The Racialization of the Politics of Reproduction in Hungary since 2010

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Abstract:

Since Viktor Orbán and his nationalist Fidesz party came to power in Hungary, not only was political democracy undermined by the gradual dismantling of its institutions, but the welfare functions of the state were also profoundly transformed. In family policy, this meant a shift away from universal transfers to transfers aimed at groups deemed "deserving" by the government. This paper investigates how the discursive construction of these categories may be racialized and the ideological function of these racializations. It also assesses the material impact this new approach in family policy has on Hungary´s Romani population. To determine the Racial disproportionality of the new policies' material impact that ties support to taxable income, it assesses the racial gaps in Hungary´s labour market. Finally, to evaluate the ideological role anti-Roma racism plays in shaping and justifying Hungarian family policy, it analyses texts by elites. It concludes that while institutional racism was always present in the Hungarian welfare system, the new approach to family deepens this as the Roma are significantly less likely to access these transfers than their non-Roma peers. It also confirms that racialization plays a significant, although not exclusive role in constructing deserving and undeserving groups.

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1: Introduction

1.1: Counter-revolution in the ballot-box

Since Viktor Orbán ascended to power in Hungary two years after the global financial crisis with a sweeping supermajority that allowed him to enact constitutional changes, the Hungarian state, including its welfare functions, has been profoundly transformed. Not only was democratic citizenship undermined by an increasingly authoritarian style of governance, but the new "Basic Law' and subsequent policy changes have also done away with "social citizenship" by making it clear that the state no longer has an unconditional obligation to strive for the welfare of all of its citizens (Szikra: 2014). Amongst these changes was the open rejection of the European Social Model or what Orbán called the "western welfare state" in favour of a "workfare state" or "work-based society" (Szikra, 2018:1). While the "punitive turn" in welfare was already underway from 2008 under the premiership of Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai, the Orbán government took much more radical steps in this direction (Vidra, 2018). Amongst the"flagship" policy innovations of the new "system of national cooperation" was reducing the availability of jobseekers allowance to three months and making any further assistance conditional upon the participation in punitive public works programmes organised by local municipalities. A more recent change is the transformation of family support policy. While universal transfers on which the poorest are relying were gradually losing their value due to inflation, new targeted transfers such as tax incentives

were introduced to subsidise families deemed “deserving” by the state, particularly those in regular employment with sufficient income (Inglot: 2020, Szikra 2018). Similarly to the transformation in and after 1989, the welfare and family policy that followed Orbán´s “revolution in the ballot box”, a deliberate policy of upward redistribution was introduced, as well as cutbacks to the safety nets that supports the most vulnerable. However, the scale of the impact of the two events is not comparable (Szikra:2018: 6). Due to their position determined by the intersecting power structures of class, race and gender, the biggest losers of both transformations were Hungary´s Roma in general and Romani women in particular (Kóczé: 2020, Vincze: 2014). While in 1989 the combination of post-communist de-industrialization and institutional racism pushed many Roma into long-term unemployment, the Orbán regime´s punitive turn contributed to their further marginalisation and put many at the mercy of local elites, sometimes creating neo-feudal personalistic dependency (Ferge: 2008, Ladányi and Szelényi: 2006, Szikra: 2014). While there is a relatively rich scholarship discussing the material impact and the ideological and discursive function of Hungary´s infamous public works programme with some limited focus on its racialized aspect, the country s subsequent changes to family support policy so far were subjected to somewhat less scholarly scrutiny. While the changes in Hungary´s family support policy are disproportionally disadvantaging the Roma, neither the racialized material impact of the policy changes nor racialized discourses in which they are embedded were sufficiently accounted for by previous research (Kózcé: 2020). By assessing the racialized material impact of Orbán´s new politics of reproduction and analysing the discursive and ideological formulations which it is shaped by or are deployed for its justification, this paper aims to fill this gap in existing research.

1.2: The contradictions of Orbán´s social policy

According to Bohle and Greskovits, the model followed by the countries of the Visegrád group after 1989 can be described as embedded neoliberalism as these countries underwent a neoliberal transformation while also retaining a relatively robust social safety net and establishing institutions of industrial policy, which is in stark contrast to the market radical path followed by the Baltic states(Bohle and Greskovits: 2007). They also investigated the changes to Hungary´s policy after 2010 and concluded that despite loud rhetoric of populism and economic nationalism and an eclectic mix of seemingly contradictory policies, the country did not depart from the "Visegrad model" of embedded neoliberalism (Bohle and Greskovits: 2019).

There were also some seemingly contradictory changes in social policy in general and family policy in particular. Szikra observed that the government's social policy contains étatist-paternalistic, neoliberal and neoconservative elements (Szikra: 2018). This eclecticism, however, does not mean that there is no consistent underlying principle guiding policymakers in Hungary. On the contrary, according to Szombati, there is a "dual state" in operation that divides its subjects into "deserving" and "undeserving" groups and allocates resources to the deserving while enacting punitive measures on the undeserving (Szombati: 2018). In the light of this, the apparent contradictions of Orbán´s social policy make more sense. The Hungarian dual state may show a neoconservative face to some and a paternalistic one to others. In other words, how much one benefits from the "embeddedness" of Hungarian neoliberalism depends to a great degree on whether one belongs to populations designated as "deserving" or "undeserving" by the country´s ruling elites. Some may benefit from generous state subsidies, while others are left unprotected from the "ravages of the satanic mill" and can easily find

themselves forced into hyperexploitative arrangements resembling a “Dickensian” poor house (Polányi: 1944, Bohle and Greskovits: 2019, Szikra: 2018).

Family policy is admittedly a key biopolitical tool deployed by the Orbán regime. This paper aims to account for the quantifiable material impact of these policies on the racialized Romani population in Hungary while also analysing the racialized discourses that may shape these policies or may be deployed by elites to their justification. While other changes to social policy, notably the punitive shift from “welfare to workfare”, has been at the focus of existing scholarship even with some limited acknowledgement of racialization, except for works by Szikra and Inglot, Orbán´s more recent policy of offering generous tax incentives to incentivise procreation was thus far not subjected to similar scholarly scrutiny. Furthermore, in both the case of the punitive turn and the shift away from universal transfers in family support as well as Hungarian social policy in general, there has been relatively little scholarship with a solid intersectional focus, and the role of the racialization of the Roma in Hungary has been thus far in general understudied (Kóczé: 2020). While colour-blind scholarship focusing almost exclusively on the class position of the Roma poor may be well-intended attempts to avoid reproducing essentialising categories, they can also obscure racialized forms of social exclusion that intersect with the class position and gender of the Roma poor and thus produce and reproduce the racialized and gendered social exclusion of a significant proportion of Hungary´s Romani population (Kózcé: 2020). By studying the role of racialization with a particular focus on Hungary´s family policy, this paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of some of the mechanisms behind the workings of Hungary´s “dual state”.

1.3: Outline and methodology

In the following chapters, I will critically review existing scholarship on Hungarian social policy in general and the family policy of the Orbán regime in particular to identify potential gaps in knowledge as well as to account for the role "colourblind" social science may play in obscuring the impact of racialization on the production and reproduction of the social and economic exclusion of the Roma. While doing so, I will apply the insights of critical responses to theories of "underclass formation" and "the culture of poverty" formulated in the North-American context on mainstream scholarship discussing the situation of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe.

Before discussing the recent changes, I will also present a brief historical overview of changes to the Hungarian welfare system up till 2010, with a particular focus on the politics of reproduction and how it affected the Roma.

As a counterfactual, I will also discuss the case of Poland. In Poland, a regime with an otherwise similar ideological and policy orientation and similarly nationalist and pro-natalist rhetoric opted for universal transfers instead of subsidising better-off families with tax incentives.

Finally, I will analyse the racialization of the politics of reproduction under the Orbán regime on two levels. First, I will present and analyse statistical data that quantifies the policy´s racially differentiated impact. Second, I will analyse the potentially racialized content or subtext of multiple texts formulated by Hungarian elites to understand how racialization might shape or justify particular policy preferences and how it may be used to essentialise categories deemed worthy or unworthy of support. While in some cases, overt racialization makes the deployment of hermeneutic methods unnecessary, I will use critical discourse analysis (CDA) to detect and interpret covert racializations.

1.4: Race: Conceptual clarification

In this paper, I will break with the tendency of most Central and Eastern European scholars and use the concept of racialization rather than "ethnicity" as an analytical category since the subject of my inquiry is not the subjective identity of the Roma but how social structures act upon them and how they are "essentialised" by public discourse. Race, however, is not understood here as a collection of visible biological features; it is rather a structure of domination that is created and reinforced by hegemonic discourses. The boundaries of "whiteness" are far from being fixed biological features. Not only are they socially constructed, but they are also constantly contested and renegotiated and might lie elsewhere in different contexts. While in the United States, for example, as a legacy of the "one-drop blood" rule designed to keep the slave population growing, a person with any black ancestry is considered black, in Brazil, people with mixed ancestry are not. While populations with darker skin have historically often been racialized, no specific visible features are needed for this, as we have seen in the historical racialization of the Irish by Anglo-Saxon majorities in the US and Britain. According to Foucault, power is not a possession but an act. As he put it, "power is not a noun but a verb" (Foucalut: 1978). Applying this insight on the enactment of power that is the subject of this paper, we should also see race as something that is done rather than something that "is".

2: Literature review

2.1: Embedded neoliberalism and the dual state

When analyzing the varieties of capitalism that emerged in East-Central Europe after the fall of communism, Bohle and Greskovits identify three different economic models. These are the market radical policies of "pure neoliberalism" adopted by the baltic countries, the neo-corporatist model followed by Slovenia and the "embedded neoliberalism" of countries of the Visegrád group (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Czechia) (Bohle and Greskovits: 2007). Building on Polányi´s ideas of market embeddedness and disembeddedness as well as the concept of "embedded liberalism" that was used to describe the Bretton Woods system, they conclude that while the Visegrád countries did embrace neoliberalism, they also establish institutions of industrial policy and some social policy instruments that were used to alleviate some of the social problems and conflicts cause by the transition. It is because of these instruments that, according to Bohle and Greskovits, the "Visegrád model" of neoliberalism merits the adjective "embedded".

In 2018 they revisited the topic focusing on Hungary to assess whether the changes to Hungary´s social and economic policy implemented since Viktor Orbán came to power in 2010 pushed the country into a different model (Bohle and Greskovits: 2018). They contrast the rhetoric of economic nationalism with the material reality of continued FDI dependency. While some sectoral taxes targeted certain foreign-owned firms, mainly in the banking and media sectors, others, notably German-owned car manufacturers, continue to receive generous subsidies. In the area of social policy, they recognise that there have been very

significant changes, most notably the introduction of a punitive public works programme targeting the unemployed that disproportionally hurts the country´s Roma population (Bohle and Greskovits: 2018: 1080). After contrasting the Orbán regime´s "loud rhetoric" of social populism and economic nationalism with the quantifiable changes to Hungary´s economy and social spending, they concluded that despite some limited diversification thanks to EU funds and remittances sent home by migrants as well as some overall reduction of social spending, the changes are not significant enough to mean a departure from the Visegrád model of embedded neoliberalism. The authors demonstrate that as far as statistical data on FDI dependency and welfare spending are concerned there has been more continuity than change while also acknowledging that changes to the welfare system affect different groups differently, notably that the changes disproportionally hurt the poor and the Roma. The overall quantifiable level of social spending, for example, can indicate the country´s overall degree of market embeddedness. However, it is an aggregate that tells little about how the advantages and protections offered by this embeddedness are distributed amongst different social groups or how they are experienced locally. The punitive shift from welfare to workfare, for example, might not translate into significantly reduced social spending as it is a relatively expensive measure that thus far proved to be ineffective at integrating its participants into the regular labour market (Szikra: 2014). Despite this, however, it radically alters the experience of those who relied on previous forms of assistance and increased the personal risk associated with shifting demand on the labour market (Szikra:2018). Thanks to its punitive function and severe violation of the personal freedom of participating individuals, similarly to how critics of the 1834 English poor law did, it might be argued that "public works" is not even strictly a welfare measure but something that belongs in the grey zone between the welfare state and the carceral state. Taking this line of argument seriously would point in the direction of segregated disembeddedness as few would argue that the neoliberal

capitalism of the contemporary United State,s for example, is more embedded because of that country´s relatively high spending on its carceral state. Bohle and Greskovits recognise the differentiated impact of the policies that Szikra described as "contradictory" (Szikra 2014). While the authors demonstrated the continued existence of Hungary´s embedded neoliberalism, further qualitative and quantitative research is needed to account for the differentiated impact and ideological function of the shift away from universal transfers had on various populations. Hopefully, this endeavour could yield further adjectives that are to be added to Hungary´s embedded neoliberalism that explain the shift that took place after Orbán, similarly to the 1834 English poor law, abolished the "right to live" (Polányi, 1944: 86).

In his groundbreaking work on the political function of anti-Gypsyism in Hungarian politics, Szombati proposed the concept of the "dual state" to describe the ambiguous embeddedness of Hungary´s neoliberalism (Szombati: 2018). Szombati argues that partially as a response to the explicit anti-Roma mobilisation of the extreme-right Jobbik party, Orbán created a "dual state" that divides the population into "deserving" "hard-working" citizens and "undeserving" "social parasites" and deliberately adjusts its social policy to make life more comfortable for the former and as hard as possible for the latter (Szomati, 2018:166). While appeasing those in regular employment by generous tax incentives, debt forgiveness, and other subsidies, the Hungarian government actively sought to exclude the surplus population from social rights and discipline them by a punitive public work programme. While Szombati gives a detailed account of what I referred to as the "segregated embeddedness" of various populations, a more detailed analysis of the material impact of the policy changes, particularly on gendered and racialized populations, could lay the foundations of a more precise understanding of how Orbán´s dual state is operating. According to Szombati, the Orbán regime not only harnessed

the moral panic about “gipsy criminality” and integrated some of the demands of its extreme-right competitor into its policy agenda, but he owes the success of his hegemonic project to the creation of the dual state. The categories of “hard-working” and “social parasites” to which Orbán divided the Hungarian population in order to justify the dismantling of what remained of the institutions of social citizenship have a racialized subtext (Szombati:2018, Kóczé: 2020). While the assertion of Szombati and Kóczé according to which the subtext of “lazy” and “hard-working” are “Roma” and “white”, seems plausible, a more detailed qualitative analysis of how the origin and function of the discourses that construct what Szombati calls the “racist common sense” that shapes public policy in Hungary could help to elucidate further the role racialization plays in the workings of Orbán´s dual state. This paper aims at contributing to this by analysing some texts by which Hungarian elites justify their policy positions against the background of a “racist commons sense” (Szombati: 2018: 165). Szombati´s account is hugely insightful, but his over-reliance on colourblind categories such as “underclass” obscures the degree to which the dual state he identifies is racialized. A few critical questions and a stronger intersectional focus could further complicate his analysis. When for example, he explains that the working middle class fell into the deserving category while the long-term unemployed are undeserving and parasitic, it begs the question of why did people who experience deprivation due to foreign-currency debt fall into the deserving category. If we consistently follow the logic of the neoliberal ethic of self-reliance, indeed, people who took a risk, “spent money they do not have,” and expect the taxpayer to pick up the tab could also be framed as social parasites if it was in the interests of the elites driving the discussion. Instead, they were presented as hardworking and deserving people who fell victim to the predatory practices of banks and thus were bailed out by the state (Szombati: 2018).

Szombati´s account of Orbán´s "dual state" explains the contradictory policies discussed by Bohle and Greskovits, and Szikra. Hungary´s system of national cooperation has done away with universal social rights and instead allocates resources or punitive measures to groups it deems deserving or undeserving. This, however, does not stop at social policy. Similar distinctions are made when it comes to corporate welfare as well. While the differentiation of "foreign" and "Hungarian" entrepreneurs is used to justify corrupt practices, foreign capitalists are divided into categories of deserving "productive" and undeserving "speculative" capitalists. While "productive" capitalists, mainly German-owned manufacturers, enjoy generous subsidies, "speculative" ones like foreign-owned banks are hit with targeted taxes. While this endeavour is way beyond the scope and focus of this paper, an analysis of the subtext of the discourses of deserving and undeserving capitalists, particularly in the context of Hungary´s recent anti-Soros campaigns, might yield interesting results.

2:2: Racialization and academic discourse in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere

According to Kózcé, mainstream scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe has thus far failed to sufficiently account for the role of the racialization of the Roma in general and the gendered racionalisation of Romani women in the particular play as structuring factors (Kóczé: 2020). While scholars often acknowledge the way certain discourses are colour coded or the way specific policies disproportionally hurt the Roma, the tendency toward and overreliance on class and a preference for genderblind and colourblind analysis, even if well-

intended, obscures the way intersecting gendered and racialized power structures shape policy outcomes as well as the wellbeing of specific populations and individuals. Building on her general critique as well as on critical responses to "colourblind" social science in the American context, I will critically examine existing scholarship on the marginalisation of the Roma to identify blind spots in existing research.

Perhaps one of the most quoted works on the social and economic marginalisation of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe was written by Ladányi and Szelényi, who builds on Wilson´s influentiall book on "underclass" formation in racially segregated inner cities in the US (Ladányi and Szelényi: 2006 and Wilson: 1987.) Wilson argued that the de-industrialization that accompanied the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism led to significant job losses among black Americans, many of whom were completely excluded from the mainstream economy and formed a new "underclass". According to Ladányi and Szelényi, something similar happened to the Roma in the "transitional societies" of Central and Eastern Europe. As Hungary and other countries with a significant Roma population transitioned from a command economy to a neoliberal variety of capitalism, "inefficient" factories that could not survive on the market were shut down, and even the remaining ones downsized their workforce as full employment was no longer a political goal. Under these conditions, the Roma, who were already overrepresented in the lower strata of the workforce under communist rule, were the first to be fired and the least likely to be re-hired as the economy improved by the mid-nineties. They argue that the transition disproportionately affected the Roma as structural job losses were compounded by racial discrimination (Ladányi and Szelényi: 9). While they acknowledge the role racism played in pushing many Roma into extreme deprivation after 1989, they also build on the theory of "the culture of poverty" first formulated by Oscar Lewis and claim that one of the significant factors in

maintaining deprivation is a specific present-oriented culture that is produced by poverty (Lewis: 1963, Wilson: 1987 Ladányi and Szelényi: 2006). In their view, the Roma who were excluded from the mainstream economic life of the country as a result of the racialized impact of the transition formed an underclass. The new Roma underclass, they claim, similarly to deprived communities elsewhere, adopted cultural patterns that help them survive day to day but also maintain their poverty in the long run. This supposed "culture of poverty" is present-oriented, solidaristic, highly egalitarian and involves mutually helping out one another, especially those in need by sharing food and accommodation, among other things. The authors reiterate the claim that these cultural patterns while helping the Roma underclass to cope with deprivation, keep them poor by hampering individual success as in a market economy, one must compete to succesed(Ladányi and Szelényi: 20). They even go as further as putting an implicit value judgement on these cultural patterns by advising against cash transfers without policies aiming at adjusting the values and cultural patterns of recipients to those of the middle class (Ladányi and Szelényi: 20). It is beyond the scope of this paper to reassess their empirical findings of the existence of such a culture but even without doing, so it is important to point out a number of issues with the concept. Their discussion of "the culture of poverty" is problematic for multiple reasons. First, it somewhat contradicts their earlier assumption about the role of racism in creating the "underclass" in the first place. By recommending policies that will make the Roma poor more individualistic and less altruistic to foster individual mobility, they obscure the impact of ongoing discrimination in the labour and housing markets and the ongoing segregation in education. The value judgement implicit in the recommendation is also problematic as it basically tells the people who were victimised by the dominant values of the existing society to adopt these values themselves instead of formulating a political response. Since the behaviours described by the authors are essentially the practice of what Kropotkin described as "mutual aid", one could turn their

recommendation on its head and suggest that adjusting the cultural patterns of the rest of society to these egalitarian and solidaristic patterns would be preferable to making the Roma poor more selfish and less egalitarian (Kropotkin: 1902). Indeed it is plausible that a more altruistic society would increase the welfare of everyone and not just the Roma, while the mobility of some Roma fostered by adopting individualistic values would still leave significant populations in extreme poverty. As Innis and Feagin put it their critique of Wilson´s use of the concept of the underclass and his reformulation of the idea of "the culture of poverty", underclass analysis downplays the role of racial discrimination and does not involve an indictment of the existing structure of society (Innis and Feagin: 1989). Another critique that was posed against´s Wilson´s argument that is also applicable to Ladányi´s and Szelényi´s work to an extent is that explaining the race entirely as a function of class is insufficient since the economic and political processes that resulted in the further marginalisation of a significant proportion of the urban black population were never colourblind, to begin with (McCombs: 2008). According to this view, the rise of neoliberalism in the US, which contributed to the destitution described by Wilson, partially owes its success to the resentment of the white population against the advancement of black civil rights. "Racial neoliberalism", which is justified by racialized discourses and had a racially disproportionate material impact, while served a variety of other purposes, was partially a "colourblind" method of maintaining white dominance in the post-civil rights era (McCombs:2018). While in Hungary, neoliberal capitalism has contributed to the reproduction and reinforcement of the racialization of poverty since 1989, it is unlikely that anti-gipsyism played a role in the fall of the Soviet economic model in Eastern Europe. For this reason, this aspect of the critique of Wilson´s work is less applicable to Ladányi and Szelényi, but it can be at the same time very useful when analyzing the changes that took place in the last decade.

While the transition from a state-managed economy to a neoliberal variety of capitalism devastated the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular, according to Szikra, the embeddedness of Central European neoliberalism identified by Bohle and Greskovits provided some degree of support to the losers of the transition in order to preserve stability (Szikra: 2014, Bohle and Greskovits: 2007). Szikra claims that this is in stark contrast with the punitive poverty governance of the Orbán regime. While Greskovits and Bohle demonstrated that despite this shift as far as the quantitative data on welfare spending is concerned, Hungary´s neoliberalism is still embedded, the selective exclusion of the most vulnerable does make a massive difference to the plight of the Roma (Szikra: 2018 and Szombati: 2018). Both Vidra and Szombai concluded that the growing populism and racist mobilisation in the late 2000s fell on fertile ground in a society in which the majority population felt increasingly vulnerable in the context of the 2008 global financial crises and that this contributed to the triumph of Orbán´s exclusionary and punitive model. When discussing the impact of the shift from welfare to workfare in unemployment support and the shift from universal transfers to tax incentives in family policy, both Vidra and Szikra acknowledge the disproportionate impact these policies have on the Roma, but they were criticised by Kózcé for failing to pay sufficient attention to gendered racialization and for not complicating their analysis with an intersectional focus (Kóczé: 2020). Kózcé also pointed out that Szikra uncritically reproduces notions such as “inactivity” and “welfare dependence”, but these notions are far from neutral (Kóczé: 2020, Baar: 2012). Perhaps the most striking example of how the lack of an intersectional focus can obscure the role of gendered racialization is a comparative study by Inglot in which he investigates why the otherwise similar regimes of Hungary and Poland opted for different ways to incentivise procreation. Inglot suggests that the Polish policy of universal cash transfers for families with children

was more successful in reducing migratory and fertility pressures and significantly reducing poverty (Inglot: 2020). He concludes that these two countries divergent policy choices and Poland´s better success when measured against the benchmarks chosen by the author are the results of a combination of institutional legacies and political factors. When discussing these political factors, he suggests, among other things, that Hungary has a more centralised structure of decision-making and that the government does not consult civil society as much as the Polish one, which leads to inferior policy outcomes (Inglot: 2020). In general, few would disagree with the assertion that consulting with the relevant civil society organisations is a good idea, his lack of engagement with other political factors, most notably that of racialization, is a massive blind spot in his analysis. While other scholars researching the shifts in Hungary´s welfare system already pointed out the role played by racist mobilisation by Jobbik and racism against the Roma in general as a critical factor as well as that the Roma are the biggest loses of the changes in material terms, Inglot completely neglects to account for the potential role of this. (Szombati: 2018, Szikra: 2014, Kóczé: 2020). The terms "Roma", "race", or "ethnicity" do not appear in his paper a single time.

In the following chapters, I wish to account for the way racialization structures the discourse of the politics of reproduction as well as the degree to which the material impact of these policies is racialized.

2:3: The interplay of economic transformations and gendered and racialized power structures

While the “swinging back” of Polányi s pendulum is not a racist conspiracy, how certain groups are impacted by it, who is protected and who is disciplined depends on political choices determined by various constellations of intersecting power structures such as class, race and gender. Beyond the quantifiable degree of market embeddedness or disembededness, these outcomes matter to a significant degree. While in the 1930s, public works programmes of the New Deal and those of the Reichsarbeitsdienst were both part of a process of “re-embedding markets” in society with many similar features, the fact that Jews were excluded from the latter is an extremely important detail that reveals that these to programmes could not be further apart from each other even if quantifiable metrics such as their cost their or impact on unemployment and consumption would suggest otherwise (Garraty: 1973). While this is indeed the most extreme example available, as far as the wellbeing of vulnerable minorities like the Roma are concerned, much more subtle, qualitative differences can also matter significantly.

3: Welfare for the wealthy: Orbán´ family support policy

3.1: Welfare and family support from 1989 till 2010

While the transition to neoliberal capitalism created social divisions hitherto unseen and as a result of structural job losses as well as racial discrimination, the Roma suffered disproportionally from this, post-communist Hungary retained a number of social policy instruments that provided limited support to the losers of the transition and families with children irrespective of need or income had access to certain support schemes. These transfers were relatively generous compared to other countries of the Visegrád Group, but these countries also had similar policies (Inglot: 2020, Bohle and Greskovits: 2018). Family support policy, while significant shifts took place throughout this period, consisted of a mixture of universal and means-tested transfers and schemes tied to employment. Family allowance, for example, was and still is available to all parents based on the number of children they have with a higher transfer for single parents and parents of children with disabilities. Child benefit or GYES, a universal form of maternity support, was available for all, but parents with a history of employment were available for paid maternity leave tied to their previous earnings (GYED). Tax incentives were also available before 2010, but they were not nearly as generous as today. The first Orbán government that was in power between 1998 and 2002 already introduced tax incentives for families with children, which were later significantly reduced under the premiership of Ferenc Gyurcsány (Political Capital: 2005).

A shift away from universal transfers in family policy combined with the punitive shift in the welfare state already started to take shape in 2008 as a result of the fiscal pressures due to the financial crises as well as growing populism and the emergence of a militant radical right (Vidra: 2014, Szikra: 2014 and Szombati: 2018). The socialist-liberal coalition and later the socialist minority government with the external support of the liberals proceeded to freeze the universal elements of family support such as child benefit (GYES) and family allowance (családi pótélék) while also cutting unemployment benefits and a public works programme the scale of which was much more limited than the policy of Orbán. Universal transfers has never been adjusted to inflation since and thus they lost their value. This punitive shift was already embedded in anti-Roma discourses. The government and the main opposition party led by Orbán were challenged by an emerging new extreme-right force with an explicitly anti-Roma agenda. Perhaps the most known example of the governments implicit acceptance of the emerging racist common sense was when prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, who is a millionaire in USD terms, visited the Roma community in one of the country´s most deprived regions only to tell them that *"You will have to go and work, I have to work too"* (Magyar Narancs: 2008).

The punitive shift in welfare policy and the racialization of public discourse on this policy area were not unique to Hungary. A shift to workfare took place all across the region (Szikra: 2014). Perhaps the most notable examples of how the deployment of racialized discourse for the justification of these reforms was how the Slovak media framed the protest movement against welfare cuts in 2004 as "Gypsy riots" (Baar:2012, Kóczé: 2020).

3.2: Welfare and family support policy after 2010

When Viktor Orbán took power in 2010, he used his supermajority not only to gradually transform Hungary´s political system into a type of hybrid regime that, according to Freedom House, seized to qualify as a democracy but also abandoned the idea of a "welfare state" in favour of a work-based society" (Bozóki and Hegedűs: 2017, Szikra: 2014, Freedom House 2019). The government took much more radical steps in the direction set by their predecessors, and the ideological pillars of the new anti-egalitarian system were entrenched in the constitution (Szikra: 2014.) As they cut taxes for the middle class, they also decreased the availability of unemployment benefits to three months which is the lowest in the EU. After the expiry of unemployment benefit, the only support available is in the form of public works. Public works is organized by municipalities and often creates humiliating conditions and neo-feudal personalistic dependency on local elites (Szikra: 2018, Bohle and Greskovits: 2018). According to Szombati, it is a punitive instrument that disciplines the unemployed and the employed and ties the surplus population to local elites (Szombati: 2018). It creates the possibility for arbitrary or racist exclusion as participants can be excluded for unrelated personal choices like "not keeping their garden in order" or as it happened in one case, for wearing traditional Roma female clothing (Kóczé: 2020). As a result of these changes, a new anti-egalitarian status quo emerged which Szombati described as a "dual state" that distributes reward and punishment to deserving and undeserving groups. Szikra described the new system as a system of distribution that redistributes resources from the bottom and the middle towards the top or, as Ferge would put it, a system of "perverse redistribution" (Szikra: 2018, Kózcé: 2020) While cutting transfers to the poorest, the tax system was also transformed in a way that benefits the richest: Thanks to Orbán s reforms Hungary now has

the lowest income tax for high earners, as well as the lowest corporate tax and the highest VAT in the EU.

Family policy was one of the key focuses of the third and fourth Orbán governments. Due to low birth rates and high emigration, the country experienced acute demographic challenges leading to labour shortages and anxiety about the nation's future (Inglot: 2020). While the country did welcome some migrant workers from Ukraine and elsewhere to fill gaps in the labour market, the government was in general so reluctant to accept migrants from certain parts of the world that it erected a razor-wire fence at its southern border and routinely violated its legal obligation to grant asylum to those fleeing war and persecution (European Commission: 2018). Instead, Orbán placed the increase of native fertility rate at the top of his biopolitical agenda. While explaining his vision of a growing but ethnically homogeneous population at a series of "demographic congresses", his speeches were sometimes followed by children in traditional Hungarian costumes performing folk dances. Economic arguments and nationalist appeals to indebtedness to heroic ancestors were intertwined in his rhetoric which had a clear völkish tone. The regime also presented the reinforcement of a patriarchal and heteronormative vision of society as a tool for preserving the nation but some of the policy choices adopted by the government in practice contradict this aim by encouraging middle-class female participation in the labour force (Szikra:2018).

The 2011 Family Protection Act already established an element of "the dual state". It states that the state provides support primarily for the "responsible upbringing" of children which according to Szikra means families with sufficient income but as we will see in chapter 6, "responsible upbringing" is the polar opposite of "procreation for a living" the subtext of which is Roma procreation (Szikra: 2018, Kóczé: 2020).

As part of the so-called “Family Protection Action Plan” in 2019, further significant transfers were introduced, including higher tax incentives, complete income tax exemption for women with four or more children, heavily subsidised mortgages and subsidies for the purchase of automobiles. These benefits are, of course, no help for the poorest and most marginalised families of Hungary, amongst whom the Roma are over-represented. On the contrary, this package is a further step toward what Szikra identified as “welfare for the wealthy, “ contributing to society’s further polarisation based on income and ethnicity (Szikra: 2018).

4: Similar aims, divergent means: The “Family 500+” Programme in Poland

4.1: “Illiberalism” and biopolitics

The governments of Poland and Hungary share several ideological similarities and have an excellent relationship. Hungary and Poland are frequently discussed together as exemplary cases of how a surging tide of nationalist populism can lead to the decline of democracy and the rule of law. They have been described as “populist”, “illiberal”, “authoritarian” and even as “post-fascist” by various thinkers, academic observers and opinion journalists (Zakaria: 2019) (Tamas:2001). The regimes of both countries indeed share many important tendencies and characteristics, and their leaders have an excellent relationship. Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Poland´s de-facto leader chairman Jaroslav Kaczynski have effectively formed an “Illiberal axis" and promised to unleash what they called a “cultural counter-revolution ” (Foy & Buckley: 2016). Both governments were widely criticised for making a mockery of democratic norms and the rule of law as both attempted and, in many cases, succeeded in extending their influence over formerly independent state institutions such as parts of the judiciary . The system of institutional checks and balances on executive power has been de-facto abolished in Hungary, while in Poland, these independent bodies (such as the Judiciary and the Ombudsman) are under sustained pressure (Freedom House 2020). According to Freedom House, democracy has been in constant decline every consecutive year in both countries since Fidesz and PiS came to power in 2015 and 2010. While Freedom House still considers Poland a democracy, it describes Hungary as “partly free”, and according to the

2020 Nations in Transit report, the country can no longer be considered a democracy (Freedom House: 2020). Both Poland and Hungary are currently under "Article 7" proceedings for violating their obligation to uphold the principles of democracy and the rule of law, but this is unlikely to result in significant sanctions as the two governments can exploit the "unanimity" rule and veto any potential sanction against each other. Both of these regimes incorporated appeals to Christian faith in their ideologies, and both share a heteronormative and patriarchal vision of society according to which the sovereignty of the individual over their reproductive functions can be questioned for religious or nationalist reasons.

4.2: Triumph of novelty over experience?

Both countries are experiencing acute demographic challenges due to mass emigration and low birth rates, which leads to anxiety about the nation's future in both countries (Inglot: 2020). Both governments also made it clear that they oppose immigration from outside Europe while recruiting migrant workers from Ukraine to ease sectoral labour shortages. Both see the solution in encouraging the native population to have more children. For these aims, both countries adopted strongly pro-natalist rhetoric and created significant new transfers to families with children. Despite the similar ideological outlook and demographic challenges, how these two regimes decided to allocate resources to encourage procreation could not be more different. As opposed to the exclusionary system of tax incentives and subsidised mortgages and automobiles, the Polish government opted for a universal cash transfer available to all families irrespective of income or employment status. In Poland, every family will receive 500 Zlotys (around 110 Euro) after every child after the first. For a

family with three children, this means around 220 euros extra tax-free income each month. Low-income families are available for the benefit after the first child already According to initial results published by the European Commission in 2017, the policy was successful in increasing spending and saving rates, increasing the number of births as well as reducing poverty, but later data (Chart 2) suggest that the Polish birth rates started decreasing again after an initial increase following the introduction of the policy. According to Inglot, the Polish policy is more successful than the Hungarian one, which lead him to carry out a comparative analysis of the two countries to explain Hungary´s different approach. As far as birth rates are concerned, it is too early to judge the natalist success of these two policies as Hungary´s more aggressive package of the "Family Protection Action Plan" that yet again increased the benefits directed at middle-class families was only implemented in 2019. While the long-term natalist efficiency of these divergent policy choices is too early to judge, comparing the change in birth rates and fertility rates across all Visegrad countries, including Slovakia and Czechia, with no similar policy innovations suggests that except for an initial spike in Polish birth rates after the introduction of 500+, all of these countries seem to follow similar trends (see Charts 1 and 2). Similar trends in these metrics, even in countries with no aggressive natalist interventions, suggest that both policies' impact has been relatively limited thus far.

Chart 1: Fertility rates across the Visegrád block (OurWorldinData)



Chart 2: Number of births per one thousand people in the Visegrád countries (World Bank)

Inglot suggests that the policy of Poland is more successful as it leads to the reduction of poverty and an initial increase in birth rates (Inglot: 2020). He called the outcome a "triumph of novelty over experience" as he found it counterintuitive that Hungary, a country with a long history of generous family support, is adopting a less effective policy tool (Inglot: 2020). While it is beyond doubt that 500+ is a better tool to reduce child poverty than Orbán´s "welfare for the wealthy", the metric of success against which Inglot assesses the success of these policies was never approved by the Hungarian government. Orbán not only never claimed that the reduction of poverty was the goal of his policy, but he even erased the idea of the state´s unconditional obligation to fight deprivation from his country´s constitution (Szikra: 2014, Szombati: 2018). When assessing the differences for the divergent policy

outcomes, he concludes that it is due to a combination of institutional legacies and political factors such as a more top-down decision making in Hungary. While it could be seen as one of the political factors, the question of ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity and the widespread racism against the Roma in Hungary is not discussed in his paper as a potential factor although Orbán justified his opposition to another universal transfer, namely universal basic income (UBI) with Hungary´s "ethnic relations" (Kormany. hu).

4.3: The racist hypothesis

Some Hungarian public intellectuals and social scientists intuitively suggested a causal link between anti-Roma racism and a preference for more exclusive transfers. In an interview with the Hungarian liberal weekly newspaper, Magyar Narancs, Balazs Kapitany, a demographer of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, was asked for his opinion on why Hungary did not follow the Polish model of family support. According to Kapitany, *" in the eyes of the Poles, children in the bottom 16% of the population are also considered Polish while in the eyes of the majority of Hungarian society they are considered Roma."* (Magyar Narancs). Marxist philosopher G.M Tamas went even further in a passionate essay written for the tenth anniversary of a 2008 anti-Roma killing spree by neonazi terrorists. When commenting on the government's social and demographic policy, he went as far as claiming: *"There are two ways to deny from the Roma the right to life: The first is the bullet and the second is social policy. (Merce)"*. While this causality seems intuitive to Tamas and Kapitány, it is complicated to verify or falsify empirically. The following chapters analysing the racially differentiated material impact of Orban s policy as well as the racialized discourses which are

used to their justification might be able to provide some insights which help to assess the plausibility and likelihood of this intuitive hypothesis.

5: Discrimination by proxy? Assessing the impact of Hungary´s exclusionary family policy on the Roma and non-Roma

As elaborated above, the new family policy instruments of the Orbán regime are making financial support available only for those in regular employment or with other taxable income like rent or dividends in a way that is designed to benefit high earners with multiple children the most. Tax incentives do not help those with little to no taxable income, and subsidised mortgages are also unavailable to those not deemed creditworthy by banks. In order to assess to what extent these policy choices disadvantage Hungary´s Roma, I will interpret quantitive data generated by Hungary´s Central Statistical Office (KSH) about the labour market participation, financial situation, and fertility rates of the Roma and non-Roma.

According to a Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) survey, the non-Roma are more than twice as likely to be employed than the Roma. The overall employment rate of working-age Roma was only 33.7%, as opposed to 72.3% of non-Roma. The gap is even wider among women. Non-Roma women are almost three times as likely to be employed than Roma women. The disparity is the widest between Roma women and non-Roma men as the multiplier is 3.7 in their case. These numbers are clear evidence for the powerful presence of gendered racialization in the Hungarian labour market, but it is also visible that the racial gap is wider than the gender gap. Non-Roma women, for example, are still significantly more likely to be employed than Roma men despite the overall gap between men and women. Since the gendered racialization evidently has a very significant impact on labour market

participation, it also follows that any family support policy that is tied to employment means significantly less support for the Roma, whose labour market participation is half of that of the non-Roma.

Another critical detail comes to light when comparing the employment rates of Roma and non-Roma men and women with similar levels of education. A very significant gap between Roma and non-Roma employment rates across almost all genders and levels of education. The Roma are significantly less likely to be employed than the non-Roma with the same level of education. The only exception to this are those who did not finish elementary school and those with tertiary education, but since very few non-Roma drop out of elementary school (0,9% vs 15,1% of Roma) and very few Roma finish university (around 1%), the numbers included in the survey must be very low which diminishes the relevance of this statistic on the bottom and the top range of educational attainment. It seems to be the case that there has been no Roma man who finished higher education amongst surveyed, and the 100% employment rate amongst Roma women with a degree suggests that that number is, unfortunately, is likely to be very low. While the gap between the employment rates of Roma and non-Roma with similar levels of education can be a result of a variety of factors, including lower grades due to deprived conditions and a segregated and discriminatory education system or different subject choices, the fact that 52% of the Roma surveyed experienced discrimination before while only 14.6% of the non-Roma did suggests that the gap is at least partially due to discrimination in the labour market (KSH:2015). The quantifiable presence of discrimination in the labour market is relevant to assessing the racialization of family policy as discrimination in the labour market spills over to discrimination in social policy if support in the latter is tied to employment. The data presented here show that a similarly qualified Roma jobseeker is less likely to succeed than

their non-Roma counterpart due to racial discrimination. If racial discrimination has a partially determining effect on one´s employment status, it follows that discrimination based on employment status is also racial discrimination by proxy, even if it cannot be proven to be its conscious aim. While it is indeed true that every single policy choice has a differentiated impact based on categories without one´s control, the numbers presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest an extremely significant racial gap with multipliers of 2-4 between different gendered and racialized categories.

Table 1: Employment Rate of working age (20-64) Non-Roma by gender and level of education in 2018 (KSH:2018)

	Male	Female	All
Did not finish elementary school	18.6%	13.9%	15.8%
Elementary school	63.6%	41.6%	51.5%
Secondary school (no Érettségi)	82.5%	64.5%	76%
Secondary school (with Érettségi)	79.2%	64.9%	71.3%
Tertiary education	91.8%	79.7%	84.8%
All	85.8%	65.3%	72.3%

Table 2:Employment rates of working age (24-64) Roma by gender and level of education in 2018 (KSH: 2018)

	Male	Female	All
Did not finish elementary school	23.3%	7%	13.3%
Elementary school	40%	20.2%	29.9%
Secondary school (no Érettségi)	63.9%	47.2%	57.6%
Secondary school (with Érettségi)	63.1%	49.7%	56.4%
Tertiary education	...	100%	85.1%
All	44.2%	23.3%	33.7%

So far, only employment rates were accounted for but the gap between the degree to which the Roma and the non-Roma can take advantage of the tax incentives is further widened by the different income levels between the Roma and non-Roma who are in employment. While there was no data available that would show the average earnings of the Roma and the non-Roma, other indicators suggest that the non-Roma earn significantly more. For example, while 41.8% of the Roma in employment are in public works, only 4.2% of the non-Roma are (KSH:2015). Income from public works is subject to a 15% personal income tax, thanks to Hungary´s adoption of a flat income tax, but since the below-minimum wage monthly income

of people in public works is only HUF85000 (around EUR243), the maximum amount of tax reduction they can get is HUF12750 (around EUR37.9).

Another factor that makes the Roma in general and Roma women, particularly, the biggest losers of the new family policy is that the Roma surveyed by KSH in 2011 had significantly more children than people who identified as members of other ethnic/national groups in Hungary. For example, while respondents identifying as Hungarians and Germans had a fertility rate of 1.9 and 1.8, respectively, this number is 3.2 in the case of the Roma (Table 3). Since the Roma tend to have more children than the non-Roma, the inflation of universal transfers and the introduction of transfers the majority of the Roma cannot access has a disproportionately negative impact on the material wellbeing of the Roma in general with an even more substantial adverse effect on Roma women and children in particular.

Table 3: Fertility rate among different nationalities (self-reported) in 2011 (KSH)

Hungarian	1.9
German	1.8
Roma	3.2

The percentage of those at risk of poverty or social exclusion is more than three times higher than amongst the non-Roma, with the majority of Roma being at risk while the Roma are 2.6 times more likely to live in severe deprivation (KSH:2019). While according to KSH there was a very significant drop in the percentage of the Roma who live in relative poverty in the last decade (from 67.9 in 2013 to 34.7 in 2019), the Roma are still around three times more likely to live in relative poverty than the non-Roma. In the light of these statistics, it becomes

apparent that a policy choice of following the Polish model and opting for the strengthening of universal transfers instead of introducing tax incentives could have led to a significant reduction in the rate of poverty amongst Roma families as well as that of child poverty. According to data published by the Polish government, the introduction of the "Family 500+" contributed to a significant drop in poverty levels. Since the Roma in Hungary are much more likely to live in poverty than the non-Roma due to historical and structural factors such as the compounding effect of institutional discrimination across generations, such a transfer could not only have increased the wellbeing of Roma children but could have been a helpful instrument in narrowing the gap between Roma and non-Roma living standards thus to a very limited degree serve to compensate for the impact of institutional racism and violence the Roma suffered by the hands of the Hungarian state throughout the last couple of centuries. Such an outcome was evidently not the goal of the Orbán regime, but in order to sufficiently account for the role of racialization in shaping the policy process, qualitative data such as texts by Hungarian policymakers should be critically analysed.

This chapter may be considered redundant for stating the obvious: The Roma are more likely to be poor and thus less likely to benefit from tax incentives. However, while some previous studies on Hungarian social policy only point this disparity out in a few sentences relying on the assumed knowledge of the reader or suggest that "deprivation is far from being a Roma-specific issue", multipliers of around four when it comes to unemployment and poverty rates of the Roma and non-Roma and sometimes above four when the disparity between Roma women and non-Roma men are concerned suggest that gendered racialization indeed play a very significant role in structuring the impact of Hungary´s dual state on various populations.

In sum, while the statistics presented above do not prove a causal link between racist intent and preference for exclusionary family policy, they show that they are disproportionally disadvantaging the Roma and especially Roma women and their children. While the criteria by which the policy determines access to support is not explicitly racist, sicnce racial discrimination in the labour market makes the Roma less able to comply with the criteria; it becomes racial discrimination by proxy even if it is not the intention of the policymaker. As long as we assume that the quantifiable disadvantage of the Roma is due to structural factors and disqualify pseudoscientific and racist arguments that assume the existence of "essential" differences between the Roma and the non-Roma, the only way to acquit the Orbán regime of this charge of discrimination would be accepting a "rising tide lifts all boats" line of reasoning. Suppose the policy of incentivising the labour market participation of parents whose work "adds the most value" to the economy leads to a significantly more prosperous country. In that case, the Roma might benefit from such an arrangement in the long run, even if structural discrimination persists. Since however the education gap between the Roma and non-Roma is widening and the government keeps divesting from education and training, it is doubtful that a significantly higher proportion of the Roma, the majority of whom currently only finish elementary school, will be able to participate in the economic life of a future prosperous society if it were ever to materialise (KSH:2018, Bohle and Greskovits: 2018).

6: Analyzing Racialized Public Discourse In Hungary

6.1: Jobbik: Saying the quiet part loud

The 2010 election manifesto of the extreme-right Jobbik party entitled “Manifesto for Radical Change” (Radikalis Valtozas Programja) is an example of totally blatant explicit racism. The 88-page long document mentions the word “gipsy” (cigány) 73 times. The term “gipsy crime” (cigánybűnözes) is mentioned on nine occasions while “gipsy problem,” (ciganyprobléma) appears twice. To say that this is a racist text would be stating the obvious, and to conclude a scholarly inquiry by stating that Hungary´s openly racist party is indeed racist would be a tautology. This text nonetheless merits scholarly attention not because there is a racialized subtext that needs to be interpreted but because, unlike other texts formulated by more “respectable” members of the Hungarian elite, this text explicitly connects racialized stereotypes, discourses and colour coded tropes to the “Roma question” thus it can help us to interpret more subtle racialization in other texts. For example, when an openly racist politician claims “the way gipsies are procreating for a living” is a burden on honest Hungarian taxpayers” while appealing to the “common sense” of the audience, it significantly changes the way we should interpret if another politician who claims not to be prejudiced claims that “procreation for a living is a burden on honest taxpayers”. According to Szombati,

Orbán successfully incorporated elements of a new "racist common sense" that emerged in the mid to late 2000s into his hegemonic project while also harnessed the moral panic about "gipsy criminality" to his advantage (Szombati: 2018). As a document that includes a detailed and explicit reiteration of this "common sense", this manifesto is a significant part of the intertextual context which should guide our interpretation of other texts including statements by Orbán concerning his reorientation of Hungary´s politics of reproduction. In the following, I will take a closer look at the most common elements of what Szombati referred to as Hungary´s new "racist common sense" shaped by the racist mobilisations of Jobbik and its paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) (Szombati: 2019)

As far as the 2010 Election Manifesto of Jobbik is concerned, the survival of the Hungarian nation is in danger and averting this danger should be the most crucial aim of any reform to the country´s family policy. The text presents the potential growth of the percentage of immigrants and Roma in the Hungarian population not only as a problem but as a significant threat to the nation's future, which must be swiftly dealt with. It is also implicit in the text that Roma Hungarians are not considered to belong to the national community no matter their identity or citizenship. Their undesirability is made explicit by expressions such as "gipsy problem" and "gipsy crime".

"The shift in proportions within the domestic population, also constitutes a basic problem of national policy. This development came into being due to the support for immigration in order to deal with demographic problems as well as the positive discrimination of miniorites, fist and foremost that of the rapidly multiplying gipsy population, whose fertility rates far exceed the national average." ("Alapvető nemzetpolitikai problémát jelent a belső népességen belüli arányok eltolódása is, ami a demográfiai problémák kezelése céljából

támogatott bevándorlás és a pozitívan diszkriminált kisebbségek – elsősorban a gyorsan, messze az országos átlag felett szaporodó cigányság – miatt alakult ki.) (Jobbik: 2010)

Notions such as "positive discrimination of minorities" deserve special attention in this text. While most relevant NGOs and academic experts of the topic would agree that the Roma in Hungary experiences widespread discrimination in areas like housing, healthcare, education and employment, the authors of the manifesto felt comfortable not only with claiming that the Roma are positively discriminated against but also to present it without any shred of evidence simply as "common sense" (Ladányi and Szelényi: 2006, Szombati: 2018, Kózcé:2020). Ideological power, according to Fairclough, can be detected in one's ability to present his ideas as "common sense" or, as Ronald Regan put in in more colloquial language ", if you are explaining you are losing" (Faircough, 2001: 33). The articulation of the baseless myth of the "positive discrimination of the Roma" as common sense by a Political party that received 16.7% of the votes in its national list speaks volumes about the hegemony of antigypsyism in the Hungarian public discourse.

Similarly to Fidesz, Jobbik in 2010 did not only see the perceived shift in the proportion of different groups but also the generally low birth rates as a problem to be dealt with by family support policy. Since, according to Jobbik, the nation faces the double threat of declining birth rates and an increasing percentage of undesirable groups in the population. Therefore, the country needs to introduce targeted pro-natalist policies that incentivise the procreation of "desirable" groups while limiting Roma procreation.

"It is however the goal of Jobbik to slow down the pace of decline as well as to later stop and in the medium-run restart the growth of the population by means of radical and consequent family policy." ("A Jobbik célja ugyanakkor, hogy radikális és következetes társadalom- és

családpolitikával a csökkenés ütemét lassítsa, majd leállítsa, középtávon pedig elindítsa a népesség növekedését. ") (Jobbik-2010)

It is, however, clear that it is not all procreation that they wish to incentivise.

"It is necessary to reevaluate the non transparent family support system in order to incentivise procreation and to counteract the phenomenon of procreation for a living" (*"Elengedhetetlen az átláthatatlan családtámogatási rendszer újragondolása is a gyermekvállalás ösztönzésére, és a megélhetési gyermekvállalás jelenségének visszaszorítására***."**) (Jobbik:2010)

Again, similarly to the notion of "positive discrimination", the existence of "procreating for a living" is presented as common sense without any reference to evidence for the phenomenon's existence. While presenting this myth as self-evident, the authors refer to the "common knowledge" present in the discursive space and expect the audience to remain uncritical as it confirms their already existing perspective. In this discursive space, thus, it is not a question if "procreation for a living" is an existing problem or not. Instead, what remains a matter of legitimate discussion is how to deal with it.

Furthermore, the text makes it explicit that "procreation for a living" is the characteristic activity of Roma women, thus politicising the fertility of Roma women by presenting it both as a burden on white taxpayers and a threat to the survival of the nation. The author claims that:

"It represents a fundamental problem that family support policies do not incentive the Hungarian´s (Magyarsag) *willingness to probreate while the Gypsies* (ciganysag) look at their childbearing as a source of reliable income" *("Alapvető problémát jelent, hogy a*

gyermeknevelési támogatások a magyarság gyermekvállalási hajlandósát nem ösztönzik, amíg a cigányság biztos jövedelemforrásként tekint a gyermekszülésre.”) (Jobbik: 2010)

While indeed there is not a lot to be decoded in this statement as the racialization is explicit, the opposition between “Magyarsag " (Hungarians) and “Ciganysag " (Gypsies) is noteworthy. Not only does the text rearticulate the “common sense” notion of “procreation for a living”, but it also reiterates the exclusion of the Roma from the political community. No matter their subjective identities or what citizenship they hold, the Roma are not only not part of the Hungarian national community or “Magyarsag”; their birth rates also pose a threat to the latter, according to the text. A shift in focus away from cash transfers and towards tax incentives is explicitly proposed as a tool to incentivise non-Roma procreation:

“ In order to counteract procreation for a living (which elsewhere in the text presented as a Roma phenomenon), *Family Allowance* (Csaladi Potlek) *should be transformed into a tax relief from the third child onwards“ “A megélhetési gyermekvállalás visszaszorítása érdekében a családi pótlékot a 3. gyermektől felfelé adókedvezménnyé kell alakítani”* Jobbik: 2010

While Jobbik presents Roma procreation as a burden on the taxpayer throughout the text, they invoke an idea that makes intervention (for example, by a shift to tax incentives in family policy.) even more urgent.

“The Gypsy population (ciganysag) *in its present state is a ticking time-bomb in Hungary today. Without immediate and significant intervention, this probloblem can even lead our country into civil war.” (“A cigányság jelenlegi állapotában ma Magyarországon egy időzített bomba. Ha nem történik azonnali és érdemi beavatkozás, ez a probléma hazánkat polgárháborúba sodorhatja.”)* (Jobbik: 2010)

Table 1: Deserving and undeserving categories according to Jobbik

	Undeserving	Deserving
Reproduction	Procreaction for a living (Megélhetési gyermekvállalás) 3X	Full-time motherhood (főállású anyaság) Taxpaying families (családban élő adózók)
Work/economic activity	Idle cirminals (nem dolgozó bűnözők) Long-term unemployement (tartós munkanélküliség) Usury (uzsora) 2x	Honest taxpaying citizens (tisztességes adófizető állampolgárok) Ordely wokring family (rendesen dolgozó család) Hungarian worker (magyar munkás) Healthcare workers (egészségügyi dolgozók) Law enforcement officers (rendfenvédelmi dolgozók) Rural unemployement

		(vidéki munkanélküliség) People who got in troble with foreign currency debt (bajbajutott devizahitelesek)
Crime	Idle criminals (nem dolgozó bűnözők) Gypsy-crminatlity (cigánybűnözés) 9X	Honest taxpaying citzens (tisztességes adófizető állampolgárok)
Race/identity	Gypsy problem (cigányprobléma) 2X Gypsyfication (elcigányosítás) Gypsies (cigányság) 28X Gypsy 73X	The Hungarian people (magyar emberek) 8x The Hungarian nation (a magyar nemzet) 32x Hungarians (Magyarság) 52X

If we collect some categories of people that Jobbik deems worthy of support and contrast them to others they see as parasitic and unworthy (See table 1), what emerges is a blueprint for the establishment of a sort of anti-egalitarian dual state very similar to the one which according to Szombati was at the end realised by Orbán (Szombati: 2018).

In sum, the text published by Jobbik requires little decoding but precisely for this reason, it gives us an excellent overview of the most common discourses, myths, and narratives of anti-Roma racism in Hungary. Two significant elements are made explicit in the text, which can be helpful when it comes to the interpretation of "colour blind" texts on family policy in

Hungarian public discourse. First, it is asserted that while population decline is a problem, the phenomenon of "procreation for a living" is an undue burden on taxpayers while the notion is explicitly linked to the Roma. The second, perhaps even more sinister element is the invocation of an existential threat to the nation by which the fertility of Roma women and non-white immigration are presented as a threat to the very existence of the national community in its desired form. Not only is this a particular anti-Roma version of the white nationalist myth of "the great replacement", but it also echoes the way Latvian elites engaged in successful homophobic mobilisation, according to Mole, by presenting the LGBT+ community as an existential threat to the nation (Mole:2011). In both cases, the fertility of individuals was discursively politicised by elites and presented as a problem: In Latvia, LGBT+ people were blamed for not procreating enough; in Hungary, Romani women are blamed for allegedly procreating too much.

6.2: Fidesz: Justifying the dual state

It is a common tactic of right-win authoritarians to present themselves as "rebels" while their objective position would be better desired as very powerful (Postone: 1980). Viktor Orban, whose regime enjoys almost unchecked power in Hungary, frequently poses as a rebel. At the 2015 Budapest Demographic Congress, he opened his address like this:

"Today the situation in Europe is that it is not PC to speak about demographic questions"... There are words that are not polite utter, not for aesthetic but political reasons." ("Ma az a

helyzet, hogy ma Európában nem PC dolog demográfiai kérdésekről beszélni. ... Vannak szavak, amelyeket nem illő kimondani. Nem esztétikai okokból, hanem politikai okokból nem illik.") (Orban: 2015)

One important clue for the interpretation of this statement is that its literal meaning is not true, and the speaker and his audience must be aware of this. The topic of demographics and demographic challenges is discussed in Europe including by policymakers at the highest level. In 2020, for example, the European Commission adopted a report on the "Impact of Demographic Changes in Europe" (European Commission: 2020). Problems such as labour shortages due to low birth rates or the sustainability of pension systems in the light of low birth rates are widely discussed and are not at all "taboo". For historical and ethical reasons, what is taboo is the discussion of deliberate state policy aiming to achieve a desired ethnic or racial makeup of a territory. In another speech by Orban addressed to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce in 2017, he clarified the demographic taboos he rebelled against.

First of all, I find it important that ethnic homogeneity must be preserved. Now things like this can be said.... We Hungarians are, of course, ethnically heterogeneous in the sense that we are a European nation. If we were to read out the names of those present here, there would be everything from Bunjevac (a Slavic group in Hungary) *to Swabian, but this is still diversity that is ethnically within a certain range. Therefore it is a sort of homogeneity; we are within one civilisation." (Ugye, először is nagyon fontosnak tartom, hogy az etnikai homogenitást meg kell őrizni. Most már lehet ilyeneket mondani. ... Úgyhogy természetesen mi, magyarok etnikailag heterogének vagyunk abban az értelemben, hogy európai nemzet vagyunk. Ha csak a neveket itt felolvasnánk, lenne itt minden: a bunyeváctól a svábig, de ettől függetlenül ez mégiscsak etnikailag egy bizonyos sávon belül maradó sokszínűség. Tehát egyfajta etnikai homogenitás, egy civilizáción belül vagyunk.")* (Orban: 2017)

Therefore, the taboo that Orban seeks to destroy is not "talking about demographics" in general but to formulate this position regarding desirable outcomes in terms of the ethnic makeup of his country. His assertion that the distinction between "us and them" lies is typical of how elite discourse sets racialized boundaries. One might ask who is inside and who is outside this "desired level of heterogeneity". Would a Bosnian Muslim belong to this civilisation? How about a French-speaking pale-skinned Catholic from Quebec or a Mexican Catholic with somewhat darker skin? One thing is clear: Similar to how the boundaries of state and nation are not the same for Orban, as evident in his desire to be "the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians" (a reference to Hungarians who live in neighbouring countries as a result of the Treaty of Trianon), the borders of European Civilization are also not identical the geographical boundaries of Europe. According to Orban, one might be born in Europe, speak a language native to Europe and be a citizen of a European country yet still not belong to "European Civilization". While Orban does not speak directly about the Roma here, a clear preference for whiteness (the contestable boundaries and in flux) is expressed here. On top of his explicit desire to ensure that desirable groups populate his country, he also identifies a threat on the horizon in the form of "ethnic replacement". At the 2019 Budapest Demographic Summit, he said the following:

"If in the future Europe is to be populated by people other than Europeans, and we accept this as a fact and see it as natural, then we will effectively be consenting to population replacement: to a process in which the European population is replaced." (Orban 2019)

Again if we give the prime minister the benefit of the doubt and assume no presence of racialization here, this sentence is odd. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "European" as "someone who is a native or inhabitant of Europe". How can then Europe ever be populated by people who are not European? This is only possible if Europe is used not as a

geographical but a cultural, religious . ethnic or racial category. The second part of the sentence is also significant: it invokes the myth of "the great replacement", a narrative that in its present form originates from far-right thinkers in France but became popular amongst white nationalists worldwide (ADL:2019). According to Orban, significant action is needed to avert the dual-threat of population decline and replacement with immigrants. According to the prime minister, the deployment of a restrictive immigration policy and generous family support for the local population is needed to avert the dual-threat. Family policy for Orban is a question of national survival. In the following sentence, he explicitly commits to a sort of nationalism based on pseudo-biological essentialism while also reaffirming the claim that the reproductive functions of individuals at least partially belong to the nation, which may justify the manipulation of fertility rates of certain groups by deliberate government policy.

"*We're also thinking in terms of the nation because we believe that families and children are in themselves the precondition for the biological regeneration of our national community. "* - (Orban 2019)

If up to this point, the position of the Roma in relation to Orban´s so-called "civilisational" boundaries was ambiguous, his way of justifying the particular policy tools to be deployed to avert "the death of the nation " repeats the racist myth of "procreation for a living" leaves no doubts. While he refrains from explicitly linking the phenomenon to Roma women, as we have seen in Jobbik s manifesto, the image of the undeserving "Roma welfare mother" is not only present in Hungary s public discourse but it has been presented by elites as "common sense" before (Kóczé: 2020:132).

"Hungary's experience – which may not be as valuable elsewhere as it is here – is that family support allowances must always be linked to employment. People are only human, and if they realise that they can live off welfare benefits, then many of them will easily go down

the path of choosing to live off benefits rather than working. … There are techniques for this, and Hungary will gladly share its experience in issues ranging from its system of tax allowances to child care allowance." (Orban: 2019)

The myth of "procreation for a living" is reproduced here in almost the same terms as seen in the 2010 Election Manifesto of Jobbik, except, in this case, the explicit claim that it is the Roma who engage in such activities was left out. Since already back in 2010, Jobbik could present the idea that the Roma have children in order to access welfare benefits as self-evident and could rely on the assumed shared understanding of the audience, we can safely conclude that in 2019 the same effect can be achieved without ever uttering the terms "Gypsy" or "Roma". The demographic congress was not the only occasion Orban referred to the myth of "procreation for a living". In the same year, he also included it in his annual "state of the nation address":

"As a country, we have exceeded our potential in supporting those who live for their children, but we have been neither understanding nor lenient with those who don't want to live for their children, but want to live off their children." - (Orban 2019)

While Orban is often accused of saying more outrageous things when addressing a domestic audience while toning down his excesses when talking to foreigners, it is noteworthy that both his "state of the nation" address and his speech at the demographic congress are available in English on government websites. While the "colourblind" reproduction of the blatantly racist narrative of procreation of a living that at the same time shows significant similarity to Jobbik´s overtly racist version is sufficient evidence for the presence of racialization in Fidesz´s ideological weaponry that is used to justify its exclusionary family policy, there are also some more explicit statements underlying the same phenomenon by

Hungary´s top government officials. According to former Minister of Human Capacities, Zoltan Balog:

"There are areas in Northeast-Borsod and Northeast-Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg counties in which this (fertility rate) *can be up to 2.39, which would be otherwise and absolutely positive trend if these children were* (not) *born in families in which those disadvantages that they inherit signal that this will not lead to the improvement of society and the quality of life. ....* (if the government doesn't intervene) *they will appear as a burden in the social system,, (Vannak olyan északkelet-borsodi meg Északkelet-Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg megyei térségek, ahol ez eléri a 2,39-et, ami egy abszolút pozitív trend lenne egyébként, hogyha ezek a gyerekek olyan családokba születnének, hogy azok a hátrányok, amiket örökölnek, azok azt jelzik, hogy nem a társadalom, az életminőség javításához fognak hozzájárulni,..., ha nem lesz jó a családpolitikánk, akkor teherként fognak megjelenni a szociális ellátórendszerben")* - Zoltán Balog (2014)

Coincidentally, the areas of Hungary where he sees high fertility as a problem (while it is desirable elsewhere) are precisely the parts of the country known to have a significant Roma population (KSH:2015). Thus, while these are also the poorest parts of the country, the procreation of poor Hungarians should also be desirable from a strictly natalist and nationalist point of view. Cash transfers directed at them should be an effective tool of national policy even if these families are indeed often finding themselves in financial hardship that the state will have to deal with unless they are not considered part of the political community and are seen as belonging to "the replacers' ' rather than "the replaced" despite being native to the country for many centuries.

While Orban himself does not explicitly refer to Hungary´s domestic ethnic makeup when talking about family policy, he does so elsewhere when he is rejecting the idea of Universal Basic Income which, according to him, would be impossible in Hungary for ethnic reasons:

There is this idea to give people money even if they are not doing anything… Now Hungary's ethnic relations are also complicated so it is not a simple question, but I would like to show that … this is a totally impossible agenda "Ez az az ötlet, hogy embereknek akkor is adjunk pénzt, hogyha nem csinálnak semmit, … Most Magyarországnak az etnikai viszonyai is bonyolultak, tehát az nem egy olyan egyszerű kérdés, de szeretném jelezni, hogy … ez egy teljességgel elképzelhetetlen program. " - (Orban 2015)

In his earlier speech at the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, the prime minister admits that ethnic relations in the country make a universal transfer less feasible. Since the same preference is visible in his preference for tax breaks for families over, for example, an increased family allowance, the same consideration of "ethnic relations" is likely to play a role in that policy as well.

Table 2: Deserving and undeserving categories according to Orbán and Balog

Deserving	Undeserving
Those who live for their children (azok akik a gyermekeikért élnek) Hungarians (Magyarok) Bunjevac (Bunyevác) Svabian (Sváb) Families and children (Családok és gyemekek)	Those who live off their children (azok akik a gyermekeikből élnek) Live off benefits Burden on the social system (teher a szociális ellátórendszeren)

Working	

Table 3: Who does and who should receive welfare benefits according to the Hungarian public (Tárki: 2010 in Bernard: 2010)

	In your opinion, how many people receive social benefits out of 100 members of this group?	In your opinion, how many people should receive social benefits out of 100 members of this group?
People in large families	43	58
The unemployed	47	53
People with low pensions	27	60
Roma	76	31
Disabled	41	67

The various deserving and undeserving categories present in statements by Fidesz leaders are mostly refraining from explicit racialization, yet their embeddedness in racialized discourses about Roma laziness, fertility and criminality certainly open them up to be interpreted as racial clues which the speaker must be aware of. According to a 2010 survey, the Hungarian public is indeed open to the idea of a racially differentiated dual state. According to respondents, all other groups (the unemployed, poor pensioners, the disabled, and people in large families) should receive more support, while the Roma should receive significantly less (Table 3). Knowing that Orbán's policy of tax incentives disproportionally exclude the Roma,

the attitudes expressed by the survey respondents may be one of the reasons for the popularity of Orbán´s policy. When reflecting on the way Orbán is creating deserving and undeserving categories, Szombati asserts that the subtext of "lazy" is "Roma" without elaborating how the link is made in public discourse (Szombati: 2018: 163). The dominant presence of identical discursive elements in overtly racist texts by Jobbik and statements by Orbán confirms this, but it does not follow from this that racialized subtext is the single motive of these statements. Indeed other groups, most notably the homeless, are also cast as undeserving by the Orbán regime and are thus excluded from the social rights associated with citizenship; these exclusions, which no doubt intersect with gendered and racialized power structures, are however beyond the scope of this paper, the focus of which is the racialized ideological and material operation of Orbán´s family policy.

6.3" Procreation for a living", national extinction and the great replacement

The phenomenon of "procreation for a living", while no evidence has ever been presented for its existence, has been a standard colour coded assumption in Hungarian public discourse, which is a crucial element of the " racist common sense" described by Szombati (Szombati: 2018). It appeared in various forms across the political spectrum. However, the extreme-right Jobbik party made it the most visible by explicitly portraying it as characteristic of the Roma, thereby constructing the fertility of Roma women as a political problem and a drain on the public purse. By reproducing the same narrative in a colourblind version when justifying his exclusionary family support policy, Viktor Orban appeared to this anti-Roma "common sense" of which the image of the "Roma welfare mother" is a crucial element, and he must have been aware of this. Apart from being a financial burden, "procreation for a living" is

also presented by Hungarian elites from Jobbik to Fidesz and beyond as a threat to the nation by multiplying the numbers of people outside the imagined political community.

The invocation of the “death of the nation " by extinction or replacement is weaponised to justify exclusionary or repressive biopolitics by subjecting bodies to the authority of the imagined community of the nation (Mole: 2001). Orban presents both his country and his civilisation (whatever that means) as being at risk of replacement by aliens. This narrative is not original to Hungary but is a common idea amongst nationalists worldwide. The myths of “the great replacement” appear in various forms, and it often involves antisemitic conspiracy theories as can be detected from Budapest to Charlottesville on anti-immigration billboards saying “Do not let Soros have the last laugh” as well as chants of “Jews will not replace us” (the elaboration of the role of antisemitism in the subject matter is however beyond the scope of this paper). In the context of family support policy, the colour coded justification of the exclusionary use of tax breaks instead of universal cash transfers shows that the Hungarian government does not see the Roma as a part of the community threatened by extinction or replacement. If they were, their procreation would be portrayed as desirable rather than as a problem.

In sum, taking a closer look at the intertextual context of statements by top policymakers in Hungary as well as on the “deserving” and “undeserving” categories which they are producing or reproducing reveals not only the presence of a racialized subtext but also the hegemony of the “racist common sense” identified by Szomati which continuous to form the background to any discussion related to welfare, reproduction, or criminality (Szombati 2018). While there is qualitative evidence for the presence of intensely racialized discourses in Fidesz´s communication concerning family policy, this does not mean that racism is the sole ideological source of these statements or the policies they justify. Szombati suggests that

Orbán at least partially owes the success of his hegemonic political project to the "new racist common sense" (Szombati: 2014). While elements of Orbán´s vision of a "work-based society" were already implemented under his first premiership between 1998 and 2002, this does not exclude the presence of similar racialized subtexts already in the nineties and before (Szikra: 2014). Indeed, while Orbán hailed his "work-based" society as morally superior to a "welfare state" already in the 90s, other politicians from the far-right Party of Hungarian Life and Justice (MIÉP) attempted to gain support by appealing to the notion of "gipsy laziness" but with considerably less success than Jobbik did a decade later (Origo). Further archival research investigating the racialized discourses present in this period could provide additional input for analysing the ideological roots of Hungary´s dual state. The mutual presence of class-based and racial prejudice cannot be excluded. There were countless historical examples when these were used to construct, maintain and reinforce each other or were mutually deployed by elites to oppose redistributive measures by left-leaning governments. This is likely to be the case in Hungary too. While the image of the "idle social parasite" is at least hundreds if not thousands of years old and was already present in the discussions around the 1834 English Poor Law, the ethnicisation of the racialization of class or caste distinctions such as the view that the English elite is essentially differentiated from those they rule over by their Normann descent has a similarly long history (Plolányi: 1944, Tamás: 2006).

Finally, it must be pointed out that while the dominant presence of heavily racialised discourses in statements by Hungarian policymakers is indeed evidence for the important ideological function of racism in Hungary´s politics of reproduction, it is in itself no proof for the existence of a direct causal link between racism and the Hungarian government opting for a system of tax-incentives as opposed to universal transfers like Poland. It cannot be stated that if, for example, racism was absent in Hungary, the country would have introduced universal family support since various other economic interests and ideological factors such

as a desire to encourage labour market participation in the interest of capital owners might also be considered by the government. However, what is certain is that the presence of racism indeed significantly increases the likelihood of the government opting for policy choices that disproportionally exclude minorities in this case and other contexts. When assessing the impact of racialization on the likelihood of opting for exclusive policy choices, the empirical verifiability of causality runs into a “chicken-egg problem”: While racialization is likely to weaken social solidarity and thus increases the likelihood of anti-egalitarian policy choices, the existence of stark social inequalities increases the likelihood of the racialization of certain groups (Kymlicka and Banting:2005, Kóczé:2020, Marx: 1870).

7: Conclusion: Embedded racial neoliberalism

Hungary´s politics of reproduction has been increasingly racialized since Viktor Orbán, and his Fidesz party took power in 2010. While institutional discrimination against the Roma has been present in the welfare institutions of the Hungarian state for as long as these institutions existed, the changes to social policy in general and family policy in particular that took place under Orbán´s rule further strengthened the disparity between how the Roma and the non-Roma are treated by the Hungarian state. The family support policies introduced in the last decade are exclusively benefiting the better off, but the degree to which social and economic exclusion disproportionately affects the Roma in Hungary suggests that the policy is racial discrimination by proxy even if the intent cannot be verified. The qualitative evidence presented confirms the strong presence of racialization in public discourse about welfare and family policy in Hungary. Indeed it has been confirmed that racialized discourses play such an important, although not exclusive role in dividing people into deserving and undeserving groups that the "dual state" identified by Szombati merits the adjective "racial" (Szombai: 2018).

As far as the racist hypothesis according to which there is causality between anti-Roma racism in Hungary and the divergent policy outcomes of Poland and Hungary is concerned, this paper remains inconclusive. It is possible that Orbán was driven by his own prejudices or the perceived prejudices of his electorate when opting for policies that exclude most Roma but based on the qualitative and quantitative data used for this study, this cannot be verified or falsified. Alternative explanations such as a desire to encourage labour market participation by adding a carrot to the stick of public works may be at play too. While its

decisive role cannot be proven, it is certain that the presence of racism, which is evident from the qualitative data analysed above, made the policy outcome of exclusive transfers more likely.

According to G.M. Tamás, neo-Victorian ideas of "workfare" combined with the arbitrary exclusions and inclusions of ethnicised, racialized or sexualised "deserving" or "undeserving" groups from social and political citizenship are characteristics of a contemporary political tendency which aims to undo the universalist legacy of the enlightenment without resorting to counterrevolutionary terror (Tamas: 2000, Szombati: 2018). This universalism could never sufficiently fulfil its emancipatory promise but, it remained a significant political force nonetheless. Revolutionary France, for example, continued to be an imperial power based on white supremacy, but through a dialectical process, the contradiction between the paper form of "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" and the reality of slavery and imperialism sparked further emancipatory claims aiming to realise a more perfect universalism as it is evident in the revolution of black slaves in Haiti and in their singing of the Marseillaise. When Orbán replaced Hungary´s welfare state with a racial dual state and entrenched elements of it in the country´s "basic law", he basically abolished the universalist "paper form" in the presence of which accusations of hypocrisy could be raised hitherto.

While the quantifiable degree of Hungary´s market embeddedness did not change significantly enough to push it out of the "Visegrád model" of embedded neoliberalism, the racial dual state that emerged as a result of the regime´s turn to punitive workfare and exclusionary family support policies creates extremely divergent degrees to which individuals benefit from the embeddedness of Hungarian neoliberalism and this divergence is based on belonging to often racialized categories of "deserving" and "undeserving". Adding a term

that was originally developed to describe the racialized impacts and motives of American neoliberalism to the categorisation of Bohle and Greskovits can describe the racialized operation of the dual state identified by Szombati. The system that emerged in Hungary since Orbán came to power is an example of embedded racial neoliberalism.

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