Making Democracy Feel:

An Exploration into Emotional Politics and Politics of Emotion

By

Vahid Moftakhari

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Zoltan Miklosi

Vienna, Austria

(2022)

Abstract

This thesis aims to provide an account of how politics affects and is affected by emotion. It comprises normative arguments in favor of the positive role emotions can play in a democratic order. Bringing up anger, as an example of negative emotion, this thesis challenges the widespread view that, due to its counter-productive consequences, anger is not a proper emotion to be expressed in the public sphere. Though in some cases dissociative, this thesis argues that the public expression of anger also has an intrinsic value. Therefore, overemphasizing the consequentialist considerations and overlooking the inherent moral value of the public expression of anger might run the risk of reducing a moral conflict to a mere practical problem.

To address the consequentialist and non-consequentialist debate about the public expression of anger, I propose to set the public expression of apt anger as a moral baseline. Then, to expound the meaning of the apt anger, I will provide a normative framework to distinguish ideal anger from non-ideal ones.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Up until the last couple of decades, political philosophy barely had viewed the role of emotions in politics as constructive. Emotions were always considered the counterpart of reason, the proper human faculty on which philosophy rests. The widespread pessimism was reinforced by the advent of political ideologies like fascism, which extensively exploited emotion-laden strategies to organize mass political mobilization (Berezein, 2018, p.48). Nonetheless, starting from the 80s, critical theory by undermining the conventional wisdom about the relationship between emotions and politics has opened up new possibilities to conceive of the relationship as constructive. No one can rule out the possibility that hegemonic discourses might manipulate emotions. However, the very fact that emotions can be exploited by political discourses reveals that they are socially constructed and hence can have liberating potential as well.

Apart from the fact that emotions are informed by the social outlook individuals take, the second theme that relates emotions to politics is that emotions represent a specific engagement with the world, which involves a normative dimension. Emotions entail a normative appraisal of matters of shared concern (Szanto and Slaby, 2020). Politics also consists of collective decision-making about public matters in a broad sense. Thus, emotions can be considered a constitutive part of politics, not a mere by-product. However, it is a reciprocal relationship. Emotions can influence politics, just like politics can influence emotions. I call the former aspect of the relationship emotional politics and the latter politics of emotions. As for the first aspect of the relationship, I will explore the positive role emotions can play in democratic politics. I will argue that the public expression of emotions can serve as an alternative way of political communication.

To substantiate my claim, I will focus on anger as an emotion whose public expression is a matter of controversy. I will claim in favor of the productive role that public expression of apt anger can play in a democratic setting. I intentionally opt for anger, an emotion that is conventionally considered reactive and dissociative, because seeing the productive potential of anger would enable me to support my claim for other positive emotions. Next, I will seek to provide a normative framework to distinguish the ideal expression of anger from non-ideal ones. If someone's anger targets the manifestations of social injustice, is aimed at changing the origins of these manifestations, metabolizes people's motivations to fight against injustice, and finally takes the perspective that everyone is entitled to have freedom, we can count it as an ideal expression of anger.

Finally, as for the politics of emotions, I will claim that the last condition of ideal anger, that is, the social perspective that informs one's anger is normatively more significant than other conditions since it can dramatically change the type of anger one expresses. Moreover, as the perspective within which anger is framed is socially constructed, I will argue that political discourses can normatively influence the type of anger one expresses.

Chapter 1: Where can emotions take us in politics?

1.1 How democratic theory thinks of emotions

It is not exaggerating to say that there has been a revival of interest in political theory regarding the role and function of emotions in politics, during the last couple of years. The rise of right-wing populism in the world, which, true or false, is conventionally associated with passionate politics, has stoked this new interest in studying how politics affects and is affected by emotions. Besides, the new social movements such as Black Lives Matter have again raised the question concerning the role of some emotions like anger in addressing structural injustices. Considering this renewed interest in studying emotions in politics, it is not easy anymore to marginalize the interconnectedness of emotions and politics by labeling emotions as irrational and hazardous.

Historically, critics have always accused liberalism of being ignorant, if not hostile, about the constitutive role of emotions in political life. In the liberal tradition, critics claim, passion and affection have been regarded as a threat to the polity. To avoid this threat liberal democrats have always tried to remove affection from the terrain of politics, critics continue. However, the opponents of liberal democracy contend that eliminating passion and narrowing down the scope of politics to rational debate and deliberation poses another threat to loyalty, solidarity, and allegiance within a polity (Markell, 2000, p.38). In light of new developments in democratic theory in the last decades and ever-increasing interest in deliberative democracy as the most influential account of democratic decision-making in the liberal tradition, the more or less same criticism has been raised against the deliberative account of democracy. Critics blame the deliberative account of democracy for its inattention to the role of emotions in democratic arrangements.

Several critics have targeted Habermas (2015) and his account of deliberative democracy as one of the best illustrations of such an effort to ignore the role of passion and emotion in democratic politics. The Habermasian public sphere as the principal site where deliberation takes place can be spelled out as a public forum where through critical and rational deliberation people make a "communicative space" (Dahlberg, 2014, p.22). Given the definition, one can claim that there is no room for passion and affection in the Habermasian conception of the public sphere. The public sphere, for Habermas (2015; 1992), is grounded upon the normative reconstruction of everyday communication and so there does not seem to be so much space for emotions and emotional expressions in the public sphere.

Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, and Lynn Sanders, each one on a different basis, argue that such an appeal behind removing emotion from politics and grounding politics merely on impartial reason would finally serve as an ideological function by reducing difference to unity (Young, 1990; Fraser, 1990; Sander, 1997). They are not the only ones highlighting the likely hazard of grounding politics on mere rational deliberation. Agonists like Chantal Mouffe (2002) have likewise raised one of the most robust criticisms toward the idea of politics as purely rational deliberation. Moreover, on a different basis but along the same line as Young, Fraser, and Sander, Michael Walzer maintains that scaling down the role of passion in politics and narrowing the scope of politics down to merely rational deliberation falls short of grasping the true essence of politics, that is, confrontation and disagreement between diverse groups. Thus, to Walzer, the idealized discussion promised by deliberative democracy can never be realized or be effective. (Walzer, 2002, p.105).

However, in response to the criticism raised against his previous works, in *Between facts and norms,* Habermas (2015) refers to the role of "informally developed public opinion" as a condition of deliberative politics' success. (p.298) He also insists on the interplay between "more or less rational opinion and will-formation" inside and outside institutions (Habermas, 2015, p.299). These remarks about the informal ways of communication that more often than not are associated with emotional and affective politics might be a sign that he is not seeking to draw an unbridgeable gap between reason and emotion and, following that, deliberation, and other affective forms of political communication. Because of his silence about the role of emotions in democratic arrangement, however, it remains hard to make a final judgment about Habermas' position.

Not all the proponents of the deliberative account of democracy are as hesitant as Habermas when it comes to emotions. In *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, and Contestation,* John Dryzek (2000), after reprehending Habermas for overemphasizing election and ignoring extra-constitutional agents as the mechanism of transmitting public opinion to administrative power, refers to "multiple channels of influence" like boycotts, protests, demonstrations, etc., which are mainly based on the public expression of political emotions, as the alternatives of election (p.26). Then, ascribing some form of a cognitive component to emotions, he undermines the idea that emotions and passions should be eliminated from politics due to their allegedly potential for being misused and distorted by demagogues. "Any formal or informal rules of debate that exclude emotional responses may be suppressing particular ways of making a point, and so making it less likely that the force of the point can be established" (Dryzek, 2000, p.53).

Skeptics have always sought to overlook emotions precisely because they presume that emotions are more prone to be manipulated and hence less reliable than reason. However, Dryzek

claims that reason can be distorted as well. Hence, it is not a convincing objection against emotions. Dryzek's (2000) defense of the potentially positive role of emotions in deliberative democracy is aligned with his broader point about "authentic deliberation", which embraces "rhetoric, humor, emotion, testimony or storytelling and gossip" in a deliberative setting. (p.1) In the same vein, in *A Minimalist Definition of Deliberation,* Jane Mansbridge (2015) describes deliberation as weighing alternative consequences through communicative processes. So understood, she claims, there is no inherent link between deliberation and rational discussion that makes reason-giving the exclusive way of communication (p.28). She is very convinced to claim that a systematic approach to deliberation should take into account various kinds of communicative interactions, including emotional ones.

Above, I presented the ongoing heated debate about whether the proponents of deliberative democracy were hostile to or welcoming of the role of emotions in democratic politics. However, without taking the side of any part, one can still claim that there is a shortcoming in literature, regarding the function of emotional politics and politics of emotion. Such a shortcoming requires theoretical investigation concerning how emotions shape and are shaped by our political life. Whether sympathetic or indifferent or even unreceptive, the democratic theory still calls for more attention to this under-developed aspect. Before coming to a decision about removing or keeping emotions in a democratic setting, one should first explore their functions in a democratic order. Attempting to fill the gaps in the field, I will try to argue in favor of the positive role of emotions in democratic politics. My major argument will aim at showing why the public expression of emotions as an alternative way of political communication is a vital part of a vibrant democratic order.

My goal, unlike Cheryl Hall (2007), is not to show that emotions are already present in deliberation. Rather, taking their existence for granted, I will try to argue why as a way of political communication, that is, a medium through which public opinion is formed, circulated between citizens, and transmitted to administrative power, emotional politics and politics of emotion play a fundamental role in a democratic order. By emotional politics, I primarily refer to the emotional ways of political communication that are associated with protests, demonstrations, strikes, performances, or other ways of public expression of emotions. By politics of emotion, I mainly refer to the ways that the emotional constitutions of citizens are shaped by political discourses. My first focus will be on emotional politics, but I will also briefly address the other aspects of the relationship. As for my main argument, drawing on the extensive literature in feminism and critical race theory, I will argue why emotions can play a productive role, particularly epistemic, in detecting not-yet-recognized forms of injustice and fighting against them under prevailing structural injustice.

1.2 Crack in wall: Addressing injustice with emotions

Iris Marion Young (2001) suggests that non-deliberative and affection-led political practices like protests, sits-in, boycotts, strikes, and so on should be supplemented with rational deliberation. She argues that unjust power relations stemming from structural injustice always conditions deliberation and makes it biased in favor of the ones wielding power and against disadvantaged ones. So, for Young, the problem of deliberative democracy is that it cannot take into account the idea of false or distorted agreement because it does lack the epistemic tool to recognize it (Young, 2001, p.685-688). Consequently, she argues for the multiplication of the forms

of political communication where these non-rational, emotional forms of communication can equip deliberative democracy with epistemic tools to identify distorted communications.

Under the conditions of structural inequality, Young contends that formal deliberative processes cannot secure justice since public deliberation requires resources, knowledge, and abilities that are not evenly distributed in a given society (Young, 2001, p.680). Given the condition, public deliberation not only fails to satisfy demands of justice but also might play an ideological role by legitimizing unjust power differentials. In addition, as the deliberative setting is always framed in a discursive system, participants might arrive at a consensus framed in a distorted discourse or, as Young calls it, a "hegemonic discourse" (Young, 2001, p.680). Considering the possibility of distorted consensus, Young claims that a deliberative account of democracy needs to be equipped with alternative ways of communication, enabling it to make visible unjust power relations masked by hegemonic discourse. To prevent distorted communication from becoming hegemonic, deliberative democracy should also embrace affection-led political practices like strikes, sits-in, etc., that potentially can bring to the fore the perspectives of disadvantaged people (Young, 2021, p.132). To explain how emotions and passions can be epistemically productive in the above sense, I will build on Alison Jagger's article (1989), *Love and knowledge: emotion in feminist epistemology.*

Opposing both positivist and cognitivist accounts of emotions' epistemic role, Jagger approaches emotions as social constructs (Jagger, 1989, p.155-156). For Jagger, emotions far from being natural drives or pre-social impulses are, in fact, social constructs, for two main reasons. First, people learn to emotionally respond to certain situations partly based on internalizing cultural practices (Jagger, 1989, p.157). In other words, people usually learn how to express their emotions

appropriately in the socialization process. Furthermore, as emotions always involve an evaluative judgment, one might conclude that they hinge on a given society's conceptual and valuational structure. For example, no one can feel betrayed in a society where fidelity is not considered a value (Jagger, 1989, p.158). However, if emotions are socially constructed, dominant groups have more chance to dominate their value and norms within structural power differentials. Then, in these cases, one can assume that dominant groups have a great chance to impose their emotional constitution on subordinate groups to make them accept a distorted consensus based on normalized unjust power relations. In other words, if the deliberative account of democracy is not equipped with non-rational and emotion-laden forms of political communication, it might lead to a distorted agreement when there is an unjust social structure.

Nonetheless, subversive emotions can crack the wall of hegemonic discourses. Here is the point where the epistemologically productive role of emotions comes in. Under the given condition, the "outlaw emotions", as Jagger calls them, can help us to see the unjust background patterns precisely because they are "epistemologically subversive" and hence productive (Jagger, 1989, p.166). These outlaw emotions can help us perceive the world in a non-conventional way if we reflect upon them and take them seriously. But the process of reflection can best be done collectively and should be considered an integral part of a democratic arrangement, as I will try to show.

An example of a subversive emotion whose public expression in politics has been very controversial among political theorists is anger. Different theorists have argued for or against the productive role of expressing anger in democratic politics. As one of the leading critics, Martha Nussbaum argues, the expression of anger not only fails to recognize injustice and fight against it

but also by playing a dissociative role, that is, splitting society into opposing camps, public expression of anger does aggravate the conflict (Nussbaum, 2016). Anger is not an appropriate emotion to be expressed in politics since it relies on a backward-looking conception of justice, which calls for retributive and vengeful actions (Nussbaum, 2015). Furthermore, anger is instrumentally destructive and should be substituted with other associative political emotions like civic love, compassion, and generosity that are more appropriate for a democratic order (Nussbaum, 2015).

In response to Nussbaum's criticism, one can claim that there is nothing inherent in anger linking it to the desire for revengeful action (Silva, 2021). Some scholars propose setting a normative distinction between morally acceptable anger and morally objectionable one, instead of asking whether angry expressions are productive or counter-productive in politics (Srinivasan, 2017). Apart from its instrumental effect, anger can be morally acceptable if it is apt, so to say if it involves a fitting response to the situation. Since anger necessarily involves normative judgment about a moral violation, we can discuss the aptness of anger based on its justifications (Srinivasan, 2017, p.128). As Lepoutre spells out the idea, two conditions should be met if anger is to be apt. First, the content of the anger should objectively involve a moral injustice. Second, the intensity of the expressed anger "should be proportionate to the severity of the injustice it is purporting to represent" (Lepoutre, 2018, p.401). Therefore, one can conclude that as anger involves a normative evaluation of a moral violation, the aptness of anger can be measured as a function of its fittingness to the objective situation it is directed to. Based on the distinct normative value attributed to anger, that is, its aptness, Srinivasan (2017) argues in favor of the public expression of anger even in cases that showing anger might play an instrumentally negative, or destructive role in achieving justice.

Apt anger, as a way of communication and making visible the unjust structures, represents the intrinsic value of publicly appreciating an injustice. Therefore, sticking to the counter-productive criticism, by not taking into account the possibility of anger to be apt, might run the risk of working as a social control masking unjust relationship.

Finding Srinivasan's non-consequentialist strategy to defend from the public expression of anger insufficient, Maxime Lepoutre (2018) seeks to strengthen Srinivasan's position by arguing in favor of the epistemic productivity of angry expressions. Lopoutre admits Srinivasan's idea that the public expression of apt anger has an intrinsic value independent of the consequences ensuing it. Nonetheless, as the intrinsic value does not have absolute force over the instrumental value, the non-consequentialist defense should be supplemented by more powerful consequentialist reasons about the epistemic productivity of expressing anger if it is to override the counter-productive argument.

Following this line of argument, I will also try to show that in considering the idea of retaliation as an inseparable part of the idea of anger Nussbaum is confusing a differentia with a genus. Then, to contribute to the consequentialist and non-consequentialist debate, I suggest setting the public expression of apt anger as a moral baseline. It means that the public expression of anger should already be held as desirable. However, for borderline cases in which the consequentialist considerations significantly outweigh non-consequentialist ones, one can argue for moving away from the baseline, on a case-by-case basis. My strategy, I think, has the merit that instead of putting the burden of justification on the shoulder of angry people, who are more likely to be the victim of a first-order injustice, shifts the responsibility to critics and obstructs on committing a second-order injustice, i.e., affective injustice. Consequently, as my argument calls for it, I will expound on the

idea of aptness, and building on Cherry's (2021) idea of the Lordean rage, I will provide a normative framework to distinguish normatively acceptable types of anger from non-acceptable ones.

Chapter 2: Losing control of the head

2.1 How emotions can play a positive role in politics

I started the first chapter with a brief discussion regarding how the public expression of emotions in its different manifestations in protests, sits-in, demonstrations, and other performative political actions can be considered as alternative ways of political communication. Therefore, along with rational deliberation and public discussion, emotional political communication should also be integral to any democratic order. However, it remains unclear how emotion-laden communications can influence democratic politics and bring about political change. So, I start this chapter with a brief discussion about two different mechanisms through which the public expression of emotions can influence democratic politics. Then, I will argue how outlaw emotions can serve as epistemic tools to unveil structural injustices.

The conventional idea about the role of emotional politics is that in a democratic political system, emotion-laden political communications contribute to the formation of public opinion in the public sphere, which would be translated into policies since, in a democratic order, politicians need to be attentive about public opinion. The proponents of this view hold that alternative political communications, as the informal ways of public opinion formation, should go hand in hand with election as the principal channel through which communicative power is transformed into administrative power (Dryzek, 2000, p.25). The central assumption of the first view is that emotional communications can influence policymaking if and only if they are sympathetic enough to gain mass attention and acceptance. Otherwise, they cannot influence public opinion and might even bring about a negative reaction. The non-conventional idea, however, does not consider mass popularity as a condition for emotional communication to be influential. The advocates of the

second view contend that even in cases where public expression of emotion is considered unsympathetic and hence fails to gain popularity, it still can positively influence democratic politics. As Hayward argues, these kinds of political actions might "shift the focus of public political discourse" (Hayward, 2020, p.455). Thus, even if unsuccessful in gaining public support, emotion-laden communications are successful in drawing attention.

Finding the non-conventional idea more persuasive, I also think that the very act of disruption might give rise to an epistemic spark. As Hayward (2020) maintains, disruptive politics can pressure bystanders who subscribe to egalitarian principles but do not necessarily apply their principles on every occasion where there is an injustice. Hayward ascribes a "motivated ignorance" to these potentially egalitarian agents. "Motivated ignorance … involves an end that motivates the relevant not knowing: namely, the goal of maintaining an understanding of the self as a good person…while at the same time enjoying the benefits of complicity in practices that violate those principles" (Hayward, 2020, p.454). In these cases where people have a psychological investment in not activating their dormant egalitarian principles, disruptive politics serves as a trigger to make them take a position. Therefore, although some people might not show sympathetic reaction or support for a particular case of activism in the short-run, political disruption, by bringing to the fore a specific case of injustice, make currently silent and unconcerned people rethink the discrepancy between their principles and the cases of injustice. And by doing so, this kind of politics, even without gaining public acceptance instantly, still might have a positive communicative effect. Of course, Hayward's argument is about the role of disruptive politics. However, one can argue that the same could be said about the public expression of emotions as it is associated with disruptive politics. In what follows, I will discuss the epistemic role of emotional

politics in detail, but for now, it is worth concluding that, unlike the widely held idea, the only mechanism through which emotional communication influences the democratic order is not to change public opinion. Even in cases where the public expression of emotions is not successful in gaining public support, it can still be influential by catching people's attention.

2.2 Outlaw Emotions: A torch against the night

The term *outlaw emotion* was coined by Alison Jagger (1989) to describe how a set of emotions can be epistemically productive when there is a structural injustice between different groups of people in a society (p.167). The term refers to the emotions that stand in tension with people's system of beliefs or values and, by doing so, challenge the dominant, naturalized norms governing unjust social relations. Outlaw emotions can provide us with knowledge about social inequalities since, being incongruent with one's broader beliefs, in fact, they expose the unequal power relations. In other words, they are epistemically productive since they are subversive and hence can call into question what Jagger calls "emotional hegemony" (Jagger, 1989, p.165).

Having admitted that emotions are socially constructed, one can further claim that the way we experience and perceive the world through our emotions is also affected by the power relations in society. If this is so, then the dominant structure and the normative expectations through which we explore the world are likely to be distorted in favor of the dominant group where there is a structural social injustice. For Jagger, emotional hegemony alludes to this biased system of expectations, values, and perceptions that are more likely to further the dominant group's interests (Jagger, 1989, p.165). However, outlaw emotions can help us view the world in an unconventional way by making visible previously naturalized unjust power relations. To better understand how outlaw emotions work and how they prevail over collective blindness in a given society, I will draw

on Charles Mills (2007) idea of *White Ignorance.* Mills' account of ignorance has the merit that is built upon a social account of epistemology. Hence, instead of focusing on individual epistemic failures, he emphasizes the social patterns of mistakes.

The primary question Mills seeks to grapple with is why the distribution of cognitive errors between different groups of people in a society with structural inequalities is not even. In other words, why are some clusters of people more prone to ignore moral facts or fail to morally cognize the world? (Mills, 2007, p.20). To substantiate the question, why do white people have more tendency not to gain a moral knowledge about the racialized society in which they are living? Mills calls this cognitive phenomenon white ignorance and defines it as "pervasive social patterns of mistaken moral cognition" (Mills, 2007, p.20). His point is not that every white person fails to gain moral knowledge or is ignorant about the racialized unjust power relations. Rather, his point is that because of the social position a white person, or other privileged ones occupy, it is more likely that they ignore the reality of injustice.

The main argument is that the causal force behind white ignorance is not "physico-biological" but rather "social-structural" (Mills, 2007, p.20). It means that in a racialized society structured around white supremacy, even non-racist people are disposed to miscognize the moral facts about the blacks since the conceptual framework through which they are looking at the world is also racialized. In fact, according to social epistemology, we hear with socialized ears and see with socialized eyes. Thus, unlike Cartesian epistemology, we are not individual cognizers with impartial epistemic tools. Instead, we have already been posited in social structures that condition our perceptions because, as Mills mentions, perception involves conceptions that are not neutral. "If the society is one structured by relations of domination, then in certain areas, this conceptual

apparatus is likely going to be shaped and inflicted by the biases of the ruling groups" (Mills, 2007, p.25). Concepts do not simply represent the bare reality outside. They involve an orientation toward the world. Therefore, there might be a possibility that they provide us with distorted knowledge by affecting the way that we perceive the world. But the main point that social epistemology emphasizes is that this possibility is not distributed evenly. The privileged groups are more inclined to unreflectively approve of the epistemic authority of the dominant conceptual grid.

The reason behind the uneven distribution of moral miscognition lies in the position of privileges in the social hierarchies. As Mills argues, under the condition of existing structural injustices, the privileged ones need to deny the existence of such structures to define themselves as morally good persons (Mills, 2007, p.35). So, in the case of collective blindness toward racialized inequalities, white people tend to ignore social injustices since such an acceptance can disrupt their self-image as morally good persons. As Hayward (2017) explains, privileged ignorance as a kind of motivated ignorance has to do with the "psychological investment" that privileged people have in keeping their moral innocence untouched through the "information gate-keeping" mechanism. A mechanism that makes them able to ignore the evidence contradicting their self-image as an ethical person (p.404).

In this context, outlaw emotions as a kind of emotional subversion can play a productive epistemic role. The privileged ones are encouraged by their social position and psychological investment not to know about social injustices. Unlike them, the non-privileged are more likely to experience injustices and hence express outlaw emotions that call into question the dominant group's emotional hegemony. Therefore, the public expression of outlaw emotions can expose the unjust power relations and make them public. To take an example, this year, while Iran's national

football team was competing to be qualified for the 2022 world cup, feminist activists in Iran ran a campaign against going to the stadium to encourage Iran's national team. As women are legally banned from getting into stadiums for football matches, they argued that men should also reject their privileges by not entering the stadium. They even expressed that they are not happy with Iran's national team being qualified and will not support it during the world cup. Their unsympathetic reaction to the Iran national football team's success was an exemplar case of an outlaw emotion exposing the unjust social structure. Though their campaign was not successful in dissuading all men from going to the stadium, it could call into question the naturalized fact that women do not have the right to watch a match in the stadium. Afterwards, even the men who disagreed with the campaign and were unsympathetic were forced to defend women's justified claim. It might be an excellent case showing how the public expression of outlaw emotions can still be epistemically productive, even without gaining mass support. In other words, that campaign disrupted men's ignorance and unveiled their privileges in the social hierarchy.

So far, I have tried to show how outlaw emotions by cracking the emotional hegemony of the dominant group can first help the oppressed groups to become aware of the unjust structures putting them in an inferior position. Second, it can also disturb privileged motivated ignorance about the social hierarchies. Now, I want to focus on a particular emotion, i.e., anger, to develop my argument in more detail. I am choosing anger since it is conventionally viewed as a negative emotion whose public expression is destructive. So, if I can show that even the public expression of anger as an emotion that is usually associated with revenge, violence, hostility, etc., is defensible, we can make a stronger claim about the positive role of emotional communication in politics, in general. To do so, I will start by bringing up some criticisms against anger as a political emotion.

I will focus on Martha Nussbaum among others since she is one of the most vigorous advocates of emotional politics while severely criticizing anger as a proper political emotion.

2.3 Eyes shut; mouth open

2.3.1 A case against anger

Martha Nussbaum makes one of the most robust cases against the expression of anger, both at the individual and collective levels. According to Nussbaum, in exceedingly rare cases and in an extremely limited way, anger might be instrumentally useful, but all things considered; first, it goes against the utilitarian idea of punishment and, what is more, it is normatively problematic (Nussbaum, 2016, p.6 & Nussbaum, 2015, p.51). As Nussbaum spells it out, anger is morally flawed since it *conceptually* involves the idea of retaliation. She claims that most of the emotions comprise a "double movement": "a backward-looking appraisal of what has occurred" and "action tendencies oriented toward a future goal" (Nussbaum, 2015, p.45). For example, when someone feels grief, their feeling contains two main components: pain for losing something about which they care as a backward-looking appraisal and an urge for restoration as the action tendency associated with grieving.

Applying the same analysis on anger, Nussbaum (2015) claims that anger involves an appraisal of damage that has been inflicted on someone or something of importance. Besides, it also consists of a wish for pain or suffering about the wrongdoer to compensate for the injury inflicted upon the victim as its action tendency (p. 46). Anger, understood in this way, has retaliation and payback as one of its conceptual components. Here is the central claim of Nussbaum. To her, the idea of payback is neither the psychological concomitant of anger nor is there an empirical coincidence between getting angry and feeling an urge to seek retaliation. The

idea of payback is conceptually tied to the expression of anger. That is to say, it is even impossible to think about anger without thinking about making the offender feel pain or inflict suffering upon them. Given this characterization, the next step for Nussbaum's argument against the expression of anger is to show why the idea of payback is morally problematic.

The angry person, according to Nussbaum, has two possible ways to think of payback. First, they would think that making the offender feel pain or suffer would compensate for the injury and restore the damage. "The imagined retaliation or payback is seen as somehow assuaging the making good the damage" (Nussbaum, 2015, p.45). This scenario, called "the road of payback", is morally problematic since it is based on a false belief that retaliation can restore the situation (Nussbaum, 2016, p.5). While considered from a rational point of view, one can readily admit that making the wrongdoer suffer or feel pain cannot address the victim's injury. Therefore, the first road is incoherent because the action, retaliation, is not in accordance with its goal, which is restoring the damage. Hence, the first road is normatively problematic.

Second, the angry person would think that imposing punishment on the wrongdoer could counterbalance the situation if they conceive damage as downranking the victim. So, if one interprets the wrongdoing in terms of downgrading their relative status, then they can claim that by imposing diminution on the relative status of the offender, payback can balance their relative status. "Lowering the status of the wrongdoer by pain or humiliation does indeed put me relatively up" (Nussbaum, 2016, p.5). In this case, there is no incoherency in the idea of payback. However, the second scenario, called "the road of status", is still normatively defective since Nussbaum argues that this road hinges upon a distorted value, i.e., relative status (Nussbaum, 2015, p.49). Anger does involve a moral judgment about an injury inflicted upon the victim. However, one might ask, what

is the salient feature of an injury inflicted upon the victim? What makes damaging morally unacceptable is not down ranking or diminution of relative status. Rather, an injury is wrong because it is an injury to human dignity (Nussbaum, 2015, p.49). Thus, the second road is also morally flawed since it depends on a distorted moral value.

After showing that both paths are normatively blocked, Nussbaum concludes that anger, unlike other emotions, like compassion, civic love, generosity, etc., is not a proper political emotion. However, she finally opens quite a narrow way for a specific kind of anger, transition-anger, that she is even hesitant to call anger (Nussbaum, 2016, p.30). "Transition-anger does not focus on status; nor does it want, even briefly, the suffering of the offender as a type of payback for the injury. It never gets involved in that type of magical thinking. It focuses on future welfare from the start" (Nussbaum, 2015, p.54). As she explains the idea, the transition-anger has not to do with the public expression of anger. It can only work as a first motivational step toward getting to social justice and must immediately turn into other positive emotions like love and compassion. But following her suggestion that barely can people cool down their anger after the first step, one might conclude that only in exceptional and rare cases anger is welcomed in politics.

Different objections can be raised against Nussbaum's argument. Firstly, she claims that the idea of retaliation is inextricably bound up with the idea of anger, but she does not provide any argument in support of her claim. She only suffices to say that if we want to conceptually distinguish anger from compassion and grief, following the philosophical tradition, we should approve payback as a conceptual component of anger. Below I will try to show how anger is an umbrella term, including different meanings and conceptions. For now, it is enough to accept that

it is conceptually possible to think of anger without considering the idea of payback. If this is so, then there remains a question about the notion of transition-anger.

Nussbaum contends that the focus of the transition-anger is promoting social welfare, unlike the normal anger, whose focus is to wish for pain or suffer for the wrongdoer (Nussbaum, 2016, p.36). However, putting aside the idea of retaliation, one can still ask why transition-anger is normatively better than normal anger. Nussbaum would answer that transition-anger conforms with the forward-looking conception of punishment since promoting social welfare is a better way to address injustice than merely showing your transitory feeling. Hence, for her, transition-anger is morally better than normal anger since the former does follow utilitarian prescriptions. Transition-anger indeed focuses on social welfare rather than personal concerns. However, is the focus on social welfare normatively higher than the public expression of anger? If someone has a just claim for being angry and their anger does not constitute any moral wrong, then can we still take it for granted that it is morally better to direct their anger toward promoting social welfare than simply expressing anger which is not instrumentally productive? Can we take it for granted, as Nussbaum does, that, ceteris paribus, a nation's problems are superior to citizens' just claims? In the next section, I will explore whether individuals have a right to express their anger and whether this right can override the consequentialist viewpoint of Nussbaum.

2.3.2 In defense of anger

Thus far, I have argued that the public expression of emotions can be epistemically productive, and hence emotional communication should be considered as the alternative way of political communication. They are normatively significant since, under prevailing unjust inequalities, they expose injustice and make them visible to the public. Then, I concentrated on

anger as one of the controversial outlaw emotions that there are many dubious assessments about its productivity in politics. For example, by emphasizing the inseparability of payback from anger, Nussbaum casts doubt upon its appropriateness as a political emotion and discusses its counter-productivity in pursuing justice. She introduces the idea of transition-anger as a highly narrow conception of anger whose only valid usage is to motivate people to do something about the nation's social welfare. Defined in this way, transition-anger does not allow for the public expression of anger since "only cooperation can really solve the nation's problem"(Nussbaum, 2015, p.55). In contrast, anger by sticking to the idea of payback dissociates people more than associates them.

However, I do not think that the idea of payback is a conceptual component of anger. I cannot find Nussbaum's claim well-grounded and tenable. Nussbaum grounds her claim on a conceptual analysis of anger as it is explained in the philosophical tradition, and by philosophical tradition, she mainly refers to Aristotle and Cicero. Nonetheless, like other concepts, anger can undertake some changes over time. In addition, Nussbaum's comprehension of the idea of payback is very sketchy and far from clear. "All I am investigating here is that anger involves, conceptually, a wish for things to go badly, somehow, for the offender in a way that is envisaged, somehow, however vaguely, as a payback for the offender" (Nussbaum, 2015, p.46). Can we think of getting angry without wishing for the wrongdoer to suffer? I think we can. But it depends on what we mean by suffering, and here is the point that Nussbaum's lack of clarity becomes problematic.

Following Srinivasan (2017), I think that what anger conceptually entails is not an urge for revenge but a desire for recognition (p.130). By recognition, I refer to a moral expectation in the angry person for their moral judgment about the injury or harm to be acknowledged by the wrongdoer. And a desire for recognition does not necessarily involve a desire for suffering or

making the offender feel pain. At this point, one would argue that putting pressure on someone to acknowledge their wrong might be suffering or painful for people, and hence Nussbaum's point is approved. However, I do not think it is the correct conclusion to be made.

There is no doubt that being the target or addressee of anger is demanding and might be painful since it calls for stepping out of one's safe zone, as Audre Lorde (1997) argues (p.283). Anger, or at least political anger, whose aim is to change, is the source of insight and so asks for breaking the safe zone. Since anger renders neutrality and indifference impossible, it might be demanding, and, hence, suffering. However, it is not the victims' problem that their expression of anger is unpleasant for other's peaceful life and safety if their anger is appropriate. I think here is the point that Nussbaum's argument goes wrong. Borrowing Lorde's words, it asks oppressed people to be "goddesses or matriarchs or edifices of divine forgiveness" for the sake of the nation's sublime goals and by doing so, in fact, is putting an extra burden on victims' shoulders (Lorde, 1997, p.286).

Let me decipher what this extra pressure contains. As I mentioned before, anger involves a desire for recognition. The angry person asks the targets of their anger to acknowledge an injustice inflicted upon them or to someone or something they care about. The public expression of anger addresses one or a group of people for their wrongdoing and calls for their recognition. So, not surprisingly, it is demanding and even suffering since it calls its addressee's moral innocence into question. On these occasions, addressees would prefer to get defensive by dismissing anger as inappropriate or, as Nussbaum calls it, as a pre-historic and irrational way of communication (Nussbaum, 2015, p.56). However, this defensive reaction could be employed as a strategy to "shift

the focus of responsibility from the one who caused the anger to the one who is expressing anger" (Applebaum, 2014, p.134)

Of course, the point that I am trying to make is not that Nussbaum's argument is motivated by a kind of defensive reaction. Instead, I claim that anger is a reaction to injustice, and hence ignoring it or calling it irrational can lead to what Applebaum calls "double anger" (Applebaum, 2017, p.134). The point that Nussbaum is missing is that dismissing anger cannot only be considered an individual response. It is more like a pervasive pattern between privileges wielding power to evade their possible responsibility for the injustice and, what is more, their strategy to safeguard their ethical innocence. Recognizing anger can unveil their complicity with the structures producing injustice. As Applebaum puts it, "by focusing on the expression of anger and blaming the person who expresses anger, dominant group members can avoid considering how they might have contributed to what caused the anger" (Applebaum, 2017, p.134). In other words, Nussbaum's criticism is undermined by her ignorance about the power dynamics behind the expression of anger and its dismissal. Nevertheless, what can be said about the normative value of expressing anger? If utilitarian considerations are not enough to reject anger as an appropriate political emotion, how can we defend from the public expression of anger affirmatively?

2.3.3 Affective In/Justice: Another break in the wall

In the previous section, I tried to undermine Nussbaum's criticism of the public expression of anger as an appropriate way of political communication by questioning the inseparability of the idea of payback from anger and highlighting the power dynamics behind the dismissal of anger. In this section, I will try to make an affirmative argument in favor of the expression of anger even when it is not productive, which means even when anger is not directed toward social welfare or

the aggregate utility of the society as a whole. To do so, drawing on Srinivasan's (2017) idea about affective injustice, I will seek to answer whether the expression of anger has a particular inherent value, independent of its consequences and effects.

Srinivasan (2017) claims that a specific kind of anger, which she calls "apt anger", can crystallize an intrinsic value overriding the instrumental disvalues discussed by Nussbaum (p.127). She argues that anger always involves a normative judgment about a moral violation. To put it differently, far from including a wish for payback, anger consists of a normative statement about how the world ought to be (Srinivasan, 2017, p.128). Thus, if anger involves a moral evaluation, then the aptness of anger is about whether the object of anger genuinely constitutes a moral violation or not. Anger is apt when the moral evaluation behind it is justifiable. Apt anger can have a normative claim for its expression since it manifests an intrinsic value. It is the collective acknowledgment of the moral evaluation involved in anger that constitutes its intrinsic value. "Getting angry is a means of affectively registering or *appreciating* the injustice of the world, and that our capacity to get aptly anger is best compared with our capacity for aesthetic appreciation" (Srinivasan, 2017, p.132). Having distinguished between merely knowing something and appreciating something, one can admit that the intrinsic value of the public expression of anger lies in its communicative capacity to make visible the invisible patterns of justice. "Anger is also a form of communication, a way of publicly marking moral disvalue, calling for the shared negative appreciation of others" (Srinivasan, 2017, p.132).

Now that we have explored the intrinsic moral value of the public expression of anger, we can take one step further and reinforce our counterargument against Nussbaum. Nussbaum believes that anger is problematic since it is a dissociative political emotion that focuses on retaliation rather

CEU eTD Collection

CEU eTD Collection

than social welfare, and hence it cannot adequately address injustice. Here, it seems that there is a normative conflict between "reasons of prudence" and "reasons of aptness" (Srinivasan, 2017, p.127). It is a normative conflict in that, on the one hand, the proponents of the counter-productivity of anger provide instrumental reasons against its public expression. On the other hand, based on the intrinsic value of anger, one might claim in favor of its public expression of apt anger. Srinivasan calls it "affective injustice" since it puts the victims of injustice in a morally irreconcilable dilemma. So, affective injustice is "the injustice of having to negotiate between one's apt emotional response to the injustice of one's situation and one's desire to better one's situation (Srinivasan, 2017, p.135). It is a second-order injustice since it leaves victims of injustice whose moral right has already been violated alone with an individual choice for which there is no morally correct answer.

Given the possibility of affective injustice, the advocates of the counter-productivity of anger should be very suspicious about running the risk of reducing moral harms to practical problems that should be solved in virtue of utilitarian considerations. In other words, if the collective appreciation of a moral violation has an intrinsic value, overemphasizing instrumental concerns might naturalize moral injustice by obscuring the moral value behind it. Therefore, Nussbaum and other opponents of the public expression of anger should be aware that calling angry people to cool down and to obey dictates of the reason might be oppressive and an instance of injustice since "it suggests that the primary locus of responsibility for fixing the problem lies with the victim rather than the perpetrator" (Srinivasan, 2017, p.133). To conclude, what justice requires when someone is facing apt anger is not to dismiss it as an inappropriate political emotion but to appreciate and acknowledge the injustice to which it is referring. To wrap up with Lorde's idea,

public expression of anger is a call for change, and hence the reaction to anger is a touchstone of distinguishing allies and enemies (Lorde, 1997, p.280).

Chapter 3: How to fight fire with fire: Toward a normative framework for the case of anger

3.1 Consequentialist and Non-consequentialist Contest

I started the second chapter with a discussion about anger as an emotion that conventionally is viewed as disruptive and unpleasant, at least regarding democratic decision-making (Cherry, 2022, p.5). Then I sought to argue for the positive role that anger can play in a democratic arrangement. I intentionally chose anger since if I could succeed in my contention about anger, as a widely held reactive emotion supposedly undermining social cooperation, it would be easier to broaden the scope of the argument to cover other emotions as well. Finally, I closed the chapter with a discussion about the inherent and instrumental reasons for and against the public expression of anger. I tried to highlight the possible normative threat of reducing the public expression of anger to a mere practical problem by overstressing instrumental reasons. My argument hinged on the inherent value of expression of anger. However, reasons of aptness, as the inherent value, cannot unreservedly override the reasons of prudence because it is not hard to imagine cases in which the damaging consequences of expression of anger are that much that might offset the reason of aptness, if not overrule it. What could be said about these purportedly countervailing cases?

Maxime Lepoutre (2018) claims that as neither counterproductive (instrumental) nor non-consequentialist reasons have "absolute force" over each other, the reasons of aptness cannot rule out the reasons of prudence *in advance* (p.406). "The aptness of anger gives us a pro tanto moral reason in favor of publicly expressing apt anger, but this moral reason could in principle be overridden by countervailing moral reasons" (Lepoutre, 2018, p.406). Therefore, Lepoutre's strategy to make a stronger case in favor of the public expression of anger is to show that even

from the consequentialist perspective, anger has some specific values. That is, it is epistemically productive. His argument is framed within a phenomenological perspective. Hence, it is somewhat different from my argument about the outlaw emotions and their epistemic productivity in cracking the epistemic hegemony of the dominant groups. Lepoutre maintains that expression of anger lets the audience take the perspective of the angry person and empathize with them in an *exclusive* way that is not possible through other ways. "It can help them imaginatively experience what it is like to be in the speaker's shoes, how the world appears or feels from where they stand" (Lepoutre, 2018, p.408).

To Lepoutre, what makes anger a distinctive way of communication and an idiosyncratic source of information is that, from a phenomenological perspective, emotions are "sources of salience" and hence can confer us a qualitatively distinct knowledge by rendering some points salient (Lepoutre, 2018, p.409). Just like a colorful picture, which gives us more details or in-depth information, anger gives us a fine-grained knowledge about a given situation by bringing some elements to the fore. This point's implication for our discussion is that anger helps us discriminate between things without necessarily having conceptualized them. "The idea is that our experiences of anger can make us perceive or sense injustices that our preexisting conceptual frameworks did not allow us to grasp. In turn, this emotional sensitivity facilitates the development of more nuanced moral concepts" (Lepoutre, 2018, p.409). To instantiate Lepoutre's argument, one can think of the fact that for hundreds of years women had been experiencing sexual harassment and abuse which made them feel bad, but up until a couple of decades ago, there was no concept to describe that irritating feeling. This example shows how feelings and emotions might precede concepts. However, it is worth mentioning that Lepoutre's point is not simply that the expression of anger

only serves as a warning bell enabling us to see already unseen injustices or already non-conceptualized forms of injustice. He also claims that public expression of anger lets the audiences have a specific, fine-grained perception, which otherwise they could not have had.

I find Lepoutre's strategy, that is, coupling the inherent values motivated by the reasons of aptness with instrumental values motivated by epistemic productivity, remarkably interesting. However, I am not sure whether it can solve the problem regarding the normative conflict between consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasons. If non-consequentialist considerations do not ex-ante override consequentialist considerations, then there is no reason to assume that a mix of the two can override the former. Suppose there are cases where the public expression of anger is too destructive instrumentally. For example, not only does it undermine social cooperation but also, by rendering impossible the formation of any collective identity to address the injustice, it blocks social cooperation. In that case, one can still remake the same point that even a mixture of consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasons might not overrule consequentialist considerations. To address the aporia, I propose to set the public expression of apt anger as a *moral baseline*. It means that until there is an adequate reason against the public expression of apt anger in any particular case, anger can be expressed without any moral consideration. In fact, what requires moral justification is any move away from the baseline, not sticking to it. Therefore, in typical cases, the public expression of anger is morally permissible unless someone provides a moral justification explaining why one should move away from baseline in that specific case. My suggestion also has the upside that instead of putting an extra burden on the shoulders of angry persons, who are more likely to be the victim of injustice and inflicting affective injustice upon them, shifts the responsibility of reason-giving to the critics.

Nevertheless, I think that aptness is still a vague term failing to provide a normative framework to think about borderline cases. In the previous chapter, following Srinivasan (2018), I defined apt anger as the one whose evaluation of moral violation is morally justifiable. Although correct, I think it still needs further elaboration and even expansion to provide us with a set of normative conditions to think about the borderline cases. By borderline cases, I mean occasions when some aptness conditions are met while some are not. Let me explain it with an example.

Imagine the classic example of structural injustice, as articulated by Young (2003). Sandy, a white single parent, sells her home to a mass construction company, but she cannot find a new place for reasons out of her reach, and finally, she must deal with the prospect of homelessness. Young argues that even though it is a matter of sheer bad luck, it still rests on market institutions' regular operation. Young takes Sandy's case as an example of structural injustice since she faces a problem about which she cannot be held responsible. In other words, it is a case of structural injustice since the harm Sandy is facing is not the outcome of her moral failure or personal fault but the unintended consequences of market institutions (Young, 2003, p.2). Now, let us suppose that as Sandy is searching for a new home, a case is offered by a real state agency, but while she is considering the option, an immigrant non-white family leases it. Understandably and justifiably, Sandy gets angry since she is being harmed without doing anything wrong. As a result, she begins to develop resentment against immigrants and non-white people who ostensibly are endangering her family's life. In this case, Sandy has the right to be angry since she is experiencing a somewhat injustice. However, from the perspective of morality, she is undoubtedly wrong to show resentment against the immigrant family. Is Sandy's anger apt here? I think it is not. Yet, it is hard to explain

how her evaluation of moral violation is wrong since she is undoubtedly experiencing an injustice. In what follows, I will try to draw a normative framework to address these equivocal cases.

3.2 The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: is anger always one letter short of danger?

Anger is typically viewed as a Pandora's Box; it releases physical and emotional harm to humankind once opened. It is usually associated with irrational decisions made of blinding fury. So, as a result of this widespread pessimism about anger, it has usually been painted "in broad strokes", as Cherry (2021) puts it (p.11). It means that some constant features or key points have permanently been attached to it without paying attention to its variations. However, as Cherry mentions, it is not necessarily the case with other emotions like love. We can conceptually distinguish between at least three types of love, namely, Agape, Eros, and Philia, each of which has its distinctive target and action tendency (Cherry, 2021, p.12). Nevertheless, when it comes to anger, at least, common sense tends to look at it as having a solid *genus* without any *differentia*. So, in response to this shortcoming in differentiating types of anger, not surprisingly, various authors have provided different taxonomies based on different criteria.

Flanagan (2017), based on the specific aim that each type of anger has, divides them into six types, including: "payback anger", "pain-passing anger", "instrumental anger", "recognition-respect anger", and "as if anger", "political or institutional anger" and finally "impersonal anger" (p.xiv). Then, while rejecting the first two kinds, Flanagan claims that other types might be acceptable under certain conditions. I will not examine each of these types in detail since I do not think classifying anger merely based on their aims can capture all the complexities. Instead, the detailed analysis by Myisha Cherry (2021) is much more convincing since she is seeking to provide

a way of distinguishing several types of political anger to describe and evaluate a specific kind of anger that is associated with injustice.

To capture the essence of racial anger against injustice, Cherry suggests distinguishing different types of political anger based on their "target", "action tendency", "aim", and "perspective" (Cherry, 2021, p.14). In the previous chapters, I already clarified target and action tendency. Therefore, here, I will only focus on aim and perspective. Aim refers to what an angry person hopes to achieve by showing their anger, and perspective refers to the ultimate values that inform and direct one's anger. In my opinion, the last component of anger, its perspective, plays a relatively more significant role in drawing a normative line between different types of anger since perspective is a function of the social outlook one is taking. In other words, the perspective that informs someone's anger works as a guiding principle that helps one to navigate their anger, but when it comes to the political anger or public expression of anger, perspectives or guiding principles represent the collective values rather than the abstract values of individuals.

Thus, perspectives fed by social outlooks are different among different social groups. As Cherry puts it, "a white supremacist and civil rights leader is unlikely to share the same anger, and this has a lot to do with their dissimilar social outlooks" (Cherry, 2021, p.15). Take the example of Sandy. What would push her to direct her anger toward immigrants? It might be said that it was simply a cognitive fault in recognizing the actual target of the anger. However, from another perspective, the non-white family is the source of her misery and hence blamable. In other words, for the one whose social outlook is framed around beliefs rooted in white supremacy, it is not hard to trace back the source of Sandy's misery to the non-whites and look at them as the target of her anger. As the guiding principle navigating her anger is not the equality of citizens but a racist

dis/value. Now, suppose that Sandy was a woke who seeks to fight against different forms of injustice in society. In that case, she definitely would become angry again, but this time, she would target her anger at the institutions and structures causing her harm and distress.

To wrap up, perspective, the last component of anger, I claim, is the most important one because, first, it can dramatically change the kind of anger people feel. Second, it depends on the social position people occupy and has to do with the normative values people subscribe to. Therefore, the "perspective" component would be of significance for our goal here. To provide a normative standard for evaluating the aptness of anger based on its perspective, I will start with Cherry's ideal type of political anger, namely, Lordean rage. However, before proceeding, it must be noted that ideal anger is not ideal in the sense that it is not in fact achievable, or it calls for perfect virtuous people to be realized, as was the case for Nussbaum (Cherry, 2021, p.28). Rather, it is ideal in the sense that it is morally superior to other types of political anger.

3.3 What makes the expression of anger a morally desirable action: It is all a matter of perspective

Lordean rage, named after Audre Lorde, is a specific type of political anger motivated by anti-racism. Its expression can be found in social movements against racial injustice like Black Lives Matter. So, the target of Lordean rage is racist attitudes, actions, and structures. Inspired by Lorde's idea that women's anger against gender-based discrimination is a source of energy for them, Cherry ascribes the same motivational role to the Lordean rage. Thus, its action tendency is to motivate people to act against racial injustice. Lordean rage is a "transformative anger" than a "transitional anger", as Cherry depicts it (Cherry, 2021, p.28). "Lordean rage, on the other hand, does not need to disappear or transition to something else to achieve certain results. Instead, it is

morally, politically, and epistemically useful for transformative ends as it is" (Cherry, 2021, p.28). Thus, to achieve its end, Lordean rage does not need to turn into other emotions like compassion and love, as was the case with Nussbaum's transition anger.

The aim that Lordean rage seeks to realize is a change in institutions, structures, policies, expectations, or whatever else that produces, maintains, and strengthens racial injustice. Finally, the perspective that informs Lordean rage revolves around the belief that freedom is an inclusive idea. To put it differently, no one can be free unless everyone is free. For Cherry, what can prevent anger from being a destructive emotion is this perspective since it cares about the freedom of others as a condition of one's own freedom. "Without this perspective, the outraged may see others as the cause of their own suffering when instead they are fellow sufferers, themselves outraged for other reasons" (Cherry, 2021, p.25). Therefore, what distinguishes Lordean rage from other forms of political anger is not that it is directed against an injustice. Sandy's anger was also motivated by unjust harm inflicted upon her. What makes Lordean rage ideal is the perspective within which it is defined. People might express their anger at injustice from a narcissist perspective, i.e., their expression of anger might reject injustice not because it is morally wrong but because it is not benefiting them.

Cherry's characterization of Lordean rage is extremely useful for depicting ideal anger. Yet, one can argue that what makes a perspective ideal is not necessarily holding the view that freedom is an inclusive value. One can be skeptical about the axiom that freedom of all is the condition of one's own freedom while simultaneously acknowledging everyone's right to have freedom. Therefore, I suggest modifying Cherry's last condition from believing in the idea of the inclusivity of freedom to merely recognizing everyone's else entitlement to be free. Now, we have

a normative framework to decide which kind of racial anger against racism is morally ideal and which one is not. In brief, if someone's anger targets the manifestations of racism, is aimed at changing the origins of these manifestations, metabolizes people's motivations to fight against injustice, and finally takes the perspective that everyone is entitled to have freedom, we can count it as an ideal expression of anger against injustice. One point, however, should be pointed out before going further. First, the people joining the Black Lives Matter protests were not necessarily well-informed about the theoretical components of their anger. Most of them probably had never scrutinized anger and its public expression, and what is more, they even did not need to know these ideas about anger. These are normative outlines allowing us to think retrospectively about concrete cases.

So far, I have tried to sketch an outline of a normative framework for evaluating racial rage. However, I do not think that any conceptual constraint prevents us from broadening the scope of the Lordean rage to any kind of social injustice. So, we can generalize the framework provided by Cherry (2021) by widening the scope of its targets to any kind of social discrimination and injustice. But to close the chapter, I want to go back to the idea that the perspective within which people frame their anger is a function of their social outlook and even is affected by the social position they are occupying. To instantiate the idea, we can turn to contemporary politics and assess how different social outlooks can motivate different kinds of anger. Tanesini (2021) identifies two types of anger representing two different social groups with distinct characteristics in contemporary politics, "arrogant" and "resistant" anger.

Arrogant anger is the characteristic of those individuals who condition their sense of self-esteem to push down other social groups that they rank as inferior. Arrogant anger is a type of

status anger as it is a reaction to a violation of the privileges that those individuals assume for themselves. "This is anger that is a response to a perceived slight about one's social rank and is designed to reassert that status. … Status anger is a natural response to conduct that does not befit what one is entitled to given one's social standing" (Tanesini, 2021, p.164). Arrogant anger is usually associated with the type of anger that white supremacists who assume some privileges for themselves express against other social groups they look at as less entitled. Thus, while its target is people of color, women, sexual minorities, and so on, its social outlook is the supremacy of their groups. Moreover, it aims to humiliate and disgrace others to elevate themselves (Tanesini, 2021, p.166). Therefore, arrogant anger cannot be apt since it presupposes a difference in worth or dignity that under no circumstance can one find legitimate.

On the other hand, resistant anger, which is very much in line with Lordean rage, is an instrument in fighting against injustice. Unlike arrogant anger, which is a response to a slight to the social rank one assumes for himself, resistant anger is a response to a slight that is racist, sexist, misogynist, or any other kind of slight that rank some people as socially inferior compared to others. "Resistant anger is anger as a response to a perceived slight inflicted upon oneself or someone with whom one identifies because of membership in a stigmatized group" (Tanesini, 2021, p.169). However, the fact that these two types of anger are associated with specific social groups, that is, white supremacist and stigmatized social groups, does not mean that only marginalized people can express resistant anger. It just means that it can be expressed by the ones who refute the whole idea of stigmatization. Similarly, arrogant anger also does not only belong to the white people. For example, an immigrant from the first generation can also develop some

negative attitudes toward the late comers to rank themselves as superior and identify themselves with other people whose social rank they assume is higher.

Conclusion

In the first chapter, I claimed that the public expression of emotions in its different performative political practices has specific communicative power, particularly in singling out invisible forms of injustice. Hence, it should be recognized by democratic discourses as an alternative and extra-constitutional way of political communication, in parallel with the formal and institutional ways of political communication. To support my claim, I focused on anger as an emotion whose public expression has raised colossal debate. Opponents usually assume a correlation between the expression of anger and negative emotions such as hatred, and resentment. Thus, they claim that, like other reactive emotions, anger, too, does not have any communicative power and cannot lead to anything more than emotional arousal. Besides, they assert that expression of anger always involves morally problematic reactions like retaliation. So, again, it is not a proper political emotion and should be replaced by other emotions like civic love, generosity, and compassion that are more beneficial for the polity. In addition, they frame anger as a disintegrative emotion splitting society rather than unifying it and failing to constitute an effective response to injustice.

In the second chapter, drawing on the idea of outlaw emotions and their role in undermining the epistemic authority of dominant groups, I tried to show how anger can play a productive epistemic role in addressing unseen injustices. Then, criticizing Nussbaum's (2013) argument against the positive role that anger can play in a democratic arrangement, I argued that anger does not conceptually involve the idea of payback; rather, it comprises the idea of recognition. Then, based on Srinivasan's (2018) claim that public expression of anger crystalizes an inherent value alongside other consequentialist values resulting from it, I posited that merely relying on reasons

of prudence might lead to the normalization of the injustice by shifting responsibility from wrongdoer to the victim. So, not only there should be other concerns than practical and consequentialist reasons regarding the public expression of anger but also ignoring non-consequential considerations would constitute a kind of affective injustice against victims who are held responsible for dealing with a kind of wrongdoing that they have already been targeted.

In the last chapter, I brought up cases in which the idea of aptness, though providing a normative criterion, fails to provide a comprehensive normative framework. I called them borderline cases of public expression of anger. Even though one can intuitively identify a moral wrong in these cases, it is not that easy to articulate how and why this type of political anger is morally problematic. Following Cherry (2021), I proposed to think of anger as having four components: target, aim, action tendency, and perspective. This framework enables us to evaluate normative aspects of anger in different dimensions and hence think about borderline cases, where some components are morally acceptable, and some are not, in a more systematic way. I closed the chapter by claiming that the fourth dimension of anger, its perspective, is relatively more significant than other components. I offered two reasons to lend support to my argument. First, the perspective through which anger is informed is very influential since a change in perspective can have dramatic normative consequences for the expression of anger. Second, the perspective of anger, rather than being something individual, is constructed socially. I think this last point has substantial significance for the whole of my contention. Therefore, I will conclude the thesis with an elaboration on this point.

My main argument was in favor of the positive role that the public expression of emotions can play in a democratic order. I called it emotional politics since my argument was based on the

idea that a democratic arrangement should not overlook the role of emotional political communication. In this regard, my focus was on how emotions could influence politics. However, the fact that the perspective that informs anger is socially constructed and so is a function of the social outlook one takes can open up new possibilities to think about the relationship between politics and emotions. If one's social outlook affects the type of anger that one expresses, then one can claim that not only emotional communication can influence political discourses, but political discourses can also influence the way that people express their emotions. I call this dimension of the relationship as politics of emotions. I claim that political discourses can influence the perspective within which anger is framed. Hence, they can influence the type of political anger people express and even normatively change the type of it. I will try to illustrate this point.

Remember Sandy's case. What if, instead of being informed by racist presumptions, her perspective was informed by egalitarian principles? She would have become angry again, but instead of blaming the non-white family, she probably would have directed her anger toward what she would consider as the common root of both her and the non-white family's misery. Therefore, if the social outlook individuals take has normative importance to the type of anger, then one can claim that different political discourses that provide different social outlooks can play an essential role in the way people express their anger and emotions, in general. In other words, the way that political discourses treat public expression of emotions would lead to different ways of politicization of emotions through different mechanisms. To substantiate my point and highlight its normative dimensions, I will examine two main mechanisms through which emotions are politicized in contemporary politics: right-wing and left-wing populism.

It is a wide-held opinion that the underlying emotional processes of populism are hatred, anger, fear, and other negative emotions. But there is a considerable difference between right-wing and left-wing populism's targets. The proponents of the former blame political elites for prioritizing supposedly less entitled social groups like immigrants over themselves and typically direct their anger toward stigmatized social groups. While the advocates of the latter criticize austerity politics leading to inequality within society and typically direct their anger toward institutions like IMF. Salmela and von Scheve identify two different emotional dynamics behind these two types of populism (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018, p.436). In other words, the way that these two political discourses treat public expression of emotions leads to dramatically and even normatively different consequences. They argue that a sense of insecurity and fear about the unstable future, coupled with a shame about being ranked at the bottom of the social hierarchy in a neo-liberal era whose main feature is the extension of competition to the whole aspects of life lies at the heart of the individuals' emotional constitution in recent decades (Salmela and von Scheve, 2017, p.569). Although such an emotional constitution has paved the way for populism, right and left populism have exploited two different types of emotional dynamism to politicize these emotions. Right-wing populism tends to suppress shame, while left-wing populism tends to acknowledge it. These two strategies would lead to different consequences. Privatization and repression transform shame into other negative emotions like hatred, resentment, and defensive anger against already marginalized people. However, acknowledging shame transforms it into a sense of collective anger and grief, which calls for collective action (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018, p.440). The reason why in right-wing populism, shame turns into hatred and resentment is that repression cannot make shame disappear. It can only lead to a "shift in their intentional directedness" through manipulation. "The idea is that psychodynamic processes change both the emotion type and its intentional object (from

self to other), with the purpose of protecting the vulnerable self" (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018, p.442). In other words, the way that political discourses deal with their individuals' emotions would lead to dissimilar consequences both in terms of targets and emotion types.

On the other hand, by acknowledging the shame, left-wing political discourses give people space to share their feelings with each other. It is a process that makes them aware of the common roots of their grievances and lets them recognize themselves as the victims of social injustices that are worsening off both themselves and other marginalized social groups. "Left-wing resentment may emerge from the acknowledgment and social sharing of negative self-focused emotions, which allows and supports their transformation into anger and indignation at particular others but also into pride, joy, and hope similarly as in various civil rights movements" (Salmela and von Scheve, 2018, p.444). Based on these two different emotional mechanisms, privatization, and publicization, one can ascribe an emancipatory aspect to the public expression of emotions since it seeks to form collective identities to express resistant anger aiming at changes in structures and institutions. In contrast, privatization of negative emotions would lead to a defensive reaction that would easily be translated into arrogant anger against generic others like stigmatized social groups, not particular others as is the case in left-wing populism.

Whether these dynamisms accurately correspond to the right-wing/left-wing populism is not my contention here. Rather my claim is that the way political discourses act toward emotions has to do with the perspective that informs emotions and hence has normative implications. Suppose it is true that the publicization of anger deepens knowledge about the social roots of individuals' dissatisfaction and leads to collective resistant anger aimed at structural change. In that case, a democratic arrangement should not turn a blind eye to the politicization of emotions.

To put it differently, a democratic discourse that revolves around the ideas of equality and freedom should embrace the public expression of emotions and, what is more, provide individuals with morally acceptable social outlooks through which they can frame their anger and other negative emotions as well. Therefore, in the non-ideal situation where there is social injustice between different groups of citizens, the inability of democratic discourses to provide individuals with a democratic perspective to reflect upon their negative emotions would not erase these emotions. Rather, as Chantal Mouffe mentions, it would only pave the way for non-democratic political discourses to manipulate individuals' negative emotions (Mouffe, 2002, p.9). In the absence of any alternative social outlook, non-democratic values would direct individuals' sense of dissatisfaction with inequalities. Then, negative emotions would serve as fertile soil for non-democratic ideals.

Consequently, the relationship between democratic politics and emotions is dramatically complicated and far from being grasped in a statement. To conclude, however, one would claim that there is a reciprocal relationship between them. I tried to capture the essence of this mutual relationship by naming these two aspects as emotional politics and the politics of emotion. Emotions can by no means be reduced to simply a by-product of political deliberation. They can influence democratic politics as an alternative way of political communication. Similarly, democratic discourses can influence the way that people frame their emotions. Therefore, as I tried to show in this thesis, the public expression of emotions can positively affect both aspects of the relationship. Under social injustice, it could be a significant medium for addressing injustices. Moreover, the public expression of emotions could also serve as a way of pushing back non-democratic emotions like arrogant anger. Otherwise, the mobilization of these emotions by non-democratic political discourses would undermine the whole fabric of the democratic body.

References

Applebaum, B. (2017). Learning from anger as an outlaw emotion: Moving beyond the limits of what one can hear. *Philosophy of Education Archive*, 132-140.

Berezin, M. (2018). Making the fascist self. In *Making the Fascist Self*. Cornell University Press.

Cherry, M. (2021). *The Case for Rage: Why Anger Is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle*. Oxford University Press.

Cherry, M. (2022). Political anger. *Philosophy Compass*, *17*(2), e12811.

Cherry, M. E., & Flanagan, O. E. (2018). *The moral psychology of anger*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Dahlberg, L. (2005). The Habermasian public sphere: Taking difference seriously?. *Theory and Society*, *34*(2), 111-136.

Dryzek, J. S. (2002). *Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics, contestations*. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. *Social text*, (25/26), 56-80.

Habermas, J. (1992). Concluding Remarks in C. Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere.

Habermas, J. (2015). *Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*. John Wiley & Sons.

Hall, C. (2007). Recognizing the passion in deliberation: Toward a more democratic theory of deliberative democracy. *Hypatia*, *22*(4), 81-95Hayward, C. R. (2017). Responsibility and ignorance: On dismantling structural injustice. *The Journal of Politics*, *79*(2), 396-408.

Hayward, C. R. (2020). Disruption: What is it good for?. *The Journal of Politics*, *82*(2), 448-459.

Jaggar, A. M. (1989). Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology. *Inquiry*, *32*(2), 151-176.

Lepoutre, M. (2018). Rage inside the machine: Defending the place of anger in democratic speech. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, *17*(4), 398-426.

Lorde, A. (1997). The uses of anger. *Women's Studies Quarterly*, *25*(1/2), 278-285.

Mansbridge, J. (2015). A minimalist definition of deliberation. *Deliberation and development: Rethinking the role of voice and collective action in unequal societies*, 27-50.

Markell, P. (2000). Making affect safe for democracy? On "constitutional patriotism". *Political Theory*, *28*(1), 38-63.

Mills, C. (2007). White ignorance. *Race and epistemologies of ignorance*, *247*, 26-31.

Mouffe, C. (2002). Politics and passions. *Ethical Perspectives*, *7*(2).

Nussbaum, M. C. (2013). *Political emotions*. Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2015). Transitional anger. *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, *1*(1), 41-56.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2016). *Anger and forgiveness: Resentment, generosity, justice*. Oxford University Press.

Salmela, M., & Von Scheve, C. (2017). Emotional roots of right-wing political populism. *Social Science Information*, *56*(4), 567-595.

Salmela, M., & von Scheve, C. (2018). Emotional dynamics of right-and left-wing political populism. *Humanity & Society*, *42*(4), 434-454.

Sanders, L. M. (1997). Against deliberation. *Political theory*, *25*(3), 347-376.

Silva, L. L. (2021). The Efficacy of Anger: Recognition and Retribution. In *The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves* (pp. 27-55). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Srinivasan, A. (2018). The aptness of anger. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *26*(2), 123-144.

Szanto, T., & Slaby, J. (2020). Political emotions. *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions, London, New York: Routledge*, 478-492.

Tanesini, A. (2021). Passionate speech: on the uses and abuses of anger in public debate. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements*, *89*, 153-176.

Walzer, M. (2008). Politics and passion. In *Politics and Passion*. Yale University Press.

Young, I. M. (2001). Activist challenges to deliberative democracy. *Political theory*, *29*(5), 670-690.

Young, I. M. (2003). *Political responsibility and structural injustice*. The University of Kansas, Department of Philosophy.

Young, I. M. (2011). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton University Press.

Young, I. M. (2021). Six Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy. In *Democracy and difference* (pp. 120-136). Princeton University Press.