DECENTRALIZED SUPRANATIONAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE IN ABOLITIONIST ORIENTATIONS

By
Jennifer Simpson

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Supervisor: Professor Zoltan Miklosi

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Dedicated to all abolitionists, everywhere.

ABSTRACT

Contemporary supra- and international governance organizations have refused to ensure basic human rights for billions of people across the globe. Falsely framed as a problem of scarcity, that we do in fact have the resources to provide essential necessities such as food, housing, infrastructure, and disaster relief is a moral failure that contravenes the legitimacy of these institutions. If supranational governance organizations (SGOs) are to guarantee human rights, how will they need to be structured, particularly with attention to the precarities that climate crises present? Decentralization, here in a polycentric, multiscalar form with local and autonomous nodes, is the alternative to hierarchical, elite, and abstracted governance. Theories premised on the acceptance of state violence are fundamentally inadequate: to guarantee human rights, SGOs must be institutionally inter- and intra-interactionally non-violent. This proposal draws inspiration from anarchic principles and abolition movements, addressing the known problems of supra- and international governance organizations in order to reimagine SGOs as both just and logistically effective. Non-violence requires cooperation, which in turn requires that each SGO be accountable, democratic, and transparent, with open access knowledge and ambulatory network connections. Climate crises additionally require that SGOs be redundant, interdependent, flexible and adaptable, with the ability to be safely experimental. Reallocation of essential resources is not contingent on political maneuvering, but instead determined by algorithm. SGO managers affirm network connections and coordinate reallocations, with safeguards against mal- and misfeasance, and democratic mechanisms for impacted demoi. Although this proposal is ideal in that it is predicated on communal essential resources, the logistics of a decentralized SGO network may be of use for international mutual aid, managing voluntary association in confederalism, and political theory beyond the binary—self-interested or cooperative—of the human condition.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Climate Crises and Supranational Governance Organizations

Climate change often refers to a near-future of global warming, where emissions cause ocean acidification, sea level rise, desert expansion, and glacial melt, with increasingly severe and frequent weather-related disasters: wildfires, floods, droughts, heat waves, and even pandemics as entire ecosystems are destroyed or placed in precarity. Tipping points, the "critical threshold at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively alter the state or development of a system" such as sea ice and glacier melt, monsoons, Amazon and boreal forest dieback, and persistent El Niño-like conditions,[1] are now considered by the ICC to be likely if global temperatures rise 1-2°C above pre-Industrial levels. This 1-2°C rise is commonly cited as what we need to avoid in order to avert climate change.[2] Here, however, tipping points for climate change becomes a misnomer: climate *change* is already here. They are more aptly described as where climate *chaos* begins. Similarly, disruptions in agricultural production, lack of access to clean water, weather disasters, and forced emigration[3] from low-lying communities will become their own sociopolitical tipping points.

Climate change[4] presents a unique opportunity to rethink supranational governance organizations (SGOs) for three reasons. First, climate change is a global phenomenon in which local actions are not the primary causes of local catastrophes, and, given that individual weather-

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[1] Lenton, T. M., et al. "Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 105, no. 6, 2008, pp. 1786–1793.

[2] In 2018, the ICC revised its initial temperature rise for moderate/high risk for tipping points from 3.5-5°C to 1-2°C.

[3] The World Bank estimates that 22.5-24 million people were displaced by climate events in 2017; by 2050 they predict at least 143 million climate migrants: a roughly 600% increase.

[4] Despite the distinction, I will use climate change, chaos, crisis/es interchangeably.

events do not necessarily confine themselves to local or even state boundaries, relying on state-restricted control of resources is inadequate: at best, dangerous, and at worst, potentially genocidal. Second, the variety of weather disasters will require a variety of resources for proper recoveries, which no state is capable of providing alone, and which, if subject to the priorities of late capitalism or political maneuvering, will be ineffective. Finally, disaster response and recovery is only a part of the imperative: lowering[5] greenhouse gases to safe and sustainable levels demands nothing less than a worldwide restructuring of both production and international relations. For these reasons, climate governance requires global coordination and cannot be solely the responsibility of individual nation states.

Current supra- and transnational organizations (S/TGOs)[6] are not only failing at reaching the agreed-upon goals,[7] but also encouraging the very production relations which are the primary cause of climate change under the guise of development, all while upholding and imposing neoliberal resource allocation and territorial borders that will undoubtedly foment further sociopolitical conflicts with the coming climate catastrophes. That the global inequalities these institutions enforce result annually in tens of millions of unnecessary deaths, hundreds of millions to food insecurity—despite 14% of global industrial food production being *wasted*[8]—and subject billions more to the violence of poverty is reason enough to abolish them: the intractable codependence of S/TGOs and global capitalism precludes any viability of reform. Climate change is here considered exceptional in that it requires specific institutional structures

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[5] As of 2020, global temperatures are estimated at 1.1°C (± 0.1°C) higher than pre-Industrial levels.

[6] I use S/TGO to refer to the current supra- and transnational governance organizations, and SGO only to refer to the proposed supranational governance organizations.

[7] United Nations, World Meteorological Organization. *Transformational Action Needed for Paris Agreement Targets - United in Science Report*. 09 September, 2020.

[8] FAO. 2019. The State of Food and Agriculture 2019. Moving forward on food loss and waste reduction. Rome. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

that would not otherwise be necessary, and exceptional in that it is not comparable to air pollution,[9] but not exceptional in a utilitarian sense, i.e. that a greater number of people will be harmed does not impose a greater significance or otherwise diminish the significance of the people who are currently harmed by global governance structures.

1.2 Ideal Normative Theory

Rethinking SGOs first begins with their normative legitimacy and our philosophical constraints on the feasibility of governance structures which uphold our moral values. When theories of legitimacy are premised on an ideal/non-ideal distinction, the forced dichotomy advocates a false binary: there is our imperfect world, and there is utopia. In this conception, ideal theory, by the association with utopia, loses its effective value to an impossible standard. The concession to feasibility in non-ideal theory not only fails to address the immensity and depth of S/TGO corruption, it evinces a defeatism toward the global institutions that are foundational to the problems we seek to address. At best, non-ideal theory prescribes no progress; at worst, it strengthens those institutions by ascribing to their existence the *totality* of imperfect realities. That we do not live in an ideal world is obvious; that we do not compose ideal theories with standards that account for both catastrophe and corruption is a political and moral failure of immeasurable magnitude. Advocating reform of structurally harmful institutions reinforces the "there is no alternative" paradigm, which not only restricts political thought and organization, but is logically untenable given the current and future social upheavals fueled by climate disasters and unequal access to resources.

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[9] c.f. Nagle, John Copeland. "Climate Exceptionalism." *Environmental Law*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2009.

An ideal theory, however, need not presume global goodwill nor unassailable institutions. An ideal theory is one which, with its values as material goals, acknowledges the mechanisms by which violations occur and, within the institutions it advocates, establishes the organizational structures by which the harms of potential violations are minimized.

To get to this world from ours requires not just a global jubilee, not just an initial redistribution, not even a hearty dinner of billionaires, but an effectively managed ongoing reallocation after reallocation of resources in an increasingly unstable, unpredictable, and interconnected environment. It requires not different individuals in positions of power but entirely different institutional structures which fundamentally restrict the scope of abuses of power. It requires global cooperation and coordination between self-governing territories. It requires rethinking legitimacy, human rights, distribution[10] and trade, the state, and enforcement. To the extent that feasibility is to be a criterion, it requires reframing the object thereof, i.e., not feasibility for change but feasibility for effect: without prevarication, it is simply more feasible that institutions requiring first a revolution will develop than it is for extant institutions to actually guarantee human rights. It is from this reality that I write.

1.3 Chapter Summaries

Chapter Two begins with the differences in normative standards for supranational governance laws and supranational governance organizations. By designating the proper domain of SGLs and SGOs as the *guarantee* of human rights, the role of democracy—which is generally

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[10] I use reallocate instead of redistribute because it mitigates, although doesn't entirely erase, the subjects of ownership. Here, a resource is managed and potentially used by a particular territory; *re*allocation is predicated on a prior allocation - that is, the nature of the resource is that it is already *for a purpose*. Alleviating the subjects quietly emphasizes the communal nature of the resource and its ease of mobility. Redistribute, which posits at least an initial owner, not only often implies a central authority, but also implies that the receiving population in turn becomes the owner. Furthermore, to distribute is to divide the resource and authority thereof, replicating the language of false scarcity in capitalism and increasing potential sights of tension.

disregarded in the context of human rights—is given defined boundaries and mechanisms. The legitimacy of contemporary and proposed democratic SGO forms is assessed in three proposals: state consent, broad accountability, and fair democratic association. Refocusing the foundational principle to guaranteeing human rights requires SGOs to be inter- and intra- institutionally and interactionally just, i.e. nonviolent. Without relying on the state to determine the composition of the demoi, I combine the principles of all affected interests and all affiliated interests, resulting in a principle of all possibly impacted. I conclude with theoretical orientations that draw inspiration from abolition and anarchy.

Chapter Three examines the values of decentralization for supranational governance organizations, both in its traditional normative sense and through the structures of existing climate organization networks. I then attend to the criticism of normative appeals for SGO decentralization; the lack of specificity is addressed by appealing to the multiscalar, polycentric governance in contemporary inter/transnational climate change organizations. Here, efficacy is treated as a normative, not instrumental, value of legitimacy. Instead of asking whether a particular type of reform is *feasible*, the question becomes what type of organizational structures are required for it to be *effective* in meeting its goals. More than a semantic distinction, efficacy operationalizes feasibility, emphasizing normative goals over contemporary restrictions.

Chapter Four provides a proposal for SGO nodes and roles. Roles include open borders, free and coordinated movement of essential resources, global communication networks, global welfare and sustainable development, and rescue and disaster relief. Nodes are examined through their managerial roles, technological coordination, and interactions with the demoi.

Chapter Five concludes with an overview, presents some known limitations, and offers potential partial applications for contemporary organization

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS

2.1 Normative Legitimacy in Contemporary Global Governance

Normative legitimacy in supranational governance organizations is predicated on three fundamental questions, the first pertains to supranational *laws*: what is the proper scope of authority, i.e. when does a law have the moral right to supersede national or transnational laws? The second two consider the *structure*: from whom does that authority derive, and in what operational manner does it manifest? The answer to the first is easily set: for SGOs, the scope and moral right is to guarantee human rights.[1] Anything more is the purview of transnational or local governments; anything less is to contradict all but the most tautological meanings of supranational.

The structural question, from whom does authority derive and in what configurations, generally first addresses the role and constitution of democracy within and between organizations. However, when issues of democracy are approached as the ability to express *preferences*, with the obligatory if perfunctory dismissal that human rights are (rightly) exempt from democratic vote, it elides the complicated nature of SGOs whose role is exactly that: the assurance and protection of human rights. Where the moral authority of democracy is illegitimate, i.e., violations to inalienable rights, the questions of democracy's scope and constitution in SGOs instead becomes a question of some of the *particular manifestations in which* these rights are guaranteed, if and only if neither the content nor the process of

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[1] By definition, supranational governance organizations have both a stronger normative obligation to fulfill their roles and a narrower scope of roles than transnational governance organizations, which may engage in non-essential relations such as aesthetic trade. This can also be somewhat paradoxically construed as supranational governance—which only pertains to human rights—has a content-independent moral obligation to comply, precisely because the scope of its laws, the guarantee of human rights, are content-dependent.

guaranteeing human rights violates human rights: which organizations are responsible for which populations, what are the means by which each organization can effectively manage its roles, what is the individual's agency in its internal operations, when do technocratic or managerial roles defer to local democracy, and what are the mechanisms of inter-organization coordination.

Contemporary S/TGOs tend to take responsibility as, theoretically if not in practice, a given. Supra- and transnational governance organizations are responsible to, at minimum, their nation-state signatories, at most, all of humanity regardless of citizenship. Legitimacy theories for a global government, whether federal, communist, or democratic assembly, similarly assume that the SGO is accountable to all. This centralization, wherein one or a small number of SGOs claim authority over and/or obligation to the rights of individuals and states presents a number of significant complications, from effective coordination to vulnerability to capture, as well as legitimate enforcement mechanisms.

To illustrate the difficulties in legitimacy between states and centralized S/TGOs, I first assess three predominate theories: broad accountability, state consent, and fair democratic association.

2.1.1 Broad Accountability

For Buchanan, broad accountability is the minimal requirements for and processes by which S/TGOs should be reviewed, held accountable, and reformed. Essentially, S/TGOs would be audited and compelled to improve by transnational civil society organizations. That these proposed auditing organizations are subject to the same history, the same economics, the same power relations, as current international law-making institutions is not considered. Oversight is entrusted to the same strong states whose abuse of the system calls for oversight in the first place. If transnational civil society organizations were immune to the asymmetrical power

relations that delegitimize S/TGOs, a practical solution in the non-ideal theory would be to structure S/TGOs in a similar fashion.

Even if they were somehow exempt, without a mechanism or theory of enforcement, it is illogical to assume that auditing S/TGOs with no legal or military power would accomplish what weak states could not. Broad accountability masks the problem without actually addressing it. Worse still, the external validation reinforces the inequalities within the international system.

Furthermore, broad accountability is a retroactive practice; although it may correct individual and systemic abuses, it does nothing to actively create a system in which tendencies toward those abuses are minimized, and is thus insufficient for the guarantee of human rights.

2.1.2 State Consent

The simple state consent view is the notion that, because states can choose to join S/TGOs or enter into treaties, the international laws are legitimized through their consent. While state consent is the contemporary sociological standard for S/TGOs, by any normative considerations it is woefully deficient. As Buchanan rightly notes, "The consent of weaker states may be less than substantially voluntary, because stronger states can make the costs of their not consenting prohibitive."[2] There are, however, two implicit issues. First, *if the agreement is not "substantially voluntary," it is not consent*. Legal theory holds that contracts signed under duress, coercion, or blackmail are null and void. To recognize a strong state-weak state coercive transaction while continuing to frame it as consensual unnaturally broadens the definition of consent, rendering it technically meaningless while preserving the underlying implications of its legitimacy. Instead of acknowledging that the current international system is based on the

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[2] Buchanan, Allen. "The Legitimacy of International Law." *The Philosophy of International Law*, by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 79–96: 91.

coercive power of few states against a majority of weak states, Buchanan concludes that simple state consent is not a sufficient condition for legitimacy.

Part of Buchanan's trouble with his use of consent can be traced to his constricted definition of coercion: "understood as a credible threat of the use of physical force against non-compliers."[3] This is a unique, constrained definition of coerce, which definitionally and pragmatically include the notion of compliance through force or intimidation, fear, or authority. Blackmail, for instance, is a form of coercion that does not rely on physical force. This is particularly important considering the habits of financial S/TGOs such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. When economic sanctions can devastate an economy, exacerbate a famine, or incite conflict, the individualized conception of physical coercion is insufficient.

Furthermore, as Buchanan himself admits about customary international law, the notion of consent is undermined by "the inability of weaker states to opt out to the process or to do without excessive costs."[4] Here, it is not a rational calculation of cost and benefit, but instead cost and consequence. This ambiguous use and application of consent detracts from the very real issues of economic coercion and unequal authority within the S/TGOs.

2.1.3 Fair Democratic Association

State consent is problematic not only in its tendency toward coercion between states, but also because states themselves are rarely fairly representative of their populations, internally exercising practices which are illegitimate. Christiano calls this the "representativeness problem" which "comes in three variants: the authoritarian variant, the minority variant, and the secrecy variant."[5] He advocates an ideal in which both the representativeness problem and international

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[3] Ibid: 84.
[4] Ibid: 92.
[5] Christiano, Thomas. "Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions." The Philosophy of International Law, by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, Oxford University Press, 2013: 4.

coercion, or, "hard bargaining," are eliminated: "a fair system of voluntary association among highly representative states."[6] Although he properly delineates the many of the forms of oppression by which S/TGOs and states lose legitimacy, by failing to account for the intrinsic competitive and capitalist constitution of the modern nation state, the mechanisms by which this ideal is established, individual state reforms, is implausible. Overcoming these issues in the modern nation state would require significant enough global, structural change that it is insensible to continue advocating for the state[7] in its modern permutation as the democratic agent.

2.2 Establishing the Demoi for Decentralized Supranational Governance

If the state is not the determining boundaries for "which institutions are responsible to which populations," how then is the demoi established, and what are the implications for theories that presume the state? The two pertinent proposals for the composition of the demoi are "all affected interests" and "all affiliated interests."

2.2.1 All Affected Interests

In the strong moral conception, all affected interests applies universally, because the realization of *all* people's inalienable rights affects the morality of all people. As List and Koenig-Archibugi affirm, "on affectedness grounds, we have good reasons to consider all of humanity a possible candidate for a demos."[8] In the weak moral conception, or, instrumentally, all affected interests applies to "everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government

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[6] Ibid: 6.
[7] Geographically-based governance territories, which could in a very broad definition be called a state, may exist in the proposed SGO paradigm, but the differences in authority, structure, and constitution are substantial enough that "state" requires new terminology together.
[8] List, Christian, and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. "Can There Be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach." Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 38, no. 1, 2010, pp. 76–110: 87.

should have the right to participate in that government."[9] Goodin delineates two primary issues, first, that the "affected" voters, when taken to mean subject to change via the policy as opposed to status quo, becomes compositionally caught in a paradox depending on whether or not the policy passes. Any policy which would potentially affect a population implies a preexisting relationship between the two populations, and the maintenance of the status quo therefore affects the possible voters. "More generally, you are rightly said to be "affected," not merely by the 'course of action actually decided upon,' but also by the range of alternative courses of action from which that course was chosen. Furthermore, you are rightly said to be "affected," not merely by what the consequences of that decision actually turn out to be, but also by what the consequences might have turned out to be."[10] Goodin advocates for an "expansive conception of 'all possibly affected interests'" in which "Virtually (maybe literally) everyone in the world— and indeed everyone in all possible future worlds—should be entitled to vote on any proposal or any proposal for proposals. A maximally extensive franchise, virtually (perhaps literally) ignoring boundaries both of space and of time, would be the only legitimate way of constituting the demos to this more defensible version of the "all possibly affected interests" principle."[11] Although his theory is broadly applicable to human rights, it faces a number of theoretical and bureaucratic issues.

First, Goodin's conception relies on states as the boundaries for affectedness, which unnecessarily complicates and conflates voting rights with citizenship; in consequence, "the status of fellow-citizens would not be permanent, . . . but would shift in relation to the issue

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[9] Goodin, Robert E. "Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives." Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, 2007, pp. 40–68: 51.
[10] Ibid: 54.
[11] Ibid: 55.

proposed."[12] To "require a different constituency of voters or participants for every decision"[13] does not impact citizenship if the basis of the affected-group boundary is not the state. Second, he concludes that, while the expansive definition of affectedness may err toward overinclusion, unaffected voters, having no stake, would vote randomly, "equally across all options, leaving the overall population unaltered."[14] This conviction assumes not only a dubious statistical invariance, i.e. that random will result in an even split, but also that voters are rational agents whose preferences are based only on the perceived outcome of the policy at hand, and who have no preference for those policies which do not affect them. Reality simply does not comport with this scenario. Allowing overinclusion and the undue influence of unaffected voters to this degree compromises the agency and authority of affected voters. Third, climate change obscures relations of effect and affect; while a demos could conceivably be traced and votes accordingly apportioned for some policies, e.g. diverting a river affects the populations in the territories on its current route and proposed route, the agricultural trade relationships of each, and the territories newly responsible for ensuring the territories along the initial route have sufficient water, we lack the technological capabilities to adequately predict the full ecological consequences, and thus the affected groups.

The expansive conception of affected possibly affected interests is a strong foundation for the scope of SGO *laws*—both in regard to human rights and climate change–but is insufficient for the implementation, or SGO structures.

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[12] Ibid: 57.
[13] This is also an overstatement; certain patterns will necessarily form, and many decisions will impact similar territorially-defined populations. Additionally, the coordination issues involved can easily be solved with technology and the restricted scope of SGOs.
[14] Ibid: 58.

2.2.2 All Affiliated Interests

All affiliated interests, in which "Territoriality, nationality, and history—"blood and soil," as the slogan goes—are undoubtedly the most common. There is no principled reason for settling on any of those, in and of themselves. It is arbitrary, from a moral point of view, where we draw the lines on the map."[15] To evade the obvious problematics of all affiliated interests, which is usually conceived as an affiliation based on nationality, culture, "identity," etc., we need only to reconceptualize affiliation as *possibly principally impacted*. Here, "impact" denotes a physicality that "affected" lacks, the geography for which determines the scope of affiliation, e.g., the voting populace for the diverted river includes the territories along both the initial and proposed routes, but not second-order affected groups, such as nearby farms that have another source of irrigation. However, the boundaries of this geography do not necessarily reside in predetermined groups, and thus neither requires a particular state configuration nor encourages overinclusion. Citizenship is able to remain "in place," while voting is context-contingent, i.e. referendums, not representatives.

By re-defining each demos for each vote, the mutable nature of the impacted groups undermines territorial and affiliated coherence, while recurring impact-inclusion with other groups creates and strengthens the "the common case in which the set of individuals potentially affected by a decision is much wider than the set sharing affective bonds and identities… The active promotion of such [we-]feelings and the pursuit of appropriate policies can be described as "identity-expanding strategies."[16] Identity-expanding strategies that simply change from one identity to another, expand to include more but do not fundamentally destabilize the meaning of,

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[15] Ibid: 48.
[16] List, Christian, and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. "Can There Be a Global Demos? An Agency-Based Approach." Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 38, no. 1, 2010, pp. 76–110: 83.

and those which rely on an Other to define themselves all carry centripetal or re-centralizing forces that will in time engender their own problems. The protean nature of the demoi here is a centrifugal force, one which does not tie identity to impact, or referendum to citizenship.

2.3 Inter- and Intra-Institutional Interactional Justice

In *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty*, Pogge distinguishes between institutional and interactional conceptions of justice; the former "postulates certain fundamental principles of justice. These apply to institutional schemes and are thus second-order principles: standards for assessing the ground rules and practices that regulate human interactions," whereas the latter "postulates certain fundamental principles of ethics. These principles, like institutional ground rules, are first order in that they apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups."[17] Although similar, the distinction lies in scope: an institution is not responsible for interactional violations which it reasonably attempts to protect, however, institutional violations may occur even without interactional violations. With the guarantee of expansive human rights as the "first principle" of SGOs, or, its institutional conception, it necessarily incorporates a degree of interactional justice by requiring that institutions be interactionally just, i.e., each SGO must also uphold interactional justice within itself, including with the demos in its calls to democracy, and within its interactions with other SGOs. While not all interactional justice is institutional, all institutional justice is also interactional. Effectively, this operationalizes the first-order ethics, both ensuring the directly-related instrumental outcomes and bolstering second-order legitimacy. It also provides a foundation for internal and intra-SGO audits, and explicitly commits to sustainability. This requirement can be thought of as the first foundation of prefigurative politics, "modes of

[17] Pogge, Thomas W. "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty." Ethics, vol. 103, no. 1, 1992, pp. 48–75: 50.

organization that consciously resemble the world you want to create. Or, as an anarchist historian of the revolution in Spain has formulated 'an effort to think of not only the ideas but the facts of the future itself.'"[18]

The most obvious, and most radical, implication of requiring inter- and intra-institutional interactional justice is that SGOs cannot rely on violence—either through assault, imprisonment, or sanctions which violate welfare standards—as a means of compelling cooperation. This will be conceptualized through aspects of both contemporary abolitionist theory and philosophical anarchism, both of which reject the legitimacy of governance through violence or threats thereof. Perhaps less immediately obvious is that these SGOs therefore cannot operate as the state, whose foundational authority is potential compliance to violence. Furthermore, the question of normative political legitimacy, which is premised on the acceptance of or obligatory obedience to violent state authority, must deny the Rawlsian division between justice and legitimacy.

The explicit refusal to engage in what is often considered a *de facto* aspect of governance means that "Those unwilling to establish an apparatus of violence for enforcing decisions necessarily have to develop an apparatus for creating and maintaining social consensus."[19] As there are innumerable ways in which organizations can be or become corrupt without violating human rights, and these degradations can—and often do—pave legal and administrative routes for future violations, I ask: How, then, are we to construct a network with strong incentives toward cooperation, one which is structured to circumvent known avenues of power abuses, and that can achieve its material goals while taking into account volatile global climate changes and attending sociopolitical repercussions? Decentralization provides some guidance here. First, however, I will elaborate on the theoretical orientations.

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[18] Graeber, David. *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004: 7.
[19] Ibid: 92.

2.4 Theoretical Orientations

The dialectical tensions within normative political philosophy—the moral question of what ought to be, and the obligation to comply with a state whose authority is predicated on its violence—contravene not only the legitimacy of the institutions in question but that of the state itself. When the illegitimacy of political authority is foundational, it cannot be made legitimate through reform. As such, the task of normative philosophy is then to return to itself, and attend to its conception of a good life without the state, assessing non-coercive modes of governance, and envisioning the institutions and moral obligations they might engender.

Disregarding the state and the capacity for reform involves reorienting values that re-legitimize them, even in critique. This reorientation follows Sarah Ahmed's queer phenomenology,[20] in which the place of individuals within sociopolitical frameworks necessarily informs and orients their conceptions of rationality and truth. It attends to the often concealed material conditions that influence both theory and political institutions: first, by denying the assumption that state violence is necessary, legitimate, or even effective; second, by respecting the work of community organizers and victims of state violence; and third, by refusing notions of human nature as stable states, i.e. that we are inherently violent or that we are inherently cooperative, instead recognizing cooperation and violence as malleable capacities.

Abolition and anarchism are two political theories that, first, uphold nonviolence,[21] and second, allow us to reorient the concepts of inquiry.

2.4.1 Abolition

Abolition's first reorientation turns from the focus on crime to a focus on harm: this recognizes the social construction of crime, the structural oppressions within and reestablished

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[20] Ahmed, Sara. *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others*. Duke University Press, 2007.
[21] Non-violence does not include restrictions on self-defense.

through the failures of incarceration to provide safety, and, importantly, moves the subjects of concern from criminal to victim. This allows SGOs to attend *first* to those who are or would be harmed, a necessary condition for efficacy and justice; to directly address structural violence by acknowledging the materiality of "abstract" violence, e.g. extreme poverty, avoidable deaths, confinement in an unstable or unsafe environment; and to undermine the legitimacy of penal response. Where abolition seems utopian, it forces a reckoning of the current system: the question becomes not how to penalize, but how actually effective are our current forms of penalization? Do sanctions, for example, actually prevent free-riding in international agreements? Or do they simply cause harm to people who had little to no say in the agreements, while the transgressors themselves generally have the power and privilege to personally avoid the consequences? If punishing free-riding is neither effective nor actually impacting those responsible, what alternative systems can we imagine that will both hold decision-makers accountable and incentivize cooperation?

Abolition reorients normative theory by requiring action as a constituent part: there is no abolition without action. This opposes, reorients, and moves Critchley's assertion for a motivating principle or motivating ethics: if ethical principles were a sufficient condition for justice, we would not have to defend normative goals so rigorously. "Abolition is a totality and it is ontological. It is the context and content of struggle, the site where culture recouples with the political; but it is not struggle's *form*. *To have form*, we have to organize."[22] By requiring action, it invests in itself a movement,[23] a motivating *action*, and openings for experimentation, which will be discussed in the next section. These actions—done on an individual and community

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[22] Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. "What Is to Be Done?" American Quarterly, vol. 63, no. 2, 2011, pp. 245–265: 258.
[23] "What, then, is becoming, rather than being, an abolitionist? Because it is a constant becoming." Ruth Wilson Gilmore

level—make apparent the fallibilities of the *homo economicus* and the specious presumptions against cooperation and that presides in contemporary political theory, all while practicing mutual aid and growing grassroots organizations.

Where police and prisons are the institutional targets of abolition, I reorient to their international corollaries, the military and debt. Where abolition is primarily concerned with minimizing harms enacted by individuals and institutions, I reorient to reducing harms from climate change.

2.4.2 Anarchism

Abolition does not dictate any specific political form, although many abolitionists are communists, socialists, and anarchists: anti-capitalists in general. Anarchism, in particular, has significant overlapping values: noncoercion, mutual aid, and prefigurative politics. While most anarchist theories take freedom as the foundational value, Critchley provides a reorientation that turns from the individual to community: "The conception of anarchism…is not so much organized around freedom as around *responsibility*, an infinite responsibility that arises in relation to a situation of injustice."[24] Responsibility, more than freedom, recognizes interdependence, compels mutual aid, and takes seriously that the moral condition that individual freedom is contingent upon others' freedoms.

The commitment to responsibility is most apparent in anarchic prefigurative politics, whose experimental forms of consensus, decision making, and accountability resist hierarchy and coercion, and specifically address the social structures that contribute to uneven power dynamics between members. As Graeber explains,

> "It is a form of action in which means and ends become, effectively, indistinguishable; a way of actively engaging with the world to bring about

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[24] Critchley, Simon. *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance*. Verso, 2007: 93.

> change, in which the form of the action-or at least, the organization of the action-is itself a model for the change one wishes to bring about. At its most basic, it reflects a very simple anarchist insight: that one cannot create a free society through military discipline, a democratic society by giving orders, or a happy one through joyless self-sacrifice."[25]

Where abolition binds actions to theory, prefigurative politics bind theory to actions. Taken together, they are able to resist the hierarchy implicit in linear order causality wherein one must first beget the other. Indeed, "content and expression are in a state of what Deleuze and Guattari call 'reciprocal presupposition.' One does not exist without the other. They are mutually determining."[26]

The prefigurative politics of anarchy are often organized in preparation of direct action, forms of resistance that expose or diminish the values, institutions, and absurdities of the state. This agonism, while necessary, is oriented as power *with* group members in actions whose power used is *against* the state. Where these politics create conditions which minimize harm, they do so internally, i.e. within their own organizations; their external effects are second-order, not minimizing harm itself but weakening the structures that cause harm. The state's responses to direct actions are often violent, from assault to imprisonment, and always have the capacity for and threat of violence: "If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism."[27] Certainly for many, the overwhelming strength of state violence engenders apathy or resignation; even for those for whom it motivates, this hyper- and pessimistic activism is *exhausting*. It is, in short, unsustainable. Furthermore, power *against*, agonism, is deeply entangled with power *over*, which

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[25] Graeber, David. *Direct Action: An Ethnography*. AK Press, 2009: 210.

[26] Massumi, Brian. *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*. MIT Press, 1999: 9.

[27] Foucault, Michel. *The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*. Edited by Paul Rabinow, The New Press, 1997: 256.

has its own centralizing and corrupting tendencies; it is an effective tactic of direct action, but not of a cooperative organization.

Where prefigurative politics work to minimize harm within their organizations, and direct action works to undermine the state which causes harm, abolition's reorientation from criminal—here, the state—to victim allows the focus of the action to be on those already harmed. This is the practice of mutual aid.[28] Power is always relational. Here Critchley's ethical responsibility is apparent: power *with* others, creating power *for* those in need. This conception of power is decentralizing, resilient, safe, and the conditions for minimizing harm are both internal, the organizations, and external, the demoi. With "ethics as a binding factor in political practice," and politics conceived not as the state but as a "non-state, non-party based form of activism that begins from the real situations in which people find themselves" the normative political obligation to compliance is reoriented to a normative political obligation to responsibility.[29] This responsibility is directed toward all people, in that it is not confined to compatriots[30] or even affinity groups; this orientation, however, does not require that each individual, or individual SGO, have the *capacity* for responsibility to all at all times, but instead decentralizes that capacity throughout the SGO network. Being directed toward all, then, is expressed by individuals as an obligation toward any. Determining the specificities of which SGO provides what to which impacted population is addressed in Chapter Three.

Obligation based on responsibility instead of compliance and governing structures that refuse violent enforcement mechanisms must rely on cooperation. Anarchist theory fundamentally opposes the assertion that human nature is inherently violent, and instead

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[28] Anarchic groups are also practitioners and advocates of mutual aid.
[29] Critchley, Simon. *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance*. Verso, 2007: 93,47.
[30] Goodin, Robert E. "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics, vol. 98, no. 4, 1988, pp. 663–686.

predicates its social organization on the belief that human nature is inherently cooperative. While proclivities for and manifold instances of cooperation are underrealized in both philosophy and political theory, this assertion disregards the socio-political causes of violence, the ability for transformation and growth, and the complexities of individuals to have capacities for each. Furthermore, it constrains political thought: first through the oppositional construct that insists on a homogenous human nature, thus creating mutually exclusive theories, e.g., ideal and non-ideal, utopianism and realism, and second, by assuming that cooperative governance requires that the entire population be similarly cooperative. Abolition's refusal to define individuals by their crime helps us regard violence and cooperation not states of being but as actions, ones which are entangled with a host of other factors, and which neither comprise nor identity or nature.

CHAPTER THREE: THE VALUES AND STRUCTURES OF DECENTRALIZED SGOS

From the standpoint of cosmopolitan morality—which centers around the fundamental needs and interests of individual human beings, and of all human beings—this concentration of sovereignty at one level is no longer defensible…Dispersing political authority…would decrease the intensity of the struggle for power and wealth within and among states, thereby reducing the incidence of war, poverty, and oppression. In such a multilayered scheme, borders could be redrawn more easily to accord with the aspirations of peoples and communities.[1]

3.1 Values of Decentralization

When contemporary international institutions first arose in the mid-twentieth century, the technological capability to quickly and effectively coordinate in a decentralized manner simply didn't exist. With the advent of the internet and computational power, the S/TGOs we have in place are no longer the *only* way of coordinating, and, given the systemic abuses, it makes sense to look at not "what are the abuses and what standards can we feasibly hold these institutions to?" but instead, "how are the institutions perpetuating the abuses, and what other structures could do similar work with less capacity for abuse?"

Decentralization fundamentally attends to security: in the substratum of human rights as well as in the institutions entrusted with their guarantee. Where contemporary S/TGOs are hierarchical, colonial, elite, questionably- or anti-democratic, abstracted, and capitalistic, they are coercive, morally and legally corrupt, ineffective, violent, unaccountable, and unsustainable. Decentralizing SGOs and limiting their scope specifically addresses the structural conditions of each of these failures. Institutionally, consolidations of power and their attendant abuses are impeded first by each SGO's interdependence, including functional specificity, networked accountability, and local autonomy, and second, by its restricted authority, i.e., by relaying the

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[1] Pogge, Thomas W. "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty." Ethics, vol. 103, no. 1, 1992, pp. 48–75: 58, 71.

mechanisms for extensive impact, the scale of potential violations by any one SGO is proactively

attenuated.

Unlike the political projects of communism, which shares many of the instrumental goals,

this proposal does not require adherence to a totalizing ideology or a central committee.

Hierarchy of any form is not capable of effectively managing without positing its policies as

scientific certainties. It does not wait for potential technological miracles, nor create a global

military for enforcement. The majority of decisions do not fall to the demoi; it largely only

obligates non-interference. It assumes neither an inherent good nor an inherent violence to

human nature. The question of a motivating theory of the subject is replaced with concrete

motivating actions. It allows for variation in local autonomy by emphasizing the requirements in

the structures of the network rather than the node, or local SGO. Finally, it does not imagine a

global governance structure out of a void, or without the various forms of oppression that plague

contemporary S/TGOs; it accounts for them by restricting the scale and scope of potential

capture at each local level.

3.2 Decentralization in Polycentric, Multiscalar Networks

Pogge, advocating for a muddled vertical decentralization "in which the political

authority currently exercised by national governments is both constrained and dispersed over

several layers, and in which economic justice is institutionalized at the global level and thus

inescapable,"[2] is undermined by his own mental calisthenics required to rationalize the state's

role. This appeal to verticality, to nested organizations, may conceivably escape or overcome the

corruptions of the state *if* global economic justice is achieved, but, given the competitive nature

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[2] Ibid: 71.

of the modern nation state, it allows a susceptibility to capture for which Pogge does not account. Nested organizations have a tendency toward centralizing power which continually endeavors to abrogate its own checks and balances. Again, while it is not unequivocally impossible to construct organizations that can resist such centripetal forces, it is at minimum a dubious proposition, one without precedent, and one which would require far more complex auditing systems than structurally evading recentralization from the start.

Polycentric, multiscalar governance theory advocates institutional overlap in lieu of vertical decentralization or nesting. Although it comprises a portion of the proposed ideal theory, it is not itself a normative philosophy; it is a description of much of the current structure of climate change organizations: "The 'Cambrian explosion' in transnational climate change governance has produced a large number of organizations, varying widely in terms of constituent and target actors, activities, and scale of operation. Individually, for all their virtues, these schemes often lack important governance competencies. As a system they are numerous and decentralized, operating with little coordination."[3] Climate governance is *already* decentralized; where its organizations and networks are effective gives a measure of instrumental proof. The obstacles it encounters—the government competencies that it lacks—are obstacles precisely because of economic incentives, such as restricted knowledge access, and obstructions from the state itself.

Characterized by "multiple, formally independent centers of decision-making authority that operate at multiple scales,"[4] which may or may not involve the state, it not only guards against capture, but supports local autonomy, organizational specialization, and collective

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[3] Abbott, Kenneth W. "The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, vol. 30, no. 4, 2012, pp. 571–590: 587.
[4] Ibid: 584.

cooperation despite the non-standardized bureaucratic network and enforcement mechanisms. Local autonomy is both a content-independent value as well as an instrumental value: while centralized governance is, when lauded, done so for its scope, the very smallness of local organizations is in fact "crucial to a community's success in organizing collective action."[5] Within the SGO structure proposed, incentives toward cooperation and collective action are paramount. Unlike centralized governance, "small and medium-sized organizations can at least approximate the face-to-face communication characteristic of local communities. As a result, they are more likely to build trust among participants and to maintain it through reputational sanctions and reciprocity."[6] Furthermore, although climate change is a global phenomenon, that its effects are *particular* to each territory is yet another reason to resist the non-local models imposed by centralized governance – the specificities of local ecologies require local knowledge in order to effectively respond to and manage changing environmental and sociopolitical conditions. Efficiency, the other oft-purported value of hierarchy, atrophies first from the necessity of particularization, and second from research showing "smaller agencies often provided superior services and that multiple agencies often developed forms of interaction— including contracting and dispute resolution procedures—that avoided gaps and overlaps[7] and enhanced efficiency"[8] despite non-standardized bureaucracy and lack of centralized enforcement.

The noted problems with polycentric, multiscalar governance include forum shopping, high degrees of fragmentation, and competition. In the proposed SGO scheme, forum shopping is unnecessary because technology determines the potential interactions, fragmentation is simply

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[5] Ibid: 585.
[6] Ibid: 585.
[7] Overlaps here refers to "serious rule conflicts…especially between the WTO and environmental regimes," i.e., nested overlap, which is distinct from polycentric overlaps, which are "more likely to lead to positive outcomes and synergy: increasing actor choice, creating complementary standards, and addressing problems in multiple ways" (582).
[8] Ibid: 585.

decentralization without knowledge sharing practices or common goals, and competition becomes inconsequential when all essential resources are recognized as communal, and reallocation is a facilitation, not a trade.

Although polycentric, multiscalar governance promotes local autonomy, engenders inter-organizational cooperation, and sets effective and efficient policies, it remains uncoordinated and competitive, as well as undemocratic, untransparent, and unconcerned with human rights. Abbot proposes "orchestration," a "nonhierarchical strategy" in which hierarchical organizations are "*supporting* transnational organizations that pursue desired goals and *steering* the governance and activities of those schemes through incentives, persuasion, and similar means."[9] This orchestration, however, is aimed not only among transnational climate organizations but also between S/TGOs and the state. This nonhierarchical strategy toward hierarchical organizations obstructs itself in its relations; attempting a just outcome by involving and appealing to the very institutions that maintain injustice will inevitably fail when it is no longer in their interest to participate. The concatenating failures of climate organizations and treaties to persuade states, corporations, and international organizations to agree to the necessary changes is sufficient proof. However, the flexibility of orchestration as a strategy should not be summarily dismissed; the reliance on incentives and persuasion over sanctions and enforcement is necessary aspect of effective SGOs.

3.3 Efficacy as Normative Orientation

Efficacy is not often distinguished as a normative value in governance theory, although it seems to be an underlying assumption of various recommendations: either the institutions are

already effective but immoral, or, where they are ineffective, the proposed reforms should then engender efficacy. By reorienting the constrictions from feasibility of institutional change to feasibility of effect, we are able to not only identify the structural impediments to the changes required, but also begin to devise the types of institutions necessary to actually ensure human rights throughout climate change.

Avoiding capture, creating or recognizing porous boundaries, and prioritizing local knowledge and networks are the predominate advantages of decentralized governance over centralized hierarchy. However, even a polycentric, multiscalar model is neither sufficient for justice nor specific enough to account for the precarities of climate chaos. The former is more than a concern of principles; that each SGO be inter- and intra- institutionally interactionally just is also a matter of efficacy—and indeed its own feasibility. In a network that fundamentally relies on cooperation, prolonged or unaccountable abuses and inequalities are systemically destabilizing. While a hierarchical structure is not similarly enervated by these types of violations, and thus may appear more secure, the only thing that is in actuality more secure is the organization itself, not the people it purports to serve. Indeed, that each node be "weak" against instances of misfeasance and malfeasance is imperative to the overall strength of the network.

3.3.1 Local and Autonomous

Local autonomy is a content-independent value: respecting the knowledge and authority of the community members who are most impacted by SGO work is an essential component of repairing the harms done by colonialism, imperialism, and global capitalism. As Slater succinctly summarizes, decentralization "has proved to be ideologically indispensable throughout the Third World…[it] can be a unifying force in the consolidation of new national identities, or a remedy for the ponderous centralized bureaucracies of peripheral states, or a policy that will 'soften

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resistance to the inevitable and potentially destabilizing social changes that "development" brings about."[10]

Decentralization, as already noted, is more resilient against climate events. That each SGO is local and autonomous is important for effective ecological knowledge and policy implementation, given the contingencies of geography and local society to environmental conditions. For example, many Indigenous groups hold knowledge that, once disregarded by scientists and governments, is proving crucial to environmental management. Local autonomy allows both variance and specialization, which is the first defense against the imposition of abstract models. Furthermore, to reiterate Abbott's findings, local organizations are more proficient at engaging community members than hierarchical governance. It also allows each SGO to form its own structure according to its unique needs, whether that includes the types of sociohistorical oppressions it guards against, cultural work practices, nodal-type concerns—such as mental health provisions for rescue and disaster relief—, and other issues.

3.3.2 Cooperative

While "voluntary association" is most often promulgated for decentralized, non-coercive networks, its reliance on an ideal of democratic participation engendering equitable outcomes, without providing the mechanisms for such interactions, is akin to the belief in the invisible hand of capitalism. As Graeber, an advocate of voluntary association, notes of capitalism, "markets don't really regulate themselves, and an army of administrators [is] indeed required to keep any market system going."[11] While the particular configuration of administrators he is referencing is necessary because the market outsources its enforcement to the state, and thus its bureaucracy,

[10] Slater, David. "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization." Development and Change, vol. 20, no. 3, 1989, pp. 501–531: 501.

[11] Graeber, David. The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. Melville House Publishing, 2016: 10.

the complexity of global governance and facilitating resource reallocation throughout climate chaos demands administrative facilitation, consensus-based organizing principles and agreements between SGOs to keep it from becoming unwieldy or partisan in its reallocations: voluntary association as it is generally conceptualized falls into the same theoretical trap as markets which govern themselves.

Cooperation requires trust and incentives. That reallocations are not a trade, and thus do not incur debts, is imperative, as much as the commitment to non-coercion. The specificity of connections, with open access to knowledge, offers a simple solution to the problems of cooperation in contemporary capitalism, i.e. production fragmentation, forum shopping, and competition. As for incentives, given current global wealth disparities and unequal access to resources, it is clearly beneficial to the vast majority of world citizens. Even considering a future in which welfare equality is reached, the precarities of climate change engender a strong incentive for interdependence, and thus cooperation. Areas with historically high concentrations of power and wealth might seem less amenable to such cooperation, but, it is important to remember that even within these cities and countries, that concentration is unequally distributed, and unavailable to the majority of the population.

Cooperation without enforcement brings the free-rider problem to the fore. However, the problem of free-riders is attenuated if the obligations are presented differently: First, the issue is not "does each SGO comply" but "is the end goal met." Thus, free riders are only an issue when their lack of contribution causes harm.[12] Second, free-riders are an issue of public benefit, not of human rights, which, being inalienable, are not contingent upon whether or not an individual or

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[12] Where free-riders do cause harm, for example, if a significant enough number of territories opt-out such that the network cannot operate effectively, a democratic assembly will automatically be called, and the global demoi are responsible for creating a new consensus agreement that best guarantees human rights.

group contributes in what is considered a fair manner. Third, in a situation in which essential resources are recognized as communal, the standards for traditional cost-benefit or game theory analysis break down. While issues with incentives for coordination might arise, they fundamentally cannot be accurately evaluated through theories predicated on conditions of competition, mutually-exclusive or singular benefit, or preferences.

Finally, to reiterate, this is not a theory that relies on *everyone's* cooperation for a common good. To take an example from the 2020 pandemic, instituting mass adoption of masks to prevent the spread of disease faces significant cultural barriers. However, large gatherings of people mutually committed to cooperation and public safety can effectively organize. SGO managers are required to be cooperative, and may in fact have more proclivities toward or practice in cooperation, but the general population need only adhere to the principle of non-interference.

3.3.3 Accountable

Accountability recognizes that instances of harm will happen despite all best efforts. Where the subject of accountability is generally the transgressor, here we reorient accountability in an abolitionist manner: the SGO network is *first* accountable to the communities in need, i.e. ensuring that the reallocation is completed by another SGO. Accountability is *second* concerned with the SGO network. In politics, this is almost exclusively considered an issue of enforcement, i.e. the practices of coercion and penalties, and, with some exceptions for restitution and reparations. However, when the guarantee of human rights is held as the sole legitimate scope of authority, enforcement as such must be rethought. Sanctions, the primary form of enforcement in international relations, harm populations in addition to and often instead of the representatives

who sign or break the treaties. Additionally, as imprisonment, military offenses, and sanctions which threaten welfare standards all violate human rights, they are not options in this proposal.

Accountability in an abolitionist orientation—minimizing harm—thus means each SGO node must recognize and specifically address local formal and informal power structures and histories. This may include providing resources and opportunities to oppressed groups and minorities for access to managerial roles, implementing quotas to ensure fair representation, and creating policies and mechanisms to avoid nepotism and clientelism. Accountability also includes intra-and inter-organizational auditing, i.e. each SGO has an audit department which upholds internal regulations, and which is randomly assigned to audit other nodal type SGOs. Prefigurative political groups often address, even obsess over, internal accountability, as well as democratic accountability, but generally do not have means or networks for inter-organizational accountability. Auditing here does not require that all adhere to a supra-organizational set of rules, but instead a network of agreements between each node or nodal type agrees to uphold for each other. Furthermore, it is impossible to standardize organizational rules across a global network without imposing regulations that, first, reinforce hegemony and biopower under the guise of objectivity or universal values, second, which will certainly benefit some more than others, and third, that can be effective without constant oversight or excessive attention to processes which do not significantly affect whether or not the SGO is effective. Audits, therefore, may result in recommendations for organizational restructuring or replacing managers, supporting an internal or intra-nodal justice process, or initiating a call to the demoi for a vote.

The third aspect of accountability is its nodal retroactive feature: responding to instances and patterns of misfeasance and malfeasance. Minimizing harm will never eradicate it entirely; repairing, as much as possible, harms done, however, is a matter of justice—not punishment.

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Justice is always relational; the means and manners of these processes should be determined by the impacted demoi, though they cannot contravene the principle of non-violence, including imprisonment.

3.3.4 Democratic

In order to countervail the centralizing tendencies of governance organizations, for example, the failures of Buchanan's "broad accountability" theory, there must also be democratic mechanisms—aside from those originated by SGOs—for replacing negligent or corrupt managers, or for dissolving a persistently corrupt or ineffective node entirely. Additionally, internal SGO democracy, worker-managed consensus practices, provides a similar counter to organizational hierarchies.

3.3.5 Transparent

Democratic mechanisms, however, rely on both accurate information about the SGO's operations, as well as the ability of other SGOs, whether from a nodal-types or within geographic proximity, to disseminate that information and/or initiate the democratic call for replacement or dissolution. Transparency, then, is a constitutional requirement for all SGOs in order to be democratic and accountable, both of which are in turn necessary for a cooperative structure.

Transparency pertains to data collection and analysis, experiments, databases, the role of technology in determining reallocation and transport paths, managerial decisions, reallocation results, and internal organizational regulations, changes, and decision-making processes. However, "making all the existing information easily available does not necessarily mean that the various audiences can easily gather the specific information they need…publishing such a huge amount of information that it is difficult to identify the relevant issues…can conflict with

the complexity of the message."[13] That information is available does not, alone, mean it is effective, either at creating an informed populace or responding to corruption. An effective definition of transparency, therefore, "is the degree to which someone affected by it can evidence whether or not it is treating them fairly."[14]

Hajer classifies three requirements for transparency to be democratically effective: public accessibility, public intelligibility, and public acceptability.[15] Accessible obligates more than mere availability, i.e., it is the SGO's responsibility to ensure that the information provided is, at least but not limited to: translated into the various languages of the demoi, adapted for the hearing and visually impaired, and available through both internet access and a physical building. In regards to public intelligibility, contextualization, presentation, and dissemination are important components, all of which though hold their own liabilities to manipulation and corruption.[16] Thus, while all decontextualized data should be publicly *accessible* to facilitate non-institutional and democratic analyses, contextualized data (i.e. performance indicators that are publicly understandable) should be *distributed* to the demoi in order for democracy to be effective. Whether or not the information is publicly acceptable is for the demoi to decide, though, unlike in contemporary policy-making, public response to acceptability is limited by the guarantee of human rights.

Transparency is an integral feature for all manners of accountability. As with public democracy, internal SGO cooperative arrangements cannot make decisions regarding their organizational arrangements without it; similarly, intra-nodal audits are ineffective in its absence.

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[13] Hajer, Maarten A. *Authoritative Governance: Policy-Making in the Age of Mediatization*. Oxford University Press, 2011: 168-9.
[14] Ibid: 65.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ensuring that there are not significant inaccuracies or elisions in information distributed to the demoi is one of the facets of audits.

While the specific types and presentations of contextualized information will differ between demoi, SGOs, and nodal types, all require accessibility, contextualized distribution, and democratic mechanisms to determine acceptability.

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To summarize: to be effective in justice precludes violent enforcement mechanisms, which compels cooperation; cooperation requires accountability, which in turn requires transparency and democracy. Democracy and sustainability both require transparency and accountability; transparency requires cooperation and accountability. They are interdependent. Local autonomy, cooperation, accountability, democracy, and transparency are primarily content-independent values related to efficacy in justice. Climate change imbues a particular and geographic unpredictability and instability; content-dependent requirements for efficacy, and thus justice, are as follows.

3.4 Climate Change Specific Requirements

Efficacy in a chaotic climate environment is resiliency. The intensity and frequency of predicted catastrophic weather-related events requires SGOs that are able to effectively mitigate and manage the consequences; in part, this means that, given the Precautionary Principle, no single node, nor even only a few nodes, can be solely responsible for a role, resource, or territory. While the efficacy requirements for justice are focused respecting autonomy by both evading and responding to oppression and corruption, that these organizations are physical entities with specific geographic locations should not be neglected. Resources, transport networks, and workplaces are all potentially affected by climate change and sociopolitical events. In order for the network to be resilient to climate change, nodes will need open access to

knowledge, redundant roles, flexibility and adaptability, interdependence, ambulatory network connections, and the ability to experiment.

3.4.1 Open Access Knowledge

The compelling urgencies of climate change—lowering greenhouse gas emissions, responsibly responding and adapting to the environmental and infrastructural breakdowns—are a motivating action for open access to knowledge. There is simply not enough time for multiple organizations to make the same mistakes, run the same experiments, or institute ineffective technologies. That billions of lives will be adversely affected by climate events, and that it is not a limitation of knowledge itself but of *sharing* that knowledge, morally requires open access. As with essential resources, we do not suffer from scarcity but from hoarding. This includes not only the aforementioned areas of SGO transparency, but also essential innovations related to welfare, climate change, renewable energy, pollution, and transportation.

3.4.2 Redundant

Reorienting the instrumental goals of SGOs as individual nodes provides the first motivation for redundancy. If we define each node's purpose as to reallocate a specific resource to other specific SGOs, the unpredictability of climate disasters threatens its ability to accomplish its task. However, if we conceptualize each node's purpose not as its own process or agency, but instead as *ensuring that the needs of the receiving population are met*, each node is given a flexibility for reallocating its responsibilities. Whether or not a particular node is able or willing to facilitate does not then consequentially determine whether or not the facilitation takes place: while not all nodes are responsible for all facilitations, all nodes are responsible for ensuring the outcome. Efficacy requires taking into account the various forms and possibilities of precarity, and being able to *first* minimize harm by rerouting responsibility, and *second* to attend

to accountability when necessary. In order to prioritize the needs of the receiving population, instead of the particularities of the facilitation itself, nodes need to be numerous with non-exclusive, or overlapping, territories to whom they are responsible. Nodes that are numerous but not redundant quickly devolves into calculations of mutually exclusive facilitations, and thus does not best ensure that the needs of receiving populations are met. Redundancy means that, while each node is responsible for a specific type of resource reallocation, and responsible to a population in a specific territory, it is not *exclusively* so.

Redundant nodes with similar roles engender more expertise concerning specific practices and environmental conditions, which, because the SGOs are transparent, promotes and expedites technological, organizational, and ecological advancements. Similarly, redundancy in auditing and accountability has numerous benefits: "When different organizations agree on the norms to be used and on their assessment, they bolster each other's legitimacy and the legitimacy of their findings. More importantly, consensus between multiple assessments increases the burden on the incumbent government to respond to criticisms and makes it more difficult to dismiss the assessments."[1]

Redundancy is also a requirement for flexibility and adaptability, ambulatory network connections, and experimentation. It strengthens local autonomy—where failures occur, the SGO can concentrate its efforts on its internal operations, instead of dividing its attention between itself and its responsibilities, and thus cannot excuse its actions or avoid accountability by citing the necessity of its work—and the resiliency of the network, because there is no "weakest link" that can cripple the network. It prepares for climate disasters, sociopolitical events, and internal

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[1] Kelley, Judith. "The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations." Perspectives on Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 2009, pp. 59–64: 63.

corruptions: that which disrupts one SGO's role in a reallocation does not affect the receival of the reallocation.

3.4.3 Interdependent

SGOs, each with redundant, nodal-specific roles, are intentionally not responsible for every aspect of governance, or indeed, even every aspect of a reallocation. Instrumentally, in a globalized world that is threatened by the exigencies of climate disasters, self-sufficiency is impossible for most territories, and, as previously discussed, expanding the boundaries of the territory to the entire world would impel unjust hierarchies. Each cannot be responsible *for* all, at every given point in time, but is instead responsible *to* all, at any given point in time.

Interdependence and autonomy are not mutually exclusive values. Critchley's questioning of the "sufficiency of autonomy" in ethical subjects is pertinent here:

> "Levinas's difference with Kant is that ethical experience turns around the facticity of a demand that does not correspond to the subject's autonomy, but which rather places that autonomy in question. Ethical experience is heteronomous, my autonomy is called into question by the fact of the other's demand, by the appeal that comes from their face and lays me under an obligation that is not of my choosing."[2]

In the institutional corollary, heteronomy, or, here, interdependence, does not negate autonomy: the obligation is in fact a *choice*, even if the specific reallocations would not have otherwise been chosen without the SGO network or climate crises in general. Autonomy is not threatened when the choice is made with full information and without coercion. Furthermore, it is not one subject or one SGO that is obligated to the other; they are always already obligated to each other; i.e. the shared obligation is co-constitutional.

If a particular territory is capable of being self-sufficient, it is certainly that population's prerogative to remain so or be part of the SGO network. In particular, historically oppressed

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[2] Critchley, Simon. *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance*. Verso, 2007: 56.

groups have legitimate reasons to be suspicious of interdependence with historically oppressive groups.[3]

3.4.4 Flexible and Adaptable

As climate precarity increases, so will situations that require abrupt and likely unexpected modifications to existing production and reallocation management. Flexible refers to a temporary change in goal or structure, whereas adaptable refers to a long-term or permanent changed in goal or structure. A flexible factory, for example, may pivot to making ventilators instead of aircraft parts, as GE workers—IUE-CWA union members—demanded through protest at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic.[4] Anticipating what we cannot predict requires that nodes and their managers be capable of contributing even outside of their specified roles. If, for example, a node needs to rapidly but briefly expand its operations to handle an emergency, another non-nodal type SGO within the same city could provide the workspace, resources, personnel, etc., and non-local nodal type SGOs can distribute the latter's responsibilities such that none are consequently overwhelmed. Adaptability here can best be conceived as a "cradle to cradle"[5] design: parts may be reused, such as infrastructure and equipment, recycled, such as managers who adapt to new roles, or biodegradable, such as roles that are no longer necessary.[6]

3.4.5 Ambulatory Network Connections

Ambulatory network connections simply means that no SGO is primarily responsible for another; where some areas have habitual needs, those reallocations are facilitated by different

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[3] While territories may opt-out, the SGO network is at least responsible for maintaining for all people within those territories retain the right to be rescued, and the right to freedom of movement.

[4] "GE Must Protect IUE-CWA Members and America." *Communication Workers of America*, 2 Apr. 2020, cwa-union.org/sites/default/files/20200330-iue-cwa-demands-ge-ceo-culp.pdf.

[5] Braungart, Michael, and William McDonough. *Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things*. Vintage, 2002.

[6] The environmental metaphor is intentional, imbuing adaptability with ecological responsibility reinforces accountability, which is often disregarded in capitalist conceptions of adaptability.

SGOs in order to mitigate affective debt relationships. This also contributes to the strength of the network by ensuring a relatively even distribution of responsibility and creating more global interactions and affiliations by reterritorializing geographies of responsibility. Additionally, because the specific inter-nodal relationships are not habitual, it hinders local elite capture by increasing the difficulty of inter-SGO cronyism, particularly in audits.

3.4.6 Experimental

Climate change, global inequalities, and the failures of dominant ideologies all compel a moral requirement to experiment. There is no one answer or theory, and even with open access knowledge, SGOs will need to experiment to effectively adapt structures and policies for their local populations, environments, and organizations. As Mariame Kaba states, "None of us has all of the answers, or we would have ended oppression already. But if we keep building the world we want, trying new things, and learning from our mistakes, new possibilities emerge."[7] The risks of experiments are mitigated in this decentralization proposal by the requirements for inter- and intra-institutional interactional justice, redundancy, democracy, and accountability. The benefits of experiments are strengthened by open access to knowledge, flexibility and adaptability, and cooperation.

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[7] Kaba, Mariame. "So You're Thinking About Becoming an Abolitionist." Medium, LEVEL, 30 Oct. 2020, level.medium.com/so-youre-thinking-about-becoming-an-abolitionist-a436f8e31894.

CHAPTER FOUR: SGO NODAL OPERATIONS AND NODAL-TYPES

"Here of course one has to deal with the inevitable objection: that utopianism has led to unmitigated horror, as Stalinists, Maoists, and other idealists tried to carve society into impossible shapes, killing millions in the process. This argument belies a fundamental misconception: that imagining better worlds was itself the problem. Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams—actually, Stalinists were famous for being rather short on imagination—but because they mistook their dreams for scientific certainties."[1]

4.1 Operational Structures

While the redistribution of essential resources often references Marx's formulation "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," decentralized reallocation is better conceptualized as *from some according to their abilities, to others according to their needs; from others according to their abilities, to some others according to their needs, and so forth*. This decentralization is not a flat or undifferentiated network where everything is connected to everything. Rather, it is a more like a pulsating or undulating lattice in which resource-specific organizations connect to other resource-specific organizations, both within and across nodal types, which in turn connect to others, which in turn connect to others, so that everything is *eventually*, *by more than one path*,[2] connected to everything.

What, exactly, are we decentralizing if not whole governments, and only in relation to climate change? In order to guarantee human rights, SGOs will need at least five primary functions: economic welfare and sustainable development, open borders, reallocation of essential resources, communication networks and knowledge sharing, and rescue and disaster response. Each individual SGO, a *node*, attends to one of the five roles, which I refer to as a *nodal type*. Although beyond the limits of this paper, each nodal type has orders of operation and standards

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[1] Graeber, David. *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004: 10-1.

[2] Dooren, Thom Van. *Flight Ways: Life and Loss at the Edge of Extinction*. Columbia University Press, 2016.

specific to its responsibilities. For example, the only benefit conferred by centralization that is not better realized through decentralization is speed. However, situations in which speed is required to prevent or respond to harm are, by definition, the purview of rescue and disaster response SGOs. This nodal type is exempt from the arbitrary affirmation process; has higher redundancy requirements; has immediate priority in transport needs; and is chosen for its combined capacity to respond and its geographic proximity to the population in need.[3]

If essential resources are acknowledged as communal, and locally-managed, how are they reallocated across the globe? What are the roles of managers and technology? The following description of SGO nodes and managerial roles are not "scientific certainties," but proposals for the types of operational questions we should be asking, namely, what are the organizational forms of supranational governance that will both work in a decentralized, non-violent manner, and also best guarantee human rights with specific attention to climate change?

Voluntary association between elected representatives in autonomous territories to approve each facilitation or reallocation is not only unsustainably labor intensive, but also allows for neglect and denial should a circumstance arise in which no SGO volunteers. If we are to keep each other safe in an unstable climate, we will need to agree on some standardizations for reallocation, both for areas that require continual or seasonal resource import, such as drought affected landscapes, and for areas that face unexpected or sudden disasters or resource shortages. Additionally, without an organizing principle to determine which SGO fulfills which services for whom, uneven volunteering threatens to create affective debts and resentment, which break down trust thus cooperation. While any network without enforcement mechanisms is a form of voluntary association, that there are consensus-determined rules and regulations that precede and

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[3] This entails lower requirements for ambulatory network connections, as some areas will experience climate disasters more frequently than others.

in fact define the associations is an important condition for efficacy. The standards here are the general welfare requirements for safety and sustainability, including but not limited to water, food, medicine, shelter, renewable energy, and communication technologies. The consensus-determined rules and regulations pertain to how needs are calculated, how reallocation SGOs are chosen, accountability procedures, security, and the like.

4.2 Technology

Technology is the pivotal difference between contemporary S/TGOs and the proposed SGOs. With the global connections fostered by the internet, the increased storage capacity of databases, the algorithmic speed to search databases, and decentralized networks that allow for security without enforcement, these hierarchical organizations are no longer necessary.[4] Technology is what allows normative theory to move beyond institutional reform while maintaining a global society. Where technological advances once inspired declarations of a future in which production was automated, human labor freed, and communism achieved, technology here plays a more modest role. Instead of automating *production*, we are automating the *coordination* of resource reallocation.

At a basic level, technology is necessary for the databases: these include but are not limited to, local environmental conditions, agricultural yields, available housing for migrants and refugees, transport networks, infrastructure supplies, meteorological patterns and predictions, as well as welfare data for local populations. Second, though no less crucial, it is necessary for knowledge-sharing and communication between SGOs, i.e., connecting the databases to databases, managers to databases, and managers to managers. Third, as a bureaucratic system,

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[4] This is not to agree that they were necessary, only that this rationale is now obsolete.

and especially as one between autonomous groups that will certainly have varying standards and forms for official approval which often produces inefficient, labor intensive, and frankly absurd requirements, technology's ability to autofill significant amounts of this paperwork should not be overlooked. Fourth, network security will have to be secure against attacks and adaptable to innovation.

Finally, because SGOs are concerned with the guarantee of human rights, which is not, fundamentally, in the purview of democratic agency, algorithms determine both the reallocations required as well as the SGOs to provide the resources and the optimal, though not necessarily most efficient, transport paths. It is important to note that the standards for the algorithm are determined by consensus among SGOs. Furthermore, the reallocations determined by the algorithm only pertain to surplus resources; following the principles of sustainability and local autonomy, reallocations cannot violate the standards of minimum welfare. Decentralization is key here; that one territory may only have a portion of the resource to meet another's needs does not endanger the receiving population, as the rest of the resources will be reallocated from other SGOs. For boundary cases in which not enough surplus resources exist globally, each SGOs should establish in the initial standards consensus procedures whether, for their territories, this initiates a rescue response, demoi call to democracy, or other reaction.

When these standards are agreed-upon, for example, the amount of solar panels to sustain a demoi, each individual node does not need to vote or otherwise decide who is responsible for the reallocation: the algorithm scans each database and determines which SGOs have surplus to be moved, assigns the initial reallocation(s) and other SGO nodes to assist in the facilitation, and determines whether additional resource reallocations are required to support the reallocating SGO(s). This restricts the capacity for abuse in political manipulation, evades game theory

approaches to coordination, prevents hoarding, normalizes resource movement, emphasizes the communal nature of essential resources, and is secure against many of the vagaries of oppressive social forces. Where one node fails, a territory or transport route is unexpectedly impacted by climate events, or an SGO denies a facilitation request, the algorithm then determines the next-best SGO and subsequent transportation to ensure that the receiving population's needs are met. This is an "opt-out" system[5] that further includes managerial affirmation and oversight as well as mechanisms for democratic override, which may be initiated by the algorithm, by SGO managers, by an auditing SGO, or by the demoi.

4.3 Managers

Technology, especially algorithms, is never neutral, and always reflects the values and prejudices of the humans that create them. Full automation risks not only perpetuating these injustices, but would do so in a guise of objectivity that obfuscates the mechanisms for responsibility and reform. Managers[6] are therefore required not only for research and physical coordination, but also to affirm network connections, volunteer for reallocations, disseminate information to the demoi, and initiate calls to the demoi. Who, then, are the SGO managers? How are they chosen for the job, and what qualities should they possess? What is their relation to the internal SGO organizing structure?

First, are managers elected representatives or technocrats? Both politicians and technocrats (or the "coordinator class" under communism) present manifold concerns: absorbing and reflecting hegemonic values; the imposition of hierarchies of knowledge and abstract

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[5] Saunders, Ben. "Normative Consent and Opt-Out Organ Donation." *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol. 36, no. 2, 2010, pp. 84–87.
[6] All SGO workers are managers.

models; institutional racism, sexism, classism, and ableism; centralizing tendencies; corruption, cronyism, nepotism, et cetera. That SGOs are local and locally-managed releases some of the tension between professional and situated knowledge. Perhaps it is a choice each demoi and SGO makes for itself. For the purposes of this essay, I will assume that managers are not elected.

For managerial qualities, we can take inspiration from mutual aid groups and the International Space Station. Recognizing that much of the work of reallocation and facilitation does not require advanced degrees, as well as the structural oppressions within the systems of accreditation, and the importance of situated, Indigenous, and experiential knowledges, "Mutual aid projects strive to include lots of people, rather than just people who have been declared "experts" or "professionals." If we want to provide survival support to as many people as possible, and mobilize as many people as possible for root-causes change, we need to let a lot of people do the work and make decisions about the work together, rather than bottlenecking the process with hierarchies that only let a few people lead."[7] For managerial roles that require technical knowledge, in order to ensure that cooperation remains the priority, astronauts provide a compelling example.

> "In the shuttle era, NASA wanted people who could operate the most complicated vehicle in the world for short stints. Today, NASA looks for people who can be locked in a tin can for six months and excel, so temperament alone could disqualify you for space flight. A certain personality type that was perfectly acceptable, even stereotypical, in the past--- the real hard-ass, say—is not wanted on the voyage when it is going to be a long one…Which is a good thing, really, because anyone who views him- or herself as more important than the "little people" is not cut out for this job (and would probably hate doing it). No astronaut, no matter how brilliant or brave, is a solo act. Our expertise is the result of the training provided by thousands of experts around the world, and the support provided by thousands of technicians in five different space agencies. Our safety depends on many tens of thousands of people we'll never meet…our employment depends on millions of other people who believe in the importance of space exploration and being willing to underwrite it with their tax dollars. We work on

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[7] Spade, Dean. *Mutual Aid: Building Solidarity During This Crisis (and the Next)*. Verso, 2020.

behalf of everyone in our country, not just a select few, so we should behave the same whether we're meeting with a head of state or a seventh-grade science class."[8]

The International Space Station is obviously a unique environment, and, while SGO managers are not locked in a tin can, the experimental character of living and working in space, the precarity of the station itself, the life- and project-threatening consequences of potential problems, and the consequential requirements for temperament all have corollaries in the SGO proposal. Temperament for SGO managers means a commitment to the goals of the organization—here, one does not need the anarchist belief that *all* people are essentially cooperative, only that *some* are willing and able to be cooperative—as well as being able to work through interpersonal issues in a manner that is not destabilizing to the organization.

Interpersonal harm is distinct from institutional harm. The latter concerns misfeasance and malfeasance; internally, i.e. that which affects the operation of the SGO but not the outcome, may be described as obstruction, and externally, i.e. where it affects a demoi, it may be described as violation. Accountability in both situations may involve transformative or restorative justice, but, for the latter, managers must also be able to be democratically removed despite the fact that they are not democratically elected.

Managers have various roles which may or may not overlap. For example, in a Global Welfare and Sustainable Development SGO, this would include conducting field work for environmental data collection and policy implementation, analyzing practices, policies, and data from other nodal-types, designing experiments and innovating technologies to address local environmental issues, canvassing and directing public awareness campaigns, cross-nodal-type

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[8] Hadfield, Chris. *An Astronaut's Guide to Life on Earth*. Vintage Canada, 2015: 39-40.

audits, as well as facilitating resource reallocation by collaborating with local production and transport, or, conversely, coordinating received resources to impacted populations.

Managerial duties also include volunteering resource reallocations and affirming network connections.[9] When the algorithm determines a particular node is the optimal SGO for a resource reallocation, that determination is contingent upon a manager's consent, i.e. volunteering. Concerning the latter, as it is technologically unnecessary—the algorithm determines both the facilitating SGOs and the receiving SGO—it is the most experimental, and should be regarded as such. Merely recognizing interdependence has not heretofore manifested in governance organizations which respect the magnitude of its meaning. By requiring an arbitrary network path between SGOs and managers to affirm[10] the connection, it reiterates and reinforces this interdependence, continually reminding them of the needs of receiving populations and work that the resource facilitating SGOs are volunteering. Similarly, access to other SGO databases, knowledge-sharing, also goes through this nodal-affirmation path, keeping managers abreast of events, providing information on emerging situations for which they might not have previously planned, disseminating technical expertise and innovations, and providing reports on internal operational experiments and changes.

Only one manager is required to affirm a network connection or volunteer for a reallocation request, unless it is flagged by either the algorithm or another manager as an extenuating circumstance, and, depending on the extremity of the situation, either requires multiple managers to affirm, the entire SGO to affirm. As an "opt-out" system, the entire SGO is required to deny a request.

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[9] Whether affirming network connections is conditional or non-conditional (e.g. SGO 1 is required for SGO 2, which is required for SGO 3 in a specific linear order, versus SGOs 1, 2, and 3 can all affirm regardless of whether or not the others in the network path have affirmed) is not addressed here.

[10] "Ethical experience is, first and foremost, the approval of a demand, a demand that demands approval" Critchley

Interdependence is not always unrecognized or arbitrary, nor should it be solely the purview of an algorithm. As SGO worker roles requires a high commitment to community care and, recognizing that managers are humans with emotions who, in a globalized society, likely have friends and family in or solidarity or affiliations with other territories, they are also given a degree of influence in the algorithm, e.g., they may request prioritization to affirm or assist certain territories.[11] For example, a manager in a Communications SGO in New Delhi has extended family in Sydney; they mark their preference in the system. When Sydney requires supplies to rebuild communication infrastructure after a devastating wildfire, if (a) the SGO in New Delhi has the supplies they need, and (b) there is no *effective* difference in the New Delhi SGO or another SGO providing it, the algorithm chooses the SGO with the marked preference to assist. If the New Delhi SGO does not have the needed supplies, and it is not otherwise impairing the ambulatory network connections (i.e. not creating patterns of affective debt), then the node is prioritized for network affirmation.

Finally, managers' roles also include facilitating calls to democracy, either when assigned by algorithm or when determined by nodal consensus.

<p align="center">***</p>

This proposal involves a global bureaucracy made more complex by its adherence to local autonomy. Although much maligned, the inefficiencies and absurdities of contemporary bureaucratic systems are in large part due to lack of transparency, competition, "bullshit jobs," intentional oppression, and upholding unjust systems of power. The first two are addressed by the organizational requirements, the third by managerial requirements, the fourth ameliorated by

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[11] For obvious normative reasons, the inverse is not true, i.e., a manager may not request that affirmations for a certain territory be sent first to other SGOs.

decentralization's restricted scope of power and requirements for locally countering systemic oppression, and the last by lack of enforcement mechanisms.

We can imagine a society where regular political participation is the norm, or, we can imagine a society whose populace is uneasy from massive social transformation, one that is dealing with the stresses of climate change, one whose surge capacity is depleted, or perhaps even traumatized and rebuilding, and *either way* the formula for determine → request → affirm / volunteer / assign → reallocate process *guarantees the end result while respecting maximum local autonomy.*

Organize.
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, "What Is to be Done?"

5.1 Guaranteeing Human Rights in the Coming Climate Crises

If we reorient our normative goals—rejecting the premise that *any* conditions legitimize state or S/TGO violence—to simply the guarantee of human rights, what are the organizational structures required for supranational governance to be effective, particularly considering the unique global precarities that climate change presents? Although advocated for by an increasing number of political theorists and activists, decentralization remains silent or vague on the global networks necessary to keep each other safe. With inspiration and guidance from abolitionist movements and anarchic philosophy, I have offered a proposal for supranational governance organizations that uphold the principles of noncoercion, minimizing harm, prefigurative politics, local autonomy, and mutual aid. To these principles, I add an emphasis on *efficacy*, in part to undermine the traditional standard of efficiency—which, it should be noted, is often only able to be considered a value as such because actors and institutions deny responsibility for negative externalities—and in part to encourage specificity in the practicalities of global coordination under climate change.

In order to *reterritorialize geographies of responsibility*, I first develop the principle of "all possibly impacted," in which protean demoi are defined not by arbitrary borders or identity, but instead delimited anew in each referendum, based on distinct events and their geographically diverse impacts. Second, I offer a proposal for a polycentric, multiscalar decentralized global network of SGOs in which reallocations of essential resources are not a trade, and in which each node is responsible *to* all but does not require that each node have the capacity to be responsible

for all. This is best described by my reformulation of Marx's principle: "*From some according to their abilities, to others according to their needs; from others according to their abilities, to some others according to their needs, and so forth*." To accomplish these ongoing reallocations and maintain network stability, I posit that SGOs will need to be: local and autonomous, cooperative, accountable, democratic, transparent, redundant, interdependent, flexible and adaptable, potentially experimental, with open access to knowledge and ambulatory network connections. The realization of each of these conditions is reliant on the realization of at least some other conditions, which are in turn reliant on others, and so forth.

This SGO network proposal is further unique in that it denies both reductionist assertions of human nature as either fundamentally violent or fundamentally cooperative; it requires cooperation only from SGO managers and does not impose any ideology onto communities; it reorients political accountability in an abolitionist direction—accountability is *first* directed to the demoi, i.e. ensuring their needs are met regardless, and only once those needs are secure is accountability directed toward the transgressing individual or SGO.

5.2 Limitations: TBDxDA and the Revolution

There are two primary limitations to this proposal, the first of which is also an opening— it does not address a number of obvious concerns, particularly those concerning a global democratic assembly. Under what conditions it called, its structure, and its scope I leave for others; similarly, the issues it might address I have left as TBDxDA.[1]

The second is perhaps more obvious. Constructing a proposal around a possible future in which resources are recognized as communal and people are free to move where they choose

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[1] "To Be Decided by Democratic Assembly"

emphasizes that, even if the state and capitalism were not barriers, the exigencies of climate change still necessitate an entirely different structures of networked global governance. Certainly the largest and most obvious impediments to the proposed supranational climate governance scheme are the state and global capitalism. While it is more feasible that a revolution will occur than contemporary S/TGOs will guarantee human rights, it is not, unfortunately, certain that such a revolution will occur. I chose to construct this proposal with communal essential resources for two other reasons: first, abolition begins with imagining the world as it should be, and working from those goals, instead of limiting our moral considerations to what might be allowed by illegitimate institutions and appeals to unsustainable "non-reformist reforms." Second, it encourages reevaluating boundaries which determine resource allocation, and, I hope, gives inspiration to potential future applications.

5.3 The Resources We Have, The Networks We Need: Potential Applications

As Graeber notes, "A revolution on a world scale will take a very long time. But it is also possible to recognize that it is already starting to happen. The easiest way to get our minds around it is to stop thinking about revolution as a thing—"the" revolution, the great cataclysmic break—and instead ask "what is revolutionary action?"[2] Mutual aid is a revolutionary action. It is not about redistributing power, that is, taking power from the powerful, or giving power to the powerless, but recognizing the respecting the power that individuals and communities already have, and creating, maintaining, and growing the networks for those powers to be effectively realized. Mutual aid simultaneously weakens centralization by decreasing reliance on, respect for, and harm from its arbitrary boundaries, builds and strengthens affinity and aid networks,

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[2] Graeber, David. *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004: 45.

and, most importantly, effectively solves a specific problem where S/TGOs have failed. It is an important corollary not only for its revolutionary actions, but also because it is a cooperative structure which utilizes the resources available. Initial agreements between SGOs could similarly take inspiration from mutual aid: contracts based on consensus, where reallocations are not a trade relationship. Here, an agreement to reallocate resources is unidirectional, although network affirmation, audits, and knowledge sharing are reciprocal; it may also contain conditions that the receiving SGO create a contractual agreement to reallocate resources for another SGO, until the network is large enough to be resilient against trade corruptions.

Some potential and partial applications of this proposal include: Where mutual aid organizations encounter issues with accounting as they scale, the ambulatory co-audit structure might provide inspiration. When they are overwhelmed, networked redundancy may be of assistance. The benefits for mutual aid groups are in the structural considerations, whereas local governments, individuals, and NGOs could benefit from the reoriented principles. When California burns for lack of firefighters, reterritorializing geographies of responsibility and adding technological coordination allows us to see that we do not need to increase employment or budgets, nor rely on an inadequate federal government, to stay safe, but only to temporarily reallocate that which we already have, i.e., firefighters from other states. Queer marriage for citizenship— reorienting the object of disregard from the letter of the law to the spirit of the law—creates more porous boundaries and extended kin groups. Global hunger, though more complex than just an issue of industrial food waste, can benefit from the prioritization of efficacy over efficiency: a reallocation program that is only 31% efficient would be 100% effective.

Decentralization and ideal normativity, if they are to become motivating actions, must work with and for the grassroots organizations that are already achieving those shared values.

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