

# **Testing Selectorate Theory in a Hybrid Regime Context**

## **Does the Change to Presidential System Provide Greater Incentives for Public Good Provision?**

by  
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
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## Author's Declaration

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Vienna, 9 June 2022

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Merve Dumanli', is written over a horizontal line. The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial 'M'.

Signature

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First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Carsten Schneider, for his support and his insightful feedback which shed light on my research. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement and endorsement.

## **Abstract**

Untangling the redistributive effects of formal political institutions in the context of hybrid regimes remains a subject that requires further investigation. It is why this study addresses the question whether the change to presidential system provides greater incentives for public good provision compared to parliamentary system in the context of a backsliding hybrid regime. Through testing selectorate theory in the case of Turkey, this study delves into the changes in the winning coalition structure and public – private good provision entailing the shift to the presidential system. Selectorate theory suggest that presidential systems compared to parliamentary ones have larger winning coalitions, therefore, are performing better in terms of public good provision. However, in the case of Turkey, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the shift to presidential system downgraded the size of the winning coalition and decreased the amount of public goods provided, while private goods increased at a significant rate. These changes can be explained by the context in which the change to presidential system has taken place.

Democratic backsliding phenomena observed in the country during recent years established the ground for the change to presidential system which was seen as a guarantee for absolute control over the state institutions. Consolidating the control over the judiciary, decreasing the power of the parliament through overutilization of ordinary and emergency decrees, and intensifying the constitutional powers of the president without effective checks and balances provide proofs for arguing the presidential system has provided the ground for further authoritarianism and backsliding rather than increasing the size of the winning coalition and public good provision.

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## 1. Introduction

Redistribution characteristics of formal political institutions and regime type has been extensively studied in the literature with a democracy-autocracy dichotomy. Applying these theories and findings to hybrid regimes would yield inconclusive results since the institutional characteristics of governance systems can be interrupted by the attributions of the hybrid regimes such as substantial constitutional powers of the leader or the structure of the winning coalition. Therefore, untangling the redistributive effects of formal political institutions in the context of hybrid regimes remains a subject that requires further attention. It is why the objective of this study aims analyze the redistributive effects of parliamentary and presidential systems in the context of a backsliding hybrid regime through testing the selectorate theory.

Both empirical and theoretical studies concerning the redistributive effects of governance type put forward that presidential systems are associated with providing less incentives for redistribution compared to parliamentary systems (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Persson et al. 2000; Voigt 2011). On the other hand, profound literature on the effects of regime types underlines the argument that democracies distribute more due to inherent attributes of the regime that is shaped by median voter's preferences (Meltzer and Richard 1981), electoral competition (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Deacon 2009; Lake et al. 2001), and the characteristics of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Yet, both strands of the literature dominantly revolve around redistributive performances of developed democracies which are characterized by well-preserved institutional designs entailing checks and balances, separation of power, and rule of law (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Deacon 2009; Knutsen and Wegmann 2016; Lake et al. 2001).

Limited research on redistribution characteristics of hybrid regimes mainly focusses on the level of political competition and the breadth of suffrage (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Larcinese 2007; Wong 2021). While high level of participation yields positive effects on

redistribution, participation without competition increases the power of the elites with further control over the selectorate and eliminates the incentives to redistribute (Wong 2021). Therefore, electoral / competitive authoritarianism, which is characterized by high levels of participation and medium levels of competition, is anticipated to provide fewer incentives compared to democracies and autocracies (Wong 2021).

Since competitive / electoral authoritarianism as a subtype of hybrid regimes has turned into one of the most common types of regimes (Freedom House 2017), examining the implications of formal political institutions (i.e., presidential and parliamentary regimes) and their characteristics in terms of public good provision contributes to the literature by the inclusion of hybrid regimes and by the empirical application of the theory in hybrid regimes.

Through using selectorate theory as an explanatory tool, this study addresses the question whether the change to presidential system provides greater incentives for public good provision in the context of a hybrid regime in which democratic backsliding is observed. To test the hypothesis of selectorate theory regarding the public good provision in the parliamentary and presidential periods of Turkey, this research follows a single within case study design. The method is utilized in order to examine the causal mechanisms behind the public good provision in the presidential and parliamentary terms of Turkey. Since the presidential referendum took place in 2017 and the most recent data is available until 2021, the presidential period will be examined from 2017 to 2021. On the other hand, policy choices of the parliamentary period will be analyzed between 2002 and 2016. The persistence of the same incumbent party and the same leader in the concerned time period (2002-2021) establishes a reliable ground for ascribing the expected changes in public good provision to the changes in the governance type and winning coalition.

Selectorate theory asserts that when the size of the winning coalition is smaller, the leader has fewer incentives to provide public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno De

Mesquita et al. 2008). Therefore, the main characteristic of hybrid regimes which is an uneven field for political competition (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013) is associated with the use of public resources for the sake of the leader's survival through maintaining the support of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Intersecting the institutional aspect regardless of regime dichotomies, selectorate theory argues that presidential systems have larger winning coalitions, and the system provides greater incentives for redistribution in comparison to parliamentary systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

It is anticipated that the application of selectorate theory in the case of Turkey can take two different directions. As suggested by the theory, the change to presidential system produces greater incentives to utilize public goods as part of distribution policies due to the increase in the size of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2008). However, in a hybrid regime context, both the components of electoral and liberal democracy erode due to violations against the unfair competition field and institutional checks and balances (Sharman 2020). Because of these characteristics of hybrid regimes experiencing democratic backsliding, there would be less incentives for the leader's survival to provide public goods in the aftermath of the change in governance type.

In the case of Turkey, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the shift to presidential system downgraded the size of the winning coalition and decreased the public goods provided, while private goods increased at a significant rate. Situating the change to the presidential system as a product of democratic backsliding process the country has been facing, it can be asserted that the system has equipped the incumbent with the necessary constitutional powers to guarantee the control over all branches of the governance. Considering the indicators which are used to identify the winning coalition, autonomy of the election monitoring body and opposition parties were heavily violated, while barriers to political participation deteriorated during the presidential period compared to the parliamentary term. It is why the winning

coalition has become more exclusive and the size of the coalition has decreased compared to the parliamentary period. As a result, the ratio of provision of public goods over private goods changes in favor of private goods, which is affected by the increase observed in public corruption variable.

In the following chapters, firstly, the literature on redistribution characteristics of formal political institutions and hybrid regimes will be examined. This inquiry will be followed by a detailed discussion of selectorate theory under Theoretical Framework chapter. In line with selectorate theory's hypothesis regarding redistribution characteristics of parliamentary and presidential systems, main hypotheses of this study, which is going to be tested in the case of Turkey, will be constructed in the following chapter. Thereafter, further details concerning the methodology, data and operationalization methods, and case selection rationale will be elaborated under Methodology section. In the rest of the discussion, a detailed assessment of democratic backsliding narrative of the case country will be presented, and this will be followed by the application of selectorate theory.

## **2. Literature Review on Redistribution Characteristics of Formal Political Institutions and Hybrid Regimes**

A broad definition of income redistribution can be delineated as direct or indirect transfer of income from some citizens to others through different mechanisms such as taxation, welfare policies and / or provision of public goods such as education, healthcare, or security (Pei, Wang, and Du 2017). Governmental provision of public goods serves as an important redistributive device which can improve welfare of all citizens (Blomquist and Christiansen 1995; 1998). Some empirical studies portray the efficiency of governmental provision of public goods over other instruments of redistribution (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988; Blomquist and Christiansen 1995; 1998; Epple and Romano 1996a; 1996b).

The most acknowledged definition of a public goods -which emphasizes non-exclusiveness and non-rivalrous characteristics (Samuelson 1954; 1955)- is adopted in this study. To elaborate, a public good can be utilized by any individual without any additional cost and competition, once it is produced (Samuelson 1954; Holcombe et al. 1997). Universal provision of such public goods by the government maximizes welfare while redistributing the income from the top to the bottom (Besley and Coate 1991; Holcombe et al. 1997; Pei, Wang, and Du 2017).

The characteristics of formal political institutions -such as electoral systems, presidential or parliamentary governance types, and unitary or federal systems of government- produce divergent redistributive results in terms of public good provision (Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2009; Linz 1990a; 1990b; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; Siaroff 2003). Both theoretical and empirical studies that examine the effect of political institutions on redistributive policies dominantly center upon developed democracies. However, few studies have analyzed the redistribution characteristics of hybrid regimes, especially from the perspective of formal political institutions.

Considering distinct regime characteristics of hybrid regimes -such as the extent of decision-making power of the leader, the structure of the ruling coalition, the degree of party institutionalization, and political competition-, untangling the impact of formal political institutions in hybrid regimes requires a rigorous interaction of both bodies of literature. Therefore, in the following section, redistribution characteristics of formal political institutions will be examined firstly, and this will be followed by a detailed discussion on hybrid regimes and their redistributive performance.

## **2.1 Literature on Formal Political Institutions and Redistribution**

Established literature on parliamentary and presidential systems underlines the institutional differences in terms of vote of confidence (J. D. Huber 1996), legislative cohesion (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Voigt 2011), and dissolution power (Becher 2015; Kayser 2005; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Strøm and Swindle 2002; Warwick 1994) which are asserted to be explanatory variables in shaping the extent of redistribution.

One of the main institutional differences between parliamentary and presidential systems -paving the way for divergent public policy outcomes- is legislative cohesion. Legislative cohesion is deeply rooted in the use of the vote of confidence and agenda-setting power which hovers between budget and spending committees (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014, 436–37). Huber asserts that since governance in presidential regimes does not entail a parliamentary majority, the vote of confidence cannot be used as an alignment apparatus for policy preferences (J. D. Huber 1996). Therefore, presidential systems establish a ground for special interest-based competition for policymaking, which can be actualized through impromptu coalitions (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014, 436). As a result of the aforementioned characteristics, presidential systems are associated with less capacity to implement redistributive policies, having a smaller public spending budget, and special-interest-based and

targeted distribution policies (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Voigt 2011).

Another difference that shapes redistribution policies is the dissolution of power which varies according to the constitutional design and is different from the use of vote of confidence. Becher's study (2015) on democratic countries suggests that dissolution power can be explanatory for understanding the effects of formal institutions and their redistributive performance since it is also effective in the timing of elections (Becher 2015; Kayser 2005; Strøm and Swindle 2002) and the survival of the governments (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Warwick 1994). Becher argues that if the chief executive has dissolution power, there is a higher probability to observe overarching changes in the direction of the redistributive policies (Becher 2015).

Persson, Roland, and Tabellini's cross-country study (2000) focuses on developed democratic countries in order to examine the impact of governance types on redistribution regarding the size and allocation of government spending (Persson et al. 2000). Authors argue that presidential systems are typically qualified with having less total spending compared to parliamentary systems due to unbalanced decision-making power between the budget and spending committees that works for the benefit of the agenda-setter of the spending board (Persson et al. 2000, 1122–27). Such an institutional design equips the budget committee with the power to determine only the size of the budget, while the spending committee has the power to shape the allocation of the budget in the preferred direction (Persson et al. 2000). Thus, the study portrays that parliamentary regimes favor redistribution toward the majority, perform better in terms of public good provision, and provide more rents to politicians while presidential systems are characterized by counter attributes.

Along similar lines, Feld and Schnellenbach's empirical study (2014) examining the relationship between formal political institutions and redistributive outcomes in developed

democratic countries puts forward that presidential systems are significantly associated with less distributive policies, while parliamentary systems provide greater incentives for redistribution (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014). The study pointedly underlines the finding that in both types of governance, redistribution heavily relies upon transfers rather than taxation (Feld and Schnellenbach 2014, 439), which introduces the importance of different transfer types that are utilized by the formal institutions.

Although mentioned studies advance our understanding of parliamentary and presidential forms of governance and their redistribution-related policy outcomes, these studies heavily focus on developed democracies, which are characterized by well-preserved institutional designs entailing checks and balances, separation of power, and rule of law (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Deacon 2009; Knutsen and Wegmann 2016; Lake et al. 2001). However, applying these theories and findings to hybrid regimes would yield inconclusive results since the institutional characteristics of governance systems can be interrupted by the attributions of the regime such as the constitutional powers of the leader or the structure of the winning coalition. Therefore, traveling the literature on formal political institutions and their effect on redistribution into hybrid regime context requires a meticulous approach that takes into account country-specific dynamics and interaction between both works of literature. For this reason, the characteristics of hybrid regimes and their performance in terms of redistribution is unpacked in the following section.

## **2.2 Literature on Hybrid Regimes and Redistribution**

Established literature on democracies and their redistributive performance is built upon the argument that democracy establishes a ground for egalitarian distribution due to prioritization of equality and justice (Knutsen and Wegmann 2016), median voter's preferences (Meltzer and Richard 1981), mobilization of economic classes (E. Huber 2001), electoral competition (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Deacon 2009; Lake et al. 2001), and finally the

characteristics of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). On the other hand, emerging literature on autocratic regimes argues that autocracies have undeniable incentives to utilize redistribution policies for the purposes of the durability of the regime and the leader (Albertus and Menaldo 2014; Knutsen and Rasmussen 2018). In connection with the distinctive characteristics of autocracies, other scholars carefully underline the argument that the degree of distribution in autocracies is contingent upon the type of autocratic regime (Cassani 2017; Mares and Carnes 2009). Furthermore, the disruptive effect of regime transition reinforces the role of elites in shaping the extent and direction of distribution (Albertus and Menaldo 2014).

Since competitive / electoral authoritarianism as a subtype of hybrid regimes has turned into one of the most common regime types (Freedom House 2017), hybrid regimes have attracted the interest of scholars. The main characteristic of hybrid regimes is characterized by an uneven field for competition between political parties (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013). Although emerging literature on hybrid regimes with relation to regime characteristics has advanced, few studies examined the social performance of hybrid regimes with regards to redistribution.

Conventional theories which are rooted in democracies suggest that as the level of suffrage increases, it produces positive outcomes in terms of social spending and redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Lindert 2004). The application of median voter theory in competitive authoritarian regimes predicts the level of redistribution according to the level of political competition and the breadth of suffrage (Larcinese 2007; Powell 2000). As the size of the population which can engage in the electoral process increases, voters can shape redistribution policies closer to the median voter preferences (Larcinese 2007; Powell 2000). Similarly, the application of selectorate theory in hybrid regimes captures contestation through the size of the winning coalition and suffrage through the size of the selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Uneven political competition associated with hybrid regimes incentivizes

the leader or the incumbent to use public resources for maintaining the support of a certain group of elites who compromise the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

One of the recent studies, Wong's cross-country study provides empirical support on the matter by examining the redistributive effects of participation and contestation in hybrid regimes (Wong 2021). The study asserts that while contestation yields positive effects on redistribution, participation without competition increases the power of the elites with further control over the selectorate and eliminates the incentives to redistribute (Wong 2021). Therefore, electoral / competitive authoritarianism, which is characterized by high levels of participation and medium levels of competition, is anticipated to provide fewer incentives compared to democracies and autocracies (Wong 2021).


While theoretical studies that examine redistribution characteristics of hybrid regimes underline the extent of suffrage and the level of political competition as explanatory variables, empirical studies that utilize median voter theory and selectorate theory contribute to the literature with the inclusion of winning coalition characteristics. These studies demonstrate the effects of political competition that steers both the extent and types of public goods provided. Thus, changes in the structures of the selectorate and the winning coalition which stems from the change to presidential system provides the conditions for intersecting the literature on formal political institutions and hybrid regimes to compare their redistribution characteristics in terms of public good provision. Therefore, further discussion on selectorate theory is conducted in the consecutive Theoretical Framework chapter.

### 3. Theoretical Framework

Given the emphasis of the study with regards to competitive / electoral authoritarian regimes -as a sub-category of hybrid regimes- and democratic backsliding observed in the case of Turkey, selectorate theory is going to be utilized as a tool for explaining the ‘‘changes’’ in public good provision entailing the change in governance type.

Selectorate theory is established upon two main dimensions which are the selectorate and the winning coalitions (See Figure 1). In Logic of Political Survival, the selectorate is defined as the population ‘‘whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership’’, while the winning coalition is identified as a subset of the former which has the power to sustain the leader’s power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 42). The theory puts forward that the leaders use a variety of public and private goods in order to stay in power. The allocation of public and private goods is closely connected to the size of winning coalition (W) whose support bestows the incumbent with political power, the size of the selectorate (S) that has a say in the selection of the leader, and the ratio of winning coalition over the selectorate ( $W/S$ ) (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2008).

**Figure 1: Dimensions of Selectorate Theory**



**Source:** Illustrated based on Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 and [directed website](#).


The theory asserts that when the size of the winning coalition and the ratio ( $W/S$ ) is smaller, the leader has fewer incentives to provide public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2008). As both values converge on each other, the difference between public and private sources becomes insignificant. Depending upon the size of the coalition, the theory claims that small coalitions would perform poorly regarding the provision of public goods.

“When the selectorate is small, this means the policy preferences of the vast majority of residents can be ignored as a part of daily, routine politics. Only the preferences of the citizens in  $S$  need attention” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 70)

While public goods function as a redistribution tool that provides greater welfare to all, private goods are limited to the benefit of the key sub-group, the winning coalition, in order to preserve their loyalty to the leader (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2008).

The intersection of the theory with regime types and formal political institutions illustrates the result that both parliamentary and presidential systems carry similar selectorate characteristics, while the size of the winning coalition differs significantly (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) (See Figure 2). As a result, the ratio of winning coalition to the selectorate is higher in presidential forms of governance compared to parliamentary ones (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). With reference to the main hypothesis of selectorate theory, larger winning coalition and a higher  $W/S$  ratio would provide greater incentives for public good provision. In contrast to the literature on formal political institutions and their redistribution characteristics, it can be deduced that presidential systems can perform better with regard to redistribution compared to parliamentary systems.

**Figure 2: Regime Types, Coalition and Selectorate Size**



**Source:** Retrieved from Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 and [directed website](#)

Main critics directed toward selectorate theory underlines limitations related to the definitions of the key concepts and assumptions. Since the key concepts that are selectorate and winning coalition are conceptualized according to their size solely, the theory is criticized with the argument that it ignores the characteristics of the selectors which is relevant to understanding different regime types (Gallagher and Hanson 2015; Kennedy 2009; Roeder 1993), and it perceives the selectorate as a homogenous body (Gallagher and Hanson 2015). Therefore, the assumption that the members of the selectorate can be interchangeable in a way that they have equal chances to be a part of the winning coalition is also criticized due to overlooking the attributions and preferences of the selectors (Gallagher and Hanson 2015). Selectorate theory is also criticized from the perspective that since authoritarian regimes lack or have ineffective formal political institutions to structure regime transition (Gallagher and Hanson 2015), key concepts of the theory might be disputable.

Considering the application of the theory in the case study of Turkey, both limitations regarding the composition and characteristics of the selectorate can be seen as inconclusive constraints. Since the change to presidential system from a parliamentary type of governance had taken place as part of democratic backsliding observed during the concerned time period,

the change in formal political institutions can be seen as the main explanatory variable. Moreover, the composition and the size of the selectorate between the parliamentary and presidential periods would not substantially alter. Therefore, the changes in the size and composition of the winning coalition would vary between the interested periods because of the change to presidential system, which can be linked to changing incentives regarding public good provision.

Another controversial hypothesis of the theory which is related to the contrast between parliamentary and presidential systems states that the latter provides more incentives for public-oriented redistribution through public good provision (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Testing this hypothesis in the context of a hybrid regime contributes to the application of the theory through reconciling the theory with backsliding hybrid regimes as well as intersecting the literature on redistributive characteristics of formal political institutions.

### **3.1 Research Question and Hypothesis**

The main objective of this research is to analyze the impact governance types - parliamentary and presidential systems- on public good provision under competitive / electoral authoritarian rule in which democratic backsliding is significant. Therefore, this study attempts to answer the research question: “Does the change to presidential system provide greater incentives for public good provision compared to parliamentary systems in the context of a hybrid regime in which democratic backsliding is observed?”. Therefore, the independent variable of the study is the change to presidential system from a parliamentary system, while the dependent variable is the public and private good provision. The context of the study which underlines regime characteristics along with the phenomenon of democratic backsliding provides a new perspective for the application of selectorate theory.

The theory suggest that presidential systems compared to parliamentary ones have larger winning coalitions, therefore, are performing better in terms of public good provision as a policy preference for the leader's survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Considering the distinct characteristics of hybrid regimes which are intensified through democratic backsliding, political institutions are utilized as means of consolidating power and tilting the political play field in favor of the ruling party (Bermeo 2016; Dresden and Howard 2015; Levitsky and Way 2010). As a result, manipulation of electoral field and erosion on formal limits on executive authority becomes prominent in shaping the political arena. Thereof, in hybrid regime context, both the components of electoral and liberal democracy erode due to violations against unfair competition field and institutional checks and balances (Sharman 2020). For instance, leaders in presidential systems where democratic backsliding is observed often have higher levels of control over the legislature branch, thereof, practice of vote of no confidence and impeachment remain improbable (Sharman 2020).

In such a context, the change in governance type -the shift to presidential system- can be seen as a product of backsliding process rather than treating the change with typologies applied to democratic presidential systems. Therefore, these important elements of backsliding hybrid regimes need to be tested against the hypothesis of selectorate theory claiming that presidential system would increase the winning coalition size and paves the way for greater incentives for public good provision. Testing the theory within a competitive / authoritarian regime, where the effects of different forms of governance can be observed through changes in the structure of the winning coalition, contributes to the application of the theory through in-depth within-country analysis.

In order to test the theory, the case of Turkey comes to the forefront to observe the effect of both governance types on the public good provision in the context of a backsliding hybrid

regime. It is anticipated that the application of selectorate theory in the case of Turkey can take two different directions.


**Hypothesis 1:** The change to presidential system provides greater incentives for public good provision compared to parliamentary systems in a backsliding hybrid regime context. (Affirmative result for Selectorate Theory) (See Figure 3)

As suggested by the theory, the shift to presidential system can produce greater incentives to utilize public goods as part of distribution policies due to two reasons. Firstly, the minimum winning coalition size in presidential systems requires the support of ‘‘50 % + 1’’ of voters to become a president or remain in the position while the same coalition size in parliamentary systems can range between ‘‘25% + 1’’ of voters to ‘‘50 % + 1’’. Secondly, since presidential system introduces multi-party coalitions to the Turkish political arena, these coalitions function as a bottom-line factor for both elections and policymaking. As a result, multi-party coalitions accompanied by the changes in the minimum winning coalition size can be linked to the increase in the size of the winning coalition, which results in a greater W/S ratio and greater incentives for public good provision. If Hypothesis I is confirmed, it means that the theory also travels to backsliding hybrid regimes.

**Hypothesis 2:** The change to presidential system would not affect or would eliminate the incentives for public good provision compared to parliamentary systems in a backsliding hybrid regime context. (Negative result for Selectorate Theory) (See Figure 3)

Since the change to presidential system took place in a period when democratic backsliding was witnessed, presidential system has equipped the president with substantial constitutional powers in the absence of checks and balances. As a result, presidential system provides the necessary legal ground for weakening the power of the parliament, increasing the power of the executive, and consolidating the control over the judiciary (Akçay 2021; Cilliler 2021; Esen and Gumuscu 2018; Tas 2018). Therefore, despite the changes in winning coalition size and the respective ratio of the winning coalition over the selectorate, the shift to presidential system would not yield significant improvements in public good provision due to certain institutional characteristics of the system. If Hypothesis II is confirmed, it proves that democratic backsliding should be considered as an intervening variable that decreases the explanatory power of the theory in hybrid regime context. Consequently, confirmation of Hypothesis II provides a call for modification of the theory.

**Figure 3: Main Hypotheses**



## 4. Research Design

### 4.1 Case Selection

Levitsky and Way's definition of competitive authoritarian regimes identifies competitive / authoritarian regimes in which "formal democratic institutions exist and are used as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage *vis-à-vis* their opponents" (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5). Following this definition, it can be stated that Turkey meets the most significant attributes of hybrid regimes which are uneven play field in multiparty politics, erosion of institutional checks and balances on executive power, and impairing the state and party distinction (Akçay 2021; Baskan 2015; Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Somer 2016). Along with the prominent hybrid regime characteristics, the most dominant form of democratic backsliding observed in Turkey is asserted to be "executive aggrandizement" which stems from weakening of executive power through institutional changes that restrain the opposition to challenge executive preferences (Akçay 2021; Bermeo 2016, 11).

In such a context where democratic backsliding has unsettling effects on formal political institutions, the change in governance type -the shift to presidential system- can be seen as a product of backsliding process. The change from parliamentary system to presidential system - which entails the consolidation of power, absence of checks and balances, and bestowing the head of state with substantial powers- provides a ground for change in the clientelist nature of the public good provision (Akyuz and Hess 2018; Cilliler 2021; Özsoy Boyunsuz 2016). Also, the instrumental and targeted provision of public goods and their significant role in creating support for the shift to presidential system signal significant changes in the public goods provision (Özel and Yıldırım 2019). Thereby, the case of Turkey presents the necessary conditions for observing the impact of both presidential and parliamentary governance in the context of a hybrid regime in which democratic backsliding is observed.

## 4.2 Methodology

This research follows single within case method to test the above-mentioned hypotheses based on selectorate theory regarding public and private good provision in the parliamentary and presidential periods of the case country, Turkey. The time frame of the study will comprise the 2002 – 2021 period to control incumbent party-related policy changes. Since the presidential referendum took place in 2017 and the most recent data is available until 2021, the presidential period will be examined between 2017 - 2021. On the other hand, policy choices of the parliamentary period will be analyzed between 2002 and 2016.

Single within case method is utilized in order to examine the causal mechanisms behind the public and private good provision in presidential and parliamentary systems. Benefiting from this method brings the advantages of minimizing the confounding effects of institutional ruptures and the legacy of past regimes. Moreover, the persistence of the same incumbent party and the same leader in the observed time period (2002-2021) establishes a reliable ground for ascribing the expected changes in public and private good provision to the changes the winning coalition as a consequence of the change to presidential system. On the other hand, examining the impact of a recent phenomenon -the shift to presidential system taking place in 2017- brings a drawback to the study by limiting the presidential period to a rather short span of time.

## 4.3 Data and Operationalization<sup>1</sup>

The latest revision of selectorate theory (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022) aims to enhance the explanatory power of the theory through testing and addressing the critiques posed by some scholars (Clarke and Stone 2008; Gallagher and Hanson 2015; Kennedy 2009;). Therefore, it offers a more favorable measurement method for its core concepts -the selectorate,

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<sup>1</sup> Further information on indicators and measurement method can be found in the Annex section.

winning coalition, public and private goods- while using institution-based continuous indicators developed by the V-dem project (Coppedge et al. 2021).

In sum, this research incorporates the same definitions and conceptualization of core dimensions of selectorate theory and follows the measurement methods used in the revised version of the theory with an aim to test the theory in the case of Turkey to compare the public good provision during the parliamentary and presidential terms.

#### **4.3.1 Measuring the Selectorate and Winning Coalition**

Empirical assessments of one of the main dimensions of the theory that is winning coalition have been critically approached by scholars regarding the theory's accuracy in differentiating policy choices between democratic and non-democratic regimes as well as within regime policy disparities (Clarke and Stone 2008; Gallagher and Hanson 2015; Kennedy 2009). In response to the criticisms, a more nuanced measurement of the winning coalition based on four institutional dimensions was constructed and tested by the authors. The main motivation behind using continuous institutional dimensions to measure winning coalition is based on selectorate theory's conceptualization of governance in terms of institutional incentives rather than using categorical -democratic or autocratic- or behavioral characteristics. Thus, the theory claims that policy differences between different regime types can be reduced to institutional incentives (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022).

Denoted by the authors, 'the new coalition indicator, which underlines institutional incentives, significantly outperforms the alternatives' (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022, 2). Therefore, throughout this study, the winning coalition will be measured with the following indicators: autonomy of election monitoring body, opposition party's autonomy, barriers to political party participation, and closed succession (hereditary, military, single party setting) (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022, 5).

These four institutional dimensions are chosen to measure to what extent the winning coalition is accessible or restrictive. The first indicator, autonomy of election monitoring body, demonstrates the institutional incentives which determine the selectorate's or a certain class of selectorate's -i.e., the ruling party or military- power to choose the government. The size of the winning coalition increases as there is an institutionalized and autonomous election monitoring body exist in the respective country (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022) . Since the presence of an autonomous election monitoring board is not enough to secure a large winning coalition given the examples of one-party states (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022), the second indicator comes into play to assess whether the opposition can participate in the elections independent of the incumbent party. The third indicator, barriers to political party participation, measures the restrictions to form competitive parties. As there is less requirements to establish a political party, thereof, greater political competition, there is a greater likelihood to observe a larger winning coalition (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022). Finally, succession characteristics is included in the measurement to differentiate non-electoral political systems. For the selectorate dimension, the size of the selectorate will be measured with the percentage of the population with suffrage.

The following indicators will be used to measure the independent variable of this research to capture the change in the selectorate and winning coalition size entailing the change to presidential system. (See Table 1)

**Table 1: Measuring the Selectorate and Winning Coalition**

Measuring the Selectorate	Measuring the Winning Coalition
Percentage of population with suffrage (v2elsuffrage)	Autonomy of election monitoring body (v2elembaut)
	Opposition parties' autonomy (v2psoppaut)
	Barriers to political party participation (v2psbars)

	Closed Succession: Indicators of succession by heredity or within a military or single party setting (v2x_ex_hereditary/military/party)
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**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12., Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022

The central assumption of the theory that ‘policy choices -in other words, the allocation of public and private goods- are shaped by institutional incentives’ (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022, 4; Clarke and Stone 2008, 387) is acknowledged in this research. Therefore, it is anticipated that changes in the size of the winning coalition would yield significant consequences in terms of policy choices between the presidential and parliamentary periods.

#### **4.3.2 Measuring Public and Private Goods**

The dependent variable of the study, the provision of public goods, is defined through non-excludable and non-rivalrous characteristics (Sharman 2020, 11). While the former attribute emphasizes that each individual can benefit from its usage without any restriction, the latter characteristic elucidates that one’s usage of the public good does not prevent another from enjoying it (Samuelson 1954; 1955). Established upon these two characteristics, selectorate theory’s definition of public goods incorporates the assumption that the use of such goods cannot be restricted to the supporters of the leader -winning coalition- but can be enjoyed by the whole society. On the contrary, private goods directly benefit the supporters of the leader and incentivize the supporters to remain loyal to the leader.

Since most public goods can be private in their productions (Aranson and Ordeshook 1985; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), drawing a sharp separation line between the public and private goods is a difficult mission. Therefore, the theory is concerned with the allocation of public and private goods and addresses the question of how selection institutions such as the coalition and the selectorate shape the balance between them (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

Both the earlier versions of the theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2008), empirical tests conducted by other scholars (Bausch 2014; Cao and Ward 2015; Kennedy 2009; Wong 2018), and the recent revision of selectorate theory (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022) make a distinction between the core and general public goods. Key public goods are comprised of civil liberties, political rights, transparency, peace / war-related indicators. All public goods in their essence are goods provided by the government that enhance the common welfare of the citizens.

On the other hand, the conceptualization of private goods in the earlier version of the theory was constituted upon black market exchange rate, corruption, and construction (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). However, the recent revision provides a more sophisticated measurement of private goods which crosses out construction-related indicators while providing a more extensive measurement with regard to corruption (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022).

To quantify the dependent variable of this research which is policy choices regarding the public and private good provision, the following indicators will be utilized. (See Table 2)

**Table 2: Measuring Public and Private Goods**

Key Public Goods	Key Private Goods
Public Goods (v2peapspol)	Corruption (v2excrptps)
Goods Ratio (v2peapspol/ v2x_pubcorr)	Executive Corrupt (v2x_execorr)
Public Goods or Clientelism (v2dlencmps)	Public Sector Theft (v2exthtps)
Transparent Laws (v2cltrnslw_osp)	Clientelism (v2xnp_client)
Elite Want Common Good (v2dlcommon)	Judge Corrupt (v2jucorrdc)
Public Want Common Good (v2dlengage)	
Free Expression (v2x_freexp)	

**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12., Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022

In order to test selectorate theory in the case of Turkey, the size of the winning coalition and the selectorate for each year will be measured. The measurement is constructed by summing the standardized values of four-dimension and dividing by four to take the average score for each year. Correspondingly, annual policy choices in terms of public and private goods will be aggregated based on standardized averages of the above-mentioned indicators and also their development will be illustrated separately.

## **5. The Case of Turkey: Narrative of the Change to Presidential System**

Following the democratic backsliding definition of some of the most recent works (Bermeo 2016; Dresden and Howard 2015), Turkey comes forward as a case which portrays characteristics of each dimension of the definition including consolidation of power in the hands of the ruling party, manipulation of the electoral field, and erosion of formal limits on executive authority (Akçay 2021; Akyuz and Hess 2018). Although identifying the beginning of democratic backsliding in Turkey is a controversial subject in the literature, scholars agree upon the argument that political actions undertaken by the ruling party including the change in governance type has reversed the direction toward further authoritarianism. (Akçay 2021; Akyuz and Hess 2018; Bayulgen 2018; Esen and Gumuscu 2018a; 2018b; 2019; Tas 2018; Gunay and Dzihic 2016; Gurbey 2019; Hekimci 2020; Kirisci and Sloat 2019; Meyersson 2016; Selcuk and Tansel 2018; Somer 2016; Yazıcı 2015; Yılmaz and Turner 2019; Yılmaz 2011). This controversy in terms of identifying the early onset of democratic backsliding is rooted in the characteristics of hybrid regimes which erode democratic quality under the legal disguise (Cilliler 2021; Somer et al. 2021; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019). In order to examine the backsliding dynamics of Turkey before and after presidential system, both empirical findings which took place in both terms and the consequences of presidential system will be covered in the following sections.


### **5.1 Democratic Backsliding Before the Change to Presidential System**

Some scholars identify the onset of democratic backsliding actions observed in Turkey as early as 2003 by stating that civil liberties have been incrementally curtailed and electoral playing field has been tilted in favor of the ruling party through deliberate regime choices (Akyuz and Hess 2018, Cilliler 2021). Intolerance toward opposition since 2003 (Cosar and Ozman 2004, 58), weakening basic constitutional rights such as free speech since 2005 (Yılmaz

2011, 2) and suppression of media since 2007 has been underlined as the authoritarian turning points (Bayulgen 2018; Cilliler 2021).

On the other hand, some analysts and scholars put forward that Turkey has started to drift apart from democratic values as of 2013, and these analyses emphasize the democratic progress incited by reforms undertaken for EU membership between 2002 – 2007 during the first term of the ruling party (Cilliler 2021; Meyersson 2016; Tansel 2018). From 2002 until 2004, Turkey’s penal code was reformed, media channels in minority languages were encouraged, and the uses of torture was restricted (Akyuz and Hess 2018). As a result, the country’s performance in terms of political and civil rights improved in Freedom House’s democracy index. According to Freedom House, Turkey’s score for political rights improves from 4 to 3 between 2002 – 2003 and gets stalled until 2016, after which the performance of the country deteriorates. Considering civil rights, there were improvements observed between 2002 - 2005. After 2005, both civil and political rights were either stalled or downgraded. (See Figure 4)

**Figure 4: Political and Civil Rights in Turkey**




**Source:** Illustrated based on Freedom House data

The evaluation of Freedom House data identified Turkey’s authoritarian breakpoint as 2005 (Cilliler 2021; Meyersson 2016, 4; Yilmaz 2011). After 2005, observers started to warn

about the shift toward competitive authoritarianism by stating the decline in competitiveness, violations on civil liberties, and incumbent's manipulation of government resources for the interest of the party (Cilliler 2021). Along similar lines, Esen and Gumuscu asserts that Turkey has evidently transitioned into a competitive authoritarian regime as the incumbent increased control over state institutions via electoral success and used this power to constitute hegemony over the society, (Akyuz and Hess 2018; Esen and Gumuscu 2018). Since 2005, Turkey's scores on political and civil liberties have been declining at an alarming rate. As a result, competitiveness of the elections was deteriorated, impartiality of the courts was heavily deteriorated, civil liberties were weakened, and incumbent's discretionary control over state resources was strengthened (Akca 2021; Akyuz and Hess 2018; Way 2008). (See Figure 5)

**Figure 5: Political and Civil Rights in Turkey (Aggregated)**



**Source:** Illustrated based on Freedom House data

Although authoritarian characteristics has started to emerge in 2005, democratic backsliding gained momentum during recent years. After 2007 constitutional amendment referendum, parliamentary type of governance converged closer to semi-presidential system in which council of ministers still exist and the president is responsible to the parliament while the popularly elected president is endowed with substantial powers (Ozbudun 2012; 2015). Consequently, 2010 constitutional amendment referendum changed nomination, appointment

and promotion procedures of the Constitutional Court and High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HYSK) in favor of the incumbent (Cilliler 2021). Under the disguise of these legal arrangements, the ruling party has intensified control over state apparatus (Esen and Gumuscu 2018; Gurbey 2019; Kirisci and Sloat 2019; Somer 2016; Tas 2018), instrumentalized punishment toward dissidents, and utilized reward mechanisms to maintain the loyalty toward the party while “functioning as a machine in the redistribution of state resources” (Akçay 2021; Cilliler 2021; Gunay and Dzihic 2016; Luca 2020; Sekhniashvili 2017).

In 2013, bans on social and conventional media channels have become prevalent while restrictions on peaceful protests and demonstrations were followed by excessive use of police force (Akyuz and Hess 2018; Esen and Gumuscu 2019; Yazıcı 2015). The country also witnessed a major corruption investigation which was initiated by law enforcement officers at the same year. The investigations involved high-ranking AKP members, ministers and family members of the prime minister. With an attempt to suspend the allegations a vast number of government officials such as judges, prosecutors, and security officers were discharged, reappointed or detained as a result of corruption allegations (Akyuz and Hess 2018).

In 2014, Erdogan -prime minister of the time- campaigned for the first direct presidential election and elected as a president with 51% of the votes (Kirisci and Sloat 2019). International observers reported that the conduct of the elections was heavily characterized by misuse of state resources and political competition was tilted in favor of the incumbent (OSCE 2015; Yazıcı 2015). Following the presidential elections, control over judicial branch was intensified by modification of the structure of the higher courts with a majority of pro-government judges (Ozbudun 2015a, 7). After 2016 coup attempt, further control over the state institutions was practiced with dismissal, imprison and detention of public officials and academics (Yılmaz and Turner 2019).

As a result of the democratic backsliding process which started in 2005, the incumbent secured substantial control over the judiciary, security forces and the army (Akyuz and Hess 2018). All these developments established the ground for the change to presidential system which was seen as a guarantee for absolute control over the state institutions (Cilliler 2021).

## **5.2 Democratic Backsliding after the Change to Presidential System**

Constitutional arrangements carried out after 2017 presidential referendum replaced the parliamentary governmental system with a presidential system. The referendum which took place in April 2017 was concluded with 51% affirmative vote of the citizens in favor of the amendment (OSCE 2017). With the alliance of Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Justice and Development Party (AKP, the incumbent), the qualified majority vote of the MPs -330 out of 550- which was necessary for the constitutional amendment was reached to legalize unconstitutional power consolidation in the hands of the president (Cilliler 2021; Tas 2018). In June 2018, both presidential and general elections were conducted under the state of emergency which was declared on 21st of July 2016, after the coup attempt (Cilliler 2021; Tas 2018). The results of the elections carried Erdogan to the presidency with 52,6% of the votes, while Justice and Development Party (AKP) obtained the majority of the seats -295 out of 600- in the parliament (Cilliler 2021).

Given the background of the shift to presidential system, both the timing of the elections which took place under state of emergency and the constitutional changes entailing the shift to presidential systems have been criticized by scholars for the creation of an unfair electoral playing field and reinforcing further authoritarianism, thereof, democratic backsliding (Cilliler 2021; Esen and Gumuscu 2018; 2019; Gurbey 2019; Kirisci and Sloat 2019; Ozsoy Boyunsuz 2016). European Council of Venice Commission's report criticized the constitutional amendment, which paved the way for the shift to presidential system, by stating that the system would lead to a personal regime (Venice Commission 2017a; 2017b). Other studies that delve

into the effects of the change in governance type emphasize the centralization of power in the executive, diminished power of the legislative branch and polarization of judiciary (Cilliler 2021; Gurbey 2019; Kirisci and Sloat 2019).

In the single-headed presidential system, the president has been endowed with absolute power over the executive processes including appointment of all ministers and high-ranking public officers without the consent of the parliament and the judiciary (Law no. 6771, Article 8; Venice Commission 2017a; 2017b). Moreover, the amendment enabled centralization of executive power in the hands of the president by allowing the president to remain his position as the chairperson of the political party (Law no. 6771, Article 18; Venice Commission 2017a; 2017b). As a chairperson, the president has also had the power to select primary MP candidates of his party, which paved the way for monopoly over legislative decision-making process (Cilliler 2021).

Another aspect that diminishes the power of the legislative branch is the constitutional changes related to overriding presidential veto power. The presidential amendment increased the simple parliamentary majority requirement with an absolute majority rule for overriding the presidential veto power of a legislative bill (Law no. 6771, Article 16c; Venice Commission 2017a; 2017b; Cilliler 2021; Ozsoy Boyunsuz 2016).

Along similar lines, parliamentary overview mechanisms were weakened while censure and vote of confidence power of the parliament were abolished following the change to presidential system (Cilliler 2021; Ozsoy Boyunsuz 2016). The impeachment process was scaled up to two-thirds majority rule from absolute parliamentary majority requirement, which makes the impeachment mechanism practically ineffective (Cilliler 2021; Egeresi 2018). On the other hand, one of the parliamentary supervision mechanisms that is questions of MPs were confined to be submitted in written form and only can be directed to the vice-president and / or

ministers while head of the government, president, is exempt from acquisition and supervision mechanisms (Cilliler 2021).

Furthermore, legislative power of the parliament has been transferred to the president through ordinary presidential decrees and emergency decrees (Cilliler 2021; Esen and Gumuscu 2018; 2019; Ozsoy Boyunsuz 2016). The ordinary presidential decrees have excluded the fundamental, individual, and political rights out of its scope while parliamentary ratification was not required (Cilliler 2021). On the other hand, emergency decrees are immediately effective after being published and are required to be ratified in the parliament within three-month duration (Cilliler 2021). Since emergency decrees are free from judicial overview and immediately executed after being published, it provides a ground for execution of undemocratic and irreversible measures (Cilliler 2021). Between 2002 – 2016, the government issued 35 executive decrees and this number went up to 37 in the consequent two-year period during which state of emergency lasted (Cilliler 2021). After the change to presidential system, the number of executive decrees dramatically increased to 65 during 2018 – 2020 (Cilliler 2021). As Kaboglu puts forward, the number of presidential decrees which corresponds to 2,229 articles significantly surpasses the volume of parliamentary legal arrangements which comprises 1,493 articles (Cilliler 2021). This dramatic change in terms of overutilization of executive decrees clearly portrays the power consolidation in the hands of the executive and diminishing power of the legislative.

Regarding judicial arrangements entailing the shift to presidential system, presidential control over the judicial appointments increased to an extent that six members of Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) were appointed by the president and the remaining seven members were appointed by the parliament which is dominated by the political party chaired by the president (Cilliler 2021). The control over Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) is critical since the institution has the authority to appoint, transfer, promote, investigate, and

punish high-ranking judiciary officials (Council of Judges and Prosecutors 2020). Therefore, entire judiciary branch can be controlled as domination over Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) is secured (Ozbudun, 2015a; 2015b).

The authoritarian dynamics observed before the change to presidential system have been perpetuated by the legal arrangements entailing the constitutional amendment. Weakening the power of the parliament, increasing the power of the president / executive, which is exempt from parliamentary scrutiny, and deepening the control over the judiciary branch offers tangible proofs of further authoritarianism and backsliding accelerated after the shift to presidential system (Akçay 2021; Cilliler 2021; Esen and Gumuscu 2018; Tas 2018).

After vividly elaborating the democratic backsliding narrative observed in the time period of the study, in the next chapter, selectorate theory will be tested in the parliamentary and presidential periods of Turkey through measuring the changes in winning coalition, public and private good provision.

## 6. Testing Selectorate Theory<sup>2</sup>

Irrespective of the regime type, selectorate theory puts forward that presidential systems provide greater incentives for public good provision since the size of the winning coalition is larger compared to parliamentary forms of governance (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2022). However, testing the theory in the context of a competitive / electoral authoritarian regime, a subtype of hybrid regimes, entails the aspects of manipulation of the electoral playing field, consolidation of power in the hands of the leader, and erosion of formal political institutions (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013). Therefore, in hybrid regimes where democratic backsliding is prominently experienced, democratic characteristics of the regime erodes away while the regime takes authoritarian turn.

In this context, a change in governance type from parliamentary to presidential system can be seen as a product of backsliding process, which enables further control over formal institutions under legal disguise. Hence, the shift to presidential system would not increase the size of the winning coalition due to uneven field for political competition, use of executive aggrandizement, and increased hegemony over institutions. As a result, the use of public and private goods would be characterized with clientelist nature for maintaining the loyalty of the winning coalition.

As Turkey becomes one of the prominent cases of democratic backsliding in the context of hybrid regimes (Selcuk and Hekimci 2020), it provides the necessary conditions for testing selectorate theory regarding its hypothesis on presidential and parliamentary systems. In the following sections, main dimensions of the theory -winning coalition, public and private good provision- are tested in the parliamentary (2002 – 2016) and presidential (2017 – 2022) periods of Turkey.

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
<sup>2</sup> Distribution of the data can be found in the Annex.

## 6.1 Identifying the Selectorate and Winning Coalition

Revised version of selectorate theory measures the main dimensions of the theory through continuous institutional indicators provided by V-dem data. The size of the selectorate is identified as the percentage of population with suffrage (v2elsuffrage). In the case of Turkey, all adult citizens have the right to vote in national elections both in the parliamentary period (2002- 2016) and presidential (2017 – 2021) periods of the analysis. Therefore, the changes in the size of the winning coalition are decisive to explain the institutional incentives for public and private good provision in the respective periods.

The main indicators composing the winning coalition size include autonomy of election monitoring body (v2elembaut), opposition parties' autonomy (v2psoppaut), barriers to political party participation (v2psbars), and closed succession which indicates whether or not the chief executive is determined by hereditary, military or ruling party succession. Figure 6 illustrates the trend in each indicator separately based on the V-dem data.

**Figure 6: Winning Coalition Indicators**



**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12, Rescaled between 0-1


In the parliamentary period, the average autonomy of election monitoring body corresponds to 1,13 while the mean of the presidential period is equal to -0,21. Although there is a significant decrease in the autonomy of election monitoring body starting in 2013, after the change to presidential system -which took place in 2017-, autonomy of the body is heavily deteriorated. After 2017, the indicator takes negative values which suggests that the election monitoring body is heavily controlled by the incumbent government. In line with above-mentioned studies which assert that the new system has accelerated democratic backsliding due to 2017 constitutional amendments, the ruling party has secured a tilted playing field *vis-à-vis* the opposition in the absence of institutional checks and balances and increased control over political institutions (Esen and Gumuscu 2018). Re-run of the Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor election in 2019, which was resulted in favor of the opposition candidate, provides another example of uneven political competition while demonstrating the consolidated control over Supreme Election Council (Cilliler 2021).

Considering the opposition parties' autonomy (v2psoppaut), during the parliamentary period opposition parties were more autonomous and independent of the ruling regime (mean: 1,73), while co-optation by the ruling regime increases in the presidential period (mean: 1,01). It is also noteworthy to underline that the decrease in the autonomy of opposition parties has started after 2015. In terms of barriers to political party participation (v2psbars), the presidential period is characterized with more obstacles to form political parties (mean: 0,89) compared to the parliamentary period (mean: 1,25). In 2015 general elections, both opposition party representatives and international observers reported that the electoral process was manipulated in favor of the incumbent while the ruling party utilized governmental resources and media access during election campaign (Akyuz and Hess 2018; Kirisci and Sloat 2019).

The only variable which portrays a contrasting trend compared to above-mentioned indicators shows that the presidential period is characterized with open succession attributes in comparison to the parliamentary period which is dominated by military succession.

Average values of winning coalition indicators portray that in terms of autonomy of election monitoring body, opposition parties' autonomy, and barriers to political party participation; Turkey had performed better in the parliamentary period compared to the presidential term. On the other hand, regarding closed succession variable, Turkey performs slightly better in the presidential period which means there is less likelihood for the military or the ruling party to determine the chief executive.

**Figure 7: Winning Coalition Size (Aggregated)**



**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12, Author's calculation


Winning coalition size which is measured by aggregating the above-mentioned indicators reveals that the average coalition size in the parliamentary period (0,46) is higher in comparison to the presidential term (0,34). Even though selectorate theory puts forward that presidential systems are characterized with larger winning coalition size, the shift to presidential system in Turkey paves the way for downsizing of the coalition. It is important to emphasize that the downward trend observed in the size of the winning coalition has started after 2013. The decrease in the winning coalition also intersects with the democratic backsliding

phenomenon which became prominent as of 2013 due to the incumbent's unprecedented control over various political institutions. (See Figure 7)

## 6.2 Identifying Key Public Goods

Key public goods are composed of the following indicators: access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol), goods ratio constructed with the inclusion of public sector corruption index (goodsratio), nature of the public goods in terms of whether or not these goods are particularistic (v2dlencmps), transparency of the laws (v2cltrnslw\_osp), elites (v2dlcommon) and public's (v2dlengage) position in the midst of policy changes, and freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp). The following figure illustrates the trend in each public good indicator separately. (See Figure 8)

**Figure 8: Key Public Good Indicators**



**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12, Rescaled between 0-1


Equal access to public goods in both terms takes negative values which means that political group affiliation plays a significant role in accessing basic public services. Average value of equal access to public goods displays a slight improvement in the presidential period. As a general trend, the ratio of public goods over private goods changes in favor of private goods which is affected by the increase observed in public corruption variable. The nature of the public goods provided during the presidential period is significantly particularistic, in other words, both social and infrastructure spending is narrowly targeted and shaped by clientelist nature. This symbiotic and clientelist change in public good provision also provides the ground for elites do not justify their position with regards to the common good of the society or the disadvantaged groups in the midst of policy changes. Finally, the long-standing deterioration in freedom of expression variable can be related to the government's attempts to suppress civil society and media organizations (Akyuz and Hess 2018; Cilliler 2021).

Studies focusing on clientelist redistribution of public resources emphasize that public investments in infrastructure, construction and housing have been used as a punishment or reward mechanism by the ruling party especially during the recent terms of the government (Gunay and Dzihic 2016; Luca 2020). Simultaneously, the same mechanism has been used to build and sustain the loyalty toward the leader via “redistribution of public goods through clientelist channels” (Gunay and Dzihic 2016; Marshall et al. 2015). As a result of amendments in Public Procurement Act and Public Private Partnerships, the incumbent has secured the loyalty of capital owners and lower segments of society (Cilliler 2021).

On the other hand, there is a significant decrease in transparency and predictability of the laws during the presidential period. Both clientelism and transparency of the laws demonstrate declining trend between 2002 – 2021. This downward trend can be explained with the gradually increased control of the ruling party over the Constitutional Court, High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK), and other high courts through modifying the

structure, assignment and promotion processes of the courts via legal arrangements (Esen and Gumuscu 2018; Gurbey 2019; Kirisci and Sloat 2019; Ozbudun 2015; Somer 2016; Tansel 2018; Yilmaz and Turner 2019).

**Figure 9: Public Good Size (Aggregated)**



**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12, Author's calculation


Although there is a downtrend in public good size, the average public goods provided in the presidential term (mean: -0,08) is notably less than the parliamentary period (mean: 0,17). The main assumption of selectorate theory, which suggests that presidential systems would create more incentives to provide public goods since the size of the winning coalition increases, yields inconclusive results in the case of Turkey. The shift to presidential system paves the way for a decline in the winning coalition size which eliminates the incentives to provide more public goods in comparison to the period. (See Figure 9)

### 6.3 Identifying Key Private Goods

Private good indicators which are constructed based on public sector corruption (v2excrptps), executive corruption (v2x\_execorr), public sector theft (v2exthftps), clientelism (v2xnp\_client), and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc) display an upward trend. It suggests that corruption has increased in each dimension during the observed time period. In each indicator,

the average value of corruption indicators is lower during the parliamentary period. (See Figure 10)

**Figure 10: Private Good Indicators**



**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12, Rescaled between 0-1

Recalling the democratic backsliding dynamics observed in Turkey, the incumbent gradually consolidated its domination over all branches of power including the legislative, executive and judicial branches. In the aftermath of the shift to presidential system, the control over formal political institutions was guaranteed via various legal arrangements. Therefore, the president's discretionary control over state resources has been extended to a great extent. As a result, overall size of the private goods increases over time. The average size of private goods provided in the presidential term (mean: 0,96) is notably greater than the parliamentary period (mean: 0,74). (See Figure 11)

**Figure 11: Private Good Size (Aggregated)**



**Source:** V-dem Codebook v12, Rescaled between 0-1

## 7. Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, selectorate theory is used to explain institutional incentives for public and private good provision in the parliamentary and presidential periods of Turkey which is characterized as a hybrid regime where the effect of democratic backsliding is prominent. The theory suggest that presidential systems compared to parliamentary type of governance have larger winning coalitions, therefore, perform better in terms of public good provision as a policy preference for the leader's survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

Based on this causal mechanism, one would expect that the shift to presidential system from a parliamentary system would increase the size of the winning coalition and result in better distributive outcomes due to the increase in public good provision. However, in the case of Turkey, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the shift to presidential system downgraded the size of the winning coalition and decreased the public goods provided, while private goods increased at a significant rate.

Recalling the narrative of the change to presidential system in the case of Turkey, the change in the form of governance can be perceived as a product of democratic backsliding phenomenon. The studies conducted on democratic backsliding process of Turkey carefully underline the argument that the authoritarian turn taken by the country is not a recent event, yet the change to the presidential system accelerated the momentum of the authoritarian turn. Authoritarian characteristics has started to gain prevalence as early as 2005. Through numerous constitutional amendments and referenda, democratic characteristics of the hybrid regime have gradually eroded under legal disguise. Under the veil of these legal arrangements, the ruling party has intensified control over state apparatus including legislative, executive and judiciary branches.

Finally, constitutional arrangements carried out after 2017 presidential referendum replaced the parliamentary governmental system with a presidential system. All these

developments established the ground for the change to presidential system which was seen as a guarantee for absolute control over the state institutions. Consolidating the control over the judiciary, decreasing the power of the parliament through overutilization of ordinary and emergency decrees, and intensifying the constitutional powers of the president without effective checks and balances provide well-grounded proofs for arguing the presidential system has provided the ground for further authoritarianism and backsliding.

Considering the indicators which are used to identify the winning coalition, autonomy of the election monitoring body and opposition parties were heavily violated, while barriers to political participation deteriorated during the presidential period compared to the parliamentary term. It is why the winning coalition has become more exclusive and the size of the coalition has decreased compared to the parliamentary period. As a result, the ratio of provision of public goods over private goods changes in favor of private goods, which is affected by the increase observed in public corruption variable. The nature of the public goods provided during the presidential period is significantly particularistic, in other words, the public spending is narrowly targeted and shaped by clientelist nature. On the other hand, the increasing trend in corruption indicators that compose the private good dimension is perpetuated after the changed to the presidential system. To sum up briefly, the shift to presidential system decreased the size of the winning coalition and eliminated the incentives to provide public goods at the expense of private good provision.

This outcome of the study suggests that Hypothesis I can be rejected, and Hypothesis II can be partially confirmed. The most important element that differentiates both hypotheses from each other is the backsliding hybrid regime context accompanied with the characteristics such as consolidation of power in the hands of the executive, deformation of institutional checks and balances, and erosion of democratic political institutions. With the intervening impact of these characteristics, expected increase in the size of the winning coalition was not substantiated after

the change to the presidential system, yet the expected decrease in public goods and substantial increase in private good provision is validated with the results.

Testing the hypothesis of selectorate theory with regards to formal political institutions -type of governance- yields inconclusive results in a hybrid regime where backsliding is witnessed. However, it is noteworthy to stress that the general hypothesis of the theory -that is the leader would have less incentives to provide public goods, as the size of the winning coalition decreases- can travel to democratic backsliding and hybrid regime context.

Given the objective and results of the research, this study contributes to the literature by providing an empirical test of the theory and reconciles the scope of the theory with hybrid regime and democratic backsliding context. Single within case study method which is utilized in this study provides an advantage for conducting an in-depth within-country analysis. However, further research which benefit from large-N cross-country design or comparative case studies is needed in order to increase the generalizability of the results. Consequently, redistributive effects of the shift to presidential system from a parliamentary system can be investigated thoroughly in the context of backsliding hybrid regimes.

Furthermore, testing the latest and revised version of the theory -which is established upon institution-based continuous indicators developed by V-dem project- on a recent phenomenon such as 2017 presidential system change of Turkey enriches the empirical validity of the new measurement utilized.

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## 9. Annex

### Definition of Indicators<sup>3</sup>

#### 1. Measuring Winning Coalition

Winning size is measured by standardizing the following indicators (Autonomy of election monitoring body, Opposition parties' autonomy, Barriers to political party participation) by fitting each indicator in the scale of 0-1. Then, the average score of four variables is used as the winning coalition size of each year.

##### 1.1. Autonomy of election monitoring body (v2elembaut)

**Question:** Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

**Clarification:** The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

#### Responses:

- 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body.
- 1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body.
- 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.

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<sup>3</sup> Definition of indicators are retrieved from V-dem codebook and author's comments are included if necessary.

- 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.
- 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

### **1.2. Opposition parties' autonomy (v2psoppaut)**

**Question:** Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

**Clarification:** An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, i.e., that has no control over the executive.

**Responses:**

- 0: Opposition parties are not allowed.
- 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.
- 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

### **1.3. Barriers to political party participation (v2psbars)**

**Question:** How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

**Clarification:** Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

**Responses:**

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).
- 2: There are significant obstacles (e.g., party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
- 3: There are modest barriers (e.g., party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
- 4: There are no substantial barriers.

**Ordering:** If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

**1.4. Closed Succession: Indicators of succession by heredity or within a military or single party setting (v2x\_ex\_hereditary/military/party)**

Closed succession variable is constructed based on three sub-indicators. The maximum value of one of the three indicators is used as the closed succession value for the respective year. In order to align the scaling direction of closed succession variable with other variables mentioned above, reverse coding is used by subtracting the values from 1.

**Hereditary Succession**

**Question:** To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by hereditary succession?

**Clarification:** Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on hereditary rule.

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

### **Military Succession**

**Question:** To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by the military?

**Clarification:** Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on the threat or actual use of military force.

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

### **Party Succession**

**Question:** To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by a ruling party?

**Clarification:** Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which a ruling party appoints and dismisses the chief executive.

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

## 2. Measuring Core Public Goods

Public good size is measured by standardizing below-mentioned indicators by fitting each indicator in the scale of 0-1. Then, the average score of all variables is used as the public good size of each year.

### 2.1. Public Goods: Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)

**Question:** Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

**Clarification:** A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

#### Responses:

- 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

## 2.2. Goods Ratio (v2peapspol/ v2x\_pubcorr)

Goods ratio indicator is constructed in relation to above-explained indicator by normalizing v2peapspol to fall between 0-1 scale and dividing that value by reverse coded version of v2x\_pubcorr plus its normalized value. The following definition belongs to public sector corruption index. In order to align the scaling direction of public sector corruption variable with public goods variable, reverse coding is used by subtracting the values from 1. Larger values indicate more public sector corruption and lower values indicate less public sector corruption.

**Question:** To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

**Clarification:** The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g., more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

### 2.3. Public Goods or Clientelism: Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps)

**Question:** Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

**Clarification:** Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelist", or "private goods." Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

#### Responses:

- 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
- 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) is public goods.
- 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public goods programs.
- 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public goods but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.
- 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

#### 2.4. Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw\_osp)

**Question:** Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

**Clarification:** This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

**Responses:**

- 0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.
- 1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.
- 2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion, but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.
- 3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.
- 4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

#### 2.5. Elite Want Common Good (v2dlcommon)

**Question:** When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

**Clarification:** Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

**Responses:**

- 0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.
- 1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.
- 2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.
- 3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests
- 4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**2.6. Public Want Common Good: Engaged society (v2dlengage)**

**Question:** When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

**Clarification:** This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

**Responses:**

- 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
- 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
- 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

- 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged, and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
- 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged, and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.
- 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

## **2.7. Free Expression (v2x\_freexp)**

**Question:** To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

### 3. Measuring Private Goods

Private good size is measured by standardizing below-mentioned indicators by fitting each indicator in the scale of 0-1. Then, the average score of all variables is used as the private good size of each year. Direction of the following variables is changed from ‘no corruption to high corruption’ scale: v2excrtps, v2exthtps, v2jucorrde.

#### 3.1. Corruption: Public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrtps)

**Question:** How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

**Clarification:** When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

#### Responses:

- 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.
- 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.
- 2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.
- 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.
- 4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

### **3.2. Executive Corrupt: Executive corruption index ordinal (v2x\_execorr)**

**Question:** How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

**Clarification:** The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

### **3.3. Public Sector Theft (v2exthttps)**

**Question:** How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

**Clarification:** When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

#### **Responses:**

- 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

- 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
- 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
- 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

### **3.4. Clientelism (v2xnp\_client)**

**Question:** To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

**Clarification:** Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

**Scale:** Interval, from low to high (0-1).

### **3.5. Judge Corrupt: Judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc)**

**Question:** How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

**Responses:**

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Not usually.
- 4: Never.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model

Distribution of Winning Coalition, Public Goods and Private Good Observations

