ONCE UPON A TIME… A SMOKE SCREEN OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE, A FAIRY TALE FOR THE DOMESTIC AUDIENCE OR WHAT?

De-Europeanization discourses and characters employed (or not) by the Polish governing party

By
Piotr Rodewald

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Supervisor: Professor Inna Melnykovska

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Abstract

In Poland, the 2015 formation of a new government by the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) party has resulted in a changing political reality, both at the domestic and the international level. Institutional reforms marking democratic backsliding have been accompanied by changes in political discourses. In fact, there is a puzzling variety of political discourses present. On the face of it, these new discourses appear to be used inconsistently, and in foreign policy discourses there is only anecdotal evidence of de-Europeanization, which is regarded as a parallel process linked to democratic backsliding. Analysing selected official documents and speeches of Polish government and officials, the study disentangles these different discourses along sovereignty, economic, and conservative/religious frames and highlights the roles of the EU, Polish government and people through the theoretical lens of the Hero, Villain and Victim triad.

This study illustrates that within the domestic context, de-Europeanization of discourses happens mostly by sovereignty and conservative/religious frames. It does not happen at all within the context of specific EU-related and international projects. Moreover, discourses present in official documents, paradoxically and arguably, not necessarily intended for a broad domestic audience, differ from those present in speeches, statements, due to different proportions of frames used and lower intensity of language. The dramatic triad of Hero, Villain and Victim is not present in narratives related to specific European projects that Poland was previously engaged in but tries to disentangle itself from. The triad, however, is heavily present in narratives created for domestic purposes. This arguably shows that the actual addressee(s) of these discourses are not the political domestic or foreign actors that are mentioned in them and are present in the dramatic triangle at the domestic stage (for instance,

the EU), but rather Polish society itself. The purpose, therefore, is clearly to boost support for the ruling party especially in the critical moments. The triad is also not present in Polish Foreign Policy Strategy (PFPS) and only mildly in 2015 PiS Manifesto, what is revealing on its own. Overall, discourses in domestic and international domains are disjoined. The findings of the study contribute to contemporary knowledge on machinery applied by illiberal regimes seeking to legitimate their ruling, among others through discursive de-Europeanization. Additionally, it demonstrates disjuncture between domestic and international domains, which is widely assumed by International Relations and Europeanization research.

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Abbreviation	Meaning
ACT	Affective Control Theory
AKP	The Justice and Development Party
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CETA	Canada-EU Trade Agreement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
PDA	Political Discourse Analysis
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CT	Character Theory
DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
DV	Dependent Variable
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	the European Union
LGBT+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
MAXQDA	Qualitative Data Analysis software
MND	Ministry of National Defence
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice)

PO	Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)
PFPS	Polish Foreign Policy Strategy
MMRTTF	The Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet
TSI	The Three Seas Initiative
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

Introduction

After winning general election in 2015 Law and Justice (PiS) introduced series of reforms into Polish public and political space, majority of which marked the de-democratizing turn. It launched rodzina 500 plus-a family benefit (along with other generous benefits), at the same time capturing Poland's Constitutional Tribunal, introducing judicial reforms that undermined judicial independence, and using public media as a propaganda tool, also while running successful election campaigns.

Now, all these actions are accompanied by discourses. The radical change in narratives present in the Polish public space has been a noticeable development since the Law and Justice government was formed in 2015. There has been evident rise in usage and variety of narratives framed mostly around conservative/ religious-, and sovereignty themes (for example emphasising Christian values as those underpinning the fabric of Polish society), but only occasionally economic themes.

What is not so obvious, however, is this development has translated into narratives that are applied in connection with Polish Foreign Policy, especially towards the EU. Specifically, if foreign policy discourses too have become more conservative and sovereignty emphasising, also with regard to specific EU projects Poland participated in.

Why to focus on discourses rather than actions itself? As Schmidt explains discursive institutionalism, which focuses to much greater extent on discourses rather than actions, is much better equipped to deal with institutional changes than rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, or sociological institutionalism (Schmidt 2008). As all the aforementioned actions are part of broader social, cultural and political changes that PiS has been swiftly introducing in Poland – and so the analysis of discourses themselves helps us to

understand these changes and their mechanism following a "logic of communication" (Schmidt 2008).

While the significance of discourses is recognized, the systemic analyses are rare. Although there have been some attempts to analyse foreign policy of, for instance, Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit 2016) or Russia (Joja 2019) through discursive lens, it has been done in rather general terms without any real attempt to quantify their presence or differentiate between those used for domestic or foreign policy purposes, especially for EU member states. In the thesis this empirically puzzling varieties of discourses related to broadly understood Polish foreign policy are disentangled and differentiated between these applied for domestic purposes and those used while working on specific EU projects.

The topic of different discourses applied by EU member states is underexplored in contemporary research. This study fills up the gap and explores the presence of the dramatic triad within different narratives-frames. Usually, these characters are found in mythology and literary fiction with the purpose of moving a plot forward, or in psychological analyses, but are also explored in political narratives (Clement, Lindemann, and Sangar 2017) to, what I claim, intensify the aforementioned discourses. Looking at the literature of the subject it seems this theoretical framework is explored for a very first time in political, if not any other context. This study also examines which political actors are assigned to each respective role, within domestic narratives and, if the same happens for specific EU projects related narrative. Additionally, it explores if discourses present in official documents differ from those present in speeches, statements, the analysed election spot, in their type and intensity.

Moreover, this study draws upon Putnam's "two-level games" theory linking domestic politics with foreign policy (1988), but at the same time questions his main theoretical claim that gaining domestic approval is the driving motivation for decisions regarding international

agreements, projects or generally foreign policy. This study shows that it is not always a case, sometimes these domains are disjointed.

All that is done with the purpose of answering the main research question: How to systematically understand de-Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy discourses?

To answer this question, a series of steps are done. Firstly, the theoretical framework based on combining Political Discourse Analysis with Affective Control Theory (ACT) and Character Theory (CT) assumptions is derived and related sub-questions through the applied theoretical analytical lens are formulated:

1) What types of discourse frames are/are not used in de-Europeanization?
2) What roles the key three actors – the EU, Polish government and the Polish people – play in these discourses?

3) Within what context, by whom, for whom, and for what purposes within Polish political scene are these discourses exploited?

Secondly, discourse and statistical analyses of official documents: the 2015 PiS Manifesto and the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy (PFPS) 2017-2021 are conducted to identify the frames, their intensity and the presence of the triad. Thirdly, detailed discourse analyses of 10 key speeches which were extensively discussed in Polish society and were covered in many national media outlets are performed. I discover what frames dominated them (conservative and sovereignty), intensity (high) as well as the extent of the presence of the triad (highly present). The narrative intensifying property of the triad is explored. Fourthly, the same analyses are performed of the Three Seas Initiative: the project Poland initiated, without explicit pretention of it becoming an alternative to the EU project. Lastly, the same is done with texts and speeches related to the aforementioned specific EU related projects from

which Poland tried to pull out from, therefore accompanying actions that could be understood as de-Europeanization.

This study is based on one case- Poland. As long as Poland is considered a representative case study for European Union (EU) member states experiencing democratic backsliding, the study's framework of analysis and findings could be applicable to them too. I use 2015 – till 24.02.2022 timeframe, as in 2015 PiS took over and created the government, what led to a change in the foreign policy discourses, both projects and non-projects related. In 2019 PiS won again and is still a ruling party. The obvious contrast between 2007-2015 period of governing by strongly pro-EU liberal Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and 2015 till 24.02.2022 period, forms a perfect timeframe for the research of how de-Europeanization of foreign policy discourses takes place. The potentially enormous impact of Russian military invasion in Ukraine on Polish foreign policy discourses is still to be assess. A very basic comparison of discourses within the successful PO and PiS manifestos are done, which explores if there are any changes in discourses.

On one hand application of Discourse Analysis is beneficial, as it gives my analytical approach a great degree of flexibility. Combination of it with basic statistical analyses thanks to applicability of Excel with Manifesto Project data base, and MAXQDA software provides additional layer of evidence for existence of researched phenomena. Addition of the dramatic triad makes the approach innovative and opens venues for further research.

On the other hand, application of Discourse Analysis is an effort-intensive endeavour and has its own empirical limitations. In this study the depth offered by Discourse Analysis when analysing chosen speeches, interviews, election spots and documents is not accompanied with the breadth of research. This approach to researching is time and energy consuming, what makes increasing the sample of speeches and statements, although possible, nevertheless

rather a difficult task. Focusing on only one EU member state- Poland, exposes findings to criticism of low generalizability, applicability of them to other countries. Lastly, intensity of discourses would benefit from stricter methodologically embodiment within Discourse Analysis theory. In defense it is necessary to point here to the fact that the unique research design of this study (frames and the triad) could be replicated in discourse analysis of political elites in other democracies, either EU member states (for instance Hungary) or countries with EU membership aspirations (for instance Bosnia), that experience the rise of illiberal and/or populist incumbents.

My thesis consists of four chapters. In chapter 1 I review contemporary research and the theoretical background. Chapter 2 reveals the research details of the methods applied, precisely justifies the selection of cases and, time frame and lastly, lists the sources of data collection. In chapter 3, detailed empirical analyses of all aforementioned documents, speeches, discourses, and projects linked with them are performed. In chapter 4 conclusions are drawn and the findings summed up.

Chapter 1 – Europeanization/de-Europeanization

The following chapter contains a general overview of theoretical approaches to Europeanization/ de-Europeanization. It consists of four parts. It opens with overview of mainstream research that defines Europeanization as a policy outcome of harmonization and compliance (section 1.1) That provides the foundation to the scholarly attempts to conceptualize de-Europeanization (section 1.2). Section 1.3 provides an overview of Europeanization discourses applied within foreign policy and different theoretical approaches. Subsequently, it introduces discursive frames: conservative and religious, sovereignty- based, socioeconomic and alternative to conservative values one, and their links with foreign policy. The chapter concludes by introducing a theoretical machinery standing behind the triad. Borrowed from psychology and adjusted to political science, Affective Character Theory and Character Theory substantiate the analytical approach of this MA thesis in dealing with the discourses directed towards domestic audience.

1.1 Europeanization as a policy outcome of harmonization and compliance

The mainstream research defines Europeanization in two ways: 1) with the focus on harmonization and compliance of national policies with EU standards and values and 2) formation of EU common policies. An active process undermining the above could be equalized with de-Europeanization, what is the very topic of my thesis. The following literature helps to understand de/Europeanization of national policy. Still, there is a need to go beyond a weakness of this theoretical lens. Considering my research question there is a need to engage not only with Europeanization of policies, but discourses that often precede them, but as well are communicated along the whole policy making cycle.

There are three different dynamics shaping Europeanisation that involve interactions of domestic and EU levels: uploading, downloading, and cross-loading (Howell 2014). They all strongly point to interaction between domestic policies and Europeanization what is a basic assumption of this study (details can be found in Appendix 1).

All the above-mentioned approaches include the domestic political aspect of policy-making, but as well treat Europeanization as a more deterministic and mechanistic process than it is. Additionally, all the aforementioned approaches tackle the idea of Europeanization, and adds to our understanding of de-Europeanization as weak sustainability of Europeanization not as an independent process. The weakness of above reviewed literature, considering my research question, is that they engage with Europeanization of policies, not discourses, and leave unanswered all of the questions relating to the inner logic of de-Europeanization understood as an independent process so crucial for this thesis. The interactivity of domestic and EU levels inspires to look closer at it, also within the context of de-Europeanization of foreign policy discourses. Although, in terms of causality this literature highlights the importance of interactions between domestic and EU dimensions and the importance of domestic factors for the outcome of Europeanization dynamics at both levels, but one could claim, it underestimates the power of domestic actors during policy shaping process. The problem of underestimated agency of domestic actors should be tackled through the prism of discursive approaches, thus returning a great deal of autonomy to domestic actors.

1.2 De-Europeanization: empirical development and attempts of scholarly conceptualization

There are two approaches explaining the empirical instances of de-Europeanization: first one focuses on mirroring, reversing, weakening of Europeanization; second sees it as a more active and distinct process.

For Tonra de-Europeanization is analysed from two perspectives: policy making and scholarly (2018). As policy making, it describes a process in which EU foreign policy does not align with some member states' "declared values or interests", where these member states are less keen to "engage in collective policy making" and/or where the policy making is explicitly weakened by their practices (Tonra 2018). Usually it happens when "populist, nativist, and/or semi-authoritarian political dynamics" challenge EU foreign policy practices and stances. In addition, some national policy makers blame institutional changes initiated by the Lisbon treaty to be part of the reason for de-Europeanization (Tonra 2018). The argument is that, without the rotating presidency within the Foreign Affairs Council, member states are less involved. This results in a loss of common spirit and readiness to cooperate among member states (Tonra 2018).

This structural approach is not in opposition to the discursive one I will apply in my research, especially as I analyse mini cases of de-Europeanization, understood as, both, the policy- and accompanying discourse change of Polish foreign policy with regard to EU level specific projects.

When it comes to de-Europeanisation as a scholarly concept, Tonra illustrates that the right approach here is less clear. It demands the answer to the question whether de-Europeanisation is a distinct phenomenon or is a direct reflection of the concept of Europeanization. In the first case, this would according to him mean conducting "extensive inductive research and generat[ing] new theory from the available (…) data" (2018), whereas the latter approach proposes a mirror, reversed definition of Europeanization to be tested against empirical findings. This type of research endeavour promises superior returns at lower cost, but there are dangers involved in those explorations linked to distorting the concept or defining it poorly (Tonra 2018). The distinct phenomenon approach is highly promising, but so far it has been underdeveloped to be used directly in this research project.

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My thesis is the attempt to follow the distinct phenomena approach, as I see de-Europeanization as an active process driven my domestic political elites, not just weakening of Europeanization, as it cannot fully explain the development of alternatives to the EU project like the Three Seas Initiative. Although I do not provide the explanation of the causal mechanism behind those changes, through application of Political Discourse Analysis, concepts of the triad and certain narrative frames, my thesis provides an insight into how those are used by active domestic political agents or when they restrain from using them. For instance, surprisingly, the triad, sovereignty and conservative frames are not used to provide justification for de-Europeanization of policy outcomes (i.e. withdrawing from EU level driven specific projects). Additionally, the applied discourse approach promises outcomes without being overburdened by the theoretical and empirical difficulties a general theory of de-Europeanisation would encounter, as highlighted by Tonra (2018).

1.3 Discursive Conceptualization of de-/Europeanization

1.3.1 Europeanization discourse in foreign policy and theoretical approaches

According to Neuman-Stanivukovic we can look at the concept of Europeanization through a poststructuralist lens to define it as a discursive practice of democratization through which the notions of the EU are treated as discursive concepts (2014). Therefore, Europe and the EU are regarded as unfixed concepts with multiple contested meanings, which are continuously produced in a discursive process. Neuman-Stanivukovic defines Europeanization as drawn from the notion of a multi-layered discourse, which "as an idea (is) produced in domestic discourses" and is conditioned by other ideas like "state" and "nation" (2018). For these reasons, EU integration is forged through interaction between "structural forces" of the EU and the national discourses interpreting it (2018). Europeanization does not happen in a vacuum, which results in a "differential meaning" of the EU in various member

states and a multiplicity of Europeanization trajectories. These, at least partly, result in

Europeanization being a contested idea, a product of domestic actors' discourses. Although

Europeanization forms domestic actors, "it is not necessarily a top-down process", as actors

themselves constitute norms. Lastly, there is a plurality of domestic agents actively shaping

the narrative of Europeanization (Neuman-Stanivukovic 2018). The empirical findings of

differentiation of Europeanization discourses in member states are in accordance with the

conceptual framework proposed by Neuman-Stanivukovic. It encourages further exploration

of (De-) Europeanization through a discursive lens.

Contrary to the general assumption that Europeanization is "limited to deliberate EU

induction of domestic policy change" Kallestrup claims that Europeanization also is caused

by "domestic discourses legitimising policy change through reference to the EU", without

EU-induction necessarily being present (2002). The last few years though, have shown that

mere existence of the EU framework is not a guarantee of deepening Europeanization itself.

There is a need to explore also the potential de-Europeanization of the foreign policy of EU

member states from both angles: a discourse used for domestic purposes and consumption,

but as well one applied while they disembark from specific European level projects. What is

important for methodology used in this study and interesting on its own, I have not been able

to find any literature related to de-Europeanization of Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) discourses.[1]

1.3.2 Frames in de-Europeanization

Discursive de-Europeanization can occur through application of frames. There is a gap in

contemporary research literature when it comes to analysis of the use of frames by EU

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[1] What is on its revealing and consistent with my findings: the highly emotionally charged sovereignty and conservative/ religious narratives with imbedded within them triad are not used by PiS government while attempting to disengage from specific EU level projects.

member states, but, for instance, Aydın-Düzgit shows how Erdoğan's uses what could be seen as sovereignty and economic frames to de-Europeanizing his foreign policy discourse (2016), whereas Joja examines how Putin applies an analogy of sovereignty and conservative frames to de-Westernizes his foreign policy narrative (2019).

The frames presented below demarcate boundaries within which character roles are developed. They provide topics and motives for characters to act (I discuss them in detail in the following part of the chapter). They help interpret reality, often (over)simplifying it. Characters need settings to justify their performance, actions. The combination of these tools: frames and characters- the dramatic triad, serves as the basis of my thesis. In case of PiS there are certain frames that I expect to be more prominent than others – for instance, conservative, religion-based and sovereignty narratives, whereas socioeconomic frame to a much lesser extent. Alternative values laden discourse might be used by the opposition as a counterweight and defence tool for minorities, but I will not discuss these from this perspective.

1.3.2.1 Sovereigntism mobilization frame

One of the most promising theoretical frameworks is the one developed by Jenne (2021). She proposes that nationalism and populism are two different forms of sovereigntism, "a political ideology or doctrine that calls for the acquisition of or increase in the political independence of a territorially defined community such as a region or state" (Jenne 2021). She adjusts sociological models and develops three sovereigntist mobilizational frames: ethno-nationalist, populist, and ethno-populist (2021). Jenne defines the populist frame is based on a wish of gaining or restoring sovereignty to the political defined nation, which needs to regain self-determination from political and/or ruling elites. In the ethno-nationalist frame domination of the ethno-national group is the base of the state, whereas the ethno-populist mobilizational frame amalgamates, unites ethno-nationalist and populist frames by narrowing the boundaries

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of the unit of sovereignty further to include only "the people of the nation "(Filc 2015 in Jenne 2021). In the case of Poland and other ethnically homogenous EU member states ethno-populist mobilization frame is the most promising to explain applied narratives. In this scenario EU plays a role of a quasi-state, empire, within which Poland, especially PiS supporters, described by Jaroslaw Kaczynski as "better Poles"(ethnic part of the frame) right to self-determination is threatened. EU political elites, other dominating states, especially "hegemonic" Germany, the opposition and its leaders described as foreign agents or even traitors set the background against which populist part of the frame is used.

The combination of this ethno-populist mobilization frame, in empirical part just call sovereignty frame, combined with conservative and religious one forms a potent conservative sovereignty narrative which has been successfully recycled by PiS. Although I see conservative frame as being subordinate to ethno-populist, a special form of it, for analytical purposes I treat it as separate, especially as often only one aspect, either conservative or purely sovereignty related is accentuated, they do not always explicitly occur at the same time. Also, for historical reasons, it is a dominating divide in Polish society which is still visible along geographical lines. Adding of the triad also adds more passive undertone to populist dimension of this frame, as Polish society is treated as a victim needed to be rescued by the Hero.

1.3.2.2 Instances of application of sovereignty frame within foreign policy realm

Some authoritarian and semi authoritarian states use sovereignty as a major narrative tool in their foreign policy; for instance, Putin has used it a couple of times in his speech on the annexation of Crimea (Kremlin 2014 in Joja 2019). To make a connection with value-laden religious and ideological concepts, he connects sovereignty to the idea of Russianism in his narrative (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2015 p. 144 in Joja 2019). The official foreign policy narrative juxtaposes "Russia as a sovereignty respecting state" against the notion of "the

Western world opposing sovereignty". In the process, the Russian identity is fused with a concept of sovereignty. Putin proclaims Russia to be the main defender of sovereignty and opposing the Western world's hypocrisy (Joja 2019). At the same time, Russia performs contradictory ideological acrobatics towards Ukraine, where on one hand Putin upheld its sovereignty, but on the other hand the alleged Western hypocrisy legitimizes Russia's superpower identity and its actions (Szostek 2017 p. 579 in Joja 2019). As Aydın-Düzgit shows, a very similar construction of the EU in Erdoğan's discourse is used, showing it as an interfering unwelcome intruder in Turkey's domestic affairs (2016). In a similar fashion to Putin, Erdogan builds an oversimplified version of the world based on binary antagonisms to provide justification for inclusion or exclusion. Erdogan uses a populist right-wing discourse to disgrace the domestic opposition by portraying them as collaborators with external enemies. Thus, a Manichean vision of the world divided into friends and enemies is created (Reisigl 2008, p. 114 in Aydın-Düzgit 2016). A nearly identical narrative is used by PiS. In this scenario PiS leaders portray themselves as saviours of Polish society, the opposition leaders are openly called traitors collaborating with the EU or Germany, whereas PiS voters are passive victims of the alleged plot against them.

The similarity with PiS's "getting up from our knees" sovereignty narrative is striking. I expect this frame to be heavily present and marked in PiS foreign policy narrative. It is used as a justification for various manoeuvres incompatible with democracy, like the politization of the Polish legal system, including the Constitutional Court, or by using public media for governmental propaganda.

1.3.2.3 Instances of application of the conservative and religious frame within foreign policy realm

Current Russian foreign policy is one of the best examples of a deeply ideologized foreign policy, marked by normative and spiritual religious discourse with a strong accent of national

exceptionalism and spirituality (Joja 2019). Putin defined the Russian value system through juxtaposition of "other" values against "our" values; Western "immoral" against Russian moral values. Through that, the illegitimacy of Western leadership is argued, and the legitimacy of conservative values confirmed. What is interesting is that by making social and religious problems salient in his foreign policy narrative, Putin addresses a broader audience by explicitly expanding the narrative beyond Russian advocates of conservatism (Joja, 2019). He does it by focusing his conservative narrative not only on Orthodoxy, but as well on Christianity and traditional values with a heavy dose of nationalism; this is, even if not consciously, still imitated by PiS. At its core it is discriminatory towards "others"; those who do not follow the above model. Justification of a new foreign policy narrative is done through the selective usage of history to portray conservative and religious values as being historic and contemporary cornerstones of Russian civilization (Joja 2019).

Putin's flagstone foreign policy project is the Eurasian Union, a space "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" (Snyder 2018 in Joja). Worryingly, Snyder highlights the connection between a fascist thinker – Ivan Ilyn – and Putin. Ilyn has a vision of Russia "as a spiritual organism, which served not only all the Orthodox nations and not only all of the nations of the Eurasian landmass, but all the nations of the world" (Ilyn in Snyder in Joja 2019). Joja claims that these religious, spiritual, or even messianic elements are the foundation of fascist political thought. The same logic has been applied by Putin to legitimize the annexation of Crimea and the overall trajectory of Russian foreign policy. A very similar narrative of Poland as the bulwark of Christianity within the EU is very heavily promoted by PiS in Poland and also abroad. The empirical similarity suggests that this frame can travel from Russia to other countries, including Poland. I explore this subject further in chapter 3.

1.3.2.4 Economic discourse thread in foreign policy

An alternative form of the discourse is one based on quasi-rational cost-benefit analyses. For instance, Aydın-Düzgit analyses various excerpts to show how President Erdogan uses the Euro crisis to champion the rhetoric of the EU's democratic and economic inferiority compared to Turkey (2016). Alleged political and economic inferiority of the EU is not as visible as other forms of negatively portraying it in in Erdoğan's discourse, but the same "binary dichotomy" of 'We' vs 'them/others' is constructed upon democratic and economic standards. The function of this discourse is to show Turkey's superiority in relation to the EU, not purely due to normative attributes, but also to domestic characteristics and standards, like its superior governance and economy (Aydın-Düzgit 2016). There are also topos used to facilitate this frame. The superiority of Turkey's democratic and economic performance could be accentuated or constructed through the use of "topos of facticity", where the EU's alleged inferiority is demonstrated as a fact and not a context-embedded assessment. Thanks to this manoeuvre, the discourse signals the qualities like "truth and precision, competence and credibility" (Van Dijk 2005 in Aydın-Düzgit 2016). Additionally, to increase the credibility of the claim of Turkey's economic advantage in comparison with the EU, the topos of numbers is applied. The weakest Southern countries within the EU are highlighted and the impact of the euro crisis on those countries is made, again, with the purpose of showing Turkey's economic superiority. As could be anticipated, such a narrative does not touch upon problems with Turkish democracy and the country's overall economic performance. This socioeconomic discourse frame is applied through limited rationality (rationalization) of economic matters. As Poland is still a net beneficiary of the EU budget, not a contributor, I expect PiS not to use this frame too often or at all towards the EU, although it could be occasionally used against Germany is context of war reparations. This frame probably appeals to the gullibility of the voters, and flexibility in interpreting reality

for domestic purposes, although it could also be used to justify the government's decision in regard to EU projects.

1.3.2.5 Alternative values laden discourse in foreign policy

The process of Europeanization or de-Europeanization of foreign policy can go via different discursive routes. Also, it could involve values other than conservative ones and the strong emotions accompanied them. For instance, it is particularly visible when the discourse of "European" value system is juxtaposed against its transatlantic counterpart, as done by Duina when he discusses Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) deal talks and emotions involved at the grassroot level in many countries in the EU.

Looking beyond pure economic- and politics-driven solutions to the puzzle of the politization of CETA and TIIP, to "something internal", Duina looks at normative, values-based concerns shared by ordinary citizens and EU civic societies. The discourse in this case focuses not exclusively on the economic and technical side of goods and services, but also the whole social context that they are embedded in: rituals, connotations, meanings and the social identities that stem from them. From that perspective, Duina concludes, TTIP's and CETA's specifications and accompanying discourses become more than just technical issues, but a dimension in which the values and identities of the EU and the US and Canada clash (2019). Their high politization cannot be fully explained just by the eagerness of political parties to stir and capitalize on the next new "hot" topic. What is truly at stake here are the differently defined issues of "consumer health, animal rights and good food" in the EU compared with its transatlantic counterparts. To make sense of it all, Duina analyses "the rhetorical logic or communicative discourse" of the process. On one side we have the EU with the rule, that "products should not be allowed unless scientific proof exists on its safety", on the other side we have the US and Canada with their liberal approach best expressed by "as long as it is not

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proved it is harmful, it is allowed." These concerns are at the core of the politization of trade deals (Duina 2019). The discourse employed by civil society organization is unambiguous, talking about "lowering of standards' concerning the environment, consumers, social matters, and even matters of culture and democracy" (STOP TTIP organization); similarly Foodwatch or Münster are against TTIP seeking to ensure that 'democracy and European values survive" (Duina 2019).

Although it could be seductive for PiS to use this type of discourse, I expect this frame not to be applied very often or at all by the government and PiS officials as it already uses emotionally loaded conservative/religion values- and sovereignty frames. There is no need to justify singling out of certain groups (farmers, for instance) as addressees of their electoral campaigns, as broader and penetrating deeper layers of voters' conscience frames can be applied with an even greater impact.

Table 1De-Europeanization frames

Frames	Conservative, religion-based	Sovereignty	Economic	Alternative values laden
Identity dimension	Religious, conservative	Political, historical	Economic superiority/ demands	Other than religious, traditional values
In-groups	"The nation" exclusionary as a group sharing conservative values and religious identity	All those sharing the view of "the independent nation", supporters of ruling party along political lines	All those supporting the government along economic policy and demands, narrative lines	Alternative groups to normally mobilized (farmers, animal rights promoting, consumer health groups).

Out-groups	All those sharing different than conservative, religious values. Foreign elites, states and international organization with "doubtful" liberal agenda.	All those supporting the idea of hyphenated identities, for example, European along national one. Foreign elites, states and International organization promoting supernational agenda.	All those not sharing the governmental narrative of economic or regime's superiority and economic demands.	Internally all those not sharing certain value systems. Organizations, states putting emphasis on different values, having different hierarchy of values to those shared by in-group members.

Source: own summary, based on Jenne's sovereigntist mobilizational frames, 2021, p 327.

1.4 The hero, villain, victim triad

I find combination of frames with the triad to be a necessary step, as rather binary -elites vs the people-purely ethno-populistic framework does not addresses observation that "the people" are rather passive in the Polish adaptation of the narrative, making them in need of a Hero. In politics, storytelling can be a powerful strategy. Themes occurring in political storytelling are related to various frames, details of which I introduced above. Narrative theory establishes the components of stories that reverberate in political life. This identification is one of main tools in political analysis (Amsterdam and Bruner 2000; Polletta 2006 in Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). To complement this, there is an extra ingredient needed to drive the plot – characters. The Hero, Villain and Victim are familiar to everyone, and can be found not only in mythology and fictional works, but also in political narratives (Clement, Lindemann, and Sangar 2017) as they play a role in political discourse: Villains are there to be blamed, provide a target for mobilizing negative emotions, and strengthen group identities (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). Victims, if good and needing to be protected, motivate action and mobilize recruitment; and Heroes becomes the gravitational centre of political

movements, uniting members, increasing agreement and commitment among them (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018).

There are two theories used to analyse the dynamics between these different characters: Character Theory and Affective Control Theory. The first one was developed to understand political narratives; the second has a broader application: it is used in analyses of social interactions (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988 in Bergstrand and Jasper 2018) or stress management (Goldstein 1989 in Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). CT focuses on two dimensions/ traits as defining character types: goodness- showing how good or bad the intentions and actions of characters are, and power— how strong (effective) and weak (ineffective) they are (Jasper et al. 2018). ACT adds a third dimension alongside the active versus passive axis. Jasper et al. link threads from "rhetoric, cognitive psychology, literary theory, visual analysis, rumour theory, and performance theory", and apply them to political characters active in situations from "elections to wars to protest campaigns" (Jasper et al. 2018). Full justification of using CT and ACT can be found in chapter 2.

Chapter 2 - Research design

2.1 Analytical Approach

In my master's thesis I explore which de-Europeanization discourses and narratives are employed by the Polish ruling party- PiS. In addition, I investigate if the dramatic Hero, Villain and Victim triad is used, and if yes, in combination with which frames in both – domestic and international project settings. I assume that the triad strengthens the impact of mobilization frames, meshing with them; it makes Outgroups (in Jenne's nomenclature) particularly threatening (Villains), whereas Ingroups are particularly vulnerable (Victims) and in need of Hero(es) not only to achieve their goals, but even to preserve the current status quo. Adding the triad creates the extreme version of the frames. The initial exploration points to a lack of the triad in a narrative related to a specific European project, that Poland was engaged in, but tries to disembark from. It also shows that some of those discourses are broadly applied by Polish ruling party in a domestic setting. In most of the scholarly literature the analyses of the topic of de-Europeanization are conducted within the context of foreign policy which is not understood as a narrative but as broadly speaking an action and in a narrow sense it also includes work on specific projects. The uniqueness of my research stems from the disentanglement of different frames within different contexts and by spotting a puzzling consistency of their application for domestic purposes, and a different frame pattern used by Polish government on European stage while working on specific projects. Moreover, I explore if frames present in official documents differ from those present in speeches, statements, etc, in the ration of frames applied and also in their intensity. Armed with these insights, I check if de-Europeanization of discourses within domestic or international frameworks happens within particular combination of frames and the triad or not at all.

The dynamics illustrated in the triad could be understood in at least two separate ways (see Figure 1). Firstly, arrows signal who creates a discourse about whom. Because of the limitations of space, I explore only some of all the possible combinations. For instance, I do not address the highly interesting protective rhetoric used by EU officials which portrays part of Polish society as a victim of the oppressive, regime with authoritarian tendencies. I focus purely on discourses from PiS' point of view only. Secondly, we could examine who is an actual addressee of the discourse and for what purposes, which can differ from the first way the triad could be analysed.

Figure 1 The complete dramatic triad

The Hero:

Officials of PiS party , Polish government, Polish President,

The Victim:

PiS supporters

The Villain:

The European Union

Germany

Sources: own illustration

2.2 Operationalizing the specific projects related discourses

In my thesis I do not try to extract any causal mechanisms, but still, I use indicators to grasp the empirical evidence for the presence of de-Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy discourses in a more analytical way. As presented in Table 2, I adhere to the theory that de-Europeanization is an active process rather than merely the absence of Europeanization processes.

Table 2 Operationalization of Europeanization/de-Europeanization of the specific projects related discourses

Indicator of Europeanization/de-Europeanization of discourses	Operationalization
The salience/ the negation of the EU CFSP/ESDP discourse in national foreign policy.	Was the EU CFPS/ESDP suggested/ purposefully rejected as the appropriate institution?
The salience/ the negation of importance given to application of CFSP and the potential actions discourse.	Was the application of CFSP/ESDP instruments in the decision-making process considered important/ not important, or a priority/ nonpriority, on the part of national governments?
The adherence to / the negation of EU policy narrative, especially over other considerations, and discourse preferences (adaptation).	Did the member state compromise/strengthen its national narrative preferences in order to accommodate the use of CFSP/ESDP boosting narratives instruments?
The use or advocating the use/ the negation of EU CFSP/ESDP narrative veil to increase national influence (projection).	Did the EU CFSP/ESDP represent a vehicle for the member state to increase their influence in particular policy area or it did not?
The use / the negation of the EU CFSP/ESDP discourse to push through policies on either the domestic or international level (projection)	Did the member state pursue/ abandon national policy preferences through the EU CFSP/ESDP in this particular case or it did not?
The existence/ the negation of shared definitions of discourse of national and European preferences among policy makers (changing preferences)	Did the member state equate/ discern national discourses with European preferences in this particular case or it did not?
The existence/the negation of norms and preferences narrative among elites in favour of the application of EU instruments over other available possibilities (changing preferences)	Did policy elites, including the elite public sphere, favour/ disapprove the application of CFSP/ESDP instruments or did they not?
Increase/decrease in public support for the EU through change of discourse on CFSP/ESDP (changing preferences)	Was there public support/opposition for the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments or there was not?
The relaxation/ tightening of traditional narratives, discourses to accommodate/ reject EU friendly discourse projects (adaptation/changing preferences)	Was the EU CFSP/ESDP suggested as the appropriate/ inappropriate institution in this case despite previously held preferences to the contrary that would have suggested the adoption of a different course of action?

Source: adapted from Gross 2007

I do not use indicators when de-Europeanization of fuzzy, non-project related discourses for domestic political gains are explored. Due to variety and multifaceted nature of them operationalization could be problematic. Flexibility offered by Discourse Analysis helps to overcome the impasse.

2.3 Assumptions

My main approach and assumption revolved around the idea, that there are different types of discourses used in domestic and specific international domains, that they are disjoined. Along with initial exploratory insights it gives rise to the first group of hypotheses related to type of frames and presence or lack of the triad in the domestic and European context. This leads to overarching

Hypothesis 1: Discourses in domestic and international domains are disjoined.

From which the following hypotheses are derived:

Hypothesis 1a: Sovereignty and conservative discourses are used for domestic political gains: winning elections or maintain the electorate's support.

Hypothesis 1b: Economic discourse is exclusively used when dealing with specific international projects to maintain an image of a rational player and/or hide the true motivation behind decisions.

Hypothesis 1c: The dramatic triad is present in discourses employed for domestic purposes and there is a lack of it in the narrative used for specific international projects.

Hypothesis 1d: De-Europeanization of discourses happens only in the domestic context; it does not happen in relation to specific European level projects (TSI and CFSP/ESDP).

The second hypothesis is based on the assumption that the change in intensity of narratives is a function of time, with peaks in intensity being linked with pre-election period. That leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The intensity of frames present in official documents, speeches and statements differs over time. Elections and scandals are the critical moments in which certain frames and the triad in discourses become most prominent and intensive.

2.4 Method

In my thesis I use Discourse Analysis as the main method of research. As the main source of data official documents and public speeches of PiS and the government officials will be used, with the aim of finding if the triad is present; who occupies the roles in the triad; what are the main frames used; how characters are portrayed in given frames; how the dynamics between them are described; and what are the main leitmotivs within the frames themselves. Looking at the theoretical approach and the main aims of the thesis, Character Theory and Discourse Analysis is a natural choice, but in combination with Affective Control Theory (the details justification of the choice can be found in Appendix 2).

In the research Political Discourse Analysis is applied, as it allows to examine lexical, grammatical and other linguistic tools used with a purpose of framing cognitive apparatus and attitudes of "the hearer (…) regarding specific political actors and their relationship with others" (Kampf 2015). As I connect the triad with mobilization frames via in-group and out-group actors (Jenne 2021), seeing it as an extreme version of it, the application of Political Discourse Analysis seems to be the most suitable, as it is often applied "in drawing the boundaries" between these groups (Kampf 2015, p.8) or to distinguish one political actor from his/her opponents. As Wilson (1990) highlights, it can also be used to differentiate the "self" from "others" by using "first, second, and third person pronouns (I, we, you, and them)" (Kampf 2015 p.9) to indicate either belonging to a group or "rejection and

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"demonization" (Kampf 2015 p.9). A key part of the triad analysis does precisely this. It could also be seen as a proxy for the first dimension of Character Theory – that is, goodness. What is more, the same method is used for analysing "political actors as either powerful or weak", and "either active or passive" (Kampf 2015, p.9) respectively, which forms part of the second dimension in Character Theory, and borrows from the third dimension of Affective Control Theory. The selection of this method, therefore, allows for full engagement in the dramatic triad analyses.

Political Discourse Analysis is also extensively used as a method of studying "the construction of discourses" (Kampf 2015). Especially, how party, national, and global discourses emerge (Fairclough 2000 in Blommaert 2001). If we exchange global for European or supranational, justification for analysing PiS discourses construction efforts related to these three levels from PDA perspective is justified. It meshes with both the triad and discourse construction perfectly, complementing research method fully. [2]

In addition, some basic statistics are found for the 2015 PiS manifesto and Polish Foreign Policy Strategy to assess the prevalence of each discourse in these official documents. For speeches and statements the volume of each discourse is assessed by applying Discourse

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[2] It would be tempting to apply Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) here, with its core notions - 'critique' or 'critical', 'ideology' and 'power' (Reisigl and Wodak 2017 in Aydın-Düzgit 2016) , and the term 'critical' is understood here as liberating people from various modes of domination (Wodak & Meyer 2009, p. 7 in Aydın-Düzgit 2016), as for instance, Poland being dominated by the EU. Firstly, this method was used to analyse the construction of both European (Aydın-Düzgit 2012; Krzyzanowski & Oberhuber 2007; Wodak 2011; Wodak & Boukala 2015 in Aydın-Düzgit 2016) and national identities (Wodak et al. 2009 in Aydın-Düzgit 2016). The last function, arguably, could be applied to analysis of PiS attempts to remodel Polish society. Secondly, it has a well-developed and established toolkit for examining texts for hints of inclusion or exclusion through "discursive construction of identities (Aydın-Düzgit 2016). Thirdly, CDA relies on text, written documents, but as well improvised speeches, or visual or electronic records (Aydın-Düzgit 2016), all the forms of communication analysed in the thesis. Fourthly, it emphasizes discursive identity construction, where the primary role is played by constructing in and out groups, "us" vs "them" (Wodak 2001, p. 73) what is also extensively done in this research. Although all this advantages of CDA speak loudly in its favour, overall, this study adhere to Political Discourse Analysis method understood in positivistic and deductive manner to maintain the consistency of the scientific approach applied in the thesis.

Analysis. The intensity of discourses is done through analyses of emotionally charged words, mostly adjectives and nouns, but as well some verbs and emotionally charged expressions. The framing of discourses in both generally understood foreign policy and specific projects is done by comparing the volume of each discourse as a percentage of the whole text coded for official documents: 2015 PiS Manifesto and PFPS 2017-2021. Analysis of framing of speeches and statements is done through application of Discourse Analysis and is self-evident. The purpose of sovereignty and conservative discourses is done by exploring timing of those, for instance, happening before election or after scandals are manifested in media, whereas the purpose of economic, rational narrative is done through exploration of basic fact and alternative, but not applied scenarios. To establish functioning of the multilayered game, the author postulates the most likely addressee(s) of various discourses distinguishing between the domestic and international contexts.

The strength of this research study lies in combining quantitative and qualitative research methods, and the usage of MAXQDA, a cutting-edge software package for qualitative and mixed methods. It allows to code (group) parts of a text and perform basic statistical analyses of it. The combination of these methods increases the validity of my findings, although quantitative analysis is performed only on documents what is a relative weakness of the research. It is, at least partially, compensated by employing Discourse Analysis, which as an approach is particularly suitable for analyzing naturally occurring speeches. Although the chosen ones have been publicly and officially delivered, there is an element of improvisation involved too, what renders analyses of them particularly interesting. Thanks to using already coded election manifestos taken from Manifesto Project and using Excel for extracting data the objectivity of the study is preserved, and partly, some of the findings confirmed.

2.5 Selection of cases

Case selection: The selection of the Polish case could be justified by the clear signs of the Polish government's changing rhetoric towards becoming more nationalistic and conservative after 2015 (Revilla Arjona 2020, Yatsyk 2019). This is part of a broader trend of rising national populism discourses in some EU member states and other countries in the world (Jenne, Kirk, Silva 2021). The expected frames applied by PiS officials, the government, Jarosław Kaczynski or President Duda are also applied by semi-authoritarian states like Turkey and Russia (Aydın-Düzgit 2016, Joja 2019). Exploration of the Polish case could render some insights how the foreign policy of this type states operates internally, and how it differs from the between-the-lines message applied by those nations when working on specific international projects or within international organizations. Nevertheless, it could be that the insights gained are only applicable to countries with similar nationalistic, populistic, or conservative tendencies within the EU, for instance Hungary. Either way, the subject is worthy to be investigated.

When it comes to Polish Foreign Policy, the selected mini cases: withdrawal from the contract with Airbus (and buying American aircrafts instead), the withdrawal from the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet project within Common Security and Defence Policy , and the withdrawal of most Polish officers from the Eurocorps there could be understood as de-Europeanizing actions. All these actions are highly puzzling as Poland, since it joined the EU in 2004, was perceived as the poster boy of Europeanization (Zuba 2020). One cannot reject the interpretation of the multifaceted and complex TSI as also being de-Europeanizing action at its core too (the overview of speeches and official announcements linked with aforementioned cases along with other selected speeches, interviews and documents crucial for this study can be found in Table 8 available in Appendix 3).

2.6 Time frame

2015 – till 24.02.2022. After Poland joined the EU in 2004, and strongly established itself within EU structures and the institutional framework, the new government, which was formed in 2007 by liberal PO, currently the main opposition party, could fully implement its pro EU discourse, including those related to its foreign policy. It stayed in power for two terms in office. In 2015 PiS took over and created the government, what led to a change in the foreign policy discourses, both projects and non-projects related. In 2019 PiS won again and is still a ruling party. The obvious contrast between those two periods 2007-2015 and 2015 till 24.02.2022, forms a perfect timeframe for the research of how de-Europeanization of foreign policy discourses takes place. February 24, 2022, marks the beginning of Russian military invasion of Ukraine. It is too early to full comprehend the enormity of the impact of this unprecedented event on Polish Foreign Policy discourses, therefore this study deals only with discourses up to that highly historically significant moment. Although I do not compare fully the discourses used by both parties, a very rudimentary comparisons of those within the successful PO and PiS manifestos are done, which fully shows the aforementioned changes in discourses.

In my research I use CT, occasionally ACT and the Hero, Villain, Victim triad as a tool helping to understand political developments in Poland and its foreign policy narrative for an extended period of time (over the 5-year period that PiS has been in power), as it focuses on political conflict and the construction of identities within it. The unusually long period of application of the toolbox offered by CT and ACT in Polish context is probably due to the deep and broad changes envisaged and attempted by PiS, which required an extended length of time. The application of the triad within de-Europeanization discourses for domestic purposes offers PiS a framework within which a variety of different Villains could be identified - or recycled - during their mandate**.**

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2.7 Method and sources of data collection

I look for any existence of the evidence of discursive frames in a key official strategic document issued by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland- PFPS 2017-2021, as well as the 2015 PiS manifesto (nature of these two documents points that they have been created to be used in international -and domestic domains respectively) I extracted the data related to negative EU discourse units from 2015 PiS Manifesto using Excel. I did the same with the 2011 PO Manifesto, to compare if there are any differences between the two. After extracting data from the 2015 PiS Manifesto, I used Discourse Analysis. It is partially done with assistance of MAXQDA software to code chosen parts of discourse units and categorize them. To make comparisons between the SPFP 2017-2021 and the 2015 PiS Manifesto possible, the statistical analyses of frames are performed by comparing their proportions to the whole coded text (by using MAXQDA software), and not the text of the whole documents themselves as the documents' wordcount differ. These methods allow not only a qualitative, but also a quantitative overview of frames. The selected speeches and statements of PiS and the governmental officials, President Duda and Jarosław Kaczynski or the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witold Waszczykowski were chosen due to them having been widely discussed by - and resonating with - the Polish public. They have been reported in many newspapers, on television as well as on the radio. All of them are available online, either in print or in alternative media formats such a video (e.g. on Twitter).

Chapter 3 - Empirical analysis

3.1 Fuzzy understanding of de-Europeanization and other foreign elements and their application within discourses for political gains at the domestic stage

The application of Discourse Analysis to the selected speeches and the election spot demonstrates that for domestic political purposes, sovereignty discourse dominates.[3] This frame is present to a large degree in all analysed speeches for the domestic audience, but as well the analysed campaign spot and the 2015 PiS manifesto (with lower intensity), which results in de-Europeanization of foreign discourses understood in its basic fuzzy form. This discourse is very often intertwined with conservative one[4], which is slightly less present, and the economic one, which is the least visible among all the three main types of narrative regarding speeches or the pre-election campaign spot but is the only one present when dealing with specific European level projects (see the details in Table 3). [5]

Table 3 The overview of the level of presence of frames and the triad in speeches for the domestic audience and related to specific European projects.

Frame	The hero	The villain	The victim	Level of presence
Sovereignty	The government, PiS, Kaczynski	The EU, Germany, the opposition	PiS supporters	Dominates
Conservative/ religious d	The government, PiS, PiS officials, Kaczynski,	The EU, domestically LGBT	PiS supporters, Polish families,	High

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[3] Here the EU is the main Villain. Germany and Donald Tusk also play negative roles, whereas the government – the president, leader of PiS- Jarosław Kaczynski and PiS officials are put into the Hero positions, although on many occasions this is not explicitly stated. The Polish people, especially PiS supporters, are portrayed as the Victim.

[4] Within the conservative/religious discourse again the liberal EU is portrayed as the main culprit who is actively plotting and is dangerously effective. The Hero remains the same, but the Victim is narrowed to Polish families. In the domestic version also children are also victimized as apparently being targeted by gay men.

5 In its pure form, it is only present once in President Duda's speech in Kamienna Gora (Duda in Gazeta.pl 2018). Otherwise, the narrative demanding war reparations from Germany plays a role on the domestic political scene, but it cannot be classified as a purely economic discourse.

	President Duda to lesser extent	community and supporters	Polish children (when LGBT+ became targeted during presidential campaign in 2020)	
The economic frame (in a limited form, for domestic purposes only)	The government	, The EU Germany	Polish society	Marginal
For international counterparts and partners	None	None	None	Exclusive
Alternative values laden frames[6]	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Marginal

Although the 2015 PiS manifesto is a document which is arguably is not widely read by electorates, nevertheless it shows the first approximation of the discourse PiS proposes to its voters There is only Polish version of it available, therefore, arguably, we could reject that it is intended in any way for an international audience too. Out of a total number of 3508 of all coded references in the manifesto available in Manifesto Project Database (2021), Excel filter function reveals that there are 275 references to positive views of National Way of Life and

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[6] Although not present in speeches there are some references to protection of Polish farmers in PiS manifesto. The conservative discourse applied in official speeches or statements is successful enough in the Polish countryside, so this discourse, supporting only some groups, is not prevalent or even needed.

negative views of emigration.[7] There are also 110 negative references to the EU.[8] Some

examples of frames and the triad as occurring in the Manifesto can be found in Table 4 (The

expanded version of it- Table 9- that additionally includes examples of frames and the triad

related to the opposition and Germany can be found in Appendix 4). When it comes to

positive attitude to traditional morality, understood as: "Maintenance and stability of the

traditional family as a value" and "Support for the role of religious institutions in state and

society", there are 79 references there. Additionally, there are 55 positive references to

nationalisation, understood in Manifesto Project as "Favourable mentions of government

ownership of industries, either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised industries in

state hand or nationalising currently private industries (may also include favourable mentions

of government ownership of land)" (2019). There are also 15 datapoints coded as showing

positive attitude towards the EU. The number is small, but still non-negligible.

As the analyses perform with the use of MAXQDA show, out of all negative EU references

contained within the 2015 PiS manifesto, the most prevalent are sovereignty and economic

frames. As Figure 2 illustrates it consists of 40.6 and 35.5 percent of the whole coded text

referring negatively to the EU from theses frames respectively. To great surprise of the

author, it contains only 8.3 percent of conservative frame in the whole coded text with

negative references to the EU.

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[7] Even if my research does not try to find a casual mechanism linking nationalism and de-Europeanization, there is an obvious framing of discourses related to a negative view of the EU, and a positive view of nationalism, nationalisation and traditional values within in PiS manifesto.[7]

[8] In comparison, out of a total number of 1326 references, the previous government's manifesto had 0 positive references to national way of life, 0 negative references to the EU, 10 positive references to traditional morality, and zero positive references to nationalization.

Figure 2 Percentage of different frames negatively depicting the EU present in 2015 PiS manifesto as the percentage of the whole coded text (MAXQDA)

Source: own elaboration

Table 4 Sample of different frames, their interpretation and level of intensity as present in the 2015 PiS Manifesto

2015 PiS Manifesto			
Frame	Examples of the frame as occurring in the manifesto	Interpretation according to the dramatic triad with short analyses of other devices used	Level of intensity of the discourse/ language applied
Sovereignty	"Poland's foreign policy is also being **reduced to**[9] an element in the EU's external action policy, which in fact means that it is **subordinated to** the interests of the strongest EU countries."	Actually, Poland uploaded its foreign policy to EU level with the Eastern Partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy, so it would serve its needs. It is another attempt to vilify allegedly hegemonic EU and Germany.	Mild to moderate
Economic	"**The heavy blow** to the Polish economy was covered up with a story of great success in terms of new resources obtained by	The Villain(s) are usually portrayed as plotting (an active ingredient) behind the scenes, whereas the Hero(s) uncovers it in	Moderate

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[9] Words and expressions in bold chosen by the author himself.

	Poland, although in fact nothing was obtained."	the dramatic finale for the benefit of the whole community (the Victim).	
Conservative	"We reject political correctness, which is **a restriction that is increasingly painful** for many Europeans and which is now imposed not only through **cultural aggression but also through administrative and criminal repression**."	This is full-blown vilification of the EU. The use of words and expressions like "cultural aggression" and "administrative and criminal repression" could not only scare, but as well cause anger, and therefore consolidate voters behind the protective Hero- PiS. It portrays the EU as evil, committed and active.	Severe (the only example of this high intensity frame in the whole 2015 PiS Manifesto).

Source: own elaboration

The moderate level of discourse intensity, when compared with actual speeches delivered for domestic political purposes, could be explained by the fact that the 2015 PiS Manifesto is an official document of a party which has not been in power for the last two electoral cycles. Also, it was issued on an early stage in the election cycle, way in advance before the critical moment, the electoral campaign, so its rather mild language could be seen as evidence in support of hypothesis 2.

It could be argued that the fact that the Manifesto frames' intensity is lower than speeches is partly linked with the role division within PiS. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of PiS, did not play any official role in the government formed in 2015, therefore his hands were not as tied, what resulted in much bolder speeches delivered by him, especially using his favoured conservative frame. If opinion polls showed a decrease in the acceptance of this form of discourse and the frame itself, future government officials could have distanced themselves itself from it.

This initial high risk, high gain strategy initiated by Kaczynski, which was already tested and established after its initial success, was later also practiced by other PiS political actors including the minister of foreign affairs and President Duda. They used anti-European narrative in its various forms during campaign elections in 2018 and 2020, or when domestic scandals dented support for PiS.

The zenith of the official negatively charged, dramatic triad-based discourse was reached during the 2018 campaign for local government elections. Refugees were painted as barbarians (suggesting this way not only their evil nature, but as well effectiveness of their actions), and the opposition - and to some extent, implicitly the EU – were portrayed as traitors and Villains that let them in (the activity/ passivity dimension playing a role here), with PiS serving as the Hero protecting the population from the future invasion (with them being good, active and strong- effective).

This frame usage plateaued and was used again in the presidential election of 2020. This time the role of the Villain was taken by the LGBT+ community, but the level of negative emotions in official presidential speeches was at a similarly high level, imbedded within sovereignty and conservative discourses. The economic discourse played a much lower role,

arguably, because of the remarkably high level of support for the EU, understood mostly as membership of the single market (Balcer et al. 2017).

These tests and experiments led PiS to rely on highly successful sovereign and conservative discourses. The presence of the economic discourse has been substantially decreased or "Germanized" instead of being directly de-Europeanised. As conservative discourse has been highly successful, alternative values laden discourse has not been used at all. What has been observed in the last 6 years of PiS' rule is a natural evaluation and evolution of frames, with strengthening, increasing in frequency, the presence in public space the most successful ones, those resonating with public opinion, and weakening of the presence of the less successful frames.

3.1.1 Sovereignty frame

The sovereignty discourse is the most prevalent type of narrative offered to Polish society and PiS supporters. The sovereignty frame is based on an imaginary dichotomy between the EU wanting to impose its rules and Poland seeking freedom from it. It is the evil, powerful and active EU, "they", who try to impose their will and take "our" sovereignty. For instance during election campaign just before local government elections, in Lezajsk, Duda juxtaposes "European Community (…) an imaginary one" (as an artificial construct) against local, "our" community (Duda in Polska Newsweek 2018) highlighting in the process all ills of the former. On October 23rd 2018 just two days after local government elections, Duda took part in a meeting with German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. During the discussion, he commented, among other things, on the actions of the EU institutions which, in his opinion, are excessively expanding their competences (Duda in Radio Zet 2018). All this was in the context of discussions on the reform of the judiciary in Poland and the decision of the Court of Justice of the EU to apply temporary measures to stop the implementation of Polish law on the Supreme Court. This already indicates framing the Court of Justice of the

EU as an institution interfering with sovereignty of the member state, but Duda goes even further. He equates the EU democratic deficit with the apparent ban on ordinary light bulbs. He states: "the EU forbids this, forbids that […]. You cannot buy one because the EU has banned it. These are the problems that people are wondering about. I don't know if this is by any chance one of the reasons for Brexit" (Duda in Radio Zet 2018). The truth that all the member states agreed to use energy-saving light bulbs is omitted and manipulated, so the listener or the reader would conclude how bad the EU is in interfering with the most basic activities and purchases of its citizens. Further, Duda voices his Eurosceptic resentment. This is through the manipulation that whatever the EU does, however rightly, could be interpreted as a "diktat" and an assault on the sovereignty of the nation (e.g. Poland). Through this framing, variation on a classic triad is emerging: the EU as an imperial (powerful and actively plotting) Villain, and the Victim- Polish nation in need of defence for their basic rights, and the unspoken potential Hero, but easily identifiable, the government.

In similar scaremongering fashion, when Duda attended the 60th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in Budapest in October 2016, he said the following:

"Poles and Hungarians gave their blood for freedom. Perhaps therefore, when we speak so loudly in Europe today about sovereignty and independence, Europe sometimes does not really understand us. We know what sovereignty and independence cost. And we will not allow this to be taken away from us" (Duda in TVP.info 2016).

Again, although not directly, he frames the EU, "Europe", as an entity in which member states' sovereignty and independence is not certain. Duda activates here the victimhood mode, makes it salient, through the use of emotionally super-charged expressions with historical connotations: "Poles and Hungarians gave their blood". To prevent this the Hero needs to step in, so it is not "taken away". It is an invitation to protective action and the support of it by the public. Duda uses twice the pronouns "we" and "us". First time to emphasise how misunderstood "we", citizens of Poland and Hungary are, giving "us" a

slightly passive undertone, making "us" the object of being "misunderstood". The second time he switches to an active mode of "we", when the collective "we" encapsulates not only the Victim, the Polish and Hungarian nations, but also the Hero, with the president(s) embodying one, so identification of one with the other can be completed.

The timing of this highly discussed speeches is not accidental. For instance, one month before the local elections in 2018, Duda again pitted the EU against Poland in his broadly discussed, high-profile speech in Lezajsk (Poland). Speaking on behalf of PiS and Polish government, he said the following: "They [the EU] should leave us alone and let us fix Poland, because that is the most important thing. I believe this is the expectation of the majority of citizens in Poland, the vast majority" (Duda in Newsweek 2018).

It is a discourse of the EU actively interfering or sabotaging the internal affairs of sovereign member states against the wishes of the victimized majority of its citizens. The implicit hero must not only keep going with a task of "fixing Poland", but also to thwart EU interference. Duda goes on:

"We will do everything we can to ensure that when our terms of office come to an end, you will be convinced that someone has finally thought about the citizens and not just about their own affairs or about some imaginary community that does not mean much to us. We need a community here in Poland. Ours. Our own" (Duda in Newsweek 2018).

It is a clear attempt to contrast Polishness, narrowly understood as a quality only fully expressed by local communities, "our community", against the European project. There is no place here for hyphenated identity. In the context of the local election, the false dichotomy only emphasises the specificity of PiS's offer and the "imaginary" one of the European community, project and any party that supports it. Through that the background for the creation of a domestic master Villain, the leader of opposition and his party, is prepared.

A month later, on 17th October 2018- just before the local election, an election campaign spot broadly discussed by Polish public became available on Twitter (@pisorgpl). It is an

ideal example how through framing and manipulation, if not hate speech, the foreign policy discourse is hijacked for domestic purposes. The spot opens with narrative: "members of Civic Platform participating in local governments, want to bring refugees in. Today they have confirmed a plan to liquidate the voivodeship [local government] offices." Initial pictures portraying members of the opposition use the photographic negative filter with violet undertone giving it a demonic look. That follows with video of Grzegorz Schetyna, the leader of PO, saying: "We propose the liquidation of voivodeship offices.", which is taken out of context. What follows is a skilful and deliberate manipulation portraying this as "another attempt to act against the government's policy". The text on the screen informs us that: "Voivodeship offices are responsible for (implementation of) the government's policy and that they decide about immigration issues". That would imply that the opposition deliberately tries to overcome governmental immigration policy through dismantling voivodeship offices. That, along with the initial demonisation of the opposition, casts the suspicion of evil intentions and creates a space within which the Villain's character can be painted. What is innovative is that the creation of the triad does not happen within the confines of "now" or "the past" but is moved to the future. It is done through imposing and projecting a scenario in which the voters are put into the potential Victim position. The dramatic duet of the Villain and the Victim is created out of thin air. An additional element of a border guard with a surgical mask on his face could be interpreted as part of narrative about refugees bringing infectious diseases with them.

This frame was previously used by Jarosław Kaczynski in his infamous speech on 12 October 2015, less than two weeks before the parliamentary elections, at a rally in Makow Mazowiecki a town near to Warsaw. It contains highly controversial remarks about refugees:

"There are already signs of the emergence of very dangerous diseases which haven't been seen in Europe for a long time: cholera on Greek islands; dysentery in Vienna; various types of parasites, protozoas, which aren't dangerous in the organisms of these people [Middle East

refugees], but which could be dangerous here. It doesn't mean to discriminate against anyone. But we have to check it" (Kaczynski in TV24 2015).

It is exactly the discourse which supposed to frighten the voters and create a need for protection and the Hero who can offer it. Again, the dramatic plot is moved into the future, but there is a need to mobilize the Victim, the voters, to prevent an imaginary disaster now. The manoeuvre is highly efficient, as the Hero does not need to act in any heroic manner right now or at all. It is enough that those who are apparently responsible for"[EU] deal to bring 100,000 Muslims to Poland […]" (Kaczynski in TVN24 2015) can be blamed for all future imaginary crimes committed by those. Anyone voicing their opposition to protect the Polish people becomes the Hero or has the chance to become one. There is not even a demand for any action, just a declaration is enough. The virtual, future Hero fighting the virtual non-existent Villain(s) is supposed to be an irresistible proposition to voters.

The refugee crisis is looked at through the sovereignty discourse and, to a lesser extent, also the conservative/ religious one to facilitate creation of the dramatic triad. The sovereignty discourse is connected with a fact that the prospect of any number of refugees coming to Poland could have been framed as being part of European Solidarity: a refugee relocation system. Those who would agree to it would have become, from the sovereignty and religious discourse perspective promoted by PiS, collaborators, if not traitors, cooperating with foreign forces. The wording of Kaczynski's speech might also not be random, but rather carefully chosen. "There are already signs of the emergence of very dangerous diseases which haven't been seen in Europe for a long time: cholera on Greek islands; dysentery in Vienna" (Kaczynski in TV24 2015). In Polish common national consciousness, there is an archetype of the heroic defence against the Muslim siege of Vienna in 1683. Arguably, it is one of the proudest moments in Polish history, the memory of which is still strongly present up to the present day. It is the symbolism of Polish hussars crushing the Ottoman army and saving Vienna and Christianity in Europe, that make mentioning Vienna by Kaczynski not a random

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choice. He uses it to strengthen the message of the imaginary danger and the necessity to act, against it. Kaczynski tries to associate Muslim refugees with the infectious diseases: "various types of parasites, protozoas, which aren't dangerous in the organisms of these people [Middle East refugees], but which could be dangerous here". Kaczynski uses the most common populist trick juxtaposing "Them", Muslim refugees, anyone letting them in- the then government of PO and the EU, against "Us", pure, not carrying any "parasites, protozoas" (by implying that also faith differentiates them). The "our ", also moral, purity is a common theme in populist discourses, but the difference between populist discourse and the triad involving one is in Manichean vision the masses have a lesser victimhood quality and are portrait as being more proactive when comparing with the triad dynamics.

Knowing that his remarks would be highly controversial, Kaczynski finishes with: "It doesn't mean to discriminate against anyone. But we have to check it" (Kaczynski in TV24 2015). Kaczynski must be aware that the same rhetoric was used against Jews by the Nazis. As Andrzej Celinski, the leader of the Polish liberal Democratic Party summarized Kaczynski as "no longer just using the language of hate, but language which is emblematic of the Holocaust. It used to be said that Jewish women carry typhus. Scaremongering about parasites is the language of Nazism. Kaczynski must know this. He's not an idiot" (Celinski in TVN 2015). The battle for the hearts of the voters moved from facts and figures into a discursive space in which also foreign policy narrative plays a role. The relocation mechanism is rejected by PiS, and the Europeanization of the foreign policy is reversed.

In the aforementioned 2018 pre-election campaign spot, the audience is asked to imagine what the year 2020 would look like. The imaginary TV presenter informs that, one year after PO dismantled the voivodeship offices, local government members of the party are getting ready to host refugees. The audience is informed by the TV presenter that, against the wish of the government of Poland, Grzegorz Schetyna has announced taking in refugees. There is

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another of Schetyna's speeches taken out of context, manipulated and stitched together from many different recordings, where he is portrayed as the arch-Villain saying " It is the issue for major cities, where Civic Platform members in local governments ...".

The creation of discourse is complete by presenting a series of dramatic pictures. Firstly, there is a woman brutally kicked from behind and falling down a train station staircase. Later on, it was discovered that the perpetrator was not a refugee, but a Bulgarian immigrant living in Germany (Szczesna 2019). Next, young men are shown throwing things around. There is some shooting and fighting shown, and a man lying in blood. Those pictures are accompanied with narrative: "Muslim ghettos have mushroomed... This is [a barely audible number] victim of the attack. Now, the inhabitants are afraid to leave their houses after dusk...sexually motivated violence, acts of aggression ... [with sound of shooting in the background]". All the pictures have the goal of associating refugees with the presented pictures of street fights, acts of terror, and sexual violence. There are pictures of guards and border officers with masks, strengthening the message of the risk of infectious diseases spreading if the opposition wins and let refugees into the country. The very same tested motive, which was used before the 2015 election was used by Kaczynski to make the opposition, PO and its leader-Schetyna, responsible for all the horrors presented. That completes the creation of the Villain and the Victim in need of protection. The rhetorical question: "Are we going to feel safe if Civic Platform will manage to carry through this plan?" sets a contrasting background against which the Hero narrative is juxtaposed as an alternative to the incoming threat: "On October 21st choose #thesafelocalgovernment, PiS on the list no. 10." The whole spot uses very similar rhetorical techniques as already used by Kaczynski in 2015: looking for imaginary threat and creating the dramatic triad. Instead of speech, the more technically refined amalgamation of sounds, images, and text bombards the senses in multiple ways to strengthen the impact of the message.

Another "sovereignty defending" speech was delivered - this time by Duda - in March 2018 in Kamienna Góra. During the celebration of 100th anniversary of Poland regaining independence, he urged the citizens to "tell their children" that Poland is "today truly sovereign and independent" (Duda in Gazeta.pl 2018). He then used historical references and framed his dispute with the sovereignty protecting discourse, pointing to those questioning the validity of existence of Poland: "Because very often people tell us: what do we need Poland for? The European Union is the most important thing." He goes even a step further, stepping close to comparing the EU to the 18th century partitioners of Poland: "Then let them [those questioning validity of existence of Poland] all remember the 123 years of the partitions." From that perspective, those apparently questioning the validity of existence of Poland could be seen as minions, collaborators maybe not displaying efficiency and power of the evil empire, the EU, but still plotting at the background to help it, as Duda warns that the Union may "take away our independence". It is potentially a very effective method of manipulating public opinion; as Poles, historically conditioned, are exceedingly sensitive to any - even imaginary - threat of losing independence.

It is not only the EU, but also Germany that is dressed as the Villain in the PiS discourse production for domestic purposes. The "German card" is not used as often as the EU blame game, but because of the historical background, it is still alive and maintained by PiS in the public space. The rhetoric of Germany representing a threat to Polish interests and interfering with it is a convenient way of redirecting public opinion when PiS popularity decreases due to, for instance, domestic scandals. In July 2017 the German newspaper, Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, discovered a link between the Secretary of State, Bartosz Kownacki and pro-Russian think tank (Newsweek 2017). In response in plain display of hostility, three weeks later Kownacki lashed out using the anti-German narrative by saying :"the children and grandchildren of German fascists have no right to lecture Poles about democracy" during

commemoration of the Warsaw Uprising (Kownacki in Wprost.pl 2017). Without denying obvious historical truths, using this type of tactless anti-German card to cover domestic shortcomings and scandals is one of the lowest points in current Polish diplomacy.

The same technique of smear campaigns, by associating current or past opposition leaders with imaginary, negative aspects of the main Villain, be it the EU or Germany, is commonly recycled by PiS. For instance, Donald Tusk, then the head of the European Council, was portrayed as an obedient international minion or as the domestic Archvillain, a traitor, who does not support Polish interests within the EU, but rather certain aspects of German foreign policy dealing with Europe and Poland. Jaroslaw Kaczynski openly calls him being "Merkel's candidate" (Kaczynski in Rzeczpospolita 2017).

In similar fashion, at an election campaign appearance in Boleslawiec, Duda portrayed his main rival, Trzaskowski, as being the German option, supported by German media. In a direct attack on the Poland correspondent of the German daily newspaper "Die Welt", Philipp Fritz, Duda deliberately uses Fritz and Trzaskowski's surnames in one sentence to strengthen the association between them and his message about the next German attack "on the election in Poland" (Duda in Wyborcza.pl 2020). As Duda put it: "Mr Fritz had recently stated that Mr Trzaskowski would be the better president from German perspective". To strengthen the image of a German minion or a domestic villain and collaborator, Duda emphasised that Trzaskowski would be willing to cooperate with the German government on issues like the German-Russian Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, and that Trzaskowski would not back Poland's war reparations claims. The last one may be true, but taken out of context; within the sovereign discourse it is charged with the same negative connotations associated with the Nord Stream 2 project making him an effective and active German agent.

3.1.2 The pseudo-economic frame

For the author, it is not surprising that anti-EU economic discourse is not very present in Polish public space. It is common knowledge in Poland that the transition to a liberal economy and EU membership turbocharged economic growth. EU sponsored projects are visible in innumerable Polish villages, towns and cities. This is reflected by Poland enjoying one of the highest levels of EU membership support among all member states. Although it is understood at a superficial level - i.e. mostly as membership of the single market with all the economic benefits of it (Balcer et al. 2017) – the eurozone- attacking narrative present in the Manifesto has not translated into the same type of attack in PiS speeches, also probably because with passage of time the situation there has improved and other forms of discourses proved to be better suited for scaremongering and for creation of the triad. If applied, this frame could have been much easier to defuse for the opposition, as very few believe that Poland will join the euro soon.

In one of the few attempts to create imaginary external economic threats, Duda, in the aforementioned speech in Kamienna Gora, invokes "faraway capitals" as places where the fate of Poland is decided and "that's where the money we make is taken." Looking at his remarks in a broader context it could be argued, he talks here about Brussels and/or Berlin. He goes on with a tirade about how "We" have to work "for the benefit of others". He not only puts "We" against "others" but accuses them of cynical exploitation. He straightway gives an alternative: the building of "our own state" to "feel you work for your own benefit" instead of being a victim "you build your own homeland". In that passage he does not put himself into the position of a typical hero, but rather that of a leader displaying a vision of a better future when "our fate" is no longer dictated by "faraway capitals ". There are limits to any discourse, and with Poland being a net beneficiary of the European budget, the economic frame has not much to offer in terms of manipulating public opinion.

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Overall, the economic discourse criticising or approving the EU or its policies is not as present in the public space as the remaining two are; although there are some references to Nord Stream 2 described for instance by Bogdan Rzonca- PiS member of the Sejm, the lower house of the bicameral parliament of Poland, as being "the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of the XXI century"(Rzonca in Polskieradio.pl 2018), but it could hardly be seen as an economic discourse used for domestic political point-scoring only. In a similar fashion, using historical grievances towards Germany, to redirect public attention and fight back the interest of the German media in the aforementioned scandal involving the former Minister of National Defence, Antoni Macierewicz and the Secretary of State, Bartosz Kownacki, the war reparations motive was resuscitated by Kaczynski. It could be described as using some form of an economic discourse, with less apparent presence of the triad. Germany could be described here as not completely reformed and still powerful Villain, Polish society as the historical Victim and the government as the dutiful and active, but not very effective Hero, which does not believe really in success of its action on international stage. Szostkiewicz sees this as a strategy to "pressure or blackmail" both- the EU and Berlin, to not deal with antidemocratic reforms of the division of power and other rule of law issues in Poland (Szostkiewicz 2017). But arguably, it is also produced for domestic consumption by the political audience to distract it from the shortcomings of the government and the aforementioned scandal linked with key figures in Ministry of National Defence.[10]

3.1.3 Conservative/religious frame

Surprisingly, the conservative discourse is not as present as sovereignty and economic ones in key documents. It contrasts with its highly visible presence in the Polish public space, also

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[10] Although the author does not have any direct evidence for it, but it is very unlikely that anyone in Polish government believes that Germany would be willing to make any reparations. In the same fashion it could be argued no one in Germany government believes that the request has been genuine. Both parties seem to know it is part of domestic political game and act accordingly.

when issues related to the EU and other aspects of foreign policy are discussed. Although the conservative discourse is a distinct one, within the analysed cases the sovereignty discourse is intertwined with it. It just a matter of emphasising certain elements within the narrative that makes a case more sovereignty discourse-based, or economic, or conservative. The apparent violation of Polish sovereignty by an EU that wants to impose its laws on its Polish victims is a recurring leitmotiv in all cases. For instance, the targeting of refugees or the LGBT+ community in the 2020 election campaign purposes. Apart from apparent violation of Polish sovereignty by the EU, the outside Villain, other discourses used have a strong phobic element too, either against another outside villain-migrants, which suffer this status due to both sovereignty and conservative discourses. Any form of discourse could be used to target any domestic group not following the normative national Catholic narrative offered by PiS and the government. Into that category, fall cyclists and vegetarians, as described by the then minister of foreign affairs Waszczykowski, as well as sexual minorities. In this conservative narrative those groups are associated with foreign, "imported" leftist ideology which apparently undermines the Christian values, threaten wellbeing of Polish families, and children.

During an interview with the German tabloid Bild, which was widely commented on in Polish media, Waszczykowski was asked about the takeover of state media and the Constitutional Court by the ruling party and if he is surprised that EU politicians are talking about a "coup d'état". In outrage, he replied, "We just want to cure our state of some diseases so that it can recover" (Waszczykowski in Bild 2016). "We", the ruling party and the government, can heroically cure "diseases". The motives of fighting dragons, monsters, lurking beasts or bringing to an antidote to the unknown torment plaguing poor villagers is a prevailing motive in the hero mythology. The apparent diseases spread by the previous government, the Villain- was "a left-wing political concept […] according to the Marxist

model". Marxism has very strong negative connotations in Poland and is seen as a system imposed by the Soviet Union; therefore, anyone spreading it must be seen as a collaborator cooperating with foreign forces, a traitor. Although not explicit, there is a hint linking the EU with the Soviet Union via the apparent use of Marxist ideology by both, and through that portraying the EU as a powerful and evil empire. That is supposed to shed a negative light on the previous, very strongly pro-European government. To the main domestic villain- then ruling PO, Waszczykowski adds minions in this new world of "mixed cultures and races", arguably referring to multiculturalism endorsed by the EU. This time this role has been given to "cyclists and vegetarians who only rely on renewable energies and fight against any form of religion." These agents promote ideals "that have, nothing to do with traditional, Polish values anymore". Those values, "traditions, belief in God", "normal family life between husband and wife" adhered to by "the majority of Poles" are portrayed to be threatened by "25 years of left-wing and liberal indoctrination", but so far this assault "could not eliminate these traditional values".

Kaczynski even goes a step further. In another broadly discussed address, Kaczynski equated Polishness with the defence of traditional values, and active participation in "rebuilding of our reality" (Kaczynski in PolskieRadio24.pl 2019). In a dichotomous way, Kaczynski paints a black and white vision of the world, where you either "are with us or against us", out-group is juxtaposed against in-group using Jenne's nomenclature. In a certain way, it could serve as a foundation of a one party, one nation system. Everyone outside is potentially a foreign agent, if not a traitor, so the adjective "liberal" could be used to describe an emerging Villain, threatening "our" traditional values and way of life.

The conservative discourse is also used on European stage, but when it is not connected to any specific European or international project. For instance, in January 2018 the Polish prime

minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, visited his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orbán. In a similar fashion, during the visit both prime ministers shared a vision of Europe "remaining European" and based on "Christian roots" thanks to rejecting migration. Thus, Orbán and Morawiecki propose an alternative "philosophical" discourse of a monocultural Europe closed to refugees, where "European values" come, according to them, from exclusively Europe's "Christian roots".

The most telling example of a conservative discourse involving less-than-usual triad is Kaczynski's speech in April 2019 in Nowy Sącz. During the speech Kaczynski openly talks about apparent prolonged and unjustifiable "attacks on Poland" due to ideological antipathy of to "the main [philosophical] stream" also within the European Parliament, but he hopes it will weaken soon (Kaczynski in Polskie Radio24 2019). Of course, where there is an attack, there is an aggressor, the Villain, and the one who is attacked, the Victim. To strengthen his argument, Kaczynski uses highly emotionally charged words like "aversion" and "anger". In a plain attempt to create a strong common identity between his party, him and the voters, he uses the pronoun "we", in the process strengthening in-group identity. What is less orthodox when compared with other speeches is that he attributes victimhood to that common "we": "we are very often the victims [of the anger and of the attacks]". There is a certain level of glorification of that victimhood, which is a common theme in Christianity, as saints were often portrayed as martyrs. In that context, paradoxically, the victimization of Poland could serve an additional purpose of strengthening nationalism and paradoxically even national pride through making salient the ethos of martyrdom, the Polish self-image as a "Christ among nations" which has already been present during the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth and through the nineteenth century. It is acknowledged in the collective Polish national consciousness, that during the 123 where Poland ceased to exist on the map, the Catholic Church was a bastion of Polishness, national identity and culture. As Kaczynski

argues that Poland "is still a Catholic country, a country where those elementary values, which built our culture, our civilisation, which on a European scale, are still alive in a Polish version" (Kaczynski in Polskie Radio24 2019). He sees winning the election as clear proof it. The siege fortress narrative of Poland being a bastion of Christianity in Europe, the EU which is under constant attack is portrayed "in a very strong way" what strengthens the impact of the narrative. Ironically, to strengthen his message he uses the word "crusade". Despite the obvious historical connotations, the religious aspect makes the apparent martyrdom of Polish Catholics even stronger and more symbolic. Again, it is in "Europe", implicitly the EU, that "a kind of ideological crusade is underway" which emphasis the active Villain qualities of the latter. He paints a picture, in which the victims who are suffering because of the "unification, a globalization of Europe", call for the hero to step in to defend them against "liberal leftism, political correctness". Kaczynski equates conservative values not only with "the rules of the civilization in which we were raised, but also with "the rules of common sense". Interestingly, the invocation to rationality occurs several times in PFPS 2017-2021.

This scaremongering and winning formula is used again and again in combination with conservative discourse. It was also used during the election campaign to the European Parliament, by using exactly the same rhetoric of threatening voters with the consequences of not choosing PiS candidates. Less than a month before the 2019 European Parliament election, Jarosław Kaczyński stressed during a meeting with voters in Krakow that choosing PiS candidates will act as "a dam against the evil that is growing in the EU and which really threatens our [Christian] civilisation" (Kaczynski in PolskieRadio24.pl 2019). Through usage of that simile Kaczynski elevates the then Deputy Prime Minister Beata Szydło and Ryszard Legutko, who was running for re-election as an MEP, to the role of heroes preparing to fight against the threatening unknown evil, the Villain, whose powers are growing. These powers could be used against the narrowly defined "Us", those adhering to Christian values and

members of the "Christian civilization". Through the previously used toolkit of associating the EU with powerful and actively seeking to destroy the traditional order menace, the completion of the triad is finally engineered.

### 3.1.4 Alternative values laden discourse

This type of discourse is not only not present but discouraged. As has already been highlighted, Waszczykowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, mentioned cyclists and vegetarians "rely[ing] on renewable energies" as having "nothing to do with traditional, Polish values […]". Although there are certain groups whose interests are particularly accentuated, for instance, farmers, who apparently are discriminated against in the EU (2015 PiS Manifesto), nevertheless the countryside is a PiS stronghold, where conservative discourse is especially welcomed and cherished, therefore there is no need for a new frame.

3.2 Economic, rational discourse in chosen major cases of de-Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy goal-oriented cases

There is nearly total abandonment of the emancipatory sovereignty and conservative discourses when specific foreign policy projects are taken on board, despite topics related to those discourses being present in PFPS. Instead, through usage of economic and rational framing, the Polish government creates an image of a predictable, rational agent, despite the obvious de-Europeanization of its foreign policy. One plausible explanation is that the projects discussed below, or rather the narratives surrounding them, are not perceived as tools serving domestic political purposes. It supports the claim that there is a strict specialization of discourses aimed at either domestic or foreign audiences. The assertion about a unique approach to specific foreign policy projects is to strengthen with the lack of the dramatic triad in any of the narratives linked with them.

A key document outlining Polish Foreign Policy goals is well-crafted Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021. It is available in both Polish and English, what hints it is also intended to be used in an international domain. The very nature of this document points rather unambiguously at this interpretation too. It heavily emphasises dangers coming from a reinvigorated Russia acting in an assertive, if not a threatening manner towards, what it sees as its sphere of influence. The EU is occasionally criticized, but in rather a mild manner and occasionally there are even references for the need to strengthen it and not allow it to break down. As Figure 3 illustrates there is a high percentage of what I classify as economic discourse (24.6% of "coded"), but in many instances it is much more sober than in the manifesto, speeches or the analysed campaign spot. Most references to the EU are related to the eurozone crisis. There is also nearly as high percentage of sovereignty- as economic discourse (21.5% of "coded). Again, as surprisingly as in case of 2015 PiS manifesto only 3,3 % of "coded" refers to conservative, religious discourse: there are some rather mild references to the Christian roots of the Union.

Figure 3 Percentage of different frames negatively depicting the EU present in Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021 document as percentage of the whole coded text (MAXQDA)

Source: own elaboration

Again, there is much less obvious ideological spin than what one could initially expect.

Additionally, rationality and realism of the approach of the current (PiS) government is very

strongly emphasised. In that sense, the expected dramatic triad within the conservative frames

in not present. As Table 5 demonstrates the triad is also not very visible when the document

refers to sovereignty and the economy of Poland. It can be found there that also the intensity

of frames is kept at low, mild level (a full version of it can be found in Table 10 in Appendix

5). What is highly visible and emphasised is the "realism" of the new approach in Polish

Foreign Policy. The word "realism" or "real" is used at least 5 times. Poland is portrayed as

an assertive and rational player.

Table 5 Examples of different frames, their interpretation and level of intensity as present in
Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021

Polish Foreign Policy Strategy			
A frame used in the text	Examples of a frame/ subject related statements as occurring in PFPS	Comments and interpretation according to the dramatic triad with short analyses of other devices used.	Intensity
Economic	"[…]the eurozone crisis - which led to a recession in almost all European economies and which has not been overcome to date."	One could say it is merely a statement of facts rather than a discourse. What is symptomatic is which elements are chosen and what the document focuses on.	Mild
Sovereignty	"It also proved to be **a mistake**[11] to seek an answer to the EU crisis in **the**	It is too broad a statement to be completely approve	Mild

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[11] Words and expressions in bold chosen by the author himself.

	unjustified expansion of the competences of EU bodies at the expense of the prerogatives of Member States and democratic procedures."	or reject it. Some scholars agree that extending the European Central Bank's competencies cannot be justified according to the EU treaties, and that the process only opens doors to the accusations of furthering democratic deficit within the EU.	
Conservative/ religious (very few)	"The important premises of the Polish raison d'état are universal values: democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as **the Christian values** that underpin European integration."	Christian values are included among many other universal ones. It is a mild strengthening attempt to change PiS' image as being within the mainstream of European politics.	Mild

Source: own elaboration

3.2.1 The Three Seas Initiative (TSI)

Although there is no overly salient Europeanization discourse present in relation to the TSI, surprisingly, there is no negation of the EU CFSP/ESDP discourse either, or any other indicators of de-Europeanization of discourses. There is a lack of conservative or sovereignty discourses, also on the TSI website (https://3seas.eu), and of the dramatic triad too. The language of official speeches and statements related to this project is diplomatic and balanced. All this combined shows strong evidence in support of hypotheses 1b, 1c and 1d. Although when it comes to hypothesis 1b, it must be said that the true motivation behind TSI

would be extremely difficult to discover. Although "the smoking gun" type of evidence is not found, the emancipatory inspiration behind the project cannot be excluded.

The Three Seas Initiative is a flagship project of the Polish government. It was launched in 2015 by the presidents of Croatia and Poland. There are 12 EU member states on the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas that participate in the initiative. As is stated in TSI Progress Report out of the 77 projects envisaged within it, 51 percent are related to transport, 32 to energy and 17 to digital cooperation and development (2020). It was welcomed with suspicion by the EU as an alternative proposal leading in the long term to de-Europeanizing Poland and extracting it from extant EU structures and regional cooperation projects. Initially, Germany was wary of the separate alliance formed by these newer EU member states; it requested to participate in the project but was rejected.

There is a difference between the explanation offered by Zybertowicz- the advisor to president Duda, and the president's own narrative. This gives a unique opportunity to distinguish between the official discourse of the Polish government, which arguably, serves as fuel for boosting domestic and EU level acceptance of the project, and/or what actually drives the initiative and whether it has politically motivated purposes. This deliberate division of the discourses used by different actors, could on one hand benefit PiS by boosting of domestic acceptance of the project without alarming the EU for an open, official, long term, rather than occasional anti EU narrative related to the TSI, or, on the other hand, and what the author thinks, because of a low public visibility and profile of the professor and a highbrow profile of a magazine it was printed in, it gives a hint what set of believes drives the project or the political motivation behind it. The Cassandra-like vision of the potential future break-up of the EU painted by Zybertowicz contrasts with the president's and other officials' surprisingly level-headed and constrained narrative when it comes to commenting on the

project and its contextual setting. That would indicate that Duda behaves as a rational actor, using deferent forms of narrative for domestic purposes even when representing his country outside its borders, and other forms of narrative for long-standing projects signalling the underlying motivation and long-term direction of the Polish Foreign Policy.

3.2.1.1 The vision of the Three Seas Initiative as outlined by Zybertowicz

It is not an accident that when interviewed, Zybertowicz compared TSI to Byzantium, which cultivated "some of traditions and customs" of Western Rome a "thousand years" after its crisis and the ultimate fall (Zybertowicz 2017). Zybertowicz predicts the crisis in the old EU countries, which would be brought by "the influence of leftist experiments in social engineering". In his view, the old EU countries will fall into a crisis that will lead to the break-up of the community (2017).

When asked directly by the interviewer if "the concept of TSI is a form of building a new community for the time after the EU" Zybertowicz answers: "We certainly have to think in terms of alternative scenarios – with different time horizons" (2017). He does not deny this interpretation of the initiative being potentially a long-term alternative to the EU. In his view, additional justification for the alternative project is violation of the principle of EU solidarity by the German-Russian Nord Stream gas pipeline system. It does not include any other EU countries, which is understood as a proof of Berlin's thinking about plan B after the break-up of the EU. The encouragement of American investments in the TSI project also is justified in a rational way as a counterbalancing measure against German hegemony (2017).

3.2.1.2 The official narrative linked to TSI

It is hard to tell if the narrative of Central European countries becoming "the custodians of the achievements of Latin civilisation" as presented by Zybertowicz, is only used for

propaganda purposes. Surprisingly, the official narrative is different from this. In a certain sense it really does not matter if Zybertowicz really believes or not in his own arguments, or if Duda believes in them too. What is important is the fact that although previously Duda, Kaczynski and other PiS officials regularly juxtaposed the liberal EU against Poland as a protector of conservative values, its flagship project and official strategy present in PFPS does not follow the same hard sovereignty and conservative discourse. If what professor Zybertowicz articulates is believed by the government, the president and the leadership of PiS, and occasionally it is expressed in their speeches, or it is purely used cynically for domestic purposes, this in reality does not matter for the purpose of this research. What counts is the usage of a different narrative in regard to TSI, which points to a deliberately distinctive division of discourses for domestic and international purposes. For instance, during the opening of the Three Seas Initiative Conference in Krakow in September 2020 Duda clearly tries to connect TSI with the whole EU project and to a narrative of international, regional and "the whole European Union" cooperation for the benefit and prosperity of all (Duda in Gospodarka Morska 2020). That strongly points to maintaining the Europeanization discourse as an indicator: "The salience of the EU CFSP/ESDP discourse in national foreign policy."

The selling point of TSI is as an example of regional cooperation within the EU, which will "accelerate the development of our part of Europe". It will serve "the entire European Union, […] the entire Community" (Duda in Gospodarka Morska 2020). This narrative also boosts the prospects of success as it would be perceived as less risky for investors if TSI as a project is portrayed as deeply associated with the EU. This makes this discourse appropriate for a rational player.

3.2.2 Justification of the de-Europeanization of Security and Defence projects with economic and rational discourses[12]

Since PiS formed the government, it also embarked on de-Europeanization of its security and defence policy, which is deeply linked with foreign policy. Nevertheless, the discourses applied to justify the decisions taken hid this fact. It is best visible when one looks closer at 3 chosen mini cases: withdrawal from the contract with Airbus, the withdrawal from the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet, and lastly the withdrawal of most Polish officers from the Eurocorps. Here the government has followed the same economic and rational agent formula applied to TSI, despite a visible "180 degree turn away from the EU in the realms of security and defence" (Bursa 2017). As it is still deeply embedded within the EU, Poland tries to maintain an image of being a reliable and rational partner, despite attempts to emancipate the Polish defence forces in certain areas.

As in TSI there are no indicators of de-Europeanization of discourses related to security and defence projects. Conservative or sovereignty discourses are not present and the dramatic triad is absent too. The language of official speeches and statements is diplomatic and balanced. Again, all this combined shows strong evidence in support of hypotheses 1b,1c,1d.

3.2.2.1 Withdrawal from the contract with Airbus

In April 2015 Airbus won a tender to supply the Polish armed forces with Caracal helicopters. In the last phase of the contract negotiation, the detail of a so-called offset was discussed under which Poland would buy 50 Caracals, and in return, Airbus would establish manufacturing facilities in Poland. The change of government resulted in the new Polish

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[12] The analysed cases are present, but not analysed from a discourse point of view in Bursa's publication (2017).

government abandoning these plans. During the conference, Antoni Macierewicz, the newly appointed minister of National Defence explained the reasons for breaking off negotiations with the Airbus Helicopters company. He said:" I regretted the position of Airbus Helicopters, which rejected, did not meet the Polish proposals related to offset, as presented by the minister of development,"(Macierewicz in Polityka 2016). His statement does not use the conservative or even sovereignty discourse so popular among PiS and the government officials for domestic purposes, that could also be applied here. There is an obvious element of the economic discourse, but very firmly using rational argumentation. As further justification for ending negotiations he added Airbus's failure to present its own proposals, but this is a far cry from vilifying Airbus, France, any institutions, or any specific person. There is no creation of the triad. Interestingly, neither pro- nor anti-European discourses are present here.

3.2.2.2 The withdrawal from the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMRTTF)

The same reason - unresolved disputes over offset revenue - was cited for the government's pullout of Polish participation in MMRTTF within Common Security and Defence Policy (Ministry of National Defence in TVN24 2016). The project was led by the European Defence Agency. Again, it shows the ongoing process of de-Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy of Poland, but interestingly, again the economic, rational reasons are brought forward to justify the move. The problem was said to be the high costs of the project and the unsatisfactory results - for Poland - of the offset negotiations with Airbus. The possibility of acquisition of MMRTTF by Poland, was, apparently, explored by Ministry of National Defence (MON) (MON in TVN24 2017), but the costs of acquisition would have been even

higher, so there must have been other reasons behind the decision. Still, the economic, rational discourse was chosen to justify the withdrawal.

3.2.2.3 The withdrawal of most Polish officers from the Eurocorps

In March 2017, MON announced "the withdrawal of most of Polish officers from the Eurocorps- an intergovernmental military unit", which does not operate directly within the CSDP framework (Bursa 2017). It is another example of de-Europeanization of Polish defence and the justification of it within a rational narrative. The Polish government claimed that the officers were needed to strengthen NATO's eastern flank "in the context of collective defence" and that Eurocorps weakens its role in regard to the implementation of tasks within NATO (MON 2017).

What makes those decisions and movements significant is the timing of them. As Poland started to detach itself from European security and defence mechanisms, these mechanisms were becoming stronger and more necessary as President Trump started questioning NATO and US foreign policy priorities. Knowing that, both the economic and rational arguments of those moves are questionable; they would more appropriately be treated as agenda driven discourses, nevertheless different than those applied in the domestic political scene. What is highly relevant is the lack of victimhood or blame games, or usage of any other scenarios where the dramatic triad could potentially be used. In the PFPS document 11 mild negative references to the EU are featured, and the ways Poland benefits from the government's current and future activities are highlighted. However, the form and intensity of language used in them is not even near how Hero is presented in speeches for domestic purposes.

3.3 Contrasting discourses for domestic and European level purposes

There are visible qualitative and quantitative differences between the two key documents, the Manifesto and the PFPS, and the way they translate into differences in the discourses applied in speeches. This could reflect differences in deliberate strategies regarding application of the discourses at the domestic and international level. As both documents are official, the mild to moderate version of discourses and language used in them could be expected and is confirmed with just one exception, an instance of using highly emotionally charged language in the 2015 PiS manifesto when alleged imposition of political correctness by the EU is described as "cultural aggression" achieved through the means of "criminal repression". Also timing could play a role here, as the Manifesto was issued at the early stage in the election cycle, so it could have contributed to taming of the language used.

As Table 6 shows one could conclude that the difference in intensity of the frames applied is only visible at domestic level, as it is moderated by political events: election campaigns or scandals. On the other hand, the preferable environment for goal-based long-term foreign policy projects demands an image of stable and rational agents, which is reflected in only mildly ore moderately negative intensity of discourses. Interestingly the dramatic triad is completely abundant, arguably to avoid antagonizing European partners.

As there are multiple instances of offensive, negative and potentially highly inflammatory language present in discourses for domestic purposes, one of the explanations of this Janus-faced behaviour is the reliance of the Polish government and PiS officials on understating of convention of a two level game diplomacy, with one game played at the domestic, national level and the other one played at the international level (Putnam 1988), by European political counterparts and decision makers in within the EU institutions. In contrast to Putnam theory this study demonstrates that discourses (in form of frames and presence or lack of the triad)

used at domestic and international level are not interdependent but are asymmetric driven by different goals and rational. It could be that it is expected by the governing party and Polish government that although these narrative excesses at domestic level are disapproved, they will not drastically and strategically change the actual behaviour of the EU or their European partners towards Poland as long as the narrative is not accompanied by harmful actions. At the international level, in relation to specific projects where foreign partners are present, the discourses change to economic and rational ones. In those foreign policy goal-oriented cases the argumentation presented by the government and reflected in official documents and/or governmental websites is level-headed and does not use inflammatory, negative language.

From what has been noted above, one can conclude that the change of the medium (from an official document to a speech), and/or timing (documents served as a starting point, whereas the type and intensity of discourses used in speeches has evolved over time) is necessary, but not a sufficient prerequisite for the change of intensity and frames offered. These changes need to happen within the domestic political environment, or at least it should be plausible, that they would be consumed by broad domestic audience.

Table 6 The level of intensity and the presence of the triad in official documents and speeches at the domestic and international level.

	Domestic consumption	International stage
Official documents	Mild to moderate versions of frames. The presence of triad.	Mild versions of frames. No triad present.
Speeches	The extreme versions of frames. Presence of dramatic triad.	Mild version of frames. No triad present.

Source: own elaboration

Not surprisingly, sovereignty discourse is the most common and successful form of shaping public opinion and feelings in Poland. Poles are particularly susceptible to the threat, even

imaginary, of losing independence. Also, the period after World War II till 1989 is treated as

a loss of independence, this time, under Soviet occupation. This frame can be found in both

key documents, but only in speeches delivered for domestic purposes. When it comes to

actual projects, Polish diplomacy restrained itself from abusing this discourse, whereas it

does happen for domestic purposes. Remarkably, the conservative discourse, elements of

which are present in many PiS speeches, is not emphasised neither in the manifesto nor

PFPS, in contrast with the economic discourse, which is surprisingly often applied in the

Manifesto. There are many references to economic argumentation in PFPS, but contrary to

expectations, an anti-EU economic narrative is rather absent from the Polish public space.

Very high support for EU membership – understood as an economic project - could be behind

it.

Table 7 Overview of the presence of the level of different frames in speeches for the domestic
audience and related to specific European projects, 2015 PiS Manifesto and PFPS

Frame	Speeches for the domestic audience	2015 PiS Manifesto	Speeches related to specific European level projects	PFPS
Sovereignty	Dominates	Dominates	Not present	Moderate to high
Conservative	High	Low	Not present	Very low
Economic	Low	High	The only present	Dominates

PiS has responded to the demands of a significant part of Polish society, which was left

behind after the post-1989 transformation. This has created a perfect background for broad

support of a more extreme narrative among the economic losers and those uncomfortable

with the rapid social liberal changes within Polish society. It is hard to establish the true

motivations behind the variation of the discourses offered by the government and PiS

officials, but behind the smokescreens of statements a picture emerges, suggesting that PiS

and the current Polish government are involved in a two-faced strategy. In the domestic context, it uses highly conservative and sovereignty emphasizing discourses for political gains, boosting its support. On the international, European stage it prefers to maintain the image of a rational actor, using what could be perceived as reason over ideological, nationalistic, and conservative narratives.

3.4 Finding

There is very strong evidence in support of hypothesis 1a. Based on the contextual interpretation, the study derives that sovereignty and conservative discourses are used for domestic political gains: winning elections or maintaining electorate support. The combination of MAXQDA statistical analyses of the official documents, and the application of Discourse Analysis to speeches and official statements both show an increase in the usage of conservative frames and decrease of economic one in the latter, when compared with the 2015 PiS manifesto for domestic political purposes, arguably due to natural evolution and selection of best fit for purpose ones.

The hypothesis 1b: Economic discourse is exclusively used when dealing with specific international projects to maintain an image of a rational player and/or to hide the true motivation behind decisions, is also partly supported. Although the author is not completely satisfied with the strength of evidence, there are some indications in support of this hypothesis, especially in relation to the image-maintaining aspect. Rationality of behaviour is emphasized in PFPS 2017-2021, and the diplomatic and business-like tone of specific project-related speeches points in that direction. The same could be said about the incongruence of the pro-European narrative of President Duda related to TSI and explanation offered by his advisor- Professor Zybertowicz. Nevertheless, drawing a conclusion about the motivation of the government based only on aforementioned evidence could be premature and requires further investigation.

There is very strong evidence in support of hypothesis 1c: there is presence of the dramatic triad in discourses employed for domestic purposes and a lack of it in the narrative used for specific European level projects (TSI and CFSP/ESDP). In the dramatic triad Polish government, PiS officials, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and President Duda portray themselves as the Hero, whereas PiS supporters, Polish families, and Polish society are depicted as the Victims of the EU or Germany, which puts the last two into the Villain position. Occasionally the Hero is not explicitly stated, but it is clear within the given context who plays that role. The triad is completely absent in discourses related to specific European level projects.

There is strong evidence in support of hypothesis 1d: de-Europeanization of discourses happens only in the domestic context; it does not occur in specific European level projects (TSI and CFSP/ESDP). De-Europeanization of discourses at the domestic political stage is obvious, both in the 2015 PiS manifesto and the speeches. What is surprising is that a pro-European narrative in speeches and statements related to specific projects and initiatives is maintained. Although someone could claim that there are some occasional very mild indications of de-Europeanization present in PFPS 2017-2021, the very low level of intensity of discourses applied could as well be interpreted as mere criticism of the EU. The present in PFPS support for close cooperation between Poland and EU, and, for instance, surprising backing for development by the EU Common Security and Defence Policy also indicates that it could be a part of bargaining strategy of the government rather than de-Europeanization of its discourse there.

Taking for account all the evidence and the high support for hypotheses 1a,1b (partly),1c and 1d, one can conclude that there is strong evidence in support of overarching hypothesis 1: discourses in domestic and international domains are disjoined.

Finally, there is strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 2: The intensity of frames in official documents, speeches and statements differ over time. Elections and scandals are the

critical moments in which certain frames in discourses become most prominent. Although, it must be mentioned that high resolution analyses paint the following nuanced picture with the subsequent necessary conditions to be fulfilled. Firstly, the change in the intensity of the language is only decidedly higher at the domestic-, and not at specific European projects related discourses, what links it with hypothesis 1a. Secondly, a form of delivery matters, what arguably explain lower level intensity of frames present in 2015 PiS manifesto or PFPS document, as is not expected that they would have extensively been read by voters, What is the strongest argument in favour of hypothesis 2 is the fact that out of ten analysed speeches, seven happened within the month preceding elections and one after a serious scandal shook PiS's public image. The highly inflammatory nature of the analysed election spot is self-evident and self-explanatory.

Chapter 4-Conclusions

4.1 Summing-up of the research question, explanatory approach and method, justification of choosing the subject, social and scientific importance

The topic of de-Europeanization of foreign policy discourses is an underexplored one. The discourses investigated here can be placed along fake news, conspiracy theories, populism and all sorts of other truth-bending narrative techniques or ideologies lying on a spectrum of half-truths on one end and plain lies on the other. Before any attempt to manage or even prevent worsening of the current state of affairs can be made, a diagnosis seems to be of paramount importance. The uniqueness of my research is enhanced by an exploration of the presence - or not – of the combination of the dramatic triad with frames within these aforementioned discourses. This has not been done explicitly so far either within de-Europeanization of foreign policy -, or even, generally, within the foreign policy research context. The issue of the presence - or not - of frames and triads within various contexts is broad enough to be explored from different angles. I decided to tackle the problem across both domestic and European dimension. This focus has helped me to clarify the research problem into my central research question: How to systematically understand the de-Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy discourses?

The breadth of the question is visible in as many as five distinct, but interlinked hypotheses four of which under an umbrella of hypothesis 1. It allows the rich tapestry of political discourses and the triad present in them to be shown in any country. For instance, earlier, the de-Europeanization of discourses in Turkey by Erdogan has been explored by Aydın-Düzgit (2016), but not in connection with the dramatic triad. From a scientific point of view, the additional level of complication linked to the fact that Poland is now part of a supranational

structure, the EU, adds to the especially fascinating challenge of disentangling the two-level discourse structure.

Multiple sources, such as official documents, speeches and statements, but also documents shedding some light on the broader context, have allowed me to explore various aspects of discourses on many levels and within different contexts. Speeches and statements were selected based on their popularity, visibility in mass media and the political power of a speaker.

4.2 Summing-up of findings

There is strong evidence that the Polish government and PiS officials have played and are playing a double-level narrative game. On the domestic political scene, they used/use de-Europeanizing foreign policy sovereignty and conservative frames in combination with usage of the triad; they portray themselves as the Heroes, the saviours of PiS voters and Polish society, with the purpose of winning elections or maintaining electoral support. Hence, hypotheses 1a ,1c and 1d are not falsified, and there is strong evidence in support of them.

At the European level, the government and PiS officials use economic, rational discourse, without any sign of the dramatic triad, to maintain the image of a rational player and, arguably, to de-Europeanize parts of its foreign policy - at least those related to its defense and security aspect and, possibly, to hide, or at least soften, the true motivation behind the Three Seas Initiative. Again, hypotheses 1c and 1d are strongly supported by available data. Hypothesis 1b is partly supported and would need further investigation of true motive behind TSI, which is beyond the scope of my research. Arguably, that double game is played with the assumption of the EU and European counterparts understanding this nuanced, between-the-lines approach to running Polish Foreign Policy. Lack of dramatic triad, anti-EU discourses as well as lack of change or even decrease in intensity of the language of official speeches related to specific EU

projects Poland has disembarked from when comparing with the one present in PFPS 2017-2021, points to the will to maintain a diplomatic and balanced imagine at international stage by PiS government venturing into emancipatory projects like TSI.

These findings are relevant for several research streams. First, they demonstrated disjuncture between domestic and international domains, which is widely assumed by International Relations and Europeanization research. The study also adds to the literature on discursive legitimation claims used by illiberal and populist leaders in democracies.

4.3 Indication of open questions, weaknesses, and venues for future research

The breadth of question and multitude of hypotheses is not necessarily accompanied by the depth of research. To increase validity of my findings one could increase the sample of speeches and statements, but as well include more official documents, especially related to any further European projects Poland is trying to disentangle itself from. Also, more some statistical analyses could have been performed on speeches and statements, and not only on documents. The intensity of discourses could be better methodologically embedded within Discourse Analysis theory.

Future research should focus on the similarities and differences, if there are any, between the frames, their intensity, and the ways that the triad is or is not used by EU member states, and countries outside of it. Future researchers of the topic could try to find out why are certain narratives used at certain times, contexts and not at other, for instance, how changes in international context, environment influences de-Europeanization of discourses at domestic and international level in Poland or other EU member states and as well other non-EU countries; lastly, why is the role of a saving Hero not played explicitly by a communicator all the time, and how the triad connect with the different frames. To check for applicability of

generalization, some further research of Hungary, for instance, would be a natural extension of this study. Further research on discourses in domestic and international domains, in also other than the EU context, for instance, the extent they are disjoined or not, could throw light on inner operation of illiberal and not only regimes.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Uploading means a process of elevating national (e.g., foreign) policy goals to EU level of policymaking to add European collective gravitas to national preferences, taking into account other member states preferences in the process as well (Blais 2015). As Börzel and Risse note, uploading also reduces adaptation costs at the national level and conformity problems (2003). In case of Poland, it used to be the Eastern Partnership a flagship project of the previous Civic Platform (PO) government that was upload to EU level; currently this lost its momentum and has not been vigorously pursued by the current government, which has translated into a decrease in uploading Polish Foreign Policy to the EU level. Instead, the government channels its energy into the Three Seas Initiative which does not show many signs of Europeanization This change strengthens the argument for the need of research going beyond explanations offered exclusively by this stream.

In the process of downloading, foreign policy positions collectively agreed at the EU level are implemented within national foreign policies, which leads to their evolution over time (Agnantopoulos 2010). There are attempts to explain Europeanization of national policy through analyses of strategic socialization that leads to the strategic adaptation of national policy positions with those at the EU. For instance, Pomorska and Juncos define it as the "adaptation of certain rules of behaviour, 'ways of doing things', stemming from interaction with members of the same group." (2006). As a prerequisite for developing the adaptational pressures, Börzel and Risse acknowledge the degree of "misfit" between EU and national level policy and institutions, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the change to occur (2009). The second condition is linked to "facilitating factors" – e.g. actors, institutions – responding to "the adaptational pressures" (2009). The process can happen

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through two different venues, supported either by rational choice institutionalism

(Featherstone, Radaelli 2003 p.9), or by sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism.

 In the first case, the "logic of consequentialism" (March and Olsen 1998; Featherstone,

Radaelli 2003, p.16) is followed, where the dissonance between "policies, institutions,

processes" at European and national level, "provides societal and/or political actors with new

opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests" (Börzel and Risse 2009 p.16). It is

done by rational actors applying the logic of consequences rather than appropriateness to

maximize "expected returns from alternative choices" (Britannica 20021).

Börzel and Risse distinguish between high and medium adaptational pressures within the

rationalist institutionalist perspective, with supposedly, even medium pressure being

sufficient to transform domestic policy provided formal institutions are present (Börzel and

Risse 2002). Although the importance of interactions between domestic and EU dimensions,

a key assumption of my thesis, is accentuated here, what is not explained and is critical, is

that this would happen only when domestic agents already see a utility in Europeanization

rather than de-Europeanization. The weakness of top-down approaches rests in neglecting the

policy shaping power of domestic agency.

Another hypothesis looks at interactions accompanied by internalization leading to

"identification with EU positions and internalization of EU norms and objectives" (Flers,

Alecu de, and Müller 2012). According to sociological institutionalism and its "logic of

appropriateness" (March and Olsen 2004; Featherstone, Radaelli 2003, p 15),

Europeanization leads to changes in domestic policy, institutions and processes through "a

socialization and collective learning process": persuasion, arguing and social learning lead to

the development of new identities and internalization of the norms (Börzel and Risse 2009;

Featherstone, Radaelli 2003, p.14). However, the necessary conditions for the process to be

successful are not completely revealed. Again, the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy and discourse related to it seems to be ignored.

Lastly, cross-loading is understood as a mutual process of learning by member states from each other within "a dense network of information sharing and mutually influencing policy making structures" (Aggestam and Bicchi 2019). At the centre of cross-loading is socialisation, which, for instance, happens during interactions and organizational learning within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) institutions. This leads to changes in belief about administrative routines as well as actual bureaucratic changes at both national and EU level. Alternatively, it can be done through interaction complemented with "critical foreign policy experience" and belief change about policy effectiveness leading to foreign policy change also at both the national and EU level (Flers, Alecu de, and Müller 2012). when interaction in CFSP institutions helps to draw lessons from experiences of others. This results in a "belief change about policy and administrative effectiveness" and cross loading foreign policy and/or administrative practices (Kerber and Eckardt 2007). Nevertheless, in the moment of writing the thesis Poland participated to a lower degree in CFSP than under the previous government, despite similar levels of participation by high-ranking officials, diplomats, etc. Interactions within CFSP has not prevented de-Europeanisation of Polish Foreign Policy (cooperation on EU level specific projects with other member states) (Bursa 2017). Interestingly, and what is not much discussed in scholarly literature, is the fact that the reverse process of de-Europeanisation through cross-loading has taken place in Poland and Hungary through socialisation on high political echelons, but on a less formal level.

Appendix 2

Character Theory allows to capture relations between characters in the triad are portrayed along two dimensions: their goodness and power. For example, Jasper lists heroes' sources of goodness, with some being compatible with conservative parties; for instance, by "protecting […] others (or) conformity to valued norms". "Generosity" is also on his list, which is the economic domain of left-leaning parties (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). The PiS narrative uses both aforementioned sources. The second power dimension is also analysed when appropriate as it is an additional source of threat building within narratives.

Where suitable, the third dimension borrowed from ACT is introduced to check how active or passive the given character is, especially if their alleged activity strengthens the threat to the Victim. These three dimensions are not analysed extensively, but only in addition to the main goal of finding if the dramatic triad is present at all.

 What must be said about the Hero is that she/he should be straightforward in her/his actions, whereas the Villain exhibits ''sneakiness, backbiting, innuendo, mudslinging, bullying, domineering, quarrel-picking, and cruelty'' (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018) and is also bad and strong enough to justify the necessity of stopping them. Additionally, Villains need to be active in plotting and scheming to fulfil their evil intentions (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018). I expect these characteristics of Villains to be used when portraying the EU, certain EU countries (Germany), but as well domestic minions, allegedly, plotting against the Polish government and Polish society. Through this, fear and hatred toward Villains can be generated, producing an extremely potent amalgamate of emotions used in political conflicts to mobilize supporters and "heighten the urgency" of an action (Cohen 1972; Dower 1986 in Bergstrand and Jasper 2018 2018). The deep and broad political and social changes attempted by PiS demand a whole plethora of Villains to weave potent and convincing narratives. These narratives, discourses, rhetoric, ideologies, and frames shape PiS supporters' understanding

of the political situation largely through simplification or by a distorting prism of the familiar tropes that PiS and Polish government provide them with. Their potency is strengthened by their familiarity; they are already well known to everyone from childhood fairy tales, providing a "simplified package of intentions and capacities" (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018); a caricature ignoring the complexities of real life.

CT extends identities beyond individuals to groups, formal organizations, and sometimes even nations. That allows me to apply the theory to the "fictional humans" so important in politics, as these collective identities provoke action (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018) . This framework serves especially well to analyse how the PiS structures discourse towards the EU, other states and the opposition through personification of them as Villains.

The application of Discourse Analysis allows for an evaluation of discourses, mobilization frames, and offers an insight how all elements (the triad and frames) are linked to de-Europeanization of foreign policy related narratives at domestic level, and how lack of them does not stop de-Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy per se.

Appendix 3

Table 8 Overview of the selected speeches, interviews, an election spot, documents and official announcements

A form of delivery	Who delivered or produced it	When delivered or produced it	Where delivered (relevant for speeches) /available (relevant for documents, official announcement)	The contextual interpretation of the addressees
Manifesto	Law and Justice	20.02.2014	online	Domestic political elites, a very narrow part of domestic audience
Manifesto	Civil Platform	09.2015	online	Domestic political elites, a very narrow part of domestic audience
Polish Foreign Policy Strategy document	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	04.2017	Online, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website	International and domestic political elites
Speech	President Andrzej Duda	11.09.2018 (just before the local government elections)	Lezajsk, Poland	Domestic Audience
Remarks during a diplomatic meeting with President Steinmeier	President Andrzej Duda	23.10.2018 (just after the local elections)	Berlin, Germany	Domestic audience
Speech	President Andrzej Duda	10.2016	Budapest, Hungary	Domestic audience, The government of Hungary, Fidesz supporters
Speech	President Andrzej Duda	03.2018	Kamienna Góra, Poland	Domestic audience

Speech	President Andrzej Duda	(just before the presidential election)	Boleslawiec, Poland	Domestic audience
Speech	President Andrzej Duda	07.09.2020	Krakow, Poland	International, European audience
Election campaign spot	Law and Justice	17.10.2018 (just before the local elections)	Online, YouTube, Twitter	Domestic audience
Speech	Law and Justice leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski	12.10.2015 (just before the parliamentary election)	Makow near Warsaw, Poland	Domestic audience
Speech	Law and Justice leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski	30.04.2019 (just before the European Parliament election)	Nowego Sącza, Poland	Domestic audience
Speech	Law and Justice leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski	30.04.2019 (just before the European Parliament election)	Krakow	Domestic audience
Speech	the Secretary of State, Bartosz Kownacki	07.2017 (just after a scandal involving him was discovered)	Warsaw, Poland	Domestic audience
Answer during the conference	Minister of National Defence, Antoni Macierewicz	08.10.2016	Warsaw, Poland	International, European and domestic audience
Official announcement	Ministry of National Defence	28.03.2017	Online, MND website	International, European political elites
Official announcement	Ministry of National Defence	03.03.2017	Online, MND website	International, European political elites
Speech	Prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki	03.01.2018	Budapest, Hungary	Domestic audience, The government of Hungary, Fidesz supporters
Interview	the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witold Waszczykowski	01.2016	----	Domestic audience

Interview	Zybertowicz, Andrzej	07.07.2017	----	Domestic intellectual elites

Source: own elaboration

Appendix 4

Table 9 Examples of different frames, their interpretation and level of intensity as present in the 2015 PiS Manifesto

2015 PiS Manifesto			
Type of a frame	Examples of the frame as occurring in the manifesto	Interpretation according to the dramatic triad with short analyses of other devices used	Level of intensity of the discourse/ language applied
Sovereignty	"Unification or **radical impoverishment**[13] of this diversity, replacing cultural heritage with **primitive experiments** in civilisation, means alienating our continent."	It is an important reference to the EU – the culturally unifying potent and active Villain allegedly trying to replace cultural (Christian) heritage with liberal, "primitive" experiments. At the same time the conservative/ religious dimension is present here.	Moderate
	"It also means consenting to hegemony, a state of affairs which has been decisively rejected by the Community's founders because the **hegemony** of a single country on a continental scale leads to the return of policies which inevitably end in **violent conflicts and, ultimately, wars**. "	Implicit reference to Germany, its apparent "hegemonic" tendencies within the EU, what ultimately could lead to a war. It is a scaremongering in its purest form. Again, the Villain is dangerous, effective and actively seeking to impose its will.	Moderate
	"We do not accept the uncontrolled **erosion of the sovereignty of the European homelands**."	PiS portrays itself as a protector, the Hero, not only on the national, but also the European level.	Mild to Moderate
	"It is Law and Justice Party which, together with the British Conservative Party and other partners from the European Conservatives and Reformists political group, has **taken up the battle** for	It rare that PiS singles out one group, farmers. As it has very high support in rural areas, it should not be surprising though. Again, PiS is	Mild

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[13] Words and expressions in bold chosen by the author himself.

		the most important issue for the Polish rural areas - the full redistribution of direct payments to Polish farmers who have been **discriminated against so far in the European Union**."	portrayed as a brave, noble Hero, the EU as potent and active Villain and farmers forced into the Victim position.	
		"Once such a state is established, the constituent entities **lose their independence**."	The EU is not a state. Again, it is scaremongering taken out of the treaties established and signed by all member states	Moderate
		"Poland's foreign policy is also being **reduced to** an element in the EU's external action policy, which in fact means that it is **subordinated to** the interests of the strongest EU countries."	Actually, Poland uploaded its foreign policy to EU level with the Eastern Partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy, so it would serve its needs. It is another attempt to vilify allegedly hegemonic Germany.	Mild to moderate
	Economic	"A telling example of this image-building exercise was the completely unfounded and **unrealistic proposal** to adopt the euro very quickly.	This part refers to PO, previously the ruling party, that in the eyes of PiS was unwise to consider adopting troubled euro. PiS is proposes a contrast to signal its virtues.	Mild
		"This project, although **completely detached from reality and economically absurd**, became the basis for a long-lasting campaign in which parties from outside the government coalition were also involved."	Not only PO, but the whole opposition is discredited as being unrealistic. The economic and political realism of PiS is particularly emphasised.	Mild to moderate
		"(only Law and Justice immediately stated that the	It contrasts the oppositions' lack of ability to foresee the	

	idea was totally **unrealistic and harmful).**"	dangers stemming from implementing of the projects with PiS competences.	Mild
	"Efforts to gain recognition from Berlin and Brussels have led [the previous government] to decisions as **disastrous** as agreeing to the climate package, abandoning the use of the veto, justified by the claim that the veto is a 'nuclear bomb."	Berlin and Brussels are the main culprits, with PO merely playing a rather passive minion role. PiS frequently emphasised it would actively seek to protect coal industry.	Moderate
	"**The heavy blow** to the Polish economy was covered up with a story of great success in terms of new resources obtained by Poland, although in fact nothing was obtained."	The Villain(s) are usually portrayed as plotting (an active ingredient) behind the scenes, whereas the Hero(s) uncovers it in the dramatic finale for the benefit of the whole community (the Victim).	Moderate
Conservative	"[…]we believe that a model of social life based on the values of our tradition, when put into practice, can have **a significant leverage effect by setting a good example**."	PiS is depicted here as a Europe-saving Hero through the process of reminding the continent of its traditional values.	Mild
	"We reject political correctness, which is **a restriction that is increasingly painful** for many Europeans and which is now imposed not only through **cultural aggression but also through administrative and criminal repression**."	This is full-blown vilification of the EU. The use of words and expressions like "cultural aggression" and "administrative and criminal repression" could not only scare, but as well cause anger, and therefore consolidate voters behind the protective Hero- PiS. It portrays the EU as evil, committed and active.	Severe

	"A Union built on the solid roots of an identity of civilisation, **not on social constructivism."**	Again, PiS' ideological offer - conservative and protective in its familiarity – is juxtaposed against the EU's apparent frivolous, excessively liberal and potentially dangerous social constructivism.	Mild
	"Let us not create Europeans, because Europeans exist, and European civilisation has great Greco-Roman-Christian roots."	Any manifestations of European civilization other than classical or Christian are rejected. Enlightenment and any humanistic traditions are not included in this vision of Europe.	Mild

Source: own elaboration

Appendix 5

Table 10 Examples of different frames, their interpretation and level of intensity as present in Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021

Polish Foreign Policy Strategy			
A frame used in the text	Examples of a frame/ subject related statements as occurring in PFPS	Comments and interpretation according to the dramatic triad with short analyses of other devices used.	Intensity
Economic	"[…]the eurozone crisis - which led to a recession in almost all European economies and which has not been overcome to date."	One could say it is merely a statement of facts rather than a discourse. What is symptomatic is which elements are chosen and what the document focuses on.	Mild
	"The prolonged **ineffectiveness**[14] and often **inconsistency** in solving economic problems […] may be a source of **disappointment** for a growing number of Europeans in a growing number of countries."	This statement is not neutral, and although it is not explicitly stated, it is set within a broader narrative of Poland becoming Europe's saviour. It is used within conservative discourse, regardless of the fact, that Poland was the only country in the EU that did not experience recession during eurozone crisis under the previous, PO's government. Still, it is used to boost PiS ideological credentials.	Mild
	"The Republic of Poland will strive to	It is one of the examples a new	Mild

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[14] Words and expressions in bold chosen by the author himself.

	make the EU's climate policy more firmly rooted in **economic reality**."	government uses to create an image of being a rational agent, which justifies its moves according to economic and political reality.	
Sovereignty	"It also proved to be **a mistake** to seek an answer to the EU crisis in **the unjustified expansion** of the competences of EU bodies at the expense of the prerogatives of Member States and democratic procedures."	It is too broad a statement to be completely approve or reject it. Some scholars agree that extending the European Central Bank's competencies cannot be justified according to the EU treaties, and that the process only opens doors to the accusations of furthering democratic deficit within the EU.	Mild
	"[Poland will] work for at European level to **restore the balance** between the principle of national sovereignty and the prerogatives of the Community institutions, and to strengthen the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the Union's decision-making processes"	Another generic statement implicitly referring to the lost balance between national sovereignty and the EU institutions.	Mild
Conservative/ religious (very few)	"The important premises of the Polish raison d'état are universal values: democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as **the Christian values** that underpin European integration."	Christian values are included among many other universal ones. It is a mild strengthening attempt to change PiS' image as being within the mainstream of European politics.	Mild

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	"Their [universal including Christian values] promotion on an international level is in the interest of the Republic of Poland, as they are the best guarantee of **peace, stability and development in the world.** Their promotion should therefore be treated both as a sign of recognition of their axiological dimension and as one of the ways of strengthening Poland's security."	Although promotion of those values puts PiS into the Hero position, especially if "peace, stability and development in the world" are at stake, there is not an explicit or implicit villain or a victim, therefore we cannot talk about development of the triad here.	Mild

Source: own elaboration

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