

JUST HOW SPECIAL IS RUSSIA? DEFINING THE MODEL OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

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Just how special is Russia? Defining the model of Russian political economy

Abstract

This essay investigates the path of Russia's political development during the post-Soviet period. It proposes that the system of Russian political economy is characterised not by the reversion of the socio-economic system that had been built during the 1990s and early 2000s but by its consolidation and adaptation to the new conditions found in a post-socialist developing economy. In terms of comparative perspective, two observations concerning Russia stand out. First, Russia experienced considerable political backsliding on a greater scale than post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Second, Russian model of political economy deviates from the parameters of other developing countries of comparable size and GDP per capita in a significant but not a dramatic fashion. While the impetus for consolidation of Russian authoritarian model has many parallels to the search of avoiding the middle-income trap, Russia demonstrates a degree of exceptionalism due to its focus on enhancing military capabilities and geopolitical goals.

Introduction

A period of some ten years after the end of the Cold War ushered in what seemed like a steady progression of countries toward a model of liberal free-market democracy. But while the key organising principles of capitalism have permeated virtually every society, the institutions of representative democracy have struggled to take root. According to the research by the political scientist Larry Diamond (2015, p.151), in 2000-2015 democracy broke down in 27 countries, among them Kenya, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey. Even the poster-boys of democratic transition in Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic – have been experiencing signs of authoritarian tendencies (Kornai, 2016; Szelenyi and Mihalyi, 2020). While representative democracy and political freedoms are still seen as ideal by many citizens across the developing world, the pace of spreading democracy has stalled. A brand of authoritarian capitalism, wherein market coexists with muscular executive authority, appears sustainable in many developing countries. The President of the United States, Joe Biden (2021) warns about the impending struggle between the liberal democracies and the assortment of authoritarian states. The idea is alive in the academia circles. For example, economic historian Adam Tooze (Tooze, 2015) suggested the struggle between democracy and autocracy has – for the last hundred years – been a key factor propelling large-scale global conflict, starting from the First World War.

Consequently, the subject of democratic backsliding has been attracting growing attention among scholars (see Waldner & Lust, 2015, 2018). This essay will focus on exploring the scale of democratic backsliding in Russia in a historical and comparative context. I will begin by laying out definition and key theories of democratic backsliding. After that, the paper will examine the trajectory of Russian political changes during the period of economic transformation in the 1990s and its aftermath. For those purposes, I will i) examine quantitative indicators of liberal democracy in Russia and ii) analyse the limitations of political rights in Russia through the framework of developmental state. After that, a comparative analysis of the Russian model of political model will be presented. To perform this analysis, I will utilise the Ward's method of hierarchical clustering, building on the research and dataset developed by Batinti and Kopstein (2021). I will conclude by discussing the possible futures of Russian model of political economy and identify its sources of resilience as well as its shortcomings. The argument this paper makes is that up to mid-2000s the path of Russian political transformation had been characteristic of other developing countries with similar economic profile. However, since the late

2000s the pace and depth of democratic backsliding has become swifter and by 2015 the country was less democratic than many developing countries. Russia possesses a number of characteristics that make it *sui generis* compared to other developed economies, namely emphasis on geopolitical sovereignty. Other significant factor is an institutional and economic legacy of Russia, including large economic during the 1990s and authoritarian state.

Literature review

The question of political transformations – and the link between dynamics of economics and dynamics of political change - is a centuries-long debate. The 19-th century's radical philosopher Karl Marx saw the development of parliamentarism in the Western industrial countries as a wanton attempt by the bourgeoisie to stave off the challenge from the working class. It was, he opined, nothing but a mirage of sharing the control over society obfuscating the inequities inherent in the capitalist mode of production (Ryan, 2013, ch.21). As the capitalist system matured, the argument went, labourers would obtain the shrinking share of the resources. This, in turn, would precipitate a revolution to overthrow the vestiges of representative government and install a new regime with a focus on the welfare of the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 1848). In reality, however, wages of workers in capitalist countries grew, as the share of spending they devoted to food declined, thanks to the industrial food production (Roser, 2021). James Stuart Mill (2004) was more sanguine about the role of representative parliamentarianism as a way to provide an equitable and effective mode of governance. Content with such arrangements implemented in Britain, Mill also pondered over the minimum level of economic development required by 'brutal' governments abroad to be able to rule themselves in accordance with what was then considered 'Enlightened' institutions (Mill, 2017). With the rise of the power of the United States, the representative mode of governance – or at least the ambition to govern in accordance with such principles - has become widespread not merely in the Western world but in other regions, too. Former fascist regimes in Europe, as well as South Korea and Japan were successfully turned into democracies. In the case of European states, this required banning selected parties (see Bourne, 2012). In the case of Japan and South Korea, authoritarian tendencies gradually gave way to more conspicuously democratic systems. The period between 1980s and 1990s became the heyday of political liberalisation on a global scale, with the advent of the Third Wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) and the hegemony of American culture and military strength.

Over the recent decades, the study of the dynamics of change in political systems moved away from sweeping generalisations and normative arguments and toward a more granular, empirical research (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Welder, 1998; De Mesquita and Smith, 2005; Asemoglu and Robinson, 2000). Two unique features of the latest wave of the study of political institutions and democratisation stand out. First, the emergence of empirical research that provides taxonomies of political regimes (see Kornai, 2016; Milanovic, 2019), as well as finding the link between the degree of openness of the political system and its state capacity or economic development (Przeworski, 1993; De Mesquita and Smith, 2005; Waldner, 1998; Bäck and Hadenius, 2008). Second feature is the decline in the normative emphasis on the universal benefits of open political systems and greater appreciation of the fragility and instability of democratic governance (Kornai, 2016; Milanovic, 2019; Waldner and Lust, 2015). The study of democratic backsliding, in particular, came to be formed as a growing strand of research on political transformation. How should backsliding be measured? What is the inter-relation between capitalism and free-markets? What factors explain backsliding? How is political regime correlated with country's economic and developmental goals?

Taking those factors into account, it is not surprising that the development of countries in the post-Soviet Union space drew the particular attention of scholars. What initially appeared as a successful transformation of the Soviet Empire into a series of docile democracies turned out to be a complicated,

painful and uneven process. While the Soviet Union during the 1980s was showing of readying for wide-ranging reforms, its collapse appeared sudden even to some close observers and also more amicable than many feared (see Wayne Merry, 2013). A titular nation and the largest Soviet republic, Russia, presented the case of democratisation that drew most controversial discussions. Moscow did not experience the humiliation and punishment on the scale that Germany endured after the First World War. Instead, Russian elite demonstrated willingness to make amends with its former rivals in the West and listened to the expertise they offered. And yet, the initial phase of reforms soon stumbled upon the elite's wariness over political freedoms and inability to reach consensus over the security architecture on the European continent. By 2010, when the leadership in Moscow laid down the economic (Putin, 2013) and political (Putin, 2007) agenda for its sovereign path of development. The period of the 1990s, where Russia suffered from a perceived lack of sovereignty – and crumbling state capacity (Popov, 2013) – became a scar on the country's psyche that its nationalist leadership was all too eager to scratch. This ran in parallel with comparatively easier accommodation with Western-centric economic system of smaller post-Soviet states, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.

Scholars and politicians continue to debate the logic behind Russian political and economic transformation in the post-Soviet period. Several variables have been put forward to explain Russian authoritarian turn, which saw the administration of Vladimir Putin concentrating greater power in the hands of central executive apparatus and limiting political participation. One such variable concerns the destructive impact of the economic crisis Russia experienced during the 1990s. The historian Niall Ferguson and the economist and former Central Bank expert in Russia Brigitte Granville pointed to the threat that poor macroeconomic governance and the disappearance of savings became a serious shock to the Russians and would heighten the demand for 'firm hand' that would keep the Russian ship steady (Granville and Ferguson, 2000). A group of scholars and observers pointed at the lack of Western financial aid to boost the prosperity of ordinary Russians (Talbot, 2003), which led to anomie and socio-economic breakdown; others, by contrast, thought American hands-on approach to helping Russia reform excessive and mismanaged (Wayne Merry, 2013). Another variable is the income Russia could count on the revenues from the sales of gas without creating better political and regulatory conditions in which businesses from others economic sectors could thrive (Ross, 2012; see Treisman, 2010 for counter-argument). Other often-mentioned factors relating to the dynamics of Russian political regime include the inability of Russian leadership to shake off their imperial ambitions (Gaidar, 2006) and lack of institutional constraints to prevent Russian leadership from putting limits on the executive strengthening their power and changing the rules of the game in its favour (see Turchenko and Shevchuk, 2016; Batinti and Kopstein, 2021). Seen in this fashion, Russia, much like the USSR or the country under Czar, has simply been reverting to its autocratic tendencies enabled by the centralised institutions.

Explanations of Russian authoritarianism	
Political factors:	
Lack of institutional veto points (Turchenko and Shevchuk)	
Legacy of authoritarian institutions (Auzan, Batinti and Kopstein)	
Imperial legacy (Gaidar)	
Economic factors:	
Resource curse (Ross)	
The 1990s economic trauma (Ferguson, Milanovic)	

Conceptualisation of Russia	
Bantini and Kopstein	Rent-extractive regime
Szakonyi, Mau	Flawed developmental state
Gaidar	Humiliated Empire

Where does that leave Russia? Much ink has been spilled by scholars in an attempt to conceptualise Russian model of political economy and pigeonhole it into a specific category. To what extent the travails of Russian burgeoning post-Soviet political system are common to what other developing countries go through? According to Shleifer and Treisman (2005), the Russian regime, despite all its woes, displays the dynamics of a 'normal' developing country. True, Russia has problems, but so do all developing countries. Political leadership in Brazil, Malaysia or Mexico, they argued, also suffered from 'the common flaws of middle-income, capitalist democracies' or, as is often the case, non-democracies (ibid., p.152). Seen in this fashion, corruption is a logical consequence of maladjusted legal framework that stipulates the need to streamline important economic activities. Concentrated capital ownership, for its part, is the way to ensure private property is not raided by criminal elements (see Alexeev and Weber, 2013, p.27).

A series of broad-brush observations by Shleifer and Treisman (2005) provoked lively discussion and further empirical investigations into the topic. Both Milanovic (2019) and Kornai (2016) agreed with the sustainability of illiberal capitalism as a model to rival democratic or 'liberal' capitalism found in the Western developed countries. Provided that democratic countries make up just 10% of the total population in the 47 post-socialist countries (with others being divided into dictatorships and authoritarian states), Russia appears to be swimming with the tide rather than against it (Kornai, 2016, p.576). Indeed, moves to limit economic and political freedom by non-Western countries could be seen as a response to their vulnerability to the influence of developed countries in a globalised economy (Milanovic, 2019; Epstein, 2014). Subject to the images of the wealthy lifestyles of Western countries, domestic populations do not thank their governments for earning more than yesterday but rather berate them for not earning as much as workers in Germany or the UK. At the same time, the double whammy of capital flight and brain drain undermines the long-term economic position of developing states (Milanovic, 2019, pp.160-165; Epstein, 2014). Indeed, a growing proportion of authors perceive those dynamics through the developmental lenses. Muscular governments are seen as the necessary instrument to promote development by overriding special interests, staving off instability and delivering on long-term agendas to get out of the middle-income trap (Epstein, 2014; Milanovic, 2019; Mau, 2020; Szakonyi, 2020).

Is the Russian post-communist history, then, just another story of catch-up economy? There are several factors that make Russia stand out among its peers in the developing world. One feature differentiating Russia from most upper middle-income developing countries is Moscow's global geopolitical ambitions. This may affect Russian trajectory of development by steering more resources into the military sphere and accentuating concerns stemming from the adverse effects of the 'global demonstration effect'. Moreover, a divide has emerged between Russia and post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of the both tightness of the links with the West and democratic freedoms. Arguably, the most relevant and ambitious attempt to explore the features of the Russian model of political economy was undertaken by Batinti and Kopstein (2021). Several observations stand out. On the empirical level, contemporary Russia is characterised by high levels of corruption, reasonable economic performance, political stability and average level of globalisation. From a historical perspective, Russia has been moving away from the Eastern European model represented by Poland and towards large developing economies such as Brazil or Turkey. From a comparative perspective, Batinti and Kopstein (2021, pp.9-11) conceptualise Russia as a rent-extracting regime that can coerce the economic agents into providing them with rents. This definition is contrasted with the rent-seeking model that 'emphasizes control over the 'gold' and profiteering' (ibid., p.10). In a brief section dedicated to how Russian extractive model evolved, the authors point to the centralised political institutions that Russian leadership inherited from the Soviet Union and that were rebuilt in its aftermath.

This research aims to fill the remaining blanks in the research of Russian political development. Works by Shleifer and Treisman (2005) and Batinti and Kopstein (2021) on the Russian model of political

economy are informative yet they can be improved upon. While the work by Shleifer captures big trends but lacks in-depth empirical data, Batinti and Kopstein (2021) do not provide an in-depth overview of the logic behind the Russian model of political economy. This investigation will both provide a case study of the emergence of the contemporary Russian political regime and explore its characteristics in a comparative perspective. For the case study, I will analyse changes in the Russian political regime through the prism of the 'developmental state' paradigm. For comparative investigation, I will build on the methodology employed by Batinti and Kopstein (2021). I will limit the sample the authors used in their research to developing countries and concentrated on political rather than economic variables.

Theoretical Premises

This research will perceive the behaviour of political elites through the prism of rational institutionalist perspective. There are many metrics that can be used to judge the performance of governments yet their ability to look after citizens' welfare is seen as the most important one. It is also an empirical fact that governments in some countries deliver better welfare for their citizens than others. One popular explanation of such differentiation relates to the 'inclusiveness' of institutions. Robison and Acemoglu (2012) differentiated between inclusive and extractive institutions. The former institutions are built with the purpose of maximizing the welfare of a broad range of the population. By contrast, the logic of extractive institutions entails the maximisation of the rents that the elites acquire at the expense of the population. This explanation, however, still leaves unanswered the causal mechanism behind the emergence of inclusive institutions in some countries. A more nuanced version of Robison and Acemoglu's argument was laid out in the 'selectorate theory' developed by de Mesquita and Smith (2005). Guided the logic of rational institutionalism, Mesquita and Smith argue that incentives of political leaders are affected by the relationship between the size of the group that can become part of the governing elite (selectorate) and the minimum number of individuals required for the leader to hold office (winning coalition). The larger the winning coalition is in relation to the selectorate, the stronger the incentive for the leader to produce more high-quality public goods. For example, military junta needs only to satisfy those maintaining order, while the systems of competitive elections stipulate that leader win the support of at least a quarter of adult individuals eligible to vote (in majoritarian systems like the UK or the US) and often close or more than a half (like in the case of direct presidential elections in France, for example). Leaders with lower W/S ratio keep their supporters on their toes and can exercise more discretion over the policy a particular country, while leaders with high W/S ratio face more pressure. It is an empirical fact that turnover of governments in democracies happen more often in autocracies.

Even if deriving the exact W/S ratio is complicatedⁱ, the logic behind the selectorate theory model is quite clear and has been found to generate valid predictive hypotheses about how states behave (see Kennedy, 2009; McGillivray & Smith, 2008). But what are the determinants of the expansion of the winning coalitions and why those coalitions grow faster some countries than in others? Is there the appropriate rate of the growth of the winning coalition or an increase in political rights? Can this growth accelerate too rapidly? In other words, why and how W/S ratios change or how states shift transition from inclusive to extractive polities or vice versa? The dynamics of political regime change are far from clear-cut. Representative democracy is the political regime prevalent in wealthy economies. Having said that, however, transition of the political regime to democracy – or the expansion of the winning coalition - provides no guarantee of achieving prosperity. To build sustainable democracy, the leadership needs to first establish the basis for material prosperity and cultivate civic institutions (Huntington, 2005; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). As Przeworski and Limongi (1993, pp.160-5) found, dictatorial regimes both at the bottom third of GDP per capita as well as those approaching the level of GDP per capita of developed countries are more prone to regime change than those with average

middle-income of level of GDP per capita. Yet being a developed country significantly increases the chances of democracy survival.

For Samuel Huntington (1968) and Waldner (1999), there is such thing as premature democratisation. According to Waldner (1999), broadening of the winning coalition may lead for the shortage of resources diverted to investment, with too much finances devoted to buying the loyalty of democratic constituents. Huntington, in his turn, was careful about warning that democracy was only feasible in states with adequate financial well-being, education and state capacity. Otherwise, unfettered access to elections may lead to the populist forces gaining support and the degree of 'governability' of the government will decrease to the point where no meaningful decisions can be taken (Huntington, 1968, pp.190-200). Huntington described this problem as 'political gap', whereby equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than "the art of associating together" (Huntington, 1968, pp.1-3). Put another way, extractive institutions can become inclusive when leaders use their discretion to invest the surplus they acquire in a welfare-enhancing manner that, in turn, creates a constituency pushing for political liberalisation. This logic entails some assumptions akin to the 'enlightened authoritarianism' argument. The process of transition, for its turn, is complicated, multi-faceted and contingent upon many variables. It is hence a fair point that a great share of research on the topic is done using the case study method (Waldner, 1998; Sakwa, 2011; Benschel, 2000).

This research will take into account three presuppositions. First, in line with the thesis of Mesquita and Smith (2005), political leaders will seek to earn as much discretion over their decisions in terms of using government revenues and implementing policies as possible. In terms of selectorate theory, this would mean limiting the winning coalition while maintain a sufficiently large share of selectorate large. Such a regime would also help insulate a given country's government from foreign pressure. The second contention relates to how leaderships tend to exercise their discretion. It is assumed that, having achieved certain level of security and wealth, countries will seek to achieve greater economic development. In the end of the day, economic power is the backbone of their influence and their safety. A set of political principles governing the behaviour of those states is often referred to as the 'developmental state' model. While the model is sometimes used to describe exclusively East Asian economies, this paper will define developmental state in a broad sense as the political regime, where i. reform initiatives emanate from the executive and bureaucrats who are isolated from political pressure; ii. the executive can be exempt from the rule of law; iii. government to a certain degree coordinates economic activity by steering resources into particular projects and helps domestic industry (Milanovic, 2019, pp. 95-6; Haggard, 2018, pp. 10-30). According to Haggard (2018, pp.7-10), the developmental model is characteristic of most states who have sought to catch up with the level of developed countries, including the US during the late 18-th and 19-th century. Strong state is seen as the way to overcome the collective action problem by making sure strategic industries have adequate information and support. Between 1960 and 2008, ten out of thirteen countries who turned from developing states into developed ones became democracies after a significant period of right-wing authoritarianism (Haggard, 2018, pp.59-60). Likewise, all but one country achieved (see the case study of the US by Benschel, 2000) industrialisation under the conditions of authoritarian state. Yet, of course, while the methods of the developmental state paradigm have been utilised by countries across the world, very few managed to put their economies on efficient footing that could yield high growth over consistent periods of time.

Finally, another cultural factor has to be taken into account is the role of ideology. As discussed above, political leaders are subject to incentives shaped by their institutional environments, namely, the relation between winning coalition and the selectorate as well as undirected spending. That said, rational institutional factors are not the only ones driving behaviour of particular leaders. They perceive the environment through the cognitive lenses that are the product of their culture, that is, a body of experience that a given state has accumulated throughout history (see North, 1990). This can be

imperial legacy, traditional rivalries, periods of instability or even personal experiences an individual was subject to. Put crudely, political leaders count with their interests as well as perceptions of how their counterparts behave. The trade-off between leaders' perceived interests and ideology shaped by experience and cultural environment results in the organisational decisions made by them (North, 1990, pp.22-23). Another way to conceptualise those theoretical presuppositions is through the analogy with Maslow's hierarchy. Having achieved security and built up capacity, national political elites would seek self-actualisation on the global arena. The goals the elites set for themselves depend on their ideology and how they perceive their goals.

Methods and Data

This research aims to investigate the logic behind the transformation of the Russian political regime in the post-Soviet era (1991-2015). In the first section, I will use the method of case study to assess the scale of Russian democratic backsliding and the rationale that Russian political leadership utilised to justify their measures. According to the developmental logic of democratic backsliding, Russian leadership would seek to constrain the access to the political milieu of rival forces, while simultaneously increasing control over economic resources. This should be accompanied by increasing state capacity and policies to build autonomous sources of economic growth. I will use measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, Freedom House Index and State Capacity dataset compiled by Hanson and Sigman (2020) to measure the level of democracy and state capacity in Russia during the post-Soviet period (1990-2015).

In the second section of the essay, I will compare characteristics of political economy of Russia with similar indicator of other large developing countries. I will include 16 countries in the sample. The states represent three regions (Europe, Asia and Latin America), have population greater than 10 million (the only exception being Hungary with 9,7 million) and are classified as upper middle-income countries (the exception is Ukraine). The sample is biased in favoured of European countries and Russia's neighbours yet entails examples from other continents as well. To measure political and socio-economic characteristics of developing countries, I will use following indicators: years: i. GDP per capita in constant prices ii. population iii. V-Dem polyarchy score iv. V-Dem liberal democracy score v. polity2 score vi. Freedom House political rights score vii. state capacity index viii. military spending per capita ix. manufacturing added value. This set of metrics should reflect the level of countries' political development as well as basic characteristics of economic development.

Logic of Russian political transformation

Russian post-Soviet political and economic transition has been analysed through various lenses. One popular narrative propagated by such authors as Edward Lucas (2008) this period as a missed chance for Russia to build democratic and transparent institutions, which then led to the oversecuritisation of political agenda and clash with the West. Authors like Alexander Auzan (2017) emphasize path-dependency viewed not in terms of the Cold War dynamic but in the context of Russian history and argue that it constrained the country's move in the direction of less stringent control over the political process. More economically-minded analysis offered by such observers as Vladimir Mau (2019, 2020) or Martin Gilman (2010) see Russian transition as a complicated problem that is complicated by a weak state and lack of institutionalised democracy. The problem, then, was not so much a lack of political will to achieve standards of liberal free-market democracy (although this played a role) but the lack of expertise, cadres and institutions. The economist Konstantin Remchukov (2002) and the political scientist David Szakonyi (2019) also point to the relative economic weakness of Russian economy to the West and its feeling of vulnerability due to unfavourable position in the global division of labour. Dissatisfied

in the blueprint that were recommended to Russia by the West, Moscow turned to the instruments of development tried by muscular states such as South Korea and Singapore.

Although not a revolution in traditional sense, the dissolution of the USSR entailed constitutional ramifications on a comparable scale. The most obvious consequence was the erosion of state capacity. According to the index of state capacity compiled by Hanson and Sigman (2020), the index for Russia declined from 0.546 in 1990 to -0.1243 in 1991. No such drop was experienced by other countries, with the highest rate of decline in state capacity being registered in Ukraine and Belarus. The economist Vladimirov Popov (2013, p.223) also used the crime rates as proxy to demonstrate the decline in state capacity. He observed that in 1987-2002 the murder rate incised from 8 to 33 per 100000 citizens. And while in state like China, transition to the market was accomplished by strong state institutions, in Russia the situation evolved in a more haphazard fashion. In Poland and Hungary, the forces of democratisation were married with the march for national independence and solidifying of sovereignty. In Russia, on the other hand, the breakdown of central authority was seen as the erosion of state capacity and the uprooting of normal life. The majority of Russians also spoke in favour of the USSR on the 1991 referendumⁱⁱ.

As the central political authority in the form of Communist Party dissipated, a political vacuum appeared and no structures were left in place to deliver reforms. Having won a public mandate in the 1991 vote, Boris Yeltsin was inaugurated as the first president. Enacting difficult economic policies became the race against time (Gaidar, 1996, pp. 55-70). In terms of cadres, in 1991-2 Yeltsin dismissed 44% of the heads of regions and districts (Kryshtanovskaya, 2006). Government was staffed by young reformers with high turnover of cadres. Thus, under Yeltsin the under-40 list of dismissed ministers included Nikolay Fyodorov (35 years), Peter Aven (37), Yegor Gaidar (38) and Sergey Sharhai (39). The pain of economic adjustment costs – supply shock and the negative consequences of the decision to lift price controls – kicked in before Russia had a working political constitution and had its political process in order. Between 1992 and 1993 Russian economy contracted by 14,5% GDP, the largest drop in the post-Soviet history (World Bank, 2020). Index of industrial production had been falling for three years beginning in 1990 before a slight recovery in 1993 (Popov, 2013). Put briefly, deep political and economic stagnation of the late Soviet period was followed by a period of instability and collapse of the Soviet system devoid of any cadre or economic resources to sustain itself.

1 Table. Metrics of Russian political model

		poli ty2	Electo ral demo cracy score	Freedom House rights score	Regime type	Lib. Dem. score	Polyarch y score	Eletoral barriers score	Opp. parties autonomy	Multi- party score	State capacity score
Wa ve 1	1991- 1994	3.7	4.3	6.25	limited multiparty	0.254	0.429	0.8615	0.00625	0.046	0.11735
Wa ve 2	1995– 1999	3	4	7	limited multiparty	0.2912	0.4668	1.149	0.0626	0.341333	0.063042
Wa ve 3	2000- 2004	6	6	5.2	limited multiparty	0.1898	0.3664	0.368	-0.2174	-0.077	0.53574
Wa ve 4	2005– 2009	4.8	5.4	6	limited multiparty	0.1494	0.3176	0.064	-0.415	-0.287	0.80566

Wave 5	2010–2015	4	5	5.333333	limited multiparty	0.127	0.289333	0.011167	-0.35167	-0.4405	0.71745
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The formation of new model of political economy in Russia is associated with three dimensions: business-political relations, constitutional structure and economics. The formation of the business-political nexus was foundational for the construction of the new Russian state. The concentration of business ownership increased between the start of privatisation process, which was largely completed by 1998, and the start of the 2000s. By 2003, companies producing 40% of Russian manufacturing output were owned by 20 largest business groups (Enikopolov and Stepanov, 2012, pp.391-2). In 2003, the ten richest families in Russia accounted for 60% of the stock market capitalization which is higher than in continental Europe (ibid.). The chief reason was the lack of clear rules of the game and risk of corporate raiding. All this made it pertinent for businesses to expand and seek protection from the government. On the other hand, the new political leadership headed by the President Vladimir Putin had interest in imposing control over the financial capital. This, coupled with the emergence of strong executive apparatus, helped rebuild the vestiges of political authority in Russia and safeguard the structural changes in the economy achieved during the period of economic reforms. The presence of radical rivals, something Huntington (1968) warned about, was still relevant in the presence of largely unreformed Communist Party and the populist LDPR party headed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Most reformist and pro-business forces, under those conditions, sided with the executive in power. The concentration of financial power and construction of the strong state apparatus ensured that the regime of Vladimir Putin could successfully reduce its winning coalition by suppressing veto points, including their Communist rivals (see Turchenko and Shevchuk, 2016).

This is the story that also reflects the quantitative parameters pertaining to Russian political situation and the semi-presidential system it promulgated. Since the adoption of Russian Constitution, the indexes of political and civil rights rose. The years 1998-2002 thus marked the heyday of political rights in Russia. Compared with the first wave of this analysis (1990-94), the second wave (1995-1999) saw an increase in the democracy, political rights and liberal democracy score. This can be explained by the consolidation of executive power without it yet having enough strength or motivation to try impose an all-encompassing control over the media or political process. By mid-2000s the Russian executive had largely completed its fomentation after the flux during the initial stage of the post-Soviet period. Among the ruling circles, too, there still remained a hope for Russia to become a version of Japan, where elections were held in a relatively unrestricted environment yet where the center-right Liberal Democratic party held the control over the executive for all but one term since the end of the Second World War (Pudovkin, 2019).

The third wave (2000-4) saw a slight decrease in the political rights score calculated by Freedom House, as well in the liberal democracy and polyarchy indexes compiled by the V-Dem database. That said, the fall was not sharp. Where a drop was more pronounced was in the more limited measures of the autonomy of political parties and their access to the political space. Slowly, the political leadership under Vladimir Putin began to take greater hold over political competition, restricting access to the electoral sphere. This meant curtailing media freedom and imposing restrictions on parties with ambitions to take part in elections. More pertinently, financial capital was concentrated in the hands of state-affiliated structures and loyal businessmen. This success at state-building was helped by the inflow of revenue from the sales of oil and gas that alleviated the financial travails Russian government faced with throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Oil revenues rose from 1,7% of GDP in 1998 to 14,5% in 2000 (World Bank, 2020; also see Appendix C).

The democratic backsliding became more prominent during the fourth and fifth waves of the timeframe investigated in this research. The decline in the standards of democracy and liberalism, as observed

using quantitative data, was of greater magnitude than between the second and the third waves. The polity2 score declined by 1.2 points. The polyarchy score declined by a third. Intensity of inter-party competition and the autonomy of political parties, too, worsened. There were a few examples that illustrate the migration of the political conflict in the electoral sphere into the competition for influence and policy entrepreneurship within the fresh iteration of the Politburo. A substantial chunk of the liberal-conservative Union of Right Forces party ended up taking executive positions in the Russian executive branch. Those included Konstantin Remchukov, Nikita Belykh and Sergei Kirienko. The latter became the head of the Presidential Administration. The LDPR party, a populist competitor to the United Russia, too, accepted its role as a competitor for internal influence within the Politburo rather than a competitor on the electoral market.

The fomentation of central apparatus in Russia saw the emergence of an authoritarian system that relies on both the formalised state apparatus (government ministries etc.) and informal networks. With regard to the former, Russian political settlement can be characterised as limited multiparty system, with the United Russia party dominating over the political process. This is in line with the characterisation made by Hadenius and Teorell (2007, p.147), who classified limited multiparty as the regime where formal competition is present but where one party controls the rules of the game. This was achieved not least through the enhancement of the powers of executive structures, namely the Presidential Administration and the Security Council. Created as analogues of the similar US bodies, Russian structures had morphed into executive bodies with wide-ranging powers but were not subject to electoral scrutiny. And while decisions are often taken in a personalist manner by the president, it is not helpful to negate the presence of institutions for multiparty competition, especially considering that, up until mid-2000s, the ruling United Russia party did face threats from other political forces. By mid-2000s the Russian leadership reached the status-quo where in it could maximise its discretion, while maintaining political competition among parties who were seen as not committed to undermining the state capacity. As for the informal networks, Russian executive relied upon the presidential administration and the business clans loosely embedded within the executive, including through the informal networks (Rodrik and Aiginger, 2019). Put together, this political construction could be described as a reconstructed Politburo, or Politburo 2.0 as one Russian political analyst described it (Minchenko, 2008). The political architecture for multi-party competition was still present but in a limited form and critical decisions involving channelling government expenditure was done without scrutiny from public authority.

Beyond the enhancement of Presidential Administration and Security Council, several reforms took place during the 2000s that solidified the role the central executive had on the country. First is the reform of the Federation Council that saw the removal of the regional governors and the selection of representative of the executives to their posts (Turchenko and Shevchuk, 2016, pp.211-214). This was done to limit the independence of local politicians who demanded concessions from the centre. The second change was electoral reform. These entailed changes introduced to the electoral system and to the electoral threshold that allowed parties to take seats in the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. In 2002 the threshold was increased to 7% and the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system was introduced to improve the chances for the ruling United Russia to gain the supermajority (Turchenko and Shevchuk, 2016, pp.213-216). The rules of the game have since been altered on several occasion, that is, more often than in most other democracies.

Reflecting the discourse analysis, it could be argued that two interrelated elements prompted Russia to push further in imposing its authoritarian control over the political process. Both pertain to the Russian leadership's relations with the West. First, despite reforms and opening, the Russian economy remained structurally weak compared to the West. By the end of 2000s the period of rapid convergence between Russia and Western countries was coming to an end. If in 1995-2010 Russia reduced the difference between the per capita level of GDP with Germany by 18%, since 2010 this difference remained approximately at the same level (World Bank, 2020). Macroeconomic stability and friendly political

relations with the West alone did not by itself lead to the improvement in economic fortunes Russian leadership expected. Western investment flowed into the economic sectors with the most certain chances of return such as retail, trade and oil and gas. Industrial capacity – a driver of productivity - did not rebound as expected. Integration with the West alone, therefore, did not allow Russian companies to become the rule-makers in technological sphere. Russian manufacturing value added was at a lower level than Turkey or Hungary (World Bank, 2020). Western investments flowed not in manufacturing, a key driver of convergence, but in retail and energy sectors (Domínguez-Jiménez and Poitiers, 2020, p.151). The windfall of revenues from oil and gas and economic development was spent on propping domestic consumption rather than on investments that could ensure export of sophisticated production (Kudrin and Gurvic, 2015, pp.31-2).

The 2008 financial crisis led to the most significant decline of the Russian GDP, thus becoming an additional reason that promoted Moscow to question its path of economic development. In his public statements following the financial crisis Vladimir Putin called for the creation of a more equitable economic model that will not be dominated by a single actor (the US) and where a stop will be put to the overconsumption and unipolarity of the global economic system that led to distorted asset prices and lack of transparency and coordination (see Putin, 2009a; 2009b)ⁱⁱⁱ. Already by the end of 2008, the Russian government [put forward](#) an ambitious plan that presented targets pertaining to the upgrade of infrastructure followed by the measures to arrest the ‘brain drain’ in 2011. There was also a move to create opportunities for the import-substitution in the ICT sector by switching public sector organisations to open-source software ^{iv}. In 2012 Putin, then acting as prime minister, published the programming article describing the contours of the new model of economic development where the state should be allotted a greater role in coordinating economic activity. The key aim stated by Putin was to overcome Russian position in the global division of labour that was formed during the Cold War. Having failed to accommodate to the Western economy, Russia would have to chart its own path and create its own technological foundations for sovereign development, Putin said.

Western liberalism, it turned out, was largely superficial as American companies did not allow products from developing countries to enter their markets because they did not meet their high standards. Nor was Russia allowed to adopt Western technologies. ‘During the crisis, our Russian companies tried to buy a number of assets abroad. As soon as it came to full-cycle technological production chains, even in the automotive industry, our Western partners immediately turned on the red light’, Putin lamented. Put simply, the Russian government could still hope that the country’s standards of living could be higher in ten years than they were today but the economic gap with the West would remain. There was a limit to what integration with the West could achieve and, beyond a certain point, Russian leadership switched from embracing integration to limiting the ‘international demonstration effect’ emanating from the economic and cultural proximity from the West. The three greatest manifestations of the ‘international demonstration effect’ include the outflow of the labour force, capital outflows (often in illegal manner) and public anger due to the inability of the leadership to deliver Western level of lifestyle.

Amplifying this dissatisfaction with the slackening pace of economic convergence was the breakdown in political relations with the West. One aspect of this breakdown is the inability of the West to incorporate Russia within its key institutions, primarily the EU. The admission requirements the EU put forward would have never been met by the Russian leadership as, in terms of Russian political realities, that would be concomitant with losing sovereignty. Russian military-economic power was greater than other post-Soviet Eastern European countries and so its divergence in political views with European leaders in Germany, the UK and France. So either the EU would have to bend its rules or Russian leadership would have to go through difficult political process that could have upset its political fortunes in an unpredictable way. Neither of those prospects appeared realistic. Second, Russia has been growing progressively impatient with the conduct of the US. While the US emphasised the dichotomy between

democracy and autocracy, Russia looked at the regimes in developing countries through the prism of the dichotomy between statehood and failed state. Put another way, the US put countries on the democracy-autocracy scale, while Russia used the state capacity metric. For the reasons of ignorance or deceit, the leadership in Moscow believed, the US is destabilising entire countries across the world, does so in a unilateral manner and there is no guarantee that Russia will be spared. This disagreement, including over the NATO expansion, essentially rendered any tight Russia-NATO partnership impossible. Russia sought a status of a veto power in global affairs, while the US and its allies considered those demands to be in excess of Russian power. The conflict in Ukraine led to economic restrictions imposed by the West and to the Russian retaliation. Put together, those factors accentuated the features of developmental state in Russia. The regime put greater premium on the values of macroeconomic stability, the role of the government and circular economy.

Overall, several trends can be discerned by following the data related to the evolution of Russian political milieu in 1991-2015. First, a destruction of the Soviet state apparatus, whose reconstitution took several years and which made peace with the capitalist system which entailed production for profit, market-set prices, free wage labour and privately-owned capital. Having said that, Russian elites were defensive about threats to its state capacity and any potential instability. Accordingly, the fomentation of the Russian political regime throughout 2000s was associated with its greater and more discretionary use of executive powers that limited the potential for the development of genuine competitive multiparty system. This defensive mindset – aggravated with the rivalry with the West – led to the most conspicuous period of democratisation backsliding after 2012. Hence, two factors affecting the trajectory of Russian political model can be ascribed to factors beyond the traditional understanding of developmental state and political gap (Huntington, 1968). One is the abundance of natural resource rents (see Appendix C) that allowed the authorities to consolidate their grip on the country's finances and gave them confidence in pursuing their policies. Another is, as mentioned, the confrontation against the West that helped shape the outlook of Russian domestic policies.

What kind of authoritarianism in Russia?

To put the development of Russian political model in comparative perspective, it is worth setting its quantitative characteristics against the metrics of other developing countries. For the template of the analysis, I will use the approach adopted by Batinti and Kopstein (2021) in their research on Russian model of political economy. For my research, I have chosen 16 countries to be included in the sample: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam. Nine (scaled) indicators will be used in the analysis: i. GDP per capita in constant prices (\$ 2015 prices). ii. population iii. V-Dem polyarchy score iv. V-Dem liberal democracy score v. polity2 score vi. Freedom House political rights score vii. state capacity index viii. military spending per capita (log) ix. manufacturing added value. Those parameters comprise a versatile range of measures concerning democratisation, while also capturing basic measures related to economic situation in a given country such as GDP per capita and manufacturing added value. The change in parameters observed throughout four waves: wave 1 (1995-9); wave 2 (2000-4); wave 3 (2005-9); wave 4 (2010-15). I will use the hierarchical clustering method using Ward's method that measures the variance of clusters taking into account the sum of squares. The y-axis (the height) represents the value of the distance between clusters or the total within-cluster error sum of squares. The x-axis represents how closely the pair of countries are associated. Dynamics of change within the parameters of individual variables can be found at Appendix C.

As seen on the dendrograms (Figure 1), in the first wave Russian model bore the greatest affinity with large developing countries like Turkey, Venezuela and Mexico rather than with post-socialist European countries such as Hungary and Poland. This pattern is maintained throughout all the waves. During

second wave (2000-4), the distance between Russia and Ukraine becomes closer and Russia's indicators for democracy moves closer to the average value observed in the sample and to the level of more politically free countries like Ukraine. Yet in waves 3 and 4 (2004-2015) distance between Russia and Ukraine grew and it fell into the same basket with Turkey and Venezuela. In wave 4 Russia also shortened the distance with China. This generally confirms the conclusion made by Batinti and Kopstein (2021) that over time the distance between Russia and other post-Soviet countries grew larger and its model.


The quantitative data also provides an opportunity to tackle the question of Russian 'normalcy'. At the time of Treisman and Schleifer's (2005) writing, Russia indeed appeared as a normal country. Russia's level of democratisation judged by polity2 score, polyarchy score and Freedom House political rights score was close to the average in the sample studied here. The shape of Russian political regime bore some resemblance to the regimes in Southern Europe or Japan during the initial stage of the post-war integration with the West. Moreover, despite Russia being far from the exemplary democracy - or having fine-tuned bureaucratic apparatus – followed a rather pro-Western geopolitical orientation. Foreign capital was welcomed and even the US-led military operation in Iraq, while viewed critically, did not lead to the breakdown in relations. Instead, Russia felt more affinity with European position on the issue rather than with the American stance but the belonging to the Western camp was out of question (The Guardian, 2003). By that time, Russia, warts and all, could still be reliably considered as a typical developing capitalist regime. Trade and investment links with the West strengthened, while the political leadership embarked on the ambition to catch up with the West sticking to the Washington consensus policy of creating suitable conditions for attracting foreign capital as a key driver for the economy (Putin, 2001).

However, in wave 3 and 4 Russian regime took more steps towards authoritarianism. While the average score across dimensions of democratisation remained stable, Russia along with Turkey and Venezuela showed weakening of political rights. As seen in the Figure 2, Russian standards of democracy began to weaken even as its economic growth or state capacity did not show signs of deterioration. The magnitude of this change is significant enough to warrant a hypothesis that Russian level of democracy was not on par with what one could expect from a country with such level of economic development, especially from the country that had tight cultural links with Western Europe. At the same time, it has to be emphasised that indicators for Russia are not complete outliers. The values of Russian z-scores for polity2, liberal democracy index (V-Dem) and polyarchy (V-Dem) have z-scores that approximate the corresponding values for Turkey (see Appendix D). Moreover, according to the metrics studied, Russia is still considerably more democratic than China.

Discussion and conclusion

The third wave of democratization that swept the countries of the former communist bloc is considered to be the crowning success of the liberal model of development. The partial rollback of this wave raised the age-old question of causation – is Russia the way it is because its regime is evil or incompetent, or the formerly liberal Putin has changed because of conditions in the country. The analysis above demonstrate that the answer is, of course, complicated. The attempts of Russia – and, increasingly, other countries on the European semi periphery (see Schneider, 2019) - to construct a distorted model of the "developmental state" indicate that the problem is deeper than the simple madness of individual politicians. Rising prosperity and integration of Eastern European countries with the West led to an increase in the appetites of the population for wealth, and the leaders could not meet those requirements in the current economic conditions.

2 Figure 1. Clustering analysis




Indicators:


GDP per capita (\$2015 constant prices) 2. Population (in millions) 3. Polity2 (-10 (total autocracy) and 10 (total democracy)) 4. Freedom House political rights index (1 (most free) –7 (least free)) 5. Liberal democracy score (0-1, 1 being the most liberal-democratic country). 6. polyarchy score (0-1, 1 being the most pluralistic country) 7. State capacity (0-1, 1 being greatest capacity) 8. Military expenditure per capita (log) 9. Manufacturing added value (% of GDP)

3 Figure 2. Change in certain variables*


GDP




Political rights score




Polity2




Liberal democracy score



State Capacity



Military expenditure per capita (log)



*Blue line – value of variables for Russia (for each wave)

Orange line – average value across 16 countries in the sample (for each wave)

The inability to compete with the West creates a demand for an authoritarian model that can limit the outflow of capital and skilled labour, mobilize resources for the development of promising industries, and build a more closed and stable political system. Having said that, Russia demonstrates features of authoritarianism and resource-dominated model of economic growth to a greater extent than other developing countries, including in the post-Soviet states. Despite a decade of attempts to kickstart industrial development in Russia, its manufacturing added value is still lower than in Hungary, Turkey or China. At the same time, the level of political freedoms in Russia is lower than the average value of indicators in countries with comparable or lower level of economic development. The current period of acute tensions with the West would likely lead to an even greater political authoritarianism and the transition of Russian political model towards the Politburo with a greater affinity with the Chinese model rather than the present-day halfway house, where the vestiges of multi-party system remain.

Despite sanctions imposed on Russia and its economic travails, there are no indicators that war against Ukraine or economic pressure will lead to regime change in Moscow. According to the analysis by Attia et al (2020, pp.9-12), authoritarian political systems with GDP per capita at \$7-10 thousand have a very significant chance of withstanding sanctions without agreeing to the terms of a sender country. As Mesquita et al (2005) and Przeworski (1993) also demonstrated, authoritarian regimes with a comparatively high level of GDP per capita survive longest in office. Russia's GDP per capita stands at around \$11,000, which leaves Russia a significant leeway in terms of facing further hardship while non-urban population would be unlikely to demonstrate signs of unrest as its style of living was not high enough in the first place. That said, while the question of the survival of Russian leadership does not appear in question, Russian developmental prospects are cloudier. Just about ten managed to break into the niche of high-income countries by 2008. In addition to the four Asian tigers and Japan, this list includes Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Israel, as well as Mauritius, Puerto Rico and Equatorial Guinea (subsequently removed from this list). Almost all of the states on the list went through a stage of right-wing authoritarianism, gradually moving towards an open political system and a liberal market. Also crucially, they were also assisted by the political union with the source of innovation in the West. For Russia, this condition will be hard to fulfil. Breaking middle-income trap requires a combination of several factors at once - the qualifications of officials, access to Western markets, international financial support, and finally, luck. Even the rotation of leading companies in the industries of a particular country happens infrequently, so what about the change in the economic primacy of entire states on a regional or global scale? In the history of the world economy, stagnation, wasted funds, and crises have happened much more often than miracles like Singapore.

The most beneficial scenario for Russia in the long-term would be its "Italization", when, after the strengthening of state institutions and the industrial base, the semi-periphery will be able to gradually abandon autocratic tendencies. Any "development state" faces a contradiction when the political regime needs to simultaneously create a political and economic elite that plays by its own rules and makes strategic decisions, the Politburo of sorts. In the end of the day, someone needs to carry out reforms, collect taxes and enforce laws where it does not contradict the interests of political insiders. Otherwise, the provision of basics such as food and economic security will be put under threat and it will be not the urban middle classes in seek of political freedoms who will come out in protest but the hungry workers. Over time, bureaucracy and business get tired of such schizophrenia. As the economy develops, the threat of radical forces coming to power decreases, the need to freeze processes within the political system goes down, and the bureaucracy and business begin to support the liberal democratic forces. If this logic is applied to Russia, then the strengthening of the state apparatus and the formation of a stable capitalist class can lead to an increase in the demand for the rule of law and the restriction of autocratic tyranny. The result will be a corrupt, poor, but quite functioning democracy like Italy and Spain.

At the same time, it is now more difficult for Russia to catch up with Western Europe than for Italy or Spain after World War II. Firstly, then the 'southerners' lagged behind West Germany in the 1960s less in terms of per capita GDP than the lag between Russia and Germany now. Secondly, it was easier for the authorities of Italy or Spain to control the situation inside the country, given the low integration of the information space and limited opportunities for capital migration. Finally, it was easier for developing countries to catch up with the West after the Second World War than in the era of high technologies, which requires additional investments from the "semi-periphery" and higher management skills.

The story behind the development of the Russian political model bears both similarities and differences to the 'developmental' explanation. This point of view, advanced by Szakonyi (2019), sees Russia as seeking to develop muscular executive institutions to avoid the political gap akin to the one described by Huntington (1968) and build foundations for the sovereign economic development. The emergence of many authoritarian features of the Russian political regime seems to fit the bill of this model. Its state capacity increased steadily as the quality of democracy declined, while overcoming the unfavourable global division of labour became Russian leadership's chief preoccupation. Having said that, Russia is different in several ways. First, Russia experienced more traumatic period during the 1990s than many of its neighbours or other developing countries. Second, Russia positioned itself as a separate pole in on a geopolitical map that got it involved with altercation with the West, a source of economic innovation and managerial 'best practices'. Just like the USSR was not a typical developing country, being engaged in global space and military race, so has Russia inherited this ambition for geopolitical grandeur. Thus, Russia can to large extent be categorised by a failed developmental state, with the failure to be attributed to the failed integration to the Western model and inability to transition away from the resource-based economy.

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Appendix A

Data for Russia (1990-2015)

COUNTRY	YEAR	POLITY2	DEMOCR	POLITICAL RIGHTS	REGIME	LIBDEM (V2X_LIBDEM)	POLYARCHY	EL. BARRIERS (V2PSBARS)	OPPOSITION PARTIES AUTONOMY (V2PSOPPAUT)
RUSSIA	1990			6		0.093	0.237	-0.307	-0.594
RUSSIA	1991			6		0.126	0.254	-0.001	-0.056
RUSSIA	1992	5	5	6	limited multiparty	0.301	0.504	1.149	0.027
RUSSIA	1993	3	4	6	limited multiparty	0.293	0.48	1.149	0.027
RUSSIA	1994	3	4	7	limited multiparty	0.296	0.478	1.149	0.027

RUSSIA	1995	3	4	7	limited multipar ty	0.301	0.479	1.149	0.027
RUSSIA	1996	3	4	7	limited multipar ty	0.296	0.468	1.149	0.027
RUSSIA	1997	3	4	7	limited multipar ty	0.289	0.462	1.149	0.027
RUSSIA	1998	3	4	7	limited multipar ty	0.285	0.462	1.149	0.027
RUSSIA	1999	3	4	7	limited multipar ty	0.285	0.463	1.149	0.205
RUSSIA	2000	6	6	6	limited multipar ty	0.228	0.415	0.962	0.147
RUSSIA	2001	6	6	5	limited multipar ty	0.209	0.382	0.598	0.011
RUSSIA	2002	6	6	5	limited multipar ty	0.181	0.36	0.108	-0.415
RUSSIA	2003	6	6	5	limited multipar ty	0.171	0.349	0.108	-0.415
RUSSIA	2004	6	6	5	limited multipar ty	0.16	0.326	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2005	6	6	6	limited multipar ty	0.156	0.326	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2006	6	6	6	limited multipar ty	0.154	0.322	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2007	4	5	6	limited multipar ty	0.15	0.321	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2008	4	5	6	limited multipar ty	0.143	0.307	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2009	4	5	6	limited multipar ty	0.144	0.312	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2010	4	5	6	limited multipar ty	0.14	0.31	0.064	-0.415
RUSSIA	2011	4	5	5	limited multipar ty	0.14	0.309	-0.038	-0.415
RUSSIA	2012	4	5	5	limited multipar ty	0.131	0.292	0.076	-0.296
RUSSIA	2013	4	5	5	limited multipar ty	0.121	0.281	0.027	-0.328
RUSSIA	2014	4	5	5	limited multipar ty	0.116	0.273	-0.031	-0.328
RUSSIA	2015	4	5	6	limited multipar ty	0.114	0.271	-0.031	-0.328

Appendix B

Table with data for clusters

code	country	region	wave	years	gdppc	pop	polyarchy	polity2	political rights	libdem	Militarypercapita	state capacity	mva
ARG	Argentina	South America	1	1995 – 1999	10792.34	36100.54354	0.8322	7	2.2	0.629	4.58919	1.03864	17.56197
ARG	Argentina	South America	2	2000-2004	9967.804	38136.80556	0.8274	8	2.2	0.6606	3.930704	0.86356	18.87181
ARG	Argentina	South America	3	2005 – 2009	12358.2	40148.19785	0.7958	8	2	0.6282	4.063333	0.91966	17.07755
ARG	Argentina	South America	4	2010 – 2015	13845.96	42422.80457	0.7815	8	2	0.605667	4.697712	0.861033	15.1463
BGD	Bangladesh	South Asia	1	1995 – 1999	601.5716	128059.4946	0.5098	6	2.4	0.2832	1.889669	-0.1491	14.65427
BGD	Bangladesh	South Asia	2	2000-2004	691.1426	139513.436	0.4866	6	3.6	0.26	1.866119	-0.33422	14.22373
BGD	Bangladesh	South Asia	3	2005 – 2009	852.7662	148989.0996	0.3418	1	4	0.1756	2.042301	-0.09885	15.71804
BGD	Bangladesh	South Asia	4	2010 – 2015	1106.422	158218.379	0.366333	3.5	3.333333	0.157667	2.671255	-0.07117	16.3126
BR A	Brazil	Latin America & Caribbean	1	1995 – 1999	6642.004	168817.6325	0.8594	8	2.6	0.7336	4.380373	0.91642	13.01835
BR A	Brazil	Latin America & Caribbean	2	2000-2004	6916.654	181248.993	0.8646	8	2.4	0.7432	4.035179	0.80082	13.62629
BR A	Brazil	Latin America & Caribbean	3	2005 – 2009	7855.537	192333.4659	0.8746	8	2	0.7836	4.643953	0.96998	14.00323
BR A	Brazil	Latin America & Caribbean	4	2010 – 2015	9000.166	202470.8505	0.876333	8	2	0.789333	5.089128	0.839933	11.08654
CH N	China	East Asia & Pacific	1	1995 – 1999	1781.809	1226565.342	0.1008	-7	7	0.0532	2.624163	0.6471	12
CH N	China	East Asia & Pacific	2	2000-2004	2594.07	1274928.336	0.1012	-7	7	0.0564	3.211445	0.66198	31.97507
CH N	China	East Asia & Pacific	3	2005 – 2009	4270.205	1311758.081	0.094	-7	7	0.0554	3.958717	0.65016	32.12905


CH N	China	East Asia & Pacific	4	2010 – 2015	6832 .835	20247 0.8505	0.08 95	-7	7	0.05 3167	4.780737	0.7178 33	30.8 7089
HN G	Hung ary	Europe	1	1995 – 1999	8035 .93	10284. 8653	0.85 38	10	1	0.76 58	4.146861	1.9902	19.0 6206
HN G	Hung ary	Europe	2	2000- 2004	9842 .712	10156. 70408	0.85 3	10	1	0.76 46	4.666063	1.8172	18.8 7309
HN G	Hung ary	Europe	3	2005 – 2009	1158 6.21	10052. 96518	0.85 4	10	1	0.76 74	5.089028	1.6764	18.6 2586
HN G	Hung ary	Europe	4	2010 – 2015	1183 4.74	9911.6 1455	0.73 25	10	1.33 3333	0.59 2	4.882605	1.5385	18.8 8607
IDN	Indon esia	East Asia & Pacific	1	1995 – 1999	1945 .766	20165 3.5909	0.28 04	-4	2.4	0.11 7	2.352125	- 0.0358 6	25.5 0666
IDN	Indon esia	East Asia & Pacific	2	2000- 2004	1977 .709	21750 2.5048	0.69 62	6.4	2	0.52 58	2.067449	0.2550 8	28.3 3726
IDN	Indon esia	East Asia & Pacific	3	2005 – 2009	2400 .031	23209 3.7545	0.71 34	8	2	0.54 06	2.597879	0.5977 6	27.2 3265
IDN	Indon esia	East Asia & Pacific	4	2010 – 2015	3033 .92	24668 5.3312	0.68 3667	8.33 3333	2	0.52 8167	3.30249	0.6160 17	21.3 9002
IND	India	South Asia	1	1995 – 1999	674. 9497	95587 8.2482	0.75 56	9	6.2	0.60 72	2.508691	0.3750 2	16.5 7612
IND	India	South Asia	2	2000- 2004	815. 5806	10413 02.064	0.74 06	9	3	0.59 58	2.744473	0.5745 6	15.6 4148
IND	India	South Asia	3	2005 – 2009	1059 .953	11251 67.307	0.73 08	9	2	0.58 58	3.234759	0.7586 6	16.8 767
IND	India	South Asia	4	2010 – 2015	1401 .453	12139 16.24	0.67 6333	9	2	0.54 5333	3.670842	0.7676 5	15.8 1477
KA Z Kaz ak hstan	Kazak hstan	Europe & Central Asia	1	1995 – 1999	3861 .914	15685. 30301	0.28 8	-4	6	0.14 62	2.658047	0.1426 46	13.4 6044
KA Z Kaz ak hstan	Kazak hstan	Europe & Central Asia	2	2000- 2004	5535 .897	15464. 06416	0.25 58	-5.2	6	0.13 04	2.888458	0.4513 6	14.9 9423
KA Z Kaz ak hstan	Kazak hstan	Europe & Central Asia	3	2005 – 2009	8094 .689	16105. 65545	0.24 26	-6	6	0.12 86	4.214082	0.8609 4	11.5 623
KA Z Kaz ak hstan	Kazak hstan	Europe & Central Asia	4	2010 – 2015	9937 .312	17229. 68917	0.23 5667	-6	6	0.12 1333	4.799734	0.8113 17	10.7 8622
ME X	Mexic o	Americas	1	1995 – 1999	8070 .761	94751. 99067	0.55 02	5.2	3.4	0.33 54	3.134043	0.7466 2	19.7 9091
ME X	Mexic o	Americas	2	2000- 2004	8706 .83	10086 6.0857	0.68 64	8	2	0.48 5	3.432849	0.7228 4	17.5 1506

ME X	Mexic o	Americas	3	2005 – 2009	8997 .006	10718 4.2115	0.66 26	8	2	0.47 14	3.576206	0.6867 4	15.8 4917
ME X	Mexic o	Americas	4	2010 – 2015	9260 .181	11477 6.5541	0.63 9	8	3	0.43 8833	3.906237	0.6696 67	16.0 2814
PA K	Pakist an	South Asia	1	1995 – 1999	1012 .574	10718 4.2115	0.36 74	4.8	4.4	0.19 5	3.282748	- 0.0946 6	14.5 7646
PA K	Pakist an	South Asia	2	2000- 2004	1062 .317	13470 1.2548	0.28 32	-5.4	6	0.14 7	3.155127	0.0093 58	10.8 1417
PA K	Pakist an	South Asia	3	2005 – 2009	1224 .872	15411 1.1437	0.38 46	0.4	5.2	0.20 8	3.441467	0.2086	13.2 8752
PA K	Pakist an	South Asia	4	2010 – 2015	1286 .111	17285 9.8268	0.45 4	6.5	4	0.26 95	3.719699	0.0257 54	13.4 7057
PO L	Polan d	Europe & Central Asia	1	1995 – 1999	6318 .322	38647. 30065	0.88 26	9	1	0.80 56	4.410365	1.4724	17.8 9533
PO L	Polan d	Europe & Central Asia	2	2000- 2004	7713 .67	38623. 42819	0.88 02	9.6	1	0.80 74	4.617876	1.243	15.3 7008
PO L	Polan d	Europe & Central Asia	3	2005 – 2009	9602 .462	38524. 11168	0.88 34	10	1	0.81 36	5.289448	1.4434	16.2 1202
PO L	Polan d	Europe & Central Asia	4	2010 – 2015	1167 3.57	38431. 26509	0.88 75	10	1	0.81 95	5.519855	1.4165	16.1 2675
RU S	Russi a	Europe & Central Asia	1	1995 – 1999	4728 .944	14743 4.1907	0.46 68	3	3.4	0.29 12	4.349736	0.0630 42	10
RU S	Russi a	Europe & Central Asia	2	2000- 2004	6015 .98	14460 0.4529	0.36 64	6	5.2	0.18 98	4.578134	0.5357 4	14.9 2576
RU S	Russi a	Europe & Central Asia	3	2005 – 2009	8277 .844	14254 4.9951	0.31 76	4.8	6	0.14 94	5.664655	0.8056 6	14.7 8344
RU S	Russi a	Europe & Central Asia	4	2010 – 2015	9301 .788	14396 5.19	0.28 9333	4	6	0.12 7	6.245458	0.7174 5	11.7 4627
RU S	Turke y	Europe	1	1995 – 1999	6220 .024	64,580	0.56 38	3	6.35	0.39 92	4.855584	1.0070 8	21.5 0821
RU S	Turke y	Europe	2	2000- 2004	6566 .337	69,634	0.64 34	6	6.91 6666	0.48 3	4.978814	1.1312	17.4 8251
TU R	Turke y	Europe	3	2005 – 2009	8157 .918	74,100	0.62 275	4.8	7.58 3333	0.47 62	5.342841	1.3188	16.4 3802
TU R	Turke y	Europe	4	2010 – 2015	9859 .861	79,891	0.49 3333	4	7.43 3333	0.33 1333	5.441964	1.2376 67	16.1 8069
UK R	Ukrai ne	Europe & Central Asia	1	1995 – 1999	1366 .897	50372. 992	0.50 74	7	3	0.30 18	2.960683	0.2845	27.1 0471

UK R	Ukrai ne	Europe & Central Asia	2	2000- 2004	1708 .097	48128. 6274	0.38 3	6	4	0.25 08	3.005271	0.5018 8	17.1 4134
UK R	Ukrai ne	Europe & Central Asia	3	2005 – 2009	2361 .736	46440. 2254	0.57 38	6.8	3	0.38 22	3.962087	0.6213 8	17.1 7299
UK R	Ukrai ne	Europe & Central Asia	4	2010 – 2015	2360 .366	45270. 8565	0.45 5167	5.33 3334	3.5	0.25 1167	4.135215	0.6995 83	12.0 604
VE N	Venez uela	South America	1	1995 – 1999	3697 .706	22358. 8494	0.74 38	8	2.6	0.58 12	4.002473	0.3069	16.8 1271
VE N	Venez uela	South America	2	2000- 2004	4225 .581	24452. 81702	0.52 02	6	3	0.26 74	4.035164	0.0870 24	17.1 0657
VE N	Venez uela	South America	3	2005 – 2009	8798 .134	26627. 87342	0.44 86	4	4.2	0.16 6	4.98509	0.3449 8	13.7 5756
VE N	Venez uela	South America	4	2010 – 2015	1372 2.7	28902. 27866	0.36 9833	1	5	0.13 2	4.451449	0.0521 03	11.7 8
VN M	Vietn am	East Asia & Pacific	1	1995 – 1999	826. 8024	76034. 18642	0.15 26	-7	7	0.09 12	2.582901	0.2615 6	16.2 9967
VN M	Vietn am	East Asia & Pacific	2	2000- 2004	1067 .648	81288. 6044	0.14 98	-7	7	0.09 9	3.009612	0.3852 2	19.8 4572
VN M	Vietn am	East Asia & Pacific	3	2005 – 2009	1423 .66	86541. 51983	0.14 94	-7	7	0.11 62	3.011405	0.4919 2	18.8 9302
VN M	Vietn am	East Asia & Pacific	4	2010 – 2015	1855 .071	92015. 02243	0.20 2	-7	7	0.13 4667	3.671928	0.6382 17	13.2 9906

Appendix C

Countries by resource rents



Source: World Bank data

Appendix D

Z-scores table (z-score for each country for each variable). Z-scores demonstrate how many standard deviations the values of each country's variables related to democratic standards are away from the mean. Tables below include each country in the sample and accounts for the four variables from PolityIV and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) datasets that are the most reputable sources of the information on democratic standards.

Wave 1

country	polyarchy	libdem	polity2
Argentina	1.112195	0.912076	0.580885
Bangladesh	-0.13485	-0.44148	0.409406
Brazil	1.217405	1.321509	0.752363
China	-1.71686	-1.34177	-1.81982
Hungary	1.195744	1.447549	1.095321
Indonesia	-1.02217	-1.09203	-1.30538
India	0.815906	0.826745	0.923842
Kazakhstan	-0.99277	-0.97774	-1.30538
Mexico	0.021419	-0.23716	0.272223
Pakistan	-0.68565	-0.78672	0.203631
Poland	1.307142	1.603337	0.923842
Russia	-0.30117	-0.41017	-0.10503
Turkey	0.074024	0.012575	-0.10503
Ukraine	-0.14413	-0.36868	0.580885
Venezuela	0.770264	0.724973	0.718068
Vietnam	-1.5165	-1.19302	-1.81982

Wave 2

country	polyarchy	libdem	polity2
Argentina	1.064449	0.992485	0.635554
Bangladesh	-0.22526	-0.5578	0.314517
Brazil	1.205228	1.312139	0.635554
China	-1.68376	-1.34571	-1.77223
Hungary	1.161329	1.394955	0.956592
Indonesia	0.567939	0.470822	0.378724
India	0.735966	0.741715	0.796073
Kazakhstan	-1.0987	-1.05934	-1.48329
Mexico	0.530853	0.31293	0.635554
Pakistan	-0.99501	-0.9951	-1.5154
Poland	1.264264	1.560587	0.892384
Russia	-0.68015	-0.82947	0.314517
Turkey	0.368125	0.30519	0.314517
Ukraine	-0.61733	-0.5934	0.314517
Venezuela	-0.09811	-0.52916	0.354646
Vietnam	-1.49984	-1.18085	-1.77223

Wave 3

county	polyarchy	libdem	polity2
Argentina	0.957625	0.851793	0.68711
Bangladesh	-0.7629	-0.86021	-0.486
Brazil	1.256255	1.439608	0.68711
China	-1.702	-1.31488	-1.82671
Hungary	1.178186	1.37833	1.022286
Indonesia	0.645353	0.520438	0.68711
India	0.711294	0.691411	0.854698
Kazakhstan	-1.13884	-1.03799	-1.65912
Mexico	0.452835	0.258682	0.68711
Pakistan	-0.60071	-0.73765	-0.58656
Poland	1.289604	1.553086	1.022286
Russia	-0.85462	-0.95931	0.150829
Turkey	0.301815	0.276839	0.150829
Ukraine	0.116309	-0.07873	0.486005
Venezuela	-0.35816	-0.89652	-0.05028
Vietnam	-1.49205	-1.0849	-1.82671

Wave 4

county	polyarchy	libdem	polity2
Argentina	1.080218	0.943595	0.663028
Bangladesh	-0.59945	-0.83914	-0.09673
Brazil	1.463891	1.674463	0.663028
China	-1.71945	-1.25498	-1.86949
Hungary	0.881976	0.889211	1.000697
Indonesia	0.684408	0.635198	0.719306
India	0.654739	0.70351	0.831863
Kazakhstan	-1.12809	-0.98372	-1.70066
Mexico	0.503697	0.279713	0.663028
Pakistan	-0.24477	-0.39412	0.409776
Poland	1.509068	1.794506	1.000697
Russia	-0.91097	-0.96117	-0.01231
Turkey	-0.08564	-0.14806	-0.01231
Ukraine	-0.24005	-0.46707	0.212802
Venezuela	-0.58529	-0.94127	-0.60323
Vietnam	-1.2643	-0.93066	-1.86949

ⁱThe measurements concerning the estimation of the winning coalition, in particular, may be imprecise. The proxies for the size of the winning coalition are the type of regimes as defined by the Polity datasets. Thus, juntas tend to have lower winning coalition size than civilian regimes. Yet there may be a differences in the sizes of winning coalition among regimes of the same category (eg. Between military regimes or civilian autocracies).

ⁱⁱYeltsin Archins, <https://yeltsin.ru/archive/periodic/54027/>

ⁱⁱⁱ <https://ria.ru/20090129/160410501.html> ; <https://www.reuters.com/article/orutp-putin-economy-idRUMSE5350U720090406>

^{iv} <https://www.bfm.ru/news/152089> https://www.cnews.ru/news/top/putin_rasporyadilsya_perevesti_vlasti