FOR THE PEOPLE OR THE PILLAR?

THE DUTCH POPULISTS' PARADOXICAL DEMANDS FOR AND

REJECTIONS OF PLURALISM

By

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Abstract

This thesis aims to map the ways in which three Dutch populist radical right parties, List Pim Fortuyn, Party for Freedom, and Forum for Democracy, express their ideas on democracy and society in the Netherlands. Through applying the Discourse Historical Approach, this thesis analyzes eight election manifestoes, published prior to each Second Chamber election in which the parties participated. For each party, these programs reveal a pattern of paradoxical claims on *pluralism*: conflicting or diverse claims on whether (liberal) democracy is desirable, whether there ought to be a place for all cultural, religious and ideological groups in society, and to what extent these groups ought to be allowed to express themselves. I conclude that in their manifestoes, the Dutch populist radical right parties speak two languages: one that is pro-pluralism and one that is anti-pluralism. Through employing *coded language*, *fallacies,* and *topoi*, the parties convey their paradoxical rejection of and demand for pluralism, and perhaps try to appeal to voters with similar conflicting desires.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to Professor Mária M. Kovács.

Professor Kovács was a great teacher and scholar, and I am grateful to have gotten to know her better in the last months of her life. She was my rock during the thesis writing process, as she was for many students from the Nationalism Studies Program over the years. Every worry I had she took away within minutes and every meeting she would give me the courage and enthusiasm to carry on with this project. I will remember her teaching, wise words, and wit, and I will remain eternally grateful for her support.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

"We have to build a new pillar," proclaimed Paul Cliteur, senator for the right-wing populist party Forum for Democracy, in an interview with newspaper *De Telegraaf* in May of 2019. The "pillar" Cliteur mentions refers to the manner in which Dutch society was organized prior to mass secularization in the 1960s. Until then, society and politics were pillarized. Pillarization in the Dutch context entailed vertical pluralism in most aspects of public life such as media, education, and civil organization. Each of the four pillars that existed encompassed a segment of the population with a distinct secular or religious ideology: i.e. Socialist, Liberal Conservative, Catholic and Protestant. While the majority of people belonging to one of these pillars would interact primarily with other members from their segment, the political elites of each group would represent their members at the level of government and compromise between the interests of the different segments.[1]

The era of pillarization is generally regarded as overcome in the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, presenting these historical social cleavages as a present-day reality in which the relatively new party ought to participate is bewildering. It is especially unexpected for a party commonly labeled as populist, considering these parties claim to speak for a unified "people," rather than a small segment of the population. Furthermore, *anti-pluralism* is often seen as a core component of populism.[2] This raises questions: is Forum for Democracy wrongly labeled populist, or do not all populists oppose pluralism?

Recognizing the puzzling proposal to establish a pillar in the discourse of Forum for Democracy, encouraged me to inquire deeper into the communication of Dutch populist radical

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[1] Michael Wintle, "Pillarization, consociation and vertical pluralism in the Netherlands revisited: A European view," *West European Politics* 23, no. 3 (2000): 139–152.
[2] Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?,* (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 3, and William A. Galston, *Anti-Pluralism: the Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 4–5.

right parties with their voters. Over the past two decades, the radical right has had a steady and significant presence in politics in the Netherlands. Three right-wing populist political parties have entered the party system chronologically: List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 2002, The Freedom Party (PVV) in 2006, and Forum for Democracy (FvD) in 2017. Each of these parties is, or was, characterized by a charismatic leader, minimal or failing internal democracy and significant success[3] in elections for either parliament or the provincial-executive and senate. The three parties do not only share commonalities in structure and size, but also in platform; all parties take on an anti-immigration stance, often referring to immigration and the elite as a threat, are Eurosceptic and wish to reform the electoral system.

My initial research proposal planned to compile and analyze a corpus consisting of sources that contain direct communication between the parties and their already committed supporters, such as party newspapers and newsletters. The plan was to review all references to the history of pillarization and the remnants of pillarization in public life that still exist.[4] In exploring these mentions of pillarization in the less direct genre of political communication, directed to a broader audience: electoral manifestoes, I found that these references were always in relation to another manifestation of pluralism in society, and employed in order to either demand or reject pluralism. This initial finding encouraged me to broaden my research topic and make pluralism in general, rather than pillarization in particular, the central topic of my thesis. This thesis therefore aims to map the ways in which the parties express their ideas on democracy and society in the Netherlands. Through analyzing all eight manifestoes of the three populist radical right parties in the Netherlands, I intend to look at how pluralism is contested in the manifestoes of the Dutch populist radical right.

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[3] Receiving 14–18 percent of the vote at the height of each party's success.
[4] Unfortunately, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, my planned visit to *Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*, the archive that houses the print sources I had hoped to analyze, was not possible. I adjusted my research approach to fit the new circumstances.

To achieve these aims, Thematic Analysis will be used to distil themes and patterns in the corpus on the level of content. After, the Discourse Historical Approach is used to analyze the linguistic devices used by the parties. By taking an inductive approach, the questions "what is populism?" or "does the radical right threaten democracy?" will not be addressed directly. Instead, the emphasis will lie on what the empirical data tells us about the communication style of the parties and the messages they convey. These findings will consequently be discussed and evaluated in the context of some of the major scholarly debates on populism, pinpointing the strengths and possible shortcomings of the various views on populism, right-wing populism, and its interaction with democracy and pluralism.

This thesis consists of five chapters. *Chapter 1* discusses the contemporary debates on populism. It will briefly outline the theories on what populism is and will summarize the major views regarding the relationship between populism and democracy. *Chapter 2* provides the context for the corpus that will be analyzed. It describes the historical role of pluralism in politics and society in the Netherlands and offers an overview of the presence of populism in Dutch politics. *Chapter 3* describes the methodology used to analyze the qualitative data and reflects on the considerations for opting for a combination of Thematic Analysis and the Discourse Historical Approach. *Chapter 4* contains the empirical section of this thesis. Here, three themes are distilled: threat, exclusion, and conspiracy, and two patterns are observed: anti-pluralism and pro-pluralism. *Chapter 5* discusses the findings and evaluates them in light of the theoretical debates discussed in *Chapter 1*.

Chapter 1. Populism, The Radical Right and Democracy

Populism and the Radical Right have gained considerable academic attention in the past decades. Various definitions of populism and approaches to the empirical study of populism have been proposed, yet there is no commonly agreed upon definition. The populism literature has expanded immensely in the past few decades. This allows me to tailor my overview of the literature to the present case. Therefore, I will focus on two analytical approaches and the contested relationship between populism and democracy. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of trends in the conceptualization of populism in the twenty-first century and discuss the scholarly debates on the relationship between populism and democracy. In *Chapter 5* of this thesis, these trends and views will be evaluated in light of the findings of this study.

1.1 Defining the Populist Radical Right

There is significant academic consensus on an analytical core that can be identified: populism places "the people" antagonistically against an "other" that is powerful.[5] However, beyond this minimal definition, there are many different approaches to what populism is, and how its manifestations can be studied. There are two major strands in this discussion. The first sees populism as having this opposition of the people against a powerful other as an ideological element, the second sees populism as primarily a way of doing politics in which this element of a people versus the elite opposition is featured, and leaves the question of ideology behind. This subchapter discusses both strands but will conclude with a brief overview of the considerations of scholars on subcategorizing manifestations of populism; especially the

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[5] Francisco Panizza, "Introduction," In *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, ed. Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005) 1–31.

categories of to which scholars assign the parties LPF, PVV and FvD. First, populism as ideology will be discussed.

Populism as Ideology

Cas Mudde's definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology is likely the most successful attempt at conceptualizing populism as an ideology. Mudde synthesizes earlier debates on what populism is and tries to overcome the common criticisms of earlier conceptualizations. Earlier attempts often did not travel well from context to context and resulted in limits to the applicability of the definition across time, space and the political spectrum. Mudde defines populism as "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of a *volonté general* (general will) of the people." A thin-centered ideology, like populism, needs another, more extensive ideology to function.[6]

Most other attempts are derived from this definition, resemble it, or propose something similar: populism claims an antagonism between the people and another entity. For example, Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnel extend the idea a bit further, adding possible multiple enemies of the people and their perceived agenda. They define populism as "an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.'"[7] Another attempt at defining populism, adopting the thin-thick distinction in a different way is suggested by Stefaan Walgrave and Jan Jagers. They consider "thin populism," appealing to the people, as the component that needs to be present

[6] Cas Mudde, "Chapter 1," in *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[7] Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnel, "Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre," in *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

for a political communication style to be considered populist. When *anti-elitism* and *exclusion* are added to this, the three components together make up what they call "thick populism." Within this conceptualization, the elite and the people can mean different things. The elite can refer to political elites, media, the state, academics, or economic actors. [8] These attempts at updating the definition by Mudde, highlight that it might not be satisfactory.

Populism as a Style, Logic and Strategy

Other attempts of conceptualizing populism leave a question of ideology behind and study populism as a manner of doing politics. The attempts I will outline are populism as *political logic,*[9] populism as *political strategy*,[10] and populism as a *style*.[11] Each of these theories offers valuable angles for the study of discourse and behavior.

The idea of populism as a *political logic* was put forward by Ernesto Laclau. In his work, Laclau recognizes populism as something discursive, yet not presenting itself in language or ideology, but in the creation of power relations. Populism is understood as a hegemonic discourse, where the concepts such as "the people" are empty signifiers that can be filled with meaning.[12] Populism can also be explained as a *political strategy*. Kurt Weyland takes this approach and defines populism as: "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers."[13] This definition, however, assumes that all populists are necessarily office-seeking and does not account for cases in which parties do

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[8] Stefaan Walgrave and Jan Jagers, "Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium" *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2007): 324–325.
[9] Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist reason* (London, New York: Verso, 2005).
[10] Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics," *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 1 (2001): 14.
[11] Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: performance, political style and representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
[12] Laclau, *On Populist reason.*
[13] Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept," 14.

manage gain organized support. Neither of these conceptualizations, however, acknowledge sufficiently the complexity of the reality of populism and populist mobilization in practice.

In a third approach, the idea of populism as a *political style*, populism is seen as something that is performed.[14] Benjamin Moffitt and Michael Tormey put forward this idea, recognizing that they are not the first to attempt to describe populism as a style.[15] However, they break with earlier attempts through not only focusing on populist rhetoric, but by developing a framework that is fitting for comparative political research. Its focus lies on "how the performative repertoires of populist leaders and their followers interact, and how this affects their relationship."[16] This framework accounts for both the context of the populist performance and its content.[17] When studying a degree of populism, rather than an either-or classification, such an approach offers a practical framework.

The Populist Radical Right

Within the abovementioned approaches, there has been an effort to categorize cases that are extremely varied, with the same label. This, however, has led to criticism. With the upsurge of anti-immigrant parties in Europe, scholars were quick to label them as populist.[18] As a consequence of the increased interest in the European manifestations of populist politics, definitions were tailored to fit these cases, but disregarded classical cases of populism or Latin American populism. Some of the attempts outlined earlier in this chapter, aimed to overcome

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[14] Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: performance, political style and representation*, 28–69. Benjamin Moffitt and Michael Tormey, "Rethinking Populism," 381–397.

[15] They mention Pierre-André Taguieff, "Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem," *Telos* 103, (1995): 9–43; Michael Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,"*Political Studies* 47, no. 1 (1999): 2–16; Carlos de la Torre *Populist Seduction in Latin America*. (Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 2010); and Dani Filc, "Post-populism: Explaining Neo-liberal Populism through the Habitus," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 16, no. 2 (2011): 221–38.

[16] Benjamin Moffitt and Michael Tormey, "Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style," Political Studies 62 (2014): 387.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Tjitske Akkerman, "Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology?" *Acta Politica* 38 (2003): 147.

these issues. Yet, the number of labels for types of populism have not stopped growing despite this. The three parties that are central in the empirical part of this thesis, are often grouped in these novel subcategories: the populist radical right, or right-wing populist.[19] Of these types of parties, often the exclusionary nature is highlighted,[20] nativism and authoritarianism,[21] opposition to globalization and multiculturalism and in the European context, the European Union.[22] I will follow these scholars in the use of the terms and will use these two labels interchangeably for all three parties in this study.

1.2 Populism and Democracy

Views on the relationship between populism and democracy do not only follow from how scholars define populism but are also heavily influenced by their normative assumptions on the functioning of democracy.[23] Three major conclusions on the relationship between populism and democracy can be distilled from the literature: populism as positive for democracy, populism as negative for democracy, and populism as both positive and negative. This subchapter will outline these three views.

Some see populism as a positive force for democracy. Ernesto Laclau argues that populism can offer a push towards democracy. Following from his and Chantal Mouffe's "radical democracy," movements that articulate different demands and aim to challenge hegemony, are beneficial for democracy. As populism includes the claim to unify the different demands under

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[19] See for examples of these references for LPF, Tjitske Akkerman, "Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology?," 147, and for PVV and FvD Cas Mudde, *The Far Right Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), and Simon Otjes "The fight on the right: what drives voting for the Dutch Freedom Party and for the Forum for Democracy?," *Acta Politica* (2020): 1.

[20] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America," *Government and Opposition* 48, no.2 (2013): 147–174.

[21] Cas Mudde, "Chapter 1," *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[22] Andrej Zaslove, "The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right," *Journal of European Integration* 26, no. 1 (2004): 69–70.

[23] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis," in Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat of Corrective for Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

the title of "the people," countering something else, it can be advantageous for achieving this aim.[24] However, this view is very visibly in the minority. Most argue that it is harmful for liberal democracy, yet recognize that populism is not undemocratic per se.

Scholars who have a preference for a liberal democratic model, generally see populism as a "syndrome" or "pathology." While not arguing that populism is a syndrome, Margaret Canovan argues that in understanding populism, we should see democracy as having two faces: a "pragmatic" face and a "redemptive" one. The pragmatic side focuses on steady institutions and practices, offering a stable democracy that is in tension with the other, redemptive side. This redemptive side contains a romantic action of unfettered popular sovereignty. These two faces need to be in balance, one cannot be without the other. When pragmatism gets the overhand and the mainstream political system does not offer this, populists appear, promising the ideal of democracy.[25] This or similar explanations, have led some to see populism as a bad development, or at least a consequence of negative developments in liberal democracies. In line with this, Paul Taggart suggests in that populism has little to offer representative politics other than indicate that it is in bad health.[26]

Many scholars also stress how context can determine or influence what the effect is of populism on democracy. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser addresses this ambivalent nature of populism. He claims that the relationship between populism does not have to be either problematic or positive and argues that populism can both be a threat to and a corrective for democracy.[27] Together with Cas Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser attempted to study the relationship between (liberal)

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[24] Or a prerequisite for democracy: "the construction of a 'people' is the *sine qua non* of democratic functioning" and "the political act *par excellence*." Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason,* (London: Verso, 2005), 154, 169.

[25] Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," *Political Studies* 47, no. 1 (1999): 2-16.

[26] Paul Taggart, "Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics," in *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, ed. Yves Mény and Yves Surel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 62–80.

[27] Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser "The Ambivalence of Populism: Threat and Corrective for Democracy," *Democratization* 19, no. 2 (2012).

democracy empirically. They hypothesize that in consolidated democracies, populism in opposition will have a more positive effect than in government, or in these circumstances in unconsolidated democracies.[28] Hanspeter Kriesi makes a similar observation. He sees populism as a force that might be able to foster positive change to Western European party systems and argues that it might realign the party systems to the changed conflict structures in these societies. Yet, this positive force is limited to the Western European context. Phillip Schmitter also reasons that populism can have a positive or harmful effect. The likelihood of a virtuous populist movement according to Schmitter's essay, depends on certain conditions. He offers thirteen conditions under which a populist movement will have a positive effect on democracy. In summary, these are: the unlikelihood the system will allow for the perpetuation of power, a disconnect between the current representatives and the electorate, and the goodwill of the populists.[29]

The reasoning that populism would be undemocratic is less prevalent than that of those who argue that while populism surely often opposes liberal democracy, it clearly advocates for democracy. Moffitt proposed to undo this strict binary and argues that both democratic and anti-democratic tendencies can coexist in a populist style. He concludes that populists do not display ambivalence towards democracy, instead, they are opportunistic: they advocate for the type of democracy that will help them gain and keep power.[30] This approach leaves the question whether or not populism and (liberal) democracy can mix, behind. These and other considerations will be reflected on in light of the empirical findings of this thesis in *Chapter 5*. First, the next chapter will provide the context of the case studies that are analyzed.

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[28] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis," in *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat of Corrective for Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.
[29] Philip Schmitter, "The Vices and Virtues of Populism," *Sociologica* 13, no. 1 (2019): 75–81.
[30] Benjamin Moffitt "Populism and Democracy" in *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 149–150.

Chapter 2. Context of the Case

To be able to contextualize the themes and patterns that appear in this case study on the Dutch populist radical right, a brief introduction into the societal and political developments of the past two centuries is essential. Furthermore, a discussion of the development and successes of the Dutch radical right in general, and in particular, the three parties of which the manifestoes are analyzed, can offer a better understanding of the parties' impact on politics in the Netherlands. This chapter serves the purpose of informing the reader on the context of the case. First, pluralism, the central concept in the findings is defined, followed by an overview of the development and functioning of Dutch democracy and a brief summary of how social groups based on religious and political ideology or migration background left their mark on politics and society. The second subchapter discusses the role of the radical right in the Netherlands, summarizing the successes of the three parties of which the manifestoes will be analyzed in *Chapter 4*.

2.1 Pluralism in Politics and Society

This subchapter discusses the ways in which diversity in Dutch society has influenced the democracy in the Netherlands. In this context, and in the analysis, pluralism is a central concept. For clarity, I will define pluralism here. Pluralism is a much-debated topic. Theorists on politics, culture and religion, each advocate for a different understanding of the term and a different response to a reality of pluralism. I aim to keep it simple and synthesize the various understandings of pluralism to be a concept that can be used in the analysis of political discourse. My definition is as follows:

> Pluralism is the *recognition* of cultural, ethnic, religious, or ideological diversity in society, and the *view* that this diversity should be accommodated to ensure no groups in society are deprived of autonomy, expression or political power.

This definition is kept in mind while analyzing the eight manifestoes and connecting the results to the literature on populism and democracy in *Chapter 4* and *Chapter 5*.

Dutch Democracy

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. The constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands dates back to 1815, but amendments in 1848 marked the starting point of the Netherlands as a parliamentary democracy. A list-system of proportional representation was introduced simultaneously with general male suffrage in 1917, replacing a first-past-the-post system with single member districts. True universal suffrage came in 1919, when also women gained voting rights. Since this point in time, there have been no significant changes of the general principles of the Dutch political system.[31]

In general, elections for the Second Chamber, the House of Representatives, are held every four years. The participation of a new party requires a registration at the Political Parties Register of the Electoral Council in the Hague and the payment of €11,250 and a list of signatures of supporters. There are 150 seats to be divided among the candidates. Formally, there is no electoral threshold – the percentage of the vote that correlates with one seat in the Second Chamber, 0.667%, is enough to secure that seat. Remainder votes are distributed on the basis of the highest average principle using the D'Hondt method that slightly favors larger parties in gaining an extra seat. Every four years there are elections for the State-Provincial. The elected members of the State-Provincial appoint the members of the First Chamber, the Dutch Senate.

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[31] See for more information on the Dutch political system in English ProDemos – House for Democracy and the Rule of Law, *Democracy in the Netherlands* (The Hauge: ProDemos, 2013).

The relatively low cost of entering the parliamentary party system[32] makes it easy for new parties to emerge. The purely proportional system furthermore leads to a high number of parties in parliament and therefore the need for multi-party coalitions in the government-executive, often requiring the support of three or four parties. Formation negotiations often are a lengthy process. Cooperation of the coalition parties and proposed direction of the government are set out in the coalition agreement.

Political parties in the Netherlands largely depend on funding from donors and membership fees, however, also receive supplementary public funding when they are represented in the first or second chamber and have at least a thousand members. This funding consists of a basic grant and additional amounts based on the number of seats in parliament and membership numbers. While most parties have internal democracy, it is not a requirement to enter into parliament. However, the condition of significant membership to be eligible to receive public funding, incentivizes internal democracy to a certain extent.

Pillarization and De-Pillarization

At some point in the nineteenth century, the formation of a 'pillarized' organization of society and politics started in the Netherlands. The metaphor of a structure with pillars illustrates the societal segmentation that existed in the Netherlands for roughly a century. Pillarised society in the Netherlands centered around religion and political ideology. The four pillars were Catholic, Protestant, Socialist and Liberal. Each pillar represented a segment in society based on a different ideology. While the Liberal group is often considered to be a pillar, it can be argued that it was instead a group of which the members simply did not belong to any of the pillars. While the other pillars clearly had their own institutions, organizations, political parties

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[32] Cost of entering the party system does not refer simply to the financial burden to participate in elections, but the combination of all factors that make securing one or more seats in parliament relatively easy or difficult.

and media outlets, the liberal segment did not.[33] When exactly the pillars formed, when they disappeared, and in what episode of history they were most influential is disputed by historians, political scientists, and sociologists.[34] What is generally agreed on however, is that pillarization served to achieve the political emancipation of groups in society.[35]

The first segment to be represented by a political party was the Protestant segment. Calvinist Abraham Kuyper established the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) in 1879. It was the first political party in the Netherlands and its main aim was to counter the liberalism among elected representatives and to reverse the implementation of the ideals of the French Revolution in the Dutch political system. The ARP held the belief that power ought to derive from God, rather than the people. Organizing themselves allowed the Protestant minority to secure power in society that matched their already solidified political strength. Catholic, still informal, organization in politics was fueled by the debates on public denominational education. The Catholic and Protestants challenged the Liberal position that sectarian schools should not receive public funding. While this so called 'school struggle' was fought, other social problems became more obvious when the first Socialist movement was established. Pacification laws between 1917 and 1919 resolved the school struggle, reformed the electoral system and established mass suffrage. This marked the start of a fully pillarized society that would last for half a century.[36]

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[33] Wintle, 2002

[34] H. Daalder, "Politicologen, Sociologen, Historici en de Verzuiling," *Low Countries Historical Review* 100, no. 1 (1985): 52.

[35] Walter Goddijn, *Katholieke minderheid en protestantse dominant: Sociologische nawerking van de historische relatie tussen katholieken en protestanten in Nederland en in het bijzonder in de provincie Friesland* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1957), Johannes M. G. Thuurlings, "De Wankele Zuil: Katholieken Tussen Assimilatie en Pluralisme," Nijmegen: Dekker en de Vegt, 1971., and D. Th. Kuiper, "De Voormannen: Een Sociaalwetenschappelijke Studie over Ideologie, Conflict en Kerngroepvorming binnen de Gereformeerde Wereld in Nederland tussen 1820 en 1930," (Meppel en Kampen: Boom, 1972).

[36] Arend Lijphart refers to the time period between 1917 and 1967 as the undisputed age of pillarization. However, he does not speak of the existence of a Liberal or Socialist pillar. Instead, he refers to a general pillar and sharp class divisions through all of these three pillars. See Arend Lijphart, *Verzuiling, Pacificatie en Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek* (Haarlem: Becht, 1990), 27–30.

Each of the segments had each their own schools and other institutions, (public) media outlets, organizations and political parties. On the political level, the societal segments were represented by the elites of each segment in society. Living as a member of one of the segments could very well mean that one would not interact with anyone outside the segment. Each pillar accommodated its own members and its members generally had no reason to opt for the use of the other pillars' services or organizations. Therefore, pillarized politics was possible for a long time, and the need for consociational and corporatist practices essential. Still today, coalitions consisting of three or four parties, and the involvement of unions and employer's organizations in policy making are common practice.

The intensity of the pillarized society decreased since the early 1960s. Secularization and successful emancipation are often highlighted as the causes of de-pillarization.[37] However, there are still remnants of pillarized society visible today. For example, public funding for education on the basis of a particular ideology is still the practice. However, with different educational and religious ideologies gaining influence, these schools do not follow the original lines of pillarization anymore. Depending on region, many schools that are still denominational in name, are not anymore in practice. Furthermore, the public media is still divided. There are public broadcasters with a particular task, such as news broadcasting; there are broadcasters with "recognition" depending on membership; and there are broadcasters with "provisional recognition," new broadcasters with lower, but increasing, membership.[38] It is this middle group that nowadays mainly in just their name, and sometimes in still in practice, directs itself to the ideological groups that were once pillarized.

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[37] Thurlings, Johannes M. G. "De Wankele Zuil: Katholieken Tussen Assimilatie en Pluralisme." Nijmegen: Dekker en de Vegt, 1971.
[38] Nederlandse Publieke Omroep, "Omroepen, Netten en Zenders," accessed 10 October 2020, https://over.npo.nl/organisatie/missie-bestuur-en-bestel/omroepen-netten-en-zenders.

New Diversity: Immigration and Multiculturalism

By the 1980s the Netherlands was considered de-pillarized. However, new divisions in society would become salient. Migration from the newly independent Suriname, and through guest labor and family unification from primarily Turkey and Morocco led to new types of diversity in society: linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious. Initially, it was expected that the second group, the non-citizen guest laborers, would return to their home countries when their employment contracts expired. Therefore, policy was directed at incentivizing these immigrants to leave at their own will. When this did not happen, policy aimed at incorporating them into Dutch society.[39]

Multiculturalism took off in the 1990s. Multiculturalism is the view that diversity and various groups and their differences should be recognized and accommodated in the dominant political culture. There is no generally agreed upon extent of the accommodation of the rights of these groups.[40] In the Netherlands, policies were primarily directed at equal treatment, labor market participation and education. Initially, policy followed the idea that, similar to pillarization, ensuring representation and accepting cultural differences would foster tolerance among individuals and groups. However, multicultural policies became heavily criticized towards the end of the 1990s. Since then, the number of new multiculturalism policies has dropped, and previously established policies have often been revoked. [41]

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[39] Sniderman and Hagendoorn, *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 1–2.

[40] The justifications for multiculturalism can be divided into four groups: *communitarian*, focusing on a "politics of recognition" see Charles Taylor "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), *liberal egalitarian*, focusing on "rectifying unchosen inequalities," see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *freedom from domination*, proposing accommodation only when it will reduce domination, see for this view Frank Lovett, "Cultural Accommodation and Domination," *Political Theory* 38, no. 2 (2010): 243–267, and lastly *historical injustice*, proposing groups marginalized in the past should be "provisionally privileged," see for this view Jeff Spinner-Halev, "Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State," *Ethics*, 112 (2001): 84–113.

[41] Laura Coello, *Significant Difference? A Comparative Analysis of Multicultural Policies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2010), 34–40.

2.2 The Radical Right in the Netherlands

This subchapter discusses the radical right in the Netherlands, with particular attention to the three parties of which the manifestoes will be analyzed in *Chapter 4*. The emergence of Pim Fortuyn into the political arena in 2002 marks a shift in the role of the radical right in Dutch politics. Therefore, this section will first discuss the radical right pre-Fortuyn before elaborating on the successes of three radical right political parties post-Fortuyn.[42]

Pre-Fortuyn Radical Right

Prior to the success of Pim Fortuyn, the radical right only had a marginal presence in the Netherlands. Unlike in countries such as Austria and France, radical parties with a nationalistic narrative remained very marginal. Two parties under the lead of Hans Janmaat, the Centre Party (Centrumpartij) and Centre Democrats (Centrum Democraten), nationalist slogans and flirtation with national socialist ideas were responded to with a *cordon sanitaire,* and Janmaat received complaints of discrimination. It was clear that these ideas were not to be publicly expressed. The parties never received more that 2.5% of the vote.

The shock of 9/11 partly lifted the taboo of discussing integration of Muslims in the Netherlands. The success of Pim Fortuyn and his ideas were met with dismissal by the other political parties. Yet, it marked a new era for the Dutch Radical Right. Since then, populist radical right, in a different style than Janmaat's politics, and a more open dialogue with the other parties, has become a permanent and significant part of Dutch parliamentary politics. Therefore, we can speak of a pre-Fortuyn Radical Right, and a post-Fortuyn Radical Right. The following section will discuss Pim Fortuyn, his party and its impact on Dutch politics.

List Pim Fortuyn

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[42] All election results mentioned in this chapter were obtained from www.parlement.com.

Pim Fortuyn was a Dutch sociologist, author, and politician. Before entering into politics, he prominently opposed multiculturalist policies in the Netherlands by the so called 'Purple Cabinets' of the 1990s. His party, List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), was established after Pim Fortuyn's break with the party Leefbaar Nederland in 2002, of which he was the party leader. Fortuyn initially decided to run as an independent candidate, but soon gained enough support in the polls to grow into a new party. In the 2002 elections, the party managed to secure twenty-six out of 150 seats in the Second Chamber, becoming the second largest party at that point in time.

On May 6, 2002, nine days before the elections, Pim Fortuyn was murdered by environmental activist Volkert van der Graaf. The LPF continued under the leadership of Mat Herben and was involved in the cabinet formation. The party secured a place in government in coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). This government, Balkenende I, lasted for only eighty-seven days due to tensions within the LPF. After the fall of the cabinet, new elections were held on 22 January 2003. Here, the LPF lost eighteen seats. Because the unrest within LPF had caused the other coalition partners to lose their faith in effective cooperation, which resulted in the fall of the cabinet, LPF did not participate in the formation negotiations for the new government.

The internal struggles and the loss of Pim Fortuyn as charismatic leader, led to a fast collapse of the party. The party participated in the elections for the European Parliament in 2004 but did not manage to secure any seats. Some prominent LPF members in parliament became independent, yet later returned as party members. In the 2006 parliamentary elections, the LPF participated under the name Lijst 5 Fortuyn, but did not manage to secure any seats in parliament. On 1 January 2008, the party was dissolved. While the successes of the party were short-lived, a new party emerged that offered a similar platform as the LPF and even housing some of its former members, however with somewhat more extreme message: The Freedom Party.

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Freedom Party

The Freedom Party (PVV) was established on 22 February 2006. Its sole member is party leader Geert Wilders. The party is not open to membership, therefore, even the members of parliament for the PVV are not members of the party itself. On many occasions, Geert Wilders' statements have led to international controversy. He has been rejected from entering some countries and was convicted of hate-speech.

Geert Wilders was, prior to the establishment of the party, a member of the Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), however because of conflict with the party leadership, he decided to become an independent member of parliament. In March of 2005, Wilders published a *Declaration of Independence*, outlining his political stance from then on. While supporters can donate to the party, it is not open to membership, unlike the LPF and other Dutch political parties. In the 2006 Parliamentary Elections, the party gained nine seats in the Second Chamber. After, the party had success as a member of the opposition, this resulted in a win of 24 seats in the Second Chamber in 2010. The PVV conditionally supported the minority coalition of the VVD and CDA. This only lasted briefly because the PVV ceased to support the coalition when they proposed cuts to manage the budgetary deficit to fit European guidelines.

The successes of the party have not been steady. In the elections held after in 2012, the PVV lost nine seats. In the most recent Second Chamber elections, the party regained some support, resulting in the win of twenty seats. In 2011, the party participated in the elections for the States-Provincial. At this election, the PVV secured ten First Chamber seats out of seventy-five, however lost one in the 2015 elections. In 2019, the PVV lost four of its seats, and now has only five seats remaining.

Similar to the LPF, the PVV has lived through internal conflict. Since its first election win, internal criticism has not been welcomed by party leader Wilders. Internal criticism was

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strongest in 2012, when four PVV members of parliament resigned from the PVV fraction and became independent parliamentarians. The criticism of PVV members of parliament concerned the lack of democracy within the party and disagreement concerning the establishment of a hotline where people could report persons from countries in Eastern Europe who "misbehave." In 2014, one of Wilders' victory speeches resulted in criticism and a lawsuit against the leader for discrimination and hate speech. In this speech, he asked the crowd to chant "less, less, less" to the question "what do you want more or less Moroccans?"[43] Primarily local and European PVV politicians distanced themselves from the statement. In 2016, Geert Wilders was convicted of hate speech and inciting discrimination. He has appealed this decision. In 2017, another party, with a platform similar to the PVV emerged: Forum for Democracy.

Forum for Democracy

Forum for Democracy (FvD) started as a think tank, established in 2015 by Thierry Baudet as a response to the non-binding referendum on the European Union's association agreement with Ukraine. Baudet was one of the initiators for the referendum. A majority of voters rejected the association treaty, but the result of the vote was not adhered to by the government, as the European Union did not allow for adjustment of the treaty in such a late stage. On 25 September 2016, the think tank became a political party and publicly announced that it would participate in the 2017 parliamentary elections. In this election, the young party managed to secure two seats in the Second Chamber. Since then, support has increased and in the provincial elections of 2019, the party received the largest share of the votes, 14,4 percent, resulting in thirteen seats in the First Chamber.

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[43] Nederlandse Omroep Stichting, "PVV aanhang scandeert: minder Marokkanen," 19 March 2014, accessed 10 October 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BaB75uznT8o.

The party structure is centralized, and all candidates are elected by a select group of party leaders. In contrast to the PVV, FvD is open to members that pay a membership fee. Yet, in the two-and-a-half years that the party has been in existence, the limited democracy within the party has already led to internal criticism. This criticism is focused on the party's leader, Thierry Baudet and the other member of parliament, Theo Hiddema. Co-establisher of the party, and supposed-to-be Baudet's second, Henk Otten has criticized the two parliamentarians for not sharing media attention with others within the party. Otten was ousted from the party in 2019 after he went public with his criticism and some party members followed. Baudet in return accused Otten of stealing from party funds. Additionally, the proposal for a hotline where students and parents can report leftist teachers, received disapproval of some within the party. This development reminds of the backlash PVV received after the establishment of the hotline for reporting persons from countries in Eastern Europe.

The announcement by Paul Cliteur in May of 2019, suggesting the party will form a pillar, seems to have caused little buzz in the media or among their supporters. However, this promise has not been without follow-up by the party. The new newspapers, broadcasters and institutions Cliteur proposes are slowly emerging. In doing this, FvD continues its criticism of the public media, and establishes its own outlets, such as a newscast and newspaper. It is unclear whether this newspaper, first published in June 2020, takes on the shape of a party-newspaper or pertains to be a news outlet like the *FvD Journaal*, the newscast of the party, implies to be. The newspaper is not publicly accessible but sold in the web shop of the party. These developments will be excluded from the present study. The following chapter will discuss the sources that are included in this study and methodology used to conduct the analysis.

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Chapter 3. Methodology and Data Collection

3.1 Rationale

This research study analyzes a corpus of eight manifestoes of three Dutch right-wing populist parties on the level of content and language. The aim of this study is to map the ways in which right-wing populist parties communicate their ideas on democracy and society. While the analysis is mindful of content that includes references often regarded as key features of populism, this study takes an inductive, rather than a deductive approach. Instead of taking a hypothesis derived from theory as a starting point, the qualitative data from the eight manifestoes of the three parties formed the basis. The scholarly debates around populism, as summarized in *Chapter 1*, will be reviewed in light of the findings in the discussion chapter, *Chapter 5.*

The methodological approach that was taken in this research is primarily guided by a tradition of studying the populist radical right that was started by Ruth Wodak. In the monograph *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean,* Wodak has compiled her own research on the many different facets of populist discourse, but also provided a framework that can be applied to cases beyond those she studies.[44] As the title suggests, her main conclusion is that right-wing populist parties' discourse and strategies revolve around making their audiences fearful. She uses the Discourse Historical Approach to analyze the cases. This approach to discourse analysis lends itself well for studying political discourses. Therefore, I chose to follow Wodak's approach.

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[44] See Appendix I for an overview of the strategies, fallacies and topoi that can be recognized in the manifestoes of the LPF, PVV and FvD. These are some of discursive strategies and linguistic devices that Wodak recognizes in the various cases she studies in her book.

3.2 Data Selection and Corpus

I chose to analyze manifestoes as they are a means of communication with the voters that is similar in shape and form across time.[45] and archived and publicly accessible to this date. Even though the selected manifestoes, the programs published before each Second Chamber election the parties participated in, vary in size, they each are part of the same genre within political discourse.[46] The manifestoes were downloaded from the digital archives of *Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (DNPP)*. Other versions than the ones archived by the *DNPP* were not taken into account. *Table 1* shows the election programs, their title, and the year of the election. Three programs of LPF, Four of PVV and one of FvD were analyzed.

Table 1: List of Election Programs

Party	Program	Year
LPF	*Business With a Heart*	2002
LPF	*Politics is Passion*	2003
LPF	*This is not the country I want to leave to my children*	2006
PVV	*Election Pamphlet*	2006
PVV	*The Agenda of Hope and Optimism*	2010
PVV	*Their Brussels, Our Netherlands*	2012
PVV	*The Netherlands Ours Again!* *The Netherlands is taken away from us. And I will get it back for you*[47]	2017
FvD	*Concept Election Program 2017*	2017

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[45] Since the publication of the first manifesto in 2002, a shift in digital communication can be witnessed. Yet, manifestoes have remained a core element in communication with the voter despite these changes. Analyzing other genres of communication with the voter, such as traditional or social media, would have led to a discrepancy in accessibility or availability of sources.

[46] The field of action the genre of party programs part of is "party-internal development of an informed opinion." See Ruth Wodak, "Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and Terms," in *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences,* ed. Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

[47] That election year, PVV submitted a one-page manifesto. However, as this was deemed insufficient to inform the voters, the party was required to offer additional clarification. I treated the one page entitled *The Netherlands Ours Again!* and the clarification *The Netherlands is taken away from us. And I will get it back for you* together as one program.

The corpus for the analysis was compiled by taking excerpts from each program, roughly forty excerpts per party. These excerpts were selected on the criterion that they directly or indirectly referred to the organization of politics and society. In Appendix I. the excerpts can be found including their translation from Dutch to English.

3.3 Methodology for Analysis

The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) is a discourse analysis methodology that transcends the linguistic dimension of a text. Context, content and language are analyzed through a two-step analysis. The first step is the entry-level analysis. This step consists of distinguishing themes in the text. The second step is an in-depth analysis. This step consists of providing context of the texts (see *Chapter 2* and *Chapter 3.2*), the macro-structure of the text, the discursive strategies that are used in the text and the argumentation schemes (see the analysis, *Chapter 4*).[48] I chose to follow Thematic Analysis to detect the themes and patterns in the text, the entry-level analysis within the DHA framework.

Thematic Analysis is a qualitative research method that aims to find themes in sets of texts.[49] This research method consists of several steps. First, codes were assigned to the 118 excerpts of 5 to 150 words. As this method is combined with discourse analysis, a latent approach was taken. Codes were assigned to the excerpt when a topic was either implicitly or explicitly present. All occurrence of explicit mentions and their extent were elaborated on in the analysis. Second, the codes were reviewed, and patterns and themes were formulated. The themes were labeled: *Enemies*, *Exclusion*, and *Alliance*, and the patterns were labeled: *Anti-Pluralism* and

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[48] Ruth Wodak, "The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean" (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015).

[49] Victoria Clarke, Virginia Braun, and Nikki Hayfield, "Thematic Analysis," *Qualitative Psychology: A practical Guide to Research Methods*, ed. Jonathan, A. Smith (London: SAGE, 2015) 224-248.

Pro-Pluralism. In organizing the codes, the qualitative content analysis software Atlas.ti was used. All entries into this software were done manually.

The in-depth analysis requires the understanding of discursive strategies, fallacies and topoi. *Table 2* defines the specific strategies that were present in the corpus. For clarity, I will define the three categories: *Discursive strategies* are strategies to achieve getting across a certain message or meaning,[50] such as to present the other negatively, see *negative other-presentation* in *Table 2*. *Topoi* are commonly used and accepted arguments. While topoi are not necessarily fallacious, they can be misleading or false.[51] *Fallacies* are faulty reasonings, these are always false and might be used to mislead the reader or audience.

Table 2: Overview of Discursive strategies, Fallacies, and Topoi

Term	Description	Page nr.[52]
Coded language	Subtly expressing a message that if expressed in a blunt matter would be considered distasteful or hateful. Can include the use of discursive strategies, topoi and fallacies.	46
Calculated ambivalence (strategy of)	Addressing multiple contradictory audiences simultaneously by using coded language, such as insinuating desired exclusion on the basis of race, followed by a denial of racism.	46–47
Positive self-presentation strategy	A strategy that relies on presenting oneself or one's own group as having positive traits.	58
Negative other-presentation strategy	A strategy that relies on presenting a person or group outside the speaker's or writer's own group as having negative traits.	63
Legitimation by authorization	Legitimation through referring to an authority such as an individual, law, tradition.	6
Fallacy of sameness	Seeing own cultural or national community as homogenous.	54

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[50] Page number in Wodak, *The Politics of Fear.*
[51] Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, "Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and Terms," in Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 208.
[52] Wodak, *The Politics of Fear.*

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Fallacy of argumentum ad baculum	Perceived dangers that threaten this homogeneity.	54
Fallacy of difference	Emphasizing difference of one's own group as clearly distinctive from other groups in order to divide one's own group clearly from the other.	54
Fallacy of comparison	Overemphasizing the superiority of one's own cultural or national community; can be explicit or implicit.	54
Topos of (internal) danger/threat	Argumentation that points to threat consequently calls for action to respond to this threat.	53
Topos of savior	Argumentation that points to a need for rescue and the speaker's role as savior.	60
Topos of culture	Argumentation that points to a common culture and an action that follows on the basis of that.	57
Topos of urgency	Argumentation that points to something that is urgent and a call for immediate action in response of this.	83
Topos of similarity/ difference/ comparison	Argumentation that points to similarity/difference/comparison between one group and another group and claims a consequence follows from that.	52
Topos of definition	Argumentation strategy where the definition of something (may be speaker's own definition) ought to lead to a conclusion/calls for a response.	57
Strategy of singularization	A strategy that relies on making oneself superior or unique. This strategy automatically incorporates the *fallacy of comparison* when it is utilized.	54
Strategy of provocation	A strategy that relies on using language to shock and appeal to audiences and aims to set the agenda in the media.	68
Strategy of victim-perpetrator reversal	A strategy that relies on blaming the victim other for victimizing the group that is the perpetrator.[53]	64

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[53] See also Andras Kovács and Szilágyi, Anna, "Variations on a Theme: The Jewish 'Other' in old and new antisemitic media discourses in Hungary in the 1940s and in 2011," in *Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text,* ed. Ruth Wodak and J. E Richardson (London: Routledge, 2013), 221–3, for the use of this strategy.

Chapter 4. Analysis

This chapter analyses the eight manifestoes on their content and language. Thirty-eight sections in the election programs of LPF have been selected, forty sections in those of the PVV and forty sections in the single election program of the FvD. These sections were selected based on the criterion that their content referred to pluralism directly or indirectly. The 118 sections range from five to 150 words. Together, these form a corpus of radical right manifesto content that refers to societal and political pluralism either directly or indirectly. The findings are structured in four subchapters, the first three each discuss a theme in the content and language of the party manifestoes. The fourth subchapter discusses two paradoxical patterns that can be found in the corpus as a whole and links the three themes together.

4.1 Two Enemies: Undemocratic Elites and Anti-Democratic Islam

The first theme that can be distinguished is a perception of an undemocratic elite and Islam as a threat to democratic values. In both of these frames, a *negative other-presentation strategy* can be recognized. The parties use the language of liberal democracy to justify how their views offer a more democratic alternative to party politics in the Netherlands than currently is the case, and use *positive self-presentation strategies* and *language of legitimization* to achieve this. This subchapter will first discuss the how the three parties refer to established political parties in their manifestoes. After, it will discuss the ways in which the manifestoes formulate the threats the parties perceive to democracy and how this threat is communicated to the voter.

The Elite According to the LPF

The LPF does not use the term "elite" to refer to the established parties, but uses the neologism of "regents," and instead of "the people," they refer to "the citizens."[54] The term "regents"

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[54] See for the use of "citizens" LPF 3, LPF 4, LPF 10, LPF 36

reminds of the system of government in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Dutch Republic. During this time, power was in the hands of a group of families that governed in an oligarchical manner.[55] For LPF, the modern "class of regents" is part of *"a completely rusted shut and self-important political culture."*[56] They furthermore refer to a "culture of regents" that is perceived as a threat to democratic values. The party employs the *topos of threat* through arguing that protection is needed. The LPF writes: *"These core values were fought for in the past centuries and should be protected daily. Not only against dictatorship, but also against a culture of regents."*[57] Mentioning dictatorship in the same sentence as the elite, and using a term that reminds the audience of the days before the establishment of democracy in the Netherlands, evokes the image of this culture as an undemocratic government and a threat to democratic values.

Aside from "class" or "culture," LPF refers to simply "political parties" that are *"primarily focused on maintaining their own power, rather than on what is best for the Netherlands."*[58] They introduce a not commonly known term to denote this practice by referring to *"a particratic party model."*[59] The introduction of new terms and arguing a consequence follows from that is a use of *topos of definition*. The label "particratic party model" furthermore evokes the image of a type of government by using the suffix "-cratic," and stresses the perceived undemocratic nature of these parties according to the LPF.

A third entity the LPF refers to in the manifestoes is "Purple." This phrase is shorthand for the so-called Purple Cabinets, the governing coalitions of 1994–1998 and 1998–2002, consisting

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[55] L.J. Price, "The Regents," *Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of Particularism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 35
[56] LPF 2
[57] LPF 19
[58] LPF 35
[59] LPF 35. There is no reference to a source from which the party adopts this term, however it is not their own. Particracy is generally used as a derogatory term that implies a rule by parties, rather than the people. Attempts have been made to use it as a scholarly concept, see for example its proposal in the context of Italy Mauro Calise, "The Italian Particracy: Beyond President and Parliament," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (1994): 441–480.

of the parties PvdA, D66 and VVD. PvdA is symbolized by the color red and VVD by the color blue, these together make the color purple. In the LPF manifestoes, this government is seen as responsible for creating division, promoting immigration, and *"not safeguarding of the democratic level in society."[60]* While it is uncertain whether the term "Purple" in the discourse of the LPF can be translated to "the elite," the membership of the governing parties in the "particratic party system" and the accusation of this coalition forming a threat to democracy, suggest that "Purple" stands synonym to "the elite."

Throughout the party's manifestoes, metaphors of processes are used to refer to the existing political culture; either in the context of "Purple" or the "class of regents." A political culture that is *"rusted shut,"[61]* or *"hermetically sealed"[62]* signifies the closedness of something that ought to be open or movable. While the metaphor of rusting refers to something that happened over time, without a specific act other than passivity causing it, the metaphor of sealing something suggests an active involvement in excluding something or someone. Another metaphor that is used in a similar manner is *"calcified structures and cultures."[63]* This metaphor of the development of a medical condition evokes a similar image as the metaphor of rusting: something that was caused because of time passing, rather than the cause of an act. In this sense, the development of undemocratic government is the consequence of inactivity on the part of government and parties.

The Elite According to the PVV

In contrast to the discourse of LPF and FvD, PVV refers to "the elite" and does not make an effort to introduce a neologism and refers often to "the Dutch people." Occasionally, adjectives

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[60] LPF 2
[61] LPF 2
[62] LPF 35
[63] LPF 16

are stuck to this term. For example, *"leftist elites,"*[64] used in 2010, and *"progressive elites"*[65] used in 2012. On all other occasions "the elites" or *"our elites"*[66] are used. Using the possessive pronoun "our," PVV highlights its perception of this entity as a national matter. The adjective "leftist" is added more often to *"politicians,"*[67] *"journalists,"*[68] and *"clique."*[69] In speaking of the elite, PVV uses metaphors of the *nation as a body*[70] and a metaphor of secular political ideology as religion. The following excerpt shows the use of both these metaphors:

> *For many of the problems that taunt the Netherlands the diagnosis is the same: elites are disconnected from reality and started doing things at their own accord that does not help regular people. Our elites converted themselves to the illusion that all cultures (and the values attached to them) are equal. Anything goes. There is no good or bad, all cultures are equal to them, the Islam or Christianity, female circumcision, shaking hands or not – what is the difference.*[71]

By referring to a "diagnosis" for "the problems that taunt the Netherlands," the PVV evokes the image of disease. While the phrase does not refer to the elites as disease directly, it labels it as the diagnosis; a word most often heard in the medical context or when something is malfunctioning. The metaphor of religion is used by claiming the elites have "converted." By portraying the elites as having religious ideology, the party is able to evoke the frame of the

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[64] PVV 9, PVV 17
[65] PVV 27, PVV 29, PVV 30
[66] PVV 7, PVV 21
[67] PVV 27
[68] PVV 27
[69] PVV 11
[70] Nation as a body metaphor and references to disease, pests and parasites were seen as 'dead' as its use reminded of the use of this term by Nazi Germany "to advance genocidal ideology," see Andreas Musolf, *Metaphor, Nation and the Holocaust* (London: Routledge, 2010). However, Ruth Wodak argues that this taboo has lessened and recognizes several cases of its use, see Wodak, The Politics of Fear, 74–76.
[71] PVV 7

alluded elites as disregarding the voters they ought to represent. In this sense, the elites are a threat to the people because they are not political, but religious.[72][73]

The PVV manifestoes, similar to the LPF manifestoes, portray the elites as undemocratic, tyrannical[74] and something that can only be challenged by the party. For example, the elites are mentioned as *"doing things at their own accord,"*[75] and that they *"have taken possession of crucial positions in our society,"*[76] suggesting the members of the elite are representatives who do not take their constituencies into account, and have grasped power rather than gained it with the consent of the voters. This conveys a *strategy of negative other-presentation*. On how the members of the elite were elected, the PVV suggests that they tricked the voters, portraying the other parties as misleading. PVV uses the metaphor of a trap to convey this: *"A proud people swims into the trap that gets increasingly tighter."*[77] Furthermore, by calling the Dutch "a proud people" the party uses *positive self-presentation* and evokes a feeling of national pride that is targeted by a malicious elite.

The manifesto furthermore suggests that the elites are fearful of "the people" and democracy: *"The progressive elites are scared to death to hear the voice of the people. We are not,"* and their power ought to be broken through the means of democracy: *"Only a radical democratization can break the dominance of the leftist elites."*[78] By claiming that the perceived elites or part of the elites are fearful of democracy, the PVV suggests the elite is undemocratic or unwilling to be democratic.

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[72] Another instance of the elites as religious can be found in PVV 15: "Reliance on benefits, violence against gay people and women, honor killings, school dropout etc. are of all times, but would be a lot less if the elites would not have converted themselves to cultural relativism."

[73] See for an example the opposite, religious belief as political ideology, the section *Islam as a Threat to Democratic Values* of this chapter.

[74] PVV 21.

[75] PVV 7.

[76] PVV 9.

[77] PVV 27.

[78] PVV 17.

The Elite According to FvD

Central to the FvD's manifesto is the party's opposition to what they call "the party cartel" or simply "the cartel." According to FvD, this entity consists of politicians, journalists, professors, and executives that are members of a group of 10.000 people.[79] In showing the elite as present everywhere in society, the party takes the threat of the elite a step further from what LPF and PVV envision as the dangerous entity, portraying it as political power that extends beyond the sphere of party politics and government. Overall, the party is much more elaborate on who belongs to this group of elites compared to LPF and PVV and employs a slightly different language compared to the other parties. Yet, like the LPF, FvD opted for the use of a neologism to refer to the "established parties" or the commonly used term "the elite." Furthermore, the party does not refer to "the people," or a similar term. While the party references national identity, and employs the *topos of culture*, they do not claim to speak for a unified people.

In the manifesto, the word "elite" is only used once. In this instance, the manifesto refers to the party's commitment *"to cut off the power of the party-elites,"[80]* on all other occasions "the party cartel," "a clique" or "they" are used. As the cartel involves individuals beyond those involved in the political parties directly, the reference to "the party-elites" shows the parties as the cog in the connections within the perceived elite. More so than LPF and PVV, the FvD employs a language of conspiracy in its manifesto. The "party cartel" is central in the text and is portrayed as an evil force that is working against the party and the people to maintain and expand their power.[81]

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[79] See FvD 2 for the introduction of the term in the manifesto.

[80] FvD 15.

[81] The populist opposition of the elite against the people have been connected to conspiracy theories before. Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser see "the elite conspiracy" as a theme occurring in cases of populist radical right parties in Europe, see "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America," *Government and Opposition* 48, no. 1 (2013): 63, 66, and Kirk Hawkins incorporates the language of conspiracies into his criterion for populism, referring to a "conspiring elite," see "Is Chavez Populist?: Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 8 (2009): 1042.

The use of the word "cartel" evokes the image of an entity that is corrupt, criminal or at minimum, unfair. They use of the word cartel in terms of economy, criminal organizations, or party model.[82] To describe their plan to counter the party cartel, they use the word "kartelbestrijding" (antitrust) that frames the concept in economic terms.[83] There are no interviews or documents indicating a link between "party cartel" as is used by FvD and *cartel party,* the term coined by Katz and Mair. As both terms concern party organization that aims at securing power through the means of the state, inspiration for the FvD's terminology in the model of party organization as suggested by Katz and Mair is likely.[84]

The manifesto suggests the existence of a system that produces politicians that disregard the interests of the population: *"It is the party that arranges the job. It is the party that proposes the candidates, and therefore the loyalty of the cartel member is with the leadership of that party – not with the voter. The benefits of the population are low on the priority list. Party interests go before country interests."*[85] The image that is signaled is of a system that disincentivizes politicians to act as representatives of their constituents. This portrayal of a lack of or failing democracy goes beyond the national context: the European Union is described as *"grown without limits and has become a completely undemocratic Moloch . . . a cartel on top of another cartel."*[86] It is furthermore claimed that undemocratic practices have been going on for a significant period: *"A very small clique of cartel members has ruled our country for decades."*[87] In this example, the language of conspiracy can be recognized again.

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[82] The concept of *cartel party* was introduced by Katz and Mair to denote category of party to supplement the types of parties recognized until then. A *cartel party* is a party model "in which colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival." Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics* 1, no. 1 (1995): 5.
[83] See FvD 10 and FvD 30 to see examples of this use.
[84] I have contacted the party via email on 25 May 2020 to inquire into the origin of the term "party cartel" as is used in the manifesto. However, I did not receive a response.
[85] FvD 2.
[86] FvD 20.
[87] FvD 38.

The language the party uses in their statements against the party cartel makes use of the frame of this entity as closed or locked, something that ought to be *"broken,"*[88] *"broken up"*[89] or *"broken open."*[90] While this metaphor suggest a static nature of the cartel in relation to the outside, metaphors that suggest movement come up when practices within this entity are discussed. For example, FvD implies a system of nepotism by the metaphor of a spinning *"job carrousel."*[91] The party claims that other parties, and primarily their leaders, arrange jobs for members of the party, in politics and in high-ranking positions elsewhere, implying entanglement of political parties and government with corporations and other organizations.

Islam as a Threat to Democratic Values

Besides the elite as enemy, the corpus suggests the existence of another enemy of democracy: Islam. PVV is most adamant and explicit about the threat of Islam. When comparing the three parties it becomes clear that for FvD, the party cartel, or the elite, is the primary threat to the Netherlands; Islam is the primary threat to the country according to the PVV; for the LPF both these Islam and the elite are seen as a threat, however it is formulated in less extreme terms.

LPF only rarely refers to Islam, and never refers to Muslims directly, but repeatedly to "groups in society." However, these groups, primarily consisting of Muslim immigrants, are not seen as the threat per se, or at least, are not pointed to directly as the threat. Instead, it is asserted that the division between these groups and the in-group, the non-Muslim Dutch, that is seen as the danger, and the elites are considered to be the cause of this division.[92] According to the LPF, the threat consists of *"Cultural developments that are counter to the desired integration and emancipation."*[93] As an example of these developments, the LPF mentions practices that

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[88] FvD 40.
[89] FvD 7, FvD 15, FvD 17.
[90] FvD 12, FvD 10.
[91] FvD 2, FvD 38.
[92] LPF 1, LPF 2.
[93] LPF 10.

are in violation with human rights and highlights and mentions *"fundamentalist Islamic circles"* as the problem. The problem, according to LPF, lies in a clash between *"Modernity and Islam"*[94] and suggests that *"The culture of Islam is at odds with the norms and values of the modern, Western society."*[95] Here the party employs *the fallacy of comparison*. Putting Islam as contrary to, and incompatible with modernity, suggests it is something of the past, something that ought to be left behind. Yet, avoidance of the LPF in labeling Islam as such as the threat, suggests hesitance of the party to point to Islam as a threat or could point to a more careful, *coded language* in order to not evoke a negative response from the general public, by hinting at the perceived inferiority of Islam.

PVV more explicitly points to Islam as incompatible with the Netherlands and a threat to the country and democracy. The party pictures Islam as a threat, one that will escalate if nothing is done. This image is strengthened by their suggestions of preventive measures.[96] Furthermore, the danger is labeled as *"imminent."*[97] Employing the *topos of urgency* together with the *topos of threat* is likely to strengthen the feeling of fear in the reader. Throughout the manifestoes, the PVV repeatedly states Islam is not a religion, but a political ideology and therefore cannot count on privileges religions ought to receive. PVV goes a step further than merely calling the religion a political ideology,[98] instead, according to the party it is *"a totalitarian doctrine focused on dominance, violence and oppression."*[99] Through its language, PVV portrays Islam as a threat to democracy. This notion is further highlighted by the following quote: *"Our liberties and our history oblige us to fight this ideology like we should with all totalitarian ideologies."*[100] In this example, the PVV uses *the topos of history, the topos of definition* and

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[94] LPF 23.
[95] LPF 25.
[96] PVV 36.
[97] PVV 9.
[98] PVV 31 and PVV 14.
[99] PVV 14.
[100] PVV 31.

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legitimation by authorization; reasoning that history, tradition and the mere fact that the PVV defines Islam as a totalitarian ideology should compel the Dutch to fight against it.

Whereas LPF uses language that does not explicitly call Islam in itself negative, PVV explicitly attributes signifiers to Muslims and Islam that are likely to be seen as negative by the reader, such as "hooligans," "criminal," "paupers" and "medieval."[101] This *negative other-presentation* is used to evoke a feeling of superiority to those readers that do not belong to this group. Furthermore, practices of Muslims are seen by the party as threats to the public order, yet the party does not specify what religious expressions ought to be considered harmful: any or some. The only example that is mentioned is the wearing of headscarves. Not clarifying and using a seemingly harmless expression as example, suggest the party's minimal definition of an expression that threatens the public order. Leaving this uncertain to the reader is a *strategy of calculated ambivalence*. When asked later, the party could claim not having meant it to entail any religious expression, but to the audiences that agree with the message that all religious expressions of Muslims are a threat to the public order, the party can claim or hint at the opposite.

4.2 Exclusion: of Us and the Other

The second theme that can be distinguished is the theme of exclusion. The parties claim victimhood of exclusion, of the people, their voters or themselves, while simultaneously proposing the exclusion of others and justifying why this exclusion would be legitimate. This subchapter will first discuss the language of victimhood and whom or what they are the victim of. Then, the exclusionary language the three parties use will be addressed, showing the differences between the three parties.

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[101] See PVV 28 and PVV 37 for the contexts in which these signifiers are used.

The Proposed Exclusion of Immigrants and Muslims

Each of the three parties propose the exclusion of immigrants and Dutch Muslims from society, or the expression of religion in society. While the parties each propose exclusion to a different extent, all three suggest a desired exclusion in some way. Three patterns in language can be distinguished: the explicit proposal of exclusion, the subtle proposal of exclusion and the language of inclusion. Explicit proposals of exclusion can be part of a *strategy of provocation*, subtle proposals of exclusion belong to *coded language* and may include a *strategy of calculated ambivalence,* and language of inclusion can be *coded language*. The more coded or calculated the language is, the more difficult it is to know the intensity of the exclusion or inclusion that is proposed by the party.

In the LPF and FvD manifestoes, overt proposals of exclusion are limited to the exclusion of people seeking refuge in the Netherlands. For example, the LPF stresses their position that "allochthonous people"[102] ought to integrate into Dutch society and immigration ought to be restricted from then onwards. The party suggest *"integration and emancipation of minorities"* can only succeed if immigration stops.[103] LPF and FvD's intention to limit immigration[104] is the only exclusion that is explicitly proposed by these parties. PVV proposes exclusion of Muslims more explicitly on multiple occasions. Primarily, the exclusion of the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression,[105] freedom of conscience,[106]

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[102] The term "allochthonous," denoting individuals born outside of the Netherlands or those with parents or grandparents born elsewhere. This word stands antonym to "autochthonous," the word used to signify those without a migration background. As of 2016, the governmental organizations do not use the term anymore. Since then "Dutch with a migration background" is used. The motivation for the change in terminology was that the term was not precise enough and had become stigmatizing to some groups in society. See Masja de Ree, "Termen Allochtoon en Autochtoon Herzien," CBS, published on 25 October, 2016, Accessed on 6 June, 2020, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/corporate/2016/43/termen-allochtoon-en-autochtoon-herzien.
[103] LPF 1.
[104] See LPF 1, FvD 34, FvD 35 for their proposed limiting of immigration.
[105] See the statement "Islamic headscarves not in public office. Prohibition on other Islamic expressions that are against the public order" in PVV 36.
[106] PVV 36.

right to a fair trial,[107] and the right to freedom of education, a freedom that is a remnant of the Dutch pillarized society.[108] To highlight an example, PVV proposes to close all Islamic schools and Mosques.[109] The party justifies the exclusion to the reader by maintaining that Islam is a totalitarian, political ideology.[110]

The LPF uses *coded language* of exclusion to signal that they desire some level of exclusion of those *"primarily originating from countries that did not take part in the centuries long Jewish-Christian-Humanist developments in Europe."[111]* They justify this exclusion by the societal division that the party sees as the consequence of a difference in cultures and multiculturalist policies. In making this argument, they employ the *topos of comparison*. They suggest that accepting the dominance of a Judeo-Christian and Humanist tradition in the Netherlands and the dominance of Dutch culture as the solution to lessen this division. The means they propose is education on Dutch culture and preventative measures against what they call *"segregation."[112]* The language of exclusion is coded because it does not explicitly propose exclusion, but rather emphasizes the adaptation of a different culture. While no statement proposes that the "*Islamic culture*"[113] should be left behind completely, the emphasis on the adaptation of the dominant Dutch culture suggests it ought to, at minimum, be less dominant. As the purpose likely was to avoid being accused of excluding groups, it is difficult to assess what is the extent of the party's desired limitation of the expression and experience of culture of these groups.

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[107] See the statement "Preventive imprisonment of radical Muslims" in PVV 36.
[108] See *Chapter 2.1 Pluralism in Politics and Society*, 11.
[109] PVV 2, PVV 4, PVV 16, PVV 35, PVV 36.
[110] PVV 14 and PVV 31.
[111] LPF 8.
[112] LPF 28.
[113] This label for the culture is used in LPF 31 and opposed to "Western society." There is a continuous mixing of labels throughout the various manifestos. The party does not mention Islam often and avoids the use of it by vaguely referring to "groups in society" and "originating from countries that did not take part in the centuries long Jewish-Christian-Humanist developments in Europe."

The PVV generally does not shy away from proposing explicitly to exclude Muslims, as was established earlier in this chapter. However, occasionally the PVV leaves out which group is targeted, making some of the statements proposing exclusion more coded than provocative. An example of this is PVV's proposal to *"anchor the Judeo-Christian and Humanist roots of the Netherlands as dominant culture"* in the first article of the Constitution,[114] the article that currently contains the equal treatment provision. With this statement, PVV subtly suggests limits to equality, but refrains from explicitly saying so by not mentioning what culture is inferior and which consequences this has for the prohibition of discrimination set out in the first article of the constitution.

Aside from provocative and coded proposals of exclusion, the corpus also contains a narrative of inclusion. This language is prevalent in the manifestoes of the LPF. As the party was the first to openly criticize Islam in the Netherlands, a focus on integration rather than exclusion is unsurprising. The party suggests on multiple occasions that it wants to prevent segregation in society, and claims segregation is stimulated by multiculturalist policies. By suggesting that the political opponent fosters exclusion of parts of society, the LPF portrays itself as the party that is inclusionary. This also becomes evident through the use of the notion of *"fitting the Islamic pillar in Dutch society."[115]* By referring to the Muslim population as belonging to a pillar that has to become part of Dutch society, the party acknowledges the history of segmentation in the Netherlands and applies it to a contemporary case of conflicting ideologies. By using this as a metaphor for their proposed integration of Muslims in the Netherlands, the party signals that these differences can be overcome through dialogue.[116] Again, the party

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[114] PVV 25.
[115] LPF 21.
[116] LPF 25.

portrays itself as the party that can bring parts of the population together, while its political opponents create undesirable division.

The Perceived Victimhood of Exclusion

While subtly or bluntly proposing the exclusion of the other, the parties also claim that they themselves, their voters, or the Dutch people in general, are the victims of exclusion. For the PVV, it is the public media, the elite and a possible future Islamic oppressor that aims to exclude. For the FvD, the exclusion occurs in political decision-making, public debate and the media. For LPF, exclusion is limited to the political system.

All three parties refer to the elite as excluding both the people and their political opponents, the parties themselves. The FvD calls the party culture *"suffocating"* and reasons that that is why valuable talent is excluded from the positions they deserve.[117] Together with LPF, FvD describes the political system as *"closed,"*[118] suggesting that new parties and new ideas are unlikely to be represented. All three parties promise they will be the party that achieves true inclusion of *"voters," "supporters"* or *"the citizen."*[119] In claiming that by following them, true democracy will be achieved the parties employ the *topos of savior*.

In addition to the exclusion from the political sphere, the parties claim that the media exclude viewpoints and voices from the public debate. PVV asserts that the public media purposefully exclude the party and condemns its viewpoints, but welcomes "leftist" figures, making the public media, according to the PVV, exclusionary and partial.[120] FvD argues that the public media do not foster open debate.[121] Through claiming their exclusion from the public media,

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[117] FvD 4.
[118] FvD 2, FvD 38, LPF 37 (LPF here uses the *pars pro toto* "the Hague" to denote politics).
[119] LPF 36, LPF 35, FvD 5 and PVV 17.
[120] PVV 21.
[121] FvD 25.

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the parties present themselves, and the voters that share their views, as unheard and purposefully kept out of the public debate.

A third context in which the parties claim exclusion is the sphere of cultural and historical identity. PVV and FvD suggest that history, culture and national identity are *"buried"*[122] and *"cut loose."*[123] They suggest that there is a plan to make the Dutch disappear and this ought to be reversed. FvD writes: *"At this moment in time, the Dutch State subsidizes segregation enhancing, do-away-with-us projects."*[124] The party does not specify what is meant by segregation in this context and whether it implies multiculturalism or the exclusion of part of the society. "Do-away-with-us" is a trope that is also used by PVV.[125] "Us" in this narrative, is not the Dutch people, but their identity. This way, not exclusion or inclusion is claimed, but continued or discontinued existence. In a similar manner, PVV suggests that the Dutch are losing their country, as "*Neighborhood after neighborhood, street after street, school after school becomes Islamized,"*[126] claims that it is already lost: "*This is our country, but it is their flags that wave,"*[127] and at other points in time speculates about a possible future in which freedoms will have to be *"handed over."* [128] This narrative of a threat of Islam taking over the country is not visible in the LPF and FvD manifestoes.

4.3 Conspiracy: The Alliance Between Our Two Enemies

The third theme concerns a language of conspiracy.[129] The primary topic is the perceived alliance between the designated elites and the designated other. However, a language of

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[122] FvD 26.
[123] PVV 38.
[124] FvD 26.
[125] PVV mentions "do-away-with-us-idealism" in the context of immigration. PVV 31.
[126] PVV 6.
[127] PVV 37.
[128] PVV 38.
[129] Eirikur Bergmann argues that the evil elite vs. the pure people duality populists often employ is similar to the conventional conspiracy theory duality of an unknowing people vs. conspirators. The evil elite message resembles the New World Order conspiracy theories in which a global elite strives after world domination and aims to

conspiracy, such as references to a powerful group or groups with bad intentions, can be detected throughout the manifestoes. This subchapter will outline how the instances of the use of this language connect with each other and discuss the variations of intensity of the accusations of collusion between the three parties.

When compared, the FvD trumps LPF, and to a lesser extent, the PVV, in the use of language that reminds of conspiracy theories. In the FvD manifesto, the "party cartel" is not just a metaphor for the incumbent political parties, it is an allegory that extends beyond the political sphere and the national context.[130] The party establishes a narrative that reminds of conspiracies of world domination, but now applied to the Netherlands and the European Union: *"A very small clique of cartel members has ruled our country for decades."* Aside from FvD's claim that the cartel is "small," the party refers to an exact number: *"It is only a group of 10.000 people who spin in a job carrousel and keep the ranks closed among themselves."[131]* This narrative, pointing to a few people having uncontested power for a significant period of time, likely aims to evoke a feeling of injustice in the reader.

As was established in the previous section, PVV sees Islam, more so than the elite, as the primary threat to the Netherlands. Yet, language of conspiracy is especially visible when the party speaks of the two enemies in relation to each other and implies that the two groups are conspiring together against the Dutch people to cause harm: *"Our battle is not easy. Not only have the leftist elites taken possession of crucial places in our society, their alliance with Islam means that also physical danger is imminent."[132]* Furthermore, it is implied by PVV that the

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establish a global totalitarian state. See "Disrupting the Trust – Nature of Populist CTs" in *Conspiracy and Populism: The Politics of Misinformation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 101.

[130] The European Union is seen as a *"cartel on top of another cartel,"* and the cartel consists of *"a small group of party members . . ."* that recruits ". . . *Executives, professors, journalists, members of parliament."* See FvD 2 and FvD 20.

[131] FvD 38.

[132] PVV 9.

elite's thinking is determined by their commitment to Islamization.[133] More *coded* insinuations of collusion suggest a role of the elite in inviting the unwanted migrants: *"What are they doing here? Who let them in?"*[134] By posing the question "who let them in?" the party subtly poses that the elites are to blame for the perceived threat.

The LPF does not suggest an elite conspiracy, however, does suggest that the elite manipulates the public. The party states that the elite propagates a *"drowsy-making and all-covering ideology of multiculturalism."*[135] By presenting the idealized multiculturalism as numbing and seen as the answer to everything, the party insinuates that the public is defenseless against this message. The other two parties also claim there is manipulation at play. FvD and PVV are both adamant about the elites use of the public media to manipulate the Dutch. PVV calls the public media *"the state media"*[136] and claims it propagates leftist views, climate hysteria and attacks the party. [137] FvD states that the public media *"has become an instrument of the party cartel"*[138] and together with the other parties, withholds information from the public.[139] This accusation of the public media being too political extends beyond a perceived direct connection with the elite, FvD claims that the public broadcaster is accountable for refugees coming to the country,[140] and that *"a thorough clean-up of the NPO is an important step in the fight against the cartel."*[141] By suggesting to have the answers to combat this evil power, FvD presents itself as a savior.

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[133] PVV 21.
[134] PVV 12.
[135] LPF 38.
[136] PVV 22, PVV 23, PVV 24 and PVV 34
[137] PVV 22 and PVV 34.
[138] FvD 30.
[139] FvD 1.
[140] FvD 34.
[141] FvD 30.

4.4 Paradoxical Patterns: Pluralism

This subchapter will discuss the patterns that can be detected across the three themes. These patterns weave through the manifestoes, and primarily surface when the topics of the organization of politics and society are central in the excerpts. All patterns relate to the concept of pluralism in some way. The two patterns that can be recognized are a *rejection of pluralism*, revealing anti-pluralism stance, and *demand for pluralism*, revealing a pro-pluralism stance. Pluralism is a broad concept that can be defined differently in various contexts. As was established in the *Chapter 2* of this thesis, it is these various contexts that are considered in the analysis of the eight manifestoes: politics, culture, and religion. This subchapter will discuss these patterns as they are present in the manifestoes for each party. This approach shows each party's varying intensity of rejecting and demanding pluralism.

Pluralism and LPF

In the LPF's manifestoes, a clear narrative of division in society can be detected,[142] together with a narrative of a desired unity.[143] This idealized unity is the party's position that the dominant culture should be the only culture expressed in public life. The party perceives this dominant culture as internally homogenous. The perceived homogeneity, when the reality is likely less clear-cut, is a *fallacy of sameness.* Simultaneously the *fallacy of difference* is evident: a comparison is made in which the Judeo-Christian-Humanist culture is presented as exceptional when compared to the Islamic culture. In addition to a comparison, the LPF uses the *fallacy of argumentum ad baculum.* The Islamic culture is seen as being in conflict with this homogenous, exceptional culture and threatens the homogeneity of the dominant culture.[144]

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[142] See for example the reference to "two dominant cultures" and "division" in LPF 25.
[143] See for example LPF 18.
[144] LPF 31.

To the LPF, it is the conflicting ideology that needs to disappear, not the individuals having that culture. The party proposes to restore unity by incorporating these individuals into the dominant cultural community. As the metaphor of *"fitting Islamic pillar in our society"*[145] shows, it is the undesirable pillarization, religious and ideological segmentation in society, that needs to be resolved. A reference to pillarization shows the party's rejection of pluralism in society similar to pillarization. Pillarization not used by the party to convey their rejection of pillarization per se, but it is used as a metaphor to stress their rejection of a multicultural society. The party employs the *topos of history* by mentioning the then recent ethnic conflicts in the Western Balkans to reason against multiculturalism: *"If the Balkan can teach us something after the dissolution of Tito's empire, it is that the multicultural and multi-ethnic society is a long-term project that is often doomed to fail."*[146] This reference, similar to the pillarization metaphor, conveys the party's rejection of cultural and ethnic pluralism.

Even though LPF rejects pluralism in society, they claim a lack of it in Dutch politics. In the party's discussion on the functioning of democracy, LPF claims representative democracy is failing. Through the neologism of "class of regents" and the use of the term "particratic" they point to a malfunctioning of democracy because not all ideological viewpoints are represented. They praise the development of the Dutch parliamentary system, the separation of powers, and commitment to human rights and equality,[147] which reveals their appreciation of liberal democratic values of which a commitment to pluralism is generally regarded to be an essential component.

The paradoxicality in the discourse of the LPF lies in the subtle demand for pluralism and a simultaneous reasoned rejection of pluralism. It is in these nuances that paradox can be found,

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[145] LPF 21.
[146] LPF 24.
[147] LPF 10 and LPF 11.

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and perhaps this points to an intention to carefully introduce the message of justified exclusion to the Dutch voter, for whom taking into account a multitude of differences is valued as part of its democratic tradition.

Pluralism and PVV

In the PVV manifestoes, a very resolute rejection of pluralism can be found. However, the party simultaneously advocates for an acknowledging and accommodating religious and cultural diversity of non-Muslims. The party speaks of a *"multicultural nightmare"*[148] and proposes the rights and freedoms of Muslims should be granted conditionally or taken away completely.[149] In doing this, the party clearly rejects liberal democratic values. Justifying the exclusion of some citizens and claiming the importance of the Dutch "Judeo-Christian heritage," and presenting the Dutch people as *"a people that is unequalled,"*[150] the party employs the *strategy of singularization* and *the fallacy of sameness*. The aim of using these devices in this context is comparison. By presenting itself as superior, the party justifies the exclusion of the other.

On many occasions in the corpus, the rejections of pluralism directly coincide with the demand for the recognition and accommodation of pluralism. The party's position on the freedom of education is contradictory. While praising Article 23 of the Constitution as it allows to have Jewish, Christian and public schools to exist alongside each other, the party proposes the restriction of the constitutional right to publicly funded denominational education for Muslims.[151] By advocating for language rights of Afrikaans speakers in Namibia and South-Africa, the party shows that recognition of minority rights elsewhere is valued. It is uncertain what the extent of the *codedness* of this language might be: limited to the protection of the

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[148] PVV 13.
[149] See for examples of these restrictions PVV 36.
[150] PVV 4.
[151] PVV 19.

Dutch language, or extend as far as a racial element in the party's justification of whose cultural rights ought to be recognized.

The PVV refers to the accommodation of ideological diversity in the Netherlands as inadequate. However, does not propose improvement, but rather suggests the dismantling of these guarantees. Most notably the party mentions the public media. By claiming that *"the broadcasters pretend that they have a color [political leaning], but they are all just as left as the others. The KRO [Catholic Radio Broadcaster] does not make any Catholic programs anymore, and the IKON [Inter-church Broadcaster Netherlands] misuses its broadcasting time to portray the PVV as the NSB [Netherlands' National Socialist Movement],"*[152] the party suggests that while diversity is accommodated in theory, there is in effect no reality of a multitude of ideologies represented. Aside from offering a paradoxical rejection and demand of pluralism, the references to an ill-intentioned elite suggests that there is no desire on the part of the elites either to ensure diversity of views represented in the public media. This strategy stresses both the rejection of and demand for pluralism.

The paradoxicality of PVV's demanding and rejecting pluralism is obvious. Compared to the subtleness of the LPF, the party does not seem to see these contrasting views as problematic. This is likely because the aim is not to justify exclusion to their voters, but to appeal to the voters already on-board with the proposal of the exclusion of Muslims in the Netherlands.

Pluralism and FvD

Paradoxical positions on pluralism are limited in the FvD's party program. Most of the manifesto focuses its attention on the power of the "party cartel." The party claims the political system disincentivizes or even restricts certain political views to be expressed. This position and the use of a neologism reminds of LPF's strategy in claiming a lack of diversity.

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[152] PVV 22

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Furthermore, in a similar manner as the PVV, the party suggests that the public media, and the multitude of voices they ought to present, do not work effectively. The party proposes not to dismantle this accommodation of pluralism, but instead demand openness about the political leaning of TV presenters and executives, and the expansion of the views represented.[153] Through demanding pluralism in this manner, the party conveys its desire to be represented in circumstances when pluralism is recognized.

The rejection of pluralism is less clear in the discourse of FvD. However, there are explicit references, such as *"at this moment in time, the Dutch State subsidizes segregation enhancing, do-away-with-us projects; while the things we ought to be proud of, the most beautiful the West has ever brought forth, is buried,"[154]* that might reveal this stance. This could point to a use of *coded language* and *calculated ambivalence*. *Coded*, because a reference to segregation most likely does not mean actual segregation and the party leaves vague what it entails. In the context of "do-away-with-us projects" this is most likely a reference to multiculturalism policies or the acknowledgement of diversity; may it be gender, race, ethnicity, or religion. The LPF also uses the term "segregation," however in the context of education and the lack of diversity within schools. Yet, in the context the civilizationist message that follows FvD's claim, this reading of the term "segregation" is improbable. By leaving it unclear, the party employs a strategy of *calculated ambivalence.*

FvD employs similar strategies to reject and demand pluralism as the two other populist right-wing parties have done before. The break with the other parties is primarily visible in the lack of mention what diversity there is or is not, and whether which type of diversity ought to be recognized and accommodated. The attention is instead drawn to who is responsible for either

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[153] FvD 33.
[154] FvD 26.

fostering or denying pluralism. The following chapter, *Chapter 5*, will discuss these and other findings of this analysis in light of the literature on populism outlined in *Chapter 1*.

Chapter 5. Discussion

5.1 Summary of the findings

The corpus that was analyzed, consisting of all eight election programs published for every Second Chamber election the parties were taking part, reveals three major themes when discussing the organization of politics and society: threat, exclusion and conspiracy. The threats the parties recognize to either themselves, their voters, "the people" or the country, are a) a perceived undemocratic elite, and b) Islam, which is perceived as incompatible with Dutch democracy and sometimes anti-democratic. The exclusion the parties perceive concerns themselves and the people, the exclusion they express is primarily directed towards immigrants and Muslim Dutch. The last theme that can be recognized is a perceived conspiracy between two of their adversaries: the elite and the immigrants.

Woven through these themes, a pattern of paradoxical claims on pluralism is visible for all three parties. Each party, to a varying extent, expresses conflicting or diverse claims on whether (liberal) democracy is desirable, whether there ought to be a place for all cultural, religious and ideological groups in society, and to what extent these groups ought to be allowed to express themselves. In doing this, the parties speak two languages: one that is pro-pluralism and one that is anti-pluralism. Through employing *coded language*, *fallacies* and *topoi*, the parties convey their paradoxical rejection of, and demand for pluralism.

While it remains speculation why the Dutch populists convey these ambiguous positions, both pro-pluralism and anti-pluralism could appeal to voters who, on the one side, feel unheard, and on the other side, feel that other voices, heard or not, do not deserve a place in Dutch democracy or society. For either the parties or their audience, varying understandings of which kind of diversity should be accommodated, and which kind should not, could lie at the basis of these paradoxical claims. In that sense, a quest for emancipation, real or imagined, drives the parties

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and the voters to push for pluralism, while their judgement that other groups ought not, or deserve not, to either be in the Netherlands or take part in politics, drives their rejection of pluralism.

5.2 Re-evaluation of the literature

The findings outlined above are in some ways surprising when considering the current priorities of the existing literature on populism. As we saw earlier, the literature has stressed populism's incompatibility with a defense or demand of pluralism, the European populist tendency towards authoritarianism, and the essential component in all definitions: claiming to speak for the people. This raises the following question: what do these findings, where pluralism is a crucial part of the Dutch populist agenda, mean in light of the debates on populism and democracy?

Of the three parties, LPF offers the most nuanced positions on pluralism and democracy. Its message in support of liberal democracy has sometimes been remarked as a distinguishing feature of Dutch populism. However, paradoxical elements are also present in the party's discourse. When considering the threat to democracy a populist party could have, and the possible benefits it could have on democracy, LPF seems to fit the right balance of virtues Schmitter suggests as having a positive effect on democracy. As the election results of 2002 showed, enough people were dissatisfied with the governing parties and the alternatives in the opposition, to elect a brand-new party to be the second largest in parliament. It could be argued that the shock the LPF left in Dutch politics follows Canovan's explanation that too much of the "pragmatic" face of democracy, opens up space for an upsurge of the "redemptive" side. However, this shock has not eliminated populism. On the contrary, it opened the door for a steady presence of the populist radical right in Dutch politics.

Of the three parties, PVV is the most exclusionary, and makes the fewest references to democracy. However, the party mentions "the people" most often. The nativist and

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authoritarian components Cas Mudde highlights as the characterizing components of the European populist radical right, are most visible in the manifestoes of the PVV. Of the three, the party uses the least coded language, and often opts for provoking rather than persuading. As the election results show, this offered the party a, thus far, lasting place in the Dutch party system. However, when considering the party's position on liberal democracy and the demand for, or rejection of pluralism, the party seems to behave with the populist style Moffitt outlines: opting for the narrative on democracy and, in- and exclusion that is likely to offer an opportunity gaining or maintaining of support, a purely opportunistic strategy.

Of the three, FvD, due to its only recent establishment, offers the least varied views on democracy and society. As their manifesto primarily was a stance against the "party cartel," the party's own ideas on pluralism are not expressed directly, rather, the cartel perceived as either denying or fostering pluralism is at the center stage. The interesting fact of the FvD manifesto is the lack of the mention of "the people." This raises the question highlighted in the introduction: is this party rightly labelled populist? The general acceptance of the populists' devotion to a pure people leaves little room to discuss outliers such as FvD, that might speak for a segment of society that is "pure," or "unheard," a "pure pillar." Perhaps speaking for "the people" is a futile strategy in a purely proportional electoral system like Netherlands, in which one will have to share power with at least one other party to be able to govern. When a populist party in question forms a coalition with non-populist parties, will the party not collaborate with the enemy of the people? Perhaps this is where the conceptualization of populism as a political style can offer a conclusive answer: being populist to an extent or offering a more nuanced answer than either being labeled populist or not populist.

5.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research

The aim of this thesis was to map the ways in which Dutch populist radical right parties express their ideas on democracy and society in the Netherlands. Through the application of the Discourse Historical Approach to the case, this thesis achieved this aim. The findings offer possibilities for further research. The purpose of this section of the thesis is to pinpoint the limitations of this study, and highlight what future research into the populism, the radical right, and parties' communication of their ideas on democracy and society could still address.

A limitation of this research was the lack of literature pluralism and politics outside the context of the United States. A further complicating factor was the lack of an existing definition of pluralism that easily travels outside the context it was written for. To overcome this, an original definition was formulated, rather than one distilled through extensive research on the understanding of the concept as religious-, cultural-, media-, ideological-, etc. Opting for this solution made it possible to capture various contexts of manifestations of pluralism, however, did make the findings of this thesis dependent on the understanding of the concept as defined here. As this study is the first of its kind, this is not as problematic yet. Nevertheless, once populism research on a larger scale will discover the relevance of the study of its relation to pluralism, a thoroughly considered definition will be crucial. Future research on the topic, could revisit the various social sciences' use of the concept, and provide a grounded approximation of the concept that can be used in the analysis of the role of pluralism in populist politics.

Another limitation of this study is the analysis of the three parties on equal foot, as three separate actors in Dutch politics. While this study acknowledged the context in which each party was successful, it did not make the chronology of the parties emerging a focal point in the analysis. The developments in the radical right and the historical context in which the

parties emerged, were addressed in the context chapter, *Chapter 2*, and in the analysis in *Chapter 4*. However, highlighting the chronology and taking it as a factor that might influence the parties' discourse on pluralism, could have allowed for more nuance and perhaps could have pinpointed to the existence of 'generations' of Dutch populism. This different approach could answer, for example, to what extent the lack of overt anti-Islam rhetoric in the manifestoes of the LPF is influenced by the LPF's role in breaking open the political debate on multiculturalism in Dutch politics as a first-generation radical right populist party.

In general, the COVID-19 pandemic hindered the availability of sources. The approach outlined in the previous paragraph, would have required a more extensive corpus, consisting of sources of various genres of political communication, rather than only party manifestoes, which the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic did not allow. The lack of available digital sources, and the restricted access to print sources during the pandemic, hindered the creation of a more extensive corpus. While the corpus opted for in this thesis consists of all available materials in within the chosen genre, incorporating sources from other genres such as digital newsletters could have allowed for a more complete picture of the parties' communication with possible voters.

Conclusion

This thesis analyzed eight manifestoes of three Dutch populist radical right parties, for every Second Chamber election the parties were taking part. Three major themes were found in the parties' discourse on the organization of politics and society: threat, exclusion, and conspiracy. Additionally, a pattern of paradoxical claims was found. Each party, to an extent, expresses conflicting or diverse claims on whether (liberal) democracy is desirable, whether there ought to be a place for all cultural, religious and ideological groups in society, and whether these groups ought to be allowed to express themselves. In doing this, the parties speak a pro-pluralism language and an anti-pluralism language. By employing *coded language*, *fallacies* and *topoi*, the parties show their rejection of and, simultaneously, their demand for pluralism.

The question this thesis started with "For the pillar or the people?," asking whether the Dutch populists speak for their voters as one of the segments in society, or for the people as a whole, did not gain a definitive answer in this study. However, the question and findings of this study pinpoints how the existing literature on populism and the radical right falls short in answering to manifestations of populist politics. The debates on populism and democracy are a valuable framework when studying populist discourse on pluralism in society. Connecting populism, pluralism and democracy in this thesis, has shown that, even within one country-context, various understandings of populism and its effect on democracy can shed light on different developments. Perhaps we are witnessing a diversification of populism, to which the multitude of definitions and approaches will not be able to give definitive answers. Or maybe this multifaceted phenomenon simply does not let itself be defined.

For the Dutch case, neither side of the coin takes away its internal paradoxes. Dutch populists can be the excluders and the excluded, the liberal and the illiberal, and the representatives of the people and simultaneously of merely a small, virtuous segment of society.

Appendix

	LPF	
	2002: Business With a Heart	**Zakelijk Met Een Hart**
1	Because of the Purple [name for cabinets in 90's] policy of tolerance a division has been encouraged, through which big groups of allochthonous people do not actively take part in society. The Netherlands is not an immigration country. The yearly wave of ten thousands of newcomers that mostly end up living in illegality has to stop. Only then the integration and emancipation of minorities can succeed. The LPF wants to work on that with force, but also requires the full input of minorities, because it is worth it to be Dutch.	Door het Paarse gedoogbeleid is een tweedeling in de hand gewerkt, waardoor grote groepen allochtonen niet actief deelnemen aan het maatschappelijk verkeer. Nederland is geen immigratieland. De jaarlijkse toestroom van tienduizenden nieuwkomers die veelal in de illegaliteit belanden, moet stoppen. Alleen dan kan de integratie en emancipatie van minderheden slagen. De LPF wil daaraan met kracht werken, maar eist ook de volle inzet van minderheden, want het is de moeite waard om Nederlander te zijn.
2	Purple has burdened the Netherlands with: - A completely rusted shut and self-important political culture of regents without creative or learning ability. […] - Migration that ran out of hand in an overpopulated country. - A division of the people because of a part of the population is social-culturally behind, primarily in the big cities. - A deadlock of the polder model with not enough protection of the purchasing power of the citizen and not too few safeguards of the democratic level in society.	Paars heeft Nederland opgescheept met o.a.: - Een volkomen vastgeroeste zelfgenoegzame politieke cultuur van benoemde regenten zonder creatief of lerend vermogen. […] - Uit de hand gelopen immigratie in een overbevolkt land; - Door sociaal-culturele achterstanden met name in de grote steden een ernstige tweedeling van de bevolking; - Het vastlopen van het poldermodel met onvoldoende bescherming van de koopkracht van de burger en onvoldoende waarborgen van het democratisch gehalte van de samenleving.
3	Lijst Pim Fortuy wants to face up to these problems with a new caring and thorough policy. Caring because only that way the interest of all Dutch citizens, without distinguishing on the basis of race, religion or orientation can be served. Thorough because a small scale solutions, based on the human scale, will aimed towards. Our standpoints are business-like, but with a heart.	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) wil aan deze problemen het hoofd bieden door een nieuw zorgzaam en zorgvuldig beleid. Zorgzaam omdat alleen daardoor de belangen van alle Nederlandse Burgers zonder onderscheid naar ras, geloof of geaardheid kunnen worden gediend. Zorgvuldig omdat steeds gestreefd zal worden naar kleinschalige op de menselijke maat gebaseerde oplossingen. Onze standpunten zijn zakelijk, maar met een hart
4	General education to become caring citizens that stick up for themselves is the red thread of the LPF.	Algemene vorming tot moderne zorgzame, voor zichzelf opkomende mondige burgers is de leidraad van de LPF.

5	Freedom of education has to be maintained, but unsocietal influences in education are countered.	Vrijheid van onderwijs waarborgen, maar onmaatschappelijke invloeden in het onderwijs tegengaan.
6	Labor participation are of great importance in our western culture and the LPF sees this as something to be maximally stimulated.	Deelname aan het arbeidsproces wordt in onze westerse cultuur als een groot goed gezien en dient volgens de LPF maximaal bevorderd te worden.
7	It is unheard of that Justice punishes the honest Turkish tailor and the hard-working Polish asparagus cutter but will not show itself in criminal neighborhoods.	Het is onbegrijpelijk dat Justitie wel een brave Turkse kleermaker en een hardwerkende Poolse aspergesteker oppakt, maar zich niet vertoont in criminele buurten.
8	For large groups in society it is the case that they are behind socially and culturally. These are primarily from countries that did not take part in the centuries long Jewish-Christian-Humanist developments in Europe. These backlogs are very undesirable, as they lead to a division in society and threaten the functioning of the big cities.	Voor grote groepen in de samenleving geldt dat ze een sociaal-culturele achterstand hebben. Veelal zijn ze afkomstig uit landen die geen deelhadden aan de eeuwenlange Joods-Christelijk-Humanistische ontwikkelingen in Europa. Deze achterstanden zijn zeer onwenselijk, daar zij zorgen voor een tweedeling in de maatschappij en een bedreiging vormen van het functioneren van de grote steden.
9	This has to be fought against with force through extra care for housing, education and cultural guidance to these groups on the one side, and a requirement for these groups that the make extreme efforts on the other side.	Dit moet met kracht bestreden worden door enerzijds extra zorg inzake huisvesting, scholing en culturele vorming aan deze groepen te besteden, maar anderzijds van deze groepen te eisen dat zij zichzelf ook tot het uiterste inspannen.
10	Cultural developments that are counter to the desired integration and emancipation, such as arranged marriages, honor killings and female genital mutilation, have to be fought through legal regulations and information distribution. Primarily the discrimination of the woman in fundamentalist Islamic circles is unacceptable. In a democratic society like ours, all citizens have the same rights and obligations, regardless of race, sex, religion and sexual orientation.	Culturele ontwikkelingen die haaks staan op de gewenste integratie en emancipatie, zoals uithuwelijken, eerwraak en vrouwenbesnijdenis, dienen door wettelijke regelingen en voorlichtingen te worden bestreden. Met name de discriminatie van de vrouw in fundamentalistisch islamitische kring is onaanvaardbaar. In een democratische samenleving als de onze hebben alle burgers dezelfde rechten en plichten, ongeacht ras, geslacht, geloof en geaardheid.
11	In the Netherlands a separation between Church and State exists, therefore also a separation between Mosque and State. Because of the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judiciary power) the citizen can develop themselves in relative freedom.	In Nederland geldt een scheiding van Kerk en staat, dus ook van moskee en staat. Dankzij de scheiding der machten (de uitvoerende, wetgevenede en rechtsprekende macht) kan de burger zich in relatieve vrijheid ontplooien.
12	The LPF states straightforwardly that the Netherlands is not an immigration country.	De LPF stelt onomwonden dat Nederland geen immigratieland is.
13	The funds saved that now go towards shelter can then be spent on improving the	De gelden die bespaard worden aan opvang kunnen dan besteed worden aan verbetering van

	disadvantaged position of all legal inhabitants of the Netherlands.	de achterstandspositie van alle legale inwoners van Nederland.
14	We do not judge anyone that seeks refuge here, we do hold the Purple State accountable for keeping the illusion in place that the Netherlands is a place for everyone.	Wij nemen het niemand kwalijk dat hij hier zijn heil komt zoeken, we nemen het wel de Paarse overheid kwalijk dat zij in het buitenland de illusie in stand heeft gehouden dat Nederland een plaats is voor iedereen.
15	Experiments with modernization of interior government (amongst others dual government) are to be continued with force. Particularly the articulate citizen (who in turn has to be called upon their responsibility) to be involved more directly with government.	Experimenteren met modernisering van het binnenlands bestuur (o.a. duaal bestuur) dienen met kracht te worden doorgezet. Met name dient de mondige burger (die overigens ook op zijn of haar verantwoordelijkheid moet worden aangesproken) directer bij het bestuur worden betrokken.
16	Calcified structures and cultures as well as accepted problems ought to be cleaned up and are not self-evident anymore (limits to the polder model, international agreements, established interests etc.) but will be solved with creativity because of politics taking responsibility.	Verkalkte structuren en culturen evenals geaccepteerde problemen dienen te worden opgeruimd en zijn niet meer vanzelfsprekend (grenzen van het poldermodel, internationale afspraken, gevestigde belangen enz.), maar zullen met creativiteit opgelost worden doordat de politiek verantwoording neemt.
17	Upscaling ought to be countered and if possible, needs to be reversed to create a working, transparent and action-oriented public administration that is closer to the citizen. The mayor and prime minister should be elected. Monarchy is non-negotiable. The head of state keeps a ceremonial role and ought to bring people together.	Schaalvergroting dient te worden tegengegaan en waar mogelijk te worden teruggedraaid ten einde een werkbaar, inzichtelijk en slagvaardig openbaar bestuur te creëren, dat dichter bij de burger staat. De burgemeester en minister president dienen te worden gekozen. De monarchie staat niet ter discussie, het staatshoofd behoudt een ceremoniële en samenbindende functie.
	2003: Politics is Passion	**Politiek is Passie**
18	In the Netherlands we have to live together and work together on the basis of general accepted core values, checked by a government of value, stimulated by education and guarded by free press.	In Nederland moeten we samenleven en samenwerken op basis van algemeen aanvaarde kernwaarden, gecontroleerd door een hoogwaardige overheid, gestimuleerd door onderwijs en bewaakt door een vrije pers.
19	These core values were fought for in the past centuries and should be protected daily. Not only against dictatorship, but also against a culture of regents.	Deze kernwaarden zijn in de afgelopen eeuwen duur bevochten en moeten dagelijks worden beschermd. Niet alleen tegen dictatuur, maar ook tegen de regentencultuur.
20	Communal awareness must be created. This expressly counts for allochthonous people.	Gemeenschappelijk besef moet worden gecreëerd. Dit geld nadrukkelijk ook voor allochtonen.
21	The fitting of the Islamic pillar in our society is a difficult and delicate process. The point of departure ought to be loyalty to our democratic values. This is a basic condition for successful integration. Pim Fortuyn gave	Het inpassen van de islamitische zuil in onze samenleving is een moeilijk en delicaat proces. Het vertrekpunt moet zijn de loyaliteit aan onze democratische kernwaarden. Dit is een basisvoorwaarde voor geslaagde integratie. Pim Fortuyn heeft ons de marsroute aangegeven

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	us the way forward to a modern society. Would you walk with us?	naar een moderne samenleving. Loopt u met ons mee?
22	He [Pim Fortuyn] formulated the key norms and values of modernity and found them in the three cultural-historical sources of the western sphere of culture: Judaism, Christianity and Humanism.	Hij [Pim Fortuyn] wist de kernnormen en waarden van de moderniteit te formuleren en te funderen in drie grote cultuurhistorische bronnen van het westerse cultuurgebied: het jodendom, christendom en humanisme.
23	With passion Pim Fortuyn described the importance of the European political cultural heritage as starting point of the modern world and warned for the clash of the worlds between two dominant cultures: the modernity and Islam. Like no other he pointed out the importance of the separation between Church and State.	Met passie beschreef Pim Fortuyn het belang van het Europese politieke en culturele erfgoed als startpunt van de moderne wereld en hij waarschuwde voor de botsing in de werelden tussen de twee dominante culturen: de moderniteit en de islam. Als geen ander wees hij op het belang van de scheiding tussen kerk en staat.
24	If the Balkan can teach us something after the dissolution of Tito's empire, it is that the multicultural and multi-ethnic society is a long-term project that is often doomed to fail.	Als de Balkan ons na het uiteenvallen van het rijk van Tito iets kan leren, is het wel dat de multiculturele en multi-etnische samenleving op zijn minst een project van een heel lange adem is en veelal tot mislukken gedoemd
25	A plea for a debate on Islam and its role in Dutch society. The culture of Islam is at odds with the norms and values of the modern, Western society. A strong dialogue between both cultures should lead to mutual understanding.	Pleidooi voor een debat over de islam en haar rol in de Nederlandse samenleving. De cultuur van de Islam staat haaks op de waarden en normen van de moderne westerse samenleving. Een krachtige dialoog tussen beide culturen moet leiden tot wederzijds begrip
26	We should not think we can cope without identity, without ideology, without proudly standing behind our history	We moeten niet denken dat we het zonder identiteit, zonder ideologie, zonder het staan in onze geschiedenis afkunnen
27	Cultural relativism weakens our own identity and destructs the core values of our society	Cultuurrelativisme verzwakt de eigen identiteit en ontmantelt de kernwaarden van de samenleving
28	Schools ought to be encouraged to actively ensure allochthonous and autochthonous students are mixed in schools. Segregation ought to be prevented.	Scholen moeten worden gestimuleerd om een actief spreidingsbeleid van allochtone en autochtone leerlingen te voeren. Segregatie moet worden voorkomen.
29	Debate in society on the tension between the articles in the constitution: freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of education [remnant of pillarized society] and antidiscrimination.	Maatschappelijk debat over het spanningsveld tussen Grondwetsartikelen: vrijheid van meningsuiting, vrijheid van godsdienst, vrijheid van onderwijs en antidiscriminatie.
30	Cultures are more stubborn than whichever economic, military, or political order. The economy is not dominant, culture is.	Culturen zijn echter hardnekkiger dan welke economische, militaire en politieke orde ook. Niet de economie is dominant, maar de cultuur
31	Perhaps the most essential terrain in which the conflict between the western society and the Islamic culture occurs is the relationship between Church and State. … It concerns a universal value. It would be good to	Wellicht het meest essentiële terrein waarop het conflict tussen de westerse samenleving en de islamitische cultuur zich doet gelden, is de relatie tussen kerk en staat … het gaat om universele waarde. Het zou goed zijn om deze

	incorporate this value in the universal declaration of human rights.	waarde op te nemen in de verklaring van de universele rechten van de mens.
	2006: This is not the country I want to leave to my children	**Dit is niet het land wat ik voor mijn kinderen wil achterlaten**
32	Fortuyn identified the core values of modernity, like the separation of Church and State, the development of parliamentary democracy, the equality of men and women, of homosexual and heterosexual people, the free market, freedom of expression, individual responsibility as well as sense of community. In a secularized society in which <u>Pillarization</u> only exists in the form of political parties and public broadcasters these core values provide something to hold on to	Fortuyn identificeerde de kernwaarden van de moderniteit, zoals de scheiding van Kerk en Staat, de ontwikkeling van de parlementaire democratie, de gelijkwaardigheid van man en vrouw, van homo en hetero, de vrije marktwerking, de vrijheid van meningsuiting, individuele verantwoordelijkheid én gemeenschapszin. In een geseculariseerde samenleving waarin <u>de verzuiling</u> alleen nog bestaat in politieke partijen en omroepen, geven deze kernwaarden houvast.)
33	He [Pim Fortuyn] wanted to deal with the <u>class of regents</u> in the Netherlands.	Hij wilde de regentenklasse in Nederland aanpakken.
34	In the times we live in now, the old ideologies do not work anymore. Our times! The Netherlands needs a new practical way of thinking and a movement lead by the people.	De oude ideologieën werken niet meer in de tijd waarin wij nu leven. Onze tijd! Nederland heeft een nieuwe praktische denkstijl nodig en een beweging vanuit de bevolking
35	The political parties that run the show in our country are primarily focused on maintaining their own power, rather than on what is best for the Netherlands. That is because the habit to arrange jobs for their members crept in. There is an almost hermetically sealed political culture. The members decide who becomes important in the party and the prominent party members subsequently have to keep the members sweet with jobs. This leads to conformism to the dominant party line and to a deadlock in which such a particratic party model is inescapable. List 5 Foruyn will do it differently. We are truly going to include voter and supporters in politics.	De politieke partijen die in ons land de dienst uitmaken, zijn primair gericht op behoud van eigen macht in plaats van wat het beste is voor Nederland. Dat komt omdat zij de ingeslopen gewoonte hebben voor een deel van hun leden baantjes te regelen. Er is sprake van een bijna hermetisch gesloten politieke cultuur. De leden bepalen wie er belangrijk wordt in de partij en die prominenten moeten de leden vervolgens met baantjes weer paaien om ze zoet te houden. Dit leidt tot conformisme aan de dominante partijlijn. En tot een deadlock waar je in een dergelijk particratisch partijenmodel nooit uitkomt. Lijst 5 Fortuyn gaat dat anders doen. Wij gaan kiezers en sympathisanten echt betrekken bij de politiek)
36	Organizations have much easier access to the political system than individual citizens. Through 'elbow work of interest groups' individual interests might be pushed out. The interests of the organized are much better heard than the interest of those who did not organize. Politicians are generally are sensitive to the participation of organization that of citizens. The close ties between civil society and the government happen at the	Organisaties krijgen veel makkelijker toegang tot het politieke systeem dan individuele burgers. Door het 'ellenbogenwerk van belangengroepen' kunnen individuele belangen in het gedrang komen. De belangen van de georganiseerden worden dan beter gehoord dan de belangen van de mensen die zich niet hebben georganiseerd. Politici zijn doorgaans gevoeliger voor de participatie van organisaties dan voor die van burgers. De verstrengeling

	expense of the possibilities for citizens to bring their issues to the attention of politicians.	tussen het middenveld en overheid, gaat ten koste van de mogelijkheden die burgers hebben om zaken onder de aandacht van de politiek te brengen.
37	Parties who do not dare to admit to the big and wrong mistakes that they have made in the past over the heads of the people who suffer from these mistakes on a daily basis. We principally choose to be on the side of the people and not on the side of the closed society of the Hague.	Partijen die geen van allen er voor uit durven te komen welke grote fouten en verkeerde keuzes zij eerder hebben gemaakt. Over de hoofden van de mensen heen die daarvan dagelijks last hebben. Wij kiezen principieel voor aan de kant te staan van de mensen in het land en niet aan de kant van de Haagse coterie.
38	We harvest the bitter fruits of decades of weak policy in which the drowsy-making and all-covering ideology of multiculturalism played the first fiddle. List 5 Fortuyn waves this false doctrine goodbye publicly and without a double agenda. Multicultural society is a contradiction in terms. The Netherlands has become multi-ethnic, but without the acknowledgement that the Netherlands only knows one culture it is impossible to let people with different ethnic backgrounds live together. The dominant culture is, without a doubt, the Dutch culture as a part of western civilization.	We oogsten nu de wrange vruchten van decennia van toegeeflijk beleid waarin de in slaap sussende en alles toedekkende ideologie van het multiculturalisme de boventoon voerde. Lijst 5 Fortuyn neemt ondubbelzinnig en publiekelijk afscheid van deze valse doctrine. Een multiculturele samenleving is een contradictio in terminis. Nederland is multi-etnisch geworden. Maar zonder de erkenning dat Nederland slechts één dominante cultuur kent, is het onmogelijk om mensen met een verschillende etnische achtergrond te laten samenleven. Die dominante cultuur is hoe dan ook de Nederlandse, als onderdeel van de westerse beschaving.

	PVV	
	2006: Election Pamphlet	**Verkiezingspamflet**
1	History and national identity prominent in curriculum of all schools	Geschiedenis en nationale identiteit prominent in het curriculum van alle scholen.
2	Retention of article 2 of the Constitution (freedom of education), but a suspension of 5 years for Islamic schools.	Handhaving artikel 23 van de Grondwet (vrijheid van onderwijs), maar een moratorium van 5 jaar op nieuwe islamitische scholen.
3	New article 1 of the Constitution: Christian/Jewish/Humanist culture should stay dominant in the Netherlands	Nieuw artikel 1 van de Grondwet: christelijk/joods/humanistische cultuur moet in Nederland dominant blijven.
4	Suspension of five years on building new Mosques and Islamic schools	Moratorium van 5 jaar op bouw nieuwe moskeeën en islamitische scholen.
	2010: The Agenda of Hope and Optimism	**De Agenda van Hoop en Optimisme**
5	Call us old-fashioned, but we still believe that the most beautiful days of the Netherlands are still ahead of us. That we are advancing towards a future that is many times more magnificent than we have experienced so far. And why not? The Dutch are a people that is unequalled. We are born out of an Uprising; a fight for freedom [from the Spanish].	Noem ons maar ouderwets. Maar wij geloven nog steeds dat de mooiste dagen van Nederland voor ons liggen. Dat we een toekomst tegemoet gaan die vele malen prachtiger is dan wat we achter de rug hebben. En waarom ook niet? Nederlanders zijn een volk dat zijn gelijke niet kent. We zijn geboren uit een Opstand; een vrijheidsstrijd.

6	In the meantime, many feel that we are losing the Netherlands. Neighborhood after neighborhood, street after street, school after school becomes Islamized.	Ondertussen bestaat bij velen het gevoel dat we Nederland aan het kwijtraken zijn. Wijk na wijk, straat na straat, school na school wordt geïslamiseerd.
7	For many of the problems that taunt the Netherlands the diagnosis is the same: elites are disconnected from reality and started doing things at their own accord that does not help regular people. Our elites converted themselves to the illusion that all cultures (and the values attached to them) are equal. Anything goes. There is no good or bad, all cultures are equal to them, the Islam or Christianity, female circumcision, shaking hands or not – what is the difference.	Bij veel van de problemen die Nederland teisteren is de diagnose hetzelfde: elites zijn losgeslagen van de werkelijkheid en zijn op eigen houtje dingen gaan doen waar gewone mensen niet beter van worden. Onze elites hebben zich bekeerd tot de illusie dat alle culturen (en daaraan verbonden waarden) gelijk zijn. Alles moet kunnen. Er bestaat geen goed of kwaad, alle culturen zijn voor hen gelijk, de islam of het christendom, meisjesbesnijdenis, handen schudden of niet – wat maakt het uit.
8	We call all Dutch to join us.	Wij doen een beroep aan alle Nederlanders zich aan te sluiten
9	Our battle is not easy. Not only have the leftist elites taken possession of crucial places in our society, their alliance with Islam means that also physical danger is imminent. The fate of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh is a warning and a reminder.	Onze strijd is niet eenvoudig. Niet alleen hebben de linkse elites bezit genomen van veel cruciale plaatsen in de samenleving, hun alliantie met de Islam betekent dat ook fysiek gevaar dreigt. Het lot van Pim Fortuyn en Theo van Gogh is een waarschuwing en een herinnering.
10	A people that is led by the wrong leaders should has to be able to part with the dominant ideology.	Een volk dat geleid wordt door de verkeerde leiders moet afscheid van de heersende ideologie kunnen nemen.
11	Let our people speak for themselves: together citizens know better than the leftist clique.	Laat ons volk zich maar uitspreken: samen weten burgers beter dan de linkse de linkse kliek.
12	We do ask the questions: What are they [Muslim immigrants] doing here? Who let them in?	Wij stellen die vraag wel. Wat doen ze hier eigenlijk? Wie heeft ze binnengelaten?
13	The multicultural nightmare that has been brought upon us cannot be accepted as an established fact.	De Multiculturele nachtmerrie die ons wordt aangedaan kunnen we niet als een vaststaand feit aanvaarden.
14	The Islam is primarily a political ideology; a totalitarian doctrine focused on dominance, violence and oppression.	De islam is vooral een politieke ideologie; een totalitaire leer gericht op dominantie, geweld en onderdrukking.
15	Reliance on benefits, violence against gay people and women, honor killings, school dropout etc. are of all times, but would be a lot less if the elites would not have converted themselves to cultural relativism.	Uitkeringsafhankelijkheid, geweld tegen homo's en vrouwen, eerwraak, schooluitval etc. zijn van alle tijden, maar zou een stuk minder zijn als de elites zich niet hadden bekeerd tot het cultuurrelativisme.
16	- The Islam is primarily a political ideology and therefore cannot in any way make claims to the privileges for religions. - No more new Mosques - Close all Islamic schools	- De islam is vooral een politieke ideologie en kan dus op geen enkele manier aanspraak maken op de voorrechten van een godsdienst. - Geen moskee er meer bij. - Alle islamitische scholen dicht.

	- No subsidies for Islamist media: Morokko.nl, Maroc.nl etc. - Cut funding for the propaganda department of multicultural Netherlands: the public media. … - Prohibition of Quran lessons in schools, as well as in buildings managed by school boards, so no Quran lessons 'after school' or in school buildings.	- Geen subsidies meer voor Islamistische media: Marokko.nl, Maroc.nl etc. - Snij in de afdeling propaganda van multicultureel Nederland: de publieke omroep. - Verbod op koranlessen op school, evenals in gebouwen die door schoolbesturen worden beheerd, dus ook geen koranlessen 'na schooltijd' of in het gebouw van de school.
17	The citizen gets it, and the elites do not. Let it be clear: the PVV is on the side of the ordinary man and woman. Wat we have to do is give the power back to the citizen. Only a radical democratization can break the dominance of the leftist elites.	De burger snapt het en de elites niet. Laat het duidelijk zijn: De PVV staat aan de kant van de gewone man en vrouw. Wat we moeten doen is de macht teruggeven aan de burger. Alleen een radicale democratisering kan de dominantie van de linkse elites breken.
18	- No subsidies for political parties	- Geen subsidies aan politieke partijen
19	Christian, Jewish and public schools should be able to exist alongside each other. We are for the retention of article 23 of the Constitution. Islamic schools, however, will close.	Christelijke, Joodse en openbare scholen moeten naast elkaar kunnen bestaan. Wij zijn dus voor behoud van artikel 23 Grondwet. Islamitische scholen gaan daarentegen dicht.
20	- Retention of exceptional education and article 23 of the Constitution, but Islamic schools will close. - Freedom of education is a fundamental right	- Handhaving van het bijzonder onderwijs en artikel 23 van de Grondwet, maar islamitische scholen gaan dicht. - Vrijheid van onderwijs is een grondrecht
21	We are a country with Judeo-Christian roots. Everything we have originates from this: our prosperity, separation between Church and State, democracy. Everyone in the Netherlands, religious or secular, is allowed to be proud of that. The past decades efforts are made to push the trusted, prosperous, cozy Netherlands into the ravine of a multicultural utopia. Our culture is under heavy pressure. Islamization, cultural relativism, hate against the West, aversion to anything that smells like patriotism determines the way of thinking of our elites.	Wij zijn een land met joods-christelijke wortels. Alles wat we hebben komt daaruit voort: onze welvaart, scheiding van kerk en staat, democratie. Iedereen in Nederland, gelovig of seculier, mag daar trots op zijn. De laatste decennia wordt geprobeerd het vertrouwde, welvarende, gezellige Nederland in de afgrond te werpen van een multiculturele heilstaat. Onze cultuur staat zwaar onder druk. Islamisering, cultuurrelativisme, haat tegen het Westen, afkeer van alles dat riekt naar patriottisme bepaalt de denkwijze van onze elites.
22	The state media excels in the past years in primarily warning against the Party for Freedom. Evening after evening people on the left [originally noun: linksmensen] who are invited by leftist media to narrate their politically correct opinions. All at your costs. The state media has misused millions in the past years to make propaganda for the climate hysteria. We are still awaiting an	De staatsomroep excelleert de laatste jaren vooral in het waarschuwen tegen de Partij voor de Vrijheid. Avond aan avond paraderen er linksmensen die door linkse omroepen worden uitgenodigd hun politiek-correcte meningen te debiteren. Dat allemaal op uw kosten. De staatsomroep heeft de afgelopen jaren miljoenen misbruikt om propaganda te maken voor de klimaathysterie. We wachten nog

	apology for it. The broadcasters pretend that they have a color [political leaning], but they are all just as left as the others. The KRO [Catholic Radio Broadcaster] does not make any Catholic programs anymore, and the IKON [Inter-church Broadcaster Netherlands] misuses its broadcasting time to portray the PVV as the NSB [Netherlands' National Socialist Movement]	steeds op excuses hierover. De omroepen doen alsof ze een kleur hebben, maar ze zijn allemaal even links. De KRO maakt niet één katholiek programma meer en de IKON misbruikt haar zendtijd voor de kerken om de PVV neer te zetten als NSB)
23	Newspapers are vital for the supply of information. The quality of many newspapers dropped significantly in the past years. Trouw [newspaper] turned from a time-honored Protestant newspaper into an 'appoint and build' paper and the once authoritative NRC Handelsblad [newspaper] nowadays is in the hands of the financier of the Socialist Party. Yet, the newspapers offer significantly more information than radio or tv. That is why the paper ought to go first. Therefore: no advertisements on state media, as it brings ad revenue for newspapers to a minimum. Additionally, the sprawl of websites of the state media ought to stop, now it competes with the newspapers, and on the internet there is no shortage.	Dagbladen zijn van levensbelang voor informatievoorziening. Het niveau van veel kranten is de afgelopen jaren danig gedaald. Trouw verwerd van een eerbiedwaardige protestantse krant tot een benoemen-en-bouw-krantje en het eens gezaghebbende NRC Handelsblad is tegenwoordig in handen van de financier van de SP. Toch biedt een dagblad altijd meer informatie dan radio of tv. Daarom moet de kant voorrang krijgen. Dus: geen reclame meer bij de staatsomroep, want dat drijft de reclame-inkomsten voor dagbladen naar beneden. Ook de wildgroei van websites van de staatsomroep moet ophouden, dat concurreert volop met kranten en op het internet bestaat geen schaarste.
24	Massively cut the funding for the state media. One public tv channel.	Flink bezuinigen op de staatsomroep, één publieke tv-zender.
25	And especially: in article 1 of the Constitution, we anchor the Judeo-Christian and Humanist roots of the Netherlands as dominant culture.	En vooral: in artikel 1 van de Grondwet verankeren we de Joods-Christelijke en humanistische wortels van Nederland als dominante cultuur.
	2012: Their Brussels, Our Netherlands	**Hún Brussel, óns Nederland.**
26	In 2010 we wrote in our election program: 'until the elections we are nine men strong, after hopefully with more.' That wish came true: one-and-a-half million countrymen voted Party for Freedom. A crushing victory. We became the third-biggest party in the Netherlands with 24 seats.	In 2010 schreven we in ons verkiezingsprogramma: 'tot de verkiezingen negen man sterk, daarna hopelijk met meer'. Die wens kwam uit: anderhalf miljoen landgenoten stemden Partij voor de Vrijheid. Een verpletterende zege. We werden de derde partij van Nederland met 24 zetels.
27	The past decades we have witnessed the slow erosion of our freedom and independence. A proud people swims into the trap that gets increasingly tighter. We were fooled into it by progressive elites that promised us prosperity and frightened us with the alternative: economic downfall and war. Who resists can count on the everlasting tune of the leftist journalists and politicians: they are xenophobes, populist or wants to hide	De afgelopen decennia zijn wij getuige van de langzame erosie van onze vrijheid en onafhankelijkheid. Een trots volk zwemt een fuik binnen die steeds knellender wordt. We zijn erin gelokt door progressieve elites die ons welvaart beloofden en ons bang maakten voor het alternatief: economische ondergang en oorlog. Wie zich verzet kan rekenen op de grijsgedraaide langspeelplaat van linkse journalisten en linkse politici: die is xenofoob,

	themselves behind the dykes. Preferably all three.	populist, of wil zich verschuilen achter de dijken. Liefst alle drie.
28	At least as worrying is the changed demographic composition. (…) Everywhere we see allochthonous people become a much bigger part of the population. In practice this means: more and more Islam, more headscarves, more criminality, impoverishment, reliance on benefits and medieval beliefs. A people that is the boss in their own country can decide who gets in and who does not. But us Dutch see the wave increase each day. And who dictates that? Mrs. Malström, an unelected multiculti-eurocrat who has the power over our immigration policy.	(Minstens zo verontrustend is de is de veranderde bevolkingssamenstelling. … Op elke plek zien we allochtonen een steeds groter gedeelte van de bevolking uitmaken. In de praktijk betekent dat: steeds meer Islam, steeds meer hoofddoekjes, steeds meer criminaliteit, verpaupering, uitkeringsafhankelijkheid en middeleeuwse opvattingen. Een volk dat baas is in eigen land maakt zelf uit wie er binnenkomt en wie niet. Maar wij Nederlanders zien elke dag de toestroom toenemen. Van wie moet dat? Van mevrouw Malmström, een ongekozen multiculti-eurocraat die de macht heeft over ons immigratiebeleid.
29	Waking up is exactly what the Dutch people are doing. And the progressive elites hate this. This is the question we have to answer on 12 September: are we proud, independent citizens who can decide on their future themselves? Or are we defenseless spectators who form an applause machine to the unelected bureaucrats such as Barosso, Van Rompuy, Juncker, Rehn, Malström – or whatever the appartatsjiks are called.	Maar wakker worden is precies waar het Nederlandse volk mee bezig is. En de progressieve elites vinden het verschrikkelijk. Dit is de vraag die we 12 september moeten beantwoorden: zijn wij trotse, onafhankelijke burgers die zelf beslissen over onze toekomst? Of zijn we de weerloze toeschouwers die een applausmachine vormen voor ongekozen bureaucraten als Barroso, Van Rompuy Junkcer, Rehn, Malmström – of hoe al die apparatsjiks ook mogen heten.
30	The citizens should have more of a say. Our crown jewel is called the binding referendum. Hot issues will be decided on by the people. The progressive elites will be scared to death by the voice of the people. We will not. Open the polling stations and let the Dutch vote on the multicultural society of the Great European Empire. Shall we bet that the left will always lose?	De burger moet meer te zeggen hebben. Ons kroonjuweel heet het bindend referendum. Hete hangijzers leggen we graag voor aan de bevolking. De progressieve elites zijn doodsbang van de stem des volks. Wij niet. Zet de stembureaus maar open en laat Nederlanders stemmen over de multiculturele samenleving of het Groot-Europese Rijk. Wedden dat links altijd verliest?)
31	Whoever has spent a few minutes on the hate sites our Islamic 'culture enrichers' express their opinion understands Van Goghs [Theo van Gogh, murdered by radical Muslim] statements. Indeed: what are they doing here? Who let them in and why shall we lure even more of them to here? The Dutch people pays the gruesome price for the lack of patriotism of a generation of politically correct politicians. Just when they should have stood up for our people, the all fell for indecent do-away-with-us idealism.	(Wie wel eens een paar minuten heeft doorgebracht op een van de haatsites waar onze islamitische cultuurverrijkers hun mening achterlaten begrijpt de wijsheid van Van Goghs stellingname. Inderdaad: wat doen ze hier eigenlijk? Wie heeft ze binnengelaten en moeten we nog meer hiernaartoe halen? Het Nederlandse volk betaalt een gruwelijke prijs voor het gebrek aan patriottisme van een generatie politiek-correcte politici. Net toen ze hadden moeten opkomen voor ons volk, vielen ze voor platvloers weg-met-ons idealisme. De

	The sluices went open for hundred thousand Muslims, lured here with jobs, benefits, houses and education. The consequences are disastrous. Now everyone gets that. Islam does not belong to the Netherlands. It will forever be a source of unrest. (…) The Islam is not a religion, but a totalitarian political ideology with here and there a religious streak. Our liberties and our history oblige us to fight this ideology like we should with all totalitarian ideologies.	sluizen gingen open voor honderdduizend moslims, hier naartoe gelokt met banen, uitkeringen, woningen en onderwijs. De gevolgen zijn rampzalig. Inmiddels snapt iedereen dat. De islam hoort niet bij Nederland. Die zal een eeuwige bron van onrust vormen. De Islam is geen godsdienst, maar een totalitaire politieke ideologie met hier en daar een religieus tintje. Onze vrijheden en onze geschiedenis verplichten ons die ideologie te bestrijden, zoals we dat met alle totalitaire ideologieën moeten doen.
32	- Prohibition of multicutli-subsidies	- Verbod op multiculti-subsidies
33	Our teachers are proud again of the Netherlands and Western civilization. They gladly teach national history and talk about the darkest chapter of our history: the Holocaust. Islamic opposition against that will not be tolerated. National anthem, flag. No problem.	Onze leraren zijn weer trots op Nederland en de westerse beschaving. Ze geven graag les in vaderlandse geschiedenis en vertellen over de zwartste bladzijde in onze geschiedenis: de Holocaust. Islamitische bezwaren daartegen worden niet gehonoreerd. Volkslied, vlag. Prima
34	Art subsidies, we will stop them. Our beautiful Dutch language we defend. Thus, the government will only communicate in Dutch. Afrikaans is closely connected to the Dutch language. That language, spoken in South-Africa and Namibia, is increasingly marginalized. The Netherlands stands up for Afrikaans and its speakers, for example through the embassies and language union. Local traditions will not be put into question: collecting Lapwings' eggs in Friesland, carnaval in Limburg etc. The Frisian language retains its place in public life. We significantly cut the state media. It already does too many things that could be done by commercial broadcasters. Nederland 1 [tv channel] resembles a commercial channel too often. The state media are also too leftist.	Kunstsubsidies, daar stoppen we mee. Onze mooie Nederlandse taal verdedigen we. Dus communiceert de overheid alleen in het Nederlands. Het Afrikaans is nauw verwant met het Nederlands. De taal, gesproken in Zuid-Afrika en Namibië, wordt steeds verder gemarginaliseerd. Nederland komt op voor het Afrikaans en zijn sprekers, bijvoorbeeld via de ambassades en taalunie Er wordt niet getornd aan mooie lokale tradities: het kievietseieren zoeken in Friesland, carnaval in Limburg etc. De Friese taal behoudt haar plek in het openbare leven. We bezuinigen flink op de staats omroep. Die doet al te veel dingen die heel goed door de commerciële zender kunnen worden gedaan. Nederland 1 lijkt vaak op een commerciële zender. De staatsomroep is ook veel te links.)
35	- Retention article 23 exceptional education remains intact. - Islamic schools will close.	- Handhaving artikel 23, bijzonder onderwijs blijft intact. - Islamitische scholen gaan dicht.
	2017: The Nethelands Ours Again!	**Nederland Weer van Ons!**
36	1. De-Islamize the Netherlands - zero asylum seekers let in and no immigrants from Islamic countries anymore: close the borders (…)	1.Nedeland de-islamiseren - Nul asielzoekers erbij en geen immigranten meer uit islamitische landen: grenzen dicht (…)

	- Islamic headscarves not in public office - Prohibition on other Islamic expressions that are against the public order - Preventive imprisonment of radical Muslims (…) - All mosques and Islamic schools to be closed	- Islamitische hoofddoekjes niet in publieke functies - Verbod op overige islamitische uitingen die in strijd zijn met de openbare orde - preventief opsluiten radicale moslims (…) - Alle moskeeën en islamitische scholen dicht
	Clarification: The Netherlands is taken away form us. And I will get it back for you	**Nederland wordt van ons afgepakt en ik pak het voor u terug**
37	Seven out of ten Dutch Muslims finds religious rules more important than Dutch secular laws. And more than one out of ten Muslims in the Netherlands finds it acceptable to use violence out of name of the Islam. That is more than 10.000 people. Many reject integration and show no respect to Dutch authority in neighborhoods such as Maassluis or Poelenburg. We get the middle finger. Islamic hooligans parade with IS-flags through the streets in the Hague and occupy bridges with Turkish flags in Rotterdam. This is our country, but it is their flags that wave.	Zeven op de tien Nederlandse moslims vindt religieuze regels belangrijker dan de Nederlandse seculiere wetten. En meer dan één op de tien moslims in Nederland vindt het acceptabel om geweld te gebruiken vanuit de islam. Dat zijn meer dat 10.000 mensen. Velen weigeren te integreren en tonen geen respect voor Nederlands gezag in wijken zoals Maassluis of Poelenburg. Wij krijgen de middelvinger. Islamitische hooligans paraderen met IS-vlaggen door de straten in Den Haag en bezetten bruggen met Turkse vlaggen in Rotterdam. Dit is ons land, maar het zijn hun vlaggen die wapperen.
38	I will protect our beautiful country when I will call the shots. And that is only possible if we can de-Islamize. I want to make that to be the core of my policies, because I refuse that this beautiful country of ours will be broken and I choose our culture and the freedom of our people. Our values are not Islamic but based on the Judeo-Christian and humanist civilization. We have the right to freedom and to decide for ourselves how we want to live and the right to never hand this over.	Ik zal ons mooie land beschermen als ik het voor het zeggen krijg. En dat kan alleen als we het de-islamiseren. Ik wil dat tot de kern van mijn beleid maken. Want ik weiger dit prachtige land van ons kapot te laten gaan en ik kies voor onze cultuur en de vrijheid van ons volk. Onze waarden zijn niet islamitisch maar gebaseerd op de joods-christelijke en humanistische beschaving. Wij hebben het recht en de vrijheid om zelf te bepalen hoe wij willen leven, en dit recht nooit af te geven.
39	The Dutch know very well that there are moderate Muslims, but definitely no moderate Islam. Two out of three Dutch agree that the Islamic culture does not belong in the Netherlands. Three quarters finds that politicians underestimate the problems regarding the increasing number of Islamists. Over three quarters sees Islam as not enriching the Netherlands. These people are right, but no-one listens to them. I do.	Nederlanders beseffen donders goed dat er weliswaar gematigde moslims bestaan, maar zeker geen gematigde islam. Twee op de drie Nederlanders vinden dat de islamitische cultuur niet bij Nederland hoort. Driekwart vindt dat politici de problematiek van het toenemend aantal islamieten onderschat. Meer dan driekwart vindt de islam geen verrijking voor Nederland. Die mensen hebben groot gelijk. Maar niemand luistert naar ze. Ik wel.
40	Everything that belongs to our culture people want to take away from is. Even Black Pete	Alles wat tot onze cultuur behoort wil men van ons afpakken. Zelfs Zwarte Piet mag niet meer.

is not allowed anymore. The elite now also wants to abolish the word 'allochtoon' [allochthonous, now 'Dutch with migration background], but it is the autochthonous that loses his country. I refuse to live with this. This is our country, our culture, our identity. The Netherlands, this beautiful country, this big nation, this shining beacon of freedom, it is ours and it will stay ours! This is the time to push out the tyranny.	De elite wil nu ook het woord 'allochtoon' afschaffen, maar het is de autochtoon die zijn land verliest. Ik weiger me daarbij neer te leggen. Dit is ons land, onze cultuur, onze identiteit. Nederland, dit prachtige land, deze grote natie, deze vurige baken van vrijheid, het is van ons en zal van ons blijven! Dit is de tijd om de tirannie te verdrijven.

	FvD	
	2017: Concept Election program 2017	**Concept verkiezingsprogramma 2017**
1	The established media and established parties would like you to believe otherwise: but we live in times of crisis. An existential crisis threatens the survival of Dutch society. Borders are no longer defended, we are exposed to mass immigration we cannot handle and the terrorist threat is increasing. Sovereignty is handed over to Brussel. We have less and less to say about our own society.	De gevestigde media en de gevestigde partijen willen u anders doen geloven: maar we leven in een tijd van crisis. Een existentiële crisis bedreigt het voortbestaan van de Nederlandse samenleving. Grenzen worden niet langer verdedigd, we staan bloot aan massale immigratie die we niet aankunnen en de terreurdreiging neemt steeds verder toe. Soevereiniteit wordt overgeheveld naar Brussel, we hebben steeds minder over onze eigen samenleving te vertellen.
2	There is a 'party cartel' in the Netherlands: a small group of party members – of a limited number of parties – is in charge. These cartel members keep the political system closed for new people and new ideas. The cartel members consist of a group of roughly 10.000 people who spin along in a carrousel of jobs. Executives, professors, journalists, members of parliament: they are recruited by the party leadership – a system of cooptation through which primarily produces followers and yes-men that do not have vision nor bravery. These career politicians then want to switch to mayoral posts, a top position at a health insurance company or the first prize: something in Brussels. It is the party that arranges the job. It is the party that proposes the candidates, and therefore the loyalty of the cartel member is with the leadership of that party – not with the voter. The benefits of the population is low on the priority list. Party interest go before country interests.	Er is in Nederland sprake van een 'partijkartel': een zeer kleine groep partijleden – van een select aantal partijen – houdt de touwtjes stevig in handen. Deze kartelleden houden het politieke systeem dicht voor nieuwe mensen en nieuwe ideeën. De kartelleden vormen een gesloten groep van circa 10.000 mensen die meedraaien in een baantjescarrousel. Bestuurders, hoogleraren, journalisten, parlementsleden: ze worden gerekruteerd door de partijtop – een systeem van coöptatie waardoor vooral meelopers en jaknikkers komen bovendrijven die het nogal eens aan visie en moed ontbreekt. Deze carrière-politici willen vervolgens doorschuiven naar een burgemeesterspost, een topfunctie bij een zorgverzekeraar of de hoofdprijs: iets in Brussel. Het is de partij die de baan regelt. Het is de partij die de kandidaten naar voren schuift. En de loyaliteit van het kartel-lid ligt dus ook bij die partijtop – niet bij de kiezer. De belangen van de bevolking komen laag op het prioritietenlijstje terecht. Partijbelang gaat boven landsbelang.
3	Democratic reform is therefore our main platform. Like Mayor Eberhard van der Laan	Democratische vernieuwing is dan ook ons belangrijkste agendapunt. Zoals Burgemeester

	said: 'party politics is at the end of its lifecycle (…) the citizen is unconvinced.'	Eberhard van der Laan het formuleerde: 'de partijpolitiek is aan het einde van zijn levenscyclus gekomen (…) de burger haakt af.'
4	There is more than enough talent in our country – but this talent does not end up in the right positions because of the obsolete, suffocating party culture. New generations will not follow Mark Rutte [prime minister] or Alexander Pechtold [then leader of liberal D66] hoping to get a job some day; they will not be laced up in the corset that is the party cartel anymore.	Er is in ons land ruim voldoende talent aanwezig – maar dat komt niet op de juiste posities terecht door de achterhaalde, verstikkende partijcultuur. Nieuwe generaties gaan niet eerst vijftien jaar achter Mark Rutte of Alexander Pechtold aanlopen in de hoop ooit eens een baantje toegespeeld te krijgen; ze laten zich niet meer in het keurslijf van het partijkartel persen.
5	We launch the Democratic Dashboard on which the voters can take matters into their own hands to change things through the means of petitions, citizens' initiatives and crowdfunding – and where they can announce themselves as candidate for public positions.	We lanceren het democratie dashboard waar kiezers zélf het heft in handen kunnen nemen om dingen te veranderen via petities, burgerinitiatieven en crowdfunding – en waar ze zich bovendien kunnen kandideren voor openbare functies.
6	We also want to invest substantially in fast internet for all of the Netherlands to ensure participation of everyone.	We willen tevens substantiële investeringen in snel internet voor heel Nederland zodat iedereen kan participeren.
7	Forum for Democracy wants to stand alongside other European revolutionary movements and break the political party cartel.	Forum voor Democratie wil dus aansluiten bij andere Europese vernieuwingsbewegingen en het politieke partijkartel doorbreken.
8	Bureaucracy and regulation eagerness, often created by the members of the party cartel, takes away the resources for people who do the real work.	Bureaucratie en regelzucht, niet zelden door leden van het partijkartel opgetuigd, trekken ook hier de middelen weg van de mensen die het eigenlijke werk doen.
9	We have concluded that the only way to change the system is to change it from within. We have to participate in elections to ensure that we will be heard.	We zijn tot de conclusie gekomen dat de enige manier om het systeem te veranderen van binnenuit is. We moeten meedoen aan de verkiezingen om te zorgen dat we gehoord worden.
10	The most important position of Forum for Democracy is what we call 'the fight against the cartel': the party cartel has to be broken open.	Het belangrijkste agendapunt van het Forum voor Democratie is wat wij 'kartelbestrijding' noemen: het partijkartel moet worden doorbroken.
11	They work for themselves, not for the country.	Ze werken voor zichzelf, niet voor het land.
12	Forum for Democracy proposes a package of measures under the name of 'breaking open the party cartel.'	Forum voor Democratie stelt een pakket aan maatregelen voor die we vatten onder de noemer 'openbreken van het partijkartel'.
13	Digital voting has to be introduced in the parliament to ensure that cartel members can be called out individually for their voting behavior.	Er moet digitaal worden gestemd in de Tweede Kamer zodat kartelleden individueel ter verantwoording kunnen worden geroepen voor hun stemgedrag.
14	Furthermore, the public debate has to be broken open – the partial and biased NPO	Ook moet het publieke debat worden opengebroken – de partijdige en

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		[public broadcaster] has to be cleaned up. The managerial ladder needs to be cleaned from top to bottom.	vooringenomen NPO moet worden gesaneerd. De bestuurlijke trap dient van bovenaf te worden schoongeveegd.
	15	Forum for Democracy wants to introduce binding referenda and popular initiatives, similar to the very successful Swiss model. This is the only way we can seriously reduce the party cartel and cut off the power of the party elites.	Forum voor Democratie wil invoering van bindende referenda en volksinitiatieven, vergelijkbaar met het zeer succesvolle Zwitserse model. Dit is de enige manier om de invloed van het partijkartel serieus terug te dringen en de macht van de partij-elites te doorbreken.
	16	We are not going to wait until the party cartel will change on their own initiative but give the Dutch the possibility, now already, to actively make their voice heard and receive more influence in the direction our country ought to take.	Wij gaan niet afwachten totdat het partijkartel ooit eens tot verandering overgaat, maar geven de Nederlanders nu al meteen zelf de mogelijkheid om actief de eigen stem te laten horen en meer invloed te krijgen op de koers die ons land uit moet uitzetten.
	17	To break the cartel even further, there has to be an increased distance between the government and the parliament.	Om het kartel verder te doorbreken moet er grotere afstand komen tussen regering en parlement.
	18	The government program will be an agreement between ministers chosen by the prime ministers in a cabinet compiled by himself. When compiling this agreement, the prime minister ought to fully consider the composition of the parliament, but nothing limits him to *also* appoint members of the cabinet with a different political color than his (or cabinet members *without* political color).	Het regeringsprogramma wordt een afspraak tussen ministers die door de gekozen minister-president zijn uitgenodigd om zitting te nemen in het door hem samen te stellen kabinet. Bij die afspraken zal de premier ten volle rekening moeten houden met de samenstelling van de door de bevolking gekozen volksvertegenwoordiging, maar niets belet hem om *ook* kabinetsleden van een andere politieke kleur dan de zijne (of kabinetsleden *zonder* politieke kleur) op te nemen.
	19	The chosen prime minister gets increased powers in which he can decide certain issues to be 'chefsache' and overrule individual ministers. Furthermore, it has to become easier for the prime minister to replace badly operating ministers and promote well-functioning ministers and state secretaries. The Netherlands cannot 2017 afford endless discussion to find compromise. Governing has to be more decisive.	De gekozen minister-president krijgt ook meer bevoegdheden waarbij hij naar eigen inzicht bepaalde zaken als 'Chefsache' kan betitelen en zo individuele ministers kan overrulen. Ook moet het makkelijker worden voor de minister-president om tussentijds slecht functionerende ministers te vervangen en goed functionerende ministers en staatssecretarissen te promoveren. Nederland kan zich in 2017 geen oeverloos compromis-zoekend overleg meer permitteren, er dient slagvaardiger geregeerd te worden.
	20	This organization [the EU] has grown without limits and has become a completely undemocratic Moloch. It is an outdated model of government; a cartel on top of another cartel.	Deze organisatie [de EU] is grenzeloos uitgedijd en verworden tot een volstrekt ondemocratisch moloch. Het is een achterhaald bestuursmodel; een kartel bovenop het kartel.
	21	Under the supervision of the party cartel government has become much too bit. This leads to a sluggish country that has too many	Onder invloed van het partijkartel is de overheid veel te groot geworden. Dit leidt tot een gezapig land waar te veel van afwachters,

	idlers, complainers, process supervisors, risk managers and herd animals.	klagers, procesbegeleiders, risico-managers en kuddedieren zijn.
22	Conflicts of interest, nepotism and a State that is partial has to be countered.	Belangenverstrengeling, vriendjespolitiek en een overheid die partijdig is moet worden tegengegaan.
23	b) maintain special education (art. 23), but very strict safeguards on quality.	b) Behoud bijzonder onderwijs (art. 23), maar zeer strenge waarborgen op kwaliteit.
24	m) reduction of the power of political parties in (local) management in education.	m) Terugdringen macht van politieke partijen in de (lokale) aansturing van het onderwijs.
25	- Promoting Dutch history and culture - Stop subsidizing segregation.	- Promoten Nederlandse geschiedenis & cultuur - Stoppen subsidiëren segregatie
26	At this moment in time, the Dutch State subsidizes segregation enhancing, do-away-with-us projects; while the things we ought to be proud of, the most beautiful the West has ever brought forth, is buried.	Op dit moment subsidieert de Nederlandse overheid segregatie-bevorderende, weg-met-ons projecten; terwijl we datgene waar we trots op mogen zijn, het mooiste en het beste dat het Westen heeft voortgebracht, onderschoffelen.
27	The past decades efforts have been made to alienate the Dutchman form his history and cut him loose from his history. This does not only have to be stopped, it has to be reversed.	De afgelopen decennia is gepoogd de Nederlander van zijn geschiedenis te vervreemden en van zijn cultuur los te snijden. Dit moet niet alleen stoppen, het moet worden teruggedraaid.
28	We want: a) All those beautiful things the West has brought forth to be taught again, advocated for again, and promoted. b) To stop subsidizing segregation. c) To stimulate business investments in Dutch film, art etc. d) In general: to love our country again and be proud of our shared history and future!	Wij willen: a) Al die mooie dingen die het Westen heeft voortgebracht weer onderwijzen, uitdragen en promoten. b) Stoppen met het subsidiëren van segregatie. c) Stimuleren investeringen in Nederlandse film, kunst, etc. d) In het algemeen: weer van ons land gaan houden en trots zijn op onze gedeelde geschiedenis en toekomst!
29	- Party membership of executives and presenters at the NPO made public. - Appointment of ombudsman who will safeguard the neutrality of the media. - Focus on education, culture and democracy.	- Partijlidmaatschappen bestuurders en presentatoren NPO openbaar - Benoeming ombudsman die neutraliteit media waarborgt - Focus op educatie, cultuur, documentaires
30	Forum for democracy concludes that there is immense bias in the public media. An overwhelming one-sidedness dominates, linked to a bit lack of true curiosity. The NPO has become an instrument of the party cartel and therefore Forum for Democracy thinks that a thorough clean-up of the NPO is an important step in the fight against the cartel.	Forum voor Democratie constateert grote vooringenomenheid in de publieke media. Een stuitende eenzijdigheid domineert, gekoppeld aan een groot gebrek aan oprechte nieuwsgierigheid. De NPO is verworden tot een instrument van het partijkartel en daarom denkt Forum voor Democratie dat een grondige sanering van de NPO een belangrijk onderdeel vormt in de kartelbestrijding.

31	Endlessly the Dutch people were told how great the association treaty with Ukraine was, and how disastrous Brexit would be. The favorite NPO-faces propagated daily that Trump would never win – and after the election results those same faces were allowed to explain why he won. The choices of topics, the guests and preferences shockingly work in the benefit of always the same political parties and issues. Other parties and positions are negatively treated and sometimes even ignored or distorted.	Eindeloos werd de Nederlandse bevolking verteld over hoe goed het associatieverdrag met Oekraïne was en hoe desastreus de Brexit zou zijn. De favoriete NPO-gezichten verkondigden dagelijks dat Trump nooit zou winnen – en na de uitslag mochten dezelfde gezichten uitleggen waarom hij won. De onderwerpkeuze, gasten en voorkeuren van steeds dezelfde presentatoren pakken schokkend vaak uit in het voordeel van steeds weer dezelfde politieke partijen en agendapunten. Andere partijen en opvattingen worden negatief bejegend of zelfs totaal genegeerd of verdraaid.
32	The NPO receives more than €900 million on a yearly basis from the Dutch taxpayer (that is over €2,5 million per day!). For all this money the Dutch people are not properly informed. Rather: the public and political opinion formation is being manipulated. This really has to stop.	De NPO ontvangt jaarlijks meer dan €900 miljoen van de Nederlandse belastingbetaler (dat is ruim €2,5 mln per dag!). Voor al dit geld wordt de Nederlandse bevolking niet goed voorgelicht. Sterker: de publieke en politieke meningsvorming wordt gemanipuleerd. Dit moet echt stoppen.
33	We want: a) Party membership of NPO board members public. b) Party membership of presenters of opinion shows and net managers public. c) Appointment independent ombudsman who will ensure neutrality of opinion and debate shows and complaints publicly treats and discusses. d) Creation of independent supervisory board for the NPO in which at random new groups of viewers are represented.	Wij willen: a) Partijlidmaatschappen bestuursleden NPO openbaar. b) Partijlidmaatschappen presentatoren opinieprogramma's en netmanagers openbaar. c) Benoeming onafhankelijke Ombudsman die de neutraliteit van opinie- en debatprogramma's waarborgt en klachten in het openbaar bespreekt en behandelt. d) Instelling onafhankelijke Raad van Toezicht voor de NPO waarin steekproefsgewijs steeds nieuwe groepen kijkers zijn vertegenwoordigd.
34	Dutch society has had to process an enormous influx of refugees. The society cannot longer take this, but the party cartel continues to bring in unheard numbers of disadvantaged immigrants. (with support of the NPO and subsidized organizations such as Refugee Aid).	De Nederlandse samenleving heeft de afgelopen decennia een enorme instroom van immigranten te verwerken gekregen. De samenleving kan dit niet meer behappen, maar het partijkartel blijft maar doorgaan met het binnenhalen van ongehoorde aantallen kansarme immigranten. (met steun van de NPO en gesubsidieerde instanties zoals Vluchtelingenwerk).
35	Our immigration policy ought to be directed towards those we need here and who we (also on the basis of cultural background) can take in.	Ons immigratiebeleid moet gericht zijn op wie wij hier nodig hebben en wie wij (ook op basis van culturele achtergrond) kunnen opnemen.
36	In the instance that integration fails, remigration is the best solution. Nonetheless,	Waar integratie niet lukt, is remigratie de beste oplossing. Toch werd in 2015 door slechts 504

	in 2015 the existing remigration arrangement was used by only 504 immigrants. This arrangement should be expanded and made more attractive. Furthermore, remigration should be allowed to be imposed as alternative punishment.	immigranten gebruik gemaakt van de reeds bestaande remigratieregeling. Deze regeling moet dus worden uitgebreid en aantrekkelijker worden gemaakt. Tevens moet remigratie als alternatieve straf kunnen worden opgelegd.
37	g) Promote remigration when integration (assimilation) fails.	g) Bevorderen remigratie waar intergratie (assimilatie) mislukt.
38	Everyone who looks at the future of the Netherlands will have a gnawing feeling of worry. A very small clique of cartel members has ruled our country for decades. It is only a group of 10.000 people who spin in a job carrousel and keep the ranks closed among themselves.	Iedereen die goed kijkt naar de toekomst van Nederland zal een knagend gevoel van bezorgdheid voelen. Een zeer kleine kliek van kartelleden bestuurt nu al decennia ons land. Het gaat om slechts 10.000 mensen die ronddraaien in een baantjescarrousel en de gelederen onderling gesloten houden.
39	Party interest unfortunately go beyond country interests too often. Quality is no longer the decisive criterion for gaining an executive top position. The Netherlands is sub-optimally governed.	Partijbelang gaat helaas maar al te vaak boven landsbelang. En kwaliteit is lang niet altijd het doorslaggevende criterium voor het verweven van bestuurlijke topposities. Nederland wordt suboptimaal bestuurd.
40	Something has to change now. Forum for Democracy is the only serious alternative to current politics. We are going to break open the party cartel and push the Netherlands to the forefront of the world stage again.	Er moet nu echt iets veranderen. Forum voor Democratie is het enige serieuze alternatief voor de huidige politiek. Wij gaan het partijkartel breken en Nederland weer opstoten in de vaart der volkeren.

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