RELIGIOUS MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN TIMES OF WAR

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Abstract

Why did the Christian Churches in the United States mobilize at times against war and at times supported it? This thesis will take a closer look into the conditions that triggered the liberal Protestant, the black Protestant, the conservative Protestant churches as well as the Catholic church to mobilize against or offer support for a war that a given US administration pursued. The scope will be on World War I, the Vietnam War, and the War in Iraq. To do so, Qualitative Comparative Analysis will be applied as a method since the presence and the absence of the outcome are qualitatively different sets (mobilization against is not the symmetric opposite of support for war). This thesis finds that a combination of four conditions is of importance: Doctrines about war, unity, a high degree of organization, and whether a strategic coalition with the political administration is present or not. As it will be shown, the findings can be well explained on the basis of already existing social movement literature, posing the question whether religious groups that (do not) mobilize are essentially different from other stakeholders, like social movements. Moreover, it is questionable whether theories that focus on different aspects regarding the factors that lead to political mobilization, like a religious market perspective, capture the political mobilization of religion equally well.

i

Table of Contents

Introduction

Much of the literature that deals with the relationship between religion and political mobilization follows one of two argumentative strands: On the one hand, it is argued that religion plays an instrumental role for political mobilization, that is, the cause for mobilization is located outside of religion. On the other hand, religion is seen as a factor that drives mobilization, since it would shape and motivate the behavior of individuals. This thesis will draw on both strands of the literature arguing that on the macro level, studying religious groups in particular situations, political mobilization can be both, instrumental and sincere. This comes by no surprise taking a closer look in the debates among scholars of social movement theory: Political mobilization is a complex process for which many factors like grievances, opportunity, framing, a collective identity, etc. need to come together (cp. Birnir et al. 2019). Or, as Audre Lorde would say, "there is no thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not live single-issue lives" (Lorde 1982).

Since religion is demanding and can interfere with all areas of a believer's life (cp. Grzymala-Busse 2012, 422-424), as will be argued in chapter one, it can vice versa be expected that an exogenous event which as well strongly interferes with a believer's life makes impartiality impossible. A watershed event such as a war bestows such a situation. That said, looking at religious mobilization in the United States, the Christian Churches had no unified response to war but at times (strongly) mobilized against it and at times (strongly) supported it. This will be shown in chapter two followed by a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the reaction of the Christian Churches in the United States to Word War I, the Vietnam War, and the War in Iraq in chapter three.

Drawing on social movement theory and the already existing literature on religious mobilization, several conditions will be identified that have distinctively shaped the churches response to war. To limit the scope and based on theoretical assumptions, the focus is going to be on an analysis of the discourses national church organizations as well as nationally known

religious leaders engaged in. Moreover, Christian Churches in the United States are for the sake of this thesis categorized as Conservative Protestant Churches; Black Protestant Churches; the Catholic Church; and Liberal Protestant Churches.

The case selection follows the hunch that all three situations of war bring about very different outcomes: First, that World War I was almost univocally (at least silently) supported by religious leaders and religious associations. It is suspected that religious affiliation plays no significant role in this case. Second, that the war in Vietnam was highly contested among churchgoers and Christian leaders and led to a division between those religious leaders and associations who actively mobilized against the war and those who openly supported it. Third, that religious leaders and associations almost univocally mobilized against the war in Iraq. It is suspected that religious affiliation plays no significant role in this case.

It will be demonstrated that the assumptions social movement theories, and in particular Sidney Tarrow, make about the way in which social movements form themselves and operate also hold if applied to the context of religious mobilization, even though religious groups are neither social movements per se nor primarily engaged in contentious politics. All in all, religious mobilization seems not to be random but follows clear predictable patterns, at least within the chosen universe of cases.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Considerations

The chapter on theoretical considerations underlying this thesis will be is structured as follows: First, a religious market perspective to explain the political mobilization of religious groups in the United States will be critically evaluated. Then, religion is situated in the larger field of social movement studies. Lastly, theoretical considerations regarding the political mobilization of religious groups in the US are being addressed. Thereby, several theoretical hunches that might play a role to explain the outcome of the analysis, namely the presence or absence of mobilization, are brought forth. However, since I cannot evaluate all theoretical assumptions in detail, four sets of conditions, which seem to be the most important elements that shape religious mobilization, are identified as predominant.

1.1 Religious Economy Models

Contrary to political frameworks in which religious groups can rely on financial support from the state or have the ability to sustain themselves through taxes (as it is the case in many European countries) in the United States, religious groups need the direct financial support of their parishioners in form of donations. Thus, religious leaders must not only compete with other religious groups for members but also have to keep their own parishioners constantly satisfied and engaged (cp. Birnir et al. 2019). For this reason, some authors suggest that religious organizations in the US try to adapt their religious practices but also their teachings in a way that attracts new members while also meeting the demands of existing parishioners. In this context, it is also suspected that religious leaders in the US instrumentalize political issues only if they believe that said issues attract new as well as engage old members (cp. Wilcox and Jelen 2002).

Paul Djupe and Jacob Neiheisel offer a so-called religious economy model, which combines said assumptions with rational choice theory (cp. Djupe and Neiheisel 2019). The authors postulate that the political engagement of Christian congregations in the US happens

and varies for reasons that are apolitical and can be predicted. Since every individual will make sure to maximize their personal benefits when choosing a religious group, a certain value can be assigned to religious beliefs. Out of this reason, religious groups need to be efficient and innovative as they are under constant pressure to meet the demands of their 'customers'. As politics is perceived as just another 'good' that religious groups might provide and as market pressure increases, it might gain in importance for distinguishment and might be offered more frequently as an attempt to diversify and complement other more distinct religious services.

Based on this model, Djupe and Neiheisel make several predictions: First, if congregants sense that their needs are not satisfied, for example because of too much political activism of their congregational leaders, they leave their congregation. Vice versa that, if congregants are satisfied with their congregation, the clergy has more space to get politically active since it is only perceived as a byproduct that does not endanger overall congregational needs (like spiritual care). Second, since minorities feel the need for overall stronger political representation, congregations which mostly consist of (ethnical) minorities expect political representation as well from their religious leaders (cp. Djupe and Neiheisel 2019, 124 and 127-31 and 145). In contrary, the discussion of political issues is more cautious among clergy that belong to Protestant Mainline Churches, as they must deal with more heterogenous congregations (cp. Djupe and Neiheisel 2019, 126 et seq.).

This assumption is confirmed by empirical studies about religious disaffiliation in the US. As Djupe et al. show, even individuals who have been for a long time in a relation with a religious community might leave because of the political stance a congregation takes, even though disaffiliation is more likely if the linkage to a community has already been weak before. However, as political differences are just one aspect of a set of individual preferences, the authors assume that political differences might either be salient because something in the action of the church has changed (e.g., an active mobilization of clergy for a pro-life rally), or the

4

overall satisfaction with clergy and church services conceals any political difference to a certain extent, as noted earlier (cp. Djupe et al. 2018, 162-165, 172 et seq.).

Although the religious economy approach seems to be a good fit for the case of the US in which approximately 40% of grown-up individuals have switched religious affiliation (cp. Putnam and Campbell 2010, 137), so called 'church hopping' is a distinct phenomenon among (liberal) protestant churches. Switching from a protestant to a non-protestant denomination or vice versa or even switching between religions like from Christianity to Mormonism, is rather complicated and happens only seldom (cp. Grzymala-Busse 2012, 425). Moreover, if one assumes, as religious economy models do, that religions under state-support satisfy the needs of their consumers only inefficiently, why do they still manage to bind people in democratic states to a certain extend successfully to their religious communities? Either individuals look out for alternatives – a process on which state support for one specific religious group should have only little effect; or individuals do not look for alternatives which violates the key assumption of said models, namely the diversity of preferences regarding religion (cp. ibid., 435-437). Additionally, as the analysis part of this thesis will show, religious economy models fail to explain why religious leaders and religious organizations in the US choose to take stances on political issues, such as war.

That said, two other assumptions religious economy models make deserve closer attention: On the one hand, it is suspected that religious communities, which consist overwhelmingly of minority groups, might be more politically engaged. On the other, an overall satisfaction with congregational life and leadership might give religious leaders more backing for political activism and mobilization.

1.2 The Situation of Religion in Social Movement Studies

As Sidney Tarrow summarizes under the term *contentious politics*, at certain moments ordinary people join forces with more influential societal actors to channel their grievances and

confront (political) authorities. This happens especially if political opportunities change; if the interaction with the political opponent is sustained and backed by organized social networks, one can speak of a social movement. That said, a change in political opportunity as well as strong grievances that motivate stakeholders and movements to act are not the only factors Tarrow identifies as necessary to sustain a social movement. Instead, he also renders solidarity of high importance. Here religion comes into the play: Religious leaders can help to create solidarity if they manage to connect collective grievance with a religious identity and individual level religious devotion (cp. Tarrow 2011, 6).

However, one can assume that religious motivations alone are too abstract – religious groups seem to rather "respond to what they perceive as social flaws, attacks on sacred values, and anti-religious practices. The tone is often defensive as religious elites declare that they are forced to intervene in politics so that their members can live godly lives. We sometimes forget that groups may suffer costs by virtue of political action and that it would often be easier to forego such action in favor of tending to hearth and home" (Wald et al. 2005, 130).

Furthermore, due to its variety of resources (public and political connections, places to meet, financial and organizational resources, leadership skills, and social networks; see Fox 2018, 73-81), religion and religious groups are often used and interpreted as instruments for mobilization. Religious infrastructure got for example in several cases downrightly got 'coopted': A paradigmatic case is the civil rights movement, for which black protestant churches functioned as institutional center, opportunity structure, and motivational basis that channeled grievances and supplied collective enthusiasm simultaneously (cp. Morris 1984, 4).

That said, one should not leave out of sight the non-instrumental, individual level of religion: Religious experience is part of the framework through which individuals deal with and understand the world around them (cp. Birnir et al. 2019). As the German philosopher Hermann Lübbe describes, based on Niklas Luhmann's *Systemtheorie*, religious individuals make use of their religion to deal with extraordinary situations and crises and to develop a strategy of action

("Religion als Kontingenzbewältigungspraxis"; Lübbe 1998, 40). Sincere beliefs can drive the individual behavior of religious individuals supported by their religious communities that provides them with the frameworks for a *Kontingenzbewältigungspraxis* in the first place. Hence, one can assume that the reasons for religious mobilization are "simultaneously sincere and instrumental" (Birnir et al. 2019, 177).

One might pose the question what makes religious identities distinct and different from other identity markers. First, they work transnationally and individuals all over the world identify with them unlike culture, nation, or language which always seem geographically limited. Second, they are extraordinarily demanding identities since religions can interfere with every aspect of one's life. Third, they are hard to suppress as they often work decentralized and local clergy have more to lose (respect and authority of their congregants) if they do not react to oppression or social watersheds such as times of war. Lastly, and in contrary to other markers of identity, religion draws on belief systems that work with absolute transcendental authorities whose supposed claims are irrefutable (cp. Grzymala-Busse 2012, 422-424).

Based on outlined theoretical assumptions, I developed the following hypothesis:

*H1: Even though the relationship between religious doctrines, religious identities, and political mobilization is not always clear or consistent, the **doctrines about war** a particular religious community holds at the beginning of a war also shape it overall response.*

Going back to Tarrow, his portrayal of the internal and external factors that guide the dynamics of social movements appears also to be a good fit to explain the underlying dynamics that guides the mobilization of religious groups.

Tarrow offers a threefold classification of **internal factors**: First, the various material but more importantly non-material **resources** available must be analyzed. In the case of religious groups, especially well-knit and well well-structured social networks, like church

organizations, seem to play a role. Moreover, the **making of meanings** should be studied, that is, the framing of contentious politics, the construction of a collective identity, and the capturing of emotions. For the argument of this thesis, especially the construction of a collective identity seems to be important, which refers to the accentuating of particular meanings of identities in order to set boundaries, to gain solidarity, and to mobilize. Lastly, Tarrow classifies internal factors as **leadership**, whereby this will be studied in the following as found in form of nationally known religious leaders and in church associations (cp. Tarrow 2011, 244-263).

*H2: A **unified response**, which is rendered visible by studying internal social movement factors, distinctly shapes whether a religious group mobilizes or not.*

External factors are on the other hand classified by Tarrow as costs that arise through political action (like repression) and the opening of political opportunity structures (cp. Tarrow 2011, 27 and 33). Moreover, and considering that the Christian Churches are traditionally already in various kinds of relationships with the political administration, an additional external factor is the question whether there is a strategic coalition between the political leadership and a Christian group.

*H3: The **presence of a strategic coalition with the political leadership** hinders any kind of mobilization against the political leadership, even though there might be strong grievances (like engagement in a war).*

Since the focus of religious groups is more on shared values and identities than on the provision of a generalized benefit, it can be assumed that religious groups do not have to deal with a collective action problem as the provision of a collective *measurable* and *rational* good is not the fundamental function of religion so that it seems logical from the beginning to assume

that common interests will not lead to further said interest in a religious group since it is not the aim or main function of a religious group (cp. Olson 1965, 2 and 15).

To the contrary of Mancur Olson's conceptualization of the collective action problem, the larger and/or the more hierarchical a religious group is (the paradigmatic example would be the Catholic Church), the more easily mobilization seems to take place. Ministers of black churches in the southern US States, to give an example, were more independent to support political protests and civil disobedience the larger their congregations were. In larger congregations, separate organizational structures and diffusion of responsibility are easier to generate than in smaller congregations in which close social control and a lack of resources might lead to tensions within the congregation. On the other hand, hierarchical religious groups like Catholics or Episcopalians in the US are not likely to facilitate smaller local units out of which mass movements might emerge, however, if leaders high enough in the authority structure decide to support a political cause materially and ideologically, it might lead to a catalyzing of social movements that are about to emerge, as the example of the pro-live movement in the US shows (cp. Mayer and McCarthy 2017, 72).

This is of course not to say that more vertically oriented religious structures, like many Muslim communities, prevent mobilization (cp. Birnir et al. 2019). Moreover, the relationship between organizational size and structure of a religious group and its effect on mobilization is generally contested. In the case of Europe, for instance, Christian Democratic parties were precisely successful because of catholic social movements that formed *against* the interests of the Catholic church and of conservative elites (cp. Kalyvas 1996, 6). One should therefore keep in mind that religious doctrines build the foundation of a religious collective and religious institutions but are not identical with the political identity a religious collective embodies. Religious groups crystallize foremost social identities, which then might transform to political identities through external cleavages and choices a community and especially their leaders make (cp. Kalyvas 1996, 8-11).

*H4: Even though the relationship between size, structure, and degree of hierarchy is not fully clear, a **high degree of organization**, that is, an established organization which represents the concerns of a particular Christian community at the beginning of a war, shapes the overall response of a religious group. A unified response seems only be feasible with a national organization that channels the overall response of a religious community.*

1.3 The Political Mobilization of Religion(s) in the United States

In the US, congregations are very actively engaged in political activism, compared to other non-political organizations. As Kraig Beyerlein and Mark Chaves show, over 40 percent of congregations in the US were at least once politically engaged (cp. Beyerlein and Chaves 2003, 242). Moreover, clergy become more and more politically engaged compared to past levels in the US (cp. Djupe and Neiheisel 2019, 126). The differences between various Christian traditions are thereby rather qualitative than quantitative: "Evangelical/conservative Protestant congregations engage in politics by distributing Christian Right voter guides. Black Protestant congregations register voters, open their doors to candidates, and distribute voter guides from sources other than the Christian Right. Catholic congregations organize demonstrations and marches, and they lobby elected officials Mainline/liberal Protestant congregations organize discussion groups around political issues and host political candidates. Although none of these political activities are completely monopolized by a single religious tradition, clear modalities are present" (ibid.). Since different Christian traditions specialize in different ways of political action, the categories Conservative Protestant; Black Protestant; Catholic; Liberal Protestant appears to be also relevant when studying the mobilization of Christian Churches in the US (cp. Djupe and Neiheisel 2019, 241).

Furthermore, studying churches in the US, a differentiation between leadership and congregants regarding mobilization seems to be a good fit because – as Putnam and Campbell show with their study on religious voting in the US – person to person endorsement of specific

parties or candidates almost never happens in church; even less than in other communal places like workplaces (cp. Putnam and Campbell 2010, 430). Religious leaders, on the other hand, might turn a religious worldview into political preferences (cp. Wilcox et. al. 2008, 875).

That said, congregations and their leaders are only one element of social structures that shape individuals, next to other elements, such as schools, workplaces, etc. Since all of these elements of social structure have political importance, it cannot be concluded that the political values of church leaders equal individual political preferences but only that they shape them to a certain extend (cp. Huckfeldt et al. 1993, 380). Moreover, Brian Calfano's survey among clergy in the Presbyterian Church of the US suggests that clergy do not act solely on their own personal political values but also heavily on the pressure they get from their constituents: "Rather than simply being a source of ideological identification denominations appear to function as a collection of particular constituencies whose cues clergy seek out and use to determine their public speech" (Calfano 2009, 98).

Yet, it is possible to draw the generalization that, particularly in the US, religious values and identities are meaningful concepts which are frequently used to not only express a religious but also a political worldview:

> Many Jews identify with one of the various theological groupings, Catholics often identify as ''traditional'' or ''progressive,'' and Protestants often identify as ''mainline'' or ''evangelical,'' and sometimes more narrowly as ''fundamentalist,'' ''Pentecostal,'' etc. These identities are built by religious leaders, who differentiate their theological tradition from others. Not all religious Americas respond to these religious identities, and some do so more as a signal of their religious commitment than any cognitive identity […]. Yet especially among more devout citizens, religious identities do seem to be meaningful—they fit well with actual theology and denominational affiliation, and are important predictors of political mobilization (Wilcox et. al. 2008, 877 et seq.).

Thus, one the one hand, religious identities are already part of the US society and just have to be 'activated' by religious or political leaders. On the other hand, values and identities are constantly formed by societal structures like churches and function as language to express one's political, religious, humanistic, etc. self-understanding (cp. Wilcox et. al. 2008, 875 and 878).

Chapter 2: Setting the Historical and Discursive Stage

The following chapter will selectively present some of the discourses the most vocal church leaders and church associations engaged in during the three chosen situations of war. Thereby, due to spatial limitations, I do not have the claim of an exhaustive representation but instead try to include discourses and historical facets that become important for the following analysis of factors that have led church leaders and church associations to take their respective stance on war.

2.1 The Churches and World War I

The following subchapter will highlight two aspects: First, that none of the churches under study had a federal organizational structure at the beginning of the war. Second, that the response to the war was all in all unified across churches under study.

Before deciding to intervene in the war in April 1917, President Thomas Woodrow Wilson kept the United States out of it for a very long time. Three months earlier, on January 22nd, he appeared in front of the Senate calling for the negotiation of "peace without victory" and the creation of a "League for Peace" (Miller Center, January 1917). That said, after the German Empire sunk without warning the American ship *Housatonic* in February 1917, the Wilson administration broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, bringing the US to the edge of war. This event was quickly followed by the interception of the Zimmerman note exploring the possibility of Mexico entering the war on the side of the Central Powers. The situation escalated even further, when five more American ships got attacked and sunk by German submarines. In consequence, the Wilson administration formally declared war against Germany on April 6th. Wilson had justified this decision four days earlier in an address to congress (cp. Piper 1985, 8; Dorrien 2001, 332 et seq.).

> The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the
> tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire
> no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material

compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them (Miller Center, April 1917).

Protestants, by the start of the war, were rather unorganized. There were 200 different denominational structures within Protestantism at that time, out of which many created their own subcommittees to handle the war issue. Some of these subcommittees and single churches condemned the war as evil, some saw it as a holy crusade to defend Christian-American values like freedom, morality, and democracy, some others concentrated-on wartime chaplaincy and ministry (cp. Piper 1985, 10 et seq.; Piper 1970, 151). This divisiveness in organization and stance on the war caused concern among the leadership of the Federal Council of Churches as moral unity seemed an urgent need among a nation that goes to war, at least according to its president Frank Mason North (cp. Macfarland 9). Out of this reason, the council decided to create a general wartime commission to unite the different Protestant groups and churches. Once established, this commission tried to find common ground between pacifists and militarists: the needs of chaplains that served the soldiers got prioritized and loyalty to the Wilson administration pledged. The Federal Council judged that the decision to send America to war was morally justified, but also stressed that war itself remained evil.

That said, not all denominations felt equally well represented in that compromise. Whereas **conservative** denominations had no problem to harmonize the war with their teachings and had urged the Wilson administration already for some time to give up its neutral stance, **liberal** denominations had pressed Wilson hard to keep America out of the war. One paradigmatic example is Shailer Mathews, who served between 1912 and 1916 as the first President of the Federal Council and had publicly campaigned against the war. Moreover, he took next to his leadership of the Council also leadership roles in several organizations that lobbied against the war like the Church Peace Union or the League to Enforce Peace. Latter was thereby as influential that it convinced President Wilson to support the idea of a league to prevent war, later known as the League of Nations.

13

That said, as soon as Wilson declared war and made war support a question of morality, Mathews and many others quickly lined up behind Wilson and expressed their support for the war giving patriotic speeches and sermons all over the country justifying the war as a morally necessary evil for Christian and democratic progress (cp. Dorrien 2003, 200). The only important theological liberal that stood firm to his belief that it was the wrong decision for the US to join the war was Walter Rauschenbusch, who had to take the heat from conservatives but also other liberals alike. Many of his critiques belonged like him to the social gospel movement, which argued that Christian ethics must address the social problems of its time. Whereas his former colleagues saw the war as an issue that America had to address to defend Christian-American values, Rauschenbusch rather feared that the war with its spike in nationalist and imperialist sentiments would lead the US astray from its way of moral progress (cp. Dorrien 2003, 118-120).

The **Black Protestant Churches** were by the beginning of the war as unorganized as the other Protestant Churches. However, while the cooperation between the different black protestant denominations grew, only the African Methodist Episcopal Church appointed a commission that cooperated with the General War Time Commission of the Federal Council. All other Black Protestant Churches concentrated on the needs of black soldiers and funded therefore the *council on the welfare of negro troops and communities* under the head of the Federal Council (cp. Fischer 1925, 489 et seq.)

Catholics, on the other hand, knew at the time the war reached America no federal organization that could channel the response of the church. Instead, different congregations, clerical leaders, and important lay persons issued their own statements reflecting a variety of views until the archbishops send a public support letter to President Wilson two weeks after the war started making war support the official view of the church (cp. Piper 1985, 13-16; Piper 1970, 151). While the Federal Church Council expressed support for the war only in cautious terms, the Catholic archbishops fervently expressed their support and loyalty.

> Inspired neither by hate nor fear, but by the holy sentiments of truest patriotic fervor and zeal, we stand ready, we and all the flock committed to our keeping, to cooperate in every way possible with our President and our national Government, to the end that the great and holy cause of liberty may triumph, and that our beloved country may emerge from this hour of test stronger and nobler than ever (Catholic Mind 1917, 233 et seq.)

Among Catholic leaders, there was no disagreement about assuring the Wilson administration support and loyalty; the highest-ranking Catholic leaders like William Cardinal O'Connell, John Cardinal Farley, and James Cardinal Gibbons all called for unity since going to war was seen as a moral duty to renew civilization. All leaders emphasized that they had neither called for the war nor that war should be celebrated; but since the Central Powers were the aggressors that provoked with unjust means a non-aggressive third state, the US had finally no other choice but to join the war selflessly merely based on high moral ideals (cp. Piper 1985, 21-23). In August 1917, the Catholic Church founded the National Catholic War Council which first was run by the leader of the Chaplains Aid organization until the archbishops decided in January 1918 that it would be better if the council would be run directly by the board of Archbishops (cp. Piper 1970, 152 et seq.).

Thereby, both the Federal Council of Churches and the National Catholic War Council became the most important organizations for not only organizing chaplaincy for soldiers but also to unite the different congregations behind the decision of the Wilson administration to go to war (cp. ibid.). One example are pastor's manuals that got printed and distributed by the Councils to urge local clergy to display service flags in their churches, to hold special services for soldiers called into duty, and to provide moral justification of the war. (cp. Piper 1985, 136 et seq.). Nevertheless, while the Federal Council of Churches helped to establish the common ground between militants and pacifists and to channel the response of the Protestant churches, single congregations and local leaders still chose for themselves a more militant or pacifist response (see the example of Rauschenbusch). Yet, the militants and pacifists had, like in the American society at the time of war, no significant public influence on the response of the church or the Wilson administration respectively. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, had

no problems to close its ranks. The firm and swift response of its highest-ranking leaders plus a framing of the war as just, thereby linking the US intervention back to a long history of Catholic social teaching about just war, made it impossible for lower ranking clergy or single congregations to publicly dissent (cp. Piper 1985, 23).

2.2 The Churches and the Vietnam War

The following subchapter will highlight two aspects: First, that conservative as well as black Protestants were in a strategic coalition with the leadership. Second, that the response to the war was very different in all churches under study and led to internal divisions among liberal and black Protestants.

The Vietnam War was a long and extremely complicated military and political conflict, wherefore this subchapter will only concentrate on the churches' response to it between March 1965, the month in which President Lyndon B. Johnson started operation *rolling thunder* – a military campaign of bombing targets in North Vietnam and of sending the first military combat troops – and November 1968, the month in which Richard Nixon won the presidential elections. This period got selected based on two observations: On the one hand, before Johnson decided to send 50,000 troops to Vietnam in July 1965, only a few American organizations protested the war, even less so church organizations or clergy as inequality and racial segregation seemed for most churches the more salient issues (cp. Friedland 1998, 141). On the other hand, from 1969 onwards, not only a new administration determined US foreign policy, but the war became so largely unpopular in the American public that opposition to the war was less divisive for the churches. Within only one year (March 1968-March 1969), the death toll of American soldiers fallen in Vietnam increased from 19,000 to 33,000 (cp. Lattin 2017). Moreover, the New York Times and other newspapers published the pentagon papers (cp. New York Times 1971), making the war was no longer justifiable by any political or religious leader respectively (cp. Quinley 1974, 6). That said, one event is particularly noteworthy within the chosen time frame,

the so-called Tet offensive. On January 30th, 1968, US forces violently pushed back a coordinated attack of the Northern Vietnamese forces that came on the most important Vietnamese holiday as a surprise in the first place. Thereby, tens of thousands Northern and Southern Vietnamese alike died or were wounded in the aftermath of the offensive as well as more than 1001 American soldiers got killed in only two weeks. The offensive and its aftermath caused a large outcry in the American public that led the Johnson administration to significantly decrease the bombing of North Vietnam and to step up diplomatic efforts. Moreover, President Johnson announced on March 31st that he would not seek reelection (cp. Johnson and Tierney 2006, 127-129; Willbanks 2008, 81 et seq.; Miller Center 1968).

The response of the **Catholic Church** was mainly defined by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), which supported President Johnson's decision to escalate the military conflict in Vietnam from the beginning, justifying it in 1966 as "work for a just peace in Vietnam" (USCCB 1983, 27). The USCCB withhold critique even after the Tet offensive: despite the turmoil going on in their country, the bishops declared in a statement in November 1968 that opinions among Catholics about the morality of the war differ and that debate is welcome in a democratic system. While welcoming the halt on bombing, the USCCB declared no moral verdict about the current US involvement in the war. It rather concentrated on the aspect of proportionality expressing the fear that the war might drain financial and political resources necessary for Johnson's ambitious project of the great society, that is, the abolition of poverty and racial discrimination as well as healthcare for all (cp. Balmer 2008, 56 et seq.; USCCB 1983, 42 et seq.). Only in late 1971, the USCCB called the immediate end of the war a "moral imperative" (USCCB 1983, 60). Thereby, in all three statements, it continuously invoked statements of the Pope and declarations made at Vatican II, like Gaudium et Spes. That said, single Catholic leaders and organizations expressed their opposition and concerns with the war despite the positioning of their bishops. The two most vocal Catholic opponents were Philip Berrigan, a priest who frequently served prison sentences for his anti-war activism and Dorothy

Day, the founder of the Catholic Worker Movement. Berrigan protested the war with actions like stealing military drafts and service records to publicly burn them or to splatter them with blood, while Day and her movement were strict pacifists who had already called on Catholics to resist the military draft in the 1940s. Not surprisingly, the Catholic Workers were one of the first organizations to also protest the Vietnam War calling for nonviolent disobedience. In public statements, Day critiqued the USCCB for its just war doctrine, arguing that it was an invention of the corrupt Medieval church who used it to gain wealth and power by supporting nation states ideologically (cp. Mehltretter 2006, 172-176; New York Times 2002).

For **conservative Protestants**, on the other hand, the war in Vietnam raised almost no tensions. A strong discomfort with the demands and critiques raised by the civil rights movement paired with a theological lens that branded communism as sinful and godless led conservative Protestant leaders to be particularly averse to any critique of American foreign policy (cp. Bogaski 2014, xii et seq.). The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) stood firmly behind Johnson (cp. NAE Resolution, 1966); influential conservative leaders like Billy Graham urged Johnson already before July 1965 privately to step up military efforts in Vietnam and to "be the man that helped saved Christian civilization" (Graham 1964).

Liberal Protestants were split on whether to support or to oppose President Johnson's military campaign in Vietnam. The National Council of Churches (NCC) as the successor of the Federal Council of Churches concentrated on organizing a Special Advisory Committee on Vietnam by which the liberal Protestant churches managed their response to the war and organized relief services for Vietnamese civilians as well as chaplaincy services. The General Board of the NCC issued its first statement on Vietnam in December 1965. This and the following statements tried to cautiously balance the diverse views of the member churches of the NCC and their leaders, advocating for a halt of the bombing campaign for negotiations, while praising Johnson's gestures towards peacemaking (cp. Policy Statement on Viet-Nam 1965; Gill 2002, 123). Although the NCC attempted to advocate in meetings with governmental

officials strongly against the war, publicly it could do nothing more than urging the administration to halt bombing and to call for peace negotiations. Said approach, to strongly advocate behind the scenes against the war while only issuing cautious public statements led to a growing dissatisfaction of both, congregations supporting and congregations opposing the war, weakening the NCC's position as representation of the liberal churches (cp. Gill 2011, 154-164; Gill 2002). The opinions within the NCC member churches ranged from Quakers, whose American Friends Services Committee advised young men how to best resist the military draft and sent medical supplies as well as food to North Vietnam (cp. Wilcox and Jelen, 305), to the Greek Orthodox Church, who supported the US wholeheartedly in its fight against the aggression in Vietnam (cp. New York Times 1966). As Harold Quinley shows with his survey among Protestant Ministers in California, the close political division of protestant leaders along denominational lines even continued in 1968, the year of the Tet offensive. Although the questioned Protestant leaders were in total more in favor of dovish policies such as withdrawal and halt in bombing, that the opinion of Protestant leaders on the war was still stable along doctrinal lines in mid 1968 comes by surprise as the attitudes of the public changed in the period (Summer 1968) in which Quinley conducted his survey (cp. Quinley 1970, 45-47). Whereas on February 15, 1968, 61% of the respondents in a Gallup survey considered themselves Hawks, that is persons who want to step up military effort in Vietnam, and 23% doves, that is, persons who wish to reduce military effort in Vietnam, by May 1st, Hawks and Doves were evenly split with 41% to 41%. These numbers stayed stable if one considers political affiliation[1] (cp. Gallup, 1972, 2105et seq.; 2124 et seq.). This bipartisan increase in Doves can be explained by the chaotic response of the US forces and the general insight that Johnson's promised soon to be victory was worthless (cp. Johnson and Tierney 2006, 127-129).

The issue of war in Vietnam mobilized conservative and liberal Protestant leaders alike, if by making public statements or by discussing the war issue within their congregations. At least in Quinley's survey, clergy opposing the war were found slightly more active in mobilizing

against the war than the ones that preferred an increase in military activity even though their congregations were overwhelmingly in support for the war and an increase in military leading to tensions within congregations' activity (cp. Quinley 1970, 49-52). In addition, opponents of the war were by far more vocal publicly, as the example of William Sloane Coffin Jr. shows. Coffin, Yale University chaplain, founded not only the Christian peace organization "Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam" (CLCAV) but also collected with other minister's military draft cards on anti-war rallies, which was illegal and led to a largely publicized and hotly debated trial against Coffin and other protestant leaders (cp. Mislin 2018). As a reaction to the indictment, eight Christian periodicals simultaneously published editorials at the beginning of January 1968 urging the Johnson Administration to end the war that was found to be corrosive for American values. Moreover, the editorials urged Christians to take matters into their own hands by using the means of civil disobedience, even though most editorials admitted that regular churchgoers favor the US intervention in Vietnam (cp. New York Times 1968).

The **Black Protestant Churches**, on the contrary, stayed mostly silent on the issue of Vietnam, as the struggle for civil rights was seen as the more salient issue that needed full attention. Especially from 1964 onwards, the time Johnson won the presidential elections, the black churches and black communities avoided everything that could jeopardize their relationship with President Johnson, who was a strong ally for an enhancement of civil and economic rights (cp. Bogaski 2014, xii et seq.). However, tensions between the more cautious church leaders that feared a drop in donations and a deviation from the civil rights cause and the more radicals that saw it as their moral obligation to protest the war grew in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) – the organization Martin Luther King established in 1957 to coordinate the actions of local black churches for the civil rights movement (cp. King 1967, 2 and Fairclough 1984, 28). When in 1966 Congress cut the budget for Johnson's war on poverty and community action programs substantively, because it needed the money for the war, bitterness within the black community increased. As a reaction to growing moral pressure

20

and said budget cuts, Martin Luther King, previously cautious to give public remarks on Vietnam, started to participate in anti-war rallies from February 1967 onwards. On April 4th, 1967, King gave a highly controversial speech at Riverside Church in New York, sponsored by CLCAV, in which he not only called for an immediate withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam and expressed support for the revolutionary forces (cp. King 1967) but also branded the Johnson administration "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today" (ibid. 2). He received a massive backlash from liberal white media outlets like the New York Times and some black newspapers, but more importantly, the fears of the more cautious SCLC leaders became true: Donations dropped so drastically that by the end of May, one third of the staff had to be let go. Moreover, all the conditions that made the SCLC one of the most powerful organizations of the Black Church were gone and could not be revoked for the opposition against Vietnam: black unity, presidential favor, and peace (cp. Fairclough 1984, 27-31; 37). Nevertheless, King's fervent support for the peace movement gave it a considerable boost, leading to one of the biggest anti-war rallies the US has seen with about 100,000 participants on April 15th, 1967, in New York (cp. Darby and Rowley 1986, 46 et seq.).

2.3 The Churches and the War in Iraq

The following subchapter will highlight two aspects: First, that the degree of unity and of organization was all in all high in the churches under study. Second, that no church was in a strategic coalition with the political leadership, except for conservative Protestants.

The United States invaded Iraq with their allies for a second time in March 2003. The military operation made swift progress: Within a month, the US brought all big cities including Bagdad under their control, leading President George W. Bush to declare victory on May 1. Yet, even after the capturing of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, armed insurgencies against the US occupation continued and increased despite successes the US could claim, like the election of a transitional government and of a National Assembly as well as a constitutional

referendum all in 2005. Therefore, by 2006, it became clear to the American public that the way towards a politically stable Iraq was long and needed continued US presence. Similar to the war in Vietnam, a high support for the war in the beginning (close to 80 percent in May 2003) steadily decreased (about 50 percent in May 2004) until the war in Iraq became similarly unpopular in the American public (about 40 percent and declining from 2006 onward) like Vietnam after 1969 (cp. Berinsky 2009, 30-32). That said, I will focus on the the churches' response to the war in Iraq between 2002, when discussions on debates of a possible invasion started, and 2006, the time by which the war had become largely unpopular. Interestingly, and unlike the two previous outlined situations of war, the churches neither had to build organizational structures to channel their response to the war, nor was the war a very divisive issue for most churches as the response was clear: opposition.

The most ambivalent response towards the war in Iraq can be found in the response of the **Conservative Protestant Churches**. On the one hand, a handful of leading evangelicals around the president of the Ethics commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, Richard Land, had already crafted a public letter to President Bush in October 2002, assuring him that an attack on Iraq would fulfill the Christian just war doctrine (cp. Land Letter 2002). On the other hand, despite the letter and the fervent support of Land for the war, conservative leaders stayed largely silent on the issue of war in Iraq (cp. Washington Post 2003). The NAE as leading organization of conservative Protestants could not come to an agreement towards their stance on the war (cp. Durham 2004, 157). That said, in late 2005 when public support for the war was already declining (around 40 percent of All Americans favored the war by then), around 60 percent of Evangelicals still supported the intervention (cp. Baylor Religion Survey 2005, Bader et. al. 2019, data aggregated by Froese and Mencken 2009, 104). This number might, however, be explained by the fact that conservative Protestants, who saw their faith as being important for the political sphere, trusted and supported the devout Christian Bush for the way he led his faith to guide his policymaking and might have also done so on Iraq. A study of Paul Froese and

Carson Mencken using 2005 Baylor Religion Survey data at least suggests so (cp. Froese and Mencken 2009, 112-114).

In December 2002, Robert Edgar, General Secretary of the NCC, published a letter to President Bush urging him to not invade Iraq, signed by many faith leaders of different religious and Christian traditions, most notably by Bush's own denomination – the United Methodists (cp. New York Times 2002). This letter was followed by many from **Protestant Liberal Church** leaders who started to mobilize and to speak out actively against the war before it even started. The NCC used all its power to not only unite Christian and religious denominations not part of the NCC against the war, but also sent delegations to meet with international political leaders such as Tony Blair or Gerhard Schröder while Bush himself refused to meet with religious leaders opposing the war. Moreover, the NCC collected donations to sponsor ads in Newspapers and in Television and build anti-war coalitions with other non-religious war groups. Together, said coalitions organized huge anti-war rallies – most notably on February 13, 2003, where approximately 10 million people in cities in the US and around the world gathered to protests the war (cp. Tipton 2008, 4-8). Whereas many Protestant congregations organized or mobilized for local protests, the NCC's opposition was by far the most pointed and persistent: "It was consensual across the mainline denominations and their leaders in Washington. It was unusually collaborative in reaching beyond the churches themselves to join with a wide range of like-minded parachurch groups, nonreligious advocacy groups, and public-affairs lobbies in the United States and overseas" (Tipton 2008, 389).

Black Protestant Churches condemned as well in separate or joint statements the war and mobilized their congregations to take part in protests they organized together with other organizations and church initiatives. Since the black churches had at that time no own political advocacy structure, they heavily relied on the structures of the NCC to protest the war and to advocate against it (cp. Smith 2008).

The response of the **Catholic Church** was as swift and firm as the response of liberal Protestants. Like the NCC, the USCCB condemned the war already before it had even started, stating that the *casus belli* of the war did not fulfill the requirements of the just war doctrine. Consequently, they urged President Bush to "step back from the brink of war and help lead the world to act together to fashion an effective global response to Iraq's threats that conforms with traditional moral limits on the use of military force" (USCCB, 2002). Several statements of the USCCB in a similar vein followed, whereby the US bishops strongly affirmed the position of Pope John Paul II, who emphasized in an address in January 2003 that military violence and military victories cannot solve the crisis in the Middle East fearing that the people of Iraq would be the primary victims of war (cp. Pope John Paul II, 2003). The strong opposition of the Pope and the USCCB allowed for a great leeway for local congregations and lower-level religious leaders to also condemn the war, to mobilize against it, and to build coalitions with other anti-war groups, religious and non-religious alike. Of special importance was thereby Pax Christi, the churches very own peace organization, who had not only financial and material resources to offer but also advocated and mobilized against the war internationally (cp. Cortright 2007, 171 et seq.).

Chapter 3: Analysis

Before proceeding with the analysis, some analytical problems, which cannot be addressed in this thesis, should be kept in mind: First, there are several factors which might have been important but cannot be studied. For example, the media had an enormous influence on the way how the public perceived a war and might have also had an influence on religious organizations and religious leaders. Second, in the 1990s, Evangelicals arose as a distinct group. For the sake of simplicity, no distinction is made between conservative Protestants and Evangelicals. Third, whether a church and its leaders are located in the South or North of the US might have an influence on the reaction of a religious group due to historical reasons. Fourth, liberal Protestants are organized in the NCC, which also must consider the opinions of non-Protestant churches, like the Greek Orthodox church. Finally, between the three situations of war, the doctrine on war in general of a church or church structure might have changed, as it was the case with the USCCB, who started to doubt the usefulness of war in general from 1993 onwards (cp. USCCB, 1993). Next to analytical limitations, it should be reiterated that the scope of this thesis is substantially limited to Christian Churches, spatially limited to the US, and temporally to times of war.

That said, within the outlined scope and limitations, the case selection of twelve cases that differ in their outcome (support for the war/mobilization against the war), temporally (the US entering WW1, the Vietnam War, the War in Iraq), and substantially (liberal Protestants, conservative Protestants, black Protestants, and Catholics) allow for descriptive inference. Based on theoretical assumptions, four conditions can be identified that might contribute to the presence or absence of the outcome. Since Y and ~Y are *qualitatively* different, that is, asymmetrical (mobilization against the war is not the exact symmetric opposite of support for the war; both are different in kind, there is no direct correlation), one should treat both as different sets.

Based on the four hypotheses outlined in chapter one, one can assume that no doctrines against war (coded as ~DAW), unity (coded as U), a high degree of organization (coded as O), and a strategic coalition with the political leadership (coded as SCL) will lead to support of war (Y). In Boolean terms, O*~DaW*U*SCL → Y. Moreover, one can assume that a high degree of organization, doctrines against war, no strategic coalition with the political leadership, and unity lead to mobilization against the war (~Y). In Boolean terms, O* DaW*~SCL*U → ~Y.

To analyze the data, I will make use of applied Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which helps me to establish set relations between the conditions and the outcome. Moreover, I am going to use the Software R and its supplementary packages on QCA and Set Relations (cp. Dusa 2019 and Oana et al. 2018). The data calibration and skewness check of the data can be found in the appendix (cp. Appendix A and B).

Step 1: Check for Necessary Conditions for the Support of War

Since no condition set is consistent enough (i.e., reaches the 0.9 threshold that is applied in good practice, cp. Oana et al. 2021, 74), there are no necessary conditions for the support of war (cp. Appendix C). However, two or more combinations of conditions might jointly be necessary for the outcome. To avoid trivialness, I only look for the combination of two conditions that are jointly necessary for the outcome. Two combinations of conditions are identified as being necessary for the outcome (cp. Appendix D). One of the combinations, no doctrines against war OR no high degree of organization might be necessary but makes conceptually no sense – Why would not having a high degree of organization be necessary for support for war? Therefore, I will only treat the other identified combination, that is, not having doctrines against war or a strategic coalition with the political leadership as a necessary combination of conditions. That is, every time we have the outcome support for the war, we either see no doctrines against war or a strategic coalition with the leadership (or both). The combination has great parameters of fit (above the good practice thresholds of 0.9 for

26

consistency inclN and 0.6 for RoN and covN respectively, cp. Oana et al. 2021, 74) and is also not overly skewed (cp. Appendix D).

Step 2: Check for Sufficient Conditions for the Support of War

The first step for the analysis of sufficiency is the construction of a truth table, which combines all logically possible combinations of conditions, no matter whether we have evidence for a row (that is, a case that fulfills said combination) or not. Rows without empirical evidence are marked with a question mark (cp. Appendix E). We can now produce the conservative solution, which only considers in its calculations rows that have empirical evidence (cp. Appendix F). Since the solution is overly complicated, we will ask the software to simplify it using the Boolean logic of minimization. The minimized most parsimonious solution is simpler (cp. Appendix G); however, one should check on which assumptions the algorithm bases the solution, that is, which truth table rows that have no empirical evidence were considered by the algorithm (cp. Appendix H). We see that the algorithm considered row 5, which makes conceptually no sense – why would there be a strategic coalition with the leadership but neither unity nor a high degree of organization? Thus, we will exclude that row from the process of minimization, as it is theoretically implausible. Moreover, we must tell the algorithm that we have identified a necessary condition that cannot be contradicted in the process (see Step 1). To avoid model ambiguity, that is, several solutions identified by the algorithm that all yield the same result, we will tell the algorithm to concentrate on the solution in which the least amount of truth table rows is needed to bring forth the result. Our enhanced solution (cp. Appendix I) tells us that that whenever we have **no** doctrines against war and an organizational structure or **no** doctrines against war and unity or a strategic coalition with the leadership and unity, we will see support for the war (~DAW*O + ~DAW*U + SCL*U → Y).

Step 3: Check for Necessary Conditions for Mobilization against War

Having doctrines against the war is necessary for not having the outcome (defined as mobilization against the war). Only said condition has high enough parameters of fit and is not overly skewed (cp. Appendix J).

Step 4: Check for Sufficient conditions for Mobilization against War

The first step for the analysis of sufficiency is the construction of a truth table (see step 2). Then we produce the conservative solution (see step 2). Said solution is already as simple as possible and cannot be minimized any further. Since no row without evidence is considered in the minimization, we do not need to enhance the solution for ~Y, mobilization against war. Hence, the solution (cp. Appendix K) tells us that only doctrines against war, **no** strategic coalition with the leadership, and unity lead to the absence of the outcome, defined as mobilization against the war (DAW*~SCL*U → ~Y).

Step 5: Robustness Test

One might pose at this point the question how robust the solutions are which the analysis brought about. We can check with R how sensitive the solutions for Y and ~Y are to changes in the cutoff point for frequency and consistency: For my analysis, I chose to set the limit for a truth table row to have enough empirical evidence at one case, since I am only working with 12 cases in total. That said, due to my small-N analysis, both solutions are not surprisingly rather sensitive to changes in the frequency threshold. As soon as one requires more than one case of empirical evidence for a truth table row, the solution formula change (cp. Appendix L).

Moreover, I set the consistency threshold to 0.8, which means that the empirical evidence needs to be at least 80 percent in a set to count as sufficient. This reflects good QCA practice (cp. Oana et al. 2021, 92). Both solutions are robust against a lowering of the consistency threshold – one could lower the threshold to 0.66 (which is way below good practice) and would

still yield the same solution formulas (cp. Appendix L). Furthermore, as can be shown with cluster analysis, is better for the evaluation of the empirical evidence at hand to treat each case of war and each religious group as separate even though they are technically the same religious groups across time and even though the data is slightly skewed within reason (cp. Appendix M).

Step 6: Theory Evaluation

Now we want to evaluate how well the QCA results fit to our original theoretical assumptions, which we made in chapter 1 and summarized in Boolean terms in the beginning of this chapter, namely O*~DAW*SCL*U → Y and O* DAW*~SCL*U → ~Y.

For the presence of the outcome, support for war, one can observe that there are no inconsistent most likely cases, which would show us that the solution contradicts our theory. That said, only 1 from 12 cases is a covered most likely case, that is, covered by our theoretical assumptions about Y. On the other hand, 6 of our cases are covered least likely cases, which suggests that our theory needs to be expanded to explain also said cases. The rest of the cases are consistent least likely cases, meaning that they do not have the outcome and hence are uninteresting for theory and solution (cp. Appendix N, Oana et al. 2021, 174 et seq.). This tells us that our four hypotheses do not explain the support for war equally well but that we need to look at the question of why the Christian churches supported a war in a more nuanced way. Our QCA results paint such a nuanced picture by showing that either no doctrines against war and a high degree of organization, or no doctrines against war and unity, or a strategic coalition with the leadership and unity lead to support for war (see step 2).

For the absence of the outcome, mobilization against war, one can observe that there are no inconsistent most likely cases, which would show us that the solution contradicts our theory. That said, only 2 from 12 cases are covered most likely cases and therefore covered by our theoretical assumptions about the absence of the outcome. On the other hand, 1 case is a covered

least likely case, which suggest that our theory needs to be expanded to explain also said case. 7 cases are consistent least likely cases, meaning that they are uninteresting for theory and solution (cp. Appendix O; Oana et al. 2021, 174 et seq.). As with the presence of the outcome, our results tell us that not all four hypotheses explain the mobilization against war equally well. Whereas our QCA results are able to present a more nuanced view (see step 4), we also have to observe that 2 cases are uncovered least likely cases, suggesting that said cases are neither covered by the theory nor by the solution we got from our analysis. These cases are Liberal and Black Protestants in Vietnam, meaning that we need within-case analysis here. If we uncover the mechanisms that explain why in both cases why we do not see mobilization against war, our solution formula (see step 4) is not threatened. Unfortunately, the limited diversity of the data does not allow for in-depth case studies as that would need pairs of cases which are maximally different in one set and maximally different in the outcome (cp. Appendix P).

Discussion of the Results

To summarize the results of my analysis, which I have identified for the presence of the outcome, support of the war, no doctrines against war or a strategic coalition with the leadership as necessary condition, meaning that when we see a war that the US enters, those Christian groups that support the war have either no doctrines against the war or are in a strategic coalition with the political leadership, or both. Moreover, I have identified either no doctrines against war and a high degree of organization at the beginning of the war, or no doctrines against war and unity, or a strategic coalition with the political leadership and unity as sufficient conditions for support of war. Meaning that when we see one of these combinations or several of these combinations present in a Christian group in the US, then it will most definitely support the war. As I have shown, even though these results do not contradict the current state of the theoretical field on religious mobilization in the US, they suggest that current theories need to be expanded as they only partly explain the outcome of the analysis in this paper. A further

analysis should also include an answer to the question why some of the identified combinations of conditions are strong overall whereas some conditions are only strong in specific wars (cp. Cluster Analysis, Appendix M). That said, that not having doctrines against war and a high degree of organization is the sufficient term with the greatest coverage of evidence for the outcome support of war is not surprising and can be well explained based on social movement literature as outlined in chapter one: Religious mobilization is not only instrumental but also sincere; collective grievances are combined with a religious identity. Therefore, even though the relationship is not always consistent, generally speaking, religious doctrines shape religious identity, which shapes whether there are enough grievances that political mobilization happens or not. In the instance of war, support can therefore only happen with doctrines that **do not** oppose war. Moreover, support will only happen if all actors pull together, which can be studied by looking at the internal factors at play, as introduced in chapter one and applied in chapter two.

Summarizing the results for the absence of the outcome, mobilization against war, we have doctrines against the war as necessary condition, which is not surprising as just explained. Furthermore, doctrines help to 'make meanings', as Sidney Tarrow calls it (see chapter one), for example by accentuating why war is against a Christian, Protestant, Catholic, etc. identity and framing the protest against war in religious terms to mobilize among regular churchgoers and to express solidarity with a general anti-war movement.

In this regard, Christian groups that decide to mobilize are not much different from other groups engaged in contentious politics. The only sufficient condition that could be identified is doctrines against war in combination with no strategic coalition with the leadership, and with unity. This is as well not a particularly surprising finding since groups engaged in mobilization need to construct a collective identity and frame their action collectively which can only happen with a high degree of unity, as outlined. The importance of no not getting coopted, that is, to let other actors (in this case the US administration) influence a groups agenda (in this instance

through a strategic coalition), is also a long-established finding in social movement theory. A rather surprising result is that for Christian groups in the US, a high degree of organization seems to be less important to mobilize against a war. This, however, is less a flaw in social movement literature, which emphasizes the need of organizational resources, but rather explained by the fact that black Protestants were never able to create their own organizational structure but relied on the NCC instead. Here, a further follow up study of the internal dynamics within the NCC might help to further evaluate how important a high degree of organization really is in the case of liberal and black Protestants.

Rather puzzling is how do deal with the reaction of black Protestants and liberal Protestants regarding Vietnam as both cases are neither explained by the theory nor the solution (see step 6). Black Protestants had a strategic coalition with the leadership and nevertheless slightly mobilized against the war rather than supported it. In this instance, one can see how important single actors such as Martin Luther King are, whose late but fervent mobilization against the Vietnam war, triggered by the decision of congress to cut important funds for the advancement of civil rights, led me to calibrate the outcome of black Protestants' stance towards Vietnam as slight mobilization against it. That said, this is rather a question of calibration (was King really a representative of the Black Church? Can his fervent mobilization against the war really be weighted as stronger evidence as the reluctance of many other Black Church leaders to mobilize against the war?) and evaluation of the within mechanism, than a strong case against the identified sufficient combination of conditions.

More importantly, however, is that both Protestant groups were not unified in their response. Here, a general analytical problem of my thesis comes becomes apparent: Since the response of liberal Protestants and of black Protestant was so ambivalent, it is hard to make the analytical decision whether both groups overall rather belong to the set Y or ~ Y. I decided in both instances that the cases belong to ~ Y, mobilization against war, since I focused on leadership. Like in the case of King for black Protestants, my decision to weight the NCC's

silent diplomacy and general survey data among Protestant Ministers as enough evidence to calibrate liberal Protestants as ~Y can be contested. Therefore, also the missing unity is not a strong argument against treating unity as part of a sufficient term for ~ Y but a question of calibration.

Furthermore, since in the instance of war in Iraq three diverse Christian groups that opposed the war are perfectly in line with the sufficient solution and necessary condition for ~Y, the solution seems to hold, if not a subsequent analysis discovers that another condition which was just present in the case of Iraq but not in the case of Vietnam, leads to perfect results for the one situation of war and mixed results with theoretically and analytically uncovered cases in the other.

As indicated in the cluster analysis (cp. Appendix, M), overall, the sufficient term for ~Y is particularly strong for Catholics as well as for liberal Protestants and back Protestants despite the two discussed outlier cases. The solid consistency of Catholics over time for both Y and ~Y might be explained by its hierarchical structure as argued in the theory section. A further study might include Christian groups that have a hierarchical structure, like Episcopalians, and compare the results to the results of the Catholic cases.

33

Conclusion

The question of how religious groups react towards war will stay a vexing issue, considering that we currently witness a war in Ukraine that is legitimized and supported by a religious group, namely the Russian Orthodox Church. How and why the Russian Orthodox Church aligned itself and its members so strongly with the war must be the topic of another study, however, this brief excursus demonstrates how salient the question of the relation between religion, political mobilization, and war is.

This thesis has shown that there are important lessons to be learned from the chosen situations of war in the US and the respective reaction to it. The fact that four conditions could be identified, which influence whether a religious group under the given scope conditions mobilized, shows that religious economy models are too short sighted with their sole focus on a religious market in which 'the political' is just another good. Taking the war in Vietnam as a paradigmatic example, the response of the Liberal Protestant Churches was anything but clear even though most churchgoers and American citizens had a very clear stance on the issue of war, as has been demonstrated with the help of opinion polls. Applying a combination of three conditions that neatly follow social movement research – the importance of unity revealed by a study of internal factors at play in a religious group, as well as the question of whether a strategic coalition with the leadership and/or a high degree of organization is present – plus one condition that rather follows the distinct research on religion and religious groups, namely whether doctrines against war are present, allowed for results that explain the various outcomes of the twelve cases under study in the best way possible: religious mobilization seems to be indeed, at least in the cases under study, to be both, instrumental and sincere. The assumptions Sidney Tarrow and other scholars of social movement theory make, hold even if applied to stakeholders (religious groups) who are not primarily engaged in contentious politics nor can be characterized as genuine social movements. At least within the presented universe of cases, religious mobilization seems indeed not to be random but followed clear predictable patterns.

That said, the point at issue is whether the results of this thesis are able to travel. As already indicated, there are smaller and bigger analytical challenges to be overcome. One the one hand, this thesis relies on a small-N analysis with a universe of cases in narrow scope conditions. Follow-up studies must on the one hand enlarge the N but also make the universe of cases more diverse. As mentioned, one could for example include Episcopalians as they are similar to Catholics in their structure. Moreover, other religions could be included as well as evidence collected over a course and not only at specific moments in time to better capture if the doctrines on war of a particular religious group have changed in between and/or whether there were other important historical trajectories with a possible influence on the outcome. In addition, more within case evidence could be collected, that is, measuring the reactions of local congregations and churchgoers throughout the US to war with a special attention to whether a congregation is based in a Southern or a Northern State. On the other hand, the literature offers detailed theoretical assumptions about the relation between a religious group and political mobilization. By climbing the ladder of abstraction, i.e., merging various theoretical assumptions into just four sets of conditions and hypotheses, relevant conditions might have been overlooked. One example is the question of whether religious groups that generally represent an ethnical minority group, like the black churches, are in total more likely to politically mobilize than groups that represent an ethnical majority group or heterogenous congregations.

Appendix

A. Data Calibration

Coding of the set DAW will be fuzzy; doctrines can be entirely against war (1), less in favor of war (0.75), more in favor of war (0.25), or not against war (0). The set ~DAW can be read as: Doctrines entirely for war (1), more in favor of war (0.75), less in favor of war (0.25), and not for war (0).

Coding of the set U will be fuzzy; unity can be high in total (1), high in organizational structure, but some vocal opposition (0.75), somewhat a unified response but no unity in organizational structure (0.25), no unity (0). The set ~U can be read as: No unity (1), somewhat a unified response but no unity in organizational structure (0.75), high in organizational structure, but some vocal opposition (0.25), high unity (0).

Coding of set O will be crisp: Either there was a high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1) or no high degree (0). The set ~O can be read as: No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1) or high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0).

Coding of set SCL will be crisp: Either there was a strategic coalition with the leadership (1) or not (0). The set ~SCL can be read as: No strategic coalition (1) or strategic coalition (0). We can now construct a data matrix including the four sets (DAW, SCL, O, U) and the outcome of each case (OUT). The case id is composed of the abbreviation for the group (**L**iberal **P**rotestants, **C**onservative **P**rotestants, **B**lack **P**rotestants, **Ca**tholics) and the name of the war (**W**orld **W**ar **I**, **V**ietnam, **I**raq).

<u>World War 1 (WW1)</u>

- Liberal Protestants (LP)
  - Doctrines against war (1)
  - Strategic coalition with leadership (1)
  - No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0)
  - High unity in organizational structure and overall, but some vocal opposition (see Rauschenbusch) (0,75)

36

- o Outcome: Support for the war (1)
- Conservative Protestants (CP)
  - o No doctrines against war (0)
  - o No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - o No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0)
  - o High Unity (1)
  - o Outcome: Support for the war (1)
- Catholics (CA)
  - o War justified with just war doctrine (0)
  - o No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - o No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0)
  - o High Unity (1)
  - o Outcome: Support for the war (1)
- Black Protestants (BP)
  - o More in favor of war (0.25)
  - o No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - o No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0)
  - o High Unity (1)
  - o Outcome: Support for the war (1)

Vietnam War (V)

- Liberal Protestants (LP)
  - o Less in favor of war (0.75)
  - o No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - o High degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1)
  - o No unity (0)
  - o Outcome: Split on the question of war; slightly more mobilization against the war (0.49)
- Conservative Protestants (CP)
  - o No doctrines against war (0)
  - o Strategic coalition with leadership (1)
  - o High degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1)
  - o High unity (1)
  - o Outcome: Support for the war (1)

- Catholics (CA)
  - o War justified with just war doctrine (0)
  - o No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - o High degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1)
  - o High unity in organizational structure and overall, but some vocal opposition (see Day) (0,75)
  - o Outcome: Support for the war (1)
- Black Protestants (BP)
  - o Doctrines against war (1)
  - o Strategic coalition with leadership (1)
  - o No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0)
  - o High disunity (0)
  - o Outcome: Split on the question of war; slightly more mobilization against the war (0.49)

37

Iraq War (I)

- Liberal Protestants (LP)
  - Doctrines against war (1)
  - No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - High degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1)
  - High unity (1)
  - Outcome: Mobilization against the war (0)
- Conservative Protestants (CP)
  - More in favor of war (0.25)
  - Strategic coalition with leadership (1)
  - High degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1)
  - Somewhat a unified response but no unity in organizational structure (0.25)
  - Outcome: Slight support for the war (0.75)
- Catholics (CA)
  - Doctrines against war (1)
  - No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - High degree of organization at the beginning of the war (1)
  - High unity (1)
  - Outcome: Mobilization against the war (0)
- Black Protestants (BP)
  - Doctrines against war (1)
  - No strategic coalition with leadership (0)
  - No high degree of organization at the beginning of the war (0)
  - High unity (1)
  - Outcome: Mobilization against the war (0)

```
##           DAW SCL O    U   OUT
## LP_WW1 1.00    1 0 0.75 1.00
## LP_V   0.75    0 1 0.00 0.49
## LP_I   1.00    0 1 1.00 0.00
## CP_WW1 0.00    0 0 1.00 1.00
## CP_V   0.00    1 1 1.00 1.00
## CP_I   0.25    1 1 0.25 0.75
## CA_WW1 0.00    0 0 1.00 1.00
## CA_V   0.00    0 1 0.75 1.00
## CA_I   1.00    0 1 1.00 0.00
## BP_WW1 0.25    0 0 1.00 1.00
## BP_V   1.00    1 0 0.00 0.49
## BP_I   1.00    0 0 1.00 0.00
```

B. Skewness Check

After having calibrated my data, skewness of the data must be checked. The data set is not

overly skewed.

```
## [1] "Set DAW - Cases > 0.5 / Total number of cases: 6 / 12 = 50 %"
## [2] "Set SCL - Cases > 0.5 / Total number of cases: 4 / 12 = 33.33 %"
## [3] "Set O - Cases > 0.5 / Total number of cases: 6 / 12 = 50 %"
## [4] "Set U - Cases > 0.5 / Total number of cases: 9 / 12 = 75 %"
```

Skewness is perfect in case of set O and set DAW, whereas the set SCL and the set U are slightly skewed; however, not in the critical range of having only 20 percent in or out a set (cp. Oana et al. 2021, 48). Moreover, there are analytical tools embedded in the software that check for problems, which might arise due to skewness, like trivialness (cp. Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 232–250).

C. Necessity Check for Y

```
##        Cons.Nec Cov.Nec   RoN
## DAW      0.321   0.397 0.604
## SCL      0.419   0.810 0.913
## O        0.419   0.540 0.685
## U        0.744   0.657 0.520
## ~DAW     0.744   1.000 1.000
## ~SCL     0.581   0.561 0.533
## ~O       0.581   0.748 0.799
## ~U       0.288   0.686 0.896
```

D. Combinations of Necessary Conditions for Y

```
##
##                 inclN   RoN   covN
## --------------------------------
## 1   ~DAW + SCL  0.937  0.840  0.905
## 2   ~DAW + ~O   0.969  0.665  0.832
## --------------------------------

Skewness for ~DAW + SCL

## [1] "Cases > 0.5 / Total number of cases: 8 / 12 = 66.67 %"
```

E. Truth Table for Y

```
##   OUT: output value
##     n: number of cases in configuration
##  incl: sufficiency inclusion score
##   PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency
##
##       DAW SCL O  U     OUT    n  incl  PRI   cases
## 2      0   0  0  1      1     3  1.000 1.000 CP_WW1,CA_WW1,BP_WW1
## 4      0   0  1  1      1     1  1.000 1.000 CA_V
## 7      0   1  1  0      1     1  1.000 1.000 CP_I
## 8      0   1  1  1      1     1  1.000 1.000 CP_V
## 14     1   1  0  1      1     1  1.000 1.000 LP_WW1
## 11     1   0  1  0      0     1  0.653 0.000 LP_V
```

```
## 13    1    1   0   0     0     1   0.592 0.329 BP_V
## 10    1    0   0   1     0     1   0.200 0.200 BP_I
## 12    1    0   1   1     0     2   0.000 0.000 LP_I,CA_I
##  1    0    0   0   0     ?     0     -     -
##  3    0    0   1   0     ?     0     -     -
##  5    0    1   0   0     ?     0     -     -
##  6    0    1   0   1     ?     0     -     -
##  9    1    0   0   0     ?     0     -     -
## 15    1    1   1   0     ?     0     -     -
## 16    1    1   1   1     ?     0     -     -
```

F. Conservative Solution for Y

```
##
## M1: ~DAW*~SCL*U + ~DAW*SCL*O + DAW*SCL*~O*U -> OUT
##
##                 inclS   PRI   covS   covU   cases
## -----------------------------------------------------------------
## 1   ~DAW*~SCL*U  1.000  1.000  0.453  0.453  CP_WW1,CA_WW1,BP_WW1; CA_V
## 2    ~DAW*SCL*O  1.000  1.000  0.226  0.226  CP_I; CP_V
## 3  DAW*SCL*~O*U  1.000  1.000  0.097  0.097  LP_WW1
## -----------------------------------------------------------------
##            M1   1.000  1.000  0.776
```

G. Most Parsimonious Solution for Y

```
##
## M1: ~DAW + SCL*U -> OUT
##
##          inclS   PRI   covS   covU   cases
## ----------------------------------------------------------------------
## -----
## 1   ~DAW  1.000  1.000  0.744  0.582  CP_WW1,CA_WW1,BP_WW1; CA_V; CP_I;
## CP_V
## 2  SCL*U  1.000  1.000  0.259  0.097  CP_V; LP_WW1
## ----------------------------------------------------------------------
## -----
##      M1   1.000  1.000  0.841
```

H. Simplifying Assumptions used by the Most Parsimonious Solution

```
## $M1
##    DAW SCL O U
## 1    0   0 0 0
## 3    0   0 1 0
## 5    0   1 0 0
## 6    0   1 0 1
## 16   1   1 1 1
```

40

I. Enhanced Truth Table and Enhanced Most Parsimonious Solution

```
##
##   OUT: output value
##     n: number of cases in configuration
##  incl: sufficiency inclusion score
##   PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency
##
##       DAW SCL O U    OUT    n  incl  PRI    cases
##  2    0   0   0 1     1     3  1.000 1.000 CP_WW1,CA_WW1,BP_WW1
##  4    0   0   1 1     1     1  1.000 1.000 CA_V
##  7    0   1   1 0     1     1  1.000 1.000 CP_I
##  8    0   1   1 1     1     1  1.000 1.000 CP_V
## 14    1   1   0 1     1     1  1.000 1.000 LP_WW1
## 11    1   0   1 0     0     1  0.653 0.000 LP_V
## 13    1   1   0 0     0     1  0.592 0.329 BP_V
## 10    1   0   0 1     0     1  0.200 0.200 BP_I
## 12    1   0   1 1     0     2  0.000 0.000 LP_I,CA_I
##  1    0   0   0 0     ?     0   -     -
##  3    0   0   1 0     ?     0   -     -
##  5    0   1   0 0     0     0   -     -
##  6    0   1   0 1     ?     0   -     -
##  9    1   0   0 0     0     0   -     -
## 15    1   1   1 0     ?     0   -     -
## 16    1   1   1 1     ?     0   -     -

##
## M1: ~DAW*O + ~DAW*U + SCL*U -> OUT
##
##            inclS   PRI   covS   covU   cases
## -------------------------------------------------------------------------
## 1  ~DAW*O  1.000  1.000  0.388  0.129  CA_V; CP_I; CP_V
## 2  ~DAW*U  1.000  1.000  0.614  0.356  CP_WW1,CA_WW1,BP_WW1; CA_V; CP_V
## 3   SCL*U  1.000  1.000  0.259  0.097  CP_V; LP_WW1
## -------------------------------------------------------------------------
##         M1  1.000  1.000  0.841
```

J. Necessity Check for ~Y

```
##        Cons.Nec Cov.Nec   RoN
## DAW      1.000    0.683 0.744
## SCL      0.178    0.190 0.712
## O        0.646    0.460 0.649
## U        0.761    0.371 0.371
## ~DAW     0.117    0.087 0.543
## ~SCL     0.822    0.439 0.471
## ~O       0.354    0.252 0.572
## ~U       0.297    0.391 0.815

Skewness for DAW

## [1] "Cases > 0.5 / Total number of cases: 6 / 12 = 50 %"
```

41

K. Truth table and Conservative Solution for ~Y

```
##
##   OUT: output value
##     n: number of cases in configuration
##  incl: sufficiency inclusion score
##   PRI: proportional reduction in inconsistency
##
##      DAW SCL O U    OUT    n  incl  PRI   cases
## 12    1   0  1 1     1     2  1.000 1.000 LP_I,CA_I
## 10    1   0  0 1     1     1  0.800 0.800 BP_I
## 11    1   0  1 0     0     1  0.680 0.077 LP_V
## 13    1   1  0 0     0     1  0.408 0.026 BP_V
##  7    0   1  1 0     0     1  0.333 0.000 CP_I
##  8    0   1  1 1     0     1  0.200 0.000 CP_V
##  2    0   0  0 1     0     3  0.000 0.000 CP_WW1,CA_WW1,BP_WW1
##  4    0   0  1 1     0     1  0.000 0.000 CA_V
## 14    1   1  0 1     0     1  0.000 0.000 LP_WW1
##  1    0   0  0 0     ?     0   -     -
##  3    0   0  1 0     ?     0   -     -
##  5    0   1  0 0     ?     0   -     -
##  6    0   1  0 1     ?     0   -     -
##  9    1   0  0 0     ?     0   -     -
## 15    1   1  1 0     ?     0   -     -
## 16    1   1  1 1     ?     0   -     -
##
##
## M1: DAW*~SCL*U -> ~OUT
##
##                inclS  PRI   covS  covU  cases
## ----------------------------------------------------------------
## 1  DAW*~SCL*U  0.923  0.923 0.703   -   BP_I; LP_I,CA_I
## ----------------------------------------------------------------
##          M1    0.923  0.923 0.703
```

L. Robustness Tests

```
## Raw Consistency T.:  Lower bound  0.66 Threshold  0.8 Upper bound  0.8

## N.Cut:  Lower bound  1 Threshold  1 Upper bound  1
```

M. Cluster Analysis

For Y

```
## Consistencies:
## ---------------
##                    ~DAW*O ~DAW*U SCL*U
## Pooled                 1      1    1
## Between Iraq (4)       1      1    1
## Between Vietnam (4)    1      1    1
## Between WW1 (4)      NaN      1    1
```

```
## Within BP (3)              NaN      1    NaN
## Within CA (3)                1      1    NaN
## Within CP (3)                1      1      1
## Within LP (3)                1    NaN      1
##
##
## Distances:
## ----------
##                         ~DAW*O ~DAW*U SCL*U
## From Between to Pooled     NaN      0      0
## From Within to Pooled      NaN    NaN    NaN
##
##
## Coverages:
## ----------
##                         ~DAW*O ~DAW*U SCL*U
## Pooled                   0.388  0.614 0.259
## Between Iraq (4)         1.000  0.333 0.333
## Between Vietnam (4)      0.755  0.587 0.336
## Between WW1 (4)          0.000  0.688 0.188
## Within BP (3)            0.000  0.503 0.000
## Within CA (3)            0.500  0.875 0.000
## Within CP (3)            0.636  0.818 0.455
## Within LP (3)            0.168  0.000 0.503
```

If we cluster the results according to war, one can see that each term of our solution formula for the presence of the outcome, i.e., support of war, is equally consistent for the war in Iraq and the war in Vietnam, whereas ~DAW*O plays no role in the case of WW1. This can be explained by the fact that none of our cases had a high degree of organization at the beginning of WW1. That said, looking at the measure for coverage, that is, how much of our empirical evidence gets covered by a particular term, we can see that for Iraq all terms of our solution are applicable but ~DAW*O has the greatest coverage by our evidence. The same can be said about Vietnam. WW1 is consistent with ~DAW*U OR SCL*U but our evidence strongly suggests that ~DAW*U is the most important solution term for WW1. To sum up, our solution is consistent across all wars, with the notable exception of WW1, which has been conceptually explained.

Looking at the consistency within each religious group, that is, treating our four religious groups for a moment as if they were one case each that only gets analyzed over different periods of time, we see that black Protestants are the only religious group whose support for war can be explained by only one solution term, namely ~DAW*U. This solution term has, however,

no great coverage, suggesting that the empirical evidence is too low to really make the inference that black Protestants will support war if there is unity and no doctrines against war. Catholics and liberal Protestants are consistent with two solution terms each, conservative Protestants with all three solution terms. That said, the empirical coverage varies greatly for each term, which is consistent for a specific religious group across time. This underlines why it is better for the analysis of the empirical evidence at hand to treat each case of war and each religious group as separate even though they are technically the same religious groups across time. Adding more situations of war and more religious groups as well as evidence that might explain how the behavior of a religious group changed between two measured time periods can help to establish time series in which each religious group is only treated as one case.

For ~Y

```
## Consistencies:
## ---------------
##                     DAW*~SCL*U
## Pooled                 0.923
## Between Iraq (4)        1.000
## Between Vietnam (4)       NaN
## Between WW1 (4)         0.000
## Within BP (3)           0.800
## Within CA (3)           1.000
## Within CP (3)             NaN
## Within LP (3)           1.000
##
##
## Distances:
## ----------
##                     DAW*~SCL*U
## From Between to Pooled      NaN
## From Within to Pooled       NaN
##
##
## Coverages:
## ----------
##                     DAW*~SCL*U
## Pooled                 0.703
## Between Iraq (4)        0.923
## Between Vietnam (4)     0.000
## Between WW1 (4)           NaN
## Within BP (3)           0.662
## Within CA (3)           1.000
```

```
## Within CP (3)              0.000
## Within LP (3)              0.662
```

Since we have no logical OR in our solution for the absence of the outcome, i.e., mobilization against war, we have one term DAW*~SCL*U → ~Y, which does not allow for much flexibility when clustering the results according to war. For WW1 and Vietnam, the data is inconsistent which makes sense as all religious groups reacted very differently to the situation of war with varying outcomes and/or conditions. For Iraq, the data is consistent, which can also be explained well as all religious groups that opposed the war had doctrines against war, no strategic coalition with the leadership, and unity.

When looking at within consistencies, the data might, as explained above, not cover enough to establish a time series. Nevertheless, the consistency and coverage scores for black Protestants, Catholics, and liberal Protestants are quite high, allowing for the careful inference that wherever doctrines against war, no strategic coalition with the leadership, and unity meet each other, mobilization against war among liberal protestants, black protestants, and Catholics is likely to happen.

N. Theory Evaluation of Y

```
##
## CASES:
## *********************
##
## Covered Most Likely (T*S and Y > 0.5) :
## ------------------
##
## Boolean Expression: ~DAW*O*SCL*U
##
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 1 / 12 = 8.33 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  1 / 7 = 14.29
%
##
## Case Names:
## CP_V
## ------------------
##
## Covered Least Likely (~T*S and Y > 0.5) :
## ------------------
##
## Boolean Expression: ~DAW*~O*U + ~DAW*O*~SCL + ~DAW*O*~U + DAW*SCL*U
```

45

```
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 6 / 12 = 50 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  6 / 7 = 85.71
%
## 
## Case Names:
## LP_WW1 CP_WW1 CP_I CA_WW1 CA_V BP_WW1
## ------------------
## 
## Uncovered Most Likely (T*~S and Y > 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: Empty Set
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  0 / 12 = 0 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  0 / 7 = 0 %
## 
## Case Names:
## No cases in this intersection
## ------------------
## 
## Uncovered Least Likely (~T*~S and Y > 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: DAW*~SCL + DAW*~U + ~O*~U
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  0 / 12 = 0 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  0 / 7 = 0 %
## 
## Case Names:
## No cases in this intersection
## ------------------
## 
## Inconsistent Most Likely (T*S and Y < 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: ~DAW*O*SCL*U
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  0 / 12 = 0 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5:  0 / 5 = 0 %
## 
## Case Names:
## No cases in this intersection
## ------------------
## 
## Inconsistent Least Likely (~T*S and Y < 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: ~DAW*~O*U + ~DAW*O*~SCL + ~DAW*O*~U + DAW*SCL*U
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  0 / 12 = 0 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5:  0 / 5 = 0 %
## 
## Case Names:
## No cases in this intersection
## ------------------
```

46

```
##
## Consistent Most Likely (T*~S and Y < 0.5) :
## -------------------
##
## Boolean Expression: Empty Set
##
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  0 / 12 = 0 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5:  0 / 5 = 0 %
##
## Case Names:
## No cases in this intersection
## -------------------
##
## Consistent Least Likely (~T*~S and Y < 0.5) :
## -------------------
##
## Boolean Expression: DAW*~SCL + DAW*~U + ~O*~U
##
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  5 / 12 = 41.67 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5:  5 / 5 = 100 %
##
## Case Names:
## LP_V LP_I CA_I BP_V BP_I
## -------------------
```

O. Theory Evaluation of ~Y

```
##
## CASES:
## *********************
##
## Covered Most Likely (T*S and Y > 0.5) :
## -------------------
##
## Boolean Expression: DAW*O*~SCL*U
##
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 2 / 12 = 16.67 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  2 / 5 = 40 %
##
## Case Names:
## LP_I CA_I
## -------------------
##
## Covered Least Likely (~T*S and Y > 0.5) :
## -------------------
##
## Boolean Expression: DAW*~O*~SCL*U
##
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 1 / 12 = 8.33 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  1 / 5 = 20 %
##
## Case Names:
## BP_I
## -------------------
```

47

```
## 
## Uncovered Least Likely (~T*~S and Y > 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: ~U + A~DW + CLS
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  2 / 12 = 16.67 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5:  2 / 5 = 40 %
## 
## Case Names:
## LP_V BP_V
## ------------------
## 
## Inconsistent Most Likely (T*S and Y < 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: DAW*O*~SCL*U
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  0 / 12 = 0 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5:  0 / 7 = 0 %
## 
## Case Names:
## No cases in this intersection
## ------------------
## 
## Consistent Least Likely (~T*~S and Y < 0.5) :
## ------------------
## 
## Boolean Expression: ~U + A~DW + CLS
## 
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases:  7 / 12 = 58.33 %
## Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5:  7 / 7 = 100 %
## 
## Case Names:
## LP_WW1 CP_WW1 CP_V CP_I CA_WW1 CA_V BP_WW1
## ------------------
```

P. Excursus: Within Case Analysis

Since our results are consistent enough towards changes, we can further increase inference by looking into the within case mechanisms. Doing so, one must study two cases, which are maximally different in one set and maximally different in the outcome. For crisp sets, any comparison between two cases with said features is good; since we have also two fuzzy sets, we can let the algorithm choose which pair of cases is not only different regarding one set and the outcome, but also according to various other criteria (cp. Schneider: SMMR, forthcoming). That said, since also the two fuzzy sets (DAW and U) display not much diversity but also mostly

take the crisp value 1 or 0, the algorithm also chooses in most instances randomly. Since the algorithm is successful in some case and since it can only increase inference to take case pairs that are either randomly chosen or hard to pass, I will compare the cases the algorithm identifies.

~DAW*O + ~DAW*U + SCL*U → Y

Since we have a logical OR between ~DAW*O + ~DAW*U + SCL*U, we need pairs of cases that are similar regarding one focal conjunct and different in the other (cp. Schneider: SMMR).

For the conjunct ~DAW*O, more specifically the focal conjunct ~DAW, the software identifies case CP_I as having ~DAW*O whereas LP_I has DAW*O. For the conjunct ~DAW*O, more specifically the focal conjunct O, the software identifies case CP_V as having ~DAW*O whereas BP_I has DAW*~O. Here, we see the problem of limited case diversity: For a perfect design, we would need a case that has ~DAW*~O and is part of ~Y. Hence, any mechanism we uncover for O is worthless as it cannot increase inference. Therefore, the conjunct: ~DAW*O cannot be further strengthened by within case analysis due to the lack of comparable cases.

For the conjunct ~DAW*U, more specifically the focal conjunct ~DAW, the software identifies case BP_WW1 as having ~DAW*U whereas LP_I has DAW*U. For the conjunct ~DAW*U, more specifically the focal conjunct U, the software identifies case CA_V as having ~DAW*U whereas LP_V has DAW*~U. Here, we see again the problem of limited case diversity: For a perfect design, we would need a case that has ~DAW*~U and is part of ~Y. Hence, any mechanism we uncover for U is worthless as it cannot increase inference. Therefore, the conjunct: ~DAW*U cannot be further strengthened by within case analysis due to the lack of comparable cases.

For the conjunct SCL*U, we have finally enough evidence to proceed with a within case analysis: For the focal conjunct SCL, the software identifies case LP_WW1 as having SCL*U whereas LP_I has ~SCL*U. For the focal conjunct U, the software identifies case LP_WW1 as

49

having SCL*U whereas BP_V has SCL*~U. Since we have a logical OR between the conjuncts, a within case comparison of the outlined pairs for conjunct SCL*U can consequently strengthen our inference that SCL*U is sufficient for Y.

```
## Focal Conjunct ~DAW :
## ----------
##    Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm M
ostTypFC
## 5     CP_I LP_I    TRUE      TRUE  0.5        1       TRUE       FALSE
FALSE
##    ConsFC_IIR
## 5       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct O :
## ----------
##     Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm
## 13    CP_V BP_I   FALSE      TRUE    1        6       TRUE        TRUE
##    MostTypFC ConsFC_IIR
## 13      TRUE       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct ~DAW :
## ----------
##     Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm
## 10  BP_WW1 LP_I    TRUE      TRUE 0.75        1       TRUE       FALSE
##    MostTypFC ConsFC_IIR
## 10     FALSE       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct U :
## ----------
##    Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm M
ostTypFC
## 4     CA_V LP_V   FALSE      TRUE 2.48        3       TRUE       FALSE
FALSE
##    ConsFC_IIR
## 4       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct SCL :
## ----------
##    Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm M
ostTypFC
## 3  LP_WW1 LP_I    TRUE      TRUE 0.25        2       TRUE       FALSE
FALSE
##    ConsFC_IIR
## 3       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct U :
## ----------
##    Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm M
ostTypFC
## 7  LP_WW1 BP_V    TRUE      TRUE 1.73        1       TRUE       FALSE
FALSE
```

```
##    ConsFC_IIR
## 7       TRUE
```

DAW*~SCL*U → ~Y

Since we have a logical AND between the conditions, we must analyze for each conjunct separately the best pair of most similar cases to see whether a mechanism is in place. For conjunct DAW, LP_I and CP_WW1; for conjunct ~SCL, LP_I and LP_WW1; for conjunct U, LP_I and CP_I. Unfortunately, for conjunct U, we are lacking comparable cases. Hence, we can strengthen inference by looking at the mechanism for DAW and ~SCL, but not for U. Since we have a logical AND, making all sets individually necessary for the outcome, inference can thus not be strengthened with the cases at hand.

```
## Focal Conjunct DAW :
## ----------
##   Typical     IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm
## 4    LP_I CP_WW1    TRUE      TRUE    0        2       TRUE        TRUE
##   MostTypFC ConsFC_IIR
## 4      TRUE       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct ~SCL :
## ----------
##   Typical     IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm
## 1    LP_I LP_WW1    TRUE      TRUE 0.25        2       TRUE        TRUE
##   MostTypFC ConsFC_IIR
## 1      TRUE       TRUE
##
## Focal Conjunct U :
## ----------
##    Typical  IIR UniqCov GlobUncov Best PairRank ConsFC_Typ MostTypTerm
## 10    LP_I CP_I    TRUE      TRUE  1.5        6       TRUE        TRUE
##    MostTypFC ConsFC_IIR
## 10      TRUE       TRUE
```

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