THINKING THE CAUCASUS AFTER BOURDIEU:

Heteronomy and Heterogeneity in the Social Lives of Security Professionals in Georgia and Armenia

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ABSTRACT

Both Georgia and Armenia have gone through cycles of elite turnover and violent conflict – from the post-Soviet upheavals of the 1990s, via the Rose and Velvet Revolutions of 2003 and 2018, to the wars of 2008 and 2020. Questions of security expertise, geopolitical positioning and responsibility for territorial loss are in both countries at the centre of political discourse. The security practices and struggles for legitimacy that elites and experts in Armenia and Georgia engage in, straddle the boundaries of the fields of security and politics. This social reality challenges 'conventional' Bourdieusian approaches in International Relations (IR) and Critical Security Studies (CSS). How can we make sense of the relationship between political competition and security expertise, if these two fields are not autonomous and institutionalised but entangled spaces? By drawing on post-Bourdieusian sociologists, this thesis pushes forward the use of Bourdieu's work in IR/CSS by foregrounding the concepts of heteronomy and heterogeneity. Based on in-depth fieldwork interviews, I propose that the dual dynamic of the politicisation of security and the securitisation of politics in the South Caucasus can be conceived of as a heteronomous intersection. This heteronomous intersection exercises a structuring effect on the strategies of security professionals. In addition, I highlight the diversity of different *habitus* formations in the Armenian and Georgian security fields. The struggle over security knowledge in Georgia and Armenia is shaped by a triangular pattern of contestation between three groups – (post-)Soviet professionals-turned-geopoliticians, military diplomats and (diasporic) brokers, and post-post-Soviet security experts.

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INTRODUCTION: "NIKOL, TRAITOR,"[1] "TRAITOR GARIBASHVILI,"[2] AND THE PUZZLE OF POST-WAR SECURITY POLITICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

"The reason for my decision to resign was to make sure that there are never any suspicions that this ministry could take some steps or agree to some ideas, initiatives going against our statehood and national interests,"[3] said Armenian Foreign Minister Ara Ayvazyan in May 2021, as he stepped down half a year after the devastating Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (27 September–10 November 2020). Soon after, his spokesperson and all his deputies left their posts, too.[4] Almost a year later, amidst a new wave of anti-government demonstrations in Armenia's capital Yerevan, Ayvazyan joined the calls for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign.[5] The protests in Yerevan must appear familiar to many Georgians. Russia's re-invasion of Ukraine in the spring of 2022 has stirred memories of the Russo-Georgian War (1–12 August 2008). Demonstrators have decried the refusal of the Georgian government led by Irakli Gharibashvili to join Western sanctions and attempts to stop Georgian volunteer fighters from travelling to Ukraine as "shameful."[6] Political parties brand one another as the "party of war"

[1] Gayane Hovsepyan, "Yerevan: Opposition Protesters Barred from Democracy Forum," *Hetq*, May 21, 2022, https://hetq.am/en/article/144736.
[2] "'Traitor Garibashvili' Faces Resignation Calls," *Civil.ge*, February 28, 2022, https://civil.ge/archives/476001.
[3] "Armenian Foreign Minister Explains Resignation," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 31, 2021, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31282523.html; Ani Mejlumyan, "Armenian Top Diplomats Resign," *Eurasianet*, June 1, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/armenian-top-diplomats-resign.
[4] Emilio Luciano Cricchio, "Armenia's Foreign Ministry Left in Shambles as All Deputy Ministers Resign," *CivilNet*, June 8, 2021, https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/620016/armenias-foreign-ministry-left-in-shambles-as-all-deputy-ministers-resign/; "Armenian Foreign Ministry Confirms More Resignations," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 7, 2021, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31295064.html.
[5] Ani Avetisyan, "Armenian Opposition Hits the Streets Again," *OC Media*, April 26, 2022, https://oc-media.org/armenian-opposition-hits-the-streets-again/.
[6] "'No To Russia!' – Protest Rally Held in Tbilisi," *Georgia Today*, March 7, 2022, https://georgiatoday.ge/no-to-russia-protest-rally-held-in-tbilisi/.

and the "party of traitors."[7] Among the organisers of the protests we find the movement and party *Droa*,[8] which counts among its ranks prominent former security officials.[9]

These episodes show that security concerns and domestic party politics are more enmeshed here than in many other places. Both Georgia and Armenia have gone through cycles of elite turnover and violent conflict – from the post-Soviet upheavals of the 1990s, via the Rose and Velvet Revolutions of 2003 and 2018, to the wars of 2008 and 2020. Questions of security expertise, geopolitical positioning and responsibility for territorial loss are at the centre of political discourse. This study explores how we can understand the fraught relationship between the 'security field' and the 'political field' in the South Caucasus. Only then can we grasp who gets to 'speak' security in Georgia and Armenia, and how and why.

To study these entanglements, I turn to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and its use in International Relations (IR) and Critical Security Studies (CSS). If Claire Wilkinson asked whether the Copenhagen School of CSS 'travelled' well to a non-Eurocentric setting like Kyrgyzstan,[10] we can ask the same for Bourdieusian approaches to IR/CSS. Heavily indebted to Weber, Bourdieu conceived of the state as a "central bank of symbolic capital,"[11] or, put differently, a cluster of autonomous bureaucratic fields that monopolises the means of coercion and symbolic domination in a given society, and determines the 'conversion rates' between different forms of capital.[12] The security field might then be a bureaucratic field that

[7] "Recent Political Developments Regarding Georgia," *Caucasus Watch*, May 3, 2022, https://caucasuswatch.de/news/5294.html; "GD: Saakashvili Returned to Drag Georgia into Forthcoming Ukraine War," *Civil.ge*, April 29, 2022, https://civil.ge/archives/488001; "They Prepared and Are Preparing a Very Big Threat Against Georgia - Mikheil Saakashvili's Statement," *Mtavari Channel*, April 20, 2022, https://mtavari.tv/en/news/82359-they-prepared-and-are-preparing-very-big-threat.

[8] *Droa* is a recent split-off-of-a-split-off of the United National Movement (UNM), which ruled Georgia during the tenure of President Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–2012/13). For its involvement in recent pro-Ukraine demonstrations, see for example Shota Kincha, "Pro-Ukraine Protesters in Georgia Demand Government Resignation," *OC Media*, March 1, 2022, https://oc-media.org/pro-ukraine-protesters-in-georgia-demand-government-resignation/; "Elene Khoshtaria: Specific Demands Include - Irakli Gharibashvili Should Go and Take the Government with Him, We Should Close the Sky to Russia and to Open it for Ukraine, Georgia Should Submit an Application for EU Membership," *Interpressnews*, March 1, 2022, https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/118562-elene-khoshtaria-specific-demands-include-irakli-gharibashvili-should-go-and-take-the-government-with-him-we-should-close-the-sky-to-russia-and-to-open-it-for-ukraine-georgia-should-submit-an-application-for-eu-membership/.

[9] "Former Ambassadors, MPs Join Elene Khoshtaria's Droa Party," *Agenda.ge*, August 13, 2021, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2021/2317

[10] Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?," *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007): 5-25.

[11] Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, ed. Patrick Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Franck Poupeau and Marie-Christine Rivière, trans. David Fernbach (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014), 122; Bob Jessop, "The Central Bank of Symbolic Capital: Bourdieu's *On the State*," *Radical Philosophy* 193 (2015): 33-41.

[12] Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, trans. Lauretta C. Clough (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1996); Pierre Bourdieu, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory* 12, no. 1 (1994): 1-18; Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State*, 3-4, 9-12, 127-

monopolises security-related forms of capital, and the political field a professionalised realm that defines the discourses of political legitimacy in a given country. However, contemporary Georgia and Armenia challenge such a perspective. The combination of protracted conflict, repeated regime change, insecure relations between state, nation, and territory,[13] and prevalent informality and patrimonial politics,[14] means that we cannot sustain an image in which impersonal state institutions regulate stable relations between fields and capitals.[15]

Although the volume of theoretical and empirical studies bringing the work of the French sociologist into the study of world politics has exploded over the past two decades (see Figure 1),[16] these are also limited in their ability to make sense of security politics in the South

135, 165-175, 190-205, 235-248, 309-311; Steven Loyal, *Bourdieu's Theory of the State: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 67-79.

[13] See, among others, Ronald G. Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Bruno Coppieters, ed., *Contested Borders in the Caucasus* (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996); Ghia Nodia, "Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity," in *Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution*, ed. Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 39-82; Laurence Broers, "Filling the Void: Ethnic Politics and Nationalities Policy in Post-Conflict Georgia," *Nationalities Papers* 36, no. 2 (2008): 275-304; Peter Kabachnik, "Wounds That Won't Heal: Cartographic Anxieties and the Quest for Territorial Integrity in Georgia," *Central Asian Survey* 31, no. 1 (2012): 45-60; Laurence Broers and Gerard Toal, "Cartographic Exhibitionism? Visualizing the Territory of Armenia and Karabakh," *Problems of Post-Communism* 60, no. 3 (2013): 16-35; Laurence Broers, *Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019); Husik Ghulyan, "Conceiving Homogenous State-Space for the Nation: The Nationalist Discourse on Autochthony and the Politics of Place-Naming in Armenia," *Central Asian Survey* 40, no. 2 (2021): 257-281.

[14] The literature on patrimonialism, patronal politics, and informality in the South Caucasus is large. The difficulty, however, is that informality/patrimonialism is not an objective descriptor but an inter-subjective product of fields of knowledge production itself, whose dominant producers may often have a stake in portraying informality/patrimonialism in a certain normative way ('corruption'). That aside, see among others Nicole Gallina, "Puzzles of State Transformation: The Cases of Armenia and Georgia," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (2010): 20-34; Henry E. Hale, *Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Huseyn Aliyev, "The Effects of the Saakashvili Era Reforms on Informal Practices in the Republic of Georgia," *Studies of Transition States and Societies* 6, no. 1 (2014): 19-33; Huseyn Aliyev, "Informal Networks as Sources of Human (In)Security in the South Caucasus," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 27, no. 2 (2015): 191-206; Alexander Iskandaryan, Hrant Mikaelian, and Sergey Minasyan, *War, Business & Politics: Informal Networks and Formal Institutions in Armenia* (Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, 2016); Bidzina Lebanidze and Kornely Kakachia, "Informal Governance & Electorate Perceptions in Hybrid Regimes: The 2016 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia," *Demokratizatsiya: Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 25, no. 4 (2017): 529-549; Lela Rekhviashvili and Abel Polese, "Liberalism and Shadow Interventionism in Postrevolutionary Georgia (2003–2012)," *Caucasus Survey* 5, no. 1 (2017): 27-50.

[15] See Adam Baczko and Gilles Dorronsoro, "Thinking about Civil Wars with and Beyond Bourdieu: State, Capital and Habitus in Critical Contexts," *Journal of Classical Sociology* (2021): 1-23 (online first); Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro and Arthur Quesnay, *Civil War in Syria: Mobilization and Competing Social Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 12-18; Kevork Oskanian, "Securitisation Gaps: Towards Ideational Understandings of State Weakness," *European Journal of International Security* 6, no. 4 (2021): 439-458; Javier Auyero and Claudio Benzecry, "The Practical Logic of Political Domination: Conceptualizing the Clientelist Habitus," *Sociological Theory* 35, no. 3 (2017): 179-199.

[16] For a number of seminal contributions, see the special issue on "Bourdieu and the International" in *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 219-345; as well as the edited volume by Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ed., *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). Figure 1 shows that, while the absolute number of articles in IR with some sort of Bourdieusian approach has been steadily increasing, the most influential work was published between 2005 and

Caucasus. Scholars of the Paris School of CSS have fruitfully brought Bourdieu into IR by conceiving of security as a semi- autonomous 'field' with its own stakes, struggles and common sense.[17] From the very beginning, these scholars have sought to modify Bourdieu's sociology for the international realm, where the overarching authority of the state to regulate relations between fields is absent.[18] Many have put Bourdieu to use in understanding how security has transformed over the course of European integration;[19] others have studied the security practices of transnational professionals in West Africa and Central Asia.[20] Few of these studies,



Figure 1 - Bourdieu-inspired articles in selected IR journals, 1980-2021

2016, especially in 2011. Note, however, that the figure excludes books and edited volumes, and only registers journal articles. The journals included in the literature search to produce this graph are listed in Appendix 1.

[17] Didier Bigo and Emma McCluskey, "What Is a PARIS Approach to (In)securitization? Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, ed. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 116-130.

[18] For early contributions see Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives* 27, no. 1 (2002): 63-92; Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, *The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[19] Niilo Kauppi, "Bourdieu's Political Sociology and the Politics of European Integration," *Theory and Society* 32, no. 5 (2003): 775-789; Niilo Kauppi, *Toward a Reflexive Political Sociology of the European Union: Fields, Intellectuals and Politicians* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Frédéric Mérand, "Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense," *Security Studies* 19, no. 2 (2010): 342-374; Didier Georgakakis, "Don't Throw Out the 'Brussels Bubble' with the Bathwater: From EU Institutions to the Field of Eurocracy," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 331-334; Antonin Cohen, "Bourdieu Hits Brussels: The Genesis and Structure of the European Field of Power," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 335-339.

[20] Médéric Martin-Mazé, "The Social Structures of Interventions: Projects, International Organizations and Border Security in Central Asia," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 15, no. 1 (2021): 70-95; Philippe M. Frowd, "The Field of Border Control in Mauritania," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 3: 226-241.

however, have applied Bourdieu's thinking to *national* contexts outside of the 'Weberian' West. The overarching image of this literature is that of an expanding transnational elite of professionals who produce dominant security discourses and practices while their technocratic settings (fields) and mindsets (*habitus*) gradually merge and converge.

A second stream of Bourdieu-inspired scholarship has been associated with the 'practice turn' in IR, which excavates the processes, performances, and interactions of 'international practices' – say, diplomacy – from the bottom up.[21] This approach, too, has its shortcomings: it concentrates on the interactions between elite state actors and wavers between overly deterministic ('any *habitus* matches its field, or not') and overly voluntaristic applications ('any *habitus* generates a myriad of improvising practices') of Bourdieu's concept of the *habitus*.

Instead of a neat separation between the social worlds of politics and security, we find that in Armenia and Georgia, the discourses, positions and dispositions straddle the boundaries between the two fields. In order to make sense of this puzzle, I turn to sociologists who have attempted to push Bourdieu's work in new directions. Based on the work of authors like Krause, Go, Eyal, Buchholz, Gorski, Steinmetz, Schmitz, and Witte,[22] I construct the notion of a heteronomous intersection, that is, a social space where the not-so-autonomous sectors of two fields overlap, so that actors find themselves in two fields at the same time. From Lahire and Wacquant I take the fundamental insight that, because actors move across multiple fields, they accumulate a multiplicity of layers of dispositions that form their heterogeneous *habitus*.[23]

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[21] Vincent Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities," *International Organization* 62, no. 2 (2008): 257-288; Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices," *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (2011): 1-36; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Introduction," in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Concepts in IR*, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 1-23; David M. McCourt, "Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (2016): 475-485; Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, *International Practice Theory*, 2nd ed. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 35-44; Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost, *Practice Theory and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 62-94.

[22] Julian Go and Monika Krause, "Fielding Transnationalism: An Introduction," *Sociological Review* 64, no. 2 (2016): 6-30; Gil Eyal, "Spaces Between Fields," in *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis*, ed. Philip S. Gorski (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 158-182; Larissa Buchholz, "What is a Global Field? Theorizing Fields Beyond the Nation-State," *Sociological Review* 64, no. 2 (2016): 31-60; Monika Krause, "How Fields Vary," *British Journal of Sociology* 69, no. 1 (2018): 3-22; Philip S. Gorski, "Bourdieusian Theory and Historical Analysis: Maps, Mechanisms, and Methods," in *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis*, ed. Philip S. Gorski (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 327-366; Andreas Schmitz, Daniel Witte, and Vincent Gengnagel, "Pluralizing Field Analysis: Toward a Relational Understanding of the Field of Power," *Social Science Information* 56, no. 1 (2017): 49-73; George Steinmetz, "Social Fields, Subfields and Social Spaces at the Scale of Empires: Explaining the Colonial State and Colonial Sociology," *Sociological Review* 64, no. 2 (2016): 98-123.

[23] Bernard Lahire, *The Plural Actor*, trans. David Fernbach (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 2011); Bernard Lahire, "From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions: Towards a Sociology at the Level of the Individual," *Poetics* 31 (2003): 329-355; Loïc Wacquant, "A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus," *Sociological Review* 64, no. 1 (2016): 64-72; Loïc Wacquant, "*Homines in Extremis*: What Fighting Scholars Teach Us about Habitus," *Body & Society* 20, no. 2 (2014): 3-17.

This paper demonstrates the utility of putting heteronomy and heterogeneity at the centre of an analysis of security politics. These concepts help make theoretical sense of a security field that is structured by the axis of politicisation and inhabited by conflicting visions of how security knowledge ought to be produced. Methodologically, I demonstrate the merit of combining objectivist 'mapping' of positions with a biographical uncovering of socialised dispositions. Empirically, I find that the struggle over security knowledge in Georgia and Armenia, despite their differences, is shaped by a triangular pattern of contestation between three groups – (post-)Soviet professionals-turned-geopoliticians, military diplomats and (diasporic) brokers, and post-post-Soviet security experts.[24] Unlike in settled, institutionalised fields, the strategies of distinction of these actors are shaped more by the axis autonomy–heteronomy than by a stable hierarchy of domination–subordination.

The remainder of this paper surveys the literature of Bourdieusian approaches to IR/CSS, elaborates on the proposed notions of heteronomy and heterogeneity to investigate intersecting fields and diverse security *habitus* formations in the South Caucasus, and provides two empirical chapters that put this theoretical work in practice.

[24] There are certainly also other types of security professionals besides these three ideal-typical clusters, an analysis of whom would have added greater complexity.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AND METHODS: CHARTING FIELDS, TRACING BIOGRAPHIES, EXCAVATING DISPOSITIONS

Bourdieu strongly opposed the rigid separation of theory and methodology in social science. Theoretical concepts ought to be used as "thinking tools" which actively construct novel and critical insights about the relations that constitute a concrete empirical reality.[25] I follow this approach with a concept-driven research strategy which may be termed abductive. It starts with a surprising observation that seems to challenge existing applications of the Bourdieusian tool kit in IR/CSS. I use the provisional framework to generate data and begin to map out patterns, and recursively use this data to adjust the concepts. The goal is to construct a plausible interpretation to match the constructed empirical patterns and practices ('if this interpretation were accurate, the observations would be a matter of course'). I go into the field with theoretical tools at hand but look out for practices and processes of meaning-making and knowledge-production which may challenge their heuristic value, before returning back to the task of crafting of contextually useful generalisations.[26]

I use three concrete instruments to generate data about the security practices in the South Caucasus, from which I reconstruct the objectivist "positional logic" and the subjectivist

[25] For Bourdieu, both theory and method depend on research puzzles. Research is a practical activity which is necessarily both theoretical and empirical – we cannot produce theory without referring to the world, while research objects cannot be crafted in the world without making theoretical choices. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), 15-35, 160-162; Anna Leander, "Thinking Tools," in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 11-27; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010): 156-187. See also Wacquant's comment that "Habitus is a way of historicising the agent – a question, not an answer," as tweeted by Jana Bacevic (@jana_bacevic), "Wacquant on 'Speaking Bourdieuese'," Twitter, 1 November 2016, 11:36 a.m., https://twitter.com/jana_bacevic/status/793401297357733888.

[26] Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, "On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology," *International Organization* 63, no. 4 (2009): 701-731; Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory, "Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis," *Sociological Theory* 30, no. 3 (2012): 167-186; Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow, *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes* (New York and London: Routledge, 2012), 26-40; Cai Wilkinson, "On Not Just Finding What You (Thought You) Were Looking For: Reflections on Fieldwork Data and Theory," in *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, ed. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (New York: Routledge, 2014), 387-405.

"dispositional logic".[27] First, based on eighteen in-depth interviews, longer periods of fieldwork immersion,[28] as well as the construction of a database of high-level careers in the Georgian and Armenian security sector based on open-source data,[29] I chart the field of the production of security knowledge.[30] How do actors and institutions relate to one another? How can the positions of security actors be made sense of on the basis of two axes: autonomy–heteronomy and domination–subordination?

Second, I construct relational collective biographies to excavate typical socio-professional trajectories which show how actors move within and across fields and strategically convert forms of capital.[31] Biographies "provide a way to examine and decode the complex fights and divisions that characterize a particular field at a particular time."[32] This second tool is used for both the field analysis and the *habitus* analysis, and links the two together.

Third, to deepen the *habitus* analysis, I use my interviews to reconstruct "the successive or parallel socialising experiences […] through which the respondent has been constituted and which have settled in them in the form of schemes or dispositions to believe, see, feel and act" and "the links that connect or that have connected a given individual to other individuals, groups

[27] Vincent Pouliot, "Methodology: Putting Practice Theory into Practice," in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Concepts in IR*, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 45-58.

[28] This research is primarily based on three fieldwork periods, during which I spoke to about eighteen interlocutors, and engaged in a number of additional informal research conversations: Tbilisi and Yerevan in August 2021, Yerevan in February 2022, and Tbilisi/online in April 2022. Less directly, I draw from further experience in the region, having worked as a research intern for a local think tank in January–June 2020 and for an international NGO in April–September 2021.

[29] This data has served primarily as an auxiliary tool for triangulation. The use of systematic prosopographic methods in IR/CSS is rare, despite its potential for better understandings of security fields. But see, e.g., Pouliot, "Methodology," 52; Julien Jeandesboz, "Putting Security in its Place: EU Security Politics, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Case for Practical Reflexivity," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 21, no. 1 (2018): 33-35; Frédéric Lebaron, "European Elites as (a) Field(s): Reflections on the Uses of Prosopography and Geometric Data Analysis Based on Three Joint Surveys of Transnational Objects," in *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg and Stefan Bernhard (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 113-138.

[30] Victoria Loughlan, Christian Olsson, and Peer Schouten, "Mapping," in *Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis*, ed. Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, and Nadine Voelkner. (London and New York: Routledge 2015), 23-56; Gorski, "Bourdieusian Theory and Historical Analysis," 327-366; Pouliot, "Methodology," 52-54.

[31] Dezalay and Garth, *Palace Wars*; Yves Dezalay, Didier Bigo, and Antonin Cohen, "Investigating the Internationalisation of State Nobility: A Reflexive Return to Double Game Strategies – An Interview with Yves Dezalay," *Political Anthropological Research on International Social Sciences (PARISS)* 1, no. 1 (2020): 103-116; Yves Dezalay, Didier Bigo, and Antonin Cohen, "Investigating the Internationalisation of State Nobility: A Reflexive Return to Double Game Strategies – An Interview with Yves Dezalay (Part Two)," *Political Anthropological Research on International Social Sciences (PARISS)* 1, no. 2 (2020): 306-336; Timothy Barrett, "Storying Bourdieu: Fragments Toward a Bourdieusian Approach to 'Life Histories'," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 15, no. 5 (2015): 1-15, esp. 4.

[32] Dezalay and Garth, *Palace Wars*, 10. It is essential that narratives of individual chronological coherence are deconstructed and re-assembled into contextual interpretations and shared trajectories. See Pierre Bourdieu, "The Biographical Illusion," in *Identity: A Reader*, ed. Paul du Gay, Jessica Evans and Peter Redman (London: Sage, 2003), 299-305.

or institutions and reconstruct the tight network of internal (dispositional) and external (contextual) constraints that weigh permanently on their actions, feelings or thoughts."[33] I find inspiration in the *habitus*-analysis developed by Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer and colleagues, who conceive of the *habitus* as a 'third layer' between positions and position-takings.[34] Interviews can be used to establish the praxeological principles that transform social experiences into meaning-making. Different dispositional formulas can be constructed to show interlinkages between how the actor has been socialised, how she experiences and interprets the central problem of the field, and how she envisions strategies and identities to conserve or transform the field.

[33] Bernard Lahire, "Sociological Biography and Socialisation Process: A Dispositionalist-Contextualist Conception," *Contemporary Social Science* 14, no. 3-4 (2019): 379-393, here 379.
[34] Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer, "Habitus-Analysis: A Method to Analyze Cognitive Operators of Practical Logic," (paper presented at the conference *Beyond Bourdieu: Habitus, Capital & Social Stratification*, University of Copenhagen, December 1-2, 2009), https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1857782; Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer, "Identity Politics and the Political Field: A Theoretical Approach to Modelling a 'Field of Identity Politics'," in *New World Colors: Ethnicity, Belonging, and Difference in the Americas*, ed. Josef Raab (Trier and Tempe, AZ: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier and Bilingual Press/Editorial Bilingüe, 2014), 375-399; Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer, Leif-Hagen Seibert, and Adrián Tovar Simoncic, "Habitus as the "Third Layer": Qualitative Data Analysis by Habitus Analysis," in *Empirical Investigations of Social Space*, ed. Jörg Blasius, Frédéric Lebaron, Brigitte le Roux, and Andreas Schmitz (Cham: Springer, 2019), 411-428; Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer, *HabitusAnalysis 2 – Praxeology and Meaning* (Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2020).

BOURDIEU'S SOCIOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES: TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

The 'translation' of the notions of field and *habitus* has spurred the most fruitful Bourdieusian contributions in IR and CSS. Fields are relatively autonomous social sub-spheres which can be studied as objective configurations of relational positions, structured by differential distributions of forms of capital. Each field has a distinct common-sense (*doxa*), logic (*nomos*), and stakes which actors are invested and interested in (*illusio*). A field produces effects externally and refracts the effects of other fields internally. Fields change as actors struggle over boundaries, resources, positions, and monopolies on authority. Some actors subvert the field, while others strive to conserve its rules and relations. Fields exist independently of whether actors identify with them.[35]

The *habitus* is a set of dispositions that pre- or semi-consciously shapes patterns of social action. A *habitus* is the accumulation of social experience of an individual, which in turn functions as a background matrix of practical inclinations and schemes of action, both bodily and cognitive, which generates an individual's subsequent perception, anticipation, and construction of the social world. Shared by actors with similar social trajectories, the *habitus* can be more or less 'in tune' with the reality of social spaces and fields. While the *habitus* is partially adaptive and dynamic, it also tends to be 'sticky' and can thus lag behind the transformation of fields: the *hysteresis* effect.[36] Bourdieu conceives of social practice and

[35] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 16-26, 94-110; Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 29-141; Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 96-106; Pierre Bourdieu, "Some Properties of Fields," in *Media Studies: A Reader*, 3rd ed., ed. Sue Thornham, Caroline Bassett, and Paul Marris (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 94-99; Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez, "Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields," in *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*, ed. Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 1-36; Anna Leander, "*Habitus* and Field," in *International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 3255-3270.

[36] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 72-95, 143-197; Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), 52-79; Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 128-163; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 115-126; Leander, "*Habitus* and Field," 3255-3270.

change as the dialectical product of the meeting of two histories, first, objectified in fields and spaces, and second, internalised in the *habitus* of individuals and groups.[37]

A security field is then the social sub-space where the authority over what counts as 'security' is at stake, while a security *habitus* is any set of dispositions that governs how security actors construct discourses and practices in ways that will be recognised in their field. The literature on these two concepts in IR/CSS has bifurcated in two directions, both of which appear unsatisfactory to make sense security knowledge-production in the post-war South Caucasus.

The Security Field: Topological Structure or Interactional Stage

Didier Bigo is the most prominent exponent of the Paris School of CSS,[38] which comprehensively brought Bourdieu to security studies. In his work he applies a critical "mapping" impulse[39] to various transnationalising fields of practice.[40] For Bigo the field of security is a "topology"[41] which weaves together bureaucrats and politicians who authoritatively claim to deal with security.[42] Catherine Goetze maintains a similar conceptualisation with respect to the field of peacebuilding.[43] Fields are thus defined not institutionally but according to the central stake which actors struggle for – that is, the definition

[37] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 87-95; Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 150-163; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 126-139.
[38] However, he criticised this label, see Bigo and McCluskey, "What Is a PARIS Approach to (In)securitization?," 116-119.
[39] Didier Bigo, Laurent Bonelli, Dario Chi, and Christian Olsson, "Mapping the Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies," in *The Field of EU Internal Security Agencies*, Didier Bigo, Philippe Bonditti, Laurent Bonelli, Dario Chi, Antoine Megie, and Christian Olsson (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007), 5-53; Didier Bigo, "The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)," in *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, ed. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 91-116; Didier Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 225-258; Didier Bigo, "Adjusting a Bourdieusian Approach to the Study of Transnational Fields: Transversal Practices and State (Trans)formations Related to Intelligence and Surveillance," in *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg and Stefan Bernhard (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 55-78; Loughlan, Olsson, and Schouten, "Mapping," 23-56.
[40] From European police cooperation via the merging of internal and external security in migration governance to intelligence and data politics. Didier Bigo, *Polices en réseaux: l'expérience européenne* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996); Bigo, "Möbius Ribbon," 91-116; Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 63-92; Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and Evelyn Ruppert, eds., *Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights* (London: Routledge, 2019); Bigo, "Adjusting a Bourdieusian Approach," 55-78.
[41] Bigo, "Möbius Ribbon," 95; Bigo et al., "Mapping the Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies," 75.
[42] E.g. police forces, border guards, military people, intelligence officers, data analysts, ministers of defence, and so forth.
[43] Catherine Goetze, *The Distinction of Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 2017).

of security or peace itself.[44] Security fields are characterised by a mix of both hierarchical confrontation and shared lifeworld.[45]

Fields vary and change. The task of the political sociologist or CSS scholar is, therefore, to *trace* the historical changes of the security field brought about by external social pressures and internal symbolic struggles, and to determine the development of its stakes and logics, the values of species of capital within it, and its relations with other fields. Even if the field is an objective space of positions, Bigo cautions against neglecting the actors that populate it. Hence, he recommends charting the social trajectories of security actors.[46] Since the production of security and insecurity resides in everyday bureaucratic practices spun by relational webs of power positions, rather than in discourses of exceptionalism, it is precisely the link between actors' positions, trajectories and practices that we should seek to understand.[47]

Scholars like Bigo and Goetze are particularly strong on demonstrating how legitimate practices of 'security' and 'peace' are produced historically by a space of hierarchically ordered actors who are engaged in internal struggles but remain linked to wider patterns of symbolic domination at the transnational level. The downside of such a 'thick' sociological approach, however, is that it casts a wide empirical net (diachronically in terms of field history and synchronically in terms of field boundaries), which puts a strain on feasibility and risks leaving little space for micro-level complexities.

Whereas Bigo and Goetze have primarily worked with Bourdieusian sociology as 'field theory', a second network of authors – centred in and around Canada and Scandinavia[48] – has

[44] Goetze, *Distinction of Peace*, 16, 39, 194-216; Bigo, "Möbius Ribbon," 91-116; Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 63-92; Didier Bigo, "Internal and External Aspects of Security," *European Security* 15, no. 4 (2006): 385-404. The security field "is a network with boundaries that create effects," so that security is "what the professionals of unease management make of it." Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations," 239; Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 85.

[45] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 74-76; Goetze, *Distinction of Peace*, esp. chapters 3, 5-7; Thierry Balzacq, Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and Christian Olsson, "Security Practices," in *International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Bigo et al., "Mapping the Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies."

[46] Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations," 237-245; Bigo and McCluskey, 120.

[47] Bigo, "Möbius Ribbon," 99; Bigo "Security and Immigration," 73-74; Bigo and McCluskey, 127; Balzacq et al., "Security Practices."

[48] See e.g. Michael C. Williams, "The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 3 (1997): 287-307; Michael C. Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (London and New York: Routledge); Mérand, "Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense," 342-374; Vincent Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities," *International Organization* 62, no. 2 (2008): 257-288; Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut, "Practice Theory and the Study of Diplomacy: A Research Agenda," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015): 297-315; Jérémie Cornut, "Diplomacy, Agency, and the Logic of Improvisation and Virtuosity in Practice," *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 3 (2018): 712-36; Iver B. Neumann and Vincent Pouliot, "Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations over the Past Millennium," *Security Studies* 20, no. 1 (2011): 105-137; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and

brought Bourdieu to studies of security and diplomacy as part of a broader turn towards 'practice theory' in IR.[49] Michael Williams and Vincent Pouliot have turned to Bourdieu to study the strategies and practices of Russia–NATO relations. For them, the security field is the social space where state actors engage in symbolic struggles and mobilise forms of capital in order to accrue competence or dominance in matters of international security.[50] Security interaction is crafted in a "cultural field of security"[51] whose "relations of power, objects of struggle, and taken-for-granted rules"[52] underwent a "doxic shift"[53] with the end of the Cold War. This tilted the power balance in favour of NATO, entrenched liberal-internationalist rules of the security 'game', and valorised cultural-symbolic over military-institutional forms of capital.[54]

Williams' and Pouliot's usage of Bourdieu's concept of the field has the advantage over the Paris School that it is more parsimonious. Pouliot's central proposition that mismatches between field and *habitus* generate a particular kind of diplomatic practices which in turn heighten symbolic struggles, can be shown to be analytically useful or not with respect to a particular case. Pouliot also lets the actors of the field speak for themselves, which provides us with greater empirical texture. However, Pouliot and Williams conceive of the security field more narrowly, *a priori* excluding many actors and reifying a complex pattern into dyadic

Vincent Pouliot, "Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2014): 889-911; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration Strategies," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 3 (2008): 663-684; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ed., *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy: Struggle between National Foreign Services the EU's External Action Service," *Review of International Studies* 40, no. 4 (2014): 657-681; Øyvind Svendsen and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Differentiated (Dis)integration in Practice: The Diplomacy of Brexit and the Low Politics of High Politics," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 57, no. 6 (2019): 1419-1430; Øyvind Svendsen, "'Practice Time!' Doxic Futures in Security and Defence Diplomacy after Brexit," *Review of International Studies* 46, no. 1: (2020): 3-19; Olivier Schmitt, "How to Challenge an International Order: Russian Diplomatic Practices in Multilateral Security Organisations," *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 3 (2020): 922-946.

[49] For Bourdieu's position within the 'practice turn' in IR see, amongst others, Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 1-36; Adler-Nissen, "Introduction," 1-23; Bueger and Gadinger, *International Practice Theory*, 35-44; Lechner and Frost, *Practice Theory and International Relations*, 62-94. For critical notes on Bourdieu's reception in the 'practice turn' literature, see amongst others Sebastian Schindler and Tobias Wille, "Change in and Through Practice: Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War," *International Theory* 7, no. 2 (2015): 1-30; Médéric Martin-Mazé, "Returning Struggles to the Practice Turn: How Were Bourdieu and Boltanski Lost in (Some) Translations and What to Do about It?" *International Political Sociology* 11, no. 2 (2017): 203-220; Jonathan Joseph and Milja Kurki, "The Limits of Practice: Why Realism Can Complement IR's Practice Turn," *International Theory* 10, no. 1 (2018): 71-97.

[50] Williams, "Institutions of Security," 296-302; Williams, *Culture and Security*; Pouliot, "Logic of Practicality," 274-277, 282-283; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*.

[51] Williams, *Culture and Security*, 2-7, 39-43.

[52] Pouliot, "Logic of Practicality," 274; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 33.

[53] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 148.

[54] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 148-161; Williams, *Culture and Security*, 39-41, 62-91; Trine Berling Villumsen "Bourdieu, International Relations, and European Security," *Theory and Society* 41, no. 5 (2012): 461-463, 466-473.

interaction. They leave a more historicised and genealogical approach to other scholars, but in doing so their field becomes a fairly 'thin' context or stage.[55]

The Security *Habitus*: Structured/Structuring or Generative

The use of the *habitus* in IR and CSS can also be subdivided into two tendencies. Authors associated with the Paris School stay close to Bourdieu's understanding of the habitus as "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures."[56] In his early work, Bigo uses the *habitus* to describe the shared dispositions that unite a diverse group of professionals in their effort to securitise migration. This transnational set of dispositions is tightly linked to the merging of internal and external security institutions. Bigo draws on Bourdieu's notion of an "ontological complicity"[57] between field and *habitus*: the managers of threat and risk perceive their world in similar ways and exclude outsiders from the field, in order to preserve its autonomy and taken-for-granted (*doxic*) practices.[58] In times, of crisis, when we do not see this hand-in-hand transformation of fields and *habitūs,* Bigo uses the mechanism of the "regression to the habitus."[59] He interprets the launch of a Global War on Terror after September 11, for example, as a knee-jerk reflex generated by "a habitus of control and coercion" among American experts and politicians.[60]

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[55] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 85; see also Williams, *Culture and Security*, 132fn8. The danger with not sufficiently tracing the historicity of the structure of the field, the social trajectories of the actors and the origins of the unequal distributions of capital is that "Bourdieu minus materialism is just game theory," as noted aptly by Erik Ringmar, "The Search for Dialogue as a Hindrance to Understanding: Practices as Inter-Paradigmatic Research Program," *International Theory* 6, no. 1 (2014): 10. In a similar fashion, Loïc Wacquant in many places warns against inserting Bourdieusian concepts without carrying out all of the required methodological operations, so that nothing would be lost from the research by leaving out the concepts altogether. (I do not suggest this is the case in Pouliot's and William's work, but it is a risk to be kept in mind.) See Loïc Wacquant and Aksu Akçaoğlu, "Practice and Symbolic Power in Bourdieu: The View from Berkeley," *Journal of Classical Sociology* 17, no. 1 (2017): 61; Loïc Wacquant, "Four Transversal Principles for Putting Bourdieu to Work," *Anthropological Theory* 18, no. 1 (2018): 10. See also Niilo Kauppi, "How Many Fields Can Stand on the Point of a Pin? Methodological Notes on Reflexivity, the Sociological Craft, and Field Analysis," in *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg and Stefan Bernhard (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 42-43. A tension between structural history at the macro level and symbolic interaction at the micro level reappears in Pouliot's other work: where one article traces patterns of international practices far back into the past, to an extent that tends towards historical determinism, another inclines towards indeterminate spontaneity. Compare: Iver B. Neumann and Vincent Pouliot, "Untimely Russia," with Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, "Power in Practice."

[56] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 72; Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 53.

[57] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation of Reflexive Sociology*, 20, 127-130; Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 146-150ff.

[58] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 65-66, 75-77; Didier Bigo, "Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon" in *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11*, ed. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (London: Routledge, 2008), 10-48.

[59] Bigo, "Security and Immigration," 77; Didier Bigo, "14 September 2001: The Regression to the Habitus," in *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*, ed. Alessandro Dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda (London: Routledge, 2010), 103, 113-115.

[60] Bigo, "14 September 2001," 113ff.

The precise genesis of forms of security *habitus* remains elusive in Bigo's early work. This is different for Kuus and Goetze, who demonstrate how cosmopolitan lifestyles, bourgeois inclinations and liberal worldviews reproduce relations of domination among European diplomats and international peacebuilders.[61] They specify how dispositions 'do the work' of reproduction. Kuus relates style and confidence in diplomatic circles to inheritances of economic and cultural capital, mediated by "specifically EU-level" social networks and norms of prestige.[62] Goetze demonstrates that the bureaucrats of international peace missions resemble a professional bourgeoisie ("*Bildungs- und Beamtenbürgertum*"), whose educational trajectories in elite institutions has shaped a middle-class *habitus* ("*Bürgerlichkeit*") that valorises selfless service to (neo-)liberal interventionism.[63]

In sum, this approach is particularly adept at tracing how *habitūs* are (trans-)formed and how both gradual dynamics and sudden shocks can serve to reproduce power relations through the operation of a *habitus* that is at once durable and adaptable. What this perspective misses, however, is further differentiation. We learn less about how and why the *habitus* produces different outcomes in different circumstances.[64]

If Bigo, Goetze and Kuus concentrate more how a *habitus* comes to be structured and structuring, Pouliot is more indebted to Bourdieu's formulation that the *habitus* generates an "intentionless invention of regulated improvisation."[65] Pouliot does not overlook that the *habitus* is historical and dispositional, but he also stresses its relational and practical dimensions: it is generative within the bounds of historical patterns of interaction with other players of the game,[66] that is, the *habitus* is "subjectivized intersubjectivity."[67] In reverse

[61] Merje Kuus, *Geopolitics and Expertise: Knowledge and Authority in European Diplomacy* (Malden, MA and Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2014); Merje Kuus, "Symbolic Power in Diplomatic Practice: Matters of Style in Brussels," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015): 368-384; Goetze, *Distinction of Peace*. This interpretation closely resembles Bourdieu's arguments in *Distinction*, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
[62] Kuus, *Geopolitics and Expertise*, 41-46, 151-160; Kuus, "Symbolic Power in Diplomatic Practice," 372-378.
[63] Goetze, *Distinction of Peace*, 69-79, 95-103, 137-145, 161-168, 170-193. In the face of neoliberal globalisation, this *habitus* has transformed from that of the long-serving "international civil servant" to that the flexible and stress-resilient "peace entrepreneur."
[64] The approach is not particularly systematic in addressing questions such as: when does a security *habitus* produce practices which undermine the symbolic capital of the agent, and when does it reinforce a position of power? When do we see inculcation and iteration, and when do we instead see adaptation and adjustment in the security *habitus*? When do international security actors clash, and when do they instead cooperate because of divergences or convergences in *habitus*?
[65] Bourdieu, *Outline*, 79; Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 57. See also Bourdieu, *Outline*, 17, 78; Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 66, 81-82, 107; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation*, 22-23, 122.
[66] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 31-33; Pouliot, "Logic of Practicality," 273-274.
[67] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 86-87.

sequence compared to Bigo's methodological practice, Pouliot begins with the uncovering of the *habitus* through practices and then contextualises and historicises them in the field.[68]

Empirically, Pouliot studies how differences in diplomatic *habitus* are connected to differences in the security practice of NATO–Russia.[69] The analysis rests heavily on the explanatory power of the distinction between matching (*doxic*) practices and mismatching (*hysteretic*) practices. Pouliot argues that NATO expansion eroded a newly deposited layer of peaceful dispositions, established in the early 1990s, so that "age-old Russian Great Power dispositions resurfaced among policymakers in Moscow."[70] Although his focus on *hysteresis* is valuable,[71] Pouliot insufficiently historicises how this older disposition was reproduced over time and socialised in concrete bodies,[72] and he does not specify the mechanism that produces this mismatch: was NATO expansion a 'trigger' or a 'critical juncture', or was it perhaps the product of symbolic 'overreach' on the part of the dominant?[73]

From Pouliot's focus on *doxic*/*hysteretic* practices, the study of the generative *habitus* has moved on to new emphases at the micro level. Adler-Nissen has examined the strategies that are generated when diplomats balance national interests with a newly acquired Europeanised diplomatic *habitus*. In later work, she moves away from the *habitus* and concentrates on symbolic interaction, quests for recognition/competence, and the hybridity of international

[68] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 65-78; Vincent Pouliot, "'Sobjectivism': Toward a Constructivist Methodology," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (2007): 368-374. Contrast with Loughlan, Olsson, and Schouten, "Mapping," 23-56. See also Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 104-105; Hilgers and Mangez, 19-22; Randal Johnson, "Editor's Introduction: Pierre Bourdieu on Art, Literature and Culture," in Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 14.

[69] Pouliot speaks of a "logic of practicality" which is ontologically prior to social action based on rules, norms or calculations. Pouliot, "Logic of Practicality," 276-277; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 1-2, 35-51.

[70] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice*, 174.

[71] But note that *hysteresis* is a fairly general phenomenon: every *habitus* has a tendency to lag behind objective social conditions. See Michael Strand and Omar Lizardo, "The Hysteresis Effect: Theorizing Mismatch in Action," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 47, no. 2 (2017): 186-187; Loïc Wacquant, "Putting Habitus in its Place: Rejoinder to the Symposium," *Body & Society* 20, no. 2 (2014): 126; Loïc Wacquant, "Following Pierre Bourdieu into the Field," *Ethnography* 5, no. 4 (2004): 392.

[72] See also Deepak Nair, "Saving Face in Diplomacy: A Political Sociology of Face-to-Face Interactions in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations," *European Journal of International Relations* 25, no. 3 (2019): 675-676. To make the claim Pouliot makes, his study would require empirical material akin to the evidence provided in Bourdieu, *State Nobility*. Helpful in this direction is Martin Müller, *Making Great Power Identities in Russia: An Ethnographic Discourse Analysis of Education at a Russian Elite University* (Zürich and Münster: LIT Verlag, 2009).

[73] Schindler and Wille suggest that Pouliot overlooks the possible interpretation that the growing rift between NATO and Russia emerged not from a mismatch between the *doxa* shaped by the dominant and the *hysteretic* practices of the dominated, but rather from a fundamental disagreement over the *meaning* of the past. Schindler and Wille, "Change in and Through Practice," 1-30. We may wish to relate this to the Bourdieusian distinction between settled and unsettled fields: Steinmetz, "Social Fields, Subfields and Social Spaces at the Scale of Empires," 102.

practices.[74] Jérémie Cornut has taken a turn from *habitus* to improvisation, studying how agents can be "more or less virtuosic"[75] in their ability to set the rules of the games of security and diplomacy to their advantage.[76]

[74] See Adler-Nissen, "Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy"; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, "Power in Practice"; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Opting Out of an Ever Closer Union: The Integration *Doxa* and the Management of Sovereignty," *West European Politics* 34, no. 5 (2011): 1092-1113. Adler-Nissen elsewhere states that she thinks that "[f]ollowing the structural Bourdieu […] creates the problem that change and contingency of any social order fall easily out of sight. Consequently, there is the risk of losing the main advantages of the recent 'turn to practice' in IR." Adler-Nissen, "Introduction," 4.
[75] Cornut, "Diplomacy, Agency, and the Logic of Improvisation," 714.
[76] Ibid., 712-736.

NEW PROPOSITIONS FOR POST-BOURDIEUSIAN IR/CSS IN POST-WAR CONTEXTS: INTERSECTING FIELDS AND PLURALISED DISPOSITIONS

Both in the Paris School and among the practice theorists, we find tensions between the generative and the structuring *habitus*, and between the reproductive and the transformative field. This is not a consequence of a simple misinterpretation of the great French sociologist, but – as orthodox Bourdieusians admit[77] – a product of frictions in the sociological work itself.[78] Does the *habitus* explain particular outcomes or is all social action dispositional?[79] Bouzanis and Kemp show that this tension results from two stories that are told about the relation between social structure and *habitus*. In the first, a specific field produces a homogenous *habitus* which either reinforces the structure of the field, thus creating a theoretical loop, or malfunctions and lets other social logics take over. In the second account, an interplay of many fields and spaces produces a heterogenous *habitus* which is always adaptable and unstable. In this case, any outcome is contingent upon the dialectics of the field–*habitus* relation.[80]

I side with this 'second' (dialectical) Bourdieu, as do sociologists such as Loïc Wacquant and Bernard Lahire.[81] In order to bring the dialectical Bourdieu to the empirics of the South

[77] Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Preface to *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* by Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), xiii, xiv; Will Atkinson, "Fields and Individuals: From Bourdieu to Lahire and Back Again," *European Journal of Social Theory* 24, no. 2 (2021): 204; Miklós Hadas, *Outlines of a Theory of Plural Habitus: Bourdieu Revisited* (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), 9-28.
[78] Christoforos Bouzanis and Stephen Kemp, "The Two Stories of the Habitus/Structure Relation and the Riddle of Reflexivity: A Meta-Theoretical Reappraisal," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 50, no. 1 (2020): 64-83; Elizabeth B. Silva, "Unity and Fragmentation of the Habitus," *Sociological Review* 64, no. 1 (2016): 166-183.
[79] We find ambiguity, for instance, in statements that "'rational choice' may take over, at least among those agents who are in a position to be rational." Wacquant and Bourdieu, *Invitation*, 731; see also Ivan Ermakoff, "Rational Choice May Take Over," in *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis*, ed. Philip S. Gorski (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 89-107. This appears reminiscent of the idea of bounded rationality, see Quentin Bruneau, "Converging Paths: Bounded Rationality, Practice Theory and the Study of Change in Historical International Relations," *International Theory* 14, no. 1 (2022): 88-114. The tension between *habitus* as being either all-encompassing or conditional is also visible in IR literature: compare Pouliot's emphasis on practicality being "ontologically prior" (Pouliot, *Logic of Practicality*) with Ted Hopf's interest in specifying scope conditions under which actors operate on the basis of habit/*habitus* or not (Ted Hopf, "Logic of Habit," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 4 [2010]: 539-561; Ted Hopf, "Change in International Practices," *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 3 [2018]: 687-711).
[80] Bouzanis and Kemp, 67-72.
[81] See, for example, Wacquant, "*Homines in Extremis*," 3-17; Wacquant, "A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus," 64-72; Bernard Lahire, *The Plural Actor*; Mathieu Hilgers, "Habitus, Freedom, and Reflexivity," *Theory & Psychology* 19, 6 (2009): 728-755; Gorski, "Bourdieusian Theory and Historical Analysis," 351-361; Hadas, *Outlines*, 17-46, 75-82. For explicit usage of dialectics by Bourdieu, see for instance Bourdieu, *Outline*, 87-95; Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 155-159; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation*, 12-15.

Caucasus, I build on the work of sociologists who have emphasised that social actors inhabit a multiplicity of intersecting fields and, as a result, embody a necessarily heterogenous *habitus*.[82]

Social Trajectories and Capital Conversions across Intersecting Fields of Knowledge Production

I conceive of the security field as a field of knowledge production. This allows for an inclusion of both state and non-state actors, and avoids a focus on bureaucratic autonomy. A focus on knowledge, authority and expertise is not new in Bourdieusian IR. Anna Leander has shown how private military companies accumulate power through the shaping of dominant security discourses and the reproduction of their status as techno-managerial providers of legitimate expertise.[83] Trine Villumsen Berling has studied how the survival of NATO after the Cold War was made possible through a shift from mobilising technical military knowledge to wielding social science as capital and constructing new networks with new experts.[84]

The Bourdieusian turn to knowledge has been taken further by scholars like Ole Jacob Sending and Anna Danielsson, who, like Goetze, study international peace- and state-building bureaucrats and concentrate on struggles for authority.[85] Following Villumsen Berling, Sending and Danielsson I define security fields on the basis of the object of the game which the players

[82] Lahire, *The Plural Actor*, esp. 11-65; Bernard Lahire, "Éléments pour une théorie des formes socio-historiques d'acteur et d'action," *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 34, no. 106 (1996): 69-96; Lahire, "From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions," 329-355; Bernard Lahire, "The Limits of the Field: Elements for a Theory of the Social Differentiation of Activities," in *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*, ed. Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 62-101; Wacquant, "Putting Habitus in its Place," 118-139; Wacquant, "A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus," 64-72; Hadas, *Outlines*, 29-46, 75-102; Will Atkinson, *Beyond Bourdieu: From Genetic Structuralism to Relational Phenomenology* (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 2016), 7-8, 14-15, 140; Will Atkinson, *Bourdieu and After: A Guide to Relational Phenomenology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 171-191; Andreas Schmitz and Daniel Witte, "National, International, Transnational, and Global Fields: Theoretical Clarifications and Methodological Implications," in *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg and Stefan Bernhard (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 79-97; Kauppi, "How Many Fields," 37-54; Schmitz, Witte, and Gengnagel, "Pluralizing Field Analysis," 49-73; Go and Krause, "Fielding Transnationalism," 6-30.

[83] Anna Leander. "The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (2005): 803-825.

[84] Trine Villumsen Berling, "Pierre Bourdieu, International Relations, and European Security," 451-478; Trine Villumsen Berling, "Knowledges," in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Routledge: London and New York, 2013), 59-77.

[85] Ole Jacob Sending, *The Politics of Expertise: Competing for Authority in Global Governance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015); Anna Danielsson, "Reconceptualising the Politics of Knowledge Authority in Post/Conflict Interventions: From a Peacebuilding Field to Transnational Fields of Interventionary Objects," *European Journal of International Security* 5, no. 1 (2020): 115-133. See also Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, "Knowledge Production in/about Conflict and Intervention: Finding 'Facts', Telling 'Truth'," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 11, no. 1 (2017): 1-20; Grégory Daho, Nathalie Duclos, and Cécile Jouhanneau, "Political Sociology of International Interventions: Peacebuilders and the Ground," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 13, no. 3 (2019): 249-262.

are invested in (*illusio*): the authority to define legitimate security knowledges in and for certain contexts.[86] Authority, here, refers to "a *relationship* between a superordinate and a subordinate actor that is *recognized* and where the latter *defers* to the former."[87] Security fields are marked by a constant quest for the recognition of knowledge. Forms of (epistemic) capital are mobilised to become symbolic capital.[88]

Danielsson points out that this theoretical orientation is well-adapted to avoid reifying the boundaries of a field based on geographies, institutions or professional affiliations. It can instead capture how expertise as authoritative knowledge is often plural and transgressive: it tends to originate in multiple places and cross professional and geographic boundaries. While I follow Danielsson in her emphasis on multiplicity, I find that she tends (slightly) towards dissolving boundaries and flattening scales altogether.[89] This may be appropriate for highly transnationalised state-building fields, but less so for contexts where the central stakes and actors remain 'national' in important ways. Few Bourdieusian studies in IR/CSS provide a clear conceptualisation of the relations and differences between national and transnational fields . However, if we set aside security as object of study for the moment, much work has been done in (post-Bourdieusian) International Political Sociology (IPS) to theorise the different scales and relations of fields more robustly.[90]

I single out three interrelated contributions that are relevant for my cases. The first expands on the idea of relative autonomy and inter-field relations. Relatively autonomy, conversely, implies relative heteronomy.[91] Every field has not only an axis that differentiates

[86] Villumsen Berling, "Knowledges," 68; Sending, 23; Danielsson, 121-125.
[87] Sending, 19; see also R. B. Friedman, "On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy," in *Authority*, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 56-91.
[88] Cf. Pertti Alasuutari, "Authority as Epistemic Capital," *Journal of Political Power* 11, no. 2 (2018): 165-190.
[89] *Contra* Danielsson, I do not think it always makes sense to think of the field of peacebuilding or the field of security as a transnational meta-field of fields, a field of power in Bourdieu's original sense, populated by exclusively the dominant actors of the ('normal') fields that are centred around specific objects of knowledge production and intervention. This presupposes that the transnational level has a different power dynamic and does not include subordinated actors from particular fields. See Danielsson, 124. See also Martin-Mazé, "Social Structures of Interventions," 73-75. Martin-Mazé highlights that the focus on transnational fields of power has "obfuscated" the study of bureaucratic fields. See also Kauppi, "How Many Fields," 185.
[90] See the special issue compiled by Didier Bigo and Mikael R. Madsen, "Bourdieu and the International," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 219-345; and the forum "Unpacking the Deep Structures of Global Governance: How Transnational Professionals Can Make Global Governance Intelligible," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 3 (2014): 324-342. See furthermore Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg and Stefan Bernhard, eds., *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge, 2020). I draw on similar trends within global historical sociology and the sociology of knowledge, for overviews see e.g. Philip S. Gorski, ed., *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2013); Go and Krause, "Fielding Transnationalism," 6-30; Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz, "From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions," *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010): 117-137.
[91] If a field is defined by its stakes and effects, then any field has to refract effects from other fields through the filter of their own logic.

actors based on the total volume they hold of the forms of relational capital that are considered relevant in the field, but also an axis that separates the actors closely dependent on forms of capital derived from other fields (heteronomous pole) from the consecrated actors who produce their symbolic capital primarily internally (autonomous pole).[92] Buchholz makes an important addition: we should differentiate between functional and vertical (i.e., scalar) autonomy.[93] A national security field can be functionally autonomous from, say, local business elites, but also vertically autonomous from transnational corporations. But the reverse may also be true: a national field may be heteronomised functionally through, say, politicisation or vertically through transnationalisation. Indeed, every security field has its transnational and its national pole.[94] Multiple forms of heteronomy shape the internal symbolic structuration of a field.[95] If traditional Bourdieusian approaches often study how autonomous fields relate through a relation of homology, that is, coincidental correspondences of structures of positions, an alternative way to think about inter-field relations, taking heteronomy as a starting point, is to conceive of the heteronomous poles of fields as field intersections, that is, social spaces where fields cross and overlap because actors are positioned in multiple fields at the same time.[96]

A second line of inquiry expands this. Scholars such as Dezalay, Kauppi and Madsen trace how power elites are multi-positional and therefore occupy dominant positions in multiple fields and reside in the space of power which regulates relations between fields at a transnationalised level.[97] These scholars stress the importance of "strategies of

[92] Gorski, "Bourdieusian Theory and Historical Analysis," 329-330, 335; Schmitz and Witte, "National, International, and Global Fields," 83-86; Andreas Schmitz, Daniel Witte, and Vincent Gengnagel, "Pluralizing Field Analysis," 53-54, 57-58, 67.
[93] Buchholz, "What is a Global Field?," 31-60; Krause, "How Fields Vary," 14-15.
[94] Schmitz and Witte, "National, International, and Global Fields," 87; Kauppi, "How Many Fields," 185.
[95] Krause, "How Fields Vary," 9-15.
[96] Steinmetz, "Social Fields, Subfields and Social Spaces at the Scale of Empires," 101-105; Go and Krause, "Fielding Transnationalism," 21-22; Julian Go, "Global Change: A Field Theory Perspective on the End of Empire," in *Charting Transnational Fields: Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg and Stefan Bernhard (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 141-159, esp. 144.
[97] Dezalay and Garth, *Palace Wars*; Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, "Hegemonic Battles, Professional Rivalries, and the International Division of Labor in the Market for the Import and Export of State-Governing Expertise," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 276-293; Niilo Kauppi and Mikael Rask Madsen, "Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security," in *Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security*, ed. Niilo Kauppi and Mikael Rask Madsen (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 1-15; Niilo Kauppi and Mikael R. Madsen, "Fields of Global Governance: How Transnational Power Elites Can Make Global Governance Intelligible," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 3 (2014): 324-330; Yves Dezalay and Mikael Rask Madsen, "In the 'Field' of Transnational Professionals: A Post-Bourdieusian Approach to Transnational Legal Entrepreneurs," in *Professional Networks in Transnational Governance*, ed. Leonard Seabrooke and Lasse Folke Henriksen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 25-38. On multi-positionality, see also Luc Boltanski, "L'espace positionnel: Multiplicité des positions institutionnelles et habitus de classe," *Revue française de sociologie* 14, no. 1 (1973): 3-26; Bigo, "Globalized In(Security)," 24; Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations," 248; Kauppi, "How Many Fields," 189.

internationalisation" and "double games." In transnational spheres, professional elites wield their connections to powerful states as delegated power. At home, they mobilise their cosmopolitan/international capital, using transnational markets and institutions to generate national prestige. At the local level, elites strike compromises with competitors, which often muddles the implementation of state-building expertise. Imperfect outcomes can then serve as a reason for the next generation of transnationally-connected elites to import *more* international expertise, thus creating an import-export loop connecting national and international fields of knowledge production.[98] In the security field, too, actors convert forms of capital across levels and intersections so that they become recognised as authoritative in national or transnational contexts.[99]

A third contribution extends the idea of the field intersection by studying it as a social space in its own right – not as a thin line where two spaces cross but as a thick boundary space. Eyal suggests that field boundaries can be conceived of as "spaces between fields," where networked actors compete over the definition of the manipulable boundaries between fields.[100] The meaning of a field intersection is not given, it is a relational product from those individuals and organisations who inhabit it. Some fields have sharp boundaries and intersections, others are blurry. Fields that are 'younger', less formally institutionalised, and less closely coupled to the central authority of the state are likely to exhibit wide and porous intersections, and fierce symbolic struggles over legitimate boundaries.[101]

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[98] Dezalay and Garth, "Hegemonic Battles," 276-293; Dezalay and Madsen, "In the 'Field' of Transnational Professionals," 25-31; Tugba Basaran and Christian Olsson, "Becoming International: On Symbolic Capital, Conversion and Privilege," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 46, no. 2 (2018): 96-118.

[99] Tessa Diphoorn and Erella Grassiani, "Securitizing Capital: A Processual-Relational Approach to Pluralized Security," *Theoretical Criminology* 20, no. 4 (2016): 430-445.

[100] Gil Eyal, "Dangerous Liaisons between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel," *Theory and Society* 31, no. 5 (2002): 653-693; Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Eyal, "Spaces Between Fields," 158-182. Powerful collective actors like think tanks can inhabit such spaces as "boundary organisations." See Thomas Medvetz, "Les think tanks aux États-Unis: L'émergence d'un sous-espace de production des savoirs," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 1-2, no. 176-177 (2009): 82-93; Thomas Medvetz, "Murky Power: 'Think Tanks' as Boundary Organizations," in *Rethinking Power in Organizations, Institutions, and Markets*, ed. David Courpasson, Damon Golsorkhi, and Jeffrey J. Sallaz (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2012), 113-133. Other scholars inspired by Bourdieu have looked at think tanks in Poland and Russia. See Katarzyna Jezierska, "Performing Independence: The Apolitical Image of Polish Think Tanks," *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 3 (2018): 345-364; Alexander Graef, "Foreign Policy Experts, Think Tanks and the Russian State: A Field Theoretical Approach," PhD diss., (University of St Gallen, 2019).

[101] Vauchez suggests that fields with fuzzy boundaries and weak internal differentiation are common at the transnational level, where overarching state authority is limited. This produces a particular interstitial power for actors who can move easily across scales and between fields. For example, it is much easier to be a an academic and a policy-maker at the same time at the EU level than at the national level. Antoine Vauchez, "The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda)," *International Political Sociology* 2, no. 2 (2008): 128-144; Antoine Vauchez, "Interstitial Power in Fields of Limited Statehood: Introducing a 'Weak Field' Approach to the Study of Transnational Settings," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 340-345. However, to avoid the language of 'weak' fields I suggest that the

Applying these three lines of inquiry to the cases of Armenia and Georgia, brings me to the following proposition: We can trace how political and security fields intersect horizontally and vertically, how multi-positioned security actors utilise heteronomy and transfer capital during their career trajectories, and how such multi-field movements and conversions impact knowledge production contestations. In Georgia and Armenia, the question of who gets to speak authoritatively about post-war security governance is primarily structured by the opposition between autonomous actors and heteronomous actors, which is in turn a product of perceptions of 'state weakness' and the politicisation of security bureaucracies.

'Opening up' the Security *Habitus* as Layered Heritage of Dispositions

If the use of the notion of the field in IR/CSS can be expanded by assuming multiple, intersecting fields, the same can be done with the *habitus*: most of the bureaucrats, professionals and experts of the security sector also inhabit *multiple* worlds and accumulate *varied* sets of dispositions. Bringing the work of Bernard Lahire to IR/CSS, Didier Bigo himself has one of the few scholars to add complexity to the security *habitus*.[102] In his 'later' work,[103] he stresses that the *habitus* is "an imperfect grammar" which is "'split,' shattered, more often contradictory than systematic, and has multiple and heterogeneous facets coming from its exposure to multiple fields."[104] Each individual *habitus* is unique yet social – resulting from positional trajectories crossing different social worlds.[105] Bigo has begun to put this understanding in empirical practice by studying clusters of "patrimonies of dispositions" (borrowing Lahire's phrase).[106] The trends and contradictions of European border security, for example, can be analysed on the basis of the overlaps, alliances and power differences between three

degree of internal structuration should be studied. Porous boundaries and degree internal differentiation can be two variables of such structuration. Low scores on these two sliding scales likely corelate with the 'youth' (short genesis) of a field. See Kauppi, "How Many Fields," 187; Gorski, "Bourdieusian Theory and Historical Analysis," 327ff.

[102] For another scholar who has drawn on Lahire to add complexity to the analysis of fields and practices in IR/CSS, see Ingvild Bode, "Reflective Practices at the Security Council: Children and Armed Conflict and the Three United Nations," *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 2 (2018): 293-318.

[103] I make this somewhat artificial distinction to highlight the difference with Bigo's work that stress social reproduction and fairly homogenous patterns of transformation.

[104] Bigo, "Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations," 238.

[105] Ibid., 241-243.

[106] Didier Bigo, "The (In)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 3 (2014): 209-225, esp. 210-211. See Lahire, "From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions," and Lahire, *The Plural Actor*.

dispositional groups – disciplinary military professionals, managerial-patronising border guards, and surveillance-minded data-analysts.[107]

Two other scholars have adjusted the idea of the security *habitus*. Frédéric Mérand adds the idea of *bricolage* to show how security actors can combine different dispositional schemata and sources of material and symbolic capital to haphazardly generate practices. This stresses not only the *dispositional* but also the *contextual* and *combinatorial* nature of security practice. Improvisation matters, especially in unstable settings, but based on concrete dispositions, forms of capital and symbolic constraints.[108] Raluca Csernatoni finds that Mérand's bricolage is particularly apt to describe the adaptability of the security *habitus* in contexts of structural transformation.[109] She speaks of a "transitional security habitus," which captures the "constantly changing and negotiated character" of dispositions inculcated in a security field undergoing turbulent post-socialist reforms.[110] In transitional contexts, lag effects (*hysteresis*) between security *habitus* and security field expand. The security field may lack agreed-upon bounds (*doxa*) and new actors bring a *habitus* from outdated fields. The appropriate *habitus* itself may become an object of, or tool in, symbolic struggles: successful actors proactively defend their dispositions or integrate new ones, and may frame their opponents as (Communist) dinosaurs.[111]

To think more systematically about the *plural* security *habitus*, as a concrete tool for empirical inquiry, I turn to post-Bourdieusian sociologists. Actors inhabit multiple cross-cutting

[107] Bigo, "(In)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes," 211-220. See also Didier Bigo, "The Transnational Field of Computerised Exchange of Information in Police Matters and its European Guilds," in *Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security*, ed. Niilo Kauppi and Mikael Rask Madsen (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 155-182. In a similar way, Bigo and Bonelli show how transnational cooperation between intelligence agencies is based on shared dispositions and capital endowments of distinct clusters of security services, detecting a split between agencies with a sense of obedience to national politicians and those that prioritise total data awareness and global cooperation. See Didier Bigo and Laurent Bonelli, "Digital Data and the Transnational Intelligence Space," in *Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights*, ed. Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and Evelyn Ruppert (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 100-122; Bigo, "Adjusting a Bourdieusian Approach to the Study of Transnational Fields," 78.

[108] Frédéric Mérand, "Bricolage: A Sociological Approach to the Making of CSDP," in *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*, ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 136-161; see also Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), esp. 134.

[109] Raluca Csernatoni, "Romania's Euro-Atlantic Security Profile Post-Cold War: Transitional Security Habitus and the Praxis of Romania's Security Field," PhD diss., (Central European University, 2014), 137-138. See also Raluca-Oana Csernatoni, "The Praxis of Romania's Euro-Atlantic Security Field: A Bourdieu-Inspired Research Agenda," in *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*, ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 212-235, esp. 223-229.

[110] Csernatoni, "Romania's Euro-Atlantic Security Profile Post-Cold War," 57. Where Csernatoni writes, "adaptation to change in itself and for itself becomes an ingrained habitual disposition, embodied by security actors as a social 'survival' tool and reflecting the shared security context of post-communist Romania," we might replace "Romania" with "Armenia and Georgia." Ibid., 58.

[111] Ibid., 63-71.

fields and therefore acquire heterogenous sets of dispositions. The turn towards individual combinations of dispositions is most forcefully advocated by Bernard Lahire, but also by others such as Will Atkinson and Miklós Hadas.[112] Lahire writes:

> We can therefore propose the hypothesis of the embodiment by each actor of a multiplicity of schemes of action […] and habits […], organized around so many repertoires and the pertinent social contexts that they learn to distinguish […] via the ensemble of their previous socialization experiences. […] [T]his stock […] turns out to be organized in the form of social repertoires […] of schemes, repertoires that are distinct from one another, but interconnected and certainly containing common elements. […] there are as many habits as the sense of (relative) contextual relevance of their application. People learn and understand that what is said and done in one context is not said or done in another. This sense of situations is more or less 'correctly' embodied […].[113]

For Lahire, actors are socialised in heterogenous worlds and cannot be reduced to their existence in one field. Actors learn to negotiate between *many* different contexts and the appropriate repertoires. At the same time, minor crises of adaptation are the rule rather than the exception.[114]

What are the diverse elements that constitute the plural *habitus*? The *habitus* consists of a "multilayered set and dynamic set of schemata."[115] We can identify different layers temporally and functionally.[116] We have the primary (generic) habitus, formed in early childhood, and the secondary (specific) habitus, formed in (educational) institutions. Tertiary, quaternary etc. layers follow chronologically.[117] For the purposes of this study, it is crucial to bear in mind that older layers and newer layers coexist. Functionally, I distinguish between a cognitive layer of categories used to make sense of the world, and a emotive–moral layer

[112] Lahire, "From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions," 329-355; Lahire, *The Plural Actor*; Atkinson, *Beyond Bourdieu*; Atkinson, *Bourdieu and After*; Atkinson, "Fields and Individuals," 195-210; Hadas, *Outlines*; Frédéric Vandenberghe, "Sociology at the Scale of the Individual: Archer and Lahire Contra Bourdieu," in *The Anthem Companion to Pierre Bourdieu*, ed. Derek Robbins (London and New York: Anthem Press, 2016), 95-116; Claudio E. Benzecry, "Habitus and Beyond: Standing on the Shoulders of a Giant Looking at the Seams," in *The Oxford Handbook of Pierre Bourdieu*, ed. Thomas Medvetz and Jeffrey J. Sallaz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 537-560.
[113] Lahire, *The Plural Actor*, 32.
[114] Lahire, *The Plural Actor*, 18-45; Atkinson, *Beyond Bourdieu*, 25-27; Atkinson, *Bourdieu and After*, 178-182.
[115] Wacquant, "A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus," 68.
[116] I further try to differentiate between, on the one hand, implicit perceptual dispositions linked to a *national* 'horizon of experience' (acquired in national settings), and on the other hand, partially or largely *transnationalised* categories, expectations and loyalties (developed in transnational fields). See Sören Carlson and Christian Schneickert, "Habitus in the Context of Transnationalization: From 'Transnational Habitus' to a Configuration of Dispositions and Fields," *Sociological Review* 69, no. 5 (2021): 1124-1140; Schmitz and Witte, "National, International, Transnational, and Global Fields," 88.
[117] Wacquant, "A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus," 68; Wacquant, "*Homines in Extremis*," 6-8; Ana Velitchkova, "Institutionalized Behavior, Morality and Domination: A *Habitus* in Action Model of Violence," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 52, no. 1 (2022): 6, 13-14; Hadas, *Outlines*, 19-24.

comprising desires, feelings and justifications.[118] In addition, there are conative or behavioural dispositions, that is, habits based on physical experiences and motor skills, which Lahire would call "dispositions to act."[119] This third layer takes a subordinated position in this study, given that I do not directly observe knowledge-production practices and habits in the field. Further ethnographic fieldwork would be required to study this dimension.

The cognitive and emotive layers are interrelated, and the degree of fragmentation or integration of the *habitus* is an empirical variable.[120] Actors can perceive the world in ways that confirm or contradict their moral and emotional attachments. There can be a strong coupling between how one feels about security, how one thinks it works, and how one enacts security practices accordingly, but this sequence can also be more or less disjointed.

The conditions and processes through which the layered *habitus* was shaped can be traced by observing socialising institutions,[121] tracing actor's individual trajectories, and inquire about various formative experiences. Moreover, the different dispositions need to be linked back to the context of the social field.[122] How plural actors negotiate, transpose, activate or inhibit different sets of dispositions in the different fields they inhabit, remains a micro-empirical matter, for which authors like Lahire and Atkinson give few concrete theoretical or methodological guidelines.[123]

Although the study of multiple heterogeneous security *habitus* formations is still in its infancy in Bourdieusian IR/CSS, the theoretical contributions outlined above nevertheless lead to a concrete proposition: In 'young' states like Armenia and Georgia, where the security field is politicised and the political field is securitised, through a relation of heteronomous intersection, we expect to find multiple heterogeneous *habitus* formations. Because of the newness of the security field, it includes both older actors who bring dispositions from other national fields where they were socialised, and younger actors who bring dispositions from

[118] Wacquant, "*Homines in Extremis*," 8; Velitchkova, 10.
[119] Wacquant, "*Homines in Extremis*," 8-9; Velitchkova, 7-9; Lahire, "From the Habitus to an Individual Heritage of Dispositions," 336-338.
[120] See especially Velitchkova (on "relational templates") as well as Lahire, *The Plural Actor*, 18-65.
[121] A full grasp of how institutional socialisation deposits layers of dispositions may require a level of ethnographic depth which is not always possible in the contexts of security politics. For one of the best examples of a deep *habitus*-based ethnography, see Loïc Wacquant, *Body & Soul: Notebooks of an Apprentice Boxer* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). In addition, note that we can differentiate between active learning versus practical mimesis; and between total or partial inculcation in socialising institutions. See Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 73, 93; Wacquant, "Following Pierre Bourdieu into the Field," 100, 117-120; Wacquant, "Putting Habitus in its Place," 126; Hadas, *Outlines*, 89.
[122] We ought to study "the modalities of the triggering of embodied schemes of action […] by the elements or configuration of the present situation," says Lahire. Lahire, *The Plural Actor*, 48.
[123] Cf. Lahire, *The Plural Actor*; Atkinson, *Bourdieu and After*. Lahire and Atkinson also differ on the matter of whether the actor retains an overarching horizon of experience (Atkinson) or is heterogeneous/plural through-and-through (Lahire), see Atkinson, "Fields and Individuals."

'newly opened' transnational fields. Because of the variable heteronomy in the security field, some actors are multi-positioned and have to balance political and security dispositions. Because of the frequent wars and regime changes, different generations of actors are shaped by different formative events. Overall, in Georgia and Armenia, struggles over security expertise are connected to clashes between different sets of cognitive and moral dispositions, as well as to divergent socialising trajectories. Different experiences generate different interpretations.



Figure 2 - Relations between security and political fields

FIELD ANALYSIS: SECURITISATION AND POLITICISATION AS HETERONOMY AND INTERSECTION

In this first empirical chapter, I trace how domestic politics is securitised in Armenia and Georgia, and conversely how the world of security professionals is politicised. It is futile to determine whether the security field initially dominates the political field and keeps this relationship in place, or vice versa. The tendency towards heteronomisation, that is, the strategy of rising security professionals to self-politicise in response to the politicisation of the security field, closes a loop between politicisation and securitisation. By entering politics with their security discourses and dispositions, these actors contribute to the domination of security concerns in the domestic political arena.

The relations of field intersection and their connection to the transnational level are depicted in Figure 2.

After Revolution and War: (Re-)Securitisation of Political Fields

Chants like "Nikol, traitor,"[124] and "traitor Garibashvili,"[125] are all but new in Armenia and Georgia. While the time when Armenia and Georgia were ruled by various alliances of warlords, intellectuals, veterans and *apparatchiks* ended long ago,[126] various governments have used the protracted conflicts of the region to bolster their legitimacy as state-builders. Opposition coalitions, in turn, have continued to draw on the 'security reputations' of key figures whose careers have straddled the boundary between security and politics, in order to challenge incumbents. There are both discursive and positional dimensions to the evolving geopolitical 'blame games'.

[124] Gayane Hovsepyan, "Yerevan: Opposition Protesters Barred from Democracy Forum."
[125] "'Traitor Garibashvili' Faces Resignation Calls."
[126] Anja H. Ebnöther and Gustav E. Gustenau, eds., *Security Sector Governance in Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Visions* (Vienna and Geneva: Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004); Gagik Avagyan and Duncan Hiscock, *Security Sector Reform in Armenia* (London: Saferworld, 2005); Georgi M. Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Jesse Driscoll, *Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Iskandaryan, Mikaelian and Minasyan, *War, Business & Politics*; David Darchiashvili and Ronald Scott Mangum, "Georgian Civil-Military Relations: Hostage to Confrontational Politics," *Caucasus Survey* 7, no. 1 (2019): 79-93.

Restoring territorial integrity was a foundational ambition of the Rose Revolutionaries from the very beginning,[127] though many scholars cautioned that state-building came to overshadow democratisation and minority inclusion.[128] The Saakashvili government successfully subdued the renegade province of Adjara in 2004, but attempts to duplicate this effort in South Ossetia eventually paved the way for the Russo-Georgian War in 2008.[129] Saakashvili's decreasing popularity and the calamitous war of 2008 sparked a wave of protests, led, amongst others,[130] by Irakli Alasania, the government's former chief negotiator for the conflict over Abkhazia, who had claimed that "this provocative war" was avoidable.[131] The Saakashvili government, meanwhile, framed itself as the only credible (neo-)liberal and pro-Western force, casting all opposition as pro-Kremlin.[132] Conversely, when an eclectic elite coalition (Georgian Dream) sponsored by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili ousted Saakashvili in 2012, the discourse of blaming the previous government for the war became commonplace.[133]

[127] "Saakashvili Takes Oath on Tomb of King David the Builder," *Caucasian Knot*, January 24, 2004, https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/1991/. See furthermore Kabachnik, "Wounds That Won't Heal," 45-60.
[128] Stephen F. Jones, "The Rose Revolution: A Revolution without Revolutionaries?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, no. 1 (2006): 33-48; Vicken Cheterian, "Georgia's Rose Revolution: Change or Repetition? Tension between State-Building and Modernization Projects," *Nationalities Papers* 36, no. 4 (2008): 689-712; Lincoln A. Mitchell, "Compromising Democracy: State Building in Saakashvili's Georgia," *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (2009): 171-183; Jonathan Wheatley, "Managing Ethnic Diversity in Georgia: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (2009): 119-134; Julie A. George, "The Dangers of Reform: State Building and National Minorities in Georgia," *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (2009): 135-154.
[129] Jones, "Rose Revolution," 46; Wheatley, 127; Vicken Cheterian, "The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars," *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (2009): 155-170, esp. 158. The 'unification' policies were accompanied by highly symbolic discourse – Defence Minister Okruashvili declared that he would resign "if we fail to celebrate New Year in Tskhinvali" (South Ossetia); former Foreign Minister Bakradze compared the capitals of Georgia's breakaway regions to the importance of the retrieval of Jerusalem for Jews. Such articulations fit within a wider habitual memory narrative which views Georgian history as a teleological process of national restoration, interrupted by internal 'traitors' and external 'invaders'. See James V. Wertsch and Zurab Karumidze, "Spinning the Past: Russian and Georgian Accounts of the War of August 2008," *Memory Studies* 2, no. 3 (2009): 377-391, esp. 388; James V. Wertsch and Nutsa Batiashvili, "Mnemonic Communities and Conflict: Georgia's National Narrative Template," in *Trust and Conflict: Representation, Culture and Dialogue*, ed. Ivana Marková and Alex Gillespie (London: Routledge, 2011), 37-48; Nutsa Batiashvili, *The Bivocal Nation: Memory and Identity on the Edge of Empire* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); "Okruashvili Reiterates S. Ossetia Reunification Deadline," *Civil.ge*, May 1, 2006, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12452.
[130] Irakli Okruashvili, Saakashvili's former hawkish Defence Minister, sat in exile in France. Saakashvili's former Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Conflict Resolution, Salome Zourabichvili and Goga Khaindrava, respectively, were also leading the protests against him.
[131] "Irakli Alasania's Statement," *Civil.ge*, December 24, 2008, https://civil.ge/archives/118136.
[132] Bakar Berekashvili, "Nationalism and Hegemony in Post-Communist Georgia," *Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation* 3, no. 2 (2018): 67-79. See also "Ruling Party MPs Speak of 'New Pro-Russian Center' Around Ivanishvili," *Civil.ge*, November 8, 2011, https://civil.ge/archives/186104; "Ruling Party Links Ivanishvili with Russia, Pledges More Funding for Parties," *Civil.ge*, October 11, 2011, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24020
[133] "PM: 'We Should Establish Truth' over August War," *Civil.ge*, April 12, 2013, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25948; "Ivanishvili on August War Probe," *Civil.ge*, April 10, 2013, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25940; "PM Garibashvili Speaks of August War," *Civil.ge*, August 8, 2014, https://civil.ge/archives/123932.

Such securitised 'mudslinging' has become an established feature of Georgian politics. A few years after erstwhile opposition leader Alasania was appointed Defence Minister in the new government, he was sacked amid a scandal over arrests in the military.[134] New opposition parties such as European Georgia have been formed almost entirely by security/foreign policy people.[135] These opposition actors also blame Georgian Dream for allowing the conflict line between South Ossetia and Tbilisi-controlled territory to materialise into a *de facto* border.[136] In the presidential elections of 2018, Georgians could choose between two former foreign ministers who characterised their opponent as some sort of Russian puppet.[137] Even if foreign policy differences need not be construed as a zero-sum game,[138] there is "extreme polarization over the level of each party's Western commitment, and questions of tactics and of perceived geopolitical differences."[139] This polarisation continues to provokes political crises.[140]

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[134] Alasania called this episode "an attack on Georgia's Euro-Atlantic choice." See "PM Dismisses Defence Minister Irakli Alasania," *Agenda.ge*, November 4, 2014, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2014/2526; "Georgian Foreign Minister Resigns," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 5, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/alasania-panjikidze-tbilisi-georgian-dream-resignation-crisis/26675249.html.

[135] European Georgia was formed as a split-off from Saakashvili's United National Movement. Its founders included Sergi Kapanadze, Elene Khostaria, Giga Bokeria, and Davit Bakradze. They were already seasoned parliamentarians, but had also occupied posts such as Deputy Foreign Minister, First Deputy Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Secretary of the National Security Council, Minister of Conflict Resolution Issues, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Other Georgian parties do not have such a dominant range of security professionals in their ranks, but even the long-standing Republican Party, whose main figures have a more legalistic professional *habitus*, includes prominent people who occupied posts related to defence, security and conflict, such as Tina Khidasheli, Paata Zakareishvili, and Ivliane Khaindrava.

[136] Gerard Toal and Gela Merabishvili, "Borderization Theatre: Geopolitical Entrepreneurship on the South Ossetia Boundary Line, 2008–2018," *Caucasus Survey* 7, no. 2 (2019): 110-133; James Brooke, "'Rural Berlin Walls' Divide Communities After Russia-Georgia War," *Voice of America*, August 12, 2013, https://www.voanews.com/a/rural-berlin-walls-cuts-communities-5-years-after-russia-georgia-war/1727897.html; "Saakashvili Comments on 'Borderisation'," *Civil.ge*, September 24, 2013, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26484; "Ivanishvili Comments on 'Borderisation'," *Civil.ge*, May 31, 2013, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26132.

[137] Henry Foy, "Frenchwoman Frontrunner to Become Georgia's Next President," *Financial Times*, October 25, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/070d1514-d774-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8; "Salome Zurabishvili's August War Remarks Draw Criticism from Political Parties," *Civil.ge*, August 9, 2018, https://civil.ge/archives/248876; "Zurabishvili Clarifies Position on Russo-Georgian War," *Civil.ge*, September 17, 2018, https://civil.ge/archives/254183; "Salome Zurabishvili – I Will Not Cede the Country to Vashadze or Russia," *First Channel*, October 30, 2018, https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/salome-zurabishvili-ready-second-round-ready-struggle/; Georgian Candidate Grigol Vashadze Denies Tight Russia Ties," *Deutsche Welle*, November 7, 2018, https://p.dw.com/p/37q6C.

[138] Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Frederik Coene, "Go West: Georgia's European Identity and its Role in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Objectives," *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 6 (2014): 923-941; Kornely Kakachia and Salome Minesashvili, "Identity Politics: Exploring Georgian Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 6, no. 2 (2015): 171-180; Kornely Kakachia, Salome Minesashvili, and Levan Kakhishvili, "Change and Continuity in the Foreign Policies of Small States: Elite Perceptions and Georgia's Foreign Policy Towards Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 5 (2018): 814-831; Levan Kakhishvili, "Towards a Two-Dimensional Analytical Framework for Understanding Georgian Foreign Policy: How Party Competition Informs Foreign Policy Analysis," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 37, no. 2 (2021): 174-197.

[139] Archil Gegeshidze and Thomas de Waal, "Divided Georgia: A Hostage to Polarization," *Carnegie Europe*, December 8, 2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/08/divided-georgia-hostage-to-polarization-pub-85937.

[140] To illustrate, in June 2019 opposition-minded Georgians massively went to the streets over the fact that a visiting Russian parliamentarian was allowed to speak from the speaker's chair in the parliament. "Anti-Russia

Unlike Georgia, Armenia did not undergo a rapid electoral revolution towards Western liberalism in the 2000s, but was rather ruled by the increasingly depersonalised Republican Party.[141] Armenia did not experience a war in the 2000s, but the stability in Nagorno-Karabakh declined from 2008 onwards, in parallel with economic decline and growing political apathy.[142] Much like in Georgia, some of the non-systemic political opposition was comprised of former security and foreign policy actors. Armenia's first Foreign Minister, California-born Raffi Hovannisian, rose to prominence and came close to robbing President Sargsyan of his post in 2013, but lost his popularity by 2017.[143] Instead, the only opposition force that made it into parliament was led by journalist-activist Nikol Pashinyan.[144]

While the Republican Party ruled as though it could rule forever, new forms of protests emerged over the years. When President Sargsyan broke his promise not to run for Prime Minister following the constitutional changes of 2015, Nikol Pashinyan led a mass movement against the establishment and forced Sargsyan to abdicate in a few weeks' time: Armenia's Velvet Revolution.[145] On the one hand, Pashinyan's rise to power was markedly different from Saakashvili's, given the fact that he lacked political experience and downplayed the geopolitical discourse of the electoral revolution. On the other hand, however, the security context turned out to be unavoidable. If the flaring up of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2016 undermined the old regime's insistence that it was the only political actor that could manage Armenia's security,[146] the war of 2020 undid Pashinyan's hopes that he could govern based on legalistic elite rotation and anti-corruption reforms alone.

Protests Turn Violent in Georgia," *Deutsche Welle*, June 20, 2019, https://p.dw.com/p/3Ko8w; Levan Kakhishvili, "From 'Peaceful Protests' to 'Manifestation of Depravity': How Did the Georgian Dream Present the June Crisis to the Public?," *Georgian Institute of Politics*, November 14, 2019, https://gip.ge/from-peaceful-protests-to-manifestation-of-depravity-how-did-the-georgian-dream-present-the-june-crisis-to-the-public/; Tornike Sharashenidze, "Too Normal? Georgia, Democracy, and the 'Gavrilov Crisis'," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, July 2, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_too_normal_georgia_democracy_and_the_gavrilov_crisis/.

[141] Iskandaryan speaks of "consensual clientelism" and "decentralised neo-patrimonialism." Alexander Iskandaryan, "Armenia: From Revolution to Revolution," in *Routledge Handbook of the Caucasus*, ed. Galina M. Yemelianova and Laurence Broers (London: Routledge, 2020), 189-190, here esp. 193ff.

[142] Alexander Iskandaryan "The Velvet Revolution in Armenia: How to Lose Power in Two Weeks," *Demokratizatsiya: Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 26, no. 4 (2018): 468-469; Georgi Derluguian and Ruben Hovhannisyan, "The Armenian Anomaly: Toward an Interdisciplinary Interpretation," *Demokratizatsiya: Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 26, no. 4 (2018): 459.

[143] In 2017, Hovannisian half-heartedly teamed up with former Defence Minister Ohanyan and former Foreign Minister Oskanian, but failed to reach the electoral threshold to enter parliament.

[144] Iskandaryan "Velvet Revolution in Armenia," 470-478.

[145] Iskandaryan, "Velvet Revolution in Armenia," 468-471, 477-479; Derluguian and Hovhannisyan, "Armenian Anomaly," 457-461.

[146] Gayane Novikova, "Armenia: Some Features of Internal (In)stability," *Caucasus Survey* 5, no.2 (2017): 177-194; Laurence Broers, *Armenia and Azerbaijan*, 167, 177.

The defeat at the hands of Azerbaijan ignited a sequence of post-war contentious politics. Right after the war, frustrated Armenians stormed their parliament.[147] The following spring, demonstrators were joined by high-ranking military men in calling for Pashinyan to resign.[148] One year later, protesters mounted a blockade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, according to one opposition leader, "no longer serves the interests of Armenia."[149] Both in parliament and on the streets, opposition against Pashinyan is led by many prominent figures with a security background – ranging from former security chief Artur Vanetsyan to former Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan.[150]

Worlds of Bureaucrats and Experts: Politicisation of Security Fields

We have seen that the positional struggle for domination in security matters 'invades' the political field. The other way around, party politics influences the social lives of security professionals both inside and outside the state. Put differently, securitisation, in Armenia and Georgia, does not imply de-politicisation.

To conceive of security as a politicised field of knowledge production, I return to Bourdieu's conception of the field of cultural production, which is structured by two axes:

[147] "Protesters Storm Armenian Parliament in Anger Over Nagorno-Karabakh Deal," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 10, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/protesters-storm-armenian-parliament/30940248.html.
[148] Ani Mejlumyan, "Armed Forces Call on Armenian PM to Step Down," February 25, 2021, *Eurasianet*, https://eurasianet.org/armed-forces-call-on-armenian-pm-to-step-down; Lillian Avedian, "March 1 Triggers Competing Rallies in Yerevan," *The Armenian Weekly*, March 1, 2021, https://armenianweekly.com/2021/03/01/march-1-triggers-competing-rallies-in-yerevan/; Georgi Derluguian, "The Yerevan Protests in 2021: A Sociological Eye," *PONARS Eurasia*, March 4, 2021, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-yerevan-protests-in-2021-a-sociological-eye/.
[149] "Recent Developments Regarding Anti-Government Protests in Armenia," *Caucasus Watch*, May 26, 2022, https://caucasuswatch.de/news/5416.html.
[150] The sitting government, which survived the elections of June 2021, has tried to detain and prosecute many of the same figures. See Lusine Sargsyan, "Primer: Post-Revolution Criminal Cases," *EVN Report*, June 2, 2020, https://evnreport.com/politics/primer-post-revolution-criminal-cases/; "Armenian General Released on Bail, Charged in Connection with 2008 Election Violence," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 28 July, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-general-released-on-bail-charged-in-connection-with-2008-election-violence/29395852.html; "SIS Puts Arrest on Ex-Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan's Property, Financial Means," *Aysor,am*, March 1, 2019, https://www.aysor.am/en/news/2019/03/01/ohanyan-property/1532433; "Former Armenian National Security Service Head Artur Vanetsyan Arrested," *Hetq*, November 14, 2020, https://hetq.am/en/article/124316; "Court Acquits Robert Kocharyan, Yuri Khachaturov, Seyran Ohanyan and Armen Gevorgyan," *Armenpress*, April 6, 2021, https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1048222/; Ani Avetisyan, "Armenia's Former Defence Minister Arrested, Charged with Embezzlement," *OC Media*, September 30, 2021, https://oc-media.org/armenias-former-defence-minister-arrested-charged-with-embezzlement/; "Armenia: Appeals Court Upholds Acquittal of Kocharyan," *Hetq*, November 29, 2021, https://hetq.am/en/article/138344; Araks Mamulyan, "Police Arrest Sisian Volunteer Unit Commander in Pashinyan Assassination Conspiracy," *Hetq*, December 1, 2021, https://hetq.am/en/article/138401; "Armenian Army Chief, Ex-Defense Minister Go on Trial Over 'Faulty' Weapons," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 19, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/armania-military-weapons-fraud/31662118.html.

autonomy–heteronomy and domination–subordination.[151] The production of security expertise "classifies [others], and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make,"[152] between expert and amateur, between politician and professional, between new and old. Hence, we can reconstruct the field and its axes – "the two principles of hierarchization"[153] – by listening to the ways in which security actors distinguish themselves from one another.

Let us begin with autonomy. We can construct an axis from security bureaucrats who remain silent inside their institutions, via neutral academics and technocratic experts who engage publicly but in a highly specialised manner, to active politicians and commentators who use their security knowledge primarily in an openly political setting. In the most autonomous sector of the security field we find 'security for security's sake', that is, a shared belief in the technocratic production of objective national security. This space disavows the logic of other fields, such as the logic of political competition.[154] Actors in this sub-sector generate field-specific symbolic capital (a 'security reputation') through "interest in disinterestedness,"[155] that is, their authority rests on the appearance of neutrality and their "recognition [is] accorded by those who recognize no other criterion of legitimacy than recognition by those whom they recognize."[156] They "dislike politics"[157] and perceive their career "as purely bureaucratic, isolated and insulated."[158] I will further explore these attitudes and views in my chapter on dispositional analysis. Important to note, for now, is that there are security professionals who build their career on the principle of depoliticization and refuse political appointments in order not to lose their "expert label."[159]

However, this autonomous sector is not dominant – not in Georgia and especially not in Armenia – in terms of overall prestige. Few 'top experts' have a secure, consecrated position. The autonomous side of the security field is more populous and more internally differentiated in Georgia than in Armenia, due to closer ties with the West in terms of economic capital (donor funding), social capital (elite networks) and cultural capital (education in Western elite

[151] Bourdieu, *Field of Cultural Production*, 29-73.
[152] Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 6.
[153] Bourdieu, *Field of Cultural Production*, 40.
[154] Adapting Bourdieu, we can state that "in the most perfectly autonomous sector of the field of [knowledge] production, where the only audience aimed at is other producers [...], the economy of [security] practices is based, as in a generalized game of 'loser wins', on a systematic inversion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies." Ibid., 39.
[155] Ibid., 40. See also Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 125.
[156] Ibid., 38.
[157] Interview Armenia 10.
[158] Interview Georgia 8.
[159] Interview Georgia 8.

universities).[160] In Georgia, we can distinguish between a somewhat more dominant sub-sector concerned with security policy, geopolitical strategy and European integration, as well as a dominated and more heterodox sub-sector oriented around conflict resolution and peacebuilding.[161] The latter forms its own subfield: all of its members also try to define legitimate security expertise in Georgia, but more dominant actors in the large think tanks are less interested in the stakes of this niche.[162]

The more dominant an actor becomes on the autonomous side of the security field, the more likely it is that they are confronted with politicisation. In Georgia, former bureaucrats tend to agree that the trend from "competence" to "loyalty"[163] in the security bureaucracies already began in the last years of the Saakashvili period, following the war of 2008. Regime stability came to be prioritised over stable policy-making and impersonal recruitment policies.[164] While over time, bureaucrats accumulated more technical competence (symbolic capital) in their field, the political leadership has grown more intrusive. "The high[er] the position you hold, the more political loyalty is expected from you."[165] Following the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, the Pashinyan government initially avoided a wholesale overhaul of state bureaucracies and took a more gradual approach.[166] However, neither in Armenia are security institutions are shielded from political turbulence. In Georgia, the independence of certain bureaucratic institutions has directly been undermined in recent years, say experts and bureaucrats alike. For example, the National Security Council (NSC), which fell under the President, has in practice been replaced by a parallel council directly subordinated to the Prime Minister.[167] In Armenia, the Velvet

[160] Georgian civil society has been more Western-funded than Armenia's, and has had closer ties to the 'revolutionary' government. See Christoph H. Stefes and Yevgenya J. Paturyan, "After the Revolution: State, Civil Society, and Democratization in Armenia and Georgia," *Frontiers in Political Science*, August 25, 2021, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2021.719478/full.

[161] Interview Georgia 4; interviews Armenia 2, 4, 9 and 10. These observations also rely on previous fieldwork conducted in Georgia during February-April 2020. In Georgia we find at least eight active think tanks and institutes working on security, foreign policy and reform, as well as a few smaller and inactive ones. There are around four prominent institutes/organisations focused on conflict research, cultural diversity and human rights, with another six smaller ones, as well as a string of about five to seven small NGOs implementing projects around women, peace and democratic development. In Armenia, I have identified six to seven security think tanks, of which three are most prominent; the others are fairly inactive or principally 'one-man bands'. Disregarding international projects and programmes, there are around five to seven active NGOs working on 'softer' security dimensions related to human rights and democratic development.

[162] Compare with Steinmetz, "Social Fields, Subfields and Social Spaces at the Scale of Empires," 109-110: "Subfields can shield unorthodox and innovative work in a settled field, but they can also function as traps for peripheral or dominated members of fields."

[163] Interview Georgia 6.

[164] Interviews Georgia 5, 6 and 8.

[165] Interview Georgia 6.

[166] Interview Armenia 5.

[167] Interview Georgia 8. Another expert gives the example of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking international partners to condemn political demonstrations on the streets of Tbilisi in 2019–20. Interview Georgia 4.

Revolution had indirect political effects. A new Secretary of the previously dormant Security Council (SC) reinvigorated the institution by recruiting highly-educated security professionals and promoting promising junior analysts, but his new teams soon came into conflict with other state bureaucracies. Officials from other ministers ignored them or complained that the new teams "were micromanaging them." Thus, political reform can generate bureaucratic paralysis.[168]

These dynamics relate to the practice of frequent dismissals and replacements of ministers and heads of departments and agencies. "With the new appointments of the Heads or Ministers," says one former bureaucrat in Georgia, "there is this fear that everything will change."[169] "Within three years you have three ministers that have different views, different objectives, different ideas, etc. And sometimes these ideas were absolutely conflicting with the ideas of [their] predecessors."[170] Georgian bureaucrats have to spent much energy on "redirecting silly ideas" from new appointees. However, if they manage, this establishes a sense of meaning and continuity in their professional lives.[171] In post-Revolution Armenia, too, professionals note that "every five months we have a new Defence Minister or a new Chief of Staff, [which] doesn't bode well for the reform process."[172] There have also been recent cases of lower-level bureaucrats being dismissed for their alleged support for Kocharyan's come-back attempt during the elections of 2021.[173]

If this is the state of the autonomous side of the security field, it is unsurprising that bureaucrats either exit the field and move into the more shielded sub-field of security-related academia and or find jobs in NGOs, research institutes and think tanks,[174] or rather choose to join the struggle actively and enter the political field on the basis of their authoritative security knowledge. These are two different strategies of capital conversion and reproduction: the former autonomising, the latter heteronomising. However, it must be noted that the maintenance of functional autonomy by neutral experts often depends on Western social and economic capital, through grant projects funded by international NGOs and research donors;[175] thus, in

[168] Interviews Armenia 4, 5 and 9.
[169] Interview Georgia 5.
[170] Interview Georgia 6. This statement is echoed in very similar words in interview Georgia 5. This was already the case in the early 2000s: within two and a half years, "three times the National Security Concept was drafted, but each time when a new national security adviser was appointed, he would throw it away." Interview Georgia 1.
[171] Interview Georgia 2.
[172] Interview Armenia 9.
[173] Interview Armenia 9.
[174] Interview Armenia 10; interviews Georgia 6 and 8.
[175] Interviews Georgia 4 and 5; interviews Armenia 5 and 9.

fact, *functional* autonomy (depoliticisation) is dependent on *vertical* heteronomy (transnationalisation).

Produced by heteronomising strategies, we find various kinds of self-politicised security actors in Georgia and Armenia. In Georgia, a well-established security actor explains how Saakashvili's authoritarian tendencies and failing conflict resolution policies forced him to go into politics and mobilise his international connections and national reputation as incorruptible negotiator.[176] Another interlocutor followed a ten-year upward career trajectory in autonomous institutions, gained experience in the security services and in military-diplomatic negotiations, before deciding to support the ambitions of his political boss, who resigned amid inter-party rifts. He disliked the "populist" turn his government was taking and felt that it was time to enter "the big league of politics."[177] In Armenia, I spoke to a former official who noticed that he had gained a popular credibility after he left diplomatic service. He initially concentrated initially on setting up a research institute to provide the political class with ideas from the outside. However, once he obtained citizenship and grew frustrated with the personalisation of Armenian politics, he decided to "pursue politics in his own name." He converted his diasporic origins and accent, and his familiarity with Western politicians and Western political culture into a source of political charisma and strategy.[178] Another former bureaucrats saw his colleagues go into politics "not necessarily because they wanted to, but they saw [no alternative] […] their feeling is that we're losing the country, and we cannot just sit back and watch how [this is] happening, how Georgia is turning into Belarus. […] [They] were very respected members of this defence and security 'tribe', but now are in active politics."[179]

Finally, in the dominated corner of the politicised sector of the security field, we find heteronomous actors who produce security knowledge not for elite allies and patrons (government or opposition), but for mass audiences. This tends to come in the shape of popularised geopolitical analysis. In Georgia this, sub-sector has shrunk over time in terms of funding and actors, because Western hegemony is so politically entrenched in this field.[180] Only a few geopolitical TV analysts remain, they are marginal figures, and most of the commentary boils down to analyses of party politics.[181] In Armenia, by contrast, there are pro-Russian and

[176] Interview Georgia 3.
[177] Interview Georgia 2.
[178] Interview Armenia 8; also interviews Armenia 7 and 9.
[179] Interview Georgia 8.
[180] See Tamar Gamkrelidze, "Hegemony of the European Project in Georgia: From Foreign Policy Initiative to the Logic of State Building and Development," *Demokratizatsiya: Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 27, no. 2 (2019): 163-186.
[181] According to interview Georgia 4.

pro-Western experts, and those who perceive themselves as balanced.[182] As in Georgia, the domestic and the geopolitical axes are linked: partisan competition is 'translated' into conflicting geopolitical orientations.[183]

[182] Interviews Armenia 5 and 10.
[183] Liberal commentators are portrayed as betraying national values in favour of the interests of their Western donors; opposition commentators are demonised for perceived any links to Russia. Interviews Armenia 1, 5, 9 and 10.

HABITUS ANALYSIS: FROM TRAJECTORIES OF EXPERIENCES TO DISPOSITIONAL CLUSTERS, LAYERS, AND INTERPRETATIONS

In this second empirical chapter, I trace the socialisation patterns of the different clusters of security actors in Armenia and Georgia to explain how the differences in positions came to overlap with differences in dispositions. The different *habitus* layers that these actors accumulate and negotiate shape a field of knowledge production in which different groups of actors speak almost entirely different 'security languages'. With each of the three primary positional formations discussed previously, I move from formative experiences to cognitive and emotive-moral interpretations of security. I then link these dispositional formations back to the structure of the field: the dialectic between field and *habitus* generates dispositional negotiations and positional strategies.[184]

(Post-)Soviet Professionals-Turned-Geopoliticians

The first *habitus* cluster in the security field grew out of the Soviet status group of proletarianized professionals and specialists. These highly-educated workers, academics and non-party managers experienced a disjuncture between high occupational-symbolic status and political-economic dependence on the state, and were at the forefront of nationalist mobilisation against the *nomenklatura* bureaucracy during the collapse of the Soviet state.[185]

In Armenia, some well-known security experts and analysts have come from these ranks. One of my interlocutors was born in a typical family of professionals (mum was an educator,

[184] It must be noted that this analysis is hardly exhaustive and merely focuses on three *habitus* formations. Many others inhabit this field: hardline security politicians on the heteronomous end, non-belligerent academics in a wavering middle position, and silent bureaucrats who retain their autonomy and primarily refrain from producing security knowledge for audiences outside their narrow institutional setting.

[185] Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer*, 144-148; Marc Garcelon, "The Estate of Change: The Specialist Rebellion and the Democratic Movement in Moscow, 1989–1991," *Theory and Society* 26, no. 1 (1997): 39-85. See also Vladimir Gel'man, "Fathers, Sons, and Grandsons: Generational Changes and Political Trajectory of Russia, 1989–2012," in *Cultural Forms of Protest in Russia*, ed. Birgit Beumers, Alexander Etkind, Olga Gurova, and Sanna Turoma (London: Routledge, 2019), 19-32.



Figure 3 - Dispositional clusters in the security field in Armenia and Georgia

dad an engineer), obtained a doctorate in physics, became a parliamentarian in 1990, and served as a diplomat in Russia in the late 1990s, before converting his symbolic capital into the recognised position of security analyst.[186] Another was born in Nagorno-Karabakh, studied computer engineering, and joined the Karabakh Movement and the war effort in the late 1980s–early 90s. When he felt that the needs of his nation changed, he moved to Yerevan to study international relations, worked at the Central Bank for a short period, and soon after became a representative abroad for the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.[187] This group of actors comes from different parts of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, typically speaks better Russian than English, and describes early service to independent Armenia as a formative experience.[188]

[186] Interview Armenia 4.
[187] Interview Armenia 1.
[188] Interviews Armenia 1, 4, and 7.

These actors tell me that "the matrix of international relations is interests, not values"[189] and that "if you don't protect your interest, you will have [only] losses."[190] They disagree widely among one another and turn towards either extremely pro-Russian or pro-Western positions, but they share an image of the world as a geopolitical chessboard. They furthermore lament Armenia's lack of "statehoodness"[191] or "governmental tradition,"[192] and are concerned that Armenia fails to be sovereign – either because of the shadow of the Kremlin or due to the nefarious influence of liberal donors and NGOs. The geopoliticians sense a decline in influence after the Velvet Revolution and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and describe their government as incompetent or immature.[193] Especially the more Russia-inclined expert I spoke to, feels left out: "donors are not ashamed to come and say that, 'we've been advised from the government not to work with you.'"[194]

Habitus layers in this group can be mixed and contradictory. On the one hand, there is the high moral–emotional value attached to geopolitics, sovereignty and national values. The solution for Armenia would be a wholesale overhaul of its state-building project and national identity. This moral disposition likely originated in the era of the Karabakh Movement. It stresses political unity and vision. On the other hand, there is the cognitive disposition that sees the world in technical terms and emphasises the need for rational "prediction, systems-thinking and scenario planning."[195]

The context of fields and social spaces matters in activating and inhibiting dispositions, as Lahire points out. In Georgia, the discourse of geopolitical competition is less salient in the security field and does not resonate as a strategy of distinction. Only a few Soviet-educated TV analysts remain and they are marginal figures.[196] Those who originate in the Soviet class of professionals, academics and specialists have either been dismissed from the bureaucracies or have become pro-Western liberals with at least some form of Western cultural capital. This underlines the ability of the *habitus* to be inhibited and transformed.[197]

[189] Interview Armenia 1.
[190] Interview Armenia 4.
[191] Interview Armenia 1.
[192] Interview Armenia 4.
[193] Interview Armenia 1 and 4.
[194] Interview Armenia 1.
[195] Interview Armenia 1; also interview Armenia 7.
[196] According to interview Georgia 4.
[197] Yet, sometimes a dispositional knee-jerk fixation with geopolitics and internal threats reappears in Georgia, when liberal analysts digress at length about the influence of Russian security services and criticise the current government for acting according to "the old Georgian habit since the end of feudal times to be very cautious, to be a servant of two or three masters." Interview Georgia 7.

One of my Armenian interlocutors could be described as a transitionary figure.[198] He was educated a geophysicist, but when the educational hierarchy blocked his academic aspirations he enrolled in a Western-funded school for future public servants. On the one hand, he served for a long time as a parliamentarian, engages in geopolitical commentary and his organisation is even described by experts on the more autonomous side of the field as being excessively pro-Western and pro-government.[199] Typical of the professionals-turned-geopoliticians, he describes security knowledge as a political way of thinking about "progress and risk" rather than a formalised form of knowledge based on higher education. He also sees his worldview as being informed by the precision of the exact sciences, stresses the value of mathematical modelling, and distinguishes in rather black-and-white terms between ethical (sharing a common language) and cynical (believing only in political manipulation) security experts in his field. On the other hand, he attended a conflict resolution course in the UK, speaks with a British accent, and organises Western-style democracy training schools. In sum, heterogeneous experiences shape heterogenous *habitus* formations, and the layers of the *habitus* can transform and adapt to changing contexts in various degrees.

Military Diplomats and (Diasporic) Brokers

Positioned on the politicised side of the field, but towards the dominant pole in terms of overall capital and recognition in the field, the second *habitus* formation in the security fields of the South Caucasus is not a stable one, but characterised by a rapid rise and fall in charisma. During the 2010s, important officials belonged to this group in both countries.[200]

Charismatic security officials who describe their career as a combination of activities from the spheres of defence and diplomacy typically come from families well-endowed with cultural capital. In Georgia these may be military families, in Armenia their roots may be in the diaspora. The professional *habitus* of these actors was formed by experiencing the Soviet collapse at a young age and often participating in difficult negotiations during the wars of the

[198] Interview Armenia 7. His dispositions may be compared to those of older Georgian liberals such as the one quoted in the footnote above.
[199] According to interview Armenia 9.
[200] This cluster of security actors differs slightly in Georgia and Armenia. In Armenia, some major 'Karabakh guys' are only recently disappearing from the political scene, while the generation of warlords in Georgia has long passed away. The main generational shift occurred in Georgia in the first half of the 2000s, whereas it happened in the second half of the 2010s in Armenia. Indeed, the security elite in Georgia comprises few people born in the late 50s and early 60s. This generation was almost entirely skipped due to the Rose Revolution. Nevertheless, as this section demonstrates, it would be mistaken to suggest that the *habitus* of the charismatic security politician has vanished from the scene in Georgia; younger actors also embody this heterogenous dispositional formation.

1990s or otherwise being engaged in diplomatic or military-diplomatic activities. My Armenian interlocutor grew up in the diaspora in an intellectual milieu, attended a string of elite universities, and adopted a worldview based on rights and justice inculcated by his student activism and training as a lawyer. Among the first diasporic Armenians to visit Nagorno-Karabakh in the late 1980s, he became haphazardly involved as a "go-between" for the Karabakh Committee and Moscow journalists and diplomats. Soon after Armenia's declaration of independence he was asked to set up a ministry from scratch. He felt "inherently programmed to do the job," despite describing the process as mostly "learning by doing."[201]

A similarly charismatic Georgian security actor had early experiences with the war in Abkhazia and soon became a respected official in the Shevardnadze government, working on counter-terrorism in the early 2000s. After the Rose Revolution, his main formative experience was his conversion from a 'hawk' to a negotiator. "I was helped […] to have informal meetings with Abkhaz politicians, ex-military [people]," he recalls, "and then we befriended each other." He earned respect from his 'opponents' on the Abkhaz side and established himself as a credible broker between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.[202]

Both characters soon felt side-lined and perceived their respective leaderships as concentrating and personalising power at the expense of national interest. Both therefore converted their reputation in the security field to a position of opposition in the political field.[203] One speaks of feelings of "uselessness" and "mistrust" motivating him to go into politics.[204] This transition to politics can be "tough," requiring a "thick skin."[205] Political dispositions came more naturally to my Armenian interlocutor than his Georgian counterpart, although the latter was arguably more politically successful. That said, both of these men were aided by their international reputations; they could convert their transnational social capital into national political capital. One says that the populace liked how he was on good terms with prominent Western politicians.[206] Another says that "it was easier for foreigners to deal with me. I was predictable for them."[207]

Their formative trajectory as rapid risers and charismatic security officials produces a worldview dominated by moral dispositions. Security becomes a matter of political vision, leadership and integrity. While they disavow narrow partisan interests and concentration of

[201] Interview Armenia 8.
[202] Interview Georgia 3.
[203] Interview Armenia 8; interview Georgia 3.
[204] Interview Georgia 3.
[205] Interview Georgia 3.
[206] Interview Armenia 8.
[207] Interview Georgia 3.

power, their discourse is oriented around reproducing an elite form of symbolic capital rather than technocratic specialisation or mass popularity. "Exposure to international organisations and processes" and a high level of academic knowledge is both indispensable and insufficient. The "key word" is "integrity," which entails a work ethic and a capacity for independent judgement. High-level security officials ought to be not only a "good manager" but also someone who "leads by example." Both of my interlocutors stress that there is no lack of "bright people in the bureaucracies" and "good strategic analysts," but the problem pertains to the personalised political class. Thus, they argue for institution-building domestically and balanced pragmatism internationally.[208] The layer of emotional-moral dispositions of a holistic political vision is negotiated with a set of more institutionalist cognitive dispositions, indicated by the use of ideas such as transparent recruitment and reliable managerialism.

These actors clashed with their political leadership, which they describe in terms of "concentrating power," "informal rule," "personality-driven," and so forth. They felt an inability to steer foreign policy in a way that prioritises national interest over regime survival, even when the opposition parties they supported made it into government.[209] Both have now withdrawn from the security field and the political field. They seem to be more skilled at the process of capital conversion (from security to political capital), than at capital reproduction (maintaining political capital).

There are also younger security actors who were shaped by the upheavals of the 1990s, occupied key military-diplomatic positions, and embarked on heteronomising trajectories with varying degrees of success. I have spoken with one such actor in Georgia,[210] but none in Armenia given the tense political situation.[211] My Georgian interlocutor gave up his environmentalist ambitions when his country found himself at war with Russia. He decided to study European politics in Western Europe, came back to Tbilisi, and dedicated ten years of his career to public service. His patriotic dispositions were strengthened by the fact that he was raised in a military family. Although he is a generation younger than my previous Georgian actor, he also acquired the reputation of an honest negotiator who was able to speak with 'the other side' (Russians, Abkhaz, Ossetians). His authority rested, likewise, on his continued public service "regardless of political turnover." He was often confident enough to tell his

[208] Interview Armenia 8; interview Georgia 3.
[209] Ibid.
[210] There are more of these actors in Georgia. I have spoken to a few of them in a previous research project.
[211] Artur Vanetsyan (born 1979) could be hypothesised to belong to this sub-category. He was director of the National Security Service of Armenia from 2018-19, and then moved to the opposition against Pashinyan after the defeat in the war of 2020. He has been at the forefront of recent protests in 2020-22. He worked in the NSS since 2000; he was trained in Russia in 2002–3.

political bosses, "I won't do it," when asked to implement impractical policies. He absorbed a military-diplomatic *habitus*: interacting with senior diplomats allowed him to "grow up faster than ever." "I'm the enemy [for them]," he says of the actors he negotiated with, but they began to respect him as "a man of word, [a man of] honour."[212]

This cultivation of trust "even helps [him] now in [domestic] politics." He is often told: "I disagree with your boss but thank you for your service." Mobilising this recognition still works in his advantage. However, "you've got to keep [this] recognition, not getting a devaluating recognition, by negotiating the lines" between professional service and political interest. Like the others, he converted his security capital when his discontent with politics became intolerable. His critique of the new course of the ruling party merges the logics/stakes of the two fields: "populist incitement is dangerous for national security."[213] Unlike the others, however, he remained linked to his previous boss, who founded a new opposition party, which has had little success. This shows again the vulnerability of this heteronomising strategy and heterogenous/combinatorial set of dispositions: openings in the political field can be short-lived.

Post-Post-Soviet Security Experts

The sector of the field of security knowledge production that is both strongly autonomous and primarily dominated, is inhabited by a new generation of security professionals whose socio-professional lives were shaped by the post-Soviet period. Most of them were born between 1976 and 1984, with outliers being younger. They experienced the upheavals of the 1990s only at a young age. The security official introduced at the end of the previous section could be understood as a bridging actor between the cluster of military-diplomatic brokers and this younger group of post-post-Soviet security professionals. He recalls staying behind in Tbilisi while his father and uncle served in all three wars of the Georgian 1990s.[214]

My Georgian interlocutors remember the corruption of the Shevardnadze era but also the initial openings towards the West and NATO.[215] One worked for the Parliamentary Committee on Security and Defence as a student and was head of the youth branch of the Atlantic Council of Georgia. Two were among the first to study at the newly opened faculty of International

[212] Interview Georgia 2
[213] Ibid.
[214] He was raised by his mother, who used to tell him to stay away from the windows of their eighth-floor flat because of the frequent gunshots in the air. Interview Georgia 2.
[215] Interviews Georgia 5 and 6.

Relations and International Law at Tbilisi State University.[216] Another studied public administration and, aged 19, was offered a job after his internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An Armenian professional relates to me how she entered a ministry at 22 and was appointed head of a major section at 29. Many of these individuals started their careers at a remarkably young age and rose through the ranks as the security fields were reformed and professionalised.[217] For some, practical immersion preceded formal education: "I knew how things worked from my backbone, sharing [my] experience with more experienced colleagues and diplomats."[218] Nonetheless, most of these actors studied abroad at reputable American and Western European universities, either before their career or after a few years of public service.[219]

International security and defence reform institutions connected these actors to a network of Western experts.[220] Cooperation with NATO socialised a number of Armenian and Georgia security experts into the specialised jargon and practical assumptions of Western defence reform and security analysis: Security Sector Reform, Defence Institution-Building; accountability, transparency, inclusivity, and ownership.[221]

These are security actors shaped by the 2000s. In Georgia, this meant a transition from "no heating"[222] in the ministries' offices and civil servant salaries which were sufficient for "only […] to buy this sim card for my mobile phone"[223] to, after the Rose Revolution, a period of "professional pride" in being at the forefront of "build[ing] our own country."[224] One former official narrates how the inculcation of this statist-patriotism was deepened in 2008. The war and the perceived lack of Western backing generated a feeling of being "incapacitated" […] But then it was something that also gave a new weight and meaning to everybody's work in the defence and security sector, and we understood how much is at stake, we understood how much better we should be."[225] At the same time, the war was a set-back: "All these [reform] developments were frozen," says another former official, "if you don't move ahead, in a

[216] Interviews Georgia 5 and 6.
[217] Interviews Georgia 2, 5, 6 and 8; interviews Armenia 9 and 10.
[218] Interview Georgia 8.
[219] Interviews Georgia 2, 6, 8; interviews Armenia 9 and 10.
Another prominent place to study for future security professionals in the South Caucasus is Central European University (Budapest). However, such people have more often ended up in the positional and dispositional group that I call 'hardline security politicians'.
[220] Interview Georgia 5; interview Armenia 10.
[221] Interview Georgia 5; interview Armenia 10.
[222] Interview Georgia 6.
[223] Interview Georgia 5.
[224] Interview Georgia 8.
[225] Interview Georgia 8.

situation like Georgia, it means already regress. […] from that point on, I think the government of Georgia primarily focused on retaining, solidifying power in the country, instead of pushing for democratic reforms and transformation."[226]

In Armenia, defence cooperation with the West and NATO halted between 2012 and 2015.[227] A younger former security professional was shaped by later events: he was conscripted in 2016 when deadly clashes flared up between Armenia and Azerbaijan, precisely when he was applying to study abroad. After his education and after the Velvet Revolution, he was asked to join a team of young experts to reinvigorate policy-making in the Security Council. When the war of 2020 erupted, he worked day and night on top-secret politico-military tasks.[228]

In both countries,[229] the state-building periods of the 2000s shaped a generation of security professionals with a coherent liberal *habitus*. They accumulated highly specialised cultural capital and acquired reputations as independent experts. Their formative experiences generated perhaps the most coherent dispositions in the field. But autonomy in the security field never matched up with domination. Developments in the 2010s produced frustrated expectations – mismatches between liberal dispositions and autonomous expertise cultivated in highly internationalised (*vertically* heteronomous) networks, and an increasingly politicised (*functionally* heteronomous) national security field.

These actors perceive their countries as politically weak and polarised. Legitimacy is slow and security governance has become concentrated in the close circles of the prime ministers.[230] Politics is "really a fight for survival instead of [a] standard political process."[231] "One man decides everything and everything [is] decide[d] on [the basis of] one man's mood."[232] The autonomous experts feel that their governments are paralysed by fear of Russian responses. "CSTO and Russia have a different kind of perception of the security sector and defence reform," says one Armenian professional. "Especially after the war [...] we are under increasing Russian influence," but at the same time Armenia aspires "to adhere to these democratic set of values and human rights. […] It's very difficult to do anything."[233] In Georgia, the governing

[226] Interview Georgia 6. The war marked the end of optimistic state-building and the beginning of defensive regime consolidation, confirm other interviewees. Interview Georgia 5 and 6.
[227] Interview Armenia 10.
[228] Interview Armenia 9.
[229] My findings suggest that the differences in state-building at the political elite level – more technocratic-neoliberal in Georgia, technocratic-oligarchic in Armenia – do not necessarily reflect on the dispositions and discourses of this group of actors.
[230] Interviews Georgia 5, 6 and 8, also 2; interviews Armenia 9 and 10
[231] Interview Georgia 8.
[232] Interview Georgia 9.
[233] Interview Armenia 10. Meanwhile, Armenia lacks sufficient understanding of Russian politics, says another former official. Interview Armenia 9.

elites "*seem* to be pro-Russian, because they are very weak.[234] Another former official felt "that the strong pro-Western identity of my country was gone and it turned from policy into narrative. […] we're actually getting into Russia's orbit, not necessarily because they said no to NATO or the European Union, but by the way we were governing and administrating our country."[235]

For these professionals, security ought to be, first and foremost, a field of bureaucratic management informed by specialised knowledge.[236] "It's... you don't want to be in politics, okay?" says one Armenian professional almost sarcastically.[237] "I stayed on with the public administration," explains one former Georgian bureaucrat, "for as long as I felt that I could isolate myself from internal politics, because this is something I'm not interested in. […] I consider myself to be an expert, and not a politician." Some of these actors emphatically lack a layer of dispositions that attunes them to political competition. The cognitive categories through which they construct security knowledge centre around "competence,"[238] "professionalism,"[239] "transparency,"[240] "fact-based analysis," and the "right method."[241] They criticise political leaders who lack "red lines" to bound their interference in bureaucratic processes,[242] or who lack an "understanding of what is a good analysis and what is a speculation and what is gossip."[243] This does not mean that these experts lack a layer of moral–emotive dispositions altogether; indeed, some have direct experience with the protracted conflicts and hold strong personal views.[244] Even so, these professionals maintain a separation between attitudes to security knowledge and personal experiences with (geo-/ethno-)political conflict. These dispositions are activated separately, based on what Lahire calls a "sense of situations".[245]

[234] Interview Georgia 5. Specifically with respect to the Russian attack on Ukraine which began in February 2022, my interview adds that the ruling party elites "feel, on the one hand, this responsibility not to […] pull Georgia into the war. […] But on the other hand they are not ready for some kind of dialogue between different groups of the society."
[235] Interview Georgia 8.
[236] One issue that was insufficiently addressed in my interviews is whether security expertise should be produced in open dialogue with wider society or in a more isolated setting. This might be a tension in the liberal *habitus*: between a democratic tendency towards dialogue and civil society engagement, and a technocratic aversion for political competition and 'populism'.
[237] Interview Armenia 10.
[238] Interview Georgia 6.
[239] Interviews Georgia 6 and 8.
[240] Interview Georgia 5.
[241] Interview Armenia 9.
[242] Interview Georgia 6.
[243] Interview Armenia 9.
[244] In particular in the Georgian case, it is clear that memories of war and instability have resurfaced because of the war in Ukraine. Interviews Georgia 5 and 8.
[245] Hence, an interview with a young researcher from the West (me) is overall not considered appropriate for talk about personal emotions, let alone suggestions regarding national dreams and future wars as with the 'geopoliticians'.

When domestic politics infringes on the bureaucratic sense of self of these actors, they may even refuse positions and leave service.[246] "I was the last man standing," recalls one interviewee, "all my good friends and colleagues with whom I was doing this business for decades, were gone already."[247] When he, too, left his post, he converted his specialised capital to academia. He describes the different strategies of his colleagues, ranging from silence to "exit" and "voice"[248]:

> Many people choose just to shut up, and continue doing what is coming from above […] even with this uncomfortable feeling, from day to day. Others like me are just trying to go to academia or […] mainly think tank[s]. [The] think-tank community now is saturated with very highly skilled and knowledgeable experts, […] because they're the people that really realise what is going on and no longer want to be part of it. […] many people that I've worked with, for years in bureaucracy and in this defence and security sector, are now in […] active politics, because […] they want to change this ugly reality that pushed all of us outside.[249]

However, we should not lead picture the dispositional negotiations and positional strategies of this cluster of actors too rigidly. Based, again, on their "sense of situations," some actors negotiate their media engagement with the technocratic specificity and confidentiality of certain reform projects they are engaged in. They combine the practices and aptitudes of different worlds – civil society, journalism, government – and are able to criticise both international and local actors.[250] Another expert underlined the importance of reflecting on one's various roles and positions.[251]

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[246] Interviews Georgia 6 and 8.
[247] Interview Georgia 8.
[248] The terms exit and voice are from Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
[249] Interview Georgia 8.
[250] Interviews Armenia 9 and 10.
[251] Interview Georgia 5: "Maybe you are even sometimes changing these roles, but the main thing is to be aware of your own role and your role's place. […] People even with very good knowledge sometimes don't reflect, don't understand their role in different situations. […] Sometimes there is a tendency in Georgia that is everyone is alienating himself or herself from this [question], and there are a lot of biases. […] This is the main thing: to understand the environment you are [in], sometimes to look at it from outside, just [to] try different 'hats' and be connected. [To] be connected to the government agencies and to the public, to understand, and then try to help, to connect needs with capacities, and vice versa. […] I can ensure that being engaged, connected, and this constant reflection of your own positioning, that's very important. Because this knowledge is knowledge, it's in the books, you can go and attend something, read, but the main thing is to make things happen in a very complicated security environment; how to move things when everything is changing every time […]; how to stay engaged with everyone [so] that you could do [something], sometimes with very, very small steps but still make those steps happen. It's a very difficult task […] especially for those working in the sector. For them, when they are engaged in this everyday working process, they have very little time left for reflections […]."

CONCLUSIONS: HETERONOMY AND HETEROGENEITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Contestation over the authority to 'speak' legitimate security knowledge in Armenia and Georgia is a matter of both divergent social responses to the entanglement of securitisation and politicisation, and clashing generations and worldviews. Contributing to the literature that applies the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu to the meso- and micro-dynamics of world politics, I have shown that a copy-and-paste application of the French sociologist's concepts of field and *habitus* would be of limited use. Instead of an image of autonomous bureaucrats and experts shaping an isolated professional field on the basis of a singular security *habitus* (or, perhaps, different state-based *habitūs*), we find in the South Caucasus that security knowledge production is shaped by discourses and practices that straddle political competition and security policy-making.

To make sense of this puzzle, I turn towards the concepts of heteronomy and heterogeneity. Heteronomy helps conceive of a field of knowledge production where the trajectories and strategies of actors are structured by negotiations between technocratic autonomy and expert status on the one hand, and political influence and public engagement on the other. Few actors make it to a position of *both* domination *and* autonomy. Instead, an increase in security prestige typically implies a pull towards heteronomy. Heteronomy provokes a number of strategies: bureaucratic silence, political/charismatic voice, and academic/think-tank exit. The trajectories of high-ranking defence and foreign policy officials who choose to convert and combine their security capital into political capital, have a tendency towards rapid rise and fall. The constant struggles between autonomising and heteronomising actors provides the mechanism connecting a context of young, geo- and ethno-politically fraught states, to the observation of entangled security politics: the continuing securitisation of domestic politics, and the continuing politicisation of security governance.

The second concept, heterogeneity, helps show that security fields in the South Caucasus are characterised both by a dispositional diversity between groups of actors, as well as a dispositional diversity within individual actors. As such we avoid reducing one security field to a one security *habitus*, and one security actor to one security *habitus*. Concretely, I use the notion of heterogeneity to identify clashing clusters of *habitus* formation that are based on distinctive layers of cognitive categories and moral–emotive judgements, which are in turn

traceable to differences in generations, education, and formative experiences. The reproduction of the state of the field is performed by a range of actors on a spectrum from silent bureaucrats to hardliner security politicians. In this study I concentrated on the triangular dialectic between the three groups that populate the middle of this spectrum: post-post-Soviet security experts, military brokers and (diasporic) brokers, and (post-)Soviet professionals-turned-geopoliticians. The geopolitical vision of the older generation of analysts is shaped by a mix of experiences in the late Soviet period and early national independence. The charismatic self-politicising officials tend to share a combination of familial cultural capital, large local and transnational networks, and extensive experience in diplomacy and negotiations. The younger generation of security experts is socialised in a thoroughly transnationally embedded *post*-Soviet world, and shaped by experiences of reform and frustrated reform.

While the balance between dominant and dominated actors in the field can change rapidly, the structuring effect of heteronomy, which is closely coupled to the diversity of dispositions in the field, seems to be there to stay in Armenia and Georgia, so long as both countries find themselves in amidst unresolved protracted conflicts.

The findings of this study carry at least three implications. First, I have emphasised the national context knowledge-production fields, at the expense of a deeper analysis of transnational links, or vertical heteronomy. If, as I have hinted, national autonomy is partially dependent on the transnationalisation of capitals and dispositions in the South Caucasus, future research might examine security knowledge production as being structured by *multiple forms of heteronomy*. Comparative work might ask whether the absence of a truly autonomous sub-sector of security expertise constitutes a more generic post-Soviet, post-socialist, post-colonial, or post-imperial phenomenon. Second, my *habitus* analysis remains a limited sketch, based on about two years of field observations and less than one year of in-depth interviewing. As such, there is much more scope for the development of longitudinal ethnographic and biographical studies of the socialisation of security experts in the South Caucasus and elsewhere. Third, there is room for normative debate based on the observation that politicisation and securitisation go hand in hand in Armenia and Georgia. Depoliticisation might achieve the monopolisation of security knowledge production in the hands of a few technocratic security experts, but it may also imply a securitising move away from democratisation. Politicisation, conversely, reproduces the centrality of security talk and security people in public debate. While it may open up democratic debate about security concerns, it encourages the monopolisation of politics by actors with ‘security reputations’ and reproduces a sense of socio-political paralysis.

APPENDIX 1: STATE-BUILDING TRAJECTORIES IN GEORGIA AND ARMENIA

Armenia and Georgia are young states. During the last years of the weakening Soviet Union, the mid-ranking *nomenklatura* elite of the southern Soviet republics jumped on the bandwagon of ethnic nationalism, spearheaded by a radicalising intelligentsia, in order to preserve their control over resources and institutions. The southern periphery of the Soviet Union had always been poorly industrialised and dominated by shadow economies. Social capital based on patron-client networks preceded political capital tied to the Party-State.[252] In the wake of the Soviet collapse, this proved to serve as little foundation for the nascent states. In Tilly and Bourdieu's terms, independent Georgia and Armenia initially struggled to achieve both the physical monopoly over coercion, protection and extraction, as well as the symbolic domination to integrate their new citizenry institutionally. However, while war united the Armenian state, more or less, it lead Georgia to near-collapse.

War with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh managed to unite the brittle Armenian republic that was dominated by the new intelligentsia centred around the Karabakh Committee. An army was formed by paramilitaries, volunteer units, and ethnic Armenian military men from across the collapsing Soviet Union.[253] As the war progressed, the intellectuals were joined by a second elite grouping: the combatants who are sometimes misleadingly termed the 'Karabakh clan'. Rather than constituting a clan based on kinship or origin, Derluguian and Iskandaryan argue that this elite group, organised around the *Yekrapah* veterans' union, shared a common experience and a *habitus* forged in the secessionist war.[254] By the late 1990s, the revolutionary intelligentsia was weakened in its societal legitimacy and its economic ability to co-opt the veterans, and was supplanted by the generation of the combatants.[255] The power of the combatants, in turn, also failed to last, and increasingly had to be shared with patronal networks

[252] Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer*, esp. 139-141, 199-202, 215-228.
[253] Taline Papazian, "State at War, State in War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and State-Making in Armenia, 1991-1995," *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 8 (2008); Iskandaryan, "From Revolution to Revolution," 189-190; Iskandaryan, Mikaelian and Minasyan, *War, Business & Politics*, 31-48, 99-112; Irina Ghaplanyan, *Post-Soviet Armenia: The New National Elite and the New National Narrative* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 40-48.
[254] Georgi Derluguian and Ruben Hovhannisyan, 452; Iskandaryan, "From Revolution to Revolution," 192-193; Iskandaryan, Mikaelian and Minasyan, 113-115.
[255] Derluguian and Hovhannisyan, 455; Iskandaryan, "From Revolution to Revolution," 192; Iskandaryan, Mikaelian and Minasyan, 48-54.

of technocrats and oligarchs.[256] After 2008, clashes in the elites gave way to a semi-authoritarian mix of consolidation, institutionalisation and management of the political field. Political legitimacy was low, but so were opportunities for opposing elites.[257] Iskandaryan speaks of a system of "consensual clientelism" or "decentralised neo-patrimonialism," in which a ruling party served as a "trade union" of sorts for oligarchs and bureaucrats alike.[258]

In Georgia, the radical fraction of the intelligentsia led by Zviad Gamaskhurdia captured the state but was immediately unable to consolidate power. Not only did the state lose control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (and Adjara), by 1992 Tbilisi found itself in a state of civil war. After deposing Gamsakhurdia, three warlords invited Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze back to Georgia. Though welcomed by liberals and *apparatchiks*, it took him until the mid-1990s to bring a semblance of statehood and replace the warlords with an army.[259] But by Georgia's late 1990s and early 2000s, a blossoming of Western-funded NGOs and a segment of young reformist elites grew frustrated with the slow pace of reform, *nomenklatura*-style of governance and incessant corruption. With the Rose Revolution of 2003, this new elite, headed by Mikheil Saakashvili, toppled the old guard and took over the state. Rapid professionalisation of bureaucratic fields followed – often combining liberal democratic



Figure 4 - Military expenditures in Georgia and Armenia (SIPRI 2021 data)

[256] Iskandaryan, Mikaelian and Minasyan, 54-57, 116-117; Ghaplanyan, 48-60.
[257] Alexander Iskandaryan, "Velvet Revolution in Armenia," 470-471; Derluguian and Hovhannisyan, 457; Iskandaryan, "From Revolution to Revolution," 193-197; Ghaplanyan, 61-70.
[258] Iskandaryan, "From Revolution to Revolution," 193-195; Iskandaryan, "Velvet Revolution," 469.
[259] Derluguian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer*, 197-202; Jones, *Georgia*, 25-104; Kimberly Marten, *Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 64-101; Christoph Zürcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2007), 128-140, 145-148.

discourse with semi-authoritarian means.[260] At the cost of growing societal rifts, neoliberal state-building strengthened the "infrastructural power"[261] of the state and its integration with the West. Among the elites, local informal social capital depreciated in value at the advantage of internationalised forms of cultural and social capital – fluent English, European political networks, American educational credentials.[262] A narrative of a 'return to Europe' dominated symbolically.[263]

The security fields of Armenia and Georgia developed in different directions during the 2000s. Georgia left the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CTSO) in 1999, while Armenia remains within it. Eduard Shevardnadze declared Georgia's intention to join NATO in 2002, and the country was given a promise in 2008 to join the Alliance one day. American-sponsored initiatives, such as the Georgia Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP, 2002–4) left a strong mark on the training of Georgia's armed forces.[264] Georgia's military budget increased fifteenfold between 2004 and 2008 – followed by a decline and stabilisation after the war with Russia (2008) and the change of government (2012). Armenia's military budget has remained more stable throughout (see Figure 4).[265] US, NATO and EU elites have come to perceive Georgia as an increasingly important partner.[266] Both Armenia and Georgia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme to enhance military cooperation with the West,

[260] Jones, *Georgia*, 107-116, 136-144, 151-153, 163-172, 177; Jones, "Rose Revolution," 33-48; Cheterian, "Georgia's Rose Revolution," 689-712; Mitchell, "Compromising Democracy," 171-183.
[261] The term is from Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 185-213.
[262] Jones, *Georgia*, 3-24, 107-112, 141-177; Stephen F. Jones, "Kakha Bendukidze and Georgia's Failed Experiment," *openDemocracy*, January 2, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kakha-bendukidze-and-georgias-failed-experiment/; Cheterian, "Georgia's Rose Revolution," 689-712; Joel Lazarus, "Democracy or Good Governance? Globalization, Transnational Capital, and Georgia's Neo-Liberal Revolution," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 7, no. 3 (2013): 259-286; Beka Chedia, "The Georgian Political Elite: Main Trends of its Circulation," *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 16, no. 3-4 (2015): 42-49, esp. 46; Sam Schueth, "Assembling International Competitiveness: The Republic of Georgia, USAID, and the *Doing Business* Project," *Economic Geography* 87, no. 1 (2011): 51-77. Also after the war of 2008, Georgia continued to remain dependent on international connections and aid funds. Some suggest that post-war development aid was used to consolidate the state and the power of the regime with semi-authoritarian means. Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Austin Cowley, "Capitalizing on Aid: Post-War Development and State-Building in Georgia," in *State and Legal Practice in the Caucasus: Anthropological Perspectives on Law and Politics*, ed. Stéphane Voell and Iwona Kaliszweska (Routledge: London and New York, 2015), 171-186.
[263] Adrian Brisku, *Bittersweet Europe: Albanian and Georgian Discourses on Europe, 1878–2008* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), esp. 153-154, 161-168, 174-180, 187-194; Kakachia and Minesashvili, "Identity Politics," 171-180; Ó Beacháin and Coene, "Go West," 923-941.
[264] Interviews Georgia 3 and 6. See also Rusudan Zabakhidze, "Georgian Defense Forces: The Role of Military Partnerships," *Middle East Institute*, August 26, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/georgian-defense-forces-role-military-partnerships.
[265] Data is obtained from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021), https://milex.sipri.org/sipri.
[266] Natia Gamkrelidze, "From Failing State to Strategic Partner: Analyzing US and NATO Political Elite Images of Georgia and Policy Implications from 1991 to 2020," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 37, no. 6 (2021): 578-599; Natia Gamkrelidze, "From a Willing Partner to Close Political and Economic Partner: Analysing EU Political Elites' Images of Georgia from 1991 to 2020," *European Security* 31, no. 2 (2022): 200-221.

but Armenia has tried to balance this with Russian domination in hard security matters.[267] Likewise, while both countries have taken part in international missions, Georgia became one of the largest troop contributors to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. Whereas Russia discontinued its military bases in Georgia in 2007,[268] it maintains a heavy presence in the Armenian city of Gyumri.[269]

	Georgia	**Armenia**
February 1988		Beginning of the Karabakh Movement and conflict
March 1989	Beginning of the Abkhazia conflict	
November 1989	Beginning of the South Ossetia conflict	
August 1990		Declaration of independence
November 1990	Zviad Gamsakhurdia elected Chairman of the Supreme Council	
January 1991	Beginning of war in South Ossetia	
April 1991	Declaration of independence	
May 1991	Gamsakhurdia elected President	
April–May 1991		Operation Ring, first major operation of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War
October 1991		Levon Ter-Petrosyan elected President
Sept–Dec 1991		Declaration of independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
Dec 1991–Jan 1992	Coup d'état and civil war in Georgia	
March–Nov 1992	Eduard Shevardnadze appointed Chairman of State Council, then Chairman of Parliament	
June 1992	Ceasefire in South Ossetia	
Aug 1992	Beginning of war in Abkhazia	
Sept 1993	Ceasefire in Abkhazia	
May 1994		Ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh
November 1995	Shevardnadze elected President	
September 1996		Ter-Petrosyan re-elected amid accusations of fraud and mass protests
March 1998		Robert Kocharyan elected President
May 1998	Renewed fighting in Abkhazia	
October 1999		Armenian parliament shooting, killing Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Parliament Speaker Karem Demirchyan
October 2001	Clashes in Kodori Valley (Abkhazia)	
Feb–March 2003		Kocharyan re-elected amid accusations of fraud and mass protests
November 2003	Rose Revolution	

[267] Interview Armenia 10. See also Sergey Minasyan, "Multi-Vectorism in the Foreign Policy of Post-Soviet Eurasian States," *Demokratizatsiya* 20, no. 3 (2012): 268-273; Shalva Dzebisashvili, "Norms versus Interests: The Ambiguous Nature of NATO's Democratic Conditionality in Armenia," *Connections* 14, no. 2 (2015): 13-35; Aram Terzyan, "The EU vs. Russia in the Foreign Policy Discourse of Armenia: The Fragility of Normative Power or the Power of Russian Coercion?," *Eastern Journal of European Studies* 8, no. 2 (2017): 185-203; Hayk Paronyan and Ruben Elamiryan, "Armenian Foreign Policy Between Eurasian and European Integration Models," *Eastern Journal of European Studies* 12, no. 1 (2021): 258-275.

[268] See Indra Øverland, "The Closure of the Russian Military Base at Akhalkalaki: Challenges for the Local Energy Elite, the Informal Economy and Stability," *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies* 10 (2009).

[269] Armenia's borders are guarded by Armenian and Russian troops operating together.

January 2004	Mikheil Saakashvili elected President	
Jan–July 2004	Crisis over Adjara; mass protests, Aslan Abashidze deposed, central authority restored	
July–Aug 2004	Tensions and clashes in South Ossetia	
June 2006	Clashes between Georgian government and Georgian warlord in Kodori Valley (Abkhazia)	
Sept–Nov 2007	Mass protests	
January 2008	Saakashvili re-elected President	
Feb–March 2008		Serzh Sargsyan elected President, mass protests violently suppressed by police
April 2008	Georgia promised NATO membership at Bucharest summit	
August 2008	Russo-Georgian War over South Ossetia	
April–July 2009	Opposition protests	
Jan–Nov 2011		Opposition protests
October 2012	Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgian Dream) elected Prime Minister	
February 2013		Serzh Sargsyan re-elected President amid accusations of fraud and mass protests, led by Raffi Hovannisian
October 2013	Giorgi Margvelashvili elected President, Saakashvili abdicates	
November 2013	Ivanishvili resigns, hands over power to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili	
June–Sept 2015		Mass protests ('Electric Yerevan') sparked by hike in electricity prices
April 2016		Renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh ('April War')
July 2016		Hostage crisis: *Sasna Tsrer* armed group demands release of opposition politician and commander Jirair Sefilian and resignation of President Sargsyan
October 2016	Georgian Dream (led by Kvirikashvili) wins parliamentary elections again	
April 2017		Ruling Republican Party wins parliamentary elections
April 2018		Sargsyan elected Prime Minister despite promise not to take this post
March–May 2018		Velvet Revolution
May 2018		Nikol Pashinyan elected Acting Prime Minister
Oct–Nov 2018	Salome Zourabichvili elected President	
December 2018		Pashinyan elected Prime Minister
June–July 2019	Mass protests ('Gavrilov's Night'), violent clashes with riot police	
November 2019	Renewed protests	
Sept–Nov 2020		Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Nov 2020(–May 2021)		Opposition protests
Oct–Nov 2020	Georgian Dream (led by Gakharia) wins parliamentary elections again	
February 2021	Gakharia resigns amid political crisis, succeeded by Prime Minister Gharibashvili	Chief of General Staff Onik Gasparyan and many other high-ranking officers call on Pashinyan to resign
April 2021		Pashinyan resigns, continues as Acting Prime Minister
June 2021		Pashinyan re-elected Prime Minister

November 2021		Renewed opposition protests
Feb–March 2022	Mass protests over government response to war in Ukraine	
April–May? 2022		Renewed opposition protests

Figure 5 - Timeline of Events: Georgia in Armenia, 1988–2022

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF JOURNALS INCLUDED IN LITERATURE SEARCH (FIGURE 1)

Selected International Relations (IR) and security studies journals searched for published articles (up to April 2022) that cite and meaningfully engage the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu: *International Political Sociology*; *European Journal of International Relations*; *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*; *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*; *Security Dialogue*; *Review of International Studies*; *International Theory*; *Journal of International Relations and Development*; *Journal of Common Market Studies*; *International Organization*; *International Studies Quarterly*; *International Studies Review*; *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*; *Cooperation and Conflict*; *European Journal of International Security*; *European Security*; *International Affairs*; *Critical Studies on Security*; *Security Studies*; *International Peacekeeping*; *Global Governance*; *Journal of International Political Theory*; *Journal of Global Security Studies*; *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*; *Territory, Politics, Governance*; *Geopolitics*; *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*; *Critical Military Studies*; *Contemporary Security Policy*; *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*; *International Studies Perspectives*; *International Relations*; *Global Discourse*; *Civil Wars*; *Conflict, Security and Development*; *Ethics and International Affairs*; *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*; *International Negotiation*; *Defence Studies*; *International Politics*; *Global Change, Peace and Security*; *Global Studies Quarterly*.

APPENDIX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewees in Georgia

	Positions[270]	***Place***	***Date***
Interview Georgia 1	Academic with brief public service experience	Tbilisi	Mid-August 2021[271]
Interview Georgia 2	Former top-ranking security/intelligence official	Tbilisi	Mid-August 2021
Interview Georgia 3	Former high-ranking defence/diplomacy official and former opposition politician	Tbilisi	Mid-August 2021
Interview Georgia 4	Academic and think-tank expert	Online	September 2021[272]
Interview Georgia 5	Expert with brief public service experience	Online	Early April 2022
Interview Georgia 6	Think-tank expert, academic and former high-ranking defence/diplomacy official	Online	Mid-April 2022
Interview Georgia 7	Academic and former parliamentarian	Online	Mid-April 2022
Interview Georgia 8	Former high-ranking defence/diplomacy official	Online	Late April 2022

Interviewees in Armenia

	Positions	***Place***	***Date***
Interview Armenia 1	Think-tank expert and former representative of NK in the US	Yerevan	Late August 2021
Interview Armenia 2	Think-tank expert	Yerevan	Late August 2021
Interview Armenia 3	Think-tank expert and former mid-ranking security analyst	Yerevan	Late August 2021
Interview Armenia 4	Think-tank expert and former parliamentarian	Yerevan	Late August 2021
Interview Armenia 5	Academic and think-tank expert	Yerevan	Mid-February 2022
(Interview Armenia 6)	Foreign diplomat	Yerevan	Mid-February 2022
Interview Armenia 7	Think-tank expert and former parliamentarian	Yerevan	Mid-February 2022
Interview Armenia 8	Former top-ranking diplomacy/foreign policy official and former opposition politician	Yerevan	Mid-February 2022
Interview Armenia 9	Expert and former mid-ranking security/foreign policy analyst[273]	Yerevan	Mid-February 2022
Interview Armenia 10	Expert, former mid-ranking defence/diplomacy analyst, former international state-building official	Yerevan	Mid-February 2022

[270] In line with Lahire it would be useful to provide further detail into the different kinds of social sub-fields that these actors have inhabited, but this would make the security actors identifiable and thus undermine confidentiality and anonymity.
[271] I also spoke with this interlocutor in early February 2020 for a different research project.
[272] Two-part interview in mid- and late September 2021. I also spoke with this interlocutor in mid-February 2020 and had another informal conversation in late May 2022.
[273] This interlocutor was also an opposition politician for a period of time, but in NK rather than the Republic of Armenia.

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