CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2022
| Author | Bogataj Stopar, Ela |
|---|---|
| Title | Who the Moral Agent Is: A Case against Impersonal Ethics |
| Summary | In this thesis, I present an argument against conceptualising ethics as impartial. I begin by discussing the problems with universalizing moral requirements for all individuals, arguing that the impersonal point of view is insufficient to impart the same moral demands on everyone. We are meaningfully distinct from one another, and because of this we choose to act differently, as well as have different reasons for the choices we make. Thus, morality – if its purpose is in telling us how to live well – cannot prescribe sameness without compromising this aspect of humanity. Next, I consider the conception of morality as a system of rules or principles meant to guide action on the basis of sufficient similarity between different situations. I argue that the world is not repetitive enough that strict adherence to rules could adequately address each situation, as well as that the capacity to morally respond to a situation is only fully exercised when applied directly to the features of each situation. Accordingly, the power of moral rules to compel us to act in certain ways is limited at best. I proceed by giving a positive argument for a personal conception of morality. On my view, the distinctness of who each of us is is an essential component of our living good human lives. Insofar as our capacity to make moral choices is influenced by, as well as constitutive of, who we are, morality cannot be external to us or the same across the board. I conclude by addressing some objections to my position. |
| Supervisor | Huoranszki, Ferenc |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2022/bogataj-stopar_ela.pdf |
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