

CIVILIZING WASTE:
WORK, NON-WORK, AND URBAN CITIZENSHIP
IN THE MAKING OF BELGRADE (1965-2018)

By

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Statement

I hereby state that the dissertation contains no material accepted for any other degrees in any other institution. The dissertation contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographic reference.

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Abstract

This thesis examines processes of city-making through the shifting moral economy of the collection of valuable wastes in Belgrade from 1965 to 2018. I explore the question of “who may benefit” from the collection of valuable waste in relation to changing forms of urban governance and policing of “hygiene” and “pollution”. I show how the distinction between forms of handling waste that are “appropriate” and those that need to be disciplined and “tamed” intersects with the ways in which the urban is politicized, most notably, deciding over who belongs and who does not. My thesis starts with the entrenchment of the Yugoslav model of market socialism through the 1965 economic reforms, which I argue brought a shift from a largely administrative to an entrepreneurial style of urban governance. In the following 30 years, the collection of valuable wastes shifted from an activity to itinerant populations, people “without employment and without a place of residency”, as well as the poorest strata of workers in working collectives, to a realm to make up for dwindling sources of state funding for the Belgradian public institutions such as the sanitation services and schools. Waste collection became organized as “volunteer” activity, tied to ideas of “good citizenship”. In the 1990s, the collection of valuable wastes became identified with so-called “unhygienic settlements” that had existed before but became more prominent in the urban structure as they grew with populations displaced by the Yugoslav wars. At the same time, massive land privatization and a regime of temporary building permits enabled the emergence of investor-led urbanization. Bringing these two developments together, the General Urban Plan of Belgrade until 2021, adopted in 2003, suggested to target “unhygienic settlements” as brownfields. In my two ethnographic chapters, I show how the “unhygienic settlements” are implicated in investor-led urbanization in two ways: they offer a source of cheap labor for international companies (chapter 8) and by engaging in the collection of valuable wastes in a construction site, they create a system of valuation that enables construction companies to dodge the landfill tax (chapter 9). The collection of valuable wastes opens a vista to multiple and partially conflicting projects of city-making. The boundary between an ideological representation of the urbanization process (as rationalization and the formation of subjects with a capacity for self-regulation) and the actual political economy of urbanization depends on the reproduction of internal Others and internal as well as external margins. The collection of valuable wastes offers an entry point into studying the way in which this frontier is being policed.

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This dissertation has been an exercise in learning through relating. The final text seems to mirror only a small portion and to present a placeholder for a new beginning that will be shaped by the changed ways of being and knowing that this process has brought about.

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	1
Acknowledgments.....	3
Table of Contents.....	5
List of Figures.....	12
List of Abbreviations.....	13
Introduction.....	14
Historicize ‘Niche Economies’.....	16
Political Economy – Dispossession and Rationalization.....	17
The Frontier – A Feminist Marxist Critique of Progressive Enclosure.....	18
Non-Work and Moral Economy.....	20
City-Making.....	23
Governing Through Nuisance.....	23
Police.....	26
Fixing the Economy.....	28
Method.....	29
Chapter Overview.....	33
Chapter 1: The Socialist Urbanization of Fiscal Crisis: Tracing Back Investor Urbanism.....	40
1.1 Socialist Urbanization, Workers, Non-Workers.....	42
1.2 Socialist Urbanization of Fiscal Crisis.....	46
1.3 The Self-Financing Municipality (1965).....	49

1.3.1 Communal Services – Price Increases or More Planning	49
1.3.2 Urban Rent	54
1.3.3 Uniting the Consumer and Producer Citizen	56
1.4 Decentralization: Marketization and Socialization	60
1.4.1 Socialization vs. Marketization	61
1.4.2 Marketization as Socialization	64
1.5 Conclusions	65
 Chapter 2: The ‘Migrant Speculator’ and the Rent-Seeking City: Changing Policy Towards Service Workers, Petty Entrepreneurs, and Individual Home Builders (1965-1974).....	67
2.1 City of Producers and its Others	69
2.2 Who is Superfluous?	76
2.3 Turning ‘Prosecuted Citizens’ into ‘Individual Investors’	82
2.4 ‘Primitive Settlements’ and Metropolitanization of Belgrade	87
2.4.1 Social Domicile.....	93
2.4.2 Mobile Schools	95
2.5 Conclusion	97
 Chapter 3: Participatory Governance of Public Hygiene and ‘Polluting’ Others (1965-1973)	100
3.1 Valuation of Public Sanitation as Service Work.....	100
3.1.1 Working Discipline	103
3.1.2 Labor Control.....	110
3.2 Commercialization of Communal Waste.....	115
3.3 Participatory Governance of Public Hygiene	120
3.4 Conclusions.....	131

Chapter 4: Waste Economy Between Wholesale of Secondary Raw Materials and Retail of 'Flawed Goods' (1965-1973).....	132
4.1 Federal Board for Raw Materials from Waste and Import Substitution.....	133
4.2 Waste Companies and City Governments	135
4.2.1 Urban Rent and Displacements.....	139
4.2.2 Increased Powers of the Communal Inspection.....	142
4.2.3 'Useful Waste' Between Wholesale and Retail	145
4.2.4 Protecting Belgrade Waste Market from Itinerant Traders.....	147
4.3 Conclusions.....	154
Chapter 5: The 'Disappearance' of Individual Waste Collectors: From Uninsured to 'Uninsurable' Populations (1956-1977)	156
5.1 Practices of Naming Waste Collectors	158
5.2 Portraits	160
5.3 From the 1956 Order on Collectors to the 1967 New Law on Trade	164
5.3.1 1956 Order on Collectors.....	165
5.3.2 Special-Order Contract	168
5.4 'Provizijanti'	171
5.5 'Waste Owners' versus 'Waste Sellers'	172
5.5 'Non-Residents' versus 'Residents of Other Municipalities'	175
5.6 The 'Disappearance' of Professional Collectors.....	178
5.7 Conclusions: Insured and 'Uninsurable' Populations.....	180
Chapter 6: Environmentalism, Austerity and the Emergence of 'Volunteers' (1974-1985) .	182
6.1 Mobilization of 'Volunteers'	183

6.1.1 Mobilizing Schools	183
6.1.2 A Matter of Citizens' Conscience.....	186
6.1.3 Environmental Governance of Waste	187
6.1.4 Austerity Measures and Volunteer Mobilization.....	189
6.2 Scientification of Waste Management	192
6.2.1 Waste Incineration	193
6.2.2 Sanitary Landfills and Wild Dumps	195
6.3 Whose Environment? Private Property, Experts and the Dismantling Local Self- Management.....	198
6.4 Conclusions.....	204
7. City Without Citizens?: 'Hygiene' as a Category in Urban Planning, Policing and Participatory Urban Governance (1985-2015).....	206
7.1 General Urban Plan (2003): Mapping Urban Wasteland.....	208
7.1.1 Discontinuing the 1985 Temporary Construction Permits	208
7.1.2 'Unhygienic Settlements' as Brownfields	210
7.1.3 Monitoring 'Wild Dumps'	213
7.2 Participatory Governance of 'Hygiene'	215
7.2.1 Volunteer Cleaning Actions.....	216
7.2.2 Policing of 'Nuisances' and Evictions.....	221
7.3 Roma Coordinators: Maintenance Work for the Temporary	224
7.3.1 Frontline Workers and Public Employment Stop	226
7.3.2 'Acting Like Good Neighbors' – Securing Tenure.....	228
7.3.3 'Field Visits' – Monitoring Floodings and Overflowing Channels	231
7.3.4 'Field Visits' – Creating Assets, Expanding the Target Population	235
7.4 Conclusion	238

Chapter 8 ‘Bring Only Those Who Are Really Willing to Work’: Roma Coordinators as Labor Market Brokers in a Context of Flexibilization	240
8.1 Informal Sector as Safety Net	240
8.2 Roma Coordinators as Labor Market Brokers	244
8.2.1 The Agency for Temporary Work	247
8.2.2 Deskillling	249
8.2.3 Finding ‘Those Who are Really Willing to Work’	251
8.3 Conclusions	256
Chapter 9: Gambling, Mining, Gleaning – Appropriation Practices on a ‘Wild Dump’ in Belgrade	258
9.1 Commercialization of Waste	259
9.1.1 Enclosure: Commercial Landfilling and Urban Recycling Systems	260
9.1.2 The Site: Makiš Field	263
9.1.3 Governance of the Unhygienic Settlement in Makiš Field	266
9.2 Gambling, Mining, Gleaning: Waste Picking on a Wild Dump	267
9.2.1 Field Entry: Meeting the Waste Pickers	269
9.2.2 Land-Filling and Recovering Raw Materials	273
9.2.3 Gambling	275
9.2.4 Mining	278
9.2.5 Gleaning	281
9.2.6 Livelihoods	284
9.3 Conclusions	287
Conclusion	289
Bibliography	298

Archival Sources.....310

Notes311

List of Figures

Figure 1 "Joca Deterđent - Vehicle Theft" (Javna Higijena 07/1965).....	104
Figure 2 "I'll Be Back Tomorrow" (Javna Higijena 04/1970).....	104
Figure 3 "Štediša - This Vehicle Does Not Know What Service Is" (Javna Higijena 12/1969)	115
Figure 4 "Our Customers" (Javna Higijena 12/1970).....	124
Figure 5 Income of Waste Companies in Yugoslavia in 1966-67 Generated from Wholesale, Retail and Trading With Deficient Goods (in New Dinar) (my table, based on Otpadne Sirovine 05/1968).....	134
Figure 6 "Domestic Sources Instead of Excessive Import" (Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1976)	183
Figure 7 "Let's Be Belgradians – We Care About Belgrade" (Sekundarne Sirovine 03/1978)	186
Figure 8 "Always in Action: For the Two Ton Lorry of Unija There Is No Holiday" (Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1976)	191
Figure 9 "With These Means of Transport It Is Impossible to Increase the Productivity of Labor" (Sekundarne Sirovine 05/1975)	193
Figure 10 "Gradual Transition to Waste Incineration" (Javna Higijena 12/1970)	195
Figure 11 "Our Local Ward We Cleaned – Now They Shall Clean Theirs" (Sekundarne Sirovine 07/1980).....	198
Figure 12 "But What Else Would Be With What They Collect?" (Urbanizam Beograda 1981 (63-65))	201

List of Abbreviations

FNRJ – Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija (Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (1945 – 1963))

INOT – Industrija Otpada (Waste Industry), short for, Organ Poslovnog Udruženja za Snabdevanje Industrije Otpadnim Sirovinama (Body of the Business Association for Supply of Industry with Raw Materials from Waste)

PSS – Public Sanitation Services (in Serbian “Gradska Čistoća”, Urban Cleanliness)

SFRJ – Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1963-1992))

SIZ – Samoupravna Interesna Zajednica (Self-Managed Community of Interest)

SKG – Stalna Konferencija Gradova (Standing Conference of Towns)

SIV – Savezno Izvršno Veće (Federal Executive Council)

SPK – Savezna Privredna Komora (Federal Chamber of Commerce)

Introduction

In 2012 I conducted field research for my Master's thesis in Belgrade on the displacement of the so-called “unhygienic settlements” from the inner city of Belgrade (Schwab 2013). Towards the end of the research one of my interlocutors, Roma activist Borka Vasić, herself affected by the forced evictions, told me her interpretation of the displacements. Through her contact with the Roma container inhabitants, she had heard that the promised employment program had fallen flat. Inhabitants were now mostly too far away from the inner city and the junk shops to engage in the collection of waste. A private company had recently gained the exclusive right to collect valuable wastes on the city landfill in Vinča. Soon, they started sending mini-busses to the container settlements to pick up the inhabitants, so that they would collect waste at the landfill for a third of what they had previously earned as independent collectors. According to Borka, this was a clear-cut case of extraction of cheap labor power through encampment, which she compared to forced labor in Nazi camps. Thinking about the evictions in the context of the re-organization of the waste sector, further evidence fell into place. In the next year, the city government built underground containers for communal waste, which prevented the informal collection of valuable materials. Two years later, in 2016, the city government sold the concession to Vinča landfill to a French-Japanese consortium SUEZ. This seemed to be a story of enclosure but upon closer, ethnographic and historical examination, it became apparent that waste kept evading the grasp of large-scale valuation schemes. As my historical research showed, a multiplicity of forms of valuation had co-existed and competed with state-led attempts to enclose the collection of valuables wastes since the marketization of the public sanitation services in Belgrade in the mid-1960s.

My doctoral thesis is not about large-scale schemes of enclosure of communal waste and their failure. Instead, it traces back the moments when the collection of valuable wastes in Belgrade

has been re-organized under various projects and agendas ever since the public sanitation services in the mid-1960s got interested in commercializing communal waste. From its onset, this process was entangled with the introduction of Yugoslav market socialism and the “withering away of the state”. The project of changing who profits from the collection of valuable wastes can be therefore, as I argue, meaningfully understood through the perspective of governmentality: the process of forging alliances between state and non-state actors, as well as the process of differentiating between deserving and non-deserving populations associated with “clean” and “polluting” types of collecting valuable wastes are crucial to understand changing regimes of waste valuation. I focussed on how access to waste was re-arranged through multiple actors and sites, and analyzed the way in which these multiple actors and sites offered the ground for contradictions and entrance points for resistances.

What I encountered in sites of waste work was not a powerful local state, but one that seemed dispersed in a multiplicity of sites subjected to police power. If they wanted to stay in that spot, they had to “promise” to keep it clean and abstain from burning of tires. If they wanted to keep the temporary housing container, they had to abstain from storing secondary raw materials in front of it. Police power is “patriarchal” in that it treats particular entities like a neighborhood or a district like a household (Dubber and Valverde 2008; Novak 1996). Displacement was both a means of punishment and socialization. The close connotation of place and “behavior” implicated in that can be seen from one of the European Investment Bank officials, engaged in the displacements, exclaiming “no matter where you put them, they will store cardboard and burn tires”. “You never know what they’re up to”, told me one of the Roma coordinators, “they’re generally friendly, but you shouldn’t go there alone”. As waste work is subjected to police power, it is “behavioralized”. Work becomes “indigenized”, as practices indicating the character of a particular population. Not economic considerations, but the shrewdness or civility of that population is judged by the work they do and vice-versa. This “behavioralized”

governance of waste work paired with the racialization of the consequences of under-provisioning is epitomized in a container, which Čukarica municipality claims to have installed as a measure to create order, to socialize inhabitants into “using” waste containers. However, the containers were those of recycling company Papirservis that can be seen throughout the city in places where collectors live and are installed by those companies to pick up secondary raw materials.

Among scholars of post-socialism, the question of enclosure and property rights is commonplace. They offer alternative accounts to enclosure and dispossession. Engrained in those accounts are questions about the differentiation of city and country-side, socialist urbanization, combined incomes, and semi-proletarianization. As notions of racialization remain largely absent from those discussions, I want to bring in the racialization of resource handling practices, the making of market subjects, the making of urban citizens, and Others. Anthropological studies on Roma waste workers and urban segregation are emerging for Czech Republic (Černušáková 2020; 2017) Serbia (Saethre 2020), Bulgaria (Resnick 2021), and Romania (Vincze 2013). In the following, I discuss the main scholarly debates where I anchor my work.

Historicize ‘Niche Economies’

The collection of valuable wastes has been mostly left out of labor history. Only in the last 20 years global labor history made an effort to historicize economic activities in the area of combined incomes, or semi-proletarianization (Amin and Linden 1997; Faure 1997; Reid 1993). Global labor history has been applied to Yugoslavia (Vukliš 2017) and produced research on unemployed hostels and sex workers in the interwar period (Petrungaro 2014; 2019).

In global and historical anthropology some studies follow changing configurations of a specific type of informal sector work over long periods (Narotzky and Smith 2006). While anthropological research on scavenging is sensitive to specific configurations of time and space (Nguyen 2016; Dinler 2016; Faulk 2012; Reno 2009) this sensitivity has not been applied to a long-term study of changes in scavenging.

Historical studies that contextualize the informal sector within broader political-economic changes oftentimes fall into a functionalist trap, defining informal sector activities purely in relation to the accumulation economy (Sanyal 2007; Kasmir and Carbonella 2014; Schwab 2016). On the other hand, anthropological studies at times single out informal economic practices as a “niche economy” – a space that can allegedly only be understood through its embeddedness in social and cultural institutions and practices specific to that place, time, and people (Brazzabeni, Cunha, and Fotta 2015; Rakowski 2016). In my thesis, I accept the idea of the multiplication of labor along the lines of race, gender, urban-rural, formal-informal and focus on the question of how these segregations have been produced and upheld over a period of roughly half a century. My analysis asks *how* waste picking in Belgrade has been produced and reproduced during this period as something that could appear as a “niche economy”, rather than *why*. Asking the question of *how* produces a genealogical account of that sector (Sundarsingh 2016): the way it was formed by and changed through contentions about various policies on trade, public order, social security, environmental protection, austerity, labor migration, vagrancy, homelessness, urban land use, and public service provisioning.

Political Economy – Dispossession and Rationalization

My first attempt at historicizing the collection of valuable wastes and free it from ahistorical accounts of “survival economies” or particularistic accounts of the “niche economy” was to embed the collection of valuable wastes into the political-economic history of waste

management and the waste economy that have been studied in other countries as decisive factors in the transformation of waste work. I looked at for example one on the dispossession of scavengers and enclosure of waste by industrialized communal waste management (Weinberg, Schnaiberg, and Pellow 2002; Köster 2017; G. Jones 2017), or the making of a public sector worker by disentangling the worker from community relations and subject him to a Fordist rationalized form of labor control (Hurl 2015; 2016). However, the problem I found with these accounts was that they tell history as a linear progression of events that lead to the techno-scientific rationalization of valuation processes, the disembedding of public services from neighborhood economies, and displacement of informal work to “elsewhere”.

Looking at the collection of valuable wastes opens the window to the frictions that appear in the project of marketization of public sanitation services (chapter 3), the attempt to replace import of secondary raw materials by domestic collection (chapter 4), or the roll-out of insurance to hitherto uninsured populations (chapter 5). How is it possible to talk about these stories in a way that does not present waste management or resource management in Yugoslavia as “lagging behind” or to regard it as an effect of the particular position in the world market and policies that Yugoslavia adopt to navigate that semi-peripheral position (Boatca 2005). What I have chosen to do in my research is to focus on the moral economy of the collection of valuable wastes, ideas of distribution and reciprocity, and political rationalities in the governance of waste and waste collection.

The Frontier – A Feminist Marxist Critique of Progressive Enclosure

By analyzing the way in which the work/non-work divide has been reproduced over time, the focus of my thesis is on a field of tension within which different forms of valuation and forms of entitlement meet, coopt, collide, or conflict. I deploy the concept of the frontier, which emphasizes that what is considered as “outside” has been shaped historically (Fraser 2013),

that “cheap nature” is produced rather than “found” (Moore 2013), and that the production of value depends on deterioration, destitution, destruction, abandonment (Tsing 2015).

This direction of research has been opened up by feminist Marxists’ critique of concepts of enclosure as progressive and primitive accumulation as a phenomenon that occurs only in a limited period in the initial stages of capitalist transformation (Perelman 2000). Focusing on the frontier is a way to acknowledge that parallel to proletarianization, labor is also constantly being segregated and multiplied (Kasmir and Carbonella 2014). The frontier has been investigated by Tsing when she studies places where the enclosure has been incomplete, precarious, or imaginary (Tsing 2005) or abandoned altogether (Tsing 2015). Tania Li introduces the term “piece-meal dispossession”, which puts more analytical emphasis on the how than on the why of enclosure – opening up the process as such to close examination, which reveals multiple points of ambiguity and opportunities for resistance (Li 2010). This opened up research into the multiplicity of practices of appropriation.

Anthropology of resources has discussed the concept of “access”, which emphasizes a continuum of resource use practices attached to holding legal entitlements in the form of property or not (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Sikor and Lund 2009), the difference between legal and effective property (Verdery 2003) and an emphasis on the temporality of property (Sikor, Stahl, and Dorondel 2009). The micro-dynamics of appropriation and dispossession hinge on what has been called “the propriety of property”, how property claims are made dependent on specific conduct of claimant populations: how certain practices are regarded as leading to “decay” can thus effectively legitimate the loss of property rights (Ghertner 2012; Blomley 2005).

The exertion of property rights is realized through or against particular structures governing certain populations. Particular forms of governance of populations do not only rest on the perceived propriety of that population, but also its conceived need for protection from the market. Li (2010) for example argues how protection became the permission slip for dispossession. Emancipation is seen here more in terms of access (to markets and resources) rather than the protection from markets (Fraser 2013; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Kalb and Mollona 2018). These authors suggest a feminist, anti-racist perspective on the double movement of society against the market: asking who is protected from the market here deals with a term “protection” that is stripped of its innocence (Fraser 2013). The question of who is protected from the market and on which grounds can become a question of whose livelihood is prioritized (Gille 2016).

These are various productive lines of research that seek to overcome the linear narratives of enclosures and dispossession oftentimes resting on an imaginary omnipotent state, rather than looking into the boundary work and practices that go into the construction of spheres and the trespassing happening.

Non-Work and Moral Economy

The idea to include non- or semi-proletarianized forms of labor into the history of capitalism has a rich foundation in global ethnography starting from Eric Wolf’s (1982) “Europe and the People without History”. Following him, anthropologists suggested the conceptual addition of “forms of production” as a critique of structuralist “modes of production”, which aim at ordering economic practices in an evolution of preconceived stages. The forms of production emphasize the movement in-between “stages”, as well as hybrid forms, the agency of cultural forms, as well as the state. Challenging the reductionist assumption that the mode of production organizes both base and superstructure (Smith 1984), ethnographic work offers a perspective

into the changing power relations (Vandergeest 1988). This research has inspired much of current historical global ethnography (Smith 1985; Narotzky and Smith 2006). From this line of research emerged the question of how certain economic practices are depicted as “traditional” and what purpose does the label serve, the question of how the “non-capitalist” sphere is constructed – both from the inside as a form of resistance and from the outside as a legitimation for practices of hyper-exploitation.

Anthropology has produced most of all social sciences knowledge on “wageless livelihoods”¹. Recently, anthropologists have deployed moral economic analysis to conceptualize the distinction of work/non-work (Grill 2018; Rajković 2018) and started to develop approaches to unemployment (Perelman 2007; 2016; Faulk 2016). Unemployment as the “formalization of a precise [ly defined] professional inactivity” (Petrungaro 2013; Walters 2000; Garraty 1978) is intimately tied to the institutionalization and normalization of certain types of work as wage-labor. Perelman (2007) suggests that in order to understand the exclusionary process that separates “survival strategies” from economic activities that qualify as work, we have to look into the capitalist work ethic. “Survival strategies” are detached from what is considered as work according to Perelman (2007) through two main patterns: (1) work is considered only what “produces (monetary) value” exchangeable on the “free market” and thus excludes subsistence activities, non-monetary or petty forms of exchange, (2) “survival strategies” are depicted as “natural”, uncontrolled, close to the “inclinations of a certain population”, and thus racialized as exempt from the civilizing quality ascribed to work in the modern capitalist work ethic.

Both Perelman (2016) and Petrungaro (2013, 2014) use the notion of *non-work* to how non (-acknowledged) -work is not simply the absence of wages but means the lack of additional rights and perks coming with a work contract. Same as in Yugoslavia, in Argentina, which is

Perelman's research site, citizenship rights were tied to a large extent to the workplace. The distinction between what constitutes work and what non-work produces histories sensible to the exclusion of certain types of work from the making of working classes based on gender (Humphries 1981; Federici 2004) or race (Roediger 2007; Bressey 2015).

The moral economy is based on Thompson's (1971) study on food riots and discusses how markets are shaped by struggles around "just prices". Different from the political economy, markets are here studied not through the perspective of competition, but through the lens of reproduction. Reproduction struggles include appeals to regulate markets in specific ways based on expectations and moral ideas of reciprocity (what is just). Appeals to the regulation of markets are thus tied to other entitlements. In the agrarian reproduction struggles these are tied to land, gleaning or fishing rights, and customary forms of redistribution. This concerns the question of the (in-) commensurability of different values, most notably, what is considered a common good and what forms of commodification are considered legitimate (who may benefit and how). Justice pertains to the sharing of profits as well as risks (Edelman 2005).

In my thesis, I will show how appeals to the regulation of the waste market give insight about changing notions of who should benefit from the collection of valuable wastes, who should carry the risks involved as well as what are appropriate forms of handling waste for whom. While it was initially a realm reserved to itinerant populations, people "without employment and without a place of residency", as well as the poorest strata of workers in working collectives, with the introduction of market reforms and the "self-financing municipality" (chapter 1), the collection of valuable wastes became increasingly a realm to make up for dwindling sources of funding for the public sanitation services or schools and tied to ideas of "good citizenship" and "volunteering" (1965-1990).

The question of “who may benefit” from the commodification of waste and which forms of handling waste are “appropriate” and which need to be disciplined and “tamed”, intersects strongly with ways in which the urban is politicized, most notably, with regard to the governance and policing of “hygiene” and “pollution” deciding over who belongs to the city and who does not.

City-Making

Looking for a non-linear, multiple actor framework to embed the history of the collection of valuable wastes, I decided to focus on projects of city-making. I assume city-making to be a process that arises as multiple actors attempt to shape the city (urban planners, City Officials, inspection, citizens) and make claims to it. The thesis explores how the Belgrade central city government, municipal governments, Roma coordinators responsible for specific settlements, and the inspection govern the collection of valuable wastes and how their attempts are resisted and conflict with each other. I carve out from these conflicts how the city as a governmental category structures the collection of valuable wastes. I do not claim that the city is the only relevant scale shaping the collection of valuable wastes, but I argue that looking at the processes in which (different parts of) the city government claims regulatory authority over this activity or excludes it as non-urban allows us to observe processes of city-making.

Governing Through Nuisance

Scholars of modern urban history have argued that liberal urban governance hinges on the creation of particularly ordered space conducive to the free movement of self-regulating people (Joyce 2003). In contrast, based on her legal studies in Canadian cities, Valverde argued that liberal governance in cities intersects with premodern, policing forms of governance (Valverde

2011). This point has since been picked up by urban scholars for cities around the globe (Ghertner 2012).

In this thesis, I take particular interest in styles of urban governance related to people and things that are exempted from free movement and whose capacity for self-regulation is questioned. I will specifically focus on the detection and policing of nuisances (Valverde 2011; Ghertner 2012; 2011b). This is a style of governance through which the city government can extend its authority over portions of the economy as well as populations that are not unequivocally under its (self-declared) auspices or are even explicitly excluded. It can regulate spheres without acknowledging their belonging to the city.

Governing of nuisance instantiates a specifically urban form of police power that differs significantly from grand “seeing like a state” schemes in that it does not aim at implementing a pre-designed form of order or future-oriented planning, but is “backward-looking, locally specific (in an unpredictable manner), and intersubjective” (Valverde 2011, 297; Ghertner 2011b). The collection of valuable wastes is particularly susceptible to indirect forms of control exerted through a particular code of civility and public order typical for urban liberal governance. Anthropologists have shown the shifting geography of those codes of civility as urban space is reconfiguring under specific projects of accumulation, which open up new “niches” for unregulated forms of work, such as food hawking around newly build shopping malls in Mumbai (Anjaria 2011) or scrap metal collection in sites of urban renewal in Hanoi (Nguyen 2016).

The emergence of such new “niches”, where particular codes of civility and public order are (temporarily) suspended can be understood in terms of the simultaneous reconfiguration of state space (Ghertner 2011a; Brenner 2004). The co-constitution of a particular form of power

in relation to the delineation of a particular territory becomes apparent as space is being restructured (Sassen 2008; Painter 2010). I show this in chapter 6 where one of the Roma Coordinators took me on something like a “guided tour” through Belgrade as it is seen through his eyes. He instructed me to develop a particular way of seeing “communal problems” and identifying “unhygienic settlements”. This was a performative reassertion of power in a situation, where the Coordinator lacked both an official position in the city government and an office place, but had to rely on an OSCE sponsored jeep as his main source of symbolic capital. His position hinged on the number of “unhygienic settlements” that he could detect and govern, but this mandate also dictated his marginal position, as those settlements, once identified, were meant to make space for “urban development proper”.

Analyzing the governance of nuisances in the liberal city helps to unpack the way in which capital’s life process rests on notions of modernity and liberal citizenship, but not in the sense that it attempts to mend all processes and populations to succumb to these logics. By looking at the way these templates are mobilized, contested, and adopted by different actors within the context of specific projects such as urban restructuring, or the marketization of public services, it is possible to study such projects not as forms of rationalization and unification, but as ways to re-imprint Others and what counts as “margins”. Governing through nuisance is thus an important additional lens to understand the way in which specific projects help the (re-) construction of the frontier and the production of an “outside”, which can be exploited in ways more extreme than would be possible in the urban space and for urban populations proper.

Re-ordering the margins in Belgrade opens a vista to multiple and partially conflicting projects of city-making. By re-ordering its margins, Belgrade city government re-organized its position within Yugoslavia and later Serbia. I show this in chapter 1 based on inter-municipal discussion on the distribution of unemployed populations, in chapter 3 with debates around the authority

of Belgrade city government over branches of non-Belgradian companies and finally in chapter 6 with the expulsion of “non-resident” Roma population during slum clearances. But the process of re-ordering the margins also splinters the assumed unity of “the city government”. In this thesis, I explore how multiple scales in the city (Belgrade central city government, municipal governments, Roma Coordinators responsible for “unhygienic settlements”) enact their own particular forms of governing populations engaged in the collection of valuable wastes.

The perspective of city-making allows me to write about the collection of valuable wastes historically, but not as a history of those who are left out from the modernization and restructuring of the city (Anjaria 2011), or those who (potentially) interrupt the logic of the universalization of capital (Chakrabarty 2009). As outlined above, theories of the frontier that I build on claim that the reproduction of capital does not hinge on converting all populations and economic practices into its own logic (Chibber 2014). The boundary between an ideological representation of the urbanization process (as rationalization and the formation of subjects with a capacity for self-regulation) and the actual political economy of urbanization depends on the reproduction of internal Others and internal as well as external margins. The collection of valuable wastes offers an entry point into studying the way in which this frontier is being policed (Wachsmuth 2014).

Police

“social police is in some sense a form of border patrol – the policing of the borders of citizenship, that is, of the categories defining those who are to come under the greater control, surveillance...” (Neocleous 2000, 82)

City governments possess the power to police (through fines, inspection, and local criminal courts) and regulate (through licenses) subjects (internal migrant workers) and entities

(businesses). Police power functions usually through by-laws that are legitimated by the need to preserve urban order, health, and well-being. Thus, city policing variously modifies the rights bestowed upon subjects and entities by legislations adopted at the regional, republican or federal level (Valverde 2011; Levi and Valverde 2006).

What police does often cannot be found in legal prescriptions. What constitutes a “nuisance” lacks precise definition in text. In his monography “The Production of Social Order”, Neocleous (2000) argues that police is acting on activities that appear disorderly. In that, police acts in the realm of “common sense”, what is “commonly understood” as orderly or disorderly, reproducing a particular order of propertied citizens. Scholars of police have shown that the ordering practices of police are only loosely related to law and legality. Police practices often rather create order that is only post-factum justified by law. Neocleous argues “law is sufficiently flexible to accommodate what police want to do” (Neocleous 2000, 99), and “discretion allows the exercise of power with the law standing at arm’s length” (Neocleous 2000, 103). This point has been demonstrated also by studies that look into how police practices have become legalized, rather than police executing law (Hall et al. 2013). Police is thus a relevant actor enacting certain boundaries of civility and borders of the urban polis rather than merely executing the boundaries prescribed in legal text.

The study of police adds to the study of city-making as a form of interlegality (Valverde 2011). Studying police shows how conflicting forms of governance can co-exist through the depoliticization of the lower state levels in execution and administration. When the exercise of state power by local officials seems to conflict with higher-order legislation such as constitutional rights these conflicts are depoliticized as a negative side-effect of the highly organized state system, to the effect that their structural consequences of lower state-level decisions are often overlooked. I will show this for example in the second and fifth chapter,

where I will refer to instances where the Yugoslav constitutional right of free movement conflicted with practices of the inspection.

Fixing the Economy

The perspective on police and governing of nuisances has particular consequences for the way I conceptualize the way in which city-making is entangled with shaping the (waste) economy. Economic sociology has been mostly interested in the crafting of instruments for governing the economy at a distance. What economic sociology describes as “economization” (Çalışkan and Callon 2009; Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007) are practices of abstraction and disentanglement (Zelizer 2011). I would argue that police comes up when “governing at a distance” fails when the abstraction of “the economy” loses touch with the ground and it needs to be “fixed” in new ways (Mitchell 1998). When the Yugoslav state became interested in the recycling economy and founded the *Board for Raw Materials from Waste* as a body of the *Federal Chamber of Commerce* in 1964, it was quick to identify goals and current shortcomings in the waste economy. However, the very act of relinquishing the friction by way of police was an act that kept the original conception of the economy unimpaired. Higher state levels continued to see the waste economy in terms of the amount of foreign currency spent on the import of secondary raw materials that could also be found domestically. Police and city government, on the other hand, saw a plethora of governance problems in the waste economy that did not have much to do with foreign currency spending, but with the urban economy and notions of disorder, nuisance, and civility. Thus, acts of “economization” and “fixing the economy” are left unsubstantiated and should be studied alongside the way in which the economy is being policed and adopted to local ordering practices.

Different from “fixing the economy” and “economization”, local ordering practices are not so much based on “disentangling” and “abstraction”, but are inherently based in forms of

enmeshment and intimate knowledge. Police, communal inspection, and Roma Coordinators, when investigating who is currently involved in the collection of valuable waste, make claims about participants in the waste economy and forge alliances around a certain conception of waste and its orderly handling that draw their authority from practically won “field knowledge” over regulations. While the “fixing the economy” is tied to ideas of progress and development, the policing of the economy is tied to concepts of civility that might conflict with ideas of progress and development articulated at higher state levels.

State control of the economy in socialist countries has often been equated with central planning. Studies of the regulation of the economy in socialist Yugoslavia or in Hungary of the New Economic Mechanism the lifting of central planning and the introduction of market reforms open the question of liberal economic governance in socialist countries (Bockman 2011; Jelinek 2020). I follow authors that have shown how liberalization does not entail a lifting of state regulation over the economy, but rather leads to a different form of articulation. My contribution is to study liberal socialist governance from the perspective of changing forms of urban governance in Belgrade since the introduction of market reforms in 1965.

Method

In this thesis, I scrutinize the way shifting forms of urban governance have shaped the collection of valuable wastes and had an effect on the multiplication of waste work both historically and ethnographically (Narotzky and Smith 2006; Kalb and Tak 2005). I focus on three main junctures (mid-1960s socialist market reforms, the advance of investor-led urbanization since 1985, demarcation of urban wastelands and sites re-construction with the General Urban Plan until 2021 from 2003) at which struggles over the question of what is waste and who may collect it became virulent in Belgrade.

I spent time in the National Library of Serbia and the City Archive of Belgrade. I have studied minutes of the Belgrade Town Hall Meetings, the professional journal of the Belgrade Public Sanitation Services (PSS), and the professional journal of the Association of Yugoslav Recycling Companies (INOT). My goal was to understand how these different actors render legible waste work and the way they discuss the determination of the value of waste work, as well as, render waste workers governable. The professional journals are platforms where the recycling companies and the PSS reflect on what the other actors (city, regional, republican and federal state government and their competitors in the field of waste management) are doing and so they provide a perspective on competing logics of handling and valuing waste. I am less interested in how waste work looked like, and more how it was negotiated between these different actors.

In the first five chapters, I examine Yugoslav professional journals and debates in the City Hall in Belgrade. Ostensibly, these debates are about the various policies and regulations pertaining to the collection of waste, unemployment, trade laws, maintenance of public hygiene and order – however, the moments that interested me most were those when these debates were led by judgments about civility of a certain population, moments where outlines of the urban polis became visible and relevant to argue for a specific formatting of the waste economy. These are often moments where we see City Officials “off-guard”, where debates around the abstract categories of “taxation of citizen side activities” can only be won by “becoming concrete”: City Officials leave the preconceived language of policy-making to draw on anecdotes and experiences (what they observed by walking through the city, or, what happened to them), on what is considered “common knowledge” that now, in a moment of contention, needs to be illuminated as the relevant background for this or that policy. The limits of civility are being laid out, in varying ways, as a way of gaining political support. Similarly, the professional

journals of the Yugoslav Association of Recycling Companies (INOT), the Standing Conference of Towns (*Komuna*), the Urbanistic Institute Belgrade (*Urbanizam Beograda*), and the Public Sanitation Service Belgrade (*Javna Higijena*) negotiate policies related to urban waste management by drawing on and partially contesting the boundaries of the urban polis by telling stories about and contesting “common” notions of civility.

My approach to the analysis of archival documents is closer to Stoler’s method of “reading against the grain” (Stoler 2010) than critical discourse analysis (Wodak 2015). I am more interested in cracks where language is uneasy and established ways of knowing are stretched in the service of a tactic of undermining and changing the meaning of certain terms than to see what are the big discursive formations.

The waste economy, as I have found it in the archive, is constituted by the interplay of a multiplicity of actors that do not stand in a clear hierarchical relationship. The focus of my approach is thus relational, focussed on how spatiotemporally “embedded actors that engage ... in sequences of mutually contingent action” (Emirbayer 1997, 291). Many of the subjects I am researching are highly mutable and slip in and out of legal categories.

This is a genealogy of the modes of urban governance that have shaped the waste economy and waste work since 1965. It argues for continuity between socialism and post-socialism in line with what scholars of socialist housing policy (Jelinek 2020), economic policy making (Bockman 2011), social policy (Melegh 2011), and waste (Gille 2007) have shown. The parallel development towards market-friendly policies and orientation towards the West in Hungary from the mid-1970s and Yugoslavia from the mid-1960s have been noted (Bockman 2011). Gil Eyal showed the emergence of the interventionist state policy toward civil society in the Czech Republic in the 1960s (Eyal 2003). These are important contributions to show the emergence of actually existing neoliberalism through path dependencies and its intertwinement

rather than opposition to actually existing socialism (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Bockman 2011).

My ethnographic research consisted of three parts, two of which became part of the thesis. My first entry point to understanding the urban governance of waste pickers in Belgrade were the so-called “Coordinators for Roma Questions” that Serbia installed in cooperation with OSCE in 2004 in most bigger municipalities. Between March and July 2015 I spent five months participantly observing the work of one Roma Coordinators in two central Belgradian municipalities. In one municipality I accompanied the Roma Coordinator mostly to his fieldwork and in the other, I participated in the meetings of the so-called “Mobile Teams” consisting of Roma Coordinator, pedagogical assistant, and social workers of another central municipality. Thus I could gain insights into both the work on the ground and the networking of Roma Coordinators with other bodies of the local state. I could not do both in one municipality, since they had different capacities. Both the field trips and the meetings were crucial to understanding the governance of “unhygienic settlements” as a prime site where the local state sought to govern populations engaged in the collection of valuable wastes as their main source of income. All these different actors come together in chapter 7, which contains my ethnography of a recruitment day of an international food retailer interested in the temporary, cheap labor force from “unhygienic settlements” all over Belgrade.

The second part of my ethnography was my work for an INGO in the field of municipal waste management reform in Serbia. The project targeted mostly municipalities in the South of Serbia and because of the politicization of the privatization of the landfill in Belgrade (in that summer the concession to the landfill to a French-Japanese consortium was signed), I was not allowed to participate in the part where the organization did research developments on that landfill. Between March 2016 and February 2017, I did research with that organization in five small

and medium-sized municipalities in Serbia, consisting of structured interviews with local PSSs, Mayors, Roma Coordinators as well as actors in the local waste economy such as owners of junk shops and waste collectors. Through that position as a research consultant, I had the opportunity to participate in international congresses of waste companies (ISWA 2016 in Novi Sad, and ReTech Congress 2017 in Berlin). As my focus in this thesis is on Belgrade, I decided to leave this material out.

The last part of my ethnographic research consisted of participant observation among Roma waste pickers on a so-called “wild dump” in Belgrade in the summer of 2018 for one month. In preparation, I did two interviews with the Roma Coordinator of that municipality and later followed the press coverage of the removal of that “wild dump” as a consequence of the neighborhood protest movement against waste incineration happening on the dump and accusations of illegal dumping through the “construction mafia”.

Chapter Overview

In chapter 1 I examine the under-researched effects of the 1965 market reforms on urban governance. I argue that the 1965 market reforms significantly shifted the political economy of Yugoslav cities from a planned, socialist mode of urbanization guided mainly by the developmental policies adopted in the City Hall, to a new mode of urbanization, where investments happened through self-government compacts (*samoupravni sporazumi*) between the now “self-financing municipality” and companies in workers’ self-management. This shift engrained the market principles of competition into urban governance, as well as consumerism represented by the so-called “Slovene” model of economic development that, as Woodward (1995) argues, Yugoslavia adopted with increasing world-market integration in the mid-1960s. On the level of the city, 1965 kicked off discussions about and experiments with the marketization of public services including the collection of waste, the mobilization of citizens’

private funds and personal engagement (volunteering), as well as experiments with the collection of urban rent. While the withdrawal of funding from cities in the West has been researched under the denominator of neo-liberalization from the mid-1970s on, research is starting to emerge that shows the non-Western geographies and earlier roots of those policies in the 1960s (Offner 2019; Diamond and Sugrue 2020).

In chapter 2 I show how the self-financing municipality had a significant effect on how municipalities formed their boundaries, both internally towards rural-urban migrants and companies from the interior of the country with branches in the city, and externally, towards its rural environs. I argue that 1965 significantly shifted how cities understood what counts as their territory and how they conceptualized “development”. In the socialist mode of urbanization, Belgrade was a “city of producers” that had definite “Others”. Similar to socialist China, it engaged in policing of the productive to non-productive population ratio for example by terminating residence permits of rural-urban migrants who lost their employment, as well as restrictive measures towards private businesses, especially in the services. In 1965 Belgrade shifted towards “economic measures” of immigration control, which meant that services, including the petty economy and companies from the interior, were now regarded as a potential source of revenue generation and migrants, who engaged in individual home-building became potential customers on an emergent market for construction land. This market-liberal form of urban governance brought at the same time a differentiation of urban citizenship rights: from a highly privileged regime shielding the interest of the urban working class proper to an introduction of partial rights in social protection, schooling, and housing. This went along with the development of Yugoslav urban sociology that cemented the division of the city into “proper neighborhoods”, where sociologists had citizens as research subjects take part in a survey about their preferences for future urban development on the one hand, and substandard

“primitive settlements”, on the other hand, which were studied in terms of deterioration, defectiveness and criminogenic factors among the inhabitants as research objects.

In chapter 3 I show the entrenchment of the self-financing municipality in the area of the governance of public hygiene. The marketization of public services brought about new mechanisms to control “peasant workers” in the Public Sanitation Services, mostly attempts at disentangling them from engaging in the private petty economy of services for citizens and become proper “civil servants”. I discuss the mobilization of bodies of local self-management (housing councils) for the policing of disorderly practices of handling waste. Volunteer practices helped circumscribe a polis of orderly urban citizens who competed for the most beautifully arranged balcony and who reported disorderly businesses and Others to the inspection. Public hygiene became an area to mobilize proper neighborhoods and schools in competitions to extract their volunteer work as an exercise in good urban citizenship, while others were subjected to increasingly punitive measures. Public hygiene as a “common good” thus became shared by a group of middle-class urban residents and a new trope for Othering and exclusion of populations found to be the culprit of pollution.

In chapter 4 I show how the new principle of urban rent affected waste companies that had to yield their central city locations to more profitable and prestigious urban developments. In this chapter, I trace the emergence of the *Yugoslav Business Association for Supply of Industry with Raw Materials from Waste* (INOT). This chapter deals with a discrepancy between federal-level policies to promote the most intense search for domestic raw materials, including raw materials from waste, adopted in 1965, and local governments policing waste companies and waste collectors. This and the following chapter will detail how efforts after 1965 to make waste a commodity traded on a “common Yugoslav market” stayed very much confined by the logic of urban governance. While the city did lose some of its regulatory power over the waste

market and waste collectors after 1965, it quickly re-instantiated its power through increasing its policing surveillance. The chapter is about the increasing police power of the municipalities and how policing became a source of generating revenues important for the self-financing municipality.

The previous chapter was about how waste companies were struggling with their low status in the economy. Especially their low repute among City Officials made them a prime target of policing. This caused them difficulties in obtaining a permanent location in the city and oftentimes restricted their ability to invest in machinery and build auxiliary structures like storage rooms, which are vital for a functioning junk shop. I have shown how waste companies dealt with the double image as “diligent suppliers of secondary raw materials” and “mobile vendors that sell outdated goods and speculate with semi-finished goods”. This also involved cajoling city governments for support to transform companies in preliminary locations with temporary shelter into “partners for industry” with permanent locations in industrial zones. In chapter 5 I show how this ambivalence reflected on the contestations around “who are the individual waste collectors”. The question of “individual waste collector” hinges crucially on the question of work ethics: who behaves as a “diligent supplier” and who engages in barter and “distorts prices”. We see from these debates that both the state and waste companies attempted to bring work ethics in relation to specific social categories and thus stabilize the identity of the “ideal” individual waste collector.

Chapter 6 is about the emergence of “volunteers” as collectors. I show how the establishment of a new regime of governing “public hygiene” exploited and thus entrenched the faultlines between citizens (surveying public order) and non-citizens (polluters). I have shown how this division was then translated into a division between ‘volunteer’ collectors (housing councils, school children, institutionalized youth, youth organizations) via the local ward, while non-

citizens collectors were banned from the collection as uninsured or “uninsurable” populations that pose a threat to public order and volunteers – professional collectors were increasingly replaced by “volunteers”. I put volunteers in quotation marks because with their work they contributed to the funding of their institutions/organizations. The shift from waste collectors to “volunteers” can be read as an enclosure of valuable wastes for the purpose of reproduction of Belgradians (dependent population should make a side-income from it, or volunteers should support schools and neighborhoods from the collection of valuable wastes).

In Chapter 7 I differentiate two different governmental logics applied to unhygienic settlements and wild dumps: one comes from urban planners and central city government (closer to the forward-looking “seeing like a state” style of governance described by Scott), the other from Roma coordinators responsible for unhygienic settlements in the single Belgradian municipalities (closer to particular nuisance-style governance described by Valverde 2011). The chapter starts with the encounter with urban planners that authored the 2003 Urban Plan, which is the first to include extensive mapping of “urban wastelands”: “unhygienic settlements”, different forms of urban greenery (polluted and clean). The 2003 Urban Plan aimed to make sense and order the urban landscape and surplus populations produced by the dismantling of socialism and the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s, which left its marks on Belgrade in the form of de-industrialization, the influx of Roma IDPs from Kosovo, proliferation of urban slums. The 2003 Urban Plan forms the background for urban redevelopment schemes targeting urban wastelands. It formed the backdrop of the 2009-2012 large-scale displacement of so-called “unhygienic settlements” consisting largely of families living from waste picking and heavily changed the moral codes involved in the governance of waste work in Belgrade. This chapter asks, what did the state do when it started to map unhygienic settlements, how is the governance of unhygienic Roma settlements taking shape through the particular mandate of Roma coordinators, how waste and water are grasped, and

then practically how Roma coordinators engage in ordering – governing through communal problems, nuisance-style governance.

In chapter 8 I analyze the role of Roma coordinators in Belgrade as labor market brokers for Roma from urban slums in the context of the labor market flexibilization in Serbia. I want to contribute to the literature arguing that Agencies for Temporary Work (ATWs) do not simply connect market demands with offers, but actively construct flexible labor markets (Peck, Theodore, and Ward 2005). Focusing on brokers, I seek to open the black box of flexible hiring by drawing attention to the infrastructure that enables flexible labor markets rather than on either the demand side (companies) or supply-side (surplus populations) (Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012). Brokers unite in themselves partially contradictory claims related to flexible hiring consisting of state discourse of protection, activation, or humanist protection, as well as interests of capital. My case study is about how an ATW taps into racialized populations and downgraded neighborhoods where the majority of the population is active in the informal economy (Peck and Theodore 2001; K. Jones 2014). I will argue that Roma coordinators in their eagerness to prove Roma from urban slums as “fit” to become workers in private companies “beyond human rights arguments”, actually started to provide crucial services that the ATW needed to engage in flexible hiring. In selecting and book-keeping on “those who are really willing to work”, Roma coordinators (a) followed racialized assumptions on the work discipline and accordingly acted as if to “compensate” the employer for hiring these racialized subjects for a job with a private company, which is being regarded as the epitome of having succeeded in reaching outside of the segments of the labor market Roma from urban slums are usually trapped in, and (b) address what is actually behind much of the assumptions about the fitness of certain racialized groups for wage labor is their dependence on it² and thus Roma coordinators also engaged in negotiating the frontier of how formal and informal sector work are related to each other (informal sector work as a “safety net”).

In chapter 9 I finally come back to the idea of enclosure of communal waste in Belgrade, now against a thick historical background of emerging forms of market-driven urbanization in Belgrade and styles of governing floating populations. This chapter is about forms of valuation that emerge not in the sites of enclosure of resources but in the wastelands produced by enclosure. I look at wild dumps, which are messy as they emerge at the interstices of three different projects through which the city tries to engage two of its key resources (land and waste) in forms of (re-)valuation: commercial landfilling (landfill tax, fencing off of the city landfill), large-scale urban recycling systems (underground containers, building of a waste incinerator), and “cleaning up” of urban land for renewal (brownfield). These projects can produce the values hoped for only if they manage to establish a definite separation of “clean” and “polluting” forms of dealing with waste and land. My ethnography of waste pickers on the wild dump on the construction site documents forms of valuation that are obscured, but do populate the interstices of these grand-scale projects of valuing waste and land. In the first part, I develop the term “appropriation practices” as a form of waste picking emerging in spaces that have been shaped by their exclusion from circles of sanitation (around commercial landfilling) and enclosure of urban recycling systems that I described in the previous chapter. In the second part, I go to my ethnography of waste picking on the wild dump in Čukarica municipality. I discuss three main practices of appropriation (gambling, mining, gleaning).

Chapter 1: The Socialist Urbanization of Fiscal Crisis: Tracing Back Investor Urbanism

From their inception as an autonomous regulatory body in 1948 due to food shortages and throughout the 1950s, local governments in socialist Yugoslavia were strengthened as a central body to preserve the living standard of the urban working class. During this period, Yugoslavia, similar to its neighboring socialist countries, pursued a politics of redistributing agricultural surplus towards industrialization. The first five-year plan was focused on industrialization, while the following plans, from the mid-1950s onwards, increasingly prioritized consumption and the creation and preservation of a certain standard of living for the urban working class (Unkovski-Korica 2016; LeNormand 2014; Dobrivojević 2016). The prime instrument was price regulations through which the government aimed at keeping life in the cities affordable while taking away from agricultural producers' potential surplus value and prevent them from engaging in "speculation" with the food products (Marković 1996; Woodward 1995).

This role of the local government as the benefactor of the urban working class shifted with the 1965 economic reform. First, the relation between the local government and companies on their territory was rekindled. Local governments' ability to draw taxes from local companies was reduced, and the companies and City Halls were put on equal footing in terms of steering the direction for urban development. Yugoslav economist Rudolf Bićanić (1973) named this as a transition from decentralized to polycentric government, with local governments and companies placed on equal footing. Second, federal funds of the municipality were discontinued. The role of the local government as the main investor in urban development (through the building of factories and housing stock), shifted to one of attracting investors. As a consequence of these two novelties, earlier instruments to counter-act uneven development between municipalities (common investment fund) faded in the background as new ideas about

comparative advantages of cities arose. These shifts were discussed by Yugoslav policymakers and especially local officials in the Standing Conference of Towns (SKG)³ under the notion of the “self-financing (of the) municipality” (*samo-finansiranje opština*).

Aleksandar Trujić, Deputy Director of the Urban Institute for Societal Planning in Belgrade, suggested in 1967 in an article for *Komuna* a system for ranking cities in terms of the geographic position, constellation of economic flows, number of scientific institutes, communication infrastructure, development of the third sector and tourism. These factors would make especially “Belgrade an economic zone [*ekonomsko područje*] ... a higher rank member in the chain of actions of economic development for the integration into the global division of labor” in terms of “financial-credit transactions, scientific and technological cooperation, exchange, production, traffic, services, information, various professions in the area of industrial refinement, storage, re-export”. Instruments like “urban rent” (*gradska renta*) were discussed as helping to transform space from a “natural category” to an instrument in directing economic development as it would express “differentiated economic potential”, and reward municipalities for showing “business acumen”⁴. From debates in the City Hall of Belgrade, I could see examples in the late 1960s where officials debated the possibility of attracting companies by offering fully developed land in central locations for favorable conditions⁵.

The dismantling of the local authorities as they had been installed throughout the 1950s and the articulation of the 1965 market reforms at the local level have been insufficiently researched (LeNormand 2008). The research on socialist urbanization in Yugoslavia either completely ignores the market reform as a juncture, or, following Ivan Szelenyi’s (1983) famous study on Hungary, emphasize the role of markets in socialist urbanization as a function of shortages, to

provide the poor with housing as opposed to white-collar workers who received state housing (LeNormand 2008; Troch 2019; Archer 2017; Vujović 1986).

This opening chapter of my thesis outlines why it is necessary to systematically re-think urbanization in socialist Yugoslavia in the light of the economic reform. I begin here with a critical review of existing research on the local government in Yugoslavia and then, relying on the professional journal of the Standing Conference of Towns (SKG) in Yugoslavia, *Komuna*, I reconstruct the major, market-oriented changes that have been introduced to urban governance after 1965.

1.1 Socialist Urbanization, Workers, Non-Workers

Socialist urbanization principles rested on a particular notion of the urban working class proper that, as multiple studies have shown, was only loosely connected to the actual composition of the working population residing in the city.

Before the 1965 market reforms, much of how the Belgrade city government defined who is surplus seems to bear similarities to the project of “reducing the urban multiplier” (Chan 1994) that has been described for other socialist cities, where extensive industrial growth is combined with particular strategies of “curbing consumption”. In this conception, the city is the place where the number of workers in the services and state bureaucracy, necessary to sustain industrial workers, and the “dependent” population related to these industrial workers (women, children, youth, and elderly) shall be kept at a minimum (Kornai 1992; Ofer 1976; 1977; Konrad and Szelenyi 1977).

The socialist city was designed as a place of relatively cheap consumption for *workers*. Along the lines of “socialist urbanization”, investment in urban goods of collective consumption in Yugoslavia was one of the instruments to reduce labor turnover and market development of wages, and with it also fluctuation between city and countryside. The investment funds were to support “the working people in the cities” and to counter-balance their relative dependency in matters of consumption in comparison to the relative self-sufficiency of agricultural producers. Discussions on the relative distribution of personal income and investment funds were present from the beginning of the introduction of workers’ self-management and can be retrieved from the memoirs of Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, who was the vice-President of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia and then President of the Central Council of the Federation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia between 1958-1967 and a prime designer of the self-management. In 1956 SV Tempo defended the subsidies for urban communal services and infrastructure saying:

“In our country, a significant part of the personal consumption is not realized through personal income, rather subsidized through general consumption (preferential transport, low prices of cultural and communal services (apartment rents, reduced prices for coal), child benefits, social insurance, etc.). If all of this would be included in the personal income, as is the case in Western countries, the real income would at least be double what it is now. True, such a system of financing personal consumption was not economically rational, but it was introduced as socially more just in order to protect the [living] standard of the urban population which lives from its work only and in order to help families with children. As more than half of the employed live in the countryside – and live well – a general increase in the personal income (so that everybody pays their rent, communal and other services according to their real prices) would benefit those that use the benefactions of [living in] the countryside and harm those that live and work in the cities.“ (Vukmanović Tempo 1972, 2:280)

In chapter 2 I will argue that leading up to the economic reforms in 1965 the policy of keeping cities cheap has been criticized as one of the reasons for the attraction of internal migrants, non-workers. This makes clear that the relation between the urban and the rural sector has to be regarded historically, not in terms of a static model of “socialist urbanization”.

An entrance point for such an analysis can be found in the work of the historical sociologist Norbert Petrovici, who argues that similar to capitalist accumulation, socialist accumulation also rested on the co-optation of non-socialist assets, and urban accumulation on the co-optation of rural assets. For Romania, he describes strategies of uneven development that enabled the socialist industry to tap into pools of cheap, so-called “peasant workers”, who could combine industrial and agricultural incomes (Petrovici 2013). Relations with the non-socialist sectors, such as the incorporation of pre-socialist industrial clusters and speculating on unpaid peasant work cannot be relegated to the beginning of capitalism and socialism, but are a constant part of it, as Petrovici (2013) argues. Petrovici (2013) explores partial proletarianization in cities in Romania in socialism and neoliberalism suggests a re-conceptualization of “socialist under-urbanization” to combined income as a strategy found among developmentalist states. Combined incomes are quite common to capitalist accumulation as well (Petrovici 2013, Kasmir and Carbonella 2014). However, in the case of socialism, the role of the non-socialist sector in the economy was highlighted and came to form the famous thesis of “socialist under-urbanization”, which made it look like fragmentation of the economy and related spatial strategies are something specific to socialist accumulation, proving its inferiority to urbanization and proletarianization “proper” in capitalist countries (Konrad and Szelenyi 1977; Petrovici 2015; Bodnar 2000).

While he ignores the related spatial strategies of uneven development, most prominently the rural-urban divide, an indicative typology of positions adopted by socialist states towards the non-socialist sector can be found in Yugoslav economist Bićanić’s work (1973, 39). In his seminal work “Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia” he shows that the forms in which the socialist sector fed on the non-socialist sector were manifold and highly politicized. The first position he outlines assumes that the development of the socialist economy and society is *endangered* by small-scale economic activities, which are a source of “continually breeding

capitalism” as “these enterprises [can be expected to] grow faster than the socialist sector”. The second position states that the non-socialist sector can help the development of a socialist economy. The non-socialist sector serves as a buffer in times of economic recession, something to be “allowed as a *temporary* concession”. The third position maintains that there is a “*permanent* place” for small-scale enterprise “even under socialism”: “It is felt that the workers concerned are operating a level of development of productive forces at which no socialist forms can develop”. It regards the non-socialist sector as “*complementary*”. An addition to the third position, specific to the Yugoslav route to socialism, regards individual entrepreneurs as a “further step towards self-management” (Bićanić 1973, 39).

The framing of internal migrants as a challenge to modernization can be regarded as practices of “nesting orientalism” and internal Othering, which was a shared obsession among developmentalist (urban) policymakers in socialist Eastern Europe, but also cities in the Global South (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Marr 2019). Noting this obsession, Yugoslav urban sociologist Mlinar (1983) critically commented on how certain issues like commuting had been over-analyzed for Yugoslavia. Curiously, it was this very focus of the country on monitoring internal migration that made American urban planners interested in learning from Yugoslavia in the 1960s and organize a joint project with money from the Ford Foundation. Praising the country’s “excellent interregional migration statistics”, American urban planners hoped Yugoslavia could help to build models for regional development. They stated that the situation of “working in the city and living outside” is nothing specific to socialist cities and that Yugoslav statistics could help them to build an economic model for the contribution of interregional mobility of labor and entrepreneurs and “their role as determinants of sudden and sustained changes in the level of regional income and expenditures” to be used in regional development planning back home (Burton, Dyckman, and Fisher 1967, 82).

By analyzing the relation between socialist and non-socialist sector in a dynamic politics of urbanization, I go beyond Petrovici (2013) who used the data about economic sectors of the Statistical Yearbook of Romania to trace rural-urban accumulation processes, most prominently in the form of combined incomes, through investment policies but does not offer an actual analysis (of shifting forms) of urban governance during socialism, which forms the focal point of my thesis. While he emphasizes the effect of shifting spatial strategies (socialist rural-urban divide to neoliberal suburbanization) on partial proletarianization, his juxtaposition of socialism and neoliberalism appraises only a particular period and type of socialist urbanization policy. He does not take into account what happened after Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia introduced market reforms. My thesis offers a more detailed historical analysis. Based on the professional journal of the Yugoslav Standing Conference of Towns, *Komuna*, I outline major shifts of (socialist) urban governance after the 1965 market reforms, which builds the foundation to unravel shifts in the governance of waste workers in Belgrade following 1965.

1.2 Socialist Urbanization of Fiscal Crisis

The movement to entrepreneurial style in urban governance has been prominently ascribed to the transition from socialism to capitalism, not only in the case of (former) Yugoslav cities (Petrović 2009; Petovar and Vujošević 2008) but socialist cities more generally (Kinossian 2012; Temelová 2007; Coles 2003). There are some exceptions, most notably the work of the historical sociologist Norbert Petrovici who traces the co-existence of a socialist and entrepreneurial style of urban governance in the case of Cluj (Petrovici under review). Other examples are studies that show the role of the International Fair in Zagreb in enabling the southern expansion of the city in the 1950s and demonstrate an interweaving of international market integration with socialist urbanization (Blau and Rupnik 2007; Vranić 2021). However, the dominant theme is to associate entrepreneurial urban governance with post-socialism.

If we regard socialist urbanization as a means to protect the urban working class from the repercussions of world market integration by way of a strong, redistributive local state, then it is necessary to investigate how the emerging fiscal crisis in Yugoslavia impacted the ability of the socialist state to uphold this protectorate. I would argue that the changes in urban governance of 1965 that I described above were a way to create fixes for the emerging fiscal crisis at the local level. I am leaning here on theories on the “urbanization of fiscal crisis” that were coined based on research in cities in the U.S. in the mid-1970s (Marcuse 1981). The advantages of the “urbanization of fiscal crisis” over a simple “marketization” approach are that the former invites to analyze the introduction of market principles at the level of the local government as a politics of redistribution that anchors fiscal crisis at a particular level of the state. The concept of the “urbanization of fiscal crisis” leads to an analysis of the creation of “fixes” – a particular politics of de-investment and accumulation that disproportionately burdens particular social groups (Marcuse 1981). I follow here Unkovski-Korica (2016, 5), who suggested regarding the ensuing debt crisis (and ultimately the disintegration of Yugoslavia), not as an automatism of Yugoslavia’s world market integration, but rather to inquire into the specific ways in which Yugoslavia set itself up in relation to external markets.

The “urbanization of fiscal crisis” offers a perspective on de-investment at the local level in Yugoslavia after 1965 that differs significantly from what has been written until now. Historical accounts depict the discontinuation of federal funding for local governments as a necessary intervention to strip local power holders of cronyism. Troch (2018, 38f.) for example repeats the argument about extensive bureaucracy as fertile grounds for cronyism. Dobrivojević (2016, 146) depicts local investment politics in factories and infrastructures as “buying consent”, which became increasingly unsustainable with an insurgent foreign debt

crisis and incited Yugoslav policymakers to find the culprit of the “unreal Yugoslav investment politics” financed through economic aid and credits from Western countries. These discourses domestic Yugoslav and foreign economists’ discourse of the late 1950s to early 1970s that legitimated the discontinuation of federal funding for the local government and advocated for more market.

Starting from the late 1950s, Yugoslav leadership pointed its finger at the building mania and inefficient allocation of resources by local politicians and company directors. Accounts of local politicians using political ties to get central government funds to build factories were common (Bićanić 1973). Not only Yugoslav leadership pointed its fingers at local government as culprits, but American economists (Neuberger 1959; Fisher 1964), and more importantly, a report drafted for Yugoslavia’s largest foreign creditor at the time, the World Bank (Schrenk 1979), wrote in favor of “more market” and less centralized distribution of funds. This report was in line with research on the local government done by American economists at the time. Hoffman and Neal (1962) and Neal (1958) studied for example how overspending was enabled by the system of so-called investment auctions, where credits were granted to those local governments and factories that bid for the highest interest rate without strict obligations on how to pay back. As a consequence of these diagnoses of the “unreal Yugoslav investment politics”, and in line with the politics of its creditor (World Bank), Yugoslavia in 1965 abolished the central investment funds and introduced a commercial credit system that allowed for enterprise-driven investment (Bockman 2011, 80), with local governments founding their own banks.

My claim here is not to say that “politically motivated” investment in the hands of local officials did not happen, but rather to show how these accounts of historians bear a striking resemblance

with how contemporaries of the Economic reform, both domestic Yugoslav politicians and foreign advisors, blamed the fiscal crisis on local governments, depicted them as corrupt and thus legitimated a new style of company-driven entrepreneurial urbanization.

1.3 The Self-Financing Municipality (1965)

In the following, I will detail parts of the debates on policy instruments that show a movement to an entrepreneurial style of urban governance as they are reflected in articles published in *Komuna*. I will analyze the consequences of the “self-financing municipality” for the local government of communal services, activation of citizens’ private funds, urban land, and private services in turn.

1.3.1 Communal Services – Price Increases or More Planning

Next to the issuing of import-export permissions, the conclusion of international and bilateral treaties for trade and foreign investment, one of the prime sites of policymaking for world market integration in Yugoslavia were discussions around the lifting of price controls. The goal was to have price relations regulated through export-import transactions, what Woodward (1995) called the “Slovene model” of development. Hopes were disappointed quickly. Already a few years after the 1965 Economic reform, Yugoslav policymakers found the forces of the global market wanting in terms of their ability to produce an “equilibrium between demand and supply”. Policymakers also remarked on the power imbalances as foreign, especially Western markets were less accessible and less open “to the influences of the markets of other countries” (Marsenić 1973, 148) than initially expected. As a result,

“80 percent of producers’ prices in the industry, almost all retail and wholesale prices of industrial products, retail prices of major agricultural and food products, rates of the railway and other transport services, rents, and prices of public utilities and health services remained under direct social control.” (Marsenić 1973, 148)

In the field of public utilities, initial experiments with liberating communal service fees led to price increases, which were answered by sharp reactions of both working organizations and citizens. The federal government intervened and re-established price controls at the local level. Local officials regarded this as an undue intervention of the federal government in an essentially local market. The incident led to a debate in the Standing Conference of Towns (SKG) on the question of where to maintain and where to lift the price control and who was entitled to make such decisions.

In August 1965 the Federal Secretary for Finance, Kiro Gligorov, visited the 9th meeting of the SKG to advocate for the decision of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) on price controls in the communal services⁶. He emphasized the importance of local governments in supporting the Economic reform: “without the support of the communes, the economic reform would probably stand on glass legs”⁷. He then explained why the SIV decided to intervene in the prices of communal services:

“no one thinks that the communal services are the basic source and only cause for the increase in living costs. But they are, certainly, regardless of how many points they mean in the living costs of one or the other family, a significant element of the living standard, especially of the urban population.” (Komuna 08/1965 “Support for the Commune – One of the Basic Preconditions for the Success of the Reform”, Kiro Gligorov, my translation)

Gligorov pointed out that the SIV had decided on the intervention in local price relations not arbitrarily but through expert evaluation: “Some hundreds of economic experts worked together to secure a big number of surveys conducted in the republics”⁸.

Town planner Branislav Piha, a member of the SKG, critically commented on the economic policies of the federal government. He described communal services as low-hanging fruit for attempts at the federal level to maintain a certain standard of living through price regulation, but not necessarily the most effective one. Piha connected the federal intervention in communal

service fees to the loss of control of the federal government over other (export-related) consumer market segments: “in order to maintain the standard of living in the frame foreseen by the reform, the federation directed its control to this area even though communal services do not present more of 2-3% of a family income”. And further: the federal government decided for this strategy “because it was not able to exert control on [other] prices, especially of food items”⁹. This resonates with Woodward’s (1995, 227) observation that attempts of the federal government to contain the effects of international market volatility on the Yugoslav economy (and standard of living) increasingly failed. In that sense, the intervention of the federal government in a quintessentially local part of the economy (public services and artisan businesses) can be read as an attempt to manage fiscal crisis by way of applying austerity measures in urban public services – a strategy of “urbanization of fiscal crisis”.

This question of the relation of price control in the area of food items vs. communal services surfaced again in 1973 when the Federal Executive Council (SIV) took decisions to liberate prices for dairy products, but further freeze the prices of public services¹⁰. Again, the SIV maintained that communal services belonged to a category of products and services which “’attack’ the stability and ’standard’ and put pressure on living costs”¹¹. In their newspaper ‘Public Hygiene’ (*Javna Higijena*), PSS Belgrade considered this assumption “unsustainable” and asked, “what do planners understand under ‘living standard’?”:

“Isn’t a flat, water and cleanliness (in addition to food) a fundamental factor for living standard? If the living standard is understood first of all as cars and other durable consumer goods then higher prices for housing, water, and the collection of waste really would disrupt the living standard of working people.” (*Javna Higijena* 03/1973 “Unsustainable Assumptions”, my translation)

PSS pointed out that under the current conditions, where communal companies have still not been included in the system of bank credits, the only way to offer quality services would be to increase service fees:

“We remind that the freezing of communal products and services has made it more difficult for communal organizations to operate, because, already before they operated on the verge of profitability, but now they are in an even more difficult position. How difficult the situation is is shown by the statements of the republican and provincial price bureaus at last year’s price conference in Sarajevo that the prices of services have become a factor hindering the construction of communal facilities ... Without the necessary funds, and in a situation where the conditions for crediting communal objects is unresolved, it is not possible to offer quality services ... in the current situation, the only way out is to increase the prices of communal services.” (Javna Higijena 03/1973 “Unsustainable Assumptions”, my translation)

While increases in communal service fees were unpopular, Piha challenged the view that the local government and communal companies had proven themselves incapable as economic actors through the price increases. Rather, he framed the price increases as a rational response to a “chaotic” infrastructural grid that grew in an unplanned, piecemeal sort of way, directed through company-led investments and not municipal planning. With this, he positioned himself as a proponent of a stronger role of the municipality. In opposition to arguments that blamed the current problems on inefficiency and corruption of the local government, which thus needs to be either dismantled or controlled by the federal government, Piha traces back some of the current problems in cities to the earlier experiments with company-driven investment in communal infrastructure.

Piha criticized the way the construction of communal infrastructure had been following the urban expansion and not the other way around since 1955 when funds for infrastructure were tied to the *Housing Fund*. The *Housing Fund* had initially been pooled at the level of the local government for communal infrastructure projects. Funds were also partially transmitted to less developed municipalities. Then, in 1960, with the *Decree on Communal Objects*, it was decided that the *Housing Fund* may only be used in the immediate surrounding of a concrete construction project, to connect the house to communal infrastructure: build pavements around the house, or to bituminize streets (Gančević 1971). With the 1965 economic reform, this development was accelerated. City officials complained that companies gained strength vis-à-

vis municipalities, but had to be convinced to care for “municipal problems”, that is, anything “outside of the company’s fences”¹². Despite this de-funding, citizens and working organizations still expected local governments to assume the same scope of responsibilities in the area of collective consumption as before the economic reform¹³. The authority of the local government was seriously challenged. A local politician described the position of the municipality after the economic reform as “neither in heaven nor on earth”¹⁴.

Piha thought that City Assemblies provoked the intervention of the federal government in the communal economy because they tried to solve a complex problem of an inefficient infrastructural grid that has historical roots through a fast solution (a price increase)¹⁵. He suggests that the needs of communal service companies should be advocated through urban planning¹⁶. Piha introduced the concept of “costs of the exploitation of the city”, suggesting that the “City becomes expensive as a whole because it is not well organized”¹⁷. The concept “costs for the exploitation of the city” advocates the role of the urban planner, who can produce an “efficient spatial organization” that would enable provisioning with commonly used infrastructure. The urban planner here offers himself as useful rather than an obstacle to company-driven urbanization.

In 1965 the role of the local government changed from acting as the main investor in urban development (through the building of factories and housing stock) to a role of attracting investors. The favored instrument became “efficient spatial planning”¹⁸. The SKG officially acknowledged the increased importance of the urban plan as the means of the local government to direct urban development by creating “general conditions for the economy” (*opšti uslovi za priređivanje*)¹⁹. Those new economic conceptions of spatial planning were most explicitly expressed through the policy instrument of urban rent.

1.3.2 Urban Rent

The concept of the “costs of the exploitation of the city” and the idea of “efficient planning” were soon translated into concrete policy instruments that enabled the local government to direct urban development and to engage in new forms of extraction that could potentially fill holes in the budget: the urban rent. Piha argues that with the urban rent

“municipalities can dispose of funds for land preparation and ordering. Thus ... the planned usage and *economizing with land* in cities has begun, which has not been the case earlier. ... The expansion of cities [urban sprawl] starts to be prevented and construction is carried out on prepared plots. ... It is up to the municipalities to further develop and improve this instrument ... because [urban rent] together with urban plans, remain the only, but still very effective means, for [local governments to] direct the development of cities.” (Komuna 10/1965 “The Role of the Municipality in the Spatial Directing of Cities after the Economic Reform”, Branislav Piha, my translation, emphasis added)

Urban rent was conceptualized as an instrument of the “self-financing municipality” to generate income and “to solve urban problems”²⁰. Specifically, it was used to control urban development in terms of reconstruction (demolition of buildings) and expansion (offer prepared plots of land to investors). I will discuss both in more detail in chapter 2. The urban rent was meant as a “solidary contribution”, not to overly burden individual investors, to whom these plots were then offered²¹.

The urban rent was build on both entrepreneurial and socialist ideas. On the one hand, it was envisioned to be the instrument that most accurately tied the budget of a municipality to the economic results achieved on its territory. Urban rent was meant to reward municipalities that showed business acumen. On the other hand, the urban rent, or “contribution for the usage of urban land” was as a fee for any surplus value derived from land that exceeded the socialist principle of income according to work and thus should not be enjoyed by individual working collectives but redistributed for common good through the municipality:

“The contribution serves to grasp those ... values in cities which did not emerge through activities of individuals or working organizations, but through the lucky coincidence that these values are located in some place in the city or that they receive a certain construction ground for usage ... neither the individual nor the working organization has the right to extract from this situation any form of benefit for themselves. Only the municipality has this right but under the condition that thus collected means not use for other purposes, but dedicates it to arrange and build the city in which those incomes emerged.” (Komuna 10/1965 “The Role of the Municipality in the Spatial Orientation of Cities After the Economic Reform”, my translation)

The principle of urban rent thus re-conceptualized capitalist concepts of differences in land value in a way compatible with socialism. Belgradian economist Dušan Stefanović described the urban rent or “contribution for the usage of urban land”, as he framed it, as an instrument used in a “transitional period” (to socialism):

“There can be no doubt that in a transition period ‘urban rent’ keeps being effective (understood in a modified form, as a new category, which no longer grows out of the private-capitalist ownership of urban land). This can be seen, for example, if we look at two stores with the same building characteristics and the same business purpose, but in different places, which provide opportunities for very different exchange ... different locations can provide significant advantages or disadvantages, and thus different real level of consumption or different success in business ... (where it is not always about the differences in the communal preparation of the land, but above all about the different benefits of certain parts of the urban land.” (Komuna 12/1965 “The Position of the Municipality under the New Conditions”, Dušan Stefanović, my translation)

In practice, it turned out to be difficult to calculate urban rent in conditions where there was no market in urban land²². Reminiscent of the original tax on natural monopolies, which was applied to rents in agriculture and eventually abandoned because of the difficulties in calculating them (Woodward 1995, n. 47, p.183), conflicts over the character of urban rent extended to conflicts over the methods for its collection.

Conflicts became apparent when municipalities sought to collect rent from working organizations that had acquired a favorable position in the city during the administrative period and could now enjoy profits from that location²³. Economist Dušan Stefanović had suggested having the urban rent collected by a communal organization, such as the Housing Company

(*Stambeno Preduzeće*), which was also responsible for the administration of the Housing Fund. He argued that the urban rent should not be regarded as a tax, but as “compensation for actually offered service of using urban land, the development and further refinement of which is the duty of this communal organization”²⁴. Collecting urban rent for the budget of the city government was politically delicate as can be seen from one article in *Komuna* (12/1967) on the question of “land rent” (*zemljišna renta*) in Belgrade collected on business spaces.

Since the 1959 Law on Nationalization, current owners (that is private individuals, working organizations, and the Housing Company) were allowed to “temporarily” rent out land or buildings to other working organizations and private craftsmen if they did not need the land for their purposes. Temporariness was poorly policed and under it was hiding a de facto booming rental market. SKG suggested that private individuals and working organizations, who were allowed to freely form a rent price with the tenant, used this mechanism to enrich themselves, while the Housing Company remained bound to certain prices. The author suggested that urban land and buildings for leasing should all be administered by the Housing Company so that profits would not end up in pockets of private individuals and working organizations, but be re-directed through the Housing Company to communal investments²⁵.

1.3.3 Uniting the Consumer and Producer Citizen

In 1965 citizens were asked to participate with more of their personal engagement and private funds. These instruments were presented as a step towards greater participation and realization of self-managed socialism and emancipation from higher government levels. The idea was to liberate companies from the burden of financial obligation towards the municipality and make citizens pay and participate more instead.

The “current material difficulties in the commune” were regarded by some as leading to a “crisis of self-management”, which would take the commune its “basic characteristic”. On a meeting of the SKG on the topic of the position of the municipality after the economic reform in December 1965, Mirko Bošković, president of the Commission for socio-economic and political relations in socio-political communities of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia pointed out “one can easily fall into such a view when one does not consider the societal and political meaning of the new economic measures”. He then treated two basic institutions of local self-management: the local ward (*mesna zajednica*) and the voters’ councils (*zborovi birača*) and how they should be re-organized in the self-financing municipality.

“The basic criteria of the constitution and the meaning of existence [of local wards] is that they should consist in the possibility for citizens to really decide directly on their own common needs, to improve the living and working conditions with joint funds. Practice and experience show that many Local Wards, especially rural ones, can operate successfully without secured funds from the outside, relying on the personal resources of citizens” (Komuna 12/1965 “Citizen-Producer as the Basic Subject of All Societal Relations – Local Ward and Voters’ Council in the Self-governing Mechanism”, Mirko Bošković, my translation)

“the voters’ councils should not be almost exclusively tied to the City Assemblies – as it is the practice now ... It is less and less possible to make demands of a material character to the [City] Assembly, and the increasingly material obligations will be passed directly on to the economy, and even the communal economy, which means, to the citizens themselves .. the voters’ councils should be relieved from the one-sided, narrow function, which in some place consists exclusively of making material demands addressed to the City Assembly” (Komuna 12/1965 “Citizen-Producer as the Basic Subject of All Societal Relations – Local Ward and Voters’ Council in the Self-governing Mechanism”, Mirko Bošković, my translation)

Drawing on personal engagement and private savings was presented as an instrument to raise the interest of citizens in the work of the municipality, that is, to outgrow “self-interest” among citizens. The self-financing municipality was thus envisioned as one which activates “passive” citizens:

“municipalities do not search for the exit from their adverse material situation in the redistribution of means between socio-political communities or in the burdening of working organizations, but, first and foremost, in abandoning the current system of determining the material frame of the municipalities by the wider socio-political community and in creating possibilities for the extended engagement of *the initiative, will and personal means of the citizens*. This has to be an important element ... in the first phase of self-financing of the municipality” (Komuna 11/1967 “Special Issue: Material Position of the Municipality and Ways for its Self-Financing”, p.16f., my translation, emphasis added)

“introduction of the new way of financing would mean *a significant incentive for the realization of the influence of citizens on the formation and execution of municipal politics*. On the one hand, it would be expected a significant increase in the interest of citizens for the work of the City Hall and other municipal bodies, while, on the other hand, the participation of citizens would receive real significance and for everyone visible and clear meaning. From such a change in relations would emerge more responsible, higher quality and more profound work of the municipal bodies in the preparation of elements for ordering municipal politics” (Komuna 11/1967 “Special Issue: Material Position of the Municipality and Ways for its Self-Financing”, p.17, my translation, emphasis added)

The new, active role of the citizens was contrasted to the old, passive, consumerist attitude of the citizens. On the consultations of the SKG held in Belgrade in December 1965, the Mayor of Zagreb Pero Pirker depicted the situation as follows:

“A big part of the [national] income created in the working organizations was centralized in the federal and republican funds and a lot of current federal and republican laws and prescriptions were especially directed to ‘protect’ the income of working organizations from giving to the commune, in which, by the way, those working organizations operate and use communal services and where their workers realize their societal standard. Because of this, the realization of some self-management rights in the commune was reduced to smaller or bigger formality, as higher socio-political communities limited or purposefully directed the material basis of the commune.

The position of the commune and its inhabitants is reflected in the fact that *citizens in the commune appear in twofold roles*, once he [sic!] appears in the Voters’ Assembly, in the settlement where he lives, with the claim that, for example, a new road, school, crib, kindergarten, health institution be built, that object of culture and sport be built, that theater and other institutions are given bigger remunerations, that parks are cleaned up and similar, and the next time that same citizen appears as a member of his working organization and then he claims that as little funds as possible will be taken from the income generated in the economy in general and his company in particular.” (Komuna 12/1965 “Position of the Municipality Under the New Conditions. Consultation of the Standing Conference of Towns”, p.4, my translation, emphasis added)

Articulated in this way, as the two-fold role of the citizens as both worker-tax-payer and citizen-consumer, Pirko depicted the defunding of the municipality as a problem of responsabilizing citizens to solve this tension through self-management, or at least, to internalize it:

“within the commune [working organizations] decide through self-management how much they want to give ... *for personal, how much for societal standard*. With the growth of personal incomes also the funds for the societal standard will grow” (Komuna 12/1965 “Position of the Municipality under the New Conditions. Consultation of the Standing Conference of Towns”, p.5, my translation, emphasis added)

He suggested that self-management is an instrument to create a direct link between demands for higher income and demands for higher societal standards and thus will bring to a “realistic frame” the “oversized consumerist atmosphere” in Yugoslavia that “everyone who requests and suggests something, who wants something, can and must decide from where this will be paid”²⁶. Pirko thinks that the current system of redistribution is the root cause of citizens having a “consumerist attitude” towards the commune:

“The current system of financing constantly creates new appetites on all sides, because it is always expected that in so far there is already a certain contribution and limited funds in the socio-political community, and first and foremost in the commune, those appetites can always be satisfied through some new redistribution of all those funds” (Komuna 12/1965 “Position of the Municipality under the New Conditions. Consultation of the Standing Conference of Towns”, p.5, my translation, emphasis added)

The activation of private funds and personal initiative went along with the installation of a new institution, the local ward, which was introduced in 1965 in some municipalities and became an obligatory representative body of the concerns of the neighborhood with the 1974 constitution. The local ward was to “unite in one person the producer and the consumer” (Duda 2020). The local ward manifested the reproduction of the principles of workers’ self-management at the neighborhood level. Following the critical appraisal of the introduction of institutions of self-management in companies as a way to deal with crises caused by world-market integration (Unkovski-Korica 2016), in the following chapters, I will show the role of neighborhood organizations like housing councils, voters’ councils, and local ward in the self-

financing municipality, specifically, their role in changing forms of governance of the collection of valuable wastes. These institutions represent the changing concept of the citizen in the municipality, her tasks, and obligations. They are crucial to understanding how the collection of valuable wastes was organized in the self-financing municipality.

1.4 Decentralization: Marketization and Socialization

If we follow the claim of contemporaries of the reform, Milentije Popović, then President of the Federal Assembly who summarized the goal of “de-etatization” at the local level after 1965 as “establishment of economic relations between citizens and municipalities”²⁷ it is worthwhile to look at how those new relations played out in various fields in more detail. Marketization and socialization are not opposites but are closely connected. I follow Zukin (2008), who argues that after the 1965 systematic introduction of market socialism, competition between the self-managing communities (working collectives, housing councils, local wards), came to replace cooperation in the name of a “common good”. So it was also through the smaller entities of self-management that market mechanisms and a logic of competition were established.

What is important for my argument about the collection of valuable wastes between work and non-work is that this was not a question of the private versus the socialist sector (which would be the relation tackled by “marketization”), but the collection of valuable waste and its definition of work or non-work very much unfolded also in relation to the socialization of certain services and activities. I will discuss this concerning the housing councils and local wards and their role in mobilizing volunteers for the collection of valuable wastes. Therefore, what I mean by work/non-work spectrum really cannot be reduced to a discussion of the formal versus the informal sector, but can be understood in a process of formatting the economy in

specific ways in relation to both the socialized and the marketized sector. I will discuss in more detail the role of the bodies of the local self-management in the maintenance of public hygiene (chapter 3) and the mobilization of volunteers in the collection of valuable wastes (chapter 6). I will show how these alliances led to the marginalization and stigmatization of “professional waste collectors” in the private sector as “unhygienic” and engaging in “illegitimate profit-seeking”.

So far I have discussed mainly the introduction of market instruments as characteristic of the self-financing municipality and the shift from urban government to governance. But, as an entity born from the idea of “de-etatization”, the self-financing municipality also relied on the principle of “socialization”, that is, involvement of citizens and citizen organizations. In 1965 we see a shift in local governments increasingly devising instruments to tap into private funds and personal engagement of its citizens to cover for holes in the budget and gaps in public provisioning of basic means of reproduction. I would see this as a precursor to the systematic introduction of self-managing communities of interest (*samoupravne interesne zajednice*, short: SIZ) and local wards in 1974. Looking at “marketization” and “socialization” as two elements belonging to the self-financing municipality helps me later to understand 1965 to 1974 as a continuous development rather than marketization met by counter-movement as LeNormand (2008) argued. For that purpose, it is necessary to briefly go into the relation between “marketization” and “socialization”.

1.4.1 Socialization vs. Marketization

Decentralization was a highly ambiguous term in Yugoslav political theory. On the one hand, it meant “socialization” of the means of production and reproduction and on the other, decentralization was often used interchangeably with “marketization” (Woodward 1995). The

meandering between the two modes of decentralization can be seen from the development of the urban service sector.

In Yugoslav towns, a lot of services were meant to be organized at the local level of self-governing communities, which was part of the Yugoslav road to socialism through “withering away of the state”²⁸. The key element was a “progressive reduction or socialization of nonproductive activities – that is, the state and public services” (Woodward 1995, 265). The “de-etatization” hinged on the development of the “commune”, which the *Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists* (1958) described in the following words:

“the commune represents the most outstanding institution of direct socialist democracy, which puts into effect government of the working people through the working people and from them. Gradually taking over the management of social affairs and having at its disposal the corresponding means for carrying them out, the Commune is not only or primarily a school of democracy, but democracy itself – the basic cell of self-management of citizens in common affairs” (Pribechevich 1958, 204)

The commune is different from the municipality. While the municipality is a body of the state, the commune is a concept from Yugoslav political theory about the organization of the city based on various bodies of local self-management²⁹. Housing councils, voters’ councils, and local wards were smaller, political units, independent from the administrative unit of the municipality and inherently meant to be non-state actors:

“Local Ward is different from all other types of local government because it is not a local unit (*lokalna jedinica*) – executive of the state government – but a local community (*lokalna zajednica*)” (Duda 2020, 737, my translation)

The role of these self-managing bodies was to provide services to working men and women:

“The aim of these housing communities will be common management and common solution of everyday problems in the life of families, especially in the care of children, housekeeping, supplying various services, administration of housing facilities, housing construction, immediate social and health care of members of the housing community, and so on. A substantial part of the supply and service network for the population should gradually become services managed by various self-governing organs of citizens.” (Pribechevich 1958, 205)

Local self-governing communities were meant to provide essential services to citizens not only in service of the “withering away of the state” but also as part of the agenda to curb the class of petty entrepreneurs by de-commodifying essential services. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s the (official) number of private trade and service establishments decreased as the state engaged repressive measures towards the private sector of services and trades. Especially in the early 1960s, this sector was regarded as prone to “economic crimes” and massively policed to prevent “speculation” and “moonlighting”³⁰. However, as Troch (2019) mentions in his article on Mitrovica, many socialist neighborhoods did not self-organize services, they continued to rely on the market and thus a petty economy in services continued to blossom³¹.

The two tenets of Yugoslav urbanization – socialist and decentralized – were presented in the *Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists (1958)* as working together smoothly. The commune epitomized the ideal of local democracy enabling the raising of the urban living standard in sync with the economic development of the country.

“Activities within a Commune are very important for the living standard of the population. Not only housing conditions but also communal services—such as transportation, handicrafts, hygiene—vitaly influence the level of the material and cultural conditions of life of the population ... the system of financing communal activities *in proportion to the personal income of citizens* should make possible a more coordinated development of communal activities *based on the general progress of the Yugoslav economy and parallel to the development of the social-economic structure of the Commune’s population, increase in productivity of its labor, and growth of its needs.*” (Pribechevich 1958, 234)

However, over time and especially in the course of the mid-1960s reforms, it was clear that they were arguably in a tensional relationship. While socialist urbanization had a focus on protecting the urban working class proper, decentralization (both in the sense of “socialization” and “marketization”) foresaw the dismantling of the administrative local state bodies able to execute such protectorate.

1.4.2 Marketization as Socialization

The swing to market mechanisms has been analyzed in terms of the two economic models in-between which Yugoslavia alternated: On the one hand there was the “socialist development model” (*Foča*), encapsulated in the “socialist urbanization”, and on the other hand the socialist-liberal “Slovene model” of export-orientated economic policymaking and focus on raising domestic consumerism and world-market integration as a force for modernization (Woodward 1995), which was the environment of the self-financing municipality.

Decentralization held the lure of the promise of workers’ democracy and raised international interest already during its introduction in the 1950s and 1960s when Yugoslavia branded itself and its position between the Blocs (Unkovski-Korica 2016). *Komuna*'s articles show that local democracy and models of participation were what gained Yugoslav city officials much attention among their colleagues from cities around the world on the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA)³². But decentralization has also been depicted as a response to solving the country’s inner dilemmas caused by world market integration. Both Unkovski-Korica (2016) and Woodward (1995) insist on workers’ self-management as part of the market liberalization, as opposed to actual workers’ control. Under the strong heading of “Misunderstandings,” Woodward starts off by saying: “The first thing that must be clarified about this new system is that it was not, and never became, a system of workers’ control” (Woodward 1995, 166). The argument that both Unkovski-Korica and Woodward make is that that the 1953 movement to decentralization and popular participation were domestic compromises to support the foreign orientation of Yugoslavia to the West and veil the introduction of market mechanisms. Decentralization was in their eyes not a part of the road to socialism but rather the beginning of the infiltration of increasingly competitive relations of production in response to world market pressures.

While I support the position on self-management as a strategy for world market integration and internalization of conflicts into the working organizations (and later urban neighborhoods), most notably, with the idea to “unite the citizen as producer and as consumer” discussed above, I would not disparage the strengthening of participation as a mere veil. Instead, I suggest analyzing how self-management supported the compromises forged for world market integration by enabling particular forms of governance conducive not only to popular consent to the project of marketization, increased competition, and de-investment, as Unkovski-Korica and Woodward suggested, but to effect alliances, in the sense of liberal governance.

Liberal governance can be regarded as essentially networked governance in alliance with various self-regulating entities on the one hand, and the strengthening of policing for areas and subjects not deemed capable for self-regulation on the other (Joyce 2003). With this approach, I think together the changing political economy with changing forms of governmentality: how political-economic transformations were articulated and implemented through particular forms of representation and regulation of subjects (Agrawal 2005)³³. I examine forms in which particular populations were subjected to different forms of governance based on judgments about their relation to property, work, and resources in terms of “civility” and “capacity of self-regulation” (Li 2014). In this way, I break down the conflict between state and market and argue for liberal governance of waste as an urban resource instead.

1.5 Conclusions

In 1965 Yugoslavia introduced market reforms that significantly shifted the political economy of its cities from a planned, socialist mode of urbanization guided mainly by the developmental policies adopted in the city assembly, to a new model of urbanization, where investments happened through self-governing compacts between the now “self-financing” municipality, companies and citizen organizations. This shift engrained into urban governance the market

principles of competition and consumerism represented by the so-called “Slovene” model of economic development that Yugoslavia had adopted with increasing world-market integration in the mid-1960s. 1965 kicked off discussions about and experiments with the marketization of public services including the collection of waste, the mobilization of private funds and personal engagement (volunteering) of citizens, as well as the collection of urban rent. While the withdrawal of funding from cities in the West has been researched under the denominator of neo-liberalization from the mid-1970s on, research is starting to emerge that shows the non-Western geographies and earlier roots of those policies.

The concept of the “urbanization of fiscal crisis” enabled me to re-write the 1965 transition as an attack on the local government and the de-legitimization of the state as an investor in urban development. The new mode of urban governance established around the “self-financing municipality” can be described as both a roll-back of the state (de-funding of selected areas) and roll-out (policing of specific economic sectors and installation of new instruments to extract profits in terms of tax and rent). My argument about the increase in policing is in line with Allcock’s (2000) observation that after the 1965 economic reforms the Yugoslav state became more “interventionist” as it had to fix economic instabilities caused by Yugoslavia’s strategy of world market integration. I wish to suggest that apart from commercial banking, the shift to the “self-financing municipality” brought with it a movement from urban government to urban governance, that is, from municipality-driven urbanization to urbanization as a process orchestrated through alliances of multiple actors (banks, companies, local wards, individual citizen investors) and ideas of competition.

Chapter 2: The ‘Migrant Speculator’ and the Rent-Seeking City: Changing Policy Towards Service Workers, Petty Entrepreneurs, and Individual Home Builders (1965-1974)

In May 1964 Milijan Neoričić, who was Mayor of Belgrade from 1961-64, suggested a rise in living costs in Belgrade. He regarded this as a measure to stop the influx of populations whom he suspected to come to the city, not because of work, but to enjoy consuming highly subsidized communal goods:

“We have to emphasize that the influx of inhabitants has not only been the result of the attraction of Belgrade as an economically developed region, the opportunities for employment and schooling it offers, but also the result of the relatively low living costs in the city. Especially we have to take into view the long practice of maintaining low rents, uneconomic prices for communal and other services and other conveniences that the city offers its inhabitants.” (Milijan Neoričić, City Hall of Belgrade, 15.5.1964)

Following this statement, social historians of Yugoslavia have argued that the city of Belgrade changed its policy towards internal migrants in 1965: previously heavily subsidized “social goods” became “economic goods” and so the city lost its “attraction of affordable living costs” to internal migrants (Selinić 2005; Unkovski-Korica 2014)³⁴. Selinić describes the change in the following way:

“During the 1960s one can see the attitude of the city officials and public personalities that immigration to Belgrade has to be stopped, but exclusively through economic measures, which in reality most probably meant to mean that, among others, the prices of communal services in Belgrade shall be increased on an economic level and thus make the city less attractive than it was” (Selinić 2005, 187)

Social historians described the shift of 1965 as one from “administrative” to “economic measures” to control the influx of internal migrants to Belgrade – the same goal pursued by new means. In this chapter, I will argue that this diagnosis is lacking and the politics of the city government towards internal migrants shifted in more complex ways during and after the economic reform.

I will do this in four steps.

First, I show who were the Others that were targeted by administrative measures before 1965. Second, I will show how the urban economy shifted from manufacturing to services after 1965. Releasing workers from industry significantly changed the criteria as well as stakeholders involved in defining *who is surplus*. Members of the Belgradian (now unemployed) working-class proper had to be defined differently vis-à-vis incoming migrant populations, who occupied the services, light manufacturing, and petty economy – activities previously stigmatized as superfluous and now gaining in importance for the urban economy. Thirdly, I will show how the “speculating migrant” had to be demarcated in new ways after 1965. Under circumstances in which the municipality was “self-financing” and explicitly sought out an “economic relation” with its citizens, the relationship between “public good” and “private interest” changed fundamentally. I show how the introduction of housing markets effectively went along with strategies to target claims of rural-urban migrants as “prosecuted citizens” and instead transform rural-urban migrants into “speculators” and the act of housing construction outside of the newly introduced urban land markets as an act of “pilferage”.

Finally, I discuss the shifting boundaries of Belgrade as a “metropolitan region”, the internalization of the rural-urban frontier, and the introduction of “cheap” or “primitive settlements”. I show how 1965 entailed giving up the ideal of the unified territory of the city with one urban living standard as it was expressed in the General Urban Plan of 1950 (Bajić-Brković 2002, 22). This was a significant change, politically, as the communal system with its subsidized consumption had been an important pillar of the proletarianization of the peasant population. The splitting up of the ideal of the unified urban territory in “producers’ settlements” and “primitive settlements” can be regarded as opening the door to “semi-proletarianization”. “Primitive settlements” were the territorial expression of a specific politics

of combined incomes. I show how “cheap settlements” can be regarded as a territorialization of poverty, that effectively enabled new forms of social policy: “social domicile”, which tied the right to extended social protection to three years of registered residency in a municipality, and “mobile schools”, which tied to “temporariness” of primitive settlements to a reduction in schooling obligation for children from these settlements.

2.1 City of Producers and its Others

After the introduction of workers’ self-management, Yugoslavia had a self-understanding as a “republic of producers” (Woodward 1995), which was built on a notion of a worker who is bound to a working organization through a long-term employment relation, as Woodward (1995, 189) defined it, “the principle officially linking political voice to economic interest, defined as belonging to those who created value and therefore financed public goods”. Following the liberal property-rights school, (“the most effective inducement for the workers lies in their recognizing that their reward depends on their own diligence”), the long-term employment relation would translate the conflict between capital and labor into one of “time horizons”: “workers’ effort and short-term wage restraint followed from the knowledge that they had political control” (Woodward 1995, 167), realized through deciding about the investment of collective income. Capital, including communal infrastructure, was regarded as “past labor” (*minuli rad*). Excluded from the category of “producers” were peasants and private artisans: “the private cultivator has not been regarded as a proper producer, but as a proprietor, a petty capitalist, who has no place within a socialist system” (Allcock 2002, 103). Rural-urban migrants were depicted as “parasitic”, interested only in “short-term economic gain” while lacking the long-term perspective necessary for a more civilized relationship with the city. For example here by Yugoslav economist Kosta Mihalović:

“The massive shift in population from the countryside brings with it a primitive way of thinking and peasant psychology. Perhaps the most dangerous attribute of this psychology is the tendency to go always for short-term gains, while more long-term and indirect concerns are ignored or despised. This breeds a parasitic attitude towards social property and general neglect of broader social interests, which indirectly also serve private interests” (Mihalović 1977, 113)

This differentiation in proper workers and peasant workers can be tied to the Yugoslav history of massive mobilization of labor after WWII for the post-war reconstruction and initial industrialization, on the one hand, and control the market development of wages on the other. The result of this was a specific regime of mobilizing and immobilizing workers, divided into categories.

Next to foreign aid, voluntary labor of the population was the foundation to give the initial push for industrializing the country, without having the investments in the industry leading to cuts in consumption. The “all available hands” or “bare hands” approach to industrialization suggests drawing on the labor force of a population not usually considered for (paid) work. It drew on housewives, youth, demobilized soldiers, and war prisoners. As Woodward (1995) argues, the composition of the volunteer brigades was part of a specific strategy of mobilization that should circumvent the danger of overt mobilization. Drafting too many agricultural workers to the factories could have led to extensive employment and undermined the long-term strategy of economic growth through intensive labor use. Volunteer brigades were to satisfy “extraordinary, but short-term demands for labor ... by mobilizing ‘all available hands’” (Woodward 1995, 78). While brigades satisfied the need for highly mobile, temporary workers from the pool of population considered non-workers, the mobilization of peasants and artisans for the industrial sector aimed at creating an industrial working class proper. was done in a step-by-step strategy, of organizing them politically at the local level through institutions of local self-government and slowly socializing them away from the “subsistence mentality” (Woodward 1995, 44).

In this context, peasant workers came to the center of attention as “fluctuators”, who, by moving between agriculture and (various) industrial jobs, would form a class of “petty-bourgeois work brigades” that “speculated with their labor” (Woodward 1995, 149). Proletarianization proper was thus re-defined as based on “permanent membership” in a working collective.

“The real innovations in this period were a response to the high labor turnover, ‘anarchv’ increases in wages and bonuses, and political labor-recruitment campaigns had for internal stabilization. [Edvard] Kardelj³⁵ began to assert ever more frequently that the essence of socialism was that individuals should be paid according to their labor, not their market price, and should be defined by the *social relationship surrounding remunerated labor (radni odnos)*.” (Woodward 1995, 141, emphasis in original)

With the introduction of workers’ self-management, part of the profit of all working collectives was not paid in personal income, but as an investment in urban collective goods, as subvention of consumption of urban services, infrastructure, and land, which informed a concept of communal infrastructure as “past labor”. In this and the following chapter, I will show how privileged forms of consumption were systematically not extended to particular workers. These workers were systematically not included in the system meant to socialize peasants into workers, thus contributing to produce a class of fluctuating peasant workers. The investment of the labor force was not counted as having any accumulative effect – although, as I demonstrate in this and the following chapters, value was being extracted from rural-urban migrant workers for the purpose of investments in urban infrastructure.

In a debate on the marketization of public services in Belgrade City Assembly in 1966, Aleksandar Pavlović, a delegate from one of the agricultural combines, pointed to the problematic nature of the concept of the communal infrastructure as “past labor” – that it makes visible only certain workers as “contributing” to urban funds, while marking others as “unproductive” and excluding them from collective consumption to a sphere of “self-help”. He

remarked that services and infrastructure had never been extended to the agricultural outskirts of Belgrade at the same level of provisioning as was the case in the rest of the city³⁶.

“in the last 20 years we received already formed industrial settlements, but industrial in the sense of agricultural production. This is the case with the territory where today the Combine Srem, Combine Dragan Marković, Combine Beograd, Combine Grocka, and may also other settlements. I work in one of those Combines – in the agricultural Combine Belgrade, so I can say that these problems more and more express themselves in the normal development of these settlements and the satisfaction of the most minimum and necessary needs of the citizens and workers of those settlements.” (Aleksandar Pavlović, City Hall Belgrade, 15.12.1966, my translation)

He said “we neglect those settlements which give a big contribution to the supply and solution of other problems of the city” and further, “I can say that these are maybe today the *most productive settlements* in Belgrade, that these are *producers’ settlements*, which supply Belgrade with the most critical, most necessary foods”³⁷.

Pavlović made a claim to public infrastructure by mobilizing the label of a “producers’ settlement” for the agricultural combine. He thus attempted to mark the agricultural workers as belonging to the “city of producers”, based on their actual contributions, which marks them as workers in a “permanent employment relationship” with a certain organization and their participation in the division of profits into personal incomes and collective incomes.

“When we talk about communal problems, we talk about New Belgrade, about Braće Jerković, about Karaburma, etc. and we neglect those settlements which give a big contribution to the supply and solution of other problems of the city. Through their contribution from the income they also *give to the communal funds* and these workers thus deserve to be paid greater attention. And this even more if one considers that the Combine ‘Beograd’ is today the most modern agricultural production and still we have 24% of our workers living in barracks. Around 900 families live in common flats – barracks that were raised in 1945 and 1946. As far as I know, the situation in other [agricultural] organizations is nothing better.” (Aleksandar Pavlović, City Hall Belgrade, 15.12.1966, my translation, emphasis added)

Similarly, the question of whether or not a person could claim the status of a “producer” determined their capacity to belong to the urban working class proper. While a privileged portion of workers (mostly white-collar) was supported by companies and local governments

in their mobility with company-owned flats, others remained in the category of a floating population that was “neither rural nor urban”, a population of eternal migrants. Certain populations were marked as “migrants” because they failed to acquire the status of “producers”. This was tied to the underdevelopment of the urban service sector, as well as to the underdevelopment of agriculture³⁸, which failed to create “agricultural producers”:

“our rural population does not have the character of an agricultural population. It is more of a specific lifestyle. Our rural dweller is autochthon, and precisely because he is not an agricultural *producer*, but still a *peasant*, in the countryside there are no professions. We know that neither in smaller nor bigger cities the Third Sector does really exist – not even in Belgrade. According to that, there is nothing which ties the rural dweller to the village. It is completely clear that he goes to the city.” (City Assembly Belgrade, Minutes of the Session of 2.6.1966 on ‘wild settlements’, Dušan Maletić, my translation, emphasis added)

Dusan Maletić argues that after the First World War, 15% of the population of Yugoslavia lived in cities and 85% in the countryside. In 1966 the percentage of the urban population had doubled to 30% but at the same time, the rural population had fallen to 50%. Maletić concluded:

“that means that there emerges a huge mass of 20% of the population which is not integrated in any way. These are people which are half in the city and half in the village, which present a constant and permanent danger and on the other hand, it is exactly from this milieu that all of these illegal constructions originate.” (City Assembly Belgrade, Minutes of the Session of 2.6.1966 on ‘wild settlements’, Dušan Maletić, my translation)

Lacking the status of “producer”, he compared the presence of this population in the city to a stray dog, who primarily satisfies his own needs, but whose presence cannot be regarded in any way as of “common interest”:

“take the example of a dog that follows a milk cart coming from the countryside to the city. The dog will follow back the milk cart to the countryside, in case he is fed well by his owner. If he does not receive enough food, the dog will stay in the city and try his luck” (City Assembly Belgrade, 2.6.1966, Debate on Internal Migrants and Wild Settlements, Dusan Maletić, my translation)

The question of internal migrants versus “common interest” was visible from conflicts between the urban plan, which was supposed to represent “common interest”, and its execution, which

led to the demolition of informal settlements of internal migrants and was thus in contradiction with the constitutional right to free movement.

The relation of housing demolitions and the constitutional right to free movement was debated at that time by urban planners. Aleksandar Djordjević, UZB, held that “measures to control population movements were unconstitutional”³⁹. The following quotes come from a report prepared for the Municipal Assembly of Krnjača, which was among those Belgradian municipalities affected most heavily by illegal construction. In February 1964 on the report on “The State of Illegal Construction on the Territory of the Municipality Krnjača” explained the situation of combatting illegal construction in the municipality referring to how individual home-builders legitimated illegal construction:

"already the first attempt to realize the prescribed measures and destroy illegal build constructions faces sharp resistance from the side of these people. It comes to spontaneous reactions against the bodies of the public administration which are responsible for preventing illegal construction. In most cases, the procedure ends with destroying the object, but the litigant turns all the way to the highest bodies of the federation.

The calamity (*nesreća*) is that these people think that their ‘*constitutional right*’ is being *violated*, that they are being *discriminated* against, and that in this way the authorities wish to forbid them to inhabit (*nastanjivati*) our capital city, which is against the existing prescriptions.

Such claims are out of place and do not have any bearing in the procedures and acts which are adopted by the respective bodies of the administration ... *We only follow the Urban Plan.*” (Municipality Krnjača, February 1964, Archive of the City of Belgrade, issue: State of Illegal Construction on the Territory of the Municipality Krnjača, box 150, p.1-3, my translation, emphasis added)

While the municipality depicted the demolitions as “mere execution of the Urban Plan” – supposing the neutrality of the Urban Plan – the builders of “illegal houses” in Belgrade, as quoted in the report, emphasized that the demolitions were part of realizing a city that they are not a part of – emphasizing the Urban Plan as a highly political instrument. The home-builders emphasized how the demolitions discriminated against a certain population: by destroying

housing space the demolition actively undermined these population's right to free movement granted by the constitution of the FNRJ.

I leafed through the records of the Department for Combatting Illegal Construction of the municipality of Krnjača and many of the complainants who received a demolition order legitimated their "illegal" construction. Historians have extensively dealt with this, so I just want to quote some of the complaints to give the reader an impression of the sense of entitlement illegal builders had and also how their decisions were legitimated by local voters' councils and encouraged by directors of Belgradian working collectives:

"We made this shack without permission because we thought that permission won't be needed. Once at the meeting of the voters' council, which was approximately last winter ..., we asked for permission to construct a shack, because we did not have anywhere to store our heating material. Mitić said then: we do not have any means, so you have to arrange something yourself (*vi se sami snadjite*). Based on that our director Djordje Jovanović, from the husbandry (*Gazdinstvo*) Kovilovo, gave us waste materials [to construct the shack]." (Municipality Krnjača, 1961, Archive of the City of Belgrade, issue: Illegal Constructions br.05-4795, box 97, my translation)

The individual home-builders emphasized their membership in a Belgrade working collective and their material need. They articulated their right to the city by alluding to need and also to how their building conformed to the appearance of a neighborhood as a whole. In their complaints against demolition, individual homebuilders explicitly engaged the accusation of "speculation" that the city government raised against them:

"As a worker, I lived with my family, wife, and six children in Borča, as a bachelor⁴⁰. Because of the difficult housing situation, I requested to be granted a flat. Since there was no hope for me to get a flat soon, I decided, as I was told by the housing committee [of my company] to somehow make myself a flat. And that is what I did. I *didn't build this house for any speculative reasons*, but to provide my small children with a roof over their heads. In this house, I invested *high materials costs for my own standards* and my economic situation. I raised the house in a spot for which I and my family paid a lot and which is not foreseen for the construction of any socialist object. Also, I paid attention that the outer appearance of the house does not deteriorate the appearance of the street as a whole in any way." (Municipality Krnjača, 1963, Archive of the City of Belgrade, issue: Illegal Constructions 770/1-185, box 128, my translation, emphasis added)

Next to workers in the agricultural combines in the outer Belgradian municipalities, workers in the public services were regarded as the main culprits in “wild constructions”:

“When I said that some [companies] do actually support these wild constructions, I would take the example of the Public Transport Company (PTC). PTC brings unqualified people from the whole country, which were farmers still until yesterday, to Belgrade on working places with very low incomes and very low productivity. ... it is exactly these drivers and other workers which yesterday came to work for PTC because people from Belgrade would not apply for jobs offered by PTC because of the small incomes.” (Dragiša Đurić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 4.11.1965, my translation)

How city officials talked about internal migrants in the public services was denigrating and shows a quasi-racialized understanding of the internal migrants’ lack of civility – something which, because of their origin, could also not be amended through education or experience:

“We have 2000 militia officers in Belgrade. Not one is a born Belgradian ... Two years ago, the average income of a militia officer was under the average income of a worker in the Public Sanitation Services. ... I do not want to *underestimate* and I do not want to offend anyone, but naturally, it is like that, that someone who grew up 200-300 kilometers from Belgrade in some village ... needs 10 years to adapt his ear to the urban life, in order to know whom he needs to approach to caution and who not, whether he needs to fine someone or not. And this is something he cannot learn from books.” (Mayor Branko Pesić, Minutes from the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 25.4.1968, my translation, emphasis added)

This order of things, with urban inhabitants consisting of producers and non-producers as floating subjects, was challenged when Belgrade’s economy turned to services.

2.2 Who is Superfluous?

In 1965 the introduction of market reforms lead to releasing “hidden surplus” from companies and closing unprofitable “political factories”. Bereft of their main resources, city officials had to fear a loss in legitimacy. “Surplus” had to be carefully negotiated. Releasing workers from industry provoked a discussion about “who is superfluous” and pitted Belgradian (now unemployed) working-class proper against incoming migrant populations, who occupied the

services, light manufacturing, and petty economy – activities previously stigmatized as superfluous and now gaining in importance for the urban economy.

The conflict can be seen clearly from a debate in the City Hall of Belgrade in June 1965 where city officials discussed a report prepared under the title "Employment and measures to determine the extent and structure of employment with the needs and possibilities of Belgrade". Initiated by the economic recession and the need to lay off workers, city officials debated who is considered surplus labor to be debunked and who is considered surplus labor that the City should take care of and bring back into some kind of employment.

Stanoje Stanojević started the debate by expressing his concern about the current criteria for defining surplus:

“In our situation now, we cannot ask whether or not we need to lay off surplus labor force, we cannot be satisfied with the current composition of the labor force in Belgrade, [it is] more the question of criteria for defining surplus labor force.” (Stanoje Stanojević, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 9.6.1965, my translation, emphasis added)

Stanojević was concerned that the criteria for defining surplus were “dictated by the current crisis and not future development plans”. With this, however, he did not simply refer to workers who had a high skill level and that the city had an economic interest in keeping, rather he was concerned with the development that: “old workers are laid off, professional workers, people who work already for many years in the city’s economy, who have built Belgrade, workers for whom their income is their only livelihood, mothers with children are laid off, disabled workers, that is, workers who have lost their health in the company and parts of their bodies”. He explained that for Belgradian companies, democratic decision-making was in the way of releasing surplus labor force. As the implementation of austerity in Belgradian companies was complicated by democratic decision-making, it seemed opportune to focus on surplus

populations from non-Belgradian companies. Stanojević pitted these “deserving” workers, against “non-Belgradian” companies that draw surplus to the city:

“I firmly believe that there is maybe even more unnecessary labor force, unnecessary potential surplus labor ...– and this is in my eyes typical – we do not see the tendency of reducing unnecessary labor force. ... in the various outlets, shops, and business units, the headquarters of which are in the interior and that have branch offices in Belgrade. I claim that these organizations present for us in Belgrade a real jungle.” (Stanoje Stanojević, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 9.6.1965, my translation)

In the case of “non-Belgradian” companies, it was not democratic decision-making that was in the way of setting off workers, but the limited grasp of Belgrade inspection. Stanojević claimed that the problem of surplus in Belgrade could be related to the limited power of the city government over workers from non-Belgradian companies:

“These are organizations which have their headquarters in the interior and that occupied housing spaces in Belgrade for their business, that pull labor force from the interior here ... they do not offer any protection at work, they break the most basic regulations in the field of labor relations. ... all of these data are available at our inspections ... However, until now no one in Belgrade was able to obstruct such businesses, because the regulations are set up in such a way that we in the City cannot persecute them ... they can only be persecuted [in the municipality], where they have their parent company (matični organ). ... everything which we write and demand from here [in Belgrade], remains unrealized there [in the municipalities in the interior].

Therefore, ... we have to see in which way we can force those, who are outside of our scope (van našeg domašaja), but do have an influence on ... our employment politics, to adhere to the politics and measures which we in the City are undertaking.” (Stanoje Stanojević, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 9.6.1965, my translation)

In stark opposition to Stanojević stands the Director of the Belgrade Fair, Jaša Rajter, who argued for the need to re-orient the economic development plans of Belgrade towards activities with “low productivity” that were then catered to by companies from the interior. Rajter gave the example of a person, “half technician, half economist”, who “came to Belgrade and demonstrated what we should do with this labor force. He came to our Fair, rented a very expensive hall, employed 3.000 women, and earned half a million dinar”. He noted this as a good example, saying that he will not go into the question of whether or not that entrepreneur

paid those women he employed well (“I won't go into the blunder he caused, that he did not pay these women the full amounts he had to”). Others suggested that activities that are at the moment obtained by street vendors should be re-organized systems where the productivity of those workers can be controlled and they can be paid accordingly and these activities can be raised into a proper sector of the urban economy:

“an operational group of people should be created who will think about how we can employ all those surplus workers in the city ... that there is quality control of that work, that it will be paid according to performance system. I think there are a lot of such jobs ... We all wear some hats on our heads for the new year. ... private individuals take that money. Nobody remembered to create a community so that in some way through this system we glue New Year's hats that we put on our heads and that it is a job that women will do in a year with invested capital ... I'm talking about hats, and there are a number of things like that. I think that such an operational group should be formed, which will help the whole thing from a commercial and technical point of view, and find a number of jobs that could employ a very large number of workers. Maybe these are not permanent solutions, but they could be used in moments like this when we have a very large number of surplus.“ (Jaša Rajter, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 9.6.1965, my translation)

Rajter thus agreed with Stanojević's presentation of entrepreneurs from the interior breaching labor codes, but far from “creating a jungle”, Rajter suggested taking this “smart entrepreneur from the interior” as a model for Belgrade to systematically develop its sector of activities with “low productivity” and employ Belgrade's unqualified labor force. As the 1965 economic reform suggested measures to draw more accumulation from consumption and services, the federal government passed Basic Citizens' Tax and Contributions Act (1963, in the following: Citizen Taxation Act), which legalized and regulated secondary activities in the private sector for public sector employees and “dependents” such as pensioners and housewives (Vraneš 1969). The Citizen Taxation Act framed services as a “safety net” for the urban working class proper.

Over the next years, the development of the services into a proper part of the urban economy gained currency. In April 1968 Mayor, Branko Pešić, argued that the City should install a fund

for the development of services and other activities with low accumulative power, rather than spend all the money on rescuing the industry⁴¹. However, service workers were still regarded as “migrants” that put a strain on Belgrade’s infrastructure. Strengthening the services was still tied to the problem of an increase of the migratory pressure from the interior:

"Every day various half-literate people, peasants, resellers, buyers, come to Belgrade, millions are made in Belgrade. These people find their way and have their pockets full of money, and we discuss the third sector activities." (Mayor Branko Pešić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly of Belgrade, 25.4.1968, my translation)

In a joint session by the City Council and the Economic Council on the development of the Third Sector in July 1968, Zoran Gligorijević, a member of the Committee for Housing and Communal Affairs cautioned that any practice to legalize small-scale service activities such as food hawking would only cause an increase migratory pressure on Belgrade. It might seem like a "popular decision to take", he argued, because it will create employment. But then he cautioned to pay attention to the question of “employment for whom?”:

"I think there is absolutely no reason to adopt this decision because mostly these products can be found in any self-service shop (supermarket), much more *civilized* packaged and prepared than it is possible when sold on the street.

The second reason that could be in favor of adopting this decision is the employment of people. It looks like it is popular to take such a decision, but ... [w]e have information that there were over ten petitions handed in ... asking for permission to engage in this activity, but less than ten petitions are of citizens of Belgrade. The rest are petitions *from the interior* ... These are people that do not have enough financial means to secure themselves a flat in Belgrade ... [they] will exert pressure on the wild and illegal construction in Belgrade ... [and] bring their families after a few months, so there will be even more *pressure on the urban funds* for securing various needs – schooling and everything else.” (Zoran Gligorijević, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 16.7.1968, my translation, emphasis added)

The employment politics in the services was thus articulated in relation to the mobility of unemployed populations. Mayor Pešić suggested that other municipalities should financially support Belgrade because it absorbs unemployed populations that would otherwise burden the budget of those municipalities.

“We employ thousands of people from the interior per year, and we do not receive any financial compensation for that from other municipalities. They are all facing the same

problems as we do, in Valjevo, Kragujevac, Pristina, they all count unemployed and plan what they will have to spend on [them], and when [the unemployed] go to Belgrade, no one [gets] anything. I would even be in favor that anyone whom we can return, we put one million dinars in a box and return him. Only last year 609 million dinars were taken from Belgrade for employment outside of Belgrade. Therefore, I would return 609 of those who came from the interior. Or the other way around: we employ them, but then, please, also send the financial means necessary for this working place you planned for this person.

Accordingly, I think we have to say the following. *It is a bit difficult to say, but I am not embarrassed to say it.* We in Belgrade educate 9-10.000 youngsters from middle schools from the interior, and we do not get a single dinar for this. A big number of these we also have to employ. First, we educate them, then we open working places for them. ... This is okay, where it works, when it does not work – please, comrades from Valjevo, this person is now educated, send some means to through in this fund [for opening working places].” (Branko Pešić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall Belgrade, 25.4.1968, my translation, emphasis added)

When Mayor Pešić suggested getting financial support from other municipalities for employing and educating their unemployed and uneducated populations, he contested the principle of the grants-in-aid, through which redistribution from richer to poorer communes happened from 1964 on (Woodward 1995, 186). Based on actually occurring migration he argued that it would not be right that poorer municipalities receive employment funds for populations that then come to Belgrade to seek employment. Further, he disputed the principle of paying for “relocation costs for employment” as a means of social security⁴² as that only puts more burden on the big cities. He pointed out that he was “not embarrassed” to make those points, hinting at the novelty of such a position, which would have earned Belgrade a bad reputation as “developing to the detriments of smaller towns” in the past, but now apparently an acceptable opinion. This debate makes sense taking into consideration that unemployment benefits were increasingly decentralized at the time and thus did become a matter of inter-municipal negotiations⁴³.

The debates about the services and the distribution of unemployed funds shed some light on the discontinuation of administrative means of migration control. The shift was expressed clearly in a debate in the Belgrade City Hall in June 1966. Then, the President of the Council

for Construction of the City Assembly (*Predsednik Saveta za Građevinarstvo Skupštine Grada*) Milorad Jovanović claimed that “any administrative regulation” of immigrant “beyond economic rationale, is doomed to fail”. Jovanović stated: “We cannot without deeper, comprehensive analysis claim that the interest of Belgrade is to prevent further [population] growth and influx (*doseljavanje*)”. And “any administrative regulation of this problem, beyond economic rationale, is doomed to fail”⁴⁴. I have already demonstrated what economic considerations played into the regulation of migratory flows after 1965 with regard to developing an urban service sector and the distribution of unemployed funds. Jovanović pointed to yet another aspect “immigration in the city presents ... a privilege depending on the free use of the accumulated means”. Rural-urban migrants would enjoy the fruits of the “past work” (*minuli rad*) of old inhabitants-producers that went into the infrastructure of the city. That is why, Jovanović explains, it is understandable that “the interest of the old inhabitants (*starosedeoce*) can be to limit further [population] growth and pursuit for administrative regulation of that [population] growth.” He thus re-framed migrants vis-a-vis urban land as “users” (as opposed to old inhabitants, producers of urban land. This had specific repercussions in the question of how internal migrants were implicated in urban development and the application of new instruments of extracting “user fees” through housing markets and urban rent.

2.3 Turning ‘Prosecuted Citizens’ into ‘Individual Investors’

During the administrative period, the city tried to operationalize a definition of surplus as those in formal employment by giving out residence permit only to those who could prove they had formal housing (Selinić 2005). In that sense, the agencies for the demolition of informal housing can be regarded as a body in the government enforcing a particular conception of surplus populations⁴⁵. In the context of the economic reform, the agencies for demolition

became difficult to maintain at the local level: officials in the Belgradian municipality Krnjača, which had one of the highest quotas of demolitions at the time, complained that the costs of demolition are high and the techniques inefficient. From the council meetings of the municipality of Krnjača we can see that municipalities often did not have a lorry to take the construction material from the site of demolition, so that very often the next day the house re-appeared on the same spot. Physical workers hired for demolition asked for higher wages because they had to fear physical attacks from the house owners, who were, oftentimes, their own neighbors⁴⁶.

In November 1965 city officials in the City Hall of Belgrade debated the issue of illegal construction. They stated that in recent years, municipalities had the responsibility to combat illegal construction, but the city government realized that demolition of illegal construction is expensive for the municipalities (up to 40 million dinars), not very successful (more rather than less illegal construction)⁴⁷. They also noted how the demolitions caused a lot of dissatisfaction among the people living in illegally constructed houses in Belgrade – in some municipalities it came even to a “real war between communal bodies and illegal builders”⁴⁸. The city officials were aware of the lack of legitimacy that the agencies for demolition enjoyed so that even the inspectorate often chose to turn a blind eye to it. Officials of the central city government lamented: “People are prone ... to condemn pilferage However, when it comes to illegal building, [inspectors] look at it more benevolently, find reasons to legitimate it”⁴⁹.

The “inefficiency” of the agencies for demolition was raised as a topic also by the SKG. In a report on the problem of illegal construction, the Yugoslav sociologist and criminologist Đuro Đurović, a regular contributor to *Komuna* on the problem of “wild settlements”, remarked that the inspection often did not act on individual home builders because of “humaneness and socialist morality”. Đurović argued that the practice of the inspection of non-execution of the

law or its own decisions has provoked “discord”: “Discord arises where and if sanctions are not executed”, leading to “psychosis [among individual housebuilders] that after all a ‘modus Vivendi will be found”. The report further claimed that the lack of coordination and information on technical building norms gave individual home-builders, who in Đurović’s perception were quintessentially “individual investors”, “the halo of ‘unprotected and persecuted citizens’”⁵⁰.

Đurović’s report on illegal housing construction for the SKG called for coordination of the politics of housing demolition at the city level, which would “secure uniform criteria, bigger objectivity, and organization”⁵¹. He argued that a centralized program would lend the demolitions an aura of objectivity by way of associating them with those bodies in the city responsible for urban and economic development planning. Acting as a mere executive force of a centralized demolition program, would depersonalize the demolitions and lend the inspection the authority of state servants that enforce “the interests of the society from individual self-will”.

Lifting the politics of housing demolitions from the level of the single municipalities to the level of the central city government, was logic in which urban reconstruction was organized. In 1966 the City Assembly Belgrade decided to allocate 1% of its revenues for a “City Fond for Reconstruction”⁵². This program was only directed at so-called “unhygienic housing in the socialized sector” and it represented “a significant, but only initial action in terms of the complete liquidation of unhygienic settlements in the city”⁵³. The ability of the city to execute demolitions, especially, to demolish “unhygienic settlements”, both in the socialized and in the private sector, became an important pillar of urban land development and the precondition to offering land to other investments. Part of this is also a program “to help companies get rid of irrational and amortized buildings”⁵⁴. Clearing and infrastructurally preparing plots of lands

were financed through the urban rent and show how the urban rent was crucial for the self-financing municipality to maintain its position of “directing urban development”. The attempt to depoliticize housing demolitions at the local level by tying them to a centralized program of urban restructuring was complemented by the introduction of urban land markets. These were another pillar of the self-financing municipality and an instrument to “direct” and “control” the expansion of the city through investors, as the municipality itself was not the primary agent in constructing new buildings anymore.

In a debate on illegal housing, city officials presented an alternative to demolition: the engagement of private individual financial means in the housing sector: “until now we engaged very little the private financial means of citizens in the housing sector – these means all go in illegal construction”⁵⁵. They assumed that people “with small incomes” could still have private financial means, for example when they “sold a house in the countryside”. Alternatively, citizen-workers could encourage their working collectives to invest extra funds in housing construction.

In 1965 the city government offered 20.000 plots for individual housing construction prepared with basic communal infrastructure for sale, with an option for working collective to secure plots for their workers⁵⁶. The provisioning of plots for individual home builders seemed to affect the press.

“We who are fighting against illegal building have, I think, the right to say that we are satisfied with the incomparable bigger support of the press than ever before. Because people cautiously search the press to catch a straw they can hold on in order to reckon with us who are chasing them [the illegal builders]. The press now assumed a feeling of responsibility towards Belgrade and has started to write about these things, apart from a few exceptions, in a way that in this fight that objectively is of psychological use for us.” (Dragiša Djurić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 4.11.1965, p.24., my translation)

The plots were initially provided for free to illegal builders, whose houses had been demolished (for example in Čukarica municipality in the first half of the 1960s), but eventually, in 1965, the city council decided that this would present a form of “privileging newcomers” and putting financial “burden on society”: The vice-Mayor Milan Rajačić explained individual housing “looks cheap for the builder, but [it] is very expensive for the society because it presents a very intense expansion of the city and thus increases the price of the preparation of the land with communal infrastructure”⁵⁷. This point had been raised as well by urban planners in socialist Yugoslavia, such as Branko Maksimović, who were not ideologically opposed to single-family homes, but pointed out that it is an expensive form of urbanization as it is spatially more expansive (LeNormand 2006, 256f.).

City officials attempted to morally denigrate individual home builders that shunned the infrastructurally prepared plots by depicting them as speculators. On the SKG meeting on individual housing in 1967 the Deputy President of the Belgrade City Assembly, Miladin Šakić argued that if the city would offer more prepared plots then the illegal building could no longer be regarded as a necessity because of housing shortage, but as an attempt of individuals to secure privileges like a better position in the city or bigger plot⁵⁸. The markets for plots would influence public opinion on individual home builders, most importantly, take away their “halo of prosecuted citizen”, and turn them into speculators who sought certain privileges:

“When the minimum possibility for legal construction is provided ... society must react sharply to the violation of its norms, especially since in such conditions, it is not just an elementary aspiration to provide a roof over one’s head, but it is a question of the efforts to acquire some privileges (better position, larger land area, etc.).” (Komuna 06/1967 “Individual Housing Construction in Cities. After the Consultation of the SKG in Novi Sad”, Miladin Šakić, my translation)

City officials constructed a market and actively sought to change the story of individuals build illegally because of housing shortage, illegal builders are escaping to pay costs for prepared

land, escaping to pay “their part”. The idea was to transform them from “prosecuted and discriminated citizens” to “individual investors” in urban land development⁵⁹.

2.4 ‘Primitive Settlements’ and Metropolitanization of Belgrade

In the mid-1960s, city officials redesigned the boundaries of the city and redefined the question of development, both in terms of reconstruction of the existing neighborhoods and expansion. Who belongs to a city and how development was measured changed. The process was a literal re-drawing of municipal boundaries and internally, a re-definition of urban citizenship.

Yugoslavia was marked by and struggled with the enormous difference between developed and underdeveloped communes throughout its existence. In 1961 (Yugoslav Survey 1963) – communes with the largest number of employed, the largest net product, the smallest territory (in reverse relation to economic power), etc.⁶⁰. All of these indicators are “counted in terms of the workplace, not the place of residency” – if the latter logic would be applied, “the difference would be less extreme”⁶¹.

Communes and districts were re-organized first in 1958 when 4000 municipalities (*opština*) were merged into 1.193 communes, and 357 districts were reduced to 95 (Hoffman and Neal 1962, 225). The 1963 constitution brought the reorganization of communes (47 were abolished, respectively, merged) with the idea to pool funds so to enable them to finance local infrastructure, but also social services themselves (Woodward 1995, 270; Bojić 2018).

“The *opština* [municipality] has under the 1963 Constitution become a central feature of the effort to find a solution through administrative decentralization to the problems of national diversity and economic and social heterogeneity peculiar to Yugoslavia” (Fisher 1964, 418)

But this merging did not level out differences in economic development – the merging has concealed differences in economic development as it produced more favorable averages. This

reorganization oftentimes brought more favorable averages in terms of the overall living standard, while covering internal inequalities, leading to a critical remark that “the difference between developed and underdeveloped areas cannot be changed by an alteration in communal boundaries” (Yugoslav Survey 1963, 2064). Quite on the contrary, the merging often maintained internal differences, as in the case of the agricultural combines quoted above. Some have argued that the way the communal boundaries were shifted was even intended to leave particular populations in a marginal position:

“Sometimes the reconstituting of local government units bordered on gerrymandering, as the government sought to make sure that worker rather than peasant influence would predominate in the new councils of producers. In the process, damage was done in many cases to local pride and, on occasion, to local well-being” (Hoffman and Neal 1962, 227)

The re-drawing of municipal boundaries mirrored urban policymakers’ perception of peasants as mere “obstacles to modernization” (Allcock 2002).

In the politics of the Belgrade City Hall, we can see this entrenchment of internal differences in the city’s strategy to cooperate in the construction of substandard, temporary settlements. Through the lens of these settlements, I would argue, it is possible to see how the idea of the city as a unified territory and body politics was given up on. Instead, we see the emergence of an idea of the city as divided into urban settlements proper, where citizens participated, and settlements that were “primitive” and increasingly studied by urban sociologists.

When Jovanović from the City Council for Construction argued for the end of administrative restrictions on immigration, he suggested that the city should accommodate those internal migrants by introducing new standards of collective consumption (housing):

“In order to solve the housing question of a number of inhabitants that are not able to bear the costs of housing in flats equipped in urban standards (*gradski opremljeni stanovi*), we should specify regions where a certain type of housing construction will be allowed that will be supplied, let's say, only with water, light and access roads, where housing constructions under minimal conditions would be allowed and the size would

be *closer to those in the village, than in the city.*” (Milorad Jovanović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 2.6.1966, my translation, emphasis added)

Jovanović depicted these settlements as in line with the conditions this population was allegedly used to: “closer to those in the village, than in the city”. Further, Jovanović argued that the advantage of such “cheap settlements” as he called them, was that they were planned as “temporary”. They would be built with the plan to remove them, on locations meant for the expansion of the city proper:

“the planned, so-called 'cheap settlement' could be formed also temporarily on territory reserved for the enlargement of the city in the longer perspective, let's say 20 years because their removal then won't present a big economic problem with regard to the small investments done earlier on in the formation of such settlements ... [the argument] that such a settlement could *spoil the look* of the access roads to the capital city cannot be a reason against the necessity to form such sub-urban, village-like settlements, elongated along the main access roads to Belgrade.” (Milorad Jovanović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 2.6.1966, my translation, emphasis added)

The topic of “cheap settlements” was also taken up by the SKG in 1967. Rajko Rajić, Director of the Federal Institute for Urbanism, Housing, and Communal Questions argued that any opposition to “cheap settlements” for hygienic reasons is out of place since these settlements had to be compared not to standard settlements, but to conditions of homelessness and crowded sub-tenancy arrangements, which were realities of Belgrade living conditions. Moreover, he referred to “sociological reasons” to oppose cheap settlements, that is, the problem of segregation. He waived this argument as well, as housing was related to the “income according to work” principle and thus segregation was in his perspective not a housing problem, but one related to the economy and which could only be solved in the economy, not in housing⁶².

As I have mentioned above, the idea for “cheap settlements” when it was born was compared to “village-like” settlements. This comparison was tied not only to the (imagined) living standard in villages but also actual differences in the financing of housing construction between city and countryside. The distinction was drawn in the area of housing as collectivist, tied to

public sector employment (collective, subsidized consumption) in the city, while “[h]ouse construction in rural areas remained a private affair with very limited regulations and communal development in rural areas was a matter of so-called self-contribution” (Troch 2019, 6). Moreover, the division was also manifested in a different understanding of public order: “Strict regulations for maintaining cleanliness in urban public spaces were introduced as an important element of communal self-management. Traditional hybrid urban-rural practices, such as peasant markets or holding of cattle, were confined or banned from the urban area” (Troch 2019, 6). The “cheap settlements” transgressed both of these distinctions. On the one hand, they mobilized individual financial means and initiative in the city, but they also made space for a different standard of living in the city.

The “cheap settlements” emerged as municipal borders were re-imagined and Belgrade became a “metropolitan area” with suburbs and hinterlands. The rural-urban frontier was thus not at the literal outer boundaries of the city as a territorial-administrative unit but ran within the city and divided it into an uneven territory. Here, urban sociology came to play a significant role in defining and policing the nature of those internal frontiers and their relation to internal migrants:

“In addition to the reconstruction of the city itself, Belgrade is expanding in other directions as well. In this respect, two sociological features of urbanization of suburban rural settlements (for example Mali Mokri Lug, Veliki Mokri Lug, Mirijevo) and on the other hand, some villages are industrializing (Železnik, Ostružnica), and become predominantly industrial zones of the city. ... It is characteristic that the process of adaptation of the inhabitants of these villages is slower than that of people who came to Belgrade from some other villages in the interior of the country.” (Komuna 07/1965 “Some Societal Characteristics of the Urbanization of Belgrade”, Gojko Babić, my translation)

In a quasi-racializing logic, the inhabitants of these “urban villages” were equated with their living environment, which the author used, in a tautological manner, to prove the resistance to change:

“The marked backwardness in the lives and perceptions of most elderly residents of some rural settlements, which enter the wider area of Belgrade, speaks of the strength of a closed rural social environment which frantically preserves its traditional value system, obliging individuals to consistently comply with established social rules (illiteracy, the position of women not working in state services, the way of living, of eating and clothing, wedding customs, superstitions and general aversion to the city and the urban way of life). In contrast to them, people from much more backward parts of the country, who permanently settled in Belgrade, are far more quickly adapting to the urban environment.” (Komuna 07/1965 “Some Societal Characteristics of the Urbanization of Belgrade”, Gojko Babić, my translation)

As proof of the role the rural-urban frontier came to play in urban reconstruction, it is worth quoting from discussions of the General Urban Plan of 1974 in the professional journal “Urbanism Belgrade” (*Urbanizam Beograd*), where urbanization was depicted as a transformation of “internal villages” into urban structures proper:

“If we carefully consider the Draft General Urban Plan of Belgrade, we will see that one of its main topics is to set the planning basis and choice of a politics to channel the growth of urban agglomeration through the transformation of rural and semi-rural settlements in Belgrade’s surroundings, integration through a system of socio-economic, cultural, traffic and other relations into a single organism of the city.” (Urbanizam Beograd 1972(20) “Yugoslav Consultation about the Village and the Problem of the Transformation of the Village in the GUP Belgrade”, Milica Jaksić, my translation)

“Cheap settlements” presented a significant shift in the imagination of Belgrade, not only as an administrative unit but also as a commune – a political community. Before 1965, the communal system in Yugoslavia was regarded as a potent means to transform peasants into politically loyal, full citizens and workers. The communal system had thus a role competitive in significance to the building of factories. Next to work, consumption posed a vehicle to transform a deficient subject (peasant worker) into a proper citizen:

“building general consumer facilities in the most suitable areas to meet the needs of the commune ... might result in finding efficient forces which would work on the realization of tasks in the further process of urbanization ... It is precisely within the communal system that one can find ... tangible solutions for the more rapid transformation of the semipeasant-semiworkers into workers ... what would be a priority task is a demand for the communal system to become one of the ... measures ... to rid the ‘peasant-workers’ of the negative aspect of their present position.” (Komuna 06/1965, Yugoslav Communal System and Processes of Urbanization, Rajko Rajić, my translation)

As Belgrade increasingly acknowledged the presence of “internal Others”, in preparation for the 1974 GUP of Belgrade, urban planning underwent a turn to social scientific methods (Bajić-Brković 2002). In 1969 the Urban Institute Belgrade (*Urbanistički Zavod Beograd*) hired “the most well-known domestic urban sociologists”, among them Đuro Đurović. Their task was to conduct a study “Sociological Approaches to the Future Development of Belgrade”. One of the three parts of the survey was entirely devoted to parts of the city “which complicate or hinder the execution of urban ideas and solutions in the city”⁶³. To understand this part, it is worthwhile briefly going into the outline of the study.

The first part of the study was dedicated to the “basic goals and values of the socialist society and socialist principles of urbanization”. The second part consisted of the results of a survey of the “attitudes among the citizens of Belgrade”. The last part treated “deteriorated parts of the city”, which as the authors announced, “will be observed as organic and functional disruption of the urban organism”. From the structure of the study is visible a division in “citizens” whose “attitudes towards current problems, dilemma, societal phenomena, processes and structures” are surveyed and another part, studying people as they are affected by deterioration and the “health, mental psychic consequences for the inhabitants that live in them”⁶⁴.

This study can be regarded as an attempt at the territorialization of “social problems” in “wild settlements”: places where rural-urban migrants live and where “private interest” predominates understanding of the “common good”. The Yugoslav urban sociology, with its most prominent figure, Đuro Đurović who authored this 1969 study for the Urban Institute and published regularly in *Komuna* and *Urbanizam Beograda*, came from the Belgrade Institute for Criminologist and Criminalistic Research. One of the prime occupations of this institute was delinquency among the children of rural-urban migrants living in “wild settlements”⁶⁵.

To understand the context of the emergence of Yugoslav urban sociology as an actor in the criminalization of poverty, it is relevant to put segregation in settlements with different living standards in the context of an ongoing differentiation of social rights directed at including “temporary” urban residents – a process which further supported the emergence of substandard settlements and “temporary barracks”.

2.4.1 Social Domicile

Mobility and its regulation became part of the decision-making on deserving and undeserving unemployed in 1967 with the introduction of the new republican Law on Social Protection and Social Protection Services which differentiated basic and extended social protection and tied the latter to residency. The law sought to realize the principle that the “center of the coordinated efforts of all societal forces shall be found in the municipality as the basic carrier of social protection”⁶⁶. In June 1967, at a meeting of the Social and Health Council of the City of Belgrade, city officials discuss the way Belgrade sought to use the new law. Čedomir Simić, the Director for the Study of Social Problems of the City, suggested that the new law could help to regulate the influx of populations which present “potential candidates for social protection services”:

“We have set in this decision as a special condition that those persons who have been permanently residing on the territory of Belgrade for at least three years have the right to this extended social protection. The meaning of this social domicile, especially when it comes to Belgrade, is not so difficult to explain. Namely, it is a well-known fact that the so-called migratory pressure, respectively, the mechanic influx of population, and especially of a population which is a potential candidate for social protection service, is very pronounced.” (Čedomir Simić, Director for the Study of Social Problems of the City, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall Belgrade, 8.6.1967, my translation)

The new system of territorially bound and differentiated rights to social protection also brought up the uneven development of the various Belgradian municipalities. City officials discussed whether uneven development within Belgrade should be acknowledged (and entrenched) or leveled (with hope for a future of the city as an evenly developed space). To talk about the

uneven development, the Director for the Study of Social Problems Simić curiously did not use the word “narrow” and wider urban area. Instead, he talked about the differences in development “between the so-called *earlier (ranijemžem)* and wider area“, emphasizing the dimension of time, which frames the city again in terms of “past work” (*minuli rad*) of “old inhabitants”. In that he chose to highlight the differentiated contribution of these various areas to the accumulation of capital and the standard of living, legitimating future uneven development with past uneven investment.

“since the costs of living [in the wider urban area] are probably lower ... we took the opportunity to reduce this extended social protection [in the wider urban area] to a level of basic social protection for a transitional period.” (Čedomir Simić, Director for the Study of Social Problems, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall Belgrade, 8.6.1967, my translation)

In a joint meeting of the City Council and the Social and Health Council, city officials debated the consequences of the differentiated social rights within Belgrade. First, the differentiation meant that users of social protection in the suburban settlements like Barajevo, Grocka, Obrenovac, and Sopot

“leave that territory and come to the narrower territory of Belgrade. Concretely, from Barajevo I know a lot of examples where the Municipal Assembly prescribed a maximum of 4000 and according to the same criteria, the municipality Čukarica prescribed 10.000 dinars.” (Čedomir Simić, Director for the Study of Social Problems, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 8.6.1967, my translation)

Secondly, “more developed municipalities” would try to get rid of social protection recipients by “building improvised barracks on the territory of other municipalities and resettle such people [social protection recipients]”⁶⁷. Radoje Spasenović, a member of the Belgrade City Council, pointed out that the burden of social protection fell unequally on poorer municipalities, in which the living costs were not necessarily lower:

“who should help social protection? Certainly, the economically stronger municipality [should help]. However, current practice shows that social protection is assisted by those municipalities that are economically weaker... [if] it was true that life is cheaper in ... Barajevo, Groca, Obrenovac, and Sopot, then the City of Belgrade would certainly

build ... accommodations of social protection on the territory of these municipalities and not in the city.” (Radoje Spasenović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly of Belgrade, 29.6.1967, my translation)

Institutions for social protection were an asset that was kept in the central municipalities for a few, while the majority of social protection recipients were externalized to other municipalities: either at the urban periphery or outside of Belgrade.

As the city opened itself for internal migrants, it installed bodies for the study of “social problems”. I would argue that these studies were directly linked to legitimating the differentiation of social rights and pre-structuring the struggles for the social reproduction of those labeled as “social problems”. The building of temporary barracks served to push recipients of social protection to the periphery of the city. These barracks became the focal point of Yugoslav urban sociology.

2.4.2 Mobile Schools

As the “wild settlement” came into view as a distinct territorial unit that allowed for the territorialization of poverty, not only the idea of the equal distribution of infrastructure across the city could be abandoned, but also other social rights could be differentiated. In this final section, I turn to a discussion on education for children from “wild settlements”.

On a joint meeting with the Belgrade City Council in October 1967, the Council for Education and Culture presented its “Plan of Measures” to realize the ambitious goal to “delete illiteracy of all citizens [of Belgrade] and create the conditions that the majority of citizens in an employment relationship can obtain basic education”⁶⁸. The goal became part of the Plan of Economic and Social Development of Belgrade 1966-1970. Until 1973 illiteracy of all employed and unemployed citizens of Belgrade up to the age of 40 was to be erased. As was the case with most developmental politics, also in the implementation of the education policy,

the city hall took much effort to define, who is the subject of these measures, that is, who counts as a Belgradian citizen, and who does not.

Already in the introductory presentation of the Plan of Measures, Velimir Skolović from the Council for Education and Culture pointed out that the problem of persisting illiteracy in Belgrade cannot be solved without also in some way controlling the constant influx of illiterate populations. He pointed out that companies would still draw very much on illiterate populations. Moreover, he argued that companies made almost no efforts to increase literacy, although most of these working collectives adopted the corresponding principles in their statutes.

As working collectives did not fulfill the task of raising literacy rates, the debate in the city assembly circled the question of what measures the local government could take to combat illiteracy in Belgrade. The city assembly did not see itself responsible to integrate all the workers that Belgradian companies attracted and grant them the same rights and living standards as Belgradians. The solutions suggested by the city officials rather envisioned new instruments, new forms of statecraft, capable to reach out to rural-urban migrants without granting them the same set of rights Belgradian citizens enjoyed. The presentation of Miljko Stanić, Member of the Council for Education and Culture, in October 1967 is especially noteworthy in this context of the invention of new instruments of statecraft directed as rural-urban migrants as “floating population”. These were instruments geared towards recording and controlling a population that would only be granted partial inclusion.

Stanić argued for a reform of schools and alphabetization measures at federal and republican levels that are "in accordance with the current state of development and movements in our society (*kretanje u društvu*)". He argued that with the current conceptions and institutions working on alphabetization, Yugoslavia would not be able to solve the problem. Rather, a

reform of schools and alphabetization should be initiated that “starts from the changes and movement in our society and a program based on [our] material opportunities”. He went on to detail the population movement in Belgrade: “Today in Belgrade there is a lot of population movement, a big mechanic growth. ... Illiterate are coming to Belgrade and some live in Belgrade sometimes as Belgradians and sometimes as the inhabitants they are outside of Belgrade”. To adapt alphabetization measures different populations (proper Belgradians and Others), he argued that alphabetization measures had to be crafted based on evidence of a specifically territorialized population: “we would have the possibility to record and follow the life and work of the youth which lives in wild settlements (*divlja naselja*), children the parents of which are without a permanent occupation, job or residency (*mesta boravka*)”. To “increase literacy we do not only need teachers, but *bodies* that will analyze, and follow scientifically and as experts social environments from the perspective of illiteracy *keep evidence of the illiterate* through that institution, respectively that school for alphabetization”. In the following, he suggested two measures to deal with illiteracy in the specific social environment of the “wild settlement”. One could be named an immobilization measure that addressed exclusively children – boarding schools⁶⁹ – and the other a measure to keep the population floating – mobile classrooms⁷⁰. Stanić suggested a gradation of social citizenship, in terms of installing special, mobile schools for these populations that would operate separately from the eight years schools, obligatory for Belgradians.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown a transition in the moral and political economy of infrastructure and services. In the years from 1955 to 1965, the city followed a somewhat elusive ideal of the urban working class with privileged access to urban infrastructure and services. The “city of producers” rested on the concept of “past labor”, which tied the right to infrastructure to years

of work. The limits of this concept became apparent with workers from the agricultural combines in Belgrade, who rejected their exclusion from the category of “producer”. This case shows how the concept of “past labor” as the basis for access to urban infrastructure and services was ideological in that it made visible the contribution of some (“old inhabitants”) to the construction of the city while concealing the contribution of others. Contestations of the workers of the agricultural combines, the owners of houses ordered for demolition, who claimed to be discriminated against in the capital city and claim their constitutional right to free movement, show how the rights that the Yugoslav socialist state sought to grant to the “working class” rubbed against a more specified concept of the “*urban* working class”.

After 1965, the question of “productivity” slipped into the background. Instead, new ideas about the segregation of urban infrastructure and services emerged based on biopolitical forms of reasoning. Most notably, the category of “primitive settlements” came to serve as a category in urban planning reserved for a population “used to rural standards of living”. The introduction of biopolitical forms of governing rural-urban migrants and their depiction as “speculators” helped to delegitimize their claim to urban infrastructure and services. In the following chapter, I will show how the Othering of rural-urban migrants was enhanced through the mobilization of urban citizens proper in participative forms of governing public hygiene, where they had the chance to prove themselves as “good citizens” versus “polluting Others”. After “past labor”, now participation legitimated the division into deserving and undeserving.

These changes in the political and moral economy of Yugoslav socialist urban provisioning oftentimes remain invisible in studies that focus on the middle-class in the socialist city where a shift from collectivist to individualized, demand-oriented forms of provisioning in the moment of the “transition” (D. Jovanović 2019). Scholars investigating urban infrastructure in the Global South and East have alerted to the blindspots arising from the application of Graham

and Marvin's thesis of the splintering urbanism (Graham and Marvin 2002) to already fragmented infrastructures (Furlong 2014; Chelcea and Pulay 2015). In such cases, the introduction of market mechanisms plays out differently from what we know from the core countries.

Chapter 3: Participatory Governance of Public Hygiene and ‘Polluting’ Others (1965-1973)

With the statement that “even if the PSS would employ 1000 more workers it cannot win against a million citizens”⁷¹, Mayor Branko Pesić heralded a new, participatory understanding of public hygiene in the late 1960s. The city government mobilized the bodies of local self-management such as housing councils (*kućni savet*) and schools to compete to the cleanest neighborhood, public hygiene was “socialized” to substitute for reduced public funding of sanitation services. At the same time, the city government and PSS increased their efforts to disentangle citizens and companies from waste valuation practices (such as the collection of valuable wastes and incineration in private ovens for the sake of heating) as “polluting”. Valuation practices, both collection, and incineration for the sake of generating (thermal) energy were enclosed in the hands of PSS. Both the socialization of public hygiene as a project of participatory governance and the enclosure of waste valuation practices were built on ideas of “civilized” versus “polluting” ways to handle waste which served to re-draw the boundaries of private interest and common good in times of the economic reform.

3.1 Valuation of Public Sanitation as Service Work

In November 1964 the Public Sanitation Services of Belgrade started their company journal called “Public Hygiene” (*Javna Higijena*). While I could not find any definite information about whether the journal was for internal circulation only, from the articles it seems that the purpose was mostly company-intern communication, but at times the assumed readership seems to go beyond PSS-staff, with articles praising accomplishments of the company or reporting about citizens leaving garbage⁷² scattered in the streets. It might be the case that they addressed city officials as readership.

In the first issue, PSS Belgrade proudly described itself as the working collective with one of the highest rates of illiteracy among its workers: according to a study from 1964, 800 workers were illiterate (60 youth, 180 under 35, 600 over 35 years of age).

“Every year in our country around 50.000 children remain without elementary education. ... we include a part of that youth in work, and we thus participate in the impressive number of 77.000 illiterate Belgradians.“ (Javna Higijena 11/1964 “Staff Education”, my translation)

PSS regarded itself as an exemplary organization of socialist Yugoslavia that helped to create the socialist citizen by socializing illiterate populations into becoming active members of a socialist working collective. However, within the next issues of the PSS newspaper, it becomes clear that PSS was also the working organization with the highest turnover rate among its workers, and one column in the newspaper deals with problems of work discipline.

PSS had to struggle with the highest labor turnover rate of all companies in the whole socialist Republic of Serbia. This situation did not change after the marketization of public services. The income of workers in the public sector of services remained below the country average and the sector had the highest rate of fluctuation in the labor force. In 1972 alone 32.989 vacancies were registered with the employment exchange (Vraneš 1974, 78). The high mobility of PSS workers translated to discussions around the work discipline within the company.

The highest turnover rate was among the unskilled (street sweepers and garbage collection workers), but also drivers fluctuated⁷³. In 1961 PSS Belgrade reported that 846 workers came and 581 left. In 1962 495 came and 492 left. In 1963 708 came and 536 left. In a survey conducted by PSS, the reasons workers indicated for possibly leaving the job were “low personal incomes”, “nature of the job”, “way of hiring workers and their inclusion in the work”, “housing problem” and “employment relationships”. PSS reported that every year 25-30% of workers left. PSS also had many sick leaves. In 1965, one article states: “if we could tackle these problems, incomes could be higher”⁷⁴. The fluctuation of the unskilled was described as

so ingrained in the structure of employment among the unskilled workers at PSS Belgrade that they were referred to in an article as “*pečalba*” – a term usually used for “seasonal workers”, who come to Belgrade only as migrant workers to earn some money and then go back⁷⁵.

In this section, I expand my argument about the making of migrant workers. While the turnover rates do indicate mobility among the PSS workforce, many of the workers were also permanently kept in a position of temporary belonging to the working collective. This can be seen from the profile of a worker portrayed in 1973 *Javna Higijena*. One of them, Huljaj Sadrije Sinan, told how he had been working for PSS for 21 years and lived apart from his wife and children for all that time because the company never secured him housing for his family. He had only received accommodation in a “Bachelor’s hotel”. When he broke his arm in a work accident he was transferred to a “lighter job” in the warehouse. Most of his earnings he sent home. “I didn’t get an apartment maybe because I’m an ordinary worker, but, mate, I know exactly by heart what’s in the warehouse and where to buy [things] for our company in the city”⁷⁶. His nickname is, tellingly, “Shock”, indicating his earned merit as a worker who knows how to save material. Despite his intimate knowledge of the working collective and the city, mirrored in his nickname, privileged forms of consumption based on company membership, such as housing, had never been extended to him.

Based on articles from *Javna Higijena* I will analyze the new instruments of disciplining low-ranking public sanitation workers after the 1965 economic reform. Because the new economic instruments demanded more participation from workers, this newspaper was meant to inform them. PSS found information of the workers of the collective was insufficient and “to some extent also impossible because our working places are scattered over all streets of Belgrade”⁷⁷. The establishment of the newspaper itself can already be regarded as an attempt to consolidate public sanitation services and communicate uniform standards that its workers shall be

disciplined by. The purpose of the journal was stated in the first issue as building a “connection on the relation between company-worker and company-every working place on the field”. However, far from working in the direction of emancipation, the newspaper actively stigmatized peasant workers, legitimated forms of exploitation and control, and contributed to the entrenchment of the precarious position of the migrant worker.

I will detail company-intern conflicts between workers who belong and those who do not and the stigmatization of peasant workers. While I indicated before the implicit racialization of rural-urban migrants, in the case of PSS workers ranks of “skilled” and “unskilled” seem to have also overlapped with ethnicity. One had a series of workers’ portraits, two on car mechanics with Serbian names and three on lower-rank workers (two street sweepers, one worker in warehouse) with Albanian names.

In the following, I analyze cases of infringement to the work discipline of low-ranking PSS workers documented in the PSS newspaper. I show how working discipline was depicted as a problem specific to peasant workers. He was accused of speculation: his waste handling practices were diagnosed as deficient because they were directed at his private economic gain, not at the maintenance of public hygiene. I will argue that the ideal image of “public hygiene” as a “service” helped to stigmatize the peasant workers as the “polluting”, economically interested Other, who needed to be subject to new forms of exploitation.

3.1.1 Working Discipline

In this section, I outline how Javna Higijena outlined the relationship of low-ranking PSS workers to waste and to the city and then, in section 3.1.2, how these accounts legitimated new forms of labor control aiming at the dispossession of those workers from opportunities to earn a side-income.

Low-ranking PSS workers were subject to a serial comic of the PSS newspaper called “*Joca Deterđent*”. In the picture below, we see a street sweeper as he locks his handcart because he heard there has been an increase in cases of vehicle theft recently⁷⁸.



Figure 1 “*Joca Deterđent - Vehicle Theft*” (*Javna Higijena* 07/1965)




Figure 2 “*I’ll Be Back Tomorrow*” (*Javna Higijena* 04/1970)

In another issue, the cartoon shows a handcart left behind at a street light with a clock saying 10 and with the note “I’ll be back tomorrow”⁷⁹, from the sky we see that it is morning, so the worker did not come back yet.

Low-ranking public service workers figure in those cartoons as the “newcomers” (*došljaci*)⁸⁰ to the city – a counterpoint of backwardness that enhanced the image of the city as the epitome of modernity, but also posed a threat to it. Some of these conflicts can be seen from a weekly column, which treated problems of working discipline.

One treated the problem of communicating to the peasant workers the concept of working hours. The author claimed that the workers from the countryside were not used to disciplinary

measures. She treated the problem that resulted if one of the garbage collectors was late and the whole vehicle could not go to work, so several employees would lose their daily income and the worker who was late had to pay a penalty. She claimed that the workers did not understand why they were being fined and regarded it as a “quirk” (*hir*) of their superior. Coming from villages, where the payment was organized in a way answering immediately to the work obtained or not, the peasant worker lacked a concept of work that unfolded in a particular temporal rhythm as part of a bigger organization:

“There [in the village] he worked in someone’s household (if he didn’t have anything to do on his own) for a day, two, a week or maybe a month, they do not want to pay him for that – fine. There is no infringement on work discipline – no fines.

For setting up a new household a lot of money is needed, which often cannot be gained in the village. He comes to work in the city. Here we have ‘permanent employment relationships’ and ‘wages’. Not daily pay (*nadnica*)! Apart from that we also have every day leaving work at a determined time. Unexcused absence makes infringement of the working discipline, and the consequences of that infringement is a fine.

But why a fine?

He is not paid that day, or for three days, and end of the story. Why is there a need for a fine? What did he do wrong? ... Sometimes it is hard to understand that because of his absence, the whole vehicle did not have enough workers. The working organization could not fulfill its obligations towards the city. Because of him, also his comrades did not realize their income that day. But he is not interested in that.

He is only interested in having been fined ‘without a reason’. He leaves believing that an injustice has been done to him. And thus the goal of the fine is not reached. It is not, because in him something still did not emerge, something called – disciplinary responsibility. And it also won’t emerge in him as long as he works for a daily pay and he is only interested in that.“ (Javna Higijena 11/1964 “My Working Day Begins With the Question ‘Why’”, my translation)

The author claims that workers did not understand why they were punished because they did not understand the system of wage labor and the division of labor, which meant that different departments in the company were responsible for different services related to different forms of waste:

“Next to the garbage which he has to collect, also rubble can be found from a broken tile stove, housing renovation, coal dust from basements, so why not work something else in addition to the salary? Well, he came only to earn money. Regardless of how. Here it is not

important that next to his working time he also uses the [company's] vehicle to acquire personal benefits (*pribavljanje lične koristi*). Why fining him, when that 'Miss' only gave them 'a treat' (*častila*)? What is indecent about that? Apart from that, he took directly or indirectly a part from the income of other workers in the company, because they know very well that for obtaining such and similar services to citizens, there is a special department in the company, and the condition that the income will be increased for all workers in the company, not only for those whom that 'Miss' 'treated' and who in an unallowed and illegal way, during the working time and on their working places came to earnings (*zarada*), and the goal of fining is not realized in this case, as well. He then sorely returns the money to the citizen and considers that the case is closed with that, and wonders, why also a fine?" (Javna Higijena 11/1964 "My Working Day Begins With the Question 'Why'", my translation)

The workers are described as being unable to resist any opportunity for an additional income, even if they know that earning 4000 dinars of carrying coal for someone with the company's vehicle⁸¹ is going to result in a fine higher than that⁸².

"The biggest adversity is that M.S. [the worker] and his likes will hardly wait for the 'next opportunity', that they will think more about coal heaps in front of houses than his actual task, that he will again stop the engine [referring to drivers and garbage collectors], leave the pipe [referring street cleaners] in front of the next heap of coal, rubble and the vehicle which until that moment swallowed garbage from the bins of the clients, will be replaced by rubble paid 100 dinars per bin. He does not care that because of this, the streets remain uncleaned, the garbage uncollected, that he will not leave (*odležati*) the ... pipe only for one hour, but that number with geometric progress increases This worker does not care that the city will look dirty and his working collective suffers from economic and moral losses." (Javna Higijena 01/1965 "Pay For Me to Collect", my translation)

Similar stories appeared more frequently in the newspaper – someone who was renovating his bathroom asked PSS workers whether they could take the rubble, they announced that there is a special department for that and immediately sent a lorry, which they took from colleagues from a neighboring block. The working discipline was about teaching the workers the right relationship not only to citizens but also to waste.

This latter point also arose for workers that collected valuable wastes on their shifts, which was also regarded as a disciplinary problem. In an article written by one of the car mechanics responsible for the maintenance of the vehicles, he depicted the problem that one of the big

lesions for infections was actually to be found not on the outside of the trucks, but in the driver cabins, where drivers store all kinds of wastes they find on the landfill:

“Almost every day, because I am a car mechanic, in my job I encounter a phenomenon, seated in the drivers’ cabin, more exactly, in the space underneath the driver’s seat. That place is a real center of contamination, dirt, and a real picture of our drivers. Every day, for about 8 hours, that place threatens to contaminate the drivers and sometimes also his workers with millions of contagious germs. If it comes to your mind to enter a driver’s cabin and peek under his seat, it could happen that you hush in surprise by the sight that offers itself to you: old copper wires, pieces of brass, cans, rotten bananas, rags, children’s toys, shoes, parts of old chimneys, bottles, leather, rubber, locks, doorknobs, scrap paper and under some you may even see a sled.

The leaders of the traffic department have long tried to eradicate the habits of the drivers to stuff everything they find on the landfill in the cabin, underneath the seat. Not even inspection as a form of controlling drivers and vehicles did help. But today, special attention is being paid to these things. On the landfill, all vehicles are washed and disinfected, but not the cabins and the space underneath the driver’s seat. Maybe by disinfecting together with the germs we could also destroy – the bad habits.

May these few lines serve as a plea to all drivers and garbage collectors (*iznosachi smeća*) to stop with the picking of waste (*sakupljanjem otpadaka*) and the current way of storing under the drivers’ seat. This really does not demand a big effort, but it secures a safe breakfast and lunch in the cabin and enables normal and safe work for those that are forced to repair such vehicles.” (Javna Higijena 01/1965 “Believe it or not”)

The car mechanics had a different relation to waste and saw it as a form of contamination, while the drivers and workers readily picked valuable items and stored them in the same place where they took their lunch breaks. This was again about inner divisions in the communal company, with the car mechanics here labeling the collection activity of valuable wastes as “polluting”.

In the next issue, a driver responded to this article on what can be found under the drivers’ seats. He told a story about how the habit of PSS workers to collect useful wastes blemished their image as public servants, which extended to the driver as him to experience denigrating treatment:

“In the last issue of our newspaper, there was an article under the title ‘Believe it or not’, which narrated now under the drivers’ seat we can find all sorts of peculiar things (*300 čuda*). I join the writer of those lines and have to ask the editors for a small space to add

something to this. It would be too much to repeat the types of peculiarities found under the driver's seat, but it is not too much to listen also to this story:

Day Monday. Around 10 a.m. I go with my vehicle down Roosevelt Street for unloading. In front of the cemetery, a traffic policeman stops me. I halt and ask myself, what did I do wrong now and touch my pocket: do I have my license and health card. 'Hey friend, leave your wallet', he comes over to me and, 'by the way, please, take these trousers, they fell off from your vehicle, and it might be needed by one of your men, see how cold it is'. Said he and disappeared. At first moment, I couldn't understand what is going on, but then I climbed down to see. And there indeed was something to see. Trousers that looked more like a usual rag – half of them not even there anymore. I blushed, because across the street the tram station is crowded with people. Red-faced I went back to the cabin and stepped on the gas to escape as soon as possible from the eyes of the travelers in the tram station. I reached the field where I work. Children were sledding on the street and my arrival disturbed them. They were angry and shouted: 'Ua, trashman (*đubretar*)'. Then I did not blush and I also did not scold them as I usually do on that slogan. I didn't, because they were right. They are not to blame for that term, we are guilty ourselves that we decorate our vehicles with various 'flags'.

This is a story about which we should think and a story that should not repeat itself. It is a story that not only we tell, but certainly also those people from the tram station and the traffic policeman and ...

The drivers should not forget that there is also a price under the title 'watch out for the aesthetic appearance of the vehicle in the city'" (Javna Higijena 02/1965 "We Ourselves Are to Blame", my translation)

The PSS garbage collectors were also accused of exploiting their position. Regular contact with Belgradian citizens (of higher socio-economic position) was used not just for earning a side income by offering additional services, but also for begging. In an article, the author laid out the problem that already for years a certain part of the PSS workforce (garbage collectors and street sweepers) would use the occasion of holidays to extend their wishes to all citizens of Belgrade –and ask them for money. He concluded that workers who are in "everyday contact with citizens and public places" do not only need professional but also "moral education":

"Our worker, our man (who according to his average pay and other benefits is much better off than a big number of workers in similar positions throughout the country) starts with the words, 'Miss, give me something'.

This evil has recently acquired even bigger scale and in it are participating even people from outside of our company. How else could we explain the appearance of strangers (*nepoznati ljudi*), wearing the uniform of our company, at the doors of some of our bosses from the field, which then (upon cross-examining the person) learn that they do not have any relation with the company?

We have to seriously tackle this problem. Apart from the professionalization of our workers, which is still of first priority in our plans, we also have to pay attention to the moral education of our men, especially those who are in everyday contact with citizens and public places“. (Javna Higijena 01/1965 “Does it Have to be Like This?”, my translation)

This stigmatization of low-ranking PSS workers led to conflicts within the company, as we can see from the letter of this street sweeper, who reported to the PSS Director how he was humiliated by the cook in the PSS workers’ canteen:

“Comrade Director, I, a garbage collector in the work unit ‘Vračar’ work in our company for 14 years. I am sorry that I have to address you, but, you are the oldest manager who runs our entire company. I am not sorry when citizens underestimate us by calling us ‘trashmen’ (*đubretari*), but I am sorry that I have recently experienced humiliation in our company. Namely, during breakfast in our restaurant, I paid for a meal and a salad of pickled peppers. The cook gave me spring onions instead of pickled peppers. I mentioned to her that I had paid for a salad of pickled peppers and she gave me onions again even though I had told her that onions are not a salad for me. Then she insulted me, saying boldly: ‘What can I do, when I have to serve someone worse than myself’. Comrade Director, I think, what makes her something better, bigger and more important than me? Why should she belittle me in front of so many workers at breakfast? And who set her up as a cook if not us workers! I think if we are trashmen, I hope we are human too.

My self-discipline kept me from hitting the food over the cook’s head so that she would [have a reason] to complain to you. I believe I’m not the only one complaining about the cook.

Todorović, Stanoje, worker” (Javna Higijena 05/1973, Letter, my translation)

From the above, it is visible how in the PSS newspaper the migrant workers were accused of being in a “parasitic” relation to the city, interested only in short-term economic gain in the sense outlined by economist Mihalović quoted in chapter 2 on peasant workers. The account of PSS workers exploiting waste and PSS equipment for private profit-seeking reminds of Major Branko Pesić’s statement that “millions are made in the services” (chapter 2) only that the city does not participate in those profits, but they are being “taken away” by “smart entrepreneurs from the interior of the country”. The question arose how the City could participate in these profits that were available from systematic exploitation of the service market and valuable wastes. This is what I discuss in the next section.

3.1.2 Labor Control

Different from workers with a fixed workplace, PSS workers were spread all over Belgrade and thus posed specific problems to questions of labor control⁸³, which underwent a few innovations during the period studied for this chapter. In 1965 after the introduction of the new Regulation on the Distribution of Personal Incomes, which puts greater emphasis on “payment per work obtained”, the PSS expressed particular difficulties determining the adequate payment for garbage collection. In these discussions, we can see the work behind determining the value of garbage collection work. The discussion mirrors the concern of the time to develop a system of valuation that adequately grasps and is able to extract the values that services generate.

In an article titled “The Key to the Question of the Distribution Should be Found in the Field”⁸⁴ the PSS journal explained that different from street cleaning and car repair jobs, which were easy to control and pay, garbage collection would pose a serious challenge to the question of the income distribution. The author detailed different systems of payment that had been tested in the last few years. Three years ago, in 1962, the enterprise had started to pay garbage collectors per cubic meter of garbage. That system was accurate in his perception, since with all lorries, except two types of lorries (Skoda and Kuka) the content could be measured. And even the cases of these two types “it can be done with a certain amount of ‘professional expertise’”⁸⁵. However, the problem was that such a system put monetary value only on the result and not the process, which, according to the author, was now regarded as a key component in the valuation of services.

Another system to distribute payment that the author outlined would be per housing block. However, that system would be ignorant of the varying amounts of garbage per block and fail to account for lorries “helping out” each other. The author pointed out the problem that the

payment system was drafted on the drawing table, which is adequate for “serial production” but not for services such as garbage collection and would thus miss its goal to increase the productivity of the workers:

“In order for such a system of payment distribution to work, ideal conditions are necessary, which we do not only not have today, but we will not have in due time. Such a system can be applied to serial production, where all phases of production repeat themselves in specific time intervals etc.” (Javna Higijena 01/1965 “The Key for the Question of the Distribution Should Be Searched in the Field”, my translation)

In the case of garbage collection, the author pointed out, the key to solving the problem of productivity would lie in the field (empirical approach) and not in offices (detached planner):

“All ‘hypotheses’ and ‘variants’ for payment distribution should be regarded through work on the field itself, and not through ‘administrative experiences’, which are formal by nature, but de facto do not solve anything. We should not rely exclusively on someone’s experience, we have to follow and measure specific units in the field itself, every phase of work, because the key to solving the problem of payment distribution and productivity gains, lies in the field and not in offices” (Javna Higijena 01/1965 “The Key for the Question of the Distribution Should Be Searched in the Field”, my translation)

The new system of payment distribution aimed at a more objective representation of the actual work obtained adapted to the unevenness and varying amounts of garbage in the city. Moreover, it crafted a new relationship between the company and workers that was built on field visits. Field visits were not only a form of accounting but also a disciplinary measure. As the author pointed out, field visits would support the ultimate goal of the new system of distribution to “stimulate work, both in a material and a moral sense, and ultimately to have a positive effect on the productivity”⁸⁶. It is in this dimension of disciplining the workers that the author deemed field visits more effective than measures that were invented on the drawing table. Even if the latter might be able to catch the complexities of varying amounts of garbage, they would have the important disadvantage that they did not intervene in the working process itself: “Such a system, which does not touch the working process and does not change it, obviously could not bring any adequate and wished-for results”. He emphasized, such a system

cannot control the one variable, which ultimately could lever out all rules, no matter how well-crafted, and that variable were the PSS workers themselves and their working ethics:

“I think that we lost sight of the fact that the [payment] distribution should be correct not only in the good and without ‘errors’ kind of sense, but that the measures also have to respect the quality of the work obtained. In the old system, we did not fight vigorously enough for the question of quality, and therefore some workers and drivers told us ‘publicly’ and ‘honestly’ that there do not exist any rules which they would not game” (Javna Higijena 01/1965 “The Key for the Question of the Distribution Should Be Searched in the Field”, my translation)

In the following, I describe attempts to control work in the field, which started at the landfill.

In July 1965 the PSS introduced a new payment system according to which workers were not paid per hour of work but per truckload of garbage discarded on the landfill. In the article “One Day on the Landfill”⁸⁷ the author described the difficulties the company inspection faced when trying to enforce the possible disciplinary measures tied to the new payment system. The author praised the disciplinary effects of the new system on the workers, who

“accepted the new Order as their own and adapted their work. They do not watch for the time, because even if the working time in our organization is from 6-13, a good number of drivers and workers are on their workplaces already before 5. They work decently, they don’t skip streets or single buildings in their block, they treat the citizens correctly. They unload their trucks in the way it is written in the ordinances, with the wish that their work will be the only measure for calculating their monthly income.” (Javna Higijena 08/1965 “One Day on the Landfill”, my translation)

But then there are also those “that look for holes in the Order”⁸⁸. In controlling the workers, the inspection chose the landfill, which, as the article set out to explain,

“is one of the main ‘*taps*’ of our working organization. It is enough to loosen the smallest valve and some unconscious drivers and workers in the garbage collection squeeze out an additional income for themselves, which, I am convinced, they didn’t earn with their work and engagement.” (Javna Higijena 08/1965 “One Day on the Landfill”, my translation, emphasis in the original)

The landfill was depicted as a place where some of the screws of the system can be fastened to avoid drainage and unnecessary losses for the company. In order to do so, PSS had to invent

new forms of governing and extending its oversight to the marginalized places. This act of outreaching can be seen from the style in which the article is written.

The article is written as a sort of field diary, describing the landfill as an adverse working environment:

“I came to the landfill on 13.8.1965 at 7.45 and stayed until 14.15. The day was sunny and windy. The working conditions were ultimately inconvenient because on the occasion of each incoming and outgoing truck clouds of dust lift themselves over the landfill, which suck into every pore of the body. The shack on the landfill does not provide any protection, because the inspection has to be in the open terrain all the time”. (Javna Higijena 08/1965 “One Day at the Landfill”, my translation)

Not only was the landfill an unwelcoming working environment, but the workers themselves also did not readily accept the inspector as an authority and acted hostile. First, the inspector admonished some of the drivers and foremen to better load their trucks and pointed out that “if the truck is not used in a rational way the working organization has millions of losses on fuel, lube oil and wear of the vehicle.” Then he started to fine and at the end of the shift he had fined 22 drivers.

“We fined drivers and foremen that came to the landfill with half-empty vehicles, which made up tours in the way that they loaded their vehicle: with empty barrels, old garbage cans, big paper boxes, and other items. Some brought grass and cut branches. In the course of one day, the drivers and workers tried to legitimize their malversations in various ways ... ‘There is no junk’ – ‘It dropped out on our way to the landfill’ and similar.” (Javna Higijena 08/1965 “One Day on the Landfill”, my translation)

The inspector further claimed that he would not have seen the need to write this article if it had not come to physical threats against him.

“I would most likely not have written this article if not the next day, 14. August 1965 at around 11 in the street Gospodar Vucic I met the driver and workers of the truck 33 (garage number 142) from the municipality Vracar, who then started a conversation with me about ‘who am I’ and ‘how am I allowed to take away their salary’. I calmly tried to convince the workers that I am a clerk on duty (*službenik na dužnosti*) and that my duty the day before on the landfill was to protect the interests of the company and thus also the interests of the workers and that I cannot allow no one to come to easy

earnings with no matter what type of prank.” (Javna Higijena 08/1965 “One Day on the Landfill”, my translation)

He was especially alarmed because the youngest of the workers, supposedly entirely socialized in the socialist system and thus a model worker, physically threatened him (to hit him with his wad of keys).

After this first visit of the inspector to the landfill, in the next issue of Javna Higijena, an article titled “The Landfill Seeks Hygienic-Technical Protective Equipment” explained that PSS will make certain investments in the landfill to improve the working conditions (irrigate the landfill terrain and accompanying roads against dust, provide lockers for the workers to keep their clothes in a clean place)⁸⁹. The author of the article emphasized that it would only need “a little interest and then everything there on the landfill will be fine”. Taken together with the fact that workers on the landfill were not even provided with protective clothes respectively working uniforms, this sentence suggests minimal investment had to suffice to order the landfill, which will remain in a peripheral position in the working collective.

“Already by solving these two problems the working conditions on the landfill would be improved. It is our responsibility to create better working conditions everywhere, because that is, among other things, one way in which the vocation can be improved. It is not enough to only lament that somewhere something is not okay, rather concrete measures have to be taken. On the landfill, there is a lot that can be done even without any expenses to be worried about. We only need to pay a bit more attention and then everything there on the landfill will be okay.” (Javna Higijena 09/1965 “The Landfill Seeks Hygienic-Technical Protection Equipment”, my translation)

This represents an effort to re-instantiate the landfill as part of the PSS company, to claim legitimate authority over the way it is organized. The landfill is one example of PSS re-instantiating their authority over a specific portion of workers by (minimal) investment. The cuts in funding presented a difficulty for PSS to request quality service from its workers. This shows how austerity measures shifted the moral economy of public sanitation work.

This points to a deeper problem: On the one hand, the failure of the liberal project to govern workers “at a distance” (Hurl 2013) was accounted for by way of emphasizing the “unruly” character of rural-urban migrants as workers and supposedly “inherently unruly sites” (outside of the city) such as the landfill. On the other hand, the dependence of the quality of service from the availability of funding could not be denied.



Figure 3 "Štediša - This Vehicle Does Not Know What Service Is" (*Javna Higijena* 12/1969)

A drawing of an old dustbin lorry covered with patches and quirks has written over it “Štediša” (“Saver”, someone who saves money) and with the subtitle “This vehicle does not know what service is” (figure 3).

This illustration of the “bruised” dustbin lorry acknowledged that the main discussion around the quality of communal services was waged at the time in relation to the lack of

funding and freezes in service fees prescribed

by federal price bureau. It provides a shift in emphasis from undisciplined workers to lack of equipment due to lack of financial means.

3.2 Commercialization of Communal Waste

As part of the marketization of public services and the ban on increasing their service fees, communal companies became interested in the separate collection and selling of “useful wastes” (*upotrebljive otpatke*). In order to do that, PSS had to intervene in existing relations of the valuation of waste. These consisted of independent waste collectors, low-ranking PSS

workers, waste trading companies, and waste-producing companies, which often left their wastes to be traded by socially endangered categories of workers as a sort of side income.

As part of the marketization of public services, communal enterprises were allowed to found new entities (*pogon*), which would operate in a more commercial logic. The PSS pursued two projects for the commercialization of communal waste after 1965: founding a subsidiary company for trading with useful wastes and first plans for building a waste incinerator (which has been discussed in several rounds up until today).

The unit for recycling (*pogon za reciklažu*)⁹⁰ was located close to the major paper mill of Belgrade – FBH, which became its major client. In its first year, 1964, the *pogon* collected 905 000 kg of scrap paper and sold it to a major paper mill in Belgrade (FHB, Umka)⁹¹. PSS was interested not only in the packaging waste that ended up in the landfill but started to take an interest in packaging waste that bypassed PSS:

“Our enterprise on average dumps around 507.000m³ garbage from the city to the landfill Ada Huja. From that amount on average 20% packaging waste, which makes around 101.000m³ waste. This could be even more because various companies trade immediately with the manufacturer, that is, [packaging] factories, and in that sense, many contracts have been concluded.” (Javna Higijena 05/1965 “Development of the Service for the Collection of Useful Wastes”, my translation)

In order to claim privileged access to the market of recyclables over other actors, PSS mobilized its mandate of maintaining “public health and hygiene”. It suggested that companies with a purely economic interest in recyclables would fall short in this regard:

“Various printing companies that because of the nature of their work have the most of these wastes, the majority of them have contracts with [recycling companies] ‘*Sirovina*’ and ‘*Obnova*’ and they transport packaging waste with their lorries. The waste is transported mostly in open lorries from in-load to out-load. Obviously, such form of transport is not in the spirit of existing Resolutions of the City government, on the maintenance of hygiene in the city, when we take into consideration that big amounts of waste stay on the street and thus create difficulties in the maintenance of the streets” (Javna Higijena 05/1965 “Development of the Service for the Collection of Useful Wastes”, my translation)

In order to align the collection of valuable wastes with considerations of hygiene, respectively, PSS claimed the exclusive right to the collection of valuable wastes:

“We consider that we are the only economic organization, which engages with the problem of public hygiene (*higijena grada*) and the cleaning of all wastes, we have the right also to collect packaging waste as well as other wastes that can be used as raw material for industrial purposes, and the value of which is expressed in foreign currency (*deviznim dinarima*).” (Javna Higijena 05/1965 “Development of the Service for the Collection of Useful Wastes”, my translation)

The claim to safe foreign currency was a recurrent one also mobilized by the waste companies. PSS mobilized it here to exclude junk shops from the business by saying that junk shops would engage in sundry trade instead of supplying secondary raw materials and thus support the import and unnecessary spending of foreign currency⁹². I will expand this topic in chapter 4.

The question of how exactly PSS collected materials for its *pogon* is not entirely clear. In 1965 PSS depicts the collection work in the following way:

“This problem has yet another, specifically hygienic-health related dimension. Upon learning that the PSS conducted an action of collecting useful wastes, a lot of people, both in the city and on the landfills, got involved (*dala su se na posao*). They formed collection points like wild dumps (*divlja deponija*) in abandoned parcels in yards, and thus it is not difficult to understand what kind of infectious danger these people bring upon themselves collecting wastes, all of these people, as well as what kind of infectious danger this presents for others.” (Javna Higijena 05/1965 “Development of the Service for the Collection of Useful Wastes”, my translation)

In the early 1970s, PSS engaged in activities to sanitize the existing landfill. Among those efforts was the regular irrigation of the surrounding streets to prevent the emergence of dust and in that same article PSS also recites an action to “remove informal collectors from the landfill”⁹³. In the PSS newspaper there is no mention, otherwise, of informal collectors on the landfill, let alone whether PSS bought materials from them. However, the professional journal of the Yugoslav Association of Companies Supplying Industry with Raw Materials from Waste (INOT) reported on the adverse working conditions of informal collectors on the landfill that

supplied the PSS *pogon* in 1972, when PSS announced to employ workers in its *pogon* for the separate collection of useful wastes.

In April 1973 the newspaper published a list with the prices⁹⁴ of its unit for the collection of valuable wastes called “*Otpad*” (waste) paid. From that it seems that the collection of useful wastes in PSS was organized in such a way that PSS workers collected raw materials during their shifts and then sold them to the PSS *pogon*, which functioned like a company-intern junk shop to gain an additional income:

“The Workers’ Council determined the prices of secondary raw materials according to which the section ‘*Otpad*’ will buy from individual suppliers and working organizations from April 1st 1973. The workers of PSS commit to selling the raw materials that they collected during their working time to the transfer station of the PSS [i.e. *Otpad*], which will immediately pay the raw materials according to the current prices.” (Javna Higijena 03-04/1973 “Pricelist of Our ‘*Otpad*’”, my translation)

In the years following the construction of the PSS junk shop on the landfill, the PSS newspaper had a few articles explaining why PSS had not had the chance to establish a monopoly for itself on the waste market. This had two reasons, mainly.

The first was related to a market ideology. PSS gave an account of who is currently populating the waste market and cast only very meager chances for PSS to establish itself as a relevant actor on that market. It blamed the problem on the specificities of that market and the conduct of actors engaged in it.

“Because everybody today is calculating and looking for pay-off it would be worthwhile to direct attention to our ‘*OUR Otpad*’ so be very careful in planning the collection of raw materials from waste. Today, raw materials from waste present a very preferential material which is pointed at from all sides and eo ipso also the number of those who have the intention to transform the raw material in question on their own initiative in dinars. ... if someone sees that he can earn some money, why would he do that via a middleman who will pay less? It will be done directly with the partner who needs the raw materials from waste for reproduction. So, we should expect that from a possible amount of 100.000 tons of raw materials, 80.000 tons will be ‘swimming’, looking for the one who pays best.” (Javna Higijena 01/1975 “Waste Materials for Prices”, my translation)

By saying that it was “understandable” that certain companies would not need a middleman in the trading of “useful wastes” such as PSS, PSS signaled that it had much less ambitious plans since the time when PSS established its *pogon* in 1964 and tried to exclude all other actors in the collection of “useful wastes” as “unhygienic”. PSS did not regard itself as the only actor dealing with waste in the city anymore, but rather as one actor on an already existing waste market with multiple stakeholders on it. PSS accepted that the fact that they are operating under the mandate of “public hygiene” does not give them a privileged position on the waste market. Their privileged access to household waste made a mere fifth of the total amount of recyclables available (20.000 tons). Against this background, it makes sense that the PSS did not integrate the collection of recyclables in its core business, but opened its own junk shop.

The second reason was that PSS seemed to acknowledge, also by how the way it organized the collection itself that the collection of waste presented a form of side-income for socially endangered workers. It argued that many of the major waste producers need to sell the waste to purchase collective goods for their workers:

“A lot of our companies envisage in their company rules that with the selling of raw materials from waste they support for example their housing construction (for their workers) or other things in their collective. That is done especially by those companies that have big quantities of raw materials from waste and make the main points on which (those collecting waste) count. It is normal that such companies look for direct purchasers/waste processing companies (*prerđjivača*) and that they will not go via a middleman to which we can also count ourselves.” (Javna Higijena 01/1975 “Waste Materials for Prices”, my translation)

Apart from housing construction, there were also companies where “syndicates appear, allegedly to use the money from the sold packaging waste to offer support to socially endangered workers”⁹⁵. “Socially endangered workers” is a category in Yugoslav social policy signifying the workers with the lowest qualification and income, and the way these workers were addressed in policy changed in the 1960s. These workers were targeted by specific social benefits of the companies themselves (like subsidized food in the canteen, kindergarten places,

holidays), while benefits such as housing were mostly used by companies to attract highly qualified workers and bind them to the company (Schult 2017:262f.). The movement of disentangling workers from earning a side-income from waste, as was the case with PSS workers, and instead, organizing the collection of valuable waste for an institution (syndicates, later schools) for purposes of funding.

What I described in this section is a transition of PSS from an actor that tried to claim a monopoly position to one that has an understanding of itself as one actor on an already existing waste market with multiple stakeholders on it. I would argue that this development is representative of a wider transition towards a governance approach to public hygiene. PSS gradually re-defined its mandate in dependence on other responsabilized and legitimate actors active in handling waste in the city: citizens, waste-producing businesses, and companies trading “useful wastes”. In the following, I will describe the “responsibilization of citizens”, which is part of the transition from government to the governance of public hygiene. In support of my argument about the co-development of marketization and socialization, I want to suggest that the experiences around the marketization (collection of “valuable wastes”) articulated with socialization in the field of public hygiene.

3.3 Participatory Governance of Public Hygiene

One year after the introduction of the market reforms, city officials in Belgrade debated the effects of the economic reform on the local economy. Former President of the Communal Services Council of the Belgrade City Assembly, as well as General Secretary of the SKG, Miladin Šakić emphasized that the Reform had “which had especially significant effects in the communal economy”. He further praised the efforts of the communal organizations in the past year to “intensely include the working collectives ‘of the communal economy’ in the finding of internal reserves, in a better organization of work, and more modern way of doing business”.

Then he criticized, obviously in replication to Kardelj's comparison of the housing market with the shoe market⁹⁶, the conception of communal goods and services as "economic goods":

"First, I think we have to start from the fact that ...the communal economy ... next to its economic character, also has a character of public service for the city. This follows from its specific position. ... This market is limited to the territory of our city. ... If the Belgradian waterworks would not supply water, then there is neither any other company, nor another market where we could buy water for the needs of the citizens, [and the] economy ... if ...the Belgradian company that produces shoes would not produce as many shoes as Belgradians need, we will import ... from other factories, but with those services, which are provided through the communal economic organizations, we cannot do this.

... [Now] their specific position is not ... regulated in a specific way, rather the most general norms and instruments, which govern the rest of the economy, are adopted also for the communal economy.

We ... emphasized only a few problems... first of all, ... the extended reproduction. ... these organizations have to invest in certain objects, which are conditioned by the development of the city, and which in relation to the capital invested do not realize any new value ... which can lead the organization in a situation that their new investments only increases the costs of these companies ... if we chose to look at it from a mere, vulgar economic point of view." (Miladin Šakić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 15.12.1966, my translation)

Then he points out that not much thought has been spent on the role of "some communal organizations in our city, in the ordering of the city, in the look of the city". In the following years, this question of the "order" and "look" of the city were the exclusive topics of two sessions in which Šakić presented a governmentalized approach to public hygiene that grasped "order" and "look" as governmental problems and not a service provided by one communal organization.

In this section and the next, I show how alliances with citizens around a certain conception of dirt, cleanliness, and valuable waste were built. As the PSS could not demand an exclusive mandate on waste, it was through these alliances that certain forms of handling waste were excluded as "polluting". In the previous section, I addressed marketization as an aspect of how the self-financing municipality organized services. In this section, I will mostly talk about the

way in which municipalities used “socialization” as a way to supplement services in public hygiene that the local state could not fully provide.

The transition from government to governance has been mostly studied for Western capitalist countries, but emergent research takes interest in how the transition occurred under conditions of market socialism. Sigley (2006) argued that after the market reforms in China in the 1970s, a “socialist-neoliberal” form of political rationality emerged that was both authoritarian and sought to govern through autonomous subjects. In the course of the market reforms, the Chinese state did not “retreat”, but “regroup”. For Yugoslavia, the goal of the “withering away of the state” has been criticized as a form of producing “quasi-state actors” in the form of self-governing communities of interest for example. After their introduction, SIZ were criticized as being by no means inferior to the state in terms of bureaucratic structures and funding available (Jancar 1992). This critique refers to the time after the 1974 constitution, but not to the involvement of the bodies of local self-government in the provisioning of public services after 1965 that I describe in this section.

As I have begun to show earlier, in the late 1960s public hygiene was subjected to new political rationalities and governmental technologies that responsabilized individual citizens and stigmatized particular businesses in Belgrade. While the lack of cleanliness was attributed solely to the PSS and its undisciplined, blundering workers before, now Mayor Branko Pesić articulated a new maxim: “As long as hundreds of thousands of citizens keep making the city dirty, one thousand PSS workers cannot win”⁹⁷. And “even if the PSS would employ 1000 more workers it cannot win against a million citizens”⁹⁸. He suggested understanding public hygiene in Belgrade not through the efficiency or lack of efficiency of the PSS, but through the conduct of citizens, something called the “basic culture of the citizens” (*osnovna kultura građana*)⁹⁹.

This new model of governing public hygiene through the responsabilization of citizens was in line with the advancement of self-managing socialism in Yugoslavia that is built on the belief that “also the most professional work cannot completely replace the creative and massive engagement of working people” (Duda 2020, 740). This mobilization aimed at the realization of local self-management, “one of the basic goals was the rapprochement of citizens and their connection in the neighborhood” (Duda 2020, 739).

This presented an attempt to set boundaries around public service provisioning for public hygiene to citizens, whose demands for cleaning services were now examined and presented as excessive. The struggle around the definition of boundaries around public sanitation services can be divided into two fields: (1) concern about unordered waste producers (businesses), (2) responsabilization of citizens and bodies of local self-government in the maintenance of public hygiene and policing of “polluting” others.

PSS newspaper dedicated a column called “Noted in Passing” to stories about unordered waste producers in the city. Here PSS complained that their mandate was defined as keeping the city clean, while citizens were allowed to leave all types of waste on the streets wherever it suited them: owners of restaurants and shops cleaned their businesses at the end of the working day and threw everything mindlessly on the street, or even put a sign on the rubbish for the PSS workers, saying, “Please remove”¹⁰⁰. Market vendors were a recurring concern of this column:

“Snaša and her husband sold vegetables on the market, so, they sat down a little ‘to have a bite’. Somehow it suited them to have their snack just there on the stairs to the market. When they finish with their food, they clean their hands and leave. Behind them on the stairs remain their – habits: packaging and other wastes“ (Javna Higijena 12/1964 “Noted in Passing”, my translation)

Market vendors were also depicted as leaving “outdated” packaging material (wicker baskets) in the streets, making clear that PSS felt responsible only for “modern” packaging waste:

„Ok, it could be also worse – these decapitated wicker baskets, which sometimes were called 'packaging' are left in our shops as a souvenir and long-term remembrance. Suppliers of the market need them no longer, so they 'junked' them. Our workers remove also that. We wonder: what will happen if someone comes to think of leaving an old locomotive in the street?“ (Javna Higijena 12/1964 “Noted in Passing”, my translation)

Drivers of construction material, coal, and (useful) wastes were another category. The problem with them was that they would irresponsibly overload their lorries or not care to cover the cargo area so that various materials were spilled over the streets near their storage rooms in *Dunavska* street and carried over to the inner city areas – even to the main shopping street *Terazije*.



Figure 4 "Our Customers" (Javna Higijena 12/1970)

PSS newspaper featured a comic showing coal transport that spills all the coal on its way with a caption saying “Our ‘Costumers’”. These were businesses “using” PSS services most heavily, but as “customers” is in quotation marks, the cartoon emphasizes the fact that PSS was not in a commercial service company-customer relationship with them, and thus, those who used PSS services most heavily, were not those who paid most, indicating that in their case, it would be due procedure to offer sanitation as an “economic” rather than as a “social good”.

The subjects targeted as “unorderly polluters” were those that were also having an ambivalent status in the urban economy: market vendors, coal companies, waste companies, construction companies. City officials were aware of how governance of public

hygiene touches upon questions of the right to the city: Miladin Šakić argued that while certain

transportation leaves the streets dirty, banning dirty vehicles without providing cleaning stations would be a violation of the constitutional right to free movement¹⁰¹. Nevertheless, measures were being adopted in the direction of fining those businesses.

The emergence of a new form of governance of public hygiene was marked by the emerging interest of the city government to know, who are the polluters and make them legible not only to the government but to the wider public through issuing newspaper reports on them. Public hygiene was considered less a matter of functioning state services and began to be shifted into the responsibility of businesses (and sometimes citizens), who became liable as “offenders” to public hygiene. The Order on Public Hygiene adopted in January 1964 prescribed:

“monetary fine of 500 dinars for every person that spits on the ground, throws garbage outside the baskets or otherwise creates dirt on public surfaces, drivers that do not clean their vehicle from mud and other dirt before the entrance on the surface of public traffic, or before the exit from the storage, construction ground or other spaces from which mud and dirt can be brought to the surfaces of public traffic, responsible persons that do not clean the open space around or in-between buildings ... Fines of 1000 to 20.000 dinar for offenses to public hygiene are foreseen for economic organizations, institutions or other legal persons that create dirt in the city.” (Politika 29.4.1964, “What Happened to the Action on Public Hygiene? Communal Conversations”, my translation)

The trope of “polluting others”, who need to be policed, was used in order to reduce claims on the City Assembly to increase provisioning of sanitation services :

“garbage removal from cities has been obtained also by... users themselves (working organizations, owners of family residential buildings and so on) and also some citizens in the form of occupation with their carriages. During removal, which is mostly obtained with ordinary peasant carts, the waste material is scattered over the city streets. What is even worse, often waste can be found in heaps and scattered on construction land next to parks or the banks of the Danube, on free surfaces intended for children’s playgrounds and similar. Practically, this city has been more dirty than clean. This situation has provoked the legitimate revolt and dissatisfaction of citizens, disparaged the appearance of the city, and seriously endangered the public hygiene and health of people. Because of this situation, citizens very often on voters’ councils and other gatherings sharply criticized municipal bodies and their services. In this, they were joined by the local press and radio” (Komuna 04-05/1965 “Prescriptions About the Maintenance of Hygiene in Novi Sad in Front of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia”, Dragoljub Milojević, my translation)

Othring and the identification of “polluters” were important strategies in the project to align the bodies of the local self-management, local wards, and voters’ councils, around the maintenance of public hygiene. Following the principles of the economic reform, these strategies helped to “activate” citizens and bodies of local self-government to engage personal initiative and private funds and thus emancipate them from “passive”, “consumerist” attitude of merely extending claims to the city assembly¹⁰². They were means to “socialize” public hygiene.

The way this problem of the re-definition of the boundaries of public services was addressed was by forging alliances and by penalizing. This again expresses the boundaries of the urban polis. The new position was articulated in several speeches by Deputy Major, Miladin Šakić. In 1969 Šakić gave a report on the main sources of pollution of the street in the city hall, which was reprinted in the newspaper of PSS¹⁰³ side-walk businesses, beginning from markets, to make-shift fruit and vegetable shops (kiosk) to various mobile vendors for seeds, peanuts, mice; citizens and businesses - and some suggestions how to target them. Šakić argued that while there were enough regulations regarding public order and cleanliness, until now the city did not engage enough in measures to execute these orders. Now, citizens should be educated, and, as this measure did not show much effect, held responsible for their actions through fines.

In order to increase its power over public hygiene, firstly, the city government reached out to housing councils, local communities, and voluntary organizations, like the youth organization Gorana, to organize competitions for cleanliness/ beautification of housing yards and balconies and enable their cooperation with the communal inspection.

Educational measures came in the form of competitions for the most nicely maintained balcony and yard and were organized in cooperation with bodies of local self-management such as housing councils. While this measure turned out to be relatively successful, it was a struggle to

expand the citizens' efforts at maintaining the cleanliness of the street and public spaces. From Miladin Šakić's presentation in the city hall:

“In relation to our yards and houses, we start to behave domestically (*domaćinski*) and respect the proverb that ‘it depends from the housekeeper what his house and yard are like’ (*od domaćina zavisi kakva mu je kuća i dvorište*). However, when it comes to the street, one part of our citizens forgets that also the street is part of the urban surroundings (*gradski ambijent*) in which all citizens are housekeepers (*svi građani su domaćini*), so they transform it into a space in which one can throw everything, wash and clean cars, mix mortar, spill waste water, unload and spill coal, and other material, so that, even if we have reached some results in ordering yards, balconies, facades, street lightening and shop windows, they are not visible because in relation to the street the stance has remained almost unchanged” (Javna Higijena 07-08/1969 “Condition and Problems in Maintaining Cleanliness”, my translation)

It is notable how a paternalist language of care is extended from the house to public hygiene. The transformation of public space from one marked by economic activities (transport, construction, vending), to one that resembles the cleanliness of a house. This application of middle-class concepts of cleanliness to public space is what I will further discuss in chapters 6 to 9.

Two years later, in October 1971 on a meeting in the city assembly with the City Economic Council on the state of public cleanliness in Belgrade, Šakić made explicit this marginalization of particular businesses from public space. He pointed out that businesses were no less obliged to stick to the rules of public hygiene than individual citizens, respectively, they did not have more rights to create dirt by merit of being an economic organization, respectively, a public service (construction companies, the police):

“I want to point out two conceptions, which, it appears to me, are our ‘specialty’, a product of the nasty relationship (*nakaradan odnos*) of some individual but also some regions. For example, the wrong opinions entrenched itself that if someone pollutes the city in the name of a working organization (for example, a cement mixer spills cement all the way from the cement storage to the construction ground) – that this is a smaller evil than when a single citizen does the same. ... disorder and dirt are being created by a lot of working organizations, but also some bodies of the city itself. ...[for example] unfortunately, a ‘Fica’ [car] with the signs of the militia was lying in the roadside ditch.” (Javna Higijena 10/1971 “Caring about Cleanliness Every Day”, my translation)

Moreover, Šakić made claims about “polluting others” and their way of thinking. PSS newspaper published his introductory speech “Caring about Cleanliness Every Day”¹⁰⁴. Šakić pointed out that the new collective form of care for public hygiene shared by (good, active) citizens was threatened by “unprincipled” individuals that could not be reached by “educational measures” and therefore it was necessary to increase penalties for them. He maintained that fines accompanying offenses to public order were currently only “symbolic” and would not bother those, who he identified as the main offenders of public hygiene. These individuals would think in an economic way, measuring the costs of keeping to the orders against the pay-off for not doing so:

“Our prescriptions foresee small, symbolic fines. These stimulate in a negative since individuals to [create] disorder and dirt in the city. Because, for example, the fine of 2000 old dinars for a person that threw out rubble and other dirt in front of his house is smaller than the service which he would have to pay [for removal]. Therefore, sometimes unprincipled (*nesavesni*) individuals have their own calculation: for them, it pays off more to pay the fine even several times than to remove the dirt from the street” (Javna Higijena 10/1971 “Caring about Cleanliness Every Day”, my translation)

The fines had been until then only symbolic, as they pursued an educational ideal. The Others to this new contract on public hygiene are using public space in an economic way and have to be targeted as such. While active citizens behaved in a way investing their personal initiative and private funds in collective goods, “polluting others” were regarded as “calculating”, that is, primarily economic subjects, which warranted targeting them in a way that was economically damaging for them.

Šakić differentiated citizens “who understand the logic of the big city” (those who were born in the city) from offenders to public hygiene, who also cannot be reached through educational measures:

“It appears to me that there are no doubts about our citizens understand respectively accept the logic of the big city, especially those who were born in it [the city] or live in it for a few decades. Obviously, there are also individuals who consciously or unconsciously violate the basic norms, discipline, and order without which life in a big city cannot even

be imagined. The suggestions we gave and will give in the future are directed especially against such violators of the basic norms of urban life.

I have the impression that sometimes we have the wrong image about the protection of citizens. In our country, the wish to reach everything by way of convincing and educating is expressed excessively. Towns in the West and East ... next to [taking] such preventive measures, also act very rigorously with administrative measures against those who do not keep to the legal and other urban orders” (Javna Higijena 10/1971 “Caring about Cleanliness Every Day”, my translation)

The image of the “unconscious” individual offender enabled Šakić to suggest increasing the fines and the executive powers of the inspection. The inspection would be authorized to give fines without a court procedure.

“The inspection in the city is very active in filing charges against individual offenders, but that is – as we say, a ‘double-edged sword’. The courts are overwhelmed with the big number of requests to initiate a trial, and for the majority of these issues, a mandatory fine of 2.000 old dinars is foreseen. However, the costs of the trial for one offense already amounts to 11.000 old dinars... According to the law, the municipality respectively City Hall is allowed to prescribe monetary fines of up to 30.000 old dinars for offenses considered in a regular court, which is inadequate today in the majority of cases regarding the severity of the offenses. Therefore, with the new Law on Offenses, we have to try to include the possibility of prescribing monetary fines in significantly higher amounts.

... We consider that the City Hall of Belgrade should be legally authorized to prescribe mandatory fines for up to 10.000 old dinars instead of 2.000, and fines in regular courts of up to 100.000 instead of the current 30.000 old dinars. Such sanctions, with an increased amount of fines, would act preventively on numerous violators of public order, ... a smaller number of people would commit offenses, and apart from that, offenders would be fined, which means that the fine would reach its goal, which is not the case today because a big amount of cases is dumped because of lapse of time” (Javna Higijena 10/1971 “Adapting Regulations to the Needs of the Big City”, my translation)

The empowerment of the inspection stands for an increase in the power of the city to define and regulate parts of the economy as local governmental problems. Empowering the inspection was a way in which the local government could reclaim power over the economy in a moment when the 1965 economic reform tried to forge a “common Yugoslav market” and abolish “local protectionism”. I will go more into this in chapter 4.

The empowerment of the inspection was also helped by the forging of alliances (Rose and Miller 1992) to increase surveying grasp: housing councils and volunteer inspectors were

mobilized to notify the inspection about offenses in their neighborhoods. One of the tools that the city assembly initiated was to publicly expose the culprits responsible for polluting the city in articles in the main daily newspapers *Politika*, *Evening News*, and *Express Politika* (both businesses and private persons). This pairing of the paternalist care for public space enabled through the extension of the authority of housing councils to the street with punitive police force has been demonstrated as a common appearance in participatory forms of urban governance that use the power of middle classes in a profit-oriented restructuring of cities (Ghertner 2011a).

By redrawing the boundaries around provisioning of the public good of public hygiene and drawing faultline between allies (conscious citizens) and offenders (those who have only an economic interest in the city), public hygiene became a highly exclusionary common good entangled with the institutions of local democracy in the city, the urban polis of housing councils.

Waste companies first found themselves on the side of the offenders and were facing displacement from the inner city and banning of their most reliable suppliers of raw materials from small sources: individual waste collectors. However, as I will show in chapter 4 and 5, waste companies were increasingly attempting to integrate themselves into the new assemblage of public hygiene. For example, in 1972 one of Belgrade's biggest waste companies *Obnova* participated in a competition organized by the city assembly to honor the company with the most order business spaces and their aesthetic appearance as well as most successful communal solutions, *Obnova* got a diploma from Belgrade City Hall and municipal government *Čukarica*¹⁰⁵.

3.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have shown how the introduction of the “self-financing municipality” shifted the moral economy of public sanitation services. Workers claimed the lack of funding as the root cause of the poor quality of sanitation services and thus challenged the discourse of the “undisciplined peasant worker”. The company tried to improve its control over workers on the landfill through small investments, re-establishing a form of reciprocity. But the picture of the “bruised” dustbin lorry with the subtitle “This vehicle does not know what service is” hints at the way in which funding cuts undermine the ability of the company to demand discipline from its workers.

The commercialization of communal waste shows how the attempt of the PSS to tap into the collection of valuable wastes had to be articulated in competition with other claimants. While PSS could draw on arguments of “hygiene” to delegitimize private waste companies, waste from companies and businesses was considered to belong to “socially endangered workers” and finance other necessities for the working collectives.

The division into urban neighborhoods proper and the “primitive” or “unhygienic settlement” that I have shown in chapter 2 informed a new participatory conception of public sanitation, which reproduced the boundaries in the form of “good citizens” who participated, and “polluting Others” who were reported.

Based on my analysis of infrastructure and public service provisioning as both connective and divisive (Angelo and Hentschel 2015), it became visible how the urban working class was produced as a bounded community against Others. The transition to the “self-financing municipality” was a moment that makes apparent the question of urban services (state, private, and provided through self-governed communities) as a politics of configuring the city as a specific community (McFarlane and Desai 2015).

Chapter 4: Waste Economy Between Wholesale of Secondary Raw Materials and Retail of ‘Flawed Goods’ (1965-1973)

In May 1967 the Belgradian waste trading company Obnova submitted a complaint to the Yugoslav Federal Trade Inspection. The local trade inspection in Belgrade had fined Obnova on several occasions for “illegitimate profit-making”. Obnova had acquired semi-finished goods from over-filled warehouses of the manufacturing industry and had sold them to local customers for prices negotiated on the spot. The local trade inspection regarded this act as “speculation with raw material prices”, which were under strict federal price control. Obnova defended itself by saying that these semi-finished goods were not traded as “raw material”, but as “sundries” – part of the urban petty economy, and thus subject to free price formation on the local market. The Federal Trade Inspection sided with Obnova on this question, confirming the existence of two waste markets: one underlying the principles of raw materials, the other principles of the (urban) petty economy.

This chapter deals with the failure of federal politics of “most intense search for domestic raw materials”, declared in 1965 for the sake of saving foreign currency on import of raw materials including those from waste. Building on the argument in the previous chapter on how the local government re-instantiated its power over the local economy through a strengthened inspection, this and the following chapter will detail how, despite the efforts after 1965 to make waste a commodity traded on a “common Yugoslav market”, it stayed very much impacted by the logic of urban governance. While the movement from decentralized to polycentric governance meant that local governments lost some of their regulatory power over waste companies and waste collectors after 1965, they quickly re-instantiated their power through

spatial planning (displacing waste companies) and increased policing (of prescriptions on the hygiene of business spaces and selling prices, including investigations into the origin of property). I will show how the federal politics of “the most intense search for domestic raw materials” was an attempt to format the waste economy that did not take into consideration implication of the waste economy in the self-financing municipality field of policing, what it considered as “urban petty economy”, which was the last resort of exclusive taxation power of the municipality after 1965 and made waste companies an attractive source for the extraction of revenues in taxes and fines.

In the following, I will first explain the federal-level policies concerning the raw material industry and then turn to the relationship of municipalities with waste companies. I will contrast the federal policy and the local level policing of the petty economy to show the ambiguous position of the private sector in the Yugoslav economy after the 1965 economic reform.

4.1 Federal Board for Raw Materials from Waste and Import Substitution

In May 1966 the newly composed Board for Raw Materials from Waste at the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Commerce held its first meeting. Present were representatives from the so-called “key industries”: the Association of Yugoslav Iron Companies (UJZ) and the Association of Yugoslav Pulp and Paper Industry, which were the main customers of a newly founded association of waste companies, which, in line with the newly emerged interest of the state in them as raw material suppliers, gave itself the promising name “Association of Companies Supplying Industry with Raw Materials from Waste” (INOT). The purpose of the federal board on waste was to solve an apparent paradox: how come our manufacturing industry

“spends billions in foreign currency assets for the import of raw materials from waste, while waste is lying around in our country, uncollected?”¹⁰⁶

Through the establishment of the board on waste, the federal government recognized the waste economy as an important pillar in the country’s struggle to reduce foreign currency spending on the import of both primary and secondary raw materials. The federal board’s first official intervention to approach this question was to conduct a survey among waste companies in order to understand the laws of the waste economy, the economic position of waste companies, and take measures to promote the “most intense search for domestic raw materials”. Based on the survey the board on waste found out that:

“A big number of small companies do not have the possibility to create all the necessary conditions for the circulation of waste (technical equipment, storing space, means of transport, collection network, sorting, processing, etc.). ... Because of all this, a big number of waste companies is on the margins of rentability, and in order to escape the creation of big operating losses in the circulation of waste, they ignore their core business (supply of raw materials) and concentrate on the retail of outmoded, flawed and obsolete goods. In that, they realize a substantial difference in price” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 “Integration of Waste Trading Companies”, my translation)

Over the next couple of years, there were several meetings of the board on waste dedicated to the problem of sundry trade, more surveys among waste companies done by some major newspapers studying economic problems, like Raw Material Review (*Sirovinski Pregled*) and Economic Review (*Privredni Pregled*), and some legislative changes to the status of both waste companies and waste collectors. However, sundry trade remained, and even increased, while the collection of raw materials stagnated, or even decreased.

	1966	1967	Index (1966 = 100%)
Total Income	470.585	538.135	114,3
- from wholesale	361.718	406.748	112,5
- from retail	99.844	118.150	118,3
- from trading with deficient goods	9.023	13.237	146,7

Figure 5 Income of Waste Companies in Yugoslavia in 1966-67 Generated from Wholesale, Retail and Trading With Deficient Goods (in New Dinar) (my table, based on Otpadne Sirovine 05/1968)

The reason for this was partially in the new Decree on Margins in Trade¹⁰⁷ that classified companies that circulate industrial waste in 1965 as wholesale (*trgovina na veliko*)¹⁰⁸. This brought about specific regulations on the maximum margins on trade. Prices of raw materials from waste fell by two-thirds on average after the introduction of this policy. With this tight budget, waste companies were unable to accumulate investment funds for new machinery.

Waste companies contested their categorization as wholesale, saying that they saw themselves as industry and emphasized that the margins on trade do not consider the costs for the work waste companies invest in the raw materials before trading them further to industry¹⁰⁹. As a consequence, big waste companies increasingly resorted to sundry trade. In October 1968, big waste companies started to admit that it is not only the small, “unprofessional” waste companies that engage in sundry trade, but that also the big waste companies drew a mere 30% of its revenues from the supply of industry, the rest from trading sundries. A report on a joint meeting of waste companies from Serbia and Vojvodina said:

“One waste company said clearly what others only thought: his company trades 70% material to supply industry and 30% sundry trade, but the company finances itself completely from this 30%. He is for specialization and integration, but he cannot say he would be against sundry trade”¹¹⁰.

As the situation around waste companies trading secondary raw materials became tighter and the development of waste trading companies into “professional partners” for the industry was also inhibited by the hostile environment they faced in cities, waste companies had more reasons to engage in sundry trade and started to advocate the practice as “selling useful waste” in front of the constitutional court.

4.2 Waste Companies and City Governments

Most waste companies had been unable to secure themselves a permanent location in the city during the administrative period¹¹¹ and continued to be on the margins after the economic

reform. City planners and city officials clearly did not consider waste companies an element that would strengthen the urban economy.

Before the 1965 economic reform, local governments held authority over waste companies in the form of handing out licenses on whether or not a waste company could operate on their territory via opening a transfer station and engaging collectors¹¹². Because of its extended network of transfer stations, INOT took pride in saying the waste economy was the first truly Yugoslavian economy, i.e. spread all over the republic already before the liberalization of administrative regulation of the trade with raw materials in 1965: “only the waste company has liberated itself already for a longer time from narrow local frameworks and expanded its business all over the Yugoslav market”¹¹³. However, this expansion was not always smooth. Waste companies documented how they were also affected by “local protectionism” – a form of intervention of local governments that, after the 1965 economic reform, was regarded as a relict from the administrative period and a hurdle to the creation of a common Yugoslav market. The hostile conditions waste companies faced especially in bigger cities were high on the agenda for the first meeting of the newly composed Board for Raw Materials from Waste at the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Commerce in July 1966:

“The members of the Committee agreed that the activities around the collection of waste materials, especially in cities, is significantly complicated by the lacking understanding of local bodies (municipal assemblies). They thwart waste company’s access to suitable locations – near housing settlements. Through banning, or highly taxing the work of waste collectors and requesting specific sanitary conditions, they destimulate the collection network.” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 “Local Authorities Complicate the Activities around The collection of waste”, my translation)

"Since waste companies mostly could not get suitable locations for their business within cities, they resorted to improvisations of canopies, prefabricated huts and similar constructions with the character of temporary solutions." (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 “Raw Materials from Waste – An Important Reproductive Material”, my translation)

INOT argued that waste companies, until 1965, different from agriculture and industry, did not receive credits through the Social Development Fund¹¹⁴, their accumulation strategy had to consist of expanding the network of waste transfer stations¹¹⁵. Therefore, INOT argued, waste companies also should not fall under the regulatory power of “the narrow political-territorial units” (municipalities) that only prohibit the development of the sector¹¹⁶. INOT here picked up the criticism of the local state as a hotbed of bureaucratic statism and connected to the goal of the 1965 economic reform to dismantle the local state (“de-etatization”).

INOT saw “local protectionism” playing out especially in the realm of local governments’ power over the licensing of waste collectors. Since 1956 larger commercial organizations and industries processing agricultural raw materials, had to receive the permission of a municipality to open a transfer station. Transfer stations were commercial entities that enabled companies to buy certain products in municipalities other than their main seat. The commercial organization could buy products from individual producers either through its own employees or through “collectors and purchasers”, whose scope of business was regulated in the Order on Buying Certain Products via Collectors and Purchasers (1956)¹¹⁷. INOT argued that municipalities should not hold the right to give out licenses to waste pickers because municipalities used this instrument to restrict the access of certain waste companies to their territory and that this immediately negatively affected the amounts of valuable wastes collected in Yugoslavia:

“although such a right is nowhere constituted, some local chambers for commerce, for various reasons, but most often also to protect the interests and position of 'their local waste companies', disabled waste companies [from other municipalities] to operate on their territory ... by refusing to hand out licenses to those waste collectors. Because of these restrictions significant amounts of raw materials remained unexploited.” (Otpadne Sirovine 03/1967 “Collectors and Purchasers in the New System of Trade”, my translation)

In 1967 a new Law on Trade¹¹⁸ was introduced that abolished Order on Buying Certain Products via Collectors and Purchasers of 1956. Waste companies embraced this shift because it seemed to disenfranchise municipalities from their authority over waste companies and create conditions for the free movement of waste companies and collectors. Waste companies hoped that they could work with waste collectors from now on “as flexibly as possible”. But soon new grounds for contestation between local governments and waste companies opened up.

First, urban rent: the self-financing municipality sustained itself mostly on the collection of urban rents and sought to develop its inner-city areas in ways that would bring revenues. Waste companies were not a part of urban redevelopment plans but had to pay the costs and faced displacement. Second, the power of the communal inspection increased: while local governments had the power to hand out licenses up until 1967, now they increasingly resorted to policing and engaged communal inspection to enforce what they understood to be federal legislation. This unfolded in two realms that I will treat in the following: The first was between local governments and junk shops. Junk shops became a prime target of the communal inspection, policing the minimal technical equipment of junk shops and the margins on trade, especially with regard to the contested category of “useful wastes”, i.e. sundry trade. Second, was the issue of so-called citizen taxation. In paragraph 25, the New Law on Trade (1967) decreed that waste collectors are now subject to citizen taxation, collected by municipalities. This regulation brought about conflicts about who was allowed to work as a waste collector in Belgrade and what type of activity the collection of waste was and whether or not junk shops had to pay health insurance contributions for waste pickers. I will get deeper into that in chapter 5.

4.2.1 Urban Rent and Displacements

Waste companies were squarely affected by the rise in urban rents, which they indicated in 1967 as the fastest-growing factor in their entire reproduction costs¹¹⁹. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 economic reform, waste companies faced a wave of displacement from inner-city areas.

In 1966 INOT reported the adoption of a decision of the Belgrade City Assembly to displace all waste companies from the urban periphery (mainly Dunavska street) and suburban residential areas to a “completely empty space” in the planned industrial zone in Belgrade municipality Krnjača. The decision was motivated by “urban plans to build in those locations and disturbance of the execution of strict sanitary measures, which are, allegedly, impossible to execute in the face of existing waste materials in those locations”. Waste companies pointed to the costs involved in infrastructurally prepare their new location in Krnjača¹²⁰. They questioned why their workers shall bear the costs of a one-sided decision made by the city assembly:

“A small number of companies of this kind, are in the position to bear such costs. And even if they are, do the members of one collective have to subject themselves to these expenses based on a one-sided decision and without their own culpability? ... the city assembly in its decision does not say a word about helping this action, at least by liberating the companies from the contributions [*dažbina*] – at least those that they owe the city assembly itself. So, the city assembly does not even step back from the incomes for the time of the resettlement of these companies. There is also no initiative that the costs that arise from the resettlement will be covered by any other factor – economic, social, political organizations, citizens, etc. That means for the well-being of the city shall be sacrificed only the collectives of the [waste] companies” (Otpadne Sirovine 08/1966 “One insufficiently convincing practice”, my translation)

Despite the allegations of the economic reform to put city assemblies and companies on equal footing, the quote above mirrors the marginalization of waste companies in the city and their exclusion from decision-making processes regarding urban development. On the occasion of

the 1966 decision on displacement, waste companies suggested forming a body consisting of representatives from waste companies and the Belgrade City Assembly to discuss the problem of waste companies in Belgrade. Waste companies were obviously not among the working collectives represented in the city assembly¹²¹.

The discussion about the responsibility of the city assembly in bearing the costs of displacement was a recurrent phenomenon of those years after the economic reform and give insight into the marginalized position of waste companies. I want to go into another case of displacement in Zagreb, where the waste company Sirovina was displaced in 1967 from the Western part of Zagreb (Trešnjevka) for the construction of the indoor sports arena (*Dom Sportova*). The new location was a piece of “expropriated land in direct proximity of the railways”, but without water, canalization or electricity. The director of the company’s workers’ council, Ivan Krajcer, warned that the displacement would eat up all the funds foreseen for investment in new machinery¹²². Krajcer and the director of Sirovina went to meet representatives of the City Assembly Zagreb to discuss the case. The city officials promised compensation for the dismantling and re-installation of the hydraulic press, which they considered the part, which was “directly affected” by the construction of the sports arena as it was “located in the way of the first phases of the [new] construction”. But even that small concession never materialized¹²³.

I quote from the Zagreb case, as it further illuminates the background of the marginalized position of waste companies in the self-financing municipality. The article pointed to a particular form of urban development politics that went at the expense of waste companies. They were forced to divert funds from the company’s development funds and workers’ wages for urban “non-economic investments”:

“The city assembly calls on economic organizations to allocate funds for *non-economic* investments, among which in the first place is exactly that mentioned sports arena. But, about the *economic* investments of Sirovina, which are closely linked to those non-economic investments, the respective working collective shall discuss [itself] and continue breaking its head about how it will spend the money for the replacement and reconstruction of machinery into the resettlement of the company.” (Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 “They don’t have it easy”, my translation, emphasis in the original)

This shows how the supposedly “voluntary” self-contribution of companies to urban development could have a coercive character at least in this case, of a working collective marginalized from the decision-making mechanisms. Sirovina pointed out that the subjection of waste companies to displacement and extraction of funds for “non-economic investments” would further harm the relation of waste companies with industry: “Knowing that industry already now hold ‘high prices’ against domestic ‘wasters’ (*otpadovci*), how will it be after the resettlement?”¹²⁴.

Waste companies faced displacement from the inner city in those years for more prestigious developments. The discussion around who bears the costs of the displacement opens a vista onto the political status of those companies in the city. These discussions show that waste companies were excluded from the provisioning hand of the city assembly that did, even after the economic reform, support industry in crisis (most prominently, paper industry). Waste companies were also not compensated for displacements that the city assembly had initiated through its urban development plans. The discussions also show how waste companies were excluded from political representation in the city hall, which enabled the externalization of displacement costs presumably in the first place¹²⁵. This means that these working collectives had to bear the costs of urban redevelopment from which they were excluded. Waste companies were treated similar to individual home-builders, discussed in chapter 2, as those that have to yield in the face of urban development proper.

Waste companies were at pains to convey to city assemblies the logistical and infrastructural conditions an appropriate location in the city would have to have and that they could not simply be resettled on an empty field:

“Because of the big growth of ... cities and the constant need for new housing, industrial companies, recreational centers, green surface, etc. it is more and more difficult to obtain a permanent location in the city, adequate for the work of waste trading companies ... Municipalities have to understand that working organizations in the area of trade with secondary raw materials cannot be located far away from streets, water pipes and electric installations” (Otpadne Sirovine 02/1972 “In Cities – the Problem of Location”, my translation)

The lack of a permanent location with adequate infrastructure made it difficult for waste companies to invest in technology or necessary buildings like warehouses:

“city assemblies ... by default, escape the allotment of permanent locations to [waste] companies, so that all their [waste companies’] investments are up in the air, and they are in constant fear that with one regular act they will be gone, and all their invested means and effort go with the wind without any compensation. They find themselves, put simply, at the mercy of single agencies within the municipalities, which have no idea about, for example, the importance of metal scrap for black metallurgy and the community, and who are neither reached by information about the allocation of big [amounts of] foreign currency for their import nor are they impressed by them.” (Otpadne Sirovine 10/1972 “There is No Scrap Metal”, Strahinja Siljevović, director Angrosirovine company, my translation)

This situation led to a focus on the mobile parts of the business: an increase in trade over the sorting, processing, and finishing of secondary raw materials, especially trade that did not have to rely on warehouses¹²⁶. This type of trade was easily criminalized and drew the attention of the communal inspection.

4.2.2 Increased Powers of the Communal Inspection

Apart from spatial planning, the self-financing municipality re-established its power over the waste companies after 1965 by way of police. I will now turn to the way the city government policed waste companies for engaging in “illegal trade activities” and how waste companies contested this label by establishing the term “useful waste”. In the last section about “minimal

technical conditions” I turn to the way in which waste companies claimed regulation and used the “criminalization” of certain forms of waste trade to exclude highly mobile competition (mobile vendors) from the waste market in Belgrade.

The line of conflict between waste companies and local governments shifted not only through the introduction of the urban rent. In addition, the self-financing municipality had a keen interest in “small sources of income”, revenues collectible from the petty economy consisting of artisans and private services. This went so far that cities were accused of standing in the way of the nationwide transition to the service economy by heavily taxing the services and small artisans. The federal government claimed that revenues extractable from the service sector were “insignificant”¹²⁷. Local governments, however, regarded the taxation of services as an important compensating factor in their tightening budgets. They have no intention to liberate this sector and present taxation as a necessary tool to exert control over this sector. This becomes visible from a special issue published by the SKG on the self-financing municipality:

“During the implementation of the economic reform, the creation of legal opportunities and favorable conditions for performing certain economic activities in the private sector enabled a significant development of private initiative. Such measures have contributed to the significant improvement of certain branches, especially services and the tourist industry in the broadest sense. However, in addition to these positive effects, it emerged the need for measures of taxation policy and suitable business control, to *prevent and eliminate the occurrence of not illegal business* but also the acquisition of unjustified income of private entrepreneurs, in order to equalize business conditions in the private and social sector and prevent unfair competition. It should be emphasized that not all existing opportunities in this regard have been sufficiently used in municipalities. *Local authorities often neglected smaller sources of income*, sometimes tax debt was easily written off without using all means to collect them ... the possibility to examine the origin of property was practically not used” (Komuna 11/1967 Special Issue: Material Position of the Municipality and Ways for its Self-Financing, my translation, emphasis added)

The announcement to use more punitive tools to extract taxes from the private sector through trade inspection was justified by the allegation of tax evasion and illegal business, proven by an investigation into “origins of property”. Municipalities justified the high taxation of the

private sector by saying that high contribution cannot only be judged in relation to the significance of crafts vis-à-vis other economic sectors but in relation to

“the efficiency of the tax services. This situation can be illustrated by the fact the municipal decisions provide for very high rates of this contribution because it is based on the assumption that there is a hidden non—taxable income among private operators.” (Komuna 11/1967 “Special Issue: Material Position of the Municipality and Ways for its Self-Financing”, my translation)

As I have shown in chapter 3 already, in this period of the transition from administrative to market rule, we see a strengthening of the police power in the city. The increased punitive powers conceded to the communal inspection after the 1965 economic reform, coincided with a re-allocation of the monetary fines the communal inspection collected, which were now going to the urban budget.

In 1970 INOT had a meeting with the federal trade inspection, in order to consult on the confrontation between municipal inspection and waste companies. In an article INOT quotes B. Marković from the republican inspection who explained:

“Earlier, revenues from the findings of the inspection went to the Federation. Later, those revenues were given to the republics. None of them were very interested in those revenues, so the activity of the inspection was in proportion to this interest. Today, however, these revenues go to the municipalities, and they are highly interested in them. So no mildness is to be expected.

Comrade Marković cited yet another, for us catastrophic fact. From the overall number of ‘findings’ of the trade inspection in this country, half are related to our companies. So half of these ‘urban funds’ (*urbanih sredstava*) again, come from our companies.” (Otpadne Sirovine 01/1970 “Meeting with the Inspection”, my translation)

Concludingly INOT points out:

“now this does not mean that we are the least serious economic sector, only that the others are more intelligent in keeping to the formalities prescribed by different laws and regulations, while we think it is enough to sincerely operate and everybody should know this without any documentation, everything else is just a formality (*sve ostalo je puka formalnost*). And because of this, we pay ‘half of the funds’.” (Otpadne Sirovine 01/1970 “Meeting with the Inspection”, my translation)

Waste companies soon came to complain that actually, the work of the inspection represented a prolongation of the administrative period and a new form of local protectionism which was used to discriminate against them. I will discuss this problem in the following with regard to price formation and equipment of waste companies (minimal technical conditions).

4.2.3 *'Useful Waste' Between Wholesale and Retail*

As I have shown above, waste companies engaged increasingly in sundry trade as their position on the market for secondary raw materials became precarious. However, their new market niche – sundry trade – exposed them again to local government intervention and further exacerbated their already marginal position in the city.

Different from “raw materials from waste” and especially ferrous and non-ferrous metals, “useful” waste did not underlie the administrative price regulations, but rather, as a consumer good, was subject to free price formation on the local market. However, local trade inspection oftentimes did not recognize this difference. The late 1960s were marked by a row of trials against waste companies by local trade inspection in Belgrade for “illegitimate profit-making”. Waste companies emphasized their vital role for the economy and suggest for inspection to accept sundry trade as a legitimate survival strategy:

“waste companies have to engage in trade with useful metal waste until they reach better prices with iron industry, which itself is not strong these days. So the inspection only revives problems that we are starting to calm down – the inspection should have consulted experts of the waste market before they denounce the trade with 'useful waste' as 'illegitimate profit-making'. Then they would have found out that sell of 'useful waste' is a form of retail, which is subject to free price formation on the local market.” (Otpadne Sirovine 11/1968 “Seizure of ‘Extraordinary Goods’”, my translation)

INOT advertised the usefulness of retail activity of junk shops:

“The kinds of useful materials citizens can find in the warehouse of a junk shop is simply unbelievable. The scale must be constantly ready to measure what citizens have found. Retail is a necessity for every waste company. From this form of trade, junk shops create the biggest part of accumulation and this enables them to supply the

industry with the necessary raw materials and that to prices that are far underneath market prices. The legislator oftentimes lacks understanding for these needs of waste companies and so it comes to misunderstandings with the trade inspection.” (Otpadne Sirovine 06/1970 “Harmonization of Business with Regulations – Rulebook on the Conditions and Manners of the Formation of Sales Prices of Products”, my translation)

In engaging in the selling of “useful waste”, INOT was not only accused of engaging in fraud of local individual customers, but also of having stolen semi-finished goods from the industry. In December 1966 INOT published an article advocating for a re-definition of the term “useful waste”, saying that “useful waste” is not only outworn machines but increasingly, semi-finished goods that have not been used in the first place.

“under waste is understood outworn assets which do not serve their original purpose, respectively, assets that have lost their original intended value, so that as such they can only partially be used for the original purpose some parts and similar.

Therefore, in our particular case, the trade with seamless pipes through waste trading companies is not allowed. Such an action constitutes an economic offense of unauthorized trade activity under Article 107 paragraph 1 item 1 of the New Law on Trade (Official Gazette of the SFRY 16/65)

The question is whether such an interpretation is consistent with the economic viability of the subject matter of the waste trading company. Namely, in the waste business, we often come across suppliers who offer for sale various damaged goods resulting from either the production process or excessive manipulation (damage due to frequent transfer from one warehouse to the next) and there are also cases of offering goods and materials due to too long storage (aged goods and materials, where the good lose their originally intended value, although, in fact, they have not yet been used. Such goods are thus transformed into a material of lesser value, which is not yet so damaged or worn out that it is, for example, a waste of smelting iron, but is sold as an interesting [item] for artisans or handicraft activity.

The current definition of ‘useful’ waste does not make sense, because it only included materials, that have been already used for the purpose they were originally produced. However, what is about materials that have lost their original value in the course of storing without being used? ...Moreover, the question whether a semi-finished good is sold as semi-finished good or as waste depends on whether the buyer will use it for its original intended use or not, and that is hard to say.” (Otpadne Sirovine 12/1966 “Sale of Useful Waste”)

This passage shows that the items that waste companies traded were not meant to exist. “Useful wastes” indicated a process where semi-finished goods, imported for the industry at the expense of precious hard currency¹²⁸, became waste without any use and then ended up in the

private sector of handicrafts and artisans, brokered through waste companies. While the state accepted that machines might become waste after too much use and could be traded by re-use companies, the fact that semi-finished goods became waste was an indication of the recession that the economy found itself in the mid-1960s. Valuable semi-finished goods, like the seamless pipes mentioned in the quote above, in the yards of waste companies, remained an issue of surveillance by the trade inspection, not only because the trade inspection suspected “illegal forms of purchasing”, but also because of “price speculation with raw materials”.

Waste companies used the distinction between secondary raw material and reusable waste to circumvent restrictions on the export of scrap metal¹²⁹. This sheds light on another dimension to the increased policing of the trade with “useful wastes”. The waste market was doubtlessly one heavily affected by world market integration, especially the import of cheaper waste materials from abroad. The division in “private petty economy” and socialist economy with regulated prices was a strategy to protect the standard of living and advance world market integration at the same time. As the protectorate of the petty economy became one of the main sources of income generation for waste companies, the inspection intervened as a way to restore the balance between the private and the socialist sector.

4.2.4 Protecting Belgrade Waste Market from Itinerant Traders

INOT pointed out that the abolition of licensing power of local governments resulting from the new Law on Trade (1967) had brought chaos and speculation on the waste market especially in Belgrade. They lamented how small waste companies were sprouting, especially from what they called “the inner country” (*unutrašnost*). In the eyes of INOT, these companies did not fulfill any criteria for trading with waste¹³⁰. In that, INOT had a surprising overlap with how the inspection framed their target of policing.

City officials regarded sundry trade as highly unruly and so it was targeted by trade inspection intensely. I found a debate in the city assembly on the inspection, where one of the main topics of illegal activities was exactly sundry trade with items broadly categorized as waste. The District Economic Court of Belgrade was concerned with economic organizations founded by “citizen groups” (*grupa građana*)¹³¹. The “citizen groups” was a hybrid business form introduced by the 1965 economic reform that permitted private entrepreneurship in social ownership. In Belgrade, the inspection was concerned with how they “suddenly started to sprout”. As the only solution to re-claim control they suggested tightening the procedure for whether or not a business acquired the resolution that their business space fulfilled sanitary-technical conditions. The inspection recommended being “quite stingy in issuing that resolution”¹³². The representative of the inspection explained:

“[w]hat these companies do in the city and in the interior is known to you both from the press and the television ... come from [Palace of] Albania¹³³, from the beginning of Knez Mihajlova street to the end and see the various announcements which point out trade around reduced prices, sell-outs, factory price reduction and so on and then see what is hiding behind those announcements. I can say that [it is] outdated and flawed goods. That harms the customer.” (Novaković Ljubomir, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 2.11.1967, debate on a “Report on the Functioning of the Inspection After its Re-Organization”, my translation)

He suggested that while formally, those companies might fulfill the conditions, the inspection would still have the power to affect the closure of those companies: “In my view, the lack of prescriptions can be made up for through praxis. It is a notorious fact that a company that wants to engage in trade has to have a warehouse. There we do not need any prescriptions.” He also suggested strengthening the executive powers of the inspection: “more frequent contact with the court and the prosecution would be useful for both the inspection and the court”¹³⁴. Soon after their introduction, “citizen groups” were after heavily policed for economic crimes and regarded as “hotbed of financial malpractice extending as far as embezzlement of socialized funds” (Dyker 2011, 164).

In this section, I want to argue that INOT engaged in internal othering – moving the blame of unruly business practice on particular participants in the waste economy. The main authors and people sitting on the INOT editorial board were from the management of three to five biggest waste companies in Yugoslavia: Sirovina (Belgrade), Obnova (Belgrade), Dinos (Ljubljana), and Unija (Zagreb). INOT oftentimes mirrored the views of a few big companies with main seats in the capital cities that were reminiscent of “local protectionism” allegedly left behind as anachronism from the administrative period. While cities could not decide anymore on the opening of a branch of a company from the perspective of its economic development plans, it could do so indirectly, as the inspection suggested in the quote above, by “being stingy” in the control of the minimal conditions for technical equipment and hygiene. It was this strategy that INOT chose in an attempt to seal off the Belgrade waste market against “itinerant traders from the interior of the country”.

INOT targeted “small waste companies from the interior” in a row of articles: These companies would compete for raw materials and engage in an unsustainable price politics of quick profits, which bigger waste companies could allegedly not engage in: “Small waste companies bring tensions in the relations of supply and demand. Often they offer higher prices and some favorable procurement conditions, which is possible since they are working with smaller amounts”¹³⁵. This attitude was in alliance with the stigma that city officials put on entrepreneurs from the “interior of the country” as creating a “jungle” in Belgrade.

INOT assumed that this proliferation of itinerant trading was caused by the new urban development policies. INOT argued that cities massively gave out licenses for the opening of transfer stations because they increasingly depended on the revenues for communal construction:

“Municipalities that had an increasing need for financial means around the building of communal infrastructure on its territories gave out very easily licenses for the opening of transfer stations to a big number of working collectives from other territories, without any economic legitimacy. For example, only in Belgrade, there are over 40 transfer stations from all over the country.” (Otpadne Sirovine 02/1972 “In Cities – the Problem of Location”, my translation)

Some of the locations that waste companies received for high prices were not even suitable for their business:

“Some municipalities demand over 3 million old dinars, for example, for the setting up a company [on their territory]. Sometimes those locations cannot accumulate iron scrap to pay only this levy.” (Otpadne Sirovine 10/1972 “There is no Scrap Metal”, Strahinja Šiljevović, director Angrosirovine, my translation)

Resettlement of Industrosirovine (Mladenovac, Belgrade), the new location does not allow for storage of waste, richer neighbors that should keep their gardens clean not to mess up waste company’s yard, Industrosirovina hopes for the municipality to intervene.” (Otpadne Sirovine 10/1972 “Industrosirovina in its New Location”, my translation)

The example further proves how cities were interested in the revenues available from waste companies, but not in their development as an economic sector.

At the beginning of 1967 INOT started to write in its newspaper about the idea to separate collection (to be done by small companies from the realm of “sundry trade”) from processing (bigger, mechanized companies). An article in February 1967 with the title “How Did we Enter the New Year and What is Going on With the Integration and Specialization?” announced:

“The waste economy has to develop in the direction of a separation between collection on the one hand, and sorting, regeneration, dressing, and processing on the other. ... At the moment, many waste companies deal with secondhand and deficient goods, which is understandable, since there are no other companies in our country that specialized in this. If, however, the collection of waste and waste processing/sorting would be separated, the collection of waste companies could go on dealing with outdated and deficient goods, while waste processing/sorting companies could specialize and professionalize their function as a supplier to the industry.” (Otpadne Sirovine 02/1967 “How Did we Enter the New Year and What is Going on With the Integration and Specialization?”, my translation)

The author added that the “specialized collection network” would be oriented towards increasing the collection of waste materials “while being obligatorily, closely linked with waste processing/sorting companies”. What is happening is subordination and deregulation of the collection network.

This becomes more clear in an article on the same issue following in April 1967, which says that while before the 1965 economic reform, the industry took all the material they could get from waste companies, now after the reforms, a new type of waste company had to be shaped, which is specialized on the supply of industry with secondary raw materials and the *supply* to the industry has to *replace* the old function of waste companies to *collect*¹³⁶.

In August 1968 INOT articulated for the first time the idea that waste companies should be regulated by orders on minimal technical equipment, which would contribute to push smaller waste companies from the market and bring them in a position of suppliers to waste processing companies¹³⁷. INOT lobbied for legislation that transforms what has been a difference in size into a division of labor in a supply chain. INOT complained that the old law regulated minimal technical equipment of waste companies¹³⁸ did not clearly differentiate between the transfer station and waste company¹³⁹. In February 1969 the Federal Executive Council (SIV) gave the first decision exclusively to regulate the waste sector: the *SIV Decision on Minimal Technical Equipment and Minimal Financial Means*¹⁴⁰. It was made in close consultation with INOT, who published the draft law several times before its final passing. One of the main regulatory foci of the new law was to establish the difference between transfer station and waste processing company, supplying industry with raw materials. The main difference between the transfer station and waste company advanced through that law was that transfer stations were not allowed to deal with waste, but only to sell the material to the bigger waste company that they belonged to¹⁴¹. Small waste companies were thus increasingly pushed in a position of the

supplier to bigger waste companies. They were pushed in a position of transfer stations with all their surpluses (raw materials and income from sundry trade) flowing to the mother company¹⁴². While the technical standards for waste companies proper were raised, at the same time, the technical conditions for transfer stations have been deregulated in order to promote the opening of more transfer stations¹⁴³. INOT estimated that after the passing of the law, from initially 90 waste companies registered in Yugoslavia, only 15-20 will be able to adhere to the new rules, the others will recede to the status of a transfer station.

The Belgradian waste market was regarded both by INOT and state officials as an instantiation of everything that needed fixing in the waste economy in Yugoslavia in general. After the adoption of the 1967 new Law on Trade, waste companies associated in INOT complained that especially in bigger cities, as the constraints on trading waste were lifted, too many actors started to trade waste and distorting prices). Belgrade was regarded as the place from where any effort at “ordering” the waste economy should start:

“Bearing in mind that there is almost no waste trading company from any part of the country that does not have a branch office in Belgrade, and the complete chaos of interests and incentives in this sector, the regulation of the waste market in Belgrade would have a significant impact on the supply of industry with all assortments.” (Otpadne Sirovine 11/1968 “The Ice is Moving”, my translation)

However, as Belgrade was also the most attractive local market for waste companies, “ordering”, at least in the mind of INOT, meant differentiating actors with a more and less legitimate claim.

INOT was careful to separate its concern about “ordering” the Belgradian waste market as a “purely economic policy” from the earlier administrative rule, which was accused of outlived forms of statism and cronyism and the opposite of economic efficiency that the economic reform had set out to establish.

In the waste economy, the administrative rule had allegedly been abolished with the adoption of the new Law on Trade (1967). After the adoption of the minimal technical standards, INOT published an article by its legal expert, Ljubomir Lazarević, who defended the minimal technical standards, arguing that they should not be regarded as a re-introduction of administrative rule, but as a purely economic policy with the goal to establish a division of labor among waste companies:

“The effects of the new regulation enforcing the the collection of waste function are already visible. In some fields, the regulations had the effect to differentiate small companies - as transfer stations - and big ones, as in the sector of old iron: if we look at it from this perspective, we can say that – regarding the natural circulation of waste materials – the measures of the Federal Secretary for Economy do not have an administrative, but rather a purely economic character, because they are founded on the needs to rationalize this business.” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1970 “Prescribed Conditions Have to be Fulfilled”, Ljubomir Lazarević, my translation)

“The idea of the minimal technical conditions was to reduce chaos and speculation, especially in Belgrade where there are 40 transfer stations... The Federal Secretary for the Economy, resp. the Federal Market Inspection ... consider that the big number of waste companies, resp. transfer stations (only in Belgrade there are over 40), without complete technical equipment and cadres, create anarchy and chaos on the waste market, by engaging more in commerce (*trgovina*) and speculation, than with their basic duty, the trade (*promet*) of wastes.” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1970 “Return to the Old”, my translation)

INOT made an effort to frame its goal of excluding or subordinating waste companies from the interior in purely economic terms. Thus they argued that a lot of waste companies from the interior would send representatives to Belgrade, “which go from company to company, raise the prices and the only those materials of the highest quality, while materials of lower quality, like iron and paper, they do not have any interest”. The author was careful to appear as a defendant of economic efficiency, open markets, and not as a local protectionist: If companies buy raw material in Belgrade, they should do so only for materials that cannot be processed in Belgrade, so that costs of transporting materials from Belgrade to other republics would be compensated by an efficient division of labor.

Soon after the adoption of the new law on technical standards, INOT authors started being concerned that the law would work for the wrong type of waste company. One article argued that even if the minimum technical conditions were to be increased, this would not affect waste companies from the interior of the country, since they were protected from visits by the inspection by their home municipalities¹⁴⁴. INOT suggested that those inherently mobile companies, where the mother company did not have a permanent location but were only provisionally located in Dunavska, were also cunning in the sense that they make “quick amendments made to satisfy the inspection” without “really modernizing”¹⁴⁵. Later, an article expressed concern that the municipal inspection in Belgrade had “started to control Belgradian waste companies”. The author claimed that the proximity of the headquarter should force the inspection to acknowledge that the minimum technical conditions were fulfilled by the company as a whole, instead of controlling every single branch. It becomes clear that INOT had a strong sense of who should be the preferred target of the law on minimal technical conditions (waste companies from the interior), and who deserved special treatment and be subject to less rigid control (waste companies with the main seat in Belgrade, here Tehnogas and Obnova)¹⁴⁶.

4.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, I contrasted the way the local government and waste companies mobilized notions of the city. After 1965 cities were dividing their land into more or less valuable areas with more or less lucrative developments planned. Waste companies did not only face displacement but also had to bear the burden of investment in urban infrastructures and prestigious developments such as sports arenas. I have demonstrated how waste companies sought to secure themselves a place in cities, which were after. Mobilizing an argument about

the contribution of waste companies to the saving of foreign currency, they met on deaf ears among city officials.

However, far from being proponents of a “common Yugoslav market”, waste companies sought to mobilize the city to protect the local market and discriminate against waste companies “from the interior of the country”. It became visible how the accusation of “speculation” was mobilized in relation to particular companies considered non-urban. Their exclusion from the urban market was legitimated by how they would distort the economy by their specific business practices. This shows how the marking of civilizational differences between rural and urban was used in specific ways to create a local market. Niches of local protectionism from the common Yugoslav market became especially important as a survival strategy for waste companies as world market integration brought increasing competition of cheap raw materials from waste imported from Italy and neighboring socialist countries, which motivated waste companies to enter the local markets of “sundry trade”.

Chapter 5: The ‘Disappearance’ of Individual Waste Collectors: From Uninsured to ‘Uninsurable’ Populations (1956-1977)

Trying to document the people who made a living from the collection of valuable wastes in the archive, I had to first find out who was interested in them and produced writing about them. I had to think about “how they mattered to whom, when, and why they did so” (Stoler 2010, 9f.). One of the strands of discussion I found was the INOT journal worrying about the “disappearance” of individual waste collectors in the aftermath of the adoption of the new Law on Trade in 1967.

My finding on the “disappearance” of waste collectors seemed to dovetail with what I had read on the decrease of opportunities for seasonal work for unqualified workers from rural Kosovo after the implementation of the economic reforms in 1965 (Ströhle 2016). Also, it resonated with the conflict I describe in chapters 1 and 3, about how the declared goal of the reform was to strengthen services and the private sector but in fact, the self-financing municipality took a strong hold of this section of the urban economy and policed it heavily.

So, while I first wondered how the new Law on Trade had brought about the disappearance of individual waste collectors, that is, *why* they had disappeared, it soon became clear that the actual contestation was waged around the question of, *who* exactly had disappeared. Who are *they*, the collectors? What I present in this chapter is a form of historical ontology (Hacking 2004). I trace contestations around the question of who are the waste collectors, practices of naming, and suggested relations between social and legal categories that emerged as waste companies were worried about the disappearance of one of their main suppliers.

Regulating the work of making a resource from a material of uncertain origin and uncertain value outside of the institution of wage labor exacerbates “classificatory anxiety” (Gille 2007). Stability can be reached potentially by creating social categories, legal regulations, and material infrastructure that approximately fit together and create an assemblage within which that work assumes a defined character, value, and place in the city. This assemblage can come close to “common sense” and then become visible only in moments of friction (Blomley 2008; Stoler 2010; Tsing 2005). These assemblages can change when one element is exchanged, providing the researcher with hints of the contingency of the process of naming. I am looking in this chapter for fragments that disclose the epistemic habits engaged to produce a (lose or strong) fit between social categories, legal prescriptions like orders on public hygiene and taxation of side-incomes, and institutional actors like the communal inspection.

In this chapter, I show how behind the repeated statement about the disappearance of individual waste collectors stood a particular change in the fit between social and legal categories formed around the collection of valuable wastes as an economic activity. I do not treat the “disappearance” of individual waste collectors as an event, speculating about the reasons why “they” disappeared. Rather, I treat it as a statement that points towards a friction in the assemblage that holds together the work of collecting valuable wastes. The “disappearance” is a friction that opens up a vista on the slippery ground on which the naming of who are the individual waste collectors and what does this work involve. Within this process, what comes to the surface, is a moral economy of the collection of waste – showing the relations of reciprocity, expectations formed relations between specific social groups, and forms of income generation considered just or unjust.

5.1 Practices of Naming Waste Collectors

“Accepting the standpoint that wastes are part of the raw material base (25% in paper industry, 15% in black metallurgy), we have to see how we behave towards this significant raw material base, not only organizations for the collection and trade with waste but all factors in the economy and society. Stories about clochards in the economic reality in France and about ‘Gypsy waste collectors’ here are actually stories about us ourselves. Such a treatment is received by this matter both in the pages of the daily press and on all other levels interested in these problems. Maybe also the status of waste trading companies is the result of such a treatment of this matter on all levels.

The contemporary economy and contemporary society in case they acknowledge wastes as an important raw material base, vitally have to change stories about ‘clochards’ and ‘gypsy [waste] collectors’ and to treat this work as it deserves, and the companies and people that work in these professions like all other economic organizations and toiler who in a specific way earn ‘their everyday bread’ in their own favor and that of society as a whole.” (Otpadne Sirovine 08/1966 “Clochards or Important Link for the Execution of Socially Useful Jobs?”, my translation)

In socialist Yugoslavia, Roma had the status of ethnicity (not nation or nationality), which went along with fewer rights and was therefore criticized by many Romani activists (Sardelić 2016, cf. Acković). Yugoslavia is often regarded as a positive exception to the assimilationist policies in other socialist countries, like Hungary, where Roma were regarded through the lens of socioeconomic position and thus as an underclass to be assimilated by integrating them into the ranks of the working class (Sardelić 2016). In Hungary, the working-class participation of Roma was according to official statistics 75%. In Yugoslavia Roma (until 1971 first Romani world congress, “Gypsies”) had the status of ethnicity and were left in self-employed professions and their participation in the working class proper never exceeded 50%. Based on oral history interviews and archival work, Julia Sardelić found out that in socialist Yugoslavia:

“most of the Roma were employed in (what was considered to be) ‘traditional Romani crafts’, which in most cases were not recognized as formal employment (Crowe 2007, 222–23). Although some Romani individuals were included in the working class in official working processes, many more were (officially or unofficially) self-employed in ‘traditional Romani crafts’ such as trough making as well as (what is considered to be less traditional Romani activity) trading. Through this economic niche, many individuals recognized as belonging to Romani minorities gained some respect similar to the respect that would have been accorded to them if they were officially part of the working class.” (Sardelić 2016, 54)

In a statistical overview of Roma according to agricultural property of 1963, they comprised the biggest portion among the landless agricultural workers (Vukanović 1963). Moreover, studies from the mid-1980s showed that the Roma were the most represented among uninsured populations in Yugoslavia¹⁴⁷, which makes sense if we look at the maneuvers I will describe here in this chapter, to keep “Gypsy waste collectors” out of any category of work that would qualify for insurance contributions. Insurance for private artisans was introduced last in Yugoslavia, after the insurance for private peasants in 1961, which left only 3% of the total Yugoslav population uninsured (Dyker 2011). In this chapter, I will show how the “Gypsy waste collector”, remained a category whose “lifestyle” was considered “irreconcilable” even with the extended system of social and health insurance as it was introduced in Yugoslavia in the 1960s to cover peasants in the non-socialist sector and self-employed entrepreneurs (Parmelee 1992).

In chapter 4 I have shown how waste companies were struggling with their low status in the economy and especially their low regard among city officials, which made them a prime target of policing and caused them difficulties in obtaining a permanent location in the city to invest in machinery and build constructions like storage rooms vital for a functioning junk shop. I have shown how waste companies dealt with the double image as diligent suppliers of secondary raw materials and mobile vendors that sell outdated goods and speculate with semi-finished goods by way of internal differentiation for example through the regulation on minimal technical conditions. This also involved cajoling city governments for support to transform companies in preliminary locations with temporary shelter into partners for the industry with permanent locations in industrial zones.

In this chapter, I show how this ambivalence reflected on the contestations around who are the individual waste collectors. The question of individual waste collectors hinged crucially on the

question of work ethics: who behaved as a diligent supplier and who engaged in barter and distorted prices. From the following debates, it becomes visible that both the state and waste companies attempted to bring work ethics in relation to specific social categories and thus stabilize the identity of the ideal individual waste collector.

5.2 Portraits

“Do you know that Mile who resells old things, who can obtain a painter for you when you need it, who can buy you fish when it is not available anywhere?”. This is how an article published in Politika Yugoslav daily newspaper in 1964 started to tell the story of a fraud committed by Mile, a “reseller with a skill”, who had been earning a living as a singer until illness took that livelihood from him¹⁴⁸. The article reminds in form and content of a parable, a short story that opens questions about ethical principles and seeks to demonstrate a moral lesson¹⁴⁹. The lesson taught here is that average Belgradian citizens could use the services of resellers, but should not hang on to the illusion that he will be able to dictate the conditions of that transaction. The story shows, the resellers operate in a network unknown to the average Belgradian citizen and that they will find a loop even if their customer comes up with a quite cunning control mechanism.

As a contrast, we can look at another article in Politika Express in 1980 which painted a completely different picture of a waste collector: Petar Berić, a highly qualified shoemaker left his “regular job” in the shoe factory Moda to engage in the collection of secondary raw materials, where, according to his own statement, he earned twice as much as in his previous job. Interviewing the waste company Feroteks about their new supplier, they were happy to report that in his new “profession”, as the article calls waste picking, Petar Berić shows exemplary “diligence and neatness”¹⁵⁰.

This chapter is about a transition in the way the work of collecting valuable wastes is institutionalized and how it is framed: from “professional waste collectors” (potentially cunning, slipping into the category of itinerant traders) to a “side-activity” of retirees and underemployed (diligent because trained in work habits and tied to one place).

Portraits of waste pickers are rare in the professional journal of INOT. The first appeared in 1967. One of the regular contributors to the magazine, Ivan Posavec, wrote about “Collector Nikola” in the orientaling form of a travel journal with the waste collector Nikola as one of the curiosities with an educative value that the author stumbled upon during his journey.

“Travelling, one oftentimes encounters such events that one did not intend to meet, but which can still capture one’s attention. And when one is even pointed to a passing scene, one acquires through it certain knowledge, or the existing strengthens, respectively, will be better explained.” (Otpadne Sirovine 04/1967 “Collector Nikola”, my translation)

On a business trip, a broken exhaust pipe forced them to stop at the local blacksmith. As the repair work was almost done,

“a to us well-known cargo arrived in the blacksmith’s yard ... ‘Well, this is your competition’- darted the blacksmith at us like in a joke. We used the time while the blacksmith finished the work ... and bombarded the newcomer with questions about success in his work, earnings, since when he collects waste and similar.” (Otpadne Sirovine 04/1967 “Collector Nikola”, my translation)

A crucial part of the story is the element of chance, both in how the INOT editor met the collector Nikola and that they were introduced to each other by the blacksmith. INOT editors were far away not only from waste collectors, but apparently also from the lowest branches of their companies, the junk shops, which had daily contact with collectors¹⁵¹. Through the unexpected damage to their car, INOT editors found themselves outside of their usual space (in between the big cities on the road) and time (having to wait for the repair of their car) and thus entered the element of chance and casual encounters that was described as the natural habitat of waste collectors.

Posavec examined Nikola's carload to estimate his income, which seemed to be a lot at first sight¹⁵². But then Posavec added into the calculation the fact that this was what the collector made a living from, his exclusive source of income. Considering that this load was the result of five days of work and that this money was not only for his personal consumption but also for reproduction costs (investment in means of transport, for times of sickness) it did not seem that much anymore:

“But collector Nikola was on the road for five days: with car and horse, maybe a cavalry – a hoof, whatever, the cargo has been transported and that is the main thing. So the earning is 3.600 old dinar per day: for the collector Nikola, for the horse, for the car, for sick leave, for yearly holiday, for pension, for ...

All this, as it can be noticed, is quite ideally calculated, because the collector Nikola often repeated in the conversation: ‘Well, you have to manage somehow, you know how it is. I sometimes travel all day and in the car only a few kilos of rusty old sheet metal.’ (Otpadne Sirovine 04/1967 “Collector Nikola”, my translation)

It is striking that the knowledge of INOT of one of its most important suppliers was left to chance. At least this is the impression that the article seeks to convey. That INOT had only passing knowledge of the waste collectors.

Another occasion when INOT reported about waste collectors was in 1972 when PSS started to be interested in the collection of valuable wastes. In August 1972 INOT had an article announcing that PSS opened a unit for processing of raw materials from waste at the landfill¹⁵³.

In that article INOT also portrayed informal collectors, who talked about the way the new prescriptions on public hygiene had affected their work.

“In Belgrade, horse carriages are forbidden¹⁵⁴, but we are at the edge of the city, almost in the village, so we escape sometimes (*promaknemo po koji put*). Otherwise, in the city we don't go. We collect everything in the car and then in our small yard we sort and prepare for selling to junk shops of the waste companies.” (Otpadne Sirovine 08/1972 “Gradska Čistoča (PSS) Opens a The collection of waste Plant. Motif from Ada Huja”, my translation)

A picture of two women pulling a small handcart behind with the text:

“Unfortunately we did not enrich ourselves yet to have at least a horse-drawn carriage. For now, we own this small cart and there we put all our goods and bring them directly from the landfill to the junk shop.” (Otpadne Sirovine 08/1972 “Gradska Čistoća (PSS) Opens a The collection of waste Plant. Motif from Ada Huja”, my translation)

Another shows two women picking coke: “In the absence of something better, here’s a bunch of unused but discarded coke. It’s a little bulky, but any foundry will thankfully buy it because it’s scarce”.

INOT had a few articles criticizing the working conditions for waste pickers on the landfill and said it was the responsibility of PUS to raise the standards¹⁵⁵.

A very different portrait can be found in the INOT newspaper in 1980, this time addressing a subject with a permanent workplace in the city (guard of a parking lot)

“Osman Dzafić is retired. He used to work in Gradska Čistoća (PSS). Today he works as a security guard at a parking lot in the center of Belgrade. In addition to this job, he also collects scrap paper. This hard-working seventy-year-old begins and ends his working day in the dark. He works, as they say, from morning to tomorrow (*od jutra do sutra*). Although it is a cold February morning, we found him neatly stacking and sorting cardboard packaging. Package by package, line by line – he made a whole bunch.

We approached. We didn’t have to say what we wanted. As soon as he saw us holding a camera and a cassette player, he smiled, come, come, do take a picture. I know you are from the newspaper... You are not the only ones. They keep coming ... [they] hear how the comrades from the local ward praise me... they are satisfied how I work, and I try to not unnerve them. Wherever I find an old box or a discarded newspaper I bring it here and put it on my pile. In the evening Unija [waste company] lorry comes and loads the paper and the next day again the same. Thus day in, day out. If it were not for the garbage that people throw here, it would be easier. I have to separate it from the paper. So they cause me unnecessary work.

-How much do you earn?

-My son, I earn as much as I work. From this you both can and cannot live... it all depends. Ten percent is the tax, I get sixty dinars per kilo. And monthly? – well, around five to six hundred thousand old dinar. I work all day, from morning to evening. There is a lot of work. The inspection demands that I keep order. You know these are the regulations that should be obeyed.

Since when do you work with paper?

Second year. I see they are looking for scrap paper, people should work, the factories are waiting. But the people throw it away. It's a pity, a great pity, people must not do that – right?

We nodded in agreement in place of an answer. ... At the farewell, ... he said: when I will be published in the newspaper, bring it to me. We'll talk again.

We left confused. An old man who turned 70 with a regular job guarding cars on a parking lot and collects, in passing, someone else's (scattered) whole salary, six hundred thousand old dinars¹⁵⁶! And such or maybe even higher salaries can be found in Belgrade's attics, basements, on streets, department stores, and who knows where else. There are them in Zagreb, Skoplje, Titograd, and Prjavor... in the whole of Yugoslavia. Perhaps it is better to ask how many such Pera Perica are there in Yugoslavia. Should they be organized and offered better conditions to collect as much scrap paper as possible? Without them a ton of paper would be left on the sidewalks of the city or as communal waste scrap paper would go irreclaimably to the landfill." (Sekundarne Sirovine 02/1980 "Note – That Must Not be Done!", my translation)

Mile, Petar Berić, Nikola, and Osman Džafić are figures that rarely make a personal appearance in the archive. It was difficult to find their traces. Yet their stories are place-holders for wider contestations around what type of work served to count as the main source of livelihood and what needed to be pressed in a side income.

In this chapter, I trace the contestations around establishing the collection of valuable waste in the category of side-income and the consequences this institutionalization had on the way the figure of the individual waste collector became associated with specific social categories. I seek to highlight especially the difference between "unemployed" and "people without permanent occupation and permanent place of residency", as well as "unemployed" vs. "dependent populations" (such as housewives, pensioners, schoolchildren) and "under-employed" in the category of the collection of waste as a "side-income" as opposed to "main income".

5.3 From the 1956 Order on Collectors to the 1967 New Law on Trade

In 1967 the new Law on Trade brought about a completely new legal regime for the collection of valuable wastes and the status of that activity along the work/ non-work spectrum. The main changes related to the contractual form in which waste companies could buy materials from

collectors (now through special order contracts). The collection of waste had been regarded before as part of the petty economy of independent artisans, under article 25 of the new Law on Trade became part of the Basic Law on Employment Relationships (OZRO), article 142-144 on “performing jobs and duties which due to their nature do not demand the creation of a specific workplace in the working organization, is not considered an employment relationship”¹⁵⁷. This opened the collection of waste to other forms of control regarding the origin of property (authorizing bills), reducing the cash transactions (to police high incomes, as the collection of waste was meant to be a “side income” only), and the issuance of insurances for waste collectors. While waste companies claimed that through these changes it “became impossible” to work with waste collectors, my argument in the following is that it was actually waste companies themselves who pushed waste collectors outside the realm of law. With the abolishment of the 1956 Order on Collectors in 1967, waste companies were hoping to gain more liberty to “flexibly” shape employment relationships. But actually, after 1967 the collection of waste was re-framed from a “profession” of non-residents to a “side income” of the resident population as well as “residents of other municipalities”.

5.3.1 1956 Order on Collectors

INOT reported that in 1951 it was the easiest for waste companies to work with collectors. They could hire “people without a permanent profession” (*lica bez stalnog zanimanja*), who would bring wastes from all over the republic. This was a reserve army of labor that the state was not concerned about in terms of care responsibilities, but only from the perspective of nuisances they might cause:

"In 1951 the *Decree on Collectors (Uredba o Sakupljačima)* was still in force, [which defined collectors] as *persons without permanent occupation (bez stalnog zanimanja)*, but who had an authorization of companies that they are working for them so that in the beginning those people were even financed from the side of the company. In the period of renewal [after WWII], when a big shortage of all types of wastes was felt, this work was very useful, because collectors brought even from the most distant regions various

types of waste (paper, iron, ferrous metals, textile, etc.). From the company, they received not only the money for bringing goods but were also stimulated in various ways for the biggest possible collection of waste." (Otpadne Sirovine 11/1970 "Collectors", my translation, emphasis added)

This direct access of waste companies to "people without a permanent profession" was canceled in 1956 through the Order on Buying certain Products via Collectors and Purchasers (in the following: Order on Collectors). With it, a system was introduced that asked waste companies to issue a legitimation to their collectors and have it certified by the local Chamber of Commerce. The changes in the 1950s were perceived by INOT later, in the 1970s as part of a constant aggravation of the regulation of waste collectors.

"With the development of our economy and especially with the development of the big cities, also the problem of collectors was put in a new way because it had to correspond to the new conditions of the economy (*uslovi privredjivanja*). In order to abolish the so-called *pick-pocketing around the city (torbaranje po gradu)* and to force waste collectors to answer for their work (*da odgovaraju za svoj rad*), a license of the Chamber of Commerce was necessary, handed out on the request of the economic organization (that is the waste company)." (Otpadne Sirovine 11/1970 "Collectors", my translation, emphasis added)

The motivation of the 1956 Order on Collectors was to regulate the collection of waste as a potential threat to public order, bordering the petty criminal act of pick-pocketing. As such the collection of waste fell into the area of responsibility of city governments. In order for the collection of waste to assume a form corresponding to public order and safety in growing cities, it was to be advanced from "pick-pocketing around the city" to licensed collection under the auspices of one waste company. The way this was done, was to tie the collectors to one waste company and confine them to engage only in this one form of work. Despite this contractual bond, collectors were defined as "outside of an employment relationship with the economic organization":

"It was stipulated that collectors and purchasers are people outside of an employment relationship with the economic organization; that they can work only with one economic organization; that they cannot use others' labor force in their activity; that they have to have a specific contract with the economic organization, which regulates their relation and that they can operate only with the authorization and legitimation of

the economic organization, which has to be certified by the City Chamber of Commerce, on the territory of which the economic organization has its seat.” (Otpadne Sirovine 03/1967 “Collectors and Purchasers in the New System of Trade”, my translation)

“The waste picker had to hand over the collected wastes only to that economic organization from which it had the working permission. Every other work would have led to the seizure of the permission.” (Otpadne Sirovine 11/1970 “Collectors”, my translation)

In 1967 with the new Law On Trade, waste became a commodity like any other and was exempted from the obligatory purchase system. On that occasion, also the Order on Collectors (1956) was abolished. Waste companies organized in INOT first unequivocally embraced the abolishment of the 1956 Order on Collectors. In the immediate aftermath of its abolition, INOT judged the Order on Collectors “pre-eminently as restrictive”¹⁵⁸.

According to the Order on Collectors (1956) waste companies were allowed to conclude a contract with waste collectors only as long as they received the permission of the local government for the collector to work on the territory of that municipality. INOT contested this rule as a limitation to its business freedom. It finds that there should be a difference between collectors who have their permanent residency on the territory of the municipality and mobile collectors that are collecting for the waste company on the territory:

“The Order [on Buying certain products via Collectors and Purchasers] asks waste companies to request a license from the municipality on the territory of which it wishes to engage a waste collector. It is okay that a municipality decides upon whether or not it wishes to give the license to work to someone who has his [sic!] permanent residency on the territory of the municipality. But it really does not make any sense that municipalities are allowed to decide on whether or not a waste company engages contracted waste collectors on their territory.” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 “Margins and Industrial Waste Trade Companies”, my translation)

With the abolishment of the 1956 Order on Collectors, waste companies were hoping to gain more liberty to flexibly shape employment relationships¹⁵⁹. However, soon after the adoption of the new Law on Trade (1967), collectors started to disappear. In 1969 an article observed:

“slowly and gradually this network became weaker and weaker, so that already by the end of last year in many organizations it was reduced to a minimum – like a symbolic left-over of earlier way to work. ... many waste trading companies, which earlier had each around a few hundred collectors or purchasers, recently completely stopped working with them.” (Otpadne Sirovine 03/1969 “Regulation of the Position of Purchasers and Collectors”, my translation)

One of the main reasons that articles in INOT newspaper invoked for the disappearance of waste collectors was “a false perception of the politics of liberalization of trade in relation to the adoption of the new Law on Trade”. They argued that after the adoption of the Law on Trade, “many companies did not know in what way and under what conditions to organize the job of the collection of waste via individual collectors and purchasers”¹⁶⁰.

In the following, I will unpack this claim about the “disappearance” of waste collectors in relation to the shifting stakes of the municipality to intervene in this area with regulations, even if there were non of its own citizens involved, and what was the position of waste companies.

5.3.2 *Special-Order Contract*

Right after the introduction of the new Law on Trade in 1967, INOT feared that its article 25 on “special order contract” might be applied to the waste economy. Article 25 determined that certain goods could not be traded by persons “outside of an employment relationship” (*van radnog odnosa*). Waste companies worried that such a regulation would again force uniformity in waste trade and would therefore be in conflict with the principles of the 1965 economic reform that demanded flexibility in the shaping of employment relationships¹⁶¹.

The new regulation of the collection of waste as stipulated in article 25 of the new Law On Trade “special order contract” (*ugovor o delu*) led to a lot of confusion within INOT. Immediately after the abolishment of the 1956 Order on Collectors and the adoption of the new Law On Trade, Ljubomir Lazarević, legal adviser of INOT, published a prudent article summarizing the regulatory change to collectors through the “special order contract”. He

pointed out two problems: liability of the company for the collectors' actions and restriction on the circle of persons employable under this contract.

First, the new form of work would bear the problem of waste companies becoming liable for their collectors. Waste collectors under [the new Law On Trade] were allowed to work for the company only if a "special order contract" was concluded, which is a relationship regulated by civil law (*građansko-pravni odnos*). According to his interpretation, this meant that the waste collector had to issue bills in the name of the company and buy waste from the financial means of the company. According to Lazarević, this new legal regulation would make companies liable if collectors engaged in illegal forms of trade¹⁶².

Second, with article 25 of the new Law On Trade the range of subjects allowed to engage in the collection of waste through a special order contract was confined, and in the eyes of Lazarević. Those subjects that usually engaged in the collection of waste were effectively excluded. The "special-order contract" could only be concluded with a person in a regular employment relationship (*radni odnos*) or a pensioner, or someone who had some other regular form of income. Lazarević emphasizes: "problem that many of the collectors are neither pensioners nor in an employment relationship somewhere because the selling of waste to the company with which he has a contract is his only source of income". He concluded: "the old limit on territory [stipulated by the Order on Collectors] has been replaced by a new limit on working time"¹⁶³.

With the new Law on Trade, the collection of waste was moved from a niche in the legal system reserved to goods tradable only under the obligatory purchase system (agricultural raw materials and wastes), to a new realm of citizen side-activities. The Basic Citizens' Tax and Contributions Act (in the following: Citizen Taxation Act) legalized and regulated secondary

activities in the private sector for public sector employees and “dependents” such as pensioners and housewives as well as private tradesmen:

“In the period 1966—1967, the number of private trades establishments increased by 7 percent and the number of workers employed in them — by 20 percent. There has also been a rise in the number of persons employed in the public sector, and of housewives and pensioners engaging in various trades in their spare time” (Vraneš 1969, 55)

“The new tax system (Basic Citizens’ Tax and Contribution Act) has introduced more objective taxation criteria, especially with regard to service trades. Prices of most services of this kind are free of administrative controls. All constituent republics have introduced health and pension insurance for private tradesmen in line with their economic potentialities” (Vraneš 1969, 55)

While waste companies first unequivocally embraced the new Law On Trade (1967) as liberalization, they soon came to criticize the consequences it had on waste collectors, which, according to one author, were “effectively pushed outside of the realm of law”¹⁶⁴. The shift in evaluation of the effects of the New Law on Trade on waste collectors can be seen in an article in 1971. Here, INOT celebrated the 1956 Order on Collectors, previously regarded exclusively as a restriction, as “legalization”. The article claimed that the 1956 Order on Collectors represented a transition from collectors being persons “without permanent occupation” and without “place of residency” (*boravište*) to the collection of waste “as a form of occupation”¹⁶⁵.

My argument in the following is that it was actually waste companies themselves who pushed waste collectors outside the realm of law. I will present two main strategies, through which waste companies pushed waste collectors outside the realm of law: first, waste companies actively sought to restrict the options of waste collectors to engage profitable (commercial) sources of waste and have them do the laborious work of collecting from household waste, instead. I will detail this process in the section “provizijanti”, which is a derogative term applied to collectors that sought out commercial sources and were then accused of illegitimate profit-making. The accusation of “provizijanti” tapped into a major regulatory concern of the state –

they could be fought by mobilizing state regulations aiming at tracing the origin of property. I will detail these regulations in the sections “authorizing bills” and “reducing cash transactions”. Second, waste companies actively sought to keep collectors outside of the category of workers that need insurance by pretending that the collection of waste is done by insured populations (housewives, pensioners). I will go into this process in the sections on “insurances” and “taxation and social policy”.

5.4 ‘Provizijanti’

The new Law On Trade provision on “work outside of employment relationships” defined waste collectors on the continuum between employed and unemployed. INOT, on the other hand, wanted collectors to obtain the status of “private salesmen” (*privatni trgovci*), advocating a status beyond what was stipulated in the provision on “work outside of employment relationships”.

Belgradian waste company UNIJA, a member of INOT, wanted to advocate for private salesmen to gain legality in the waste economy. Until now, this category was known only in the area of market vendors. In his mind, the institution of “private salesmen” would restrict waste collectors in a particular way suitable for the needs of waste companies: he would be allowed to buy wastes from citizens only (not from commercial or industrial sources), he would not be allowed to sell to anyone else than the waste company he had a contract with, he would not be allowed to engage in re-selling or other itinerant jobs¹⁶⁶. However, soon waste companies came to realize the downside of this as well: instead of merely collecting, “provizijanti” (people who work as middlemen and live from brokerage fee of reselling, ‘brokers’) appeared that traded the materials and did not only do the physical work of collection but engaged capital in buying-selling as middlemen:

“This topic has been touched upon several times, however, now it has sounded alarm. Several discussants claimed that whole teams of people, usually pensioners, from our ranks, and also other people, are lurking around the country with their pockets overflowing from money and throw out our companies from various factories and other owners of old iron. What is at stake here, it was claimed, is a whole list of various illegal actions, including corruption. The deficiency of scrap metal on the market and the hunt on it by the foundries, some processors and exporters, only fuels an atmosphere [conducive] for the work of such persons. ...

When the legislator gave this provision on the possibility for work on provision ..., it had on mind that this institution will be applied, at least when it comes to our sector, to work in those places where it is economically unsustainable to employ a person on a workplace – in smaller places, villages, etc. The work of ‘provizijanti’ in big cities and industrial centers presents a deviation and the deception (*izigravanje*) of this benevolent provision of the legislator.” (Otpadne Sirovine 11/1970 “Plenary Meeting of INOT”, my translation)

Waste companies suspected that excluding waste collectors from commercial sources of waste (shops, artisans, industry), was one of the reasons why they disappeared¹⁶⁷. INOT blamed this on a row of new regulations that the state extended at the time to waste collectors, which I will detail in the following. Those regulations, in the eyes of INOT, “almost completely eliminated this activity [the collection of waste] and transformed it into a job profitable only for speculators”¹⁶⁸. With the new regulations, the state tried to extend tax and insurance obligations to the realm of the collection of waste. INOT, on the other hand, made efforts to keep waste collectors outside of those regulations. It employed two main strategies: first, it introduced the difference between “waste owners” and “waste sellers”. Second, INOT claimed the category of “non-residents” for waste collectors, as opposed to the state, who sought to make waste collectors “residents of other municipalities” for the sake of identifying the responsible localities for insurance payments.

5.5 ‘Waste Owners’ versus ‘Waste Sellers’

Before the introduction of the Citizen Taxation Act, it was waste companies – that is, the purchaser of services and goods from the sector of “quasi-economic activities” (a regulatory term that was applied to activities from the petty economy) – who carried the tax obligation.

With the introduction of the Citizen Taxation Act, the tax obligation was transferred to the person that exercised services and sold goods. Through this transfer of the tax obligations to the persons engaged in the petty economy, rather than the purchasers/ consumers of petty services/ goods, the legislator was in the position to re-articulate its old concern with floating populations in the petty economy (that the 1956 Order on Collectors had institutionalized through municipality-issued licenses for collectors), now in the guise of tax evasion.

INOT author writing about the new system of “verification bills”,

“The intention of the new regulation is, at least in my perception, ... to condemn the ill-founded enrichment of individuals who, by changing their place and registering craft and catering shops, transport and various other activities outside their place of permanent residency (*mesta stabilnog prebivališta*), have avoided their obligations towards the community” (Otpadne Sirovine 09/1968 “Purchase of Industrial Waste and Old Things from Individual Households and Verification of Bills”, my translation)

The system of “verification of bills” (*overa računa*) was introduced in 1968 with the amendment of the Citizen Taxation Act in order to curb tax evasion¹⁶⁹.

INOT tried to escape from this tax obligation. They argued that the “verification of bills” should be obligatory only for selling “bulky wastes”, such as old agricultural machines, but “households selling their own waste”

“The new rule obliges persons who sell waste – no matter how small the amount – to authorize the bill with the Secretary for Contributions (*Sekretarijat za Doprinos*) of the local municipal authority. From this are not even exempted households, who sell their own waste (*sopstveni otpad*).” (Otpadne Sirovine 09/1968 “Purchase of Industrial Waste and Old Things from Individual Households and Verification of Bills”, my translation)

The author argued that the new system would create multiple problems: discourage household waste owners (*imaoci otpada*) to sell their own waste, create unimaginable queues in front of the municipal Secretary for Contributions, and harm industry as secondary raw materials would end up on landfills rather than being re-used. In order to demonstrate the absurdity of the new regulation, the author alluded to a member of a Belgradian household, who goes to the transfer

station to sell her own consumer waste. This person was clearly different from the subject that the legislator had in mind when adopting this regulation. The legislator aimed at regulating a population that earned money in Belgrade's service sector, without residing on Belgrade territory and thus not paying tax contributions. It was one of the policy instruments directed at the services, where Belgrade City Assembly suspected that "millions are being made". The Citizen Taxation Act gave cities an instrument to tap into the monies generated in the services and cut "illegal enrichment" (chapter 2).

The lobbying of INOT showed an effect: with the decision of the Federal Executive Government (SIV) in 1969, waste collectors and citizens selling waste were exempted from the duty to verify bills in the municipality¹⁷⁰. Two months later, INOT corrected the information: it was only citizens selling their own waste who were exempted from the duty to verify bills¹⁷¹. The legislator tried to eliminate maneuvering space around the taxation on waste selling activities, especially the abuse of tax liberation valid only for citizens selling their own waste, by introducing a limit on cash transactions.

A new regulation was introduced that prescribed that any amount over 500 dinars per year could only be paid to the bank account of the person selling waste. Reducing the cash transactions was yet another attempt to draw the boundary between waste workers (who come to sell waste they collected) and waste owners (who come to sell their own waste). Moreover, the new regulation also re-articulates the concern of the state with floating populations, as the opening of a bank account was tied to the place of (registered) residency.

5.5 ‘Non-Residents’ versus ‘Residents of Other Municipalities’

At a meeting INOT articulated the following claims with regard to enabling the work of waste pickers, most importantly, to liberate waste pickers from the obligation to open a bank account.

“Liberate waste ‘collectors’ of all types from the obligation to open a bank account, because ‘according to the nature of the job’ that is not viable. A ‘collector’ is constantly on the move. He, so to say, does not have a permanent place of residency (*mesto stalnog boravka*). Nevertheless, ‘collectors’ would pay taxation on citizen income and income taxation, like all citizens of SFRY. Those contributions to the community are secured via special taxation booklets, which are issued by the [state] body where the collector registered his place of residency as domicile (the place where he received his ID)” (Otpadne Sirovine 05/1975 “Self-governing agreement towards a specialization in the collection and trade of wastes”)

In another article the author argued that the identity of people that bring wastes is often “unknown“ and so the tax payment via the place of residency is impossible¹⁷². It is clear that INOT wanted to reclaim the category of “people without a permanent place of residency” (non-residents), but the system of opening a bank account required finding out where the collectors had their place of residency (residents of other municipalities).

In several articles INOT tried to explain how these attempts to ‘pin down’ the waste collectors in the territorial logic of the Yugoslav tax (and insurance) system was conflicting with the goal of the Yugoslav state to collect more secondary raw materials and improve the domestic raw material base. They referred to the old Order on Collectors from 1956, which allowed municipalities to hand out permissions to waste collectors, without regard to the question of the place of residency of this person, or employment status. The license they handed out back then was an instrument to allow “non-citizens” of that municipality to collect and sell waste on the territory of that municipality. Back then, INOT mobilized the category of “non-resident” to defend its “business freedom” – claiming that it would not make any sense for municipalities

to demand regulatory power over “non-residents” engaging in the collection of waste on their territory.

In September 1975 INOT reported that transfer stations in the Belgradian municipality Palilula were checked by the Income Administration (*organa uprava prihoda S.O. Palilula*). The local inspector took the position that the company was responsible to pay trade tax and other contributions for its waste collectors: 1,29% child protection¹⁷³, 1% for accidents at work¹⁷⁴, and 6% disability insurance and pension fund¹⁷⁵. The author found this measure to be in contradiction with the SIV decision to promote the collection of waste in order to reduce import: “In practice, such measures are infeasible because we cannot each time we buy goods pay through bank some specific socio-political organizations (insurances) according to the place of residency of the respective waste seller”¹⁷⁶. And further: “Oftentimes, people who bring waste are pupils or persons whose identity is unknown, so it is impossible to pay contributions for these people”.

Belgrade inspection sought to make waste collectors “residents of other municipalities”, while waste companies claimed the old category of waste collectors as “non-residents”. The principle of ‘citizens of other municipalities’ is relevant since the introduction of the ‘social domicile’ principle (discussed in chapter 1) and the way it is tied to insurance coverage¹⁷⁷. Moreover, waste companies invoke the category of “waste owner”, in order to escape insurance contribution payment. They argued that most people who came to sell waste did this as a “side-income”. They would be “people in employment relationships”, that is, insured populations, such as, for example, the “socially endangered workers”, underpaid workers mentioned in chapter 3, who sold the wastes they came across in their workplace.

“Waste owners are mostly people in an employment relationship, who do not collect specific wastes, but sell their own wastes and therefore do not have any secondary profession (*sporedno zanimanje*), which would need to be qualified here. Only those people for which the collection of waste is the only source of income, who do this as

some sort of a profession, as it was earlier the case, could be subdued (*podvrgnuti*) and placed in the treatment of civil-legal relation, and for them to pay the above-mentioned contributions.“ (Otpadne Sirovine 09/1975 “We Report From the Field. Are There Any Prescriptions That Halt the Collection of Waste From Households?”, my translation)

Obnova, therefore, responded to the surveillance by the inspection by saying that they think the inspection made wrong claims and that it was necessary to demand via INOT and the Chamber of Commerce of the City of Belgrade to “replace the prescriptions that curb the collection of waste“.

Moreover, INOT argued that it was difficult to subject collectors, who are not on a special-order contract to this taxation because even the law is not clear as to how and according to which prescriptions these individuals shall be taxed. Quoting from the Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, number 51/71, the author pointed out that in article 14 of the law, taxation was due in the place where the collector has her registered residency, and in case “registered residency of the taxpayer from paragraph 1 of this article is on the territory of one municipality and the family has its residency on the territory of another municipality, the tax will be paid on the respective income account of the municipality on the territory of which his family has registered residency”. While article 14 assumed that the municipality where the family of the taxpayer lives was the rightful recipient of tax and insurance contributions (as they will bear the caring responsibilities), the author points out that article 17 of the same law said, “[i]ncome tax for these activities is calculated and paid according to prescriptions which are valid on the territory of the municipalities where he permanently obtains the activity and will be paid on the respective accounts of that municipality”¹⁷⁸. INOT claimed this inconsistency in the law to make it impossible to pay insurance contributions for the collectors.

In 1977 the waste company Obnova Belgrade sent a complaint to the Social Accounting Service (*Služba Društvenog Knjigovodstva* (SDK)) of the SR Serbia regarding the taxation of waste collectors and their relation with waste companies¹⁷⁹. First, the SDK insisted that

collectors would underlie the principle of citizen taxation, but then, upon a second-degree organ revision, Obnova received a positive reply:

“The position of the second-degree organ in the case is: that ... [t]he working organization ... concludes with the physical person only a purchase contract, that is a contract on purchasing old things and waste ... The working organization pays the physical person-seller the purchase price for the collected things and wastes, but not a personal income or compensation for executed work.

According to this follows the unequivocal conclusion that ... persons who sell old things and waste to working organizations ... did not ... execute any work from which would arise the duty to pay taxes and contributions.“ (Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1977 “And Finally the Right Attitude”)

For the federal level, the collection of waste was thus labeled “non-work”. Any payment made to waste collectors was equal to a purchase contract, nothing from which insurance claims could arise.

5.6 The ‘Disappearance’ of Professional Collectors

Right in the first issue of its journal, INOT lobbied for municipalities to reduce taxation on waste pickers:

“in paragraph 18 the mentioned Law [on citizen taxation] gives the possibility to decrease taxes or liberate citizens altogether from taxation in case this could promote the development of certain economic and other activities, or realize goals of social policy, or other goals of general interest.

With regard to the deficiency of many waste materials, insufficient coverage of so-called ‘small sources’ [e.g. communal waste] and the hard work of waste pickers, using the possibility given by the mentioned Law [on citizen taxation] would stimulate a bigger number of people to engage in augmenting the amount of waste materials coming from transfer stations” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 “Some Remarks From the Draft of the Basic Trade Law”, my translation)

Municipalities made use of their right to reduce the taxation of “side activities” of private citizens as a social policy measure. Belgrade for example abolished taxation for waste pickers in 1975, when unemployment numbers reached another high. In December 1975 the City Hall

Belgrade adopted the decision that “no tax will be paid on individually realized incomes from the collection of waste”¹⁸⁰. One of the municipalities of Ljubljana (Bežigrad) followed Belgrade. INOT recommended that her member companies should insist in their respective municipalities to have the recommendations of the SIV from 20.3.1975¹⁸¹ executed and taxation on the collection of waste withdrawn. The tax liberation was extended through to 1977¹⁸².

In the notes of the seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, I found that the reasoning behind abolishing the taxation in 1975 was to incentivize self-employed activities among “guest workers” that massively returned to Belgrade from Western Germany and remained unemployed in Yugoslavia¹⁸³.

Waste companies were skeptical about how singular measures like verification of bills or later several rounds of tax reduction would bring back the waste collectors.

“of course, one should not cultivate too many illusions that this problem can be solved overnight... in conditions when the once well-practiced (*uigrana*) network of collectors and purchasers has disintegrated almost in one breath, it is necessary to make greater and more persistent efforts in order to re-created such a network.” (Otpadne Sirovine 03/1969 “Regulating the Position of Purchasers and Collectors”, my translation)

In 1972 tax on waste picking was lowered from 27% to 10% in all Belgradian municipalities, but waste collectors, “already long ago stopped engaging in this work, they found new professions and sources of income, so it will be difficult to hire them again, especially because they do not have much trust in the permanence and longevity of some stimulated tax bases”¹⁸⁴.

Apart from the lack of trust in the permanence of the stimulating measures, waste companies also suspect that waste collectors lost interest since the space for them to engage in trade has significantly reduced and they are now mere collectors: waste companies got more and more interested in bigger waste sources and abandoned the focus on individual waste collectors, this lead to decreasing interest:

“Not being able to develop their business towards a larger number of economic organizations and thus expand the range of goods with which they do business, individual collectors and purchasers are increasingly disappearing, so it can be assumed that soon none will be left.” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1971 “How to Incentivize Collectors”, my translation)

Towards the mid-1970s the efforts to increase collection from household waste went in two directions: one was to organize a collection network and employ collectors and equip them with small lorries, the other is to replace them with volunteers. I will discuss these two novelties in the next chapter, as they are part of a new deal on waste in cities.

5.7 Conclusions: Insured and ‘Uninsurable’ Populations

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the collection of valuable wastes shifted from a realm reserved to itinerant populations, people “without employment and without a place of residency”, as well as the poorest strata of workers in working collectives, to a realm to make up for dwindling sources of funding for the public sanitation services or schools and tied to ideas of “good citizenship” and “volunteering”.

Since 1956 waste collection had been framed by legislation as an occupation of a “non-resident population”, whose activity local governments regulated only with regard to public order and to prevent stealing. In 1967 the new Law on Trade framed waste collection from the perspective of social security. Waste companies were now obliged to conclude a so-called “civil-legal relation” with waste collectors, which entailed that waste companies pay insurances for “professional waste collectors” (child protection, health, workplace accident, pension fund SIZ). The civil-legal relation was enforced by local governments as they were concerned enforcing the principle of social domicile and reduce the population with social security claims. Waste collectors were now legally not “non-resident population”, but ‘residents of municipalities outside of Belgrade’.

Waste companies complained that this new regulation led to the disappearance of “professional waste collectors”. They contested the new law as infeasible on three grounds: first, people who came to sell waste were pupils or pensioners - dependent population who do not need insurance coverage or are already covered and who undertake waste collection not as a profession, but “pastime”. Second, people who come to sell waste were people in a working relation who do not sell what they collect but “their own waste”. In that sense, from the perspective that INOT, this category of waste sellers were “waste owners”, not “waste collectors”. They do not engage in the *collection* of waste but they sell what they *own*, and so it would be contradictory to pay social insurance contributions for them as engaging in a *side-activity*. Moreover, framing them as “waste sellers” had the advantage to depict them as “insured population” (they are already covered by their employers with insurance). And thirdly, people who do have the collection of waste as their main source of income have a lifestyle incompatible with locality-bound logic of insuring workers (they are not simply “uninsured”, but actually “uninsurable” populations): in accordance with the “nature of that job”, they are mobile, they “do not have a permanent place of residency” or at least, “not one known to the waste companies”, “their identity is oftentimes unknown”. Therefore, with these people who have the collection of waste as their main source of income, it is impossible to find out their home municipality “to which insurance payments that go along with a civil-legal relation, could be directed”.

Chapter 6: Environmentalism, Austerity and the Emergence of ‘Volunteers’ (1974-1985)

In the previous chapter, I have shown how INOT articles on the disappearance of waste collectors often pointed to the negative attitude of local authorities with regard to the work of individual collectors: “because of health and hygiene reasons those authorities consider that this profession shall not be allowed [in the city] and in that sense complicate and make the work of collectors impossible”¹⁸⁵. In response, waste companies increasingly turned to various types of “volunteers”: school children, youth organizations, and institutionalized youth in state care. In this chapter I argue that this shift was not just caused by changing standards of public hygiene, but, more importantly, an effect of the self-financing municipality, which increasingly drew on the “voluntary” collection of useful wastes to finance public institutions such as schools, local wards, institutions for childcare.

The involvement of the public in waste management went along, similar to cities in the West, with the popularization of environmental protection (Strasser 2000). What I describe in this chapter is the emergence of an environmental protection agenda that articulated with the re-organization of the collection of valuable wastes with volunteers among urban citizens, housewives, schoolchildren, housing councils (section 6.1 Mobilization), as well as with the scientification of waste management (section 6.2 Scientification). I will show how this new assemblage led to marginalizing waste companies, which were, initially, not successful in presenting themselves as “environmental actors”. I show how the bodies of local self-management that had been mobilized for the collection of waste in the environmental assemblage were increasingly criticized as obstacles for the “environmentally viable solutions” to urban problems (6.3 Dismantling Local Self-Management). I will show how the bodies of

local self-management were first mobilized and then dismantled in the name of expert-led environmentalism.

6.1 Mobilization of ‘Volunteers’

This section is about how the marginalization of professional waste collectors was substituted by alliances with bodies of local self-management. The section supports my argument on the way in which the bodies of local self-management were not a “counter-movement” to marketization, but rather an important pillar of the self-financing municipality and vital for the execution of austerity measures.

6.1.1 Mobilizing Schools



Figure 6 “Domestic Sources Instead of Excessive Import”
(*Sekundarne Sirovine* 06/1976)

The mobilization of schools for the collection of valuable wastes was possible because schools increasingly lacked financial support from the municipality. The transition from professional to volunteer collectors can be thus regarded as a redistribution of the profits that can be gained from valuable wastes for the benefit of public

institutions like schools and citizen organizations that provided public services such as local wards.

“one Belgradian elementary school needed funds for the organization of physical culture (*fiskultura*) and other activities and could not get these from the budget of the municipality. This school organized the collection of waste materials via its students ... and in two-three days they emptied basements and storage rooms and ... the school received near to 400.000 dinars, which served very well for the organization of the above-mentioned activities. Apart from this, also housewives were delighted with this action and grateful to the school that it emptied in this way necessary space in the

apartments.” (Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 “Are There Conditions for Increasing Purchase of Wastes from Individual Households?”, my translation)

INOT conducted surveys among primary schools in Belgrade to see whether they were interested in participating in the collection of scrap paper. One director of a school at the outskirts of Belgrade said, “we don’t have as much money as schools in the city center, for us old paper collection is a benefactor”¹⁸⁶. In 1972, the waste company Angrosirovina sent letters to almost all schools on the territory of Belgrade saying there was no better collector than schools. They said that primary schools in Belgrade with their even distribution over the city presented a “natural collection network”. The collection would be organized as a “competition” between schools. School children should learn how valuable old paper was. Schools that had financial problems would get to purchase various teaching aids from the money earned with scrap paper¹⁸⁷.

“In *Angrosirovina* we believe that the community suffers great damage from the elimination of collectors and that their reactivation requires a lot of effort and understanding and that waste companies are not able to solve this problem by themselves, but ... [that it] requires the involvement of the wider community. Regarding wider collection actions in households and smaller places [like] villages ... they give priority to contacts with schools and local government bodies. They believe that there are inconceivable possibilities, especially bearing in mind that these funds [from the collection of waste] can solve many problems of schools and local wards, especially through a form of collecting and paying the local self-contribution (*mesnih samodoprinosa*) and solving particular communal problems: roads, warehouses, teaching houses, maintenance of poor students.” (Otpadne Sirovine 10/1972 “Industrosirovina in Its New Location”, my translation)

The mobilization of youth in the saving actions was depicted as having educational value. The new actors in the collection of waste also brought the need to re-evaluate the position of junk shops in cities: while they were earlier considered “dirty” and something to be displaced to the outskirts, the new rationale was to have them accessible and more central, so that youth could sell their collected materials easily¹⁸⁸. The involvement of children with waste brought back concerns about the impacts of collection work on health. In January 1971 INOT newspaper re-opened a column for health problems: “while earlier on we wrote about hygienic-technical

security, now we write about the health of our youngest, it should be to inform parents how to protect their children”¹⁸⁹.

The collection of scrap paper had to be depicted as valuable in terms of reaching particular pedagogical goals. In the beginning, these were mostly about the idea of the saving measures, which started to be at the forefront of economic policies from the mid-1970s and organized through competitions between schools and bodies of local self-management. For an article on the school collection actions, INOT interviewed a mother whose child participated in the collection action:

“Regularly with my son, the champion, now in the second grade, I collect scrap paper and take it to school by car. I find it a very useful action, especially since large foreign currency savings are being made, and my son has a feeling of being very useful. I would also say that the purchase price is not important at all, important is the work and the satisfaction that comes from the joy of your child’ – tells us Comrade Kacarević, a clerk from Belgrade, ‘not only schools, but local wards could profit from selling their waste materials’.” (Otpadne Sirovine 09/1975 “More and More Belgradians Understand the Importance of Collecting”, my translation)

Saving foreign currency was here referred to as a reason for participating in voluntary the collection of waste actions, while city officials did not accept this as a legitimate reason to adopt orders more conducive to the work of professional waste collectors.

The re-organization of the collection of valuable wastes from a profession of “non-residents” to a side-income for under-employed and finally volunteering in a frame of pedagogics is especially noteworthy in the case of the mobilization of institutionalized children, who were very often from “wild settlements”. These children were now mobilized for scrap paper collection not as work, but as a pedagogical measure:

“We also visited the Central Shelter for Children and Youth and talked to its director, Antonijo Marić. ‘Our Center has 75 boys aged 8-18 and for them to participate in such an action would be very useful. It is known that any work is therapeutically useful, and in this case, it would be also useful for society. Therefore, we invite working organizations that engage in the purchase of secondary raw materials for their representatives to visit us and agree on cooperation. ... Our proteges were very happy

to participate in such actions because it is an opportunity to mix with children that have parents, talk to them and make friends ..., and to not feel neglected and removed from the social life of the environment where they live.” (Otpadne Sirovine 09/1975 “We Are Reporting from the Field – A time of Acquiring Habits”, my translation)

We see how “volunteering” borders what is conducted as “public work” schemes today – supporting underfunded areas of public services with unpaid labor extracted from particular categories of the population under the paradigm of “socialization” or “pedagogical value”.

6.1.2 A Matter of Citizens’ Conscience



Figure 7 “Let’s Be Belgradians – We Care About Belgrade” (Sekundarne Sirovine 03/1978)

The main change after 1965 that I discussed in chapter 3 was that the maintenance of public hygiene shifted from a public service (fully funded by city assembly) to a matter of citizens’ conduct (“1000 PSS workers cannot clean what a million Belgradians make dirty”). Gorana, a youth organization

usually remembered for its tree-planting

actions, was suggested to play a bigger role in how cities maintained and created greenery in a discussion on the problem of lack of funding for the public gardening services (*Javno Zelenilo*):

“It is not understandable, dear comrades, how it is possible that so little is being talked respectively made use of one organization, which is praised not only in Serbia, but in Yugoslavia and which even foreign countries acknowledge as being useful, and that is the movement ‘Gorana’. We know that today one worker ... in Serbia costs 2000 dinar, in Belgrade even more. And we have a workforce in the youth in abundance (*na pretek radne snage u omladini*). And not only that. We are seeking from the youth not only their physical work and their contribution so that hospitals, factories, or schoolyards come to get greenery as soon as possible, but to teach the youth ... through such a movement, where they don’t pay any membership fee, but, on the contrary, we seek their vigor, good organization and will, which will make them fall in love with this domain.” (Dimitrije Velicković, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 31.3.1966, my translation)

With the Master Plan of Belgrade of 1972, Belgrade was re-envisioned as a “city in an archipelago of greenery” (Bajić-Brković 2002). The new relation of urban citizens to the environment was also underlined through a movement of construction of weekend houses in the surroundings of Belgrade. Greenery, similar to “public hygiene” has been shown to be a project that was “socialized” with citizens taking the lead in its maintenance (Novaković 2009), but also in re-defining the environs of Belgrade, which, as I show in the later section, was getting into conflict with “professional forest management” later on.

6.1.3 Environmental Governance of Waste

Environmental policy-making started to take off in Yugoslavia with the 1976-1980 five-year plan, which “first mentioned the need for environmental controls” and then the “1981-1985 plan finally mandated environmental measures” (Jancar 1987, 140). In 1976, the Federal Council for the Protection and the Improvement of the Living Environment published the first issue of “Man and the Environment” (*Čovek I Životna Sredina*), a scientific journal devoted exclusively to environmental issues. That same year, the state founded a Board for Secondary Raw Materials, and INOT renamed its newspaper from “Raw Materials from Waste” (*Otpadne Sirovine*) into “Secondary Raw Materials” (*Sekundarne Sirovine*). This shift was quite significant as it was the first attempt of INOT to secure itself a place in the new political and economic state agenda around environmental protection.

Waste companies had taken up on the new political-economic opportunities around the protection of the environment from its inception and organized a joint company Tehnogas, with Belgradian waste company Obnova among the founding members. The joint company Tehnogas had a special focus on the contribution of waste companies to solving the “problem of the pollution of the human environment, especially of the problem in big cities like Belgrade”¹⁹⁰. Tehnogas had come as an outsider to INOT, it had originally been founded as a

specialized company in the transformation of industrial waste for the production of “technical gas”, a source of energy for industry. The dominant position that Tehnogas reached in the following years was part of the marginalization of the previous waste (collection and trading) companies.

The endeavor of INOT to become part of the new assemblage around environmental protection was not always successful. INOT had to fight with an image of waste companies as “dirty” and found itself marginalized in the new assemblage around environmental protection. It increasingly took the backseat behind more powerful claimants of waste and state funding: PSS and industrial actors engaging “wasteless technology”¹⁹¹.

While this marginalization on federation-wide gatherings meant exclusion from funding opportunities, what I want to focus on in this chapter is the way in which the new environmental assemblage around waste led to an exclusion of INOT waste companies at the local level. Focusing on the local level is not only a choice resulting from my research question on the way in which waste valuation activities are governed in relation to processes of city-making. The research question resonates with the fact that environmental policymaking in Yugoslavia remained highly local and sectarian, with the municipalities playing a primary role in monitoring and policing sources of pollution (Jancar 1987, 44). Based on the logic of the workers’ and social self-management, which installed representatives (delegates) of particular companies, sociopolitical organizations, and self-managed communities of interest, “the republican or federal level is not responsible to a mass constituency ... What public input into the environmental policy process there is, occurs only at the local level, specifically, on local issues” (Jancar 1987, 47). Experts, equally, did not intervene at the federal, legislative level but primarily through alliances with local authorities. Experts worked as consultants and such

consultancies were won through compacts and self-management agreements (Jancar 1987, 47f.).

For waste companies, this had two consequences. First, in order to integrate themselves in the federal level political assemblages around the environment (and later, austerity measures and the stabilization program) they had to organize at the local level through seeking out alliances with local companies, sociopolitical organizations, and the municipality.

Second, municipalities became more interested in the commercial usage of communal waste to compensate for the lack of financial means. While decision-making power had been allotted locally, not much funding was available at that level so that “self-management has added little to local government’s financial autonomy” (Jancar 1987, 194). As local budgets were tight, outside funding in the form of cooperation with companies was the only possibility for local government to engage in major environmental projects like a recycling plant¹⁹². A well-known example of this was Kragujevac, “Yugoslavia’s Detroit”, where the Zastava car factory joined public enterprises in an “industrial-communal cooperation in the construction of water treatment systems” (Jancar 1987, 194).

6.1.4 Austerity Measures and Volunteer Mobilization

Tehnogas was the company that took up and implemented recommendations articulated by the Federal Executive Council (SIV) and the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce to collect waste in the frame of the “saving actions” in cooperation with local youth councils¹⁹³. In December 1975 Tehnogas organized an action for the collection of scrap paper in cooperation with Belgrade municipality, local wards, and elementary schools¹⁹⁴. As an incentive, Tehnogas reached an agreement with the Youth Council to collect in all municipalities in the Republic of Serbia and that the Belgrade Bank would open bank accounts for the youth organizations that collect¹⁹⁵. In April 1976 during an action of the Youth Serbia called “We Collect Secondary

Raw Materials” Tehnogas and Belgrade Bank signed contracts with the municipalities¹⁹⁶. These actions, however, did not give the wished-for results. In May 1976 Tehnogas reported on the first round of the competitions between youth organizations from February 25th on, waste companies had problems picking up the collected materials: “it did not give the hoped-for exit for the improvement of the economic position of our companies“¹⁹⁷. Waste companies claimed that the Youth Actions oftentimes by-passed waste companies and distorted the prices¹⁹⁸. The youth actions were discontinued as they did not bring the expected results¹⁹⁹.

Tehnogas appeared as a new, important player on the waste market, while other once established waste companies took the back seat. Belgradian waste company Obnova for example reported a gradual decline since 1970 which also could not be counterbalanced by joining Tehnogas, Obnova wanted to become a big working collective like Dinos in Slovenia²⁰⁰, which had practically a monopoly in the whole republic of Slovenia. The way Obnova lifted itself from the crisis was in 1980. With their new director, Rajko Tomić, who had previously been president of a housing council in the Belgrad municipality Old Town, Obnova was able to establish links with housing councils of that central municipality and thus managed to integrate itself into the new environmental assemblage of the collection of waste around the bodies of local self-management²⁰¹.

This forging of alliances was crucial in the new era of the collection of waste in the absence of professional waste collectors. The new forms of volunteer mobilization built on a tradition in Yugoslavia where the Red Cross asked households to contribute donations and wastes in the aftermath of catastrophes like floodings. The Secretary of the Federal Commission for Secondary Raw Materials had recommended that this type of collection, known from emergencies, should now in the course of austerity measures become the status quo. She said, “the challenge now is to establish such [emergency] action in a more permanent way”²⁰².



Figure 8 “Always in Action: For the Two Ton Lorry of Unija There Is No Holiday” (*Sekundarne Sirovine* 06/1976)

This is what Tehnogas tried to do. Tehnogas attempted to institutionalize the collection of waste in cooperation with volunteers which ran in parallel to humanitarian collection actions via the Red Cross. In figure 9 we see a lorry with the Red Cross sign belonging to Unija waste

company, which was also a member of Tehnogas, collecting paper. Moreover, Tehnogas tried to establish contractual relationships between the municipality, youth organizations, schools and invest in propaganda for the collection. In 1971, Tehnogas was nominated for the price for the best propaganda²⁰³. Judging from the remarks in that article that in times of decentralization many other waste companies could not afford to invest in propaganda, because other companies would profit from the investment’s result of increased collection activities in schools and local wards, we can assume that Tehnogas had a relatively dominant position on the waste market²⁰⁴.

With the 1974 new constitution, local wards became an obligatory body of local self-management in each municipality. They re-organized waste work in that they mobilized volunteer labor as political activism (Duda 2020). In November 1980 the conference “The Local Ward and The Family” organized together with the Yugoslav Council for Environmental Protection, INOT made a presentation on the topic of “Role of Public Media in the Action of Collecting Secondary Raw Materials”, criticizing the lack of organizing on the side of waste companies that mobilize citizens to collect but do not pick up the collected materials²⁰⁵.

6.2 Scientification of Waste Management

“In recent years, Belgrade has taken numerous measures to protect the environment. Among these measures [are] the General Urban Plan and the Stages of Development Plan of Belgrade 1976-1980 adopted by the city assembly... At the beginning of 1976, the city assembly has adopted the Action Program of Measures for Environmental Protection, which has already yielded positive results. ... [however, t]he actions of the collection of waste in Belgrade take place at the city level with the participation of the public utility companies, but not with the waste companies” (Sekundarne Sirovine 05/1977 “From Pioneers to Academics”, my translation)

“In many programs and actions for the protection of the human environment, communal organizations are the only working collectives which ‘professionally’ obtain the activity of the collection of waste. Working organizations for the collection, processing, and transformation of wastes in secondary raw materials are apparently intentionally forgotten” (Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1977 “A New Form of Cooperation”, my translation)

As noted above, with the adoption of city-wide action programs for the protection of the human environment, the engagement of youth organizations and schools in the collection of waste became more widespread and systematized. However, waste companies found themselves frequently not included in those actions and said that this was the reason why collected materials were left to create “new temporary landfills”, because of the belief that “there is still no one [in Yugoslavia], for whom it would pay off to take them”²⁰⁶.

As I have shown in chapter 2, the immediate reaction of the municipality to cuts in federal funding was to try and enter the market for the collection of valuable wastes. In 1973 PSS Belgrade founded its own sub-branch for the collection of useful wastes (*pogon*) and bought a Swedish paper press for 100 tons of paper²⁰⁷. After 1976 a few Yugoslav companies like the shipbuilding company 3.Maj-Rijeka started to produce “environmental technology” for public waste management, like incinerators or waste sorting machines or clearance facilities for wastewater. Private companies organized in INOT were not on the radar of such machine-building companies²⁰⁸.



Figure 9 "With These Means of Transport It Is Impossible to Increase the Productivity of Labor" (Sekundarne Sirovine 05/1975)

In the era of environmental technologies, waste companies organized in INOT found that they were ill-equipped to keep pace (see figure 11).

The process of forging alliances with science started in 1970 when the Institute for Technology and Metallurgy (ITM) in Belgrade did an investigation of the composition of communal waste in Belgrade and suggested a first investment program for a "municipal waste processing plant".

A 1975 meeting of technicians, chemists, and PSS Belgrade was an important milestone. The meeting was used to suggest a research program for both the

landfilling and collection of useful wastes accompanied by science and technology – and to ask the federal government to finance this research and initiate a common program for the development of controlled landfills in all regions and republics²⁰⁹. The symposium led to the joint publication of the Yugoslav construction company Energoprojekt, City Secretary for Urbanism, and PSS Belgrade²¹⁰. At the request of the City Secretary for Communal and Housing Affairs, Energoprojekt suggested a project for the "hygienic neutralization of garbage and waste for which it is economically proven that it is for our capital city"²¹¹.

6.2.1 Waste Incineration

"The possibilities for the derivation of thermo-energy through waste incineration are multiple and the usage of this energy can significantly reduce the expenses for cleaning-separation of waste. However, in order to find an economic solution for close cooperation between the bodies of the government-potential users of thermo-energy and producers of the facility for waste incineration is necessary. The latter has to dispose of specialized expert knowledge in the area of technology, production of thermo-energy, supply-distribution of thermo-energy and urbanization."

(Sekundarne Sirovine 8/1978 “Obtaining Thermal and Electrical Energy. Electricity From Waste”, presentation of Robert Calame, my translation)

“In Belgrade, it is forbidden to burn garbage and waste in furnaces for central heating, in ovens, and in open space. Working and other organizations which act against this prescription will be fined up to 3000 dinars and individuals in organizations and private individuals up to 300 dinars. It shall be added the information that ‘Energoprojekt’ for the needs of the City Secretary for Communal and Housing Affairs developed a project for the hygienic neutralization of garbage and waste about which it has been scientifically proven that it is for our capital city.” (Sekundarne Sirovine 08/1977 “Incineration Banned”, my translation)

PSS had started experimenting with the commercial usage of waste after the 1965 economic reform had left gaps in their budget. Beginning from November 1968 when the newspaper first published an article on a waste incinerator in Osaka in Japan²¹², efforts to build an incinerator became more relevant. In July 1969 PSS Belgrade participated in the meeting of the International Association of Public Sanitation Companies in Basel²¹³ with the agenda to seek out international cooperation partners for the construction of a waste incinerator in Belgrade. The PSS discussed the proposal in January 1971 with the vice president of the City Hall Miladin Šakić, the outcome of which “considering different scenarios” (none of which is discussed in the article), “we came to the conclusion that waste incineration is the best possible solution”²¹⁴. They discussed possibilities to finance the incinerator. The next month, Swiss and German companies visited Belgrade municipality to promote their incinerators²¹⁵. The article claimed there are “three ways to manage waste: dumping, composting, incineration – Belgrade has only used the first one until now”.

1974, however, presented a turning point where PSS, the City Government’s Housing Company and scientific institute Vinča for the first time suggested an investment program for the building of a “municipal waste processing plant”²¹⁶. In January 1976 Energoprojekt suggested a detailed plan²¹⁷. Following examples from Western Europe and the U.S., the PSS

Belgrade undertook a survey into the composition of communal waste, being interested especially in the amount of packaging waste that could be recuperated and sold or burned. The option of an incinerator became economically viable because of the increased caloric value of communal waste caused by bigger amounts of plastic. Paper waste was to be separated before the incineration as the value of paper scrap was estimated to be higher than electricity sold from incineration²¹⁸. It makes sense from this perspective that the paper collection actions could exist in parallel to plans to build the incinerator.

However, it soon turned out that building the waste incinerator would be too expensive²¹⁹,



Figure 10 “Gradual Transition to Waste Incineration” (*Javna Higijena* 12/1970)

bringing up the old topic of lack of possibilities for credits for communal companies. Moreover, it was difficult to find a location for the facility²²⁰. I will return to the problem of the location in the last section “Whose Environment?”. In the next section on sanitary landfills and wild dumps, I will show how environmentalism enabled urban planners to draw new distinctions between planned and unplanned developments. This distinction, reminiscent of the emergence of “primitive settlements” described in chapter 2, served a particular city-making

project that aimed at making a distinction between waste-handling practices considered “hygienic” and those considered “unhygienic”.

6.2.2 Sanitary Landfills and Wild Dumps

The main landfill on the Belgradian half-island Ada Huja, which had been opened in 1960 was increasingly regarded as a problem in the late 1960s. Ada Huja landfill produced an increasing number of complaints by citizens of the nearby housing area Karaburma. In November 1971

PSS newspaper reprinted an article that had appeared in Politika daily newspaper, where inhabitants living near the landfill, such as militia officers, explained how the sewage of their settlement is congested because of the waste²²¹. Finding a location for a new landfill in Belgrade turned out a difficult process because of the dynamic expansion of the city so that a variety of locations were suggested and dropped again²²². The problem of finding a new location was blamed on the extreme “localism” produced by the structure of local self-management. For example, in April 1973, even without a new location in sight, the Belgradian municipal government of Palilula (to which Karaburma belongs) sent a letter to the PSS ordering the closing of the landfill as of June of the same year. PSS turned to the city hall in protest.

In June 1973 the Town Planning Institute suggested Vinča as a location for the new landfill. The Town Planning Institute cited several advantages in favor of Vinča, especially that the site was located near to the Institute for Nuclear Sciences meaning that the land had little value for housing construction or agriculture. This shows that by 1973 the discussion around the economic valorization of urban land, very much led in theoretical terms in 1965 (chapter 1) had become relevant for planning decisions.

As the Town Planning Institute was trying to find a new location, the landfill on Ada Huja was increasingly considered as an example of “unplanned development”. In an article on the protection of the human environment and spatial planning published in Komuna in 1976, architect Bratislav Stojanović differentiated between “urbanization [which] unfolds as a result of a combination of actions of different forces” and gave numerous examples of “the destruction or endangering of the environment”, on the one hand, and planned development, which took into consideration environmental protection, on the other. As an example for “urbanization beyond urban solutions in Belgrade,” Stojanović gave a picture of the landfill on

Ada Huja and an “unhygienic settlement” in New Belgrade. The developmental, ordering claim of urban planners stands here in uncomfortable dissonance with the fact that both Ada Huja landfill and many of the “unhygienic settlements” had their roots in actually planned structures (like “primitive settlements” embraced in 1965).

Stojanović described urbanization as a process resting not only on the urban but that there are “many intermediate forces whose actions lead to the state as it is”²²³. He suggested that “unplanned” urban development cannot be understood in terms of the absence of the state, but as a conflict between different societal and corporate actors who seek to realize their interests in alliance with different bodies of the municipality. Thus, in his example, the plan of the central city government to transform Ada Huja into an archipelago of greenery stood in conflict with various companies that went on using the landfill – forms of usage which were increasingly labeled as “wild dumping”²²⁴. This suggests a subtle transition from principles of participatory urbanism to a more centralized practice of labeling certain developments as “unplanned”. This understanding of “unplanned” urban development and the call for “more planning” stood in a tensional relation with Yugoslav participatory principles of urbanism. In the next section, I will argue that this was the beginning of calls for more centralized planning under the shield of “environmental protection”.

6.3 Whose Environment? Private Property, Experts and the Dismantling Local Self-Management



Figure 11 "Our Local Ward We Cleaned – Now They Shall Clean Theirs" (*Sekundarne Sirovine* 07/1980)

In the early 1980s, we can see a shift where the assemblage around public hygiene and waste management with the local self-management bodies, the local wards, and housing councils started falling apart. The bodies of local self-management were increasingly criticized as sectarian and as standing in the way towards big investments like a sanitary landfill, a waste incinerator, or a recycling plant. Experts in the local government, as well as the market based on private land ownership, were now increasingly emphasized as the more efficient form of land

management than participatory planning (local ward). I want to argue that “environmental protection” was a strong enabling narrative to disenfranchise participatory forms of urban planning and dismantle the socialist sector towards more private land ownership²²⁵.

This shift can be seen from the journal Belgrade Urbanism (*Urbanizam Beograda*) issued by the Town Planning Institute Belgrade (*Zavod za Urbanizam*). The architect and engineer Ljubodrag Simić repeatedly wrote about environmental protection and private property in the journal. He outlined typical conflicts between local citizens organized in local wards and housing councils, on the one hand, and urban planners on the other hand, around environmental topics such as tree cutting and waste management. These articles mark a transition in the way the constituency of “public interest” was understood.

Simić said that in the past, it was always peasants that had been accused of the disappearance of forests, with their “asocial, petty-proprietary mentality”²²⁶. He thus mobilized to the typical Other of urban “public interest”. However, Simić marked a turn in this understanding. He pointed out that the biggest portions of forest that remained were those in private ownership, while forests in municipal landownership had been sold out as construction land:

“The destruction of nature, for example, due to the mislocation of factories can be prevented in most cases, because the location of an industrial facility generally has to go through some forums ... location of weekend houses are mostly a matter of the municipalities themselves. It is clear what this can look like when it is known that everyone can dispose of their own land as they wish, starting with the municipal authorities. In that case, they stand on the position that is completely in line with the current interests of ‘their peasants’, but these are by no means the interests of the community as a whole, they are often not even far-reaching interests of the municipality itself” (Urbanizam Beograda 1980 (56) “Environmental Protection and Private Property”, Ljubodrag Simić, my translation)

He argued that Belgrade had kept its environs unplanned, not covered by the General Urban Plan, so greenery was not mapped and cannot be protected:

“In our country, for now, the landscape cannot be protected as long as there is no spatial plan or urban plan for it at the level of the General Plan, so the municipality is obliged to implement it, however, even the immediate vicinity of Belgrade is not covered in this way ... in the municipality of Sopot of 4554 hectares, the amount of 2837 hectare is in private ownership, in the municipality of Obrenovac the share of the private sector is as much as 2515 hectare to a total of 3067, in the municipality of Barajevo 2715 to 4234, in the municipality of Grocka 2350 to 2898 the share of private forests in the municipality is close to three-quarters of the total territory. And it is precisely these municipalities that are under the strongest pressure today in order to convert agricultural and forest land into construction plots. It is the absence of any restrictions on the free disposal of privately owned land that completely prevents any systematic, efficient approach to managing the ecological situation in our country.” (Urbanizam Beograda 1980 (56) “Environmental Protection and Private Property”, Ljubodrag Simić, my translation)

Simić presented municipal landownership as a playing field for private interests and so not the scale at which planning for the sake of environmental protection could be executed. The article expressed a very critical stance towards citizens and their capacity to form “public interest” in line with environmental protection goals:

“Citizens usually do not accept what does not satisfy their current interests ... lack of collective consciousness ... Therefore, nature protection in the territory of a municipality or perhaps a local community is the least thing of that and such a unit [the municipality or local community], because the protection of nature is not something that can be solved at that level.” (Urbanizam Beograda 1980 (56) “Environmental Protection and Private Property”, Ljubodrag Simić, my translation)

The journal *Urbanizam Beograda* further defended an expert-driven form of urban development by articles that said how the building of a waste incinerator in Belgrade or a recycling plant failed as it was opposed by localistic, sectarian interests represented by bodies of local self-management. A commission of experts studied various locations in Belgrade for the new landfill and came up with two locations. However, the implementation was hindered by the local municipal assemblies and local wards. Citizens were now depicted as “totally ignorant” and “extremely suspicious”:

“Although the adoption procedure has a positive tendency for the immediate beneficiary to be involved in the decision-making process, in essence, this idea is distorted. It turns out that the immediate user is *totally ignorant, extremely suspicious*, and that the system of the procedure allows him to delay the adoption of planning documents at certain stages, even without prior consideration, and thus jeopardize the solution of communal problems of the City as a whole.” (Urbanizam Beograda 1981 (63-65) “Planning Procedure for Waste Treatment in the Area of Belgrade”, my translation, emphasis added)

The article suggested two steps: first, that the public would need to be more informed about “currents of scientific-technical studies, which shall be adopted”. Second, regarding the solution of communal problems, the article suggested giving ultimate decision-making power to the planners and relegate local wards and local municipal assemblies to a mere “consultative” function.

The article ridiculed the lay manner in which local wards used a language of environmental protection for their own interest: Simić criticized the “upstart mentality” (*skorojevički*) among local wards, which tended to reach around the “hot potato” and none of them was ready to take responsibility: “why don’t you go with this [plan] to them [other neighborhood]?”. Hinting that part of the disparaging of the bodies of local self-management in Belgrade was based on the

assumption that these bodies were dominated by internal migrants from the “inner country” (Šumadija), Simić ruminated about the lack of civility among the bodies of local self-management in Belgrade: “as if everything in Šumadija has lost its sense of distinguishing moral from immoral – education and culture are not the same thing, completely uneducated, illiterate people can show far more feelings for the community”. He went on to give the example of plans for the construction of a tram:

“We all know examples of such situations. You can attend any meeting of a planner with a Local Ward discussing the question of a temporary bus turntable. The local ward is always against it. ... The local ward even has relevant experts who calculate that the GSB (Public Traffic Company) will not achieve any savings with it, experts who checked the asphalt surface and concluded that it does not meet the needs of such traffic, experts who can quite well assess the state of the environment in case the proposal will be adopted. The fact that there is no such data does not confuse them. ... In vain appeals and claims of experts ... that both economic and environmental reasons require a tram. They always know better, and their argument is always (what cynicism!) – the environment. *Whose environment?* When considering building a garbage recycling factory, or possibly an incinerator, many municipalities are struggling just to be in every territory other than their own” (Urbanizam Beograda 1981 (63-65) “The Problem of Environmental Protection in the Framework of the Program of Economic Stabilization”, Ljubodrag Simić, my translation, emphasis added)



Figure 12 "But What Else Would Be With What They Collect?" (Urbanizam Beograda 1981 (63-65))

The article concluded with a picture of two women waste collectors with the subtitle saying “They [citizens expressing themselves through bodies of local self-management] despise them, even hate them. But what else would be with what they collect?” (see figure 14).

The question of “whose environment” brings to the table not only the question of waste collectors, but population demarcated as rural in the urbanization process of Belgrade. As I have shown in chapter 2 on the emergence of “primitive” or “cheap settlements”, as construction of an internal frontier of rural-urban divide, the outer, actual municipal boundary and its movement

“outwards” into rural hinterlands was depoliticized. With the 1974 GUP, Belgrade re-fashioned itself as a “settlement in an archipelago of greenery”. This was a way of re-framing the frontier of the city growing into rural surroundings as a city surrounded by an urban understanding of nature as a recreational space. This brings to the fore another aspect of the gesture of “civilizing” as appropriation of land, labor force, and resources.

In line with market-liberal approaches to environmental protection, Yugoslavia protected natural reservoirs through commercial developments, which is relevant for understanding later decisions of the City of Belgrade that allow for construction on top of drinking water sources (chapter 9).

Part of the local government of environmental concerns was that it intermingled with the profit-orientation of the local government, which Jancar called the “utilitarian” approach to environmental protection:

“In Yugoslavia, the attitude may be even more utilitarian. Nature reserves, such as Plitvice Lakes, are not only areas with a unique ecology; they are also economic enterprises that must pay their own way if they are to be preserved” (Jancar 1987:50)

As such, groundwater protection in Belgrade happened through commercial usage, most prominently on Ada Ciganlija, while non-commercial usage was presented as polluting.

As waste management became a matter of citizen involvement, it became codified in terms of civilization. For example in 1979 a Belgrade newspaper commented on river pollution in Kosovo, a region which had received most of the developmental aid from other Yugoslav republics, not as a problem of lack of infrastructure, but the article “insisted that the fault was ... a lack of public awareness. Residents, according to the writer, appeared to believe that the proper place for trash was the river” (Jancar 1987, 90). The attribution to varying levels of civility marked where pollution was regarded as “self-inflicted” and where it became a scandal:

“In Yugoslavia, political salience is particularly important at the local level. Environmental protection is clearly a matter of greater urgency for a republican capital than for less politically visible areas, and the larger cities are able to find funds for pollution control projects. The contamination of Belgrade’s water supply is a national and international scandal. The pollution of Kosovo’s rivers is not” (Jancar 1987, 198)

This shift has been described by architectural historians who observed a transition in urban planning from visionary projecting of a future city to the turn to empirically studying the city and its dynamics, characteristics, and planning as a modulation of a complex process of “urbanization” (Bajić-Brković 2002). The new balancing between planning and assessment of the situation happened in three regards: First, the 1972 GUP acknowledged that the city had developed “past” the urban plan (Bajić-Brković 2002, 25). Secondly, planning now became a matter of greater public participation. In 1969 the Town Planning Institute published the first issue of its journal *Urbanizam Beograda*. Thirdly, urban planning became a matter of scientific investigation. When 1972 GUP started to be designed in 1968, the Town Planning Institute was newly constituted - urban planners were joined by engineers, sociologists, medical doctors, specialized studies were ordered, the Institute made contracts with foreign consultancy agencies especially around the planning of traffic (Bajić-Brković 2002, 28; LeNormand 2014). This transition to the involvement of multiple stakeholders has been described for Western cities as a shift from government to governance, where experts replace democratically elected representatives – dismantling of the state promoted by the idea that it has failed to deliver on social justice and environmental protection. The question is how to evaluate these shifts in socialist Yugoslavia?

The scientification of urban planning and the way it related to the ideal of self-management was discussed by urban planners of the time, most notably Branislav Piha. This scientification and greater involvement of various experts in the planning process was at odds with the declared goal of greater public participation. It started already in 1965 with the transition from

social planning to regional planning. Regional planning was contested because it went along with an abstract language of experts:

“social planning operated within a well-known and accessible set of terms and socially accepted ideas, while regional planning was still an emerging practice, fraught with terminological uncertainties, methodological specificities and expert language that was inaccessible to the general public (Piha 1965)” (Bojic 2018:2)

6.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have shown how waste companies were marginalized from the waste market through the new “environmental technologies” that introduced definite distinctions between “clean” and “dirty” waste handling practices. Some waste companies tried to become relevant actors in the new scheme of collecting wastes in the name of the protection of the environment and austerity measures. The alliance around Tehnogas was an attempt of waste companies to embed themselves in the assemblage of science, investment, and popular participation, which characterized the collection of waste in the name of environmental protection.

The goal of this chapter was to show how the shift to an environmental, expert-led discourse de-politicized the question of waste collection and excluded the possibilities of different groups to make a claim to waste based struggle to reproduce a specific livelihood (like for example “socially endangered workers”, who were regarded as legitimate claimants of waste). From the perspective of the environment, the question of access to and legitimacy of specific forms of commodifying waste becomes reduced to the question of “clean” versus “polluting” forms of waste handling.

In this chapter, I build on chapter 3 where I traced the establishment of a new regime of governing public hygiene, which exploited and thus entrenched the faultlines between citizens (surveying public order) and non-citizens (polluters). I have shown how this division was then

translated into a division between “volunteer” collectors (housing councils, school children, institutionalized youth, organized youth) via the local ward, while non-citizens collectors were banned from the collection of waste as uninsured and also “uninsurable” populations that pose a threat to public order and volunteers. I put volunteers in quotation marks because with their work they contributed to the funding of their institutions/organizations. The shift from waste collectors to “volunteers” can be read as an enclosure of valuable wastes for the purpose of reproduction of Belgradians (dependent population should make a side-income from it, or volunteers should support schools and neighborhoods from the collection of valuable wastes).

In chapters 3 to 6, I adopted a perspective on the governance of public hygiene that enabled me to go beyond the relationship between the private waste recycling companies and PSS as a crude opposition between private and public (Valverde 1995; Rose and Miller 1992) with private waste recycling companies interested in resource extraction vs. public company interested in public sanitation. Rather I can show how a particular project of “public hygiene” re-organized the waste market. I show how similar political rationalities and governmental technologies changed the definition of waste, the waste market, and waste work and thus affected both public and private waste companies - albeit in different ways.

7. City Without Citizens?: ‘Hygiene’ as a Category in Urban Planning, Policing and Participatory Urban Governance (1985-2015)

In the early 2000s, Yugoslav architects and geographers, most notably Ksenija Petovar and Miodrag Vujošević, have related the massive sell-out of public space in Belgrade to a “democracy deficit” stemming from the legacy of state socialism. They described how Belgrade has fallen victim to “investor urbanism” and diagnosed Belgrade to be a “city without citizens”. They explained the onset of “investor urbanism” in Belgrade as growing on the fertile ground of corrupted notions of “public interest” dominated by the state socialist ideology (Petovar and Vujošević 2008). Without any appraisal of the Yugoslav model of decentralized socialism and its role in urbanization that I described in the previous chapters, Petovar and Vujošević claim that the socialist state had manipulated “public interest” in its own interest: “the role of ideology is to obscure the interested side and action of the state and to emphasize its regulatory (managerial) role [instead]” (Petovar and Vujošević 2008, 24).

Petovar builds her argument on how socialist urbanization acted as a trailblazer for “investor urbanism” in that both disregarded the “public good”, which refers to the “universally accessible dimension of the common life of citizens”. The public good refers to a particular form of living together, which can neither be secured by a monopolistic state, nor by the market. Quoting Giddens, Petovar points out, “the market cannot secure the public sector. The market cannot create secure neighborhoods or clean streets and side-walks” (Petovar 2010b, 17). Pointing their fingers to “pollution” and “chaos” caused by illegal constructions, they came to the conclusion that Belgrade had become a “city without citizens”.

In this chapter, I want to show how “pollution” and “chaos” of illegally erected buildings have been targeted, since the mid-2010s by tools of participatory urban governance. Participatory urban governance was introduced as a panacea to create “secure neighborhoods, ... clean streets and side-walks”. In continuation of neighborhood organizations during socialism, I will show how citizens were mobilized around a specific concept of “hygiene” and the policing of “polluting others”. I deflect attention from the axis of “investors” or state vs. “citizens”, suggested by Petovar, and instead, highlight alliances of state, investors, and different citizen groups (middle classes vs. slum inhabitants) that prove the entrenchment of social inequalities through participative forms of urban governance.

In this chapter I will show how the concept of “hygiene” in planning and policing re-organized citizenship through forging particular communities: on the one hand (white) neighborhood organizations policing “polluting others” (section 7.2), on the other hand, counter-initiatives in Roma settlements, where (self-organized) maintenance of “hygiene” was relevant as a practice to secure tenure in the face of the negligence of the central city government (7.3). I will show the continuities between two allegedly very different governmental logics applied to “unhygienic settlements” and “wild dumps”: one comes from urban planners and central city government and could be described as the forward-looking “seeing like a state” style of governance described by Scott (1998) (section 7.1.). The other style is connected to policing, deployed by municipal agencies such as inspection, neighborhood organizations, and Roma Coordinators, which is closer to the logic of spontaneous intervention, guided by a “common sense” of order based on local knowledge (Valverde 2011; Neocleous 2000).

7.1 General Urban Plan (2003): Mapping Urban Wasteland

The General Urban Plan of Belgrade until 2021 (GUP 2021) (Urbanistic Institute Belgrade 2003) responded to and aimed to make sense of the structures that had emerged since 1985 deregulation of urban planning, which Petovar regarded as at the roots of “investor urbanism”. However, this regime also enabled, as a form of “soft social policy” the accommodation of populations displaced by the 1990s Yugoslav wars. I would argue that it was especially the latter, surplus populations generated by the war, that were targeted by the discontinuation of deregulated planning. I will discuss this in the following section on the discontinuation of temporary construction permits. Further, I discuss the labeling of “unhygienic settlements” as brownfield. In 2008 a publication on the redevelopment of urban land suggested including “unhygienic settlements” in the scheme of “pollutants, ruins and unresolved property issues” that hinder urban development. In his chapter on “Unhygienic Settlements as Brownfield Locations”, urban planner Ivan Divjak suggested that the logic of brownfield in Belgrade could also be deployed to “solve difficult social issues that block the sale of urban land” (Danilović et al. 2008). “Cleaning up” would not only attract investors but also force the city to solve environmental and social problems. It seems therefore relevant to look at the techniques in which the GUP 2021 made visible waste land (including “unhygienic settlements”) (section 7.1.2), how wild dumps were included in “risk assessment” schemes (section 7.1.3). In section 7.2 I move on to show how categories of “hygiene” and “pollution” became mobilized in schemes of participatory urban governance.

7.1.1 Discontinuing the 1985 Temporary Construction Permits

The dismantling of urbanistic standards, norms, and prescriptions that Petovar regards as forming the roots of “investor urbanism” started with the introduction of temporary urbanistic and construction permits in 1985. This system of building permits did not only enable “investor

urbanism”, but also formed the backdrop of a form of “soft social policy” through which the city accommodated populations displaced during the 1990 Yugoslav wars.

The idea was for this 1985 regulation to allow individual homeowners to make improvements to existing buildings, but it soon spiraled out of control. With the onset of the war “[i]n the beginning of the 1990s, the Decision on the Temporary Building Permission was used massively by private builders, both for housing and for business and other objects” (Petovar 2010b). In the 1996 elections, Belgrade became the first local authority to oppose the Milošević regime (Jansen 2001). In the following financial repression, the city had to increase forms of “investor urbanism“. The only way to finance itself was to sell profitable city land. In that informal construction was actively endorsed as a profitable source of income, re-enforcing commercial relations to land that were established in the mid-1960s.

“normative concerns about the public good appear only in planning documents while they disappear in the leasing contracts on properties for construction as urban planning institutions have no mechanism to control plan implementation. In such circumstances, [...] the entrepreneurial private sector takes advantage by corrupting those who decide, leading to domination of ‘investor urbanism’” (Vujović and Petrović 2007, 375)

The regime of the “temporary building permits” changed the structure of the city in that lucrative public spaces were privatized, but it also played a role in the accommodation of refugees. In the 1990s a total of 166.000 refugees came to Serbia (about 112.000 came to Belgrade), many of which were left without support by the state and had to engage in informal construction. In 1995 the Law on Planning and Construction changed in that way that informal housing was not anymore considered a criminal act – a move that is often interpreted as “social policy to allow people, at the first place refugees, to solve their housing needs themselves since the system was not able to do so” (Žerjav 2009, 34 quoting an interview with urban planner Ivan Kucina).

In that sense, the 1985 order, far from creating a “city without citizens”, had multiple stakeholders engage in construction, not only for profit but also for living. However, the latter group was soon delegitimated, mostly, by enabling the participation of middle classes in the creation and policing of “public hygiene”.

7.1.2 *‘Unhygienic Settlements’ as Brownfields*

One of the ways in which the GUP 2021 discontinued the system of temporary permits and tried to make sense of the urban landscape these permits had helped to create was to delineate areas regarded as “urban wastelands”. New tools such as GPS and satellite allowed, as one of the authors of the GUP 2021 explained, to “grasp actual territorial developments that are not in line with planning documents and building permits”. These techniques made visible two aspects of the urban landscape: “unhygienic settlements” and “wild dumps”. Both were grasped through a logic of pollution that had to be removed for Belgrade to protect its greenery, underground water, and safeguard proper waste management.

In October 2015 I met Zlata Vuksanović-Macura, an urbanist, to talk to her about the way in which the drafting of the GUP 2021 went along with an elaborate effort of mapping Roma settlements. She and her husband Vladimir Macura, who was the chief city planner for the GUP 2021, have dedicated their professional lives to the built structure of Roma settlements (Vuksanović-Macura and Macura 2014; Vuksanović-Macura 2020), settlements on the fringe (Macura 1997; Vuksanović-Macura 2012) and parks and greenery in Belgrade (Vuksanović-Macura and Ćorović 2016; 2013). In the early 2000s, Vladimir Macura had founded an organization for the formalization of Roma settlements (DURN).

In the interview, Vuksanović-Macura pointed out that most of the planners and architects working in the Town Planning Institute only think about big infrastructure developments (like the building of bridges, renewal of boulevards, building underground containers) and do not

think about a Master Plan that should also represent poor neighborhoods. When those neighborhoods were included for the first time in the GUP 2021 in 2003 this was due to her husband, who was then director at the Town Planning Institute and had dedicated his interest to Roma settlements for the last two decades of his career. In her reading of the situation, mapping could be a tool in improving living conditions in those settlements. The detailed study on the geography and demographic composition of Roma settlements in Belgrade, which the Town Planning Institute produced alongside the plan of 2003 came along with a disclaimer. Printed on the cover of the print version it said that this information is “not allowed to be used for projects that would harm Roma population” – expressing a certain awareness of the possibilities following the mapping.

Vuksanović-Macura explained that the mapping of the “unhygienic settlements” could not be understood independently from other novelties the GUP 2021 used and was part of a more general move towards “flexibilization of planning”. The GPS and satellite made it possible not only to include impoverished Roma settlements for the first time into the GUP 2021, but these technical novelties enabled the inclusion of different types of greenery:

“Before these innovations, the GUP was made in such a way that the whole territory was colored in one type of green and then the planners carved settlements out of the green and then out of these settlements commercial zones. That system was not flexible at all.” (Interview with Zlata Vuksanović-Macura, 28.5.2015)

Before 2003 the GUP had only one type of green, which represented a generalized background, non-urbanized void, into which houses, streets, parks, and other elements of urban development proper could be drawn. Through the new system, the GUP started to differentiate between different qualities of “voids”, with different implications for the type of urban development project possible in that place.

I would argue that urbanization as filling a void (one type of green marking “non-urban”, possibly “nature” in general) follows a very different logic from urbanization on “different types of greenery”. Marking the different types of greenery in the GUP articulates different relations of urban development and types of ruins (brownfield, greenfield, urbanization as projects of renewal). Urbanization is here understood as a process of articulating relations between the new and the old, rather than urbanization as sprawling into the void. This is urbanization as urban renewal.

One such articulation of the new with the old is brownfield redevelopment through which cities remake urban land to be put on the market for investors. The GUP said that the cleaning of wild dumps is crucial to the project to produce land for sale:

“The expansion of existing and the formation of new economic zones will be motivated by the need of domestic and foreign investors for clean locations, those which are not burdened by unresolved property issues, old buildings, outworn infrastructure, to start new economic cycles. Today such locations in Belgrade practically do not exist and have to be opened up.” (Urbanistic Institute Belgrade 2003)

The logic of the brownfield suggests that a spot of land is cleaned from traces of prior usage. Certain activities are thus displaced from the contemporary city into the realm of the “previous”. The naming of brownfield sites erases certain activities that are part of the urbanization process and makes them seem superfluous, nuisances that have to be cleared out on the way to urbanization proper. Declaring an activity as “prior usage” is an attempt to establish a separation in time which suggests that prior and current or new usage do not overlap. In between happens a “cleaning up”.

However, in reality, until 2008 only 18% of the land that investors had bought in Belgrade had been actually “redeveloped”. The remaining 82% remained in various patterns of land-use, where developers intersect with “prior usages” (Danilović et al. 2008). For example, a big

portion of land meant for the development of the “Delta City” project in New Belgrade was the site of the Belvil informal settlement, where investors entered into “rentier” relations with informal occupiers (Schwab 2013; Kilibarda 2011).

I would argue that the image of “cleaning up” is out of sync with the reality of the urbanization process, which is not imprinted upon a “clean”, “empty” background, but emerges through a thick tissue of already pre-structured space and relations. Against the imagination of the “clean location” stands the actual implication of activities labeled as “wild dumping” in the very preparation of construction grounds. I will detail this process my ethnography of waste collectors on a “wild dump”, respectively, construction site in chapter 9. “Cleaning up” creates a focus on the creation of a new, visible, and clean (post-industrial) now, while making invisible the workers who do the “cleaning up” and whose bodies are infected with pollutants (Dillon 2014). “Clean up” implies here displacing “previous”, actually current, usages marked as polluting to places less visible place, onto disenfranchised populations, where “damage” can be less easily made accountable (Nixon 2009).

7.1.3 Monitoring ‘Wild Dumps’

The screening of “wild dumps” started with the GUP 2021 that envisioned a centralized waste management system including the sanitation of one city landfill. Among one of the first actions, the City of Belgrade sent out a “Questionnaire on Old and Wild Dumps” to its constituent municipalities in 2005. Many municipalities declared that they were taking care of the locations where wild dumps occurred through regular cleaning actions. What I will detail in this section is the co-evolution of planning and monitoring activities. This has to be understood within a new paradigm of urban planning, the so-called “continuous planning”, which was adopted the first time in Belgrade for the GUP 2021 (Macura et al. 2019). “Continuous planning” sets out to adapt planning to “actual developments” and unforeseen effects occurring in the

implementation of new structures (Macura and Vuksanović-Macura 2020). I would argue that it produced a continuity between planning, monitoring, risk assessment, and policing. I will show this process as relevant for the governance of “wild dumps” and, later on, for “unhygienic settlements” as well.

“Wild dumps” can be spotted via GPS. A communal inspection of January 2005 took an additional strategy of *seeing* wild dumps, which was to ask municipalities to issue reports. These reports included, apart from the location, outstretch, and amount of waste, also other information that turned the “wild dump” from a problem to be removed into something more complex that needs permanent surveillance. The municipalities were asked to add the history of the dump (deploying categories like “former municipal landfill, now closed”, “partially covered with sand”), the likelihood of the waste spotted on the surface interacting with groundwater sources (by adding for example that the location of the wild dump is “frequently subject to overflow of the Danube”), and, most crucially, by adding the presence of certain populations around the “wild dump” (“homeless war veterans”²²⁷, “Roma”²²⁸). All of this additional information turned the “wild dump” from a problem to be “cleaned up” once, into something that has to be targeted through a complex process of risk assessment. Risks pertained to the contamination of ground water, for the dump to reappear, and finally, the proximity of a certain population, framed as a “financial risk” – if there was a certain population in the direct vicinity of the wild dump that could be supposed to recreate the dump after it is cleaned up this would put strain to the municipal budget. The “wild dump” was translated into the biopolitical rationale that could translate the proximity of a population into a “financial burden” for the municipality. The “wild dump”, and as I will show in section 7.3 of this chapter, the “unhygienic settlement” were thus re-framed into governance problems in relation to the task of conducting the conduct of certain populations. As I will show in later sections, this is how

the il/legality of property relates to propriety and the perceived need to conduct the conduct of particular subjects.

In the report of the communal inspection (24.1.2005), “wild dumps” were numerically listed for all the Belgradian municipalities. The biggest territory covered by wild dumping of waste by far according to this report was in Čukarica municipality with 20,500 m³ in five locations (compared to Palilula where their occurrence was much less and more dispersed with 3500 m³ in 30 locations), with three sites making for the majority of wildly dumped waste²²⁹. The main location in Čukarica (Makiš Field) became the site of my ethnography on waste collectors that makes chapter 9.

7.2 Participatory Governance of ‘Hygiene’

In this section, I want to show how the concept of specific populations that pose a threat to public hygiene has been entrenched by the tools of participatory urban governance that mobilized (middle-class) citizens against “polluting others”. I describe “volunteer cleaning actions” in Belgrade starting with an official campaign “We Clean Serbia” between 2009 and 2012, but since re-enacted by multiple non-state actors such as recycling companies and neighborhood organizations. I argue that the “volunteer cleaning actions” trained citizens to perceive particular types of uncleanliness, make the care for “public hygiene” their personal concern, and transform “public hygiene” from an abstract to a community good that had to be policed by surveillance of “polluting others”. As Staeheli (2008) pointed out, “community” can be a prime site where the boundaries of citizenship are negotiated, the morals of who is being included and who is excluded. I will show how the “cleaning actions” put forward a specific model of care for communal hygiene (and citizenship) and then, in section 7.3, how Roma coordinators put forward a competing model, based on forging a different kind of community that suggested negligence of the central city government as the reason for pollution and forged

an alliance of care between old and new inhabitants of a Roma settlement, as well as the municipality where they were located as the cure.

7.2.1 Volunteer Cleaning Actions

In 2009 within the campaign called “We clean Serbia” (2009-2012), initiated by the then Minister for Environmental Protection, the city government named “wild dumps” as the biggest source of pollution in Belgrade and selected 40 most hazardous for intervention²³⁰. The campaign coincided with a year after the 2008 financial crisis resulting in increasing numbers of unemployment among the Serbian population. The campaign was presented by the then governing Democratic Party as a chance to change the consciousness of citizens. When the Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning explained the action to the parliament he hinted at the necessity of developing new habits in a year that will be shaped by an increase in unemployment:

“He noted that, while 2009 would ‘be a year in which sadly many people will lose their jobs’, the year would also be remembered as one in which ‘the citizens of Serbia began to change their habits’.” (Oliver Dulić, quoted in Kilibarda 2011, 602)

The cleaning of “wild dumps” was presented as an “extraordinary activity” of the Public Sanitation Services (PSS) that could only be managed in “cleaning actions” together with volunteers.

Following the action “We Clean Serbia” and the displacements, the link between undesirable populations and the acquisition of public space for specific middle and upper-class projects under the precursor of maintaining hygiene took a turn to policing.

The major wave of displacement of unhygienic settlements from the city center (which I will treat in the next section) led to a growth of the settlement in the Čukarica woods. Since 2012 the waste handling practices of the collectors have been the target of a neighborhood protest

movement against the air pollution resulting from the burning of secondary raw materials. The municipality reacted to the protest movement. In 2012 the municipal government decided to install containers to facilitate the selection work of waste pickers. With the installment of the containers, the municipality at the same time made a distinction. In a statement headed “Removing dump from the unhygienic settlement Čukarica landslide” the municipality proudly reported that it “finally succeeded to tackle the multiannual problem of continually extending rubbish heaps and spread of bad smells from the burning of tires, because of which citizens constantly faced big ecological harm”²³¹. Moreover, it stated that after the cleaning action the “local Roma promised to keep their settlement clean”²³². This promise included that they would not engage in the burning of tires that goes along with the more profitable processing of electronic waste. They had to instead retreat to the realm of packaging waste, e.g. mostly paper and glass.

With the resettlement of the train station in the course of the grand-scale urban renewal project “Belgrade Waterfront” to Makiš Field, a wooden area just below the neighborhood, and accompanying construction projects (“Tesla City”), a new source of electronic waste started opening up. The waste collectors receded to the construction site and surrounding forest areas. As I will show in more detail in chapter 9, new construction sites offer liminal spaces where activities that are not allowed anymore in other parts of the city can exist under the cover of “temporariness” of the site – a dynamic that Nguyen (2016) also described for the waste companies in rapidly redeveloping Hanoi.

After several letters of complaints issued by the residents of the Čukarica Landslide housing area located above the new construction site on Makiš Field, in 2014 finally, the Inspection for Environment went out to investigate the case of big clouds of smoke occurring in the early evening hours over Makiš Field, blown over the housing area. However, the attempt of the

neighborhood group to mobilize the inspection around activities on the construction site remained unsuccessful. The category of “wild dump” was not easily mobilizable for the construction site and the forest.

In its letter informing the residents of Čukarica Landslide about the investigation, the Inspection explains its failure to find the “source or culprits causing the smoke”, but emphasized its goodwill:

“On the 14.07.2014 around 10 p.m. the Deputy Secretary for Inspection, Sector for Environmental Protection, Water and Sanitary Inspection, Aleksandra Radinović, along with the assistance of the communal police ... went out on the field following a complaint by ... who reported that in the unhygienic settlement across the street from their building smoke can be seen and smelt coming from the settlement.

Through our field visit, we were able to ascertain that really there is smoke and an unpleasant smell from the burning of rubber, cables and similar waste, which comes from the forest, where the unhygienic settlement is located ... we estimated that it is not safe for us to enter the forest ... because of our own security, we were not able to discover who does the burning of waste and where exactly.

I want to remind you that the communal police and Water and Sanitary Inspection went on a field visit already several times regarding this cause, and the last time it was able to ascertain remnants of burned communal waste on a green surface, near Obrenovački Highway, but the site was abandoned and we did not catch anyone in the act of burning waste.

According to paragraph ... the Inspection for Environmental Protection is authorized to control companies, households, and legal persons (both foreign and domestic) engaged in registered economic and other activities using natural resources, endanger or pollute the environment, but against citizens, we cannot apply the prescribed measures that apply to company owners and legal persons. Nevertheless, the Deputy Secretary for Inspection went on a field visit in order to show that it helps its clients [those who reported the smoke] and other citizens to solve problems with the air pollution caused by the lifestyle of the inhabitants of the unhygienic settlement.”

The inability of the environmental inspection to intervene did put only a temporary halt on the activities of the neighborhood against the waste collectors. In 2015 many cities in Serbia established communal police. It is a department that has a very unclear mandate and consists of a workforce not trained in police (Aleksić 2016), but oftentimes bureaucrats that lost their jobs in the rationalization of the public sector (Avlijas 2010). Since its introduction, the

communal police has massively reduced the number of street vendors that are working outside of licensed marketplaces and regularly targets waste pickers that try to recuperate materials from the newly introduced underground containers or ban their vehicles from specific parts of the city (Aleksić 2016).

In 2016 the City of Belgrade initiated a new service based on tools of e-government, which, on the one hand, aimed to inform citizens about ongoing construction works or cuts in public services in specific parts of the city, and, on the other, enabled citizens to report communal problems to the responsible city departments: communal police, public sanitation services, public transport etc. Introducing the app, the new Mayor, Siniša Mali said:

“This is a big change in relation to how previous urban governments worked. We want to be in permanent communication with citizens, to solve problems and to be a modern European metropole, but to also show that we are better and more efficient, because we listen to citizens” (City of Belgrade, 22.4.2016, Presentation of the Application Beokom for the Reporting of Communal Problems in the City, <http://www.begrad.rs/lat/predstavljena-aplikacija-beokom-za-prijavlivanje-komunalnih-problema-u-gradu/>)

The introduction of the communal police in combination with the new app produces an “ad-hoc” logic, where citizens are in a position of customers reporting problems. The City of Belgrade seems to have introduced a more flexible, demand-based form of intervention, possibly expanding beyond the binding of legal codes defining rigidly the mandate of the environmental inspection and expanding it to a dimension of anything experienced as “nuisance” (Ghertner 2012). Emphasizing their own position as active citizens contributing to “public hygiene”, inhabitants of the Čukarica neighborhood posted pictures of themselves engaging in volunteer waste cleaning actions from the public surface in their neighborhood in their Facebook group, while sending pictures of supposed culprits creating “wild dumps” via the new app. In one of the posts promoting the usage of the new app, a neighbor framed the “polluting others” as a “security risk” to their children. The relation between “communal

problems” and “security” does not seem to be a coincidence. The app was introduced together with a new Secretary for Defense, Emergency Situations, Communication and Coordination of Relations with the Citizens of the City of Belgrade headed by Darko Glavaš, which emerged from the flooding of May 2014 and legitimated the need to forge alliances with citizens in the securitization of the city (Milenković, Kekić, and Glavaš 2017).

The on-the-ground governance of Roma settlements has been studied through the lens of securitization (van Baar 2011), where “undesirable groups are defined in terms of threat, placed under surveillance and managed through securitarian dispositifs” (Ivasiuc 2015, 53). These studies have argued that security is concerned with understanding “the practical reason and the historicity of [different actors’] actions” (Bigo 2014 quoted in Ivasiuc 2015, 54). This form of knowledge corresponds to what Valverde explains as the “droit de police”, which is a form of urban governance decisively different from seeing like a state (mapping described above).

Ivasiuc argues from her ethnography of a neighborhood watch group in Rome, how “(in)security practices are intimately linked with the perception and construction of decay, both in its material form embedded in the urban décor and perceived through visual clues of ‘matter out of place’” (Ivasiuc 2015, 55). She highlights the performative aspect of securitization in vigilante practices that both legitimate the need for securitization (framing clues in the landscape as proof of ‘insecurity’) and produce security (through vigilante observation).

Reminiscent of the shifts I described in chapter 6, waste is de-coupled as a source of livelihood from minority, mostly Roma population, and made into an arena to develop useful habits of austerity among citizens. The introduction of instruments such as Beokom enables citizens to take an active role in monitoring communal hygiene that deflects the attention away from cuts in public services and the nuisances coming with Belgrade being a permanent construction site. Citizens are being granted a sense of participation that often comes down to inconsequential

choices (f.e. between three different designs of the planned metro) (Cardullo and Kitchin 2019). Moreover, it enables citizens to engage in monitoring marginalized populations, which puts the burden of pollution on racialized others and deflects attention from the lack of state provisioning.

7.2.2 Policing of 'Nuisances' and Evictions

In this section, I will argue that the category of “nuisance” became relevant to the right to housing. This is important to understand the relevance of the strategies that Roma coordinators engaged in with regard to preventing nuisances.

With the GUP 2021 of 2003, the City of Belgrade adopted an official program of resettling 17 “unhygienic settlements” on their territory affecting chiefly Roma families, many of them internally displaced persons from Kosovo²³³. Starting with infrastructure projects financed by the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 2009, the City of Belgrade took as its right to engage in the displacements. The then Mayor of Belgrade, Dragan Đilas, legitimated the displacements by saying that he was going to send all the people not registered in Belgrade back to the places “where they came from” and in this, he “won’t acknowledge unrealistic suggestions of international organizations that returned tens of thousands of people from Europe without providing us [the city] any help to integrate them”. He legitimated the displacements by constructing a certain right of the city to engage in economic development, which cannot take into consideration treaties adopted at the state level that aim at poverty reduction and integration of repatriated refugees from EU countries. The displacements were legitimated in a logic of competition, where, in order to claim a position side-by-side with other metropolises of the world, Belgrade had to clear its inner-city land for profitable developments.

The displacements left the Roma from “unhygienic settlements” split up into different status groups. Those who were not born in Belgrade were expelled from the city and transferred to “their hometowns” (place of birth)²³⁴. For those acknowledged as refugees and those that were born in Belgrade and thus registered in the city at the time of displacement, the city installed container settlements and build a few social housing complexes in several of its municipalities. Those Roma that had been displaced from the very territory of infrastructural projects were categorized as “Project Affected People” and governed according to different rules of “integration” that resulted from the conditions of the EIB loan. This meant greater monitoring by international organizations such as Bankwatch, resulting in the City of Belgrade caring with greater dedication. The City of Belgrade firmly held the containers in its own hands, as an asset and instrument in social policy towards Roma that it (had to) invest in, partially in order to fulfill lending conditions of the EIB and to calm down media attention that followed the first forced displacements and reports by Amnesty International and Bankwatch Network on the case (Schwab 2013).

The container settlements and social housing complexes became tools to enforce a certain police order and elevate “nuisances” to the level of an offense that could result in losing the right to housing space. The right to a container was set up as a part of social welfare and therefore could be cut in case the inhabitant did not comply with any of the rules, such as employment schemes, which implies that they were not allowed to decline jobs offered to them by the City Government. Another “offense” that could lead to losing one’s right to the container, was if the inhabitants stored secondary raw materials in the settlement. The official mission of the container settlement was to “socialize” Roma so they could be moved to social housing. One of the urban planners I interviewed for my Master's thesis told me that these settlements were sometimes called “informal collective centers”. The way the container settlements were set up within a framework of social security was, according to my

interlocutor, in danger of “reproducing refugee camps” in case the inhabitants would not learn proper conduct, “be civilized” in the form of paying for electricity bills, not storing waste in front of their temporary shelter and somewhere on the future horizon, transition to formal employment (Schwab 2013). De facto, what happened, is that the central city government withdrew from care and led the container settlement decay after it had resettled the “project-affected people” closely monitored by international organizations to social housing.

The relation between the displacement of “unhygienic settlements” and cleansing of “wild dumps” was made explicit in the action “We Clean Serbia”, In the report on the “Quality of the Living Environment in Belgrade” of the City Secretary for Environmental Protection from 2012, a list of “extraordinary cleaning activities” conducted by the PSS in 2011 included: “Spring action cleaning of the shore of Danube and Sava, cleaning action of space between blocks, cleaning of streets and other public surfaces before and after the Belgrade marathon²³⁵, resettlement of Roma” (Secretary for Environmental Protection of the City of Belgrade 2013, 218). Part of the cleaning actions of public spaces for the marathon, which takes place every year is also to fence off Roma settlements along the route and covering the fences with banners to hide these settlements from sight. This collapse of the multiple meanings of the term “cleaning” shows the direct link produced by the campaign “We Clean Serbia” between disciplinary, austerity measures, social and ethnic cleansing (Kilibarda 2011, 602).

In the following section, I want to show how Roma coordinators entered the governance of container settlements and other settlements whose future status is undefined and future unknown. The Roma coordinators had no entitlement to decide about who had access to and right to stay in a container settlement or social housing, they were excluded from the administration and distribution of these valuable assets, which were administered by the City Secretary for Social Protection. Equally, they rarely managed to formalize a settlement by

introducing a formal land registry system. Nevertheless, they managed to enter on the level of the policing of such settlements and thus engaged in practices that did, as I would argue, secure tenure even without granting formal rights to their client population.

I will in the following describe two strategies through which Roma coordinators made themselves indispensable, how, in the absence of formal rights to distribute housing, they engaged in practices that should serve to secure tenure and housing, mostly by way of spotting and managing “communal problems”.

7.3 Roma Coordinators: Maintenance Work for the Temporary

In a newspaper article with a title that is very explicit about the superfluous character of “unhygienic settlements” (“An Appendix Two Minutes from the City Center” [*Slepo Crevo na Dva Minuta od Centra*]), the journalist interviewed inhabitants of a house on the Old Fairground. That family said they had inhabited the house since before WWII. They described the insecurity of tenure during socialism where they were not allowed to do any amendments to the house and only when Milošević came to power (1989) they could build a bathroom. Now their biggest concern was that they could be perceived as “unhygienic” because of “those people living under the bridge”, referring to Gazela “unhygienic settlement”, which grew mostly from Roma fleeing from war in Kosovo during the 1990s: “because of the disgrace under the bridge, we are all called “unhygienic” now. They are polluting all of us, and so we are also called unhygienic. A few times I found a passerby relieving himself in my yard”²³⁶. The inhabitant alluded here to how the label “unhygienic” weakened the effective power she had over her property.

The article hints at the relationship between maintenance and security of tenure, propriety, and property claims, which I regard as at the heart of the work of Roma coordinators. This includes

also the idea that “nuisances” can spill over from one settlement to the next and “spread” the semi-legal status of one settlement onto the surrounding ones. In the following section, I focus on the type of maintenance work that Roma coordinators engaged in to secure the tenure of their client population and contain “nuisances” from spreading.

Roma coordinators engaged with Roma in urban slums and container settlements as a population inhabiting a liminal space in the city – structures regarded as “only temporary” from the perspective of urban development plans. Not being acknowledged as citizens of Belgrade, this population constantly risked displacement by the city government for urban development projects or based on the nuisances of “unhygienic living conditions”. As Roma coordinators lacked the power to intervene in the development plans of the city, they focussed on minimizing the second reason for displacements, and that is “nuisances” arising from “unhygienic living conditions”. In that, they tackled the negligence of the city government towards both urban slums and container settlements, not by way of confronting, but by treating the risk of the spread of “nuisances” as a mundane, day-to-day problem to be handled. They thus engaged in what I would call “maintenance work for the temporary”.

In this section, I will first contextualize what kind of worker Roma coordinators are. Then I unpack how the mobilization around the cleansing of “wild dumps” shaped the strategies in which Roma Coordinators sought security of tenure for their client population, trying to tackle the characteristic of “unhygienic” in disciplinary ways as well as deflecting the roots of “unhygienic living conditions” back to the negligence committed by the central city government.

7.3.1 Frontline Workers and Public Employment Stop

“Coordinators for Roma Questions”, short, Roma coordinators (in Serbian they were usually referred to as *romski koordinatori*) were established first time in 2003 through a pilot project by OSCE and the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. After the end of the project, most positions were shut down again. In 2008 Ministry for Human and Minority Rights funded another round of employing Roma coordinators. Again they did not stay for long in most municipalities. But this time, in 2008, when Roma coordinators were established for the first time, also the law on public employment stop came into force so that the position of Roma coordinator was not formalized. According to a study that the office of the Ombudsman conducted in 2013, “18 municipalities systematized the working place of a Coordinator for Roma Question and these people were employed permanently. However, no definite criteria existed for choosing Roma coordinators, Roma coordinators did not have regulated working status or job description. Roma coordinators were employed in varying ways: via international organizations, via projects financed by donor organizations, via special-order contract²³⁷, as coordinator for minorities” (Ombudsperson 2016). In a statement on the need to regulate the position of the Roma coordinator the Ombudsman pointed out: “without a job description, legal working status, rights, and obligations Roma coordinator cannot help to improve access of Roma to government bodies and institutions, Roma coordinators often do not have adequate working conditions and do not participate in decision-making processes that affect Roma population” (Ombudsperson 2016).

While the law on public employment stop introduced in 2008 officially granted the possibility of an exception to promote hiring officials representing minorities, Roma coordinators’ positions were still rarely transformed into a public employment position. In a report in 2013, the Ombudsman pointed out, until then the law on public employment stop had not been

amended in a way granting an exception to the employment of Roma coordinator (Ombudsperson 2013, 190ff.).

Roma coordinators have been the subject of critical studies of Roma integration politics. They are often depicted as an epitome of the transition from activists to administration, which is regarded as the depoliticization and cooptation of Roma activists as it trapped them in structures of the state and EU funding mechanisms (Jovanović 2013, Kovats 2003). According to Jovanović, Roma coordinators were “accorded an advisory role, but denied any decision-making powers. Co-opted, and possessed of a sense of purpose Institutional participation has empowered institutions for window-dressing rather than our people for influencing governmental policies.” (Jovanović 2013:198f.)²³⁸.

While my following ethnography shows the lack of access to state funding, I disagree with this assessment that Roma coordinators merely serve as a form of “window dressing”. Putting Roma coordinators within the context of a restructuring of the state itself and its functions, especially the strengthening of the nuisance-policing, activities of the Roma coordinators to prevent nuisances do seem quite significant in terms of preventing evictions. The above-quoted voices seem to have assessed the function of Roma coordinators against the backdrop of whether or not coordinators create access for their client population to the services of an idealized, actually non-existent welfare state. I would put Roma coordinators in the context of the securitization and purification of cities and see them as relevant agents preventing evictions.

In this context it does not seem to be a coincidence that in the law on rationalization of the public sector (“public sector employment stop”), two categories of workers, both what one can consider frontline workers, were marked as potentially exempted: public officials that have the function to represent minorities and communal police (Avlijas 2010). It makes sense, therefore, to analyze, as I do in this chapter, the role of Roma coordinators in the context of the wider

roll-back of services, a transition to policing of “nuisances” by means of participatory forms of urban governance.

7.3.2 ‘Acting Like Good Neighbors’ – Securing Tenure

The way these two different logics, the one deployed by the central city government (in cooperation with INGOs) and the Roma coordinators engaged can be seen from one settlement, where UNOPS placed “Project Affected People” in a container settlement next to one of the oldest Roma settlements in Belgrade, called Orlovsko (“Eagle’s Nest”) (Macura, Cvejić, and Mitrović 1995). Next to the container settlement, IOM built a recycling yard to employ “Project Affected People” from the container settlement. This led to discontent. The inhabitants of Orlovsko protested against the establishment of the container settlement and eventually, some of the inhabitants of Orlovsko were offered employment in the recycling yard as well as a concession. The City of Belgrade became the owner of the recycling facility. The local Roma coordinator had only partial insight into the process.

In one of the meetings I had with the Roma coordinator of this municipality, I asked him about his relation to the inhabitants of the container settlement. He said, the City of Belgrade owns everything, the containers, the recycling yard, “all we can do is to act like good neighbors, providing some help here and there, where needed”. “Acting like good neighbors” implicated certain interventions that can be identified as what I defined earlier as a form of governance based on a participatory model of community.

The infrastructure of the container settlement next to Orlovsko was starting to fall apart at a certain point. Water from open pipes started to run down massively to the old Orlovsko settlement, transforming streets into swamps. The Roma coordinator intervened and got the support of his municipality to asphalt one road in the container settlement and exchange the

leaking pipe and build a small fountain so that inhabitants would have a more robust facility for water supply.

The Roma coordinator later explained to me that they also had problems with some of the families in the container settlement, who were not behaving very well, fighting in their home and on the street. He saw his mandate heavily restricted by the fact that this family was inhabiting a container and thus in the responsibility of the City of Belgrade Secretary for Social Security. The only way he as Roma coordinator of this municipality could do something about the situation would be by setting up a “community room”, where community activities could be organized, targeting both the domestic Roma from Orlovsko and the newly arrived. In allegory to the water flowing down from the container settlement to Orlovsko, producing a swamp, he said that one such family, which did not behave very well, could be a problem for the whole settlement and had to be taken care of before the problem “spread”.

I would argue that what we see from the above example is how the introduction of Roma coordinators enabled new ways of governing “communal disorder” by way of setting it up as a problem of “community”. In the above example, we see that malfunctioning infrastructure is framed in terms of community, where the Roma coordinators “act like good neighbors” and where the broken pipe was addressed through the lens of community, securing the peaceful co-existence of old and new inhabitants, rather than a problem of the negligence of the central city government. The project of governing through community replaces the question of provisioning with questions of “disharmony” in the community that needs “mediation” (Agrawal 2005, 95). As a social worker, the Roma coordinator uses intimate forms of governance, where knowledge of families and rumors are mobilized to tap into the forms of “reciprocal control” that participative urban governance is built on. The Roma coordinator enters the stage of community without significantly more powers than any of its members.

This new style of governance affects also the constitution of new places for the exercise of this intimate form of state power. In the case of the container for Orlovsko, the Roma coordinator discussed the possibility to realize a “community room” by re-purposing a shipping container that Caritas had provided a few years ago and that was now the property of the municipality. The “community container” would be a way to overcome the governmental division that the City of Belgrade created by keeping the social housing estates as a valuable asset exclusively in their own hands, while leaving the responsibility to tackle “community problems” to local Roma coordinators. The new space was meant to help overcome the multiple division of the Roma target population (new and old inhabitants, “project-affected people”) and help to organize formal access to a target population out of reach.

As the container settlements were in place for a period by far exceeding the way they were envisioned as “temporary housing solution” until social housing is built, the City government started to lose its grip on them and resources meant only for a strictly defined group of “Project Affected People” started to leak. The last time I visited one of the container settlements (“Makiš 1” in 2018, 9 years after it had been installed) the containers had been partially transformed in houses by added constructions from cardboard. There were also parts of dismantled containers showing up in a nearby informal settlement. The local Roma coordinator told me that empty containers were inhabited by new families now, partially with her intervention and that the city government plans to prevent this from happening by removing containers of families that received a flat.

The two governmental logic, of the resettlement program led by the central city government, and the Roma coordinators in the single Belgradian municipalities differ in two important ways: first, temporality. The resettlement program of the city government envisioned a timeline tied to “socialization”, with a period of living in container settlements – a clear

developmental form of time from which individual subjects could be removed upon non-compliance with the goals of “socialization” (e.g. creating “nuisances”). The Roma coordinators, on the other hand, acted on maintaining structures that were envisioned by the central city government as “only temporary”. They thus enlarged their target population as well as increased their assets. Offering to “mediate conflict”, e.g. reduce “nuisance”, he could get the municipality to designate an old container as a “community room”. Second, dividing target populations versus forging alliances. While the central city government introduced various categories to divide the (chiefly) Roma population affected by resettlements to create categories of relative deservingness, the Roma coordinators worked on a territorial logic of groups composing one settlement and relations with the responsible local municipal government. I will further unpack the strategies of the Roma coordinators as “maintenance work for the temporary” in relation to the creation of assets, the increase of the target population, and the territorial logic focussed on solving communal problems (as opposed to categories of “deservingness”) in the following section.

7.3.3 *‘Field Visits’ – Monitoring Floodings and Overflowing Channels*

OSCE established in 2003 Roma coordinators in municipalities “that have Roma on their territory”. Roma coordinators were to build the capacities of those municipalities to communicate with Roma living in “unhygienic settlements” and help them, through this territorial logic, realize the rights they were granted as citizens of the Serbian state. One of the main tasks that Roma coordinators I accompanied engaged in was to help in obtaining short-term social assistance for their clients (*jednokratka pomoć*). Whether or not a municipality “has Roma on its territory” is a question of visibility and legitimacy. This includes the question of whether or not the single bodies of the municipality made the effort to reach out to “unhygienic settlements”, which are, per definition, off the grid, and if they did so, whether or not they acknowledged this population as in their realm of responsibility. Roma returnees from Western

Europe, whose asylum requests had been turned down, were denied social assistance in Serbia thereafter. While Belgrade displaced its Roma population with birth certificates from other Serbian cities, I found some evidence that in those cities (interviews with waste collectors in Kraljevo in June 2016), Roma were denied the right to social assistance based on having lived in Belgrade for the past 10-15 years. Thus, one can say that the mandate of Roma coordinators in Belgrade was, literally speaking, tied to a moving target. Enhanced through their precarious employment situation, this produced the necessity for them to constantly re-create their own mandate, by carving out both target population and assets.

Much of the work of the Roma coordinators that I observed went into constructing and safeguarding their mandate, making themselves indispensable. Making themselves indispensable was equal to cementing a reality in which Roma living in urban slums presented a problem of care and maintenance, not one of displacement, cleansing, and renewal. I would argue that Roma coordinators, in absence of actual power to secure tenure and property rights, engaged in certain performative actions of observing what they perceive as “communal problems” and thus make a claim to “manage” risks, but also creating assets.

On my first day with the Roma coordinator in March 2015, I first conducted a formal, recorded interview in the office space in the municipality that he shared with two other city officials. He had a computer there, where he saved pictures and tables accounting for the number of beneficiaries of the actions when he distributed donations in the settlements he was responsible for. When I suggested spending some time with him to understand his work, he wanted to go immediately and visit some of the settlements, so I could *see (da vidiš sama)*. “Field visits” in conjuncture with a particular form of “seeing” were a big part of his job and instructive for how he could “make assets” in the absence of state funding and decision-making power.

While the position of Roma coordinators was often precarious and they lacked office space and permanent employment contracts with the municipality, some of them received a vehicle for “field visits” from OSCE, which was a major object of pride and professional identity. In the following, I will show how “field visits” made him someone with intimate knowledge of the territory that served two purposes: on the one hand, it helped the Roma coordinator create assets and expand its target population by way of complementing the logic of the census through territorial knowledge of settlement structures. On the other hand, the “field visits” brought Roma coordinators to the attention of the policing departments of the municipality. With the flooding of May 2014, the city government rolled out its technologies to gain oversight over its territory. For one, it introduced the Beekom service – a form of networked governance including citizens into the surveillance of communal problems and offenders to public order (“polluting others”). But in this municipality, frontline workers like the Roma coordinator were asked to report back to the municipality about communal problems – starting from reports in the immediate aftermath of the flooding on the water stand and damage caused by the flood.

On the field visit, the Roma coordinator recounted to me how he had become important for the municipality in tackling communal problems during the time of the floods in May 2014. When we were driving around the municipality in the car that the municipality got from OSCE, he was eager to direct my attention to the current level of the Danube, ponds left by the rainfalls on the streets, and a system for dewatering in an informal settlement built in a swampy area near the Danube. These were a few channels built next to non-asphalted roads that the municipality had built under his supervision. After the spring floods had severely devastated parts of that municipality in 2014, water management, including monitoring developments in water protection zones, became a central concern of the city government. What is important

here, however, is that the way water management problems were approached in a biopolitical way, concerned with conducting the conduct of specific populations instead of addressing issues of “investor urbanism” endangering the flood protection systems and over-burdening communal infrastructure (de-watering systems as well as sewage). As I have mentioned already above, Beokom was introduced at the time of the 2014 May floods with a declared goal to securitize the city from catastrophes by enhancing the communication between the central city government and citizens. It enabled citizens to address air pollution in Belgrade by pointing their fingers to specific “polluting others”. The Roma coordinator explained the intervention in the settlement, addressing its obvious inefficiency by way of the status of the settlement, but still regarding the maintenance of the channel system as a yardstick to judge the conduct of the population.

When we entered a settlement near the Danube, which I will call Swamp here, he explained, “these are people that started to buy plots here in the 1980s, but the settlement really grew in the 1990s. Unfortunately, and that I only learned recently, the whole settlement is located on a water source (*vodoizvorište*) and so there is no chance that building permits will be issued”. In that, he made clear that the intervention was a form of maintenance work for a structure that can only be temporary. On the other hand, he pointed to ponds of water gathering on the street exclaiming “they are incapable of keeping the channels clear of waste, look at the mess”.

In that sense, on the ground, solving communal problems had racializing undertones. Solving communal problems was one of the practices through which the Roma coordinator acted in a policing capacity, disciplining subjects incapable of self-regulation. His solving communal problems in the “unhygienic settlements” was an act of tailored risk assessment reminiscent of how the city government “took care” of “wild dumps” through a biopolitical logic of risk

assessment. that was carefully crafted to be different from what be regarded as risk or adequate infrastructure in the rest of the city (“temporary”, sitting on a water source). I will come back in chapter 9 to the question of who is allowed to build on top of a water source and who is not. Floods have been a recurring problem in Belgrade, massively since 2014, and are often ascribed to sell-out of public land in water protection zones around river Danube and Sava (most prominently, in the case of protests against illegal construction in Savski Nasip²³⁹).

7.3.4 ‘Field Visits’ – Creating Assets, Expanding the Target Population

When the Roma coordinator took me on a “guided tour” through Belgrade as it was seen through his eyes and educated me in particular forms of seeing “communal problems” and identifying “unhygienic settlements”, I would argue that he introduced me to the chore of his mandate. I follow here Ivasiuc’s argument on how para-state actors like neighborhood police established their mandate through a particular way of seeing based on a judgment about particular conjunctions of population, activities, and places judged as safe or unsafe (Ivasiuc 2015). In the section above I used this lens to show how Roma coordinators engaged in risk assessment regarding flooding. In this next section, I will show how he flexibly used such associations of territory, population, and communal problems to create assets and enlarge his target population.

As we were driving from the municipality building over the bridge to the outskirts of the municipality, the Roma coordinator helped me understand how he spotted Roma settlements. Seeing was crucial because his area of responsibility was constituted by a complex assemblage of built structures, remnants of previous eras. In a way catering to me being from Germany, he was eager to point out those built structures with “German origin”, so I would recognize their value: for example, when we passed one settlement, he pointed, “these are warehouses build during World War II, Germans occupied the country, but they did leave us some useful

infrastructure”, then later, “these are containers that Caritas Essen (Germany) installed in 2006”.

2006 was years before his mandate started, showing that he did not just narrate his own mandate to me, but mobilized knowledge about the history of those structures. This seemed important in order to appropriate those structures as a domain he had intimate knowledge about and was thus in a position to govern as assets for his target population. For him, these structures, appearing as areas for “clean-ups” on the GUP 2021, were not old structures that had to be erased, but, quite on the contrary, “previous usages” offered opportunities for futures. He imagined for example the warehouses and the settlement around them to be developed in “urban villages”, where inhabitants would make a living from keeping small farm animals such as chickens and pigs. Seeking to realize that idea, he invited me a few days later to participate in an event organized by the Serbian Delta Foundation, on the topic of “social entrepreneurship”. It was mostly rural initiatives that sought to bring the Roma population into employment through picking forest fruits for example. The Roma coordinator took the chance to talk to other presenters about his idea of the chicken and pig farms.

In that way, he engaged in reaching out to under-invested parts of the city - territories which enabled the city to exclude racialized populations. I would suggest that the Roma coordinator used the increase in interest of the municipality to monitor “public hygiene”, which had cemented his mandate, to turn it to the advantage of his target population.

This point can be illustrated by way of the “Action Plan for Roma Integration for the City of Belgrade” that the Roma coordinator was in the midst of preparing when I participated in his work. He told me that in his current position every request he makes has to go through all types of committees within the city administration, before being decided upon. That could take

months or even a year. He said he would like to apply for EU projects and he could do it, but without a functional relationship with the city administration, it is almost impossible. The Action Plan would oblige the City to take action. For this Action Plan, the Roma coordinator attempted to bring his way of seeing, his “local knowledge” in a form recognizable by higher city government levels. Most importantly, he wanted to re-do the census and count Roma in Belgrade informed by his intimate knowledge of the terrain. He said, the census counted around 4000 Roma in his municipality, but this number is “too small”. “My strategy is to go and visit each settlement on the territory of the municipality where there are communal problems and thus increase the count of Roma”. He understood his way of “spotting” Roma settlements that he applied for the field visits could actually change the formal count of the Roma population in Belgrade and be translated into a form of capital that would get him access to other assets. In this perspective, spotting Roma through communal problems seems to reinforce racialized segregation based on judgments about the “hygiene” of a particular group and thus reinforce the type of “Roma Urbanism” OSCE has been accused of.

On the other hand, he seemed to apply the lens of “communal problems” in conjuncture with minority populations more generally. We also went by settlements inhabited by the Romanian minority for example, where the Roma coordinator monitored communal problems. The practice of other Roma coordinators I talked to confirmed this observation: one of them explained that through his mandate and the field visits, he actually functioned as a voice for other minorities living in substandard settlements in the city as well. This coincides with the way censuses have worked in the past to assess ethnicity, where citizens of various groups would declare themselves as Roma as a way to access humanitarian or state-provided assets (Sikimić 2006).

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the division of the urban territory in city proper and wastelands articulated with specific concepts of “community”, enacted through technologies (Beokom) and ways of seeing (“field visits”). New forms of mapping in combination with tools of participatory urban governance re-shaped the moral economy of “communal hygiene”. It supported de-investment and policing of “polluting others”, but, as I hope to have shown in relation to the Roma coordinators, also set up competing visions of reciprocity and expectations (“acting like good neighbors” and communal problems as a way to “create assets” and “expand the target population”).

The city government, neighborhood organization, and Roma Coordinators treat “hygiene” not through a framework of generalized “salus populi” (health or safety of the social body as a whole), but by differentiating territory and populations in communities with different “risks” attached to them (Rose 2001). While the division of the territory can be made through large seeing-like-a-state schemes (mapping of “wild dumps” and “unhygienic settlements”), the turn to “continuous planning”, the mobilization of municipal reporting systems, and finally the engagement of citizens in the policing show how concerns about hygiene were then tied down to “police”:

“Le droit de police targets specific, typically local, ever-changing situations (typically, situations of disorder rather than crime) that seem to require tailor-made risk-management strategies rather than the application of fixed laws... this power corresponds to a particular form of knowledge, namely, a quasi-Aristotelian phronesis, a practical wisdom that consists in the ability to decide, in each instance, which measure will best promote security, prosperity, order, public morals, and salus populi (welfare), without being bound by the general, rational, coordinated principles and rules of le droit de justice (see also Foucault 2005)” (Valverde 2009:147f.)

The mobilization of “community” encapsulates the liberal transition from government to governance. The liberal state understands itself “as a limited sphere that must operate through

forms of regulation that exist outside itself” (Dean 2007, 110). The liberal state concentrates its powers in the “defense of liberal freedoms”, forms of order that are regarded as a prerequisite to liberty (Goldstein 2012). Community, in this view, is both a site of self-regulation and a site where liberal freedoms need to be defended through policing. In Rose’s words, replacing Bentham’s panopticon through community (the “community-civility game”):

“virtue regenerated – crime reduced – public safety enhanced – institutionalization banished – dependency transformed to activity – underclass included – democratic deficit overcome – idle set to work – political alienation reduced – responsive services assured – economy reinvigorated by seating it, as it were, within networks of trust and honour - the Gordian knot of state vs. individual not cut but untied, all by a simple idea in politics: community”. (Rose 1999, 187)

In this type of governance, “community” is both the problem (ascribed specific characteristics that pose risks) and the solution (conducting conduct happens through community and its relations). In the mobilization of “citizens” for matters of “public hygiene” the concern is around “democratization” as a backdoor to gaining the collaboration of citizens in heavy projects of urban restructuring and austerity. In the case of “unhygienic settlements”, “community” is mobilized as an entrance point to disciplinary measures as well as to legitimate racialized forms of exclusion from public services and displacements. But also, and this is what I discussed in section 7.3, “community” can be forged to realize alternative visions of the relations within which “hygiene” can be realized.

Chapter 8 ‘Bring Only Those Who Are Really Willing to Work’: Roma Coordinators as Labor Market Brokers in a Context of Flexibilization

In this chapter, I analyze some of the enabling structures that help various companies tap into “unhygienic settlements” as a pool of cheap labor. Building on my previous chapter, where I have demonstrated how “unhygienic settlements” were put in a position of “temporary” structures only, permanently threatened by eviction, in this chapter I argue how those spatial forms of exclusion produced a specific politics of combined incomes as another aspect of how Roma coordinators engaged in “maintenance work for the temporary”.

When I started out my field research and asked about the employment of Roma from “unhygienic settlements”, I often got the answer that PSS Belgrade is the main employer of this labor force and that other companies interested in hiring such workers would contact the PSS. As many Roma from “unhygienic settlements” are not registered with the National Employment Service (NES), the PSS seemed to be functioning informally as a sort of employment agency for this workforce. What I describe here in this chapter is the emergence of a new alliance of actors on the scene of brokering workers from “unhygienic settlements”: an agency for temporary work (ATW) in cooperation with the Roma National Council (RNC) and Roma Coordinators.

In the first part, I present my theoretical framework to grasp the informal sector as a safety net. In section 8.2 I come to my ethnography of Roma Coordinators as labor market brokers.

8.1 Informal Sector as Safety Net

In a volume of 2015 “Formalizing the Shadow Economy in Serbia“ that economist Gorana Krstić from University in Belgrade edited with Austrian economist Friedrich Schneider for

USAID Business Enabling Project, economist Mihail Arandarenko (University of Belgrade) argues for the impediments the informal economy poses for economic growth, saying that the informal sector leads to “no net new jobs being created – but just bad jobs that drive out the good ones” (Arandarenko 2015, 12). He argues that before the economic crisis in 2008, the informal sector was regarded by policymakers in Serbia as a form of buffer zone against the economic hazards of transition and a sphere where the population could be incited with an entrepreneurial spirit. After the economic crisis, the informal sector became increasingly visible as an impediment on the way towards full marketization, what Arandarenko points out as a dual labor market in Serbia (Arandarenko and Aleksić 2016).

Since about 2008 a row of novel instruments and institutions have aimed to encroach upon informal sector work and push these workers to the primary sector in Serbia, most notably: the introduction of activation measures for the unemployed in 2014 and the introduction of agencies of temporary work (ATW) so that employees hired via ATWs are massively replacing workers on better contracts (including holiday, workplace security, sick leave) and instead of creating new jobs, one workplace is cut into three workers on leasing (Bakovnik et al. 2017).

In the context of these new atypical forms of employment, the informal sector or survival strategies are undergoing an ambivalent process of re-evaluation in policymaking and governance. On the one hand, the informal sector is regarded as an impediment blocking the moves to integrate workers into the new forms of employment (as it gives exit options), on the other hand, I observed in the practice of implementing these policies – that the informal sector work is regarded as a “safety net”: the enabling background against which workers are able to participate in flexible and precarious formal employment²⁴⁰.

After the 2008 world economic crisis, Breman (2009) made the curious observation that the crisis is only deemed to pose a hazard for (wage) workers in the Global North, while workers

in the Global South were regarded as protected from the effects of the crisis by working in the informal sector. Although informal sector work de facto suffered the same detrimental effects (prices for secondary raw materials for example reduced by half, forcing collectors to work overtime and bringing more family members into the collection work), economists of the World Bank came to hail the informal sector as a form of “safety net”, legitimating even a move to create more jobs like in the informal sector without collective bargaining, fixed payment, etc. as this form of work proved “crisis-resistant”.

The question of for whom does unemployment as the absence of formal employment poses a risk is structured by gendered and racialized discourses on the figure of the “main breadwinner”. In this chapter, I will show the work that went into assigning Roma from “unhygienic settlements” to a sphere where reproduction does not depend on their wage-labor in the way that it does for other urbanites. This assignment parallels the assignment of women to the sphere of reproduction dependent on the figure of the “main bread-winner” in that both women and Roma in urban slums are made to inhabit spaces, which are imagined as exempted from market logic or as in the example quoted above, from the effects of economic crisis²⁴¹. Through this assignment, the work of women (or Roma in urban slums) “whether in use-value or commodity production, is obscured, does not appear as 'free wage labor', is instead defined as an 'income-generating activity, and can hence be bought at a much cheaper price than male labor” (Mies 2014, 116). I will argue that being excluded from the group of “main breadwinners” has shaped Roma from “unhygienic settlements” in a way similar to what Mies (2014) described for women, as the “optimal labor force”.

In moments of (labor) market liberalization survival strategies of the most vulnerable are investigated, tested, squeezed, or expanded, targeted by various measures, and their relation to the sphere of “productive” waged employment is recalibrated. Fraser (2014) calls this

recalibration of the frontier the expanded reproduction of capitalism. Through this expanded notion of capitalism we come to see that not all workers enter the labor market on equal terms, but gendered and racialized, and I argue in this chapter that we can understand this inequality by looking at the way in which safety nets are being constructed, how workers separated into different groups based on these safety nets and how the relationship between formal and informal sector work is being recalibrated in a moment where formal labor is undergoing flexibilization.

In this chapter, I am interested in how policymakers, economists, and labor market institutions mobilize the notion of the “safety net” to disentangle the price of work from the question of the survival of the workers. As I will argue in this chapter, safety nets are not merely a passive background that serves to subsidize wages or social benefit payments, but they are created. Safety nets are crucial in the commodification of workers, they allow for market operations that are based on the fiction of the worker as a commodity (Polanyi [1944] 2001). Investigating the construction of safety nets helps to understand the constitution of the frontier dividing work from non-work and the particular formatting of the economy supporting that process.

Looking at how Roma coordinators negotiated with the ATW, I draw conclusions on the recalibration of the relation of informal sector activities to formal employment in the process of commodification of the Roma labor force.

In this chapter I will analyze how Roma coordinators tried to handle recruitment for the ATW: on the one hand, the ATW needed workers that do not have to fully rely on the job as hygienists. Announcing that the pay would be very low and paid irregularly, they needed workers deemed to partially rely on a “safety net”. On the other hand, workers who are not fully dependent on the job offer a risk for the employer and it is this risk that the Roma coordinators tried to manage by setting up a “register of those who are really willing to work”. The work of Roma

coordinators can be compared to the street-level bureaucrats described by Thiemann (2017; 2016) as “under-implementing the law”. Frontline workers such as Roma coordinators are adding an autonomous layer to understanding how the “safety net” works that cannot be grasped through regulations alone. I extend my argument from the previous chapter about how Roma coordinators engage in the management of certain problems to cement their position in the absence of actual decision-making power and access to resources. In this chapter, I show how they are involved in co-producing the precarious position of their target population.

8.2 Roma Coordinators as Labor Market Brokers

After attending for half a year the monthly meetings of the Roma coordinator with the mobile team (consisting of officials from different realms of the municipality), in July 2015, I came to attend a rather unusual event. With some pride in his voice the Roma coordinator announced that now, private companies had started being interested in Roma. A security company had contacted the Roma National Council (RNC) when looking for people to be hired as hygienists in the newly opened warehouse of the Belgian food company Delhaize near Belgrade. He pointed this event out to me as an exception: “usually we have to force employers with human rights arguments”. The Roma coordinator announced this event by warning his colleagues, who work in the settlements to be cautious in picking the candidates: “this is an opportunity, do not humiliate us in front of the recruiter”.

A day later we met in the premises of the RNC. Roma coordinators from three different Belgradian municipalities had brought 30 candidates whom they deemed most entitled and fit to access the labor market “proper” represented by private companies “beyond human rights arguments”. They had brought mostly young men, all of them with high school diplomas, some also with finished professional training, and four middle-aged women, who had already worked in cleaning services for several years. The room where the recruitment was taking place was

festooned with posters of the big international donors' organizations, advertising educational projects financed by EU/UNOPS saying for example, "Knowledge is a safe way to work" (*Znanje je siguran put do posla*). The event that unfolded was in striking contrast to the message. It soon became clear that this private company was not interested in hiring Roma for their diplomas and working experience. When candidates started promoting themselves by flagging their qualifications, the recruiter only kept repeating "don't worry, the tasks are extremely simple, you don't need any previous training for that".

The Agency for Temporary Work (ATW) had turned to the Roma National Council (RNC) as a last resort only after they had tried to tap into subsidized workers via the so-called "activation scheme" for the unemployed offered by the National Employment Service (NES), which financially supported companies that hire long-term unemployed workers. The agent expressed his dissatisfaction with the NES, saying he had received "very few, all old workers, not willing to put any effort". Contacting the RNC, he also wanted Roma workers that were registered unemployed for at least 6 months in order to receive the subsidies. However, this was not a must-criterion. Employing Roma from urban slums via RNC was apparently still offering more advantages than NES subsidies.

Already on the very day of the recruitment, the candidates meant to work as hygienists were being shown a training video for forklift driving. At the end of the day, it was clear that the recruiter had come searching for a group of workers ready to flexibly adapt to tasks beyond the job description written in the work contract and who could cope with low, irregular wages as they partially relied on additional informal sources of income and family support networks.

The Roma coordinators were eager to cement their position in this recruitment process over the NES and make themselves indispensable in the process of opening the slums they were working as a pool of such labor force to the ATW. Imitating what the Agent had demanded

from the NES, the coordinators set up a register of workers they had recruited from their settlements in order to track infringements and who quit the job in order to be able to sanction those workers by not offering them any other job in the future for example.

In this chapter, I want to analyze the role of Roma coordinators in Belgrade as labor market brokers for Roma from urban slums in the context of labor market flexibilization in Serbia. I want to contribute to the literature arguing that ATWs do not simply connect market demands with offers, but actively construct flexible labor markets (Peck, Theodore, and Ward 2005). Focusing on brokers, I seek to open the black box of flexible hiring by drawing attention to the infrastructure that enables flexible labor markets rather than on either the demand side (companies) or supply-side (surplus populations) (Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012). Brokers unite in themselves partially contradictory claims related to flexible hiring consisting of state discourse of protection, activation, or humanist protection, as well as interests of capital. My case study is about how an ATW tapped into racialized populations and downgraded neighborhoods where the majority of the population is active in the informal economy (Peck and Theodore 2001; K. Jones 2014). I will argue that RCs in their eagerness to prove Roma from urban slums as “fit” to become workers in private companies “beyond human rights arguments”, actually started to provide crucial services that the ATW needed in order to engage in flexible hiring. In selecting and keeping books on “those who are really willing to work” Roma coordinators did two different things.

First, they followed racialized assumptions on the work discipline and accordingly acted as if to “compensate” the employer for hiring these racialized subjects for a job with a private company, which was being regarded as the epitome of having succeeded in reaching outside of the segments of the labor market Roma from urban slums are usually trapped in. Secondly, they address what is actually behind much of the assumptions about the fitness of certain

racialized groups for 'wage labor' is their dependence on it²⁴². Thus, the Roma coordinators also engaged in negotiating the way formal and informal sector work are related to each other (informal sector work as a "safety net").

8.2.1 The Agency for Temporary Work

In 2015 the Belgian food retailer Delhaize opened a distribution center in Stara Pazova, 40 car minutes away from Belgrade²⁴³. Delhaize is also active in the field of flexibilization of labor market policies, for example with the introduction of the very much contested "dual education program"²⁴⁴. In pursuit of new workers, the distribution center subcontracted the security service provider company "FPS Sistemi". As the recruiter from FPS later explained in a meeting with the Roma coordinators, he had first attempted to recruit workers via the National Employment Services (NES) but was not satisfied with the number of workers he had received and found NES to be working too slowly. He had received five workers in six months and now he needed 100 workers within the next two weeks. Moreover, he was not satisfied with the "fitness" of those workers, who were all "old" and had "little motivation to work". Additionally, he was lamenting the "inefficiency" of the NES in keeping track of workers that turned out to "lack motivation". In his eyes, NES should be sanctioning such workers to clear the pool of workers on offer²⁴⁵. So he turned to another pool of workers, deemed more hospitable to low wages. He contacted the Public Sanitation Services (PSS), which is known as the biggest employer of Roma from urban slums in Belgrade. The PSS forwarded the recruiter to the Roma National Council (RNC), where Roma coordinators facilitated the process of the recruiter tapping immediately into a pool of racialized labor force, deemed to be hospitable to low wages and bad working conditions. The recruiter of the FPS thus opened a pool of workers for Delhaize, which could not be found via the NES, because, first of all, many Roma are not registered at the NES and second, even if they are registered, anti-discrimination standards would prevent employers from demanding particular categories of workers deemed

to be hospitable to low wages based on racialized criteria. Peck and Theodore (2001) refer to this process as “crude sorting-function” of ATWs, helping employers to bypass the anti-discrimination legislation regulating labor market services offered by national employment services.

Although they had existed already before, ATWs were for the first time legally regulated in Serbia in 2015. The new Labor Law introduced a non-discrimination principle that is part of the *EU Directive 2008/104/EC on Temporary Agency Work*. With the novelty, some forms of temporary work were adapted to the standards of full-time work with regards to the right to holiday, and sick leave. But certain categories of temporary work remained excluded from these regulations. Legislators found that temporary work should only be regulated in case it concerns types of work that are “at the core business of the company in question”, while work such as “security” and “cleaning” was regarded as “services” provided to a company from an external provider, a subcontractor²⁴⁶.

In the case study I am presenting in this chapter, the subcontractor FPS was officially a small company offering security services, like fire protection, money transport, but also a section of “auxiliary jobs” (*pomoćni poslovi*) including hygienists²⁴⁷. In practice, “hygienists” was a label that the security company used to recruit workers for different kinds of jobs in an unregulated manner. In my case study, workers hired as hygienists were meant to work in the warehouse and drive forklifts among other tasks. So the subcontractor for “auxiliary jobs” de facto operated as an ATW to provide workers for the core business of a company, such as forklift drivers for the warehouse of a food retail company²⁴⁸.

In the following, I will describe how Roma coordinators took a very ambivalent position as labor market brokers. In a way they can be regarded as agents within the advertisement of cheap labor power of Roma from urban slums in Belgrade: a workforce that is framed as and,

here in this situation, actively advertised as hospitable to low wages and inadequate working conditions. On the other hand, Roma coordinators also negotiate certain working conditions. I will depict this ambivalent position through a more detailed depiction of the recruitment day I participated in.

8.2.2 Deskilling

During the recruitment meeting, a young job candidate asked whether the company offered its employees possibilities for advancement. He added that he had finished a qualification as an electro-technician and would like to hand in his diploma together with his application material. The representative of the ATW, in the following, “Agent” said, yes, at a certain point the company might need also qualified workers, such as architects, but for this recruitment round now he would like to see from applicants that they are open to doing various jobs that have to be done. By giving “architect” as an example for a qualified position, he drew a line between qualified and unqualified in an area that seemed out of reach for the population sitting in the recruitment room. In that way, he excluded the possibility of someone who finished a qualification as an electro-technician to pass as qualified at all. The Agent enforced this by saying, there is no need for you to hand in your diploma – canceling the possibility of advancement through skill from the horizon of future possibilities. Moreover, by saying that the candidates would do “various jobs”, he suggested that they would all be on the same level of “unskilled” and not hierarchically ordered, as would be necessary for the candidates to hope for advancement.

Another candidate raised his hand and said that he was currently already working via this very same Agency in the airport and asked, whether he would have to participate in the training for this job? The Agent answered, yes, the training is specific for this very job, “other qualifications you might have from elsewhere do not count”. Through its own hiring strategy, the Agency

perpetuates a pool of workers that are forced to remain in the category of “unskilled” as the Agency does not even acknowledge training that it provided previously to workers as a skill.

Workers hired through ATWs are kept on the level of “unskilled” also because of the complete indeterminacy of the jobs. This pertains to the lack of a binding job description, which would be the precondition for the acquisition of something that can be traded as a “skill” on the labor market afterward. While the formal job description through which the Roma coordinator announced the “employment opportunity” in front of the mobile team was “hygienist”, I was puzzled at the recruitment meeting to see that candidates were acquainted, already on that very day, with one of the basic key tasks. This was not related at all to hygiene, but they were presented with a seven minutes short film on how to drive a fork-lifter.

While qualification for forklift driving might seem like some sort of “formal skilling”, it soon turned out that also this skill would be acquired in a way that does not hold any validity outside the gates of that very company. One of the younger candidates asked whether he would be required to have a driver’s license. The Agent waived the question, saying that the state regulations on traffic did not apply because this was “inter-company traffic”, the rules of which were determined by the company itself. He added, “you don’t have to worry, the job is not demanding. You do not need any pre-qualifications at all. Everything you need for this job, you will learn in the company on your working place”. As it became clear later, those men and women that had been hired in a previous round more than two months ago still did not hold a formal confirmation of being trained, fork-lift drivers. The explanation for this given by the Agent was that “rarely any company will be able to provide all the documents required by Law formally on the spot, it is normal that workers already work before they receive their driver licenses”.

I will now turn to how the Roma coordinators negotiated this situation.

8.2.3 Finding 'Those Who are Really Willing to Work'

When I later sat down with one of the pedagogical assistants, Vesna, who had also recruited candidates from the Roma settlement she worked in, she was upset about the way the recruitment day had unfolded. I asked her what she thought about the job offered and she answered, “why should we educate ourselves, send our children to school when, in the end, they are hired as ‘unskilled workers’?”. But on the other hand, she said, “usually we have to force employees to hire Roma with human rights arguments, this time this agency came by itself to hire Roma”.

When the Roma coordinator joined us she told him about a few young men that she had recruited for this very job in an earlier round. She had heard from them that they did not get anything written to prove that they had started working already. She said angrily that it was not okay, that the company made them work immediately without having signed anything.

In spite of the doubts about the quality of the jobs and the trustworthiness of the ATW, it became clear that the Roma coordinators were eager to grab the chance and institutionalize the RNC as a mediating body on the labor market for Roma from urban slums. The Roma coordinators offered the ATW different services in order to qualify and cement their position as brokers facilitating the ATW to tap into Roma from urban slums. These services were set up in a way imitating what the ATW had been missing from the National Employment Services.

In the following, I will unpack the strategies Vesna and also the other Roma coordinators engaged in to convince the ATW that they were indispensable in the ATW’s efforts of placing

Roma from urban slums on the market for temporary labor. What the Roma coordinators did could be described as “doing the work of choosing the ideal worker” (K. Jones 2014).

The informal sit-together after the recruitment meeting of Vesna, me, and two other Roma coordinators was eventually also joined by the Agent himself. Vesna took the chance to press the Agent to make it a requirement for Roma workers that want to be hired by him to have a recommendation by the RNC. The Agent said he could not do that. Vesna tried to convince the Agent that he needs the RNC to hire Roma workers from urban slums, because “only people like Roma coordinators and pedagogical assistants are able to assess, whether someone is really motivated to work”.

I would argue that the “motivation to work” stands in direct relation to the fact that precarious formal jobs, like those offered through the ATW, compete with informal sector activities. To demonstrate how this clash was negotiated I will give a short sequence from the discussion among the Roma coordinators and the Agent in which they talked about an incident when one of the younger Roma that had been hired in a previous recruitment round via the RNC sold perfumes on the shop-floor.

After the Agent had come in, Vesna kindly asked him whether he was satisfied with his new employees and whether any incidents had occurred. He answered that he was very satisfied, that Roma are very good workers and only minor incidents happened. One of the younger men had been selling perfume on the shop floor, which was then forbidden: “you can only do one job at a time”. Vesna asked about the payment, whether people who had started to work now at the beginning of August had received their first payment at the beginning of September. The Agent said “generally yes”, but “it could be the case that the company happens to not be liquid

at that moment of payday and that the workers don't receive payment". He added, "but that is everywhere like this". One of the Roma coordinators disagreed saying, well, not everywhere - people working for the Public Sanitation Services do get their pay every month. Then Vesna asked about the probation period. The Agent answered, well, people will already work even if they did not finish their practical training for fork-lifting. That is not according to the law, but "rarely any company could provide all the licenses and documents needed immediately, whenever law asks for it". But, as a sort of consolation, he added the workers would get "nice uniforms from the company".

Vesna stated that "one month without payment, ok, that's doable", adding "I've been in that situation", but two months are two full months, and "that's really hard". The Agent said, well, after all, all of these guys have been unemployed before and now they received a chance. He pointed out, "we all have to start small and then we can progress". He started talking about himself, that he had started as a police officer, then worked as security for money transports and then after a while got the manager he is now. Vesna said again, well, if payment would not come in then only those can stay who have some other support. Those who completely depend on that job will leave. One of the Roma coordinators added, yes, someone else to support them or some other job on top, like selling perfume. The Agent countered, "well, they will have to bear that, they have been unemployed and we have all started from zero. The company will now employ 100 more people until the end of the year and I think that is a very decent offer". All agreed on this.

The conversation shows the way in which the safety net was mobilized and negotiated between Roma coordinators and the Agent. The Roma coordinators emphasized that with the outlook of going a month or two without payment, it was necessary for the workers to be able to generate some extra income (like petty trade). Otherwise, they would have to rely on their

families, which would be an investment that seemed large in comparison to the little prospects for a brighter future that this job offered in return. The Roma coordinators mobilized also the way in which PSS pays its workers as relevant background to negotiate what is “standard” in employment relations (like regular payment). The recruiter could here refer to the position of the company as market actor as opposed to PSS being a state company, thus different principles apply. For Roma Coordinators a non-state company employer was desirable and prestigious for various reasons, most importantly I guess that their clients could “make it” on the “free market”. That this market was relying on relations of patronage and reproduced marginalization became apparent for all participants of the recruitment day, but still the lure of the market was working and the positions were desired.

The Roma coordinator who had been first contacted by the ATW, took the newly acquired role of the RNC to function as mediating institution on the labor market very seriously and to “avoid humiliation in front of the recruiter” was, therefore, a pressing concern. After the first meeting with the Agent, he got very indignant about what he heard of his colleagues, the health coordinators and pedagogical assistants who were doing the recruitment from their respective settlements, that some younger men had already quit the job again. He ordered all of the coordinators in a harsh tone to his office and when everybody took a seat, he commanded: “take out paper and pencil to write this down: I want from you a list of all those that took that advantage of taking a job and left it again so that we do not mediate this person again on a job”. This reminds of the situation I referred to earlier when one of the pedagogical assistants asked whether the Agent could make it a requirement for Roma from “unhygienic settlements” to have a recommendation from the RNC if they want to work for him. They both show how Roma coordinators engaged in activities to cement their position in the recruitment process, make themselves indispensable, almost a supplement institution to the NES.

I met the Agent once more together with the Roma coordinator, who I accompanied on “field visits” earlier (see chapter 7) (in the following: Hasan) and another Roma coordinator (in the following: Mirko), from a smaller Belgradian municipality in the Roma National Council a few days later. They were planning the next recruitment round.

Hasan addressed me explaining that this job the Agent is offering was much better than working for the Public Sanitation Services (PSS). PSS had been continuously decreasing the pay, changing contracts and here people have the possibility to get promoted. The Agent added that work in his company would also be much cleaner: the working environment would be inside, climatized and people were encouraged to wear hand-gloves for their safety and not to get dirty. Also, the shifts were shorter. Only the warehouse was farther away in comparison to PSS relative to the Belgrade city center. Hasan agreed and said that it might be a problem for people who have families. The Agent said, the company organized transport from the city to the warehouse.

I asked them how much they pay at PSS at the moment. Mirko answered, about 25000 Dinar, roughly 200 Euro, he added. It seemed like the Agent had guessed that I knew that the job he offered paid 12000 Dinar per month so that I had asked this for the sake of comparing the two jobs. So the Agent addressed me and said that he assumed that “anyway, people are working privately (*rade privatno*)”. With this, he explained that his job relied on workers having a side income. He further promoted his offer by saying that from the second month on, the workers would be allowed to choose between shifts. Older workers would be offered to work more inside, while younger workers could opt for increasing their pay by obtaining tasks in the area which is cooled down to 5 degrees.

This shows the very ambiguous way in which the safety net was assumed as relevant background for the recruiter to be able to hire workers from “unhygienic settlement” under such conditions, while at the same time demanding them to work in a way as if they could live from this job only (not engaging in side-activities on the shop floor).

All participants in this meeting with the Agent, while pointing to certain deficits here and there, upheld the consensus that the jobs the Agent was offering were better than PSS jobs. Roma coordinators were consensually treating work for the PSS as “dirty work”, something that should be overcome for the purpose of integration in “clean employment”. The working positions as hygienists were celebrated for their cleanliness, for taking place indoors. The “cleanliness”, in their eyes, made the job better in spite of the fact that PSS paid better and regularly. Ideas of “civilized”, clean work, indoors, for a private company, not dealing with waste were put above the need for a job to provide for a livelihood.

No one objected to the Agent’s justification of the low payment by pointing out possibilities for side- or additional income. Rather, Mirko confirmed the cooperation of the RNC with the Agency. He asked the Agent whether he knew the names of those who did not show up for work anymore. The Agent said he will look it up and send them an email with a list of names of those employed now and those who quit. Mirko said, “I’m only choosing those guys who are really willing to work and I tell them before, think about whether or not you want to work before you start there, once you’ve started, you will stay. You cannot change your mind after you’ve started.”

8.3 Conclusions

With setting up the register of “those who are really willing to work”, I would argue, the Roma coordinators imitated the “contractualism” inherent in the new labor market services provided

by the state under “activation”, which replaces basic rights, such as the access to the labor market, through a contract in which subjects have to adhere to certain rules in order to stay eligible for the services (Baar 2009; Borghi and Van Berkel 2007). In this context, the “motivation” of the applicant becomes part of the contract and a resource that can be drawn on (Newman 2007). With the statement, “bring only those who are really willing to work”, Roma coordinators agreed to cooperate in enabling highly exploitative work arrangements, demanding workers to engage in side-activities or draw on their family as support in order to be able to do the job.

The ATW resorted to the RNC applying this instrument from the repertoire of new public management in its recruitment process. The readiness of Roma coordinators to set up a registry of candidates recording their commitment and “motivation” is a way to compensate the ATW for the risk it took upon itself in considering a pool of candidates regarded as inherently unreliable, lacking the ability of long-term commitment. Roma coordinators, by expressing that their clients would otherwise “only be hired for humanitarian reasons” ignored a reality of racialized workers recruited for highly risky and exploitative jobs. By suggesting that a candidate who leaves the job would “embarrass” the RNC, they raise the demands of the ATW and its appetite for a highly flexible, cheap labor force over the need of its client population for securing a livelihood.

Chapter 9: Gambling, Mining, Gleaning – Appropriation Practices on a ‘Wild Dump’ in Belgrade

In August 2018 I was sitting with Sadrije, a 24-year-old Roma man from Kosovo, on a vast plain of sand reaching into the swampy forest at the edge of one of Belgrade’s central municipalities. Next to us in a pile, a small collection of scrap metal that we had collected during the morning. From the shadow provided by a piece of cardboard tucked in the door of his car, we watched a bulldozer flattening out the heaps of rubble into a plain that was to become construction land. Sadrije told me, “imagine, underneath us, all this is waste, imagine how much there is”. Blinking at the bulldozer through a cloud of swirling dust, I thought of all the metal scrap and other items that were covered here, stuff that Sadrije and the other waste pickers had not managed to retrieve and were now lost, covered with an impervious layer of sand. Then, another picture came to mind: a few kilometers further down in the forest was one of Belgrade’s drinking water purification plants, which drew water from the underground water of this Makiš Field.

In August 2019 the city closed the site, naming it one of the “biggest wild dumps” in Belgrade and claiming the “construction mafia” had endangered the development of the city by dumping rubble in the future site of the metro. Soon after the closure, another actor concerned with wild dumps praised the closure: the president of the Belgrade Public Sanitation Services claimed that through the closure, the amount of construction waste brought to the city landfill by private companies and the revenues the city generated through landfill tax, had increased by 74% already in the first three days after the action.

9.1 Commercialization of Waste

This chapter is about forms of valuation that emerge in the wastelands produced by enclosure. Most prominent among such wastelands are “wild dumps”. They emerge at the interstices of three different projects through which the city tries to engage two of its key resources (land and waste) in forms of (re-)valuation: commercial landfilling (landfill tax, fencing off of the city landfill), large-scale urban recycling systems (underground containers, building of a waste incinerator), and “cleaning up” of urban land for renewal (brownfield). These projects build on an (imaginary) definite separation of “clean” and “polluting” forms of dealing with waste and inhabiting urban land. My ethnography of waste pickers on the “wild dump” in the construction site documents forms of valuation that are obscured. Here, “clean” and “polluting”, new and old land usages intersect.

In the first part of this chapter, I describe the site of my ethnography, one of the drinking water sources of Belgrade currently reconfigured as construction land for the building of “4,5 million square meters of luxury flats and business spaces”²⁴⁹. In the second part, I go to my ethnography of waste picking on the “wild dump”. I discuss three main practices of appropriating valuable materials from construction waste delivered to the “wild dump”: gambling, mining, and gleaning. I take these three practices of the collection of waste as a lens to study the social order that emerged to make the interstice of urban restructuring inhabitable and different types of waste valuable.

I connect to the literature that studies livelihoods generated in the wastelands or “ruins of capitalism” and their relation to accumulation strategies (Moore 2015; Tsing 2015). This literature emphasizes how the appropriation of values does not go along with enclosure of resources, but rather with the exclusion from or abandonment of former sites of enclosure, that is, the production of wasteland (Tsing 2015)²⁵⁰. Applied to the case of urban wastelands, the

concept of appropriation practices offers an addition to the literature that looks at brownfield rehabilitation through the lens of environmental racism, the unequal distribution of environmental harms (Dillon 2014; Nixon 2009). Appropriation practices are skillful ways of inhabiting niches and yielding values that would not be otherwise accessible for large-scale accumulation schemes.

9.1.1 Enclosure: Commercial Landfilling and Urban Recycling Systems

In this section, I show how the specific policies of the city government to enclose communal waste brought about new sites for appropriation practices outside of those enclosure schemes. I show how the collection of waste as a practice moved from the streets of Belgrade to “wild dumps”.

With the introduction of the New Law on Waste Management (2009) Belgrade and other bigger cities have been incentivized to introduce large-scale urban recycling systems in the form of underground containers, and some forms of separate collection of household waste as well as commercial landfilling. These activities were accompanied by increased scrutiny of waste picking as the “polluting and polluted other” of waste management proper. In chapter 7 I have shown how they were subjected to increased surveillance of the communal inspection and fining actions, which very much eliminated their presence from the streets of Belgrade.

In 2017 the City of Belgrade signed the concession of the city landfill Vinča to the French Japanese consortium (SUEZ) to sanitize the landfill and build a waste-to-energy (WtE) facility (incinerator). The first step to sell the concession to an investor was to calculate the actual amount of communal waste, to enclose it through fencing off the landfill, and to replace the open waste containers in the city with underground containers. Enclosure was accompanied by campaigns and the criminalization of “wild dumping” of waste, done by citizens but mostly by

companies in various public spots in Belgrade. “Wild dump” gained attention as the biggest source of pollution in Belgrade and a massive burden on the public budget.

After the landfill in Vinča had been fenced off, the city introduced a landfill tax. With the landfill tax, payment was not only related to the service of “removal of waste from the city”, but additional value was put on dumping, re-framed as a new service of “sanitary landfilling”. Before the landfill tax, PSS was paid to remove waste from the city. The payment followed a logic of utility costs calculated per square meter of the housing unit. Someone with a bigger apartment would pay higher fees than someone with a smaller apartment without regard to the amount of waste produced. While the “waste removal” fee was aimed at pollution in the city that can be removed, the landfill tax re-frames waste management in a logic of “cost of pollution” that goes beyond the pollution it causes within the city. To designate the area of a “sanitary landfill”, the city landfill had been fenced off and furnished with a scale at the entrance of the landfill, documenting the weight of the load lorries brought. The fence and the scale enable a new logic of “payment per kilo” that applies to companies and commercial waste producers and complements the previous logic of “payment per square meter of housing”. The emphasis is shifted from “waste removal service” to “sanitary disposal” with the fence and the scale as the devices enabling a calculation of the “cost of pollution” (Cvejanov 2017).

With the fence, and the new types of calculation made possible, communal waste became visible as a problem of pollution that needs management beyond its removal from the city. Vinča landfill rose from a non-place, a disposal site somewhere at the outskirts of the city, to a valuable asset put for bidding by international companies specializing in “sanitary disposal techniques”.

The biggest source of “wild dumps” is construction waste. In 2019, of the 500 000 tons of construction waste produced per year in Belgrade, only 200 to 300 000 end up in the Vinča

landfill, the rest being dumped throughout the city and suburbs²⁵¹. As Belgrade is undergoing heavy urban restructuring, much attention is paid to the amount of construction waste undergoing recycling. The EU foresaw for Serbia to reach the goal of a 70% recycling rate of construction waste by 2020²⁵². The “wild dumps” are regarded as the main problem not only in terms of environmental pollution but also in terms of hindering the efforts to install a material recovery facility (MRF) for construction waste at Vinča. Such a facility would have to be “supplied” with construction waste regularly in order to pay off. For construction companies, it is, however, cheaper to dump the waste outside of the city's landfill and thus dodge the landfill tax.

The enclosure of valuable wastes took several forms in Belgrade: the building of underground containers that made access to materials for collectors more and more difficult, the policing of the vehicles collectors used to transport the materials, and finally the displacement of waste collector settlements from the inner city, with its abundance of raw waste to the outskirts in the years between 2009-2012. As I mentioned in chapter 7, the collection of waste was being made additionally complicated as the city government tied the right to alternative housing to the condition that no secondary raw materials shall be stored in the settlement.

The enclosures resulted in the exclusion of waste pickers from relatively easy to retrieve secondary raw materials and pushed them into lower-paid and more laborious appropriation practices. This can be observed very clearly with the example of waste pickers on Vinča landfill. The enclosure of the landfill has led to a form of quasi-proletarianization of waste picking in the very site of the new “sanitary” city landfill. The collectors that lived in settlements next to the landfill were displaced. To supplement for them, a subcontractor organized the collective transportation of Roma waste collectors who had been displaced to container settlements. This company had them collect PET bottles on the landfill for a percentage of what those materials' value would be on the market of recycling shops outside

of the landfill. On the landfill, collectors got about one-third of the price for PET bottles that they would get outside.

The story of Vinča landfill seems to fit classical stories of enclosure and semi-proletarianization. The site I chose for my field research was a site that was not so easy to grasp with the theory of enclosure. On the landfill, we can observe how waste pickers were pushed down the value chain as they worked with waste materials that now belonged to the PSS. PSS had laid formal property claims on the recyclables by means of the fence. As the value chain was extended, waste pickers' share in the profit decreased. The site I investigated is where appropriation happens without formal property claims. On this site, declared as a "wild dump" waste collectors intersected with actors in urban reconstruction, construction companies, but also had to be aware of carefully avoiding the "spread of nuisance", which could have resulted in eviction.

9.1.2 The Site: Makiš Field

In Makiš Field practices of appropriation took place in a context where first, construction companies were dodging the landfill tax and engaged in "wild dumping". Secondly, this is a site where construction waste (rubble) is used as the foundation for a housing construction planned in this very area. This duality made the site interesting to study the intersection of "urban reconstruction" (clean) with usages declared as "prior" (polluting) (Dillon 2014).

Makiš Field is a swamp located near the river Danube, from which Belgrade Waterworks has exploited ground water since 1896. Belgrade is considered lucky to have its own natural source of drinking water. However, urbanization projects have continuously encroached on the borders of the protected area. In 1980 the city built a railway switchyard on parts of the field and a highway dividing the field into two. That part of the field neighboring the Danube has maintained its status of a protected area, while the part with the switchyard has been

increasingly opened for smaller building projects. Since 2017, plans of the city to build a metro under the whole field (that have existed already since the 1960s) have been renewed. These plans go along with a project to build a large business complex called “Tesla City” on the field. These projects have gained currency by the relocation of the main train station of Belgrade to the former switchyard as a consequence of the “Belgrade Waterfront” mega-project (Grubbauer and Čamprag 2019). In the very location of the landfill, the building of the metro is planned. The transformation of the field into building ground is opposed by the City Secretary for Environmental Protection as well as a group of urbanists, including Ksenija Petovar, who raise the topic of groundwater pollution in the course of large-scale construction projects near the Danube.

The “wild dump” is located in the half of the field that is neighboring the residential area Čukarica Landslide and is part of one of those smaller building projects that followed the building of the switchyard. The Urban Plan of Belgrade (2016) indicates that housing will be built on the very spot where the dump is right now.

A variety of construction companies came to dump rubble in Makiš Field during my field research. The most prominent were two big construction waste companies from Belgrade that according to their websites also engage in recycling. One of them advertised on its website that it provided for the “legal disposal of construction waste so that construction companies do not have to resort to illegal disposal sides with the risk of being fined”²⁵³. But the company is itself also a recycling shop that purchases all types of secondary raw materials. From all the construction waste they receive, what was brought to the wild dump on Makiš Field was mostly rubble, because the materials that were easy to retrieve from construction waste, the company collected itself. What the company considered rubble was brought to the “wild dump”. While the company advertised its services by asking “Why to make a dump out of your construction

site?” (*Zašto da pravite deponiju od svog gradilšta?*), the more relevant question seems: “Why not make a construction site from your dump?”.

Companies that wished to dispose of construction waste on Makiš Field had to pay 1500 dinar per lorry to the landlord of the terrain. The money was collected by the bulldozer driver during the day and one family of waste collectors, who acted as deputy guards during the night. While the lorry drivers delivered the money to be paid for disposal, they also received “tips” from some of the collectors. “Tips” were meant to incentivize the lorry drivers to bring more of the valuable materials toward the dump.

The status of this spot as a “wild dump” was not apparent at first sight. Most frequent were lorries with sand and soil, but in-between came also lorries with construction waste. They unloaded all in one spot of the landfill, where the collectors were working. In the summer after I had done my field research on the landfill, the city government closed down the site by placing a physical barrier at its main entrance and installing surveillance cameras on the building opposite to the entrance. The city government announced that every lorry that disposes of construction waste will be fined. The press articles following this shut-down reported “This is an urban parcel of land on which daily 150 lorries unload soil, all organized by the construction mafia”. The deputy Major Goran Vesić said, “This parcel is located on the future route of the metro so that those who organized this did not only commit a criminal act but also endangered the construction of the metro”²⁵⁴. The director of PUS Marko Popadić announced two days after the closure of Čukarica and another few smaller wild dumps in Belgrade that the disposal of construction waste on Vinča landfill has increased by 74% and that a few million dinars were made from this. He also announced that PUS had transmitted information on the names of companies that dispose of construction waste in Vinča to the City Secretary of Urbanism²⁵⁵. The Mayor initiated the adaptation of the regulations so that one of the conditions for issuing a construction permit will be “proof on the circulation of construction waste”. In order to

increase the availability of legal disposal possibilities, the city government announced that it will open a few more legal disposal sites in Belgrade. Further, he announced, “citizens have to know that the only legal place for the disposal of construction waste is the official landfill in Vinča”.

To complete the equation of the governmentality of waste on Makiš Field I finally turn to the local Roma coordinator.

9.1.3 Governance of the Unhygienic Settlement in Makiš Field

When I met the local Roma coordinator, she was proud to show me the activities that she engaged in to contain “nuisances” of the Roma settlement in Makiš Field: “they like to throw their waste all over the place, so we put these two big containers there”, “they ran on the street a lot or came with their vehicles and blocking the traffic, so we put up a few bollards at the entrance of the settlement facing the main street”. She emphasized to be operating on a day-to-day level, as “the City government plans to remove all of the unhygienic settlements, but when exactly, that I don’t know” (Roma Coordinator Čukarica 10.9.2018). When I asked about the protest movement regarding activities in the Roma settlement of burning tires, she told me that she had asked the collectors to reduce this practice. I asked what she thought where they got the tires from and she said, they are walking in the city on the construction sites and take it from there, I guess. But if you are more interested in waste, you should go and talk to the City government, we are only the municipality” (Roma Coordinator Čukarica 10.9.2018). Same as the Roma coordinator I followed in chapter 7, the Roma coordinator in Čukarica also engaged with waste only on the level of communal order, while the fundamental questions on legality were to be discussed with higher city levels.

Her account of Roma stealing cables from construction grounds and providing containers for paper waste short-circuited complex questions of the relation of the waste economy intersecting

with urban reconstruction in Belgrade as ‘behavioral’ problems of a particular community, who form the lowest segment in the scaffold. On the other hand, her activities around “disciplining” waste handling practices, also enabled their persistence as a source of income, in that she conveyed to the collectors a sense of the markers of “nuisances” (such as open fires to burn cables) that they should avoid in order to keep living from the collection of waste.

9.2 Gambling, Mining, Gleaning: Waste Picking on a Wild Dump

“Makiš water source is a public good par excellence and on the example of Makiš the relationship of actors in Serbia and Belgrade towards so-called public goods can be analyzed, on which literally the future of this city depends ” (Ksenija Petovar, “In Search of the Public Interest: Domains of Urbanism”, Centar za Kulturnu Dekontaminaciju, 17.11.2020)

“Public awareness [of the environment] is lacking, which is why citizens do not consider waste a public good that has to be taken care of [by professionals], but rather treat it as a resource that can be infinitely exploited.” (Department for Environmental Engineering at Faculty of Technical Sciences, Novi Sad (Tot et al. 2016))

The two quotes above show how the “public good” was mobilized in manners relevant to the governance of Makiš Field. The first is a quote from the urban planner and geographer Ksenija Petovar mobilizes Makiš Field as a site to spot the worst effects of “investor urbanism”. The second is from environmental engineers at the University of Novi Sad who invoke the notion of the public good to legitimate the enclosure of waste and the ousting of “polluting” waste exploitation practices at the hands of individuals for their “private interest”.

These grand narratives about the environment, pollution, and acquisition of public land for “private interest” are crisscrossed on multiple levels through actual practices of appropriation taking place on Makiš Field. These take place in an alliance between investors, waste pickers, construction companies dodging the landfill tax, and Roma coordinators protecting livelihoods that are increasingly marginalized from the streets of Belgrade and therefore migrate in sites of

illicit urbanism. I am relating here to the work of Nguyen (2016), who has followed waste pickers in Hanoi and shows exactly how their work unfolds in conjunction with construction sites, showing how informal waste recycling shops open next to urban renewal projects. The very process of “modernizing” the city intersects with and provides the ground for livelihoods that are to be obliterated by that process.

I observed different forms of the collection of waste on Makiš Field that I divided roughly into gambling, mining, and gleaning. These are my terms and not emic. However, I have tried to coin these terms based on the accounts waste collectors gave of various waste picking practices and how they differentiated them. The valuation strategies on Makiš Field intersect with planning strategies as they try to pin down in the reality of the urban development taking place in ruins a separation between waste and value²⁵⁶.

What I will refer to in the following as “gambling” entails waste pickers “tipping” lorry drivers to bring more of the valuable construction waste to Makiš. The actual effect of “tipping” on the appearance of more valuable materials in the landfill was an issue of debate among the collectors. Gambling reminds of what Tsing describes as salvaging, where work and speculation collide²⁵⁷. Gambling is a form of the collection of waste that I observed as a strategy of those individuals, who were implicated in the management of the “wild dumping” on Makiš: it was that one family which acted as deputy guard and collected the fees from the lorry drivers.

Waste collectors who, based on their main collection strategy, I will call in the following “miners” and “gleaners”, on the other hand, regarded the “wild dump” as a common. They framed the collection of waste on a “wild dump” as a “trophy hunt” for the brave, but also required hard work. Many of them thought that the site should be open to anyone willing to do this work. These individuals opposed the practice of “tipping” lorry drivers as a selfish strategy, using money (instead of work) to appropriate valuable materials. Those engaging in “tipping”,

on the other hand, presented the practice as necessary to “preserving the dump”. They said thus that the “wild dump” is not simply a common, but that it had to be maintained, as “tipping” lorry drivers would safeguard the continuous influx of new materials. Those engaged in “tipping” also underlined their role in “maintaining” the “wild dump” by managing and trying to prevent the activities that could be perceived as “nuisance” and which in their experience were most likely to cause police intervention. Most notably, this included open burning of tires and fights among the collectors.

9.2.1 Field Entry: Meeting the Waste Pickers

A few days before my first arrival on the “wild dump” on Makiš Field, Luiza, one of my key interlocutors had posted a video of the dump on Facebook on “public”. Standing on the edge of the sandy plain, she made a slow full circle with the camera of her mobile phone. She screened Stefan waving from the driver seat of his car, with his brother leaning over to the open window. Then the camera waved further to show Stefan’s mother sitting under the umbrella gazing to the right behind her, about to put on her gloves and get up. Behind them, a huge lorry was arriving, overfilled with rubble. It passed by the camera just at hand length, followed by a cloud of dust which eventually gave way to some of the younger collectors and Luiza’s husband who emerged in the picture as they were gathering around the cargo area that was about to unload bulky concrete parts with a fulminant noise. Moving further over the vast sandy area to the woods of the swamp land and a few housing estates of Čukarica municipality visible on the horizon. The camera waved back to Stefan, who was in a discussion with his brother, and then to the rubble heap, which started being populated by the collectors. With the first tilt of the camera one could hear Luiza saying: “So that Europe will see how we Roma are living here in Serbia” (*Da Evropa vidi kako mi Romi ovde živimo*).

I think this video is significant because it points to how my interlocutors' understanding of their economic activities on the landfill was formed in a transnational field of migration, where the forced displacement from Western European countries (mostly Germany) back to Serbia was experienced as an absolute exclusion from access to paid work. The "wild dump" also assumes a prominent place within media and NGO coverage of the failure of the repatriation of Roma refugees from Western Germany. The "wild dump" and working on it has thus acquired meaning within a transnational context of migration. It is noteworthy that Luiza pointed to the conditions on the "wild dump" as "living conditions", not a working environment. This directs at an important contrast in the way how the protest movement depicted the collectors as "unconcerned" with the air pollution caused by incineration, and only interested in "private profits". Within Belgrade, they were framed as "polluters", while in addressing "Europe" Luiza emphasized work on the landfill as a symptom of exclusion of Roma in Serbia.

When I spotted the "wild dump" on Makiš Field for the first time, a bulldozer was blocking the entrance. I asked the driver whether there were any people collecting paper here, alluding to three containers of the big paper recycling company Papirservis in front of a settlement of shanties. The settlement and the containers were slightly hidden from immediate view from the street, located a bit lower where the wood began. The bulldozer driver pointed me to the sandy path leading next to the settlement to what looked to me like a construction ground. "On the landfill, down the way, there are some people collecting paper". From the street, it was difficult to identify this terrain as a landfill, but when I walked down the path winding through hills of sand and earth I arrived at a sandy plain with some heaps of construction waste balancing on the edges. From here I could see that this sandy plain was like an island growing into a swamp covered with threes. In the middle of the plain, I saw a car with all doors open and an umbrella against the sun. Next to the car in two heaps was some paper and metal scrap. A group of three

people was resting here and suspiciously watching me approach. The woman in her late fifties on the backseat and the man in the front seat were Ivanka and her oldest son, who had moved to Belgrade from a village near the city of Vranje in the south of Serbia 20 years ago. In front of their car, sitting under the umbrella on a piece of cardboard, was Sadrije, a young man who came to Belgrade from Kosovo. All of them were Roma, but the different places of origin mattered.

Ivanka lived with her family in the shanty settlement at the entrance to the landfill. They had lived there for 10 years and were regularly badly affected by the spring flooding of the nearby Danube. Their lives had changed somewhat when in 2017 the first lorries came and started filling up the swampy ground of Makiš Field with construction waste and sand and the landfill started to grow in front of their front doors. Ivanka's family had close relations with the landlord of the building ground and the bulldozer driver, who worked as a sort of janitor on the landfill. He collected the fees for disposing of 1500 dinar (12 Euro) from the lorry drivers. As I learned later, Ivanka's oldest son worked nightshifts from 7 pm to 5 am, collecting fees from lorry drivers. These close relations with the landlord gave the family privileged access to the landfill. Ivanka's oldest son recounted to me: "During the night, this place is a true idyll, it is completely silent, you can hear frogs from the swamp. I'll have a beer or two and just enjoy it, the peace, the silence (*mir, tišina*). I also collect. It is really peaceful, nothing like during the day". Also, there was Ivanka's nephew Stefan, who had developed good relations with the lorry drivers and thus regularly secured himself some materials before they were being unloaded on the landfill. Sadrije, on the other hand, was from a larger shanty settlement in a part of the wood immediately across the street from the residential area Čukarička Landslide. That settlement grew from Roma coming from Kosovo. Sadrije told me, "I did not come [to the landfill] in the beginning, because I didn't want to make problems". Ivanka and her sons told me on different

occasions, “they are unlike us, we are Serbian Roma, those are *shiptari*, Roma from Kosovo. You have to watch out, when you go to their settlement, they are saucy (*bezobrazni*)”.

Ivanka and her sons offered me to go for a coffee back to their settlement, to sit with them in the shadow of the umbrella or the car for the breaks and have a sip of cola or a chocolate bar. Sadrije and the other collectors from his settlement, on the other hand, challenged my association with Ivanka’s family from time to time in a playful manner, for example by encouraging me to collect for someone from them in front of all the other collectors including Ivanka’s family. Ivanka’s family, who was the one benefitting from my collection work, on the other hand, usually emphasized my outsider role: “she only studies what we are doing and her materials go to whomever (*idu bilo kome*)”. A third person, Radoslav, who lived in a different part of Belgrade in an informal settlement of brick houses and came by car to the landfill with his wife Luiza, both Roma from Vranje, encouraged me to collect for myself in order to gain some respect. Observing me with Ivanka’s family for a few days, without having spoken much to me, he told me: “You have to collect for yourself” and even offered “I will drive you to the recycling shop so you can sell by yourself”. One of the next days he and Luiza invited me to their house for dinner and he told me: “Now you collect for Ivanka, but behind your back, they are laughing at you (*iza leđa, oni se tebi smeju*)” and “you should not allow them to exploit you, this is your labor power (*ne smes da dozvoliš da te iskorišćavaju, to je tvoja radna snaga*)”. Radoslav and Luiza worked as street vendors, as well, with selling clothes they purchased through their own network from Germany. They had a strong sense of ownership of their labor power, where they preferred being self-employed over selling their time to someone else. When Luiza met Radoslav, she gave up her job in a bakery and joined him in being self-employed. Radoslav told me he had earned up to 400 Euro a day together with Luiza on the landfill in the beginning. Now there are too many people, especially “*shiptari*” (Albanians), he told me, which he cannot stand.

These negotiations about my labor power revealed something about the relations between Ivanka's family, Sadrije and the other collectors from Kosovo, and the street vendor couple from Vranje: their respective forms of claiming the right to be on the landfill, to collect and different work ethics. Ivanka and her family had most rights on the landfill, which seemed to stem mostly from the fact that the landfill opened and had its main path leading in front of their settlement, which enabled them to form contacts with the lorry drivers and the landlord. In the following, I will first depict the different strategies through which my interlocutors collected and then illuminate the role this work played in their lives (section 9.2.6 Livelihoods).

9.2.2 Land-Filling and Recovering Raw Materials

The work of recuperating materials from the landfill was organized mostly according to the rhythm of newly arriving lorries. When a lorry arrived, from each "team" at least one person ran to the new lorry to try to get their hands on the parts which were most easy to retrieve. If there happened to be a big block of composite concrete with steel rebars, the collectors mostly declared it to the others as "theirs" according to the principle that whoever put their hands on it first in the process of unloading. They would return later with a sledgehammer to mine the steel bars from the concrete. Attending the unloading was not only to claim materials for later recovery but also to pull out materials while being unloaded before they settled in one big inextricable heap. When a lorry was unloaded we stood around, the most courageous ones very close to the unloading, trying to grab pieces of sheet metal or electricity cables before they were buried under concrete blocks, dust, or parts of trees.

The materials on the lorries were heavy and stuck in the heaps of massive concrete blocks that were often tied together with metal and formed a complex intertwined whole that behaved in unpredictable ways whilst being unloaded. In order to uncover bits and pieces of valuable materials from the rubbish heaps, it was useful to have them spread out as much as possible so

that things would lie next to each other rather than on top of each other. The collectors pointed lorry drivers to where they should unload, mimicking ushers on a parking lot. They shouted at them to encourage that they unloaded as far as possible at the very edge of the landfill so that the waste would spread on the slide down to the swamp. Lorry drivers sometimes got stuck by driving to that very edge and the pickers shouted instructions that the drivers should unload a bit only, drive half a meter forward, unload more.

The work of recovering raw materials thus went in cooperation with the lorry drivers and under time restrictions. The unloading of construction waste was “land-filling” in the literal sense - turning a swamp covered with trees into a building ground by filling it with left-overs from other construction projects and demolished buildings from the city. The collection of waste was possible in the time window opening between a lorry unloading and the bulldozer rolling over to do the actual work of “land-filling”: pushing the heaps of rubbish down the slide to the swamp, flattening the ground of the landfill, and covering everything with a layer of sand. The materials that could not be recovered before being covered with sand and earth sedimented into the ground.

On my first day Stefan told me that the landlord was a very nice guy, he did a lot for us, "the deal is that we can work here, but we are not allowed to make mess". Stefan was the one who “kept order”. While the collection of waste was allowed, by “keeping order” Stefan was the one who would safeguard the primary purpose of the unloading of rubble, which was to turn the swamp into a building ground and not have communal police intervene because of “nuisances”. Lorry drivers approached Stephan at points to order for example that the collectors should not climb on the filled load bed to grab materials before they were unloaded. Stefan also took a leading role in directing the lorries on the landfill. Once I heard him shouting at the other collectors “since when are you the one to tell the drivers where to unload, don’t mix yourself in my affairs”.

Stefan was eager to avoid quarrels and other things that might have caused police intervention on the landfill. There were situations when the collectors were getting into fights, but it never came to physical violence. Stefan usually intervened, when he was around and it seemed to be part of his deal with the landlord where he promised to “keep order”. Being fined for fights by the police was part of the experience of some of the collectors. Stefan’s cousin once arrived on the landfill from a court hearing, where his daughter-in-law had been fined 5000 dinars for having been involved in a fight. Apart from fights, also the burning of tires of electricity cables to extract copper was a possible source of “nuisance” that could provoke police intervention on the landfill.

When we sat down for a lunch break Sadrije said, "imagine one year ago, all of this was trees and water, now, this whole terrain, all of this is waste, what we are sitting on, all waste, imagine how much there is, right under us". Sadrije’s thinking about all the materials buried underneath the flat ground somewhat reflected his, at times, idle attempts to recover materials all by himself before the bulldozer came to flatten the new heaps of rubble out and cover them with sand. He told me, “I’m doing everything by myself, you should work for me, see how many they [Ivanka’s family] are, they have enough money, you should rather work for me”.

In the following, I’m going to talk about different forms of work on the landfill that the collectors were engaging in, different valuation strategies, which I have called gambling, mining, and gleaning. These three forms did not stand easily next to each other and especially my undefined role provoked the collectors to explain the conflicts among them.

9.2.3 Gambling

Stefan behaved like the manager on the landfill: “I’m here the longest, I know all of the drivers”. He attended the unloading only sometimes, but without trying to get in a good position near the unloading to grab valuable materials. There were several situations when Ivanka

shouted at some of the collectors, who approached a newly unloading lorry, “that is Stefan’s” (*to je na Stefana*). There were also situations in which drivers gave particular items specifically to Stefan and which he then himself engaged in preparing for reselling. Once he got a stovepipe, which he meticulously cleaned from remnants of oil by burning paper sheets inside.

Stefan did not speak of him paying the drivers as buying materials from them, but as “tipping” (*častim vozačima*). That helped him to defend the practice of giving money to the lorry drivers as serving also the interests of the other pickers. It also underlined his friendly relations with the lorry drivers, which put him in a different position than all the other collectors. Consequently, his practice of “tipping” was contested by the other collectors.

The other collectors did not always accept Stefan claiming a whole lorry for himself on the grounds of having paid the lorry drivers something. In one situation, Sadrije was getting angry, when Stefan chased the others away from a lorry full of metal. Stefan tried to calm him down saying, there will be another one from the same company. When that other lorry arrived, it contained only a few pieces of sheet metal. Sadrije exclaimed, “For this, you paid 500 dinars? There is no metal at all!”.

Along with his role as “guardian of order” on the landfill, Stefan tried to defend his practice of “tipping” as something serving the common good. He also tried to establish himself as a person invoking trust in an ultimately unpredictable system of lorries coming and unloading sometimes only rubble, sometimes valuable materials. After the clash with Sadrije, Stefan explained to one of the other pickers from Kosovo “see, that lorry is from the same company” and telling me, “I’m here on the landfill from the very beginning, I know most of the drivers”. Sadrije did not accept Stefan’s self-proclaimed position. When I asked Sadrije whether he would also give money to the drivers from time to time like Stefan, Sadrije uttered frustratedly: “He got the drivers used to getting money (*navikao ih je*)”. With this, he suggested that the

lorries would come in any case to unload materials and whether or not there was something valuable in their lorries was not in the driver's power. In that sense, giving money to the drivers would only be a way of spoiling them. Getting someone used to something is also quite different from “buying materials”. With his choice of words, Sadrije signaled that he accepted Stefan’s way of putting exchange relations with the drivers as an “economy of favors”. Only that in Sadrije’s eyes, there was no favor being done.

Radoslav did not veil his contempt for the practice of “tipping”. He told me, “look, if I wanted to, I could give 2000 dinar to the lorry drivers, but I don’t want to do this. The landfill is for everyone who comes to work there. No matter how much you work there, whether you take a break or not, whether you smoke a cigarette or not, even for a small piece of metal, it belongs to everyone”. In his eyes, I should sell the materials I collected myself. I think that he encouraged me to sell by myself because that would work in favor of this principle that everybody, no matter how capable or how hard-working, should be able to take materials and sell them. This concept of work stood against Stefan’s practice, which in Radoslav’s eyes presented an attempt at manipulating the distribution of materials that in Radoslav’s perspective should happen solely based on the principle of prowess.

While Sadrije expressed once that he regretted not being able to give money to the drivers, it was clear that Sadrije’s and Radoslav’s concepts of work collided frequently with that of Stefan. Sadrije’s strategy was tied to agility, he was seemingly everywhere and nowhere at the same time. He teased me with how little metal I recovered saying jokingly “you’re running poorly (*slabo trčiš*)”. Later he explained to me, “I’m doing everything here by myself. I had a brother of mine helping, but he didn’t want to work, he only came to earn some money for cigarettes and left again. With him it was easier, I could grab metal from the lorry and he could carry it to our heap. Now I’m on my own again”. The sons of Ivanka (cousins of Stefan) made fun of Sadrije. On one occasion, Sadrije had secured himself a concrete block with rebars on

one heap and came over to the next unloading lorry and claimed another one, which one of Ivanka's sons was also interested in. Sadrije was told: "you did not even finish that one over there and already have a new one, look at you, you are quite a handyman (*ti si bre univerzalac*)". "Univerzalac" is usually used for someone who has no specific profession and who is always around for any kind of repair job if a professional craftsman would be too expensive.

Gambling opened up a line of conflict between different understandings of the landfill as a common (Sadrije and Radoslav) and one with special rights arising from an economy of favors and tipping (Stefan). Stefan tried to invoke a notion of scarcity, which legitimated the practice of tipping, while Sadrije thought of the plentiful gone to waste underneath the sand as he was not fast enough to retrieve the material before being buried.

On the other hand, "tipping" has also be understood in the context of the position of Stefan to "keep order" on the landfill. In parallel to what I argued about the Roma coordinators, "keeping order" can be seen as an attempt to safeguard the site against police intervention, and closure or eviction.

9.2.4 Mining

Once a collector had claimed a concrete bloc with rebars as theirs, they had to decompose it with a sledgehammer or at least pull it away from the waste heaps before the bulldozer came to push the heaps down the slide. Sadrije told me that decomposing a concrete block to uncover the steel rebars would be around one hour of work.

When I first saw Radoslav and Luiza on the landfill they arrived with their car and put out the speaker and music on the roof of the car. Radoslav went to explore the leftover heaps and Luiza followed him with the sledgehammer. I was sitting with Stefan and his family and we observed them from the cool place in the shadow of their car, waiting for the next lorry to arrive. Radoslav also came over when a lorry arrived, but he and Luiza made it a point that they had

come to work on the landfill. They busied themselves with searching the remnants, I could rarely see them idly waiting.

Radoslav and Luiza lived in a better settlement with brick houses and sewage a few kilometers away from the landfill. He told me that the others on the landfill were envious because he and his wife Luiza lived better than them. “Those down on the landfill are greedy, their eyes are hungry (*gladne su im oči*), they are wretched, piteous, Luiza and I, we are different from them.” Being different from the others related to work ethics and to knowing how to deal with money, to portion it, and plan in advance. “They down there on the landfill are giving all their money for drinking, gambling. We are different, we don’t drink, we don’t gamble”.

Radoslav emphasized his work ethic. “I do any kind of work, I’m not saving myself. Luiza and I, we got up at five his morning. Earlier, we had up to three loads, which we brought to the recycling shop in one day”. He told me that he and Luiza were paying 300 Euro per month together to the pension fund (*platim 300 evra mesečno radni staž za mene i Luizu*), so they have a nice life when they retire.

Sadrije and Radoslav stood in contrast to Stefan, who mostly relied on his position as guardian on the landfill and got to materials with the exertion of control, but also by managing what could be considered a just distribution of materials to avoid provoking quarrels. When Stefan had claimed one of the concrete blocks with rebars for himself and had defended it against Sadrije, Sadrije was about to leave, but Stefan shouted at him, “come back, you have to help”. Also, some of the other collectors from Kosovo helped. Sadrije told me later on, “I get the metal and Stefan the copper. Copper is our gold”.

Luiza, on the other hand, had claimed a cable, which was stuck under the concrete block and which she only got when people around Stefan moved parts of the concrete block. When Radoslav came to work on the block with the sledgehammer, Stefan told him to get his hands

off and when Radoslav confronted him, saying, “how is this possible? Now everything is yours? You are not humans (*Vi niste ljudi!*)”, Stefan tried to legitimate himself by saying, “we helped Luiza before and she got a cable”.

In Radoslav’s eyes, me collecting for Ivanka’s family was not right, I guess because it further supported them, while another person collecting for herself would support his system that anyone can come to the landfill and take materials, as long as they claim them by way of engaging their own labor power.

The process of mining went under severe time restrictions because most of the collectors would have to also run to newly arriving lorries and thus could not afford to work continuously on uncovering one piece of metal from the concrete blocks. Moreover, the time for uncovering materials from the heaps was restricted by the work of the bulldozer, who came a few times a day to push the new heaps down the slide to the swamp. The bulldozer did not simply mark the end of the collection time, but also intersected with it sometimes. Luiza and Sadrije explicitly asked the bulldozer driver for help on some occasions. Once Sadrije tied the end of a metal stick going through three massive, loosely connected concrete blocks to the shovel of the bulldozer and the driver rode backward, the stick unlocked itself from the shovel, the driver came back a bit and one more attempt, this time successful. Luiza stood once on the side of the bulldozer, driving together with him over to a heap, where she had found something.

Miners, especially Radoslav emphasized his work ethic, his ability to dispose of his labor power and money in a calculated way, which made him and Luiza different from Ivanka and Stefan. For Radoslav, the landfill was a site where everyone with work ethics could earn some money and he despised Ivanka and Stefan for framing the collection work in terms of relationships and favors, which became obvious when he expressed his disapproval of me

collecting for them and encouraging me to be my own person on the landfill independent from Ivanka's family.

9.2.5 *Gleaning*

In her film 'The Gleaners and I' Agnes Varda (2000) described gleaning as the work of collecting leftover vegetables and fruits after the main harvest is done. This description is very fitful for the type of work done by the least powerful actors on the landfill, which were a group of under-aged boys from Kosovo, who collected mostly sundries, small items that were interesting to them for re-use, or less valuable materials or smaller amounts for selling and sometimes assisted Sadrije.

The land-filling that was done by the bulldozer oftentimes eased and enabled a particular type of recovery of raw materials. When the bulldozer came to spread the heaps a group of boys from Kosovo started to collect among what the others had left behind. While they were not in the position to engage in recovering materials from big concrete blocks ("mining") they playfully mimicked that type of work, pretending that, like with the older collectors, the bulldozer driver had helped them in their work. They ran around the bulldozer while it was "cleaning up" and shouted at old driver: "Granny, you are my sun! (*Deda, ti si moje sunce!*) Look what I found thanks to you!".

Gleaners collected the kind of materials that the others left, for example, brass hinges in doors and windows or items with use-value. One of the gleaners found little bottles of shampoo, which he opened for us to smell and shared with the others.

Radoslav and the Ivanka occasionally made fun of the collectors from Kosovo. The jokes suggested that collectors from Kosovo were not in the position to properly differentiate between what is only "rubble" - worthless in the eyes of the collectors - and what is steel rebars. When the younger collectors from Kosovo ran over to a lorry, which in Radoslav's estimation

did not have any valuable loading he imitated them euphorically shouting “*rashevina, rashevina*” (instead of *ruševina*, Serbian for rubble) and turning to me, saying, “*nepismeni su*” (they are illiterate). And one of Ivanka’s sons who sat next to us shouted jokingly “*ramatura*” (instead of *armatura*, Serbian for steel rebars). From collecting next to Sadrije and the boys from Kosovo I had seen that they are joking with this, it became like a dictum, when a new lorry arrived one of them would shout ‘*ajmo! Rashevina!*’ (let’s go! (new) rubble!).

On the landfill plastic bottles and paper were also an item for gleaning.

Plastic bottles contained in construction waste were usually of bad quality (dirty and scratched), but still, one could find them and fill a few sacks within a few hours. Ivanka had done that once on a day when not many lorries were arriving and those that came contained nothing valuable. She and one of her sons then left to go with the car through the nearby residential neighborhood and collect bottles from the containers. They did this when there was not much in the landfill. Another situation that showed that plastic bottles were an item for gleaning on the landfill (that is an item not having much worth, demanding meticulous labor for collecting), was when an older Serbian woman appeared on the landfill one day. She stood a bit shyly next to the other collectors, not engaging in any conversation with them, observing and taking plastic bottles. She told me “I came to look what the Gypsies are doing here”. When I asked her, why she would not take metal, she told me “metal only to those who may take it”, indicating that she did not feel entitled to the metal. This underlines the position of the practice of gleaning on the landfill, reserved to the least valuable materials and least powerful populations within the hierarchy established on the landfill, with a Serbian Roma family on top.

Cardboard served from time to time for some of the collectors to build windbreaks on the landfill or protect themselves from the sun. During my time on the landfill, it was only collected once for selling. A lorry arrived with a rather untypical load, items from a decluttering of a

school, as it seemed from the books, posters, and boxes with whole collections of photo negatives and drawers filled with file cards. I arrived on that morning just after that lorry had left and stood a bit clueless next to Ivanka, two of her sons, and Sadrije, who were busy collecting. I started roaming through the materials, looking at some of the books and Sadrije used that moment of idleness to encourage me to work for him: “I’m collecting paper, you can throw that here”. I started taking different sorts of cardboard and throwing them over to him. He pointed out to me, “see that heap of white paper, take that”. I asked him whether he would separate the paper because the price for white office paper is higher than that for cardboard. He told me, no, I would never get enough of that office paper here to sell it separately. With another book in my hands, Stefan told me, we are taking books to the fleamarket, you can give those to me. When Sadrije protested, saying, but I’m collecting paper, I said a bit awkwardly, but this is a book and Stefan joined me, saying, she is right, this is a book, you collect paper, and the case was closed, the book went to Stefan.

From that lorry, Sadrije got his whole van filled with paper and drove off immediately to the Papirservis recycling shop next to the landfill to sell it. When he came back, Ivanka confronted him, “how much did you get for the paper? Did you at least bring us some juice?”. And later when Sadrije sat down in his van to eat some bread, Ivanka shouted at him “first you sold that paper all by yourself and now you are stuffing yourself with bread (*sad trpaš hleb u sebe*)” in a way making clear that she considered him selfish. This shows another dimension of what I understand how “gleaning” is different from collecting, as the items from gleaning are more spread out over the landfill, less easily claimed as property of one person and when one person takes it, it is still somehow considered as creating value that should not only serve that person. The fact that this lorry bringing waste from a decluttering was a matter of chance or good luck made it something that all should benefit from equally. But also, and this is what I turn to in the next section, was Sadrije dependent on Ivanka’s family in various ways, which accounts

for both why he could not easily take something only for his own profit and why Ivanka's sons belittled Sadrije's acting agile because they considered him less powerful.

9.2.6 Livelihoods

The work on the landfill was of very different qualities for each of the collectors. This can be understood from the way they framed the landfill as compared to other sources of livelihood they had engaged in, as well as the relations the collectors had with each other.

As I mentioned above, Radoslav and Luiza were working as street vendors and paid into the pension fund as self-employed. While Radoslav had found a way to have a portion of his economic activities formalized (he held a license to work as a musician and for vending) and pointed to the comforts of his life organized entirely outside the realm of waged labor, on his own virtues (hard work, friendly relations with people around him), Stefan and his cousins were caught in an ambivalence between seeking employment (abroad) and the collection of waste as an income strategy next to social benefits. Stefan told me for someone like him, Roma, to be employed on a permanent contract in Serbia, he would have to pay at least 3000 Euro to the employer.

Due to my fieldwork positionality as a white, middle-class person, whom the collectors assumed to have a permanent flow of income, most likely from work that can be considered “clean”, my appearance on the landfill was followed by some with joking comments, by others with aggressiveness. These comments gave me insights into what type of income-generating activity the collection of waste was in relation to other strategies.

On my third day on the “wild dump”, I met Robert. It was clear that he had not come to collect. Different from the others, he was well-dressed, with spotless sneakers and a colorful cap, sitting loosely on his head. He was not dressed for collecting, which demands a lot of bending down, climbing through sharp and oily items, and sometimes even running. He watched us for a

moment from the side, and then planted himself in front of me, asking me what I was doing here, where I was from, and then how much my monthly pay was (*koliko ti je plata*). The question about my monthly pay was also brought up by the others, but in a more joking manner: “look how little she collected, but ok, she has a monthly pay (*ona ima platu*)”. Some of the others intervened, asking Robert, “why did you come? You’re collecting?”. He made a face at this and left soon after. The next day when I arrived, he was dressed in more shabby clothes, like the rest of us, and was collecting. He cursed when he saw me and violently dragged and threw items from the heap in a way I had to step back not to be coincidentally hit. The youngest among the boys from Kosovo, Ferdie, worryingly looked at me, checking whether I had heard what Robert was saying and told him, “but she is a girl”. When we were walking over with what we had collected to our respective collection points in the middle of the landfill, Robert asked me whether I was doing any sport, like self-defense, in case someone would attack me physically. I asked back, “who would attack me?”, and he said, “god forbid someone attacks you”. On his third day, it seemed he had made peace both with me and the collection work. While he was decomposing window frames that the others had left behind, he pointed me to the hinges explaining, “these are brazen, brass is 250 dinar a kilo”.

While on the first day he came to check the landfill as a potential place to work and regarded me as an invader, maybe even a barrier to him coming back, on the second day I felt there was a moment of shame, which he transformed into aggressiveness, while on the third day it seemed that he had settled in a position on the landfill (like the other boys from Kosovo mostly among the gleaners) and he connected with me on the grounds of shared work. He told me that he had been cleaning car windows on the traffic lights before and now wanted to see how much he could get here on the landfill.

Sadrije made a living on the landfill in a position that seemed subordinate to Stefan and his family. Sadrije owed money to Stefan and his family and they, in turn, enjoyed asking favors

from him. On one occasion, for example, they asked Sadrije to pull with this car a concrete block. Stefan's cousin standing next to me, observing the scene, told me, "yeah, I'm not doing this, it usually ruins the engine". In another situation, Stefan had asked Sadrije to get something to eat and to drink and told him, "you can take my car", as an incentive. When Sadrije asked for money, Stefan responded, "I just wanted one energy drink, that much you can certainly afford to buy for me, no?". After Sadrije had come back with quite a lot items from the bakery, and he and Stefan's family sat down to eat, Stefan's cousin got up when I went over to them and pressed a piece of bread in my hand with a smirk on his face, "here, eat this, Sadrije has thrown a round today (*Sadrije je častio danas*), it is his birthday".

The debt that Sadrije had towards Stefan did not easily translate, however, into a clear division of claims to materials on the landfill. One day, when Stefan and Sadrije were in a fight over one concrete block with steel rebars, I heard Sadrije saying, "ok, I will return you the money, but don't you curse my children for a piece of metal", and Stefan responded, "this is not about that money, this is about you being greedy". As the person in charge of "keeping order", Stefan tried to calm down the quarrel quickly. It is thus clear that his position made Stefan both more powerful but also vulnerable to the other waste collectors' readiness to stick to his regiment of "keeping order" and not engage in quarrels.

Finally, and here I return to the opening scene, the collection of waste had an element of shame and secretness to it. When Ivanka saw me overhearing the conversation between Stefan and Sadrije she snapped at me, "see, how we are fighting over a piece of metal? I even hurt my leg here". I think this can be read as an attempt at preempting what she thought I must have thought about the scene. She invoked how fighting over something that could not be perceived as valuable by me, a white middle class person with a monthly income, could earn my ridicule and invoke racialized beliefs about Roma as "uncivilized". This was the form of ridicule that Stefan and the others had used against the collectors from Kosovo. On the one hand, by adding

that she had hurt her leg, she addressed me as someone who had seen herself how physically exhausting and also dangerous the work on the landfill was. In that she put me in the shoes of a witness, with a role similar to Luiza's video addressed at "Europe", who would share the perspective on this work as inhumane.

9.3 Conclusions

The enclosure of communal waste and criminalization of waste picking as polluting has created new sites and new practices of waste collection (gambling, mining, and gleaning on a "wild dump"). One of them is the "wild dump", where the risk of police intervention tied to the presence or absence of "nuisances" created a specific racialized niche within which Roma and white Serbian population engaged in the extraction of values. As Roma and other marginalized populations started extracting valuable wastes from the "wild dump" they created a system of valuation that intersected with the purpose of construction companies to dodge the landfill tax and the agenda of the landlord to get cheap "land-filling" for a construction project.

I have shown in this chapter how waste collection changes in relation to the site it takes place. The "wild dump" is governmentalized in specific ways that affected waste collection and created a hierarchy of collection strategies and entrenched the racialized division between Serbian and Kosovo Roma. Stefan engaged in the role of guardian of order, which enabled the symbiosis between "investor urbanism" creating a high-risk environment from where marginalized populations could extract values. While his role of gate-keeper gave him privileged access to certain materials, he was most aware of the conditions under which waste collection could take place (prevent the spreading of nuisances), while the other collectors had only their labor power, but regarded the "wild dump" as a common.

Conclusion

This thesis has discussed the changing ways in which city-making has shaped the collection of valuable wastes along the work/non-work spectrum over the course of about half a century. Based on this I would suggest a perspective on the frontier as a place generative of alternative futures that are easily forgotten when focusing only on the history of work proper and the city proper. This is to suggest yet another interpretation of my title “civilizing waste”. If we free “civilization” from all the baggage it brings with it, and look at it as basically concerned with questions of “how to live together”, then a focus on waste (both literal communal waste and built structures that are going to waste, foreseen for demolition) and retrieving valuable elements from waste, can generate imaginations about alternative futures. In that sense waste can be “civilizing” in the sense of imagining alternative futures of how to live together – a question inspired following Anna Tsing’s interest in the possibilities of life in the ruins of capitalism (Tsing 2015).

In chapter 2 I have shown how city planners build “primitive settlements” as “temporary structures” that were then actually entrenched by practices of social policy where richer municipalities transferred poor inhabitants to those settlements as a way to manage claimants on social protection, but through those practices making temporariness pretty permanent. For inhabitants of those settlements, they were a way to realize a life in the city with their families, when their place of employment actually wanted to frame them as “bachelors”. As I have shown in chapter 3, not all workers were in a position to realize this alternative life and some, like the warehouse worker “Shock” at PSS, actually remained in the position a migrant worker whose temporary arrangement of traveling back and forth between home (where his family was) and work became a durable structure of 20 years. Notably, “Shock” was a worker who knew where to obtain replacement parts for the PSS company when no one else knew – we can

assume here that he was drawing on the petty economy in “useful wastes”. He was thus someone who stitched together worlds of artisan production (drawing their raw materials from junk shops as primary raw materials were reserved for industrial production) and socialist sector, being an agent at the frontier.

In chapter 4 I have shown how the trade with “useful wastes” offered a vista into an economy in crisis, where industry gave away precious primary raw materials and semi-finished products as they were lying around in their yards unused. The policing surveillance of the inspection framed the trade with “useful wastes” through the lens of theft, upholding a vision of the economy as one where primary raw materials would not go to waste. Junk shops re-distributed those materials to the artisan sector, which was excluded by the industry-focused economic policy from engaging in import-export or tapping into primary raw materials. In that junk, shops supported and enacted an alternative future of the economy. The relation between work, non-work, and city-making is shaped here also by the inspection, which occupies an ambivalent position of both policing certain businesses and workers as non-urban, but on the other hand, collects fines as contributions for the city budget from them.

In chapter 5 I have discussed how the collection of valuable waste transitioned from a professional activity of the “non-resident” population to a side-income for the urban working-class proper and its dependents. Waste companies acted on this frontier to change the collection of waste as a side-income, but at the same time, also pushing waste collectors out of the realm of legislation and entitlement to insurance contributions.

In chapter 7 I have shown how Roma Coordinators are mobilizing the city as an assemblage of structures from different eras that can serve as an asset for them. I have shown in chapter 8 how this logic of asset-making and making themselves indispensable also shaped their work as brokers. In both capacities they are doing the work of stitching together disparate elements and

thereby create the way in which work and non-work relate to each other, are articulated together as well as planned and unplanned structures in the city, how they relate to each other, suggesting a practice that intertwines city-making as a multi-actor process rather than one led by one powerful actor with a clear-cut, single-purpose agenda (“investor urbanism”, “Roma Urbanism”). Without the power of an international humanitarian organization such as OSCE, Roma Coordinators are creating ways of living together that are built on inter-twining rather than singling out one target group or built structure (as I have shown in chapter 7, on how Roma Coordinators went about spotting “communal problems” and thus effectively representing not only Roma but also other minorities living in substandard settlements). In their position they work as translators, imagining and enacting how structures of the past can be an element for a possible future (“urban villages”).

Looking at the frontier between work and non-work from the perspective of Roma Coordinators makes clear that they are both gatekeepers (reinforcing structures that exclude a specific population from full citizenship in the city) and translators (weaving together disparate elements to make a different whole that has specific imaginations of the future attached to it that diverge from what more dominant actors would imagine the city to develop towards). The frontier is in that sense a place that is generative of alternative futures, which are practiced already in those places: Roma Coordinators weaving together substandard settlements of different minorities through the shared lens of the problem of water management or by building a channel system that might be perceived as “primitive” by urban planners, but offered an adaptation to lives on a swamp.

In chapter 9 I show that in sites of reconstruction of the city, in my ethnography to a group of waste pickers who live and make a living on a swamp. Following the work of Williams (2003) who describes how Roma in France perceive the world of the *gadje* (white people) as one of

abundance, we can see waste as offering a vista on alternative perceptions of the economy. The *manuš* (“person” in Romani) see the plentiful where the *gadje* only grasp pollution.

Waste is a place of friction from where alternative futures emerge for how city-making, work, and non-work articulate. Which types of work are regarded as essential for the city and which are marginalized and weaved back in through practices that are rendered mundane or even invisible? The frontier is structured by “frontline workers” such as Roma Coordinators that engage in the work of “stitching together” seemingly disparate elements. Far from insignificant this seemingly mundane practice changes the fabric of the social and “weaves back in” practices deemed as “polluting” (in the case of Makiš Field) and built structures that are foreseen for “removal”. Instead of spectacular claims that no one should live on a swamp, “stitching together” offers a perspective on a world where people do actually live in such conditions. I am drawing here on the concepts of Anna Tsing “Life in the Ruins of Capitalism” (Tsing 2015). There is a fine line between seeing “stitching together” as conservative practice or viewing it as a mundane practice that changes the social fabric to create alternative futures. Following feminist Marxists who work on reproductive activities, we can think here of what is declared as “maintenance work” not as contributing to a preconceived status quo, but as maintenance in the sense of creative acts of maintaining lives under changing conditions such as pollution and climate change.

My thesis has made several contributions.

I started with a lens on changing forms of waste work inspired by Gille’s (2007) notion of “waste regimes”. When I found the journal of the Yugoslav Association of Companies Supplying Industry with Raw Materials from Waste (INOT), I noticed how the journal changed its name from “Raw Materials from Waste” to “Secondary Raw Materials” in 1975, which seemed to correspond to one of the major shifts Gille had identified for Hungary, the movement

from metal to efficiency regime in conjunction with the global energy crisis. However, what stuck out from the very first issue of the journal from July 1965 that I opened was a concern of waste companies that federal policies towards the collection of waste conflicted with municipal policies regarding hygiene, unemployed, and the petty economy. One of the main ideas of the waste regimes, that they re-define what exactly waste is, was of interest for me throughout the thesis, but I focused on struggles around the definition, very often at the local level, rather than the big discursive formations.

By way of focusing on urban citizenship (implying that there are people who do not belong) and city-making projects (in the plural), my approach is inherently interested in conflict and the making of divisions, which, in the field of the collection of valuable wastes oftentimes express themselves through framing of this activity as work and other times non-work. While Gille was interested in the specific ascriptions of wastefulness to socialism and to question the differentiation from capitalism thus made, my interest is how “wastefulness”, polluting waste handling practices, or speculation with raw material prices was mobilized to entrench divisions in citizenship and support particular city-making projects, which in and of themselves were sometimes contested as to whether they were socialist or tipping into capitalism. The starting point of my thesis, the 1965 economic reform, marked the beginning of a series of contestation about the role of the market in the socialist city and the collection of valuable wastes was one of the sites where these struggles were fought out.

The role of the market was understood in relation to another dimension of decentralization, which was socialization. The relation between market and socialized goods is apparent in the service sector and the maintenance of public hygiene. In my thesis, I have suggested seeing both sides of decentralization as entrenching a form of liberal market-oriented governance that helped establish ideas of competition and “economic relations between municipality and

citizens”, rather than one of marketization and counter-movement (socialization). I have argued that both socialization and marketization were part of building a specific urban polis and maintaining the excluded status of “polluting” or “uncivilized others”.

Research on decentralization as a strategy of coping with the negative effects of world market integration and accelerating debt has mostly emphasized how national borders were enforced. Research has engaged intensely with how socialist Yugoslavia entrenched rural-urban division and led to intense othering of rural-urban migrants as well as the question of whether the Yugoslav secessionary wars were a “revenge of the countryside” (Allcock 2002; Bougarel 1999; Vujović 2000). Less research has been done on how decentralization hinged on entrenching the uneven development between different municipalities, which can be seen from the policing and othering of internal migrants. By focusing on the municipality as an agent in the production and entrenchment of uneven development, especially the self-financing municipality created in 1965, my research slightly differs from what has been done. I focus on how after the market liberalization the provisioning of basic services, including maintenance of public hygiene depended on the construction of a specific urban polis around notions of civility, forging alliances with specific subjects and excluding Others, secured by a specific type of urban governance tied to the self-financing municipality. Belgrade as the capital city was at the forefront of both nationalist and rural-urban segregation. But my argument, following LeNormand (2008), is that Belgrade oftentimes served as a laboratory to test specific policies to solve various forms of crises shared by Yugoslav cities after the 1965 turn to the “self-financing municipality”.

The othering of internal migrants was based on a (quasi-) racializing discourse and suggests further research into Baker’s (2018) thesis on the racialization of rural-urban migrants. While I do highlight the mobilization of ethnicity where it came up in the archival material, most

material hinges on rural-urban as a form of racialization. In her work on the governance of populations from rural Kosovo as a creation of a Yugoslav underclass Stroehle (2016) points out how the precarity of their lives effectively exempted them from “normal biographies”. In chapter 2 I discuss the introduction of “cheap settlements” and “mobile schools” as policy instruments that legitimated the exclusion from ‘normal biographies’ for a certain population and entrenched ‘unhygienic settlements’ as an urban space that enabled the normalization of live-forms outside the protected forms of reproduction that the ‘urban working-class proper’ was entitled to – a development closely tied to the emergence of Yugoslav urban sociology. “Primitive settlements” can be seen as part of those technologies that created a Yugoslav underclass in that they maintained the status of certain populations as “floating” and “temporariness” legitimated their exclusion from full citizenship.

One possible, yet underdeveloped contribution can be to trace back the emergence of a particular racialized form of “governing through community” since the emergence of Yugoslav urban sociology to the installation of Roma Coordinators charged with policing and provisioning of “unhygienic settlements”. Following these settlements since the mid-1960s, when they were first integrated into urban planning, we see how these places were charged with successive, partially overlapping governmentalities, from settlements of floating populations to humanitarian governance directed at them as “informal refugee centers”. The continuity of those places as gathering areas for the “non-resident” population raises attention to the ways in which mobility is differently marked and policed, showing the continuity of the differentiation into legitimate and non-legitimate forms of mobility in specific political, economic, and racial configurations.

The establishment of “primitive settlements” in conjunction with the foundation of Yugoslav urban sociology offers a vista into the territorialization of poverty (Roy and Crane 2015) as a

precondition to a very neatly demarcated concept of “public good”. The territorialization of poverty splits up urban territory in different communities, with different rights and “risks” attached to them. This is how the territorialization of poverty supports the governance through community, which replaces concern for the social body as a whole (Rose 2001).

Building on earlier work that has investigated Roma settlements through the lens of the “state of exception” (Picker and Roccheggiani 2014; Daniele 2011), in this thesis, I investigated the “temporality” of particular build structures and planning decisions as an instrument of power, showing that temporality can open up to arbitrary, practically racializing practices that are not mentioned in any legal text and that temporality is a tool of power not only in extreme cases of the “state of exception”. Marking structures as permanent or temporary opens them up for different forms of manipulation and exertion of power.

Refracting the “public good” through the lens of “governing through community” in the sense of Agrawal (2005) who showed how ‘community governance’ is a particular form of appropriating value that is part of the value chain, I have hinted at the double-bind of the commons, both as a place of domination and part of possible counter-movements (Kalb and Mollona 2018).

In the opening chapter on the socialist entrepreneurial city, I have demonstrated how the relationship between “public good” and “private interest” is negotiated at the level of the city in ways that diverge from federal policy. This became most apparent from the debates around public service fees and price regulation in the course of world market integration. What counts as ‘private enrichment’ is seen differently at different levels of the state.

The types of ‘private enrichment’ discussed in chapters 2-5 fall into the realm of the droit de police, which targets specific, typically local, ever-changing situations, typically situations of disorder rather than crime (Neocleous 2000; Aleksić 2016). This can be seen with regard to

street vendors, on whom inspection turns a blind eye, or individual home builders. In chapter 2 I have shown how the possibility for policing ‘disorder’ in the hands of inspection, that is attuned to *droit de police*, rests on the availability of certain infrastructure, institutions, and forms of knowing readily available for an inspector to judge a phenomenon as disorder and execute the decision. Setting up markets of infrastructurally prepared plots of building land, establishing vending zones, and pathologizing those who did not participate in these markets in the form of ‘wild settlements’ under the purview of urban sociologists are ways to sharpen the distinction between ‘common good’ and ‘private enrichment’ and turn ‘disorder’ into ‘crime’. In this way, informal homeowners, engaging in an act of civil disobedience to claim their constitutional right to free movement and claiming an identity as “prosecuted, and discriminated against citizens” were transformed into “speculators”.

Urban planners and police are effectively working at the frontier in a way aiming at canceling out alternative futures from arising. However, in their attempts to realize the city proper they encounter friction and get enmeshed in a plethora of alternative projects of city-making and activities around the re-claiming of materials and built structures foreseen for demolition and waste. As in Goldstein’s (2015, 198) words, on the “persistence of poverty” as a “constitutive dilemma for the idea of historical progress”, I would argue that through the lens of waste we can see a plethora of activities and structures of enmeshment that challenge dominant narratives of hygiene and pollution, progress and backwardness, past and future.

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Notes

¹ EASA 2016 Panel on Anthropology of Unemployment

² See for example Roediger (2007) on a historical study on how the introduction of wage labor was reconciled with the political ideology of liberalism by way of

³ The Standing Conference of Towns was an voluntary association of local politicians that had no decision making power. The professional journal of the SKG Komuna, which contains pieces written by local officials, by town planners and other experts in urban governance as well as reports of the regular meetings of the SKG give an important insight into trends and changes in Yugoslav urban policy making.

⁴ Komuna 05/1967 “Some Methodological and Economic Aspects of the Development of the Regional Spatial Plan of Belgrade”, Aleksandar Trujić, Deputy Director of the Urban Institute for Societal Planning, Belgrade, my translation.

⁵ This is the case for example with the extension of the Belgrade Fair for which the City planned to offer land to favorable conditions (Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 30.09.1969).

⁶ Komuna 08/1965 “Support for the Commune – One of the Basic Preconditions for the Success of the Reform”, Presentation of the Federal Secretary for Finance on the IX. Meeting of the SKG Yugoslavia, Kiro Gligorov, my translation.

⁷ Komuna 08/1965 “Support for the Commune – One of the Basic Preconditions for the Success of the Reform”, Presentation of the Federal Secretary for Finance on the IX. Meeting of the SKG Yugoslavia, Kiro Gligorov, my translation.

⁸ Komuna 08/1965 “Support for the Commune – One of the Basic Preconditions for the Success of the Reform”, Presentation of the Federal Secretary for Finance on the IX. Meeting of the SKG Yugoslavia, Kiro Gligorov, my translation.

⁹ Komuna 09/1965 “Economic Reform and Spatial Planning”, Branislav Piha, my translation.

¹⁰ Javna Higijena 03/1973 “Unsustainable Perceptions”

¹¹ Javna Higijena 03/1973 “Unsustainable Perceptions”

¹² “The company has [now] overshadowed the municipality and figures as an independent and most important factor in the commune. The funds of the companies are large and the company is able to solve its most important problems with them, and the municipality has only the budget at its disposal with which (according to the voters’ councils) to solve the most important tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. A large company solves its problems first ... What is outside the ‘fence’ of the company is less important and is required to be addressed by the municipality. I must admit, however, that in recent times there has been a growing belief among companies that ‘municipal problems’ are in fact problems of every working organization and that everyone must participate in solving them” (Komuna 04/1966 “How to Source Funds in the Commune – the Relations Between Big Companies and Small Municipalities”, Husein Hadžić, President of the City Assembly Priboj na Limu, my translation.)

¹³ “The transition of the period when the municipality played a major role in the formation of funds and their distribution, to the period when such a role ceases, was very abrupt and municipalities entered it quite unprepared ... The very persistent belief of citizens and working organizations that the municipality is obliged to solve a number of tasks ... and the practical inability of the municipality [to fulfill them], leads to a number of conflicts between municipal authorities on the one hand, and citizens and labor organizations on the other” (Komuna 04/1966 “How to Source Funds in the Commune – the Relations Between Big Companies and Small Municipalities”, Husein Hadžić, President of the City Assembly Priboj na Limu, my translation), “According to one, the municipality – in fact the City Hall – came in a very non-emulous material position, because it is not capable to ... realize those functions which it is assigned by the Constitution. According to another opinion, the practice shows to an increasing degree that municipalities should not develop with wider functions of managing socio-economic relations, because processes in those relations are carried by other forces of the society, so the functions of the municipality shall be reduced to a few functions typical and already realized in the traditional forms of local government. As a result of these opinions two opposed claims emerge: [some] claim a ‘strong’ City Hall ... others negate almost all functions of the municipality and attribute many sins of the current economic development to the ‘strong’ municipality.” (Komuna 10/1965 “Material Position of the Commune under the new conditions. On the occasion of the consultation of the Standing Conference of Cities”, my translation)

¹⁴ Komuna 04/1966 “How to Source Funds in the Commune – the Relations Between Big Companies and Small Municipalities”, Husein Hadžić, President of the City Assembly Priboj na Limu, my translation.

¹⁵ “Indisputably, communal organizations on their side contributed to such a reaction of the federation. They had the support of the City Assemblies in setting new prices of communal services and goods. Together they tried to solve, with the help of the reform, to solve aggregate problems in this area. However, such a big problem cannot

be solved in a short period, or through price increase only.” (Komuna 09/1965 “Economic Reform and Spatial Planning”, Branislav Piha, my translation)

¹⁶ “For such interventions an urban plan is necessary which would recognize exactly those needs of the communal services. With its help conditions can be created that would remove disproportions and secure a rational and economic grid communal installations in the city. Otherwise, the work without an urban plan won’t give any guarantee that the difficulties will be removed. Because of that, the reform especially emphasized the dependency of the communal economy and its transactions from urban plans” (Komuna 09/1965 “Economic Reform and Spatial Planning”, Branislav Piha, my translation)

¹⁷ Komuna 09/1965 “Economic Reform and Spatial Planning”, Branislav Piha, my translation.

¹⁸ Komuna 10/1965 “The Role of the Municipality in the Spatial Directing of Cities after the Economic Reform”, Branislav Piha, my translation.

¹⁹ Komuna 10/1965 “The Material Position of the Commune Under the New Conditions. On the Occasion of the Consultation of the Standing Conference of Cities”, my translation.

²⁰ Komuna 10/1965 “The Role of the Municipality in the Spatial Directing of Cities After the Economic Reform”, Branislav Piha, my translation.

²¹ Komuna 12/1965 “The Position of the Municipality under the New Conditions”, Dušan Stefanović, my translation.

²² Komuna 10/1965 “Material Position of the Commune Under the new Conditions. On the Occasion of the Consultation of the Standing Conference of Cities”, my translation.

²³ Komuna 11/1967 “Special Issue: Material Position of the Municipality and Ways for its Self-Financing, p.10, “Land Politics”, my translation.

²⁴ Komuna 12/1965 “The Position of the Municipality under the New Conditions”, Dušan Stefanović, my translation.

²⁵ Komuna 12/1967 “Some Problems of Business Space and Land Rent in Belgrade”, Gavro Marjanović, my translation.

²⁶ Komuna 12/1965 “Position of the Municipality under the New Conditions. Consultation of the Standing Conference of Towns”, my translation.

²⁷ Komuna 11/1967 “Special Issue of Komuna: Material Position of the Municipality and Methods for its Self-Financing”, my translation.

²⁸ In Yugoslav political economic thought the notion of “decentralization” had several meanings, one of them meant “marketization” (Woodward 1995).

²⁹ Local self-management (*lokalna samouprava*) is curiously translated as “social self-management” in the American translation of the Program of the League of Communists (Pribechevich 1958)

³⁰ “In the period 1955—1964, however, the number of private establishments and of the staff and apprentices employed in them fell off. The number of establishments decreased by 34 per cent, of workers by 43 per cent, and of apprentices by 68 per cent. It should, however, be borne in mind that the capacity of private trades was actually greater as in these years there was a considerable amount of “moonlighting” in the private sector. This is seen in the number of unregistered workers and in the existence of unregistered workshops. It is estimated that over 30 per cent of personal services, repairs and the like was performed by ‘moonlighting’”(Vraneš 1969, 51f.).

³¹ “the socialist neighborhood continued to rely on the private services provided by craftsmen in the old bazaar, although these were constantly tarred for being particularly susceptible to economic crimes (tax evasion, poor labor conditions), poor services, and long waiting times. Modern canteens were one of the emblematic modern services residential communities were supposed to provide, but instead, various private chickpea and seed sellers with deplorable hygienic conditions mushroomed in the city.” (Troch 2019, 9)

³² Komuna 2/1966, The Standing Conference of Towns and the International Union of Local Authorities, Miladin Šakić.

³³ The role of decentralization and liberal governance of resources and local economies has been examined by Arjun Agrawal in relation to community forest management in India. Why apply research on a rural policy in South Asia to urban Yugoslavia? The reference is not arbitrary. It can be traced back to India’s and Yugoslavia’s shared history with decentralized governance. Again, my focus is not on policy mobilities, but I find it illuminating that Agrawal began his work on decentralized governance with a report on the roots of the policy in South Asia and West Africa (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). There he cites as decisive influence for the development of decentralization as a globally travelling policy the “Report to the United States Agency for International Development by the Project on Managing Decentralisation” (Cohen et al. 1981), which is based on American planner John W. Dyckman’s experience in Yugoslavia of 1981. This hints at the roots of this policy in urban Yugoslavia, where it was studied by American urban planners in the American-Yugoslav Project funded by the Ford Foundation. American planners studied participatory forms of governance both in urban Yugoslavia and in urban India, but later it became mostly associated with rural Global South (Immerwahr 2015). My research suggests looking at the hidden, socialist-urban roots of decentralization policy.

³⁴ These goods were “preferential transport, low prices of cultural and communal services (apartment rents, reduced coal prices), child benefits, social insurance” (Vukmanović Tempo 1972).

³⁵ Economist, Yugoslav politician at Federal level, considered main creator of Yugoslav self-management.

³⁶ Aleksandar Pavlović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall of Belgrade, 15.12.1966, my translation.

³⁷ Aleksandar Pavlović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall of Belgrade, 15.12.1966, my translation.

³⁸ In a debate on ‘wild settlements’ Dusan Maletić argued that after the First World War, Yugoslavia had 15% population in the cities and 85% in the countryside. Now (in 1966), the percentage of urban population had doubled (30%), but at the same time the rural population has fallen to 50%. “that means that there emerges a huge mass of 20% of the population which is not integrated in any way. These are people which are half in the city and half in the village, which present a constant and permanent danger and on the other hand, it is exactly from this milieu that all of these illegal constructions originate” (Dusan Maletić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 2.6.1966, my translation).

³⁹ Djordjević 1966, Problems of Urban Development of Belgrade, pp.13f., quoted in LeNormand (2006, 263).

⁴⁰ Many companies at that time provided their workers that came from the inner country only with single rooms in bachelor hotels. I will come back to this point in chapter 2 on how Public Sanitation Service workers lived.

⁴¹ “We have means in the City Employment Office and now all of the companies before acquisition (pred stecajem) to receive from this fund so not to abandon 100 or 200 workers. I am not in favor of covering something that we are not sure, whether it will survive or not. We do not need activities of that kind which create big accumulation, but everyday services to our citizens, means that can create their own return on investment (*sama sebe obrće*).” (Branko Pešić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assmby Belgrade, 25.4.1968, my translation).

⁴² “The system of unemployment relief entails many benefits — special cash benefits, free-of-charge health care (including dependents), children’s allowance, the right to so-called training for employment (vocational training, training for higher skills,11 reimbursement of transport and moving expenses for those who must change their place of work and residence for the purpose of employment), a lump cash grant in specific cases, free-of-charge board and lodging in workers’ reception centres and canteens, etc. A specific feature of this scheme is the institute of cash benefits, in which respect Yugoslavia differs from other countries in that only unemployed members of households whose revenue per member of household does not exceed a specific amount (income census) are entitled to such benefits.” (Nikolić 1974, 21)

⁴³ The basic principles governing the system of unemployment benefits are uniformly defined for the entire country, while detailed elaboration and application of these principles fall within the competence of the republics, autonomous provinces, communes and self-managing communities of interest for employment affairs. In view of the fact that Yugoslavia is developing socialist production relations on self-management foundations, an increasing number of problems in this sector are dealt with by social compacts and self-management agreements rather than by laws and other legal rules. This is the more so since practice to date has shown that this system provides the most efficacious ways and means to overcome and resolve the various crisis situations that may occur in individual social environments — when it is necessary to adjust individual options and wishes to possibilities obtaining at the given level of the economic development of society.” (Nikolić 1974, 22)

⁴⁴ Milorad Jovanović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall Belgrade, 2.6.1966.

⁴⁵ Illegal building started immediately after 1945, but only in 1956 did the municipality of Krnjača form the “Department for Combatting Illegal Construction” (*Služba za Suzbijanje Bespravno Gradnje*). The houses destroyed per year significantly increased: 1956 – 24; 1960 – 158; 1961 – 134; 1963 – 198. However, taking into consideration that two thirds of illegal construction in the time between 1945-66 appeared in 1958-1966 (Münnich 2013, 223), one can imagine that the agenda of demolition was increasingly a fight against Goliath.

⁴⁶ Municipality Krnjača, February 1964, Archive of the City of Belgrade, issue: State of Illegal Construction on the Territory of the Municipality Krnjača, box 150, p.5

⁴⁷ Illegal construction of individual housing started in Belgrade immediately after 1945, but only in 1956 did the municipality of Krnjača form the “Department for Combatting Illegal Construction” (*Služba za Suzbijanje Bespravne Gradnje*). The houses destroyed per year significantly increased: 1956 – 24; 1960 – 158; 1961 – 134; 1963 – 198. (Municipality Krnjača, February 1964, Archive of the City of Belgrade, issue: State of Illegal Construction on the Territory of the Municipality Krnjača, box 150). Two thirds of illegal construction in the time between 1945-66 appeared in 1958-1966 (Münnich 2013, 223).

⁴⁸ Dragiša Djurić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 4.11.1965, p.32.

⁴⁹ Milorad Radojević, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 4.11.1965, p.27.

⁵⁰ Urbanizam Beograda 1969 (3), “Illegal Housing Construction in Belgrade”, Đuro Đurović, dipl. Sociologist, my translation, emphasis added.

⁵¹ “Defining a long-term policy for solving the problem of illegal housing construction can only be done within a special city service for the repression of illegal housing construction. The service would ensure preventive, efficient and uniform application of measures in order to prevent illegal construction on the territory of the city. It would also, through its work on creating long-term policies, provide uniform criteria, greater objectivity and an

organized solution to the problem of illegal construction in the city” (Urbanizam Beograda 1969 (3), “Illegal Housing Construction in Belgrade”, Djuro Djurović, dipl. Sociologist).

⁵² Official Gazette of the City of Belgrade 1966(3).

⁵³ Urbanizam Beograda 1969 (2), “Program for the Sanitation of the Unhygienic Housing Stock in Belgrade”, Đuro Đurović.

⁵⁴ Komuna 09/1965 “Economic Reform and Spatial Planning”, Branislav Piha.

⁵⁵ Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly of Belgrade, Debate on Illegal Construction, 4.11.1965, p.57.

⁵⁶ Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly of Belgrade, Debate on Illegal Construction, 4.11.1965

⁵⁷ Milan Rajačić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, Debate on Illegal Construction, 4.11.1965, p.9.

⁵⁸ “although there are obligations of cities to take measures to improve individual construction, which would be both economic or social in nature and which will lead to the prevention of illegal construction, it must be stated that builders of illegal erected housing are violators of certain social norms and regulations, so that the application of administrative measures should not be neglected.

Illegal housing was very often viewed favourably by the public, which could objectively be a support to those who built illegally. When the minimum possibility for legal construction are provided, which has been a very common case also until now, society must react sharply to the violation of its norms, especially since in such conditions, it is not just an elementary aspiration to provide a roof over one’s head, but it is a question of the efforts to acquire some privileges (better position, larger land area etc.). Therefore, the implementation of efficient administrative measures should be ensured, but with the maximum finding of all ways to provide conditions for legal housing construction.” (Komuna 06/1967 “Individual Housing Construction in Cities. After the Consultation of the SKG in Novi Sad”, Miladin Šakić, Deputy President of the City Assembly Belgrade, my translation)

⁵⁹ SKG also conducted a study among individual house builders in 12 cities to support its point: “in individual housing construction, builders in recent years have not participated almost at all in the costs of land development. Out of 1.167 surveyed builders of individual residential buildings in 12 cities, 5.8% of builders paid 800.000 or more old dinars for land development costs, and according to rough estimates, the minimal costs for development (complete preparation) amount to 2-3 million old dinar. At the same time, the share of builders who did not pay anything or gave an amount of up to 200.000 old dinar per plot is 77% of the total number surveyed” (Komuna 06/1967 “Individual Housing Construction in Cities. After the Consultation of the SKG in Novi Sad”, Miladin Šakić, Deputy President of the City Assembly Belgrade, my translation)

⁶⁰ In 1961 “The average commune had 250 times less resources than the most developed ones. About 820 thousand million dinars worth of fixed capital was concentrated in the five most powerful communes, which means that 0.7 per cent of communes managed about 15 per cent of total fixed capital in the socialist sector of the economy. At the same time 225 communes had less than 500 million dinars worth of fixed capital.” (Yugoslav Survey 1963, 2068)

⁶¹ “The five most underdeveloped communes according to this attribute were Zjuni, Orlande, Srbica and Maleševo, all in Kosovo and Metohija, and Lipkovo in Macedonia, which had between 19 to 25 thousand dinars net product per head of the population. Small per capita net product was the result of the small volume of material production in the communes in question. However, the population of these communes do not entirely live from the net product. It is a general practice for the inhabitants of underdeveloped areas to earn part of their income by working in economically more developed areas, as a result of which the differences between developed and underdeveloped areas are to a certain extent levelled off.” (Yugoslav Survey 1963, 2068). The “proportion of agricultural in total population decreased from 77 per cent in 1931 to under 61 per cent in 1953, 50 per cent in 1961 and 38.2 per cent in 1971” (Ginić 1973, 45). “In 1971 15 per cent of the total number of employed inhabitants worked outside their place of permanent residence; this percentage was ... biggest in Kosovo (24 per cent)” (Ginić 1973, 49). Notable population decrease not only in the countryside, but generally in less developed regions, including towns: “even in some towns in which secondary and tertiary activities are still not sufficiently developed or which are at some distance from major economic centres... The towns with a decreasing population included mining localities” (Ginić 1973, 51f.)

⁶² Komuna 02/1967 “Programming and Development of Cities and Housing Construction under the Conditions of the Reform”, Rajko Rajić.

⁶³ Urbanizam Beograda 1969 (4), “Sociological Approaches to the Future Development of Belgrade”.

⁶⁴ Urbanizam Beograda 1969 (4), “Sociological Approaches to the Future Development of Belgrade”.

⁶⁵ interventions suggested here are typical of the territorialized governance of poverty that comes up in this time and constitutes the beginning of urban sociology and social scientific approach in urban planning and governance. Komuna publishes articles by the sociologist Djuro Djurović, for example a review of a book on “Youth Delinquency in Industrial Settlements” published by the Institute for Criminologist and Criminalistic Research in Belgrade, which deals with a territorialized understanding of criminality, researching the “criminogenic conditions” of particular settlements in industrial cities. The study finds “a larger number of under-aged migrants were prosecuted (55,6%)” and in “smaller cities with higher population growth show a significantly higher number

of under-aged migrant offenders (61,6%) ... The study found that population size, urban growth, and migratory movements play a significant role in crime” (Komuna 03/1966, “Youth Delinquency in Industrial Settlements, Institute for Criminological and Criminalistic Research in Belgrade”, Đuro Đurović, my translation)

⁶⁶ Cedomir Simić, 29.6.1967, City Hall Belgrade. For an explanation of the role of the municipality in social protection see also (Nikolić 1974; Parmelee 1992)

⁶⁷ Radoje Spasenović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 29.6.1967.

⁶⁸ Velimir Skolović, Minutes of the Seating of the City Hall Belgrade, 20.10.1967, my translation.

⁶⁹ “In order to realize institutions for alphabetization under the current conditions of our development, we have to adopt new regulations on the basis of which we would have the possibility to record and follow the lives and work of the youth which lives in wild settlements, children the parents of which are without a permanent occupation, job or residency (*mesta boravka*), children and youth which are not included in the 8 year school. We need evidence on the movement of those who are illiterate. It is necessary to adopt a regulation on the obligatory registration of illiterate and on the duties of working organizations towards the illiterate labor force, especially the physical labor force of illiterate. ... We have to consider the fact that illiteracy is connected to social problems and educational neglect (*vaspitanu zapustenost*). Socially and materially deprived cannot be alphabetized, neither gathered in schools with any methods or means, as long as, next to other institutions for alphabetization, we do not have institutions for alphabetization of an boarding school type (*internatskog tipa*). If we have institutions for alphabetization of a boarding school type, we would not have to force this young person to come, but he would come by himself to the institution.” (Miljko Stanić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 26.10.1967)

⁷⁰ “We would not lose anything by having mobile classrooms for that purpose and to have them nearer to the working organizations, where there is most illiteracy. I also don’t agree with those, who say that every pupil, no matter whether or not he is capable to manage the program of the 8 year school, should sit in the bench until he is 15 years old with the other pupils, to disturb the teaching and pull the level of the teaching down. ... If he is not able to manage the program of the 8-year school within 8 years, he should learn what he can manage to learn. We offer him a program, which is adequate for him. We gather such pupils in special schools, with special programs, which are adequate for their capabilities” (Miljko Stanić, Minutes of the Seating of the City Assembly Belgrade, 26.10.1967, my translation)

⁷¹ Javna Higijena 05/1972 ‘Aprilska akcija cistoce – uspela. U gradskoj skupstini Beograda cule su se reci priznanja ‘Gradskoj Cistoci’ za zalaganje na likvidaciji divljih deponija’

⁷² In Serbo-Croatian “smeće” was used mostly for what needs to be removed for sanitation (garbage), while the word “otpad” was used for discarded materials that could be re-used or otherwise turned to value (waste).

⁷³ Javna Higijena 01/1965 ‘Jedna nemila pojava’

⁷⁴ Javna Higijena 01/1965 ‘Jedna nemila pojava’

⁷⁵ Javna Higijena 02/1965 ‘Moze li se ovoj fluktuaciji radne snage reci stop?’

⁷⁶ Javna Higijena 03-04/1973, “Meet Shock”, my translation.

⁷⁷ Javna Higijena 11/1964 ‘Uz nasoj prvi broj’

⁷⁸ Javna Higijena 07/1965 ‘Joca Deterdjent’

⁷⁹ Javna Higijena 04/1970

⁸⁰ The strong association of PSS workers with recent migrants can be seen exemplary from a show that TV Belgrade recorded in 1973 and selected a street sweeper of PSS Belgrade as protagonist to tell his life story and how it was to live in the big city and how everybody, with a little discipline, could save enough money to afford a weekend house. (Javna Higijena 12/1973 “TV Beograd snima seriju dosljaci”)

⁸¹ This is a fifth of the monthly income (around 20.000 dinar), rent for a bachelor flat for PSS workers ranges from 1000 to 1500 dinar/month (Javna Higijena 02/1965 ‘Samacki stanovi – Stalno aktuelni’)

⁸² Javna Higijena 01/1965 ‘Plati da nosim’

⁸³ In the debates in the City Hall PSS workers are repeatedly depicted as unruly

⁸⁴ Javna Higijena 01/1965 ‘Kljuc za resenje pitanja raspodele treba traziti na terenu’

⁸⁵ Javna Higijena 01/1965 ‘Kljuc za resenje pitanja raspodele treba traziti na terenu’

⁸⁶ Javna Higijena 01/1965 ‘Kljuc za resenje pitanja raspodele treba traziti na terenu’

⁸⁷ Javna Higijena 08/1965

⁸⁸ Javna Higijena 08/1965 “One Day on the Landfill”

⁸⁹ Javna Higijena 09/1965

⁹⁰ It was re-named in 1974 in “BOAL Waste” (*OOOR Otpad*). BOALs, or, Basic Organizations of Associated Labor were smaller units within self-managed companies, a novelty introduced with the 1974 constitution (Dyker 2011).

⁹¹ Javna Higijena 05/1965 “Development of the Service for the Collection of Useful Wastes”

⁹² Javna Higijena 07/1965 “Useful Raw Materials in the City Garbage”.

⁹³ Javna Higijena 10/1971 “Where to Dispose of City Garbage”.

⁹⁴ The prices offered are in line with what INOT reports (OS 03/1973) on the market for non-ferrous metals.

- ⁹⁵ Javna Higijena 05/1965 “Development of the Service for the Collection of Useful Wastes”, my translation.
- ⁹⁶ In Kardelj’s words, it was necessary “to fight against the vulgar belief that producing shoes is economic while producing housing is social” (LeNormand 2008). This was part of a larger agenda to transform “social goods” into “economic” ones.
- ⁹⁷ Javna Higijena 05/1972 ‘Aprilska akcija cistoce – uspela. U gradskoj skupstini Beograda cule su se reci priznanja ‘Gradskoj Cistoci’ za zalaganje na likvidaciji divljih deponija’
- ⁹⁸ Javna Higijena 05/1972 ‘Aprilska akcija cistoce – uspela. U gradskoj skupstini Beograda cule su se reci priznanja ‘Gradskoj Cistoci’ za zalaganje na likvidaciji divljih deponija’
- ⁹⁹ Javna Higijena 07-08/1969 ‘Stanje I problem održavanja cistoci’
- ¹⁰⁰ Javna Higijena 07-08/1969 ‘Stanje i problemi održavanja cistoce’
- ¹⁰¹ (Miladin Šakić, Debate ‘Information on measures for ordering and more beautiful appearance of Belgrade, 17.5.1966)
- ¹⁰² See Bošković referenced in chapter 1, section “Uniting the Consumer and Producer Citizen”.
- ¹⁰³ Javna Higijena 07-08/1969 ‘Stanje I problem održavanja cistoci’
- ¹⁰⁴ Javna Higijena 10/1971 ‘O cistoci – svakodnevno brinuti’
- ¹⁰⁵ OS 02/1972 U nasim preduzecima
- ¹⁰⁶ Otpadne Sirovine...
- ¹⁰⁷Sl. List SFRJ 33/65, ‘Uredba o marzama u trgovini’
- ¹⁰⁸Until then, the status of Yugoslav waste companies, which were mostly funded immediately after the Second World War, was not really classified and they were policed by orders from various sectors (industry, agriculture, trade)
- ¹⁰⁹ Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 ‘Marza I Preduzeca za promet industrijskih otpadaka’
- ¹¹⁰ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1968 Integracija da ili ne [Integration yes or no]
- ¹¹¹ “Insufficiency of storage space, especially masonry, [warehouses] also complicates normal working. However, companies in the majority of cases could not get suitable locations for those purposes, so they resorted to improvisation, building of canopies, pre-fabricated barracks and similar, all with a character of temporary solution.” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966 Otpadne Sirovine – vazni reprodukcionni material [Raw materials from waste – an important reproductive material])
- ¹¹² This system of transfer stations and collectors was institutionalized in 1955 as a means through which municipalities regulated the trade of agricultural and other raw materials. This is the so called ‘decentralized’ period, when city governments were immediate superior to local companies (Bićanić 1973). They offered larger commercial organizations or industries that processed agricultural and other raw materials the possibility to buy immediately from individual agricultural producers (Official Gazette of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) 55/48). The opening of transfer stations could be prohibited through the municipality or through the local agricultural cooperatives (which were the socialist institution regulating the trade with agricultural raw materials) operating in the respective municipality.
- ¹¹³ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1966 ‘Specijalizacija – neophodan uslov poslovanju’ [Specialization – a necessary condition for business]
- ¹¹⁴ Drustveni Razvojni Fond – see Woodward – Socialist Unemployment chpt 7
- ¹¹⁵ In whole Yugoslavia in 1967 90 specialized waste companies and about 320 waste transfer stations. (Otpadne Sirovine 06/1967 ‘Nasi Bilansi’ [Our balances])
- ¹¹⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 07/1966, ‘Integracija Preduzeca za Promet Otpadaka’
- ¹¹⁷ This Order defines the following goods as tradeable via individual collectors: “Economic organizations can buy the following products via collectors and purchasers (in the following ‘collectors’): (1) milk, poultry, eggs and feathers, (2), animal hair, (3) medical plants, (4) forest fruits (5), tartaric, (6) amphibians, (7) wastes.” Sl. List FNRJ 1956/52 “Naredba o kupovini nekih proizvoda prekosabiraca I otkupljivaca”
- ¹¹⁸Sl. List SFRJ 1/67
- ¹¹⁹ Otpadne Sirovine 06/1967 ‘Nasi bilansi’ [Our balances]
- ¹²⁰ “The costs of resettlement, having in mind the numerous elements – destruction and construction of buildings, moving mechanization, introduction of communal [infrastructure] electro, PTT [post, telegraph, telephone] connection etc. – won’t be small. They will even be quite high.” (Otpadne Sirovine 08/1966 Jedna nedovoljno ubedljiva praksa [One insufficiently convincing practice])
- ¹²¹ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 “They don’t have it easy”
- ¹²² “We have burning need to exchange outworn machinery (lorries and engines for waste regeneration), [but now] we have to invest that money in construction. From us ever better quality is requested and we know how we could realize this, but the displacement of the company has disabled any effort in that direction.” (Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 Nije im lako [They don’t have it easy])
- ¹²³ “[Sirovina] has to sell its ... engines to the investor who builds the sport arena, and compensation for those engines the responsible [state] bodies do not wish to discuss” (Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 Nije im lako [They don’t have it easy])

¹²⁴ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 “They don’t have it easy”

¹²⁵ There are also examples where waste companies successfully got compensation for re-location, such as Trgosirovine in Sarajevo, where the City Housing Company (Gradsko Stambeno Preduzece) build a betomized path, organized the land (uredjenje zemljista), paid for the old building, delivered all material from the old warehouse to the new and executed all communal works (Otpadne Sirovine 12/1971 U Sarajevu se gradi veliko skladiste I sortirnica otpadnih materijala [A big warehouse and sorting house for waste materials is being built in Sarajevo])

¹²⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 06/1967 Nasi bilansi, Otpadne Sirovine 02/1972 U gradovima – Problem lokacije

¹²⁷ “A particular problem present also the politics of communes towards private artisans. The practice show that especially in the area of personal services and in some art crafts is outstanding the necessary stimulation of private crafts. Private crafts is socially legitimate not only in the professions which are deficient or in which it is not profitable business of working organizations in the services, but also as complementary assortment of goods and services on our market, which is still deficient. This stimulation can be realized through suitable taxation politics and also a determination of long-term politics toward private artisanship, which has to build trust in the measures which municipalities and the societal community undertake and, departing from such trust, start to invest in the advancement of their activities.

It has been established that the influx of funds in the municipal budgets on the basis of taxing private artisans is insignificant, and amounts to 2-3% of the overall funds of the City Assemblies, so it is obvious that an inadequate politics of taxing private crafts cannot significantly advance the material condition of the municipality. This has already today lead a certain number of cities to lump sum the taxation of private artisans in personal services and also completely liberate from the payment of taxes of those artisan which are in a permanent employment relationship and in their free time obtain various services. This is at the same time a serious warning to what extend the question of private artisans has sharpened, because on many areas they are almost cut in half in relation to the number of private workshops before ten years” (Komuna 06/1965, Materijalni Polozaj Usluznih Delatnosti u Opstinama [Material position of service businesses in municipalities], Rajko Rajić)

“many subjective weaknesses in relation to the crafts in general, and to the private in particular. This is, above all, about sectarianism of certain authorities and responsible political workers, which see in every private artisan a speculator and potential capitalist, that is, an enemy of the socialist system. The justification of such an attitude could always be found in various speculations with goods, tax evasion and unjustified enrichment of single artisans, which really provoked sharp reactions from working people. And where political sectarianism and ignorance combined with genuine resentment, it could come to frontal showdown with private artisans, which was reflected in excessive taxation, unnecessary tightening of conditions for receiving a work permit, discrimination of artisans in supply with reproduction materials, in the distribution of business spaces etc. Of course, such actions on the other hand caused dissatisfaction and resistance of the majority of artisans and deepened their distrust in a honest relation of the government towards the working artisan, distrust which today, under radically changed circumstances, is still difficult to eradicate.” (Komuna 10/1967 ‘Uloga I Perspektive Privatnog Zanatstva u Socijalistickoj Privredi’ [The Role and Perspective of Private Crafts in the Socialist Economy], Vinko Hafter, Deputy President of the Executive Council of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia)

¹²⁸ The topic of semi-finished goods was politically sensible as they, together with raw materials and capital goods “consistently made up 80-90 per cent of total Yugoslav imports in the period since 1960, with raw materials and semi-finished [goods] alone accounting for 60-80 per cent” (Dyker 2011, 186). As such they made up for a big amount of “foreign aid and loans that [were] used directly to finance the import of production inputs” (Dyker 2011, 94).

¹²⁹ Otpadne Sirovine 12/1966 ... DINOS workers: rails can be exported as usable material (not as iron)

¹³⁰ Otpadne Sirovine 07/1967 Iz delatnosti Poslovnog Udruženja INOTa – Obazriva odluka

¹³¹ The ‘citizen groups’ (grupa gradjana) was a hybrid business form introduced by the 1965 economic reform that permitted private entrepreneurship in social ownership. Soon after their introduction, ‘citizen groups’ were after heavily policed for economic crimes and titled them “hotbed of financial malpractice extending as far as embezzlement of socialized funds” (Dyker 2011, 164). In July 1971 a government decree banned them from the import of semi-finished goods (Dyker 2011, 162). This and a campaign in 1973 against long working hours and low payment were levered against the private enterprises (Dyker 2011, 162).

¹³² Debate in the City Hall on a “Report on the Functioning of the Inspection after its Re-Organization” (2.11.1967) Novaković Ljubomir

¹³³ High-rise building in the central shopping street Knez Mihajlova.

¹³⁴ Debate in the City Hall on a “Report on the Functioning of the Inspection after its Re-Organization” (2.11.1967) Novaković Ljubomir

¹³⁵ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1966 ‘Specijalizacija – Neophodan Uslov Poslovanju’

¹³⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 04/1967 ‘Preduzece za promet otpadnih materijala u novim uslovima poslovanja’

¹³⁷ Otpadne Sirovine 08/1968 ‘Kakva Organizacija Preduzeca za Promet Otpadaka’.

¹³⁸ Sl. List FNRJ 33/60

¹³⁹Otpadne Sirovine 09/1968 ‘O minimalnim tehničkim uslovima’

¹⁴⁰Otpadne Sirovine 02/1969 ‘Posle Odluka SIV-a’

¹⁴¹Otpadne Sirovine 10/1968 ‘O posebnim minimalnim tehničkim uslovima’

¹⁴² Small waste companies of the size of a transfer station compromise the development of the whole sector, they should only work as collection points for bigger waste companies (Otpadne Sirovine 06/1968 ‘Mesto I Uloga Preduzeća za Promet Otpadaka u sadašnjem sistemu prometa robe).

¹⁴³ Otpadne Sirovine 02/1969 ‘Iz rada organa poslovnog udruženja INOT. Kratak rok za sprovođenje odluke SIV-a’

¹⁴⁴ Otpadne Sirovine 07/1967 ‘Izdelatnosti Poslovnog Udruženja INOTa – Obazriva odluka’

¹⁴⁵ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1970 Beograd i problem sakupljanja otpadaka u velikim gradovima [Belgrade and the Problem of The collection of waste in Big Cities]

¹⁴⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1974 Inspekcija i dalje uporna

¹⁴⁷ in a survey conducted for the center for social work in 1985 the small number of Roma respondents from one municipality answered 65 (28.1%) that they have health insurance via their work place, 7 (3.9%) pay health insurance themselves (like self-employed), 84 (36.4%) have their health insurance covered by the municipality and 69 (39,8%) are without insurance. The article says: „We know that the expenses of municipalities on the territory of which a big number of Roma is settled, for their health insurance are big. As example we cite the municipality Cakovec, which spend around 8.000.000 dinar for this purpose in 1980, or the Zagreb municipalities, which in the same year gave around 7.906.000 dinara.“ (Galogaža 1985, 77f.)

¹⁴⁸ “Do you know that Mile who resells old things, who can obtain for you a painter when you need it, who can buy you fish when it is not available anywhere? You don’t know him? Pity. He is [a] really good [person], that Mile, he was a singer, then he became sick and now – this. He resells and takes a small provision. Sometimes, admittedly rarely, Mile ‘jokes’ with [his customers]...

One tailor from the city centre bought a pair of new, dainty, shoes in a shop. But he could not wear them for more than two days, because they were tight. He asked in the shop to return them, but the salespeople were relentless. He heard that Mile resells, found him and asked him to do that for him.

-Listen, Mile – said the tailor – here is the left shoe. When you find a buyer, come with him and you’ll get the other shoes and – a provision.

Mile took the shoe, put it under his arm, and left satisfied. Five days passed, then ten, then a month, then three months. Mile did not show up at the tailors. And one day, by coincident, the tailor meets him.

-What happened, Mile, what happened with the shoe? Asks the tailor.

-Well I did not sell it yet, Mile justified himself.

-Come on, admit what happened, everything will be fine.

-If that’s the case, master, then I will admit – answered Mile. I found a handicapped and sold the shoe to him.

The tailor looks at him, invites him to get give him also – the right shoe. Or...”

(Politika, 4.1.1964, A reseller with a skill)

¹⁴⁹ <https://literarydevices.net/parable/>

¹⁵⁰ “Petar Beric, highly qualified shoemaker from Kosjerica, more than five months ago left his regular job in the shoe factory ‘Moda’ and started regular collection of wastes. In his new job big help was shown to him by the working unit of the company ‘Feroteks’ in Kraljevo which buys secondary raw materials from him regularly. According to Petar Beric, engaging in this job realizes double the income than before in the factory, and there is so much waste that he barely managed to collect them and perform their selection and separation. Both in his former collective and in Feroteks they emphasize his exemplary diligence and neatness.” (Politika Expres Belgrade, Zanimanje-Sakupljac Otpada [Occupation – Waste Picker] (quoted in SS 08/1980 ‘What does the press say about us?’)

¹⁵¹ In a meeting of the editorial board in 1966 INOT decides that in order to “bring closer our newspaper to the workers in our collectives, the editorial board has suggested ... to engage more in contact with workers and servants in our warehouses and junk shops and sorting stations: to interview them and ask their opinion about the development of the business, the organization of work, the placement of goods” (Otpadne Sirovine 10/1966 Sastanak redakcionog odbora lista ‘otpadne sirovine’). A regular column in the newspaper is ‘From our working collectives’ containing portraits of waste companies.

¹⁵² “After paying and loading the old iron, which could have been around 200 kilos, I started to calculate: this is blacksmith metal, first class [metal], Nikola will get in the best case around 18 old dinar per kilo, which means he will earn around 2.600 old dinar on this job. In his car he already has around 400 kilo similar metal, let’s say another 5.200 old dinar earning. Additionally he has ferrous metal (mostly brass) around 20 kilo and let’s say he earns 10.000 old dinar, the whole earning will be around 17.800 old dinar.”

¹⁵³ OS 08/1972 ‘Gradska Cistoca Formira pogon za prikupljanje otpadaka. Motiv sa Ade Huje

¹⁵⁴ In 1961 the City government adopted a New Law on Public Hygiene which banned horse carriages and carts from the city territory. This brought initially a crisis of supply, since many farmers brought their produce to the city in such vehicles that were now banned (Münnich 2013).

¹⁵⁵ Otpadne Sirovine 06/1967

¹⁵⁶ For comparison, this was the average income for a construction worker, which in Serbia in 1980 was 6568 new dinar (the old dinar is in a relation of 1/100 to the new dinar) (Vukmirović 2006).

¹⁵⁷ Otpadne Sirovine 03/1973 Ugovor o delu I ugovor o obavljanju povremenih poslova

¹⁵⁸ Otpadne Sirovine 03/1967 Sabirači I otkupljivači u novom sistemu prometa robom (Lj.L.)

¹⁵⁹ “[The old system] did not take into account the specificity of each particular economic organizations, and [instead] determined uniform [working] relations. ... Basic economic reasons demand that in this period of economic reforms also this activity [of collecting waste] – like all other activities – will be advanced in the maximum way possible. And this activity certainly can be advanced in a proper way, if it is stimulated, not only by establishing certain relations, but by its liberation from administrative and other limitations. ... *New Law On Trade* sets off from the necessity to establish the maximum possible liberalization of this institution [of collectors and purchasers]” (Otpadne Sirovine 03/1967 Sabiraci I otkupljivaci u novom sistemu prometa robom [Collectors and Purchasers in the New System of Trade])

¹⁶⁰ Otpadne Sirovine 03/1969 Regulisanje položaja otkupljivaca i sabiraca [Regulation of the position of purchasers and collectors]

¹⁶¹ “Current experience shows without doubt that waste companies are very interested to work via collectors and purchasers. Because of that, we can assume with certainty that all waste companies will decide to work with persons outside of employment relationship (odlučiti za poslovanje sa licima van radnog odnosa) and will constitute corresponding provisions in their general act.

Since working with collectors and purchasers, in the future, won't be regulated with any specific orders, there will be in practice, in its own rights, come up the question after the concrete way in which [collectors and purchasers] will work. In the successful and efficient work of collectors and purchasers are interested, first of all, economic organization, which can, without any doubt, provide appropriate stimulating conditions... [these] can be varied, depending on a whole row of concrete conditions, characteristic both for individual regions, and for certain products or group of products. Therefore, it would, of course, be wrong and in contradiction with the essential principles of the *New Law On Trade*, if one would – without regard of past experience – try to find some ‘common system’ or similar, because that would in any case be an act of returning to the old, survived, forms and relationships.” (Otpadne Sirovine 03/1967 Sabiraci I otkupljivaci u novom sistemu prometa robom [Collectors and Purchasers under the new system of trade])

¹⁶² OS 08/1968 Otkupljivac u svetlosti novog zakonodavstva o robnom prometu [Purchaser in the light of the new legislation on trade]

¹⁶³ Otpadne Sirovine 09/1968 Status ugovornih otkupljivaca otpadaka [Status of Contracted Waste Purchasers]

¹⁶⁴ Otpadne Sirovine 05/1973 Zasto promet sa sakupljacima otpada? [Why trade with waste collectors?]

¹⁶⁵ Otpadne Sirovine 12/1971 Problem privatnih sakupljača

¹⁶⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 09/1968 Status ugovornih otkupljivaca otpadaka

¹⁶⁷ “Not being able to develop their business towards a larger number of economic organizations and thus expand the range of goods with which they do business, individual collectors and purchasers are increasingly disappearing, so it can be assumed that soon none will be left” (Otpadne Sirovine 07/1971 Kako stimulisati sakupljace)

¹⁶⁸ Otpadne Sirovine 11/1971 ‘Ministarstvo’ za otpadne sirovine [‘Ministry’ for raw materials from waste]

¹⁶⁹ član 36 Zakona o izmenama I dopunama Osnovnog zakona o doprinosima I porezima građana, Službeni List SFRJ br.32/68

¹⁷⁰ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1969 SIV je odlucio [SIV decided]

¹⁷¹ Otpadne Sirovine 03/1969 Regulisanje položaja otkupljivaca I sabiraca [Regulation of the position of purchasers and collectors]

¹⁷² Otpadne Sirovine 09/1975 Izvestavamo sa terena - Da li neki propisi koce prikupljanje otpadaka od domacinstava?

¹⁷³ doprinos za neposrednu deciju zastitu po stopi od 1,29% Sl.Gl. SRS 17/72

¹⁷⁴ doprinos za sl. nesrece na poslu po stopi od 1% Sl.List grada Beograda 17/72

¹⁷⁵ doprinos za invalidsko i penzijsko osiguranje po stopi od 6%

¹⁷⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 09/1975 Izvestavamo sa terena. Da li neki propisi koce prikupljanje otpadaka od domacinstava?

¹⁷⁷ In 1967 the federal government introduced the so called ‘social domicile’, which gave municipalities the right to grant certain social rights only if the person can prove residency on the territory of that municipality for three years. The discrepancy between populations living on the territory of the city and those actually registered and granted social rights existed already before the social domicile, but was definitely entrenched with the law and thus very much discussed in the City Hall in Belgrade. However, in a debate on ... a member of the Council for

Public Health (...) pointed to the problem of people with infectious diseases “roaming” through the country, as they would receive social rights in Belgrade only after three years and their ‘home municipality’ would not be willing to take them back, once they left for Belgrade. She suggests that people with infectious diseases would be excepted from the three-years rule. The president of the City Hall, Branko Pesić, however, pointed out that tuberculosis is treated free of charge in Yugoslavia, so there is no reason to change the rule.

¹⁷⁸ Otpadne Sirovine 04/1974 Sakupljaci I sakupljanje sekundarnih sirovina

¹⁷⁹ „Already for a few years INOT tries to get an adequate translation of the legal prescriptions regarding the *buying of waste from citizens*. Inspections of the City Halls and SDK have falsely treated this purchasing as a form of legal-citizen relation and forced our member working organizations to pay withholding tax and contributions to the SIZ [health, disability, children]. For years we tried to convince the republican bodies that this is not okay, but no one did not understand us. In spite of the SIV recommendations that this question shall be solved in the interest of the biggest possible purchasing of secondary raw materials and thus protection of the human environment.“ (Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1977 I na kraju pravilan stav, emphasis in original)

¹⁸⁰ Sekundarne Sirovine 02/1976 U Beogradu gradjani oslobodjeni placanja poreza od prihoda koje ostvare sakupljanjem otpadaka

¹⁸¹ Sekundarne Sirovine 12/1975 Informacija o problematici sekundarnih sirovina

¹⁸² Sekundarne Sirovine 03/1977 – U Beogradu se sakupljanje sirovina ne oporezuje - I u 1977 godini grad Beograd oslobodio je obaveze placanja poreza po odbitku gradjane koji ostvare prihod sakupljanjem otpadaka – Sl. List grada Beograda 22/76, clan 6, tacka 3, stav 2

¹⁸³ Skupstina Grada Beograda, Zajednicka Sednica svih veca, 30.12.1975, Primedbe Izvrsnog Saveta na Predlog medju opstinskog dogovora o uskladjivanju poreske politike, 23.12.1975 – bring a quote here??. Schult (2017) explains: “legalizing parallel self-employed activities became a strategy of the political leadership to deal with low income levels and critical supply situations in the 1970s” (see also (Dobrivojević 2012, 228–29). See Schierup on 1974 a first high in the number of returnees (Schierup 1990, 104)

¹⁸⁴ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1972 Industrosirovina na novoj lokaciji

¹⁸⁵ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1967 Postoje uslovi za povecanje otkupa otpadaka iz individualnih domacinstva [Are there conditions for increasing purchase of wastes from individual households]. The importance of ‘public order’ regulations in circumscribing spaces and activities to the effect of excluding Roma from it, can be seen in the big percentage of ‘offenses to public order’ of 65,8% in a survey among Centers for Social Work in 1980 on the total criminal offenses committed by Roma “Strolling 5 (1.6%), Begging 38 (12%), Prostitution 6 (1.9%), Offenses to Public Order 208 (65.8%), Criminal Cases 59 (18.7%)” Survey Among Centers for Social Work, 1980 (Galogaža 1985)

¹⁸⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1971 Stari Papir je nas dobrotvor [Scrap paper is our benefactor]

¹⁸⁷ Otpadne Sirovine 12/1970 Moze li se sprovesti akcija prikupljanja starog papira i u Beogradu

¹⁸⁸ Slovenian company ‘Slovenija-Promet’ reports in 1972 that it intends to open transfer stations also in Belgrade, which are more accessible, especially for youth (Otpadne Sirovine 12/1972 Staklena ambalaza [Glass Packaging]).

¹⁸⁹ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1971 Kolera

¹⁹⁰ Sekundarne Sirovine 04/1974 ‘Obnova’ I ‘Tehnogas’ zajedno

¹⁹¹ “we would like to point out the impression of a certain gap in the illumination of the work and problems of [our] business remained. Our business association INOT could and should have identified and prepared a number of topics on the work and position of [our companies] and used this opportunity to communicate them to the public. An exception in this sense is the company ‘Unija’ Zagreb, which gave a noteworthy report on its activities and experiences in the collection of secondary raw materials and participated in the exhibition of technical means of protection of the human environment” (Sekundarne Sirovine 02/1976 Prvo Jugoslovensko Savetovanje o Sekundarnim Sirovinama)

¹⁹² “so much of the republican and commune budgets has been designated for essential administrative and public services, including aid to the underdeveloped republics and provinces, that there is little left over for the communes to allocate independently. Self-management then does not leave the lower government administrations much more leeway in determining how locally generated funds are to be allocated than does the Soviet centralized allocation system. Virtually the entire commune budget is predetermined by the republics through federal and republican regulations regarding commune distribution of local money to the SIZ (68) and essential administrative and social services and to priorities set at the federal level through republican agreement, such as assistance to the backward regions. Under these circumstances, commune interest in undertaking a major environmental project is understandably low, unless the community can find funding from the outside” (Janar 1987, 193f.)

¹⁹³ Sekundarne Sirovine 12/1975 Informacija o problematici sekundarnih sirovina

¹⁹⁴ Sekundarne Sirovine 12/1975 Izvestavamo sa terena – iz Privredne Komore Beograda, Sekundarne Sirovine 12/1975 Iz Privredne Komore Beograda – Projekat prikupljanje starog papira

¹⁹⁵ Sekundarne Sirovine 01/1976 Visestruka korist

¹⁹⁶ Sekundarne Sirovine 04/1976 Akcija Omladine Srbije ‘Sakupljamo Sekundarne Sirovine

- ¹⁹⁷ Sekundarne Sirovine 05/1976 Akcija ‘Sakupljamo sekundarne sirovine’ Izlaz u poboljšanju ekonomskog položaja nase delatnost
- ¹⁹⁸ Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1976 Iz rada naseg udruzenja – Prikupljanje i Plasman Starog Papira
- ¹⁹⁹ Sekundarne Sirovine 02/1977 Sta je sa akcijama mladih
- ²⁰⁰ Sekundarne Sirovine 07/1980 Radni Vek Medju Sekundarnim Sirovinama
- ²⁰¹ Sekundarne Sirovine 07/1980 Obnova o Obnovi
- ²⁰² Humanitarian roots of the collection of waste - interview with Secretary of Savez za drustveno vaspitanje dece Zlaticom Nastic - she said until now collection actions took place in aftermath of catastrophies (flooding, earthquake) (Otpadne Sirovine 02/1971 Sve zavisi od preduzeca za promet otpacima)
- ²⁰³ Otpadne Sirovine 01/1971 Sakupljanje otpadaka i propaganda
- ²⁰⁴ The article argues that in the time of centralization much more propaganda for collecting materials from waste (in schools, for households, in cinemas) - in times of decentralization companies do not want to invest in propaganda anymore because competing companies might profit from it in the end.
- ²⁰⁵ Sekundarne Sirovine 11/1980 Povodom Sastanka: Sredstva Informisanja u Akciji Prikupljanja ss – Sirovine iz otpada su briga celog drustva [On the Occasion of the Meeting: Means of Information in Actions of Collecting Secondary Raw Materials – Raw Materials from Waste are the Concern of the Whole Society]
- ²⁰⁶ “In its Action Program, the City Assembly has omitted working organizations for the collection and processing of secondary raw materials as one of the direct bearers of active protection of the human environment and economic management of secondary raw materials. Hence, many of the popular collection actions remained only initiatives or gave half results, because the collected quantities of waste did not go beyond temporary landfills, which confirms the fact that ‘there is still no one who would have an account [an economic interest] to take them’” (Sekundarne Sirovine 05/1977 Od pionira do akademika)
- ²⁰⁷ Sekundarne Sirovine 06/1977 Novi oblik saradnje
- ²⁰⁸ “Within the framework of the traditional ‘Winter Magic [Fair]’, which is held every year at the Belgrade Fair, this time three very important conferences for us were held: on waste water treatment, on the incineration of industrial waste, on where the working organization ‘3.Maj – Rijeka’ appeared as an organizer, which produces equipment under a waste recycling license. Unfortunately, as we did not receive invitations from the organizers to participate, these conferences were attended on [our] own initiative, in order [for us] to regularly monitor the development in the field of secondary raw materials that take place outside the scope of our working organizations” (Sekundarne Sirovine 03/1978 Zimske Carolije I Otpaci)
- ²⁰⁹ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1975 Da se ne zaboravi
- ²¹⁰ Zbornik radova sa Simpozijuma o ostvarivanju, preradi i iskoriscavanju smeca i otpadaka sa posebnim osvrtom na stanje u Beogradu, Gradska Cistoca, Energoprojekt, Gradski Sekretarijat za urbanizam izdavac je Drustvo Inzenjera i tehnicara, hemicara i tehnologa Beograd, 11000 Beograd, Kneza Milosa 7
- ²¹¹ Sekundarne Sirovine 08/1977 Zabranjeno Spaljivanje
- ²¹² Javna Higijena 11/1968 ‘Izgradnja postrojenje – stvar buducnost - Odrzano predavanje o spaljivanju smeca’
- ²¹³ Javna Higijena 08/1969 ‘Prisustvovali smo IV internacionalnom kongresu u Bazelu’
- ²¹⁴ Javna Higijena 01-02/1971 ‘Unistavanje smeca – spaljivanjem. Sa sastanka u Gradskoj Cistoci u vezi dogovora za definitivno resenje unistavanja smeca u Beogradu’
- ²¹⁵ Javna Higijena 03/1971 ‘Kuda sa smecem’
- ²¹⁶ Otpadne Sirovine 10/1975
- ²¹⁷ Sekundarne Sirovine 01/1976 Strucnjaci Beogradskog ‘Energo-Projekta’ Predlazu Beogradu Fabriku za Spaljivanje Smeca
- ²¹⁸ Sekundarne Sirovine 01/1976
- ²¹⁹ Javna Higijena 12/1971 ‘Izgradnja objekta za spaljivanje smeca kostace 200-300 miliona’
- ²²⁰ Javna Higijena 01/1972 ‘Gde spaljivati smece (inz. Nikola Jovanović) Osvrt na izvod iz nacrt generalnog plana Beograda’
- ²²¹ Javna Higijena 11/1971 ‘Drugi o nama: Stizu zalbe s Karaburme’
- ²²² Javna Higijena 06/1973 ‘Informacija o deponovanju smeca na gradskim deponijama u Beogradu’
- ²²³ Komuna 1976 (31) ‘Zastita covekove okoline urbanizmom’ [Protection of the Human Environment with Urbanism], Bratislav Stojanović dip.ing.arh.
- ²²⁴ Komuna 1977 (34-35) ‘Beograd – Zastita Sredine’ [Belgrade – Environmental Protection], Prim.Dr. Petar Stepanov.
- ²²⁵ The shift I am describing here corresponds to the shift historians of Yugoslavia have described, in the early 1980s more favourable accounts of private landownership as more ‘efficient’: Yugoslav economist Joze Mencinger contest in 1980 the 11hc rule saying that the private sector is not encroaching on the socialist sector, on the contrary, that land in the socialist sector is lying idle (Dyker 2011, 211, 275ff.). Agricultural land lying idle is also picked up as a topic under ‘environmental protection’ in Komuna (Simić) saying that not industry, but agricultural land lying idle is one of the main sources of environmental degradation in Yugoslavia,. In 1983 a program financed by the World Bank supporting small entrepreneurship.

²²⁶ Komuna 1980 (56) Zastita Zivotne Sredine I Privatna Svojina [Environmental Protection and Private Property], Ljubodrag Simić, dipl.inz.arh

²²⁷ Communal Inspection, 24.1.2005, lists 30 locations of wild dumps in the municipality Palilula,

²²⁸ Report by Resnik, Kijevo (Rakovica), 15.4.2005 – “In order to permanently clean up the dump in Leticevoj street (Kijevo) the Roma settlement, which creates the dump, has to be removed (dimension 100x200m) ... from the list of 28 wild dumps, 80% have been removed in the last action of cleaning the city (the problem is that the same locations are quickly renewed)

²²⁹ 1. Ibarska Magistrala – right site, about 10.000m³, 2. Stari Obrenovacki Put, about 6.000m³, 3. Milorada Jovanovića, opposite to ‘Ateks’, about 4.000m³ (Communal Inspection, 24.1.2005)

²³⁰ Cf. Report on the Quality of the Living Environment in Belgrade, 2012.

²³¹ Gradska Opština Čukarica, 17.09.2012, http://www.Čukarica.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1373%3A2012-09-17-14-06-49&catid=7%3AAkcije-projekti&Itemid=74&lang=lat, my translation.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ This program was first articulated in the course of the Urban Plan (2003), various protests against social housing for Roma from unhygienic settlements let the city to postpone the project several times until in 2009 infrastructure projects financed by the EBRD and EIB made a first wave of displacements necessary. Most of the population was placed in shipping containers. As now European credit institutions were involved in the displacements, the Bankwatch network got active in criticizing shipping containers as housing solution and thus building of social housing re-appeared on the agenda of the City of Belgrade.

²³⁴ ‘Hometowns’ in Serbia were often not willing to take Roma from Belgrade back. Parallel to Roma who are forcefully send back from Western European countries, where they have been working, which are more and more refused social benefit payments in Serbia as a form of sanctioning (See Blic article), also returnees from Belgrade were treated as working migrants that now illegitimately claim social benefits and faced difficulties re-claiming right for social benefits (Personal conversation with Roma that worked as waste pickers in Belgrade until 2012 and were send back to their ‘home-municipality’ in Kragujevac (DATE)).

²³⁵ Part of the cleaning actions of public spaces for the marathon, which takes place every year is also to fence off Roma settlements along the route and covering the fences with banners to hide these settlements from sight.

²³⁶ Glas Javnosti, 13.4.1999, <http://www.glas-javnosti.rs/clanak/beograd/glas-javnosti-08-09-2008/slepo-crevona-dva-minuta-od-centra>

²³⁷ Special order contract can be concluded for a service which is outside of the main area of the employee with a person that works as self-employed <http://porezi.blogspot.hu/2015/02/ugovor-o-delu.html>

²³⁸ Roma coordinators have emerged from local NGOs “Roma activists moved from the streets into offices and from mobilization to administration. The struggle for change became more removed from our communities and more immersed in bureaucracy”, Roma-in-charge “a person of Roma ethnic origin, nominated by the government, accorded an advisory role, but denied any decision-making powers. Co-opted, and possessed of a sense of purpose, the Roma-in-charge enters a higher comfort zone at some remove from the quality of life of the average Roma citizen. Such comfort functions as a sophisticated tool of financial and political control ... mutated from independent civil society watchdogs to utterly dependent clients ... all Roma-in-charge at central government level – have possessed no power: no power to decide over paving roads or piping water into a Roma mahala ... If appointed at a local level, as were the Roma municipal coordinators in Serbia, Roma-in-charge have had no power over bussing our children to school from a remote mahala, nor have the Roma teaching assistants had the power to desegregate a school. Institutional participation has empowered institutions for window-dressing rather than our people for influencing governmental policies.” (Jovanović 2013:198f).

²³⁹ <https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/oliver-ilic-zbog-nepostovanja-zakona-na-savskom-nasipu-ugrozeni-vodosnabdevanje-beograda-i-odbrana-od-poplava/>

²⁴⁰ Informal economic activities have gained increased attention and research work since the economic crisis in 2008 and the increase in unemployment (ETF 2011) and (IPSOS 2009 Rapid Crisis Assessment). In 2008 the Serbian 'Labor Force Survey', which replaced the 'Living Standard Measurement Study' (2002-2007), introduced a definite tool to make visible formal and informal employment separately (Krstic 2011).

In 2009 the quantitative 'labor force survey' was complemented by a qualitative study on 'vulnerable groups' commissioned by the Team for Social Integration of the Government of Serbia. Qualitative analysis should serve to make visible assets that cannot be made visible through the ‘classical’ indicators measuring the position of the labor force. Roma in urban slums, small-scale agricultural producers and single parents were asked about their survival strategies, including waste picking for recycling, ‘not buying certain kind of food anymore (mostly meat, fruits, sweets)’, etc. spendings that remained the same: among others coffee, cigarettes, and other chemical substances which regulate the workings of the nervous system like bensedini, dijazepani.

‘Survival strategy’ bears a morality of financial discipline. Money saving strategies are not regarded as marker of desperation, but valuable discipline that will help the poor get out of their poverty. Participants of the survey were

asked to evaluate the 'effectiveness' of their survival strategies on a scale of 1-5. The value-judgement implicit in this rating of 'survival strategies' can be seen from the fact that not all money saving strategies were elevated to the level of a 'survival strategy' offered to rating. While the report indicates that many interviewees reported that they do not send their children to school anymore so they do not need to invest in school books and clean clothing, 'not sending children to school' was not elevated to the level of a 'survival strategy'.

This can be seen in the context of the re-structuring of the welfare state, which builds on the privatization of social risks, in which "the personal becomes both an object (of new strategies) and a resource (to be mobilized in the process of constituting new forms of self governing welfare subjects)" (Newman 2007, 4).

²⁴¹ See Tania Li's work on how the construction of protectorates for 'non-market subjects' can itself be part of accumulation strategies that encroach upon commons etc. (Li 2014).

²⁴² See for example Roediger (2007) on a historical study on how the introduction of wage labor was reconciled with the political ideology of liberalism by way of

²⁴³ <https://www.bizlife.rs/biznis/poslovne-vesti/74142-delhaize-otvorio-distributivni-centar-u-staroj-pazovi/>

²⁴⁴ Foreign investors are very present in the field of flexibilization of labor legislation (Radenković 2016). Delhaize is among those employers that are actively advocating measures for the deregulation of the labor market, tapping into 'atypical', non-unionized labor force (Reljanović 2017). Delhaize for example actively advocates the much criticized 'dual education', which has been praised as 'magnet for foreign investors' (<http://edukaplus.com/vesti/dualno-obrazovanje-magnet-za-strane-investitore-privredna-komora-srbije-i-giz-potpisale-memorandum-o-razumevanju/>). The scheme makes young adults during their education already work half of the week for a hourly payment that is way under the minimum wage and gives employers the chance to exploit labor force beyond the usual obligations it has towards employees as these youngsters are officially still in education²⁴⁴. Flexibilization taps into pools of workers framed in some way as 'dependent population' and not 'bread-winners'. I will show in this chapter also how Roma population is framed as a population not in need of a 'main income'.

²⁴⁵ "I asked the Agent whether he could have gotten so many people via the National Employment Service (NES). He said, well, NES only send 5 people in the whole last months that I asked for people, and they were all elderly people, who took long breaks and some were obviously not willing to work. The Coordinator Hasan said protestingly, but elderly people should also have jobs. The Agent agreed, yes, but they have to work. So the Agent called NES to have them deleted from the register (but he says, NES is simply inefficient, they do not keep track)." (my fieldnotes)

²⁴⁶ In a report on the regulation of ATWs according to EU prescriptions in Serbia, the Center for the Development of Syndicalism (Bakovnik et al. 2017) points out that 'cleaning' can be both regarded as 'core-business' and also provided by an external service sub-contractor, which makes a difference with regard to the status of the worker. The key characteristic which makes it belonging to the 'core-business' of the company, and thus makes the workers leasing workers and not workers of a subcontractor, is the question of whether "work is done under surveillance and control of the client company" (Bakovnik et al. 2017, 7).

²⁴⁷ <http://sistemfps.rs/services/pomocni-poslovi/>

²⁴⁸ Work on leasing was introduced as a practice of employment already before the Labor Law started to regulate Temporary Employment Agencies and the rights of workers on leasing. In 2015 Temporary Employment Agencies and work on leasing was first regulated in the Labor Law, which adjusted in some points the rights of temporary employed via agencies to the rights of direct employees (in terms of their right to strike, to yearly holiday, to sick-leave). Exempted from these regulations were workers hired via the Omladinska Zadruga (which is originally meant to mediate student jobs or other categories of young people who want to gain first work experience under 30 years old). These categories still have no right to sick-leave, yearly holiday, or dismissal wage since their contracts run for a maximum of 120 days and afterwards a new contract is set up under a new name, but same conditions. <http://radnik.rs/2017/03/ministarstvo-radnik-moze-vise-godina-da-radi-bez-odmora-i-bolovanja/> Moreover, exempted from the regulation of workers in temporary contracts are people that offer services, which do not belong to the main area of sphere of action of that respective employer, but general services. In this category fall 'cleaners', 'hygienists' and people working as 'security service'. <http://radnik.rs/2017/07/bolji-uslovi-rada-na-lizing-ali-ne-i-za-radnike-obezbedjenja-higijenicare-i-zadrugare/>

²⁴⁹ Decision of the Belgrade City Assembly of December 2020 (Danas 2020)

²⁵⁰ The relation between governance (forms of knowing and governmental techniques) of resources and how these regimes shape work has been explored by political ecologists (Li 2011; 2014), or in a slightly different light, by Agrawal (2005), inquiring into how environmental governance has shaped subjectivities among forest dwellers in North India.

²⁵¹ <http://www.gradjevinarstvo.rs/vesti/11334/810/u-beogradu-oko-500-000-tona-gradjevinskog-otpada-godisnje>

²⁵² <https://reciklersrbije.com/nepohodne-investicije-od-15-mil-eur-do-2035-godine-reciklaza-70-gradjevinskog-otpada/>

²⁵³ <http://beorec.com/usluge.html>

²⁵⁴ <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/vesic-divlja-deponija-na-cukarickoj-padini-bice-zatvorena-ovo-je-sve-rezija/n3lzsx6>

²⁵⁵ <https://www.energetskiportal.rs/zbog-otvaranja-divljih-deponija-beograd-gubi-nekoliko-miliona-evra/>

²⁵⁶ Tsing (2015) makes the argument about recovering of value from the ruins. The recovery happens in the interstices of urban renewal project – probiotic (mutual beneficial interaction of two systems or species, different from parasitism where only one side benefits) to the work of building a new construction ground from construction waste. Nguyen (2016) in a similar way observed how informal waste recycling shops open next to urban renewal projects in ... and thus the very process of modernizing the city intersects with and the ground for livelihoods that are to be obliterated by that process.

²⁵⁷ Tsing also describes for the salvage accumulation, a definite line between speculating, labor is difficult to draw “Where should the line between laborers and capitalists be drawn in the matsutake supply chain, when both sides of every transaction are hedging and speculating and thinking about their activities as a form of market participation?”