

IT'S LOGIC AND HEURISTICS! A CRITIQUE OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY AND RHETORIC

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Abstract

The topic of populism seems to be popular lately. This MA thesis is a meta-analysis of populist ideology and rhetoric, and proposes logic and heuristics as means for research phenomena populism is about. It is divided into three sections. The first section is about the critique of populist literature regarding its normative framework, i.e., populist ideology. Populist ideology attributes (dualist antagonistic division of society, anti-establishment attitudes, and general will) and instances of populism (Narodnik movement, Chavez, and Trump) are analyzed and criticized. The second section is about populist discord and its scoping method (semantic text analysis). At the beginning of the section, methodological pluralism will be discussed. Dictionary-based computerized content analysis, holistic grading, and clause-based semantic text analysis will be presented as examples of semantic text analysis. Roel's analysis of Viktor Orban's speech will be criticized due to interpretative bias at the end of the section. The third section is about logic and heuristics. It starts with basic information about political manipulation and an example of human reasoning research (Wason's Selection Task). There will be general information about the logic and heuristic. Also, a brief, logical analysis of 2020. the presidential debate between Trump and Sanders will be demonstrated. Regarding heuristics, it will be presented how it can be used within political science (e.g., voting behavior) by appealing to some research that relied on a heuristic.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Populism has many different definitions and types. It can be scoped within the categories of ideational approach, movement (mobilization), strategy, or rhetoric (discursive style). Many social scientists, both critics, and proponents are aware that populism is a broad and vague topic. This is the core theoretical problem that occurs in all types of populism. The definitions of populism are rare and do not give firm foundations for generalization formation. Thus, populism cannot be defined as a theory, but it is claimed that populism should be scoped by the ideational approach. In the first section of the thesis, populism will be addressed as ideology due to incoherent agreement of what populism is regarding the normative framework. However, in the second and third parts of the thesis, populism will be analyzed as a form of rhetoric because political scientists rely on populist discord when conducting empirical research.

This thesis aims to provide critique and meta-analysis of populist ideology and rhetoric, and pinpoint logic and heuristic as an alternative approach. Basic information and problems of the populist rhetoric will be addressed. Populist rhetoric relies on the dualist antagonistic relation between the people and the elite. The concept of the people is used in a positive connotation, while the concept of the elite is used in a negative connotation. The elites are described as a corrupt and selfish group that manipulates the masses. It can be argued that the topic of populist rhetoric is political manipulation that can be studied in political texts (e.g., speeches). Because the theoretical, i.e., normative framework is too broad and ambiguous, this is a difficult task to do. Instead, already established methods are suggested: logic and heuristic. Logic is used in every human activity, and pioneers of heuristics (Amon Tversky and Daniel Kahneman) received one of the highest rewards- the Nobel prize. Both methods provided positive results in the sciences and are also applied by political scientists. This means that no theory is needed when researching political manipulation, but only these two methods.

The first section is about the populist ideology and its attributes, populist movements, and figures. The point of the section will be to criticize populist ideology for lacking a proper definition and essential property that ought to distinguish it from other ideologies. The dualist (and antagonistic) division of society seems rather simplified, meaning that society cannot be divided between only two groups (the people and the elite). Further, attributes such as anti-establishment attitudes and general will be discussed and criticized. It will be pointed out that

the main problem of populist ideology is conceptual stretching. Conceptual analysis and John Gerring's (1999) few conditions for proper concept clarity will be provided as an example of how one ought to establish a normative framework. Moreover, the Russian populist movement Narodnik and two political figures Hugo Chavez and Donald Trump will be introduced and analyzed as instances of populist movement and figures. Due to different time periods and geographical areas, the three are chosen, so the proper randomized effect would be achieved. It will be presented why they are labeled as populist and why this label is not necessary. In case of refutation of populist ideology, the two solutions will be suggested at the end of the subsection: ideological particularism and communitarian categorization.

The second section will be about populist discord and semantic text analysis. Before turning to heuristics and logic, it would seem appropriate to scope methods that populist scholars rely on when conducting their research. At the beginning of the section, methodological pluralism will be discussed. The point of the discussion is that methodological pluralism does not give precise criteria and norms for conducting research and causes epistemic anarchism. Moreover, three types of semantic text analysis will be presented: dictionary-based computerized content analysis, holistic grading, and clause-based semantic text analysis. Lastly, Roel Popping's (2018) example of clause-based semantic text analysis of part of Orban's speech will be provided and criticized. No matter the advantages and flaws of the methods in question, the research results will often suffer from interpretative bias due to the vagueness of the populist normative framework.

The third and most important section will be about logic and heuristics as an alternative for the empirical phenomena that populist scholars research. Before diving into the subject matter, a few words will be spent on political manipulation, and Wason's selection task (Sekulic 2016: 28) will be demonstrated to show how people's reasoning can be researched. Firstly, the basic information about formal and informal logic and its distinction from rhetoric will be explained. Logical fallacies play a significant part within informal logic, and thus 4 types will be briefly presented. Secondly, there will be an informal logical analysis of the arguments of Trump and Joe Biden during the 2020 Presidential Debate. Thirdly, the general information and types of heuristics will be discussed. Bias is a crucial part of heuristics, and thus, anchoring, representativeness, and recognition bias will be explained. After that, it will be pinpointed how heuristics research can and is applied in political science. This will be done by presenting the research about well and ill-informed voters, party cues, and the physical appearance of political

figures. The section's point is to demonstrate that logic and heuristics could be used as a method to scope political manipulation.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section is about the critique of populist ideology literature, which results in the incapability of forming a proper normative framework and, thus, fails to categorize certain movements (e.g., Narodnik) and figures (e.g., Chavez or Trump) as populist. This is caused by the broadness and vagueness of the normative framework. Populist ideology does not contain a proper definition, lacks essential properties, a simplistic view of society, and the attributes of populist ideology (anti-establishment attitudes and general will) contain serious flaws. This can be seen in incoherent views of populist scholars (Müller (2016) and De Spiegeleire, Skinner, and Sweijjs (2017)) when determining what makes person or movement a populist one. When it comes to movement and figures, it seems that there is no consensus about them being populist. As an alternative to populist categorization, two solutions are proposed: ideological particularism and communitarian categorization (of populist phenomena).

2.1 On Populist Ideology and its Attributes

Populist ideology is problematic because of the weak normative framework as it lacks proper definition and is vague. It suffers from conceptual stretching. Conceptual stretching occurs within the attributes populist ideology relies on the so-called Manichean division of society (antagonistic dualism), anti-establishment attitudes, and general will. Unfortunately, all these concepts are vague and problematic as well. At the end of the section, conceptual analysis and family resemblance will be proposed as means to create a proper normative framework.

One of the reasons for the populist ideology being vague lies in the fact that it has many different definitions and conceptions. Kirk. A. Hawkins and Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser (2019: 1) claim that the concept of populism is a pejorative which "describes organizations and ideas that we think are demagogic." But why then not simply say that politicians and organizations are demagogic? Jan-Werner Müller (2016: 1) admits that there is no precise theory of populism and that the populist ideology suffers from incoherent criteria for ascribing the political actors as populists. On the other hand, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Clarissa Skinner and Tim Sweijjs (2017: 26) claim that every populism definition contains the elements of "the people" and "the elite." Most structured definition was given by Cas Mudde (2017: 48) who defines populism within the ideational framework as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general

will) of the people." The two elements (the people and the elite) are considered to be in an antagonistic relationship. Thus, many proponents of populism assume the so-called Manichean division into society on majority (the people) against the minority (the elites).

The populist ideology lacks essential properties and is based only on a relation (between the people and the elite). It is considered to be a so-called *Kampfbegriff* (battle concept) due to its Manichean conception. But this is an aspect every theory has. Every theory has a rival one in natural and technical sciences (e.g., string theory vs. quantum mechanics or deep learning vs. machine learning) and the same applies to social science (e.g., rational choice theory vs. institutionalism). Every theory and ideology have some essential and specific property. For example, an essential property of egalitarianism is equality (e.g., equal opportunity), and communism is about a community and the needs of each person (according to his or her abilities). Moreover, communist ideology contains the claim that there is a conflict among the classes, especially against the workers and (evil) capitalists who exploit them. But the ideology is not based on that relation, but on principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". This is an important property of an ideology as it makes it specific and different from other ideologies. Populist ideology lacks that.

The reference to Manicheism seems problematic as there is no reliable information about the religion itself. During the early period of the Middle Ages (around 3rd and 4th century AD), Manicheism was proclaimed to be heretical. Allegedly it was a combination of an ancient Persian religion with Christianity and Judaism. The core idea was that the materialistic world was evil, and the spiritual was good. This kind of evaluative dualism is the one proponents of populist ideology have in mind. However, Croatian medieval historians, Ivo Goldstein and Borislav Grgin (2006: 31), claim that the foundational principles of Manicheism that we are familiar with today are not reliable because the original manuscripts are mostly destroyed. The only sources we have today are the secondary ones. They were written by Christian theologians (e.g., Augustine of Hippo), meaning that they are biased. Thus, the Manicheism as a term ought to be rejected. Instead, the proponents of the populist ideology may use the concept of dualism, i.e., antagonistic dualism, as the explanation of their idea. It is also a custom in science to use neutral concepts (such as dualism) instead of poetic or evaluative ones.

The proponents of the populist ideology appeal to the dualist division of society. As was mentioned, they perceive societal actors in a binary relation; the people vs. the elite. Although there is a conflict between people of higher societal hierarchy (e.g., directors of companies)

and lower (e.g., workers), this is just an oversimplified society's framework. The relation between social actors is a little bit more complicated than that. It seems that this kind of dualism neglects the people from the middle societal hierarchy and a conflict between people from the same societal hierarchy (e.g., among elites).

However, the society is a bit more complex than the dualist framework, as the proponents of the populist ideology suggest. The interest group framework is familiar for some period of time and is an important element for political science research. There are different ways to determine interest groups. This depends on many factors such as state regime or era. Usually, political scientists refer to agriculturalists, laborers, and businessmen.¹ These interest groups are characteristic mostly for contemporary democratic states. Briefly stated, one of the most obvious ways to notice their interaction is during an economic recession. Peter Gourevitch (1986) believes that economic crises cause alignment of interest groups coalitions. The economic crises give space for changes in policymaking and breaks the old interest group coalition(s).²

Some proponents of populist ideology refer to the concept of anti-establishment attitudes as a supporting concept (attribute) to the populist ideology. Müller (2016: 1) believes that populism is a synonym for anti-establishment attitudes. If one thinks about, the concepts of establishment and anti-establishment are in contradict relation.³ Every concept with “anti” prefix is problematic because it does not describe what the concept is, but what is not. This kind of approach does not lead anywhere as one can spend the whole eternity explaining what the establishment attitudes are not about.⁴ Therefore, establishment should be defined first. According to the online Oxford Dictionary, establishment in a political sense is defined as people or a certain group of people who possess power and are resistant to change. Although Müller (2016) does not define what exactly he means by the concept of establishment, he claims that populists want to replace political actors in power.

¹ These interest groups are the most general ones. For example, pensioners can also be considered as an interest group. There are pensioner political parties in many countries (e.g., in Croatia, Slovenia, England, Hungary etc.).

² The more detailed description of the interaction between interest groups is not the topic of this thesis, and thus will not be further discussed. More information can be acquired in A. J. Cigler, B. A. Loomis, and A. J. Nownes (2020.) *Interest Group Politics*, 10th edition, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

³ Logic square is the reference here.

⁴ Instead, the proper term to use would be counter-establishment attitudes. This way, the logic square rules are respected, and it can be claimed that counter-establishment attitudes are about the attitudes of people who are against the ones who possess power and are resistant to changes.

However, the agony does not end here as the concept establishment is, as is the populist ideology, too broad. The establishment may also denote an organization or institution. It can be said that Western states have a democratic establishment. The proponents of the populist ideology argue that a populist is always against the establishment in both mentioned senses. They are against current people who hold some kind of power (e.g., government), and some of them are against the current state's (e.g., democratic) establishment. Some proponents of the populist ideology may say that the meaning of the concept of establishment varies across the contexts. If this is true, then the proponents of the populist ideology must bite the bullet and admit that there may be a situation where every individual who criticizes people who possess power (e.g., a government) and disagrees with its current work is, if not a populist, then a supporter of one.

As already noted down, the concept of the general will is considered to be one of the most important attributes of the populist ideology. The concept was introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. At first glance, one would think that general will is the will of the majority of people. But this is incorrect. He distinguishes the will of all (the sum of individuals' will) from general will. To achieve general will, all votes must be counted and equally weighted (Social Contract, bk. II, ch. II, p. 172). Likewise, Rousseau claims that general will cannot err, but people with their deliberation can make judgement fallacies. (Social Contract, bk. II, ch. III, p. 172). There are two interpretations of Rousseau's conception of general will. According to the procedural interpretation individuals (assembly of citizens) deliberate alone what is the best for them and their society. On the other hand, there is another interpretation according to which deliberation is not enough for individuals to achieve general will. As Jonathan Wolff (1997: 79) points out, the usual meaning of general will is supposed to be about general interest and is applied equally to all citizens. None of the groups can be excluded from it when policymakers deliberate about a certain policy but they must have in mind what is in the common interest.

What proponents of the populist ideology claim is that general will is in fact the will of all people. As appealing as general will may sound, it is rather unclear how general will can be determined, i.e., common interest or how one ought to give proper norms to respect and act upon it. Rousseau does not give concise information on how one determines and knows what general will is. Among other things, he would propose that an individual should be forced to act according to the general will. This is one of the main problems of Rousseau's conception of general will. When proponents of the populist ideology argue about general will, this is what they have in mind. They claim that a populist politician uses the concept of the general will as

justification for their rule and policymaking. But the fact that politicians appeal to general will is nothing more than demagoguery. It is unclear why there is a need for the theory behind this discussion.

Moreover, the main problem of populist ideology is conceptual stretching. Giovanni Sartori (1970: 1034-1035) defines conceptual stretching as "vague and amorphous conceptualizations that are caused by the gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision". The framework of the people and the elite and struggle among each other is something which every political theory consists of. For example, communist theory explicitly states that there is a conflict among the socio-economic classes.

Liberal democracy framework and a transitory feature may be taken as the elements of research domain. The populist ideology presupposes the liberal democracy⁵ context. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 2) believe that populist actors act usually within the liberal democratic framework, but the same approach can be applied within other forms of political systems. If these criteria are respected it could be claimed that the Nazi movement was a populist one. They emerged and acted during the democratic period in Germany but were proposing xenophobic and antisemitism ideology. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 2) claim that one of the main problems of the populist ideology is that movements and actors get this (negative connotative) label by others. But movements are usually called by the name of their leader or ideology. Therefore, calling Nazis a populist movement seems redundant. The proponent of populist ideology may argue that the Nazi movement had been a populist one because of the transitory feature of the populist ideology. It means that populism is a temporal phenomenon that fades out or becomes something significant. Unfortunately, it seems that there are no precise criteria at what point a movement starts being populist and when it stops.

Furthermore, it seems that the populist ideology's research domain are the people and the elite. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 9) propose a constructivist way of defining people. They claim that people are a simplification of reality. They believe that the concept "the people" is excellent because it can be interpreted differently. For instance, it can be interpreted as the common people or as a nation. However, this is the core of the problem of the incapability to determine the domain of research. If one thinks about it, the concept of people suffers from a slippery slope because it is difficult to determine where precisely the threshold between the

⁵ The concept of democracy often suffers from a slippery slope.

people and the elite is. If a homeless person receives 10 000 euros, it is difficult to say whether he or she is poor anymore.

Conceptual analysis and family resemblance are familiar tools for building the normative framework. Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu (2004: 127) state that “only when we understand the meaning of the word can we employ it in formulating precise questions and thus provide correct solutions.” The conceptual analysis can be achieved by defining necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, Robert Nozick would argue that the rational agency capacity is a necessary and sufficient for X to be considered a person. This means that if a being (e.g., an animal) does not possess rational agency capacity, it cannot be considered a person. The point of Nozick’s analysis is, among other things, to show that humans are persons and animals are not.⁶ Another way of creating normative framework may be family resemblance. The point of this method is to connect similar or overlapping properties of certain concepts. Usually, there is one essential property that connects concepts. For instance, the usual example of this method is games. Just as there are similarities (e.g., eyes, height, temperament) among relatives, the same principle applies for games (e.g., board games, cards, sports). However, family resemblance is an exceptional tools and alternative if conceptual analysis does not provide proper solution. The reason for that is that family resemblance does not provide explicit rules how to form a relationship between the concepts, i.e., its rules for establishing the relationship are mostly arbitrary.

John Gerring (1999) gives a few conditions for proper concept clarity. Every concept should be used and defined by Occam’s Razor, i.e., the Principle of Parsimony. A concept does not necessarily have to use many attributes. In fact, the fewer attributes it appeals to, the better the concept and the same goes for theories. For example, scientists prefer the Theory of Evolution instead of Creationism because the Theory of Evolution does not need an extra entity- God.⁷ Gerring (1999: 373) believes (internal) coherence to be the most important feature of a good concept. Coherence is achieved by a core attribute, accompanied by one or a few other attributes. The relation between core and accompanied attributes and among accompanied attributes must be logical or functional.

To summarize, this section's point was to demonstrate why the normative framework of populist ideology is weak. It relies on the attributes of anti-establishment attitudes, antagonistic

⁶ In Nozick’s defense, he claims animals may possess personhood partially.

⁷ This is not questioning the God’s existence but exemplifying the function of Parsimony Principle.

dualism, and general will, all of which are problematic. Conceptual analysis and family resemblance methods are proposed as an alternative for proper normative framework formation. The next section is about three populist movements in different periods and the alternative to populist ideology.

2.2 On Populist Movements and Figures, and Alternatives for Populist Ideology

It is argued that populist ideology is widespread and has a long tradition. Allegedly the first populist movements emerged in the 19th century. This section is about the three populist movements that are selected by different periods and continents to test the proper randomized effect. The first populist movement is Narodnik from the 19th century in Russia, the second one is Chavez's Venezuelan populist movement in the 20th century, and the American presidential candidate Trump in the 21st century. Main information about each three will be presented with critiques. Each of the three is troublesome due to normative framework problems. Because of the broad, vague, and incoherent normative framework, it is highly unlikely to do applicable populist categorization. Finally, there are two solutions for this problem: ideological particularism and communitarianism as the substitute for all empirical phenomena that populism is about.

Russian movement Narodnik is considered to be among the first populist movements (Eatwell 2017: 367).⁸ It was a peasant movement in 19th century, i.e., in 1860s and 1870s at the time when serfdom was abolished. The main purpose was to form “a new order based on mythologized peasant institutions and values” (Eatwell 2017: 367). Movement leaders were students (so-called critically thinking elite) who wanted to fully transform Russian society. It seems that they wanted to full despotism abolishment. Also, there was a political party Land and Freedom (*Zemlya i Volya*) that was the main organization of Narodnik movement. Venturi (1960: 319) argues that it is difficult to give a movement coherence. They were against the government centralization and were proposing that people, i.e., peasants ought to participate in solving the region (oblast) problems. Eventually the movement failed due to lack of peasants' understanding and distrust of Narodnik movement.

However, there are disagreements about whether Narodnik movement is a populist. R. Pipes (1964) points out the problem of the meaning of the word *narodnichestvo*. According to his words, *narodnichestvo* has changed its meaning multiple times. Besides populism, it can denote agrarian socialism and a phase of revolutionist social movements during the period of the

⁸ Alongside with 1880s Populist Movement (Farmers' Alliances) in the USA.

second half of 19th century (Pipes 1964: 441, 443). The fact that there is dispute of Narodnik movement being either agrarian, socialist, or populist casts doubt on possibility of categorization of it. Another thing to have in mind is whether movements from the 19th century (and pre-World War One period) could be comparatively analyzed since social stratification in most countries differs from the one in the 20th century.

Venezuelian president Chavez can be taken as an example of left-wing populist movement. It could be claimed that Chavez was leftist who was anti-globalist and against the free-market reforms. Nevertheless, Hawkings (2003: 1153) believes that Chavez can be recognized as a populist because his discourse was about the people and his “enlightenment” to carry out the will of the people, i.e., general will. Chavez had a strong charisma which can be observed in linkage with “ordinary people” as some of them identified him as brother (Hawkings 2003: 1149). Like most of the populists he sees world within the dualist antagonistic framework (good and evil) by making negative comments about the elite and the opposition. The elite and the opposition were the Evil, and some of his former party members that became his oppositions he labeled as traitors (Hawkings 2003: 1154). On the other hand, he and his party are seen as forces of good. It should be noted that Hawkings (2003: 1145) admits that it is difficult to categorize Chavez as a classical or neo-populist.

However, Chavez is often considered to be a socialist. He and many other Latin American leaders (e.g., E. Morales) are associated with the concept of 21st century socialism (Webber 2003: 14-15). The reason for that is (are) his (their) socialist reforms and associations. Firstly, during his mandate, there was a constitutional ban on privatization of the oil industry, and he made sure that workers’ salary is sufficient for their life expenses. Secondly, his political party Fifth Republic Movement (which merged with some other parties in 2007 into United Socialist Party of Venezuela) was a democratic socialist party. Likewise, “Motherland, socialism, or death” was the slogan of Chavez’s political party. Thirdly, he considers history to be teleological (Hawkings 2003: 1153-1154) which goes hand in hand with Marxist view on history. One of his main principles is that the people are the ones that move the wheel of history and struggle against the imperialists. However, some political scientists (Webber 2003) disagree with Chavez being categorized as a socialist.

Trump is categorized as right-wing populist, i.e., nationalist-populist or populist sovereign. H. Gusteron (2017: 210) gives the family resemblance of agendas and movement properties: xenophobia (mostly religious, ethnic, and immigrant), representation of ordinary people (e.g.,

workers) that are misrepresented by the left-wing parties, labeling current established government as corrupt one, and hostility towards the international organizations (e.g., NATO) or institutions (e.g., European Commission). Trump's rhetoric is often called the blue-collar narrative. As the USA is seen as a divided society, Trump was counting on the votes of white people workers. Gusteron (2017: 212) states that Trump's political campaign (in 2016.) contained many topics based on race, gender, and immigrants. Whether in academia or outside, Trump supporters would claim that Trump is, in fact, a conservative. They might also add that the populist label is used to discredit him.

It seems that the main point of Trump's campaign was to cause emotional triggers for white Americans. For example, he proposed building a wall on the Mexico border to protect the country from increased crime rates and unemployment. It seems that many (especially white people) workers despised previous government(s) due to the immigrant and affirmative action policies. They believed that that was the main cause of their unemployment. In other words, they felt discriminated against, and this is the target that Trump, with his rhetoric, was aiming for. In order to increase his chances and to reach for workers and voters within all educational levels, he used simpler vocabulary compared to Obama or H. Clinton (Wang 2018). An instance of Trump's appeal to emotions will be demonstrated in the third section.

The proponents of populist ideology may suggest that every populist movement can still be classified as a populist even if it is categorized differently (e.g., socialist). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 6) claim that ideologies such as socialism are considered thick-centered ideologies, meaning they must have their own concepts and norms that make them specific compared to the other (thick-centered) ideologies. They consider populist ideology to be thin-centered, meaning that it uses restricted morphology that binds with the elements of other thick-centered ideologies. But this is a redundant thing to do! It is rather obscure why and how binding with thick-centered ideologies solve any problems, as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 6) admit that populism cannot give comprehensive solutions for political science puzzles. Also, considering the discussion from the previous subsection, it seems that elements of populist morphology have serious flaws (conceptual stretching).

As pointed multiple times, political figures ascribed as populists are nothing more than demagogues. Demagogues (e.g., Alcibiades) appeared during the period of Ancient Greece, especially during the period of Athenian democracy. Patricia Roberts Miller (2017.) argues that demagoguery typically includes promised stability, diffusion of responsibility, and framing the

opposition groups for economic problems or public policy problems. The polarization of society does this into dualistic antagonism, false alternative (us vs. them rhetoric), putting identity problems (e.g., security from immigrants) first instead of policy ones, subjective perception of truth, and logical fallacies. Truth to be told, this is no easy task to scope, but there are methods (such as logic and heuristics) to study these phenomena.

There is a problem with the categorization of so-called populist movements and political figures. As presented in the previous section, the normative framework of populist ideology is too broad and vague. Also, it seems that each populist movement and figure interpret the concept of “the people differently”. Narodnik movement appealed to the peasants, Chavez mostly to the low-income families, and Trump to (white people) workers. Narrowing down the concept of people seems to weaken the coherence of the normative framework. If populist ideology is to be refuted, there must be a proper alternative for empirical phenomena (later referred to as populist phenomena) populist ideology is all about. Ideally, an ideology should be defined and demarcated by the specific necessary and sufficient conditions. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Due to the thesis limitations, two possible alternatives are proposed: either to scope these populist phenomena as particularities or as a universal category.

The first solution could be ideological particularism. There is a position in meta-ethic called moral particularism. Moral particularism is defined as a position “which insists on considering each moral situation as it arises, in isolation from others, and rejecting general principles” (Proudfoot and Lacey 2010: 127). The same can be applied to ideologies. Therefore, ideological particularism could be defined as an ideology that is specific to certain country or geographical area. This already done by some political scientists (Hawkins 2003) and is specific for Latin American leaders (e.g., Chavismo or Peronism). Integrative Yugoslavism can be another example of ideological particularism. During the period of Monarchist Yugoslavia⁹ there was an ideology that proposed the merge of three “tribal” nations (Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs) into one and unified Yugoslav nation.

The second and more plausible solution would be to categorize populist phenomena within the communitarianism position. The question of rights’ primate is one of the object of many discussions in political philosophy. Positions such as communism, conservatism, and communitarianism propose priority of collective rights, while on the other hand liberalism

⁹ Monarchist Yugoslavia is the unofficial name for (first) Yugoslav state from 1918. to 1941. because it was renamed many times.

proposes that individual rights come first. Thus, communitarians suggest that community comes first, and individuals are “embedded into a concrete moral, social, historical, and political context that is constitutive of individual identity” (Bunin and Yu 2004: 122-123). Relying on the Parsimony Principle, positions such as communism or conservatism could be merged into communitarian domain.¹⁰ In this case, communism would be synonym for radical left-wing communitarianism, and conservatism would be right-wing communitarianism. The common ground of so-called populist political figures and movements is their appeal to community they are part of, and this is the reason why there ought to be categorized as communitarians. All of them characterize themselves as the protectors of their community and competent enough to determine what is in best interest (i.e., general will) of their community.

The point of this section is to demonstrate that it is challenging to make applicable categorization of political figures and movements as populist. The main cause of that is a broad, vague, and incoherent normative framework. This casts doubt on the possibility for further populist research. Because of that, two alternatives were proposed. The second one seems more promising due to the possibility of generalization of what used to be populist phenomena. The next section will be about the populist discourse and semantic text analysis, i.e., how populist scholars conduct their research.

¹⁰ Many political scientists would disagree with this proposition. Due to the limitations of the thesis, there will be no arguments proposed to justify why this is a good idea. Also, political scientist such as M. C. Young (2020.) had the similar proposition.

3. POPULIST DISCOURSE AND SEMANTIC TEXT ANALYSIS

The previous section was about the normative problems of populist ideology. The populist ideology seems too broad and conceptually stretched. This section is about the relation of populist discourse and its methodology. This section aims to demonstrate that a broad, vague, and incoherent normative framework leads to relativism and methodological pluralism, which denies the opportunity to form a general framework for scoped empirical phenomena. The method of analysis will be semantic text analysis. For starters, the problems of methodological pluralism will be discussed and criticized. Next, language in populist discourse will be discussed. The language is binary (it is about the people and the elite) and abundant in emotive expressions. Finally, semantic text analysis will be demonstrated in general terms and how it is used in political science. A part of Orban's speech will be used as an example of the application of semantic text analysis. Regardless of the quality of the semantic text analysis (as a method), due to the normative problems and incoherence, the results of the analysis will suffer from interpretative bias.

Keeping in mind the discussion from the previous section, another problem of the populist ideology is that it implies methodological pluralism. Methodological pluralism could be defined as a position that proposes the use of various methods within one scientific field. There are various types of populist discourse research methods. For instance, there are measurements of populist attitudes and discourse analysis. Amit Ron and Majia Nadesan (2020: 223) admit that "study of populism is particularly muddy," and unacquainted scholars or readers might believe that it lacks normative bias. This seems like an insufficient justification. Whether natural or social, every scientific field must have precise criteria and norms that determine how to conduct research for it. However, this is difficult to achieve if the normative (i.e., conceptual) framework is not clear.

Furthermore, methodological pluralism may result in epistemic anarchism since there are no norms which method should be primarily applied. This view is proposed by methodological skeptics (such as Paul Feyerabend). They believe that science cannot have universal criteria because it may harm scientific progress. In other words, they propose an anything-goes approach meaning that anyone can use any method without proper justification. In social science, methodological pluralism causes relativism, but in natural sciences, it may be dangerous. For instance, if an anti-vaxxer movement becomes successful, serious medical problems would occur.

The language in populist discourse and rhetoric is binary and full of emotive expressions. Discourse is a concept that can be defined and interpreted differently. Continental philosophers would define it as “the basis on which to defend the legitimacy of social and political practices” (Bunin and Yu 2004: 185). This is the definition most political scientists would probably agree with. The populist discourse involves two already mentioned concepts: the people and the elite. The people are used in positive connotation and the elite in negative. The elite is demonstrated as a group of corrupt people who pursue self-interest on the people’s account. The people are presented as victims of the elite’s establishment and manipulation. Populist politicians¹¹ may also mention the concept of anti-elite to express their anti-establishment attitudes and positions. Populists usually invoke support to fight against the elites and proclaim themselves as the defender of the interest of sovereign people.

One of the methods for populist discourse research is semantic text analysis. Carl W. Roberts (1997: 55) defines semantic text analysis as “a quantitative text analysis method in which not only themes but also grammatical relations among themes are encoded.” This is done by specifying the texts of germane to the domain of research interest and by using the semantic grammar¹² that specifies the relations that could be encoded between themes in the texts. When the text’s themes are encoded, they can be used as elements of conducted research. Roel Popping (2011.) claims that it can be named content analysis as well. Social scientists tend to focus on the content of the text, i.e., audible and visible symbols, unlike linguists who study text structures. Semantic text analysis implies precise semantic grammar for texts that are analyzed.

Political scientists tend to use semantic text analysis for populist discourse research. It is a quantitative method because it measures how many times specific references (i.e., words or concepts) are mentioned and can be used in any textual source of communication (e.g., speeches, social media posts, interviews, and similar). Paris Aslanidis (2017.) proposes a comparative analysis of populist discourse and texts. He believes that increasing the measurement’s reliability and validity will decrease the possibility of bias, and the dependent variable ought to be gradual instead of binary, meaning that a text or a person can be determined as more or less populist. Furthermore, there are three types of semantic text analysis:

¹¹ People other than politicians can also be categorized as a populist.

¹² Roberts (1997: 57) argues that semantic grammar is “a strategy for describing text structure.” This is done by pinpointing speech acts regarding the function of the analyzed text genre.

dictionary-based computerized content analysis, holistic grading, thematic text analysis, and clause-based semantic text analysis.

Dictionary-based computerized content analysis is a computer-assisted analysis that can measure populism or any other kind of social phenomena within political texts (e.g., party program). The content of the analysis depends on the researchers' topic of interest. They create the research content from qualitative readings. Here, the problem is that there is no rule on how many concepts an analysis should contain. Besides, the validity of the analysis depends on the content of the dictionary, meaning that there is room for different interpretations that may cause bias.

In contrast to dictionary-based computerized content analysis, holistic grading is a method that takes the full text into consideration. Unlike the previous approach, holistic grading is not based on specific (populist) keywords. It utilizes a binary value system meaning that (political) text is evaluated either as populist or not populist. However, there is also a three-point grading scale. The 0 marks non-populist text, 1 marks mixed populist text, and 2 marks a populist text (Aslanidis 2017: 8). The problem of this method is reliability and bias because political text depends on coders' interpretation and evaluation of it. The coders must be well-informed about the text's content, but also there is a possibility of bias again. It is unclear how the valid interpretation should be determined and who is competent enough to do it. Again, having in mind the previous section, this seems like a difficult task because results of populist text analysis would be differently evaluated.

Last but not least, there is clause-based semantic text analysis. The analysis relies on semantic grammar. The text is grouped in a set of clauses that are called semantic triplets. The triplets are used as a coding unit and consist of subject, predicate, and object. In populist discourse, the people and the elite are assigned as subjects that interact with predicates and eventually form a relation to the object. Aslanidis (2017: 11-12) claims that semantic triplets can follow grammatical rules (subject-predicate-object format), which guarantees systematic analysis of any text in any language. It is not limited by the text size, such as paragraphs or social media posts. For example, multiple predicates within a sentence will not cause any coding problems. Popping (2018: 2167) explains how clause-based semantic text analysis works on the part of Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's speech:

If we want to stop this mass migration, we {Hungarian people} must {inevitability} first of all curb Brussels {security reason}. The main danger to Europe's future does not come from those who want to

come here, but from Brussels' fanatics of internationalism. We {Hungarian people} cannot {impossible} allow Brussels to place itself above the law {security reason}. We {Hungarian people} shall not allow {impossible} it to force upon us the bitter fruit of its cosmopolitan immigration policy {security reason}. We shall not import to Hungary crime, terrorism, homophobia and synagogue-burning anti-Semitism. There shall be no urban districts beyond the reach of the law, there shall be no mass disorder or immigrant riots here and there shall be no gangs hunting down our women and daughters. We {Hungarian people} shall not allow {impossible} others to tell us whom we can {no reality claim} let into our home and country, whom we will live alongside, and whom we will share our country with. We know how these things go. First we allow them to tell us whom we must {no reality claim} take in, then they force us to serve foreigners in our country {political reason}. (Speech on 15 March, March 15, 2016)

The point of Orban's speech was a defense against foreign (Brussels, i.e., EU) impact on domestic policymaking. He presents himself as a protector of Hungarian interests. The words in brackets are added by Popping to give a contextual explanation. He claims that the subject is Hungarian people. An example of how coding functions here is that words with negation (such as "not allowed") can be coded as "impossible." Moreover, rationales within the populist context are also taken into consideration. Popping (2017: 2168) mentions five of them: politics, economics, culture, welfare, and security. However, the problem is that every politician talks about the topics such are politics, economics, culture, welfare, and security. For populists it is specific that they use culture, welfare, and security rationale more often than politics and economics.


Even with the assumption that semantic text analysis produces infallible results, there still might be interpretive bias. No matter how well coding may function when everything, in the end, depends on coders' and researchers' interpretation of the text content. The clause-based semantic text analysis seems a useful method, but it fails to avoid interpretive bias, which results in relativism. Popping (2017: 2164) himself is aware of that as he explicitly claims that the decision whether the clause "we" that denotes "own group" is populist or not depends on researchers' decision. This is problematic because it makes populist categorization relative. Some populist researchers (e.g., Spiegeleire, Skinner, and Sweijs 2017: 27) claim that political figures are not populist if they appeal to the people. On the other hand, other populist researchers (e.g., Müller 2016: 2) claim that it is not enough for political figures to have anti-elite rhetoric to be immediately categorized as populist. A different view on populist ideology will surely affect the interpretation of the results of semantic text analysis and may provide different research results.

The purpose of this section was to demonstrate that problems of the normative framework can cause relativism and methodological pluralism, which will not result in forming generalizations about certain empirical phenomena. Methodological pluralism may sound appealing, but it has a high price. It brings skepticism of universal scientific methods, which, for sure, are not perfect and change over time. But the price is high because it brings relativism and epistemic anarchism. Most scientists would probably use a theoretical framework with imperfect norms and methods than the broad one relying on methodological pluralism. This is an obvious outcome of populist discourse. However, semantic text analysis seemed to solve this problem, but as was demonstrated, it also suffers from relativism, i.e., it lacks firm criteria to analyze text contents. The populist ideology is about the political manipulation that politicians or any other person do to deceive some group of people. Logicians would have said that whenever people appeal to the collective's approval, they commit logical fallacy *ad populum*. The alternative methods (logic and heuristics) for political manipulation analysis will be discussed in the next section.

4. POLITICAL MANIPULATION

Populist ideology seems too problematic, as was pointed out. Instead, the object of research should be political manipulation. Political manipulation can be defined as the methods that politicians use to deceive, manipulate, or distract voters and citizens in general. An extreme version of political manipulation can be called propaganda.¹³ The analysis of political manipulation can be conducted by informal logic and heuristics. It does not require any theory behind it, only these two already established methods. The difference is that logic is a normative discipline, while heuristic is rather descriptive in nature. Logic is mostly qualitative method,¹⁴ while heuristic can be used as a qualitative and quantitative method.

Logic and heuristics can be categorized as theories of reasoning.¹⁵ Dragana Sekulic (2016: 12) states that logic, due to its normative nature, is about how people ought to infer, and heuristic due to its descriptive nature is about how people reason. There is also a meta-normative question about the justification of certain inferring norms. There are many experiments about people's reasoning. Wason's selection task is a good example:



The respondents were presented with four cards. Each card had a letter on one side, and a number on the other. The task was to check the rule: If there is a vowel on the one side of the card, then there must be an even number on the other side. In order to give correct answer, one must turn a card with vowel on the one side, and odd number on the other side. A good logician would use here the rule of implication according to which a statement is false if antecedent is true (vowel), but consequent is false (odd number). Thus, the card with a vowel (A) is turned to see if there is an odd number (3) and vice versa the card with an odd number (3). Important

¹³ This applies mostly to the authoritarian regimes.

¹⁴ Both formal and informal logic are qualitative one, but some sorts of formal logic (e.g., Boolean logic) are used in many quantitative methods.

¹⁵ There is a difference between the concepts of reasoning and inference. Reasoning is cognitive process (Bunin and Yu 2004: 592) and includes the possibility of belief revision. On the other hand, inference refers to the procedure of following the logical norms (Sekulic 2016: 14).

thing to have in mind is if a card that contains an odd number, it must not contain a vowel. The usual mistake respondents made was turning a card with a consonant (B) and even number (2). However, the rule does not imply that it is not allowed for a card to have consonant and even number. Less than 20% of respondents of the task answered correctly (Sekulic 2016: 29).

4.1 On Logic

Logic is a study that is used in all spheres and sciences. Therefore, it can also be used to study political manipulation. Aristotle believed that logic is an instrument (*organon*) for proper thinking. Some people confuse it with rhetoric, so firstly, there will be a brief explanation of their distinction. Next, the main features of informal logic will be explained. Informal logic seems to be more interesting to political scientists because its main purpose is argument analysis that can be done by finding and exposing logical fallacies. Politicians' speeches usually contain many fallacies, and for that reason, there will be a brief speech analysis of Trump's and Biden's presidential debate speeches. Thus, the point of this subsection is to demonstrate an instance of logical analysis that could be applied in political science to scope political manipulation.

Logic is often confused with rhetoric. Logic is the study of the methods and standards of inference (Kelley 2014: 2). In contrast, rhetoric is "the art of making elegant speeches in order effectively to persuade or influence an audience" (Bunin and Yu 2004: 608). Therefore, logic is about inference, and rhetoric is about persuasion. But that does not mean that both domains exclude each other. Logic is used to form a persuasive argument, and rhetoric also requires valid reasoning and knowledge of inference rules. The difference is that logic tends to be unbiased because its main objective is to provide valid reasoning. That means that if social scientists see that their arguments are invalid, they will be rational, admit a mistake, and accept valid reasons, leading to argument improvement or refutation. In contrast, rhetoric should never admit mistakes as the main purpose is to win the debate.¹⁶

There are two types of logic: formal (also known as symbolic and mathematical logic) and informal logic. Formal logic is "concerned with inference on the basis of the extensions of the concepts, predicate expressions, and propositions employed" (Bunin and Yu 2004: 353). Basically, formal logic is not concerned by the particular content of the arguments but by the formal part of them (explication of an abstract rule). This means that natural language (e.g.,

¹⁶ This is argued in principle. In reality, social scientists are rarely eager to admit a mistake and make big changes to their arguments (and theories), let alone to refute them. In other words, it is hard to be unbiased if they worked for a long time on their arguments or theories.

English) is not necessarily the domain of the formal logic but artificial (e.g., predicate logic has its own syntax).

On the other hand, informal logic seems far more useful to political science. It is associated with critical thinking, which is the reason why it is often called argumentation theory. Logical fallacies, i.e., errors in reasoning, are an important part of it. There are two substantial types of logical fallacies: paralogisms (unintentional fallacies) and sophisms (intentional fallacies). The determination of whether a fallacy is paralogism or sophism usually depends on context. Generally, it is the case that a very inconsistent argument is more likely to be a result of paralogism. For example, it is familiar that a good argument is the one in which true premises result in true conclusion. Paralogism occurs then if S scientist believes that all premises and conclusions of his theory are true, while in fact, they are not. Proponents of phlogiston theory committed paralogism because they were assured that their theory is true. In political science, it could be said that politicians suffered from paralogism if she or he proposed a bad policy (e.g., bad vaccine) due to ignorance. Consequently, most of the fallacies are sophisms.

Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen, and Kenneth McMahon (2014: 110-112) divide logical fallacies into four types.¹⁷ The first types of fallacies are the fallacies of relevance. Premises of the argument are not relevant to the conclusion. In this sense, the statement “If dogs are mammals, then $1+1=2$ ” would be an example of a relevance fallacy. These are the most frequent fallacies as they are good means to deceive interlocutors. The second type is the fallacies of defective induction. In this type, premises are relevant to the conclusion but are weak or inefficient to support the conclusion. The most common fallacy within this type is called the argument from ignorance. In a corruptive affair, politicians may say that some of their associates are innocent because there is no evidence otherwise. Next, there are fallacies of presumption. These sorts of fallacies occur when premises rely on unjustified assumptions. It is often misconception that certain immigrants are reluctant to work due to the bad economy in the country they come from. Finally, there are fallacies of ambiguity. The culprit is different meanings or equivocal statements or words. For instance, the word cardinal may have two different meaning- a bird species or a rank of the Catholic Church, second in precedence to Pope.

Politicians’ speeches are usually full of logical fallacies. They often misinterpret laws, customs, facts, and opponents’ statements. This occurs especially during political campaigns and

¹⁷ They admit that there is no single taxonomy of logical fallacies because there are so many of them I. M. Copi, C. Cohen, and K. McMahon (2013: 10). However, logical fallacies are not problematic per se, but there is just no consensus for grouping them.

debates. On October 22nd, 2020. in Nashville, Tennessee, there was a US presidential debate between Trump and Biden on NBC News. The host was K. Welker. There were 6 major topics. The chosen topic for logical analysis is a coronavirus crisis. Due to the word limitation, only part of the speeches that contain a logical fallacy will be presented. The chosen parts of Trump's speech are:

We have no choice. We can't lock ourselves up in a basement like Joe does. He has the ability to lock himself up. I don't know. He's obviously made a lot of money someplace, but he has this thing about living in a basement. People can't do that. By the way I as the president couldn't do that. I'd love to put myself in the basement or in a beautiful room in the White House and go away for a year and a half until it disappears. I can't do that.

And Kirsten, every meeting I had and I'd meet a lot of families, including gold star families and military families. Every meeting I had and I had to meet them, I had to. It would be horrible to have canceled everything.

I said, "This is dangerous and you catch it." And I caught it. I learned a lot. I learned a lot. Great doctors, great hospitals. And now I recovered. 99.9 of young people recover. 99% of people recover. (...) We have to recover. We can't close up our nation. We have to open our school and we can't close up our nation, or you're not going to have a nation (Rev.com, October 22nd, 2020.)

The committed fallacy in every paragraph is an appeal to the emotions, i.e., *ad misericordiam*. In other words, Trump here relies on pity. In the first paragraph, he is pointing out that many people cannot financially afford shutdown as Biden can, and although he has an opportunity to do so, he does not do it because of the compassion for other citizens. In the second paragraph, he again wants to prove that he cares for fellow citizens because he prioritized visiting gold stars and military families. In the third paragraph, he explains that he recovered from the coronavirus, so he can get the compassion to everybody who suffers from it.

Furthermore, there is *ad hominem*. After Biden criticized Trump for not doing enough to prevent the number of infected, Trump replied that people could not lock themselves in their basement as Biden can. Trump's argument is based on Biden instead of his position on how to reduce the number of infected. The second paragraph is an example of the red herring fallacy. Instead of proposing the solution to the coronavirus crisis, Trump tries to distract the attention of listeners, host, and even Biden by mentioning the need to visit and give moral support to gold star and military families. The last two sentences in the third paragraph seem odd. Without any context, the statement about schools remaining closed causing the nation decrease suffers from *ignoratio elenchi* fallacy. It is simply unclear how schools' shutdown would result in nation loss. It would appear that Trump here misses the point of the consequences of schools'

shutdown. However, knowing the context, it can be argued that Trump made here *ad baculum*, i.e., appeal to force. Trump exaggerates to people that school shutdowns will have severely negative consequences, which is not entirely true due to the online lectures.

Biden's speech and replicas were not flawless but also contained some logical fallacies:

The expectation is we'll have another 200,000 Americans dead between now and the end of the year. If we just wore these masks, the president's own advisors have told him, we can save a 100, 000 lives.

We're in a situation now where the New England Medical Journal, one of the serious, most serious journals in the whole world said for the first time ever that the way this president has responded to this crisis has been absolutely tragic. And so folks, I will take care of this. I will end this. I will make sure we have a plan.

Number one, he says that we're learning to live with it. People are learning to die with it. You folks home will have an empty chair at the kitchen table this morning. That man or wife going to bed tonight and reaching over to try to touch, there out of habit, where their wife or husband was, is gone. Learning to live with it.

What I would say is, I'm going to shut down the virus, not the country. It's his ineptitude that caused the country to have to shut down in large part, why businesses have gone under, why schools are closed, why so many people have lost their living, and why they're concerned. Those other concerns are real. (Rev.com, October 22nd, 2020.)

Biden commits similar fallacies as Trump. The first paragraph contains two fallacies: *ad misericordiam* and jumping to the conclusion. He wanted to point out that if a certain amount of people dies, it will be Trump's fault. Even if Trump enforced a law regarding mask-wearing, this itself would not prevent people from getting infected. He appeals without any justifications to statistics; he just jumps to the conclusion if their negative outcome happens, it is Trump's fault. The second paragraph contains *ad populum* and appeals to the authority fallacies. Biden here implies that New England Medical Journal is one of the best in the world because "everybody" claims that. Based on that assumption, he feels credible to claim that Trump's response to the corona crisis was catastrophic. The third paragraph contains *ad misericordiam* and *ad baculum*. The purpose is to receive the pity of people and to "warn" people that more deaths will happen if they elect Trump again. Red herring is the fallacy in the final paragraph. Firstly, it is unclear how one could shut the virus, and secondly, he uses the shutdown statement as a source to shift the blame of economic problems caused by the coronavirus. Likewise, it seems that the point of the last paragraph is to build the justification for his future policies regarding the shutdown.

This subsection gave an instance of logical analysis that political scientists may use while performing research on political manipulation, which in this case is occurred in a presidential debate, i.e., politicians' speeches. Logic is used to form inferences properly in every branch of our lives. This is done by formal and informal logic. Since formal logic is mostly used for abstract and mathematic reasoning, informal logic seems more appropriate for political science. It has firm and strict rules, making it a good tool for analysis, such as politicians' speeches, as demonstrated in the presidential debate between Trump and Biden in 2020. Everybody makes logical fallacies, and informal logic helps us to recognize them and avoid them. However, logic is rather a normative method, but heuristics may be used as a foundation of empirical research of peoples' cognition to reason regarding some empirical phenomena.

4.2 On Heuristics

Another way of analyzing political manipulation is through the heuristic method. Here, basic information about the heuristic will be presented and how one can use it in political science to scope political manipulation. Bias is considered to be a significant part of heuristics. Both cause distractions in reasoning. Next, the most common types of heuristics will be presented: anchoring, representativeness, and recognition heuristics. After that, the relation between heuristics and political science will be demonstrated by referring to the two pieces of research. The first is about information shortcuts being a good way of making a decision when voting. The second is about potential candidates' physical and personal characteristics having an impact on voters' preference formation.

Heuristics can be defined as cognitive shortcuts people rely on when making a certain inference.¹⁸ People manage a lot of information every day. If they contemplated each decision (e.g., what to eat for breakfast), they would not achieve much in life. This is one of the reasons why people rely (mostly unconsciously) on all sorts of patterns. Time-saving is considered to be one of the most valuable characteristics of heuristics. However, it has its price. Not all decisions are made that way. For example, important decisions such as real estate purchases require more time even though a small number of people make this kind of decision hasty. The inference is based on subjective probability approximation and recognizable environment conditions. Judgments made by this kind of inference are made quick but have limited validity because it depends on many factors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974: 1124). In other words,

¹⁸ There is no consensus of heuristic definition. It could be additionally explained by appealing to the family resemblance relationship. Similarly, like games, the heuristic can be explained by the appeal to its examples. The stated definition contains elements that all heuristics contain.

people often make errors in reasoning. Bunin and Yu (2004: 304) claim that heuristic reasoning “may not include routine application of established knowledge” (e.g., logical rules).

Bias is a key part of heuristics. Amon Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974: 1127) name availability bias as judgmental heuristics. A person may claim that it is easier to work with a certain group of people rather than the other. The reason for that conclusion is a personal experience which makes the conclusion biased. The source of bias is the ability to recall specific information or event. This is called bias from retrievability. It ought to be distinguished from bias from imaginability. Bias from the imaginability is based on an individual’s ability of “over- and underestimation of an event probability which is easier or more difficult to imagine or generate” (Sekulic 2016: 21). This happens in political science as well. It is often a case that a certain political ideology is endorsed by the whole family.

Furthermore, there are other types of heuristics. One of the most famous is the anchoring heuristic. This heuristic occurs when people conduct estimation but are affected by some other or previous estimation. Kahneman (2013.) gives an example of Gandhi’s age estimation experiment. If the interlocutor was presented with a higher number (e.g., 114), it would be more likely that the response will be overestimated (e.g., 86). On the other hand, if a lower number was presented (e.g., 35), then the response is likely to be underestimated (e.g., 48). The representativeness heuristic is about estimation based on proofs that possess similar properties for a certain outcome. The problem is that many other properties are neglected, which may have an impact on the outcome. Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1124) give an example with a librarian. There is a person that is polite, geeky, has a need for details, order, and structure. If one asked people randomly what is the job occupation of the person in question, many would answer librarian. The inference results on the properties that are thought that most librarians possess. The point is that people often rely on generalizations and (not necessarily negative) stereotypes.

Gerd Gigerenzer (2008.) mentions recognition heuristics. When people are faced with a dilemma, they will usually pick the option they find more familiar than the other. Usually, their inference here is based on the rule of thumb. Gigerenzer explains this by a survey question about the size of Heingjing and Chernobyl. Most of the respondents believed that the non-existing city Heingjing is bigger than Chernobyl because it sounds Asian or Chinese. Also, Chernobyl sounds familiar because of the nuclear power plant catastrophe, which has nothing to do with its size. On the other hand, he argued that having more information may also cause

inference error. The survey questions whether Detroit is bigger than Milwaukee were presented to American and German students. Most of the Americans gave the wrong answer (that Milwaukee is a bigger city), unlike Germans. The fact that American students were more familiar with Anglo-Saxon geography was actually a flaw because they had too much information on disposal.

Heuristics play an important role in political science as well. The branch within political science that studies heuristics and biases is voting behavior. Most of the regular people believe that voters spend time reflecting and deliberating whom they are going to vote for. Recent studies demonstrate that this Aristotelian way of perceiving democracy is idealized. In reality, this is not always true because it seems that most voters are likely to be ill-informed and make swift decisions regarding voting.

The fact that voters are ill-informed does not mean they can't make the same decision as well-informed do. Arthur Lupia (1994.) claims that information shortcuts can make ill-informed voters behave like well-informed ones. The assumption is that well-informed voters make prudent decisions.¹⁹ He claims that some voters do not want to waste time gathering information about potential incumbents but rather rely on information shortcuts. They may receive the information from acquaintances, political parties, media (e.g., internet), etc. The problem here is the unreliability of information. The acquaintances could misinterpret their political views, which would decrease the quality of information. Lupia (1994.) used the survey of California voters' responses on five insurance reform ballots. The results showed that respondents who had lower factual knowledge about insurance policies relied on information cues that enabled them to use limited knowledge to affect the outcome the same way well-informed voters would.

Party cues can be taken as an example of anchoring bias in political science. They are the type of cues that manifest through any element that presents a party. Usually, this is presented by the party ideology or candidates' demographic properties. In other words, people label or associate a particular party with the ideologies and certain candidates. Ted Brader et al. (2012: 1488) argue that cues may serve as information shortcuts for policies that they think a party implies. They argue that elements such as longevity or ideological coherence may also impact on voters' preferences. Parties that exist for a longer period of time usually will be more popular

¹⁹ As it was mentioned in the survey about Detroit and Milwaukee, more knowledge may cause mistakes in reasoning. The same thing might happen in the process of voting or preference formation.

than the new ones. Moreover, the clearer the ideology expression is, the more likely voters will rely on it to predict future policies. Another example of anchoring bias in political science can be examined during the voters' expectation of coalition forming. It seems logical that parties that are ideologically similar or positioned closer in the political spectrum will form a coalition. Likewise, the vast majority of voters do not expect a coalition of rival and, usually, two most popular parties. For example, in Austria a coalition between the conservative (Austrian People's Party) and green (The Green Alternative) party was formed. This was unexpected outcome since parties differ in almost every aspect. In contrast, many predicted a coalition between The Green Alternative and Social Democratic Party of Austria.

It is a familiar fact that physical appearance and personal character are some of the most important elements voters take into consideration. Alexander Todorov et al. (2005.) conducted research about how voters perceive candidates' competence. The voters' perception is based on candidates' facial expressions. The survey respondents received two black and white photos from the two runners-up candidates of the US Senate race in Wisconsin in 2004. Both candidates smile on photos. The authors claim that respondents did not have any background information about the candidates. The point of their research is to show that mainstream position that voters do reflect and deliberate when forming preferences but also rely on hasty reasoning and candidate's non-verbal features also matter.

In conclusion, the point of this part was to give basic information about heuristics and to demonstrate how it can (along with bias) and is used in political science. This was done by defining what heuristics is and how it is scoped. Three types of heuristics were explained and supported by the experiment examples. Likewise, it was demonstrated how these heuristics, namely anchoring and recognition ones, can and are applied in political science, i.e., voting behavior studies.

5. CONCLUSION

The point of the thesis was to demonstrate the broadness and vagueness of the normative framework of populist ideology. The main idea is that the empirical phenomena populism does not require theory behind it, but only methods such as logic and heuristics that can be used to scope political manipulation. The first section was about populist ideology normative issues and populist movement. The second section dealt with the methods (semantic text analysis) populist scholars use and their issues. The final section contains summarized information on informal logic and heuristics, experiments about human inference and reasoning, and implication of both in political science. It should be noted that even though the thesis suggests refutation of populist studies, this does not necessarily have to end like that. If populist scholars make their normative framework more specific, the interpretation of research results would probably become more coherent, and thus populist studies would have been saved.

Populist ideology faces many normative problems which result in conceptual stretching. It is rare to find a definition of populism, i.e., populist ideology, but even the proposed ones (Mudde 2017) seem to be very broad. Populist ideology lacks essential property that ought to distinguish it from the other ideologies. If dualist antagonistic society division is thought to be, it is too broad and simplistic. The attributes are also problematic; the attribute of anti-establishment attitudes suffers from the incapability of threshold determination, meaning that it is unclear where the threshold is between establishment critic and populist. Also, the concept of Rousseau's General will is known to be vague due to the possibility of different interpretations. The second subsection's purpose was to implement populist ideology's normative framework on empirical phenomena, i.e., political movement and figures. It was argued that labeling all three as populist would be a redundant move. Instead, two solutions were proposed; ideological particularism and communitarian category as a substitute of empirical phenomena populism is about.

The second section was about populist discord and semantic text analysis. This section aims to describe an empirical method, i.e., semantic text analysis populist scholars use. As was seen previously, the discourse is binary, meaning it revolves around the people and the elite. It is full of emotive expressions as it prays for the people and bashes the elite. Popping's (2018) clause-based analysis of Orban's speech was provided and analyzed at the end of the section. It was concluded that due to the normative issues, the outcome of semantic text analysis is relative. The reason for that is different result interpretations due to different understanding of populism.

For a research study or domain to be successful, one ought to establish a proper normative and methodological framework. It doesn't matter if this is done inductively or deductively. It is stunning that populist scholars explicitly acknowledge that the whole populist idea or study is conceptually broad and "muddy" (e.g., Ron and Nadesan (2020) or Müller (2016:2)), yet they persist in pursuing it! This is an instance of emperor's new clothes within social sciences. As demonstrated at the end of the second section, all empirical research can be in vain without a proper normative framework. It is like having a blurry treasure map; it is highly unlikely one may find a treasure with it. In the case of populism study, it seems that the empirical results depend on the researcher's, i.e., coder's interpretation which makes it relative. Regarding methodological pluralism, there should be consensus and justification when choosing empirical methods for a certain study within the social sciences. Many social science studies (e.g., gender studies) face similar normative and methodological problems. Due to that problem and replication crisis, more meta-studies like this thesis are needed. In other words, social scientists need to conduct more metascience research, i.e., they should rethink and reevaluate the normative and methodological frameworks they operate with.

Logic and heuristics are proposed as an alternative to political manipulation research. It seems that the whole populist study is about how certain political figures and movements attempted to deceive and manipulate people in order to justify their reign. Logic differs from rhetoric by its unbiased approach (at least in theory) and is a normative discipline about inference. In this thesis, informal logic analysis was applied in Presidential Debate between Trump and Biden in 2020. The result demonstrated that both presidential candidates often use logical fallacies. On the other hand, heuristics as a descriptive discipline mostly relies on experiments to research people's reasoning capabilities. In this thesis, it was demonstrated how general principles regarding heuristics are related to political science.

There are many other ways to scope political manipulation. Logic and heuristics are not perfect methods but are among the best ones to choose. Neuroscience can be used to scope how people reason when faced with a specific type of manipulation and how to prevent being deceived. In this thesis, logic was used to analyze how politicians try to deceive the people by consciously committing logical fallacies. Heuristics were used to demonstrate how people react when faced with some external obstruction that is caused by political manipulation. The two can be used the other way, meaning that people's inferring skills could be tested and politicians' reaction or creation of heuristic traps.

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