachevo.net. March 8, 2018.  
<http://www.mukachevo.net/ua/news/view/314331>.

"Zakarpats'kyi drayv." Charivnyi svit podorozhi.  
<http://svitpodorogy.com/ekskursijni-programi-po-ukraini/zakarpatskij-drayv>.