Fabian Riesinger

MAKING AN ISLAND: THE TRANSFORMATION(S) OF RHODES UNDER EARLY OTTOMAN RULE (1522–1560)

MA Thesis in Late Antique, Medieval and Early Modern Studies

Central European University Private University

Vienna

July 2021

Making an Island: The Transformation(s) of Rhodes under Early Ottoman Rule (1522–1560)

by

Fabian Riesinger

(Germany)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies,
Central European University Private University, Vienna, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Late Antique, Medieval and Early Modern
Studies.

Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU.

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Chair, Examination Committee

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Author's declaration

I, the undersigned, **Fabian Leonardo Riesinger**, candidate for the MA degree in Late Antique, Medieval and Early Modern Studies, declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Vienna, 31 July 2021

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Abstract

From 1310 to 1522 the Knights Hospitaller, the Order of Saint John, had their headquarters on the Eastern Mediterranean island of Rhodes. After an unsuccessful siege in 1480, the Ottoman Empire conquered the island and the eponymous city-fortress in 1522. This paper explores three perspectives on transformations kicked off by the Ottoman takeover of Rhodes. Firstly, examining contemporary historiography allows for an approach centered on the individual participants in the siege. I have identified them in Ottoman *fetiḥ-nāme*s, conquest diaries, and the Venetian *Diarii* of Marino Sanuto. Secondly, over the early Ottoman period of Rhodes, the island changed tangibly. To investigate this, I survey the architectural transformations of Rhodes-City from the 16th century on. New and restored structures served the logistic but also spiritual accommodation of the new arrivals. Finally, Rhodes' changing position in the Eastern Mediterranean networks of power is relatable from the surviving *mühimme* registers of the 1550s and the 1560s. These minutes from the Porte to local officials allow us to glimpse both the military-political use of the island and the lives of those who inhabited it.

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Introduction

From 1310 to 1522 the Knights Hospitaller, the Order of Saint John, had their headquarters on the Eastern Mediterranean island of Rhodes. After an unsuccessful siege in 1480, the Ottoman Empire conquered the island and the eponymous city-fortress in 1522. And thus, the history of Rhodes ends—at least as a unique entity in Western historiography. Or as Molly Greene puts it: "After 1522 and the triumph of Ottoman sovereignty, the [Dodecanese] islands disappear, rather abruptly actually, from our view."[1] While the sieges of Rhodes have warranted their own publications in popular history writing,[2] the early Ottoman period does not figure into this at all. With Nicolas Vatin's *L'ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l'Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes (1480-1522)* there is a specialized Ottomanist volume on the matter—and I rely heavily on it—but overall, its purview ends with the 1522 siege too.[3] It is in Turkish scholarship that more specific studies and in-depth knowledge exist—albeit rather dispersedly in university theses.[4] Instead of condensing these works for an English-speaking audience, this paper serves to re-examine the sources, add Italian language material, and propose three perspectives on the transformations brought about by the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes.

Albeit it hidden, the research question of this thesis is in the title. "Making an Island" does not only sound catchy, but it is meant to allude to the potential that the early Ottoman

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[1] Molly Greene, "'Victims of Piracy?' Ottoman Lawsuits in Malta (1602-1687) and the Changing Course of Mediterranean Maritime History," in *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel's Maritime Legacy*, ed. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri, International Library of Historical Studies 67 (London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 191.

[2] Eric Brockman, *The Two Sieges of Rhodes: 1480-1522* (London, 1969); Nanami Shiono, *The Siege of Rhodes*, trans. Carolyn L. Temporelli, Wilburn Hansen, and Steven Wills, orig. ed. 1985 (New York, 2020).

[3] Nicolas Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l'Empire ottoman etlLa Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes (1480-1522)* (Paris, 1994).

[4] Sema Kılıçaslan, "Rodos Türkleri Halk Kültürü" (Doktora Tezi, Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2019); Ahmet Korkmaz, "16. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında İstanbul'un İaşesinde Rodos'un Yeri ve Adanın İaşesinde Temini (Mühimme Defterlerine göre)" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Karaman, Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey Üniversitesi, 2019); Savaş Songur, "XVI. Yüzyılda Rodos Adası ve Akdeniz'deki Önemi" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 1999)

rulership impacted Rhodes substantially. Instead of tracking some changes the island was subjected to, I attempt to uncover the shared ramifications of three sets of transformations from diverse perspectives. These are arranged from the smallest unit of analysis to the biggest, that is, from the human individual to the architecture of a city to the networks spanning oceans. Each chapter explores how the Ottomans "made an island" when they took over Rhodes in 1522. The first one focuses on the individual participants of that very siege. The Ottoman made Rhodes their own after beleaguering the stronghold of the Knights Hospitaller for a good six months. While they are sometimes secretive, an attentive reader can coax the names of individuals, their ranks and positions, and personal relations from the contemporary documents. To this end, I have employed a well-known Italian-language source, the *Diarii*, journals, of Marino Sanuto. Acting as the *de facto* chronicler for the Republic of Venice, Sanuto astutely observed the goings-on in the Mediterranean in 58 volumes between 1496 and 1533. Number 33 covers the period from March 1522 to February 1523 in the form of collected letters and comments by Sanuto.[5] For the Ottoman perspective, I have worked with a source type specific to the kind of event in question. A successful military campaign warranted glorification in the form of a *fetiḥ-nāme*, a conquest diary, composed by an articulate observer and dedicated to the conquering sultan. Together with one *rūz-nāme*, a daily journal kept by someone close to the ruler, I have examined two *fetiḥ-nāme*s in multiple editions for details on the conquest of Rhodes.[6]

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[5] Marino Sanuto, *Diarii: I Marzo MDXXII – XXVIII Febbraio MDXXIII*, ed. Federico Stefani, Guglielmo Berchet, and Nicolò Barozzi, vol. 33, 58 vols. (Venezia: Fratelli Visentini Tipografi Editori, 1892) See the list by the University of Pennsylvania Libraries, http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/metabook?id=sanudodiary.

[6] Mehmet Yaşar Ertaş and Hacer Kılıçaslan, eds., "Rodos'un Fetih Günlüğü Kanuni Sultan Süleyman'ın Rodos Seferi Rûznâmesi / The Dairy (Ruzname) of Kanuni Sultan Suleyman's Rhodes Campaign," *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries)* 12, no. 1 (2017): 1–36; Necati Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan'ın 'Er-Risale el-Fethiyye es-Süleymaniyye'si [The Report of Süleyman's Conquest]" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1989); Necati Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Er-Risale el-Fethiyye er-Radosiyye es-Süleymaniyye [The Report of Süleyman's Conquest of Rhodes]" (Doktora Tezi, Kayseri, Erciyes Üniversitesi, 1993); Murat Yıldız, *Celalzâde'nin Rodos Fetihnamesi (İnceleme-Metin) [Celalzade's Conquest Diary of Rhodes]* (İstanbul: Libra, 2013); Merve Saygın, "Tevârih-i Feth-i Rodos (İnceleme – Metin - Dizin - Tıpkıbasım) [The History of the Conquest of Rhodes]" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2021).

The second chapter serves to investigate the architectural makeup of Rhodes and the makeover the eponymous city received after the Ottoman conquest. I focus on two kinds of structures and reasonings to build them. On the one hand, the changing population of Rhodes necessitated changed religious facilities. Muslims, newly migrated and/or displaced to Rhodes, needed mosques for their spiritual needs, and the Porte needed them to assert dominance in a region formerly ruled by non-Muslims. On the other hands, the reconstruction of military structures such as the walls were logistically necessary but ultimately projected power too. When exploring the historical architecture, I relied on contemporary accounts in many of the already mentioned sources and projected back from 20th century material. Notably, Zeki Çelikkol provides an overview of the Ottoman architecture on Rhodes in a thematic volume.[7]

The third chapter takes a step beyond the shores of the island itself and regards Rhodes in its relational context. While it was the sole center of operations for the Knights Hospitaller, Ottoman Rhodes had to be embedded into complex military-political networks spanning the Eastern Mediterranean and reaching both to the West of the same Sea and eastward into the Indian Ocean. This chapter therefore pursues the question, whether the Ottoman conquest changed the character of Rhodes' relations and ultimately made it an island in the sense of an isolated space. The major source type for this investigation has not been used in this study so far. The early *mühimme defter*s, registers of important affairs, from the 1550s and 1560s accommodate this kind of question as they record directives from the Porte to local authorities. Simply put, they reveal what Constantinople wanted from Rhodes, or how the Ottomans attempted to make use of the island. The *mühimme* registers utilized in this study are the volumes three, five and six which have been published between 1993 and 1995. I focus on

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[7] Together with İbrahimgil's thesis on the Murat Reʾis social complex, Çelikkol's album was essential for the study of the Ottoman sacral architecture on Rhodes. Ammar İbrahimgil, "Rodos, Murat Reis Külliyesi Belgelemesi ve Restorasyon Önerisi" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2012); Zeki Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri ve Tarihçe*, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları 6, 25 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986).

number three because its time frame between 1558 and 1560 is still explicitly in the purview of this paper but I have fruitfully consulted the other volumes as well.[8]

Altogether, the sources were treated in a comparative and contrasting manner. The secondary literature served to guide the study of the primary material and pose challenges to (re)read the sources if available research had left some questions open.[9] In fact, they had to be regarded in tandem: When an individual depiction from one source could be corroborated by another, this is highlighted. Cases in which they clashed warranted special attention as well. The inclusion of non-written sources in the form of architecture posed a particular challenge. Admittedly, an art historian might have solved it differently. But as a cobbler, I stuck to my last and attempted to "read" the buildings as well. It is amazing how much they reveal when the individuals behind them and the contexts in which they exist are considered. This way, the central chapter condenses most aspects of all chapters into the analysis even though the source base is the thinnest.

Regarding the treatment of (source) languages, this paper warrants several considerations. Firstly, the Italian sources were consulted without in-depth linguistic analysis. The Italian language of the 16th century is not identical to the modern variety, but it is—some quirks notwithstanding—readable without specialized knowledge, or even a historical dictionary. In some cases, the TLIO, *Tesoro della Lingua Italiana delle Origini*, as well as the online version of the *Dizionari Garzanti Linguistica* have been of great use.[10] For the specific

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[8] Nezihi Aykut et al., eds., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (966–968/1558–1560)*, Dîvân-ı Humâyûn Sicilleri Dizisi 1 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993); Hacı Osman Yıldırım et al., eds., *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (973/1565–1566)*, Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn Sicilleri Dizisi 2 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1994); Hacı Osman Yıldırım et al., eds., *6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (972/1564–1565)*, Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn Sicilleri Dizisi 3 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995).

[9] Speaking of availability, the specialized reader might miss a number of important publications as well as (unpublished) source material. There is no denying that the scope of this thesis is rather constricted. How about, for instance, the volumes Islands in the Ottoman Empire edited by Antonis Hadjikyriacou and Insularités ottomanes edited by Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein for some theoretical considerations and comparative cases? Where are the loose-leaf documents from the archives? Frankly, 2021, the year this thesis was composed, has been bad in many regards and access to research material was one of them.

[10] See http://tlio.ovi.cnr.it/TLIOm/ and https://garzantilinguistica.it.

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case of Marino Sanuto, it is important to note that the language of the *Diarii* is indeed Italian. Sanuto served the Most Serene Republic of Venice but did not put down his observations in Venetian. The reproduced letters from his informants examined here are in Tuscan Italian too—and therefore easily accessible to me.

Secondly, all Ottoman Turkish source material included in this study has already been published in transcription. This leads to a clash in transcription systems that might seem like inconsistencies to the reader. Each quoted passage in the footnotes is taken directly from the respective edition. So, while Mehmet Yaşar Ertaş and Hacer Kılıçaslan, the editors of *rūz-nāme*, transcribe into modern Turkish, Merve Saygın who edited the Konya edition of Celalzade Mustafa's *fetiḥ-nāme* uses an intricate linguistic transliteration that had been so far unknown to me. My own transcriptions distinguish between two categories. Ottoman expressions and terminology taken from the sources are rendered according to the *İA* system, that is, the transcription used for the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, the Turkish translation of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*—not the *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. In this variant, initial *hemze* is dropped, ġ̇ is always rendered ġ and never ğ, and long vowels are only indicated in Arabic and Persian words while written vowels in Turkish words are neither indicated with macron above nor below the letter.[11] The second category concerns the names of individuals. I do not transcribe them; I use ğ and only indicate vowel length if phonetically necessary. Ḳānūnī Sulṭān Süleymān becomes Kanuni Sultan Süleyman. Personal names are formalized enough and do not usually require the use of diacritics to make them indistinguishable. The only exception is that I still like to write out every letter. So, all captains in this paper keep the

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[11] The reference I traditionally give for this transcription system is the German language introduction to the Ottoman language by Buğday. It is available in an English translation as well. But during the preparation of this thesis, I realized how clunky it can be—especially if I am not really transcribing all that much myself. Plus, a host of diacritics hinders machine readability which I would rather like to support. These volumes do not appear in the bibliography. See Korkut M. Buğday, *Osmanisch: Einführung in die Grundlagen der Literatursprache* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999), 1–4; Korkut M. Buğday, *The Routledge Introduction to Literary Ottoman*, trans. Jerold C. Frakes (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 1–3.

transcribed *hemze* in Reʾis. Finally, the translation of Ottoman Turkish requires some finesse, and I am still working on it. That is why, for this language I do require a handful of dictionaries. The printed ones I have available are the so-called *Eski* and *Yeni Redhouse*, while online I employ *Kamus-i Turki*, particularly for the spelling functionality.[12]

All told, this study of the early Ottoman rule of Rhodes relies on a diverse set of sources and seeks to support an ambitious point: The period in question is relevant to the further development of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Süleyman and the island of Rhodes has played a pivotal role in the Ottoman hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean. This thesis alone does not prove all of that. It does, however, explore three paths that build upon each other to investigate this set of questions. Regardless of its small scale, this study shows to what extend the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes in 1522 transformed the island and its position in the Mediterranean networks of power. The three perspectives focus on units of analysis that are intricately linked but easy to break down: individual, city, and island— together they make Ottoman Rhodes.

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[12] The dictionaries do not appear in the bibliography. See James W. Redhouse, ed., *A Turkish and English Lexicon Shewing in English the Significations of the Turkish Terms* (Constantinople: A. H. Boyajian, 1890); U. Bahadır Alkım et al., eds., *Redhouse Tükçe/Osmanlıca-İngilizce Sözlük / Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary*, 18th ed. (İstanbul: Sev Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık, 2000); https://kamusiturki.com.

Chapter 1.
The Conquest of Rhodes Revisited

1.1 Identifying individual actors

In 1521, the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes elected a new leader. The order's seasoned Grand Prior of France, Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, became the head of the Knights of Saint John as Grand Master. Eric Brockman, in his popular history *The Two Sieges of Rhodes*, paints the preparation for the war between the Knights and the Ottoman Empire as somewhat of a battle of wits between the Grand Master and Sultan Süleyman. They exchanged vaguely threatening letters, placed spies at each other's courts, and l'Isle-Adam fortified the walled city of Rhodes. After the siege of 1480 and Selim's disrupted plans of 1520, a renewed Ottoman attack was imminent.[13]

Brockman mentions the most important Ottoman and Hospitaller actors as well as many more knights by name. Aside from the commanders-in-chief, I am seeking out a handful of military and administrative figures on either side in my sources. This selection should give me a broad overview of the posts needed to fill during a siege as well as a glimpse at the lasting impact some individuals could have on the space. On the defending side, I was aiming to find the chancellor Andrea d'Amaral plus the turcopolier[14] John Buck and Gabriel de Pommerols, the lieutenant of the Grand Master, both of whom I could not detect. Additionally, I tried to seek out the catholic bishop Leonardo Balestrieri, and—if possible—the Greek Orthodox metropolitan whom Brockman identifies with the name Clement. Amongst the Ottomans, I am

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[13] The author does not identify his sources well. I gather that Süleyman's letters he presents in translation are from Ettore Rossi's work on Celalzade Muṣṭafa's *fetiḥ-nāme*. Unfortunately, Rossi's *Assedio e Conquista di Rodi nel 1522 secondo le relazioni edite ed inedite dei Turchi* (Rome, 1927) was not available to me. Eric Brockman, *The Two Sieges of Rhodes: 1480-1522* (London: John Murray, 1969), 111–19.

[14] The turcopolier commanded the light cavalry and was charged with the defense of the coast. This title was always held by an English knight. Whitworth Porter, *A History of the Knights of Malta. Or, The Order of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem*, [orig. 1858], vol. 2, Cambridge Library Collection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 287.

focusing on the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed Paşa, as well as the viziers Çoban Mustafa Paşa and (Haʾin) Ahmed Paşa, the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, Kasım Paşa, the Grand Admiral Palak Mustafa Paşa, and Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis, a famous corsair and navy captain. Additionally, I am keeping İbrahim Paşa, and Piri Reʾis for their later impact in mind.[15]

1.1.1 Who was in charge on either side

In his *Diarii*, the contemporary Venetian chronicler Marino Sanuto extensively reports the power structures in the Eastern Mediterranean. The spellings are somewhat arbitrary and volatile in the edition of 1892, but the Ottoman actors are clearly recognizable. And from the beginning of the war on Rhodes in June 1522, most of their mentions are in some way connected to the island. This was not always the case as Venice had regular contact with the Porte. The Grand Vizier who is quite unmistakably identified as "Perì (Piri Mohamed) pascià"[16] appears already in February 1522 in a letter that Sanuto reproduces by Andrea Marzello, the Venetian representative (*bailo*) of Corfu. In a mix of spy report and state of the union, he reports the goings-on in Constantinople too including that they "held the wedding ceremony and feast of the sister of the Turkish Lord married to Ferhad Paşa, who is one of the four advisors of the Turkish Lord; and that Piri Paşa is the one who governs and commands everything."[17]

When the war gets hot, Sanuto's informants are on the ground. He reproduces a letter by one Zuan Antonio di Bonaldi who "with divine help found [himself] with [his] ship here on Rhodes."[18] Bonaldi dutifully reports that for twelve days now, Ottoman ships had been appearing in the channel of Rhodes and that on this day, June 26 (*hozi, a 26 Zugno*), they first

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[15] Brockman, *Two Sieges of Rhodes*, 118–22; Nicolas Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l'Empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes (1480-1522)*, Collection Turcica VII (Paris: Peeters, 1994), 343–45.

[16] Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:729.

[17] "[F]ate le noze et feste di la sorella dil Signor turco maridada in Ferach bassà, ch'è uno di quatro consieri dil Signor turco; e che Perì bassa è quello governava et comandava el tutto;" Sanuto, 33:37.

[18] "[C]on l'ajuto divino mi atrovo con la mia nave quì in Rodi," Sanuto, 33:386–87.

landed on the island to lay siege to the city. But, according to him, Rhodes was prepared. Goods had been stockpiled aplenty and the walled city was fortified with great numbers of fighting men and artillery. Bonaldi invokes John the Baptist (*san Zuan Batista* in the letter), the Knights Hospitaller's patron saint, and hopes for God's help against "this dragon who wants to devour the Christian people."[19]

Amongst these early beleaguerers was Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis (*Curtogoli* in the source). Together with one *Caramamuth*, likely Kara Mahmut Reʾis, he is mentioned in early June to have led the Ottoman forces in their approach to Rhodes.[20] Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis reappears in Sanuto's chronicle in early November when he recounts the Grand Master's tale of a crushing victory against the Ottomans. Apparently, l'Isle-Adam had sent letters to "the Pope, the Emperor, and other potentates" in a final attempt to incur their support. According to him over the course of four battles, they had "sent 30 galleys of Kurtoğlu to the bottom of the sea," had "flayed Piri Paşa alive," and had "cut the head off the mentioned Kurtoğlu." But even Sanuto remains doubtful as it "is not a letter from our general, and they do not believe [it]."[21] This doubt was justified. About a week later, the chronicler mentions Piri Mehmed Paşa again who must have been well enough—until he and the second vizier Mustafa Paşa were injured by gun fire. But more importantly, in the same paragraph Sanuto reveals a plot to overthrow the fortress of Rhodes. Someone had fled the city, defected to the Ottomans, and told them to attack a weak spot in the fortifications.[22]

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[19] "[A]juto contro de questo drago che pensa divorare el populo Cristiano," Sanuto, 33:387.

[20] "Scrive che il Signor havia fato che Curtogoli et Caramamuth corsari fosseno con la sua armata apresso il capitanio come proveditori," Sanuto, 33:341.

[21] "[L]etere di quel Gran Maestro drizate al Pontefice, a l'Imperator e altri potentati, […] Rhodi haveva hauto quatro bataglie, et si havea defeso valentemente, e visto il Turcho non haver potuto obtenir la terra, et che quelli di Rhodi havia mandato a fondi 30 galie di Curtogoli, unde l'havea fatto schorticar vivo Perì bassà, e fatto taiar la testa a ditto Curtogoli, et si havea retrato di la terra col campo più anchora era su l'ixola. […] Tamen non è letere dil Zeneral nostro, et quelli non credeno," Sanuto, 33:500–501.

[22] "[E]t ferito de uno schiopo Peri bassà et Mustafa bassà; et di uno fuzito di Rhodi andato in campo dil Turcho a dirli bombardi da la parte dil palazo e di l'hospedal ch'è il più debol locho;" Sanuto, 33:511.

While, Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis does not reappear in Sanuto's *Diarii* of 1522, we can be very sure that he had kept his head. Two entries in Sultan Süleyman's *rūz-nāme* reveal a crucial point in the siege and Kurtoğlu was directly involved. On December 10, 1522, the Ottomans had called a truce with the Knights Hospitaller. Under Mustafa Paşa's watch, they exchanged envoys, receiving two Christian men, one of whom was a ship captain. The Ottoman camp sent the *zaġarcıbaşı*, a high-ranking Janissary and keeper of the hounds, and Ahmed Paşa's deputy (*kedhüdā*) into the fortress. On December 11, Kurtoğlu Reʾis was deployed. He sent a spy boat and then "went inside [the fortress] to consult with the *Megali Mastori*."[23] Veiled by the literal translation to Greek is the Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaller, Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam. Now, Kurtoğlu, the corsair turned navy captain whom l'Isle-Adam had tried to chalk up as a victim of the war, sat right across from him to negotiate.

But the talks were not going smoothly. Only three days later, the *rūz-nāme* records the resumption of cannon fire from the city and notes: "Two of our soldiers remain inside, that is, the *zaġarcıbaşı* and the translator."[24] So, while Kurtoğlu Reʾis was not in Rhodes-City anymore, the Sultan's hound keeper was still hard at work. Unfortunately, he is unnamed in my sources. The conquest report, *fetiḥ-nāme*, by Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi corroborates this, mentioning an uneasy truce with likely schemes by the infidels (*kāfir*, pl. *küffār*)[25] on

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[23] "Yevmü'l-erbaʻa fî 21 minh *[10 Aralık]*: Bugün kalʻadan kefere emân […] dileyüp, bunlar dahi vire edüp, içerüden iki yarar kâfir çıkup ve bizden dahi zaġarcıbaşı ve Ahmed Paşa kethüdası, birer hidmetkâr ile ve mukaddemâ içerüden çıkup müslümân olan şahsı içerüye gönderdiler ve vire, Mustafa Paşa gedüğünden oldu. İçerüden çıkan mezbûr küllâbın biri mîr-i felar, biri kapudanmış. / Yevmü'l-hamîs fî 22 minh *[11 Aralık]*: Dîvân olup, zikr olunan iki nefer kefere el öpdüler ve ikisine dahi hilʻat giydirdiler Ve rûy-ı deryâdan karavul olan Kurdoğlu, bir câsûs kayığın tutup gönderdi ve felar beyi, Megali Mastori ile müşâvere etmeğe içerüye gitdi," Mehmet Yaşar Ertaş and Hacer Kılıçaslan, "Rodos'un Fetih Günlüğü Kanuni Sultan Süleyman'ın Rodos Seferi Rûznâmesi/The Dairy (Ruzname) of Kanuni Sultan Suleyman's Rhodes Campaign," *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries)* 12, no. 1 (2017): 27.

[24] "Yevmü'l-ahad fî 25 minh *[14 Aralık]*: Sâbıkan olan vire, yine darb ü harbe tebdîl olunup vazʻ-ı sâbık üzere her top yerlü yerinden atılmağa başladı ve dün çıkan kâfire bir mikdâr akçe inʻâm olundu ve hilʻat verildi ve onların iki nefer kimesnesi taşrada ve bizim iki nefer âdemimiz içerüde kaldı ki zaġarcıbaşıyla tercemândır ve bugün sabâhdan ahşama değin şol denlü top atıldı ki vasfa gelmez, hatta küffâr-ı şekâvet-şiʻâr âciz ve fürû-mânde olarak tekrâr emân dileyü gördü, katʻâ iʻtibâr olunmayup peyâ-pey toplar atıldı, arası kesilmedi," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, 28.

[25] The *rūz-nāme* contains the same episode one day earlier quoting one Christian informant saying that the Ottomans were being tricked: "'*Küffârın sizin ile vire edüp emân dilediklerinden garaz, mahzâ netîce-i hîledir*," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, 28.

muḥarrem 25, that is, the same day. At the same time, it mentions the *zaġarcıbaşı* and some men who "knew the state of war and peace" (*cenge ve barışıḳlıḳ aḥvāli bilüp*) as negotiators inside Rhodes-City.[26]

Conjured up as the *Megali Mastori* in the *rūz-nāme*, Grand Master l'Isle-Adam led the most important talks on the side of the Knights. He would have been flanked by the order's chancellor Andrea d'Amaral but by December 1522, Amaral had already made his choice. Sanuto's *Diarii* reference him in a letter dated November 27, 1522. Writing from *Candia*, a Venetian citizen (styled as *sier*) relates the goings-on around him to his brother-in-law. For Crete, he recounts the visit of "an ambassador of the Turk, of whom one does not know what he came to do."[27] Mostly, however, he details the state of the siege on Rhodes. He reports that "on Rhodes they are in good spirits, they are not afraid of anything, and they do not wish for anything but 500 fresh men" as many had been injured by gunfire from the Ottoman siege battlements. Amongst them "el Martinengo" had lost an eye.[28] But according to the letter, the Ottomans were losing their drive—in fact "the Turk despairs."[29] The late chancellor of the Knights Hospitaller Andrea d'Amaral appears towards the end of the letter amid praises for the defenders. Identified not by name but simply as "a Portuguese friar" (*ferier*, cf. French *frere*), the letter writer reports his downfall. He had plotted against his brothers-in-arms and lost his head for it:

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[26] "padişāh-ı ẓafer-maḳām ṭarafından [10] zaġarcıbaşı ile ba'żı cenge ve barışıḳlıḳ aḥvāli [11] bilüp kimseler daḫı içerü ḳal'aya gönderilüp / (47b) [1] aḥvāl-i cenge ve cidālden ḫalāṣ olup lākin Pīr Muḥammed Paşa [2] gedüginden bir kāfir firār idüp gelüp eyitdi kāfirleriŋ [3] ṭaleb-i amānına inanmak ḥaḳīḳat degildür belki ḥīle- [4] dür Firengistān ṭarafından imdādı gelecekdür ol ācilden [5] ḥīle iderler didi fi'l-vāḳi' mel'ūnlar bu vech-ile ḥīle- [6] leri muḥaḳḳaḳ olup Muḥarremü'l-ḥarāmıŋ yigirmi beşinci güni," Merve Saygın, "Tevârih-i Feth-i Rodos (İnceleme – Metin - Dizin - Tıpkıbasım)" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2021), 193, fols. 47a, 47b. Note that Saygın's transcription of the *fetiḥ-nāme* is very complex and meticulously arranged by folios and lines. As mentioned in the introduction, I have made no changes to quoted passages save for ignoring bold face and color.
[27] "[U]no ambasciator dil Turcho di quì, el qual non si sa quello sìi venuto a far," Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:569.
[28] "Dice come in Rodi stanno di bon animo e non hanno paura di niente e non voriano altro se non 500 homini freschi, perchè ne sono assai feriti, et tulli da schioppi, perchè li turchi hanno facto da una banda un monte di terra, che soperchia la terra et stanno a bresaiar quelli di dentro con li schioppi. Et el Martinengo ha perso uno occhio da un schiopo," Sanuto, 33:569.
[29] "Tamen li turchi non vogliono più darli bataia, […] non osano et hanno paura, […]. E il Turcho si dispera." Sanuto, 33:569–70.

It is true that they have little wine left; but they have enough ammunition, bread, rice[30] and water, and they wait for the west wind to pass, and they are hostile towards the Turks, of whom they say they will not let them go in anymore, and they want to cut them all and burn their fleet; which is in the worst possible shape. They have discovered an act of treason committed by a Portuguese friar, who used to be the first man of Rhodes, and he had been outdone by the current Grand Master, by two votes, and they cut his head off. And everyone inside is in good spirits.[31]

The same Martinengo who had lost an eye also reported the final defeat of Rhodes to the Venetians. Sanuto abridges and reproduces a letter dated January 5, 1523, sent from Zakynthos (*Zante*), an island to the West of the Peloponnese. Identified both as Cabriel and Gabriel (Tadin) da Martinengo, the Venetian informant details l'Isle-Adam's decision to give up the island of Rhodes to the Ottomans. He writes: "Today with greatest grief, I inform you that on the 20th of December the most revered Grand Master […] took the decision to leave the land to the Turkish Lord, provided that they promise to spare their people and belongings."[32] And not only the beleaguerers were to blame, Martinengo alleges, as the order (*la Religion*) had been given up by the Christian rulers of Europe and its most natural allies. While the Knights Hospitaller had worked hard to secure the island, they ran out of the necessary resources and men to defend the city. Here, Martinengo reveals how close he had been to the Grand Master, saying that he informed l'Isle-Adam he was fleeing the island as he

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[30] One could translate *risi* here as "laughter" from *ridere*. But in this context, I have chosen "rice," considering it a plural of *il riso*. In fact, rice had been present in Europe since the Arab expansion. By the 15th century the cultivation of rice had reached Northern Italy. So, it is safe to assume that the Knights Hospitaller stocked up on it too. Cf., H. C. Darby, "Chapter II: The Face of Europe on the Eve of the Great Discoveries," in *The New Cambridge Modern History. Volume 1: The Renaissance, 1493–1520*, ed. G. R. Potter and Denys Hay, first publ. 1957 (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 32.

[31] "Vero è che hanno pocho vino; ma hanno assai munition, pan, risi et aqua, et aspetano il socorso di ponente, e sono tanto inanimati contra turchi, che dicono non li lasserà più andar dentro, e li voleno taiar tutti e brasar la sua armada; la qual è tanto malissimo in ordine, quanto sia possibile. Hanno discoverto uno tratato che menava un ferier portogalese, qual era el primo omo di Rodi, et era cazudo Gran Maestro da costui che è adesso, di 2 balote, et li hanno taiato la testa. E tutti dentro stanno di bon animo," Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:570.

[32] "[H]ora con grandissimo cordoglio la avisarò, che a 20 di D zembrio [*sic*], il reverendissimo Gran Maestro con suo sacro consilio e il populo di Rodi prese apontamento di restituir la terra al Signor turcho, salvi de lor persone e robe con pur assai promission se li manteniranno." Sanuto, 33:602.

too did not have anything anymore to lend to the cause. In fact, he considered himself important enough that "the sultan wanted to have him in his hands for many reasons."[33]

This might have just been accurate. Gabriel Tadin da Martinengo, or Gabriele Tadino da Martinengo, was not just some observer who found himself on Rhodes during the war. As an engineer, he had joined the headquarters of the Knights Hospitaller specifically to spruce up the defenses in preparation of a siege. He appears twenty-four times in Sanuto's *Diario* of the year 1522, comparing not badly to Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam with thirty-two mentions. Martinengo did not belong to the Grand Master's "ordine Gerosolomitano," the order of Jerusalem, but was a "cavaliere di s. Giovanni del Tempio," that is, a templar.[34]

Before coming to Rhodes, Martinengo was in Venetian service on Crete. A short note from March 1522 attests to his "works done [there], should the Turkish navy come to that island."[35] By late June, a Rhodian Knight by the name of Antonio arrived on Crete and reported the Ottoman aggressions in order "to request on behalf of the Grand Master, Sir Gabriel da Martinengo, our governor[36] over said island of *Candia*, whose coming would save that land." But the Venetian rectors denied the request fearing that the Ottomans would turn towards Crete, so he was needed to keep reinforcing the defenses.[37] Well, Martinengo was nothing but a man of action. So, a short note dated to July 20, just reads: "As Sir Gabriel da Martinengo, governor

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[33] [V]edendo non potersi più tenir per non haver homini a la difesa, havia capitolato di dar la terra al Turcho, […]. La povera Religion è stata abandonata *non solum* da tutti principi christiani, ma da li soi proprii. […] "Io, visto questo, andai dal reverendissimo monsignor Gran Maistro, et li dissi, non havendo più di combatter nè reparar la terra, saria stato bene avisato zerchar di salvarme, perchè per molte ragioni il Signor turcho averia zerchato de avermi ne le mani," Sanuto, 33:601–3.

[34] Sanuto, 33:742, 761.

[35] "[L]e operation fate; sichè venendo armata turchesca a quella ixola," Sanuto, 33:182.

[36] I am hesitant to believe that Martinengo was in fact the Venetian governor of Crete. Brockman, for instance, assigns the roles very differently. But Sanuto is adamant in making Martinengo out as *governador*. Eric Brockman, *The Two Sieges of Rhodes: 1480-1522* (London: John Murray, 1969), 123–24.

[37] "Come quel zorno era zonto lì uno brigantin spazato a posta per il Gran Maestro di Rodi con uno ferier chiamato domino Antonio […]. Pertanto era venuto de lì a rechieder da parte dil Gran Maestro domino Gabriel da Martinengo governador nostro sopra ditta ixola di Candia, qual venendo sarà la salvation di quella terra. *Unde* loro rectori li risposeno che'l ditto domino Gabriel la Signoria l'havia mandato al governo di quella ixola, qual non erano securi che l'armata turchescha non si voltasse de lì, et conveniva atender a la fortifichation, sì che senza ordine di la Signoria non lo darìa." Sanuto, *Diarii*, 33:417.

of this island, departed, *without saying goodbye to the host,* he went to Rhodes trusting his own judgement."[38]

When leaving Rhodes again, Martinengo did inform the host—but of course not the new patron. According to Sultan Süleyman's *rūz-nāme*, the Ottomans had finally conquered the city of Rhodes on December 24, 1522, when "Piri Paşa and Ahmed Paşa entered the castle and Balı, the leader of the janissaries, together with 150 fighting men went in as well."[39] The following day, the Ottomans ceremonially made the city their own. The *rūz-nāme* notes:

> Today, by the grace of God, at the time of the noon prayer, in the noble name of the inspired ruler (*ḫüdāvendigār*), the sultan's (*hünkār*) muezzins recited the call to prayer (*ezān*) in the Arab tower and the red and yellow standard of the janissaries was hoisted on the same tower and many times the imperial band played, and festivities took place. And Ferhad Paşa came crossing the sea and met with the army. And the call to prayer (*gül-bāng-i Muḥammedī*) with cries of Allah Allah filled every corner of the castle.[40]

Here, the events leading up to the Ottoman reign over Rhodes come to an end. The Venetian and the Ottoman source material focused on individual actors to different degrees. The last section, for instance, mentions Ferhad Paşa, who had also appeared in Sanuto's report above as one of Sultan Süleyman's advisors (*consieri dil Signor turco*). This goes to show that the Venetians had a close eye on individual Ottoman notables. Intriguingly, that is not always the case regarding the Knights Hospitaller. Important members of the order, as highlighted by Brockman for instance, do not recognizably appear in Sanuto's *Diarii*. The letters and comments either reference the highest leadership such as Grand Master, Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, and the disgraced chancellor Andrea d'Amaral, or refer to some Rhodian *ferier*s

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[38] "Come domino Gabriel da Martinengo governador di quella ixola era partito, *insalutato hospite*, et andato come si iudicha in Rhodi," Sanuto, 33:419.

[39] "Pîrî Paşa ve Ahmed Paşa kollu kolundan kal'anın içine girdiler ve yeniçeri ağası Balı dahi yüz elli nefer yeniçeri ile içerü girdi," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 30.

[40] "Bugün bi-inâyetillâh vakt-i zuhrda devletlü Hüdâvendigâr nâm-ı şerîfine, kule-i Arab'da Hünkâr mü'ezzinleri ezân okuyup ve yeniçerilerin kızıllu sarılu sancağı kule-i mezbûrede dikülüp ve nice def'a nevbet-i şâhî çalınup şenlikler oldu ve Ferhad Paşa dahi deryâdan ubûr edüp gelüp orduya mülâkī oldu ve kal'anın her köşesinde sadâ-yı Allâh Allâh ile gül-bâng-i Muhammedî âfâkı tutdu," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, 30.

on a first-name basis. Antonio, for instance, the knight who asked for Gabriel da Martinengo's support is not identified in any other way, but the respective letter notes he was "very indignant and used strange words."[41]

In fact, it was Gabriele da Martinengo himself who from July 1522 on became both Sanuto's major informant and a subject of scrutiny. His letters were transmitted via Crete and kept Serenissima informed. At the same time his "going rogue," and leaving Candia to fortify Rhodes, was the talk of the town. But he had no repercussions to fear as "by defending this land, he defends the State of the Most Illustrious Lady," that is Venice.[42]

The present Ottoman sources generally do not mention Venetian or Rhodian individuals by name. L'Isle-Adam, designated as the *Megali Mastori*, is the exception. But it happens that the *ruz-nāme* recounts visits of individual city dwellers to the Ottoman war camp. They would bring information, sometimes bordering on deceit; other times they even deserted and converted to Islam.[43] In general, the local Christians are referred to as "infidels," *küffār* in this passage from the *rūz-nāme*, or *kefere* in Necati Avcı's Turkish rendering of the Arabic language *fetiḥ-nāme* by Tabib Ramazan. The Knights and the population of the city are then collectively identified as *Rodos keferesi*. For instance, they are characterized such: "These, namely the infidels of Rhodes, are richer and more powerful than the others in two aspects, in terms of goods and labor."[44]

Seeing that Venice had a vested interest in Ottoman affairs, Sanuto's *Diarii* are more generous when it comes to identifying individuals from the 'other' side. There are a few prominent Ottomans, that have not been covered yet. A Venetian ambassadorial report from

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[41] "[M]olto sdegnato, usò stranie parole," Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:417.

[42] "Intendemo il Martinengo esser bandito et messo rebello. Certo non merita reprensione, che essendo a defension di questa terra, el defende el Stado di la Illustrissima Signoria," Sanuto, 33:417–19.

[43] Cf. the entries of September 29 in which a *kāfir* converts and dons the *ḫilʿat*, the robe of honor, and December 13 in which the *kāfir* provides valuable information but returns to the inside of the castle. Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 20, 28.

[44] "Bunlar yani Rodos keferesi iki yönden, mal ve hizmet yönünden başkalarından daha zengin ve daha güçlü idiler," Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Report of Süleyman's Conquest of Rhodes," 94.

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late February 1522 details the goings-on at the Porte after the conquest of Belgrade in 1521. The envoy, Marco Minio, describes the Ottoman court, its financial situation, and the state of military. Seemingly, he had been in contact with Mustafa Paşa, the beylerbey of Greece, and "amico nostro," our friend. He also presents a quick character study of the young Sultan Süleyman. According to Minio, "his live is judged very lavish. He often goes to the palace of the women, causes some disorder, and likes to go for joyrides on a *fusta*, a sailing ship." Then the envoy explains the contemporary Ottoman power structure. He states that the sultan had four *bassà*, pashas, likely to be understood as Viziers. The first one was Piri, who "takes care of everything," the second was Mustafa, whom the letter writer likes. He even considers him handsome (*di bel aspeto*). The third pasha is called *Fereal*—a name I cannot reliably place. Maybe it is Ferhad Paşa who has already appeared in the *Diarii* as Ferach. The fourth one, who had not been mentioned yet, received the name *Cassin bassà*.[45] This is Kasım Paşa. Even though the report goes on to say that a *belarbei* (in the Italian spelling) wants his post, we know from the *rūz-nāme* that he was in fact the *beylerbey* of Anatolia.[46]

Amongst the Ottoman navy, I could not identify Palak Mustafa Paşa, the admiral, or *ḳapudan-i deryā*, in Sanuto's *Diarii*. It appears that Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis, the corsair who had been harassing the Knight's ships long before the war,[47] was simply more notorious. In the *rūz-nāme* we hear that by December 16, 1522, the man at the helm changed: "Palak Mustafa Paşa was dismissed, and the captaincy was given to the *bey* of Vlorë (*Avlonya*), Behram Bey."[48] I could not identify Piri Reʾis, the nephew of the infamous pirate Kemal Reʾis,

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[45] "Mustaphà bassa, qual è belarbei di la Grecia, amico nostro […]. La vita del Signor è iudicata molto lasciva. Va spesso al seragio di le done, fa molti desordeni, va spesso a spasso con una fusta. […]; al presente ha quatro bassà. Perì di nation turco qual risponde a tulti […]. Il secondo è Mustaffà di nation schiavon, homo molto discreto e gentil, di bel aspeto […]. Il terzo è Fereal bassà di nation da Sibinico […] Quarto è Cassin bassa, turco vechio […] si dice sarà dismesso e il belarbei voria tuorli il suo loco," Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:314–16.
[46] "Anadolu Beylerbeyisi Kasım Paşa," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 10.
[47] Brockman, *Two Sieges of Rhodes*, 112–13.
[48] "Balak Mustafa Bey maʿzûl olup kapudanlık Avlonya Beyi Behram Bey'e verildi," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 28.

who likely had been engaged in piracy too but would later come to fame as a geographer.[49]

Thus, from these sources I cannot conclusively prove that Piri Reʾis did in fact participate in the siege of Rhodes. If he was there, he had not yet achieved the necessary level of notoriety to be included in the present reports. That likely changed in the following years with the dedication of his book on navigation, the *Kitāb-i Baḥriye*, to Sultan Süleyman.[50]

To conclude this section, there are few individuals whom I could not identify by name at all. Both the Catholic bishop, called Leonardo Balestrieri by Brockman, and the Orthodox metropolitan, Clement, do not appear in my sources. There is one mention of "a Greek priest" amongst the Rhodians in a letter by Martinengo,[51] and of "a number of priests"[52] in Celalzade's *fetiḥ-nāme*. The apparent name of the Rhodian bishop, *Balestrieri*, appears as an expression in Sanuto's *Diarii* but only in the literal sense. There are a few individuals identified as *balestrieri* by profession, that is, crossbowmen.[53] The Venetian Patrician house Balastro comes close but, at least in the 1522 reports, they lack a member named Leonardo.[54]

On the Ottoman side, I am missing one important figure. The later Grand Vizier Pargalı İbrahim Paşa does not appear in the present sources. İbrahim was part of my considerations because he is connected to the construction of the Süleymaniye Mosque in the Old Town of Rhodes. According to a study of the local Ottoman architecture by Zeki Çelikkol, he built two mosques on Rhodes while *en route* to Egypt.[55] İbrahim does appear in the following year of Sanuto's *Diarii* in a report from July 1523: "This *Embraim* is of the nation of Parga."[56] It is

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[49] Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 82–85.

[50] For a particularly intricate manuscript, cf. Piri Reʾis, "Kitāb-i Baḥriye [Book of Seafaring]" (Late 17th century), Ms. W.658, Digitized Walters Manuscripts, http://purl.thewalters.org/art/W.658/description.

[51] "[U]no papa grecho," Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:511. This could be translated as "a Greek pope" which is not applicable but would point to a clergyman of higher standing, such as a metropolitan.

[52] "[B]irḳaç papazlar," Saygın, "Celazade: History of the Conquest of Rhodes," 164.

[53] Sanuto, *Diarii*, 1892, 33:724, 738, 743.

[54] Sanuto, 33:678.

[55] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 51.

[56] "Questo Embraim è di nation di la Parga," Marino Sanuto, *Diarii: I Marzo MDXXIII – XXVIII Febbraio MDXXIV*, ed. Federico Stefani, Guglielmo Berchet, and Nicolò Barozzi, vol. 34 (Venezia: Fratelli Visentini Tipografi Editori, 1892), 360.

important to note that he is presented in the same breath as Ahmed Paşa who had his hands in the "problèmes que la Porte rencontrait […] en Égypte," as Nicholas Vatin puts it.[57] Indeed, he likely stopped by Rhodes to commission the mosques only after Ahmed Paşa had earned the byname *ḫāʾin*, that is, the traitor. Dissatisfied with İbrahim Paşa's appointment as Grand Vizier in the summer of 1523, Ahmed Paşa asked for the post of governor (*vāliʿ*) of Egypt. Seeing that Egypt had become Ottoman only recently too, he was quite successful. One political plot led to the other, and in January 1524, Ahmed Paşa rebelled, declaring himself the sultan of Egypt. The Ottoman forces made short work of him.[58]

1.1.2 Who remained after the siege

Before his fatal stint as the ruler of Egypt, however, Ahmed Paşa was a trusted representative of the Porte. In his history of the two sieges of Rhodes (1480, 1522), Nicholas Vatin reproduces several relevant letters. The first two written immediately after the Ottoman conquest are by Ahmed Paşa. He appears to be in charge of organizing the immediate aftermath of the siege. In the first one, tentatively dated December 30, 1522, he reports dealing with an unwelcome denizen of Rhodes-City, the movement of troops, and some wrongdoing by his own men.[59]

Ahmed Paşa's second letter after the siege follows around January 11, 1523. It is, in fact, a lengthy report about the measures necessary to hold the fort—quite literally. He notes that problems arising with unruly citizens were dealt with by reinforcing the presence of guards both in the city and the countryside. Those non-Muslims who had not followed the Knights Hospitaller's emigration, were moved outside of the walls of Rhodes-City. In addition to that, the letter makes it clear who of the abovementioned Ottoman officials would stay on the island

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[57] Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 368.

[58] Abdülkadir Özcan, "Ahmed Paşa, Hain," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 2 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989), 113.

[59] These letters are examined more closely in Chapter 2. Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 498–502.

and who would return to other posts. Specifically, Behram Bey, the current admiral, was to accompany Ferhad Paşa and transport troops back to the mainland. Kasım Paşa, on the other hand, was delegated to serve as the custodian of the fortress and would thus stay. Regarding his own responsibilities, Ahmed Paşa notes that he too would now leave and follow his sultan. However, Vatin raises the question whether these letters were written on Rhodes at all. His reasonable theory is that Ahmed left for the mainland already and stayed in Marmaris before traveling to the capital. There he could receive communication and prepare the reports.[60]

Following Vatin's suggestion, I matched the letters with the *rūz-nāme*. For January 1523, it mentions neither Ahmed Paşa's nor Kasım Paşa's involvement. The January 4 entry notes that four *sancaḳ bey*s from Anatolia received the task to repair the fortress. One Dizdarzāde Mehmed Çelebi, the *sancaḳ bey* of Mytilene/Lesbos (*Midillü*) supported them, as he was charged with the stewardship of Rhodes which did not constitute an administrative unit yet.[61] A short reference provided by Ettore Rossi confirms this and clarifies the term *dizdār* for me; it means being tasked with the upkeep of a fortress. In addition to that, Rossi's contribution strongly confirms that Kasım Paşa, the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, was indeed involved in the necessary restorations following the conquest.[62]

According to Şerafettin Turan, Sultan Süleyman initially gave the responsibility for Rhodes and the surrounding islands to Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis. This administrative connection between an important seafarer and the region would later be formalized when the Dodecanese became the charge of the respective *kapudan-i deryā*, the Grand Admiral.[63]

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[60] Vatin, 503–15.

[61] "Yevmü'l-ahad fî 16 minh *[4 Ocak]:* Kal'a-i Rodos ta'mîri masla- hatı için sancakları halkı ile dört sancakbeyi ta'yîn etdiler ki biri Menteşe Sancağı Beyi Emîr-i Âhûr İskender Bey ve biri Karasi Sancağı Beyi Sinan Bey ve biri Aydın İli Beyi Lütfi Bey ve biri Sa- ruhan Sancağı Beyi Ferhad Bey ve cezîre-i Rodos'da bi'l-fi'l müs- takil sancak olmağa tahammül olmamağın, Midillü Sancağı Beyi olan Dizdarzâde Mehmed Çelebi sancağına zamîme edüb, kal'a-yı mezbûreyi gelüp ta'mîr etmeğe bile mu'âvenet etmek buyruldu," Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 32.

[62] Ettore Rossi, "Nuove ricerche sulle fonti turche relative all'assedio di Rodi nel 1522," *Rivista degli studi orientali* 15, no. 1 (1934): 99–100.

[63] Şerafettin Turan, "Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hâkimiyetinden Çıkışı," *Belleten* XXIX, no. 163 (1965): 78.

1.2 Reporting victory: The genre of *fetiḥ-nāme*

Throughout this chapter, I have referenced two *fetiḥ-nāme*s and one *rūz-nāme* without clarifying the source types and their significance for the present issue. In difference to general chronicles and (world) histories, they are quite restrictive in scope and often very immediate. A *fetiḥ-nāme*, conquest report or book, was traditionally a long letter or edict issued by an Islamic ruler proclaiming, and thus solidifying, their victories to the wider world. In the Ottoman context, this official practice was expanded with a literary type of *fetiḥ-nāme*s mostly written by courtiers and dedicated to the conquering sultan to appeal to their patronage. It is not always clear whether the individual authors took part in the conquests or relied on first-hand accounts. When it comes to genre, the line separating *fetiḥ-nāme*s from *ġazavāt-nāme*s, reports of military campaigns, is blurry. Maybe they form a subgenre; maybe they do not constitute a genre at all but rather a framework. In any case, *fetiḥ-nāme*s are an attractive source type for their immediacy and the possibility to contextualize the contents relatively clearly.[64]

The term *rūz-nāme* corresponds quite well to the concept of a journal or diary. In both cases the literal translation as "daily (book)" applies. Entries sorted by days allow for the recording of various information and quick access later. As an integral part of the Ottoman (financial) bureaucracy *rūz-nāme*s, or *rūznāmçe*s, were used to record daily income and expenses. In general, *rūz-nāme*s make for very useful sources as the potential information contained is very varied. Economic data could be derived from an accounting *rūz-nāme*, court life could be explored based on the sultan's daily agenda, and notable events were conveyed in *rūz-nāme*s serving as newspapers.[65] The one examined here is a *sefer rūz-nāmesi*, an expedition notebook. On (military) campaigns, the scribe accompanying the sultan would record the daily events of strategic and, in retrospect, historical importance. According to Yaşar Ertaş and Hacer

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[64] Hasan Aksoy, "Fetihnâme," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 12 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995), 470–72.
[65] Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, "Rûznâme," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 35 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2008), 278–80.

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Kılıçaslan, the editors of the Rhodes campaign *rūz-nāme*, the authors often were the same as the sultan's private scribe in the court, the *sır kātibi*.[66] A daily report like this is an invaluable source as it provides the most temporally immediate information about the goings-on in war times. In addition, the data is accessible by calendar date and deliberately concise which makes comparisons, as I have done with Sanuto's diary, very convenient.

For the conquest of Rhodes, I have worked with three sources of these types. The *Tevârih-i Feth-i* Rodos is Merve Saygın's edition of the conquest book by Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi. It is the newest version of this famous contemporary text. In difference to Murat Yıldız's 2011 edition, *Celalzâde'nin Rodos Fetihnamesi*, Saygın based it on a manuscript from the Konya Regional Manuscript Directorate (*Konya Bölge Yazma Eserler Müdürlüğü*). Her edition was published well into 2021 as her *yüksek lisans tezi*, the equivalent of a master's thesis, at the Selçuk University in Konya. Her transliteration is intricate and consistent using very specialized characters.[67]

The Arabic language *fetiḥ-nāme* by Süleyman's physician Tabib Ramazan was edited and rendered into Turkish by Necati Avcı. It exists in two versions. The 1989 edition published as his *yüksek lisans tezi* includes a facsimile of the original text and is typewritten. The 1993 edition titled *Tabib Ramazan: Er-Risale el-Fethiyye er-Radosiyye es-Süleymaniyye* constitutes his PhD dissertation and is more accessibly typeset. While I could not reliably work with the Arabic text, I refer to the Turkish translation of the PhD version in chapters two and three.[68]

Finally, the *rūz-nāme* published by Ertaş and Kılıçaslan has already been pointed out. Published 2017 in *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, it is fairly recent. According to the editors,

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[66] Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 3–8.

[67] Unfortunately, Yıldız's edition was never fully available to me amidst the closure of research infrastructure in 2021. Yıldız, *Celalzade: Conquest Report of Rhodes*; Saygın's edition arrived late in my source collection, but I could make use of it. A note on the transcription: As much as I personally appreciate a reversible transliteration, some of the glyphs utilized must be so specialized that my reader software only shows blank boxes. I have not included such examples. Saygın, "Celazade: History of the Conquest of Rhodes," 44–45, passim.

[68] Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Report of Süleyman's Conquest"; Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Report of Süleyman's Conquest of Rhodes."

Akif Erdoğru has published the text already, but he had to rely on an incomplete copy of the original. In any case, Erdoğru's version was not accessible to me. The present edition by Ertaş and Kılıçaslan is based on a complete manuscript in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul. As already lauded, its use had various advantages for me including the seemingly reliable dating and the sense of immediacy, even urgency invoked by the concise entries.[69]

I present these editions here instead of in the introduction because their publication history is intrinsically linked to the topic of this chapter. Marino Sanuto's *Diarii* constitute an amazing history of Venice spanning almost 40 years, from 1496 to 1533. Published between the 1870s and 1900 in 58 volumes, they have been a reliably available source for the era.[70] The Ottoman source base, on the other hand, is less established. It is continuously expanding—often thanks to individual dissertation projects. The developments on Rhodes after the Ottoman conquest, and as this chapter shows, the war itself, can be regarded from the vantagepoint of the individual—be that a notorious corsair or an enterprising engineer, a contemporary observer or a present-day historian. They shape our perception of those events that set the scene for transformations that are necessary for the individual and the community alike. Architecture, the common denominator of chapter two, exemplifies the interplay of the individual and the structural level.

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[69] Ertaş and Kılıçaslan, "Diary of Süleyman's Rhodes Campaign," 7–8, passim.
[70] The University of Pennsylvania Libraries offer an overview website of the online accessible volumes of Sanuto's *Diarii*, http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/metabook?id=sanudodiary. My own digging has shown that most should be findable on https://archive.org/.

Chapter 2.
The Visible Transformations

2.1 Ottoman sacral architecture

When the Ottomans captured Rhodes, they immediately established a mosque. Named after the conquering sultan himself, the island's main mosque, the Süleymaniye, is traditionally dated to 1541.[71] But as the provision of religious infrastructure was a top priority of the new occupants, an Islamic house of worship must have been set up in the immediate aftermath of the conquest. In fact, Ṭabib Ramażan's contemporary *fetiḥ-name* recounts the establishment of a mosque virtually at the same time as the Ottoman victory. Analogously to Meḥmed II's first prayer in Hagia Sophia after the conquest of Constantinople,[72] Süleyman performs the Friday prayer in the new mosque as soon as possible.[73]

The expression of power through the site of the prayer is intrinsically linked to the history of the mosque itself. Drawing on a rich pre-Islamic tradition of sacral architecture, the earliest mosques were established to honor the Quranic stipulation to pray in a space that is distinct from the surroundings and ritually pure. At the same time, a mosque is not necessarily a separate building and can belong to larger structures such as a fort or the ruler's residence. The early 8th century Umayyad Mosque, for instance, was part of an architectural ensemble with the caliph's palace. It was thus incorporated into the physical power center of the early Muslim realm. This way, the caliph could exhibit grandeur and his claim to sovereignty in the same space as humbleness and religious piety.[74]

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[71] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 51.
[72] Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), 52–53.
[73] "Aziz Jan Kilisesi'ni de bir cami ve ilahi ibadetgah yaparak; […] Cuma namazını orada yani Aziz Jan'da kıldı." Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Report of Süleyman's Conquest of Rhodes," 194.
[74] Lorenz Korn, *Die Moschee: Architektur und religiöses Leben* (München: C. H. Beck, 2012), 8–11.

Being relative latecomers amongst the great Muslim empires, the Ottomans soon developed their own style of sacral architecture. With the tradition of Islamic Golden Age and Anatolian Turkish examples at their disposal, they also incorporated aspects of Byzantine architecture. Architectural historian Doğan Kuban emphasizes that spatial organization under a central dome was a structural principle of Ottoman mosque building. Representative imperial mosques in particular were outfitted with grand domes, often supported by smaller ones to the sides. Here too, a tendency to build multi-purpose ensembles emerges. Mosques were paired with religious schools (*medrese*) and other buildings according to the local necessities, such as Sufi sanctuaries (*tekke*), to form social complexes (*külliye*). Depending on the location and the scale, they benefited the public while projecting the sultan's authority.[75]

Within the first decade of Rhodes' incorporation into the Ottoman Empire, at least 16 mosques and smaller *mescid*s are attested in the city. This is evident from a fiscal survey prepared around 1528 which has been analyzed by Elias Kolovos. Assessing the numbers of taxable households, the Ottoman authorities recorded 18 Muslim *maḥalle*s, neighborhoods, mostly associated with a smaller *mescid*. Two places of worship lay in the inner fortress. Notably, Kolovos identifies the "Illustrious Mosque (*Câmi'-i Şerîf*)" as likely the first sultanic mosque of Rhodes. This would make it the direct predecessor of the Süleymaniye Mosque and a successor to one of Catholic churches inside the Knights' fortress.[76]

In this chapter, I focus on two religious buildings or religio-social complexes that are not contemporary with the conquest but are representative of the Ottoman incorporation of Rhodes: The Süleymaniye Mosque and the Murad Reʾis social complex. My choice was

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[75] Doğan Kuban, *Muslim Religious Architecture: Part II. Development of Religious Architecture in Later Periods*, Iconography of Religions, Section XXII: Islam, Fascicle Three (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 18–21.

[76] The author has graciously shared a forthcoming book chapter on the topic with me. I was enthused to see that someone was working simultaneously on such a relatable topic with another source type. The page numbers given here are relative to the manuscript I have received. In addition, I am thankful for his valuable comments and corrections during the defense of this thesis. Elias Kolovos, "The Fortress and the Town of Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey After the Siege of 1522," in *The 1522 Siege of Rhodes: Causes, Course and Consequences*, ed. Simon Phillips (Taylor & Francis/Routledge, forthcoming), 2–5.

determined by the continued importance of these buildings to the present day and the availability of visual material.

2.1.1 Süleymaniye Camii: An early necessity

The establishment of the Süleymaniye Mosque of Rhodes has been alluded to several times now. But the exact circumstances are unclear. Both Zeki Çelikkol, in his monumental catalogue of Ottoman architectural heritage on Rhodes, and Neval Konuk, in an article for the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, provide a variety of possible dates and origin stories. According to Çelikkol, the Süleymaniye could in fact have been the youngest "Turkish" addition to the architecture of Rhodes, potentially only built in 1808. The same year is confirmed by Konuk for a major restoration campaign of the structure in preparation for a visit by Sultan Abdülaziz. Both authors, however, agree that the mosque itself must have been established in the early days of the Ottoman possession of the island. Çelikkol recounts a popular legend, that Sultan Süleyman himself was the original founder of the mosque, basically inaugurating it with the first Friday prayer in the city. Ultimately, Konuk considers 1530 to 1541 the most likely period of establishment for the Süleymaniye Mosque, and Çelikkol agrees on its completion in 1541. They both connect it with the legacy of Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa who at this point had already earned the unfortunate epithet *maḳtūl*, the executed.[77]

As the exact dating of the Süleymaniye is virtually impossible, the accounts of its preceding architectural environment vary too. If it was established immediately, according to Çelikkol and Konuk, the site a so-called Holy Apostle(s) Church (*Saint Apostoli Kilisesi*) could have been repurposed.[78] Kolovos, by contrast, does not record a church named in reference to the apostles amongst the Christian *maḥalle*s in the Ottoman fiscal survey. This might suggest

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[77] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 51–52; Neval Konuk, "Süleymaniye Camii ve Külliyesi," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 38 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2010), 113–14.
[78] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 51; Konuk, "Süleymaniye Camii," 113.

that any building of that name had already been repurposed by 1528. The author identifies the first sultanic mosque of Rhodes as a likely successor to the central Knightly church of Saint John of the Collachium.[79] This corresponds to the name given for the first converted church in Tabib Ramażan's *fetiḥ-name*.

> Making the church of Saint John (Aziz Jan) a mosque and a place of worship, he [sultan Süleyman] cleansed it from being a place of idols and the devil. He performed the Friday prayer there, that is at Saint John. Then, having achieved his goal, he headed towards Constantinople with blissful inspiration.[80]

Regardless of the difficulty to determine its pre-history, there is a mosque today that represents the early Ottoman incorporation of Rhodes. After the significant reconstruction in 1808, the Süleymaniye Mosque has received renovations in the 1890s as well as from 1988 to 2005. According to Konuk, the latter works were carried out "using the building techniques and materials of the period," so the "the mosque stayed true to its historical features."[81] Unfortunately, the article does not disclose to which historical period this assessment refers. It remains unclear to me whether the restorations emphasized the 1808 incarnation of the mosque or its potential 16th century guise. Ultimately, the architectural analysis is not contingent on this information, as I have decided to reproduce and work with the ground plan and the sections from Çelikkol's catalogue (Figures 1a and 1b). Published in 1986, it does not include any changes made from 1988 on.

A first look at the ground plan reveals a variation of Kuban's main principal of Ottoman mosque architecture: The central dome organizes the entire structure but it is not as dominant as in the imperial mosques on the continent, such as Sinan's Selimiye Mosque in Edirne.[82]

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[79] Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 3, 5–7.

[80] "Aziz Jan Kilisesi'ni de bir cami ve ilahi ibadetgah yaparak; putların ve Şeytan'ın yeri olmaktan temizledi […] Cuma namazını orada yani Aziz Jan'da kıldı. Daha sonra saadetli devleti ile hedefini elde ederek Kostantiniyye'ye yöneldi," Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Report of Süleyman's Conquest of Rhodes," 194.

[81] "Caminin tarihî özelliklerine sadık kalınıp dönemin yapı teknikleriyle malzemesi kullanılarak," Konuk, "Süleymaniye Camii," 113.

[82] Kuban, *Muslim Religious Architecture: Later Periods*, 20–21, 25.

Relative to overall structure, the central dome is raised and rests on its own support walls rather than being buttressed by the side domes. The main prayer room is taller than the lateral bays allowing for more light to enter the space. It contains the *miḥrāb*, the prayer niche, with the *minber*, the pulpit-like structure, to the right. The staircase to the minaret is found on the right-hand side of the entrance to the central hall. The portico at the front of the building helps to harmonize the overall space with seven smaller equidistant, identical domes. The ablution fountain is located vis-à-vis the main building in what I can only assume to be a courtyard.

Regarding the architecture, it is plausible that the Süleymaniye Mosque of Rhodes served to project Ottoman power without the grandeur (and frankly, the investment) of the continental imperial mosques. The main prayer room appears to lack a dedicated space for the sultan to participate without mixing with the crowd. In the Ottoman context, the so called "hünkâr mahfili"[83] (sultan's space) typically took the form of an elevated enclosure, a lodge, above the prayer room of imperial mosques. In the sections of the Süleymaniye Mosque, I cannot identify such an architectural feature. This might suggest that actual visits by the ruler had been rare enough to not warrant the construction (or the continued upkeep) of a *maḥfil*.

The present mosque drew its representative potential from its appearance and symbolic value. The structure itself, with three sizable domes and a single minaret reaching much higher than the surrounding buildings, was accompanied by a very powerful name. Both the architectural features and the dedication to Sultan Süleyman surely made an impression on the local population and stationed troops. Born out of the necessity to establish a dedicated space to pray, Ottoman (and likely any imperial) mosques projected power by reminding the populace of the sultan's rule even in his absence. As he had prayed on the first Friday after the conquest of Rhodes, he maintained a presence in every prayer thereafter.

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[83] M. Baha Tanman, "Mahfil," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 27 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003), 331.

2.1.2 Murad Reʾis Külliyesi: A necessary addition

The Murad Reʾis complex is a multi-purpose ensemble of religio-social structures to the North of the oldtown of Rhodes. It comprises a mosque, an ablution fountain and a well, eight tomb monuments (*türbe*), a graveyard, and a social center with a sanctuary or dervish lodge (*tekke*), a library and administrative buildings. Çelikkol calls the mosque Murad Reʾis Mosque and dates it to 1636, while the Turkish architect Ammar İbrahimgil prefers the name Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque and the date 1622. Çelikkol acknowledges the involvement of Ebu Bekir Paşa as the one who endowed the respective pious foundation (*vaḳıf*). The *türbe* I am focusing on is the eponymous tomb of Murad Reʾis, a 16th century Ottoman corsair and navy captain.[84] Both authors mention his death around 1609, with a burial shortly afterwards on the already existing Muslim graveyard of Rhodes-City. The site's oldest structures comprise some parts of the graveyard as well as the lodge, both of which İbrahimgil dates to the 16th century, i.e., the first Ottoman century of Rhodes.[85]

According to İbrahimgil, the location of many of the monuments that form the Murad Reʾis complex has changed over the past century. With the Italian conquest of Rhodes in 1912, as elaborated below, extensive archaeological digs and restoration works were conducted to emphasize the "Italian" aspects of the local architecture. In the process, the Muslim graveyard was relocated to the outside of the city walls adding to the Murad Reʾis complex and the *tekke* in its present-day place.[86]

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[84] Note that the timeline of Murad's life is confusing and often contradictory. Seeing that İbrahimgil refers to Çelikkol, their accounts somewhat match but don't line up entirely either. Portrayals in other languages add to the confusion. Just compare the English language Wikipedia entry "Murat Reis the Elder" in which the dates are so conflicting that Murad appears to have taken responsibilities in naval warfare at the age of four. An index of Mediterranean corsairs in Italian, seemingly inspired by Salvatore Bono's eponymous volume, lists various contemporary captains named Murad, in multiple spellings, with the most likely candidate under "Murad Rais/MoratAga," https://corsaridelmediterraneo.it/mourad-murad-rais2/. For this paper, I prefer not to focus on the actual life of Murad but on his resting place—his afterlife if you will.

[85] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 28–34; İbrahimgil, "Murat Reis Külliyesi," 15, 20–31.

[86] İbrahimgil, "Murat Reis Külliyesi," 16–17.

The already cited thesis by İbrahimgil is not meant as a historical exploration of the Murad Reʾis complex but as a concept for an intensive renovation of the site. He explores "the changes the buildings have undergone until now, to find out their original form according to scientific data and to prepare the ground for restoration works."[87] The architect admits his unhappiness with contemporary Greek and EU-sponsored restoration projects, going as far as putting "restorasyon" in quotes. Instead, he proposes his plan to restore the site's "architectural identity" (*mimari kimliğini*) both in form and in function.[88] Seeing the claim to a historically faithful reconstruction argued so passionately, I feel confident in my choice of cross sections from his thesis. In fact, İbrahimgil provides sections of the current state of Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque and the *türbe* of Murad Reʾis as well as potential ones after the proposed restoration. I have decided to reproduce the latter (Figures 2a and 2b) as they appear to be idealized Ottoman versions of the two buildings I want to analyze.

Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque (Figure 2a) is a moderately sized domed mosque on a square ground plan. The prayer hall contains the *miḥrāb* and the *minber* as well as what appears to be a balcony. I presume it is not supposed to hold a lodge for the sultan (*maḥfil*) but rather serve as a space for the women participanting in the prayer. The minaret is on the right-hand side of the entrance. It is not apparent from the section whether the staircase is accessed from the inside or the outside of the building. A stone porch invites the visitor to enter and observe the interior. While the overall structure is modest in size and form, the interior is quite ornate with detailed trims and elaborate decorations.

The *türbe* of Murad Reʾis (Figure 2b) is a small octagonal building with a dome. It appears to be designed for function, that is, as a resting place for the body of Murad. While the interior is rather plain, the sarcophagus in the center is typically draped with colored cloth. It

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[87] "Caminin tarihî özelliklerine sadık kalınıp dönemin yapı teknikleriyle malzemesi kullanılarak," İbrahimgil, 177.
[88] İbrahimgil, 177–78.

is likely a cenotaph with the body being buried beneath the *türbe* building. In the section, I can see a structure reminiscent of a pole standing perpendicular to the sarcophagus. It might hold a turban symbolizing a figure of (religious) importance.

In fact, Murad Reʾis had become somewhat of a local saint. According to Çelikkol, both Muslims, particularly women, and Orthodox Greeks ("Ortodoks rumlar") would visit the tomb, to make offerings and pray for good health. Even the last King of Italy, Victor Emanuel III, is said to have visited the site tying his handkerchief to the sarcophagus.[89] If this happened in 1910, as Çelikkol states, his offering must have been very effective, as the Italians acquired Rhodes only two years later. But not only in recent history, Murad was revered. In Çelikkol's transcription, an inscription above one window of the building reads:

Yüz sür der'i Murad'a ferş et ruhu niyazı	Face the door to Murad, give your praying soul
Seyret ne zî keremdir ol şahı dilnûvazı	See what grace this king shows to the heart
Kıldı gazada rihlet bin on sekizde nâfi	In one thousand eighteen he died in battle
Tarih i tam'ı oldu ol demde lâfz ı Gâzi[90]	He became known as a *Gazi* in history[91]

Taken together, the Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque and the tomb of Murad Reʾis project a different kind of power than the Süleymaniye Mosque in Rhodes-City. While the Süleymaniye served to firmly establish the Ottomans on the island, the Murad Reʾis complex appears to have grown out of communal relations and spiritual need. Conceptually the *tekke*, the dervish lodge, represents this the best but it is visible too in the architecture of the mosque and the *türbe*. Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque is unimposing but functional and inviting. It gives the impression of a house of worship that could be realized with a modest endowment and many helping hands. While the Süleymaniye of Rhodes is not grandiose but clearly imperial, Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque seems neighborly and personal. And Murad Reʾis tomb functions accordingly. It is essentially

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[89] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 31–32.

[90] In the non-paginated appendix, Çelikkol provides a photograph of the inscription (Resim 26). The quality is not quite good enough for me to read it in full, but what I can glean corroborates the author's transcription. Çelikkol, 33.

[91] The year 1018 H corresponds to 1609/10. If we take Çelikkol and İbrahimgil by their word, the *türbe* was established shortly thereafter.

a shrine, built to be accessible. Its architectural simplicity is inviting to both pilgrims and passersby of the distant and the recent past—even across the religions. This way both the mosque and the main *türbe* of the Murad Reʾis complex epitomize the normality of the Ottoman possession of Rhodes. If the Süleymaniye symbolizes the sultan, Murad Reʾis is simply one of his men. Abstracting from this to the sphere of sacrality, the Süleymaniye Mosque projects the divine while the Murad Reʾis complex stands for the familiar, the folk belief. As this was not provided by the imperial claims of the early Ottoman possession of Rhodes, the establishment of the Murad Reʾis complex was a necessary addition to the Muslim religious infrastructure of Rhodes.

In the two preceding subchapter headings, I have used Turkish terms to refer to the structures in question, Süleymaniye Camii and Murad Reʾis Külliyesi, even though I do not do that anywhere else in the text. This emphasizes the continued Turkish interest, particularly from individuals, in the architectural heritage of Rhodes. Both Çelikkol in the 1980s and İbrahimgil in 2012 do not write about the matter neutrally, neither do they claim to. İbrahimgil laments the perceived maltreatment of the monuments and Çelikkol begins his book with an episode from his youth. When he learned about the "Turkish" possession of Rhodes before World War I, he developed a sentimentality for the island, which lead him to eventually compile his collection.[92] This, again, is mirrored in the sacral architecture of Rhodes. The nostalgia of an imperial past and a vague familiarity permeate the spaces of Süleymaniye Camii and Murad Reʾis Külliyesi.[93]

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[92] Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, IX–X.
[93] I too have an anecdote to add to this. When I first talked about my project with a Turkish fellow of mine, he chimed in telling me how interested he was in the Murad Reʾis complex. He added, given the chance, he would like to shoot a documentary about the place focusing on the remaining *türbedar*, the tomb keeper. He could even name her: Zeynep hanım.

2.2 Reappropriation of existing space

After the 1522 Ottoman conquest, the island of Rhodes did not change hands again until the 20th century. The space gradually evolved from the Knights Hospitaller's stronghold to a local center embedded in a wider empire. This chapter examines the Ottoman approach to the military, or rather non-religious, structures in the cityscape they encountered.

In 1912, the Kingdom of Italy conquered Rhodes and the surrounding Dodecanese islands from the Ottoman Empire. A 1918 Italian administration report allows for a glance into how they approached tasks the Ottomans had faced 400 years prior. The report details the ongoing reconstruction works on Rhodes (and Kos). Entitled "Archaeological Mission and Superintendence for Monuments and Excavations," it explains the Italian plans "to give back to the monumental city of the Knights this character of artistic beauty, […] which is an unassailable testament to the great influence exercised by the Latin civilization on these islands."[94] Six out of seven projects focus on the island of Rhodes, four on Rhodes-City. One project concerned the walls of the city-stronghold with the expressed aim to rid one of the gates of the "Turkish encampments that defaced it."[95]

Evidently, the Italians did not merely appropriate the conquered space, but they restructured it to project imperial power and a historical claim to the island(s.) In this section, I discuss the Ottomans' approach to many of the same structures, namely the fortifications. It becomes clear that the Ottomans too started reconstructions works early in their possession of Rhodes. However, their projection of power was communicated in the sacral architecture, and the repairs were rather pragmatic measures.

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[94] "[A] ridare alla monumentale città dei Cavalieri quel carattere di bellezza artistica, (...) che è documento inoppugnabile della grande influenza esercitata dalla civiltà latina in queste isole," Zacharias N. Tsirpanlis, *Italokratia Sta Dōdekanēsa 1912-1943: Allotríōsē Tou Anthrṓpou Kai Tou Peribállontos / The Dodecanese Under the Italians (1912-1943): Alientation of People and Environment* (Rodos, 1998), 307.
[95] "[B]araccamenti turchi che la deturpavano," Tsirpanlis, 312.

2.2.1 New arrivals: Soldiers and the city

In summer 1522, Sultan Süleyman commanded 200,000 to 300,000 infantry soldiers in the Ottoman attack on Rhodes. With such a massive army, it is no wonder that the eponymous city-stronghold surrendered by Christmas. Not to speak of the fleet of 700 ships cutting off the harbor and controlling the waters around the island. After the Knights Hospitaller who had fought valiantly evacuated mostly unscathed, the Ottomans were facing an even worse enemy: logistics. Where would they put up all these fighting men?

These numbers, of course, are dreadfully inflated. The entire narrative is biased—from both sides. According to Nicolas Vatin, the message of a very strong fleet is conveyed by seventeenth-century Ottoman chronicler Kâtib Çelebi. Meanwhile, the estimated numbers of foot soldiers derive from the accounts of Marino Sanuto, the Venetian chronicler discussed above, and Jacques de Bourbon, an illegitimate descendant of the House of Bourbon who was present during the siege.[96] A pamphlet attributed to the Grand Master of the Knights, Philippe Villiers de l'Isle-Adam backs Bourbon's number up. While it might seem that he ascribes the Ottoman victory purely to their advantage in numbers, l'Isle-Adam also makes mention of their potent military technology:

> I defended myself to the extent of [my] might together with my valiant and strong men, but the hordes of Turks were so many who ran against the walls and the gates, that they covered the hill [and] the plain with banners, all crying out flesh, death, death, that around Troy there were not so many men, nor armed troops that strong and powerful.

> Their encampment held three hundred thousand Turks that even thinking [of them] they give me fear with unlimited and large artillery, gatti and grili to strike the walls and […] with fires created beyond measure bombarding in the evening and in the morning that it resembled hellfire itself.[97]

[96] Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 350–53.

[97] "Io mi sono diffeso al piu potere con la mia gente valorosa [e] forte, ma tanto era de Turchi le gran schiere che correuan ale mura, a le porte che'l monte el pian copriuan de bandiere tutti gridando carne, morte, morte che intorno a Troia non fu tanta gente, ne tanta armata si grande e possente._Tre cento milia Turchi el campo hauia che anco pensando me metton paura con infinita e grande arteglieria, gatti, [e] grili, per buttar le mura, [e] [...] con fuoichi lauorati oltra misura bombardando la sera e damattina che parea proprio l'infernal fucina," P[hilippe] de Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, 'El lagirmoso lamento che fa el gran mastro de Rodi, con li suoi cauallieri a tutti li Principi de Christianitade nella sua partita. Con la presa di Rodi. [The Tearful Appeal of the Grand Master of

The Ottoman documents published by Vatin, allow for a glimpse into who actually populated the fortress of Rhodes immediately after the initial "hordes" had assailed it. Around December 30, 1522, about a week after first entering the walled city, Aḥmed Paşa writes a letter to the Sublime Porte. After Muṣṭafa Paşa had left the island, Aḥmed oversaw the operation. He reports two main incidents. Firstly, the guards found the family of the "infidel called the son of Cem"[98] and arrested them. They were handed over to the Grand Vizier, Piri Meḥmed Paşa, who processed them for delivery to Constantinople. Secondly, Aḥmed Paşa reports "about the state of the city [that someone] in some houses killed the men and looted their possessions."[99] He acknowledges that when the troops first entered Rhodes-City, they took some of the inhabitant's properties. The specific culprits, however, remained at large. When questioned, the janissaries on guard duty blamed the *sipāhī*s, cavalrymen, of Rumelia and Anatolia. The *beylerbey*s, the commanders of Rumelia and Anatolia, were then made to leave the island with all their *sipāhī*s. According to Vatin, a troop of about 150 janissaries remained in Rhodes, while a total of 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers had entered the city when it was captured.[100]

About two weeks later, Aḥmed Paşa reports the whereabouts of the *ḳapūdān bey*, most likely the Grand Admiral. He had reached the fortresses of Kos and Bodrum[101] and "les braves et nobles *ẕimmî* des ces forts" let him in.[102] The present "frères" that is the Knights Hospitaller,

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Rhodes, with his Knights Towards all the Christian Princes in Their Lot. With the Capture of Rhodes.]', n.d., [2]. *Gatto* (cat) and *gril[l]o* (cricket) are siege engines, according to the historical dictionary TILO, http://tlio.ovi.cnr.it/TLIO/.

[98] "Cem oğlı adına olan kâfirü[...]," Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire Ottoman*, 498. Prince Cem, or Cem Sultan, was a pretender to the Ottoman throne who had fled to Rhodes in the 1480s. His son had either been discovered during the capture of the city, or in a nearby fortress a few days later. While Cem's son was executed, this report refers to the capture of his wife and two daughters who had seemingly remained in the city.

[99] "[Ş]ehrüñ aḥvalinden baʿẕ-ı evlerde âdamlar ḳatl édüb esbâbların ġâret édermiş," Vatin, 498.

[100] Vatin, 498–502.

[101] Bodrum had up to this point been the Knight's access point to the Anatolian mainland. Metin Kunt, "Introduction," in *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age*, ed. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 40.

[102] Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 508.

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according to Vatin, left without resistance or harm.[103] The letter writer constructs a dichotomy between the Knights who needed to be expelled and the "good" Christians, that is the local Greeks who upheld the "sacred treaty," assigning them their position as Ottoman subjects.[104] At the same time, there must have been some fears around Rhodes-City that the Knights would not stay away. Aḥmed Paşa reports that the security around the city has been increased by placing *bekçi*s,[105] that is watchmen, and closely guarding the city and the surrounding villages.[106] At the same time, the new occupants set out to restore the damaged structures of military importance. They started filling the trenches utilized during the siege, commissioned a new iron chain to secure the harbor, and planned to replace so far wooden elements with structures made of stone.[107]

Altogether, the establishment of the Ottoman occupants in Rhodes-City appeared to be a rather small-scale but well-organized operation. The newcomers did not seem to aim for a grandiose display of power but worked with a somewhat nervous intensity to secure the place again. Whether this changed over time, might be shown by incorporating register type sources that regard longer time frames.

2.2.2 Calm after the siege: Repairing one's own damage

To further secure the city, the conquerors started restoring the walls themselves. Long before the Ottoman conquest already, the city-stronghold had been infamously well-fortified. Essentially the entire town is closed off. It constitutes one crescent-shaped fortress delimited by walls on three and the harbor on one site. According to the Mediterranean historian Ann Williams, the Ottomans could make use of the defensive capabilities of the stronghold almost

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[103] Vatin, 508.
[104] Vatin, 503, 508. Sacred treaty: "ʿahd-nâme-i şerîf," Vatin, 503.
[105] "[B]ekciler ḳonıldı" Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 503.
[106] "[Ş]ehr ve ḳurâʾ-ı eṭrâf daḫi ihtimâm üzre ḥıfz olınur," Vatin, 503.
[107] Vatin, 503, 507–8.

immediately. In her assessment, the incorporation of Rhodes added a valuable position to their military network while providing them with a fortress that did not need great repairs.[108]

When in 1480 Mehmed II had attempted to capture the island, he could not break through the walls of Rhodes-City. And at least in 1505 and 1516, the stronghold was fortified again. To pierce such a fortification, one would need powerful cannons. As lamented by l'Isle-Adam above, the Ottomans possessed this technology. According to Palmira Brummet, their siege strategy involved transferring the artillery from the ships onto the land surrounding their targets instead of shooting from the sea. Before using this tactic against Rhodes, the Ottomans employed it on the island of Leros in 1506 and throughout other Aegean islands.[109]

To their own detriment such an approach was quite effective. So, when the Ottomans took over Rhodes, their fortress walls had been pierced by their own cannon fire. Ettore Rossi provides us with snippets from an order by Sultan Süleyman to repair the damages done to the fortress. It is notable for the brief, but detailed description of the different hands and methods needed to undertake such restoration works. The *beylerbey* of Anatolia, Ḳasim Paşa, is assigned to oversee the restoration works.[110]

Ṭabib Ramażan's *fetiḥ-nāme* offers an extensive passage about the state of the fortress and its (former) citizens in the direct aftermath of the Knight's surrender. Süleyman's establishment of a mosque and the first Friday prayer, has already been introduced above.

> The sultan forgave their crimes, he never demanded their goods, their children, and their wives, and was content with receiving the castle. The sultan did not deny the requests of those who did not want to settle in his realm and wanted to leave Rhodes without serving him, so they went where they wanted to go from Rhodes. Those who wanted to settle in Rhodes and wanted to pay the tribute (*haraç*) every year, were absolved of the tribute for three years by the sultan. Later, the sultan sent decrees (*ferman*) to three castles, that is Bodrum, İstanköy and Tahtalı. […] When these decrees (*hüküm*) reached the kings of the

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[108] Ann Williams, "Mediterranean Conflict," in *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age*, ed. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 40–42.
[109] Palmira Brummett, "The Overrated Adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman Naval Power," *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 3 (1993): 517–18, 527–30, 539.
[110] Rossi, "Nuove ricerche," 99–100.

aforementioned castles, they declared their complete obedience to the kingship and surrendered their castles, doing what the infidels of Rhodes had always done. Since the castle was demolished and had to be repaired, the sultan ordered four of the *sancak beys* to repair it. Making the church of Saint John (Aziz Jan) a mosque and a place of worship, he cleansed it from being a place of idols and the devil. He performed the Friday prayer there, that is at Saint John. Then, having achieved his goal, he headed towards Constantinople with blissful inspiration.[111]

According to Tabib Ramażan, Süleyman charges four *sancāḳ beys* with the restoration of the fortress instead of the *beylerbey* Ḳasim Paşa. This passage, however, is especially notable for the focus it puts on the walled city of Rhodes as a castle (*ḳalʿa*). Sultan Süleyman receives the city with the surrender of the Knights and immediately makes use of its fortified nature—not militarily but by regulating the population. Who wanted to leave, could do so. Who wished to stay, received a three-year tax exemption.[112] This way, the former elite could leave with their dignity somewhat intact while the populace was incentivized to remain and actually populate the city. Additionally, the Ottomans used *sürgün*, forcible resettlement from one region in the Empire to another, to form a sizeable Muslim community in the city within the first decade of their rule. Kolovos points out that this is apparent in some of the *maḥalle* designations in the survey of 1528. This happened, for instance, when the *mescid* recorded as the namesake for its surrounding neighborhood was named after the region where the newcomers were moved from.[113]

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[111] "Hünkar onların suçlarını bağışlayarak; malları, evlatları ve eşlerine asla tamah etmedi ve kalenin teslim alınmasıyla yetinde [*sic*]. Hünkara, memleketinde yerleşmeyerek ona kulluk etmek istemeyerek Rodos'tan ayrılmak isteyenler bu isteklerinden alıkonmadılar ve Rodos'tan, istedikleri yerlere gittiler. Rodos'tan ayrılmayarak orada yerleşmek isteyip her yıl haraç ödemek isteyenlerın de, hünkar haraçlarını üç yıl bağışladı. Daha sonra hünkar Bodrum, İstanköy ve Tahtalı gibi üç kaleye de fermanlar gönderdi. [...] Bu hükümler, zikredilen kale krallarına ulaşınca, hünkara tam itaatlerini bildirdiler ve kalelerini teslim ederek Rodos keferesinin her zaman yaptığı şeyleri yaptılar. Kale yıkıldığı ve tamir edilmesi gerektiği için, hünkar sancak beylerinden dördüne orasını tamir etmelerini emretti, Aziz Jan Kilisesi'ni de bir cami ve ilahi ibadetgah yaparak; putların ve Şeytan'ın yeri olmaktan temizledi [...] ve Cuma namazını orada yani Aziz Jan'da kıldı. Daha sonra saadetli devleti ile hedefini elde ederek Kostantiniyye'ye yöneldi," Avcı, "Tabib Ramazan: Report of Süleyman's Conquest of Rhodes," 193–94.

[112] According to Kolovos, taxation of the population of Rhodes was even suspended for a period of five years. Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 2–3.

[113] Kolovos, 5; Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 366–67.

Population regulation too is a way to 'repair one's own damage.' With the siege, the number of inhabitants of the inner city of Rhodes had diminished and the customary leniency, allowing the foe to leave, depopulated it even more. Plus, a significant Muslim community had to be recruited from other sources in any case. So, with tax incentives, *sürgün*, and an influx of Jewish people from other parts of the Empire,[114] Rhodes-City filled up again. The damage had been done both in material and in human resources, so to say, but the new Ottoman stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean recovered rapidly.

For Muslims, an investment like the imperial Süleymaniye Mosque also acted as a factor to pull population in. This way, the two subjects of this chapter, military (infra)structure and sacral architecture, served many of the same purposes. Both fortresses and mosques could be used to protect, overserve, and ultimately regulate the population. The Muslim faithful were expected to fulfil their prayer duties and form a sizeable community, the same way the soldiers were expected to maintain and man the fortified structures. Otherwise, the integrity of the city would be at risk both from the inside, with the populace absconding, and from the outside, if no forces were to prevent military incursions. In fact, around 1529, the Ottoman authorities of Rhodes discovered a serious threat. Local ecclesiastical figures, merchants and even some Janissaries had hatched a plot to bring the Knights Hospitaller back and undermine the Ottoman rule. According to Kolovos, this is probably the reason why the Christian communities of Rhodes were banned from living in the inner city after the survey of 1528.[115]

In this chapter, I have explored how the physical space of Rhodes-City had to change after the Ottoman conquest in 1522. On the one hand, the sudden influx of Muslims made the establishment of Islamic sacral architecture necessary. On the other hand, the military nature of the conquest, meant that Ottoman soldiers had to be accommodated in the city and were

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[114] Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 9–10.
[115] Kolovos, 7–8; Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 532–37.

employed particularly in the fortification system. The sacral architecture had two specific results in the Süleymaniye Mosque and the Murad Reʾis funerary and social complex. While the former served to express Ottoman imperial authority as part of the townscape, the latter lay metaphorically and literally more outside of the center. Individual worshippers and visitors who had heard about the shrine of Murad, the seafarer, could retreat there.

The overall importance of certain architectural elements for Rhodes is unveiled when examining a contemporary map. The infamous captain and cartographer Piri Reʾis had taken part in the conquest of Rhodes in 1522, before he dedicated his "Book of Searfaring" (*Kitāb-i Baḥriye*), a veritable world atlas, to Sultan Süleyman in 1525. The included map of Rhodes (Figure 3) is derived from a late 17th, early 18h century manuscript preserved and digitized by the Walters Art Museum. [116] The manuscript is detailed, beautifully illustrated making use of different colored inks and gold foil, and, as far as I can tell, fully functional as a collection of portolan charts. The map of Rhodes is oriented to the south. So, Rhodes-City in the northern bay of the island is unfamiliarly found on the bottom of the page. Surrounded by settlements seemingly for food supply, the city appears in a familiar guise: Completely walled in. The depiction also features two mosques with minarets inside the city walls.

It is unclear to me whether this map portrays the world as it has been during its original compilation by Piri Reʾis, that is in 1525, or whether it shows the world of the late 17th century, the manuscript's era. Regardless, the overall impression is that the map depicts Rhodes as a visibly Muslim city. In difference to that, the two settlements to the east (the left) are walled cities too but exhibit high steeples or castle towers instead of minarets. The northern one is labelled, I assume, "Ḳalʿa-i Taḥtalı," the fortress of Tahtalı, and the southern one is "Ḳalʿa-i Lindoz," the fortress of Lindos. While these two strongholds retain their visible features from the pre-Ottoman period, the image of Rhodes-City has clearly been Ottomanized. And this

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[116] Piri Reʾis, "Kitāb-i Baḥriye."

stands to reason. The combination of fortress walls and a mosque constitutes the hallmark of Ottoman imperial power over Rhodes-City and by extension the entire island of Rhodes. Regardless of the map's era, the Ottoman authority appears to be contingent on both military and spiritual hegemony.

Chapter 3.
The Redefinition of Rhodes' Role in the Aegean

3.1 As a (…) hub

The exceptionally convenient position of Rhodes in the Aegean had served the Knights of Saint John well. Located just off the Anatolian coast, they could run raids on the littoral settlements and withdraw quickly enough to the relative safety provided by isolation. Their own integration into trade and provision lines did not stop them from harassing the Eastern Mediterranean shipping routes either. And the outpost at Bodrum was a thorn in the side of the Ottomans. To say it with Metin Kunt, Sultan Süleyman "removed the Hospitaller menace" almost immediately after his accession.[117] The island of Rhodes was now firmly in Ottoman hands—and somewhat removed from its earlier relational context. Who was there left to raid surrounded by friendly territory?

The island had to change, or at least the mode it sustained itself. The new occupants and occupiers had to find ways to make use of its advantageous geographic position. In his assessment of the Ottoman fiscal survey prepared between 1524 and 1528, Elias Kolovos shows that the island lost none of its strategic qualities after the conquest. The fortress of Rhodes-City as well as those on the surrounding islands were well equipped. Through *sürgün*, forcible resettlement, the Ottomans had brought in a Muslim civil population, while maintaining a tight military presence. The city (re)developed an internal economy as well as the essential religious infrastructure for the Muslim, Jewish and Christian communities.[118] This way, surveyed right after the Ottoman conquest, Rhodes is shown to function as expected. This does, however, not reveal how the Ottomans made use of the island on a larger scale.

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[117] Kunt, "Süleyman: Introduction," 35; Williams, "Süleyman: Mediterranean Conflict," 40–42.
[118] Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 2–5, 10, 18–20.

The first chapter of this study was about how the island changed hands. Six months of occupation, tiring on both sides, resulted in the negotiated departure of the Knights Hospitaller and the installment of an Ottoman regime on Rhodes. The attestation of major individual actors in the sources made it apparent that this was a conflict taken seriously by both the belligerents and external observers—Venice in this case. The contemporary reports conveyed a sense of urgency and were important for this analysis to witness Ottoman Rhodes in the making.

The second chapter served to examine the physical changes, the main city of Rhodes experienced to accommodate new settlers as well as the occupying force itself. Architecture, often well observable over long stretches of time, revealed the projection of imperial power followed by the normalization of Ottoman rulership over the island. The immediate changes led to long-term adaptations and alterations in the physical make-up of the city. While the analysis was localized, the entire island was implicated.

This chapter bridges both preceding perspectives by regarding Ottoman Rhodes neither immediately after the conquest nor on the long-term. The survival of *mühimme defterleri* from the 1550s and 60s, gives us the opportunity to examine Rhodes from a new vantage point and a chronological midway point. Aptly translatable as "records of important affairs," these collections of minutes issued by the Porte contained all manner of instructions and notifications for local officials.[119] This way, they reveal how the Ottoman administration viewed Rhodes in its relations context and how they made use of the island. The *mühimme* register I have focused on for this study is the *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* from the Ottoman Archive in Istanbul, recording the goings-on of the years 1558 to 1560. In addition to that, I have surveyed the records collected under the numbers three (1565–66) and six (1564–65) and included relevant

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[119] Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, "Mühimme Defteri," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 31 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2006), 520–21.

information. All registers were edited and published in the 1990s by research teams for the Turkish State Archives.[120]

The chapter is divided into two modes of interpreting early Ottoman Rhodes that seem contradictory but are non-exclusive and sometimes mutually dependent. Both relate strongly to the island's geographical position and consequent usage potential. In the second part, I consider it an island of exiles and civilians. Of course, it is literally an island, but that section serves to highlight the insulating qualities of a place as well connected as Rhodes—which leads to this first part, in which I contemplate Rhodes as a hub for military and economic activity.

3.1.1 Military: East and West

Not even forty years into the Ottoman possession of Rhodes, it is obvious that the island has not lost any of the military-strategic potential the Knights Hospitaller enjoyed liberally. Be it a stopover from Egypt, or a potential gateway to the Western Mediterranean, Rhodes' position was advantageous and important to preserve. A series of minutes from summer 1559 reveals discussion on how the island should be protected. The documents numbered 132 and 133 were addressed to Ali Bey, the former *sancaḳ beyi* of Rhodes, and Ahmed Bey, the current governor respectively. The documents number 134 and 135 concerned Şücaʿ Bey, the *ḳapudan* of Egypt. The Porte appointed Şücaʿ Bey to take Rhodes under his protection (*ḥıfẓ*) against the

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[120] It is important to note that the edition of *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* I have available does not provide transcriptions of the original orders but summaries (*özet*) in modern Turkish. In these cases, my references include them as if they were sources. Nezihi Aykut et al., eds., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (966–968/1558–1560)*, Dîvân-ı Humâyûn Sicilleri Dizisi 1 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993); Hacı Osman Yıldırım et al., eds., *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (973/1565–1566)*, Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn Sicilleri Dizisi 2 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1994); Hacı Osman Yıldırım et al., eds., *6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (972/1564–1565)*, Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn Sicilleri Dizisi 3 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995).

"wretched infidels and other pirates (*korsan*) and the *levend*[121] crew."[122] In addition to that, Şücaʿ Bey was informed that both he and Ahmed Bey were beholden to the admiral Piyale Paşa regarding the protection of Rhodes.[123] Yet, later in the same *defter*, it becomes clear that this plan fell through. The entry number 215, dated August 14, 1559, was directed to the *bey* of Rhodes. It served to instruct him not to approach the *ḳapudan* of Egypt for defense against pirates and other dangers. The *bey* of Rhodes, Ahmed Bey I presume, was expected to take care of the maritime protection of the island himself.[124]

In fact, Rhodian initiative was required on several occasions. In the early months of 1560, a message reached Ahmed Bey ordering him to ready two ships and have them join the Ottoman navy. The minute read that "[the] imperial navy was ordered to go out into the sea, and it was decided to set sail, God willing, on the first day of the blessed month of *Receb*,"[125] corresponding to March 28, 1560. Again, Captain Piyale Paşa, here identified as the "Cezâyir Beglerbegisi," the *beylerbey* of the [Aegean] islands, was named as the responsible Ottoman official.[126]

A later entry reveals one of the queries of this military operation. A minute dated *Ramażān* 29, 967, that is, June 23, 1560, attests the Ottoman conquest of another island.

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[121] Muslim pirates who could at times serve as irregular soldiers for the Ottoman Navy, or as Colin Imber terms them "free-booting Muslim corsairs." Seeing them viewed in a context of hostility, makes me think of the *sekbān*, musket-bearing irregular soldiers, some of whom went rogue during the so-called Celali rebellions in the later 16th century. Are these dynamics comparable? Colin Imber, 'The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent', in *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies 20 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2010), 14, 34.

[122] "[K]üffâr-ı hâksârdan ve sâ'ir korsan ve levend tâ'ifesinden," no. 133, Aykut et al., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 67–68.

[123] "Rodos Begi olan Ahmed […] kapudanum yanına varmak emr olınup, sen Rodos'ı ve ol cânibleri hıfz u hırâset itmek emr idüp ol bâbda müşârün-ileyhe hükm-i şerîfüm gönderilüp anun gibi sen ol cevânibde bulınursan kendü varup mûmâ-ileyhe gitmek emrüm olmışdur," no. 134; "Rodos begine, yanında olan gemiler ile kapudanum Piyâle […] yanına varmak emr olınup Rodos'un muhâfazası sana fermân olınmağın […]," no. 135, Aykut et al., 68.

[124] "[M]üşârün-ileyh cânibine gitmeyüp Rodos'un ve ol etrâfda hıfz u hırâseti lâzım olan yalılarun ve limânlarun ve deryâ yüzinün gereği gibi hıfz u hırâsetinde olup aʿdâdan ve levend ve korsan tâ'ifesinden nevâhî vü kurâya ve reʿâyâya ve müsâfirîn-i bahre zarar u gezend irişdürmekden ziyâde hazer idesin ve Mısr kapudanına dahı tenbîh idesin ki, kendü semtinde hıfz u hırâseti lâzım olan yirleri onat vechile görüp gözedüp," no. 215, Aykut et al., 102.

[125] "İşbu sene-i mübârekede deryâya donanma-i hümâyûnum çıkmak emr olınup in-şâ'allâhü'l-eʿazz gurre-i Recebü'l-mürecceb'de çıkmak mukarrer olmışdur," no. 899, Aykut et al., 400.

[126] No. 899, Aykut et al., 400.

According to the congratulatory report addressed to Piyale Paşa, the fleet had set sail on April 27, and reached Djerba, off the coast of present-day Tunisia, on May 8. The Ottomans made progress, but they needed some time as "the surroundings of the castle were heavily fortified with battlements (*tabya*), and the conquest was slow and difficult."[127] Eventually, they breached the fortress held by "infidels" and subdued the island.[128] And this conquest becomes completely relevant to this study if I understand the belligerents correctly. The mentioned *küffār*, in fact, included the Knights Hospitaller who had been headquartered on the island of Malta since 1530. So, as this was not their main island, the conquest of Djerba was not a second instance of the conquest of Rhodes. Yet, it was its logical consequence. By securing Rhodes in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Ottomans had pushed the maritime enemy lines well to the West. In combination with Egypt, they possessed essentially two hubs so well positioned they could readily advance into the Western Mediterranean.

But not only advances in the Western direction were enabled by the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes. The *mühimme* register of 1558 to 1560 also relates the island to the Easternmost expansions—albeit in a roundabout way. The entries 940 and 999 from April 1560 reveal who, in fact, took over the protection of Rhodes after the discussion of the previous year. The official announcement reads: "Decree for *Ḫıżır Reʾīs* from among the *ḫaṣṣa reʾīs*[129] that: I ordered Aḥmed […] who is still the *bey* of Rhodes to [join] a naval expedition, and I appoint you, who are coming to Rhodes with your galleys, for the protection of Rhodes."[130] Ten days later, Hızır Reʾis is presented with a roster of tasks including "taking care of the wretched infidels and

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[127] "[H]isâr-ı mezbûrun etrâfı tabya ile ziyâde müstahkem olup fethi gāyetde saʿb ü müşkil olup," no. 1268, Aykut et al., 564.

[128] No. 1268, Aykut et al., 563–64.

[129] A *ḫaṣṣa reʾīs* was the captain of a state-owned naval vassal. Colin Imber renders the term as "galley captain" which I am following. Imber, 'Navy of Süleyman', 39–40.

[130] "Hâliyâ Rodos Begi olan Ahmed […] deryâ seferine emr olınup Rodos'da gelen kadırgalar ile seni Rodos muhâfazasiyçün taʿyîn eyleyüp," no. 940, Aykut et al., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 419.

other pirates of the *levend* crew, […] and the safekeeping of the Islands."[131] This is major because Hızır Reʾis is not some captain in the Ottoman navy. According to entry number 1032, he ousted Şücaʿ Bey as the *Mıṣır ḳapudanı*—which in turn let Rhodes finally fall under the same protection as Egypt. And, crucially, it reveals him as "Kurd-oğlı Hızır."[132] In fact, a bearer of this name did already appear in Chapter 1: Kurtoğlu Muslihiddin Reʾis, dubbed *Curtogoli* in the Italian-language sources. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Kurtoğlu family had apparently established itself in the Ottoman navy. In the same register, one Kurtoğlu Ahmed is mentioned who too was charged with reinforcing the Ottoman waters around Rhodes.[133]

Kurtoğlu Hızır Reʾis is particularly known as the commander of an Ottoman expedition in support of the sultan of Aceh in modern-day Indonesia. According to Giancarlo Casale, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa charged the then "captain of Alexandria" in 1567 to prepare a fleet to sail to Southeast Asia. The plans fell through; Hızır Reʾis only reached Aden.[134] But for the purposes of this demonstration this is enough. Rhodes was not only a gateway to the West—as in the Western Mediterranean. The island's strategic position in close conjunction with Egypt even gave rise to an Ottoman captain bound for the East.

3.1.2 Economic: Grain and gunpowder

The economic relations of Rhodes were closely linked to the military exploits back in the period of the Knights Hospitaller. Raiding nearby Ottoman territory was even more a supply measure than a part of military operations intended to hurt the enemy. This blending of military and economy remained in the Ottoman era, but the expression changed. In the 1565/66 *mühimme* register, two goods in particular are mentioned to pass through Rhodes: Grain and

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[131] "[G]ereği gibi görüp gözedüp küffâr-ı hâksârdan ve sâ'ir korsan levend tâ'ifesinden kılâʿ u bikāʿa ve nevâhî vü kurâya ve yalılara ve müsâfirîn-i bahra zarar u gezend irişdürmeyesin ve Adalar bâbında muhâfaza içün," no. 999, Aykut et al., 444.
[132] No. 1032, Aykut et al., 457.
[133] No. 139, Aykut et al., 70.
[134] Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 130–35.

gunpowder. Both pertain to the realm of supply—albeit in different fashion and direction. The entries 320 through 322, dated October 1565, address in order a vizier called Mustafa Paşa, the *beylerbey* of the islands, Piyale Paşa, and the unnamed *bey* of Rhodes. From the chronological context, we can infer that the vizier is Lala Mustafa Paşa who commanded the Ottoman land forces during the just abandoned siege of Malta.[135] According to the editors, the first directive mandates to "send the *bey* of Rhodes [back] to safeguard Rhodes; and to deliver grain (*zahîre*), that had been [originally] sent for the expedition to Malta, to the *bey* of Rhodes in order to sell it on Rhodes."[136] The third one directly orders the same *bey* to return to his island, and bring a ship from Dubrovnik with him that was carrying a supply of grain to combat the shortage the people of Rhodes had been suffering.[137] The editors' summary of the second directive does not refer to Rhodes directly. Instead Piyale Paşa is instructed to make sure that the troops return unhindered (from Malta) and are supplied with grain.[138]

By November 1565, the problem is not yet sorted out. From the entries 513 and 514, it is apparent that Rhodes was still suffering from a shortage of grain. To combat this, the Porte sent an order to the *bey*s and *kadı*s (*ḳāżī*) of Menteşe, the Anatolian region nearest to Rhodes, and Teke, the province around Antalya to the East. According to the editors, it reminded them that Rhodes was suffering from grain shortages and that supply ships were to pass through

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[135] Abulafia: Lala Mustafa Paşa would go on to lead the troops in the 1570/71 conquest of Cyprus as well. Note that David Abulafia does not identify the actors "Mustafa Pasha" and "Mustafa Lala" with each other. This is my assumption. David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean*, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 2014), 431–35, 448–49.

[136] "Rodos beyini de Rodos gemileri ile Rodos muhâfazasına göndermesi; ayrıca Malta seferi için daha önce gönderilmiş olan zahîreyi de Rodos'ta satılmak üzere Rodos beyine teslim etmesi," no. 320, Yıldırım et al., *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 59.

[137] "Rodos gemileri ile birlikte Rodos muhâfazasına gidip kâfir gemilerinin Rodos'a ve denizdeki rençber gemilerine zarar vermesine engel olması; ayrıca hâlen Moton'da olduğu haber alınan bir Dubrovnik gemisi ile daha önce gönderilmiş olan zahîreyi de teslim alarak zahîre sıkıntısı çeken Rodos halkına günlük narh üzerinden satması," no. 322, Yıldırım et al., 59.

[138] "Vezir Mustafa Paşa tarafından tam techizatlı olarak donatılıp emrine verilecek olan gemilerle Preveze açıklarına giderek düşman donanmasından kıyılardaki halka herhangi bir zarar gelmesini engellemesi; zahîre hususunda sahillerde bulunan kadılara emir gönderildiğinden, askerlerin zahîre ihtiyacını buralardan tedârik etmesi," no. 321, Yıldırım et al., 59.

unimpededly.[139] The second message was for the *bey* of Rhodes. It explained that the next-door

neighbors had been urged to actually let the grain supply reach the island.[140] Going out on a

limb, I interpret this as a sign residual conflict from when Rhodes was not yet incorporated into

the Ottoman Empire. The regions of mainland Anatolia bordered by Rhodes had experienced

more than two centuries of Hospitaller raids and general animosity. That they were on the same

side now, did not automatically mean the locals would pass up the chance to snatch some of

the supply meant for Rhodes. I am not saying that the *bey*s and *kadı*s of Menteşe and Teke had

to be reminded that the island was Ottoman, but a firm order from the center could not hurt.

But the Ottomans did not only supply their troops and regions with foodstuff. The

equipment lists for the fortresses on newly conquered Rhodes, for instance, reveal an intense

need for gunpowder. According to the fiscal survey analyzed by Elias Kolovos, around 1524

to 1528, the fortress of Rhodes-City was equipped with 662 cannons, and 1171 harquebuses,

contemporary rifles. Lacking a point of comparison, I cannot say whether the 69 big barrels,

29 small barrels and almost 10 000 pouches of gunpowder are a lot, but it does sound like it.

When including the more than 1000 bombs, it appears that the warfare of the period was indeed

significantly gunpowder based.[141]

In the 1565/66 *mühimme* register, Rhodes does not take center stage as a recipient of

black powder, instead it occupies more of an intermediary position. Three orders from March

1566 refer to the island in the gunpowder supply stream. Entries number 1169, 1171 and 1172

instruct three different Ottoman officials to travel to Alexandria, then to Tripoli and then to

join forces with Piyale Paşa. Karabıyık Mehmed, a *ḫaṣṣa reʾīs* or galley captain would

accompany Mahmud Paşa, the *beylerbey* of Egypt. En route, they would pick up the *bey* of

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[139] "Rodos halkının zahîre sıkıntısı çektiği ve öteden beri zahîre aldıkları yerlerde kendilerine engel çıkarıldığı bildirildiğinden Rodos beyinin temessükü ile gelen hiç bir gemiye bu hususta engel çıkarılmaması ve zahîre verilen gemilerin içine adam konularak Rodos'a ulaştığına dair temessük aldırılması," no. 513, Yıldırım et al., 92.
[140] "Zahîre hususunda sıkıntı çeken Rodos halkının öteden beri alageldikleri yerlerden zahîre almalarına engel olunmaması hususunda Teke ve Menteşe kadılarına hüküm gönderildiği;" no. 514, Yıldırım et al., 92.
[141] Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 14–16.

Rhodes and then be joined by the *ḳapudan* of Alexandria, Mehmed Bey. Together they were ordered to sail to Tripoli and load gunpowder from there.[142] The summaries of all three directives include an instruction like this: "On the way, let no cannon ball be shot for nothing, and do not allow any gunpowder to go to waste."[143] For me, this includes words of warning not to engage the enemy if not absolutely necessary. The order to the *bey* of Rhodes makes it clear to "be careful around the enemy let no harm come to the soldiers and the ships."[144] Yet, it does make the impression that this is also a call to conserve the good itself. Gunpowder was in demand, so all of it had to reach the destination. And Rhodes was very well on the way, regardless of where in the Eastern Mediterranean the Ottoman fleet sailed. An order collected a month earlier, in February 1566, gives first instructions for the voyage emphasizing explicitly the intermediary role of the island. The *bey* of Rhodes was told to "have the gunpowder found in Tripoli brought to Rhodes by galleys, store it in an appropriate location and then send it to Constantinople."[145]

Ultimately, it boils down to Rhodes geostrategic position again. It has become apparent that the island served as bridge on the imperial, and admittedly military, supply lines. But regardless of that, the population of Rhodes had to provide for themselves. Returning to the *mühimme* register of 1558 to 1560, there is a case in which this did not work. The entries 12, 13 and 28 from June 1559 paint a picture of how Rhodians could be isolated from the necessary supply by the highest order. Number 12 was addressed to the *bey* of Gaza, number 13 to the *bey* of Rhodes, and number 28 to an individual by the name of Turgud, the trustee of the Sultan's Mother's Foundation (*Valide Sultan Vakfı mütevellisi*). And this is the crucial point. The land in question belonged to a pious foundation (*vakf*) endowed by Sultan Süleyman's

[142] Nos. 1169, 1171-72, Yıldırım et al., *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 187.

[143] "[Y]olda boş yere kimseye top attırmayıp barut israfına meydan vermemesi," no. 1172, Yıldırım et al., 187.

[144] "[D]üşmana karşı dikkatli olup askerlere ve gemilere bir zarar verdirilmemesi;" no. 1169, Yıldırım et al., 187.

[145] "Trablus'ta bulunan barutun da kadırgalarla Rodos'a getirilip uygun bir yerde saklanarak daha sonra İstanbul'a gönderilmesi," no. 962, Yıldırım et al., 158.

"wife," the royal consort Hürrem (Sultan) who had died in 1558.[146] She is identified as the mother of Şehzade Selim, the future Sultan Selim II. All addressees were advised that ships from Rhodes would come to purchase the yield (*maḥṣūl*) of the foundation which was not permissible for the Porte.[147] This shines a light on how an island like Rhodes—undoubtedly, a hub in the imperial supply stream—could be excluded from transregional business too. The geographic position might have been more than convenient but cutting it off was equally possible. Local actors, like the *bey* of Gaza and Turgud, the *mütevelli*, could be warned well before the Rhodians were to arrive. When they returned to their island empty-handed, the remoteness of their space was all the more isolating.

3.2 As an island of (…)

Before publishing his study on the siege of Rhodes, Nicolas Vatin edited the *Vāḳıʿāt-ı Sulṭān Cem*, the Events of Sultan Cem, an anonymous narrative about a pretender to the Ottoman throne. Analyzing it in relation to a contemporary Latin source, Vatin examines the world of Ottoman-European diplomacy in the late 15th century.[148] In his study of the two sieges of Rhodes, he goes on to say that this project brought him to "[l]'idée du présent livre."[149] Indeed, the two are strongly connected. In 1482, when Cem was outgunned in the Ottoman succession conflict with his brother Bayezid II, he fled to Rhodes. The Knights Hospitaller took him in as a valuable prisoner but soon shipped him off to France. From there he eventually ended up in Rome. Cem's stint on Rhodes forced the Ottoman center and the Knights Hospitaller to interface diplomatically very soon after the late Mehmed II's attempt to conquer

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[146] Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 56–58.
[147] Nos. 12-13, 28, Aykut et al., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 12, 18.
[148] Cf. Nicolas Vatin, *Sultan Djem. Un prince ottoman dans l'Europe du XVe siècle d'après deux sources contemporaines: Vâḳıʿât-ı Sulṭân Cem, Œuvres de Guillaume Caoursin* (Ankara: Société Turque d'Histoire, 1997).
[149] Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 1.

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the island in 1480. Even though he was likely worth a pretty penny in ransom, the Knights Hospitaller preferred to extend his exile by sending him to Western Europe until his death in 1495.[150]

In fact, Cem has already appeared in this study. As part of his volume, Vatin published a sizable source collection. Ahmed Paşa's letter immediately after the conquest of 1522 mentions the apprehension of "infidels" related to the "son of Cem." Apparently, the exiled Ottoman of 1482 had left some offspring on the island. They must have converted to Christianity and merged into Rhodian society.[151] This *Cemoğlu* and his family had become products of the isolation an island like Rhodes could provide. To a certain degree, they exemplify both cases presented in this subchapter: Exiles and civilians.

3.2.1 Exiles: Rowers and rulers

The *mühimme* register of 1558 to 1560 does not go as far as explicitly calling Rhodes a prison island. But there is a phrasing that appears notably often in reference to the island: Criminals were apprehended in different parts of the Empire, and they were sent to Rhodes or the *bey* of Rhodes to "küreğe koşmak, koymak, konulmak."[152] K*ürek* can mean both shovel and oar, but the implication is clear. They are convicted to serve as rowers on the galleys. And Rhodes was the optimal space to organize such an endeavor. The island was isolated enough to remove transgressors completely from their previous lives and near enough to the Ottoman center of power to make use of them as rowers when required. Order number 113 from July 1559 makes this explicit: "Deliver them to serve as oarsmen to the *bey* of Rhodes and caution the sent men that upon delivery you might take firm hold of them and send them to my Threshold of Felicity."[153]

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[150] Casale, *Ottoman Age of Exploration*, 23; Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 1–7.
[151] Vatin, *L'ordre de Saint-Jean et l'Empire ottoman*, 498–502.
[152] Aykut et al., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 795.
[153] "[K]üreğe konmak içün Rodos begine teslîm itdüresin ve gönderdüğinüz âdemlere tenbîh idesin ki, teslîm olınduğına temessük alup Südde-i saʿâdetʾüme gönderesin," no. 113, Aykut et al., 59.

Throughout the 1558 to 1560 register a grand total of 43 cases of "sending someone to the oar" appear.[154] Out of these, ten mentions relate to the island of Rhodes or the *bey* of Rhodes.[155] While this ratio can hardly be considered conclusive, it shows some involvement of the island. But, indeed, the practice was prevalent all over the Empire. So, to reconstruct how Rhodes figured into the Ottoman system of justice and exile, it is necessary to identify a bigger fish. And in July 1560, a really big fish is mentioned. Directive number 1323 reads:

> Decree for the *kadı* and the *dizdār* (keeper of the fortress) of Rhodes that:
>
> I commanded that you imprison the Crimean Khan (*Ḳırım Ḫān*) who was recently sent to Rhodes in the inner castle. And I declared that:
>
> As to my order, do not let any individual from your own men meet with the aforementioned when he has been imprisoned in the inner castle. If someone like him arrived from the outside and presented a letter, detain them too, apply a seal to the presented papers and send them with the mentioned seal to my Threshold of Felicity. Let no one from the outside meet with him against my noble command.[156]

The Crimean Khanate was a contemporary Muslim state that has often been regarded as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. While more recent scholarship has moved away from this assessment, there was a certain degree of subordination of the Crimean khans towards the Ottomans sultans. This did not go unopposed. There were various Crimean pushes for further independence, such as by Khan Gazi II Giray around 1600 and to some extent by Sultan Süleyman's contemporary Khan Sahib Giray.[157] But the Ottomans developed a number of

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[154] Aykut et al., 795.

[155] Nos. 113, 414, 611, 630, 854, 1233, 1243, 1256, 1304, 1404, Aykut et al., 59, 185, 273, 285, 380, 548–49, 552, 557–58, 578, 622–23.

[156] "Rodos kādîsına ve dizdârına hüküm ki: Anda Rodos'a irsâl olan Kırım Hân'un iç-kal'ada habs olınmasın emr idüp buyurdum ki: Emrüm üzre mezkûrı iç-kal'ada habs eyleyüp kendü âdemlerinden gayrı bir ferdi bulışdurmayasın. Eger anun gibi hâricden gelüp mektûb sunarlarsa kendüleri tutup habs idüp sunduğı kâğıdların bir kîseye koyup mühürleyüp mezbûr ile Südde-i sa'âdet'üme gönderesin. Emr-i şerîfüme mugāyîr hâricden kimesneyi bulışdurmayasın," no. 1323, Aykut et al., 586.

[157] The articles by Mária Ivanics and Natalia Królikowska in the 2013 volume on Ottoman tributary states provide great insight into the debate about the Ottoman-Crimean relationship. But they give no clues as to who was exiled to Rhodes around 1560. Mária Ivanics, "The Military Co-Operation of the Crimean Khanate with the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy 53 (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2013), 275–79; Natalia Królikowska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Gábor Kármán

control mechanisms that were not available in the other direction. They, for instance, demanded Crimean princes as hostages to keep them at the Porte. Ultimately, the Ottomans could easily dispose of uncooperative Crimean rulers by exiling them—more often than not—to Rhodes.[158]

This way, the Crimean khans became a regular presence on the island and left an impression in another field, this study has attempted to pursue. After losing his state to Catherine the Great in 1782, the last Crimean khan, Şahin Giray, ended up in exile on Rhodes too. There he was executed in 1787.[159] His tomb (*türbe*) was erected in the Murad Reʾis social complex which has been extensively introduced in chapter 2. The octagonal building houses the graves of Şahin Giray and some of his predecessors including crown princes. Together with the *türbe* of Canibek Giray, it forms the Crimean section of the cemetery in the Murad Reʾis social complex. It is only reasonable to assume that the "big fish," the exiled *Ḳırım Ḫān* who arrived on Rhodes around 1560, has been laid to rest there too.[160]

3.2.2 Civilians: Neighborhood and hardship

Having been populated after 1522 with a mix of newly added Muslims, reintroduced Jewish inhabitants and remaining Christians, Rhodes must have reflected the diversity of the Ottoman population on a small scale. The expulsion of many Christians from the eponymous city and the continued presence of soldiers led to sizable Muslim population.[161] As I argued in chapter 2, their needs were served with a tight network of religious infrastructure. The 1558 to

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and Lovro Kunčević, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy 53 (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2013), 43–47, 62–65.

[158] However, I could not find any references to who might have been exiled to Rhodes around 1560. The somewhat disloyal Sahib Giray had been deposed in favour of Devlet Giray in 1551. And in 1560, Devlet was very wrapped up in his own campaigns. I can only speculate that the prisoner on Rhodes was rather a Crimean prince than a khan per se. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy 47 (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2011), 89, 95–97, 131, 146, 448–49.

[159] Kołodziejczyk, 212–13, 218.

[160] Zeki Çelikkol also provides photographs of the Crimean khans' graves in the unpaginated appendix. Çelikkol, *Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri*, 34, 36–40.

[161] Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 2–9, 18–19.

1560 *mühimme* register mentions the potential addition of another mosque. It can be found in a directive for the *kadı* of Rhodes from December 1559. "So far there is no mosque (*mescid*) on the waterfront where the Muslims can perform their prayer," it reads, and commands the addressee to find a "suitable location" and make an estimation (*taḥmīn*) of the requirements.[162]

But it was not always easy for the residents of Rhodes. The fifth *mühimme* register (1565/66) contains a directive to the *kadı* of Kavala, a harbor in present-day Northern Greece. "The people of the fortress of Rhodes," requested crops to buy because "as the soil found here is very stony [they] fell behind on the yield," and suffered a shortage of grain.[163] And that year must have been particularly bad. Just like above, this entry dates from November 1565 which is after the grain supplies from the attack on Malta must have been delivered.

Nevertheless, the Porte kept Rhodes open to newcomers. The sixth *mühimme* register which covers the year 972 (1564/65) offers a remarkable episode in this regard. The directive in question was addressed at the *beylerbey* of the islands and reported the following letter from the *bey* and the *kadı* of Eğriboz, Euboea in Modern Greek, to the Porte.

> Ten *ẕimmi* individuals from the *aʿyān*s of the Greek and Albanian infidels who were inhabitants of the island of Andros came. On that island the inhabitants are close to 1800 Greek and Albanian households (*ḫāne*) and fifty to sixty Frankish households. Twelve [?] Frankish individuals stole the island's crops, did bad things with the locals and their wives and killed some and they gave provisions to war and pirate ships. The malice and atrocities have no end.[164]

They knew who to blame, the Frankish ruler identified as "Mültezim (tax collector) Franceşko Şomartine." Following Elias Kolovos, they essentially wanted the Ottomans to drive

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[162] "*Rodos kādîsına hüküm ki*: Hâliyâ Rodos'da yalı kenarında Müslimânlara namâz edâ idecek bir mescid olmayup […]; zikr olınan yalı kenarında Müslimânlar vakit namâzın edâ idecek ihtisâr üzre bir mescid ne mahalde münâsibdür ve binâ olınduğı takdîrce ne mikdâr nesne ile hâsıl olur? Tahmîn-i sahîh ile tahmîn itdürüp dahı arz eyleyesin," no. 635, Aykut et al., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 286.

[163] "Kavala Kadısı Mevlâna Abdülbâki'ye: Rodos Kalesi halkı, bulundukları yer taşlık olduğu için tereke yetiştiremediklerini, bu sebeple zahîre sıkıntısı çektiklerini söyleyerek kendilerine tereke verilmesi," no. 488, Yıldırım et al., *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 87.

[164] "Andıra cezîresi sâkinlerinden Rûm ve Arnavud keferesi aʿyânından on nefer zimmî gelüp cezîre-i mezbûrede sâkin olan Rûm ve Arnavud bin sekiz yüze karîb hâne olup Frenk elli-altmış hâne olup on iki nefer Frenk cezîre-i mezbûre mahsûlâtın zabtidüp ehl ü ıyâllerine fiʿl-i şenîʿ ve baʿzın helâk idüp ve harbî ve korsan gemilerine azık virüp fesâd ü şenâʿatlerinün nihâyeti yokdur," no. 252, Yıldırım et al., *6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 141.

away the Catholics who exploited them.[165] But according to the *mühimme*, the Porte had another proposition: "If on the island of Eğriboz there is a free space, you may let them migrate and give them lodging. If there is no free space on Eğriboz, you can send them to the island of Rhodes and accommodate them there."[166] If this ever came to pass, I do not know, but I do know that it allows for the investigation of early Ottoman Rhodes to come full circle. Resettling some Andros islanders on Rhodes is simply *sürgün* by another name.

By the 1560s, the Ottomans were still in the process of making Rhodes their own. The redefinition of Rhodes' role in the Aegean I tease in the chapter title was not as harsh as it could have been. The island did not change *in* its relational context but *for* its relational context. The military-strategic position of Rhodes was as convenient as ever. But in conjunction with Egypt, the Ottomans had even more use for it than their predecessors. The economy of the island ran along military supply lines too. Rhodes served as a bridge to literally secure their smooth sailing. But even the slightest remoteness can be isolating. Those exiled to Rhodes experienced this first-hand—if they were important enough to not be reassigned as oarsmen in the imperial navy. Finally, some people just lived there; historical civilians are difficult to capture. Thankfully, there are physical testimonies in architecture to somewhat grasp the world they inhabited. And sometimes that world is an island—not too far from the mainland to be useful, but far enough to remove an unruly khan or two.

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[165] Elias Kolovos, "Insularity and Society in the Ottoman Context: The Case of the Aegean Island of Andros (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)," *Turcica* 39 (2007): 52.

[166] "Ağrıboz cezîresinde bir hâlî yir var ise ana göçürüp temekkün ü tavattun itdüresiz. Ağrıboz'da hâlî yir yoğ ise Rodos cezîresine gönderüp sekenâtların anda itdürüp," no. 252, Yıldırım et al., *6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 141.

Conclusion

In essence, the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes did change the island quite substantially. Regarding this issue from the three perspectives proposed in chapters one to three, shows that all transformations Rhodes went through were interwoven and built upon each other. That is to say, the three units of analysis individual, city, and island connect both vertically and horizontally. It is easy to find the vertical axis: Individuals populate the city; the city functions as a hub for the island to partake in the surrounding networks. For the horizontal plane we need to fill these terms with meaning obtained from the sources. Let me illustrate this with a chain of examples that is easily constructed from the preceding chapters. When Ahmed Paşa and Piri Mehmed Paşa relied on Muslihiddin Reʾis to handle much of the siege in 1522, they paved the way for Hızır Reʾis to both assume the protection of Rhodes in 1560 and to lead the Ottoman expedition to the Indian Ocean in 1567. This way, the Kurtoğlu-clan had firmly established itself in the Ottoman navy. While architecture and naval history might seem an unlikely pair, the establishment of famous corsairs and captains reflected directly back to the shores of Rhodes. The 17th century Murat Reʾis social complex with the eponymous captain's *türbe* exemplifies the attraction of the local individuals to legend and the deep reverence for seafaring. Here, individual, city, and island do not interact linearly and chronologically but connect freely and throughout the periods of Ottomans Rhodes, going far beyond the original purview of this paper too.

One could allege that, all these transformations notwithstanding, Rhodes simply lost relevance under Ottoman stewardship. Viewed through a cynical lens, the signs are easy to see: From the headquarters of an international order to the backwater of an Empire that was already getting too big for its own good; from a thriving community of co-religionists to a diverse but divided city population; from a node of communication to a shore of isolation. All these

accusations have their merits, or rather specks of truth within them. The analysis of the *mühimme* registers clearly shows that Ottoman Rhodes had its problems with isolation. The food supply was not always guaranteed, and the population had to grapple with famine. But the Ottoman could employ their own networks of communication and Rhodes was easy to reach if provisions were absolutely needed. The potential for isolation itself was turned into a virtue. By adding exile to the uses of Rhodes, the Porte made it essentially more "island-y," more isolating, than before.

But this does not apply when it comes to the general population. It is particularly the internal diversity that served the maintained contacts between Rhodes, the mainland, and other Mediterranean islands. On the one hand, the potential refugees from Andros highlight the overall connecting capability of Rhodes' "island characteristic." On the other hand, the religious diversity of Rhodes-City illustrates how strong the ties were to other parts of the Empire and far beyond. As Elias Kolovos shows, the newly settled Muslims and the returned Jewish inhabitants named their religious communities after the regions they felt connected to. Amongst others, this is exemplified by the existence of two Jewish neighborhoods named "New Firenze" and "Old Firenze" inside Rhodes-City.[167]

And for the Knights Hospitaller—they did not give up Rhodes easily. To argue that the island lost all relevance immediately after the Ottoman conquest, would invalidate the fact that the order continued to covet it. Both Molly Greene and Elias Kolovos (with reference to Nicolas Vatin) note conspiracies aimed at dethroning the Ottomans in favor of the Knights Hospitaller.[168] The new owners continued to prepare for hostile measures by restoring the walls and projecting their power—both externally through military fortifications and internally through sacral architecture.

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[167] Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 8.
[168] Greene, "Ottoman Lawsuits in Malta," 191–92; Kolovos, "Rhodes According to the Ottoman Survey," 7–8.

Ultimately, these arguments do not serve to prevent criticisms to the findings of this study. Rather, they are meant to illustrate the potential of exploring multiple perspective and source types and then putting them into conversation with each other. Just like the units of analysis in this thesis interact with the focus—the transformations during the early Ottoman rule over Rhodes—they can be detached, used for specific arguments, and reassembled again. The three individual perspectives on Rhodes fit together like those three sections of wall around the crescent-shaped bay on the Northern edge of the island. The individuals who participated in the siege shape the reader's understanding of the goings-on in the Eastern Mediterranean as the Ottomans expanded their maritime reach in general and incorporated Rhodes in particular. The architectural heritage is adapted and given shape in accordance with who makes use of the space. This investigation allows us not only to locate mosques but churches and synagogues and gives a face to the changing population of the eponymous city without the need to provide absolute numbers. And the military-strategic position of Rhodes was as convenient as ever. Together with Egypt, the island formed for an axis of unprecedented Ottoman control over the Eastern Mediterranean. This allowed for potential expansions both to the West—the conquest of Djerba, as noted in the *mühimme* registers, comes to mind—as well as to the East by using Egypt as a bridge into the Indian Ocean.

Further research can draw on any of the perspectives explored here. Going beyond Rhodes-City for architectural observations, for instance, would be phenomenal. I have some ideas for potential source types to pursue this issue; *evḳāf* registers, the records of pious foundations, come to mind. But for the moment, several questions that should be approachable with the present set of sources remain open for me. Regarding the provisioning of Rhodes, we know about grains from the *mühimme* registers, but what about rice? Generally, how can we study diet (and cuisine) in the 16th century Eastern Mediterranean? What about the animals? The interior of Rhodes is mountainous—where are the goats and the sheep in the sources?

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What about the cats that are ever-present in today's city of Rhodes? Somewhat more gravely, a final question always sat at the back of my head while writing. Is it productive to examine the Ottoman conquest and incorporation of Rhodes—not to mention most other islands in the Eastern Mediterranean—in terms of colonial history?

With the 500-year anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes approaching, it is high time to re-examine this little island's role in the grand Süleymanic era. Through the grapevine, I have heard of publications being prepared for the occasion which is most welcome. This thesis can be considered early input to the discussion by contributing three perspectives on how the early Ottoman rule transformed the island of Rhodes—how the Ottomans made an island. While this metaphor is still difficult to apply, there is a way to illustrate it very well. The map of Rhodes from Piri Reʾis' book on navigation (Figure 3) visibly underscores the findings of this study. The work of an individual, be it Piri Reʾis or the unknown creator of this specific map, shapes the observer's perception of the city of Rhodes. As mentioned above, it is depicted as clearly Muslim featuring two minarets. Finally, while the city-stronghold lies to the North of the island, it is not shown at the top of the page. Instead, the map is oriented to the South. The present-day observer must reorient themselves and realize that the map—and therefore Rhodes—has been made in a multilayered and distinctly Ottoman context.

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# Appendix: Figures

Plan: VIII — Süleymaniye Camii Planı

Figure 1a. Ground plan of Süleymaniye Mosque with domed portico and the fountain in Zeki Çelikkol, Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri ve Tarihçe, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları 6/25 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), non-paginated appendix, plan 8.

Plan: IX — Süleymaniye Camii cephe kesiti   Plan: X — Süleymaniye Camii yan kesiti

Figure 1b. Sections of the Süleymaniye Mosque in Zeki Çelikkol, Rodos'taki Türk Eserleri ve Tarihçe, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları 6/25 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), non-paginated appendix, plans 9-10.

Şekil 7.14. Murat Reis Külliyesi, Ebu Bekir Paşa Camii

Figure 2a. Sections of Ebu Bekir Paşa Mosque in the Murad Reʾis complex. This rendering is an idealized Ottoman version of the building according to the restoration plans in Ammar İbrahimgil, "Rodos, Murat Reis Külliyesi Belgelemesi ve Restorasyon Önerisi" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2012), 447.

Şekil 7.21. Murat Reis Külliyesi, Murat Reis Türbesi

Figure 2b. Sections of the tomb (türbe) of Murad Reʾis in the eponymous complex. This rendering is an idealized Ottoman version of the building according to the restoration plans in Ammar İbrahimgil, "Rodos, Murat Reis Külliyesi Belgelemesi ve Restorasyon Önerisi" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2012), 454.

Figure 3. Map of Rhodes in the book on navigation of Piri Reʾis, originally composed in 932 H/1525. The map is oriented to the south. This depiction of Rhodes-City clearly shows two mosques with minarets in Piri Reʾis, "Kitāb-i Baḥriye [Book of Seafaring]" (Late 17th century), Ms. W.658, Digitized Walters Manuscripts, fol. 103a, https://www.thedigitalwalters.org/Data/WaltersManuscripts/W658/data/W658/sap/W658_000215_sap.jpg.