

Central European University
Department of International Relations

**Reintegration:
The Wrong Approach to Peace-building in Afghanistan**

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By
Zulfiqar Amani

Thesis Supervisor: Erin Kristin Jenne
Professor, Department of International Relations, Central European University

Budapest, Hungary

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Acknowledgement:

To my beloved family, friends, supervisor and instructors.

Abstract:

This paper addresses the question why US strategy to achieve durable peace in Afghanistan has failed. The first chapter is about US involvement in Afghanistan. It argues that the literature pays a greater attention to Afghanistan from a strategic perspective—linking the problem of Afghanistan and 9/11 attacks to Al-Qaida and Cold War. Explaining the problem from the perspective of Al-Qaida and Cold War is strong but not enough because it will not show the blue-print for the long term solution. There is a need for a critical perspective which defines deep roots of 9/11 and make sure that such incident will not happen ever again.

The second chapter is about the conflict management approach of US in Afghanistan. US choose the ‘Reintegration’ approach of conflict management which was matching the ethnic composition of Afghanistan. It pays a close attention to how institution design formally paved the way to dominance of a single ethnic group on resources and discriminating others. It has empowered the ethnic spoils and accordingly the reintegration has failed. First, it critically evaluates the reintegration in case of Afghanistan, and second, it implies that reintegration has failed by offering empirical evidences that how the ethnic groups are still divided, corruption and discrimination is going on.

The third chapter proposes power-sharing as a potential solution. It argues that participation, autonomy, proportionality and minority veto entailed in power-sharing are potential means to accommodate the interest of each ethnic group.

It concludes that US strategy to achieve long-term peace in Afghanistan has failed due to ‘Reintegration’ approach of conflict management, un-proper institution and electoral design, all of which are not matching ethnic composition of Afghanistan. Alternatively, it suggests the

‘powers-sharing’ approach as a solution because it will alter the institution design and electoral system which will give each ethnic group proportional political power, autonomy and minority veto to create a true inclusive society.

Research Design:

Research Question

Why did the US-led peacebuilding mission fail in Afghanistan?

Hypothesis

The strategy of conflict management failed in Afghanistan because of US' reintegration approach. It has failed because of wrong institution design which is not matching the ethnic composition of Afghanistan. The institutional design based on reintegration has formally given the power to a single ethnic group which dominated resources and government appointments, as a result, the ethnic spoils were empowered and discriminated other ethnic groups.

My dependent variable is "success of conflict management" and my independent variable is "Power-sharing"

Methodology and Data

I use process tracing to show the operation of each of these components of Reintegration in the case of post-2002 Afghanistan engagement failed by the standards of the mandate. I show the mechanisms by which they failed, tracing their function in exacerbating existing division, distrust, tension and violence among ethnic groups as the ruling group systematically exclude others from political power. The data used in this paper comes from different trustworthy sources, such as, academic articles, reports and books. Some of the data also comes from news articles which are broadcasted by different news agencies in English and Dari.

Introduction:

The civil war in Afghanistan was wholly driven on the basis of ethnicity even though slogans were mostly or partly, Shia and Sunni based, but these parties fighting one another were solely made of specific ethnic groups. For example, the ruling party was Jamiat Islami made of ethnic Tajiks the leader of which was also the President of Afghanistan, Hizbe Wahdat was all ethnic Hazaras and Hizbe Islami was fully Pashtuns. Mullah Omar the leader of Taliban, who pursued unification through Islam in Afghanistan, where Islam has always played significant role in the politics, successfully unified Pashtuns of different clans and took control of most parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban were ethnically Pashtuns who provided training centers to Al-Qaida because they would gain more political and military support and second it would be more difficult for non-Pashtuns to challenge the Taliban rule. Al-Qaida was found responsible for 9/11 attacks, the US military swept away the Taliban regime and cleared Al-Qaida training centers in the country.

The US immediately initiated its peace-building mission in Afghanistan. Afghans were very hopeful about the future of the country as Afghanistan gained the unquestionable support of the international community but realistically it was not an easy mission for the US to carry as the country got fully destroyed as a result of civil. The challenging issue US had to address was accommodation of all ethnic groups' interest it was difficult because these ethnic groups fought each other in long bloody wars and bringing them together is not easy due to experiences of hatred, fear and misery. After twenty years of operation, Afghanistan is still missing peace, security and prosperity. There are various explanations for why twenty years of financial, military and diplomatic support did not bring peace. This paper tends to explain the major explanations of how the conflict started and why US failed to achieve long term peace in the

country from a wrong conflict management strategy. US choose the reintegration approach for managing the conflict which was not suitable strategy.

The ethnic groups which fought one another for political power, the reintegration has not accommodated their vital interests, instead, it created a formal ground for one ethnic group to take the political power and control the resources. It has failed because it established the rule of one ethnic group over others which hardened the ethnic divide and promoted ethnic spoils.

In following pages I will discuss how Afghanistan's history is full of tensions where a centralized government hardly existed.

Violence and ethnic division in Afghanistan's Contemporary History

Afghan history is full of ethnic and regional tensions. In case the tribal factions were not well represented in the power structure, the autonomous tribal leaders ignored the central governments' attempts to degrade local authority, values and traditions. Their attempts would fail even if they were humanitarian, democratic or modernization. Through a short review of Afghanistan's history, I would like to point out how the new blockage—the ethnic tension and division, has been raised on the way of peace and stability.

Till the mid-eighteen century Afghanistan was divided between the different empires in the region specially based in Iran, Central Asia and India.¹ Since Afghanistan consists of highlands and low, some, highly agricultural, while others with severe cold weather had no infrastructure. Therefore, the empires administered only the lands useful for them and easy to be reached and left others autonomous. They governed the land by choosing a local elite as apolitical partner—pursuing federal system of the government.² Finally, in 1747 Ahmad Shah Durrani created Afghanistan state by managing the tribal political web through diplomacy or violence.³ Durrani similar to other empires only appointed governors and left regions autonomous.⁴ After his death, these factions started to fight for power, however, Dost Mohammad Khan could restore the order in Afghanistan but still the ethnic division was the most important issue in the Afghan Politics.⁵ This is most probably because Afghanistan was a newly established country, and the autonomous regions came under the administration of the central government and the war over the power

¹ Thomas Barfield. "Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power Before the U.S. Withdrawal." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): P. 56

² Ibid. P.56

³ Keane. Conor. "US Nation-Building in Afghanistan" Routledge. New York. 2016. P 28.

⁴ Barfield. Thomas. Op. cit. p. 57

⁵ Ibid. P.29

after the death of Ahmad Shah Durrani has left some bad impacts—made the ethnic division fortified.

Even if the central government brought or planned to bring infrastructure and services to the tribal factions, they still resisted submitting to the central government unless they were well represented in the government. Dost Mohammad Khan, who took over after Timur Shah, heavily relied on consolidation of his rule through the military.⁶ Besides, he brought infrastructure and postal communication system but still the tribal authorities ignored his efforts.⁷

The tribal factions have always ignored the central government, especially if it could rely on foreign support. Shah Shuja and Yaqub Khan who had the support of British Empire, were always perceived as British puppets.⁸ Having support from outside made the government to some extent careless about ensuring that it enjoyed the internal and tribal support. Therefore, the distance between the central government and regional authorities has increased with the passage of time. And such heavy dependence on the foreign support made the government vulnerable because in case the foreign support was cut off, the government could easily be vanquished by the tribal authorities; it would collapse itself due to lack of resources. And comparatively, the rule of such kings or presidents were relatively shorter than others, with exception of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. For example, Yaqub Khan ruled the country for less than a year and Shah Shuja for three years. As for Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani's longer rule, the reasons for that can be durable international support and the constitution—a legal framework, constituting government through elections allowing the regional leaders represented in the government.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

On the other hand, the rulers who relied on the military to consolidate their power have governed longer than others, for example, Abdur Rahman Khan who suppressed the tribal authorities and brought the power into his palace ruled more than twenty years. Centralization of power was not easy; he killed 40 tribal elites and more than hundred thousand which is not a practical solution today. And such suppression caused the Pashtuns to be dominant group with Tajik running the government and Hazaras, Uzbeks and Aimaq leaders disappeared. Among minorities Hazaras faced serious discrimination.⁹ Daud Shah also mostly relied on army, ruling from 1953 to 1963 as prime minister and from 1973 to 1978 as president.¹⁰ He reached the throne for the second time through a coup, pledging allegiance to the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)—Afghanistan's communist party. By 1978, his regime completely depended on USSR military and economic aid.

The regional powers opposed Daud Shah's Marxist reforms—advancing women rights, providing public education and implementing a Soviet-style agricultural system. Reforms to empower women contradicted Islamic law and traditional values of tribal powers. With these and other reforms believed to be rooted in Marxism, these promoted perceptions that Daud was a foreign puppet. In the Saur Rebellion, local protests spread to the extent that the government became unable to keep the order and collapsed.¹¹

After the fall of the Soviet-backed government, the Soviet Union invaded the Afghanistan with the aim of centralizing state power: thereby ignoring the ethnic divisions and Afghanistan's system of tribal authority. The tribal factions known as Mujahedeen united by Islamic beliefs used US weaponry and financial support to eventually eject the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

⁹ Ibid. p.57

¹⁰ Keane, Conor. Op. cit. P.30-32.

¹¹ Ibid. p.32

Not reaching a political consent, the civil war triggered by the Mujahedeen led to the rise of Taliban regime.¹²

Afghanistan's problem has been ethnic division since its establishment. In its contemporary history Afghanistan has not experienced a stable peace due to lack of an inclusive government. The leaders in Afghanistan failed because of "unwillingness to share power and a winner-takes-all approach to politics."¹³ Some of the rulers could reduce violence for a given time through total victory by suppressing other ethnic groups but the ethnic groups raised and rebelled again. This is why Afghanistan's history full of ups and downs in terms of peace and conflict.

The conflict in Afghanistan is not a recent one but it has been there since its establishment due to ethnic divides. Therefore, linking the conflict in Afghanistan with regional and international issues is not a strong integral explanation. Such conceptualization is significant because how we understand the problem determines the solution to it. In the next chapter I will pay a close attention to literature on Afghanistan's conflict and argue that a big chunk of the literature on Afghan conflict is connected with regional and international strategic issues. The literature correlated the issue of Afghan conflict with various international issues such as the Cold War and the terrorism, and systematically driven away the attention of international community from its core reason which is ethnic divide and ethnic conflict.

¹² Barfield, Thomas. Op. cit. p. 59

¹³ Barfield, Thomas. "Afghanistan's Arduous Search for Stability." *Current History* 115, no. 780 (2016): 136. Accessed June 03, 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48614158>.

Chapter I:

US Involvement in Afghanistan

A considerable amount of literature indicated below shows that conceptualization of the Afghan conflict is mostly from a strategic perspective not a critical one which explores the deep roots of the problem in Afghanistan. These authors pay a great attention to Al-Qaida, terrorism and Cold War without asking how Taliban could take over the country and prepared training centers to Al-Qaida. Furthermore these authors explain as if the Afghan conflict raised as a result of security dilemma between US and USSR during the cold war while the conflict and instability has been there since its creation. These authors pay a great attention to the measures US took or should take without asking the vital questions how the tragic attacks of 9/11 happened and why Afghanistan? The discussion of Al-Qaida and US invasion of Afghanistan is relevant but it is also important to know why Al-Qaida used Afghanistan not Iraq or Sudan as its safe heavens. A critical answer is that the ethnic conflict prepared the ground for Al-Qaida to operate in Afghanistan. The terrorist groups are dangerous but they are even more dangerous when they get access to territory and resources. To avoid Afghanistan being the safe heavens of terrorists it needs a long-terms solution—resolving of the ethnic conflict and establishing an inclusive government which accommodates the interest of all ethnic groups. It is important to take into account that the conflict in Afghanistan is an ethnic conflict and the issues of Al-Qaida and Cold War are not the reasons behind it.

1. Al-Qaida in Afghanistan

According to most accounts, the United States was pushed into Afghanistan by the imperative to dismantle Al Qaeda, to which Taliban-led Afghanistan offered safe haven. Al Qaeda known as a single terrorist organization come out to be an international chain of network of radicals, having

affiliations in China all the way to Africa,¹⁴ out of which the Taliban was an important and strong partner due to their control over the territory and resources offered by a safe territorial haven in Afghanistan.¹⁵ It is understood as a globalized insurgency based on local franchises, rather than a traditional top-down organized terrorist organization. Al Qaeda and Taliban's close affiliation is rooted in their specific Islamic ideology known as Salafi school of thought or Wahabi—an extreme ideology in Arab countries.¹⁶ Al Qaeda's strategic goal was to destroy US primacy in the region and free the Islamic states from the presence and dominance of the US. Therefore, according to some scholars, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are not only terrorists but also insurgents because terrorist uses violence to draw attention and the latter seeks to overthrow the political order.¹⁷ Al Qaeda has conducted numerous attacks on US soil and overseas, killing hundreds and wounding thousands, for example, in US military was attacked in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar El Salaam in 1998.¹⁸ The most shocking of these was the 9/11 attack on New York's twin towers, Pentagon in Virginia and Pennsylvania, which killed more than 3000 people; symbolically repeating an earlier attack on the Twin Towers by Al-Qaeda in February 1993.¹⁹ In his speech, US president George. W. Bush called upon the Taliban to deliver all Al Qaeda leaders, destroy all their camps and cut off their support. With the Taliban declining the request, United States immediately declared the Global War on Terror

¹⁴ Here I am talking about the Al Qaeda's direct and indirect link with ETIM, IMU, Haqqani, Boko Haram and others.

¹⁵ Taddeo Valentina. "U.S. Response to Terrorism : A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign." *Journal of Strategic Security* 3, no. 2 (2010): 28.

¹⁶ Syed Junaid Ahsan. "Re-Emergence of Afghanistan after Bonn Conference." *Pakistan Horizon* 55, no. 1/2 (2002): 66.

¹⁷ Op. Cit. Taddeo.

¹⁸ "TIMELINE - Major attacks by al Qaeda." Reuters (2011)

¹⁹ Ibid.

(GWOT), starting in Afghanistan. Gaining the support of the western countries and United Nations, US strikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda started in October 7, 2001.²⁰

2. US and USSR reasons for Afghan civil war

US involvement in Afghanistan can be traced back to the cold war, as it mobilized Mujahedeen against USSR who invaded the country by providing them weaponries and finances. Aftermath of Afghanistan running into chaos, the four major states, Pakistan, Afghanistan, USA and USSR signed the Geneva Accords on April 14, 1988, to provide path for peace and stability for Afghanistan. Back then, the US saw USSR as a security threat and could not see Afghanistan turning into USSR's ally and provide a launch pad for the USSR to South Asia. Therefore, the US countered USSR by supporting resistance groups in Afghanistan.²¹ Despite the Geneva Accords and the fact that serious war was going in Afghanistan between USSR supported government and US supported resistance, both US and USSR preferred to reach an agreement bilaterally, without inviting their Afghan allies to the negotiations. US Secretary of State, George Shultz invited his Soviet counterpart to Washington, to sign an agreement to stop the Soviet assistances to Afghan government. The agreement known as positive symmetry in which Washington was given the right to aid the groups it supported regardless of Geneva accords. Soviets being threatened by resistance and US, agreed to depart Afghanistan without providing support for Kabul.²² However, later none of the agreements were truly implemented, neither the Geneva accord nor the Positive Symmetry, as both parties kept supporting their preferred parties, as a result, it ignited an extremely violent war. Even if Soviets fully departed Afghanistan in 1988, they kept supporting Kabul government by providing them advanced military equipment.

²⁰ Op. Cit. Taddeo.

²¹ Op. Cit. Sayed. P. 56.

²² Ibid. p. 57.

But mujahidin with support of US could effectively counter Najibullah's regime. After the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 Najibullah was left alone and agreed to create a new interim government, but due to pressure coming from US and Pakistan he had to resign because Mujahidin ignored to include him in the power structure.²³

After the collapse of USSR, US disengaged from Afghanistan leaving it with anarchic situation which is a dominant explanatory variable for the initiation of the civil war in the country. According to the theory of Barry Posen the civil war broke out because there was no government or security providing agency.²⁴

Barry Posen in 1993 in his article "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" was the first author who used security dilemma theory to explain ethnic conflict.²⁵ While his work opened new window of research and debates at the same time his work was criticized as well maybe because it was the first research in the area. Posen's research was based on hypothesis that Security dilemma can occur when the conditions are similar with interstate level. And according to Posen's Security Dilemma at Intrastate level, when Afghanistan having multiple ethnic group (Pashtuns 38%, Tajiks 25%, Hazaras 19% and Uzbeks 6%)²⁶ collapsed, it created the anarchic situation which led the ethnic groups to take security measures independently. The condition is similar to interstate level, security dilemma occurred at intrastate level (ethnic groups would misperceive the notion of self-help in terms of seeking security). After structural condition was met the second stage enters—the test of intentionality, where parties would mostly rely on the history, Afghanistan's history being full of ethnic tensions, while testing the intentions of each

²³ Ibid. 63.

²⁴ Posen, Barry. 1993.

²⁵ Roe, Paul. "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): p. 183.

²⁶ World Population Data Sheet, (Washington: Population Reference Bureau, May 2001), p.6.

other. Posen argued assumptions based on history would lead to misperception due to four reasons: manipulated history, history preserved in stories and poems, adhering view of another's history and each groups own version of history.²⁷ Anarchy—a fundamental prerequisite for Security dilemma, is what Michael Ignatieff agrees upon with Posen, by stating that absence of a state would create systemic fear which will boost terror and ethnic hatred.²⁸

Security dilemma explains how the US and USSR contributed to the civil war in Afghanistan, US could play a greater role in supporting inter Afghan talks and the creation of interim government and avoid the bloody civil war, but it did not. The lack of potential mediator in Afghanistan in the post-Cold War period paved the way to civil war which lasted 3 years as the ethnic leaders didn't reach a power-sharing agreement. Civil war was major reason for the radical Taliban to take over the country, who later established close ties with Al Qaeda allowing it have training camps in Afghanistan. Before the tragic 9/11 attacks, the US was reluctant to take any actions except for the tactical actions by bombarding Al Qaeda military camps in Afghanistan as a response to attacks on US military and US embassies.²⁹ With Taliban's severe human rights record which is completely against US' liberal values still there is no record US taking serious actions. It was predictable as the US has not played a considerable role during Afghanistan's civil war as well, leaving the burden on UN.

²⁷ Ibid. P.189.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "Afghanistan profile – Timeline." BBC (2018). Accessed April 25. 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253>

3. US invasion of Afghanistan

The US was also reluctant to have a long-term engagement in Afghanistan. But the tragedies of 9/11 according Bush Administration was worldview changing and world changing.³⁰ President George Bush in an address to congress said, all of the changes was brought upon us in a single day.³¹ The Secretary of State, Colin Powel said it was a different world, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld stated that the world is changed, and National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice said 9/11 has crystalized our vulnerability.³² All these senior officials were engaged in building legitimacy for changes in US foreign policy. Previously, the administration had been focused on its domestic agenda and mostly focused on China which had newly opened its market to foreign investments and was now seen as a future security threat.³³ Iraq accused of having weapons of mass destruction was also in focus with debate going on about its priority.³⁴ After 9/11, the US foreign policy was shifted to GWOT, and it immediately set about to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Besides, law enforcement and financial assets freeze were implemented. Thanks to US military capabilities and the Northern Alliance (non Pashtun alliance against the Taliban), the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces resist no more than two months.³⁵ While politicians and media in the west were talking about achievement, the real war had just begun. This is because the Taliban were not defeated, but rather temporarily driven away. To make sure that the country did not fall into hands of radicals again, there had to be well performing democratic government. The US strategy, was to devote considerable attention and resources to

³⁰ Crawford, Neta C. "The Road to Global Empire: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Policy After 9/11." *Orbis* 48, no. 4 (January 1, 2004): 685.

³¹ *Ibid.* & The changes he talks about is changes in foreign policy.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.* p. 690- 91.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 691.

³⁵ *Op. cit.* Taddeo. p. 29.

Afghanistan, the US planned to defeat insurgents and create a democratic government.³⁶ The wrap-up of the Afghan mission was planned prior to 2003 the invasion of Iraq, at which point resources would be shifted toward Iraq. None could have imagined that after 18 years of presence in Afghanistan, still no end is to the war is foreseen.

Correlating the Afghan conflict with terrorism and Cold War is strong to explain rationales for immediate US response but not sufficient to explain the long term solution. Such correlation has limited the policy choice because a major part of the US response in Afghanistan, as explained above, is related with countering terrorism, not the deep roots of the problems which is ethnic divide. Until the problem of ethnic divide is not addressed, it is difficult if not impossible for international community to achieve meaningful long lasting peace and stability; and make sure that the country will not fall into the hands of terrorists in the future. Such explanation also ignores the centuries long problem between the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and depicts it as recent strategic issue with no historic roots. This in turn has left out the need for serious discussions and measures on ethnic divide in Afghanistan. In the upcoming chapters the paper proceeds with the criticizing the reintegration strategy of peacebuilding in Afghanistan, explaining why it has failed, and proposing alternative strategy based on power sharing.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 30.

Chapter II:

US lead conflict management strategy in Afghanistan

One or the other way, US had to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan so US can ensure long term success against Taliban and Al Qaeda. To ensure that the country will not fall into the hands of terrorists, the US pursued state-building strategy based on reintegration. The Bonn Accord was signed by all parties in 2001 to create an interim government that worked to organize Loya Jirga (traditional referendum) in which the new constitution for the newly established government was designed and the interim government organized presidential election.³⁷ The interim government needed a lot of financial and technical help to fulfill all the goals promised in the Bonn Accord.

The US has a poor record of peace-building with eleven failure and only four successes (in Japan, Panama, West Germany and Grenada); only five of them could sustain democratic regimes for more than three years after the US withdrew. In 2004, Loya Jirga passed a constitution affirming the nation of Afghanistan as a centralized unitary.³⁸ Sarah Lister in her article, “Changing the Rules? State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan” claims that:

“...centralized state institutions in Afghanistan have co-existed uneasily with fragmented, decentralized traditional society since attempts at state-building began in Afghanistan. For centuries, tribal and religious leaders created ‘micro societies’ which related to central and other powers on the basis of negotiation and patronage.”³⁹

³⁷ Op. cit. Sayed . p. 67.

³⁸ Lister, Sarah. “Changing the Rules? State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan.” *Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 6 (July 2009): 990–1009.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 993.

Facing the prospect of reintegration into a unitary state, concerns among Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks ethnic groups were raised that centralized government will serve Pashtuns and the dominance of Pashtuns in the cabinet confirmed their concerns. Despite such ethnic tensions, the US preferred a centralized government as a way to restrain strong local leaders and reduce crime, but picture of legitimacy of central government was marred by widespread corruption.⁴⁰ Despite ubiquitous power rivalries at the local level, postwar Afghanistan is one of the world's most centralized country, fiscally and administratively, leaving local governments with a minimal coordinating role.⁴¹ The US ignored all the ethnic tensions in accepting the unitary model, as it was in a hurry to create a legitimate government. The plan was to hold a general presidential election in Afghanistan. However, one presidential election candidate argued that the situation for election is not good, that it should be delayed until next year and it should not be sacrificed for the US November election.⁴² The candidate further accused George Bush for holding election in Afghanistan as soon as possible, so he could use it as an achievement of his administration in his campaign for the upcoming US presidential election.

According to Barfield, the West believed that in absence of a strong centralized government, Afghanistan would fall apart into mini-states or would get aligned with the neighbor states.⁴³ In fact, Afghans themselves were not interested in tearing apart Afghanistan, after all, Afghanistan in the past 250 years was a single country.⁴⁴ Throughout the history of Afghanistan, ethnic factions had many good chances to do so but they did not. Even the tribal leaders that gained territorial control during the 1990s did not announce independence. The US believed that without

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 994.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Chandra, Vishal. "Politics in Post-Taliban Afghanistan: An Assessment." *Strategic Analysis* 29, no. 2 (April 2005): 233.

⁴³ Thomas Barfield. "Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power Before the U.S. Withdrawal." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): 54-55.


⁴⁴ Ibid p.54

the strong centralized government the ethnic groups may go to war against each other again. However, not all of the tribal factions agreed on how the new government should be formed and who should be in the center of it.⁴⁵ The international community chosen reintegration to build peace by establishing the a centralized unitary state. In the following paragraphs I will test the reintegration theory application in case of Afghanistan and explain why reintegration was not a good strategy to peacebuilding in Afghanistan.

Reintegration

Reintegration recognizes distinct culture and tradition of each ethnic group but implements measures to ensure their participation in cultural, political, economic and social aspects of the country.⁴⁶ Reintegration share the characteristic that they aim to create a bigger and inclusive society, it allows representation of each ethnic group. In implementation of reintegration, scholars face the dilemma of accommodating the different interests and identities. Considering that it is a strategy of conflict resolution; policy makers must take into account the years of bloody conflicts ethnic groups have gone through. It is not an easy and short-term goal, but requires years of flow of resources and assistance to achieve an inclusive community.

Reintegration aims to create an inclusive society without causing the ethnic groups to abandon their distinct society. It is supported by scholars such as Donald Horowitz, Timothy Sisk, and Benjamin Reilly.⁴⁷ It is the only preferred policy which



⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Op. cit. Hadden.

⁴⁷ Wolf, Stephan. "Electoral-Systems Design and Power-Sharing Regimes" in Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, edited by O'Flynn. Ian, and Russel. David. p. 30.

responds to the globalization and population movement.⁴⁸ The objectives reintegrations in the context of the Afghanistan it is unlikely to work. Scholars would agree on the fact that ethnic war brings population movement but separate them due to security reasons. It causes them to move from their primary place of living to a place dominated by their ethnic fellows. It is the main reason why each region of Kabul is dominated by a specific ethnic group, as in the ethnic map⁴⁹ indicated that Hazaras dominates the western part, Tajiks are in the north and Pashtuns are in the east. Reintegration is supposed to be applicable when the societies are ethnically divided not geographically but as indicated above not only the capital city of Afghanistan is ethnically and geographically divided but also according to Thomas Barfield the whole country is divided.⁵⁰ He points out one of the most significant facts in terms of ethnic composition of Afghanistan is that each ethnic groups makes majority of population in one or several regions of Afghanistan. For example, it can be clearly seen in figure 1, Pashtuns are majority in the east and south, Hazaras in the central Afghanistan, Tajiks in Northeast and west, finally, Uzbeks in Northwest.




Figure 1⁵¹

⁴⁸ Op. cit. Tom Hadden. P. 35.

⁴⁹ The map is taken from Google Maps, articulations are added by me based on my experience of being an Afghan citizen who have lived in Kabul for years. The circles are not software generated but rather they indicate a rough idea of where the three large ethnic groups are concentrated.

⁵⁰ Barfield, Thomas "Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power Before the US Withdrawal." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 90. Council on foreign Relations. September/October 2011. P.56

⁵¹ Ibid.

National government, membership in public bodies and law enforcement agencies, and public employment are three spheres in which reintegration can be pursued. States should represent the all ethnic and religious minorities without discrimination so that each minority group can take an effective part in making of the decisions and policies concerning them. But in case of Afghanistan, this has been never the case, as the president would appoint officials for the provinces instead of a democratic election. The officials appointed by president lacks public support, therefore, people rely on their own traditional way of solving their problems instead of relying on the government. It is an explanation to the Jenifer Brick Murtazashvili's concept of "Traditional Authority" and "Customary forms of dispute resolution" practiced by tribal factions in the rural areas of Afghanistan.⁵² According to reintegrationist, to ensure that minorities and their rights are well protected there has to be measures which would make it easy for minorities to be represented in national government and parliament. In deeply divided societies, to avoid the risk of permanent exclusion of ethnic group which may lead to conflict, there is need for some proportional provisions of ministerial posts are required. Here as well, in Afghan government minorities and their rights are not protected due to a centralized government and lack of checks and balances. One of the evident example is that President Ashraf Ghani appointed ministers even though parliament did not give them vote of confidence still The President kept them as the head of ministries, ignoring the parliament.

Reintegration is likely to be appropriate in the membership of appointed public bodies and the agencies of law enforcement at a national level. There should be a balanced representation of gender and ethnic groups in the law enforcement and legislative bodies. At least until now no

⁵² Murtazashvili. Jennifer. B. "Diagnosing the failure of State-Building Efforts in Afghanistan" Central Asian Affairs. 2015. p. 13.

one can argue for a balanced representation of ethnic groups in Afghan government.⁵³ Third sphere where reintegration should be pursued is employment in the public sector.

Reintegration: Logic, Conditions and Challenges

Aside from the general concepts discussed above, reintegration is critically illustrated in the work of Erin Jenne:

“... societies riven by war can be rebuilt by returning combatants and ethnic minorities to their prewar communities and by promoting ethnic cooperation in local institutions. Over time daily contact between the former combatants is believed to rebuild cross ethnic bonds and gradually consolidate ethnic peace.”⁵⁴

According to Jenne, the reintegration is a mean to rebuild multi-ethnic communities that went through ethnic war, the initial step of which is returning displaced groups to their initial home, followed by institutional design with diverse electoral districts which promote cross ethnic appeals among politicians.⁵⁵ As a result, the integrated ethnic groups are less likely to commit violence against each other in absence of international mediators.⁵⁶ In Afghanistan, appeals are wholly on basis of ethnicity because of a centralized institutional design which made the political interaction to be zero-sum—allowing one group to win another to lose. For example, the parliament is not based on political party, which is an important way to promote cross ethnic appeals, as a result, it allows MPs to enter the parliament to on a basis of ethnicity.

⁵³ Ferdaws. 2019. “Ethnic Majority and Power Monopoly,” <https://8am.af/ethnic-majority-and-power-monopoly/> Accessed June 2021.

⁵⁴ Erin K. Jenne. 2010. “Barriers to Reintegration after Ethnic Civil Wars: Lessons from Minority Returns and Restitution in the Balkans,” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 12, No. 4. P. 370.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 371.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 372.

In order for reintegration to work, beside a principle barrier there are conditions should be met.⁵⁷

In Afghanistan due to the experiences of fear, hatred and misery ethnic groups perceive each other as a threat. Therefore the ethnic spoil is well established which allows the ethnic leaders to play ethnic cards and maintains the community homogenous.⁵⁸ In presence of ethnic spoils one groups gains control over resources which promotes discrimination among groups.⁵⁹ In case of Afghanistan there are two things which can be added to Erin's concept of ethnic spoils; first, the type of system created can empower the ethnic spoils. For example, in Afghanistan the centralized government has given more authority to the president due his full control over resources, to discriminate other ethnic groups. Reintegration as a well developed theory should draw a specific line for the specific type of institutional design which may work with it. Second, reintegration with a centralized government promoted discrimination regardless of communities being heterogeneous or homogenous. For example, recently President Ashraf Ghani appointed a Pashtun governor to homogeneous province where Ethnic Uzbeks are living which caused thousands of locals to protest and accused the government for discriminations against them.⁶⁰

Another major condition for reintegration to work is that local institutions should back up the reintegration strategy.⁶¹ In Afghanistan, institutions are not well established, broken, discriminating and corrupt. A major reason is its design which allows only a specific group to decide policies and appoint officials and other reason could be long term war.

Afghanistan has been divided since its creation and the experiences of war throughout the history have further hardened the ethnic identity which made it hard for Afghans to reconcile without

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 371

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 371

⁵⁹ Ibid. 372.

⁶⁰ "Daud Laghmani Introduced as New Governor of Faryab at Army Base." Tolo News. Accessed June 05, 2021.

<https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-172214>

⁶¹ Op. cit. Jenne. P. 372.

meaningful representation in the government. Reconciliations has failed because it was never based on power-sharing. Centralized government has further challenged the reintegration strategy because it has given solid reasons for elites and also people to block the cross the ethnic appeals. A good example would the elections of 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019 which was handed with serious fraud accusations but these elections have successfully brought up the ethnic divide where the Farsi-speaking candidate would get majority of votes in the North and the Pashtun candidate would get the majority votes in the South.⁶²

Reintegration did not work theoretically because of some core reasons outlined above. In the following paragraphs outlines some major examples and argues why reintegration strategy failed.

Reintegration: a failed strategy in Afghanistan:

The reintegration strategy in Afghanistan's case can be challenged not only theoretically but also empirically. Empirically, the post-war Afghanistan is full of corrupt institution, ethnic divide, violence and discrimination all of which confirms that the reintegration has not achieved its favorable results—an inclusive cooperating community. There is a long record for these claims; however, I will only discuss some of the most significant of them.

Corruption:

Post-war Afghanistan has always been in the list of top ten most corrupt countries.⁶³ Corruption has been one of driving reasons why a lot of foreign aid was not used properly. With the

⁶² Qazi, Shereena. 2019. "Afghanistan's presidential election: All you need to know." Al-Jazeera. Published. Sept. 27, 2019. Accessed June 05, 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/27/afghanistans-presidential-election-all-you-need-to-know>

⁶³ "CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX." Transparency. 2021. Accessed June 05, 2021. <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/afg#>

reintegration strategy a centralized government was created which still lacks checks and balances allowing the ruling class to decide unilaterally. And this has made the corruption an easy practice. This is why there tens of cases of huge corruptions worth from a hundred million dollar to almost a billion.

Discrimination:

The creation of a centralized a government has also prepared formal ways of discrimination. This handed with ethnic divide makes vulnerable the groups which are not well represented in the government. The Enlightenment Movement (TEM) was one the rare movements which crystallized the discriminatory policies of Afghan government. TEM made of ethnic Hazaras protest twice which went viral in international media accused government for discriminating them from developments projects.

Based on contract between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, 500kV electricity will be imported to Afghanistan from Turkmenistan. Fitchner a German company was responsible to scientifically study and design Afghanistan's Power Sector Master Plan and propose the possible route for transmission of imported energy. According to Fitchner's final report published in April 2013, proposed the Hazara inhabitant Bamyan route as the best choice by pointing out certain benefits.⁶⁴ But the government chose Salang route over Bamyan, where mostly Hazaras are living.

In reply to TEM, the government said that the decision was not adopted by the current regime. At other times, it stated that there is not enough budget to build through Bamyan route because it was more expensive than Salang route. In reply to the second point of the government, the

⁶⁴ "Power Sector Master Plan," *Fitchner*. Ministry of Energy and Water. Power Sector Master Plan.

protestors argued that the donor of the project is Asian Development Bank not the government of Afghanistan. As a result, there was no chance at all for the government to win the debate, therefore, it has decided to take an additional line from Salang to Bamyan which will be even more costly compared with only Bamyan route .

Furthermore, the government has adopted quota system in access to higher education to limit the ethnic Hazaras from getting admission in the national universities. Before the majority of students entered the universities through Kankor test (competency based test) were Hazaras. Such positive discrimination gets the shape of discrimination when government is not adopting quota system policy in appointments of the government. In a scandal, a Hazara was proposed for a high position in President's Administrative Office, in a voice the recruiters responds, that the candidate is competent but the problem is that he is Hazara.

In other case, Abdul Rashid Dostum, representing Uzbek and Turkmen minorities in government and the former vice president of Afghanistan who has supported the peace process since the beginning of the intervention, was accused by someone unknown from the north for sexual assaults. The truth or wrongness of the case was never clearly known but after that, Mr. Dostum was not allowed to enter the country again after his trip to Turkey. His case has also raised concerns as the Afghan government under a Pashtun president sidelined other minorities. "The announcement by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's office came after U.N., U.S. and European Union officials in Kabul condemned the alleged abuses and called for a swift investigation."⁶⁵

On the other hand, the Pashtun warlord, "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a fugitive Afghan warlord and former ally of al-Qaida and the Taliban, returned to the city he had once showered with rockets,

⁶⁵ Gul. Ayaz. "Afghan Officials Probe Abuse Allegations Against Dostum." VOA News. Accessed December 24, 2017. <https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-officials-probe-abuse-allegations-against-dostum/3635063.html>

he was welcomed at the presidential palace”.⁶⁶ At the public level people accused the government and the entire international community for violation the human rights convention which prohibits double standards.

Considering the high rate of distrust of people on the government indicated in figure 2, people blaming the government for racial discrimination explained in Enlightenment Movement and the two warlords cases and the ethnical composition of Afghanistan discussed in chapter 2 are solid evidences show that the approaching peace with unitary government is not a good approach. Because, such system of the government has raised ethnic tensions and distrust. To achieve peace and to keep peace government needs the support of people and gain it the government has to get rid of ethnic tensions and make sure that each ethnic group is well represented in the government.




Figure 2

Source: The Asia Foundation⁶⁷

⁶⁶ “Kabul welcomes the Afghan warlord who once shelled its citizens.” The Gaurdian. Published Oct. 24, 2017. Accessed June, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/kabul-welcomes-the-afghan-warlord-who-once-shelled-its-citizens>

⁶⁷ “A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2016.” The Asia Foundation. Published 2016. Accessed 2 April, 2018. https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016_Survey-of-the-Afghan-People_full-survey.Dec2016.pdf

Ethnic Division:

In the post-war Afghanistan ethnic groups have been divided to an extent that not only policy have been problematic but also words. Words listed bellow apparently seems short and simple but they have been problematic through the post-war history of Afghanistan. These words have been securitized to an extent that it caused various conflict between the Pashtuns and Non-Pashtuns.

Pashto	English	Farsi
Pohanton	University	Danishgah
Pohanzai	Faculty	Danishkadah

In various tv shows there has been arguments on the usage of these words. While Pashtuns accused the usage of words ‘Danishgah’ and ‘Danishkadah’ to be Iranian but Non-Pashtuns says this is our mother language and this is our identity and challenging them is challenging our identity. Regardless of linguistically who is right it shows that the Afghans overall are ethnically divided that the go through conflicts because of using politicized words. For example, in Herat University, the Pashtun and non-Pashtuns students fought one another because of the university’s billboard. Pashtun students demanded the elimination of the word ‘Danishgah’ from the billboard and others were fighting to keep it in the billboard. Due to this problem, until this day the Herat University lacks a billboard on its entrance.

Furthermore, Afghans also have a long history for having problem over the question of ‘what they are as a nation?’ Pashtuns believes that everyone living in the territory of Afghanistan are Afghans, but there are non-Pashtuns who believes that ‘Afghan’ word is taken from ‘Awghan’

which is a word used to describes Pashtuns. The problem gained significance when the process of distributing the newly designed indentivity cards was on its way. Pashtuns elites were demanding that in new IDs the word Afghan should be used to indicate the nation. But others believe that the ethnicity of ID holder should be indicated because the word 'Afghan' only represents Pashtuns. After a years of debates and protests some of which were violent; both Nationality and Ethnicity were added in the new IDs.

In short, making a bigger picture from the cases of corruption, discrimination, and ethnic division it might be not wrong to conclude that the reintegration has failed. Because the institutional designed required for reintegration was not adopted, as a result, the centralized government has given formal authority for a given ethnic group to control resources which empowered the ethnic spoils. With a wrong institutional design the reintegration in Afghanistan has empowered a given ethnic group to an extent that it can decide policies and appointments of all provinces where in some it has minimum population. The international community not only over the ethnic spoils but indirectly promoted it through creation of a work institution design which hardened the ethnic divide. Therefore, instead of inclusivism, exclusivism was promoted as other ethnic groups were left out and a given ethnic group gained control over resources and power.

A major condition for reintegration to work is the support of local institutions to efforts to reintegrate but in Afghanistan these institutions due to a centralized government had minimal coordinating (not executive) roles which further challenged the likelihood of reintegration's success.

From the case of multi-ethnic Afghanistan one major lesson should be learned that is hyper-nationalist leaders should be accommodated in a power-sharing model. In other words, the more government is decentralized the more likely it is for ethnic groups to achieve ethnic harmony and cooperation and the more centralized means more discrimination and ethnic division which may cause violence. Reintegrationists should specify the institutional design to accommodate the existing ethnic groups. These institutions should be able to take care of ethnic spoils and mediate the potential security dilemmas by having members from each ethnic group in it.

Chapter III:

Power-sharing in Afghanistan: logic, characteristics and factors

The Afghan civil war superficially looked like a religious conflicts as during the civil each groups would bring the issue of Shia and Sunni but appeals were all based on ethnicity. For example, Wahdat political party was made of Hazaras, Jamiat Party was all Tajiks and Islamic Party was Pashtuns; these ethnic groups fought deadly wars against one another. Aside from survival in an anarchic situation another major reason was that none of the ethnic groups wanted to be excluded from power structure. The post-war experience has shown that elites from different groups were given a place in the government they cooperated. For example, when Ata Mohammad Noor—a strong Tajik elite, was suspended from governor of Mazar-i-Sharif he challenged the decision of the president. But when he was given concessions he left the office silently. The same is true about Mohammad Muhageq insulting the president accepted to be advisor to the president. This is why Arendt Lijphart argues that no matter how hard the ethnic identities are it is still manipulated and, “Instead of a ‘given’ it is more like ‘take’ or a chose’.”⁶⁸

Power-sharing realizes ethnic division, and proposes measures to manage it before it turns into a bloody war. Furthermore, it realistically deals with the possibility manipulation of ethnicity and due to the fact that assimilation is limited and takes a very long time, therefore, it rejects the forging of the different ethnic groups into a homogenous community.⁶⁹ Power-sharing can significantly decrease ethnic tensions by giving each ethnic group their proportional political power, and avoid suppression.

⁶⁸ Arendt Lijphart. 1990. “The Power-Sharing Approach,” in Joseph Montville (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, p. 492.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 493

According to Arendt Lijphart power-sharing should be given a chance prior to the partition. And if power-sharing failed then the ultimate solution is to the ethnic war is partition. According to him partition as ultimate solution to end ethnic wars because of two major reasons, first, most violence is the result of government's effort to resist to, and second, even if partition may entail some violence still its way lesser when compared with the violence prior to partition.⁷⁰

In order for Power-sharing to work there are at least two key conditions should be met.⁷¹ (1) Absence of majority: Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country none of the given group is constituting majority of population (Pashtuns 38%, Tajiks 25%, Hazaras 19% and Uzbeks 6%). (2) Absence of huge socioeconomic differences: while ethnic groups have similarities in terms of culture and also religion but there are differences in languages and political ideology. Since each given group is homogenous in their own strongholds therefore the socioeconomic differences is not a significant issue. Other factors that favor power-sharing are (3) that the ethnic groups in Afghanistan are roughly of similar, (4) not too many groups exists in the country, (5) these groups are geographically concentrated and (6) these groups have prior experiences of compromise.⁷² These requirements are significant but not sufficient for powersharing to work successfully.

Furthermore, power-sharing has a good record of success empirically also it is well developed strategy theoretically. So incase international community moves to sharing-sharing it means they are moving to a newer strategy from failed one.

Power-sharing is relevant because the characterization of it has the capacity to mediate the security dilemma among ethnic groups and does not allow the ethnic spoils to promote hatred,

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 493

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 496

⁷² Ibid. p. 498.

division and discrimination. The four character of power-sharing can accommodate the interest of each ethnic groups in Afghanistan, give the required autonomy so groups can manage their distinctiveness, adopt transparent standards for appointments and allocation of funds, and the power for minorities to protect their core interests.

Proportional Participation

The ethnic groups which fought one another wanted to be fairly represented in the government; therefore, power-sharing upholding the participation of representatives can fairly accommodate the interest of each group.⁷³ Institutional design is a vital thing in post-war and power-sharing suggesting numerous institutional reforms to create a parliamentary system. One of the reasons why power-sharing seems so relevant in case of Afghanistan is that it has a defined institutional design in which all of the ethnic groups will represented and none of the ethnic group can eliminate and discriminate others. The participation of representatives is vital any conflict because it proportionately divides resources and appointments among each group and leaves no room for discrimination.

Power-sharing is one of the key approaches to resolving conflicts in divided societies. It is directly connected to institution design, in other words they go hand in hand. Being so important in conflict resolution, each school of thought has a specific view of which electoral system best delivers peace and stability in the country. In a divided society that has gone through years of conflict and bloodshed, institutional arrangements are necessary to avoid absolute majoritarian democracy.

The work on consociational power-sharing is founded on the pioneering scholarship of Arend Lijphart and contains four major characteristics: minority veto, proportionality in voting system

⁷³ Ibid. p. 494.

and employment in the public sector, a grand coalition government and segmental autonomy.⁷⁴ These characteristics can be found in the several successful cases such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Malaysia.⁷⁵

Integrative power-sharing, on the other hand, is associated with work of Donald Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly who believe that instead of rigid institution design electoral formula should reward the candidates for moderation.⁷⁶ It is argued that it creates the arena for electoral incentives, bargaining, aggregate political parties or coalitions.⁷⁷

For consociational power-sharing, institutional design is very important but does not ignore the importance of electoral system. Consociationalists, pays greater attention to the link between institutions design and electoral system. Reintegrationists pays greater attention to the stability of post-election period and the electoral system.⁷⁸ In case of Afghanistan, it can be clearly seen that if electoral and institution design is not according to ethnic composition then stability cannot be achieved. The country is ethnically divided, with Pashtuns making 38%, Tajiks 25%, Hazaras 19% and Uzbeks 6% of the population.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Afghanistan's institution design is a unitary presidential system,⁸⁰ with two round electoral system.⁸¹ The electoral system in Afghanistan prepares the ground for discrimination, domination and not only fails to create an inclusive government, but also undermines the whole peace process. Electoral system and

⁷⁴ Montville, Joseph V. *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, c1991. P. 494-495.

⁷⁵ Stefan Wolff p. 60

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 60- 61.

⁷⁹ World Population Data Sheet, (Washington: Population Reference Bureau, May 2001), p.6.

⁸⁰ Lister, Sarah. "Changing the Rules? State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan." *Journal of Development Studies* 45, no. 6 (July 2009): 990–1009.

⁸¹ "Afghanistan election guide: everything you need to know" *The Guardian*. Accessed May 25, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/03/afghanistan-election-guide-candidates-list>

institution design that was followed as a part of the reintegration approach, aimed to create an inclusive society, has failed because they both gives the whole political power to one ethnic group. The constitution granted excessive power to the president, further contributing to the problem, the following are some of the apparent president's power granted by constitution⁸²:

- Being the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of Afghanistan,
- Appoint the Ministers, the Attorney General, the Head of the Central Bank, the National Security Director as well as the Head of the Red Cross with the endorsement of the House of People, and their dismissal and acceptance of resignation
- Appoint the Justice of the Supreme Court as well as justices of the Supreme Court with the endorsement of the House of People,
- Appointing, retiring and accepting the resignation and dismissal of judges, officers of the armed forces, police, national security as well as high ranking officials according to the provisions of law,
- Appoint heads of political representatives of Afghanistan to foreign states as well as international organizations;
- Endorse laws as well as judicial decrees;

It is true that that the president has two deputies from different ethnic groups. But they are symbolic, because they don't have executive powers granted by constitution, which says that they must help the president in performing his power. Further, there is no clarity or specific authority given to the vice president.

⁸² "The Constitution of Afghanistan." Ratified January 26, 2004. Accessed May 25, 2019. P. 17-18.
<http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf>

While reintegration insists on moderation through election campaign, bargaining and coalition, there is no guarantee that it will happen. By contrast, the Consociationalists achieve moderation through representation which can be guaranteed by the institutions and electoral design. Consociationalism is regarded as more practical because through the institution designed minorities are protected from the domination of the majority. In case of Afghanistan, it is clearly seen why the consociational approach makes more sense and is more practical compared with reintegration.

Integrative and consociational, are two major approaches in power sharing which is deeply divided in terms of delivering and achieving political process successfully. In other words, mostly a hybrid approach is used. One reason for that is each case of conflict is different from one another and the approaches cannot comply with all the cases. The electoral system can shape the result of elections, but still it is voters who determine the outcome of the elections. Governments should choose to conduct the politics in such a way that the ethnic majority does not neglect or harm the minority's representation and interest, which it does in the case of Afghanistan and the multi-party ethnic coalition government does not collapse while going through a difficult decision.

Apart from the effects of elections, political institutional design is very important. While it is not the whole, it is an integral part. There are different mechanisms such as: consociations, federalism and territorial autonomy that can be employed to construct states institutions and consolidate proportional participation. If the west wants to achieve democracy in Afghanistan, proportional participation which should be achieved through one of the mechanism mentioned above. The country's electoral system should be designed based on ethnic composition of the state because if the two are not matching, there is a high chance of state going into chaos. In a

deeply divided societies, both should ensure that an inclusive government is created that further leads to non-violent and democratic processes.

Required Degree of Autonomy

Power-sharing in Afghanistan gives each of the ethnic group the required autonomy to accommodate their differences.⁸³ This is very relevant in case of Afghanistan because each ethnic group is homogenous at a given part and autonomy is best way to manage the differences especially now that these ethnic groups fight on what to call the university. It is a long-term solution for ethnic groups' language, cultural and religious differences.

Since these ethnic groups are concentrated in certain part of the country which is a good match for federalism. Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and others are already in favor of such system which promotes autonomy. Autonomy gives a degree of self-determination to a the qualifying ethnic group, giving them a degree of control over their economic and social activities. Within an established state, it is practicable to ensure the meaningful participation of minorities in decision making which concerns them and it should grant them effective political autonomy to that end.⁸⁴

The most convincing sphere to grant autonomy to regional and local governments in areas where minorities are concentrated. Creating a special administrative structure is a strategy to ensure the maximum participation of minorities in political, economic and social policies which affect them and their region.⁸⁵ There is a need for agencies and institutions for the promotion of minorities' culture and language. These autonomous administrations should also have their own separate courts. The problem might be associated with the problem of discrimination of other minorities with in an autonomous group which might foster fragmentation and separation.

⁸³ Ibid. p. 494.

⁸⁴ Op. cit. Hadden. p. 38.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 38.

There are different factors to be considered while deciding the most appropriate strategy or combination of strategies whether to go for autonomy or reintegration. Some of the major factors should be taken into account are the nature, location, size, and population map of each minority groups. According to Tom Hadden, autonomy is preferred to a well-organized minority.⁸⁶ According to him, autonomy should be granted to rural minorities who are well established than to several different ethnic group in large city.⁸⁷ Taking Hadden's argument and applying it to the case of Afghanistan, it can be concluded autonomy stands to be preferred strategy. Taking into consideration the population map of Afghanistan developed by Barfield and the fact that Afghanistan's 70% of population are in rural areas much of whom live in mountains, deserts and steppes which made it for the central government hard to reach them. In such case, autonomy would make more sense.⁸⁸ The government being unable to reach rural areas due to lack of infrastructures, is main reason why rural areas remained ungoverned or poorly governed. And the fact that central government is unable to deliver them utilities, goods, transparent governance, therefore, the rural population always questions central government's legitimacy and would resist against it.

One other consideration in the choice between the reintegration and autonomy in divided societies, is the nature and history of a state.⁸⁹ Until the mid-eighteen century, Afghanistan was divided between the different empires in the region specially based in Iran, Central Asia and India.⁹⁰ Finally, in 1747 Ahmad Shah Durrani created Afghanistan state by managing the tribal

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Thomas Barfield and Neamatollah Nojumi. "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability." Middle East Policy Council. Volume XVII. Accessed 25 April. 2018. <http://www.mepc.org/bringing-more-effective-governance-afghanistan-10-pathways-stability>

⁸⁹ Op. cit. Hadden. p. 38.

⁹⁰ Op. cit. Barfield, Thomas. P.56

political web through diplomacy or violence.⁹¹ Durrani, similar to other empires only appointed governors, left regions autonomous.⁹² After his death, these factions started to fight for power, however, Dost Mohammad Khan could restore the order in Afghanistan but still the ethnic division was the most important issue in the Afghan Politics.⁹³ In short, the history Afghanistan clearly indicates that autonomy has been there through-out the time.

Proportionality

Power-sharing defines strict requirements and standards for allocation of resources and appointments in the government.⁹⁴ This is important because recently there was scandal that the presidential palace allocates a huge amount of money on 18 types of different meats while the salary of school teachers remains to be 6000 Afghanis (around 85usd).⁹⁵

Divided societies lack a common demos through which collective decision should be taken. There is more than one leader to claim legitimacy, therefore, the principle of majoritarian decision making in such conditions are undemocratic and oppressive. In divided societies, the leaders tend to advance the interest of their own ethnic group; one reason for that is lack of trust among the leaders. Achieving trust depends on the rule of law that unfortunately in Afghanistan is missing. According to Duncan Morrow, under such situation there is little chance for reintegration to succeed.⁹⁶ With the lack of rule of law, leaders tend to lead their followers toward three main ways. First, Antagonism which seeks to promote their primacy over the others, second, management and mitigation which tends to cooperate with competing ethnic

⁹¹ Keane. Conor. "US Nation-Building in Afghanistan" Routledge. New York. 2016. P 28.

⁹² Barfield. Thomas. Op. cit. p. 57

⁹³ Ibid. P.29

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 495.

⁹⁵ "The '18 types of meat' menu takes social media by storm." Salaam Watandar. Jan. 27, 2021. Accessed June 06, 2019. <https://swn.af/en/2021/01/27/the-18-type-of-meat-menu-takes-social-media-by-storm/>

⁹⁶ Morrow, Duncan. "Breaking Antagonism? Political Leadership in Divided Societies" in Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, edited by O'Flynn. Ian, and Russel. David. p. 46.

group, and finally, negotiated arrangements to achieve balance of power. Here as well due to unproper institution design, there is a minimum chance that the leaders would not pursue antagonism because the constitution of Afghanistan has no room for the second or third party.

In divided societies, antagonism is the beginning of political life not the end. Universal values documented in the international humanitarian laws are difficult to translate into policy, which is very unpleasant for politicians. It is important because the relations among politicians are not based on trust but antagonism. The actions of Afghan politicians are important as because it be strong dynamic toward antagonism among different ethnic groups and further divide them.⁹⁷ Furthermore, it is impossible to prevent the majority political leadership from exploiting such divisions and securing a monopoly over state resources. Therefore, the responsibility of conflict resolution should be recognized as the international responsibility, should not be left to the national leaders.

Thinking of political leadership in divided societies and reintegration approach simultaneous, it will be seen that reintegration carries a higher chance of failure as it creates the situation of exploitation by leaders compared with power-sharing.

Minority Veto

Finally, power-sharing gives an ultimate means for minorities to protect their interests. This is significant because there are various cases of overruling in Afghanistan. For example, National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) enacted a decision which divides other ethnic

⁹⁷ Duncan Morrow, p. 56- 57.

groups into smaller groups.⁹⁸ Such incidents and decisions are potential reasons for violence and tensions between ethnic groups which can be avoided through a minority veto.

What makes power-sharing a well developed theory is that it has solution to special circumstances. In case the ethnic lines in Afghanistan get diffuse the proportional representation can effectively respond to relative change and it can also address the change in distinct identity and fluid identity of the group.⁹⁹ Furthermore, when ethnic groups are geographically dispersed then arrangements shouldn't be based on territory. The good thing is that power-sharing has no fixed blue print instead it is flexible to various institution designs and ethnic arrangements. In other words, it can accommodate the changes which might happen in ethnic composition of Afghanistan and it has the capacity to address ifs and buts of each ethnic group.

Power-Sharing: An Alternative

Political and legal approach are two different approaches through which the accommodation of minorities' rights can be seen. Human rights lawyers tend to see issue from the general principles which should be applied universally but politicians tend to deal with it more pragmatically to achieve long term stability and peace.¹⁰⁰ Having said that, for politicians to achieve long term peace and stability is a matter of research and information, as each case of conflict is holistically different. In the literature the issue is broadly, divided among human rights defenders who favor more autonomy over reintegration, and politicians who say, in fact, there is no exact rule about whether to give the ethnic groups autonomy or integrate them into an inclusive society. Legally speaking, there are many documents such as The Universal

⁹⁸ Ansar, Masoud. "Mixed Reactions in Parliament Over NSIA's Ethnic Categories." Tolo News. March, 17. 2021. Accessed June 06, 2021. <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-170772>

⁹⁹ Op. cit. p. 500.

¹⁰⁰ Hadden, Tom . "Integration and Autonomy: Minority Rights and Political Accommodation" in Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, edited by O'Flynn. Ian, and Russel. David. p. 30.

Declaration on Human Rights, The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which grants autonomy at the same time further fosters the reintegration of the groups.¹⁰¹ But these documents do not solve the tensions among different groups. One reason for that is because they have no clearly-defined preconditions. It is difficult to know whether those resolving the conflict should encourage reintegration among different ethnic groups, even if they had to diminish their traditions and cultures, or they should allow promoting those cultures and grant autonomy. Politically, it is not clear whether it is right to promote communal differences than investing time and resources to achieve reintegration. Similarly, it is also not obvious that communities should be left alone while choosing between autonomy and reintegration.¹⁰² There might not be strong empirical data which indicates preferences one over another but in case of Afghanistan as indicated above the reintegration did have satisfying results, therefore, moving to power-sharing would not be a wrong option.

Assimilation and autonomy are two other broad approaches aside from reintegration which deals with ethnic issues nationally.¹⁰³ Assimilation is when ethnic groups each with different culture, identity and tradition are subordinated to the dominant one to make a larger inclusive society.¹⁰⁴ In the context of Afghanistan, the theory is vague about the ‘dominant one’, whether dominant in terms of culture, politics, or economic, is unclear. According to World Population Datasheet, Pashtuns make 38% of the population¹⁰⁵ and are the biggest ethnic group that is politically dominant due to the fact they are well represented in the government controlling major

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p. 31.

¹⁰² Ibid. p. 33.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 33- 34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 34

¹⁰⁵ Op. cit. World Population Data Sheet.

government institutions, while linguistically and population wise Persian speakers (Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Aimaqs) are dominant. Therefore, if assimilation approach is pursued, policy makers have to identify what ‘dominant’ means to them and evaluate the potential risks of each rule.

Autonomy, contains establishing of structure through which each ethnic community hold control over political, cultural and economic on the regional and/or local level.¹⁰⁶ There are some reintegrationists such as Ian O’Flynn, David Russell and Donald Horowitz, who sees autonomy as driving factor for separation, possible war, and even establishment of another sovereign state.¹⁰⁷ They must take into account in such strategy that ethnic groups are not given the autonomy internationally nor the right of creating their own army or foreign policy. There is a huge difference between national and international autonomy.

Bottom line, neither approach is a coherent package. Scholars understand that each approach has its own special preconditions, and that there is need for elements from other approaches to manage a conflict effectively. But now that the reintegration came out to be a failure in case of Afghanistan it worth giving a try the power-sharing as it is a well developed theory matching the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ O’Flynn, Ian, and David Russell. *Power Sharing : New Challenges for Divided Societies*. London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2005.

Findings

The civil war was wholly driven on the basis of ethnicity even though slogans were mostly or partly based on Shia and Sunni, but these parties fighting one another were solely made of specific ethnic groups. It was the civil war between the ethnic groups which paved the way for Taliban to take over the country and cooperate with Al-Qaida. While for some authors the conflict of Afghanistan might be new and correlate it with cold war and Al-Qaida. In fact the conflict in Afghanistan has been a very old one having roots in history. Ahmad Shah Durrani created Afghanistan state by managing the tribal political web through diplomacy or violence. Durrani similar to other empires only appointed governors and left regions autonomous. The history confirms that even if the central government brought or planned to bring infrastructure and services to the tribal factions, they still resisted submitting to the central government unless they were well represented in the government. This shows Afghanistan's problem has been ethnic division since its establishment. In its contemporary history Afghanistan has not experienced a stable peace due to lack of an inclusive government.

Such political unrest caused the civil war which prepared the ground for Taliban—a Pashtun extremist group to take over the country and cooperated with Al-Qaida responsible for 9/11 attacks. US invaded Afghanistan to get rid of threats the US faced. To make sure that US won't face any threat from extremists groups in Afghanistan in long it decided to carry peacebuilding and statebuilding strategy. To achieve its long-term goals the US created a centralized unitary state to reintegrate the ethnic group. Such government did not have a meaning place for each ethnic group, as a result, the government existed along with corruption, discrimination, violence and ethnic division. The reintegration strategy failed to create an inclusive government as a result the whole process came out to be a failure. In short, the reintegration strategy has just extended

the historical problem of Afghanistan by creating a centralized government which has place for one ethnic group and formally allowed a single ethnic group to take the political and control the resources.

Power-sharing can be a potential solution to the problem. As it creates an inclusive government in which each ethnic group can find themselves safe as it:

- upholds the participation of representatives can fairly accommodate the interest of each group.¹⁰⁸ Institutional design is a vital thing in post-war and power-sharing suggesting numerous institutional reforms to create a parliamentary system. One of the reasons why power-sharing seems so relevant in case of Afghanistan is that it has a defined institutional design in which all of the ethnic groups will be represented and none of the ethnic group can eliminate and discriminate others.
- gives each of the ethnic group the required autonomy to accommodate their differences.¹⁰⁹ This is very relevant in case of Afghanistan because each ethnic group is homogenous at a given part and autonomy is best way to manage the differences especially now that these ethnic groups fight on what to call the university. It is a long-term solution for ethnic groups' language, cultural and religious differences.
- defines strict requirements and standards for allocation of resources and appointments in the government.
- sharing gives an ultimate means for minorities to protect their interests. This is significant because there are various cases of overruling in Afghanistan.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 494.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 494.

In a multiethnic country like Afghanistan, power-sharing has most practical blueprint to create an inclusive government and accommodate the vital interest of each ethnic group. Therefore, it is potentially promising to avoid Afghanistan being the safe haven of the terrorists organizations in the future and accordingly avoid the tragic incidents like 9/11.

Conclusions

The conflict in Afghanistan is not a recent one but it has been there since its establishment due to ethnic divides. Therefore, linking the conflict in Afghanistan with regional and international issues is not an integral explanation. Such conceptualization is significant because how we understand the problem determines the solution to it. A considerable amount of literature indicated above shows that conceptualization of the Afghan conflict is mostly from a strategic perspective not a critical one which explores the deep roots of the problem in Afghanistan. These authors pay a close attention to strategic issues surrounding the incidents of 9/11 such as Al-Qaida and its allies leaving the essential question that how Taliban could take over Afghanistan and prepared training centers to Al-Qaida. They do however give some consideration to Cold War which was a major reason for the conflict in Afghanistan in 1990s.

Correlating the Afghan conflict with terrorism (Al-Qaeda) and Cold War is strong to explain the initiation of War on Terror and invasion of Afghanistan by US but not sufficient to explain the blue print of the long term peace in Afghanistan. These researches have limited the policy choice and lead the major part of US efforts in Afghanistan toward issues of terrorism and left out the measures required to address the deep roots of the conflict in Afghanistan. This is very important because if the deep roots of the conflict is not addressed and issues of ethnic divide is not resolved through a power sharing mechanism then the possibility of another international crisis is likely. Furthermore, resolving the ethnic divide is very essential because without it, it is difficult

to imagine the long term peace and stability in Afghanistan. This is also the major determinant of answer to the question of whether the country will fall into the hands of terrorists in the future or no. It also ignored the ethnic divide which has been source of the conflict in Afghanistan for centuries. Ignoring the ethnic divide as a foundational cause of the conflict left out the serious discussion and debate on ethnic divide and measures to address them. This in turn brought the un-debated centralized unitary government.

With the lack of debate it seemed very convincing for The West to believe that in absence of a strong centralized government, Afghanistan will fall apart into mini-states or align with neighbors.¹¹⁰ While historically Afghans had good chances of doing so but they did not. For example, in 1990s when there was no government and each ethnic group was armed and gained territorial control still they came to together to negotiate creation of a new government. Similarly, they had other good chances as well throughout the 250 years.

On the other hand, US believed that in absence of a centralized government the ethnic groups may go into another war therefore chose the reintegration strategy and created a unitary centralized government. US unilaterally decided the strategy it wanted to pursue and created a government it wanted and did not engage the Afghans namely the ethnic groups in the debate of which sort of government would work well in Afghanistan.

The ethnic groups namely Tajiks, Harazaras and Uzbeks had serious concerns over the prospects of the reintegration and unitary state believe they were worried that the centralized government will serve Pashtuns. Because there was ubiquitous power rivalries among ethnic groups during in the contemporary history of Afghanistan and it was very serious during the civil. Despite such

¹¹⁰Thomas Barfield. "Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power Before the U.S. Withdrawal." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): 54-55.

rivalries US created one of the most centralized government fiscally and administratively with a minor coordinating roles for the local governments. US was in a hurry to wrap up things quickly partly because there was an upcoming election in the US and the developments in Afghanistan could be a good achievement for the President Bush administration.

US aimed at rebuilding a multi-ethnic community through reintegration that went through war by returning the displaced people, disarming each group and followed with a centralized institutional design by creating diverse electoral districts which aimed at promoting cross ethnic appeals among leader. But in reality, the centralized institutional design which had one seat with all the power has made the appeals to be wholly on basis of ethnicity because of it the political interaction to come to be zero-sum. In such system one ethnic group come out to be the sole winner and others to be losers. These ethnic groups have fought one another in deadly battles and gone through extreme experiences of fear, misery and hatred, therefore, it is difficult to expect cross ethnic appeals.

Therefore the ethnic spoil is well established which allowed the ethnic leaders to play ethnic cards and maintained the community homogenous. In case of Afghanistan there are two things which can be added to Erin's concept of ethnic spoils; first, the type of system created can empower the ethnic spoils. Second, reintegration with a centralized government promoted discrimination regardless of communities being heterogeneous or homogenous. Reintegration also failed because institutions were not supportive of the process. These institutions are not well established, broken, discriminating and corrupt. A major reason is its design which allows only a specific group to decide policies and appoint officials and other reason could be long term war. As a result, reintegration coupled with corruption, discrimination and ethnic division has failed.

Power-sharing realizes ethnic division, and proposes measures to manage it before it turns into a bloody war. Furthermore, it realistically deals with the possibility manipulation of ethnicity and due to the fact that assimilation is limited and takes a very long time, therefore, it rejects the forging of the different ethnic groups into a homogenous community. Power-sharing can significantly decrease ethnic tensions by giving each ethnic group their proportional political power, and avoid suppression.

Power-sharing is relevant because the characterization of it has the capacity to mediate the security dilemma among ethnic groups and does not allow the ethnic spoils to promote hatred, division and discrimination. The four character of power-sharing can accommodate the interest of each ethnic groups in Afghanistan, give the required autonomy so groups can manage their distinctiveness, adopt transparent standards for appointments and allocation of funds, and the power for minorities to protect their core interests.

The ethnic groups which fought one another wanted to be fairly represented in the government; therefore, power-sharing upholding the participation of representatives can fairly accommodate the interest of each group. Institutional design is a vital thing in post-war and power-sharing suggesting numerous institutional reforms to create a parliamentary system. One of the reasons why power-sharing seems so relevant in case of Afghanistan is that it has a defined institutional design in which all of the ethnic groups will represented and none of the ethnic group can eliminate and discriminate others. The participation of representatives is vital any conflict because it proportionately divides resources and appointments among each group and leaves no room for discrimination.

Power-sharing in Afghanistan gives each of the ethnic group the required autonomy to accommodate their differences. This is very relevant in case of Afghanistan because each ethnic group is homogenous at a given part and autonomy is best way to manage the differences especially now that these ethnic groups fight on what to call the university. It is a long-term solution for ethnic groups' language, cultural and religious differences.

Power-sharing defines strict requirements and standards for allocation of resources and appointments in the government. Finally, power-sharing gives an ultimate means for minorities to protect their interests. This is significant because there are various cases of overruling in Afghanistan.

According to Arendt Lijphart power-sharing should be given a chance prior to the partition. And if power-sharing failed then the ultimate solution is to the ethnic war is partition. According to him partition as ultimate solution to end ethnic wars because of two major reasons, first, most violence is the result of government's effort to resist to, and second, even if partition may entail some violence still its way lesser when compared with the violence prior to partition.

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