

**TRADITIONALISM: ITS MEANING AND IMPACT
ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN
POLITICS**

By

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Gender Studies

*In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Gender
Studies*

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Vienna, Austria

2021

Abstract

Gender inequality in politics is often viewed in terms of institutional factors, such as electoral and party systems, which may favor female politicians or, conversely, exacerbate women's underrepresentation. However, this does not answer the question of the root cause of gender discrimination. What creates the preconditions for a negative attitude of voters towards women in politics? What makes it stay resilient even as the government makes efforts to reduce gender disparity?

In this paper, I examine the relationship between various phenomena that are often associated with traditionalist worldviews (high levels of religiosity, preference for a strong authoritarian leader, and homophobia) and voters' attitudes toward female politicians. I also analyze the degree of traditionalism of politics at the state level (for example, through assessing the legal status of same-sex relationships) and how it forms a social background that favors gender discrimination at the individual level. I also compare their influence with the effect of socio-economic factors.

I find that cultural factors in general play a greater role than socioeconomic ones. The attitude of the government towards gender roles is of the greatest importance, as it creates conditions for the open manifestation of sexism, including in relation to women in politics and other spheres of public life. Individual traditionalist views are also associated with negative perceptions about women's ability to be political leaders. The influence of socio-economic aspects is noticeable only if they are directly related to a person's lifestyle (age, income, employment status). However, it was unexpected to discover factors such as GDP per capita, the level of crime and corruption in society do not have any effect on the manifestation of attitudes to women in politics.

Acknowledgements

I want to sincerely thank Eva Fodor for being my supervisor. Your support has helped me through this process through which you have patiently guided me throughout the year and have always been here to help.

I am also very grateful to Levente Littvay for the support, for the new knowledge that made this research possible, for the excellent courses that were sometimes challenging, but always inspiring.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and / or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

I further declare that the following word counts for this thesis are accurate:

Body of thesis (all chapters excluding notes, references, appendices, etc.): 15 662 words

Entire manuscript: 18 807 words

Signed: Marina Stupko

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Introduction

Recently, the intensity of discussions on the need to improve gender equality in politics has increased in the world. More countries are introducing quotas aimed at increasing the representation of women in parliaments and governments. However, this did not bring the quick desired result that policy makers hoped for. The experience of those countries that embarked on the path of achieving gender equality several decades ago (primarily Scandinavia) shows that the situation is improving, but not as rapidly as initially expected. The active presence of women in politics and their participation in decision-making, as well as the promotion of gender-sensitive issues on the agenda, form a certain social background, within which women are more easily perceived as political leaders. However, gender stereotypes continue to exist and influence their activities.

At this point, efforts towards gender equality are often formal. Authorities usually believe that an increase in the presence of women in parliaments and governments will automatically solve the problem, since this is the most explicit criterion for assessing the degree of discrimination against women in politics. In practice, the hidden discrimination manifested in the individual negative assessment of female politicians in comparison with their male counterparts by voters is at least equally important. The impact of this factor becomes most evident when the quotas are removed or the electoral system is changed to one that is less favorable to women, which negates all the results in the struggle for equality that have been achieved. This effect could be observed after the collapse of the USSR, whose states adopted gender quotas for parliamentarians. The percentage of women after the first elections in independent states was significantly lower than in the parliaments of the USSR, and in most cases, it was not possible to reach this level again even now, 30 years later. For example, as a result of the last communist

elections in Hungary, the proportion of women in parliament was 20.7%, after the first multiparty elections - 7.3%, and in 2021 - 12.6%. In the Czech Republic, these figures were 29.5%, 8.7% and 23%, respectively. Moreover, quotas, in the absence of real decision-making abilities of women, only exacerbated the problem of discrimination at the level of society: women were perceived as doing nothing and only taking away jobs from men who could do “real work” (Galligan and Clavero, 2008). While quotas are measures that in themselves can positively influence the position of women in politics, this example shows how risky it is to focus only on the formal aspects, without trying to influence social norms. Even in democratic societies where women were involved in the political decision-making process (for example, in Scandinavia), the change in public opinion about their ability to be political leaders was delayed by decades. Voters preferred men more often even in those cases where women were typical participants of the political process (Matland, 1994).

In the framework of most studies, scientists tend to pay more attention to the formal efforts of the state to establish gender equality in politics (quotas, promotion of women to key positions, etc.) or socio-economic factors, without considering the socio-cultural component. However, this approach does not address the underlying causes of gender discrimination in politics. Also, there are many works that analyze the connection between sexism and one specific aspect of the traditionalist worldview, for example, a high level of religiosity. However, apart from other factors, it is difficult to assess their real significance. In this study, I examine the influence of a whole range of traditionalist views of voters on their choice in favor of a candidate of a particular gender.

Studies of the relationship between the traditionalist worldview and negative attitudes towards women in politics allow us to understand the internal mechanisms of discrimination at the

individual level, as well as the degree to which traditionalist thinking and its individual aspects influence such discrimination. They are intended to draw the attention of policy makers to the fact that an effective gender equality policy must take into account its manifestations in an integrated manner. Work on changing social norms affecting the distribution of gender roles and, as a result, attitudes towards women in politics, business and other key areas of public life should be carried out more explicitly at the society level, since the mere presence of women in the political space of the country may not be enough for automatic changes.

The aim of this work is to answer the question “to what extent does the traditionalist worldview determine obstacles to the political career of women?”. I am studying the influence of various aspects of traditionalism (level of religiosity, preference for a strong leader, and degree of homophobia) on a person's attitude towards women in politics. An additional question is to what extent the level of traditionalism makes it possible to predict attitudes towards women in the public sphere in general. To do this, I use an index that includes the respondent's opinion about the ability of women to be political leaders and business executives, as well as the need for higher education for girls. In addition, I also study the influence of various socio-economic factors, both at the individual level and at the state level, to find out which of them determine attitudes towards women in politics and the public sphere.

I use a multilevel model to figure out which aspects of the traditionalist worldview and socio-economic factors have a statistically significant influence on an individual's attitude towards women in politics, as well as in the public sphere in general, and to compare the degree of their influence. To do this, I:

1. define a list of independent and control variables based on previously published research in this area;
2. carry out the Pearson correlation for each of the dependent and independent, as well as control variables individually in order to find out which of them have a high correlation coefficient and, therefore, can be included in the model;
3. run a random intercept multilevel model with selected variables;
4. define standardized beta coefficients for those variables that have shown high statistical significance in order to be able to compare their effects on the dependent variables.

This work consists of an introduction, two chapters and a conclusion. In the first chapter, I reveal the essence of traditionalism, analyze the issue of the universality of patriarchal traditions and substantiate my choice of certain aspects of the traditionalist worldview for this study. In the second chapter, I describe the data and the method, and analyze the results.

In this work, I found that all aspects of the traditionalist worldview have a very high level of statistical significance in predicting a person's attitude towards women in politics. At the same time, within the framework of this group of variables, their influence differs: if for the level of religiosity it is relatively low, then the level of homophobia is one of the most influential factors. Nevertheless, all of them to one degree or another are associated with the individual's stereotypical perception of gender roles.

Political activity is the aspect of the public sphere in which the participation of women is associated with the greatest gender discrimination, and this is typical for all countries, regardless of their level of democratization. The second dependent variable (an index that included attitudes towards women in politics, economics, and higher education) showed

consistently higher rates. This is due to the respondents' significantly less discriminatory judgments about women in education and key positions in business.

Socio-economic factors that are directly related to the individual's lifestyle (age, income, employment status, etc.) also in all cases show a high level of influence on attitudes towards women in politics. The gender and age of the respondent are of the greatest importance, while employment status and the number of children in the family are of the smallest. Of the independent variables at the country level, only the proportion of women in national parliaments, the level of government restrictions on religion, and the legal status of same-sex marriage affect attitudes towards women in politics. At the same time, none of the socio-economic factors at this level (GDP, the Human Development Index, the level of crime and corruption) allows predicting the individual level of discrimination. This indicates that only those factors that directly characterize the circumstances of an individual's life have an impact on his or her attitude towards women in politics.

Chapter 1. The concept of traditionalism

In this paper, I answer the question of whether traditionalism influences negative attitudes towards women in politics, and, if so, which aspects of it are most primary. Since in order to achieve this goal it is necessary to understand what is the essence of traditionalism, in this chapter I consider various approaches to its definition and its relationship with conservatism. It also analyzed the issue of the universality of patriarchal traditionalism and various types of societies in which patriarchy may be less pronounced. I conclude that the rule of men at the highest levels is a universal and traditional feature of all societies, regardless of whether women enjoy authority at the level of families and clans. In addition, I justify my choice of key aspects of traditionalism, which are used in my research as independent variables.

Traditionalism

Traditionalism does not have a universal definition, and among the existing ones it is difficult to find one that would reflect its most significant essential features. Some authors tend to perceive traditionalism as “the degree of people’s adherence to cultural values, traditions, and norms” (Salari, Shiu, and Zhang, 2017, p. 643). While this definition is capable of capturing the fact that traditionalism has a relationship with the degree of expression of such a commitment, nevertheless, the substantive difference between traditionalism and non-traditionalism is not clear here.

Shils (1958) understands traditionalism as “the self-conscious, deliberate affirmation of traditional norms, in full awareness of their traditional nature and alleging that their merit derives from that traditional transmission from a sacred origin” (p. 160). This definition is valuable in that it includes the mention of sacredness as one of the key components, however, the mentioning of self-consciousness can be challenged. Many authors draw a line between

formal adherence to tradition, which is invariably associated with critical perception, and socialization in a society where their necessity cannot be questioned. For example, Campbell, Lee, and Cothran (2010) consider traditionalism as the result of such socialization: “traditionalism is the socialization factor of personality, made up of socially desirable traits and referring to the ease by which an individual is socialized to traditional ideologies” (p. 199).

In this paper, I proceed from the definition given by Flere and Lavrič (2007). They characterize traditionalism as “a value complex that idealizes the past, which is a socially constructed depiction of the past, although there is also some objective connection with inherited patterns of behavior and thought, particularly patterns that can be considered irrational and patriarchal substance” (p. 596). It is important that this definition presents traditionalism not as a homogeneous phenomenon, but as a set of values that can manifest themselves to varying degrees in the worldview of individuals, as well as at the level of societies. The idealization of the past is a crucial aspect, as an appeal to the past is often part of traditionalist discourse, especially when discussing social innovation, and serves as an argument in favor of maintaining the old way of life.

It is also difficult to distinguish between traditionalism and conservatism. Researchers also can not come to a consensus when analyzing their relationship. For example, E. Kalaycioğlu (2007) considers traditionalism as one of the aspects of conservatism, “at the crux of which stand local and even parochial customs, mores, folklore, and orientations, most of which are cloaked in religiosity” (p. 236). Hiel and Mervielde (2004) distinguish two types of conservatism: cultural and economic. If the definition of the first is close enough to the definition of traditionalism and includes gravitation towards cultural traditions, conformity and closeness in relation to everything new, then the second is “involving beliefs about equality versus inequality in the

distribution of power, income and opportunities, preference for capitalist ideology, and faith in private initiative or state economic intervention” (p. 661).

Nevertheless, a number of authors note that cultural conservatism and traditionalism also have essential differences that are not limited to the degree of adherence to tradition. For example, Bernal (2013) analyzes the case of radical cultural changes in China in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, influenced by Westernization and the political revolution that ended the monarchy. The period after 1907 is characterized by a change in the mood of the former supporters of foreign culture, who began to reject the culture of the West, and "inevitably they became conservatives, not traditionalists" (p. 90) Not being able to fully accept their own traditions uncritically again, they formed a complex of ideas, within which the Chinese culture was transformed “into something artificial” (p. 90). Although the cultural aspect was still the focus of these conservatives, the perspective of their perception shifted to “the analysis, articulation, and preservation of “traditional ”Chinese culture” (p. 90). Bernal presents a different point of view on the differences between traditionalism and conservatism: if, in the first case, traditions are perceived as an integral part of the way of life and, being deeply integrated into society and its norms, are accepted without judgment, then conservatism is more critical of them, and in this case, following traditions becomes selective, and the traditions themselves are often perceived as a tool, including in the political struggle. Mannheim (1953) also presents conservatism as a more self-aware and mature form of traditionalism.

In general, most authors agree that traditionalism cannot be perceived as a phenomenon completely identical to conservatism. However, in the framework of this study, it is not possible to draw a clear line between those respondents who have traditionalist views and those who adhere to the position of conservatism, since their attitudes towards gender roles are often

similar. It is assumed that the favorable background created by the state for the manifestation of sexist views (the absence of gender quotas in politics, support for marriage as a union of a man and a woman who have clearly defined roles within the family) will equally provide representatives of both groups with greater freedom in expressing their views on women's activities in public sphere. However, at the individual level, the variables were selected in such a way as to capture the effect of traditionalism: it can be assumed that a high level of religiosity, as well as a preference unambiguously given to a strong leader who does not consider other branches of government, is more likely to correlate with traditionalist views than conservative ones. Although this effect may also appear for the latter, it is expected to be smoother in their case.

Universality of patriarchy

Arguments related to the universality of patriarchal traditions usually come across a counterargument: not all traditions are the same and not all of them are patriarchal. Moreover, patriarchy in its classical sense may not exist in the modern world. Also, can we talk about a general trend without taking into account local and regional specifics? Is it possible to talk about gender roles, meaning by them exclusively the features characteristic of the Global North, if in the Global South they can be understood as something completely different?

In feminist discourse, there are still discussions about the essence of patriarchy. Radical feminists believe that it represents a system of male dominance over women, which exists at all levels, from interpersonal contacts to state institutions. Thus, Pateman (1988) views patriarchy, or patriarchal law, as “the power that men exercise over women” (p. 1). At the same time, she analyzes the transition from traditional to civil law, which changed the patriarchy in form, leaving the former essence in which men had full control over women. Nevertheless, if

in the first case the primacy belonged to older men (paternal patriarchy), then as a result of the social contract it passed to men as a whole: “in the modern world, women are subordinated to men as men, or to men as a fraternity” (p. 3). Men are parties to this agreement, and women are subjects. The social contract led to the fact that the life of society was divided into two spheres: public and private. If, within the framework of the public, men realized their newfound civil liberties, then the lot of women turned out to be exclusively the private sphere: the household and the upbringing of children. However, the family is as imbued with male domination as the public sphere. They are inextricably linked to each other and serve as the foundation of patriarchy. Hartmann's (1979) point of view on the essence of patriarchy is quite similar to that of Pateman. Men are in a hierarchical relationship with each other based on their class differences. However, they are all “united in their shared relationships of dominance over their women; they are dependent on each other to maintain that domination” (p. 177). Patriarchy is based on male control over the female labor force, hindering their access to resources and limiting their sexuality. This leads to the fact that women are forced to do either domestic work or low-paid and hard work, which is not attractive to men and does not bring either power or prestige. Andrea Dworkin (1979) believes that the power of men is based on seven tenets: self, physical strength, capacity to terrorize, the power of naming, the power of owning, the power of money and the power of sex. All of them are an integral part of any culture that supports patriarchy even in the absence of any objective prerequisites for the establishment of male dominance.

Nancy Fraser (1993) argues that the concept of patriarchy in the context in which Pateman saw it is outdated. Marital relationships have ceased to be a master and a subject relationship and have evolved into an unequal partnership. The very dominance of men over women has acquired “more impersonal structural mechanisms that are lived through more fluid cultural

form” (p. 180). Thus, the concepts of masculinity and femininity have undergone changes, the boundaries between gender roles are constantly being revised as a result of social development. However, Fraser argues that the volatility of patriarchy has led to its reproduction and persistence even in conditions where individual women may refuse to obey individual men.

Thus, despite the fact that the power of men is adaptive and takes on new forms over time, at the moment, patriarchy as a phenomenon is still one of the foundations of the social order. Pateman (1989) warns against abandoning the term under the influence of the idea that patriarchy in its traditional sense is already obsolete: “‘Patriarchy’ is, to my knowledge, the only term with which to capture the specificities of the subjection and oppression of women and to distinguish it from other forms of oppression. If we abandon the concept of patriarchy, the problem of the subjection of women and sexual domination will again vanish from view” (p. 35).

Although patriarchy can be discussed in different contexts (for example, through the comparison of rights that women have in different societies), in this paper it is understood as the prevailing power of men at the highest levels (it can be a state, a region or a settlement in the case of small communities). There are numerous studies which show that while individual elements, such as women's influence within the family and their authority may vary, men's sovereignty remains a constant.

The main question I am interested in is to what extent the difference in customs can affect the representation of women in politics, and whether this influence is substantive and not formal. The examples of individual tribes whose customs do not fit into the framework of European countries: the matrilineal organization of the family, polyandry, the practice of men to cover

their faces, etc., can serve as an argument in favor of the fact that not all societies are patriarchal. These facts indicate a different role for women and their higher authority in the communities than they would have in a truly patriarchal society, and it is assumed that adherents of such traditions will have a more favorable idea of the ability of women to be political leaders. But is this so in practice? To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze two main aspects: the distribution of gender roles in such societies, as well as the influence that their representatives can have on policy at the highest level.

The most striking example in relation to societies that have non-traditional gender roles for the West are those of them, which are characterized by matrilinealism (accounting for relatives only on the mother's side), matrilineality (maternal inheritance), and matrilocality. In such a society, the mother is the head of the family, and the lives of its members are organized around her home. Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2009) provide an example of the Khasi society in northeastern India. The household center is the grandmother, who lives with her unmarried daughters and youngest daughter, whether she is married, and unmarried or widowed sons and brothers. The youngest daughter always lives with her mother and ultimately inherits headship in the home. In the event that the older daughters get married, they settle separately not far from the mother's house. After marriage, a man lives on the territory of his wife. Most of the key decisions are made by women, men work for money for the benefit of the household of their wives, however, as a rule, they do not play a significant role in the family.

Nevertheless, despite such a social structure at the household level, management at the level of cities or villages, or, earlier, native states called Syiemships, is carried out by men. In Syiemships, it took place through a gathering of male elders. It is now run by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, which also has exclusively male representation (*Khasi Hills*

Autonomous District Council, n.d.). The Act issued by the Council (Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, 2007) regarding provisions for the appointment and succession of the Syiem, Deputy Syiem, Electors and Headmen of Myllichem Syiemship, clearly identifies “Deputy Syiem” as “a Khasi male adult belonging to any of the ”Lai Kpoh” of the Syiem clan of Myllichem Syiemship and duly appointed under the provisions of this Act”.

Another such example is the Garo community in Bangladesh. As in the case of Khasi, inheritance is passed from mother to daughter, and women are the main breadwinners in their family (Dey 2008). The Garo woman has the right to choose a man and propose to him; after the wedding, the husband moves to his wife's house. Everything that a man earns before marriage belongs to his mother (or sisters, in the event that the mother died early); after the wedding, his funds belong to his wife. However, the husband has the right to dispose of his wife's property in consultation with her. The inheritance can go to any of the daughters, the parents make a choice together, but the last word rests with the wife, since it is she who is the owner of all family funds. The heiress, unlike her sisters, cannot choose a husband on her own, the decision is made by the father, and in this case he is not obliged to consult with his wife. Just like Khasi, Garo men hold power at the local and community levels (Harbison, Khaleque, and Robinson 1989).

The position of women in communities with the custom of polyandry (for example, in Tibet) is also often more significant than in those where a monogamous or, even more so, polygynous family is adopted. For example, women often occupy positions in the administration (but men still predominate in key positions), and also play a significant role in the social life of the community. However, families in this case are patrilineal, and polyandry is usually due to economic reasons. The inheritance goes to the first son, while the others can be the part of his

family and become co-husbands of his wife. However, in Nepalese society, polyandry coexists with polygyny. Family structure is often dependent on economic well-being. Rich men can afford to have multiple wives, while poor brothers become the husbands of one woman due to inheritance issues and too high bride price (Schuler. 1989).

Thus, societies with matrilineal family organization are not a mirror of patrilineal ones. Moreover, those of them, which are characterized by a noticeable predominance of the influence of women in everyday life and within the household, did not avoid full or almost full male representation at a higher level of government, which is also a part of their traditions. Although only a few examples are presented here, this trend is general. Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2009) admit that, as part of their research, they tried to find a matriarchal society that reflected all the basic features of a patriarchal one, but failed. Goldberg (1993) puts it this way: “there are societies that are matrilineal and matrilineal and where women are accorded veneration and respect but there are no societies which violate the universality of patriarchy defined as “a system of organization in which the overwhelming number of upper positions in hierarchies are occupied by males” (p. 1639). Lowes (2020) supports this view, arguing that “in both matrilineal and patrilineal kinship systems, men often retain positions of power and authority within the kin group. This is commonly known as patriarchy. Thus, in a patrilineal society, there is concordance between who determines group membership and who holds political authority, while in a matrilineal society there is not” (p. 2) . In my opinion, the main mistake in the interpretation of the influence of women on politics in such societies stems from the confusion of the concepts of "matrilineal" and "matriarchy". However, matrilineal societies borrow the features of the latter only in part, which affects the distribution of roles in the private sphere, but, as traditionally, as in patriarchal ones, leaves politics at the mercy of men.

While there are other models of societies that could theoretically be considered egalitarian, none of them has full gender equality. The group of countries where the proportion of women in parliament is 50% or more (UAE, Cuba, and Rwanda), in practice, does not demonstrate significant involvement of women in politics. Key decisions in them are made by a group of men with real powers of power. These examples are covered in more detail in Chapter II. On the contrary, a group of Western countries with a high level of women's participation in politics (mainly in Scandinavia) have made some progress in involving women in decision-making. However, none of these countries still has equal representation of men and women in parliament; when appointing ministers, women are more likely to get posts associated with the “traditional women's sphere” (health and education), and a fairly high percentage of female parliament members to a greater extent associated with the peculiarities of the party and electoral systems, rather than the will of the voters. At the same time, a certain level of prejudice towards women in politics remains among the population. Thus, there are no societies that would be completely egalitarian or, moreover, matriarchal, i.e., managed by women at the highest level, and not just within the family.

Aspects of traditionalism

Within the framework of this work, my task is to identify individual factors that would make it possible to assess the level of an individual's adherence to the traditionalist worldview. The most common characteristics of a person with traditionalist views in the scientific literature are a high level of religiosity, a negative attitude towards homosexuals, and a preference for a strong authoritarian leader. Although the list of possible factors is not limited to these three, it is impossible to consider all of them in a single study. Thus, I stopped at these, because they both characterize the degree of traditionalism and, as shown in many works, affect the attitude of a person towards women in politics. In addition, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter,

I also analyze the impact of socio-economic factors at both the individual and national levels, which can also potentially influence attitudes towards women in public life.

Religion

According to the views of some researchers, religion affects discrimination against women in two ways: firstly, through the behavior of religious authorities (who “might explicitly teach stereotypical views of the genders”), and secondly, through “broader values incorporated into religious teachings”, thus having an indirect impact on society (Mikołajczak, Pietrzak, 2014, p. 387-388). Setzler and Yanus (2015) distinguish three levels of influence:

- through the promotion by religious organizations of policies that preserve conventional gender roles,
- through the deliberate promotion of gender stereotypes by religious leaders that jeopardize gender equality,
- through the preservation of the “male-dominated decision-making structures” (p. 3) of the majority of religious organizations, which is justified by adherence to the traditions of teaching.

The authors assert that, as a consequence, followers of religions tend to believe that “women are less effective leaders than their male counterparts” (p. 3). I could add that observation of a structure in which grassroots and leadership roles are distributed disproportionately (in the first case, most of them are occupied by women, in the second case, all or almost all of them are assigned to men), combined with the teaching positions according to which God created men and women strictly to fulfill certain roles (in the case of women - mothers and housewives) are able to convince parishioners that political activity and leadership in general "are not inherent

in women by nature", which means that they do not need this a priori unable to effectively perform such functions.

Siordia (2016) examines the relationship between the intensity of religious ideology and adherence to gender roles, also finding a statistically significant correlation between them ($p\text{-value} < 0.01$). The more pronounced individual religiosity, the more likely a person will also adhere to traditional views on the roles of men and women in the family and society, while a high correlation is characteristic of both sexes. The difference between Siordia's study and mine is that I use the World Values Survey, which covers a large number of countries, and I include significantly more variables in my model, while it uses the results of the Longitudinal Study of Generations conducted among 300 families in California. and examines only religiosity and commitment to the family.

Reynolds (1999) analyzes the impact of religious denominations on the proportion of women politicians in parliaments and cabinet ministers. The results of this study show that religious affiliation can influence the perception of women in politics. However, the most statistically significant result in comparison with Catholic countries is demonstrated by the Eastern Orthodox, most of whom, in fact, represent highly secular societies that developed under the influence of the USSR (Geffert and Stavrou, 2016). Although a significant part of the population may consider themselves Orthodox (for example, in Russia in 2017 71% of citizens considered themselves Orthodox Christians, in Ukraine this number was even higher - 78% (Masci, 2019). It is noteworthy that although in 2008 the percentage of Russians who noted that that they are Orthodox was about the same, 72%, but only 56% claimed that they believe in God, and 7% attended church at least once a month (*Russians Return to Religion, But Not to Church*, 2014)), the attraction of these countries to religion is not so much a desire for God

how much the search for traditional cultural symbols capable of uniting the nation (Bekus, 2010), it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Based on this, it should be understood that the level of support that the state provides to a particular religion does not necessarily correlate with the level of religiosity of citizens, which means that it can hardly serve as a criterion in assessing the influence of individual religiosity on attitudes towards women in politics.

Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel (2009) assess the impact of religiosity on attitudes towards gender equality from a different perspective. They investigate the difference in attitudes towards gender roles between Germans and Turkish immigrants in Germany. While Germans were generally more egalitarian, Turkish immigrants of the first generation were significantly more likely to adhere to traditional gender roles, and Turkish immigrants of the second generation occupied an intermediate position between them. However, between Germans and Turks, who have a similar level of religiosity, there was a similar attitude towards gender roles. At the same time, if religious values largely explained the attitude of the Turks towards gender equality, among the Germans it is determined by a large number of factors.

I believe that three main conclusions which are significant for my research can be drawn from this. First, the ideological adherents of traditionalism are characterized by a high level of religiosity and an understanding of the role of women as subordinate to men, regardless of their country of residence. Secondly, the external environment is capable of influencing the worldview of people, but it does this gradually, within several generations. Thirdly, since my study includes not only those countries that are characterized by a high level of traditionalism at the state level, it is necessary to take into account various factors that contribute to the

formation of negative attitudes towards women in the public sphere. Thus, religion is one of the key components of the traditionalist worldview, but not the only one.

***Hypothesis 1a.** The higher the level of religiosity of an individual, the higher the likelihood that he or she will negatively assess the activities of women in politics.*

Homophobia

Negative attitudes towards gays and lesbians are another characteristic feature of traditionalist thinking. The conventional concept of the family is based on the fact that family members are in a pronounced hierarchical relationship. In this case, the father of the family, as a rule, is assigned the leading role, the rest of the household obey him. Depending on the characteristics of culture and social conditions, the next step in the hierarchy is taken either by his wife or children, depending on the age and gender of the latter. However, stratification is carried out according to gender, which determines the order of subordination: in strongly traditional societies, the wife never dominates her husband, and sons are valued more than daughters.

Same-sex marriages threaten this system by the very fact of its existence: if both spouses belong to the same sex, this erodes the hierarchy and casts doubt on its inviolability. Greater variability in relationships between family members indirectly affects society as a whole, suggesting new scenarios that were not previously considered, and can contribute to the desire of women to get rid of domination by their husbands. Traditionalist objections to same-sex relationships, and especially the legalization of same-sex marriage, often sound like “women should be women, men should be men” (Kincheloe et al., 2010, p. 191). Although women will not cease to be women, being in same-sex marriage or an equal relationship with a man, the traditionalist view

of a woman refers to a complex of gender roles, refusing to follow which, she partly loses this status.

Suzanne Pharr, in his famous work “Homophobia: A Weapon of Sexism” (1993), puts it this way: “A lesbian is perceived as a threat to the nuclear family, to male dominance and control, to the very heart of sexism. Gay men are perceived also as a threat to male dominance and control, and the homophobia expressed against them has the same roots in sexism as does homophobia against lesbians. ... They are seen as betrayers, as traitors who must be punished and eliminated” (p. 1).

There is plenty of quantitative research to support Pharr's arguments. For example, Brogle examines the relationship between homophobia and attitudes towards traditional roles, establishing a statistically significant correlation between the two ($p\text{-value} < 0.005$). Ioverno et al. (2018) conclude that negative attitudes towards homosexual couples are highly correlated with traditional attitudes towards masculinity and femininity. Stark (1991) also shows that homophobia has a correlation between homophobia and belief in female and male roles with $p\text{-value} < 0.0001$. Wilkinson (2008) explores this phenomenon from a different perspective, finding that negative attitudes towards lesbians have a high correlation with sexism ($p\text{-value} < 0.001$). Whitley (2001) also found a statistically significant relationship between attitudes towards homosexuality and attitudes towards women, sexism, and endorsement of traditional male role norms.

However, these studies have focused on the relationship between attitudes towards gay people and perceptions of gender roles in general, while my goal is to find out if this phenomenon affects attitudes towards women in politics.

Hypothesis 1b. *The higher the level of homophobia, the higher the likelihood that a person will have a negative attitude towards women in politics.*

Preference for a strong leader

The preference for a strong leader is another feature of the traditionalist worldview. A significant part of traditional societies and organizations that have adopted their views (for example, religious ones) are characterized by paternalism in the form of a rigid hierarchy with a leader, to whom all subordinates obey in exchange for protection and guardianship. “The coexistence between benevolence and authority in paternalistic leadership stems from values in traditional societies pertaining to the father figure who is nurturant, caring, dependable, but also authoritative, demanding, and a strict disciplinarian” (Pellegrini, 2008, p. 394). Even if the relationship between individuals was not built according to this principle, these norms were integrated into society to such an extent that they formed a similar attitude towards the leader, regardless of whether he fulfilled the duties of a “father” in relation to subordinates in practice. Although, in accordance with the Pateman’s (1988) concept, in modern society power has passed from fathers to men in general, the criteria for leadership remain the same.

The leader's influence meant his ability to defend not only his own interests, but also the interests of his subordinates. In this case, such qualities as assertiveness, aggressiveness, the ability to achieve one's own goals by any means, make decisions individually and impose them on others were important (Paulson, Wajdi, and Manz, 2009). These qualities were considered inherent in men (Camilleri and Kushnick, 2016), which additionally supported the postulate of leadership as a purely male role.

According to gender stereotypes, women are characterized by opposite qualities: altruism, a tendency to care for others, flexibility, gentleness and compliance (Kambarami, 2006), which do not fit well with the traditional idea of a strong leader. Even in modern society, where women often occupy leadership positions, they are usually expected to have a democratic leadership style: the desire to involve others in the decision-making process, the establishment of communication, the ability to take into account the personality and character of subordinates, and management through a reward system rather than punishments, etc. (Hoyt, 2010). While not all women leaders are prone to this behavior, and democratic leadership has certain advantages, leadership is often perceived as not a woman's business because it does not fit into traditional gender roles. At the same time, the behavior of women showing “masculine” leadership qualities is discouraged due to inconsistency with the stereotypical image of a woman, and when assessing women's abilities to be successful leaders, such examples are often ignored. In the second case, democratic leadership is not recognized as “strong,” and such a leader is perceived as incapable of supporting his subordinates. Based on this, my goal is to test whether the traditional perception of leadership as a purely masculine sphere influences attitudes towards women in politics.

Hypothesis 1c. *The more a person tends to favor a strong leader, the more likely he or she will have a negative view of female politicians.*

Chapter 2. The impact of traditionalism on the perception of female politicians

The second chapter is devoted to describing the data and methods and analyzing the results. In this chapter, I dwell in detail on the groups of variables¹ used in this study, as well as the methods and the reasoning behind choosing them. I argue that factors that have different influences on a person's lifestyle determine their worldview to varying degrees. As a result, the influence of the variables at the individual level on the respondents' attitudes towards women in politics, business, and higher education is significantly more prominent than of the variables at the country level.

Data

I used data from World Values Survey (WVS) 7th and 6th waves. The original sample included 53 countries, but due to lack of data, the final sample contains only 43. Due to the lack of data (especially on crime, corruption and HDI rates), it was not possible to retain some countries in the sample, such as Taiwan, Lebanon, and Malaysia. Of these 43 countries, 38 were interviewed in 2017-2020, four in 2011, and one in 2012. Given the significant time difference, the rest of the data correspond to the date of the WVS: for example, for the countries surveyed in 2011, the data for all variables refer to 2011. The sample was compiled in such a way as to include data on countries of all regions. The Americas are represented by 11 states, Asia 15, Europe 11, Africa 4, Oceania 2 (see Table 1). Certain countries (UAE, Cuba, Rwanda) were deliberately excluded from the sample due to the fact that the indicators of the representation

¹ A variable is an indicator that can take on different values (for example, age can vary from one respondent to another, GDP varies from country to country). This study includes three groups of variables: dependent ones - what we want to explain (attitudes towards women in politics and other key areas), independent ones - those factors with which we explain this (for example, various aspects of traditionalism), and control ones - which are other factors that can also influence the dependent variables (for example, socio-economic factors).

of women in politics do not reflect the real powers of female politicians in these countries (this will be discussed below).

The World Values Survey (*World Values Survey*, 2020) is an international survey conducted since 1981. The study is conducted in countries with different political regimes at different stages of economic development and representing different cultures, which allows researchers to assess how attitudes towards women in politics and other aspects of the public sphere can vary from country to country. The questionnaire includes questions about social and religious values, preferences regarding the political regime, possible prejudices about certain social groups, economic values, attitudes towards globalization, and a number of other factors. It also includes demographics to assess the relationship of certain responses to gender, age, income, etc. Data in the World Values Survey is collected using the face-to-face interview or phone interviews for remote areas method. The minimum sample for most countries is 1200 interviews, but for countries with a large number of residents (USA, China, Russia, etc.) it should be at least 1500.

In this case, the World Values Survey is the most appropriate data source for my research, as it is an international survey conducted on all continents, while most other social studies focus on one region. In addition, the WVS focuses on social values and includes more questions about the respondent's attitude towards a particular social phenomenon than most other surveys that focus on more general aspects, such as economic well-being. This provides the researcher with a choice of several questions, united by one topic. Finally, although the WVS also includes questions specific to one region or one specific country, the bulk of the questions are asked to all respondents, regardless of their place of residence, which allows for comparisons between countries.

Data for the explanatory variables at the country level were obtained from a variety of sources. Data on the presence or absence of gender quotas in a given country was taken from the Global Database of Gender Quotas, a joint project of the International IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm University (International IDEA et al., 2021). Information on the representation of women in national parliaments, up-to-date at the time of this study, was taken from the database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Parline, 2021). I used the Government Restrictions Index (GRI) of the Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center, 2011–2018) to assess the level of restrictions on religion imposed by national governments. This index is based on several published cross-national sources and includes 20 variables, such as an official ban on the activities of religious organizations, attempts to eliminate the presence of a religious group in the country, physical violence against members of a particular religious denomination, etc. etc. Data on the presence or absence of an official religion, as well as on the legal status of same-sex marriage were taken from open sources on the Internet, individually for each country.

The World Values Survey provides a valuable source of information on public perceptions of gender roles, in particular, how open the public sphere should be to women. My research uses two dependent variables. In the first case, I want to understand how the attitude of respondents towards women in politics changes depending on other factors, both personal (religiosity, attitude towards homosexuals, etc.) and external (level of economic development of the country, representation of women in politics, the presence or absence of gender quotas, etc.). WVS includes the question “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that, on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do?”, which allows me to operationalize it. It uses a scale of 1-4, where 1 is strongly agree and 4 is strongly disagree. The

total mean is equal to 2.72. In the second case, I am interested in attitudes towards women in the public sphere in a broader context, which includes an assessment of their performance in politics and economics, as well as the need for higher education for girls. To operationalize this variable, I use an index representing the mean of answers to three questions:

- On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do
- A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
- On the whole, men make better business executives than women do

They all use the same scale from 1 - strongly agree to 4 - strongly disagree. Cronbach's alpha for the questions is 0.789, which indicates a decent level of internal consistency.

These spheres are united by the fact that, despite some progress over the past decades, they are still considered as the men's domain. The gender gap in politics persists despite efforts to reduce it (Le Barbanchon, 2018), and women politicians are still assessed as insufficiently competent, as a result, political activity is still associated among voters with men (Ballington, 2008). Society perceives economics as a predominantly male domain (Marlow, Henry, and Carter, 2009), a phenomenon that becomes more apparent when comparing small and large businesses and analyzing the gender gap in executive positions. Women make up a significant proportion of small enterprise owners (Kuadli, 2021), but there are few of them among the owners of large businesses (Keller, Molina, and Olney, 2020). The same applies to employees: women more often prevail in lower positions, but among executives, there are significantly fewer of them (Sharen and McGowan, 2018). Higher education is an area with a similar problem, although at first glance the circumstances are more favorable here. Despite the fact that female students in many countries (but not all) represent at least half of the total student

population, in practice, they often face discrimination during the educational process (Jacobs, 1996), and the situation has not improved in recent years (Leathwood and Read, 2010). The indicator of attitudes towards women in these three key areas allows us to assess the overall level of prejudice against women's high position in public life in a particular country, as well as compare it with the indicator of attitudes towards women politicians separately. The mean for the index is equal to 2.86, the difference with the first question is statistically significant (p -value < 0.001).

The independent variables at the individual level include three questions from WVS that represent various aspects associated with traditionalism (see Table 2). The first is the level of religiosity, which is assessed using the question "How important is God in your life?". The answer is measured on a ten-point scale, where 1 is not at all important, 10 is very important. It allows me to assess the individual level of religiosity. The mean for religiosity is 7.23, which indicates a fairly high level on average in this sample. The correlation coefficient with both dependent variables is equal to -0.173 and -0.196 respectively and shows a high level of statistical significance ($p < 0.0001$). While the WVS questionnaire contains several similar questions, for example, "How often do you attend religious services these days?" or "How often do you pray?", in practice, they can only demonstrate the formal side of adherence to religion. In a highly religious society, even a non-religious person may follow rituals under pressure from others, and, on the contrary, a believer may not feel the need to go to church or pray regularly, preferring other forms of appeal to God. The second question is related to the preference of an authoritarian leader: "Is having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections good or bad?". In this case, a scale of 1-4 is used, where 1 is very good, 4 is very bad. The sample mean is 2.52, the results of the correlation with the dependent variables are statistically significant ($p < 0.0001$), the correlation coefficients are equal to 0.132

and 0.173. The image of a strong leader is often associated with a ruler who is able to make decisions on his (as it is typically a male) own and who does not need to share powers with parliament or other government officials. In this respect, the question is best suited to assess the preference given to a “traditional” strong leader who has the opportunity to not trouble himself with democratic procedures or to follow them formally. The third variable includes the attitude towards homosexuals: “Is homosexuality justified?” Its choice is conditioned by the fact that it allows us to assess how much the respondent is inclined to perceive gender roles as unshakable and clearly defined. Evaluation is carried out on a ten-point scale, where 1 - Never justifiable, 10 - Always justifiable. Here a respondent gives a general assessment of homosexuality as a phenomenon. The views of the majority of the respondents on homosexuality can be described as traditionalist: the average value is 3.83, i.e. most interviewees believe that homosexuality cannot be justified. Although the WVS has other questions on this topic, for example, “Do you agree or disagree that homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples?”, when answering them, a respondent may be guided by considerations other than just his or her views on the permissibility of same-sex relationships. For example, she or he may believe that a homophobic society can psychologically traumatize a child raised in such a family, and parents are unable to provide their children with protection from public opinion. A question free from such factors better reflects an individual opinion about the justification of homosexual relationships.

I use gender, age, income, the number of children in a family, and employment status as control variables at the individual level. In relation to both indicators, the gender of the respondents played a significant role. Women show markedly more optimism about female politicians and women in other areas of public life than men. Gender is coded as dummy: 1 - male, 2 - female, the majority of respondents in this sample are female. Also, I believe that age can influence

attitudes towards women in politics and other key areas. There is ample evidence in the scientific literature that conservative attitudes increase with age, which also include a preference for families with traditional gender roles (Feather 1977). In addition, as there has been an increasing dynamic of redefining the roles of men and women in recent decades, the values adopted by younger generations may differ from those of older people due to changed conditions. Officially, only people over 18 years old can participate in the WVS, however, according to the rules, the age threshold can be lowered if the required sample size for a population of 18+ is reached (1200 respondents). This sample included respondents from 16 to 103 years old, the mean age is 42.75. Age, the same as gender, has a statistically significant relationship with both dependent variables. Employment status was included in the list of control variables as, according to modernization theory, more financially successful people tend to show more inclination towards democratization (Lipset, 1959). Employment status included 7 categories: full time employee (30 hours a week or more), part time employee (less than 30 hours a week), self-employed, retirees, housewives, students and unemployed. Employment status has been coded as dummy according to whether a person has a paid job. Most people in this sample are unemployed. For the same reason, income levels were included in this list. In terms of income, respondents were asked to indicate which income group from 1 to 10 in their country they belong to. The mean is 4.75 which is close to the intermediate value. The sample includes both the poorest and the richest representatives of these countries. However, this study revealed a non-linear relationship between income and attitudes towards women in politics, economics and higher education. In both cases, as income increased, the tendency of the respondents to consider a woman no less capable leader than a man, increased as well, with the exception of the richest group, whose indicators are approximately equal to the indicator of the poorest group. The number of children in their families ranges from 0 to 23, the mean value is 1.79. Children can also be a factor in making people prefer men in politics,

economics and higher education. Firstly, those people who initially share traditionalist values may strive for a larger number of children in the family; secondly, with the increase in the number of children, the family's resources decrease, and in families with a small income, parents are often forced to choose whom to educate. In this case, preference is often given to sons.

I selected the independent variables at the country level in order to demonstrate whether the state creates a favorable social background for the active participation of women in the public sphere, including politics. Thus, the presence or absence of gender quotas in the national parliament may indicate whether the government treats gender inequality in politics as a social problem that needs to be addressed (Lu and Lu, 2020). Only the legislated quotas were taken into account, since voluntary ones, firstly, reflect the individual position of the party, and not the state, and secondly, they are rarely universal in nature: even if voluntary quotas are adopted in most parties, they may differ in terms of conditions, since they are adopted at the internal, not the cross-party level. The average is 0.49, which means that almost half of the countries in this sample have adopted legislated quotas.

The second indicator, the proportion of women in national parliaments, serves as an indirect indicator of how much voters are willing to support female candidates in elections. I only took national parliaments into account, as they tend to have the highest level of competition between male and female candidates due to their wide range of powers. Regional and municipal parliaments are often less attractive to male politicians, leaving more room for women to participate (Medeiros, Forest, and Erl, 2019; Verge, Novo, Diz, and Lois, 2017). I considered only unicameral parliaments or the lower house of a bicameral one since citizens have the opportunity to influence the election of their members. Although there are countries in the

world in which the proportion of women in parliament is equal to or exceeds 50% (Rwanda - 61.3%, Cuba - 53.4%, the United Arab Emirates - 50%), studies show in these countries, the representation of women in parliament does not have a substantive impact on politics. The large proportion of women in parliament is due to the state's attempts to involve them in the political process in order to improve the country's international image (Rwanda (Burnet 2008) and the UAE (Al-Mutawa, 2020)) or achieve equality on the way to building a socialist state (Cuba (Vázquez, 2003)) however, like many policy decisions taken at the top, this step is not capable of making a qualitative difference, and real power is still concentrated in the hands of men (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). Women “were mere symbols of inclusion, which appeared to be in line with foreign aid ideas” (Burnet, 2008, p. 368-369). Devlin and Elgie (2008) note that their increased presence in politics influenced the inclusion of gender-sensitive issues on the agenda, but “has had little effect on policy outputs” (p. 237). In addition, despite the significant representation of women in the public sphere, which goes back several decades, Rwanda is still characterized by a patriarchal distribution of gender roles: “in Rwanda, as in many countries, social norms teach men from a young age that women and girls raise children and perform household tasks, whereas men's identity is often defined in large part by their ability to earn an income and provide for the family” (Doyle, Kato-Wallace, Kazimbaya, and Barker, 2014, p. 517). The same is applicable for Cuba and the UAE. Anna Pertierra (2008) argues that the trend towards an increase in the formal representation of women in government exists at the same time with a trend towards the strengthening of traditional gender roles: “while policies and institutions introduced during the Soviet years transformed many aspects of life for women in Cuba, these transformations have not been accompanied by changes of equal magnitude to the practices and identities rooted in domestic life that remain strongly associated with femininity or womanhood. On the contrary, in the post-Soviet era traditional associations of women with the household have become even more comprehensive than in the preceding

decades” (p. 751). In the United Arab Emirates, this is not so much a desire for liberalization as for an increase in “women’s contributions to the nation”, while preserving traditional gender roles at the family level. Government and public opinion continue to send conflicting messages simultaneously broadcasting that women are capable of being leaders and supporting traditional stereotypes (Al-Mutawa, 2020). Increasing the representation of women in parliament, in this case, is carried out through quotas (UAE), active encouragement from the state (Cuba), or a mixture of these methods (Rwanda). Since such measures leave little room for voter preferences to express themselves, these countries were excluded from the sample.

As explained above, the Pew's Government restrictions index is used to analyze the restrictions imposed by the state on the free exercise of religion, which takes into account various indicators, such as laws, government policies, and actions taken in order to reduce the influence of all or most religious denominations. The result is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 is the maximum level of restriction. The mean value is 4.23.

The presence or absence of official religion of the state indicates whether there is a religious denomination that enjoys the right to spread its characteristic beliefs without restriction or with minor restrictions and, thus, to influence the understanding of the population of social values (Pérez-Díaz et al., 2010). This factor is not always directly related to the previous one: the presence of a state religion supported by the authorities does not guarantee religious freedom for all other confessions. However, it is an indirect indicator of the extent to which the government has the ability to influence social norms, determining which religious teachings the population will have free access to, and to which it will be difficult (North and Gwin, 2004).

The legal status of same-sex marriage is a significant indicator of adherence to traditionalism manifested at the state level. Justification of the need to prohibit homosexual relations occurs by referring either to religious norms or to the old traditions that declared homosexuality sexually “deviant” (da Silva et al., 2020). The status of same-sex relationships is determined on the following scale: 3 - same-sex marriage, 2 - civil union, 1 - recognition of marriages contracted in other countries, 0 - none, -1 - fines for homosexual relationships, -2 - imprisonment, -3 - death penalty. The average is 0.6, i.e. most countries at the state level demonstrate a positive attitude towards homosexuals, which slightly contrasts with the opinions of individuals, most of whom tend to treat homosexuals negatively.

As control variables at the country level, I used factors that allow us to analyze the social and economic well-being of states. These included GDP per capita (World Bank and OECD, 2011–2020). The GDP of the poorest country in the sample is equal to 855 USD and for the richest country it is equal to 60755 USD, with the mean equal to 18065.55. I also included the Crime Index generated by Numbeo (2011–2020). Numbeo is the database of information on the quality of life which includes the safety rates by countries. According to this index, the crime rate is measured on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is the safest countries, 100 is the most criminalized ones. The lowest score is 13.73, the highest one is 70.55, the average is 44.96. To determine the level of corruption, the Corruption Perceptions Index was used, also using a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt countries and 100 is very clean ones. For the level of corruption, the range is wider than for the level of crime: the minimum value is 22, the maximum value is 93, and the average value is 45.97. I also included inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI) as a control variable, which takes into account how access to health care, education, and income is distributed among the inhabitants of each country. IHDI uses a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 is the country with the most inequality and 1 is the

country where everyone has equal access to social benefits, the mean is equal to 0.653. In the same way as all other variables, the IHDI shows a statistically significant level of correlation with attitudes towards women in politics and the index ($p < 0.0001$ in both cases).

Method

In order to answer the research question about what plays the primary role in perpetuating a person's attitude towards gender roles and, as a consequence, women in politics: traditionalist attitudes that prevent the revision of gender roles, or public policy that creates a favorable background for the manifestation of a certain attitudes towards women, it is necessary to take into account the whole complex of factors. As is evident from Table 2, simple correlation does not give an exhaustive answer: all independent and control variables have a high level of correlation with each of the dependent. In almost all cases, the p-value is less than 0.001. The only exception is employment status, where the p-value is only less than 0.05. This may be due to the inclusion in the group of students who do not work for money, who have a significantly more positive attitude towards women, both in politics and in other areas of the public sphere. This indicator of students is an exception in the category of the unemployed and is more in line with the average indicator of the group working for money. Nevertheless, even in this case, we can talk about a statistically significant correlation.

The advantage of this method is that it allows researchers to identify a list of variables, the inclusion of which in the general multilevel model is logically justified. R^2 usually rises as the number of variables increases, even if their values are random, since the probability that new data will “explain” the noise increases. Multilevel models assess the effect of each variable separately and relative to each other, however, they have a typical problem of multicollinearity, since the individual factors selected to explain the dependent variable tend to be related to one

sphere, which means that the chances that they will be correlated with each other are high. Eliminating variables that are not statistically significant, but can increase collinearity, can partially solve this problem. In this case, since all the independent and control variables showed a high level of statistical significance, I did not exclude any of them when moving to the multilevel model.

When building the multilevel model, I tested random intercept models and random intercept and slope models to determine which one was more appropriate. However, in models with random slope, the variance of the slopes for the independent and control variables was close to zero: for example, in the case of the first dependent variable for the level of religiosity as well as for the attitude toward homosexuals it was less than 0.001, for the preference for a strong leader it was equal to 0.002 (see Table 2). None of them were larger than one, the highest was 0.12 (HDI in the case of attitudes towards women in politics). Based on this, the use of a multilevel model with a random slope is hardly justified in this case. Comparison of models by means of ANOVA showed that models with random intercept have better fit than the others.

Results and discussion

One of the main findings of this study was that in all cases the indicators of attitudes towards women politicians were lower than the indicators of attitudes towards women in the public sphere as a whole. This can be explained by the inclusion in the second variable of the question about the necessity of higher education for girls: although a hundred years ago it was considered almost exclusively a male prerogative, in recent decades, when in many countries, especially in the West, the level of university enrollment among female students equaled or exceeded enrollment rates for male students have influenced perceptions of the need for higher

education for women. These results also indicate the importance of a continued presence of women in politics: the fact that New Zealand and Germany rank first and second in terms of positive attitudes towards women politicians, respectively, is explained by the fact that in both countries in key positions that offer opportunities for adoption decisions, there are women: Jacinda Ardern as Prime Minister of New Zealand and Angela Merkel as Chancellor of Germany, who has held this post since 2005. It should be noted that the data for Estonia, where women hold the posts of President (since 2016) and Prime Minister (since 2021), dated 2011, which makes it impossible to assess the effect that the presence of women in the political field has on Estonian society. Later indicators were not included due to lack of data. Similarly, for Sweden, where the representation of women not only approaches 50% in parliament, but also makes up more than half (12 out of 22) in government, incl. in positions such as Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the data is also valid for 2011, and it is highly likely that the current figures for 2021 are higher than ten years ago. These countries show some of the smallest differences in attitudes towards women politicians and women in business and education. The lowest rates are in Muslim countries with low GDP per capita: Pakistan (GDP is 1482 USD), Jordan (4312 USD), Indonesia (3893 USD) and Tunisia (3317 USD). In Nigeria the proportion of muslims is only slightly more than 50%, but GDP is one of the lowest in the sample: 2027 USD. At the same time, Turkey, whose policy is characterized by the influence of secularization processes, and whose GDP is equal to 9455, ranks fifth among all 15 Asian countries. Pakistan is the only country with an index value less than 2, which indicates that the vast majority of respondents are convinced that politics, business and higher education are not women's affairs. Even with regard to education, which shows the result that is most favorable for women, public opinion remains adamant. At the time of 2018, when the WVS survey was conducted, 40% of the country's population remained illiterate. Given the tendency of patriarchal societies with limited resources to educate sons rather than daughters, and the strong

influence of Islam, it is not surprising that public opinion is inclined to believe that men are more in need of higher education than women.

Another important finding is that, although all independent variables at the individual level showed a very high level of statistical significance ($p\text{-value} < 0.001$), the influence of public policy, as well as socio-economic factors at the country level on the perception of women in the public sphere is much more limited. Inequality in access to social benefits, GDP, crime and corruption, and state religion are not correlated with the performance of both dependent variables. In all cases, $p\text{-value} > 0.05$.

Based on this, it can be argued that gender stereotypes are reproduced in society, relying on ideas borrowed from previous generations, and are more persistent than the social background formed by the state agenda. I suppose that the reason for this phenomenon lies in the duration of the impact: gender roles have been formed and consolidated in a patriarchal society for many centuries. In addition, the possibility of critical reflection on the provisions of traditionalism and state policy is also different. The difference in the roles of men and women is one of the first phenomena that a child encounters when growing up: the father goes to work, the mother brings up the children, and looks after the house. Even if the child grows up in an incomplete family where the mother combines the functions of breadwinner and housekeeper, she or she will not lack examples of more “traditional” families that they see from their peers. Moreover, these stereotypes are transmitted verbally and non-verbally everywhere, including outside the family. While much of what a child learns from close relatives in childhood is subject to critical analysis in the future based on information from other sources, in this case he or she has nowhere to get information that would directly contradict what he heard in the family. In addition, boys usually have little incentive to challenge the dominance of men, while girls are

pressured from an early age to be conformable, and by the time they grow up, they tend to learn to live up to their assigned roles. Unequal distribution of resources and additional responsibilities assigned to women hinder their independence from men, which leads to the reproduction of this model. The assimilation of these rules in early childhood leads to the fact that they become part of the basic understanding of the world. Changing them is possible if the child observes many different family models and sees examples of both women and men performing the entire range of work, not limited to those that are prescribed only to men or only to women. However, such social changes are a matter of a long time, during which several generations change. It is noteworthy that GDP and other economic indicators are only indirectly related to this: although the chance of equal representation of men and women in the public sphere often increases with the country's welfare (Löfström, 2009, Falk and Hermle, 2018), this study shows that by itself it does not solve the problem of gender stereotypes. However, I assume that when the greater (and substantive) representation of women in politics, economics, and higher education is achieved, this can form a social background that is then reflected in the perception of new generations. This may explain the fact that the proportion of women in parliament shows a high level of correlation with the perception of women in politics and other spheres, while there is no correlation with GDP for both variables.

Compared to traditionalist attitudes integrated into society, state policy is more opportunistic in nature. Nevertheless, judging by the results of the study, it, unlike economic factors, has a significant effect on the formation of stereotypes about gender roles as they create favorable conditions for the manifestation of already existing views. For example, a formal ban on same-sex marriage may lead to more frequent manifestations of hostility towards gays and lesbians. In addition, the results for attitudes towards homosexuals at the individual and state levels show consistency not only with each other, but also with the attitude of respondents towards women

in politics, economics, and higher education. Thus, it can be argued that this aspect is best correlated with traditionalist views related to gender roles.

However, the key aspects of the political agenda might not penetrate the public consciousness deep enough to fundamentally change the worldview of people. This may explain why, even in countries where governments have made consistent efforts to ensure greater representation of women in politics (for example, Norway), despite their high percentage in parliaments, the population remained skeptical decades later (Matland and Studlar, 1996).

Although the independent variables of the individual level demonstrate high statistical significance, its level differs several times (see Table 3). So, in the case of religiosity, the beta-value is -0.33 (the minus is due to the negative relationship between the level of adherence to religion and the belief that women can be as good political leaders as men), but in the case of a preference given to a strong leader, it is equal to 0.68, and in the case of attitudes towards homosexuality - 0.11. It is assumed that this effect is caused by the growing level of secularization in many (although not all) modern societies and, as a consequence, the decline in the importance of religion (Inglehart, 2020) against the background of persisting traditionalist attitudes that are transmitted through other mechanisms. The link between religiosity and perceptions of gender roles may be stronger in theocratic countries, where the importance of role separation is emphasized by the teachings of state religion. However, in more secularized countries, such relationships are less pronounced. This is explained both by the fact that in such countries even highly religious people have the opportunity to more selectively approach the teaching, choosing its most acceptable aspects for themselves, and by the fact that traditionalist attitudes continue to be present even in atheistic societies. At the same time, based on empirical observations, it can be assumed that religion gives traditionalism

an ideological rationale, thus creating an additional level of support, in the absence of which traditionalist attitudes are eroded faster under the influence of modernization changes.

Moreover, the state religion, being a powerful ideological pillar of traditionalism in theocracies, can be just a formality in other conditions, as evidenced by the indicators of this variable: its p-value is 0.63 in the case of the first dependent variable and 0.8 in the case of the second. For example, in a state where secular power is more influential than religious, religion can be perceived as a convenient tool for achieving political goals, for example, rallying the nation around common traditions (Beyers 2015). However, in this case, religious leaders do not have the ability to determine the political course and fight for their own influence, and the balance of power is carefully controlled. Russia is a good example in this respect. According to article 14 of the Constitution, “The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one.” (*Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 14.*, n.d.). In doing so, the government is taking numerous steps to reinforce the relevance of religion, with an emphasis on Orthodoxy. In practice, however, there is a desire to use religion as a unifying nucleus behind this. In 2020, an amendment to Article 67 of the Constitution was adopted, mentioning God, which contradicts the above article: “The Russian Federation, united by a thousand-year history, preserving the memory of ancestors who passed on to us ideals and faith in God, as well as the continuity in the development of the Russian state, historically recognizes established state unity” (Antonov, 2020). Nevertheless, de facto Russia really remains a secular state (60.5% of the population argue that religion is not important in their daily lives (NationMaster, 2014)), which means that this or that religion is unlikely to have a significant impact on the formation of gender stereotypes in Russia. The high level of positive correlation between the level of government restrictions on religion and attitudes towards

women in the public sphere also indicates an indirect influence of secularization on weakening the influence of traditionalism.

The correlation with indicators of government restrictions imposed on religion, although statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), is not as pronounced as in the case of personal religiosity. First, a high level of restrictions can be characteristic of both a state striving for a high level of secularization (for example, China) and a state whose policy is aimed at protecting the dominant status of a particular religion (for example, Iraq). Second, even in the first case, religious policy determines only the external social background, while adherence to religious values is often transmitted at the family level (Dudley and Dudley, 1986). The influence of religion at the individual level can remain strong if several generations have not changed since the beginning of active secularization. Nevertheless, there is a definite connection between government restrictions on religion and attitudes towards women in politics and other key areas. A high GRI level may indicate an ideological confrontation between the dominant religion and the rest of the denominations. In turn, this may be an indicator that, due to the significant role of religion, society is traditionalist in its views.

The preference for a strong authoritarian leader and the perception of homosexuals are highly correlated with both dependent variables. The reason for this, most likely, is also the lagging of democratic values at the individual level in comparison with the state. Even if the state actively promotes the policy of equality, the individual preferences of the population remain the same. Although such a policy can influence the values of young people who socialize in the new environment (the correlation of both dependent variables with age is very high), it cannot be expected to change the views of those who initially adhered to expressed traditionalist values. Both same-sex marriage and general democratization of the population

are relatively new phenomena that have not managed to gain a foothold in society. Even in the recognized “old” democracies, the idea of universal equality (class, gender, racial, etc.) has only begun to be widely discussed in recent decades. In addition, the positive attitude of Western traditionalists towards a leader who can afford to act without taking into account the opinion of the parliament and the population can be explained by dissatisfaction with bureaucracy and political crises caused by “excessive” deliberation, especially in conditions of high party fragmentation. For traditionalists inclined to idealize the past and do not consider democracy to be of value in itself, having a strong leader may seem to be a means of solving all the problems associated with it. For more conservative societies, authoritarian leadership is often a characteristic model of governance, and the population usually does not have the opportunity to reanalyze its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, despite the fact that within each country at the individual level there are adherents of both traditionalist and democratic values, public policy is not able to significantly affect the personal attitude of people towards women in the public sphere.

Most of the control variables at the individual level are statistically significant, ranging from $p < 0.001$ for gender, age, the number of children, and income to $p < 0.01$ for employment status. These results can be considered predictable. Women are more likely to believe that female politicians, business executives, and students are not less successful than men, compared to male respondents. Age is negatively correlated with a benevolent attitude towards women in the public sphere: the older the respondent, the more likely he or she will give preference to men. Income distribution is also highly correlated with both dependent variables: on average, the higher the income, the more positive attitudes towards women in politics and other key areas. However, the richest group is the exception, as it exhibits the same attitude as the poorest. Two possible explanations can be offered for this: the underrepresentation of wealthy

respondents in the sample (in this case, the result does not show a general trend, but the opinion of several individuals) and the fact that men occupying the highest positions in society are more inclined to perceive women as competitors. However, the mean of the sample is 4.75 with standard deviation equal to 2.58, which is close enough to 5, i.e. the second option can be considered more likely. Employment status for women in politics shows less statistical significance than for the index, which may be associated with a greater public consensus regarding female politicians (such a consensus is evidenced by the fact that in all countries the indicators for the first variable are lower than for the second, see Table 1). However, the index also includes questions about attitudes towards female business executives and the necessity of higher education for girls, and this can affect the discrepancy between those who make money and those who do not. First, in the context of limited resources, preference is often given to men, and the results of this study confirm this: respondents who work for money are more likely to believe that women have the right to occupy leadership positions in business and study at universities, while the answers of the unemployed demonstrate the opposite trend. Secondly, the category of those who do not work for money includes pensioners, who are the most conservative group due to their older age. In general, the control variables at the individual level, as well as the independent variables at the same level, are characterized by a high level of statistical significance.

Country-level control variables, by contrast, do not show any significance. While it might be assumed that variables such as the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index or the crime rate, which are related to the standard of living of individuals, can shape their opinion of women in the public sphere in the same way as the level of income or employment status, in practice they do not have any effect. The assumption that GDP per capita correlates with a positive attitude towards women due to the fact that it may indicate a society's tendency towards

democratization (countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which are obvious outliers, were excluded from the sample) is not confirmed. In the case of both dependent variables, the p-value for GDP is higher than 0.9. The level of corruption in society also does not affect the perception of women's success in politics, business and higher education.

Thus, this study allows us to distinguish two main trends. First, the indicator of attitudes toward women in politics in all countries is lower than the aggregate indicator of attitudes toward women in politics, business and higher education. Second, the personal traditionalist views of individuals have a consistently high level of significance. The results of the study also provide an opportunity for a more detailed comparison of the degree of influence that each of the variables has on attitudes towards women in the public sphere. The most significant were government restrictions on religion and the legal status of same-sex marriage, with beta equal to -0.151 and 0.14, respectively. They are followed by the individual level of homophobia and gender with beta = 0.114. Although it could be assumed that gender would be in the first place among all variables due to its extremely high not only statistical, but also substantive significance, some of the sociocultural factors have greater predictive potential. The proportion of women in national parliaments (beta = 0.104) and the preference for a strong leader (0.068) can also be seen as highly significant. An intermediate position is occupied by the respondent's level of religiosity (-0.033), age (-0.025), income (0.016), and the number of children (-0.016). The least significant variable is employment status with beta equal to 0.009. This result is likely due to the inclusion of students into the group of unemployed, while their result is not typical in relation to the rest of the subgroups.

Conclusion

Thus, it is my finding that cultural factors, on average, have a greater influence on attitudes towards women in politics than socio-economic ones. In addition, the importance of the latter also depends on the extent to which they are interconnected with the life circumstances of a particular individual. As shown in this work, social and economic factors that are directly related to it (such as age, income, and availability of work) do have a significant impact on their willingness to positively perceive the activities of women who transcend the gender role that prescribes them to remain within the private sphere. However, an unexpected finding was that national-wide factors such as GDP do not necessarily allow predicting the attitude of its population towards women in politics. While richer countries may have a large proportion of the population that has a higher income and is friendly to women in the public sphere, which gives the impression that GDP determines the level of gender discrimination, in practice this is not the case. The lack of statistical significance of GDP, while the statistical significance of individual income is very high, indicates a different trend. In each country there is a division according to the level of income, access to social benefits, opportunities to find a job, etc., which determines the lifestyle and worldview, both individual and of the social environment with which a person interacts. Accordingly, stratification exists at the level of social groups, not countries. There is a greater chance that the poor in Germany will share views on the gender roles of the poor in Albania than those of their richer compatriots. The main difference is that the proportion of such citizens with a low standard of living in Albania will be higher than in Germany.

With regard to social policy at the state level, a different picture is observed. The presence of gender quotas and official religion are rather formal criteria that do not directly affect the worldview and do not form its socially acceptable framework. However, the proportion of women in parliament, restrictions on religion and the status of same-sex marriage are a consequence of the general level of traditionalism characteristic of a particular state. Since the study excluded those countries where the percentage of women in parliament was artificially raised to 50% or more, and where this does not reflect the real participation of women in political decision-making, as well as the prevalence of gender stereotypes among the population, the results can be considered to reflect the real situation. In this case, the high percentage of women in parliament is the result of a long struggle for gender equality. This manifests itself even if there are quotas in the country (since, with the exception of the UAE, they do not reach 50%), as well as if the electoral and party systems favor the representation of women in politics: if women were able to achieve high representation, this can be the evidence of fairly favorable conditions. However, these conditions did not arise overnight, but were the result of long-term social transformations. This is also evidenced by the fact that the index showed higher indicators than the attitude towards women in politics separately. This was achieved mainly due to the question of the need for higher education for women. Less than 200 years ago, it was much more difficult to imagine a female student than now the female president of a country. Nevertheless, decades of mass education for women in universities have shaped the public perception of higher education for girls as a self-evident continuation of schooling.

Government restrictions on religion may indicate the key role of a certain ideology (most often, a certain religion, although, for example, in the case of communist countries, such an ideology may also be secular), which is protected from competition from the carriers of other ideologies. The presence or absence of a state religion does not play a significant role in this, obviously

due to the fact that this feature is often formal: not all states prescribe in the constitution or other legislative acts the dominant position of one religion, while in practice it can be fully supported. At the same time, even if such a clause, which is a tribute to traditions, exists, this does not mean that such a religion is dominant in practice. Restrictions on religion are indicative of real action taken by the government to protect its status, and therefore better reflect the current situation. In any case, this confirms the assumption of a connection between traditionalism and religion, which, however, is not straightforward. The beta weight of the GRI is significantly higher than that of the individual level of religiosity, which indicates that the social background that favors the manifestation of traditionalist views regarding gender roles is more important than personal adherence to religion. The same applies to the status of same-sex marriage. In the event that the state openly declares the unacceptability of homosexual relations, its population is socialized in conditions of open homophobia and a strict separation of gender roles, which leads to a more negative attitude towards women in the public sphere.

In contrast to the previous group of variables, all socio-economic factors at the individual level showed high statistical significance. The most influential of these is gender: unsurprisingly, women are clearly far more likely to have a positive view of female politicians. Age also influences the perception of women in politics: older respondents were more skeptical about their activities than younger ones. Income also predicts attitudes towards female politicians: the general trend is that the higher the income, the more positive this attitude is. The more children there are in the family, the more negatively the respondents, on average, treated women in politics and the public sphere. Employment status also has some impact, albeit to a lesser extent: working people are less skeptical of women in politics.

Finally, the most important group of factors in this study is associated with various aspects of the traditionalist worldview. All of them demonstrate a very high level of statistical significance. However, their influence on attitudes towards female politicians varies significantly. The lowest level of influence shows the degree of adherence to religion. In all likelihood, the trend towards secularization in most countries (although not in all) plays a key role in this. In this case, the importance of religion in the life of an individual may decrease, but other cultural and socio-economic factors still remain in force, allowing gender discrimination to remain at the same level. The influence of preference for a strong leader is more than twice that of religion. This aspect is very closely related to the distribution of gender roles. Traditionalists may believe that women in key positions in politics and business undermine the concept of leadership as a purely masculine sphere, in which a woman is not able to succeed due to the lack of such “masculine” qualities as assertiveness, the ability to stand on her own and achieve her goals. The increase in the number of women political leaders and business executives casts doubt on the validity of this principle. I believe that the relatively low level of influence of this factor is associated with the wording of the question (“Is having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections good or bad?”). While in some traditional societies, the authority of a sole monarch or leader may be welcomed or taken for granted, most respondents live in modern societies where the separation of powers and the orientation of politicians towards the opinion of the voters are not only a value, but also a fundamental principle of organizing the political system. This could have caused some of the otherwise traditionalist respondents to give a negative assessment of this type of leadership. However, I believe that if the question did not stipulate that strong leadership means the denial of democratic institutions, it could demonstrate a greater degree of influence on attitudes towards women in politics. The degree of homophobia, also associated with the distribution of gender roles, shows the greatest influence from this group of factors. This points to the fact that

the social hierarchy based on the separation of the roles of men and women is still one of the key obstacles for women wishing to pursue a career in politics. Even if they have the necessary qualities and resources to do so, the traditionalist principle that a woman cannot be a leader, especially if it involves ruling over men, continues to be the reason that voters are more likely to choose a male candidate.

Thus, the degree of expression of individual traditionalist views plays one of the most important roles in shaping attitudes towards women in politics along with the presence of resources and the egalitarianism of the country's culture. In the absence of measures aimed at blurring the boundaries between gender roles (in particular, the promotion of female leadership and male household chores and childcare at the state level), public opinion will change at a slow pace. Although the representation of women with real powers in politics is beneficial as new generations are socialized in these conditions, substantive changes take decades. Consistent government policies that would take into consideration cultural factors and be aimed at reducing the importance of gender roles can significantly speed up this process.

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Appendix

Figures

Attitude toward female politicians by state

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do
1 - Strongly agree, 4 - Strongly disagree




Figure 1. The distribution of the average attitudes towards women as political leaders

Tables

Table 1. Means for the dependent variables by country

Country	Variable I	Variable II
<i>Europe</i>		
Germany	3.39	3.44
Sweden	3.33	3.44
Netherlands	3.18	3.28
Spain	3.09	3.13
Slovenia	2.96	3.08
Greece	2.95	3.10
Romania	2.80	2.98
Cyprus	2.76	2.95
Ukraine	2.57	2.67
Estonia	2.52	2.84
Russia	2.31	2.53
<i>Americas</i>		
Argentina	3.15	3.19
USA	3.13	3.23
Peru	3.02	3.06
Guatemala	3.01	3.10
Brazil	2.99	3.05
Mexico	2.96	3.05
Bolivia	2.88	2.91
Ecuador	2.88	2.90
Chile	2.85	2.93
Colombia	2.81	2.88
Nicaragua	2.77	2.82
<i>Asia</i>		
Japan	2.85	2.99
Hong Kong	2.78	2.85
Thailand	2.52	2.62
China	2.45	2.69
Turkey	2.45	2.62
South Korea	2.42	2.57
Kazakhstan	2.41	2.57
Vietnam	2.39	2.57
Iran	2.34	2.47
Philippines	2.31	2.44
Bangladesh	2.19	2.32
Indonesia	2.12	2.29
Myanmar	2.04	2.14
Jordan	1.87	2.37
Pakistan	1.71	1.89
<i>Africa</i>		
Ethiopia	2.68	2.92
Zimbabwe	2.55	2.85
Tunisia	2.24	2.55
Nigeria	1.87	2.21
<i>Oceania</i>		
New Zealand	3.41	3.45
Australia	3.36	3.49
Total mean	2.72	2.86

Source: World Values Survey

Note: Variable I - the attitude towards female politicians, Variable II - index

Table 2. The distribution and the correlation of variables

Variable	Unit	Min	Max	Mean (SD)	Correlation with Variable I	Variance (SD), Variable I	Correlation with Variable II	Variance (SD), Variable I
<i>Independent variables, individual level</i>								
How important is God in your life?	1-10, 1 - not at all important, 10 - very important	1	10	7.23 (3.3)	-0.173***	< 0.001 (0.02)	-0.196***	< 0.001 (0.02)
Having a strong leader is good or bad?	1-4, 1 - very good, 4 - very bad	1	4	2.52 (1.05)	0.132***	0.002 (0.04)	0.173***	0.002 (0.04)
Is homosexuality justifiable?	1-10, 1 - never justifiable, 10 - always justifiable	1	10	3.83 (3.34)	0.327***	< 0.001 (0.02)	0.351***	< 0.001 (0.02)
<i>Control variables, individual level</i>								
Gender	1 = male (dummy)	1	2	1.52 (0.499)	0.119***	0.008 (0.09)	0.143***	0.006 (0.08)
Age	Years	16	103	42.75 (16.31)	0.032***	< 0.001 (0.002)	0.025***	< 0.001 (0.002)
Income	Income group, from 1 to 10	1	10	4.75 (2.08)	0.073***	< 0.001 (0.01)	0.08***	< 0.001 (0.01)
Children	Number of children in the family	0	24	1.79 (1.71)	-0.086***	< 0.001 (0.002)	-0.1***	< 0.001 (0.002)
Employment status	1 = paid work (dummy)	0	1	0.59 (0.49)	-0.009*	0.002 (0.05)	-0.009*	< 0.001 (0.003)
<i>Independent variables, country level</i>								
Gender quotas	1 = legislated quotas (dummy)	0	1	0.49 ((0.49)	-0.077***	0.06 (0.2)	-0.094***	0.006 (0.08)
Proportion of women in national parliaments	Percentage	6	48	25.85 (10.61)	0.261***	< 0.001 (0.005)	0.277***	< 0.001 (0.003)
Government Restrictions Index (religion)	1-10, from 0 - no restrictions to 10 - absolute restriction	0.8	9.3	4.23 (2.58)	-0.306***	< 0.001 (0.007)	-0.323***	< 0.001 (0.009)
State religion	1 = yes (dummy)	0	1	0.36 (0.48)	-0.222***	0.04 (0.2)	-0.252***	0.08 (0.3)
Legal status of same-sex marriage	-3-3, from 3 - same-sex marriage is legal to -3 - death penalty for homosexuality	-3	3	0.6(1.8)	0.371***	0.002 (0.04)	0.391***	0.002 (0.04)
<i>Control variables, country level</i>								
GDP	USD	855	60755	18065.55 (18532.93)	0.313***	< 0.001 (< 0.001)	0.344***	< 0.001 (0.002)
Crime Index	0-100, 0 - safest, 100 - most criminalized	13.73	70.55	44.96 (11.38)	-0.064***	< 0.001 (0.005)	-0.088***	< 0.001 (0.005)
Corruption Perceptions Index	0-100, 0 - highly corrupt, 100 - very clean	22	93	45.97 (19.43)	0.274***	< 0.001 (0.002)	0.316***	< 0.001 (0.003)
Inequality Adjusted Human Development Indicator	0-1, 0 - most unequal, 1 - absolutely equal	0.35	0.86	0.653 (0.14)	0.28***	0.12 (0.3)	0.312***	0.2 (0.5)

Significance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Source: World Values Survey, World Bank, Numbeo, UN, Pew Research Center

Note: Variable I - the attitude towards female politicians, Variable II - index

Table 3. Coefficients of the variables in multilevel models

Variables	Estimate (SE), Variable I	Beta, Variable I	Estimate, Variable II	Beta, Variable II
Level of religiosity	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.33	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.019
Preference for a strong leader	0.059*** (0.004)	0.068	0.065*** (0.003)	0.092
Attitude toward homosexuality	0.031*** (0.001)	0.114	0.027*** (0.001)	0.123
Gender	0.209*** (0.007)	0.114	0.205*** (0.006)	0.135
Age	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.024	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.041
Income	0.007*** (0.002)	0.016	0.009*** (0.001)	0.025
Children	-0.008*** (0.002)	- 0.016	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.022
Employment status	0.017** (0.007)	0.009	0.023*** (0.006)	0.015
Gender quotas	-0.127 (0.07)		-0.109 (0.07)	
Proportion of women in parliaments	0.009* (0.003)	0.104	0.007* (0.003)	0.107
GRI	-0.054** (0.018)	-0.151	-0.042* (0.017)	-0.146
State religion	0.038 (0.079)		0.005 (0.08)	
Legal status of same-sex marriage	0.071* (0.03)	0.139	0.052 (0.03)	
GDP	0.000007 (0.000005)		0.000002 (0.000005)	
Crime Index	0.003 (0.004)		0.003 (0.004)	
Corruption Perceptions Index	-0.008 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.004)	
HDI	0.513 (0.45)		0.549 (0.43)	

Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Source: World Values Survey, World Bank, Numbeo, UN, Pew Research Center

Note: Variable I - the attitude towards female politicians, Variable II - index