Kill Once, Dead Twice: Dead Body Management and Power in Turkey's Counterinsurgency Against the PKK

By

Cihan Erdost Akin

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Supervisor: Dr. Paul Roe

Vienna, Austria

2022

Copyright Notice

I, hereby, declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other institutions. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Cihan Erdost Akin

Vienna, 29 July, 2022

Abstract

This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between the state and the enemy Other's dead bodies in the context of (counter)insurgency. Particularly, it investigates how the Turkish state manages the dead bodies of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) fighters, and traces the journey of the dead from killing to burial. While making sense of "dead body management", it analyzes the power relations dead body management entails, and it theorizes about how power operates in the realm of the dead. Following the existing literature on power and the body, we can make sense of parts of dead body management through sovereign, bio-, necro-, and normative power. However, dead bodies slip from an analytical grip. No theory alone can explain the complex power relations dead body management entails.

I argue that various forms of power interplay in dead body management. Although disentangling is not always possible, I propose using assemblages and machines as metaphors to make sense of this interplay. I demonstrate how necro/normative, necro/sovereign, and sovereign/normative power assemblages operate, and what their components and technologies are in three stages of dead body management in Turkey's counterinsurgency campaigns: postmortem violence, pre-burial processes, such as transportation of dead bodies and forensic autopsies, and funerals.

Dead body management does not only happen within the context of counterinsurgency; it is a part of counterinsurgency. It is a product and productive of the social order. I argue that dead body management performatively produces the state of exception, disciplines and subjugates the Kurdish population, (re)produces Kurdistan as an internal colony, where death lurks in the background and law is suspended, and discursively constructs the Self as biopower guided by care while violently managing populations.

Security is an indispensable element of dead body management. First, it has an explanatory value; the ontological insecurities insurgents pose help us make sense of dead body management. Second, security discourses and practices bring a certain reality into life; the colonial administration of Kurdistan was made possible by the securitization of funerals. Third, *dispositif de sécurité,* built on the logic of risk, is insufficient to make sense of the case at hand as it fails to account for the colonial and colonizing violence. We can observe a particular logic of security that goes beyond the conventional understanding of eliminating a physical threat. As a technology of necro/normative power, this logic is an extreme form of elimination that not only kills but seeks to destroy any trace of the subject's existence, as if they have never lived. In this regard, this dissertation contributes to Critical Security Studies by enriching our empirical and theoretical understandings of dead bodies as an oft-overlooked area and to the literature on power and the body.

Translation Note

All translations of the Turkish sources are mine unless stated otherwise. I provided the English translation of the cited newspaper headlines in square brackets. When a certain word does not translate well, I provided other options or explained the context in the footnotes. I translated some idioms word by word and explained the meaning in the main body or footnotes.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the intellectual, financial, and emotional support of numerous people and institutions. It is not possible to list them all here, but this should not prevent me from expressing my gratitude. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Paul Roe. Thanks to him and his meticulous approach to literature and literature reviews, now my colleagues come to me to seek help with their literature reviews. Paul has not only consistently provided constructive feedback but also been emotionally supportive. His supervision style, and faith in me, helped me become an independent and confident researcher. I also would like to thank Alex Astrov and Michael Merlingen, members of my supervisory panel, for being supportive when I decided to change my topic, and their critical and constructive feedback. Even though we have not interacted yet, I would like to thank Jessica Auchter for agreeing to be the external examiner and thank you for being an inspiration for me.

I am very grateful for my family; I could not ask for a more supportive family. I am also very grateful for my CEU family: Alberto, Giorgia, Nassim, my co-author and dear friend Jacqueline, and many others. Thank you for your friendship, camaraderie, and intellectual insights

I also would like to thank my host-supervisor in Sweden: Maria Stern. Her feedback and literature suggestions were invaluable and have played a significant role in (re)shaping my dissertation. She also made me feel very welcomed. Maria and Swati Parashar showed me that more compassionate and critical academia is possible without giving up on academic excellence. I am grateful for my colleagues and friends there; some of their comments on my topic were very influential, and they immensely contributed to the kind and welcoming

atmosphere at Gothenburg University. I need to mention the Swedish Institute; even though I am deeply critical of their neo-colonial agenda, my time in Sweden would not have been possible without their financial aid.

A special thanks to all the people I met in the Kurdish community centers, cafes, and bars in Cologne and Berlin. I felt like part of the community during my stay. Moreover, when I was targeted by the state, nationalists, and reactionary forces within the Turkish left who publicly accused me of being a "Western spy" exploiting the Kurds for Soros money, they showed solidarity with me without stopping offering their constructive criticism and helping me facing my privileges.

Thank you, Paula; sharing the flat with you was a great experience and my first years were joyful thanks to you. Clare. She had to endure me talking about death and violence all the time and she shared the excitement about my academic achievements as well as the pain of uncertainties and rejection. Many thanks to Zsofi; although she has become an integral part of my life by the end of my PhD journey, her unconditional love and support helped me keep going in the most difficult part of this journey. Thanks to Uygar, Efe, Burç, Aydan, Orhun, and Ceyda; even though you also joined at the last part of my journey, you have been very supporting, intellectually stimulating, and kind; knowing that there are such people in academia restores my faith in it.

Last but not least, thanks to my good old friends from Turkey, especially Oğuzhan and Candan. When I had to leave Hungary and could not return to Turkey for two years due to security reasons, they offered immense emotional support and opened their houses to me in Berlin.

Finally, thank you, Robin Bellers and Jacqueline Dufalla for editing and proofreading my convoluted text full of poststructuralist jargon.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CS	Copenhagen School
DBP	Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (Democratic Regions Party)
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People's Democratic Party)
IHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
TC	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Republic of Turkey)
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
YPG	Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units)
YPJ	Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (Women's Protection Units)

Dedicated to

All victims of state violence. Some of the stories I heard will forever haunt me

Ismene:

The rulers are far stronger than we are and we have to do as they say, not only about this but also about far worse things.

So, what I shall do, on my behalf, what is the only thing left for me to do, is, to pray to the dead souls, to forgive our Polyneices and then to do exactly as Creon says.

Trying to do deeds beyond your ability, my sister, is madness! Mindless folly, dear!

Antigone:

Fine then!

I will neither beg you nor would I be happy to accept your help, even if you had offered it to me my sister! You can believe what you want but I shall go and bury him. My death will be sweet once I bury him, because I will be lying next him in the underworld, having committed sacred, blessed crime.

The time I'll have to please the dead, sister, is far longer than the time I have to please the living. I will be among the dead for ever.

But you, Ismene, you can choose whether or not you want to dishonour those things that are honoured by the gods.

Introduction

This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between the state and the enemy Other's dead bodies in the context of (counter)insurgency. This relationship starts with the point of killing and does not end even when the body is buried. *A relationship marked with death and violence, a story of power; power over our bodies, power over life and death, the living and the dead.* Thus, this dissertation is also about the dead's journey - an odyssey marked with power and violence. Specifically, it studies the case of the Turkish state and the dead bodies of PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) insurgents.[1] Amidst the war that spread to urban areas for the first time, a particular form of violence became more common. It was a form of violence that was not entirely novel for the Kurdish population but shocked many in Turkey. This violence chooses dead bodies as its primary site, challenging the conventional understanding of security as the elimination of physical threats, for dead bodies do not pose a physical security threat. This form of violence also challenges the idea that the state kills only to protect.

Turkish security forces mutilated the insurgents' dead bodies, dragged them on the streets behind armored vehicles, and displayed the female fighters naked. They burned some of the bodies, leaving no trace of corporeal remains recognizable as human beings. Furthermore, the mobility of dead bodies has become subject to politics and security; their

[1] The terminology of the PKK is a complicated and politically loaded question. Turkey acknowledges the PKK as a terrorist organization, and the official discourse calls the fighters "terrorists", whereas the Kurdish political movement chooses to refer to them as "guerilla". In Turkey, referring to the fighters as either "terrorists" or "guerillas" usually signifies a political and ideological position. Depending on the context, I prefer "PKK fighters", "PKK militias", and "insurgents" to maintain impartiality. Not everyone would accept this choice as impartial, for many deny that there is no insurgency, only terrorism. However, analytically the PKK and the broader Kurdish armed revolts show the characteristics of insurgency; thus, I have stuck to this terminology. For further information see, Mustafa Coşar Ünal, "The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Popular Support: Counterterrorism towards an Insurgency Nature," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 432–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.661610; Özlem Kayhan Pusane, "Turkey's Military Victory over the PKK and Its Failure to End the PKK Insurgency," *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 5 (September 3, 2015): 727–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2014.979801; Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, 2009, http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9780814796115.

transportation is regulated, delayed, prohibited, and criminalized. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) *regime* under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan instrumentalizes autopsies by creating and disseminating knowledge about the insurgents and by using rhetorical technologies to serve the official counterterrorism campaign.[2] Burial practices and rituals are also part of this relationship; funerals are regulated, delayed, prohibited, subject to discourses and practices of security (*securitized*), and criminalized.[3] Elected Kurdish mayors, who organized or attended funerals, are dismissed from office, only to be replaced by trustee mayors (*kayyum*) directly appointed by the regime, even though the procedure dictates that the city council should elect the new mayor.[4]

These examples show us that the Turkish state, through its various apparatuses, pays special attention to the dead bodies of PKK insurgents. More precisely, the state invests in *managing* dead bodies. The immediate question raises here, and this dissertation seeks to answer is: How does the Turkish state manage the PKK fighters' dead bodies in, and as a part of, the counterinsurgency campaigns restarted in 2015? The following question is: What does "management" indicate, or how can we make sense of the various ways that state apparatuses treat the dead as "management"? I started the dissertation with these questions.

[2] 20 uninterrupted years of the AKP rule resulted with the government having control over the judiciary, military, media , and capital. Since the AKP does not only govern state institutions but also created their own brand of competitive authoritarian regime, Onur Bakıner call this rule "regime". See, Onur Bakıner, "'These Are Ordinary Things': Regulation of Death under the AKP Regime," in *Turkey's Necropolitical Laboratory: Democracy, Violence and Resistance*, ed. Banu Bargu (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019). Many call it "the AKP regime"; however, after 2017, the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) became a part of the government. Other nationalist, statist, and anti-Western groups such as Vatan Partisi (the Homeland Party) often allies with the government, and even has the capacity to influence policy making. Therefore, instead of "the AKP regime", I will use "regime" throughout this dissertation. I use the state and regime interchangeably only in the case of Turkey since the state and the government are interwoven.

[3] In this dissertation, I do not follow the contested and rigid framework of the Copenhagen School when I refer to securitization. Instead, by securitization I refer to a discursive understanding of security, as in an issue is discursively constructed as a matter of security. It implies that even an issue is regarded as *failed securitization* by the Copenhagen School's framework, I still understand it as a matter of securitization.

[4] Kayyum is translated as "trustee mayors" in official documents and refers to the mayors appointed by the central government when the elected mayors were dismissed from office.

However, dead bodies cannot be isolated from the social structures and populations to which they belong. Managing the dead is also managing the living, the space they live in, and what discourses are allowed in this public space. It is not enough to show what dead body management looks like in a particular empirical context. Dead body management is a site where microphysics of power is in play. It is inscribed with various forms of power: the power that substracts, suppresses, and destroys, the power that disciplines, the power that erases and hides, the power that produces and orders… Therefore, the following central questions are: How does power operate in and through dead body management? What political functions does dead body management perform?

Considering that dead body management takes place within the context of (counter)insurgency, and dead bodies, their transportation, and funerals become subject to securitization, the first body of literature I visited to answer these questions is Critical Security Studies (CSS). War and conflict produce dead bodies, and the stakeholders, scholars study, pay attention to managing these bodies. Yet, Security Studies and International Relations (IR) - disciplines predominantly concerned with war and conflict - often overlook dead bodies as an analytical category. This is not surprising for traditional security studies as a discipline concerned with physical security threats against nation-states.

On the other hand, with its more diverse ontology and broader understanding of security that allows us to study the politics of security, CSS gives more space to study (dead) bodies. We can talk about a 'corporeal turn' in IR and CSS, as more studies have started to take bodies more seriously.[5] From biometric technologies, like body scanners, to suicide bombers, numerous examples illustrate that our biological bodies can both affect and be affected by security politics and be subjects and objects of security. Yet, even though there is a growing

[5] Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, eds., *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

interest in bodies, dead bodies remain rather understudied.[6] Most studies within CSS seem to be interested in the visual politics of dead bodies instead of centering the analysis on dead bodies corporeally and understanding 'the politics of the dead' more holistically.[7] Although visuals of dead bodies is a critical part of the relationship between Turkey and the insurgents' dead bodies, visualization of the enemy's dead is not the only practice the state engages in. We need to delve deeply into the literature to make sense of this relationship.

I am not the first one to highlight this gap in the literature. Jessica Auchter not only underlines the understudied nature of dead bodies but argues that dead bodies are subjects and objects of security; thus, we need to pay more attention to them.[8] According to Auchter, dead bodies can be referent objects of security or security threats. Soldiers risk their lives to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades; Osama bin Laden's dead body was 'buried' at sea because of security concerns; and the image of Alan Kurdi's dead body has become a symbol of the international community's failure in dealing with the refugee crisis.[9] Furthermore, Auchter stresses that the actors of IR engage in practices and discourses regarding the dead, calling it "dead body management".[10]

Although Auchter successfully pushes us toward a direction that can help us make sense of the empirical phenomenon at hand, there is a caveat. By dead body management, she refers to "how they [dead bodies] are secured and governed, and the political and legal structures in

[6] Lauren B. Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations*, Oxford Studies in Gender and International Relations (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[7] David Campbell, "Horrific Blindness: Images of Death in Contemporary Media," *Journal for Cultural Research* 8, no. 1 (2004): 55–74; Jessica Auchter, "On Viewing: The Politics of Looking at the Corpse," *Global Discourse* 7, no. 2–3 (July 3, 2017): 223–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1314908; Lene Hansen, "Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis*," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (January 19, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110388593.
[8] Jessica Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies: The Future of Security Studies?," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 36–50, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv005.
[9] Alan Kurdi was a three-year-old Syrian boy whose body was found on Turkish shores. The images of his dead body were circulated in international media and have become iconic.
[10] Ibid.

place to manage them".[11] However, we do not quite know what dead body management is, what the term 'management' analytically entails, and how we can study politics of security and power relations. Furthermore, dead body management as an analytical category creates the impression that it is a generalizable framework, not leaving room for microphysics of power. Last but not least, Auchter's focus on what dead body management means for security does not provide us with the tools we need to analyze the politics and the political functions of security. To theorize on management and build the tools to analyze power relations and politics of security, we need to go beyond CSS.

To make sense of bodies, management, and power, the first literature I turned to is Foucauldian accounts of biopower. Dead bodies cannot be isolated from the society and the population(s) to which they belong; thus, biopolitics offers us a framework to make the connection between body, power, and population management. However, Foucauldian approaches, especially in security studies, tend to overlook state violence and manifestations of sovereign power while extensively focusing on governmentality of unease and risk management.[12] In this regard, these approaches fail to account for state violence that is colonial and colonizing. While the modern Western state might primarily be marked with biopolitics and governmentality, they do not abstain from killing in the colony. At this point, Achille M'bembe's necropolitics comes in handy.[13] As the other side of the biopolitical coin, necropolitics manages populations by killing them or exposing them to death. However, often corporeality fades into the background in necropolitical accounts, while other times, it is intertwined with sovereign power. Sovereign power also invests in dead bodies; it is inscribed

[11] Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies", 37.
[12] Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives* 27, no. 1_suppl (February 1, 2002): 63–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105.
[13] Achille M'bembe, "Necropolitics," *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.

on the body through violence and the withdrawal of law.[14] Neither bio/necropolitics nor sovereignty, however, can fully grasp the politics of funerals and mourning. As Judith Butler shows us, a different form of power operates through the technologies of mourning. This power renders certain deaths *ungrievable*; it does not necessarily abandon the subject but rather never acknowledges the subject in the first place.[15]

A theoretical challenge appears when we shift our attention to the existing literature on the theoretical accounts of the intersection between power, management, and the body. Previous studies have exclusively focused on a specific aspect of dead body management and offered a reading through a specific form of power, such as a necropolitical interpretation of dismemberment or a biopolitical reading of burial practices.[16] This is not necessarily a shortcoming; these studies offer us substantial and profound interpretations. However, it also means that we do not have a more holistic account of dead body management. When we try to satisfy this ontological curiosity, we encounter that there is no *the dead body management* as a generalizable framework. No account of power can explain this complex phenomenon alone, and dead bodies reveal their analytical thresholds.

The Turkish state's relationship with the PKK fighters' dead bodies shows that dead body management is a systematic and continuous phenomenon while simultaneously being incomplete and contingent. Dead body management is an assemblage of a myriad of actors, discourses, and practices. It is a site where these various forms of power interplay- *an assemblage wherein assemblages of power operate*. Therefore, even though no account of

[14] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998).
[15] Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*, Reprint edition (London ; New York: Verso, 2006).
[16] Thomas Gregory, "Dismembering the Dead: Violence, Vulnerability and the Body in War," *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 944–65, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115618244; Benedikte Møller Kristensen, *The Proper Funeral: Death, Landscape and Power among the Duha Tuvinians of Northern Mongolia*, *Governing the Dead* (Manchester University Press, 2020), https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526151599/9781526151599.00012.xml.

power can explain the phenomenon, we can better understand these processes by using machinic connections and assemblages as metaphors.[17]

Regarding the Cases

In this dissertation, I will trace how power operates at each step of dead body management. As mentioned above, I see the relationship between dead bodies and the state as a journey; thus, these 'steps' are chronological. The journey is from the point of death to the burial. Following this, the empirics of the dissertation are structured in three temporal stages: the immediate aftermath of killing, which is postmortem violence, pre-burial processes, and the politics of burial and funerals. This chronological unfolding of dead body management determines my case selection. There are more practices other than postmortem violence that come after killing and before the pre-burial stage, just like there are more pre-burial practices than I discuss in this dissertation, or more cases of postmortem violence than I analyze. I will focus on the most prevalent practices and the most discussed cases.

I will look at three major cases in the section on postmortem violence and the politics of (in)visibility it entails. The first one is the sexualized violence inflicted on the PKK's female fighters, with special attention paid to Kevser Eltürk (also known as Ekin Wan), the most widely known case. Eltürk's, and many other female fighters' dead bodies, were subject to sexual(ized) violence, and visuals of their naked, mutilated bodies were circulated on social media. Another case is Hacı Lokman Birlik, whose dead body was tied to an armored vehicle and dragged on the streets. In both cases, security forces rendered the bodies visible. However, simultaneously, state agents sought discursive invisibility. The erasure of subjectivities assists corporeal visibility. Yet, not all postmortem violence seeks corporeal visibility. During the

[17] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, Illustrated edition (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 2009); Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 002 Edition (Minneapolis: UNIV OF MINNESOTA PR, 1987).

urban war, many insurgents and civilians were trapped in the basement of a building, which was then destroyed by artilleries, and the security forces burned the bodies, leaving 'heaps of flesh', bones, and ashes unrecognizable as human remains.

Dead bodies are not static remains; regardless of whether they are subject to postmortem violence, they must be transported. They move from the conflict zone to the morgue, and after the autopsy procedures, move to the burial ground. The relationship between Turkey and the PKK has a unique characteristic: the state fights the insurgents, who are Turkish citizens, in four countries (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran). I will examine the incident where YPG (People's Protection Units) and YPJ (Women's Protection Units) fighters' dead bodies were not allowed to cross the Syrian border to be buried in Turkey. While not only has it been a widely discussed and controversial case in Turkey, the border policies demonstrate the complex nature of dead body management, where sovereignty and bio/necropolitics are in an entangled relationship. Then, I will focus on the discursive regimes and technologies regarding forensic autopsies, which are specifically conducted when the cause of death might have been a crime or death is caused by violence. Autopsies generate knowledge; however, contra to the assumptions in the literature, it is not necessarily biopolitical. Autopsies are instrumentalized for the discursive construction of the insurgents as non-Muslim, foreign agents.

Finally, I will look at the case of securitization and criminalization of the insurgents' funerals, which led the Kurdish representatives and deputies, who organized or attended these funerals, to be dismissed from office, imprisoned, and replaced by trustee mayors. The case selection regarding the burial stage of the journey is a difficult task mainly because there are countless cases where dead bodies were not delivered to the families for burial, and numerous cases of funerals that were banned, delayed, securitized, or attacked. Instead of focusing on individual cases, I will analyze the discursive regimes and tensions regarding the criminalization of funerals. This discursive focus allows me to concentrate on the power

relations and the ideology that are in the official state discourses without going over a large number of cases individually. Furthermore, securitization and criminalization of funerals, and the trustee mayor policy it has enabled, point to a function of dead body management that we cannot simply overlook: (re)production of Kurdistan as an internal colony.

An Overview of the Arguments

There is not a single, simple, and thesis-statement-like argument of the dissertation. Like the components of dead body management in a machinic and rhizomatic relationship, several arguments, some which are offshoots of one another, connect to each other. The first argument to start the discussion is that dead body management cannot be boxed into a rigid, generalizable framework. Dead body management slips from an analytical grip. The empirical phenomenon at hand shows us that the regime manages the insurgents' dead bodies through its various apparatuses, such as the security forces, prosecutors, forensic pathologists, the media, and the grand assembly. They manage the dead in numerous ways and employ distinct technologies. Dead bodies are mutilated, displayed, eradicated and rendered invisible. They are discursively framed as non-humans or ontological threats. Burial processes are delayed, and funerals are securitized and criminalized.

Similarly, the existing literature on the (dead) body and power illustrates the diverse ways of managing (dead) bodies and how distinct forms of power can be observed in these diverse areas. While each account of power opens one door and sheds light on a specific aspect of dead body management, it closes another. No theory of power can explain this empirical phenomenon alone, nor do they have such claims of parsimony. However, this should not mean that we need to give up on the attempt to theoretically make sense of the various ways that the state invests in the enemy Other's dead.

To answer the first question of how the Turkish state manages the insurgents' dead bodies, I suggest looking at "the story of the dead" in temporal terms, meaning that I trace the politics of the dead from the moment of killing to the burial. The regime gets involved in the insurgents' dead bodies in three stages: killing and its immediate aftermath (i.e., postmortem violence), pre-burial processes, and burial/funerals. Corporeal postmortem violence comprises its distinct technologies, such as mutilating the body, displaying bodies naked, or eradicating the bodies and rendering them invisible. Pre-burial processes include the regulation, prohibition, and securitization of transporting dead bodies, which brings border policies into the scene. It also includes the bio/necropolitical regime of truth generated by forensic autopsies. Lastly, burial/funeral processes consist of the prohibition, regulation, securitization, and criminalization of funerals, which relate to technologies of mourning.

The next task is to examine the power relations in these stages. The answer to it is simple but incredibly difficult to unpack in the mainstream academic way of a concise thesis statement. The central argument is that the various forms of power discussed above interplay; sometimes, they are entangled to the degree that it is impossible to pinpoint and label them distinctively. Other times, they are assembled, working hand-in-hand yet serving different functions. The rest of the dissertation aims to illustrate and analyze this interplay, for the microphysics of power suggests we analyze power at its application. In this regard, I do not aim to propose "dead body management" as a generalizable analytical category; rather, I use the term for heuristic reasons and as an umbrella term to refer to the bricolage of actors, discourses, and practices that target the dead.

I also argue that dead body management does not only happen within the context of counterinsurgency; it is *a part of* counterinsurgency. We should understand dead body management as a product *and productive of* power relations and the social order. To illustrate, Turkey's authoritarian regime and its enmities, of course, play a significant role in enabling

and justifying postmortem violence. However, the question of authoritarianism go beyond this; we should not perceive the state of exception as a pre-given reality. Dead body management is an exercise of power, and it is productive of the social order. To put it in an empirical context again, dead body management performatively produces the state of exception, renders the Kurdish community as the enemy Other and non-citizen/bare lives or non-humans whose bodies are violable.

Dead body management also (re)produces Kurdistan as an internal colony where death lurks in the background and law is suspended. Such management deterritorializes and reterritorializes public space, regulating what is allowed in the so-called public sphere. It discursively constructs the Self (the state) as a biopower, guided by care, and reduces the "Kurdish Question" into a mere problem of terrorism. It also disciplines, punishes, and subjugates specific populations, such as the Kurdish community and women who resist. In the end, dead body management is a form of population management.

Last but not least, security is an indispensable element of dead body management. First, it plays a critical role in making sense of dead body management. As discussed earlier, security studies overlook dead bodies, and because of its ritualistic and social elements, managing dead bodies have been studied primarily through an anthropological lens. This overview has shown us that dead bodies and their management are constantly subject to securitizing narratives in the context of counterinsurgency. The PKK and its fighters are discursively constructed as ontological threats to the values and norms promoted by the regime, such as heteronormativity, docile femininities, patriotism, and a unitary-centralized state. The body represents the materialized form of these ontological threats, enabling postmortem violence. However, through the individual dead body, a larger population is targeted. The dead body becomes a means to convey a message, which is an interpretation that bio/necropolitics allows us to reach.

However, disciplining and punishing the larger population through individual dead bodies is also a response to the regime's ontological insecurities.

Second, regarding terrorism, particularly the concept of "terrorist funerals", terrorism functions as a *master signifier* and has paved the way for justification of the violence, suspension of law, and the criminalization of public mourning, which enabled the trustee mayor policy. It shows us that Foucauldian approaches, once again, fail to account for the colonial and colonizing violence. *Dispositif de sécurité,* that is built on governmentality and logic of risk management, is insufficient to make sense of the case at hand as there is a more brute security logic in play - a logic of elimination. However, it goes beyond the conventional understanding of eliminating a physical threat.

This security logic is complemented by normative power and assisted by a logic that seeks to derealize, deindividualize, and dehumanize the subject. It is an extreme form of elimination that not only kills, but seeks to destroy any trace of the subject's existence as if they had never lived. Finally, through the perlocutionary functions of forensic autopsies, an image of an infidel, foreign terrorist is constructed. This imagined foreign terrorist undermines the ethnic sentiments of the insurgency by reducing it to terrorism and political issues to mere security issues.

In this regard, this dissertation aims to have several contributions. First, it sheds light on an overlooked empirical phenomenon and offers an alternative reading. This "alternative reading" is not limited to dead bodies. The link between the trustee mayors and dead bodies, for example, has not been discussed academically. Second, it seeks to contribute to the literature on power and the body by demonstrating the analytical thresholds of each account of power when the subject matter is the dead and their functions when they are assembled. It also contributes to the debates in necropolitics by taking a novel methodological approach; instead

of the researcher identifying practices as necropolitical, it takes a phenomenological approach and demonstrates how the targeted community interprets the violence. Third, it aims to enrich our theoretical and empirical understanding of the dead in the context of security by responding to the call to "pay attention to dead bodies".

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is composed of six chapters. It starts with setting out the state of the field; Chapter 1 briefly introduces how dead bodies have been studied in security studies, then discusses the literature on bodies, power, and management. It shows the rooms each theoretical account opens and their thresholds when the subject matter is the dead. In this chapter, I unpack what I briefly mentioned here: dead bodies in CSS, the concept of "dead body management" from Auchter, and accounts of sovereign, biopolitical, necropolitical, and normative power.

Chapter 2 builds a custom analytical and conceptual toolbox tailored for the empirical and theoretical puzzle of this study. Even though I have borrowed concepts and theories from numerous approaches, I have paid attention that they align with each other ontologically and epistemologically. Chapter 2 clarifies how I understand and operationalize some concepts and justifies how they are aligned. Following a new materialist approach, I offer an understanding of the dead body as both materially and discursively constructed, and a product and productive of power and a social order. After offering a performative understanding of power, I suggest using Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's concepts of machines and assemblages as metaphors to make sense of the interplay and multiplicity of power and the complexity of dead body management. Then, I propose three categories of power couplings/assemblages where I delve into the previously discussed forms of power, how they can possibly interact, and what functions they might perform. I finish the chapter by discussing methodological implications and choices.

Chapter 3 is predominantly concerned with providing the empirical context in which the case studies take place. For this reason, it starts with a brief overview of the Kurdish Question, the PKK's history and ideology, and the state's stance against them. However, it is not a descriptive chapter. The purpose of the chapter is to help the reader understand some of the practices and discourses analyzed in the subsequent empirical chapters. I demonstrate how the PKK and its insurgents are perceived and discursively portrayed as perverted monsters. Constructing the insurgents as ontological threats to the desired values and subjectivities of the regime, these discursive frames set the conditions of possibilities for postmortem violence. Then, I discuss the features of insurgents' funerals and how they are understood as sources of insecurity and threat. This discussion will be critical to make sense of why and how funerals are regulated, delayed, securitized, and criminalized, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 4 addresses postmortem violence. I analyze various forms of postmortem violence, such as mutilation and naked display of female insurgents, the case of an insurgent named Hacı Lokman Birlik, whose dead body was dragged on the street by an armored vehicle, and the dead bodies that were burned and rendered invisible during the urban warfare in Sur and Cizre. Analytically, I investigate visibility and invisibility as key components of dead body management and practices where we can observe an interplay of the sovereign, bio/necro, and normative power. Although sovereign and normative power are integral parts of the power assemblages, necroviolence seems to be the driving force. Therefore, I unpack necropolitics phenomenologically by examining the Kurdish politicians and civil society's narratives about how they interpret the violence.

In Chapter 5, I move to analyze the practices and discourses governing what comes after postmortem violence and before burial, what I called the "pre-burial" processes. Transportation of dead bodies and forensic autopsies appear as the prominent sites of dead body management operating in the pre-burial process. The case of the YPG and the YPJ

fighters, whose dead bodies were not allowed to pass the Syrian border illustrates a sovereign/necro power assemblage and highlights the border as a sovereign tool within the field of governmentality. The chapter continues by discussing the forensic autopsies' function of constructing a foreign/infidel terrorist image, which undermines the ethnic sentiments of the insurgency and reduces it into an issue of terrorism. It is also an example of how corporeal signifiers and discursive formations get intertwined. I then return to the transportation of dead bodies by unpacking how they have become a matter of security.

Finally, Chapter 6 covers the politics of funerals. First, I discuss how the regime and the Kurdish politicians accuse each other of doing "politics of death", while they place their own actions either on a supra-political level or the sphere of security. These accusations are predominantly centered around funerals. Therefore, I analyze how organizing and attending funerals have been securitized and criminalized. Bringing a sovereign/normative assemblage to the scene, the criminalization of funerals pave the way for the infamous trustee mayor policy. On a theoretical level, we can observe how sovereign means such as the prohibition of grief work hand in hand with technologies of mourning. This discussion contributes to Butler's formulation of deaths that cannot be mourned by highlighting public figures who shall not mourn.

In the concluding chapter, I underline some of the limitations of this study, briefly address some areas that I drew attention to but underexplored, and highlight some areas and raise a few questions for further research. In this chapter, I draw attention to four areas: first, I note that the dead's journey does not end even with burial. Graveyards are exhumed, cemeteries are destroyed, and graves are regulated. In a way, dead body management involves a politics of bones and stones. Second, I summarize the points I have raised throughout the dissertation about why and how dead body management contributes to the colonization of Kurdistan. Third, I discuss what the entire analysis could mean for CSS. Finally, resistance to

dead body management remains underexplored, which is one of the biggest limitations of this study. In this section, I remind the reader that power is always resisted, briefly illustrate a few examples of resistance, and raise questions for further investigation.

Chapter 1 – The State of the Field

This chapter builds on the discussion very briefly introduced in the Introduction on how dead bodies have been studied in Critical Security Studies (CSS) and the various forms of power that can shed light on the relationship between the body, power, and management. It begins by surveying the existing literature on dead bodies in CSS. Previous research demonstrates the oft-overlooked yet analytically critical role of dead bodies in practices and discourses of security. The CSS literature brings us to the concept of "dead body management", coined by Jessica Auchter.[18] However, we need to go beyond the security literature to find answers to how power operates in and through dead body politics and analyze the 'management' aspects. Thus, the second body of literature I survey is the theoretical accounts of power that open analytical room for the relationship between power, (dead) bodies, and management, which includes political violence.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I will map out the security literature on dead bodies. While this discussion might introduce the reader to other aspects of dead body politics that I do not cover in this dissertation, its purpose is also to demonstrate why it is necessary to go beyond the security literature. Second, this chapter will introduce different approaches to power, discuss their strengths, the doors they open, and their limitations. Third, by examining the literature on theories of the relationship between power and the body, I build the first step for building a custom analytical framework tailored to analyze the empirical phenomenon at hand.

[18] Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies".

1.1 Dead Bodies in Security Studies

Even though war and conflict produce dead bodies, and despite the attention involved actors give to managing them, dead bodies are largely ignored in security studies. Traditional approaches to security are concerned with the state's security against foreign military threats, leaving little analytical room for bodies in general. When dead bodies make it into the analyses, it is usually in the form of a "body count"; they need to be reduced into numbers and variables that can be analyzed with positivist methods.[19] Viewing the state as the referent object to secure, these studies aim to draw some strategic lessons that can be used to maximize national interest.[20] For example, counting combatant losses and comparing them with the initial number of troops may reveal the enemy's military capacity and effectiveness. Counting bodies can also have analytical purposes, particularly in monitoring trends, defining concepts and analytical categories, such as what kind of conflict can be counted as war, the differences between "old and new wars", or for humanitarian purposes, e.g. calling for an intervention.[21]

Such traditional approaches are normatively problematic and analytically limiting. On the normative level, counting bodies neglects questions of respect and dignity, hides the violence of war, and normalizes and justifies violence. The main analytical problem for this dissertation is how the politics of death is neglected. Reducing dead bodies into variables misses the questions of how, where, and why these people died. Without paying attention to the identity of the victims, the conditions that enabled their death or desecration of their dead

[19] Ibid.

[20] Baruch Fischoff, Scott Atran, and Noam Fischoff, "Counting Casualties: A Framework for Respectful, Useful Records on JSTOR," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 31, no. 1 (February 2007): 1–19; Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie* 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 145–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6.

[21] Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton University Press, 2009); Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, 1 edition (Oxford: Polity, 2004); Lacina and Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat"; Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Third edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012); Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer, "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): 49–70.

bodies, and the rationale behind these actions, we are unable to understand the functions of violence and the effects of war.

On the other hand, CSS opens more room for the politics of the dead. Dissatisfied with the traditional approaches' extensive focus on civilian casualties and the dehumanizing language they use, such as "collateral damage", many scholars suggest moving beyond counting civilian casualties and instead focus on the politics of killing.[22] The politics of killing involves questions concerning where and how the subject was killed, how it is justified, and what function killing serves. A key part of the politics of killing includes the representation of the killing and the dead body. The so-called 'aesthetic turn' or the 'visual turn' in IR significantly impacted security studies and increased the attention given to dead bodies in the discipline. Representation here, then, is understood as the visual representation of dead bodies.

Studies highlight how the visual regime of the dead is marked by corporeal invisibility.[23] Dead bodies have been disappearing in the media since the Vietnam War, which functions to sanitize and prettify war.[24] However, "when dead bodies do feature in the media", as David Campbell argues, "they are more often than not bodies of dead foreigners".[25] *I had to look at dozens of images of dead PKK fighters; the violence on their bodies was clearly visible. In contrast, I had seen only images of soldiers' coffins or pictures of them taken when they were alive, smiling in their uniforms.* The politics of representation manifests and strengthens the hierarchical Self-Other dichotomy; if "our" dead is invisible whereas "their" dead is visible, they must be different. The visual regime of the dead has tangible political consequences.

[22] Alex Bellamy, *Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Thomas Gregory, "Civilian Casualties, Non-Combatant Immunity and the Politics of Killing: Review Essay," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 187–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1175271.
[23] Auchter, "On Viewing"; Campbell, "Horrific Blindness".
[24] Campbell, "Horrific Blindness"; John Taylor, *Body Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe and War* (Manchester University Press, 1998).
[25] Campbell, "Horrific Blindness", 64.

While visuals can dehumanize the depicted subjects and be a continuation of violence, they can also have humanizing effects and trigger sympathy, as exemplified by Alan Kurdi.[26] Visuals can also be part of a securitizing discourse.[27] Last but not least, they can render the Other violable and vulnerable, cause care fatigue or voyeurism, and/or glamorize and sanitize war.

However, the politics of visibility cannot be reduced only to visuals. For example, as Melissa Wright shows, activists interpreted the increasing number of dead bodies on the streets of Mexico as state failure - thus insecurity. State agents, on the contrary, argued that this increase signified the cartel's desperation, and thus, the state's success in fighting the cartels, i.e. increased security.[28] For Charlotte Heath-Kelly, dead bodies signify the threshold of state sovereignty since mortality is one type of existential anxiety that resides outside the state's capacities, challenging the limits of the state.[29] Dead bodies can also signify insecurity and disrupt assumptions about security. For example, speaking out is a source of insecurity for Nepali migrant workers in Qatar; thus, questions regarding their security and mobility became visible only through their death.[30] In short, public visibility of dead bodies shape understanding of security; thus, visibility does not necessarily equate to visualization.

Furthermore, as Auchter shows us, dead bodies are managed and become subjects and objects of security. Regarding management, if the visuals of the dead, or their (in)visibility, signify security and insecurity, success and failure, power and helplessness, it only makes sense that state actors seek to manage the visibility of dead soldiers and enemies. However, management is not limited to visual regimes. Auchter underlines international humanitarian

[26] Auchter, "On Viewing".
[27] Hansen, "Theorizing the Image for Security Studies".
[28] Melissa W. Wright, "Necropolitics, Narcopolitics, and Femicide: Gendered Violence on the Mexico-U.S. Border," *Signs* 36, no. 3 (2011): 707–31, https://doi.org/10.1086/657496.
[29] Charlotte Heath-Kelly, *Death and Security: Memory and Mortality at the Bombsite* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).
[30] Priya Dixit, "Let the Dead Speak! Mobility, Visibility and (in)Security in Qatar," *Critical Studies on Security* 3, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 112–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1005419.

law's prescriptions for treating the dead, the different treatment of dead soldiers and dead enemies, and what this regime of governance implies. International law prohibits mistreatment of the enemy's corpses. It indicates that dead bodies are perceived as "political persons".[31] Therefore, a violation of this principle relates to the question of who counts as human.

On the one hand, regarding dead bodies being subjects and objects of security, soldiers often risk their own lives to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades. In addition to demonstrating the investment in the dead, this example also shows us that dead bodies become the referent object. Furthermore, retrieving and repatriating the dead, especially the soldiers, illustrates not only the "management" but also the question of the relationship between the dead, the nation, and the territory. Dead bodies of the enemy Other, on the other hand, often become a security threat or subject to violence. Auchter gives the example of Osama bin Laden, whose dead body was 'buried' at sea because of security concerns, as the US officials were afraid of retaliation and his tomb becoming a shrine that would strengthen Al Qaeda's recruitment.[32]

This also reminds us that burial and funeral practices can be referent objects or security threats. Another example is IRA funerals, discussed previously, which were securitized because of the previous clashes during the funerals and the ontological insecurities funerals cause due to their performative and ritualistic elements.[33] Burial does not end dead body management. Auchter argues that mass graves are symbolically used for reconciliation, "revitalization of historical narratives", or discursively supporting claims over historical

[31] Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies", 44.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Kevin Hearty, "Spoiling Through Performative Nonviolence: Ritualistic Funerary Practice as a Violent Dissident Irish Republican (VDR) Spoiling Tactic," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 42, no. 6 (June 3, 2019): 581–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1402430.

injustices.[34] In short, according to Auchter, dead body management can tell us "how states and individuals define their own security".[35]

Management of dead bodies relates to the questions of Self and Other, nation, territory, identities, memories, and (in)justice. Therefore, another point Auchter manages to highlight is that dead body management is marked by power relations. As Thomas Gregory illustrates, the so-called Kill Team in Afghanistan killed civilians, dismembered the dead bodies, and took body parts as "souvenirs".[36] This type of violence, according to Gregory, transcends the question of life and death; it dehumanizes subjects and seeks to destroy their bodies. Such violence defies the rational security logic of elimination, which is based on the idea of eliminating a physical security threat. It is marked by power - a power that seeks to eradicate subjectivities along with the body, leaving corporeal remains unrecognizable as human beings. It relates to a normative and ontological question of who counts as human.

Auchter and Gregory's approaches guide us towards a more suitable direction for analyzing the politics of the dead and the power relations that dead body management entails. However, in the limited space of a journal article, they fail to provide a framework for such an analysis. In fact, it is questionable whether it is even possible to have such a framework. After all, these studies also demonstrate that the particular form of dead body management is contingent upon the surrounding context. Power, on the other hand, is relational, diffused, and complex. Auchter's study in particular shows us that dead bodies cannot be isolated from society, the population(s) they belong to, and questions of identity. Security studies is not theoretically and conceptually equipped to address the relationship between dead bodies,

[34] Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies", 46.
[35] Ibid., 47.
[36] Gregory, "Dismembering the Dead".

management, and power. Therefore, in the next section, I move to another body of literature situated primarily in political theory.

1.2 Accounts of Power: The (Dead) Body, Violence, and Population

To answer how power operates in and through dead body management in Turkey's counterinsurgency campaigns, we must first understand how the relationship between power and body is understood in various ways. The accounts of power and the body also shed light on the concept of management. In this section, I discuss sovereign, bio-, necro-, and derealizing power, or what I call, normative power, and how these approaches understand the role of the body, and their analytical thresholds when the subject matter is dead bodies. When we review these accounts of power, a challenge appears: no theory can grasp the complexity of dead body management alone when we focus on dead body management more holistically.

However, the purpose of the following sections transcends merely showing that these theories alone cannot explain the empirical phenomenon, for they do not have such parsimonious claims to begin with. When we examine these various forms of power, we see that sometimes they are inseparable. Other times, they work hand in hand, complementing each other. In managing dead bodies, various forms of power interplay. This point will constitute one of the main arguments of this dissertation, and the forms of power explained in this section will be the basis for the conceptual framework I propose in the next chapter.

1.2.1 Sovereignty and the Body

A traditional understanding of sovereignty dictates "juridical sovereignty", a notion that the state has no authority over it except international law, and this authority is drawn from law. Mainstream accounts of sovereignty tend to analytically neglect bodies. However, it is not impossible to envision how sovereignty and bodies are linked; law and authority, after all,

regulate what we can do with our own or others' bodies. In some accounts of sovereignty, this link is more explicit.

Sovereign power, according to Michel Foucault, is the power over life and death, symbolized by the sword in the sovereign's hand.[37] In Foucault's account, sovereign power is exercised as a means of deduction; the sovereign subtracts a portion of the wealth and products via taxes, seizing material possessions, time, labor, and eventually their subjects' lives.[38] The sovereign's logic is "take life or let live", best exemplified by public executions. As Foucault demonstrates in his genealogical work, torture and extreme violence in executions were a spectacle for the public. Particular crimes, such as treason, were brutally punished to deter the sovereign's subjects from resisting. The body was a site on which power was inscribed. The wounded, decapitated, dismembered, and impaled bodies, or the body hanging from the gallows, demonstrated the sovereign's right and power over the body.

Following this formulation, it seems as though we can make sense of dismemberment and the display of dead bodies, i.e. postmortem violence, in Turkey's counterinsurgency campaigns. It can be interpreted as an extreme form of demonstrating sovereign power. However, in this formulation, there is a sovereign decree; the sovereign, as the head of the state, decides who may live and who must die. Yet in practice, this is not always the case. Security forces, from Israel to Turkey, to the US and Sri Lanka, executed the injured enemy and dismembered and desecrated their dead bodies.[39] From the media to the judiciary, a network of actors justify, silence, or acquit these acts.

[37] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980),
[38] Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
[39] Tehmoor Khan, "The Sri Lankan Soldiers 'Whose Hearts Turned to Stone,'" *Channel 4 News*, July 27, 2011, https://www.channel4.com/news/the-sri-lankan-soldiers-whose-hearts-turned-to-stone; Linah Alsaafin, "Israel Slammed for 'Necroviolence' on Bodies of Palestinians," *Al Jazeera*, February 24, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/24/israel-slammed-for-necroviolence-on-bodies-of-palestinians; Joanne

An important question to address is how we can define or identify sovereignty when we see it. For Carl Schmitt, the sovereign is the one who can decide on the state of exception. Thus, sovereign power resides in the capacity to suspend law.[40] Building on the notion of suspension, Giorgio Agamben argues that sovereign power resides in the capacity to produce an order based on the exclusion of bare life.[41] Performing the exception comprises the suspension of the law, and the law is withdrawn from the human being, leaving a bare life without legal status. However, those who are subject to the exception are not necessarily freed from the juridical order; through its suspension, the law includes human beings. In other words, bare life is included in the order through its exclusion.[42] In Steven DeCaroli's words: "those caught in this suspension (law's withdrawal) are not simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, exposed, and treated on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside become indistinguishable".[43] In Agamben's formulation, the law is not necessarily the critical function of sovereignty, for sovereignty precedes the law. The suspension of the law is activated by the illocutionary force of utterance, declaring a state of emergency. Therefore, the sovereign predates the declarative utterance, and Agamben knows who the sovereign is.[44] In contrast, according to Judith Butler, sovereignty does not precede the suspension. Butler sees suspending the law as a performative action that brings sovereignty into life.[45] This is a point I will further elaborate on in the next chapter with the conceptual framework.

Laurier, "The Kill Team: Are US Military Atrocities in Afghanistan Just the Work of a Few 'Bad Apples'?," *World Socialist Web Site*, January 10, 2020, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/01/10/kill-j10.html.

[40] Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab, 1st edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

[41] Agamben, *Homo Sacer.*

[42] Ibid.

[43] Steven DeCaroli, "Boundary Stones: Giorgio Agamben and the Field of Sovereignty," in *On Agamben: Sovereignty and Life*, ed. Steven DeCaroli and Matthew Calarco, 2007, 64.

[44] Elena Loizidou, "Butler and Life: Law, Sovereignty, Power," in *Judith Butler's Precarious Politics: Critical Encounters*, ed. Terrell Carver and Samuel Allen Chambers (London ; New York: Routledge, 2008).

[45] Butler, *Precarious Life.*

When we shift the understanding of sovereign power from the right to take life to the state of exception and suspension or withdrawal of the law, we can identify new areas of dead body management where sovereign power is exercised. In addition to the example of the Turkish military, Israeli security forces, for example, are famous for extrajudicial executions - a practice where the law is suspended. In the case of postmortem violence, such as mutilation and dismemberment, if the perpetrators are actors of state apparatuses, the law protects them, even if that means suspending the law. Furthermore, the dead and their families have the right to a proper burial, granted and protected both by domestic and international law. Therefore, delaying, prohibiting, or attacking funerals could also mean the law is withdrawn both from the dead (as a political subject) and the family, producing bare lives and dead.

To sum up, regardless of whether we understand sovereignty as the right to take life or produce the state of exception, sovereign power is present in dead body management. However, contra to Foucault, who distinguished governmentality from sovereignty, Butler shows us, through the example of officials in Guantanamo Bay who "deem" a given prisoner deserves indefinite detention, that sovereign practices occur within the field of governmentality.[46] Sovereignty alone is then insufficient to grasp the management aspects and account for productive power. Therefore, it is necessary to look at other forms of power that complement sovereignty and examine what other doors a more governmental approach would open to study the (dead) body.

1.2.2 Biopolitics: The Human Body and Population Management

The existing body of literature in CSS shows us that targeting dead bodies is rarely, if ever, about the individual; rather, a larger population is targeted through the individual dead body. Even a prominent figure like Osama bin Laden's body was disposed of because of the

[46] Ibid.

concerns over its effects on the masses. In Wright's study, women's dead bodies in Mexico are treated and perceived in a certain way, not as who they are *individually*, but as an aggregate group of "public women" and women who defy social norms.[47] It means that the body becomes a site where regimes of discourse and power inscribe themselves, and where aggregate populations are managed through the individual body, which is a view propagated by Foucault and Foucauldian studies.[48]

Foucault famously identifies a new form of power that accompanies the juridico-political sovereign power of "take life or let live".[49] This new form of power is *biopolitics*, a political rationality that seeks to sustain and promote life, functioning through the logic of "make life or let die".[50] In modernity, the sovereign's power over life and death is complemented by the power over life, constituted by two intertwined poles. On the one hand, there is *anatamo-politics of the human body*, marked with disciplinary power. Anatamo-politics takes the individual body as its central ontological unit and considers it a machine that can be disciplined, optimized of its capabilities, extorted of its forces, and rendered more useful or docile.[51] Disciplinary power seeks to make individuals internalize norms, roles, and practices by marking the body, torturing it, training it, and forcing it to carry out tasks and perform certain rituals.[52]

On the other hand, there is biopolitics marked with biopower - the power over life. Biopower takes populations as aggregate groups; thus, biopolitical investment in the human body goes beyond the individualizing disciplinary power. In order to manage populations as aggregate groups, biopower devote resources to regulate life expectancy, health, illness, dying,

[47] Wright, "Necropolitics, Narcopolitics, and Femicide".
[48] Judith Butler, "Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions," *The Journal of Philosophy* 86, no. 11 (1989): 601–7.
[49] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 136.
[50] Ibid., 138.
[51] Foucault, *Discipline & Punish*.
[52] Ibid., 25

sexual behavior, and reproduction.[53] In other words, biopolitics invests in populations by regulating a series of biological processes. In a way, it is possible to talk about these two co-constitutive forms of power as "disciplining the individual body and regulating the collective or social body".[54]

This deduction, Foucault argues, is no longer the primary form of power.[55] In contrast to the deductive logic of juridico-political sovereignty, biopolitics seeks to "ensure, sustain, and multiply life".[56] Apparatuses of liberal governmentalities and biopower coincide. They function through the regimes of truth that dominate the fields of medicine, psychiatry, economics, politics, and knowledge on welfare; through technicalization and recording data concerning health, illness, death, and reproduction; and through technologies of surveillance.

Foucault's account of biopolitics opens room to study the relationship between the body, power, and politics. Particularly because it approaches populations as aggregate groups, it can shed light on discussions concerning dead bodies not being targeted as individuals. However, if biopolitics is primarily about fostering and elevating life, how can it apply to the questions of war and violence?

1.2.2.1 Biopolitics, War, and Violence

The question of how security and war relate to biopolitics is a complex one since Foucault started his 1975 lectures at the College de France by building the concepts of security and war only to abandon them shortly after.[57] Foucault tries to understand the discrepancy between liberal governmentality, the dominant discourses on human rights, life and liberty, and

[53] Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978 - 79*, 1st pbk ed., [Repr.], Lectures at the Collège de France (New York: Picador, 2010).
[54] Stuart Elden, "Strategies for Waging Peace: Foucault as Collaborateur," in *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).
[55] Foucault, *History of Sexuality.*
[56] Ibid., 138.
[57] Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*, trans. David Macey, First edition (New York: Picador, 2003).

increasingly violent, bloody, and genocidal wars. For him, the answer resides in the rise of biopower; wars are no longer waged for the sovereign but the entire population. In order to foster and elevate the life of a population, others must die, meaning that wars are racialized and serve a purifying function. War becomes a means and a technology of power for population management. The goal is not simply to defeat the enemy anymore, but to eradicate an undesired and threatening population. To move from war to security, in Foucault's writings, security appears as "an ensemble of mechanisms by which the biopolitical imperative to make life is operationalized governmentally".[58] Also called *dispositif de sécurité*, this concept has less to do with protection and is more connected to circulation, promotion, contingencies, statistics, patterns, and behavioral regularities.[59] Security's relation to war, however, remains unaddressed.

Influenced by these ideas, Foucauldian Security Studies (FSS) keeps the critical tradition of challenging the state-centrism of mainstream security studies, and the human body becomes the center of analysis. More precisely, FSS interrogates how security mechanisms function through the human body. Following the idea of *dispositif de sécurité*, FSS deals with how security is performed at the micro-level through data recording, surveillance, and statistics, and how various actors are involved in managing insecurity and unease.[60] In FSS, security is not the result of the logic of exception nor the suspension of normality, as the Copenhagen School suggests. It is more about statistical regularity.[61] Therefore, a phenomenon like

[58] Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, eds., *Foucault on Politics Security and War* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 12.
[59] Ibid., p.11.
[60] Bigo, "Security and Immigration"; Peer Schouten, "Security as Controversy: Reassembling Security at Amsterdam Airport," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 23–42, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613515014; Seantel Anaïs, "Ethical Interventions: Non-Lethal Weapons and the Governance of Insecurity," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 537–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611425367;.
[61] Didier Bigo, "Security: A Field Left Fallow," in *Foucault on Politics Security and War*, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 93–115.

counterterrorism, for instance, is also about contingencies, risks, production, and governance of terror and fear.[62]

FSS pushes us toward a direction that takes corporeality seriously in war and security studies. However, biopolitics can reach its analytical limits when the subject matter is political violence, especially state violence. State violence, public executions, or other sovereign practices are more prevalent than Foucauldians assume; their axioms are embedded in an imagined Western liberal order. Therefore, their analyses do not travel unproblematically. Furthermore, Foucauldian approaches undermine sovereign, physical, and structural violence that Western liberal states inflict in/on colonial/colonized spaces. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the colonial spaces cannot be reduced to managing risks and contingencies.

1.2.2.2 Biopolitics and Dead Bodies

The definition of biopolitics as "fostering life or disallowing it to the point of death" indicates that the human body we are talking about is the living body. Regarding death, Foucault argues that "now that power is decreasingly the power of the right to take life, and increasingly the right to intervene to make live… death becomes the end of life, the end of power too. Death is outside the power relationship… Power no longer recognizes death. Power literally ignores death".[63] Similarly, Charlotte Heath-Kelly argues that security is a response to death anxiety, and death draws the limits of state sovereignty, for the state is helpless against death.[64] Despite Foucault's claim that power ignores death, this is not necessarily the case. Medicinal data, statistics, and life expectancy can be acquired from dead bodies. Furthermore,

[62] François Debrix and Alexander D. Barder, "Nothing to Fear but Fear: Governmentality and the Biopolitical Production of Terror," *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 398–413, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00083.x; Michael Dillon, "Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence," *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 7–28, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00002.x.
[63] Foucault, *Society Must be Defended*, 247-248.
[64] Heath-Kelly, *Death and Security*.

practices regarding the burial of the dead could be another technology of power that divides populations into subgroups and manages them accordingly. Therefore, although Foucault tends to neglect death and the dead body, the framework of biopolitics allows space for the analytics of the dead.

A growing body of literature, particularly in anthropology and history, successfully demonstrates a genealogy of the dead as an object of modern biopolitics. To give a brief overview, although the Church brought some standardization and rules to how the dead should be treated and what constitutes a proper burial, the motivation was pastoral rather than to govern populations. The Canon law regulated proper burial, which comprised having the ceremony in a church and burial in the churchyard, and excluded those who were not baptized and who had broken the Ten Commandments.[65] The Great Plague of London in 1665 had triggered discussions on the role of the administration in public health and disease control; church burials were temporarily suspended, and bodies were disposed of in large quantities.[66] However, the eventual standardization of burials with reference to public health became a phenomenon in the 18th century. Laws and regulations of the modern state prohibit extramural cemeteries and uncontained bodies by referencing public health and potential diseases that decomposing bodies may spread.[67]

Another example is the regulation of open-air burials in Mongolia under Soviet rule. The Duha tribe in northern Mongolia follows the Shamanic ritual of open-air burials wherein the Shaman places the corpse in wild forests to be eaten by scavengers. The Soviet regime prohibited this practice and dictated a compulsory burial in cemeteries. Anthropologist

[65] Anne Irene Riisoy, "Deviant Burials: Societal Exclusion of Dead Outlaws in Medieval Norway," in *Cultures of Death and Dying in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Mia Korpiola and Anu Lahtinen (Helsinki: the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2015).
[66] Vanessa Harding, "Burial of the Plague Dead in Early Modern London," *Centre for Metropolitan History Working Papers Series* 1 (1993): 53–64.
[67] Stepputat, *Governing the Dead*, 16-17.

Benedikt Moller Kristensen interprets this as an attempt to nationalize local subjects through centralizing burials and as a branch of biopolitics "as the state sought to govern the population's health through their corpses".[68] A similar ritual is practiced in Tibet, where the corpse is placed on a mountaintop to decompose or be eaten by carrion birds. The Tibetan tradition of "sky burials" was also prohibited by communist China during the Cultural Revolution since it was seen as a primitive religious tradition.[69] Both cases demonstrate biopolitical governance of dead bodies, with sovereign elements present; the state apparatuses govern the dead bodies and burial practices to regulate public health, and religion, and centralize burial practices to keep a better record of populations and reinforce their authority.

Biopolitical governance of dead bodies goes beyond the regulation of burial practices and works hand in hand with the bureaucratization of life (and death), knowledge production, and new technologies. The systemic registration of the cause of death as exemplified by the death certificate is another example of the relation between biopolitics and dead bodies. Like burial practices, death certificates became a responsibility of secular institutions in the mid-17th century and centralized in Europe by the 19th century.[70] Death certificates declare the date, location, and cause of a person's death. Thus, they are part of the recording and surveillance mechanism. They are used to generate knowledge about disease trends, and leading causes of death and shape policies regarding public health.[71] Advancements in technology and medical sciences gave rise to forensic science. Like death certificates, forensic practices generates knowledge from the dead to manage the living. Forensics also reinforce the state's claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence.

[68] Kristensen, 'The proper funeral', 35.
[69] Seth Faison, "Lirong Journal; Tibetans, and Vultures, Keep Ancient Burial Rite," *The New York Times*, July 3, 1999, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/03/world/lirong-journal-tibetans-and-vultures-keep-ancient-burial-rite.html.
[70] Lawrence K. Altman, "Making the Right Call, Even in Death," *The New York Times*, July 1, 2013, sec. Health, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/health/making-the-right-call-even-in-death.html.
[71] Stepputat, *Governing the Dead*, 17.

Counter to Foucault's claim that power ignores death, Foucauldian studies demonstrate how biopower can be relevant for the dead. However, even in the examples discussed above, it is possible to observe the prioritization of life over death. More importantly, biopolitics reaches its analytical limits at political violence and the violence inflicted on dead bodies such as the mutilation of dead bodies, their public display, or burying them in unnamed mass graves, as well as regulating, delaying, prohibiting, or attacking burial ceremonies. Although Foucault briefly mentions race as the primary principle in stratifying and managing populations and the main driver of modern wars, Foucauldian studies also fail to give enough analytical attention to violence in the context of racialized (neo)colonial relations.[72]

1.2.2.3 Homo Sacer and the Bare Life

For Foucault, biopolitics is a phenomenon of modernity. The sovereign power over life and death characterized by the right to take life recedes to the background while biopower becomes the dominant rationality in the western liberal world. Agamben contests this view by arguing that biopolitics not only precedes modernity, but it has been the core of politics.[73] Following an Aristotelian tradition, Agamben highlights a distinction that he takes from Greek: *zoē* and *bios*. *Zoē* refers to "bare life", life reduced to its necessities -thus sometimes called animal life-, whereas *bios* is "political life", a qualified and legitimate form of life in a society.[74] Agamben argues that the Western *polis* rests on relegating *zoē* to the *oikos*, the household. Therefore, *zoē* is included in the social order by virtue of its exclusion.

The exclusion of biological life, reduced to its necessities, establishes the core of politics; thus, it is not a modern phenomenon. The exclusion of bare life constructs human life

[72] Pal Ahluwalia, "Post-Structuralism's Colonial Roots: Michel Foucault," *Social Identities* 16, no. 5 (September 1, 2010): 597–606, https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2010.509563; Vivienne Jabri, "Michel Foucault's Analytics of War: The Social, the International, and the Racial," *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 67–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00005.x.
[73] Agamben, *Homo Sacer*.
[74] Ibid. 9-42.

as a subject without any legal status, i.e.a bare life without rights. Bare life's exceptional state is embodied in the example of *homo sacer,* which in Roman law refers to the body "who can be killed with impunity yet cannot be sacrificed".[75] As the individual contains these two distinct qualities, the individual subject is a biological object -bare life- with political rights -bios-. The state has significant stakes in the physical life of its constituents. What follows is that sovereign power resides in the capacity to create homo sacer, i.e. deciding the "value or non-value of life as such".[76]

The role of the human body in this formulation is also significant. Homo sacer is stripped of their political rights; their body is disposable and vulnerable to violence. However, unlike Foucault's account of biopolitics, *homo sacer* leaves more analytical room for political violence and death. The biopolitical logic of "they must die so that we may live" is more evident here. The main issue is that Agamben's approach heavily depends on the exception's juridical logic and death, and the juridical seems to precede and is more encompassing than the political.[77] As we will see in the following chapters, sometimes death exceeds the juridical logic of exception or is performatively produced through death and the dead. Nevertheless, Agamben's discussion on biopolitics guides us in a helpful direction: the power over life cannot be separated from power over death. *Thanatopolitics* always complement *biopolitics*.

1.2.3 Necropolitics: The Other Side of the Coin

In his seminal essay "Necropolitics", Achille M'bembe questions the limits of biopolitics and points out that state violence, civil war, and late-modern colonial wars are increasing, where "the murder of the enemy is the primary and absolute objective".[78] Biopolitics, he argues, needs to be complemented by necropolitics, which can be defined as the

[75] Ibid., 114.
[76] Ibid., 80.
[77] Stuart J. Murray, "Thanatopolitics: Reading in Agamben a Rejoinder to Biopolitical Life," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 5, no. 2 (June 2008): 203–7, https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420802024350.
[78] Mbembe, "Necropolitics,", 12.

"sovereign's right to decide who may live and who must die".[79] For M'bembe, exercising sovereignty is exercising control over mortality and defining life as the deployment and manifestation of power. Such formulation of necropower based on killing is best exemplified in colonial wars, an element that is massively overlooked by Foucauldian studies. M'bembe argues that colonies resemble the Schmittian notion of the state of exception. The colony is seen as a space inhabited by "savages"; thus, the relationship between the colony and colonizer does not constitute a relationship between two equal sovereigns. Therefore, "the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner".[80] Colonial wars become a site where "the ends of war" and "means of war" get blurred, and sovereignty is reduced to an expression of enmity and power over life and death.

M'bembe's approach to necropolitics transcends the right to kill; it is also the right to expose other people, including the state's own citizens, to death, as well as placing bodies in a liminal space between life and death, as exemplified by apartheid and slavery. However, we should not understand biopolitics and necropolitics in dichotomous terms. Rather, they are almost inseparable. Like biopolitics, necropolitics is concerned with managing populations as aggregate groups. Under necropolitics, individuals are not killed merely as individuals targeted as a criminal or evil person; instead, they are targeted as sub-populations whose death would benefit a specific populace. Therefore, biopolitical management of populations entails necropolitics and vice versa. As Jasbir Puar points out, in M'bembe's "death worlds" there is a "totalizing narrative about the suffocation of life through the omnipotent forces of killing. In the face of daily necropolitical violence, suffering, and death, the biopolitical will to live plows

[79] Ibid., 11.
[80] Ibid., 25.

on".[81] After all, as Foucault shows us, the death of a population could be in the name of the protection and management of life, i.e. "in order to support life, the sovereign must suppress some life".[82]

It becomes even more evident in counterinsurgency/terrorism discourses. American violence in Iraq and Afghanistan -even a case like Abu Ghraib-, for example, is often justified as eliminating terrorist threats so that Iraqi and Afghani civilians can thrive. As Puar argues: "bio-necro collaboration conceptually acknowledges biopower's direct activity in death, while remaining bound to the optimization of life, and necropolitics' nonchalance toward death even as it seeks out killing as a primary aim".[83] A question to address at this point is, then, how the bio-necro collaboration can relate to dead bodies.

1.2.3.1 Necroviolence and Dead Bodies

If we strictly follow M'bembe and understand necropower as the right to kill and follow Puar to highlight bio-necro collaboration, how can we explain the violence that callously takes the dead body as its primary site and the power that functions in the realm of the dead? It is better to be cautious about highlighting biopolitics in the bio-necro collaboration in a phenomenon like postmortem violence since this might trivialize this form of violence's excessive and brutal nature. Then, the following question is: if necropolitics is about killing, does it mean that corporeality vanishes from the analysis? Excessive attention to killing gives the impression that the framework stops with the subject's death. Such a reading of necropolitics would be a limited one. As a biopolitical management of bodies possible after death, so is necropolitical management. Often but not exclusively, necropolitical management after death takes the human body as its main site.

[81] Jasbir Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 33.
[82] Foucault, *Society must be defended*, 253.
[83] Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 35.

Banu Bargu's concept of "necropolitical violence" helps us to make sense of the power relations between the dead body, state, and political violence.[84] For Bargu, necropolitical violence is:

> those acts that target the dead bodies of those killed in armed conflict, by way of their mutilation, dismemberment, denuding, desecration, dragging, and public display, the destruction of local cemeteries and other sacred spaces that are designated for communication with and commemoration of the dead, the delay, interruption, or suspension of the conduct of funerary rituals, the imposition of mass or anonymous internment, the pressure for clandestine internment, and the repression and dispersion of funeral processions for the newly dead.[85]

Her conceptualization of necroviolence differs from M'bembe's original formulation of necropolitics as decimating populations through massacres. In Bargu's words, it is "the violence that takes as its object the realm of the dead".[86] The necropolitical features reside in its function of "dishonoring, disciplining, and punishment of the living through the utilization of the dead as postmortem objects and sites of violence".[87] Jason De Leon also uses necroviolence to refer to "the violence performed through the specific treatment of corpses". In Leon's formulation, necroviolence also targets the living by horrifying them. For instance, US immigration law enforcement have left the dead bodies of migrants trying to cross the Mexican-US border in the wild to be consumed by animals in order to deter immigration.[88]

In this sense, necropolitical violence/necropower seems as though it is the framework that gives the most room for analyzing dead bodies. However, using necropolitical violence as an umbrella term to cover "an entire ensemble of diverse practices that target the dead as a surrogate for, and means of, targeting the living", as Bargu does, has an analytical cost.[89] I do not intend to narrow the scope of violence to cover only direct and corporeal violence.

[84] Banu Bargu, "Another Necropolitics," *Theory & Event* 19, no. 1 (February 19, 2016), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/610222.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Jason De León, *The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail*, California Series in Public Anthropology 36 (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015).
[89] Bargu, "Another Necropoliotics".

Seemingly indirect and structural acts like interrupting commemoration and delaying funerals are indeed a form of violence.[90] However, funerals in particular bring other forms of power into play. Prohibiting burials, for instance, not only strips the dead of their right to be buried but also strips their close ones from the right to bury, bringing sovereignty onto the scene.

In the example of funerary regulations, the law is suspended for a particular group. Regardless of whether we see sovereignty in the Schmittian sense (as the decree of the state of exception), in the Agambenian sense (as production of the bare life), or Butler's idea of performatively suspending the law, prohibiting burials has elements of sovereign power. What is counted as necroviolence also comprises a network of various actors, practices, and discourses. These involve not only direct or structural violence, but also regulation and management in a governmental fashion such as forensic autopsies, transportation of bodies, and the regulation of the public space where the funeral takes place. Last but not least, the politics of funerals inevitably involve technologies of mourning that cannot be grasped by necroviolence/necropower alone.

1.2.4 Normative Power: Technologies of Mourning and Memorialization

The politics of funerals, mourning, and commemoration are an integral part of every (counter)insurgency. Both the soldiers' and the insurgents' funerals carry political importance for the stakeholders of the war. Funerals become a site to reinforce a sense of unity among a particular community and galvanize nationalist, religious, or ethnic sentiments. From Northern Ireland to Palestine, to Turkey, insurgents' funerals involve certain rituals that challenge the state's -or the enemy's -authority. Therefore, the state often prohibits or regulates "the enemy's" funerals, mainly manifesting sovereign power in the form of suspending law or

[90] In Islam, the corpse must be buried within three days. However, this has become a cultural practice; even the families who do not follow Islamic laws and norms strictly follow the three-days norm. Therefore, delaying the burial process mean that families are prevented from their cultural and religious rights.

creating bare lives. However, as Butler shows us, another form of power is exercised through the lack of public grief, producing *ungrievable lives*.

The dead body is not simply material waste; the biological body might die, yet the political life can survive the biological death. As Katherine Verdery argues, a remembered dead body is more than a corpse; it is a material symbol of history.[91] Therefore, states are heavily involved in memorialization processes since it is a significant component of nation-building and statecraft. Memorialization distinguishes between who is important and who is not, who is welcomed in national history and whose memory must be eradicated.[92]

For Butler, mourning and memorialization relate to a more fundamental question than who is welcomed in national history. Rather, it is fundamentally about who counts as a human.[93] With the example of 9/11 and the War on Terror, we can see the American victims and troops were publicly mourned, their names and faces are shown, and their stories are told. However, Iraqi and Afghani civilians' deaths were not even acknowledged. Butler argues that some people are rendered into nameless and faceless figures - *ungrievable lives*.[94] Some deaths do not have an obituary; we do not know their names, faces, stories, and subjectivities. They are not mourned because their lives are not counted as lives in the first place. The power at work here is not Agamben's bare life per se. Power abandons life, producing the bare life, whereas, in Butler's formulation, some lives are not abandoned by power as they have never been recognized by power from the beginning.[95] In this form of power, the subject is derealized, as if they have never existed. The form of power we discuss here is neither fully sovereign nor bio/necropolitical.

[91] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
[92] Ibid.
[93] Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?*, Reprint edition (London ; New York: Verso, 2010); Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[94] Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[95] Ibid.

It is better to name this power for the sake of clarity, and I stick to *normative power*, even though it may be confusing for some readers. In mainstream liberal and constructivist theories of IR, normative power is usually understood as a legitimate actor's capacity to create or promote norms in the international sphere as in "power over opinion".[96] I use normative power in a different way entirely. Normative violence is a term suggested by Butler, who argues that norms can be violent in themselves and be used to normalize violence.[97] In this case, norms regarding who can be mourned and who shall remain ungrieved is a form of productive violence (producing ungrievable lives) that derealizes subjects.

Furthermore, for Butler, grievability relates to normative schemes of intelligibility, as something that "establish[es] what will and will not be human, what will be a livable life, what will be a grievable death".[98] It is a question "centered on the problem of unreal and unrealizable lives".[99] In this regard, it can also be called *normative power*. Normative power operates through enabling or foreclosing comprehension of the human, shaping our understanding of who counts as human. Normative violence, then, is not a violation of a norm, or violence that is normative, but the violence of norms. The normative element of producing what counts as human simultaneously and inevitably excludes some lives.

For Butler, ungrievability -thus normative power- is about the capacity to be mourned, which takes the form of a lack of public grief or non-acknowledgment of death. However, what about the circumstances where derealization, effacement, and erasure are enforced? Let us take Sophocles' story of Antigone, for example, or the Catholic Bishop Edward Daly of Derry

[96] Anna Skolimowska, "The European Union as a 'Normative Power' in International Relations.," *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, no. 18 (2015): 111–31; Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, "Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?*," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 2 (2007): 435–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00717.x.
[97] Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (New York ; London: Routledge, 2004).
[98] Butler, *Precarious Life*, 146.
[99] Samuel A. Chambers, "Normative Violence after 9/11: Rereading the Politics of Gender Trouble," *New Political Science* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 43–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140601170792, 47.

prohibiting IRA funerals, or the Turkish state suddenly and abruptly prohibiting -then allowing but securitizing- PKK funerals. These cases involve the exercise of sovereign power in the form of a sovereign decree or suspension of law. From Israel-Palestine to Turkey to Ireland, a myriad of actors -from the media to mayors- engage in this campaign of derealization in a governmental fashion. Prohibition of funerals is often justified to maintain the public order or manage the risk and contingencies of insurgency/terrorism. Last but not least, through regulation or prohibition of public mourning, a larger population is sought to be disciplined, punished, and controlled.

In these cases, subjects are abandoned by power rather than not acknowledged by it. Therefore, it is questionable whether we can make sense of them only through Butler's formulation. However, reading these phenomena only through sovereignty would also draw an incomplete picture by neglecting the technologies of mourning that shape normative schemes of intelligibility.

1.3 Conclusion

Even though the starting point of this dissertation is empirical, it addresses critical theoretical issues. The primary purpose of this chapter was to pick up the discussion I briefly introduced in the limited space of the introduction and elaborate on it. This elaboration has two purposes and functions: first, to clarify the theoretical puzzle, and second, to map out the discussion on the dead, security, and power. Security studies help us to some degree to make sense of the relationship between the Turkish state and the PKK insurgents' dead bodies by introducing the concept of "dead body management".

Dead body management raises important questions and guides us toward new research agendas; yet, we do not quite know what dead body management is and what kind of power relations it might entail. Various accounts of power, such as sovereign, bio-, necro-, and

normative, can shed light on the relationship between power, body, and management. However, when we survey them, we encounter that each form of power explains specific aspects of dead body management while failing to account for dead body management holistically, especially in the context of state violence and in non-Western, colonial, and colonizing settings, like Turkey.

The second purpose, to map out the discussions on dead bodies, security, and power and discuss their strengths and limitations, was the first step to building an analytical framework. No theory of power can explain this empirical phenomenon alone, yet they do not have such parsimonious claims to begin with. The main reason why no theory of power alone can be the answer is that they are all present in dead body management. Sometimes, one account of power is dominant in a specific stage of dead body management; other times, they are entangled or assembled.

Therefore, in order to analyze the empirical phenomenon that concerns this dissertation, we need a custom conceptual and theoretical toolbox tailored for this specific purpose. As this chapter established the roots of the discussions on power, body, and management, the next task is to build this toolbox. The next chapter continues this discussion by conceptualizing dead bodies and a performative and discursive understanding of power, introducing a machinic and assemblage-oriented ontology, digging deeper into the theoretical accounts of power by focusing more on dead bodies, and discussing the potential couplings and assemblages of these accounts of power

Chapter 2: Conceptual Toolbox and Methodological Implications

The existing theoretical approaches discussed in the previous chapter guide us toward a way to make sense of the relationship between power, bodies, and security. In this chapter, I continue in the direction that these theories have guided us and delve into the functions of power, keeping attention on dead bodies specifically. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the potential interlinkages of power, where we can observe them, what they can possibly perform, and how we can study them. By doing so, I build an analytical and conceptual toolbox that can be later operationalized to make sense of the empirics.

"Building" and "toolbox" are not words I chose arbitrarily. It is crucial to note early on that I do not aim to offer a generalizable framework of dead body management.[100] Rather, I continue surveying the existing approaches by digging deeper into them, borrowing some specific concepts and theories, and combining what are ontologically and epistemologically alignable. I then build a custom toolbox, specifically tailored for analyzing this empirical phenomenon. However, this does not mean that these concepts and approaches can only be applied to Turkey; they have histories embedded in numerous cases and potentialities for future cases. Therefore, when necessary, I referred to other examples than Turkey.

The chapter is structured as follows: first, I offer a conceptualization of the dead body following a new materialist framework. Then, I propose a performative approach to power. What follows is a discussion of dead body management as an ensemble and the potential interlinkages of power with its assemblages and entanglements. I finish by explaining the

[100] In fact, it is contested whether we can even call this a framework, for I do not strictly follow a theoretical "framework" and apply it to the empirics but rather let the empirical analysis demonstrate the interplays of power.

methodological implications of this 'framework' and justifying some of my methodological choices.

2.1 Conceptualizing the Dead Body

What is a dead body, and what does it signify? This seemingly easy question brings a complex issue. The dead body cannot talk or walk; does this mean it is merely an inanimate object? Following a new materialist approach, I propose to approach the dead performatively. One of the implications of this approach is to understand (dead) bodies as a product and productive of power and the social order in which they are embedded. It also allows us to perceive bodies as something both material and discursive. Another implication is not to engage in the debate whether dead bodies are intrinsically subjects or objects and instead to investigate the discourses, practices, or moments that performatively produce the dead body as a subject, object, or 'abject'.

Even though the dead cannot talk or walk, they are not necessarily conceptualized as objects. Most modern societies do not see the dead body as a material waste or as a disposable object. We should not leave bodies on the streets to decay, dissolve them in acid, or mutilate them limb by limb. Nor should we inflict violence on the already dead or have sexual intercourse with them. These things happen, and when they do, they transgress a norm, or even a taboo; they are frowned upon if not criminally punished, and they trigger a feeling of repulsion. The rationale behind this norm, or taboo, is that the corpse was once a living human being, and the body reminds us of the person when they were alive. In other words, the dead body is not entirely detached from an identity. Therefore, there is an expectation that the dead should be treated with dignity.

They are also political subjects with rights, as the right to a proper burial demonstrates. Furthermore, even when the material remains of a person have decayed, their memories haunt

us. They keep affecting our lives. In other instances, when material remains of the body are found, they can drastically change our understanding of history, who the perpetrators were, and the state of politics.[101] In a certain sense, the dead has agency.[102] In short, these characteristics of the dead signal to us that they are not entirely objects; on the contrary, they carry some elements of a subject.

On the other hand, the dead body is not entirely a subject. The corpse cannot respond when the dead body and its political rights are violated. The right to a proper burial, to oppose disinterment, and to seek damages for mutilation of the body are the rights of the next of kin. In the US, for example, if someone rapes the victim prior to a murder, they would be charged with murder and rape, whereas if they rape the victim after the murder, there would be only a murder charge, for "the law does not serve personhood to dead bodies".[103] The corpse can also be an object that reminds us of our own mortality, signifying death, decay, and impurity.[104] In some instances, like warfare, it becomes a site where, through violence and display, victory, sovereignty and domination can be signified. In other cases, like autopsies, they become an object of the medical gaze. Rationalist approaches in IR and security studies tend to treat the body as a material object animated by the individual's mind; thus, dead bodies are "brute facts" that can be ignored.[105] The dominant understanding of a political subject is an abstract one, where there is reason and rationality but not always grounded in a body.[106]

[101] Joost Fontein, "Remaking the Dead, Uncertainty and the Torque of Human Materials in Northern Zimbabwe," in *Governing the Dead: Sovereignty and the Politics of Dead Bodies*, ed. Finn Stepputat (Manchester University Press, 2020), 114–40, https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526151599/9781526151599.00016.xml.
[102] Zoë Crossland, "The Agency of the Dead," in *Distributed Agency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190457204.003.0019.
[103] Rose Hackman, "'Necrophilia Legislator' on a Crusade to Outlaw Loophole of Arcane Era," *The Guardian*, September 4, 2015, sec. Life and style, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/sep/04/necrophilia-laws-massachusetts-loophole-aaron-vega.
[104] Deborah Posel and Pamila Gupta, "The Life of the Corpse: Framing Reflections and Questions," *African Studies* 68, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 299–309, https://doi.org/10.1080/00020180903381248.
[105] Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence*, Introduction 3.
[106] Terrel Carver, "'Public Man' and the Critique of Masculinities," *Political Theory* 24, no. 4 (November 1, 1996): 673–86, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591796024004004.

The literature on embodiment can help us to challenge this Cartesian model and make sense of the subject-object and body-mind dichotomies in a more nuanced way. Embodiment draws our attention to the biological and the social elements of the body and understands the subject as embodied. In such an approach, the body is both a material object and a category of discourse. It is "a material object and a living and acting organism possessing rudimentary forms of subjectivity that becomes, through a process of social appropriation, both a social identity and a cultural subject".[107] According to Pierre Bourdieu, an embodied subject is a socially informed body.[108] A socially informed body is both a product and producer of the socio-political conditions; as Lauren Wilcox argues: "bodies are constituted in reference to historical political conditions while at the same time acting upon our world".[109] While embodiment challenges the body-mind Cartesian duality , it also provides a framework that allows us to study the social and political in relation to the body.[110]

However, the special status of the dead body raises questions. Does death cause "disembodiment," or in other words, is the Self no longer embodied? If the dead body is not entirely a subject, can we talk about its embodiment at all? Even though these are important questions that we should keep in mind, they reside outside this dissertation's scope. Because of these questions, I abstain from referring specifically to "embodiment" when talking about dead bodies; however, we can still borrow the idea of a body as a product and producer of the socio-political conditions to make sense of the dead body.

The dead body often slips from a firm analytical grip, so it is hardly surprising that no account of power alone can explain dead body management. Julia Kristeva highlights this

[107] Terence Turner, "Social Body and Embodied Subject: Bodiliness, Subjectivity, and Sociality among the Kayapo," *Cultural Anthropology* 10, no. 2 (1995), 145.
[108] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812507.
[109] Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence*, Intro 3.
[110] E. A. Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*, Theories of Representation and Difference (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

feature of the dead body and conceptualizes it as neither a subject nor object but *the abject.*[111] According to Julia Kristeva, abject primarily refers to the human reaction of horror and repulsion to a threatened breakdown in meaning. Contra to Jacques Lacan's "object of desire", where a symbolic order of meaning persists, abject "draws toward the place where meaning collapses".[112] The breakdown of the meaning that ensues following the rupture between 'subject and object' or 'Self and Other' triggers such a reaction. For Kristeva, the corpse is a primary example of abject/abjection. In her words, "the corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject!".[113]

The corpse reminds us of our own materiality and mortality; its abjection lies in this feature of blurring boundaries between life and death, the living Self and the dead Other, threatening the stability of the order wherein the Self is alive. However, this approach neglects violent death. Political violence has different dynamics than natural death. In war, the enemy's dead bodies signify the vulnerability and violability of the Other rather than our own materiality and mortality. The abject corpse has the potential to disrupt identities and the order; thus, it is excluded and cast away. In this regard, the abject can illuminate why dead bodies are rendered invisible and pushed into the private sphere. However, why in specific contexts, the state apparatuses inflict corporeal violence on the dead body and render it visible or invest in violent management of the dead remains unanswered.

Some scholars identify turning subjects into objects as one of the functions of violence and its spectacle.[114] The display of violence does not transform the subject into an object fixedly and linearly. A photograph or a video takes a snapshot of the ever-fluid, never-complete

[111] Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon Roudiez, Reprint edition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982).
[112] Jacques Lacan, *Desire and Its Interpretation: The Seminar of Jacque Lacan, Book VI*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Polity, 2019); Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 2.
[113] Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 3-4.
[114] Campbell, "Horrific Blindness"; Liz Philipose, "The Politics of Pain and the Uses of Torture," *Signs* 32, no. 4 (2007): 1047–71, https://doi.org/10.1086/513022.

subject. This snapshot makes it possible to talk about the body *as if* it is an object to gaze at in a temporally bounded moment. The display of violence produces a body whose subjectivity is rendered invisible, whereas corporeality is highlighted. However, the vulnerability of corporeality can also trigger sympathy for the temporarily objectified subject and have humanizing effects.[115]

Following this discussion, I propose approaching the dead body as neither a subject nor object while simultaneously being a subject and an object, and focusing on the "production of dead bodies". Instead of deciding whether the dead body is essentially an object, subject, or abject, we should inspect the events, discourses, performances, and practices that produce the dead body as an object, subject, or abject. Discourses, politics, and the body's materiality are intertwined in such a chiasmic relationship that "materiality cannot be separated from cultural and discursive forces".[116]

On the other hand, discourses are also performances that give birth to a certain reality; they enable or constrain actions. Discursively marking certain bodies as deviant or threatening has substantial and material implications. They create racialized and sexualized bodies that are violable, killable, and/or need to be tamed. The absence or invisibility of certain bodies in the public discourse also creates bodies that do not matter, are derealized, and rendered ungrievable. Discursively framing certain dead bodies as "carcasses", for example, sets the conditions of possibilities for their desecration. Forensics and autopsies produce the dead body as an object of the medical gaze. Inspecting the practices and discourses that produce certain dead bodies (violable bodies, bodies to save and honor, etc.) in return, enables us to conceptualize such practices and discourses as technologies that constitute dead body management and to analyze engrained power relations.

[115] Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[116] Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence*, 11, 45.

Finally, this new materialist and embodied approach to dead bodies as a producer and product of the social order brings the relationship among dead bodies, territory, space, nationhood, and citizenship to the forefront. If we want to bring the social order into the analysis, we cannot isolate the dead body from society. Mutilation and display of a dead body is a form of violence that does not target the victim as merely an individual. The display indicates that the living population is targeted by using the dead body as a means. Rendering racialized and sexualized bodies violable has implications for the entire population. When proper burial is denied, it is not only the dead individual's right that is violated; the right to proper burial encompasses the next of kin. Therefore, by studying the practices and discourses regarding the dead, we can better understand the Self and Other dynamics in the context of counterinsurgency/terrorism.

2.2 A Performative Approach to Power

Accepting the (dead) body as a product and productive of the social order and a site where power is exercised on and through has an implication on how we should understand power - power is performative. The performative elements in biopower are rather self-evident. Michel Foucault has famously advocated for an account of power that not only destroys but produces. As he argues, power produces reality and regimes of truth.[117] For Foucault, power is relational and everywhere. Power is a struggle, decentralized, and omnipresent. Thus, it has multiple origins and is always in relation to others.[118] It means that power is not something you possess but rather exercise. The idea that power is exercised rather than possessed guides the other forms of power discussed in the previous chapter and has serious theoretical and

[117] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[118] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, 1st American Ed edition (New York: Vintage, 1980).

methodological implications that contribute to building the basis for the dissertation's main argument.

To begin with, moving beyond the traditional understanding of juridical sovereignty, I operationalize sovereignty as a performative concept. Judith Butler's reading of Giorgio Agamben guides such conceptualization of sovereignty. Following Agamben, I keep the emphasis on the suspension or withdrawal of the law, exemplified by the state of exception. However, as Butler proposes: "sovereignty is produced at the moment of this withdrawal, therefore, we must consider the act of suspending the law as a performative one which brings a contemporary configuration of sovereignty into being, or more precisely, reanimates a spectral sovereignty within the field of governmentality".[119] This definition has methodological and analytical implications.

First, instead of exclusively looking for discursive utterances of the state of exception, we need to examine practices that suspend law. Second, sovereignty and governmentality are not exclusively distinct fields; as Butler shows us, we observe 'a spectral sovereignty within the field of governmentality', where the law is instrumentalized in a governmental fashion. An example Butler provides is Guantanamo Bay, where the officials can "deem" the prisoner's status and decide on indefinite detention without a legal verdict.[120] In this sovereignty within the field of governmentality, where the lines between the exception and norm get blurred, petty sovereigns like the officials in Guantanamo Bay wielding the power of deeming appear.

Now the question is: what is this approach's implications for studying political violence? Let us take the "extrajudicial killings" in Israel as an example. In June 2020, Ahmed Erekat, a 26 year-old Palestinian man, lost control of his car when he was asked to stop at a checkpoint, crashing into the checkpoint and knocking a soldier down. When he emerged from

[119] Butler, *Precarious Lives*, 61.
[120] Ibid.

his car, posing no imminent threat, he was shot at the spot and left on the street to bleed to death.[121] Israel is known for its "shoot-to-kill" policy; as the defense minister claims, "no attacker should make it out of any attack alive".[122] However, what constitutes an attack is not always clear, as Erekat's story illustrates. Erekat's death is considered an "extrajudicial killing" - an execution, by human rights organizations.[123] Nevertheless, Erakat's action was treated as an attack, and thus no legal action was taken. In this example, we can observe an illocutionary utterance of the exception preceding the suspension of law.

What about the instances where there is no such discursive declaration of the exception, which we can commonly see in this dissertation's case study - Turkey? This performative approach to power, and sovereignty in particular, proves useful in such instances. Hacı Lokman Birlik, a PKK militiaman, who was found wounded and executed, and whose dead body was dragged on the streets by an armored vehicle, is an example illustrating the performative understanding of sovereignty's analytical value. The only legal action taken was disciplinary action against the security forces who took the visuals and published them on social media.[124] Execution, the desecration of the dead body, and its visualization violate domestic and international laws. Therefore, we observe suspension of the law, but there is no declaration of the exception preceding the suspension. Through the exercise of execution and desecration of the dead body and its legitimation through the lack of legal action, law is suspended, and sovereign power is (re)produced.

[121] Noura Erakat, "Extrajudicial Executions from the U.S to Palestine," *Just Security*, August 7, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/71901/extrajudicial-executions-from-the-united-states-to-palestine/.
[122] Harriet Agerholm, "Israeli Officials 'Backing Shoot-to-Kill Policy against Palestinians,'" *The Independent*, January 2, 2017, sec. News, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-shoot-to-kill-policy-palestinian-suspects-human-rights-watch-idf-soldiers-west-bank-gaza-strip-a7505486.html.
[123] "Israel: Release Body of Slain Palestinian," *Human Rights Watch* (blog), September 14, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/14/israel-release-body-slain-palestinian.
[124] "Davutoğlu'nun 'Hacı Birlik'i sürükleyen polisler görevden alındı' açıklamasına HDP'den yalanlama [The HDP disproved Davutoğlu's claim that 'police officers who dragged Hacı Birlik are dismissed']," *T24*, December 20, 2015, https://t24.com.tr/haber/davutogluna-yalanlama-haci-lokman-birliki-surukleyen-polisler-gorevden-alinmadi,321101.

Similarly, we can approach bio/necropower and normative power performatively. Necropower and biopower are the other sides of the same coin; thus, like biopower, necropower is decentralized, relational, and exercised instead of being possessed. Necropower, therefore, is not something possessed by the state and rather put into practice only through its apparatuses. From low-level bureaucrats to prosecutors, from doctors to ordinary citizens, necropower is comprised of a myriad of actors. Particularly, Banu Bargu's conceptualization of *necroviolence* illustrates exercises of necropower, such as delaying funerals.[125]

In addition, we can understand the normative power with derealizing functions in productive terms. The normative schemes that regulate who can be mourned produce subjects who do not have the capacity to be mourned, or in other words, *ungrievable lives*. They are simultaneously a product of the existing power relations. As Butler argues, their deaths are not mourned because their lives are not counted as lives in the first place.[126] The logic of 'inclusion through exclusion', that we see in Agamben's account, is present here. This dehumanization, i.e. not being counted as life and human, comes to life through exclusion: the lack of public mourning.

If power is circulated, exercised, and relational, then one practice can be an exercise of multiple forms of power. In other words, one practice can perform multiple functions, simultaneously serving different accounts of power. These forms of power are often inextricably intertwined yet perform distinct functions. Therefore, despite their entanglement, they are in an assemblage. Biopower and necropower are textbook examples of this phenomenon. A certain population is sought to be eliminated so that another population can live and thrive. Therefore, even a brutal act such as a massacre can have biopolitical underpinnings. What we have at hand, then, is a bio/necro collaboration. The same logic can

[125] Bargu, "Another Necropolitics".
[126] Butler, *Precarious Life*.

be applied to the other forms of power. Going back to the example of Hacı Lokman Birlik, sovereign power, exercised through the suspension of the law and the right to take life, is not the only operating power. The dead body was dragged on the streets, and the video and pictures of this were circulated on social media and deliberately sent to one of Birlik's relatives. The perpetrators wanted the violence to be seen because this violence sends a message. A larger population is targeted through the individual dead; thus, it is also an exercise of necropower.

The entangled assemblages of power are more apparent when we look at a chain of events or dead body management more holistically. Executing the wounded and desecrating the body can be interpreted as sovereign power, while dismemberment and its visualization can be understood as an exercise of necropower. By subsequently erasing the dead's subjectivity, necropower produces normative schemes intelligibility, i.e. normative power-. Sometimes it is impossible to pinpoint a practice and claim that *this is* sovereign power and *that is* necropower. Taking life is a clear example of this; it is an act where the line between sovereign power and necropower gets blurred. Nevertheless, dead body management appears as an ensemble of technologies wherein various forms of power are intertwined and interplay.

2.3 Dead Body Management and Assemblages of Power

I have already used the term "dead body management" countless times and will keep using it throughout the dissertation. Therefore, at the risk of repeating myself, I would like to elaborate on how I understand and employ the concept. Even though Jessica Auchter does not provide an explicit working definition in her article "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies", where she coined the term, her writing gives us enough clues about how she understands and uses it.[127] She understands the term as "the political and legal structures in place to manage" dead bodies and how they are secured and governed.[128] My definition is not far from Auchter's; yet,

[127] Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies".
[128] Ibid., 37.

there are some essential points I need to note. Unlike Auchter, I do not seek to define or explain dead body management as an empirically generalizable phenomenon. When I talk about dead body management, I do not refer to "the dead body management". Rather, I use the term to refer to the treatment of the dead. Treatment, here, is understood as the numerous ways that power invests in the insurgents' dead bodies. Potentially, we could also call it "dead body politics", and sometimes I use this term. However, dead body politics cannot match management's systemic, systematic, deliberate, and calculated features.

The word "management" is sometimes misleading. Because of its entrepreneurial or governmental underpinnings, one might rule violence out as a part of management. As previously stated, I use the term dead body management for heuristic reasons. More precisely, I use it to be consistent, concise, and to refer to the various ways that the Turkish regime, which includes many actors, treats the insurgents' dead bodies. Violence is one of those "various ways". At this point, the bio/necropolitical collaboration demonstrates its analytical value. It is, after all, violent management of populations. However, we cannot solely rely on Bargu's *necroviolence* because we might miss other forms of power and the 'non-violent' discourses and practices governing the dead.[129]

Dead body management has no intrinsic and universal essence, yet it is still possible to study how dead body management unpacks and how power operates in a specific empirical context by building a conceptual and theoretical toolbox fit for the task. As discussed earlier, Foucault's analytics of power is one of those tools as it suggests we study definite actors, practices, techniques, technologies, and strategies of power. For the sake of brevity, henceforth, I call the distinct actors, practices, techniques, technologies, and strategies of power,

[129] Non-violent might not be the best choice here. For example, a discussion on where bodies are allowed to be buried might not seem violent at first glance, but it can cause violent and desecrating practices like exhumation. Nevertheless, this discourse still differs from what Bargu means by necroviolence, which involves more direct violence even when it is structural violence.

"components of dead body management". Delving into the specifics of the empirical context, the components I have identified are: 1) dehumanizing discourses and discursive construction of the Other as deviant; 2) killing; 3) postmortem visceral violence, like dismembering, visualizing, or hiding the bodies; 4) regulating, securitizing, or criminalizing the transportation of bodies, which includes border policies; 5) strategic use of forensic autopsies; 6) regulating, attacking, prohibiting, securitizing, or criminalizing burial and public mourning; and 7) the instrumentalization of the law and the state of exception.

Although I identified and analyzed these components based on my case study, we can observe most of these components elsewhere, and there might be more components of dead body management that I do not address here. Because of its sensationalist and brutal characteristics, we hear a lot about the dismemberment of dead bodies, whether in Israel or Afghanistan. However, in every conflict, dismembered bodies still need to be transported, buried, and mourned -or mourning needs to be regulated-. Some of these components are open-ended, such as "regulation"; regulating funerals, for instance, can take the form of delaying the funeral, deciding on what can be shown in the space where it takes place, prohibiting it, and/or exposing it to security measures. At this point, temporal, spatial, and social contexts can become decisive on what dead body management can exactly look like. On the other hand, there are components of dead body management that can be observed elsewhere but are not relevant to this dissertation's case study. An example would be rendering dead bodies as referent objects of security. This is a practice that the stakeholders engage in but does not apply to this study since the focus is exclusively on the management of the enemy's bodies. Additionally, the Turkish regime does not seek to secure the insurgents' bodies.

A distinctive feature of the Turkey – PKK conflict plays a key role here and shows us that power operating in and through dead body management is not universal either. In Turkey, "the enemy" is a citizen. This means that the state has legal obligations towards the

insurgent/terrorist's family, such as giving the body back to the family and ensuring a proper burial. We cannot observe such an obligation of the US in Afghanistan, for example. Prohibiting the burial of a citizen in Turkey, regardless of their status as the enemy, means suspending the law, since the state is responsible for providing funeral services to their citizens. However, this does not apply to the US' counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. This illustrates the risks of applying this tailor-made framework to elsewhere without considering the context.

2.3.1 Thinking Through Assemblages and Machines

In short, dead body management is an ensemble - a bricolage of actors, discourses, practices, governmental rationalities, techniques, and technologies. *An assemblage! A network of machinic connections.* Assemblage as a concept and metaphor can assist us in making sense of dead body management and the associated complex power relations. I need to stress that I do not strictly use assemblage in a Guattaro-Deleuzian sense (if such a thing is possible); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have never proposed a fully formed theory of assemblage, and for them, concepts should be tools that we can play with freely.[130] Instead, we should think of assemblages and machines as analogies.

An assemblage is not reducible to a single logic; it consists of multiplicities. It implies heterogeneity, contingency, instability, partiality, and situatedness.[131] "The temporality of an assemblage is emergent. It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake".[132] This is why it is an appropriate conceptual tool in our tailored toolbox to understand various forms of power and components of dead body management. A helpful example that Thomas Nail uses to understand assemblage is the difference between a body and

[130] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, European Perspectives (New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Pr, 1994).
[131] Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, eds., *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005),
[132] Ibid., 12.

a machine. The body is a unit; if you take the heart out, neither the heart nor the body will function independently. An assemblage, on the other hand, is more like a machine. Each element of the assemblage can be assembled in a myriad of ways, with each new mixture forming new assemblages.[133]

Dead body management is a multiplicity of heterogeneous actors, discourses, practices, bodies, spaces… *it even comprises material items, such as a mortuary refrigerator, a body bag, an autopsy table, a lancet, a rope, a vehicle, a shovel… that we, as scholars, overlook. Forensic pathologists, prosecutors, security forces, grave diggers… Various actors, various material objects in a machinic connection...* "Everywhere it is machines", Deleuze and Guattari argue, "machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections".[134] Life is a production and reproduction of machinic connections. The human-machine operates a medical assemblage of other machines, like a mortuary refrigerator, an operation table, and a lancet. Take the doctor out of dead body management, and both the doctor and dead body management can function independently; assemble them with other machines or assemblages, and they will have a different function.

Forms of power that dead body management entails are also in a machinic and rhizomatic relationship. When two machinic connections come together, they bring their own machines, cogs, and wheels that connect in new ways. Let us take postmortem violence and visualization of violence as an example. Postmortem violence is a multiplicity on its own, comprising actors (security forces), practices (killing and inflicting violence on the dead), visualization of violence with technologies (phones, cameras, social media…). Visualization is assisted by a lack of textual narratives, erasing subjectivities. This connection between postmortem violence and visualization entails necropower that seeks to discipline the living

[133] Thomas Nail, "What Is an Assemblage?," *SubStance* 46, no. 1 (2017): 21–37.
[134] Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus.*

population by exposing them to the dead. It also entails sovereign power that produces bare lives -and bare dead whose bodies and rights are violable-, and normative power that erases subjectivities. These forms of power are entangled in this machinic connection yet functioning together and performing distinct roles. My purpose is not to disentangle them per se but to try to reveal the entanglements. I also seek to identify the points where the lines between power get blurred or where components of dead body management and forms of power are distinguishable, and discuss their function.

For heuristic reasons, I paired some of these connections of power, which proved to be a difficult task. On the one hand, the categories of assemblages I propose below are not ideal types. I also do not intend to give an impression of providing a rigid framework that can be applied anywhere and treats forms of power as easily distinguishable. On the other hand, I do not want to take the easy way out by claiming that it is incredibly complex to disentangle and leave the phenomenon unaddressed. I do not necessarily see these categories as a framework but rather as analytical tools that help us demonstrate, understand, and analyze how different forms of power are entangled and interlinked. It is an opportunity to dig deeper into these forms briefly discussed in the previous chapter and have a more nuanced and specific discussion on the relationship between power and dead bodies. It is also an opportunity to examine how power operates in the realm of the dead, or how it might operate in different empirical settings, before delving into the case study. For this reason, I have sometimes referred to other empirical examples than the case study.

2.3.2 Necro/Normative Power

Let us start by examining how necropower and normative power operate together. There are three major areas, which are also related to the case studies, where we can observe the necro/normative play. First, postmortem violence is one of the primary sites where necro/normative power is exercised. When referring to postmortem violence, one might -

rightfully- think in temporal terms and include any violence that comes after death, such as delaying funerals, similar to what Bargu does with necroviolence. I use postmortem violence specifically to refer to the violence that takes the dead body as its primary target, like dismembering, denuding, or dragging the dead body, or in other words, direct and corporeal violence inflicted on the dead body.

We can begin by discussing the necropolitical elements of postmortem violence, which reside in postmortem violence's productive functions of ordering populations. There is a common misconception that anything related to the realm of the dead must be necropolitical. Necropolitical elements of postmortem violence are present not merely because violence operates in the realm of the dead; rather, they reside in targeting the dead body not only as an individual but as a member of an aggregate group. The enemy as an individual does not pose a physical threat anymore after they are killed; thus, postmortem violence defies the rational security logic of eliminating a physical and existential threat. The violated dead body is a racialized, gendered, sexualized, and dehumanized body. Through destruction, violence becomes productive. By viscerally destroying the body, postmortem violence (re)produces a (sub)population (whether in ethnic, racial, or gender/sex lines or at the intersection of them) as disposable and violable, simultaneously reproducing a hierarchical social order.

Furthermore, postmortem violence often uses the body as a site to convey a message. The specifics of the message, unsurprisingly, would depend on the context. For example, in some cases, the violence inflicted on the dead bodies and its public display has a strategic motive of deterring civilians from joining the insurgency. Koevoet, the counterinsurgency branch of the South West African Police, executed not only the guerillas but guerilla suspects, tied the dead bodies onto bumpers or spare tires of their vehicles, and displayed them openly

as they passed through the civilian villages in Namibia.[135] In other cases, like Turkey's counterinsurgency operations, female insurgents were displayed naked, and most of them had injuries on their breasts and hips, which I will further discuss in Chapter 4. The Kurdish community and feminist circles usually interpret this as punishing deviant women.[136] In this example, the motive is not solely a strategy of deterrence but of disciplining subjectivities.

This discussion brings the question of visibility to the forefront and highlights it as a technology of necropower; for the violence to act as a message, the dead body needs to be visible. The example of lynchings can help us explore the question of visibility in a different light. Lynching is such a distinctively American and sensitive phenomenon that it should not be extracted from its historical, cultural, and spatial context. However, it can still tell us about violence as a performance and its spectacle. Lynching is a highly ritualized and performative form of violence. They were often the actions of large mobs; hundreds, sometimes thousands of people, either as perpetrators or spectators, would attend.

The cultural power of lynching rests on its spectacle, (re)producing the racialized, hierarchical social structure. The presence of onlookers, the ritualized conduct of violence, and its staged display give lynchings a theatrical dimension.[137] There had also been signs of postmortem violence on the lynched bodies. Since often the perpetrators accused black men of sexually harassing white women, the white mob would dismember their genitalia and display them naked. In addition to racial hierarchy and white supremacy, this also sends a message to black men to "know their place", thus constructing a segregated gendered and sexual social order. Lynch mobs used new mechanics of spectacle to enact and perpetuate their violence;

[135] Rousseau Nicky, "Death and Dismemberment: The Body and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare in Apartheid South Africa1," in *Destruction and Human Remains* (Manchester University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719096020.003.0009.
[136] Bargu "Another Necropolitics".
[137] Wendy Harding, "Spectacle Lynching and Textual Responses," *Miranda*, no. 15 (September 18, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4000/miranda.10493.

new technologies, like photographs and films, have changed the conduct of lynching throughout time.[138] Testimonies of black Americans show that the spectacle of lynching brought more terror than lynchings.[139] Images of lynchings are also images of white power, black helplessness, and racial hierarchy, and they stand as icons of white supremacy.[140]

Although there is almost a consensus that the visualization of violence is a continuation of violence, not every scholar interprets postmortem violence and its visualization as necroviolence; there is also normative power in play.[141] A lot has been said about the visuals depicting the violence in the Abu Ghraib prison. However, we know very little, if anything at all, about the victims. What are their names? Why were they there? What do they look like when the black hoods are off? What are their stories? One might feel bad for them and criticize the US military and imperialism, yet these images (re)produce them as objects of the gaze. As Liz Philipose argues, violence and its visualization turn subjects into objects.[142] The violence in Abu Ghraib is not only racialized but also racializing. Brown bodies are visually represented as bodies marked with violence, bodies that are violable and expandable. *Brown bodies with no names and faces, only wounds and death for our spectacle.*

The example of the so-called Kill Team -the US army soldiers who killed civilians in Afghanistan, including a fifteen-year-old boy, posed with the dead bodies and took body parts as souvenirs- further illustrates the normative aspects of postmortem violence. As Thomas Gregory reminds us, such violence reduces the dead body into corporeal remains, "heaps of flesh and bone rather than individuals with names, faces, and stories to tell".[143] He suggests that postmortem violence is an excessive level of violence that exceeds the rational security

[138] Amy Louise Wood, *Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940* (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2011), p.10; Ashraf Rushdy, "Exquisite Corpse," *Transition,* no. 83 (2000): 70–77.
[139] Wood, *Lyching and Spectacle.*
[140] Wood, *Lynching and Spectacle*; Rushdy, "Exquisite Corpse"; Campbell, "Horrific Blindness".
[141] Gregory, "Dismembering the Dead"; Stepputat, *Governing the Dead*.
[142] Philipose, "The Politics of Pain and the Uses of Torture,"
[143] Ibid.

logic of eliminating a physical threat that can kill you. Such excessive violence has other functions than eliminating a threat; it serves normative power by removing body parts and dismembering the body to the point that it is not recognizable as an individual, or even as a human being. Why this violence occurs and what it does relate to the normative schemes of intelligibility, e.g. Afghani lives are not counted as lives because they are not seen as fellow human beings.

Not every postmortem violence has the same features, and neither are they all visible. However, they can still be a site of necro/normative power. Some violence targets specific body parts, such as genitalia, breasts, hips, and face, and displays the body in a way to send a particular, often sexualized and racialized, message to the living. In other cases, dead bodies are blown up by landmines, grenades, mortars, artilleries, and tank fires; when this is done in mass numbers, limbs and viscera of each individual are mixed in a big pile of flesh, not only unrecognizable as individuals but also as human beings. Sometimes, dead bodies are burned, leaving nothing but bones and ashes. The heap of flesh and bones is buried in mass graves without anyone seeing or knowing. *No names, no faces*…

Necropower is also present in these cases; victims are killed and violated as aggregate groups. However, this brutal form of violence is also marked by normative violence. It is complicit in a dehumanizing logic, shaping the normative schemes of intelligibility regarding who counts as human. This also illustrates to us the productive features of necro/normative power. Dead bodies are not a priori corporeal remains; they are produced as corporeal remains through destruction, transforming dead bodies into objects. In this regard, necro/normative power deterritorializes and reterritorializes the body. Through the deterritorialization of the body, the public space, and the social order that the bodies are part of, are reterritorialized. Thus, necro/normative power is productive of the order in which certain populations are violable and ungrievable.

Following Butler, I propose that a derealizing logic assists dehumanization. Postmortem violence is made possible because the target is not considered a human being that counts as one; a life that does not count as life; a dead that does not deserve dignity; a body without a name and a face, disposable and violable… Normative violence has been discussed in terms of absence: the absence of grief, not acknowledging the death (a mortuary, for example), and the invisibility of the names and faces. Therefore, it might seem counterintuitive to associate normative violence with postmortem violence that pursues visibility. However, postmortem violence that pursues visibility is after corporeal visibility. Koevoet, the US military soldiers in Afghanistan, and Turkish security forces have something in common; they have displayed the enemy's dead bodies as if they are trophies in a hunt, reducing the dead body into corporeal remains. Therefore, corporeal visibility simultaneously derealizes the subject. Some forms of postmortem violence do not seek visibility. Instead, they erase any trace of materiality and subjectivity. For example, burning the bodies, dissolving them in acid, and hiding them in unnamed mass graves erase even the traces of the former corporeal existence, as if the person then has never existed.

The exercise of necro/normative power is not limited to postmortem violence. First, discourses can be exercises of power. Discursive framing of the (enemy) Other as less than human, non-human (disease, vermin etc.), pervert, monstrous, or traitors brings a certain reality to life. This framing has tangible implications as it sets the conditions of possibility for postmortem violence. The discursive production of the Other as non-human marks them violable and ungrievable. Secondly, the necropolitical act of massacres and genocides are often coupled with burying the dead in mass or unnamed graves. As the examples from Latin America and Turkey illustrate, there are unnamed graves, or the grave is completely absent in the case of enforced disappearances. A certain population is not only eradicated but also abandoned by power. Like Butler's ungrievable lives, no names or faces appear in the

obituaries, and no grave indicates the person's discursive or corporeal presence. Therefore, funerals and graves become a technology of necro/normative assemblages through its absence.

To summarize, the necro/normative assemblage produces racialized and sexualized bodies that are violable, disposable, and marked with death and violence. It transforms subjects into objects: flesh and bones without faces, names, and stories, and thus, without subjectivities. It seeks to erase the individuality and humanity of subjects while simultaneously seeking to discipline, punish, intimidate, and dehumanize the Other as an aggregate population.

2.3.3 Necro/Sovereign Power

The previous section established postmortem violence as a product and productive of necro/normative power assemblages. However, following the performative understanding of sovereignty discussed earlier, it is possible to find elements of sovereignty in postmortem violence. One way to see the sovereign elements would be to understand sovereignty as the right to take life. Postmortem violence is this right extending beyond death - the right to inflict violence, the right to kill again. It is a form of violence that claims absolute ownership of the body since the sovereign can inflict violence, and it does not constitute a crime. The dead body dragged on the streets by an armed vehicle is a modern version of the display of impaled bodies on the battlefield or the city walls. They demonstrate the might of the sovereign and stand as an example for those who defy the sovereign. Sovereign power seeks to conquer.[144] In this context, it conquers the body even after its death. Foucault's allegory of the sword in the sovereign's hand lends itself to the soldier's boot stepping on the enemy's dead, symbolizing sovereign power.

Like the other power assemblages, necro/sovereign power has a complicated relationship with the body. The individual dead body becomes a site onto which sovereign

[144] M'bembe, "Necropolitics".

power is inscribed. However, the body is targeted as a part of an aggregate group - targeted as a racialized and sexualized body and producing racialized and sexualized bodies through the violence inflicted on them. Necropower categorizes and manages populations by eradicating them or exposing them to death. Necropolitical elements of postmortem violence in the necro/normative assemblages reside in necropower's function of disciplining and punishing the living population. When assembled with sovereignty, necropower performs another function; the agent that conducts necroviolence claims authority over the population and the space where violence takes place.

The sovereign elements of the necro/sovereign assemblage practiced through violence will be clearer by revisiting some examples we have already discussed. For example, in Ahmed Erakat's case, a Palestinian man who lost control of his car and subsequently was shot and left to bleed out, Israeli security forces deemed Erakat's action as a terrorist attack and thus refused to help the wounded man. As Butler illustrates by the example of the officials in Guantanamo Bay deeming the suspects to pose a danger to the state and deciding on indefinite detention, the power to "deem" someone dangerous and take action is "a sovereign power, a ghostly and forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the midst of governmentality".[145] After Erakat's death, Israeli authorities held his dead body for more than ten weeks despite the agreement between Israeli and Hamas authorities that the dead bodies shall be returned to their families for a proper burial. Furthermore, we should not forget that the incident occurred at a checkpoint. Therefore, this act constructs the security forces, wielding the power to deem, as petty sovereigns. It also reinforces and reproduces Israel's claims of sovereignty over the contested spaces and the subjects living in those spaces, while simultaneously performing a necropolitical function of population management by eradicating sub-populations.

[145] Butler, *Precarious Life*, 59.

We can observe a similar dynamic in the cases of extreme postmortem violence that dismembers and displays bodies, such as the Kill Team in Afghanistan. This violence is dehumanizing, yet it is also made possible by a preceding matrix of intelligibility, wherein the subject of violence is dehumanized. In these processes of dehumanization, race plays a vital role. However, we should not forget about the spatial context in which this violence took place. The US has no such sovereign claims over these spaces like Israel does, and yet, from the Abu Ghraib to Kill Team, such atrocities that target the body happen in this colonial context.

As M'bembe reminds us, "a peculiar terror formation" comes into life in the colony and under the apartheid regimes.[146] In the eyes of the colonizer, the colony is inhabited by savages; the relationship between them is not one between two equal sovereigns. The distinction between combatant and non-combatant, enemy and criminal, becomes unnecessary.[147] The US military creates *homines sacri* outside its borders by producing violable bodies, establishing its colonial and sovereign power. "The sovereign right to kill", according to M'bembe, "is not subject to any rule in the colonies. The sovereign can kill in any manner".[148] What follows is that postmortem violence in the colony brings an entangled relationship between necro and sovereign power into life. *Considering the colonization of Kurdistan is a contested issue, you may be questioning the value of a discussion on necropower and the colony for a tailored framework. I will not try to prove why Kurdistan has been a colony, this is the starting point for the discussion.* The importance instead of this discussion is to show how Kurdistan is (re)produced as a colony through necropolitics.

Like necro/normative assemblages, necro/sovereign assemblages are not limited to (postmortem) violence. In fact, the term "necro/sovereign assemblages" has been used before

[146] M'bembe, "Necropolitics", 22.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid., 25.

by Ege Islekel to analyze technologies of mourning. Islekel accentuates the state apparatuses' investment in mourning practices as a necro/sovereign act that couples with bio/sovereign assemblages.[149] A bio/sovereign assemblage refers to "the deployment of technologies of control over the population and life". Whereas, by necro/sovereign assemblages, she refers to "the technologies of bio-sovereign assemblages that target the dead and death through the intervention and regulation of practices of mourning".[150]

Islekel points out a very particular regulation of mourning practices: its absence. She does not talk about the absence of mourning along the lines of Butler's ungrievable lives; the issue here is not necessarily the capacity to be mourned. Instead, she highlights enforced disappearances and mass graves as technologies that erase life and death. There is no life to surveil or govern, no dead that signifies sovereign power (as the display of postmortem violence does), and no death that can be mourned. As the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo's slogan "*aparición con la vida"* [bring them back alive]" illustrates, the relatives cannot mourn or have closure, despite the significant likelihood of the disappeared's death.[151] According to Islekel, we observe an economy of power that distributes death and "the right to die" among populations.[152] Therefore, power over life and death is coupled with managing populations by regulating death and mourning. Sovereign power is merged with necropower.

By pointing out the *absent death* as a technology of necro/sovereign assemblages, Islekel pushes us towards a valuable direction to better understand the politics of the dead in a more complex way. Yet, absent death in the form of enforced disappearances and mass graves is only one form of necro/sovereign technologies. An exclusive focus on the absent death would

[149] Ege Selin Islekel, "Absent Death: Necropolitics and Technologies of Mourning," *PhiloSOPHIA* 7, no. 2 (2017): 337–55, https://doi.org/10.1353/phi.2017.0027.
[150] Ibid., 351.
[151] Avery F. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*, New University of Minnesota Press edition (Minneapolis London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
[152] Islekel, "Absent Death".

cause us to miss the other contemporary technologies of power. Furthermore, her understanding of sovereign power is heavily based on a Foucauldian tradition that defines it as power over life and death. What doors will open if we have a different conceptualization of sovereignty? What other techniques, technologies, and practices of necro/sovereign assemblages can we identify? More importantly, what empirical and analytical implications would that have?

Let us take Agamben and Butler's approach to sovereignty, for example. Combining Agamben's emphasis on the withdrawal of the law with Butler's performativity, which holds that "sovereignty is produced at the moment of the withdrawal", gives us more analytical room to inspect the contemporary configurations of sovereignty within the field of governmentality, thus providing a better framework to make sense of entanglements and assemblages.[153] Similarly, I consider "bare life" as a process and focus on performances that attempt to create bare lives as Agamben's original formulation faces the risk of undermining the subjects' resistance and unintentionally assuming an omnipotent authoritarian model of the state. In the realm of the dead, we can also talk about the *bare dead*. By bare dead, I refer to the same mechanism of legal withdrawal from the subject, rendering its (dead) body violable, and its political life, which had survived biological death, disposable.[154]

When we shift our understanding of sovereign power from exclusively the right to take life to the performative act of suspending the law, or producing bare life/dead through this suspension, we can identify new actors, practices, and discourses where necro/sovereign assemblages are in play. The transportation of dead bodies, for example, is a phenomenon that we encounter in Turkey's dead body management but is overlooked in the literature. In Turkey,

[153] Butler, *Precarious Life*, 61.
[154] Cihan Erdost Akin and Jacqueline Dufalla, "Sovereignty and Death: Post-Mortem Visual Representations in Turkey and Russia's Media," *Millennium* 49, no. 2 (January 1, 2021): 224–47, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298211031995.

the state invests in transporting dead bodies through various apparatuses. Transportation is regulated, securitized, and criminalized. Especially in Security Studies, we tend to neglect the period between the moment of death/killing and burial. A few studies mention how soldiers can risk their own lives to retrieve and transport the dead bodies of their fallen counterparts, rendering dead bodies as referent objects of security.[155] However, the transportation of dead bodies can be securitized -*a matter of security*- not only as referent objects but also as security threats.

We can find other examples than Turkey. Israel, for instance, had the long-standing policy of not returning Palestinian bodies to deter attackers from seeking glory since Palestinians would have honored their dead as martyrs during the funerals. When the bodies were returned, their transportation and the exchange were conducted with a heavy presence of security forces, allowing only a small number of friends and families to enter the morgue.[156] The sovereign elements in these examples reside in the withdrawal of the law. As citizens, Kurds and Palestinians are deprived of exercising their rights.

Citizens become subject to the logic of exclusion. They are treated as non-citizens and enemies. This brings the concept of the criminal law of the enemy into the scene. "The criminal law of the enemy", also known as "enemy criminal law", in original *feindstrafrecht*, is a concept coined by the German legal philosopher Günther Jakobs and refers to the idea that certain people who are enemies of the state or society can be exempt from the protection of the civil and penal law.[157] It is not a codified law but is a term to explain what happens empirically. Its importance for our discussion is that it stands as a sovereign exercise.

[155] Auchter, "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies".
[156] Emily Harris, "Israel's Return Of Palestinian Bodies Is Fraught With Emotion And Politics," *NPR*, January 5, 2016, sec. Conflict Zones, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/05/462037563/israels-return-of-palestinian-bodies-is-fraught-with-emotion-and-politics.
[157] Günther Jakobs, "Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsgutsverletzung" 97, no. 4 (January 1, 1985): 751–85, https://doi.org/10.1515/zstw.1985.97.4.751.

Nevertheless, Bargu's conceptualization of *necroviolence* covers some of the questions regarding certain in-between processes, such as rejecting to provide services like preparing dead bodies for religious ceremonies or transporting them. Sovereign elements complementing necroviolence become clearer when we consider the provincial administrative systems that we can observe in Turkey based on a welfare model. Municipalities are responsible for providing funeral services, including finding the burial site, assigning an imam to prepare the body and lead the ceremony, and transporting the body from the morgue or the house to the burial ground. Therefore, rejecting to provide this service means withdrawing the law from certain populations. It relates to the deceased's family and friends' right to a proper burial, punishing the family and depriving their rights as equal citizens. The sovereign means of withdrawing the law serves necropolitical functions.

Transportation of bodies can potentially bring the question of borders into the equation. The complex and unique territorial conditions and the apartheid regime in Israel make the border dynamics complicated. On the other hand, the US counterinsurgency operations abroad do not even have to deal with the borders regarding transporting dead bodies. The Turkey – PKK conflict poses some further unique challenges; the Turkish state fights against its citizens across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, meaning there is a specific border regime in play, yet no one asks for the dead's passport and visa. The enemy killed outside the Turkish borders is put into military vehicles and passes through the border. Usually, the family is informed, and they can take the body from the border, or the body is transported to the family's hometown. The sovereign exception appears when the border regime is abruptly and unlawfully interrupted, as we can see in the case of the YPG/YPJ fighters held at the Syrian border, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.

Another site where necro and sovereign power are assembled is forensics and autopsies, another oft-overlooked area. When morgues, forensics, and autopsies are put under analytical

scrutiny, they are treated as a clinical field - a biopolitical technology that produces knowledge and data from the dead to govern and foster life.[158] Forensics and autopsies can be technologies of counterinsurgency/terrorism. Forensics is used to identify the insurgent/terrorist to produce knowledge about who is on the battlefield, draw networks within the terrorist organizations, and identify who is responsible for acts like placing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that blow up roads, bridges, etc.[159] On the other hand, autopsies appear as a strategic performance that reveals a network of actors as agents of dead body management. From pathologists to prosecutors, various actors work together to produce a regime of truth. Autopsies can reveal or conceal extrajudicial killings and postmortem violence. In cases where the state accuses a certain person, party, or population of conducting the attack, autopsies can confirm or challenge these accusations. Sovereign means are employed to conceal the state's atrocities. Pathologists and local prosecutors wield the power to deem that the case might be a threat to the state, constructing these actors as petty sovereigns within the field of governmentality.

To better grasp the necropolitical functions of autopsies, let us pause to picture a scene of an insurgent/terrorist's autopsy.

> *A dead body is transferred from the morgue, a container, a simple refrigerator* (as we can see in the case of YPG/YPJ soldiers waiting at the Syria-Turkey border and the urban war in Cizre and Sur), *or directly from the scene of the battlefield to the operation room in the hospital. The cold and naked body is all hidden in a tightly sealed body bag, marked with a tag that usually shows only a number. All this concealment turns drastically once the forensic pathologists open the body bag. Now the prosecutor and the pathologists' gaze is on the body, doing the first inspection to locate the bullet holes. The visceral visibility becomes quite literal once the lancet touches the skin. The name,*

[158] Claudia Merli and Trudi Buck, "Forensic Identification and Identity Politics in 2004 Post-Tsunami Thailand: Negotiating Dissolving Boundaries," *Human Remains and Violence: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2015): 3–22, https://doi.org/10.7227/HRV.1.1.2; Joseph Pugliese, *Biopolitics of the More-Than-Human: Forensic Ecologies of Violence* (Duke University Press, 2020); Dave Holmes and Jean Daniel Jacob, *Power and the Psychiatric Apparatus: Repression, Transformation and Assistance* (Routledge, 2016).

[159] Jon Michael Connor, "Forensics Brings New Ways to Fight Counterinsurgency Warfare," *U.S Army* (blog), January 8, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/215780/forensics_brings_new_ways_to_fight_counterinsurgency_warfare; Brian A. Jackson, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': The British Experience in Northern Ireland," *Military Review*, Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment, LXXXVII, no. 1 (February 2007), https://marshallcenterciss.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16378coll5/id/439.

> *story, subjectivity of the person fade into the background as the body's materiality strengthens, as the body turns into an object of gaze and inspection.*

This is not necessarily a gaze and inspection to produce medical knowledge. Rather, the body is often inspected to produce a particular story, for example, that they were not tortured before death.

Such objectification and deindividualization of the body is not necessarily what makes this practice necropolitical; it is the production of a regime of truth - the story that serves the state. Identifying the subject through forensics and autopsy can also have necropolitical functions. When accompanied by discourses that mark a certain population as violent, barbaric, and violable, forensics and autopsies become a technology of necropower. Identification of the perpetrator as an Arab, Kurd, non-Muslim, or any other identity markers of the Other shapes public opinion regarding the attack and the violability of the Other's dead body. In some cases, "the truth" about the death is not bent; on the contrary, details are declared in a gruesome way. Autopsies again become a technology that sends a message to the living - *this is what happens if you rebel.*

Finally, by accepting Bargu's argument, wherein delaying, prohibiting, securitizing, or disrupting funerals are exercises of necroviolence, we can approach funerals through a necro/sovereign view. Targeting funerals punishes the living and structures specific populations in a hierarchical social order. It is a continuation of violence and its necropolitical elements are rather self-evident. Like disrupting the transportation of dead bodies and manipulating forensic autopsies, sovereign means serve necropolitical functions. Because the right to bury is a right of the family and the individual (insurgent/terrorist)'s, crime cannot be legally extended to the family. To therefore punish the family, the sovereign can affect the funeral practices, thus suspending the law.

Depending on the context, the discursive utterance of the exception can precede the withdrawal. For example, Israel codified the regulation of funerals to prevent them from turning into performances where martyrs are glorified. In other cases, petty sovereigns with the power of deeming appear. Catholic Bishop Edward Daly of Derry, for instance, deemed the IRA was violating religious codes and banned IRA funerals from religious services. In Turkey, local mayors and governors ban or heavily regulate funerals and deem them as a threat to public order.

Funerals are collective events where national symbols are reproduced and reinforced. In ethnic and religious insurgencies, the reproduction of the national, political, or religious causes plays a critical role for each party involved. Prohibiting the military-style gun salute in IRA funerals, slogans and flags in Palestinian ones, and flags and other political symbols in PKK funerals have something in common despite the major empirical differences. The state targets any signifier of the enemy's sovereignty. Understanding sovereignty as a zero-sum game, the state claims sovereign power by repressing the other party's sovereign claims. Funerals, however, are complex performances that cannot be grasped even by the necro/sovereign assemblage alone; normative elements are present too. The next section unpacks and examines funerals further by adding normative power into the equation.

2.3.4 Sovereign/Normative Power

Analyzing funerals requires us to find a balance between individuality and the collective. Funerals are social and collective events, yet it is a performance of memorialization for the individual. The individual, however, might have been killed as a member of a specific population. Keeping the attention on the individual subject as a member of an aggregate group will reveal another power interplay present in the politics of funerals: the sovereign/normative power assemblage. In *Precarious Life*, Butler extensively discusses deaths that are not

recognized by power and do not have the capacity to be mourned.[160] Islekel talks about enforced disappearances as absent death that produces an abject form of mourning.[161] Both are present in the cases I examine in this dissertation yet, they are not the only technology governing grief. Therefore, we need another tool in our toolbox to study the mechanisms that prohibit public grief, regulate the space, discourses, and performances that take place during funerals, and construct funerals as a matter of security. This conceptual tool should keep the balance between the individual and collective, and account for the *securityness* of funerals as sovereign/normative power.

Construction of funerals as a security threat is a common phenomenon in (counter)insurgencies/terrorism. Osama bin Laden's dead body was "buried" at sea over security concerns as the US officials "did not want his burial place to become a terrorist shrine".[162] Israeli authorities have raised their concerns about Palestinian funerals becoming a ground for Hamas to recruit new people.[163] The same concern regarding recruitment is shared by the British authorities regarding the IRA.[164] However, we should not reduce the securityness of the issue merely into the recruitment process. By doing so we might neglect the state's concerns about the performative elements of funerals and what they signify. Political symbols, rituals, and the visibility of a large crowd are interpreted as signs of support, strength, and vitality, and have become matters of security for the state.

[160] Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[161] Islekel, "Absent Death".
[162] "Osama Bin Laden: What Happened to His Body?," *BBC News*, May 2, 2011, sec. South Asia, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13261680.
[163] Anchal Vohra, "Why Israel Is Afraid of Palestinian Funerals," *Foreign Policy*, May 25, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/25/shireen-abu-akleh-funeral-israeli-palestinian-conflict-journalist-killing/.
[164] Leonard Downie Downie Jr, "Ulster Prepares for Sands' IRA Funeral," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/05/06/ulster-prepares-for-sands-ira-funeral/1bcfac65-8b2a-4ddd-a49f-72dd44104095/; Maggie Scull, "The Troublesome World of Paramilitary Funerals," *RTÉ News and Current Affairs*, July 8, 2020, sec. Brainstorm, https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/0708/1151996-northern-ireland-paramilitary-funerals-troubles-bobby-storey-provisional-ira/.

For example, since the IRA hunger striker, Bobby Sands', funeral attracted around 100,000 people and brought international attention to the republican cause in 1981, the British security forces' presence drastically increased at funerals.[165] Regardless of whether it is the unionist, republican, or the British troops' funeral, funerals have become a part of the war zone, with occasional armed clashes happening during funerals. Nevertheless, British officials have claimed that the gun salute during IRA funerals to justify increased policing.[166] In the context of insurgencies, bodies are often given to the families on the condition that the funeral will not turn into a political rally. It shows that security concerns transcend the so-called "hard security", such as an armed clash during the funeral or using funerals for recruitment, and the concerns include sovereign ones regarding the reproduction of the enemy's political and ethnic/national identities.

Sovereign/normative elements are not limited to the concerns about sovereignty, as understood in a zero-sum game; securitization of funerals enables or normalizes sovereign means, like prohibition, that then serve normative violence. As I will elaborate on in Chapters 5 and 6, even though funeral services are among the municipalities' responsibilities, the mayors were later charged with terrorist propaganda. Here, sovereignty shows itself in how the law is withdrawn. However, combined with the instrumentalization of the law, it functions within governmentality. This discussion is still connected to the funeral as a collective practice.

However, the sovereign means employed over security concerns have implications on the normative schemes of intelligibility at the level of the individual. In Turkey, memorial acts, like reciting poetry and carrying the deceased's pictures, have been criminalized and securitized. Even deputies who had immunities were legally charged for attending funerals and

[165] Maggie Scull, "The Troublesome World of Paramilitary Funerals," *RTÉ News and Current Affairs*, July 8, 2020, sec. Brainstorm, https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/0708/1151996-northern-ireland-paramilitary-funerals-troubles-bobby-storey-provisional-ira/.

[166] "Funerals Become Potent Weapon for IRA," *UPI*, April 12, 1987, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/04/12/Funerals-become-potent-weapon-for-IRA/5986545198400/.

engaging in performances of grief or memorialization. This meant their immunities were first lifted before being charged. Such sovereign means target the individual alongside the collectivity to which they belong. The media has published visuals depicting deputies corporeally expressing sadness, such as crying, hugging the mourning family etc., and these visuals have become part of the securitizing discourse. These acts punish the community by prohibiting grief ,but it also constructs the dead as ungrievable. Therefore, normative power is put into play through sovereign means of prohibition, criminalization, and legal punishment.

We should not understand normative power/violence as strictly and exclusively as Butler formulated it in *Precarious Life*, that is, as the lack of capacity to be mourned or not be acknowledged by power. In these examples, power acknowledges death and invests in it to govern it. However, normative power takes a step further; it seeks to eliminate the subject from public discourse. It seeks to erase the name, picture, and stories. Therefore, as normative power suggests, it still produces lives that are not counted as lives and deaths that are ungrievable.

Prohibition of public mourning and its defiance reminds us of the Greek story of Antigone. In the story, Polynices leaves Thebes to gather an army and attacks Thebes, fighting against his brother Eteocles. Both Eteocles and Polynices die in the battle, leaving Creon as the king. While Creon gives Eteocles an honorable burial, he orders that there shall be no burial and mourning for Polynices, and his corpse shall be left to rot on the battlefield as a punishment for Polynices' treason. Polynices' sister Antigone defies King Creon's order, and buries and mourns Polynices, for which she is later punished. There is a sovereign decree in this story, the grand declaration of the exception in a Schmittian sense. Butler's critique of Agamben is not necessarily applicable here as we know who the sovereign is, and he decides to suspend the norm of proper burial. Banning proper burials and public mourning still happens worldwide; however, the ban is not always preceded by a sovereign decree.

The funeral becomes a site of contestation where necro/sovereign mechanisms are put into play and are resisted. Sometimes, burial and public mourning occur only to be followed by criminalization, securitization, and penalization, producing a precedent law. The act of criminalization, where law is suspended, performatively produces sovereignty. Petty sovereigns, like the mayors, bishops, and security forces, become (post)modern Creon. In this new age of modern Creons, modern Antigones emerge; similarly, the new Antigone does not always utter her defiance or engage in a grand burial performance. Rather, they defy the criminalization of the publicness and the politicization of funerals by visualizing the political signifiers, and they defy the normative violence by visualizing and commemorating the names and faces of the new Polynices.[167]

2.5 Methodological Choices and Implications

I have so far laid out how I understand or operationalize certain concepts and theories, and how they differ from conventional understandings. The methodology is mostly informed by the concepts and theories I have assembled, and some of the conceptual choices have methodological implications. Since this dissertation argues that there are various forms of power, and numerous practices, discourses, and technologies constituting dead body management, it does not have a rigid and linear methodology. Yet, I will briefly discuss some of my choices and methodological implications of the concepts I employ.

We can think of dead body management as an ensemble of assemblages or a machine of machines. An assemblage is never fixed; assemblages get deterritorialized, and in their reterritorialization, the disassembled assemblage can be reassembled with different assemblages, forming a new one.[168] Therefore, we cannot talk about the essence of dead body management and its assemblages of power. Deleuze and Guattari ask us to focus on what an

[167] Akin and Dufalla, "Sovereignty and Death".
[168] Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*.

assemblage can do instead of its essence.[169] This is in line with the Foucauldian account of relational and productive power, as Foucault asks us to focus on its points of application.[170] The methodological implication would be studying definite actors, practices, techniques, and technologies.[171]

The performative and discursive approach to power has some methodological implications. Regarding necropolitics and normative violence, there are some implicit implications. If we follow the argument that a larger population is disciplined or deterred through the dead body, it assumes that the dead body becomes a signifier conveying a certain message. In a way, violence is understood as language. Violence does not talk for itself; rather it is a polyvalent signifier that is case sensitive and has multiple meanings and functions. Therefore, there is inevitably a process of interpretation. This leads us to a methodological crossroad. One option is that the analyst can offer their own interpretation. Henri Myrttinen's approach illustrates another option: In his study of male genital mutilation as a form of violence that conveys a message, Myrttinen seeks to overcome this methodological challenge by studying the narratives of the perpetrators where the meaning of violence is directly stated instead of assessing the meaning by himself as a researcher.[172]

Although Myrtinnen's conceptualization of violence as language guides this research, it is impossible to replicate his methodological choices since Turkish security forces do not explicitly state their motivations. Furthermore, if we want to explore the performative functions of violence, it is not enough to study the perpetrators' motivations and statements since the receiver can interpret the message differently. The best way to study how the target population

[169] Deleuze andGuattari, *What Is Philosophy?*
[170] Foucault; *The History of Sexuality*; M'bembe "Necropolitics".
[171] William Walters, *Governmentality: Critical Encounters*, 1. publ, Critical Issues in Global Politics, 3# (London: Routledge, 2012), 14.
[172] Henri Myrttinen, "Languages of Castration - Male Genital Mutillation in Conflict and Its Embedded Messages," in *Sexual Violence Against Men in Global Politics*, ed. Marysia Zalewski et al., n.d.

interprets violence would be an ethnographic study. I refrained from conducting an ethnographic study for two reasons. First, when I started this study, the conditions in Turkey were harsh. Parts of Kurdistan were not accessible as they were declared special security zones. A purge against academics started after they signed a peace petition, and politicians, activists, and academics related to the Kurdish political movement were being arrested. Second, postmortem and other forms of necroviolence were a fresh and ongoing phenomenon. As someone who had no training in psychology, I was concerned about triggering traumas. Yet, part of me was uncomfortable with doing an "armchair" analysis. Using the privilege of the European safety net, I went to Cologne and Berlin, the two capitals (in addition to Paris) of the Kurdish political movement in Europe during the hunger strikes and massive "free Öcalan" protests. I informed the community centers and the people about my research but avoided conducting formal interviews.

For the phenomenological interpretation of violence, I studied the parliamentary debates and questions posed by the pro-Kurdish political party HDP (People's Democratic Party), speeches of Kurdish representatives, statements, and press releases of civil society organizations, and media reports of interviews with local people. Without robust ethnographical work, the interpretations of violence will inevitably be incomplete. Yet considering the representative features of the HDP and civil society, it will still give us a fair idea. In Chapter 3, I studied the discursive framings of the PKK and insurgents, or in other words, how the insurgent is perceived and portrayed as racialized and sexualized subject. I surveyed the pro-government media, state agents' speeches, handbooks of the Ministry of the Interior, and parliamentary debates. I used thematic analysis and divided it into discursive themes based on their prevalence.[173] In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I also referred to the parliamentary

[173] Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (January 1, 2006): 77–101, https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa.

debates, state agents' speeches, handbooks and guidelines of ministries, the pro-government media, and state-backed civil society organizations' press releases to study how the regime understands, depicts, and justifies dead body management. In addition to practices, these discourses are vital to identify what form of power(s) is at play.

Another important methodological question to address at this point is how we can identify power when we see it and how we can study this. If power is exercised instead of possessed, then examining practices is one way to identify and analyze it. Let us take sovereign power, for example; if we follow Agamben and Butler and understand sovereignty as the performative withdrawal or suspension of law, we can first examine the codified law, then the action, and judge whether the act constitutes a suspension of the law. In addition to the phenomenological interpretation, bio/necropolitics can be studied at the points of their exercise. Conceptualization and methodology are interwoven at this point; the Foucauldian understanding of biopolitics based on recording, coding, and classifying biological data means that we can examine practices, such as forensics, as exercises of biopower or exposing the public to death as necropower. Finally, since I understand discourses as practices and practices as discourses, we can also study discourse to identify and analyze power. For instance, if biopower is about protecting, fostering, elevating, and managing the lives of population(s), discursively constructing the Self as an actor that provides security, welfare, and cares for the population indicates that there are traces of biopolitics.

When it comes to the actual discourse analysis, this dissertation is primarily guided by Norman Fairclough's take on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).[174] CDA is predominantly a linguistic analysis; thus, I paid attention to both the syntactic and semantic construction of texts.

[174] Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (London; New York: Longman, 1989); Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, New edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Norman Fairclough, *Media Discourse*, 1st Edition edition (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1995).

Why CDA is the best fit for the task at hand is Fairclough's emphasis on the social theory of the functioning of language in political and ideological processes, enabling the analyst to examine the relationship between language, discourse, power, and ideology.

Finally, identifying and analyzing the functions of certain signifiers play a key role in the analysis. For example, banners and flags at the funerals are signifiers of the "national-symbolic" with "resurrectory" functions.[175] From the images of the national-symbolic to texts, the concept of the master signifier will help us to make sense of the processes of securitization. A master signifier, in Lacanian terms, refers to signifiers without a signified; in other words, they are empty signifiers. What makes them significant -and different from empty signifiers- is that a master signifier pins down a meaning or multiple meanings to itself, or in other words, meaning is sewn to the signifier.[176] Turkishness -or any other nationality-, for instance, does not have a signifier on its own as there is no essence of Turkishness. Yet, by pinning down meanings (e.g. patriotism, steadfastness, hospitality etc.) it forms an illusionary symbolic order.

The concept of the master signifier was adopted by securitization scholars; Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver argue that master signifiers decrease the need for elaborate arguments about why the issue needs to be securitized.[177] "Certain words or concepts automatically bring the logic of danger, vulnerability and fear with them, whereby the necessity to combat them does not have to be elaborately argued every time".[178] "Terrorism" is one of those 'certain words or concepts'. When terrorism is uttered, there usually is no need to convince the audience about

[175] Hişyar Özsoy, "Between Gift and Taboo: Death and the Negotiation of National Identity and Sovereignty in the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey" (Austin, The University of Texas at Austin, 2010), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-854/OZSOY-DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=2.

[176] Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Psychoses*, trans. Jacques-Alain Miller and Russell Grigg, Reprint edition (New York London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink, 1st edition (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007).

[177] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 253–76.

[178] Juha A. Vuori, "A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 3 (June 1, 2010): 255–77, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610370225, 259.

the "securityness" of the issue since terrorism, as a master signifier, "automatically brings the logic of danger, vulnerability and fear".[179] What meanings are attached to the master signifier are contingent upon the context, which is a task I take on in the analysis chapters.

With this chapter, now we have the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological tools in our toolbox tailored to analyze the empirical phenomenon and address the theoretical questions guiding this research. However, before starting the empirical analysis, one more step is required. The next chapter will provide an empirical overview of the PKK and the Kurdish Question, and offer a discursive analysis of the perception and portrayal of PKK insurgents and their funerals. The discussion on the discursive construction of the enemy Other and the funerals as ontological security threats are vital to make sense of the empirical cases in the subsequent chapter

[179] Ibid.

Chapter 3: The PKK, The Kurdish Question, and Discursive Construction of the Enemy Other

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the empirical context vital for making sense of the empirical analyses in the following chapters. The chapter does this in two ways. First, it aims to guide readers who are unfamiliar with Turkish politics to follow the in-depth discussions about how dead body management functions in Turkey's counterinsurgency, which is achieved by providing a brief overview of the Kurdish Question and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). Second, it discusses how PKK fighters are perceived and portrayed and what an insurgent's funeral looks like. Insurgents are depicted as perverted monsters, threatening not only the physical unity of the state and people's lives but also normative gender roles and identities. Similarly, funerals pose ontological insecurities because of their resurrectory functions. These discussions will help us understand postmortem violence's sexual characteristics, as well as the discursive justifications for postmortem violence and the securitization of funerals.

3.1 "The Kurdish Question" and an Overview of the PKK

The Kurdish Question is often used to refer to the fact that Kurdish people do not have a state.[180] Estimates suggest that there are between 36.4 to 45.6 million Kurdish people in the world, making them the largest ethnic population without a state.[181] The largest populations are in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, making the Kurdish Question an international issue. Historically, its roots can be traced to the late Ottoman period, when the Kurdish population in the empire started to be displaced and subject to policies of Turkification. With the fall of the

[180] Ruwayda Mustafah Rabar, "What Is the Kurdish Question?," *OpenDemocracy*, September 23, 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/what-is-kurdish-question/.
[181] "The Kurdish population," Foundation Institut Kurde de Paris, January 12, 2017, https://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/the-kurdish-population-1232551004.

empire and the Turkish War of Independence, a series of Kurdish uprisings in the newly founded Republic of Turkey started. Dead body management was also present in these uprisings. For example, Sheikh Said, the leader of the first modern Kurdish rebellion, was hung by the republic's secular and military elite, and his grave is still unknown to this day. In the 1938 Dersim rebellion, security forces posed with decapitated heads.[182]

The Kurdish Question is a historical and international phenomenon, yet I refer to how it is perceived in Turkey when I use the term. In Turkish, it is often called "the Kurdish Issue" (*Kürt Sorunu*), and it refers to primarily a Turkish phenomenon that is a compilation of the systematic oppression of the Kurdish population in Turkey, human rights violations, the suppression of cultural and linguistic rights, the impoverishment in Kurdistan, and the armed rebellion.[183] It is not my intention to discuss the entire history of the Kurdish Question owing to limitations on space here. However, since this dissertation is predominantly concerned with the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, and the PKK is at the core of the Kurdish Issue, you – the reader - may benefit from a brief empirical overview of the PKK's insurgency, if you have not come across the case previously.

The PKK was founded in 1978 amidst the political turmoil in Turkey, where violence among the armed radical leftist groups, ultra-nationalist paramilitary groups, and the counter-guerrillas backed by NATO swept the country. The driving force behind the founders of the PKK was their extensive focus on the colonization of Kurdistan by Turkey, a position that was

[182] "Dersim gerçeği [The Truth of Dersim]," *Radikal*, November 19, 2011, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/dersim_gercegi-1070007/

[183] Kurdistan is used in multiple meanings. It does not exist as a state. An autonomous region in Iraq is called Iraqi Kurdistan. Historical or imagined Greater Kurdistan is believed to stretch from middle Anatolia, eastern and southeastern Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), northern Syria (Western Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), and western and northwestern Iran (Eastern Kurdistan). I will keep using Kurdistan to refer to the region in Turkey. Although it is not an official region, historical, demographic and linguistic elements allow us to talk of a Kurdistan.

not unanimously accepted by the Turkish left. Eventually this led the Kurdish revolutionaries to split from the Turkish left, founding their own fractions.[184]

Founded as a Marxist-Leninist organization, the PKK's initial declared goal was to establish an independent and socialist Kurdistan. The PKK started its first armed resistance in 1979, primarily targeting the Kurdish feudal lords and tribal leaders accused of collaborating with the state and exploiting the peasants. The 1980 military coup was a huge catalyst. Many socialists were imprisoned, tortured, and executed. The intersection of Kurdish and socialist identities placed the Kurdish socialists in a more precarious position. Following the coup, the Kurdish language and expressions of Kurdish culture, such as clothing, flags, and even names, were prohibited. The official state position denied the existence of Kurdish identity, calling them "mountain Turks".[185] As the state's iron hand grasped firmer, the PKK gained more support, eventually launching an insurgency against the state in 1984, which has been ongoing with sporadic ceasefires and peace attempts.

The 1990s were a turning point in the insurgency. Tansu Çiller's government launched a new counterinsurgency campaign in 1992 where the local population was punished for supporting the insurgency; the Turkish military started burning down or shelling villages, deforesting the area, and the paramilitary groups initiated the now infamous forced disappearances and executions. On the other hand, the PKK began using suicide bombers and targeting civilians. This atmosphere of violence was ameliorated in 1999 when the PKK's chairman, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured and imprisoned, followed by a unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK, who withdrew their forces from Turkish Kurdistan and settled in the Qandil Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan. The 90s are remembered as a dark time because of the

[184] Joost Jongerden, "Gender Equality and Radical Democracy: Contractions and Conflicts in Relation to the 'New Paradigm' within the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)," *Anatoli. De l'Adriatique à La Caspienne. Territoires, Politique, Sociétés*, no. 8 (October 1, 2017): 233–56, https://doi.org/10.4000/anatoli.618.

[185] Yusuf Karadaş, "Dağ Türkleri [Mountain Turks]," *Evrensel*, February 20, 2017, https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/78521/dag-turkleri.

civilian casualties that the PKK caused on the one hand, and the village burnings, forced disappearances, mutilation of dead bodies, and torture and executions in prisons by the state on the other hand.

2004 was another milestone for the conflict. Under their imprisoned leader Öcalan, the PKK went through a paradigm shift. Disillusioned with orthodox Marxism and the concept of the nation-state and heavily influenced by the American thinker Murray Bookchin, Öcalan declared a new paradigm, which he called "Democratic Confederalism".[186] Öcalan believes that all kinds of oppression started with the subjugation of women.[187] He believes the break with neolithic primitive socialism coincided with the accumulation of surplus products by the institutionalized male, relegating domestic labor to the private sphere, making class hierarchies possible.[188] Just as feudalism is a form of the institutionalized male, the nation-state state is a modern manifestation of it. Needing the bourgeoisie to replace the feudal order, the nation-state weaved itself together with capitalism. Therefore, according to Öcalan, "exploitation is not only sanctioned by the state but even encouraged and facilitated".[189] He concludes that an independent Kurdish state would only reproduce these power hierarchies; thus, the Kurdish movement needs a new model that breaks away from the nation-state, capitalism, patriarchy, and domination over nature in what he calls "a total divorce".[190]

Following the principles of democratic confederalism, the Kurdish movement restructured itself. The PKK denounced certain tactics, like suicide bombing, and established ideological education camps, where they teach the principles of democratic confederalism, separate female brigades, and hundreds of horizontally organized committees. Similarly, the

[186] Abdullah Öcalan, *Democratic Confederalism* (Cologne: International Initiative Ed., 2013).
[187] Öcalan, *Democratic Confederalism*; Abdullah Öcalan, *Liberating Life: Women's Revolution* (Cologne: International Initiative Ed., 2013)
[188] Öcalan, *Democratic Confederalism*
[189] Ibid.,12.
[190] Öcalan, *Liberating Life*.

civilian political movement restructured its organization by building ecological and women committees, mobilizing bottom-up through thousands of fractions, and introducing a co-chair model wherein there is both a male and female chair from the smallest neighborhood committees to the head of the legitimate political parties. In 2004, when the paradigm shift took place, the PKK also declared an end to the ceasefire, and the so-called second insurgency lasted until 2012.

What ended the second insurgency was the "Solution Process", the peace negotiations that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government initiated. There are many theories and speculations explaining why the peace process failed in 2015; that is not the concern of this dissertation, except for the parts that relate to dead body management, which I will discuss throughout the empirical analyses.[191] Regardless of the reason for failure, the end of the Solution Process opened a new era where Turkey witnessed an unprecedented level of violence with new characteristics. Despite the public memory of the 90s, dead bodies have been systematically targeted and have become a subject of public scrutiny more in the post-2015 period. This dissertation addresses the cases that have been occurring after 2015, which can be called the third insurgency.

3.2 Discursive Framings of the PKK

Part of the reason I focused more on the PKK than the Kurdish Question in a broader sense is that the Kurdish Question, or the Kurdish Issue, is a term that is not widely accepted. From the coalition governments of the 1990s, to Erdoğan's regime, and to the opposition parties, it is a common position that *there is no Kurdish issue, there is only an issue of*

[191] For some of the explanations why the peace process failed see, Harun Ercan, "Is Hope More Precious than Victory?: The Failed Peace Process and Urban Warfare in the Kurdish Region of Turkey," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 118, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 111–27, https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-7281636; Burak Bilgehan Özpek, *The Peace Process between Turkey and the Kurds: Anatomy of a Failure* (London: Routledge, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315122182; Bahar Başer and Alpaslan Özerdem, "Conflict Transformation and Asymmetric Conflicts: A Critique of the Failed Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 33, no. 8 (November 17, 2021): 1775–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1657844.

terrorism. Even words like insurgency, rebellion, and uprising are frowned upon. The reader should note this point because one of the functions of dead body management is (re)producing this discourse, or undermining the ethnic elements of the insurgency and reducing it to simply an issue of terrorism. However, you should not feel responsible for remembering, though, for this is an argument I will repeat as I reveal how exactly this connects to dead bodies. The official state discourse and the majority of the public perceive the Kurdish Issue as a non-issue or merely a problem of terrorism provoked by the PKK. Now, the question is: how does the regime perceive and portray the PKK and their insurgents? The answer to this question is essential to make sense of dead body management, the exact shapes that necroviolence takes, and the reactions -or their lack of- to the politics of death.

Studying the discursive constructions is vital because, following a new materialist approach, I understand bodies as materially and discursively produced, while simultaneously producing material and discursive regimes.[192] Studies on normative violence demonstrate that while postmortem violence or lack of public grief produces subjects as non-subjects and humans as non-humans, discourses of dehumanization often precedes postmortem violence or lack of public grief.[193] In this regard, I consider the discursive construction of the PKK and its insurgents as *conditions of possibilities* for dead body management, particularly postmortem violence.

Although in the dissertation's structure, this chapter comes before the analysis of the cases of dead body management, I bounced back and forth between the analysis of postmortem violence and the discursive construction of the enemy Other, following abductive reasoning. I arrived at this point due to my attempt to make sense of postmortem violence and its justifications. Undoubtedly, material and psychological conditions, such as the conflict taking

[192] Grosz, *Volatile Bodies;* Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence*.
[193] Butler, *Precarious Life*; Gregory, "Dismembering the Dead".

place in special security zones, the embodied psychology of warfare, and enmity, play a role in postmortem violence. However, they are not sufficient to explain postmortem violence since the Turkish state has fought against other insurgent or terrorist groups in special security zones, yet postmortem violence seems unique to the counterterrorism operations against the PKK. The cases studied here are not merely products of some rogue soldiers; it is a systemic phenomenon involving a myriad of actors.

A discursive approach sheds light on the conditions that enabled postmortem violence, guides us to understand the discursive and performative actions of the state apparatuses, and helps us make sense of the mass public's silence against state violence. The main data corpus consists of state institutions' textual discourse in handbooks and official statements, speeches of state agents, parliamentary debates, and pro-government and right-wing newspapers. I have employed thematic analysis to identify themes/frames, and Norman Fairclough and Vin Dijk's account of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to make sense of the frames.[194] The data sample shows the presence of multiple discourses that construct distinct figurations of the enemy Other. These multiple discourses have the function of demonization and dehumanization in common. Postmortem violence occurs within the conditions of possibility yielded by a discourse that dehumanizes the enemy Other.

The enemy is simultaneously imagined as a monstrous murderer/baby killer, a hyper-sexual queer pervert, and an animal or non-human. The "baby killer" frame draws an enemy figure who is monstrous and incapable of acting morally, thus not deserving moral treatment. On the other hand, the queer pervert frame constructs the enemy as not only a physical threat to the soldiers' lives and the integrity of the state but also an ontological threat to the heteronormative gender roles that Erdoğan's regime envisions. This sexualized representation

[194] Braun and Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,"; Fairclough, *Language and Power*; Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Fairclough, *Media Discourse*.

of the enemy also shapes the sexual characteristics of violence. Last but not least, the enemy is as associated with animals and diseases; what then follows is the metaphor for the enemy's dead as a carcass. In this framing, dehumanization becomes more literal and evident. I do not claim any causal link between these discourses and postmortem violence; rather, they play a constitutive role in enabling and justifying. Like the violence itself, dehumanizing discourses contribute to turning subjects into objects, and thus, they are also a part of dead body management.

3.2.1 The Separatist Terrorist Organization and The Monstrous Baby Killers

The framing of the PKK as a "separatist organization" and PKK insurgents as "baby killers" is so prevalent that "PKK" is often dropped from the sentence, leaving "separatist terrorist organization" as a metaphor. 'Separatist terrorist organization' has been used to define the PKK since the late 1980s, when the insurgency declared that an independent socialist Kurdistan was its goal. The paradigm shift in 2004 and Öcalan's statements of giving up on secessionism are largely ignored, and the social imagery of the PKK as a separatist movement has stayed strong. This is evident in the official discourse of state institutions, such as the ministries, the mayor's offices, and the Turkish Armed Forces.[195]

Such portrayal of the PKK has two primary functions. First, it counters the narratives that depict the PKK as a guerilla or insurgent group fighting for the oppressed Kurdish population's social recognition, rights, and liberties. Second, and related to the previous point, this discourse has securitizing functions. It undermines the social, economic, and political aspects of the Kurdish Question and reduces it to an issue of terror that needs to be addressed

[195] "Hizan Ilçesinde Bölücü Terör Örgütü (BTÖ) Mensuplarına Operasyon Icra Edildi. [An Operation Was Conducted against the Separatist Terrorist Organization in Hizan]," T.C Bitlis Valiligi, accessed March 8, 2020, http://bitlis.gov.tr/hizan-ilcesinde-bolucu-teror-orgutu-bto-mensuplarina-operasyon-icra-edildi; "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı," accessed February 27, 2020, https://www.tsk.tr/Home/YurticiOlaylar; "Terör Çalıştayı Raporu [Report of Workshop on Terror]" (Ankara: Uluslararası Terörizm ve Güvenlik Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2016), https://www.pa.edu.tr/Upload/editor/files/Teror_Calistayi_Raporu.pdf.

by military means. It also closes the potential for a democratic and diplomatic solution to the problem. Whereas the civil society organizations and opposition groups could potentially support an emancipatory movement, there is no such room if the movement is a 'separatist terrorist organization'. This has consequences for body politics as well. Triggering the security logic of elimination, this securitizing discourse affects military practices, such as executing fighters instead of capturing them wounded.

Alongside the 'separatist terrorist organization' framing of the PKK, the fighters are framed as 'baby killers'. 'Baby killer' is so commonly used that even a google search of the term in Turkish (*bebek katili*) brings the Wikipedia page of Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK and its leader Öcalan started to be called baby killers after a massacre in 1993 where 33 civilians, 13 of whom were children and babies, were killed. After the paradigm shift in 2004, the PKK denounced the propaganda of the deed and declared the Turkish armed forces as the only legitimate target. However, more attacks occurred where babies and children were killed. In 2018, an army officer's wife was killed along with her 11-month-old baby in a roadside bomb ambush. The Minister of the Interior Süleyman Soylu responded to the attack by stating that "The PKK were baby killers 40 years ago; they are still baby killers today".[196] The 'baby killer' label was employed to discredit the YPG (People's Protection Units) too. In 2019, Kurdish forces in Syria, organized under the YPG, responded to the Turkish military incursion by randomly shelling across the Turkish border, killing many civilians, including children. The Ministry of National Defense's response to the YPG's attacks was, "The PKK baby killer is the same as the YPG baby killer.".[197]

[196] "İçişleri Bakanı Soylu: PKK 40 yıl önce de bebek katiliydi, bugün de bebek katili [Minister Soylu: PKK were baby killers 40 years ago, baby killers today]," *BBC News Türkçe*, August 1, 2018, sec. Türkiye, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-45027161.

[197] "9 aylık Muhammed bebek YPG/PKK'nın kurbanı oldu [9 months old Muhammed became a victim of YPG/PKK]," *TRT Haber*, October 10, 2019, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/9-aylik-muhammed-bebek-ypgpkknin-kurbani-oldu-435129.html.

The baby killer frame is catchy and widely used, and it constructs an image of the enemy who is immorally perverse to the degree that they do not have respect for even children's lives. This discourse marks the enemy with death; they do not hesitate to kill themselves (e.g., suicide bombings and hunger strikes) or others. Against this monstrous, thanatopolitical Other, a specific image of the Self is constructed: a Self that is not barbaric like the enemy, a Self that values life. The Self is guided by biopolitical care and necropolitical necessity. Thus, the monstrous terrorist needs to die so that the babies can live.

Like the 'separatist terrorist organization', the 'baby killer' frame closes spaces for debates and a peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question. Numerous politicians and media outlets have dismissed Öcalan's call for a ceasefire and a new peace process after the attempts failed in 2015 by calling him a baby killer who is not credible to talk about peace.[198] Newspapers and civil society organizations strengthened this discourse by portraying Kurdish politicians as terrorists and traitors, as they argued that anyone who does not denounce baby killers are monsters themselves.[199] 'The baby killer' also closes potentialities for sympathy and affective politics, serving normative power by producing *ungrievable lives*.

When the atrocities of the Turkish state against Kurdish fighters, such as forced disappearances, mutilation of dead bodies, or mass graves, are brought up, those who voice these atrocities, as well as people joining protests or attending funeral ceremonies, are demonized for grieving for baby killers.[200] It does not matter if the atrocity is brutal, like the mutilation and display of dead bodies; the baby killer deserves no sympathy. The monster is

[198] "Bebek katili Abdullah Öcalan'dan HDP'ye yeni çağrı [Baby killer Öcalan's new call to the HDP]," *Yeni Akit*, August 16, 2019, https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber_/bebek-katili-abdullah-ocalandan-hdpye-yeni-cagri-888994.html; "Seçim uğruna Öcalan açılımı! [An Öcalan process for the elections]," *Yeni Çağ Gazetesi*, June 22, 2019, https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/secim-ugruna-ocalan-acilimi-239106h.htm.

[199] "Apo Bebek Katili Bir Teröristtir, Ona Güzelleme Yapan da Teröristtir [Apo Is a Baby Killer Terrorist, so Is Anyone Supporting Him]," *Republic of Turkey Association of Veterans and Martyr Families*, 2014, https://www.gaziler.org.tr/?/0/haber_detay/1941.

[200] "Bildiriyi İmzalayan Akademisyenlere Tepki [Reactions to the Academics who Signed the Petition]," *Milliyet*, January 18, 2016, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/bursa/bildiriyi-imzalayan-akademisyenlere-tepki-11168645.

not human, so their lives are not counted as lives and their death are not grieved. The monster, after all, deserves no humane treatment. The insurgent's body is vulnerable and violable even after death; the (imagined) lack of moral integrity enables the violation of bodily integrity.

3.2.2 The Queer Pervert

The enemy does not know of morality and has no respect for cultural values, not only because they defy the state's unity and are monstrous baby killers but also because they defy gendered and sexual norms. The PKK insurgents are often portrayed as highly sexualized subjects, and their sexualities are imagined to be pathologically failed, pervert, and repulsive. Therefore, the Other is a racialized and sexualized subject, and they threaten the ethnic unity of the state and the heterosexist patriarchal order the regime envisions. The sexualized image of the enemy Other is constructed through a few discursive means, and what is highlighted tells us about the regime's gendered and sexualized insecurities. First, the mere fact that insurgents engage in sexual intercourse is presented as scandalous and used as a means of devalorization. As a Marxist-Leninist, armed revolutionary group, the PKK advocates celibacy and total commitment to the revolution. Highlighting the presence of sexual intercourse portrays an image of an insurgent who is not in the organization for their ideals. It tells a story to the sympathizers: *the PKK is not what you think*.

The image of a sexual insurgent is backed by highlighting promiscuity and group sex, thus drawing a hyper-sexual insurgent figure.[201] Contraceptive pills found in a raid by the Special Forces were presented as evidence of the PKK's "perverted and disgusting face".[202] By

[201] Neşet Dişkaya, "İtirafçı PKK'lıdan Kandil hikayeleri [Kandil stories from a confessor]," *HaberTürk*, October 11, 2012, https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/784253-itirafci-pkklidan-kandil-hikayeleri; "Teröristten yoz ilişki itirafı [A terrorist's confessions of a perverted relationship]," *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, November 27, 2012, https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-teroristten-yoz-iliski-itirafi-252262/; "Seks karşılığı PKK'ya baskın istihbaratı [Intel for PKK in exchange of sex]," *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, November 18, 2009, https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-seks-karsiligi-pkkya-baskin-istihbarati-97013/.

[202] "İşte PKK'nın sapık ve iğrenç yüzü! [Here is PKK's perverted and disgusting face]," *Takvim*, November 16, 2012, https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2012/11/16/iste-pkknin-sapik-ve-igrenc-yuzu;

condemning such sexual behaviors and labeling them "immoral", the former Minister of Interior criticized the PKK for "having no respect for family life and human dignity".[203] Therefore, highlighting non-reproductive, premarital, and non-monogamous sex in the narrative produces hyper-sexual subjects and marks such sexual acts as illegitimate and perverted since they are deviant from the cultural norm of family values.

Second, the PKK insurgents' sexualities are perceived as pathologically failed and perverted. There is a heavy emphasis on sexual exploitation of children and rape within this discourse. A report by the Ministry of Interior claims that child rape is a common practice in the PKK camps, and the pro-government media outlets often refer to the medical expression of "pedophilia" and label the PKK as a perverted and repulsive organization.[204] The texts that explicitly label the PKK as "perverted" or refer to "perverted relationships" also include homosexual relationships as an act of perversion.

The link between homosexuality and perversion is often very explicit. The following newspaper headlines and editorial statements capture the prevailing sentiment: "perverted homosexual relations started in the PKK",[205] "perverted relationships in the PKK: gay and lesbian brigades are formed",[206] and "coalition of perversion: LGBT and the PKK".[207] A handbook of the General Directorate of Security Special Operations Department also warns

[203] "PKK sapık ve iğrenç bir ideoloji üzerine kurulu" [PKK is based on a perverted and disgusting ideology]," *NTV*, December 24, 2011, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/pkk-sapik-ve-igrenc-bir-ideoloji-uzerine-kurulu,X-zZ28DDaEqWgpygZBpI3g.

[204] Sırrıberk Arslan, "Esra'yı 14'ünde kaçırdılar 18'inde infaz ettiler [They kidnapped 14 year old Esra, executed her when she was 18]," *Sabah*, September 27, 2019, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2019/09/27/esrayi-14unde-kacirdilar-18inde-infaz-ettiler; "PKK'daki çocuk ve kadın istismarını anlattı [He told about sexual exploitation of women and children in PKK]," *CNN Türk*, December 11, 2018, https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/pkkdaki-cocuk-ve-kadin-istismarini-anlatti.

[205] "Eşcinsel sapık ilişkiler başladı! PKK'dan kaçan kadın teröristin itirafı [Gay perverted relationships started! Confessions of a woman who escaped PKK]," *Demiroren Haber Ajansı*, March 18, 2019, https://www.internethaber.com/escinsel-sapik-iliskiler-basladi-pkkdan-kacan-kadin-teroristin-itirafi-2008092h.htm.

[206] "PKK'da sapık ilişki [Perverted relationships in PKK]," *Hürriyet*, January 29, 1998, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pkkda-sapik-iliski-39004310.

[207] "Küresel şeytanların Sapıklık Koalisyonu: LGBTİ [Coalition of Perversion among Global Devils: LGBTI]," *Yeni Söz*, June 17, 2016, http://www.yenisoz.com.tr/kuresel-seytanlarin-sapiklik-koalisyonu-lgbti-haber-13870.

about "degenerate" sexual behaviors in the PKK like homosexuality.[208] There is also a tendency to single out and highlight "lesbian relationships.[209]

Sexuality, violence, and death have a closer relationship than one might think. George Bataille claims "sexuality is inextricably linked to violence and to the dissolution of the boundaries of the body and self by way of orgiastic and excremental impulses".[210] Particularly, the homosexual is associated with death. Butler argues that "the male homosexual is figured time and time again as one whose desire is somehow structured by death, either as the desire to die, or as one whose desire is inherently punishable by death".[211] Because of its association with AIDS, homosexual sex is perceived as a self-destructive act for heterosexuals. As Puar argues, "this kind of sex not only kills oneself, but also, through the demolition of the self, kills others".[212] Building on Butler, Puar holds that like the homosexual, the suicide bomber is always already dying and is consumed by "perverted" desires to kill themself and others.[213] In Puar's equation, we do not necessarily engage in queering the terrorist, for "queerness is always already installed in the project of naming the terrorist", both associated with perverseness and death.[214]

Following Bataille and Puar's argumentation, queer sexualities threaten the boundaries and the symbolic order of things. Thus, the sexualized population is abjectified, and the "queerly abjected populations are marked for death".[215] However, sexuality cannot be isolated

[208] Hasan Kırmızıtaş, "Terör örgütlerinin bilinmeyen yüzü [The unknown faces of terrorist organizations]," *Milliyet*, 97.24 2008, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/teror-orgutlerinin-bilinmeyen-yuzu-970666.
[209] "Terroristten yoz iliski itirafi"; "Çarpık İlişkiler Örgütü Pkk [PKK: An Organization of Perverted Relationships]," *Milliyet*, December 12, 2018, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/carpik-iliskiler-orgutu-pkk-ankara-yerelhaber-3210965/.
[210] M'bembe, "Necropolitics", 15-16; Georges Bataille, *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*, trans. A. Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 94–95;
[211] Judith Butler, "Sexual Inversions," in *Discourses of Sexuality: From Aristotle to AIDS*, ed. Domna Stanton (University of Michigan Press, 1992), 83.
[212] Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 72.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Ibid., xxiv.
[215] Jinthana Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco, eds., *Queer Necropolitics*, Social Justice (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, a GlassHouse Book, 2014), 2.

from sex and gender. Singling out lesbian relationships in the discourses, for example, reinforces Sjoberg and Gentry's argument that women's sexualities –and the violence women conducts- need to be specifically accounted for.[216] If the female insurgent is loyal to the celibacy vow, she defies the cultural norms of motherhood, whereas if she breaks the vow, she defies the norms of celibacy and purity. As a violent actor, the female fighter already defies the desired passive femininity. As a "sexually perverted" actor, she defies the sexual norms.

The female Kurdish insurgent is an ethnic Other, the sexual Other, and the sexualized Other. She is the ultimate threat to the regime, threatening the unity of the state, people's and even babies' lives, family values, the heterosexual, patriarchal order, and the discursive, symbolic order where the body and mind and the Self and Other are distinguishable. The physical threat can be eliminated by killing the insurgent; yet, the ontological insecurities her subjectivities pose persist, eventually becoming constitutive of the violence that targets the dead body.

3.2.3 The Carcass

The baby killer and pervert discourses have dehumanizing functions as they create a monstrous image. Another prevalent discursive frame takes corporeality and dead bodies at the center; Kurdish insurgents - the terrorists - are portrayed as vermin and animals and their dead bodies as carcasses. Dehumanizing functions are present when the term is understood as a devalorizing force; however, this discourse also produces subjects as non-human. This is, in fact, a common practice in the context of war and terrorism. Existing studies have shown that

[216] Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics*, First edition (London: Zed Books, 2007).

most of the dehumanizing metaphors that dominate the public discourse on the "Global War on Terror" systemically figure the enemy as an animal, vermin, or metastatic disease.[217]

Dehumanizing metaphors have politically severe and tangible implications. While conceptualizing genocide as a process rather than a product, Gregory Stanton identifies the first three stages leading to genocide: classification, symbolization, and dehumanization.[218] Metaphors of animals, prey, and diseases are special signifiers in the way that they manage to capture, in a single rhetorical gesture, all three of these steps. This single rhetorical gesture identifies/classifies, marks, symbolizes, and extremely devalorizes the Other. Although animal metaphors are not as common in the representation of Kurdish insurgents in Turkey as the baby killer or the pervert frames, they are noteworthy.

The most common animal metaphor is "dogs". It is important to note that there are two words for a dog in Turkish: while "*köpek*" is a literal translation of the dog -the animal-, "*it*" refers to "mutt" and is used as a curse word, which has the connotation of "bastard". Although both words are commonly used as dehumanizing metaphors in daily life, *köpek* is also observable in official discourse. For example, responding to a HDP (People's Democratic Party) deputy's speech in the parliament where he referred to the PKK as "armed Kurdish opposition", MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) deputy Mensur Işık said, "there is no armed

[217] Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills, "'The Vermin Have Struck Again': Dehumanizing the Enemy in Post 9/11 Media Representations," *Media, War & Conflict* 3, no. 2 (August 1, 2010): 152–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635210360082; Steuter Erin and Wills Deborah, "Discourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror," *Global Media Journal : Canadian Edition* 2 (January 1, 2009)

[218] Gregory Stanton, "The 8 Stages of Genocide," *Genocide Watch*, 1996, http://genocidewatch.net/2013/03/14/the-8-stages-of-genocide/.

Kurdish opposition in Turkey; there are only the PKK dogs (*PKK'li köpekler*)".[219] On the other hand, mutt (*it*) is commonly used in online and print newspapers.[220]

A more common and less explicit metaphor that is widely used refers to the PKK camps as "terrorist lairs" and "PKK lairs".[221] There is an emphasis on winter raids and how the PKK fighters live in caves during winter.[222] Narratives that report the raids into "PKK lairs" as "the lairs are penetrated" and "PKK lairs are exterminated" reinforces the dehumanizing function of animal metaphors.[223] Last but not least, the Minister of the Interior, who warned the EU that "The PKK has spread around Europe like cancer," illustrates the disease simile.[224]

The intimidating Other is imagined as "an animal in human form"; thus, their dead bodies are *carcasses*.[225] While conceptualizing the dead body, I have argued that instead of looking for the essence of the body and engaging in the subject-object dichotomy, we should examine the practices and discourses that are producing the dead body. Calling a dead body a

[219] Bülent Sarıoğlu, "PKK'ya 'silahlı muhalefet' dedi, Meclis karıştı [Called PKK 'armed opposition, tension in the grand assembly]," *Hürriyet*, February 15, 2020, sec. gundem, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pkkya-silahli-muhalefet-dedi-meclis-karisti-41447857.

[220] Ersin Ramoğlu, "Kusursuz Fırtına [The Perfect Storm]," *Sabah*, August 20, 2015, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/bolgeler/ramoglu/2015/08/20/kusursuz-firtina; Gökçe Fırat, "Dinsizin Hakkından İmansiz Gelir [An Old Poacher Makes the Best Gamekeeper]," *Türk Solu*, September 28, 2014; "Londra'da PKK'lı İtler, Türk Derneğine Saldırdı! [PKK Dogs in London Attacked a Turkish Institution]," *Yeni Akit*, August 4, 2019, https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/londrada-pkkli-itler-turk-dernegine-saldirdi-697813.html.

[221] "PKK'lı Teröristlerin İnlerine Girildi [PKK Lairs Were Penetrated]," *Sabah*, January 27, 2020, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/01/27/bitliste-pkkli-teroristlerin-kullandigi-5-siginak-imha-edildi; "Terörist Inlerindeki Görüntüler 'YPG-PKK Ayrımı'nı Yalanlıyor [Images from Terrorist Lairs Disprove the Lie of 'YPG-PKK Difference']," *Anadolu Ajansı*, October 23, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/terorist-inlerindeki-goruntuler-ypg-pkk-ayrimini-yalanliyor/0; "PKK'lı teröristlerin inleri ortaya çıktı [The Lairs of PKK terrorists revealed]," *Yeni Çağ Gazetesi*, January 30, 2018, https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/-422587h.htm; Tunca Bengin, "PKK'lı Teröristlerin İnlerine Kış Baskını [Winter Raid on PKK Lairs]," *Milliyet*, October 3, 2019, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tunca-bengin/pkkli-teroristlerin-inlerine-kis-baskini-6045093.

[222] Bengin, "PKK'lı Teröristlerin Inlerine Kış Baskını [Winter Raid on PKK Lairs]."

[223] "PKK'lı Teröristlerin Inlerine Girildi [PKK Lairs Were Penetrated]."; "Terör örgütü PKK'nın inleri imha edildi [Terrorist PKK's lairs were exterminated]," *Star*, February 19, 2019, https://www.star.com.tr/guncel/pkkli-teroristlere-ait-6-barinak-ve-siginak-imha-edildi-haber-1435222/.

[224] "Bakan Soylu: Afrin, PKK Tarafından Dünyanın En Büyük Uyuşturucu Merkezi Haline Getiriliyordu [Minister Soylu: PKK Was Making Afrin the Biggest Drug Center in the World]," *Milliyet*, January 24, 2020, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/bakan-soylu-afrin-pkk-tarafindan-dunyanin-en-buyuk-uyusturucu-merkezi-haline-getiriliyordu-6129449.

[225] Michael K. Green, "Images of Native Americans in Advertising: Some Moral Issues," *Journal of Business Ethics* 12, no. 4 (April 1, 1993): 323–30, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01666536.

carcass is a clear example of a discourse that produces the dead bodies of the Other as objects; the corporeal remains of a non-human. The PKK fighters' dead bodies are called carcasses in all segments of society. The term is ubiquitous in online forums, social media, and daily life. It is observable from daily life to parliamentary debates to the media, yet, used more frequently in local and small newspapers.[226] However, the term managed to find a place in mainstream media through *Yeni Akit*, a widely read Islamist newspaper, and more mainstream online news portals that circulated *Yeni Akit*'s news.[227] More importantly, it finds a place in official public discourse, including the parliament, as MHP representatives tend to use the term frequently.[228]

To conclude, these three framings of the PKK and their insurgents work together and play a constitutive role in enabling and justifying postmortem violence. The baby killer and queer pervert frames produce an enemy image causing ontological insecurity, and their threatening subjectivities, immorality, and impurity mark their bodies as violable. On the other hand, the carcass theme produces the insurgents as non-humans whose dead bodies are objectified, vulnerable to violence and decay, like animals. Calling the dead bodies of the insurgents carcasses constructs all the insurgents as non-humans, not only justifying the previous cases of postmortem violence but also enabling future cases. In this regard, alongside

[226] Merve Ilhan, "Karadeniz'de PKK leşleri! [PKK's carcasses in the Black Sea]," *Samsun Gazetesi*, July 15, 2018, https://www.samsungazetesi.com/samsun-haber/son-dakika-karadeniz-de-pkk-lesleri-h1121422.html.
[227] "PKK'ya Çok Ağır Darbe! Leş Sayısı : 390 Terörist Öldürüldü [Heavy Damage on PKK! Number of Carcasses: 390]," *Yeni Akit*, August 8, 2015, https://www.fibhaber.com/nevsehir/pkkya-cok-agir-darbe-les-sayisi-390-terorist-olduruldu-h38041.html; "PKK leşleri her yerde [PKK carcasses are everywhere!]," *Yeni Akit*, September 10, 2015, https://m.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/pkk-lesleri-her-yerde-92609.html; Akif Bedir, "Mıntıka temizliği [Area cleaning]," *Haber7*, October 16, 2019, https://www.haber7.com/yazarlar/akif-bedir/2906738-mintika-temizligi.
[228] "MHP'li Büyükataman: "Arkadaşı Demirtaş, Dostu Kılıçdaroğlu Olandan Milletin Menfaatine Olacak Bir... [Büyükataman from the MHP...]," *Haberler*, May 1, 2019, sec. Politika, https://www.haberler.com/politika/mhp-li-buyukataman-arkadasi-demirtas-dostu-12003655-haberi/; "MHP'den CHP'ye 'Memnun musun Bahçeli?' tepkisi! [MHP's reaction to CHP's statement of 'Are you glad Bahçeli?']," *Yeni Dönem*, April 22, 2019, https://www.yenidonem.com.tr/mhp-den-chp-ye-memnun-musun-bahceli-tepkisi/66708/; "MHP Genel Başkanı Bahçeli: Döktüğünüz şehit kanlarında boğulacaksınız [MHP's Chairman Bahçeli: You will drown in the martyrs' blood you spilled]," *Akşam*, October 4, 2018, https://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/bahceli-doktugunuz-sehit-kanlarinda-bogulacaksiniz/haber-780004.

considering these discursive frames as conditions of possibilities, we can also approach them as an integral part of dead body management as discursive technologies of power assemblages.

3.3 "Martyrs Don't Die": The "Guerilla" Funeral and the Politics of Resurrection

When I stepped into a Kurdish community center in Cologne as a part of my research process, I was greeted by the pictures of fallen YPG/YPJ soldiers covering the entire wall facing the entrance door. They are the first thing you see when you enter. Most of them are smiling; they look young and full of life. Others look tough and determined. All of them are wearing YPG/YPJ uniforms; the background is covered with green, yellow, and red stripes - the colors of Kurdistan. Beneath every picture, there is information about their real name, code (guerilla) name, and birth and death dates.[229] *Under the pictures, there is a desk standing like an altar. The desk is full of red dianthus flowers, a type of flower usually given at funerals, and there is a notebook where anyone can express their grief. I must have been looking at the pictures and the altar for too long; an old Kurdish man approached me, and while rubbing my shoulder to comfort me, he told me in Kurdish, "Don't worry son, martyrs don't die"* (*şehit namırın*).

Both the pictures/altar and the slogan the old man uttered represent a bigger phenomenon that Hişyar Özsoy calls "resurrectory politics in Kurdish political culture".[230] The insurgents' funerals are the primary site where resurrectory politics is performed. Like the discursive framings of the PKK insurgents, funerals are vital to make sense of the regime's policies and discourses. Particularly in Chapters 5 and 6, I will discuss how funerals are perceived as a security threat and criminalized, which paved the way for the trustee mayor policy, where the elected mayors were dismissed from office and replaced by appointed

[229] Every guerrilla takes a new name when they join the PKK, what they call "code name". Code names are given after either their fallen comrades or Kurdish folk heroes.
[230] Özsoy, "Between Gift and Taboo".

mayors. Discourses enabling and justifying the trustee mayor policy are comprehensible only if we know about the context of PKK funerals and their securitization.

There are several practices and discourses that constitute resurrectory politics. First, since its foundation, the names of the fallen soldiers have played a big role in the PKK. The insurgents who join the organization adopt a code name; these code names are almost always given after "the martyrs". Furthermore, martyrs' names are given to the surviving fighters after an operation, newborns, public spaces, and the military operations of the PKK. Second, visibility of the martyr's identity is essential to grieving and memorializing them. Faces and names of the dead cover the walls of community centers and private homes. In addition to the flags of the PKK and Kurdistan, political symbols of the martyr's specific brigade -such as the anarchist International Freedom Battalion, the Queer Insurrection and Liberation Army, YPG, YJA Star (Free Women's Unit) etc.- accompany the pictures and coffins, rendering political identities visible. Last but not least, the living take an oath to keep the martyr's struggle and ideology alive.

These examples show that resurrectory politics is part of everyday life; yet, the most prominent site where the politics of resurrection is performed is still at the funerals. As Özsoy argues, the Kurdish struggle is "a sacred communion of the dead and the living".[231] The insurgents' funerals are significantly different from soldiers' funerals. They are not simply private sites for grieving; they are performances where the communities get together and share a sense of belonging to the nation and the cause of the insurgency. There they proudly display their politics and send messages to the state. They are full of flags, political symbols, and slogans.[232] The living highlights the political character of the dead and celebrate the dead's

[231] Ibid., 1.
[232] This is not entirely unique to the Kurdish culture. Politicization of funerals and funerals as a site of resistance can be observed in other insurgency groups.

dedication to the cause and loyalty to their people. Flags, banners, and slogans also reproduce and celebrate the idea of Kurdistan. In the public imagination, martyrs die so that the Kurdish national identity can live.

These politicized and resurrectory features of the funerals make them a security threat, or at least causes of insecurity for the state. Before delving into the case-specific examples of how and why the PKK funerals are sources of insecurity, let us examine the funeral conceptually. As the anthropological approaches suggest, the ritual of burial/funeral is conceptualized as a "rite of separation" that reorders social relations.[233] The burial ceremony resides at the threshold between life and death, separating the living from the dead.[234] Burial of the dead body confirms the death. By burying the bodies underground, we performatively construct the 'above-ground' as the space of the living. Burial means that the dead are gone and will not come back. The burial ritual is a rite marked with transformation; it transforms the space by separating life and death, and it "transforms persons into non-persons, ancestors, spirits or just corpses".[235] The rite also reproduces or challenges the order of social relations. It brings the relationship between the deceased and the political community to the forefront. Rank, status, and membership that order social relations become more visible with the ritual. Not every death triggers similar emotions and reactions, and not every funeral carries the same importance. How grandiose the funeral is tells us about the deceased's social status.

Another important point about the transformative elements of the burial rituals is the deceased's incorporation into the collectivity of the dead. Martyrs are seen as valorized and desired units of collectivity, regardless of whether they are insurgents or soldiers. Therefore, the insurgent's funeral is wedding-like, a passage from being merely a dead body to the

[233] Stepputat, *Governing the dead*, 20.
[234] Agamben, *Homo Sacer*.
[235] Stepputat, *Governing the dead*, 20.

idealized martyr. Bloch and Parry see the celebration of the dead's incorporation into the collectivity of the dead as a celebration of society.[236] For them, it indicates continuity and fertility. The aspect of the celebration of society becomes stronger in the context of political violence. In a case like the Kurdish funeral, the celebration encompasses the fantasy of Kurdistan and the PKK's ideology. Martyrs are celebrated for their sacrifice; the martyr dies so that the cause/ideals and the nation can survive. In a way, the Kurdish funeral is a passage to resurrection.

The presence of political symbols in the insurgents' funeral is an important phenomenon that extends beyond the symbolic resurrection of an individual. Through flags and other symbols, the fantasy of Kurdistan is reproduced and strengthened. The colors of Kurdistan's unofficial flag cover everywhere, from women's traditional scarfs and clothes to flowers and banners. One can get overwhelmed with bright yellow, green, and red. It is rather common to see the coffins covered with the same color pattern and a red or yellow star in the middle, the unofficial flag of the PKK. According to Turkish Flag Law No. 2983, only parliamentarians, high-ranked civil servants, supreme court members, and security forces' coffins shall be covered with the Turkish flag. Although it is not mandated, the regular practice for the rest is covering the coffin with a green cloth that says "every soul shall taste death" in Arabic script. The PKK martyr's coffin, on the other hand, is covered with either the unofficial Kurdish or PKK flags. The coffin, then, becomes a signifier itself, conveying the message that while every soul might taste death, martyrs do not die.

"Martyrs do not die" is a slogan that can be heard at every funeral. Unlike the traditional Turkish funeral, which is seen as a space for silence and grief, the Kurdish insurgent's funeral is loud. "Kurdistan will be the graveyard of fascism", "long live chairman Apo", and

[236] Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry, eds., *Death and the Regeneration of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511607646.

"vengeance" are the most common slogans. Alongside the political symbolism, these slogans turn the funeral into a highly political event where the sentiment of resistance and loyalty to the insurgency's cause is shared and reinforced, while the state is openly defied.

The insurgent's funeral is also a collective event. I argue this for two reasons. First, it is a collective event because of the participants. Whereas most funerals -except for famous politicians, state agents, or celebrities- are private events attended by only the people who knew the deceased, sometimes an entire town attends the insurgents' funerals. Commonly, daily life stops when there is a funeral; shops and bazaars close down as the townsfolk, including the shop owners, attend the funeral. Strangers help carry the coffin and cater the event. The belief that martyrs sacrifice themselves for their nation leads people to see the martyr -regardless of whether they knew the martyr personally or not- as everybody's loss. Second, the funeral is a collective event because of the dead. Holding one funeral ceremony for more than one martyr is a common practice. Collective funerals happen especially if the martyrs were in the same brigade or died together. The tradition dictates burying the dead either where they were born or where their family currently lives. If numerous fighters died together but have to be buried separately because of geographical divides, pictures and names of the fallen comrades accompany the single coffin.

The political and collective nature of the insurgents' funeral and its function in reproducing the Kurdish national-symbolic makes the funeral ritual an egregious performance for the Turkish audience. Media representation of the funerals and the discussions in the parliament shows us that the main concern is that "the funerals turn into a rally".[237] Therefore,

[237] Ali Leylak, "PKK'lı teröriste miting gibi cenaze töreni [A rally like funeral for a PKK terrorist]," *Milliyet*, August 27, 2008, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/galeri/pkkli-teroriste-miting-gibi-cenaze-toreni-450968; Ali Leylak, "Terörist cenazesi PKK gösterisine döndü [Terrorist funeral turned into a PKK rally]," *Milliyet*, June 26, 2010, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/terorist-cenazesi-pkk-gosterisine-dondu-1255763; Ali Leylak, "PKK mitingi gibi terörist cenazesi [A rally like terrorist funeral]," *Milliyet*, May 5, 2012, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/pkk-mitingi-gibi-terorist-cenazesi-1536666; The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 24, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 54, January 17, 2013,

in a way, politicization becomes securitized, an argument that I will unpack in Chapter 6. While the Kurdish community celebrates the martyr's performative resurrection ritual with slogans and national and political symbols, the regime perceives the same performance as PKK propaganda. In highlighting the PKK flags, MHP deputies in particular frame the funerals as performances through which the PKK asserts its hegemony and sovereignty.[238] Slogans like "vengeance" are frowned upon, yet the flags especially are highlighted in the texts.

What is notable is that the mainstream media and MHP deputies avoid naming the flags as "PKK flags". Instead, they refer to them as "pieces of cloth that have colors symbolizing the so-called flag of the PKK",[239] or "The PKK's rags (*paçavra*)".[240] They avoid discursively acknowledging that the PKK has a flag as it would legitimize a terrorist organization. Often, flags or banners with Kurdistan's tricolor are not distinguished from the PKK symbols, associating national symbols with terrorism. The choice of word in Turkish, *paçavra*, is interesting because *paçavra* is not simply a piece of cloth or rag, but it means either an "old and disposable rag" or "someone or something worthless or hideous".

Following the end of the peace process in 2015, the AKP government took a similar stance to the MHP, where they framed the funerals as attempts of the PKK to claim sovereignty. More explicitly, concerns were raised about PKK propaganda. The state ideology desires a homogenous Turkish nation wherein ethnic minorities call themselves Turks and a docile Kurdish community does not defy the unity and legitimacy of the state. Therefore, the resurrection of the terrorist/guerilla, reproducing and reinforcing the commitment to the collective cause, and belonging to the Kurdish nation ontologically threaten the state.

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21877&P5=H&page1=21&page2=21.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Leylak, "PKK mitingi gibi terrorist cenazesi [A rally like terrorist funeral]".
[240] TBMM, 24/3/54.

I will elaborate on the securityness of burial practices and funeral ceremonies throughout this dissertation, mainly focusing on legal and security practices and discourses. To make sense of how delaying, prohibiting, and attacking burials and funerals are justified, we should keep in mind what the insurgent funerals look like and how they are perceived and portrayed by the regime. In a way, dead body management starts with this discursive construction since these frames enable or constrain how the body is treated after death. However, if we do not want to lose the focus on the 'dead' body, it would be fairer to say that the journey starts with killing. The next chapter is about the first step on the dead's journey: postmortem violence. This is a journey of the relationship between the state apparatuses and the enemy Other's dead bodies.

Chapter 4: The War Against the Dead Body: Postmortem Violence and Politics of (In)Visibility

Having conceptualized the dead body, power, and security, and discussed the discursive perception of insurgents that set the conditions of possibilities for dead body management, I will now move on to analyze the first aspect of dead body management: postmortem violence. This is the first step of the dead's odyssey in the relationship with the regime - a relationship marked by power relations. Postmortem violence and its following politics of (in)visibility have a violent relationship that simultaneously (re)produces sovereign, necro-, and normative power. The chapter is structured around three cases: the mutilation and naked display of female insurgents' dead bodies, Hacı Lokman Birlik -whose dead body was dragged on the streets-, and the burned dead bodies in the basements of Cizre during the urban war. I selected these cases because they are instances of postmortem violence that shocked the nation and were discussed the most. Studying these cases reveals the interplay of various power assemblages, their technologies, and their functions, and the purpose of this chapter is to show how this interplay unfolds.

As discussed in Chapter 2, postmortem violence is simultaneously an exercise of sovereign, necro-, and normative power. As explained earlier in necro/sovereign assemblages, sovereignty shows itself through both destruction and the suspension/withdrawal of the law. The display of the dead body is a picture of sovereign conquest, yet it simultaneously sends other messages with necropolitical functions. It targets the women, the insurgents, and the Kurdish population, and seeks to discipline, tame, and subjugate deviant subjectivities. Necro/normative power, on the other hand, thrives on invisibility. It seeks to erase the subject,

their life, and their death. As the case of burned bodies will illustrate, necro/normative power aims to eradicate corporeality alongside subjectivity.

Despite the interplay, necropolitics appears as the most apparent force. When postmortem violence is rendered visible, it speaks and sends a message. Just like any "text", it is a subject of hermeneutics. Therefore, I studied these interpretations and highlighted three prominent discourses. They confirm the necropolitical functions of postmortem violence's visibility but differ in the interpretations of who the target is and what the message is.[241] Among these three discourses, the most widely accepted and circulated one is that this form of violence targets all women and seeks to discipline deviant femininities. It also targets the Kurdish population and disciplines and subjugates the Kurds. On the other hand, the third discourse does not specify the target or message like the others; it underlines another significant performative function of postmortem violence, which reveals the state's 'real' violent face.

Necropower does not solely rely on visibility. Dead bodies are mutilated and buried in mass graves, or as the case study illustrates, they are burned or damaged to the point that they are no longer recognizable as human beings. Necropolitics is present because it is population management by eradicating a sub-population. Power becomes productive through destruction. By eradicating certain bodies, it produces disposable and deformable bodies. Through the mechanisms of invisibility, both in terms of corporeality and subjectivity, a sovereign/normative assemblage is put into play. The sovereign capacity to produce the *bare dead* creates deaths that cannot be mourned, lives that do not count as lives, and bodies that should not exist. Analytically, this discussion is no less important than technologies of visibility. However, in this chapter it does not take as much space and attention. The main reason is that empirically we are more likely to observe cases of visibility. Second, there is not

[241] This is why unpacking necropolitics take the majority of the space and attention in comparison to the other forms of power.

enough discursive material and credible sources to put technologies of invisibility under the same level of scrutiny.

4.1 Violable Dead Bodies: Violence and Visibility

After 2015, when violence escalated to unprecedented levels, dead body management often, but not exclusively, targeted female insurgents' bodies. As discussed in Chapter 3, female insurgents are not perceived as "normal women", but rather they are perverted monsters - promiscuous, queer, baby killers. Thus, they need to be treated as such. They need to be eradicated, their dead bodies are rendered violable, and through eradication and destruction, the femininities they represent are disciplined. Women are not the only targets; male insurgents are also subject to postmortem violence and technologies of visibility, albeit the characteristics of violence and its message are different. Postmortem violence is not that simple. As an assemblage, it consists of a myriad of actors, apparatuses, discourses, and practices. Inevitably, such a complex mechanism entails entangled power relations. In this section, I delve into the details of the cases and examine postmortem violence, technologies of visibility, and the governing discourses.

4.1.1 Female Insurgents: Naked Display of Dead Bodies

On 10 August 2015, amid an armed clash between the Turkish security forces and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) , the dark night in the mountainous areas of Muş's Varto district was illuminated briefly by the Turkish military flares. Subsequently, a sniper located and shot down a PKK fighter named Kevser Eltürk, also known as Ekin Wan, on the spot. This is what the official narrative says. The marks on her neck might say something else. After finding bruises on her body, especially on her neck, her family and *İnsan Hakları Derneği* (Human Rights Association) suspect that she might have been captured wounded and executed later, or that she was strangled. The most likely scenario, however, is that her body, whether alive or dead, was dragged by a rope around her neck. The news about Kevser Eltürk shocked

Turkey and even the international community to a certain degree. The reason was not her alleged execution or torture. The women who received Eltürk's dead body, washed, and prepared it for the burial ceremony declared that there were signs of torture on her body, but this information was widely ignored except for only a handful of opposition or Kurdish newspapers.[242] Later, two photographs of Eltürk were published on social media with the caption "we killed the terrorist who attacked the security outpost".[243]

One of the photographs was taken at night, showing Eltürk's dead body in her guerilla uniform. In this first visual, Eltürk is lying face down on the ground, her arms and legs stretched long, so the body looks vertical. The photograph does not necessarily look staged; it gives the impression that this is the position where the security forces found her dead after the clash. Her left leg immediately catches the eye; while her entire body is stretched in a vertical line, her left leg is sticking out to the left at a 90 degrees angle. Her blood-stained trousers and the position of her left leg show that she was shot in her left hip.

Eltürk's dead body is naked in the second photograph, lying on the gravel-stoned ground, next to human-sized pieces of cardboard and a plastic bag. The light indicates that this photograph was taken later, in daylight. There are three men in the photograph, only visible up to their waist. They look civilian, wearing jeans, regular shoes, and casual shirts. The only thing that reminds the viewer of their "authority" is the blue plastic medical gloves that the man in the middle is wearing and an item that looks like a walkie-talkie in another man's hand.

[242] Faruk Ayyıldız, "O fotoğraftaki kişinin Kevser Eltürk olduğu anlaşıldı, [It was found out that the person in the photograph is Kevser Eltürk]" *Evrensel*, August 16, 2015, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258456/o-fotograftaki-kisinin-kevser-Eltürk-oldugu-anlasildi.
[243] Tweets are deleted because the photographs violate the rules. The censored visuals and the caption can be found in Ayyildiz, "O fotoğraftaki kişinin Kevser Eltürk olduğu anlaşıldı,".

While the debate whether the pictures are really from the military operation that took place the previous day and whether it is Kevser Eltürk's body, the Mayoral Office of Muş made an official announcement the next day:

> We have identified some visuals of a woman (bayan), a member of the PKK terrorist organization, who was neutralized due to an armed clash that they engaged in the rural areas of our province on 10.08.2015, were circulated on social media. These visuals cannot be accepted by public opinion and our Mayoral Office. We initiated the legal and administrative investigations against those who took the pictures and published them on social media.[244]

Many NGOs and newspapers shared the announcement as a confirmation of "the torture on Eltürk's body".[245] However, the statement tells us more than that with a closer look.

First, what the visuals depict is missing in this text. A vague language, like "some visuals" and "these visuals", covers the nakedness of and the signs of violence on Eltürk's body, hiding it from the public. The relationship between postmortem violence and visibility is an interesting and complicated one, just like the complex and entangled power relations it entails. Regardless of the perpetrators' motivation, visuals circulated on social media have rendered the dead body visible as well as the violence inflicted on it. However, the state and pro-government media have not reported the case; only the opposition newspapers shared the censored versions of the photographs. In the official statement, the Mayoral Office did not talk about the violence, and the Minister of the Interior has not responded to any official parliamentary inquiry proposed in the grand assembly.

[244] "Basın Duyurusu [Press Release]," T.C Muş Valiliği, August 16, 2015, http://www.mus.gov.tr/basin-duyurusu16.

[245] "Muş valiliği Ekin Van'a işkenceyi reddetmedi [The Mayoral Office of Muş did not deny the torture on Ekin Van]," *İleri Haber*, August 16, 2015, https://ilerihaber.org/icerik/mus-valiligi-ekin-van39a-iskenceyi-reddetmedi-20350.html. "Muş Valiliği, çıplak PKK'lı kadın cesedini doğruladı [The Mayoral Office of Muş confirmed the naked female PKK fighter's corpse]," *TimeTürk*, August 16, 2015, https://www.timeturk.com/mus-valiligi-ciplak-pkk-li-kadin-cesedini-dogruladi/haber-44316; "Valilik de kabul etti; öldürülen Kevser Eltürk'ün kıyafetlerini çıkarıp çıplak fotoğraflarını kim çekti ve dağıttı? [The Mayoral Office accepted too; who took and distributed the naked photos of Kevser Elturk]," *T24*, August 16, 2015, https://t24.com.tr/haber/valilik-de-kabul-etti-oldurulen-kevser-Eltürkun-kiyafetlerini-cikarip-ciplak-fotograflarini-kim-cekti-ve-dagitti,306455.

There could be various explanations for this discrepancy. For example, the state is not a black box - a homogenous actor with a fixed and universal interest. The actors involved in this incident, whether the special forces or the crime scene investigation unit, and state actors like the mayor, ministers, etc. might have different interests and agendas. Alternatively, the state could be instrumentalizing its different apparatuses, using security forces for visibility while acquitting itself through bureaucratic channels. The "why question" should not interest us; instead, we should focus on what this combined visibility and invisibility performs. Therefore, we should not see such politics of (in)visibility as a discrepancy. The analysis I propose does not, in any way, suggest a rational, calculated, and systematic state policy. Instead regardless of the motivation -whether it is calculated- we should focus on the political functions and performances of power; power with its its continuities, disjunctures, and assembled machinic connections.

Alongside its necropolitical functions that I will discuss later, the visuals of Eltürk are visuals of sovereign power. As discussed earlier, sovereignty is tied to the body and death, as well as the anxiety and fear this relationship entails.[246] This fear is not necessarily the fear of death but rather the thresholds and limits that death, and the dead body as a signifier, draw or abolish. As Charlotte Heath-Kelly argues, death reminds us of the limits of sovereign power understood in godly and omnipotent terms; it disturbs the illusion of sovereignty and power.[247] What Heath-Kelly describes is more relevant for deaths that the state cannot prevent, whereas what we have at hand is state violence. Nevertheless, even in state violence, the dead body points out the question of thresholds.

[246] Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share. 2/3: The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty* (New York: Zone Books, 1991); Robert Hertz, *Death and the Right Hand*, 1st edition (London: Routledge, 2006); Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*.
[247] Heath-Kelly, *Death and Security*.

Considering the resurrecting features of the insurgents' funerals, would killing the enemy mean that the exercise of sovereign power by the state over life and death ends with "the enemy's" death? Would this exercise of sovereign power leave room for the enemy to then exercise sovereign power through funerals, placing the state and the PKK in a zero-sum game regarding sovereignty? I do not pose these questions to find an answer; we should instead use them to think about postmortem violence. Postmortem violence and its visualization extend sovereign power beyond death, an area usually considered within the field of governmentality. Besides the normative features, such as cruelty, looking at these pictures also reminds us of the state's very material power over our corporeal bodies. The caption that complements the visuals, 'we killed the terrorist who attacked the security outpost.' draws the image of a victorious Self against a barbaric, threatening enemy Other.

The relationship between sovereign power and visibility also entails necropolitical elements. The lines between necropower and sovereign power get blurred. Eltürk was not killed, tortured, and displayed only as an individual but as a member of a (sub)population. Violence is rendered visible, and thus it reaches a wider audience, demonstrating the sovereign power of the state and conveying a message that disciplines and deters. The enemy is "neutralized", and her body is violated, which (re)produces a racialized and sexualized social order wherein the deviant Other is eliminated and desecrated.

However, as the Mayoral Office's statement, the lack of press coverage, and the official responses illustrate, visibility is assisted by invisibility, bringing the derealizing normative violence to the forefront. According to international law, this act that I suggested as a manifestation of sovereign power also constitutes a crime; thus, it is acquitted by the bureaucratic machine by not acknowledging it. In addition to legal impunity, invisibility performs other functions necessary for studying power. Power targets, desecrates, and displays

the dead body. Power also abandons the dead body and its political life, creating a reality where Eltürk's body was not tortured and displayed naked.

Visibility and invisibility work together, building a necro/normative assemblage. In the discursive regime, where the subject is included through exclusion, Eltürk has no name, no face, and even no life or death. It was not Eltürk who was killed, tortured, and displayed naked; it was "a woman member of the PKK terrorist organization" or "the terrorist who attacked the outpost" - a perverted monster who threatens the state and the nation both physically and ontologically. A life that does not count as life so a death that was deserved. We should not forget that what is rendered visible is the biological body, in its naked, violated, and vulnerable state, while her individuality is rendered invisible. Therefore, Eltürk's dead body is reduced to corporeal remains.

While the photographs openly display violence, sexual characteristics, and the body in a material and corporeal sense, the Mayoral Office's narrative normalizes and sanitizes them. Necropower always goes hand in hand with biopower. In the official discourse, "terrorists" are rarely *killed*; instead, they are *neutralized* or *captured dead*. "The enemy" is sexually and ideologically deviant, and thus her body can be violated. Yet, she is also a terrorist and so a physical threat, disrupting the life and order of ordinary citizens, whose death would allow others to live. Although neutralizing could mean injuring, capturing alive, and/or disarming, it is used to define the act of killing. Killing is not a violent and intimate act in this discourse; instead, it is necessary, technical, and sanitary.

This official narrative also hides the sexualized and gendered features of violence that were rendered visible by the staging of the photographs where Eltürk's dead body was displayed naked. The office prefers to use the term *bayan* instead of *kadın* to refer to a woman. In the Turkish language, *bayan* is an equivalent of Mrs. / Ms., whereas *kadın* refers to woman

or female. Feminists have established that the term *bayan* abstracts women from their biological existence and strips them from their bodies, sex, and sexuality.[248] Men are never referred to as *bay* (Mr.) but always as *erkek* or *adam* (man or male) unless *bay* is a title. In addition to the discursive erasure of Eltürk's womanhood, the official discourse does not address the sexualized nature of violence in any way.

The sexualized postmortem violence inflicted on Eltürk and its visualization is not an isolated case; as the conflict intensified and spread into the urban areas from the rural guerilla warfare, more naked bodies were displayed. Similar practices and discourses can be found in the other cases, illustrating the systemic character of this form of dead body management. In particular, the siege laid on some cities and imposed curfews illustrate the peak of the corporeally violent side of dead body management that also sought visibility.

In February 2016, state forces took pictures of the naked body of two women fighters they killed in Cizre, a town under a curfew, and published them on social media. In one of the photographs, the woman is lying on her back on a cobblestoned road in the city, only with her socks, underwear, and a jacket loosely covering only her arms on. Deep wounds, resembling cuts, on her hip and breasts are clearly visible, even in the low-resolution pictures. The fresh-looking wounds raised questions about whether she was tortured or subject to postmortem violence.[249] There is a big puddle of blood on the right side of the dead body, and next to it, a soldier stands in khaki trousers and military boots. Another soldier stands on the left side in the dark blue uniform of the special forces. Security forces are in the frame only up to their waist.

[248] Güray Çağlar König, "Dil ve Cins: Kadın ve Erkeklerin Dil Kullanımı," *Dilbilim Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 1 (February 1, 1992): 25–36.
[249] "Öldürüldükten sonra çıplak halde teşhir edilen kadın bedeni için önerge [Parliamentary question for the female body that was displayed naked after she was killed]," *Evrensel*, February 15, 2016, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/272679/olduruldukten-sonra-ciplak-halde-teshir-edilen-kadin-bedeni-icin-onerge?a=78c75.

The second picture also shows a naked dead body lying on the ground, next to her torn and ripped clothes. However, the two men standing next to the dead body are in civilian clothes.

Like Eltürk's case, the HDP's (People's Democratic Party) requests to build a commission to investigate the incident and the inquiry they proposed to be answered by the Ministry of the Interior have been ignored. Instead, the Mayoral Office of Şırnak denied that the photographs were taken in Cizre and said:

> Since it was declared that the counterterrorism operations ended successfully, there are photographs released on social media by unknown sources. These photographs are part of a smear campaign that seeks to undermine the success and discredit our security forces in the eyes of the public. Our security forces do everything by the law. Our security forces have always worked for our people's security and welfare, and they always will.[250]

Responding to the mayor's accusations, HDP's Şırnak representative, Faysal Sarıyıldız, showed other photographs from the same counterterrorism operation.[251] These photographs also show the dead bodies of the Kurdish fighters; however, the photograph is taken from a wider angle where one can see the street and a military vehicle passing.[252] Confirming that the streets are in Cizre, Deputy Sarıyıldız claimed that the mayor's function is to hide this violence. The mayor has a role in a bigger mechanism where there are those who conducted the violence and those who ordered it.[253]

There are many ways to read the mayor's statement and Sarıyıldız's response. The one I propose is to see it as a discursive tension between biopower and necropower. Numerous actors repeat the Mayor's narrative on many other occasions, as we will see throughout the dissertation. The narrative is part of a larger discursive regime that (re)produces an image of

[250] "Basın Duyurusu [Press Release]," Republic of Turkey, Governor's Office of Şırnak, February 11, 2016, http://www.sirnak.gov.tr/basin-duyurusu-11022016.
[251] "Görüntü Cizre'ye ait değil diyen Şırnak valisine Sarıyıldız'dan fotoğraflı yanıt [A visual response from Sarıyıldız to the governor who claimed the visual is not from Cizre]," *Cumhuriyet*, February 16, 2016, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/goruntu-cizreye-ait-degil-diyen-sirnak-valisine-sariyildizdan-fotografli-yanit-480075.
[252] During the urban warfare, there were many other groups than PKK and sometimes the civilian (non-guerilla) population joined the warfare. Therefore, I preferred the term Kurdish fighters, or insurgents, over PKK fighters.
[253] "Görüntü Cizre'ye ait değil diyen Şırnak valisine Sarıyıldız'dan fotoğraflı yanıt [A visual response from Sarıyıldız to the governor who claimed the visual is not from Cizre]."

Turkey where the rule of law exists. The Turkish state is benevolent and responsible for its populations' "security and welfare". Critiques of Foucault accuse Foucault and Foucauldian studies of Eurocentrism and even racism.[254] Although Eurocentrism is evident, it does not mean biopolitics and governmentality cannot travel outside Europe. What we observe here are biopolitical concerns in the discourse, which are not necessarily biopolitical practices of governance as formulated by Foucauldians. In this discourse, there is a particular regime of counterterrorism whose purpose is to ensure security and welfare.

For one population to live and thrive, another needs to die. Framing the counterterrorism operations as a biopolitical mechanism, a technical necessity, means that there is no room for postmortem violence beyond eliminating a physical security threat. Both statements of the Mayoral Offices of Muş and Şırnak target the photographs and those who took and published them. They do not condemn, or even acknowledge, the violence. They are rather concerned with what these visuals can do to the counterterrorism/insurgency campaigns' and the state's image.

On the other hand, Deputy Sarıyıldız contests this image of biopower. The discourse he is a part of and (re)producing draws a mechanism where things are connected in a machinic structure - a necropolitical war machine. The state machine starts turning the cogs and wheels by ordering these operations, where the law stops and anything is permissible. The military machine connects to the body machine, killing, desecrating, and displaying it; the bureaucratic machine connects to the military machine, concealing, justifying, and sanitizing the violence that connects the military and body machines. Sarıyıldız's comment that the mayors are part of a larger mechanism might sound conspiratorial, and as a researcher, I am cautious of such

[254] Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Racism in Foucauldian Security Studies: Biopolitics, Liberal War, and the Whitewashing of Colonial and Racial Violence," *International Political Sociology* 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 2–19, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/oly031.

claims. His commentary assumes a discursive sovereign decree that precedes the action. I am not sure of this, however. There was likely no sovereign decree, and the security forces appeared more as petty sovereigns.

Nevertheless, we can better understand his commentary by focusing on the performances of these actions (e.g., conducting, ordering, concealing) instead of interpreting them as motivations or a rational and calculated grand plan. Regardless of the actors' motivations and whether the acts were contingent or planned, security forces conducted postmortem violence, rendered it visible, and the mayors tried to conceal it. Machinic connections are not necessarily designed and put into play by a certain actor; in Deleuze and Guattari's analogy, the orchid is becoming the wasp, and the wasp is becoming the orchid, building a wasp-orchid assemblage, but they are in a machinic relationship with ruptures and continuities. It is a relationship that was not set into play by another being.[255] The security forces and the bureaucratic apparatus are assembled through these machinic connections. This assemblage eliminates a physical threat, challenges an ontological threat, produces violable dead bodies, erases subjectivities, and hides the violence and the body upon which violence was inflicted and inscribed. Thus, it also is assembling bio/necropower and the derealizing power of normative violence.

4.1.2 Theatrical Violence: Dragging Dead Bodies

Stripping the body naked, leaving the naked dead body on the ground, and taking photographs of it is staged violence circulated for a political economy of gaze and spectacle. Hacı Lokman Birlik's case illustrates this. Female fighters were not the only ones whose dead bodies were subject to violence and spectacle. On 3 October 2015, Birlik, a male PKK fighter,

[255] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*. Also see, Jon Roffe and Hannah Stark, "Introduction: Deleuze and the Non/Human," in *Deleuze and the Non/Human*, ed. Jon Roffe and Hannah Stark (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137453693_1.

an amateur actor and director, and HDP deputy, Leyla Birlik's, brother-in-law, was killed during a counterterrorism operation. His death is controversial. The former Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, claimed that Birlik was killed "while attacking the police with a rocket launcher" during the clashes in Şırnak, whereas according to the eyewitnesses and a photograph of Birlik's wounded but alive body directly sent to Leyla Birlik, he was found alive and executed.[256] According to the eyewitnesses' report, an armored vehicle passing by opened fire on Birlik while he was attending to his wound on the street.[257] The 28 bullets found in his body during the autopsy strengthen the eyewitnesses' report.

Then, security forces tied a rope around Birlik's neck, attached the end to the back of the armored vehicle, and dragged Birlik's dead body on the streets to the police station. Several visuals were published on social media once again. The most circulated photograph in the opposition news outlets shows Birlik's dead body being dragged by the armored vehicle. The photograph does not show the desecrated body in detail, like the visuals of female fighters; Birlik is fully-clothed, *no visible blood*, and his body is tied to the back of the vehicle with a rope. *A cobblestoned road, another civilian car, a shop and an ATM* – the photo was taken in a city. In addition to the photograph, a video was published on social media. The angle shows us that the video was taken from the vehicle; the 30-second video only shows Birlik's body being dragged. Later, Dicle News Agency found and circulated two other photographs, likely to be taken from CCTVs.[258] One of these photographs shows a group of police officers and security forces in front of the police station, gathered around the armored vehicle, taking

[256] Hatice Kamer, "HDP'li Birlik: Sürüklenen akrabam yaralı ele geçirildikten sonra infaz edildi [Deputy Birlik: My relative was caught injured and later executed]," *BBC News Türkçe*, October 6, 2015, sec. Haberler, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151005_sirnak_leyla_birlik; Robert Mackey, "Turkey to Investigate Images of Dead Kurdish Man Being Dragged," *The New York Times*, October 5, 2015, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/world/europe/turkey-to-investigate-images-of-dead-kurdish-man-being-dragged.html

[257] Kamer, "HDP'li Birlik: Sürüklenen akrabam yaralı ele geçirildikten sonra infaz edildi".

[258] "Hacı Birlik'in Cansız Bedeninin Karakol Önüne Getirildiği Görüntüler Ortaya Çıktı [New visuals show Birlik's dead body brought to the police station)]," *Diken*, October 6, 2015, https://www.diken.com.tr/haci-birlikin-cansiz-bedeninin-karakol-onune-getirildigi-goruntuler-ortaya-cikti/.

pictures of Birlik's dead body with their phones. The other photograph shows a group of police and security altogether, posing with Birlik's dead body.

This violence goes beyond eliminating an existential security threat and is complicit in a dehumanizing logic. It is a form of normative violence that erases traces of humanity and individuality. The brutality of the violence, *the photograph of the security forces posing with his dead body*, reminds me of what Thomas Gregory talks about with the Kill Team in Afghanistan.[259] He argues that the Maywand District murders were so brutal that the corporeal remains of the victims were no longer recognizable as human beings. The autopsy report on Birlik states that 15 bullets were fatal; there are valid suspicions that security forces kept shooting at him even after he died.[260] His hip and arm were destroyed by a bigger gun, fired from a closer range. The right side of his body was completely crushed, indicating that his dead body was likely run over by the armored vehicle dragging him.

Following M'bembe's original formulation, where necropolitics is understood as population management by exercising the right to kill, Gregory does not read the Maywand District murder through a necropolitical lens. However, we have established earlier that necropolitics should not be limited to the right to kill. Population management is not limited to deciding which population shall live and which population must die; management also covers how the (sub)populations shall live and die. Necropolitics is also about "dishonoring, disciplining, and [punishing] the living through the utilization of the dead as postmortem objects and sites of violence".[261]

[259] Gregory, "Dismembering the Dead".
[260] Kamer, HDP'li Birlik: Sürüklenen akrabam yaralı ele geçirildikten sonra infaz edildi"; "Otopsi raporu: Şırnak'ta cesedi yerlerde sürüklenen Hacı Lokman Birlik'e 28 mermi isabet etmiş! [Autopsy Report: 28 bullets found on Hacı Lokman Birlik, whose corpse was dragged on the streets]," *T24*, October 5, 2015, https://t24.com.tr/haber/otopsi-raporu-sirnakta-cesedi-yerlerde-suruklenen-haci-lokman-birlike-28-mermi-isabet-etmis,311902.
[261] Bargu, "Another Necropolitics".

We should not overlook the theatrical elements of Birlik's case. The 28 bullets found in his body, running over his dead body with an armored vehicle, dragging the body on the streets, and publishing these acts on social media are performative actions. Here, I do not refer to performativity as understood by John Austin or Judith Butler. They are performative in a theatrical sense, like the lynchings in the US were. The violence is made possible by dehumanization, while it is simultaneously dehumanizing. Yet, it is not simply an "irrational" act that comes from enmity, fury, and matrixes of intelligibility regarding who counts as human. It is systemic and rational enough that "someone" wanted Leyla Birlik and the rest of Turkey to witness the state of Hacı Lokman Birlik. What is being witnessed, however, is not Hacı Lokman, or Kevser Eltürk, as the individuals they are. The captions on the pictures and the statements of state agents illustrate this; we witness the mutilated and desecrated state of "the terrorist", "the Kurdish separatist", "those who defied the state"…

Let us take a closer look at some of these statements. Violence inflicted on Birlik was so brutal that one cannot help but wonder if any actor could ever justify it. There has not been a unified and coherent narrative from the regime's side. The first official statement came from the Ministry of the Interior: "an investigation started regarding the incident which allegedly took place in Şırnak and circulated on social media. The Republic of Turkey is a constitutional state. Our counterterrorism operation will continue in a determined fashion adhering to the rule of law".[262] The word 'alleged' in the ministry's statement is indicative of the disbelief that was widely shared in social media regarding whether the visuals are authentic. However, the clouds of suspicion were lifted as the pro-government media outlet *Sabah* confirmed that the visuals

[262] "Tartışma Yaratan Kareyi Sabah Doğruladı [Sabah Confirmed the Controversial Image]," *OdaTv*, October 4, 2015, https://www.odatv4.com/siyaset/tartisma-yaratan-kare-0410151200-82565.

were real. *Sabah* claimed that this is a routine counterterrorism measure all around the world against the possibility that the corpse is instrumentalized as an explosive.[263]

This justification trivializes the act as a routine, nothing exceptional, and represents it as something technical - a biopolitical necessity of risk management that functions through the body. Moreover, it reorders the Self and Other dynamics. The action of the Self that might seem barbaric is, in fact, a biopolitical technicality to protect life; it is the Other who is barbaric and does not respect their own dead by instrumentalizing them as weapons.

As the indignation among the public grew, PM Davutoğlu made a statement:

> We cannot possibly approve those visuals about this member of a terrorist organization who was neutralized by the security forces while attacking the police forces with a rocket launcher. We gave the necessary orders to initiate the legal and administrative investigations about this issue. Such wrong acts cannot be approved, especially by our law enforcement agency who risk their lives, fight against terrorists by abiding the law, and pay maximum attention not to hurt a single civilian. I assure our nation that we will not tolerate such behavior and actions that seek to discredit our determined counterterrorism operations' legitimacy and lawful grounds. Despite all barbarism of the terrorist organization, Turkey will continue its struggle against terrorism by following the law.[264]

Davutoğlu's speech can be unpacked in a myriad of ways, but I will focus on a few points relevant to our discussion. To begin with, like the Ministry of the Interior's text, Davutoğlu's statement highlights the rule of law – here alone, three times. We should not forget about the state of the conflict when Birlik's case occurred. In October 2015 in Şırnak, when and where he was killed, the city was sealed off and under curfew. Urban warfare had been going on in several areas, and the news of civilian casualties and the desecration of dead bodies were causing tension in the public. In other words, the incident happened during a time when the legitimacy of counterterrorism operations had been constantly questioned due to the level of state violence. Therefore, with statements like "Turkey will continue abiding by the rule of

[263] "PKK'lı teröristin cesedinin sırrı ortaya çıktı [The secret behind the PKK terrorist's corpse is revealed]," *Sabah*, October 4, 2015, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/10/04/pkkli-teroristin-cesedinin-sirri-ortaya-cikti.
[264] "Demirtaş'ın Twitter'da paylaştığı fotoğrafla ilgili soruşturma [Investigation for the picture Demirtaş shared on Twitter]," *BBC News Türkçe*, October 5, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151004_demirtas_fotograf_sirnak.

law" and "lawful grounds of the operations", state agents go beyond Birlik's case and seek to legitimize previous acts whose legitimacy has been questioned.

The normative violence of postmortem violence continues through discourse. The violence that reduces the insurgents to their corporeal remains, leaving them unrecognizable as individuals, and even human beings, is hidden in the text. The individuality of the subject is not recognized. The vague language we could see in the Mayoral Offices' statements shows itself in the PM's text as well. The subject: *Hacı Lokman Birlik*, is: a *'member of a terrorist organization'*; what happened to him is: *'those visuals,'* and *'such wrong acts'.* Furthermore, although Davutoğlu claims that they cannot approve 'such wrong acts', he adds that 'the terrorist' was initiating an attack with a rocket launcher, which has not been proven and remains controversial. What the security forces did might be wrong, but the PM reminds us that the "victim" was, in fact, a "perpetrator".

It brings us to another performative function of the PM's statement; a particular image of the Self and Other is (re)produced. The law-abiding heroic security forces who risk their lives, yet do not hurt civilians, fight against the barbaric enemy who attacks the security forces with rocket launchers. The Turkish military does not kill; they "neutralize" threats. The military follows the law, whereas the savage enemy does not have rules and laws. In this image, the Turkish state fulfills its biopolitical duties of protecting and elevating its population's life by eliminating the threatening (sub)population.

Portraying counterterrorism operations as a biopolitical technology also structures the security dynamics. Besides the obvious physical threat of the terrorists against the public and the security forces, another process of securitization functions in the background. It is not along the lines of the Copenhagen School, where an existential threat moves from the realm of politics to the sphere of security, but rather an issue discussed with reference to security. The legitimacy

of counterterrorism operations is constructed as the referent object. The visibility of postmortem violence becomes a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the counterterrorism campaign.

This subtle securitization process can be seen both in discourse and practice. The Mayoral Offices' narratives in the previous cases and Davutoğlu's statement highlight the credibility and legitimacy of the counterterrorism operations. Two weeks after the Birlik incident, Davutoğlu made another statement where he said: "because they shot this video, exhibited this behavior, and discredited the legitimate and democratic nature of counterterrorism operations, two members of the security forces have been dismissed from their positions. We have received information that this was an organized and calculated act".[265] Building on the claim that this was an organized plot against the legitimacy of the operations, the pro-government media assisted the securitizing narratives by claiming that the visuals were taken and published by members of the terrorist Gülen sect that had infiltrated the police force.[266]

The traditional idea that there is a strict syntactic hierarchy in a grammatically correct sentence is challenged by critical discourse analysts. As Teun van Dijk argues, "often the same meanings may be expressed in different syntactic categories of variable scope, depending on contextual constraints".[267] Therefore, how the sentence is structured reveals hints on power and ideology.[268] Starting the sentence with 'because they shot this video' orders the value of things. Furthermore, 'exhibiting this behavior' is another ambiguous signifier that Davutoğlu uses,

[265] "Lokman Birlik'in sürüklenmesi: İki polis açığa alındı [Dragging Lokman Birlik: Two police officers were dismissed]," *BBC News Türkçe*, October 15, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151012_sirnak_goruntu.
[266] "FETÖ'cü Polisten Demirtaş'a WhatsApp'tan Canlı Yayın [Live WhatsApp Broadcast of FETÖ's Police for Demirtaş]," *A Haber*, May 8, 2018, https://www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2018/05/08/fetocu-polisten-demirtasa-whatsapptan-canli-yayin.
[267] Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse Semantics and Ideology:," *Discourse & Society*, July 26, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926595006002006, p.257.
[268] Teun Adrianus van Dijk, *Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Dimensions of Discourse* (Academic Press, 1985); Fairclough, *Language and Power* .

like ‘such wrong acts’ in his previous speech. Davutoğlu, the Mayoral Offices, and the Ministry of the Interior have never named and explicitly condemned postmortem violence and the display of dead bodies. Therefore, we do not know whether ’such wrong acts’ or ‘these behaviors’, which cannot be accepted by the regime, refer to the violence, shooting and publishing the visuals, or both.

In both the naked display of the female fighters and the case of Birlik, legal and administrative actions only targeted the personnel who shot and published the visuals. Even though the PM claimed that two police officers were dismissed, there had been no legal action against those who conducted the violence. Although desecrating dead bodies is a criminal act in domestic and international law, the act has not never been named as “desecrating a dead body”, let alone legal action taken. Therefore, in practice, it seems as though what cannot be accepted by the regime is more the publishing of visuals than the mutilation of dead bodies. Albeit state officials do not openly endorse postmortem violence, the state protects the perpetrators through legal and administrative apparatuses. Even though there were around 30 police officers next to Birlik’s dead body, the Police Office named only 6 personnel to the prosecutor, and an investigation started against 2 police officers for distributing the visuals.[269] In Eltürk’s case, the Chief of Police denied any responsibility and claimed that probably the crime investigation team that came from another city took the photographs.[270] No legal action has ever been taken in Eltürk’s case.

In short, alongside postmortem violence, visibility and invisibility appear as critical components of dead body management. Once again, I would like to remind the reader that I do not claim that the state rationally and deliberately organizes everything. I also do not entirely

[269] “Davutoğlu’nun ‘Hacı Birlik’i sürükleyen polisler görevden alındı’ açıklamasına HDP’den yalanlama [The HDP disproved Davutoğlu's claim that "police officers who dragged Hacı Birlik are dismissed"],”.
[270] Eren Keskin, “Kader Kevser Eltürk (Ekin Van) Olayına Dair İnceleme Raporu [Examination Report of the Kader Kevsel Elturk Incident],” Special Report (Insan Haklari Dernegi [Human Rights Association]), September 4, 2015), https://www.ihd.org.tr/kader-kevser-elturk-ekin-van-olayina-dair-inceleme-raporu/.

rule out the possibility that the state administers dead body management through its various apparatuses in a deliberate and organized way. The actors' motivations and whether they coordinated with each other are simply irrelevant here. Postmortem violence, its display, the associated legal measures, or their lack of, are the actions and discourses constituting dead body management.

I have argued that corporeal visibility and discursive invisibility work together, producing normative power alongside bio/necropower. Following Bargu's conceptualization, necropolitical violence dishonors, disciplines, and punishes the living population. Methodological concerns have not been taken seriously in the studies of necropolitics. The researcher usually looks at events and decides that the act is necropolitical. The violence is published and circulated on social media or directly sent to people, such as Leyla Birlik, meaning that there was a desire for people to witness it despite the state agents' attempts to hide it. Therefore, to discuss the necropolitical functions of postmortem violence, I find it necessary to look at how the receiving audience interprets it.

4.2 Unpacking Necropolitics: Languages of Violence

Even though necropolitics and normative violence work hand in hand, necropower requires more scrutiny. We have established that the approaches to necropolitics that understand necropolitics as population management, not merely by exterminating (sub)populations but by disciplining and punishing them through exposure to death and the dead, implicitly conceptualizes violence as language. Political violence is considered a form of language, particularly in insurgency wars, since the insurgents are left without other means of communication.[271] The state or para-military groups, on the other hand, often resort to violence

[271] Christopher Cramer, *Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries* (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2006); H. van der Merwe, "Violence as a Form of Communication: Making Sense of Violence in South Africa," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 3 (January 1, 2013): 65-84–84; Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (London ; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1982).

to send a message to the civilians who support or are sympathetic to the insurgency. Regardless of whether the perpetrator is the state or the insurgents, biological bodies become a site through which messages are conveyed. We then need to examine what this message is and what it performs.

After studying the narratives of the Kurdish politicians, civil society, feminist organizations, and the opposition media, I have identified three themes, discourses, or interpretations of violence repeated in these narratives. These discourses are not necessarily from distinct actors or narratives; the third discourse in particular can be found with the others in a single text or speech. In the first discourse, the gendered elements of postmortem violence are highlighted; this discourse proposes (deviant) women as the target of the violence and the primary audience. The function of postmortem violence is interpreted as disciplining femininities and punishing women. In the second discourse, postmortem violence is regarded as political revenge that targets the entire Kurdish population. Finally, the third discourse does not focus on the target (audience); rather, it suggests that postmortem violence sends a message about the state by showing "its faces".

4.2.1 Targeting Women: Disciplining Deviant Femininities

The paradigm change in PKK in 2004 has had a strong influence on the political and civilian Kurdish movements. Following the feminist principles suggested by the prominent leaders of the PKK, such as Abdullah Öcalan and Sakine Cansız, Kurdish politicians have been voicing the gendered features of postmortem violence in parliament. The actors, who interpret this violence as a disciplinary force targeting women, go beyond the ethnic Kurdishness and include Turkish feminist journalists, scholars, and public figures. They share a common view that postmortem violence and the naked display of female insurgents is a patriarchal technology that seeks to discipline and punish women whose femininities challenge the "ideal women" that the regime envisions.

This interpretation that identifies the target audience as women shows varieties regarding *which* women are being targeted and where the violence is rooted. First, some feminist circles suggest that the violence inflicted on the Kurdish women insurgents' dead bodies targets all women. For example, in a text where she offers her interpretation of Eltürk's case, feminist scholar Nazan Üstündağ reminds us that while the nation-state constructs its nationhood and national identity, it simultaneously constructs gender roles and identities, and it defines national masculinities and femininities.[272] As apparatuses of the state, the police and the military protect the national femininities and masculinities while protecting national identity. War, Üstündağ argues, creates a rupture in these identities. Within war, women who do not fit the ideal national femininity are punished; in ethnic conflicts, women's bodies become even more significant because sexual(ized) violence against women punishes and humiliates men, women, and the entire population simultaneously.

Üstündağ explicitly considers the violence inflicted on Eltürk's body as language. In her words, "Ekin Wan (Kevsel Eltürk) was punished, and a message to a population is inscribed on her dead body by stripping her naked: Death will not be the end of you".[273] Which population is this message targeting? Even though Üstündağ acknowledges that women's bodies are instrumentalized to target men or the entire community, in her narrative, she tries to reach women throughout Turkey. She argues that by investing in the dead, particularly by inflicting violence on and sexualizing women's dead bodies, the state extends its punishment mechanisms to after-death and penetrates the spheres traditionally seen as private and intimate.

[272] Nazan Üstündağ, "Ekin Wan'ın bedeninde ifşa olan devlet ya da kadınlar sıra bizde [The disclosure of the state through Ekin Wan's body or women, it is our turn]," *Evrensel*, August 23, 2015, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258899/ekin-wanin-bedeninde-ifsa-olan-devlet-ya-da-kadinlar-sira-bizde?a=2e1e4.

[273] Ibid. "Death will not be the end of you", originally "ölmekle kalmayacaksınız" can also be translated as "you will not only die but also…"

Üstündağ explicitly addresses the women in the "west" (western Turkey, a term also used to define the non-Kurdish population) and warns them not to dismiss this case because it happens to Kurdish women. In her words, "this concerns us too, us in the west. Because, surely, the space for women will close down. As the state penetrates these spheres, their femininities and bodies will be a target too. They will be punished with a grand ceremony once they step outside the 'state-femininity'".[274] According to her, this is a new stance, a new struggle of the Turkish state - an effort to assert itself in every private, familial, religious, and sexual sphere. Therefore, she argues, "Currently, it is not the Kurds who are the subject of extermination and denial. It is women!".[275]

This view is repeated by many actors, especially by the Kurdish politicians. For example, Çilem Küçükkeleş, HDP's Mersin representative, offers her and her party's interpretation in an inquiry they posed to the Minister of the Interior:

> What happened to Kevser Eltürk (Ekin Wan)'s body is exactly the same inhumane practices as in the 1990s, which are still fresh in people's memories, such as torture, tying the guerilla's dead bodies with rope and dragging them, and the mutilation of body parts. Moreover, torture on Eltürk's body and displaying her naked is the continuation of a war tactic employed against women for centuries. When we consider the humiliating words against women by the men in governmental positions, the level of violence against women, and the sexual and physical violence against women's bodies all around the world, including Turkey, it is crystal clear to us that this incident is an example of punishment of women by the patriarchy.[276]

The temporal elements in Deputy Küçükkeleş's inquiry are important. By going beyond the 1990s, she also moves the discussion beyond merely ethnic features. In public memory, the 1990s equates to violence against the Kurdish population. By highlighting the continuation of violence throughout centuries, Küçükkeleş conceptualizes this violence as predominantly violence against women. The function of this violence is 'crystal clear' for her, which is the patriarchal punishment of women.

[274] Ibid.
[275] Ibid.
[276] Çilem Küçükkeleş, Parliamentary Inquiry No: 439 (Ankara: Grand National Assembly of Turkey, August 19,2015), https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d25/7/7-1580s.pdf

As more cases of postmortem violence and naked display occurred, the interpretations of violence have become more systematic. The view that this violence targets all women has been adopted by the party and voiced by the male members of the HDP as well. For instance, responding to the cases of two women displayed in Cizre, HDP's Deputy Chairman İdris Baluken said:

> Earlier, Ekin Wan's dead body was subject to inhumane torture and displayed naked. Today, another woman in Cizre was subject to the same inhuman violence and unfortunately displayed naked. We condemn this cowardly rationality that regards torturing a dead body as heroic. We curse this inhumane treatment enforced on *all women* through this woman in Cizre who was slaughtered.[277]

Although he does not explicitly name this violence as a war tactic, like the other deputies, by arguing that the violence was enforced on all women through this one individual woman in Cizre, or Ekin Wan as an individual, Baluken implicitly highlights women's bodies becoming a medium for such patriarchal state violence. Similarly, HDP's Adana representative, Meral Danış Beştaş, makes this point in another inquiry for the Minister of the Interior.[278] There she stated that women's bodies become a war zone, and through Kevser Eltürk, this systematic targeting of women as a tactic is employed again.[279]

This discourse is not limited to the HDP; civil society, particularly women's organizations, interprets it similarly. Mersin Women's Platform, for example, also announced that "The torture of Ekin Wan and the display of her naked is the masculine state's rationality's attack against womanhood as an identity and women's freedom. We condemn the efforts to

[277] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 38, February 11, 2016, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22531&P5=H&page1=7&page2=7; emphasis added

[278] In the Turkish parliamentary system, deputies/MPs/representatives are elected from the provinces/cities and they represent the city in the parliament. "Adana" in the sentence "HDP's Adana representative", then refers to the city.

[279] "Beştaş: Kevser Eltürk'e yapılanlar IŞİD barbarlığının simgesi haline gelmiş uygulamalardır [Beştaş: What happened to Kevser Eltürk are practices that have become the symbol of the IS' barbarism]," Halkların Demokratik Partisi, accessed June 7, 2022, https://hdp.org.tr/tr/bestas-kevser-elturk-e-yapilanlar-isid-barbarliginin-simgesi-haline-gelmis-uygulamalardir/6301.

undermine women and their freedom".[280] More examples can be found, but they share a common theme: this form of violence is regarded as something systematic, a continuation of a war tactic that has been employed for centuries, of which the perpetrator is not simply the security forces but the patriarchy. In this discourse, Eltürk and the other numerous, unfortunately nameless, women were stripped naked because they were women. The patriarchal state has been subjecting women to sexual and physical violence for centuries; this is only a continuation. Therefore, even if the message is for the Kurds, which some actors contest as they deem the message is for women as well, this component of dead body management puts every woman in its sights.

There are also nuanced discourses that specify *which* women are the target and give more explicit explanations as to why women are being punished, acknowledging here the interpretation of postmortem violence as a form of punishment. These narratives do not contest that the audience is all women; however, they suggest that what and who is being punished is the resisting women. This is evident in the narrative of Benazir Coşkun, a member of HDP women assemblies. Echoing Üstündağ's points, Coşkun also sees the violence as "an expression of the state's enmity and anger against women", and argues that "in all dirty wars, women's bodies become sites of war. Women's bodies are used to convey a message".[281] She continues, it is "A message to women who are resisting. They are threatening the public / populations by torturing dead bodies".[282]

This discourse indicates that the *target audience* is the public, or all women, but the *targeted population* is resisting women. It constructs postmortem violence as a technology with

[280] Hazal Öksüz, "Mersin Kadın Platformu: 'Ekin Wan Çırılçıplak Onurumuzdur' [Mersin Women's Platform: "Ekin Wan Is Our Naked Honor]," *Bianet*, August 18, 2015, https://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/166929-mersin-kadin-platformu-ekin-wan-cirilciplak-onurumuzdur.
[281] "'Kadın Bedenini Teşhir Eden Devlet Kendini Çırılçıplak Soyuyor'" [The State That Displays Women's Bodies Is Stripping Itself Naked]," *Dicle Haber Ajansi*, February 14, 2016, http://www.diclehaber.com/tr/news/content/view/499673?from=1251254157
[282] Ibid.

disciplining motivations and functions., The HDP representatives (re)produce this discourse, exemplified in Coşkun's speech, in the parliament as well. HDP's Batman MP, Ayşe Acar Başaran, for example, reminds the grand assembly about Kevser Eltürk and the other female guerillas subjected to postmortem violence in Silopi and Cizre. Başaran argues, "the real reason behind the naked display of dead bodies is to intimidate all women who fight for a feminist cause. We all know that the regime's purpose is to suppress women, Kurdish women, and the Kurdish population and keep them from resisting".[283] Similarly, in a heated debate in the parliament, HDP's Diyarbakır MP, Çağlar Demirel, named the systematic display of women's dead bodies as "a strike against the women's fight (cause/struggle)".[284]

In this discourse, the function of violence is very strategic and systematic. The regime not only wants to punish the "resisting women" but also seeks to display the corporeal signs of this punishment. The disciplining functions reside in the technologies of visibility. By rendering the violence visible, the regime seeks to intimidate other resisting women. The living resistant women are being exposed to the dead with the purpose of intimidating them and preventing them from resisting. At this point, we should remember the discursive construction, or perception, of PKK's women fighters. Due to their sexuality, position on women's emancipation, experience as armed fighters who defy Turkish patriotism, PKK's women fighters and the women of the Kurdish civilian/political movement are perceived and represented as ontological threats. The regime combats this ontological threat through discursive means, such as closing the public space for such deviant subjectivities or representing Kurdish women as perverted monsters.

[283] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 39, February 16, 2016 https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=44340.
[284] Ibid., It is the same session, yet since the minutes are long the relevant part can be found in the next pages: https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=44342

In this discourse, the security forces are an apparatus, a technology of the regime in their campaign against these women as physical and ontological threats. The regime targets the dead because they feel threatened. A group representing the socialist feminists, for instance, made a statement:

> The women are resisting! They are resisting against the state's military and police. They are resisting in a way that the regime manifested its masculinity on dead women, the masculinity that it failed to show when these women were alive. They are scared like crazy of the living women, thus they took revenge on their dead bodies, in their own way. Because the women are resisting![285]

I deem this discourse is still aligned with a necropolitical approach to violence; however, it does not necessarily consider postmortem violence as a message with disciplining functions. It proposes postmortem violence as almost something reactionary, an affective act of revenge, a performance of failed masculinity. It is necropolitical, not because of its disciplining functions, like Bargu suggests, but rather, it is population management by exterminating an undesired population: the resisting women.

The image of the resisting, thus threatening, women is repeated on many other platforms. To illustrate, a more nuanced interpretation appears in an opposition newspaper where the author, Mehveş Evin, claims "the model of femininity in Kobane is an essential threat to the regime who regards women's national responsibility as giving birth… Maybe this is why the psychological warfare within the military operations, that take place in the streets, neighborhoods, and households, is also taking place on women's bodies".[286] The model of femininity in Kobane Evin talks about, is armed women, organized horizontally as women's brigades, who openly adopted women's emancipation as one of their goals. This "model" is a

[285] "SYKP Kadın Meclisi: Çıplak ve ölü bedeni yere serilmesin diye direniyordu kadınlar! [SYKP Women's Assembly: Women are resisting not to lay dead and naked on the ground]," *Siyasi Haber*, February 12, 2016, http://siyasihaber4.org/sykp-kadin-meclisi-ciplak-ve-olu-bedeni-yere-serilmesin-diye-direniyordu-kadinlar.
[286] Mehveş Evin, "Soyulmuş Ölü Kadın Bedeni, Neyin Intikamı? [Naked Dead Body of a Woman Is the Revenge of What?]," *Diken*, February 12, 2016, http://www.diken.com.tr/soyulmus-olu-kadin-bedeni-neyin-intikami/.

threat because as autonomous units fighting for their own principles, they defy the regime's ideal docile woman who should contribute to the nation by giving birth.

4.2.2 Targeting the Kurds: Revenge

So far, I have presented and discussed the interpretations of postmortem violence and technologies of visibility that identifies the target group as women, Kurdish women, and resisting and/or deviant women. Other interpretations take the target group one step further and propose that the target group is the entire Kurdish population. Similar to the previous discursive theme, these discourses interpret violence as disciplining the Kurdish population or seeking revenge. The reason for revenge seems to be different in these discourses. Some of the narratives constituting this discourse are gendered; however, instead of the ontological threat of these deviant women, they highlight, and sometimes reproduce, the patriarchal relationship between women's bodies, the nation, and honor.

To begin with, a common interpretation of the increasing cases of postmortem violence suggests that the Kurdish population is being punished for the June 7th general elections. On 7 June 2015, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) lost its majority in the parliament for the first time. The effective campaign of HDP's co-chairs, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, played a significant role. Due to the 10% threshold to enter the parliament as a party, the Kurdish political movement had joined the elections by nominating independent candidates from the predominantly Kurdish cities until the 2015 elections. In 2015, the HDP decided to join the elections as a party, an action widely regarded as a gamble since they faced the risk of having no seats in the parliament if they could not pass the threshold.[287] Although

[287] "HDP Eş Genel Başkanı Selahattin Demirtaş Muharrem Sarıkaya'ya konuştu: Seçimi AİHM'e götürürüz [HDP's Co-Chair Demirtaş spoke to Muharrem Sarıkaya: We will take the election to ECHR]," *HaberTürk*, May 20, 2015, sec. gundem, https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1080414-selahattin-demirtas-secimi-aihme-gotururuz.

there was no significant decrease in the AKP's votes, they lost the majority because the HDP had more seats than before as they passed the 10% threshold.

This view is more common in an informal setting; it is voiced on the streets, cafes, and social media. It is something I have heard often during the time I have spent in Kurdish community centers in Cologne: *looking at the TV showing the same channel non-stop, reporting the news of yet another case of a mutilated insurgent,* the old man sitting next to me suddenly said, "they could not digest the elections yet".[288] When I asked him if he could elaborate, he continued, "yes, they are not over the June elections. They are punishing the Kurds because of the election results". A young man sitting at another table jumped in the conversation, "I do not think so. You must remember it, know it, better than us. They were doing this in the 1990s as well". The old man replied, "Sure. But, then… why did this violence start exactly after the elections?"[289] The old man's comment caused a brief silence in the room before the conversation moved to another topic.

His comment left even me confused, and I had not ever found the explanation of "revenge for the elections" satisfactory. The temporal element that he was highlighting is interesting. It sounds convincing since postmortem violence, and even other violent elements of dead body management, was not this prominent in the 2004-2013 period of the conflict. It re-started and dramatically increased after the peace process failed and parties went back to the conflict in 2015, following the June elections. It is even more common among the public to consider returning to the conflict as revenge for the elections or a strategical move for the November elections. Dead body management, or postmortem violence -to be more precise-, appears as an exercise of revenge within a revenge campaign (counterinsurgency operations).

[288] Fieldnotes, Cologne, March 2018.
[289] Ibid.

A more important element regarding temporality is the rupture and continuity it highlights. When the first instances of postmortem violence and the displaying of dead bodies occurred in 2015, opposition media outlets, civil society, politicians, and many other actors raised their concerns about whether Turkey was going back to the 1990s.[290] Parliamentary records show that HDP deputies noted these actions' longer history, as they reminded people about the 1938 Dersim rebellion, where security forces posed with a decapitated head.[291] State violence on dead bodies is not new for the Kurdish population. However, this is an interrupted continuation. "Going *back* to the 90s" indicates a sense of progression. Going back not only refers to going back to a past time in a linear temporality; it also refers to a rupture. It is going back to a practice that has been considered abandoned, a level of violence that is believed to no longer exist.

A more common interpretation proposes that the target audience is the Kurdish population but does not necessarily consider postmortem violence as revenge. HDP deputy, Ayşe Acar Başaran, reminds the members of the grand assembly that "when desecrating dead bodies and publishing them on social media, the state thinks they are punishing the individual, but alongside the individual, they are punishing the family and the entire population".[292] Many are convinced that punishing a larger aggregate group is what the state wants anyways. For example, in response to the display of a female insurgent in Cizre, four months after the Eltürk case, the Diyarbakır Bar Association stated: "There is no doubt that the purpose of defamation of the deceased is defamation and provocation of the Kurdish population. The suspects seek to

[290] Karin Karakaşlı, "'Cizre halkından güç almaya gidiyorum' ["I'm going to get strength from the people of Cizre]," *Agos*, September 26, 2015, https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/12849/cizre-halkindan-guc-almaya-gidiyorum.
[291] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 24, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 44, December 21, 2011 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21085&P5=B&page1=43&page2=43
[292] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 38, December 15, 2017, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=64658

send a message to the people of Cizre and the Kurdish community, and to provoke them by the inhumane and humiliating acts they had committed".[293] This narrative interprets violence as language; however, it does not interpret the message. Instead, it highlights the act's motivations and/or implications, which are listed as provocation and defamation.

Hacı Lokman Birlik's brother also sees the violence inflicted on his brother as language, and he interprets it as such, "I [the state] have the power to ban your language, culture, and life. I can establish domination, even over your dead body".[294] Birlik's brother's interpretation does not indicate a reactionary notion of revenge; instead, it points to a more systematic mechanism. This discourse displays the necropower in play. Power stratifies the population and manages the sub-population's life and culture by dominating their bodies. A colonizing machine is attached to the war machine, and this assemblage connects to the body machine. Necropower targets the Kurdish population but manages them by oppression and discipline instead of extermination.

From Birlik to female insurgents, to the civilians in Cizre, all people subject to postmortem violence are Kurdish; these discourses identify the target as the Kurdish population, often highlighting the victims' Kurdish identity. Gendered elements come back when the target population is interpreted as the Kurdish population in the cases of sexualized violence on the female insurgents' dead bodies. The disciplining functions of necropower come back to the scene in this discourse. Notably, in the discourse that identifies the target population as women, necropower disciplines deviant femininities. However, in the discourse that

[293] "Diyarbakır Barosu'ndan Cizre'de öldürülen kadınları teşhir eden görevliler hakkında suç duyurusu [Criminal complaint from Diyarbakir Bar Assocciation against the security forces who displayed dead bodies of women in Cizre]," *T24*, February 12, 2016, https://t24.com.tr/haber/diyarbakir-barosundan-cizrede-oldurulen-kadinlari-teshir-eden-gorevliler-hakkinda-suc-duyurusu,327946.

[294] "İnsanlığın Belleğine Nakşedilen Bir Resim: Hacı Lokman Birlik [An Image Carved on the Humanity's Memory]," *Gazete Patika*, October 4, 2021, https://gazetepatika16.com/insanligin-bellegine-naksedilen-bir-resim-haci-lokman-birlik-24344.html.

identifies postmortem violence as revenge or punishment and the target audience as the Kurdish population, necropower disciplines the Kurds through women's bodies.

Following the Eltürk incident, HDP's deputy co-chair Meral Danış Beştaş proposed an inquiry where she said, "Is the ferocity that happened to Kevser Eltürk, and the latest inhumane actions of torture, execution, massacre, and sexual assaults, a war tactic that is re-employed against the Kurdish population?"[295] Diyarbakır Bar Association believes that the purpose of this violence is "defamation and provocation of the Kurdish population.[296] The old man in the community center reminded us that the Eltürk incident occurred right after the election results; thus, it is an act of revenge. Civil society and women's organizations also claimed that the Kurdish population is targeted and being punished as a response to the increasing sexual violence on female insurgents' dead bodies. Nurcan Baysal, a Kurdish journalist, said, "the state thinks that when they strip the Kurds naked, they will make the Kurds bow and obey".[297] These examples illustrate the relationship between gender and the nation, wherein women are perceived as cultural and biological reproducers of the nation; thus, by sexually assaulting women, parties of the conflict seek to hurt the enemy nation.[298]

However, sexual assault of women in war cannot be reduced to material and biological reproduction. Gendered conceptions of honor play a critical role in this relationship between sexual violence and the nation. Sexual violence, especially rape, is often used to humiliate men and the entire nation.[299] Following traditional gender roles, sexual violence against women in

[295] "Beştaş."
[296] "Diyarbakır Barosu'ndan Cizre'de öldürülen kadınları teşhir eden görevliler hakkında suç duyurusu [Criminal complaint from Diyarbakir Bar Assocciation against the security forces who displayed dead bodies of women in Cizre]."
[297] Nurcan Baysal, "Kürdü Çıplak Soymak [Stripping the Kurd Naked]," *T24*, October 10, 2017, https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/nurcan-baysal/kurdu-ciplak-soymak,18262.
[298] For the relationship between the gender and nation see, Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (SAGE Publications, 1997).
[299] Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond* (London ; New York, NY : Uppsala, Sweden: Zed Books, 2013).

war challenges the masculine identity of "the protector", thus serving an emasculating function. Sexual violence within "your territory" seriously disrupts the gendered myth of protection; the masculine state fails to protect the feminized territory and nation, and men fail to protect the women - the promise that the illusion of protection rests on.

Moreover, particularly in Islamic contexts, idealized femininity is associated with purity and chastity. In the so-called honor culture, women's purity and chastity are the family's honor that must be protected at any cost. What follows is that the purity of the nation is associated with the purity of the nation's women.[300] Therefore, many then seemingly consider postmortem violence defamation or the punishment of the Kurdish population because the violence desecrates the dead body; the wounds on the sex organs and displaying the body naked make the body impure. The dead body is not merely a material waste; it is a *woman's* body. It dishonors the nation in patriarchal rationality. Therefore, in this discourse, power targets the Kurdish population.

Although gender plays a key role in making sense of the violence, unlike the discourse that identifies the target population as women, necropower here targets the Kurdish population through women's bodies. In the former, the necropower targeting women seeks to discipline women and femininities; in the latter, it seeks to punish the Kurdish population by "dishonoring" the bodies and to deter them from resisting. However, by doing so, it simultaneously reproduces and reinforces the patriarchal relationship between women's bodies and the nation. The interpretation of postmortem violence as targeting the entire Kurdish population do not explicitly state this. However, if the state punishes the Kurdish population through women's bodies, it implies that all Kurdish women are targeted. After all, if the

[300] Laura Sjoberg, *Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War* (Columbia University Press, 2013).

purpose is to punish the population by targeting "their women", any Kurdish woman can be potentially subject to state violence.

4.2.3 Faces of the State, Self, and Other

> *Let vows of fit respect pass both, when conquest hath bestow'd*
> *His wreath on either. Here I vow no fury shall be show'd*
> *That is not manly, on thy corse; but, having spoil'd thy arms,*
> *Resign thy person; which swear thou.*
> *(Iliad Book XXII, ll. 219-22).*

When Hector of Troy faces blood-thirsty Achilles seeking revenge for Patroclus, he proposes to Achilles that no dead body should be treated with rage regardless of who ends up victorious. Refusing Hector's proposal, Achilles ties Hector's dead body to his chariot after killing him and drags the body back to the Greek camp, then around Patroclus' tomb. Still thirsty for revenge, Achilles keeps degrading Hector's body. Even the gods sympathize with Hector; Apollo denounces Achilles before the rest of the gods, saying:

> One that hath neither heart
> Nor soul within him that will move or yield to any part
> That fits a man, but lion-like, uplandish, and mere wild,
> Slave to his pride, and all his nerves being naturally compil'd
> Of eminent strength, stalks out and preys upon a silly sheep[301]

Even Zeus, a supporter of Achilles, is convinced and advocates for ending the degradation of Hector's body in a way that does not injure Achille's honor. The story and Apollo's words shows us that degrading a dead body is considered a savage and dishonorable act. One of its functions is triggering sympathy for the victim, while another reveals the perpetrator's bestial, raw, and barbaric side.

A common interpretation of postmortem violence suggests that it also sends a message about the perpetrator. This discourse differs from the other discourses that explicitly identified the target and the message. Even though it does not offer us an interpretation of who the target audience of violence is, it is still a discursive interpretation of violence and quite prevalent in

[301] (Id., ll. 41-45)

public discourse, thus, deserving inquiry. Since the perpetrators are security forces and the law protects them, violence reveals the face of the state. Postmortem violence can send two messages at the same time. While it is interpreted as sending a message to women or the Kurdish population, it simultaneously tells something about the agent of violence. Therefore, this is not necessarily a distinct discourse; a text that interprets the violence as sending a message to the Kurds also tells something about the perpetrator.

The dead body, as the means of communication, is perceived as a message itself. Violence and its spectacle produce bodies as objects, objects of violence, and objects of the gaze.[302] Because the threat is already eliminated, postmortem violence is usually understood as an act that sends a message to the living; thus, transforming the dead body into an object of communication. It violates the norms regarding the dignity of the dead, revealing an actor who cannot respect even the dead. It also displays the enmity of the state toward the Kurdish population, challenging the official, and biopolitical, discourse of the state, which maintains that there is no Kurdish Question but only the question of terrorism and counterterrorism.

To begin with, a particular narrative that can be usually observed in sources close to the PKK or the Kurdish political movement offer a theoretical reading of the sexualized postmortem violence. They argue that the state is an entity, an embodiment of the institutionalized male, and the sexual state violence specifically targets political/politicized women; through sexual violence, the institutionalized male asserts dominance over the political woman. [303] At first glance, this view is no different from the first discourse that identifies the target as women. Targeting the political women is implicit; however, it also points out a dynamic about the state's Self and power. As the institutionalized male, the state desires to

[302] Philipose, "The Politics of Pain and the Uses of Torture"; Campbell, "Horrific Blindness".
[303] "'Kadın Bedenini Teşhir Eden Devlet Kendini Çırılçıplak Soyuyor' [The State That Displays Women's Bodies Is Stripping Itself Naked]."

control the private, the divine, the family, bodies, and sexuality, attempting to be omnipotent. As Benazir Coşkun argues regarding the naked display of female insurgents, "In every dirty war, women's bodies are used as objects on which a message is inscribed. The ferocious violence we are witnessing is a photograph of sovereignty".[304] Coşkun continues, "she [the displayed insurgent] is not only a woman's body anymore but a manifestation of the state's vicious methods".[305]

Particularly in the comments regarding the naked display of female insurgents, the metaphors of "stripping" and being naked are often used. We can observe it in slogans, headlines, and texts in protests, media, and the parliament, such as "the state that was disclosed in Ekin Wan's body", "the state is stripping itself naked by displaying dead bodies naked", "Ekin Wan is the naked face of the state's war", or "what is being naked is not the woman they slaughtered but the regime's rationality of war itself".[306] Another common metaphor is the faces or the masks of the state, and we should read these two metaphors together intertextually. Regarding the female insurgents displayed in Cizre, Benazir Coşkun said, "by doing this [displaying the insurgents naked], the state is pulling its mask down. They are trying to humiliate the people's and women's resistance by displaying women naked. By doing so, they are only pulling the mask down and revealing their savage sovereign acts".[307] Similarly, KJA (Free Women's Congress) activist Emine Erkan stated, "By stripping Ekin, the male state has once again pulled the cover on its own rapist male dominance, and manifested its misogyny,

[304] Ibid.
[305] Ibid.
[306] Emek Ve Adalet Platformu, "KŞKMİ: 'Ekin Wan Savaşın Çıplak Yüzüdür' [KSKMI: "Ekin Wan is the Naked Face of the War]," *Emek ve Adalet Platformu*, August 23, 2015, https://www.emekveadalet.org/alinti/ekin-wan-savasin-ciplak-yuzudur/; "Kadın Bedenini Teşhir Eden Devlet Kendini Çırılçıplak Soyuyor"; Üstündağ, "Ekin Wan'in bedeninde ifsa olan devlet ya da kadinlar sira bizde"; "Yüksekdağ: Bir Türk Kadını Olarak Bu Fotoğrafa Sessiz Kalmayı Hakaret Sayarım [Yüksekdağ: As a Turkish Woman I Take It as an Insult to Stay Silent to This Photo]," *Bianet*, February 12, 2016, https://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/172063-yuksekdag-bir-turk-kadini-olarak-bu-fotografa-sessiz-kalmayi-hakaret-sayarim.
[307] "Kadın Bedenini Teşhir Eden Devlet Kendini Çırılçıplak Soyuyor"

disrespect to any value and its own war guilt. This is why the naked body of Ekin Wan demonstrates to us the misery of fascism".[308]

This narrative assumes a real face of the state covered by a mask, a view I cannot entirely agree with because it assumes there is Truth and a fixed, underlying identity that can be revealed. This "real face" is sovereign, violent, savage, masculine, rapist, and dominating. Stripping the mutilated body naked transgresses the norm of dead bodies' purity and integrity. This discourse, however, is not limited to the comments about female insurgents. Responding to the case of Hacı Birlik in a parliamentary debate, HDP's deputy chairman İdris Baluken said, "what is dragged on the streets of Şırnak is not the dead body of a young Kurd, it is the humanity (human dignity) itself".[309] Similar comments highlighting human dignity have been voiced numerous times in the grand assembly.[310] In this rendering, only a savage would inflict violence on the dead, drag the body on streets, or strip them naked to display.

In fact, most of HDP's narratives constituting this discourse produce an image of the Other (the state) that is barbaric and savage. When HDP's co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ said, "what is being naked is not the woman they slaughtered but the regime's rationality of war itself", for example, she added, "there is no cloth that would make those who committed this savagery look like a human".[311] This notion of inhumanness, or non-humanness, is repeated on other occasions. For instance, HDP's Adana representative, Meral Danış Beştaş, claimed, "Things that were done to Kevser Eltürk are the embodiment of IS' barbarism… They are not only the extreme end of torture but also immorality, misogyny, sexist patriarchal rationality,

[308] "Thousands in Şırnak: Ekin Wan's Naked Body Is Our Honor," *ANF News*, August 10, 2015, https://anfenglish.com/women/thousands-in-sirnak-ekin-wan-s-naked-body-is-our-honor-12440.
[309] "HDP Grup Başkanvekili Baluken'in Basın Toplantısı [Press Statement of HDP's Deputy Chair Baluken]," *TBMM Meclis Haber*, October 5, 2015, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=134126.
[310] As an example see, "HDP Grup Başkanvekili Baluken'in Basın Toplantısı [Press Statement of HDP's Deputy Chair Baluken]."
[311] "Yüksekdağ: Bir Türk Kadını Olarak Bu Fotoğrafa Sessiz Kalmayı Hakaret Sayarım [Yüksekdağ: As a Turkish Woman I Take It as an Insult to Stay Silent to This Photo]."

and inhumane savagery".[312] Reference to the IS to show the regime's savagery or inhumanness is common as well. It can be observed on numerous occasions, but to illustrate one, HDP's former Mardin representative, Gülser Yıldırım, said, "the AKP is targeting Kurdish women through Ekin Wan, displaying the same unhuman rationality of the IS", or when talking about Hacı Birlik, Baluken said, "What the regime is doing is exactly the same example of the IS' barbarism".[313] The parallels they draw with IS is a rhetorical tool to stress the regime's "savagery and barbarism". However, considering they gave these speeches when the AKP regime was accused of collaborating or being complicit in the IS, this rhetorical tool simultaneously contributes to these accusations.

If the state's mask fell and its real face was revealed by engaging in postmortem violence, then what was the mask and what is under the mask? What is under the mask is rather self-evident in the texts: the savage and violent side of the state. The mask and real face metaphors are embedded in colonial and biopolitical relations. Discursive regimes at work for decades have been producing a savage and barbaric image of the Kurdish insurgents. As discussed in the previous chapter, "the baby killer" frame has played a critical role in enabling and constraining how dead bodies are managed. Against this savage and threatening Kurdish Other, the Turkish state is constructed as a civilized and civilizing force.

Considering the previous literature and discussions on Kurdistan being a colony, and M'bembe's point about the colonizers' necropower resting on the social construction of the colonized as savages, the Turkish state's image as a civilized and civilizing force has colonial underpinnings.[314] In this colonial imaging, the region is impoverished, there is no public order,

[312] "Beştaş."
[313] "Nusaybinli kadınlar: Ekin Wan direnişimizin çıplak halidir [Women of Nusaybin: Ekin Wan is the nakedness of our resistance]," *Evrensel*, August 16, 2015, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258484/nusaybinli-kadinlar-ekin-wan-direnisimizin-ciplak-halidir?a=bfa40; "HDP Grup Başkanvekili Baluken'in Basin Toplantısı [Press Statement of HDP's Deputy Chair Baluken],"
[314] Hamdi Ahmet Akkaya, "Kürt hareketinin örgütlenme süreci olarak 1970'ler [1970s as the period of the Kurdish movement's mobilization process]," *Toplum ve Bilim* 127 (2013), https://iletisim.com.tr/dergiler/toplum-ve-

and the Kurdish population dies because of the terrorist PKK; the state invests in the region and builds infrastructure, but the PKK destroys them. There is not even an issue of insurgency but rather terrorism. Therefore, a violent colonial face lies under the civilized and civilizing colonial mask. It is not only the Turkish state's mask that fell off then but also the mask of colonialism.

This colonial relationship also relates to the question of biopower and necropower. The discourse that constructs Turkey as a civilizing force also produces biopower. Through its numerous apparatuses, the state invests, builds infrastructure, identifies and neutralizes threats; the capital flows in and out of the region, deterritorializing and reterrotiralizing it. In other words, power seeks to manage, protect, elevate, and foster life against the destructive power of the PKK. With these violent practices targeting dead bodies, we see another side of the state's power. It is a power that destroys, eradicates, erases, disciplines, and punishes. Therefore, behind the mask of biopower in this discourse, the state's face is a necro/sovereign power.

4.3 Deformable Dead Bodies and Politics of Invisibility

So far, we have discussed postmortem violence that is rendered visible and how some actors interpret this form of violence. Because of its visibility, postmortem violence is considered a form of language, conveying a message to the living; thus, it has disciplining necropolitical functions. However, not all of the violence inflicted on dead bodies is rendered visible. We heard the news of how Kurdish insurgents' dead bodies were mutilated in northern Syria, following the Turkish military's incursion into the Afrin district in 2018, only from sources close to the PKK, since the agents of violence have not sought a similar form of visibility.

bilim/3/sayi-127-2013/9997/kurt-hareketinin-orgutlenme-sureci-olarak-1970ler/10194; Ismail Beşikçi, *International Colony Kurdistan* (Gomidas Inst, 2016).

There is also another form of postmortem violence that I would like to highlight. It is a form of violence that deliberately seeks invisibility - an exercise of power that rests on erasure and complete eradication of the enemy Other. It is a form of violence and power that we can observe in the massacre in the basements of three apartments in Cizre in 2016. The level of violence reached its peak around 2016 when the war spread to urban areas. Cizre was one of these urban areas; it was when and where female insurgents were displayed, and both civilian and insurgents' dead were left on the streets due to the curfew.

Amid the urban warfare, around the 41st day of the curfew, a building collapsed due to artillery fire. HDP's Şırnak representative, Faysal Sarıyıldız, claimed, based on the news he received from the ground, that there were around 28 people stuck in the basement and seven of them were dead.[315] Sarıyıldız accused the government and state officials of not sending ambulances to treat the injured. While President Erdoğan denied this accusation, PM Davutoğlu claimed that no one might be injured in the basement. One day later, AKP's deputy chairman Ömer Çelik said they sent ambulances, but either no one showed up, or the ambulance received fire from the terrorists.[316]

Meanwhile, the state-owned media outlet, TRT (Turkish Radio and Television), published a news article announcing that 60 terrorists were killed in Cizre. The news was swiftly deleted from the official website.[317] Later, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces released an official statement declaring that 20 "separatist terrorists" were neutralized

[315] Mehmet Efe Altay, "Cizre'de bodrum kat karanlığı; ilk günden bugüne neler yaşandı? [The darkness of the basement; what has happened since day one?]," *T24*, February 8, 2016, https://t24.com.tr/haber/cizrede-bodrum-kat-karanligi-ilk-gunden-bugune-neler-yasandi,327392.
[316] Ibid.
[317] "TRT, 'Cizre'de Bodrum Kat Operasyonunda 60 PKK'lı Terörist Öldürüldü' Haberini Yayından Kaldırdı! [TRT Deleted the News of '60 PKK Terrorists Were Killed in a Basement in Cizre']," *T24*, February 8, 2016, https://t24.com.tr/haber/trt-cizrede-bodrum-kat-operasyonunda-60-pkkli-terorist-olduruldu-haberini-yayindan-kaldirdi,327316.

in Cizre.[318] Following the TRT's news, Sarıyıldız reminded the public that there were 62 people trapped in another basement, and some of them were children, raising suspicions that TRT was trying to conceal a civilian massacre. It is debated whether they were all civilians or members of the PKK; local sources reported that they were unarmed, and the crime investigation units found no weapons in the basement, yet it is difficult to determine who is a civilian in insurgency wars.[319]

"The basement crisis" ended with the destruction of the buildings, leaving around 130 to 178 dead.[320] According to Human Rights Watch, more than 130 unarmed people were killed by Turkish security forces in three different basements.[321] Reports from the UN and local human rights NGOs, based on eyewitnesses and autopsy reports, note that most dead bodies were burned or severely damaged by artillery and tank fire that continued even after the buildings collapsed.[322] Unlike the previous cases where bodies were displayed, no visuals were published by the perpetrators. When the counterterrorism operations stopped, Deputy Sarıyıldız and members of human rights organizations visited the scene and found burnt skulls and bones lying next to unburned pieces of wool, raising suspicions that there was a controlled fire.[323] Due to the curfew and conflicting statements, it is difficult to discuss whether it was a civilian massacre or those who were hiding in the basements were insurgents. It is not possible

[318] "Cizre: 'Üçüncü bir bodrum katında yaralılar var' iddiası [Cizre: The claim that there are more wounded in a third basement]," *BBC News Türkçe*, February 10, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160210_cizre_ucuncu_bodrum.
[319] See: "Cizre Gözlem Raporu [Cizre Observation Report]," Special Report (Cizre: Insan Hakları Derneği [Human Rights Association], March 31, 2016), https://tihv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Cizre-G%C3%B6zlem-Raporu_31-Mart2016.pdf.
[320] Numbers show difference based on the sources.
[321] "Turkey: State Blocks Probes of Southeast Killings," *Human Rights Watch*, July 11, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/11/turkey-state-blocks-probes-southeast-killings.
[322] "Cizre Gözlem Raporu [Cizre Observation Report]"; "'Alarming' Reports of Major Violations in South-East Turkey," *UN News*, May 10, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/528832-alarming-reports-major-violations-south-east-turkey-un-rights-chief#.WkT67lWnGUk.
[323] Fatih Polat, "Cizre Ön Inceleme Raporu: Bodrumda Yanmış Kemikler, Yanmamış Yünler [Cizre Preliminary Observation Report: Burnt Bones, Unburnt Wools in the Basement]," *Evrensel*, March 7, 2016, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/274330/cizre-on-inceleme-raporu-bodrumda-yanmis-kemikler-yanmamis-yunler.

to confirm Sarıyıldız and the locals' allegations. For example, informants on the ground argued that they found pieces of jowl and teeth that could not belong to an adult due to their size, indicating that the victims could not be insurgents; however, they could not have precise information because cavities were severely burnt.[324] This example, alone, where violence is so brutal and dehumanizing that corporeal remains are not even identifable, already tells a lot about this form of violence.

What we are talking about here is a type of violence that not only kills or even mutilates the body, but it destroys the integrity of the body to a degree that we cannot even tell whether it belongs to a child or an adult. It is an extreme form of necropower that manages populations by not only ending, but also attempting to eradicate, corporeal existence. A specific population is deemed, and produced, as not worthy of corporeal existence. Even the flesh and bones need to be eradicated.

There are dynamics and power relations in play other than necropower. It is a dehumanizing, deindividualizing, and derealizing violence. As discussed previously in the discursive construction of the enemy as an animal/carcass, dehumanization does not only refer to *less of a human* but to *non-human*. As Adriana Caverero argues, "death may transform [the body] into a cadaver, but it does not offend its dignity or at any rate does not do so as long as the dead body preserves its figural unity, that human likeness already extinguished yet still visible, watchable, for a period before incineration or inhumation".[325] This violence left the victims unrecognizable as human beings, offending their dignity by not preserving their figural unity.

[324] Ibid.
[325] Adriana Cavarero, *Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence*, trans. William McCuaig (Columbia University Press, 2008), 8.

Embodied subjects were abjectified, "reduced to their constituent parts", *a pile of flesh and bones*.[326] The dehumanizing logic in this form of violence is different from the cases of Birlik and female insurgents. The violence inflicted upon Birlik and other female insurgents, and its spectacle, strip them of their subjectivities, leaving a mutilated and sexually subjugated dead body to gaze at. The dead body is dehumanized, stripped of dignity, and a signifier of sovereignty and victory. On the other hand, the burned bodies in the basements demonstrate a more extreme form of dehumanization that leave bodily remains unrecognizable as human beings. Deindividualizing and derealizing logics assist dehumanization. The burned, crushed, or mutilated bodies in Cizre are "reduced into their constituent parts", but these parts are mixed with one another, together constituting heaps of flesh, a mixed pile of bones… Some were burned to ashes; when Lütfiye Duymak –a civilian from Cizre- went to the morgue to receive her husband's dead body, she was given five kilos of ashes and burned bones.[327] Ashes, bones, and flesh were given to families without any DNA tests to confirm the deceased's identity.

Violence was complemented by the regime's denial, erasure, and silence. The victims' names, faces, politics, and history were erased from public discourse as the officials made no statements, pro-government media did not cover the news, and the independent media reported only the death toll. The invisibility of the victims' identity markers, on the other hand, hinders the public's capacity to see them as individual beings who had relationships, hopes, desires, and fears. Therefore, as Butler suggests, these lives can be considered ungrievable lives: deaths that are not mourned because their lives are not counted as lives. We can observe an exercise of necropower that kills and eradicates the bodies of a population. It is simultaneously an exercise of normative power that shapes the normative schemes of intelligibility and orders

[326] Gregory, "Dismembering the Dead", 946.
[327] "Cizre'de Öldürülen Duymak'ın Eşi: 5 Kilo Kemik Vererek, 'Al Bu Senin Eşin' Dediler [Duymak's Wife: They Gave Me 5 Kilos of Bones and Said 'Here's Your Husband']," *Evrensel*, February 26, 2016, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/273580/cizrede-oldurulen-duymakin-esi-5-kilo-kemik-vererek-al-bu-senin-esin-dediler.

who counts as human. To conclude, we observe an exercise of necro/normative power that manages by massacring while seeking to eliminate traces of the subjectivities and the corporeality of the targeted population.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, through the examples of female insurgents, whose dead bodies were displayed naked, and Hacı Lokman Birlik, whose body was dragged on the streets by a vehicle, we discussed performative, almost theatrical, elements of postmortem violence that renders the dead body, and the violence imprinted on the body, visible, which turns the body and violence into a spectacle. I proposed that this form of violence is an exercise of multiple forms of power. Visuals construct a Self that is guided by biopolitical care, have necropolitical functions of managing populations, and shape the matrixes of intelligibility regarding who counts as human. The pictures of dead bodies are also pictures of sovereignty. It is a violent and extreme extension of sovereignty into bodies; it is the state's attempt to expand its power to death and beyond and to penetrate the private, divine, and sexual.

Agreeing with Bargu's conceptualization of this violence as necroviolence that disciplines and punishes the living population, I tried to demonstrate the technicalities of necropower. If violence is language, it needs interpretation. Methodological questions regarding necropolitics are widely ignored. I identified three discourses by studying narratives of Kurdish politicians, civil society, and the opposition media. The first discourse highlights the sexual and gendered features and identifies the target audience as (deviant) women. The second identifies the target audience as the Kurdish population. The third discourse underlines another function of violence: revealing the state's "real face". I, as the researcher, do not want to choose a side and argue that one interpretation is more accurate than the other. If a Turkish woman and a Kurdish man both feel that this message is for them, and it disciplines their

behaviors, then regardless of the perpetrators' motivation, necropower targets both women and the Kurdish population.

Not all violence is rendered visible. In the case of the basements in Cizre, we could observe that power sometimes seeks invisibility. Dead bodies were deformed to the degree that they were no longer recognizable as individuals, even human beings. It is a form of necropower since it eliminates the undesired population by massacring; however, it is also an exercise of normative power because of its dehumanizing, deindividualizing, and derealizing functions. On the other hand, theatrical violence seeks corporeal visibility while simultaneously erasing and silencing discursive visibility, thus bringing necro and normative power together. This sovereign/necro/normative assemblage functions to assert the state's power over bodies, even in the postmortem. This assemblage reduces subjects to their corporeal remains, erases the subjective and corporeal existence of the enemy Other, and disciplines and punishes the living population by exposing them to the dead.

The next chapter purses dead body management to the next stop of the dead's journey, what I call, the pre-burial processes. It examines practices and discourses that occur between postmortem violence and burial that are oft-overlooked in the few existing studies on dead bodies. We tend to forget that dead bodies are not static remains; they need to be transported. Since this transportation happens in the context of war and conflict, these bodies are subject to forensic autopsies. In this regard, the next chapter examines the politics of mobility and studies forensic autopsies as a practice that weaves corporeality and discursive regimes together. It will show us that performatively produced sovereignty and necropower, which disciplines and subdues the living through the dead, extend beyond postmortem violence.

Chapter 5: Pre-Burial: Terrorist Bodies, Autopsies, and Politics of Mobility

Postmortem violence shocks many people due to the extreme violence and gore; even though Turkish state actors have sought discursive invisibility, the public's reaction has put the regime in a defensive position. In short, it has attracted both media and scholarly attention. Pointing to postmortem violence and the display of dead bodies, one might argue that the state does not leave the Other alone, even after death. The discussion, which I covered in the previous chapter on the relationship between different forms of power and postmortem violence, supports this view. Whether sovereign, bio/necro-, normative, or an assemblage of them, power extends into the postmortem by investing in the body. Postmortem violence is not the end of the story as the dead body's journey is supposed to end with its burial. However, there are many other steps and practices in between killing and burial. Dead bodies need to be transported; they are moved from the spot they were killed to the morgue, from the morgue to the family's house or a religious site, and from there to the burial ground. Because the Turkish military and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) also fight in Syria and Iraq, dead bodies cross borders. They also go through forensic autopsies. Last but not least, dead bodies are prepared for burial according to their religion or next of kin's wishes.

This chapter investigates what comes after killing, or postmortem violence, and before burial, or in other words, how dead body management continues in the pre-burial processes. The investment in and the management of insurgents' dead bodies continue in such in-between practices, and security plays a significant role in the pre-burial aspects of dead body management. Autopsies are often controlled; forensic pathologists and prosecutors tend to work together to conceal or manipulate information, especially to cover state atrocities and protect the security forces.

Autopsies are also instrumentalized; for example, when specific identity markers are on the insurgent's body, such as a cross, they are announced to the public. Either way, autopsies produce truth claims, and thus, they are embedded in power relations. Using the perlocutionary functions of autopsy reports, actors like the media, state agents, and politicians construct a foreign (Christian) terrorist figure that is then instrumentalized to support the regime's biopolitical claims regarding the "(counter)insurgency vs. terrorism" debates.

Autopsies are not the only in-between practice; the transportation of bodies becomes subject to regulation, securitization, and/or criminalization and becomes a site where various forms of power are assembled and entangled again. Nevertheless, a sovereign/necro-assemblage helps make sense of the case. The mechanisms of sovereign power are evident when the border comes into the scene. Over the concerns about disrupting public order, the bodies of YPG (People's Protection Units) and YPJ (Women's Protection Units) soldiers who died in Syria fighting against the IS (Islamic State) in 2015 were not allowed to cross the border to be buried in Turkey. Considering the fighters and their families are Turkish citizens, who are supposed to possess the right to a proper burial, the sovereign tool of the border is used to produce a sovereign exception. This sovereign exception is widely interpreted by the Kurdish population as *feindstrafrecht*, the criminal law of the enemy.

Withholding bodies for a prolonged interval also defies the Islamic ritual of burying the dead in three days, preventing the families to exercise their cultural and religious rights and beliefs. Since the law withdraws from both the family and the dead, sovereignty can be read through Agamben's *bare life* and its modification *bare dead.*[328] However, as Bargu argues, forcefully withholding the body is an exercise of necroviolence.[329] Like the previous chapter,

[328] Agamben *Homo Sacer*; Akin & Dufalla, "Sovereignty and Death".
[329] Bargu, "Another Necropolitics".

I surveyed how the Kurdish politicians interpret these cases, and these interpretations support Bargu's argument.

Border crossings are not the only practice regarding the politics of mobility. In some cases, the service of transporting the dead to the burial ground is denied, whereas in other cases, mayors -and even drivers- who provided this service were subject to security discourses that frame them as terrorists, then criminalized. Arranging the funeral vehicle to transport dead bodies is the municipalities', or any other local authority's, responsibility. Therefore, the prohibition or criminalization of this service constitutes another example of *feindstrafrecht*. Since there is no preceding discursive utterance of the exception, we see another example of sovereignty being performatively produced within the field of governmentality, as Butler suggests.[330] Furthermore, suspension of the law is simultaneously the instrumentalization of the law, something that Butler reads as "sovereignty functioning within the field of governmentality".[331]

The securitization and criminalization of funeral vehicles bring sovereign, bio/necro-, and normative power together; the law is instrumentally suspended, the living population is punished through the dead, and memorializing practices and signifiers are erased during transportation. However, the policy pursued over funeral vehicles performs another significant function: (re)producing Kurdistan as an inner colony. Providing funeral vehicles for the insurgents was perceived as a security threat, and a criminal act, and this action ended with the imprisonment of the elected Kurdish mayors, replaced by the appointed trustee mayors.

This chapter also reveals that security discourses start to play a more critical role in comparison to postmortem violence. Talking about the autopsies and the transportation of bodies in security terms (i.e., securitization of the pre-burial) enables specific actions to be

[330] Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[331] Ibid.

taken. For example, withholding dead bodies at the border for thirteen days, an unprecedented and unjustifiable act, was justified based on the security concerns that funerals may disrupt public order. Other primary functions of security discourses are, first, reinforcing the official state discourse: the Kurdish Question is a problem of terrorism and the regime is a biopower that seeks to protect and foster the Kurdish population against 'the foreign and terrorist PKK'. Second, it sets the conditions of possibility for the trustee mayor policy, enabling further colonization of Kurdistan.

The chapter is structured following a temporal unfolding of dead body management, like the dissertation itself. It does not mean that I talk about a series of events in a linear and chronological timeline; for example, in the first section on the border policies, the case took place in 2015, whereas I give examples from 2005 in the last section on funeral vehicles. I structured it instead as how the management or the journey of a dead is ordered. First, I discuss the transportation of dead bodies from sites of the conflict to the morgues or burial grounds, which was a process that has not been at the center of political discussions or analysis until YPG/YPJ fighters' bodies were not allowed to pass the Syria-Turkey border in 2015. Bringing up the questions of decay and the suspension of the law, the border now stands as a site where we can observe how sovereignty and necropolitics interplay.

Before the burial, the dead go through forensic autopsies. I discuss autopsies and their role in discursively undermining the insurgency, reinforcing the state's official discourse on the Kurdish Question as a problem of foreign-backed terrorism by producing a foreign terrorist image, and discursively (re)producing the regime as a biopower. Finally, dead bodies must be transported from the morgue to a mosque, or the family's house, for religious and/or post-death rituals and preparations, and from the mosque or the house to the cemetery. In the last section, I discuss how elected Kurdish mayors are framed as a security threat and legally charged for

supporting terrorism because they provided funeral vehicles for the insurgents, which again, is a responsibility of the municipalities according to Turkish law.

5.1 Terrorist Bodies and Politics of Mobility

Surveying the existing studies on the politics of death and dead bodies demonstrates a tendency to conceptualize dead bodies as static material remains.[332] Studies of funerals, on the other hand, primarily focus on technologies of mourning and memorialization on a performative and discursive level.[333] We, as researchers, tend to forget that dead bodies move. They move from the conflict site to the morgue, private houses, and/or the burial ground. More precisely, they are transported, since moving indicates a sense of agency. Therefore, they are subject to the politics of mobility.

Regulation of mobility inevitably brings questions of power and sovereignty. It is a practice produced by and productive of a racialized, gendered, and often colonial social order. We cannot possibly imagine apartheid regimes without reference to the regulation of the racialized subjects' mobility.[334] In particular, border regimes and the capacity to decide who can enter and exit create an inside-outside dichotomy, and it structures the inside in a racialized way. Similarly, incarceration and other forms of forcibly withholding the body are part of the colonial and racialized social structure.

[332] There are studies that do not fit into this tendency as they focus on exhumation and reburial, migrants' bodies that move or zombies (walking dead). For some examples, see, Craig Young and Duncan Light, "Corpses, Dead Body Politics and Agency in Human Geography: Following the Corpse of Dr Petru Groza," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38, no. 1 (2013): 135–48, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00502.x; Jessika O. Griffin, "'We Are the Walking Dead' : Zombie Spaces, Mobility and the Potential for Security in Zone One and The Walking Dead," May 5, 2012, http://cardinalscholar.bsu.edu/handle/123456789/196002; Dixit, "Let the Dead Speak!".

[333] Margaret Gibson, "Death and Mourning in Technologically Mediated Culture," *Health Sociology Review* 16, no. 5 (December 1, 2007): 415–24, https://doi.org/10.5172/hesr.2007.16.5.415; Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*; Heath-Kelly, *Death and Security*.

[334] Judith A. Nicholson and Mimi Sheller, "Race and the Politics of Mobility—Introduction," *Transfers* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 4–11, https://doi.org/10.3167/TRANS.2016.060102.

The structure that determines who can move and under what conditions does not exempt the dead from this order. On the contrary, the regulation of the dead's mobility produces this racialized and colonial social order. The dead are both a subject and an object; dead bodies do not automatically lose their social rights granted to them and protected by law just because they are now dead. Normatively, the dead are expected to be treated with dignity in many cultures. Therefore, the arbitrary restriction of the dead body's mobility, kidnapping the body, leaving the body at the site of conflict, or forcefully holding the body constitute violence. As this violence targets, disciplines, and punishes the living through the dead, Bargu perceptively calls it *necroviolence*.[335] Conceptually and theoretically, the regulation or prohibition of the dead's mobility brings sovereign and necropower together.

In the context of Turkey's (counter)insurgency, dead body management invests in the dead's mobility in two ways. First, the state employs its control of the border as a technology of power. Second, the funeral vehicles that are supposed to be provided by the municipalities have become subject to securitization and criminalization. These two components of managing the dead's mobility are quite distinct. Even though they fall under the conceptual category of "politics of mobility", their history, actors, power relations, and political functions are diverse; thus, I will analyze them separately.

5.1.2 Dead Bodies at the Border

Managing the dead through the border regime can be best observed in the case of YPG and YPJ fighters waiting at the Syrian border for thirteen days.[336] When the Syrian Civil War started in 2011, many young Kurds from Turkey, as well as socialist Turks, joined the fight in northern Syria against IS. Because of the peace process, there had been no problem with the

[335] Bargu, "Another necropolitics".
[336] Unlike PKK that fights a guerilla war, YPG and YPJ are organized units of the Syrian Democratic Forces. However, northern Syria is an autonomous yet not widely recognized entity. Therefore, I prefer the term "fighter" over insurgent or soldier.

fighters' dead bodies passing the border to be buried in their hometowns in Turkey. However, when the peace process failed, and the parties fell back to their routine of reciprocal violence in the summer of 2015, the border policy changed. Initially, the Turkish state's fight against the PKK expanded beyond the border, not in the form of a military incursion but rather by targeting the dead bodies of YPG and YPJ fighters killed by IS. In August 2015, dead bodies of YPG and YPJ fighters were denied entry to pass the Syrian-Turkish border to be buried in Turkish territories where the fighters were originally from. Forty-five bodies waited at the border, twenty-three of which were at Mürşitpınar, which borders the Syrian town of Kobane, where the battle between the Kurds and the IS was the most intense. Bodies were kept in special containers attached to tractor-trailers, resisting the summer heat of Syria for thirteen days. They could pass thirteen days later, on the special condition that there shall not be any "rally-like funerals".[337]

When the families and journalists confronted the local authorities, they found themselves in a maze of bureaucracy, where each department pointed to the other so that no one department or person could be held accountable. A BBC journalist tried to reach the Mayor of Silopi, the border town, but he could only talk to the mayor's private secretary, who told the journalist that "the mayor gave us strict instructions. He will give no comments about this issue. You should contact the governor's office".[338] On the other hand, the mayor told an HDP deputy that "we are doing whatever the law dictates. If you find it unlawful, go to court".[339] The Mayor of Suruç, another border town, stated that this exceeded their authority, and they were told not to let the bodies pass by the council of ministers.[340] Although there is no record of this council

[337] "Sınırda YPG'li cenaze krizi [Crisis of YPG corpses at the border]," *BBC News Türkçe*, August 3, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/08/150803_ypg_cenaze_sinir.
[338] "Sınırda YPG'li cenaze krizi [Crisis of YPG corpses at the border]." Silopi is a town and municipality belonging to the province of Şırnak. Here, Silopi's mayor asks the journalists to contact the governor of Şırnak.
[339] Gozde Kazaz, "İHD'den sınırda bekletilen cenazeler için uluslararası çağrı, [International call from IHD for the dead bodies waiting at the border]" *Agos*, August 4, 2015, http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/12366/ihd-den-sinirda-bekletilen-cenazeler-icin-uluslararasi-cagri.
[340] "Sınırda YPG'li cenaze krizi [Crisis of YPG corpses at the border].

meeting and no official or legal reason has been provided to this date, the Ministry of the Interior raised their concerns to the HDP representatives that funerals might disrupt public order and security.[341]

According to the IHD (Human Rights Association/*İnsan Hakları Derneği*), bar associations, and HDP deputies, this bureaucratical mess and lack of legal reasoning is not a coincidence because the decision is not lawful in the first place. "According to the Turkish constitution", the head of IHD argues, "regardless of whether they are alive or dead, the state cannot refuse entry to its own citizens".[342] IHD confronted the council of ministers with this argument and demanded the council reassess the situation and allow the dead bodies to cross the border, yet the state officials rejected the IHD's proposal without providing the reason behind it or addressing the legal issue. Local bar associations conclude that this is an arbitrary political decision and is not in accordance with the law.[343]

Here, we observe the investment in the dead and their management by regulating and controlling borders. This management, however, is conducted arbitrarily by suspending the law. Sovereignty is diffused and spread into the paths and rooms of the bureaucratic maze as if it is in a gaseous or liquid form. The driving force behind this sovereign ban is security, or, at least, the quasi-official justification is grounded on security concerns. As an exercise of dead body management, this border policy produces a social order in which some citizens are exempted from exercising their rights, interpreted as the criminal law of the enemy by many. However, it is not simply a question of laws and rights. Dead bodies had been withheld for a long time, raising the question of decay. Families waited at the border, not knowing if and

[341] Ibid.
[342] Kazaz, "İHD'den sınırda bekletilen cenazeler için uluslararası çağrı,[International call from IHD for the dead bodies waiting at the border]"
[343] "'Bu Zulmü Kabul Etmeyin': Habur'da 13 YPG'linin Cenazesi Dört Gündür Bekletiliyor ['Don't Accept This Cruelty': Dead Bodies of 13 YPG Fighters Have Been Waiting at Habur for Four Days]," *Diken*, July 30, 2015, https://www.diken.com.tr/bu-zulmu-kabul-etmeyin-haburda-13-ypglinin-cenazesi-dort-gundur-bir-tirin-icinde-bekletiliyor/.

when they could retrieve their children's bodies. What we observe is, therefore, another site where sovereignty and necropolitics, or sovereign and necropower, work hand in hand.

5.1.2.1 Securitization and Sovereign Withdrawal of the Law

Let us start with analyzing this case by focusing on its legal dimension, or more precisely, its relationship with juridico-political sovereignty. I did not choose to focus on the juridico-political features spontaneously or cherry-pick it to have a coherent theoretical framework - I do not even have a rigid framework to begin with. Rather, surveying the parliamentary discussions and newspapers revealed that the most prevalent discourse is built on the arbitrariness of this decision. In 2015, when these incidents were taking place, the Kurdish political movement's response that highlighted the domestic and international law, norms, and human rights confused many. The majority of the Turkish opposition could not make sense, or approve, why one would underline that the action is arbitrary and unlawful against a regime that does not recognize the rule of law. The unlawfulness and arbitrariness of this policy might not be surprising for the reader who sees Turkey as an authoritarian state that does not follow the rule of law either. I would not contest this view; Turkey is indeed an authoritarian state that has defied the law countless times.

However, the view that the law does not matter and that an authoritarian state like Turkey can do whatever it will, regardless of the law, is an easy caricature from the West of an authoritarian state. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) regime's legitimacy is highly dependent on popular elections. Furthermore, as a member of the Council of Europe and NATO, Turkey self-identifies as a constitutional state, or state of the law, on the discursive level. Law provides the legitimacy that the regime often seeks; thus, having a two-thirds majority in parliament, the AKP regime has often bent the law or passed bills they desired instead of defying the law, until the parliamentary system was replaced by a presidential one in 2017. Even after the state of emergency was declared following the failed coup attempt in

2016, the regime ruled the country with by-laws instead of taking arbitrary actions without legal reasoning.

Moreover, the Kurdish community did not highlight this arbitrariness to argue that Turkey is becoming authoritarian, a debate that has polarized Turkey for decades, but they did it to point out the power relations at play.[344] They underlined it to point to a more biopolitical dynamic that divides the populations into subpopulations and manages them, while simultaneously highlighting the sovereign mechanisms of the exception, the ban, and the withdrawal of power. They underlined it because it (re)produces the Kurdish people as non-citizens, as subjects of the criminal law of the enemy. Even though the regime did not necessarily have to go through the classic process of securitization as formulated by the Copenhagen School, wherein the *securityness* of the issue is intersubjectively constructed, they still used "maintaining public order" and "preventing clashes between opposite groups or riots" as their justification. As I have shown in Chapter 3, and as we will further see in the next chapter, the security concern is the funeral itself rather than potential clashes. In this particular case, this is evident by the state agents' condition that funerals should be held privately and should not turn into rallies.

Even though funerals have already been framed as an ontological security threat, the regime did not inform the public about the rationale behind not allowing dead bodies to pass the border. As the magic word of "terrorism" functions as a master signifier, the public did not need to be convinced about this arbitrary border policy. Nevertheless, the issue at hand has been discussed in terms of security. Regardless of whether securitization is built upon concerns

[344] While mostly liberal scholars believe that the AKP government has experienced democratic backsliding, and has been gradually becoming authoritarian, others hold the view that the AKP has always been authoritarian and even find the question *whether* Turkey is getting authoritarian ludicrous. For an example of the democratic backslide argument see, Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü, "Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 9 (September 1, 2016): 1581–1606, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732.

over physical security (clashes between opposite groups) or ontological security (funerals' resurrectory performances), and regardless of whether securitization enabled the extraordinary measures (arbitrary border policy on dead bodies) or simply retrospectively justified and normalized it, security engages in a productive relationship with the border policy as a technology of dead body management. Security enabled, or justified, the sovereign exception, but it is enough to end the discussion here. Now the questions to address are: What does the border policy, as a sovereign exception, politically do? What functions does it have? What kind of power relations can we observe in this relationship?

To start addressing these questions, let us first get back to the juridico-political dimension, IHD stressing the arbitrary and unlawful nature of the decision is a discourse that can also be found in the narratives of the Kurdish politicians and civil society; it is a discourse that highlights the sovereign power exercised through the border regime. Şırnak HDP representative Ferhat Encü's narrative about the incident echoes what IHD's position represents: the lack of legal justification is not a coincidence. He argues that on the domestic level and in the world there is no law prohibiting the burial of dead bodies, and he indicates that the decision might not have been that arbitrary, as he believes that PM Davutoğlu and President Erdoğan decreed the prohibition.[345] However, there is no trace of such a decree, nor a record of the alleged council of ministers meeting. Because there is no written account of the decision or any legal justification, the HDP and the civil society organizations could not appeal the decision.

HDP's former deputy co-chair, İdris Baluken, also highlighted the arbitrariness of the decision. Implying that it is a novel act, he argued that "prohibiting the dead bodies to pass the

[345] "Davutoğlu'nun talimatıyla YPG/YPJ'lilerin cenazeleri sınırdan içeri alınmıyor [Dead bodies of YPG/YPJ are not allowed to pass the border because of Davutoglu's instructions]," *Sendika.Org*, August 11, 2015, sec. 5 Deniz, https://sendika.org/2015/08/davutoglunun-talimatiyla-ypgypjlilerin-cenazeleri-sinirdan-iceri-alinmiyor-284626/.

border and punishing the families through this has no place in any religion, any law, any norm and has not been seen anywhere in the world throughout history".[346] He continued in an official parliamentary question (PQ) directed toward PM Davutoğlu:

> Is there an official decision made by the council of ministers regarding prohibiting twenty dead bodies from passing the Turkish border? Has it been declared to the families and the public if there is such a decision? Considering there is no such legal grounding, there is an arbitrary (*keyfi)* decision regarding the dead bodies and border policy. Do you think this aligns with the rule of law you promised to follow?[347]

The word Baluken used for arbitrariness (*keyfi*) comes from *keyif* , which means pleasure, and like arbitrariness in English, it has the connotation of individuality; something was done as the person desired without following the rules and obligations. The actors this discourse points to are Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, the regime's executive agents.

Even though Kurdish politicians like Encü and Baluken claim that behind this unlawful and arbitrary decision that manages the dead, there is Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's decree, no verbal or textual utterance of such decree is known to the public. It does not matter whether a sovereign decree precedes the suspension of the law or if the original decision gets lost in the maze of bureaucracy. We are still talking about a performative exercise of sovereignty within the field of governmentality. Sovereignty, as formulated by Butler, is present; the very act of suspending the law produces sovereign power.[348] On the other hand, if we follow Agamben's formulation that sovereign power resides in the capacity to create bare lives, we can find it in the bare dead; the dead abandoned by the law, thus rendered violable.[349]

This exercise of sovereignty is conducted, or the state's sovereign power is constructed, by targeting the Kurdish community and structuring the social order by their exclusion. For

[346] "HDP'den Davutoğlu'na 'bekletilen cenazeler' soruları [HDP's questions for Davutoğlu about the 'waiting dead bodies']," *ANF News*, November 26, 2015, https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/hdp-den-davutoglu-na-bekletilen-cenazeler-sorulari-58962.
[347] Ibid.
[348] Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[349] Agamben, *Homo Sacer*; Akin and Dufalla, "Sovereignty and Death".

Encü, it is a systematic phenomenon, as he claims, "this fascist manner is a part of the dirty war that the state has been conducting for thirty years".[350] As discussed previously, this border policy was new. What has been going on for thirty years is, in Encü's words, this "fascist manner"', which was namely arbitrary and unlawful decisions taken by the regime that prevent the Kurdish community from exercising their rights. In this phenomenon, we can observe the production of bare life/dead, where the law is withdrawn, if we follow Agamben. If we follow Butler instead, we can interpret it as performative production of sovereignty within the field of governmentality. However, these interpretations come from a scholarly tradition. The Kurdish movement prefers the term "the criminal law of the enemy".

Violations of the rights and liberties of the PKK fighters are no longer surprising for the Turkish audience; since the fighters defy the state and engage in "terrorism", in the eyes of the state apparatus and (the majority of) public opinion, the law no longer applies to them. As enemies of the state, *feindstrafrecht* applies to the PKK fighters. It brings legal and normative discourses together; on the normative level, the "baby killer" monstrous and perverted terrorist is violable, and their subjection to violence does not deserve sympathy. As enemies of the state and society, they should not be protected by the law.

Feindstrafrecht has been used by the pro-Kurdish political parties and Kurdish civil society for decades to refer to the state's treatment of the Kurdish population.[351] It has come to the forefront once again following the incidents of dead bodies waiting at the border. To illustrate, HDP's Ankara representative, Filiz Kerestecioğlu, filed an official parliamentary question to be responded to by the Minister of the Interior where she said:

> The dead body of MHP (Nationalist Movement Party)'s Deputy President of Fatih [a district in İstanbul], İbrahim Küçük, who died in the Turkmen Mountains in Syria, fighting alongside the

[350] "Davutoğlu'nun talimatıyla YPG/YPJ'lilerin cenazeleri sınırdan içeri alınmıyor [Dead bodies of YPG/YPJ are not allowed to pass the border because of Davutoglu's instructions]."
[351] Güllistan Yarkın, "İnkâr Edilen Hakikat: Sömürge Kuzey Kürdistan," *Kürd Araştırmaları*, June 30, 2019, http://kurdarastirmalari.com/yazi-detay-nk-r-edilen-hakikat-s-m-rge-kuzey-k-rdistan-26.

> jihadists on January 26, 2016, was brought back to Turkey in only one day and buried on January 27. In contrast, the dead bodies of our citizens fighting against the IS to defend human dignity were prohibited from passing the border. How could your ministry explain this?[352]

Although Kerestecioğlu does not use "the criminal law of the enemy" explicitly, she highlights the contrast, the different treatment of a Kurdish fighter and a jihadist, who are supposed to be criminals in the eyes of the state. Like Kerestecioğlu, HDP deputy Encü points out the different treatments by highlighting that the foreign fighters, such as the German fighters among the YPG/YPJ, passed the Turkish border and were given to their families. He claims that the way the Kurdish youth is treated is a practice of enmity.[353]

On the other hand, civil society organizations use *feindstrafrecht* more explicitly. To illustrate, the co-chair of Meya-Der (The Mesopotamian Association of Aid and Solidarity for the Families Experiencing Forced Disappearances), Şükrü Baytar, said, "the Turkish state has employed the criminal law of the enemy to the Kurdish freedom fighters' dead bodies and their families. Most often, we are forced to wait in 50° C arbitrarily so that we would be ground down".[354] An important point for our discussion in Baytar's speech is how he highlights both the fighters' dead bodies and the families as the actors who are subject to *feindstrafrecht*. The criminal law of the enemy is not a legitimate law; rather, it describes an existing practice. Therefore, despite having the status of being an "enemy", the fighters' bodies are supposed to be protected by both domestic and international law.

Extending the enemy criminal law to families is noteworthy. One way to approach this extension is that the state/regime subscribes to a form of kinship politics that holds the kin

[352] Filiz Kerestecioğlu, Parliamentary Inquiry No: 2578 (Ankara: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, August 19,2015), https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d26/7/7-7525s.pdf.
[353] Zeynep Kuray, "Mürşitpınar'da bekletilen cenaze sayısı 20'ye yükseldi [The number of corpses waiting at Mürşitpınar increased to 20]," *ANF News*, August 11, 2015, https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/mursitpinar-da-bekletilen-cenaze-sayisi-20-ye-yukseldi-52360.
[354] Ferhat Arslan, "Baytar: Güneşte bekletilen cenazeler için BM harekete geçmeli [Baytar: The UN needs to take action for the dead bodies waiting under the sun]," *ANF News*, August 12, 2015, https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/baytar-guneste-bekletilen-cenazeler-icin-bm-harekete-gecmeli-52407.

responsible for an individual's actions.[355] Another explanation would be that, regardless of whether the family is held responsible, the Kurdish population is perceived and treated as enemies. Considering the collective nature of "guerilla funerals", the target of such border policies and the *feindstrafrecht* extends beyond the family to cover the local Kurdish population. The community aspect is even stronger in the case of YPG/YPJ fighters at the border. This border policy was put into practice in the context where the peace process failed, and while the PKK was fighting against the Turkish state, the YPG/YPJ was fighting against the IS and other militia groups backed by Turkey in Syria. Dead bodies were coming in huge numbers as the battle in Kobane intensified. Kobane has a symbolic value for the Kurdish community; later, the battle of Kobane was called "the Stalingrad of the Kurds," and the "martyrs" of Kobane were highly respected among the Kurdish population in Turkey.[356]

In fact, it does not even matter for our discussion whether we conceptualize the border policy as the criminal law of the enemy. A performative function of *feindstrafrecht* is an unlawful withdrawal of the law from the enemy subject. Therefore, to keep the attention on the discussions on power, we can conceptualize it as an exercise of sovereign power. Another aspect that requires attention in Baytar's speech is his interpretation of being forced to wait in the summer heat as a tactic to grind down the families, civil society organizations, and activists. This idea is not limited to Baytar's speech; from civil society to the Kurdish politicians in the parliament, many have portrayed this incident as an act of violence. Therefore, the border regime appears as another site where we can observe an entangled relationship between necro/sovereign power.

[355] Let us not forget that the judiciary is not entirely independent and the arbitrary decisions like this are often decided by President Erdoğan or the Council of Ministers. Therefeore, I prefer the state or the regime as the actor/subject instead of the judiciary.

[356] Julian Gavaghan, "Why Kobane Is the Kurds' Stalingrad and How ISIS Fight like the Nazis," *Yahoo News*, October 27, 2014, http://uk.news.yahoo.com/why-kobane-is-the-kurds--stalingrad-and-how-isis-fight-like-the-nazis-180036523.html.

5.1.2.2 Necroviolence and Politics of Mobility

When defining necroviolence, Bargu includes "the delay, interruption, or suspension of the conduct of funerary rituals".[357] Following Bargu's conceptualization, we can observe examples of necroviolence present in the case of YPG/YPJ fighters waiting at the border. It is, after all, a delay of the ritual. However, it is not only the fact that funerals were delayed that makes it necroviolence, but it is also the conditions under which dead bodies and families were waiting. Bodies were kept arbitrarily; families knew neither why their children were kept forcefully on the other side of the border nor when or if they would receive the bodies. As the example of forced disappearances also demonstrates, this temporal uncertainty is psychologically damaging for the families.[358] Moreover, considering that this was happening in the summer of 2015, both the bodies and families were waiting in 50° C. Although the dead bodies of the fighters were kept in a tractor-trailer with a refrigerating system, witnesses note that bodies began to decay due to being kept for more than ten days under extreme weather conditions, where power outages are common.

Bodies are not static; it means that they are not only transported, but things move within them. *The Deleuzian flow is at play; the body is not a perpetual motion machine. There is a disjunction in the flow of life; where the flow of life stops, the flow of death begins.* When we think temporally, as Deleuze asks us to do, leaving or forcefully withholding the dead body indicates decay. *The body machine is now connected to the death machine, for death is not static either, with its moving and flowing bacteria and fungi, ever-transforming the body*. As Auchter argues, it is a process wherein "our own materiality is merged with the vitality of other beings".[359]

[357] Ibid.
[358] Islekel, "Absent Death".
[359] Jessica Auchter, "The Politics of Decay: Death, Mortality and Security," *Critical Studies on Security* 5, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 222–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1334354.

In this regard, decay is an abjectifying and objectifying process. A decomposing body is threatening and repulsive, for decay breaks boundaries; the line between the Self and Other, the human and the non-human, becomes blurry. Thus, it is considered as something that should be prevented or rendered invisible. Rendering the decomposed/ing dead body is objectifying since it is usually only animal carcasses that can decay visibly. This aspect of dehumanization and impurity lies behind the ritual of burying the dead in three days in Islam, a ritual and a right withdrawn from the dead YPG/YPJ fighters and their families, simultaneously (re)producing bare lives and bare dead while the cogs of necropolitics are turning.

Therefore, the first element of violence resides in decay and decomposition. It is a form of violence, like other examples of necroviolence, that targets both the dead body itself and an aggregate group through the body. As Baytar explains, "the dirty politics they [the regime] conduct through our people/nation (*halk*) defy all law, values, and ethics. These young people [YPG/YPJ fighters] represent the hope for freedom, for our people, and the regime prevents them from being buried, holding them in 50 degrees, right in front of their families' eyes".[360] As the IS encircled the Kurdish areas of northern Syria and had become both a physical and ontological existential threat to the Kurdish population, the "martyrs" have become a significant symbol for the Kurdish population. Thus, the Kurdish population is targeted as an aggregate group through the symbolic value that these dead bodies have as martyrs and the symbolic functions of decay. Moving beyond Foucault's account of biopolitics and M'bembe's 'right to kill', in Chapter 2, we have discussed bio/necropolitics in terms of the right to expose someone to death. Here, we can observe exposing a population to the dead and its decomposition.

[360] Kuray, "Mürşitpınar'da bekletilen cenaze sayısı 20'ye yükseldi [The number of corpses waiting at Mürşitpınar increased to 20]."

The second element is about the psychological toll/violence on the families. Following Deleuze's suggestion of thinking temporally instead of merely spatially enabled us to focus on decay as a process and conceptualize it as a technology of necropower. Temporality plays a critical role here again. Families are forced to wait, knowing that their loved ones' bodies are decaying, not knowing when and if they can retrieve the body. Representatives of civil society organizations present at the border have noted that families are sadder about the "torture on the dead bodies of their children" than their death. In the interview with Meya-Der, Baytar continued, "Families are experiencing psychological trauma due to having to watch the martyrs being kept for days in this summer heat. It is difficult to even talk about this".[361]

In short, Bargu is right about conceptualizing the delay of funerals as necroviolence; however, I would not call this phenomenon only delay, but the forceful withholding of dead bodies, or the regulation and/or prevention of their mobilities. After all, it is a form of violence that targets an aggregate group through death and the dead. As an example of necroviolence, it has political functions. Similar to the discussion on postmortem violence, I prefer to approach these functions phenomenologically. Studying the interpretations of this violence reveals a very similar discursive formation to postmortem violence. It is interpreted as a continuation of a systematic policy (dead body management) that targets and punishes the Kurdish community and reveals the state's cruel and violent face.

The first discourse I want to draw attention to identifies this particular practice of necroviolence as punishment and the primary target as the fighters' families. To illustrate, the HDP posed the following official parliamentary question to PM Davutoğlu:

> Your temporary government started a process with the Suruç Massacre. This process involves the political decision to prevent the dead bodies from passing through Habur and Mürşitpınar borders. This arbitrary decision that turns dead bodies into political instruments defies all the legal and ethical norms. No political stance or situation, even war, cannot justify tormenting the families by delaying the burials and denying giving them the bodies. Such inhumane treatment of the families leaves heavy damage on public memory. In this context, we pose the

[361] Ibid.

> following questions… [after a few questions regarding the arbitrariness of the decision] Are you going to provide an explanation to the families? What are the reasons for punishing the families by not giving their children's dead bodies to them?[362]

There is a lot to unpack in this PQ. For example, unlike the other opposition parties in the parliament, the HDP addresses the government as the temporary/interim government, reminding people of the limitations of the government's capacity and the legal arbitrariness of their actions. On the other hand, the text accuses the government of politically instrumentalizing dead bodies or, in other words, engaging in "dead body politics", a frequent accusation that I will analytically scrutinize in the next chapter.

An essential point in this text for our current discussion, however, is identifying the target population as the fighters' families and the purpose of this violence as punishing them. Whereas Meya-Der emphasized both dead bodies themselves and families as the subject of *feindstrafrecht,* the HDP's discourse identified the act as an 'inhumane treatment of the families', 'tormenting the families', and 'punishing the families'. Whereas the former points to sovereignty in play, the latter highlights necropolitical functions. Similarly, HDP's Urfa representative, İbrahim Ayhan, claims that the AKP has employed this tactic since the peace process failed and that the AKP government is resorting to blackmail and attempting to hold politics hostage by putting psychological pressure on these families.[363] Challenging the government, HDP deputies Ayhan and Encü declared they would not concede and be part of this blackmail. These texts show us that this border policy is regarded as an arbitrary decision and violent; however, this violence is not mindless. Rather, it is believed to be deliberate with certain political functions.

[362] "Güven, IŞİD'e karşı savaşta yaşamını yitiren 23 YPG'linin cenazesinin sınırda bekletilmesini meclis gündemine taşıdı [Güven brought the issue of 23 YPG fighters who died in the war against IS waiting at the border to the parliament]," Halkların Demokratik Partisi, accessed April 20, 2022, https://hdp.org.tr/tr/guven-isid-e-karsi-savasta-yasamini-yitiren-23-ypg-linin-cenazesinin-sinirda-bekletilmesini-meclis-gundemine-tasidi/6293.
[363] Kuray, "Mürşitpınar'da bekletilen cenaze sayısı 20'ye yükseldi [The number of corpses waiting at Mürşitpınar increased to 20]."

The question that arises here is: what are these political functions? Where is the "blackmail" in this issue, and what does it seek to achieve? For what reason are the families being punished? Neither the HDP's parliamentary question nor Ayhan and Encü's comments give us an explicit answer. A possible answer can be located in the interpretations of postmortem violence, that the Kurdish population is being punished for the election result. Although, as discussed earlier, this explanation seems too reductionist and conspiratorial, it could potentially be what Ayhan and Encü mean by blackmailing. The peace process broke right after the June elections when the AKP lost its majority, and urban warfare, displaying dead bodies, and the border regime the dead bodies and their families were subjected to were all taking place. A coalition government also could not be formed, and the country was heading towards a new election under the interim AKP government. Thus, dead bodies could be held hostage and the subject to blackmailing in exchange for Kurdish votes.

Alternatively, like postmortem corporeal violence, the fighters' families and the larger community are punished for the insurgency and for not complying with the regime in a broader sense, which is not limited to the elections. Meya-Der's representative, Şükrü Baytar's, comments reinforce this view, as he argued, "They are intimidating and threatening our people by using the martyrs' dead bodies. Those running the state see red; they are hungry for blood".[364] In this view, the Kurdish population is not only being punished but also intimidated and threatened to prevent them from joining or supporting the insurgency. Thus, it is not merely mindless violence out of enmity but rather a strategic punishment.

These explanations come from an inter-textual analysis, as we could observe them in the interpretations of postmortem violence and the display of dead bodies. However, the context of the YPG/YPJ fighters brings a distinct explanation to the scene. Kurds are not only

[364] Arslan, "Baytar."

punished for the insurgency in Turkey but also for joining the fight in northern Syria. The Kurdish movement in northern Syria established autonomous zones and extended its territorial control, which Turkey perceived as a security threat. The official state discourse raised concerns about the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Syria, and by highlighting the links between the YPG/YPJ and the PKK, it argues that an autonomous, legitimate, and strong Kurdish presence in Syria, bordering Turkey, would strengthen the PKK and provide them with a better capacity for conducting terrorist attacks.[365]

Although the Kurdish movement in Syria has established self-governing zones, their primary fight had been against the IS rather than the Assad regime. Those whose dead bodies were piled at the border died while fighting against the IS and other jihadist groups. Like the display of dead bodies, HDP representatives perceive the act of withholding the bodies as a message. However, highlighting the particularities of the context, Baluken asks, "What is the message you are trying to convey? These people were fighting against jihadist groups. Are you saying that even the dead bodies of those who fight against such groups will be punished? Is not this a sign showing your support for jihadist groups?"[366] Baluken's questions in the parliament came at a period when the government had been accused of clandestinely supporting jihadist groups in Syria.[367]

[365] YPG is portrayed as a security threat in multiple ways. It is framed as a threat to the local population, mainly Arabs, in northern Syria: "İletişim Başkanlığı PYD/YPG'nin gerçek yüzünü anlatan film hazırladı [Directorate of Communications prepared a film revealing the real face of PYD/YPG]," Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İletişim Başkanlığı, accessed April 20, 2022, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/stratejik_iletisim_calismalari/detaylar/iletisim-baskanligi-pyd-ypgnin-gercek-yuzunu-anlatan-film-hazirladi/. It is also portrayed as a branch of PKK, thus threatening Turkey and the Turkish population directly, see, "PKK/KCK Terör Örgütünün Suriye Kolu: PYD-YPG [PYD/YPG: The Syrian Branch of the PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization]," Strategic Reports (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, May 2017), https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar/icisleri.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/deneme/YAYINLAR/%C4%B0%C3%87ER%C4%B0K/pyd_arapca.pdf.

[366] "HDP'den Davutoğlu'na 'bekletilen cenazeler' soruları [The HDP's questions for Davutoğlu about the 'waiting dead bodies']",.

[367] There are both domestic and international accusations. For an example of the domestic discussion see; "MİT tırları soruşturması: Neler olmuştu? [The case of the MIT trucks: What happened?]," *BBC News Türkçe*, November 27, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/11/151127_mit_tirlari_neler_olmustu. For an international example see, Meredith Tax, "Turkey Helps ISIS Attack Rojava," *The Nation*, February 1, 2022, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/turkey-isis-rojava-prisoners/.

These questions point to a discourse wherein the act of withholding dead bodies from their families is a message to the Kurdish population that the Kurdish people would be punished for defying the Turkish state's interests in Syria. The arbitrary decision of forcefully withholding the bodies is a suspension of law and the withdrawal of it from the dead and their families, which performatively produces sovereignty. However, the specific actor(s) behind the decision, who vitalizes sovereignty, is concealed. Responsibility diffuses and slowly evaporates in the governmental mechanisms of an unsolvable bureaucratic maze. The act of withholding the bodies is an exercise of sovereign power within the field of governmentality. However, it is simultaneously an act that speaks. It is a message for the living by instrumentalizing the dead - a form of violence that seeks to punish, intimidate, discipline, tame, and subdue.

Finally, the securityness of the issue is another element that distinguishes this particular necropolitical practice's functions from postmortem violence. It also provides another alternative explanation of why one of the perceived reasons for this act is blackmailing. In addition to punishing the Kurdish population for the elections, the insurgency, and the developments in northern Syria, by forcefully withholding dead bodies through the instrumentalization of the border disciplines, regulates, and shapes the funerals. In a way, dead bodies were held as hostages, and the regime blackmailed their families in exchange for depoliticizing the funerals. By managing the dead's mobility, the regime simultaneously targets the resurrectory performative politics of funerals. It is dead body management in two ways, managing the corporeal body and through the body, managing the discursive sphere.

Necroviolence is both destructive and productive, and it has multiple and ambivalent functions. Like the interpretations of postmortem violence, a particular discourse identifies one of the functions of this border policy as revealing "the state's face". Reminding people that the regime, mainly the PM and President, is behind the decisions, HDP's co-chair, Selahattin

Demirtaş, directly targeted the regime and told them, "We hope you have not lost your conscience to the degree that you can insult and torture dead bodies".[368] The affective politics present in Demirtaş's speech is observable in the discourse on the border regime the government imposed on the dead bodies. HDP's İbrahim Ayhan also argued, "this inhumane treatment clearly reveals the unscrupulousness of the temporary government".[369] Similarly, HDP's Van representative, Tuba Hezer, said, "The AKP has demonstrated its cruelty by not giving the bodies for ten days".[370] The most prevalent discourse on the issue is about the decision's arbitrariness and unlawfulness; however, this arbitrary decision is simultaneously an "inhumane" one, revealing the immoral features of the regime.

Like the interpretations of postmortem violence that highlight "the state's face", this discourse also functions to challenge the official state discourse of the technicalized phenomenon of counterterrorism. The question at hand is not simply an issue of terrorism and a technical response of sterile counterterrorism operations. Meya-Der's co-chair, Baytar's, comments about the issue support this point. Building a link between this case and Hacı Lokman Birlik, whose dead body was dragged along the street, he claims that the regime's treatment of dead bodies reveals the Turkish state's enmity toward the Kurds.[371] In this discourse, the regime is cruel and unscrupulous, motivated by enmity; there is nothing technical or sterile about it.

However, what is different from the interpretations of postmortem violence is a heavy emphasis on the IS and religion, primarily due to the context wherein the Kurdish fighters' died

[368] "IŞİD'in Öldürdüğü 13 YPG'linin Cenazesi Altı Gündür Ailelerine Verilmiyor [13 YPG Fighters' Bodies, Killed by the IS, Have Not Been given to the Families for Six Days]," *Diken*, August 1, 2015, https://www.diken.com.tr/isidin-oldurdugu-13-ypglinin-cenazesi-alti-gundur-ailelerine-verilmiyor/.
[369] Kuray, "Mürşitpınar'da bekletilen cenaze sayısı 20'ye yükseldi [The number of dead bodies waiting at Mürşitpınar increased to 20]."
[370] "Cenazeleri 10 gün boyunca bekletilen gerillaları on binler uğurladı [Tens of thousands said farewell to the guerillas waited at the border for 10 days]," *Evrensel*, August 5, 2015, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/257653/cenazeleri-10-gun-boyunca-bekletilen-gerillalari-on-binler-ugurladi.
[371] Arslan, "Baytar."

fighting against the IS in Syria. After "martyrs do not die", the most common slogan cried during the fighters' funerals was "Murderer - IS, collaborator - AKP".[372] This discourse was (re)produced at the so-called elite level as well; the co-chair of DBP Şırnak Province, Gülenç, argued, "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who keeps saying 'according to Islam', has nothing to do with Islam. For us, the IS is no different from the AKP government".[373] Here, Gülenç refers to the instrumentalization of Islam, i.e., political Islam, as something the IS and the government share, in addition to their enmity and cruelty against the Kurds. There were dissident voices among the religious community. The Association of Clerics of İstanbul for Support and Solidarity (DIAYDER) gave a press release condemning the government's actions and claiming that "The AKP government defends itself based on its religious identity. Then, they have to stop their position on withholding the dead bodies. There is no place for such an action in Islam".[374]

In short, the Kurdish political and civil movements claimed the function of keeping the dead bodies revealed the regime's concealed affective and immoral characteristics. Identifying and highlighting the performative functions of dead body management has political functions as well. This discourse challenges the official narrative on the Kurdish Question as a matter of terrorism and counterterrorism while simultaneously confronting the regime's Islamic self-identity.

5.2 Terrorist Bodies and Politics of Forensic Autopsies

Pre-burial is not limited to transportation of bodies, and transportation is not limited to border policies. Forensic autopsies are a critical practice the regime engages in during the pre-burial process. Autopsies demonstrate the relationship between the materiality of the body and

[372] "Cenazeleri 10 gün boyunca bekletilen gerillaları on binler uğurladı [Tens of thousands said farewell to the guerillas waited at the border for 10 days]."
[373] Ibid.
[374] "DİAYDER: Cenazelerin verilmemesi İslam'a aykırı [DIAYDER: Withholding dead bodies is against Islam]," *ANF News*, August 1, 2015, https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/diayder-cenazelerin-verilmemesi-islam-a-aykiri-51858.

discourses and the entangled power relations between biopolitics and necropolitics. It is now well-established in new-materialist approaches that bodies are produced by and productive of social and political relations.[375] Material bodies and discursive regimes are inextricably intertwined. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Kurdish insurgents, and even civilians, are discursively framed as terrorists, which functions as a master signifier. Such framing, and the social order it produces, do not exist in a discursive realm isolated from materiality. The insurgent's body is socially and politically produced as "the terrorist body".

Forensics is a critical technology of power in the production of terrorist bodies. Due to the scientific discourses they refer to and the field it operates in, forensics is believed to generate credible information about the actors in the conflict. How, where, and in what condition the bodies are found is strategically used in certain narratives to justify killing. For example, when 34 civilians were killed in an aerial bombardment in Roboski (a village by the Iraqi border) in 2011, the authorities declared that the incident took place by the border, in a restricted special security zone.[376] Using this information, many have argued that the civilians were smuggling across the border and collaborating with the PKK; thus they did not deserve sympathy.[377] There are numerous cases where forensics generated knowledge and confirmed the deceased's identity as a terrorist. Such knowledge includes highlighting where and how they were killed, the arms they were carrying, which are sometimes planted. This knowledge generated by forensic experts is then used against the allegations that the victims were civilians,

[375] Kevin McSorley, ed., *War and the Body: Militarisation, Practice and Experience*, First issued in paperback, War, Politics and Experience (London New York: Routledge, 2015); Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence*.
[376] "Şırnak İli Uludere İlçesi Gülyazı (Bujeh) Ve Ortasu (Roboski) Köylerinden 38 İnsanın Öldürülmesine İlişkin İhd Ve Mazlum-Der Önizlenim Raporu [Preliminary Observation Report of IHD and Mazlum-Der on 38 People Killed in Roboski Villages]," Special Report (İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association), December 29, 2011).
[377] Yılmaz Özdil, "Sayın kaçakçı [Dear Smuggler]," *Hürriyet*, January 6, 2012, sec. yilmaz-ozdil, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/sayin-kacakci-19614987.

arming the forensic expert with the power to 'deem'. Since this knowledge can justify state violence, forensic sciences become a critical technology, or an apparatus. [378]

In this section, I will draw attention to a particular forensic technology: autopsies, instead of talking about forensics in a broader sense. There are two primary underlying reasons for focusing on forensic autopsies in particular. First, forensics becomes less relevant in the context of armed conflict, where killing does not constitute a crime. Second, in comparison to forensics, when understood as criminalistics, as the focus on the dead body is corporeal, autopsies seem to be a more critical technology than crime scene investigation, for example. One might think that the most common and practical function of managing autopsies is to spoil evidence. However, in the case of the Turkey – PKK conflict after 2004, there are only a handful of examples of spoiling evidence at autopsies.[379] This is primarily because of the increasing authoritarianism, and the regime penetrating the judiciary system; prosecutors appointed by the regime do not even press charges, eliminating the need to spoil evidence. When the evidence is spoiled, it is usually done clandestinely, making it impossible to research.

Another function of autopsies will be the focus of this section: its role in the (re)production of terrorist bodies and the bio/necropolitical discursive regime. While discussing the conceptualization of the (dead) body, I suggested that instead of appointing pre-given status to the dead body in the subject-object-abject spectrum, we should examine the practices and discourses producing the body as such to reveal and deconstruct the power relations. As we have discussed in Chapter 2.3.3, autopsies have objectifying and necropolitical functions. The person's name, story, and subjectivity fade into the background as the body's

[378] For an example see, "13 kişinin hayatını kaybettiği Kuzey Irak'taki operasyonla ilgili neler biliniyor? [What do we know about the operation in Northern Iraq where 13 people died]," *BBC News Türkçe*, February 14, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-56060642.

[379] The most known case is the 16 year-old Mahsum Mızrak. Although the autopsy report showed that he was killed by a teargas canister, officials sent unrelated bullets. The culprits were never found. See, Gökçer Tahincioğlu, "Rafta kalmış uçurtma [The kite left on the shelf]," *Milliyet*, February 16, 2014, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/gokcer-tahincioglu/rafta-kalmis-ucurtma-1837357.

materiality strengthens, as the body turns into an object of gaze and inspection. It is not necessarily a gaze and inspection to produce medical knowledge. Rather, the body is often inspected to produce a particular story, for example, that they were not tortured before death.

5.2.1 Autopsies: Corporeal Elements in Constructing the Christian Terrorist

The information generated by forensics and autopsies produces another narrative, a bio/necropolitical tale based on the identities of the insurgents. Specifically, by highlighting whether the insurgents were circumcised and pointing out the jewelry and tattoos of Christian symbology, like the cross and Jesus, an image of "the Christian terrorist" is constructed. For example, a member, later the head, of the constitutional committee and founding member of the AKP, Burhan Kuzu, said, "autopsies of the terrorists who had been butchered (*gebertilen*) must be done without exception. You will see that a great majority of them are uncircumcised. Wake up, my Kurdish brother, please wake up".[380] Kuzu's statement is significant for our discussion and needs to be unpacked. I would like to note here that there are many other texts and speeches of state agents and media reports along these lines. In other words, while we can talk about a discourse on circumcision, Kuzu's tweet represents a larger discourse.[381]

Kuzu's statement highlights the importance of autopsies as a technology of power in the relationship between the state and dead bodies. It shows the strategic role of autopsies in dead body management: autopsies 'prove' that the terrorists are not Muslims; thus, the PKK is not an ethnic insurgency but a foreign-back terrorist group. This role is not limited to the

[380] Burhan Kuzu (@BurhanKuzu), "Gebertilen Teröristlerin muayenesi mutlaka yapılmalıdır.Görülecektir ki,önemli bir bölümü sünnetsiz.Uyan Kürt kardeşim ne olur uyan artık," Twitter, September 7, 2015, 10:28 PM. https://twitter.com/BurhanKuzu/status/640984999894847488?s=20&t=iWREQhn5z9zueL4USJMZgA.
I translated "gebertilen" as "butchered" however, there is not an equivalent of this word. Gebertmek is a slang for killing but it has the connotation of killing an inferior being.

[381] For some other examples see, "Geçmişin 'PKK'liler Sünnetsiz' Söylemi, Burhan Kuzu'yla Yeniden [The Old Discourse of 'Uncircumcised PKK Members' Resurrected with Burhan Kuzu]," *Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*, September 8, 2015, https://www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/167447-gecmisin-pkk-liler-sunnetsiz-soylemi-burhan-kuzu-yla-yeniden; "PKK'lılar sünnetsiz çıktı [It turned out that PKK members were uncircumcised]," *HaberTurk*, February 5, 2008, sec. yasam, https://www.haberturk.com/yasam/haber/54386-pkklilar-sunnetsiz-cikti; "'Bazı PKK'lılar sünnetsiz' [Some PKK members are uncircumcised]," *Milliyet*, August 21, 2010, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/bazi-pkk-lilar-sunnetsiz-1279153.

traditional biopolitical understanding of autopsies as generating medical data or reinforcing the state's monopoly on violence. From a strictly Foucauldian perspective, one might contest the argument that what we are discussing here is a relationship between *the state* and the dead and rather frame it as the relationship between *power* and the dead. However, in Turkey, where the regime has control over various spheres, Kuzu perceives autopsies as a site and an apparatus for the state's dead body management. He invites the actors of dead body management to use this apparatus to identify and expose corporeal markers of race, ethnicity, and religion.

Why does Kuzu warn "his Kurdish brothers" to wake up? What is the issue or threat that he is warning the people against? For someone who knows that, particularly in Syria, there are local communities like Christian Kurds, Assyrians, and Armenians in the PKK, and voluntary international brigades attracted to the PKK's socialist and anarchist ideology, the presence of Christians and other non-Muslim groups is not surprising. Kuzu's statement is an integral part of a discourse that frames the PKK as an actor stooging for "foreign agents".[382] These foreign agents are unnamed "imperial powers" who want to divide Turkey. Such conspiratorial thinking is common across the political spectrum. Even the main opposition CHP, and the republican leftist groups like ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party) resort to this narrative from time to time.[383]

[382] This discourse can found in state agents' speeches and state institutions' statements such as Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek's speech, "'PKK'nın arkasında büyük dış güçler var' [There are major foreign powers behind PKK]," *Cumhuriyet*, June 12, 2010, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/pkknin-arkasinda-buyuk-dis-gucler-var-153304, and the Ministry of the Interior, "Bakanımız Sn. Soylu Terörle Mücadele Şube Müdürleri Değerlendirme Çalıştayına Katıldı [Our Minister Soylu Joined the Workshop on Counterterrorism]," Republic of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior, January 11, 2022, https://icisleri.gov.tr/bakanimiz-sn-soylu-terorle-mucadele-sube-mudurleri-degerlendirme-calistayina-katildi-11-01-2022, as well as the media, Taha Akyol, "PKK ve dış güçler [PKK and Foreign Powers]," *Hürriyet*, December 13, 2016, sec. taha-akyol, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/taha-akyol/pkk-ve-dis-gucler-40306064.

[383] "Republican leftists" refer to certain leftist groups that do not denounce Atatürk's republic project as bourgeois like other radical socialist groups, and embrace it instead. For a few examples of this discourse see, "2017'ye girerken ekmek, yaşam ve özgürlük için bir yol var [There is a road to bread, life, and freedom on our way to 2017]," *Birgün*, December 27, 2016, https://www.birgun.net/haber/2017-ye-girerken-ekmek-yasam-ve-ozgurluk-icin-bir-yol-var-141006; Erol Manisalı, "Dincilik, PKK ve emperyalizm sarmalındaki Türkiye [Turkey encircled by fundamentalism, PKK, and imperialism]," *Cumhuriyet*, February 7, 2017, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/erol-manisali/dincilik-pkk-ve-emperyalizm-sarmalindaki-turkiye-671767; K. Öymen Örsan, "Türkiye'de kim anti-emperyalist? [Who is anti-imperialist in Turkey]," *Cumhuriyet*,

This discourse serves a political function. First, it undermines the political agency of the Kurdish population that sides or sympathizes with the insurgency. The demands of the Kurdish armed political movement are ignored because of the idea that they are not the genuine demands of the Kurdish people but rather staged by the imperial powers. The civilian Kurdish community's political will is undermined even more. While the insurgent might serve imperial powers out of malice, the Kurdish citizen is believed to be fooled by the PKK. In this narrative, the PKK tricks the Kurdish people with an ethnic discourse while their real agenda is not the liberation of the Kurds or fostering Kurds' lives but dividing the country for their and imperial powers' interests.

Second, this discourse undermines the Kurdish movement's insurgency aspects and reduces it to a mere issue of terrorism supported by foreign agents. Such discourse discredits the ethnic characteristics of the conflict. It cannot be an ethnic insurgency if the fighters are not Kurdish in the first place. Here, the Kurdish identity is associated with and fixed to the Muslim identity. By highlighting the PKK's links with imperial powers, thus touching upon postcolonial anxieties, this narrative alienates the leftist Turkish community, who can be sympathetic to the PKK. Highlighting the fighters' foreignness and links with Christianity also targets the conservative Muslim Kurds and seeks to alienate them from the PKK. Even amid unprecedented violence, state agents were careful not to take an openly hostile position against the Kurdish identity, and they sought to conceal practices that go against Islam such as delaying burials. Instead, they held the PKK accountable for every atrocity. The reason behind these was concerns about jeopardizing the legitimacy of the counter-terrorism/insurgency operations and alienating the Muslim conservative Kurds.

November 4, 2019, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/orsan-k-oymen/turkiyede-kim-anti-emperyalist-1573286.

Finally, the discourse we are examining relates to the relationship between the state, power, and the dead, demonstrating the entangled and/or assembled bio/necropower. This dissertation shows that the official state discourse keeps discrediting the insurgency and reduces the Kurdish Question to a security matter of terrorism. By using the knowledge generated by the dead, oddly by their genitalia, a foreign terrorist is constructed. Additionally, the regime is performatively produced as a biopower, which, at least on a discursive level, seeks to protect and foster Kurdish lives against this foreign threat. The insurgent needs to be killed to protect the Turkish population and foster the Kurdish population's lives. However, the desire to expose religious and ethnic identities through autopsies can also be interpreted as a necropolitical practice. The infidel can be killed, and the state apparatuses must investigate their body to serve the regime's interest in managing (sub)populations. Last but not least, this discourse demonstrates the investment of the stakeholders we study in the dead body. The regime engages in dead body management to the degree that they want the dead's genitalia to be examined without exception.

5.2.2 The Media and the Christian Terrorist

In addition to circumcision, the most prevalent discourse I identified highlights the accessories and tattoos found on the body. It means that I had to abandon the traditional forensic method of discussing where and how the body is found and focus on what is found on the body. Specifically, Christian symbols, like the cross, are perceived and represented as scandalous and rhetorically instrumentalized to create a "foreign terrorist".

Discursively highlighting the foreignness of the insurgents serves to discredit the ethnic claims of the insurgency, turning the ethnic insurgency into terrorism and a pure security problem without political underpinnings. Through the construction of the Christian terrorist body, the Kurdish population has become the referent object of security in a biopolitical sense. The state and its apparatuses, like the security forces, appear as agents of biopower, protecting,

managing, and elevating Kurdish lives by eliminating the terrorists represented as not even Kurdish. However, as usual, necropower assists biopower. Unlike the discourse on circumcision, necropower is observable at a disjunction in visual representation and the language used in texts, which brings the politics of (in)visibility back to the scene.

To begin with, in addition to the discourse on circumcision, the Christian terrorist is constructed by referencing jewelry and tattoos found on the insurgents' dead bodies. This construction assembles actors like crime scene investigation teams, forensic pathologists, prosecutors, state institutions and agents, politicians, and the pro-government media. The fact that such symbols are found on dead bodies is perceived and represented as something scandalous and sensational that must be reported. This news is usually accompanied by headlines, such as "a necklace depicting crucified Jesus was found on the dead body of a PKK terrorist", "there was a cross on the terrorist who was killed", "cross found on the Iranian female terrorist", "a cross found on the dead terrorist", "there was a tattoo of the cross on the dead terrorist's arm"…[384]

However, under the guise of objective reporting, there is a premise that this is newsworthy. The "newsworthiness" and sensationalist features are established via several textual means. It is often explicit that we ought to pay attention to the symbols. In the age of

[384] "Öldürülen Töreristin Kolunda Haç Dövmesi Çıktı [Tattoo of Cross Found on the Dead Terrorist's Arm]," *Erzurum Gazetesi*, March 28, 2018, http://www.erzurumgazetesi.com.tr/haber/Oldurulen-toreristin-kolunda-hac-dovmesi-cikti/115118; "Son Dakika: Valinin Su Içtiği Çeşmenin 700 Metre Yakınında Üslenmişler [Flash: They Built a Base 700 Meter from the Well That the Governor Uses]," *Milliyet*, March 27, 2018, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/son-dakika-valinin-su-ictigi-cesmenin-700-metre-yakininda-uslenmisler-2635378; "Öldürülen Teröristten 'haç Şeklinde Kolye' Çıktı [There Was a Cross Necklace on the Dead Terrorist]," *Anadolu Ajansı*, April 21, 2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/oldurulen-teroristten-hac-seklinde-kolye-cikti/802248; "Teröristin Üstünden 'Haç' Çıktı [Cross Found the Terrosit]," *Yeni Şafak*, March 11, 2016, https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/teroristin-ustunden-hac-cikti-2432206; "Öldürülen Terörist'in üzerinden haç işareti çıktı [Cross found on the dead terrorist]," *Sabah*, September 28, 2015, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/28/oldurulen-teroristin-uzerinden-hac-isareti-cikti; Sema Alim Dalgıç, "İran Asıllı PKK'lı Kadın Teröristin Üzerinden Haç Işareti Çıktı [Cross Found on the Iranian Female Terrorist]," *Sabah*, March 3, 2017, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/03/03/iran-asilli-pkkli-kadin-teroristin-uzerinden-hac-isareti-cikti; "Bitlis'te 10 teröristin öldüğü operasyonda 2 PKK'lı böyle yakalandı [2 PKK terrorists were captured like this in the operation where 10 terrorists were killed in Bitlis]," *Sözcü*, March 3, 2017, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/son-dakika-haberi/bitliste-10-teroristin-oldugu-operasyonda-2-pkkli-boyle-yakalandi-1711358/.

digital media, it can be achieved by typing certain words in bold. For example, in one of the Anadolu Agency's, the state-run news agency, articles, the case is reported as such: "**A necklace in the shape of a cross with the figure of Jesus on it** was found on an **Iranian** named **Salar Acem** who was neutralized in a military operation in Şırnak against the **terrorist organization PKK**".[385] The words in bold tell us what is important in the text, not even in the sentence, since in the original text, the only other word in bold that was not in the quotation is the location of the military operation. Namely, they want to stress that who was killed was a terrorist, an Iranian, and a Christian.

The sensationalist feature of the news is also established explicitly and with syntactic means. Cross-shaped necklaces or tattoos found on the bodies are reported with sub-headings and exclamation marks, indicating that it is something shocking and newsworthy.[386] *Sabah*, a pro-government news agency, reports the news as such: "The terrorist who killed Nihat Çarpak in 2014 was captured dead in the counterterrorism operation conducted by the Bitlis Gendarmerie Command Post. The traitor was Iranian and a cross-shaped necklace was found on her dead body, garnering attention".[387] This text is syntactically built without a subject; we are not given the information about whose attention was garnered. The author attempts to draw the reader's attention to her nationality and religion, *the necklace*, by suggesting that they have already garnered attention. This discourse is not limited to the media; we can find it in the state institutions' announcements as well. To illustrate, the Mayoral Office of Tunceli made the following statement after a military operation: "The PKK terrorist with a cross on his neck and

[385] "Öldürülen Teröristten 'haç Şeklinde Kolye' Çıktı [There Was a Cross Necklace on the Dead Terrorist]", bold in original
[386] Dalgıç, "İran Asıllı PKK'lı Kadın Teröristin Üzerinden Haç Işareti Çıktı [Cross Found on the Iranian Female Terrorist]; "Son Dakika: Valinin Su Içtiği Çeşmenin 700 Metre Yakınında Üslenmişler [Flash: They Built a Base 700 Meter from the Well That the Governor Uses],".
[387] Dalgıç, "İran Asıllı PKK'lı Kadın Teröristin Üzerinden Haç Işareti Çıktı [Cross Found on the Iranian Female Terrorist]."; "Teröristin Üstünden 'Haç' Çıktı [Cross Found the Terrosit]," "Haç kolyeli terörist bakın kim çıktı! [Look at who the terrorist with cross necklace is],"; *Akit*, April 21, 2017, https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/hac-kolyeli-terorist-bakin-kim-cikti-309714.html.

hand was captured dead in Tunceli".[388] Even a state institution reports the religious signifiers as something that the public needs to know.

The most striking part about this discourse that builds the foreign terrorist is the rupture it entails. The rupture is observable when we look at the visual and textual representations of "the Christian terrorist bodies" and compare them with the broader representation of the dead. The corporeal invisibility in the media, the discursive erasure, and the sanitary language in the official discourses are replaced by visualizing the dead, reporting the cases, and abandoning the technical language of counterterrorism when it is about the Christian terrorist.

The media outlets at the center of our discussion tend to use "neutralizing" and "capturing dead" to refer to the PKK fighters' deaths. Although we see morbidly violent practices, like as the mutilation of the dead, such sanitary language has been adopted for decades. It is part of the state discourse that precedes the AKP government that reduces the "Kurdish Question" to merely a terror problem that can be solved with military operations.[389] In this discourse, the state's motive behind military operations is not to oppress and control a population out of enmity but by "neutralizing" the threats.

Discourses on counterterrorism technicalize and sanitize violence. Violence becomes a technical necessity to eliminate the terrorist threat. It needs to be eliminated for the physical security of the Turkish population and the welfare of the Kurdish population. Since it is a technical necessity, the terrorist is not killed; they are neutralized. The biopolitics of counterterrorism has been conceptualized by focusing on contingencies and risk

[388] ""BOYNUNDA VE ELİNDE HAÇ İŞARETİ OLAN TURUNCU LİSTEDEKİ PKK'LI TERÖRİST TUNCELİ'DE ÖLÜ OLARAK ELE GEÇİRİLDİ [PKK Terrorist on the Orange List Who Had Cross on His Neck and Hand Was Captured Dead]," Republic of Turkey, Governor's Office of Tunceli, March 27, 2018, http://www.tunceli.gov.tr/boynunda-ve-elinde-hac-isareti-olan-turuncu-listedeki-pkkli-terorist-tuncelide-olu-olarak-ele-gecirildi.

[389] Altan Tan, *Kürt sorunu [The Kurdish Question]*, 10th ed., Timaş yayınları Düşünce dizisi, 1960 5 (İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2011).

management.[390] The physical and military violence within biopolitics is usually associated with massacres and racial purification. However, as we have discussed, counterterrorism is portrayed as a necessity to foster and elevate the population's life. In this regard, the discursive regime of counterterrorism engages in a machinic relationship with the discursive regime of biopolitics.

The rupture occurs in visual representation and language, and this rupture points out necropolitical mechanisms. Although some texts keep using the sanitary language of neutralization, when reporting on the cases of Christian terrorists, many others use the word "killing".[391] The Christian terrorist demonstrates a liminal space - a tension between biopolitics and necropolitics. Their very construction of foreignness serves a biopolitical discursive regime wherein the PKK does not have credible ethnic claims; thus, the state seeks to protect and foster the Turkish and the Kurdish population against this foreign threat. However, the Christian terrorist is an infidel, a separatist, malicious foreign agent marked with death. The infidel terrorist does not need to be neutralized; they can be killed.

The rupture is more evident in the visual regime. The word killing is used in other texts than the reports on the Christian insurgents; thus, one might even question whether it is really a rupture. I would not claim that abandoning this sanitary language is limited to the Christian insurgents, but it is more common and likely in the news coverage of the Christian insurgents. When the textual and visual elements are considered altogether, it becomes more difficult to contest that there is indeed a disjunction. At the visual level, we observe the corporeal visibility

[390] Christos Boukalas, "Government by Experts: Counterterrorism Intelligence and Democratic Retreat," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5, no. 2 (August 1, 2012): 277–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.703809; Debrix and Barder, "Nothing to Fear but Fear".

[391] "Son Dakika: Valinin Su Içtiği Çeşmenin 700 Metre Yakınında Üslenmişler [Flash: They Built a Base 700 Meter from the Well That the Governor Uses]"; "Öldürülen Teröristten 'haç Şeklinde Kolye' Çıktı [There Was a Cross Necklace on the Dead Terrorist]"; "Öldürülen Terörist'in üzerinden haç işareti çıktı [Cross found on the dead terrorist]"; "Teröristin Üstünden 'Haç' Çıktı [Cross Found the Terrosit]"; "Bitlis'te 10 teröristin öldüğü operasyonda 2 PKK'lı böyle yakalandı [2 PKK terrorists were captured like this in the operation where 10 terrorists were killed in Bitlis]."

of dead bodies. The dead bodies of female insurgents and Hacı Lokman Birlik had a complex relationship with the politics of invisibility. Whereas their mutilated dead bodies were published on social media, likely by the security forces or paramilitary groups, these visuals could not find a place in the pro-government and the state media. Only the opposition media published the censored versions of these photographs. On the other hand, the complete opposite happened in the case of "the Christian terrorists". The same media outlets, owned by the oligarchs or the state, showed the censored photographs of the dead, whereas the opposition media has not covered this news.[392]

One of the visuals in question is a collage of two photographs.[393] One photograph shows the dead fighter lying face down on a bright yellow rag; the blood around his head is visible despite the censor. This photograph is photoshopped next to another one; there is only a hand in white medical gloves holding a cross-shaped necklace. The other visual is a photograph of Salar Acem, whose Iranian nationality was represented as shocking.[394] Acem is lying face up on the ground, his face is censored, but we can see the cross-shaped necklace with the figure of Jesus on his neck. Visuals of other cases do not illustrate the dead, but a hand in medical gloves usually shows the cross-shaped necklace.[395]

Visuals of the dead have ambivalent effects. As the previous studies suggest, they can have humanizing and dehumanizing functions.[396] The opposition media publishing the censored images of the female insurgents and Birlik can be interpreted as a resistance to normative violence, an attempt to keep them alive in public discourse, and to reveal the state

[392] "Öldürülen Teröristten 'haç Şeklinde Kolye' Çıktı [There Was a Cross Necklace on the Dead Terrorist]"; "Öldürülen Terörist'in üzerinden haç işareti çıktı [Cross found on the dead terrorist]"; "Öldürülen Töreristin Kolunda Haç Dövmesi Çıktı [Tattoo of Cross Found on the Dead Terrorist's Arm]."; "Haç kolyeli terörist bakın kim çıktı! [Look at who the terrorist with cross necklace is]."
[393] "Öldürülen Terörist'in üzerinden haç işareti çıktı [Cross found on the dead terrorist]"
[394] "Öldürülen Teröristten 'haç Şeklinde Kolye' Çıktı [There Was a Cross Necklace on the Dead Terrorist]"; "Haç kolyeli terörist bakın kim çıktı! [Look at who the terrorist with cross necklace is]."
[395] "Teröristin Üstünden 'Haç' Çıktı [Cross Found the Terrosit]"
[396] Auchter, "On Viewing"'; Campbell, "Horrific Blindness".

atrocities. Even HDP's former co-chair, Selahattin Demirtaş, shared the image of Birlik with the caption, "look at this photo well. It was taken the other day in Şırnak. No one should forget this because we will not".[397] On the other hand, as David Campbell argues, visuals of dead bodies are often hidden; when the body is rendered visible, however, it is usually the Other's dead.[398]

Although the insurgent is the enemy Other in general, visuals of postmortem violence on subjects, like Birlik -a Muslim, male, ethnically Kurdish, Turkish citizen-, are rendered invisible in the media to not discredit the legitimacy of counterterrorism operations. On the other hand, the Christian/infidel's dead, as the ultimate and unproblematic enemy Other, can be rendered visible without hindering the legitimacy of the operations. In this context, the corporeal visibility of the "corpse" serves a dehumanizing function. Visuals of the dead produce "the Christian terrorist's dead" as objects that signify glory, the success of the state and its security apparatus, and the defeat of "the foreign terrorist". They are pictures of sovereign victory and suppression of the necropolitical object, revealed by the medical-security assemblage of forensic autopsies.

5.3 Transporting the Body: Security and Funeral Vehicles

The dead's journey continues after the autopsy and continues to be subject to the regime's management and security discourses and practices. The border regime imposed on the YPG/YPJ fighters' dead bodies is not the only practice, or technology, governing, prohibiting, regulating, or securitizing the dead bodies' mobility. Regardless of whether they cross borders or move within the state territories, dead bodies must be transported. In principle, the state's role in transporting dead bodies relates to questions of biopolitics and sovereignty,

[397] Selahattin Demirtaş [@hdpdemirtas], "Bu fotoğrafa iyi bakın. Önceki gün Şırnak'ta çekildi. Kimse unutmasın, biz unutmayacağız çünkü.," Tweet, *Twitter*, October 4, 2015, https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/650585392752762881.
[398] Campbell, "Horrific Blindness".

an assemblage of it, or as Butler argues, sovereignty functioning within the field of governmentality.[399] As discussed earlier, forensics generates criminal knowledge and increases the state's data-recording and surveillance capabilities while reinforcing the state's monopoly on violence. The state's investment in the dead's transportation, at least in Turkey, resides in the claims of the state's role in promoting welfare, caring about its citizen's needs, and fostering their lives.

Following the principle of the "social state" as defined in the second article of the Turkish constitution (i.e., The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state, governed by the rule of law), transportation of dead bodies is a public service. It is codified in the public health law; according to Articles 222 and 228:

> 222. The municipalities are obliged to provide assistance with transporting dead bodies and must keep vehicles designed for this purpose ready. It is forbidden to use public transportation vehicles to transport dead bodies or use funeral vehicles for any other purpose.
>
> 228. A document must be procured by the municipality where the dead will be buried for the dead body to be transported from one municipality to another, regardless of whether the transportation takes place before or after the burial.[400]

The details and procedure of this service vary depending on the municipality; yet, if the family does not explicitly show an interest in using private funeral services, the municipality is responsible for the service.

Municipalities have denied this service to the insurgents and Kurdish political prisoners' dead bodies on numerous occasions. *Feindstrafrecht* shows itself again here. Power abandons certain subjects; the law is withdrawn from the insurgents and their families, making them non-citizens, and even enemies. This has been a common practice for insurgents/terrorists since the notorious 1990s. Functioning as a master signifier, the magic word of *terrorism* has

[399] Butler, *Precarious Life*.
[400] Umumi Hıfzısıhha Kanunu [Public Health Law] 1930, https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.3.1593.pdf

enabled and normalized this act. Together with the discursive framing of the PKK as monstrous perverts, they have constructed the terrorists' dead bodies as objects, the enemy's body that does not deserve the rights and protections that the law promotes. However, labeled as terrorists, Kurdish political prisoners face the same treatment.

The most recent example is Mehmet Sevinç, who died suspiciously in prison on 3 April 2022; Sevinç's dead body, then, was denied of public services, including transporting the body. Even before the transportation process, his death was a necropolitical story in itself. As the guards claim, they found Sevinç, who had been incarcerated for 28 years, lying unconscious in his solitary cell.[401] Taken to the hospital, Sevinç died after an operation on cerebral bleeding. Sources close to the PKK and Mehmet's daughter, Berivan Sevinç, claim that he was killed.[402] Berivan draws attention to the inconsistencies in the official story, particularly that although the guardians claimed to have brought Sevinç to the hospital around breakfast time, the hospital records show that he was admitted to the hospital at 3:50 AM, and no information has been given as to why a patient with hypertension was in the solitary cell.[403] The story would have been necropolitical even if he was not murdered; Mehmet Sevinç, as a member of an aggregate group in terms of ethnicity and ideology-, has been subject to a slow death, like many other political prisoners, excluded from the invitation to life. Like his life, his death is a subject of security. Not as the referent object or the security threat, as Auchter assumes how dead bodies can be subjects and objects of security, but by being embedded in security discourses and actors. Soldiers, not doctors, informed Berivan about her father's death, for example.

[401] "Cezaevinde bir ölüm daha: Tutuklu Mehmet Sevinç yaşamını yitirdi [Another death in the prison: Prisoner Mehmet Seviç lost his life]," *Gazete Karınca*, April 7, 2022, sec. Cezaevleri, https://gazetekarinca.com/cezaevinde-bir-olum-daha-tutuklu-mehmet-sevinc-yasamini-yitirdi/

[402] "Prisoner Dies in Solitary Cell in Manisa," *ANF News*, April 7, 2022, https://anfenglish.com/news/prisoner-dies-in-solitary-cell-in-manisa-59172; "Turkish State Continues to Kill Detainees in Prisons," *Hawar News*, April 7, 2022, http://hawarnews.com/en/haber/turkish-state-continues-to-kill-detainees-in-prisons-h29966.html.

[403] "Tutuklu Mehmet Sevinç yaşamını yitirdi [Prisoner Mehmet Sevinç lost his life]," *Evrensel*, April 7, 2022, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/458861/tutuklu-mehmet-sevinc-yasamini-yitirdi.

The story does not end here either; in fact, our discussion begins here. Mehmet Sevinç was imprisoned and died in a hospital in Manisa. After his death, his dead body was brought to İzmir for the autopsy procedure. Then, his body was transported from İzmir to İstanbul by cargo plane.[404] His family, waiting in front of the hospital in Manisa for days, went to İstanbul to receive the body. However, the family was not provided with a funeral vehicle and had to transport the body from the morgue in İstanbul to the burial ground themselves.[405] In their hometown, the local imam, who is responsible for preparing the dead body for the burial, refused to wash the body for the burial and lead the final prayers (*cenaze namazı*), claiming that it is "forbidden".[406]

Denial of funeral services is another example of necro/sovereign/normative assemblage in an entangled interplay. We do not know whether the prohibition of pre-burial services came after a performative utterance of a sovereign decree or by municipalities, with imams appearing as petty sovereigns, but regardless, excluding the family from the rights granted by the law is a sovereign exercise. This exclusion is produced by and productive of normative schemes of intelligibility. As Topuz argues,

> because the family members were not considered citizens, they were denied the provision of a funeral vehicle. Later the imam refused to lead the religious services. It is not enough to be counted as a citizen; they must not be counted as a human so that the state's policy on the Kurdish Question can be effective.[407]

Topuz highlights the causal inference; because the family members were not considered citizens, or even humans, they were treated as such. Although I agree with him, there is also a

[404] "Cami İmamı, cezaevinde şüpheli şekilde ölen Mehmet Sevinç'in cenazesini yıkamadı [Imam refused to wash Mehmet Sevinç's dead body, who suspiciously died in prison]," *Artı Gerçek*, April 8, 2022, //artigercek.com/haberler/bir-utanc-daha-cami-imami-mehmet-sevinc-in-cenazesini-yikamadi.
[405] Ali Duran Topuz, "Siyaset meydanında ölüye zulüm diriye zulüm [Oppression of the living, oppression of the dead in the political sphere]," *Artı Gerçek*, April 11, 2022, http://artigercek.com/yazarlar/ali-duran-topuz/siyaset-meydaninda-oluye-zulum-diriye-zulum.
[406] "'Cami İmamı, cezaevinde şüpheli şekilde ölen Mehmet Sevinç'in cenazesini yıkamadı [Imam refused to wash Mehmet Sevinç's dead body, who suspiciously died in prison]"; Topuz, "Siyaset meydanında ölüye zulüm diriye zulüm [Oppression of the living, oppression of the dead in the political sphere]."
[407] Topuz, Siyaset meydanında ölüye zulüm diriye zulüm [Oppression of the living, oppression of the dead in the political sphere].

performative element of producing these families as non-citizens and non-humans. As Sevinç becomes an ungrievable life -since he does not deserve, or have the capacity, to be mourned- so does the Sevinç family, as they do not deserve to mourn. This sovereign exercise, which also constitutes normative power, simultaneously has the function of managing aggregate groups. Sevinç was left to die, if not killed directly; by regulating the transportation of his dead body and by investing in exclusion, power targets the living alongside and through the dead. Through killing, disciplining, and punishing the living, necropower is exercised.

5.3.1 Funeral Vehicles, Security, and Trustee Mayors

The phenomenon of not providing funeral vehicles, as exemplified in Sevinç's case, is a common practice that we can observe in Turkey's dead body management. It is, however, not the only practice. An interesting, and sinister, part of dead body management regarding transportation uses securitization as a technology. However, instead of prohibition, like the YPG/YPJ fighters at the border, criminalization becomes the product of securitization. Kurdish mayors are legally charged for providing funeral vehicles on the grounds of supporting terrorism.

Power is everywhere. For instance, legally charging political actors for a service that is a municipal responsibility can easily be read as a sovereign exercise. It is power at its application, as Foucault suggests.[408] Power precedes the action, yet, the action (re)produces power. However, we should also look at what power, in its entanglements and assemblages, produces, or what it politically does, its effects, and functions. It is not enough to say that necropower manages aggregate groups; we should examine how exactly this management unfolds and what other political functions it brings to life.

[408] Foucault; *The History of Sexuality*

Criminalization, enabled by securitization, has paved the way for the trustee mayor (*kayyum*) policy, wherein the elected Kurdish mayors were dismissed from office, often imprisoned, and replaced with the appointed trustee mayors. The gaseous form of sovereignty that we could observe in the bureaucracy regarding the YPG/YPJ fighters' dead bodies at the border changes its form. Sovereignty, in its traditional legal and administrative form, tries to expand into and solidifies itself in "Kurdistan". Securitization followed by the criminalization of transporting the dead becomes a component of dead body management: a technology of necro/sovereign power that serves colonizing functions in this particular context.

The criminalization of transporting bodies, or to be more precise, providing the service of transportation, has a history preceding the trustee mayor policy. In 2005, for example, three PKK fighters were killed in rural areas of the Batman province. Either deliberately, or motivated by the fear of retaliation, no institution was willing to provide a funeral vehicle. The search for a vehicle went on for three days. With the initiative of Diyarbakır's mayor, Osman Baydemir, the Diyarbakır municipality sent an ambulance to Batman. The mainstream media and the central government turned the mayor's initiative into a scandal as the mayor was accused of abuse of authority, misuse of public resources, and supporting terrorism.[409] The same pattern of sending ambulances to carry the dead continued creating multiple "ambulance scandals".[410]

Therefore, criminalization/securitization cannot be reduced to its contribution to the trustee mayor policy. Among mainly the secular Kemalist opposition, there is a trend to dismiss the importance of such practices and policies targeting the dead. They tend to believe that these are simply excuses and a strategic move of Erdoğan to gain administrative control in the southeastern region (Kurdistan), where most of the provinces are governed by the HDP.

[409] Özsoy, "Between Gift and Taboo", 10.
[410] Ibid.

Although, in principle, I would not entirely reject the argument that the AKP desires to gain administrative control, dismissing such pre-burial practices as a mere strategic move is reductive. It dismisses the old, systematic, and polyvalent characteristics of dead body management.

However, there is something novel about the post-2015 period. Armed with the authority to rule by decree, granted by the state of emergency that followed the failed coup attempt in 2016, the Ministry of Interior dismissed 28 elected governors in southeastern Turkey and appointed mostly the acting governors as mayors.[411] Mayors were charged with using the municipalities' resources to support terrorism. In addition to the accusations of using the municipalities' vehicles to dig trenches and build barricades that the insurgents used in urban warfare, there was also "using the municipalities' vehicles to carry terrorists' dead bodies" in the bill of indictment.[412]

In 2005, Baydemir was accused of turning an ambulance into a funeral vehicle. Article 222 of the public health law states that 'it is forbidden to use public transportation vehicles to transport dead bodies or use funeral vehicles for any other purpose'. Therefore, the charges against Baydemir in 2005 were not necessarily unlawful or arbitrary, even though it was ethically questionable since it is not uncommon to use ambulances as funeral vehicles in other contexts. Starting from 2016, however, even using the municipalities' designated funeral vehicles was considered a crime.

[411] In the Turkish administrative system, each province has a governor (*vali*) appointed by the state and an elected mayor. Likewise, cities within the province has an appointed governor (*kaymakam*), who is hierarchically under the governor of the province, and elected mayor. Municipalities/districts within the cities only have elected mayors. In a way, governors represent the state whereas mayors represent the people. Governors has the authority over the police and the gendarmerie, and can inspect the mayoral office. Mayors, on the other hand, are responsible for governing the daily activities and infrastructure in the city. Therefore, a governor also acting as the mayor has absolute authority over the region.

[412] "Kayyum nedir, neden atanır, görevleri nelerdir? [What is a trustee mayor, why are they appointed, what are their duties?]," *Milliyet*, September 11, 2016, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/kayyum-nedir-neden-atanir-gorevleri-nelerdir-2309792.

A cynical reader, especially those familiar with Turkish politics, would suspect that Baydemir was punished for providing pre-burial services for the terrorists' dead or "carrying the terrorist body", not because he used ambulances. If that were true, it would be the defacto motive in Baydemir's case, whereas in the post-2016 period, the criminalization of transporting the terrorist's dead body was codified, and this became a precedent case. It was not codified in a classical sense, that a proposal was drafted and passed. Rather, "transporting the terrorist bodies" was a performative speech act present in the state agents' and prosecutors' accusations or offered as evidence for supporting terrorism. Although there is no law about carrying terrorist bodies, the judiciary found the mayors guilty and dismissed them from office, constructing the act as a crime regardless of the existing laws and codes.

Considering that the municipality is supposed to transport the dead, how do state agents justify these legal charges? The reader should not forget that the separation of powers was almost non-existent at this point, and the prosecutors either take direct orders from the government or take actions that would please the government. The Minister of the Interior, Süleyman Soylu, was responsible for the trustee mayor policy. Soylu and other actors of the AKP government have offered more justifications than the legal branch.

To illustrate, following a heated discussion in January 2017, right after new trustee mayors were appointed, Minister Soylu staunchly defended the policy by claiming that the municipal funds and facilities are used to finance and support terrorism. In the parliamentary debate, he said,

> We have determined that earth-movers belonging to the municipality had been used to dig trenches and build barricades against the security forces during the incidents that followed the June 7 elections. Just look at these… Okay, we can count hundreds of examples, but here are a few. I want to restate this: it is crystal clear with legal evidence that municipalities' vehicles

> were provided for terrorist funerals, symbols of the terrorist organization were put on the vehicles, giving social aid only to the terrorists' families….[413]

Soylu lists twelve reasons, all separated by commas in the text and acting as evidence, for the mayors' organic links to the PKK. Here, Critical Discourse Analysis, particularly formulated by Norman Fairclough, comes in handy since it allows for more room to study a single text while keeping our attention on power relations.[414] Commas used in this text might seem innocuous at first glance; however, they have a syntactic function. Commas are used for separating list items, and this is what Soylu does, listing the reasons for the legal action. More precisely, he lists the examples proving that mayors are affiliated with the PKK. A comma separates providing funeral vehicles from covering the vehicle with symbols; syntactically, the same sentence could have been formulated grammatically as "covering the vehicles belonging to the municipality with PKK's symbols". It indicates that providing the vehicles and symbols are perceived as two separate examples, two criminal acts.

The Ministry of Interior proposed a similar argument to justify the trustee mayor policy in a report they released in 2019, in which some visuals were also provided as evidence.[415] Explaining the process that led to appointing the trustee mayors, the report states that "funeral vehicles of municipalities were covered with the pictures of the terrorists and the so-called rags (*paçavra*) of the organization (PKK), turning the vehicle into a propaganda machine".[416] Three images accompany the text. The first one illustrates a funeral vehicle from the Siirt municipality. A poster of the insurgent is hung on the vehicle's hood; it is a headshot of the insurgent. Another portrait, a smaller picture than the poster, is by the front window. Both

[413] Republic of Turkey the Grand Assembly (TBMM), Debate (3 January 2017), https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic_yazici?P4=22806&P5=H&page1=110&page2=110

[414] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*.

[415] "Belediyelerdeki Kayyum Sistemi ve Mevcut Durum Raporu [The Report on the Trustee Mayor System and the Current Situationin the Municipalities]" (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı, March 18, 2019), https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar/icisleri.gov.tr/IcSite/illeridaresi/Yayinlar/KayyumRaporu/kayyum_nihai_rapor.pdf.

[416] Ibid., 15.

pictures are headshots against a green background; there is no symbol, nothing but the smiling woman who is now dead. Two people are leaning out of the vehicle's window, carrying flags. There is no symbol on the flag, at least from what we can see in the image; it has the three colors of Kurdistan: yellow, red, and green.

The second image is also a funeral vehicle, but it belonged to the Diyarbakır municipality. There are no flags this time. There are portraits of the dead fighters on the hood and front window, five or six of them (the vehicle is far away, and the light on the right side of the image makes the posters blurry). It is impossible to detect any symbol in the portraits because of the angle, resolution, and light; however, the portraits are against a yellow background, which distinctly symbolizes YPG/YPJ forces in northern Syria. The third image is a funeral vehicle from the Batman municipality. It is the only image with undisputable symbols, whereas the first image has the flag of Kurdistan, not necessarily the PKK, and the second has YPG/YPJ symbols, whose status as a terrorist organization is contested, the third image includes the portrait of the insurgent against a red background (classic for PKK fighters) with the red star in a yellow circle (the symbol of the PKK). The PKK's flag lies on the right side of the portrait, a red star in a yellow inner and green outer circle against a red background. On the left, there is a portrait of the PKK's chairman, Abdullah Öcalan.

Visuals, in this context, perform two primary functions. First, they are securitizing images. Contributing to associating the mayors with the PKK, they help frame the mayors as a matter of security, a threat to national security and the sovereignty of the state. Functioning as a master signifier, the slightest reference to terrorism brings the perlocutionary act of feeling threatened and the illocutionary act of securitization. The image of the Batman municipality's funeral vehicle, for example, has a Kurdistan flag; considering that the PKK uses the same colors and the intervisual and intertextual context, the image immediately builds the connection between Kurdistan and terrorism.

Second, images and the text that accompanies them bring a sovereign/normative assemblage into *the sphere of the pre-burial*, where a necro/sovereign assemblage has been at the forefront so far. Both the text and images in the ministry's report frame the display of the insurgent/terrorist's portrait as a criminal act that justifies the trustee mayors policy. The sovereign tool of prohibition, or arbitrary criminalization, serves to construct ungrievable lives - whose lives are not counted as lives. Normatively not counted as humans, the insurgent/terrorist must be a faceless figure who cannot be mourned.

5.4 Summary and Conclusion

The regime's investment in managing the dead continues in the temporal period, what we can call the "pre-burial", which mainly includes transportation of dead bodies and forensic autopsies. Because the Kurdish Question and Turkey's fight against the Kurdish insurgency extends beyond Turkey's border, we see border policies as a part of dead body management. Dead bodies of YPG/YPJ fighters who died in northern Syria were not allowed to pass the Turkish border. The decision was justified based on security concerns over public order that the funerals might interrupt. The Kurdish political movement has primarily underlined the decision's arbitrariness while conceptualizing it as a form of violence that punishes and blackmails the families and the broader Kurdish community.

The insurgents killed within Turkish territories do not go through a similar practice; often, dead bodies are transported unproblematically with the military's vehicles from the site of the conflict to the hospitals for autopsies. However, the investment in managing the dead shows its face again at this very point. Autopsies are a crucial biopolitical technology that generate knowledge. Even though autopsies are sometimes manipulated to acquit state atrocities, their principal function is to construct and portray *a Christian (infidel), a foreign PKK terrorist*. This is achieved by corporeal and material signifiers such as the male genitalia (whether they are circumcised), tattoos and jewelry, information acquired during the forensics

and autopsy procedures. How the foreign terrorist is perceived and depicted points out a disjunction in discourse and is (re)productive of a social order, in which the foreign terrorist can be "killed" (unlike the Kurdish insurgents who are "neutralized"), and their dead body can be rendered visible in the media. Politically, it has a vital function; the construction of the foreign terrorist discursively challenges the ethnic claims of the insurgency, attempting to discredit PKK's legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurdish population.

Last but not least, the process of transporting the dead bodies via "civilian" (read non-military) vehicles to the family's house or the cemetery is also subject to prohibition, securitization, and criminalization. Even though providing funeral vehicles is among the municipalities' responsibilities, Kurdish mayors have been legally charged for providing this service. Even displaying the pictures of the insurgents -whose bodies are being transported-, has been shown as evidence of the issue's securityness. Elected mayors were dismissed from office and replaced by loyal trustee mayors (*kayyum*) appointed by the central government.

With their distinct practices, actors, and discourses, these three aspects may seem irrelevant or disconnected to the reader at first glance. What brings them together is dead body management and the power relations it entails. Deleuze and Guattari's concepts and their ontology come in handy in making sense of these seemingly disconnected, or loosely connected, phenomena. They are connected in a rhizomatic relationship, as multiplicities in an "n-1 dimension".[417] This is multiplicities in a Bergsonian temporal and virtual sense, the "many" constituting an assemblage, simultaneously one and many.[418] For example, the border regime simultaneously constitutes a sovereign exception, produces a certain population as the enemy, who shall not be subject to the law, and punishes, blackmails, and subdues the Kurdish

[417] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 6.
[418] Jae Eon Yu and Jeong Woo Lee, "Creating Rhizomatic Networks and Ethics for the Marginalized Group," *Systemic Practice and Action Research* 21, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 253–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11213-008-9095-7.

population, all the while producing sovereign and necro- power. The border regime itself is then an assemblage with entangled power relations. Autopsies, on the other hand, construct the image of the foreign terrorist; the Self is a discursively biopolitical agent that seeks to protect and foster the population against this foreign threat, bringing a bio/necro dynamic to the forefront. The criminalization of providing funeral vehicles is also a practice that is simultaneously an exercise of sovereignty and necropolitics. Securitizing images, however, complicates the sovereign/necro assemblage by shaping the normative schemes of intelligibility.

Assembled, and functioning together, these three distinct areas demonstrate the regime's continuous involvement in managing the Other's dead. They serve similar, yet distinct, functions. They penetrate and reinforce the administrative control of Kurdistan, withdraw the law from the Kurdish population, abjectify the insurgents' dead bodies, render them violable, punish and torment the families, and discredit the insurgency. Unlike postmortem violence, the pre-burial aspects of the state's involvement in the dead feed from security dynamics. Securitization plays a critical role in dead body management and rather unexpectedly brings normative power to the already complicated power assemblages. The regime's involvement in the dead continues, and the role of securitization and normative power only gets stronger in what follows the pre-burial practices.

Chapter 6: Politics of Funerals and Who Can (be) Mourn(ed)

This chapter traces the final steps of the dead's journey: the practices and discourses of burial and funerals. Studying the politics of funerals reveals an interesting tension between politicization, depoliticization, and securitization. While the regime accuses the Kurdish movement, especially the HDP (People's Democratic Party), of doing "politics of death", the HDP accuses the regime of the same thing, albeit they understand politics of death differently. In other words, both parties accuse each other of doing politics of death while engaging in the politics of death themselves without acknowledging it. The regime situates its politics of death in the realm of security, whereas the HDP places their acts on a supra-political level. The regime's discourses represent the politicization of funerals as a threat; in a way, we can talk about the securitization of politicization. This discussion shows us more than the blurred lines between politicization, depoliticization, and securitization. Securitizing discourses bring a sovereign/normative power assemblage, with necropolitical underpinnings, into life and play a critical constitutive role in the trustee mayor policy.

The previous chapter established that some pre-burial practices serve the trustee mayor policy, such as the transportation of dead bodies. Following that discussion, this chapter examines how attending and organizing funerals are securitized and criminalized. It also shows how funeral politics are an integral part of the trustee mayor policy and thus the colonial relations between Turkey and Kurdistan. In terms of power relations, the politics of funerals indicate an interplay among sovereign, necro-, and normative power. Having securitized the issue, the regime lifted the immunities of HDP representatives and mayors with the support of the opposition. Even though organizing funerals is the municipalities' responsibility, the fact that Kurdish mayors and deputies organized or attended the insurgents' funerals was shown as

evidence, "proving" their link with terrorism, constituting a sovereign exception and the withdrawal of the law. The basis of securitization is the reproduction of "the Kurdish national-symbolic". In other words, the securitization of politicization functions to discipline and subjugate the living population through the dead, bringing necropolitics into play.

Finally, the politics of funerals in Turkey reveal an unusual element of normative power when assembled with sovereign power. The regime uses sovereign means to control technologies of mourning, which has a double function; it determines *the capacity to be mourned* and *the capacity to mourn*. This differs from *ungrievable lives*; whereas ungrievable lives are about the value of the subject as a human being and lack of public grief, what we observe here is the prohibition of public grief. Once again, this is not surprising; after all, they are "terrorists" and "baby killers". However, we can also observe the management of mourning, not just being mourned; *the capacity to mourn* goes hand in hand with *the capacity to be mourned.* The management of public grief still relates to the condition of humanization. Kurdish insurgents' (and political prisoners) deaths are not allowed to be publicly mourned, and Kurdish politicians are prohibited from mourning, this prohibition regulates matrixes of intelligibility, or in other words, which lives are counted as lives.

6.1 Politicization, Depoliticization, and Securitization

There is a widespread agreement in the literature on dead bodies that death and dead bodies are pushed into the private sphere, particularly in Western modernity.[419] This assumption, however, is built on "non-violent death", thus, inevitably neglecting the political features of political violence. It would be absurd to argue that dragging a dead body behind an armed vehicle on the streets and publishing the video on social media is a matter of the private sphere. However, even in the case of Turkey, which is not a textbook example of "Western

[419] Steppetutat, *Governing the Dead*.

modernity" and where deaths in question are caused by political violence, we can observe that death and the dead are pushed into the private sphere.[420] In Turkey, we can talk about a norm based on the Islamic belief that dictates respect for the dead. The human body, according to Islam, is created by Allah in the perfect shape; thus, regardless of their sins, dead bodies need to be treated and buried with dignity since only Allah can judge the dead.

Studying the discourses of state officials and the pro-government media shows us that respect for the dead or "proper burial" is understood as providing a peaceful and non-politicized rite of passage. Politicization, in this context, is perceived as a process that instrumentalizes an event, person, or phenomenon to achieve a goal for an aggregate group, regardless of whether it is a religious or ethnic community, political party, or nation. There is the assumption that politicization equates to instrumentalization. When understood as instrumentalization, politicization indicates that the dead are deindividualized and instrumentalized for a certain group's gain. Thus, Allah's creation is not respected, which is seen unacceptable by the regime. Even though this understanding of politicization leads to targeting not only the Kurds but any funeral of victims of state violence, the resurrectory features of Kurdish funerals make them the primary target.

By targeting the insurgents' funerals, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government challenges the Copenhagen School's framework in which an issue can be classified along a spectrum, from non-politicized to politicized, securitized, and de-securitized.[421] The politicization of funerals has become a security threat. The securitization of politicization has not gone through the conventional spectrum of being a political issue to a security issue. The so-called realm of politics, where an issue is debated democratically, was

[420] Bakıner, "These Are Ordinary Things".
[421] Antonia Does, "3. Securitization Theory," in *The Construction of the Maras : Between Politicization and Securitization*, ECahiers de l'Institut (Genève: Graduate Institute Publications, 2013), http://books.openedition.org/iheid/719.

closed to funerals. Such a securitization process is not necessarily because of the authoritarian structure of Turkey but rather because the parties engage in a discursive practice of accusing each other of doing the "politics of death", which is perceived as something shameful.

While refusing to admit their own engagement with the dead/death politics, both parties accuse one another of doing the "politics of death". To combat the human rights discourse that the HDP sometimes resorts to when challenging the ban on attending funerals, the AKP regime accuses the HDP, and the broader Kurdish community, of not respecting the dead and instrumentally politicizing the PKK fighters' funerals. Meanwhile, the regime does not abstain from politicizing death when it serves its political agenda. The regime uses the funerals of soldiers killed by the PKK as a tool of mobilization and consolidation, mainly when national unity seems to be in jeopardy. President Erdoğan started using funerals to give political speeches, including listing the government's social, political, and economic achievements. As Onur Bakıner argues, this is something that "no politician had dared to do despite the longstanding tradition of using soldiers' funerals for nationalist mobilization".[422] A picture of President Erdoğan from August 2015, where he was standing next to a coffin covered by the Turkish flag with one hand on the coffin and the other holding a microphone, giving a political speech, became a controversial iconic image illustrating this new trend.[423]

The regime not only accuses the HDP of doing "politics of death" but also takes action to prevent politicization. For example, dead bodies of the YPG/YPJ soldiers waiting at the Syrian border for thirteen days crossed the border on the condition that funerals should not be like rallies. Similarly, some of the bodies waiting in the morgue or fridges were given to the families only if they avoided the cemeteries in the city center, buried their dead at dusk or

[422] Bakıner, "These Are Ordinary Things".
[423] "Erdoğan'a tepki yağıyor, [Revulsion to Erdogan]" *Sözcü*, August 17, 2015, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/erdogana-tepki-yagiyor-911643/.

dawn, and prevented mass attendance.[424] Even in these seemingly depoliticizing instances, there is a logic and discourse of security in play. Since politicization is perceived as a matter of security, securitization aims for depoliticization. Moreover, the securityness of these funerals is not confined to discourse. Funerals are also sites where there is a heavy physical presence of security forces, barriers, police cordons, and checkpoints. The regime invests in managing the funerals by employing its security apparatuses to control, regulate, and discipline funerals to erase or conceal them from the public space and suppress their political features. Securitization aims for depoliticization, yet its primary purpose is preventing the resurrectory functions of funerals.

On the other hand, as a politicized sacrifice for a political goal, the Kurdish community celebrates the fighter's funeral as a political event where the Kurdish national-symbolic is reproduced. Yet, the HDP does not always celebrate or acknowledge the political nature of funerals in public debates. Concealing the political features of funerals, HDP representatives and mayors frame their attendance on a supra-political level. Organizing and attending funerals, they argue, are a subject of human rights and morality. In other instances, without acknowledging that funerals are politicized, Kurdish politicians represent their attendance as their responsibility since the deputies represent the people present at the funeral. As the AKP accuses the HDP of doing politics of death, the HDP accuses the regime of the same thing, albeit they understand politics of death differently.

How does each party understand the "politics of death"? What function does the "politics of death" discourse perform? How does it relate to "dead body management?", and

[424] Haydar Darıcı and Serra Hakyemez, "Neither Civilian nor Combatant: Weaponised Spaces and Spatialised Bodies in Cizre," in *Turkey's Necropolitical Laboratory: Democracy, Violence and Resistance*, ed. Banu Bargu (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 85.

what power relations does this discursive tension entail? To answer these questions, I delve into the textual details of the "politics of death" in the next section.

6.1.1 "Politics of death" and Who Can Do It?

The discourse on the "politics of death" shows us that the primary issue for the regime is the politicization of funerals, when signifiers of Kurdishness, deviance, and rebellion are rendered visible, and the martyr/terrorist is symbolically resurrected. This is not unique to PKK funerals; for example, Israeli forces attacked the Al-Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh's funeral because the coffin was wrapped in the Palestinian flag.[425] Nevertheless, it is a part of continuous dead body management; thus, it requires further scrutiny. Corporeality fades to the background in the politics of funerals, especially when compared to postmortem violence and pre-burial management. Therefore, one might even question whether the management of funerals can be considered "dead body management", for death and the dead are not the same.

I maintain that funerals should be considered part of dead body management, particularly considering that one of the purposes of this dissertation is to approach "the politics of the dead" more holistically. Even though the regime's involvement in the funeral does not necessarily target the dead body, the funeral itself is a ritual of burying the dead body. The regime does not directly target the body, as they do in autopsies, for example, but it gets involved in managing the coffin. Even the discursive and performative elements of funerals cannot be isolated from the dead body, for without the body, there would not be these discursive elements. The resurrection of the national-symbolic is connected to the subject, and the body and subjectivity are inextricably linked. The corpse, the coffin, the flag that covers the coffin, the shoulders that the coffin is carried on, and the burial site -where the dead body's journey is supposed to end- are all in a machinic relationship. *Another assemblage!* Furthermore, the

[425] Farah Najjar, "The Palestinian Flag: A Target for 'Erasure' by Israeli Forces," *Al Jazeera*, May 13, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/13/why-is-israel-afraid-of-the-palestinian-flag.

discursive politics and the securitization of funerals affects tangible policies and practices regarding dead bodies.

If we revisit the case of YPG/YPJ fighters waiting at the border that we discussed in Chapter 5.1.2, we can better see the relationship between corporeality and the funerals' discursive features. AKP deputy Mehmet Naci Bostancı's speech in the parliament during a heated discussion on the border policy supports this point.

> 493 bodies have passed without a problem so far. Don't make funerals / dead bodies (*cenaze)* a part of your political propaganda.[426] Regarding these 11 bodies, if you are going to follow religious rituals in line with respecting the dead, go ahead. But if you are going to turn this into political propaganda, then no! We are talking about respect for the dead … Putting flags, slogans… Are these respecting the dead?[427]

Security concerns over "public order" and the underlying ontological insecurities about the politicization of funerals had tangible effects on corporeality as they have enabled the forceful withholding of dead bodies at the border. In a way, the politicization of funerals has become securitized, and securitization paved the way for politicizing corporeality.

Bostancı's speech brings us back to the norm of death being a matter of the so-called private sphere. His speech manifests the security concerns about the politicization of funerals, as illustrated by highlighting 'turning funerals into political propaganda. However, security is not the only point his speech emphasizes; it demonstrates a discourse on respect and gives hints about the imagined proper funeral. An amenable funeral needs to be attended by a few who know the deceased; a silent space only interrupted by women mourning; an ascetic space free of political symbols; a practice that follows religious rituals; and a performance that should

[426] In Turkish, cenaze refers to both the dead body that is prepared for the funeral (washed and shrouded), as well as the funeral as an event.
[427] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of the General Assembly, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 27, January 13, 2016, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22507&P5=H&page1=41&page2=41

stay in the private sphere. Defying these would disrespect the dead and enable, or justify, the government's intervention.

The accusations go beyond disrespecting the dead and politicizing the funerals. There is a common belief that the Kurdish political movement instrumentalizes death and victimhood to such an extent that it is believed that the HDP and the PKK organize attacks, or let violence take place, to instrumentalize victimhood and increase their votes. Many believe that the PKK organized the bomb attack on an HDP rally in Diyarbakır to generate victimhood before the upcoming general elections, even though the authorities found the Islamic State guilty.[428] The AKP employs such conspiratorial thinking in parliamentary settings as well. The AKP's former vice president, Hamza Dağ, accused the HDP when an angry mob attacked Hatun Tuğluk's, HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk's mother, funeral. Dağ stated that:

> It is the same actors who decided to bury the body at this exact location and brought the angry mob there. Who turned this into a crisis by bringing the body there and informing the mob about the location? Unfortunately, they re-initiated the period of provocations and plots by instrumentalizing death[429]

In the same speech, Dağ continued his accusations by claiming that "they pulled the plug of Berkin Elvan [a 15-year-old boy shot by the police during Gezi Park protests and who had been in a coma for a year] right before the elections".[430] He also pointed out a continuous temporality by arguing that "we have seen this conspiracy a lot. Give up on this warmed-over plot". AKP deputy Bostancı made a similar accusation regarding the dead bodies kept in refrigerators during the curfews. Bostancı claimed that the DBP (Democratic Regions Party, an offshoot of

[428] "Bombalı araç, Yüksekdağ ve Önder'in tutulduğu komplekse ulaşacaktı [The bombed vehicle was going to arrive where Yuksekdag and Onder was]," *BBC News Türkçe*, accessed June 14, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/37882868.
[429] "AKP'li Dağ Böyle Okudu: Hatun Tuğluk'un Cenazesine Saldırı 'Bayat Operasyon' [That's how AKP Deputy Dag read it: Hatun Tugluk incident is a banal conspiracy]," *Diken*, September 17, 2017, .
[430] Ibid.

the HDP) municipalities do not take the dead bodies on purpose to generate victimization and turn it into propaganda.[431]

Until this point, I have discussed "dead body management" as an assemblage of practices, discourses, and technologies employed exclusively by the regime. With these accusations, the regime simultaneously portrays the Kurdish political movement as the actor engaging in "dead body management". While it is believed the regime's dead body management functions to discipline, punish, and torment the Kurdish population, the Kurdish Other's dead body management serves to construct a narrative in which Kurds have respect neither for the living nor the dead. This narrative produces a barbaric Other, a necropolitical agent who can instrumentalize the dead for their own political agenda.

The HDP has vehemently challenged these accusations, illustrating a discursive tension where each party accuses the other of instrumentalizing the dead. For example, responding to Bostancı's accusations regarding purposefully not burying the dead during the urban wars, HDP deputy Hişyar Özsoy said:

> Taybet İnan… was it DBP municipalities who did not bury İnan? Bodies are waiting at the Rojava border [the Syrian border]; so are our municipalities not transporting them? We have witnessed these with our own eyes. I am shocked by the level of denial. We said this before, let's address the issue of dead bodies and funerals, and solve it once and for all. We are calling the state: Take your hands off the dead bodies of the Kurds that you killed! Let people bury their dead however they want.[432]

Using Taybet İnan as an example is striking. İnan was a 57-year-old woman killed by sniper fire on the street during curfew; İnan's dead body stayed at the same spot where she was shot for seven days due to the curfew. When her family tried to retrieve the body, they were met by gunfire. Özsoy places the responsibility on the state/government as it is their security apparatus that prevents the bodies from being taken. He also highlights the limited administrative capacities of HDP municipalities, such as the jurisdiction over the borders, thus shifting the

[431] TBMM, 26/1/27.
[432] Ibid, 38.

responsibility back to the government. Furthermore, his narrative challenges the accusation that the Kurdish community instrumentalizes the dead by arguing that people just want to bury their dead, and it is the state who has its hands on the dead.

In other instances, the reciprocal accusation of doing "politics of death" is more explicit. For example, AKP's Malatya representative, Nurettin Yaşar, argued, "Turkey cannot catch a break if this politics of death will not stop", responding to the HDP representatives who brought up the topic of the state practices on dead bodies in a parliamentary debate. Özsoy countered Yaşar by pointing the finger back at them: "You are the ones doing politics of death".[433] Özsoy often tries to discuss the "politics of death" by framing the issue as a normative and moral one. Against the AKP's narrative that "it is not the Kurds being killed but rather terrorists", Kurdish politicians refer to the Islamic belief that the dead body belongs to Allah; thus, judgment is removed from the dead.

Furthermore, Özsoy claimed that even if they are terrorists, "the dead have the right to be buried. This principle is in human rights, morality, and Islam".[434] He challenged the AKP's discursive attempt to frame every dead as a terrorist by reminding them of the example of a 70-year-old woman who was not buried: "Don't do politics by hiding behind the word "terrorism". We are talking about a 70-year-old woman".[435] It would be absurd for someone to accuse a politician of "doing politics"; what Özsoy implies is instrumentally employing the word terrorism to pursue a political agenda that serves the AKP as a party instead of the citizens that the AKP, as the government, should serve. In this regard, both the AKP regime and its fierce contestant, the HDP, understand politics as the art of instrumentalization to pursue a specific political agenda that would serve the interests of a specific group.

[433] TBMM, 26/1/27.
[434] Ibid., 38.
[435] Ibid.

Even though they use "politics" or "doing politics" in similar ways in their discourses, each party understands the politics of death differently. They accuse each other of doing politics of death while both parties engage in it. The Other's politics of death is illegitimate, whereas theirs is just. This tension is also visible in a parliamentary debate about a bill regarding the budget of the general assembly. The debate arose when AKP deputy, Arzu Aydın, claimed that "this is not the budget for those who attend terrorist funerals".[436] Meral Danis Beştaş, HDP's co-deputy chair, responded by repeating the Islamic belief that the dead should not be judged, and on principle, the HDP will share the pain of those who lost a loved one, regardless of whether it is "those in the mountains" (referring to PKK fighters) or a soldier.[437] As the debate got heated, other AKP and HDP deputies jumped in. The conversation between Muhammet Emin Akbaşoğlu from the AKP and Dirayet Dilan Taşdemir from the HDP further illustrates this tension:

> Akbaşoğlu: No deputy can and should attend a terrorist's funeral. Respect for the state, the nation, and the victims requires this.
>
> Tasdemir: No state can attack a dead body. A state should not attack a grave, excavate the body, break the stones.
>
> Akbaşoğlu: The principle of individuality of a crime is a general law norm. No regulations ban you from visiting the family, but you cannot attend a funeral and turn it into a political show.
>
> Mihrimah Belma Satır (AKP): You cannot go to the terrorist's funeral. It is that clear.
>
> Beştaş: We are representative of these families. We are supposed to attend the funerals for the families. Please don't do politics of death. Open the Turkish Penal Code, point out a clause and tell us: "you can go to the funeral of those but not of these".
>
> Satır: You have been doing the same thing for 40 years.
>
> Beştaş: Look, we pursue "politics of life". We defend peace, life, and democracy despite your attacks and smearing so that there will be no more deaths. We do not discriminate among the dead. We are by the side of the families whose kids were killed in Roboski; we go to the families whose kids died in the mountains [guerillas]. When I was the Adana representative, I used to go to soldiers' funerals as well. If you do not do provocations, we will go to any funeral. You should go too; I suggest you do so. Politics of peace, politics of life require this.

[436] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 27, Legislative Year: 4, Session: 33, January 16, 2020, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Tutanaklar/Tutanak?BirlesimSiraNo=23525&BaslangicSayfa=52&BitisSayfa=52&Tur=H

[437] Ibid.

Akbaşoğlu: We have nothing to do with traitors.[438]

Unpacking this exchange demonstrates how interplay of power functions and the role security plays.

6.1.2 "Politics of death", Security, and Power

First, the debate shown above brings us back to the imagined distinct spheres of security and politics and illustrates how each party understands "politics of death" differently by referencing the realm of security and politics. The AKP places the government's actions, such as killing the terrorist, even if they were caught injured, banning funerals, or initiating legal action against those who attend funerals, in the realm of security. A terrorist is a physical security threat to the soldiers and the civilian population, as they are simultaneously an ontological threat to the unity of the state and the norms and values of the imagined nation. Therefore, they need to be eliminated. Regardless of whether the people attending the "terrorist's funeral" are terrorists, in the AKP's eyes, the funeral is the terrorist's funeral or a *terrorist funeral.* It is a potential site for reproducing and reinforcing the politics, ideology, symbology, and values that pose such ontological threats. Hence, these necessary security acts do not constitute "politics of death". Moreover, Akbaşoğlu's comment about not turning the funerals into a political show further strengthens the securitization of politicization.

In the regime's discourse, the HDP engages in the politics of death by turning funerals and grief, things that are supposed to be private, into politicized sites. Even though the ideal space for funerals is considered the private sphere, securitization mechanisms are adopted to ensure the funerals remain in the private sphere. The funeral site is fantasized as an austere space, free of political symbols, a private space merely for mourning and following religious rituals, attended only by the family. However, it ends up a securitized place, surrounded by police barricades and lines, checkpoints, and security forces patrolling the area with their hands

[438] Ibid.

on their submachine guns. The motto of second-wave feminism reminds us that the "personal is political" or "the private is political". Here, we see blurred lines between "the private sphere" and "the security realm". Considering the security concerns are over politicization, the public, private, and security mash together, making it more challenging to make sense of them as distinct and separate realms.

Second, while the HDP accuses the government of doing politics of death, they place their acts on a supra-political level. Beştaş's call for grief and sharing the pain are reminiscent of Butler's conceptualization of grief as a means of reconciling with the Other. The HDP uses a language that seeks to humanize the dead and those left behind by constantly referring to universal human rights, morality, and cultural norms and values, including Islamic norms. In this discourse, it is only humane to attend a funeral and share the pain. For them, it is the AKP that does politics of death by killing, displaying the dead, and regulating or banning burial, funerals, and public grief. These acts are not merely a matter of security but rational and calculated political moves to punish, intimidate and discipline the Kurdish population. In other words, these are the exercises of the state's necropower.

The discursive challenges between the AKP and the HDP are also discursive attempts to construct a biopolitical Self against a necropolitical Other. The Self is imagined and portrayed as an actor that seeks to protect and foster life, whereas the Other is an agent of death. As Beştaş explicitly states, in their view, the HDP pursues 'politics of life' whereas the government pursues 'politics of death'. However, while accusing the government of doing politics of death and calling for a stop to politicizing funerals so proper mourning can occur, the HDP addresses neither the political nature of the funerals that the PKK and its sympathizers openly and proudly embrace, nor the politics of death that the PKK conducts, such as hunger strikes.

Third, this conversation demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the political decisions taken regarding funerals. The HDP's persistent demand to know the legal grounds for the discrimination among funerals continues to be ignored. One might argue that ignoring these demands is a strategic rhetorical move to hide the illegality of the actions. However, in other instances like the bills of indictment, the main justification is provided as terrorist propaganda. If that is the case, "attending funerals" alone should not be listed as a crime on its own. As I will show throughout this chapter, in the bills of indictment and the state actors' speeches, attending funerals is often singled out from terrorist propaganda and listed as a crime on its own. Ignoring the legal grounds for prohibiting attending funerals also highlights certain subjectivities and rationalities of the regime. For the regime, attending a terrorist funeral is such a self-evident crime that it does not even require a legal justification. Terror/terrorism/terrorist as a master signifier eliminates the need for elaborate arguments about why the issue is legal and just. However, here terrorism is not merely a signifier that securitizes the issue. The terrorist's funeral should not be attended, not necessarily because of the physical security threat the living terrorist posed, but rather as Akbaşoğlu stated during the debate, because they 'have nothing to do with traitors'. In a way, the HDP deputies who attended the funerals are punished for attending not only terrorist funerals but traitor funerals, thus, committing treason themselves. As traitors, or the enemies of the state and society, deputies are then subject to the criminal law of the enemy.

Through instrumentalizing law, which Butler sees as an element of governmentality, and its withdrawal, necropower and sovereign power are weaved together. There is no clause in the Turkish Penal Code prohibiting attending funerals, yet deputies are not always charged for terrorist propaganda but instead for attending funerals. This arbitrariness is also an exercise of sovereign power as it bypasses the law and decides and acts on the state of exception. It is reminiscent of King Creon's sovereign decree that Polynices shall not be properly buried and

publicly mourned for his treason. This exercise of sovereign power functions through the dead body; it is, after all, about the conditions and processes of burying the dead. Through the dead body, it regulates the space –(the funeral site and what can be shown in the public space), and other bodies (bodies present at the funeral, mourning bodies that later became incarcerated bodies). In this regard, even when sovereign power is in play, corporeality does not lose its significance. Through the apparatuses of law that regulate the space and bodies, bodies and subjectivities are disciplined. Mourning bodies become incarcerated bodies, as being present by the dead body is interpreted as treason, and this treason is punished to discipline the living community's sense of belonging to the Turkish nation and its patriotic values.

Such sovereign mechanisms and arbitrary decision-making do not only show themselves in the parliament and in law; when the lines between the exception and normal get blurred, we can observe petty sovereign figures, like the police. The police appear as an essential state apparatus that exercises such sovereign power. A dialogue between the HDP deputy, Saliha Aydeniz, and a local police chief when Aydeniz's attempt to attend a funeral was prevented arbitrarily by the police, demonstrates this point.

> Aydeniz: With what authority, on what law are you preventing me from attending the funeral? Is attending funeral terrorism or preventing a deputy from attending terrorism? You are cowards.
>
> Police: Don't insult a state official!
>
> Aydeniz: I'm not insulting you.
>
> Police: You are the cowardly ones. You cannot talk to us like that. If you are a deputy, act like one. Go back, move backward!
>
> Aydeniz: Don't yell at me! You cannot shout at me like this!
>
> Police: You cannot yell at police officers.
>
> Aydeniz: I want to go. I want to attend this funeral.
>
> Police: I'm not allowing it.
>
> Aydeniz: With what authority? For what reason?
>
> Police: If you are a deputy, go attend to people's problems. Don't come to a terrorist funeral and be a provocateur… You are a civil servant; you are getting your salary from this state, and

> you dare to come to a terrorist's funeral. We are not allowing people to attend terrorist funerals, and we are not going to!
>
> Aydeniz: I want to exercise my right.
>
> Police: If you want rights, go seek your rights somewhere else. We are not allowing you here. *You found a village without a dog, so you're walking without a stick*. No more of that.[439]

Once again, a few points arise that require analytical scrutiny. First, even though we see the police as a petty sovereign decision-maker, this does not mean that the police can make a decision that goes against the sovereign will of the government or the state. Rather, they exercise the state's sovereign power as one of its apparatuses. Sovereignty is diffused, spread, and exercised by governmental apparatuses. Yet, the police officer does not feel the need to provide a legal justification for preventing Aydeniz from attending the funeral. The discursive utterance of 'I'm not allowing it' seems to be enough, functioning as a sovereign decree and an illocutionary speech act.

Second, the police highlighting the salary aspect catches our attention. We can see that various actors use this narrative at different times. It is part of a grander discourse on the state-citizen relationship. Since the Ottoman Empire, many state actors, from sultans to the Kemalist elite to President Erdoğan, used the motto "make the people live, so that the state can live". Statism and sacrifice culture have been highly valued; for example, the Turkish Student Oath, like the US Pledge of Allegiance, ends with "My existence shall be a gift [shall be dedicated] to the Turkish existence".[440] In short, the state is not for the people; the people are for the state. What follows is that even if it is a deputy, anyone receiving their salary from the state needs to serve the state and its interests. The idea behind the salary is that it is the taxpayer's money.

[439] "Terörist Cenazesine Katılmak Isteyen HDP'li Vekile Polisten Tarihi Ayar [A Phenomenal Comeback from the Police against a HDP Deputy Wanting to Attend a Terrorist Funeral]," *Yeni Şafak*, October 21, 2018, https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/terorist-cenazesine-katilmak-isteyen-hdpli-vekile-polisten-tarihi-ayar-2185005.

[440] The Student Oath was recited in every school day until 2013. The full text is: "I am a Turk, honest and hardworking. My principle is to protect the younger, to respect the elder, to love my homeland and my nation more than myself. My ideal is to rise, to progress. Oh Great Atatürk ! On the path that you have paved, I swear to walk incessantly toward the aims that you have set. My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence. How happy is the one who says, "I am a Turk!"

According to the police officer, attending a terrorist funeral goes against the people's will; thus, people's money is being used against them, neglecting that the people present at the funeral are taxpayers too and that Aydeniz is their representative. As a petty sovereign wielding the power of 'deeming', the police officer decides what the people's will is. More importantly, he also decides on the threshold of the people/citizen and who is included.

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the idiom he uses in the end: 'walking without a stick in a village that has no dog'. The idiom refers to the people who act brave only when there is no threat. Since the funeral is seen as a site of reproduction and resurrection, organizing, and attending funerals are interpreted as showing strength and challenging the state's authority. When he says 'no more of that [walking without a stick]' he also claims the role for himself of being the dog in the village, the order in anarchy, and the authority to end the symbolic rule of the Kurds. It seems as though with 'no more', he does not only refer to himself and the police force he represents to put an end to the Kurds walking without a stick but to a broader system: the regime's new stance against terrorist funerals. What is this new stance? It is not only using the police to prevent politicians from attending the funerals physically but also letting them do that only to charge them for organizing and attending funerals later. Most of the deputies were imprisoned, and mayors were dismissed from office to be replaced by trustee mayors. In the next sections, I unpack the regime's stance and policies toward the terrorist funerals and its role in the trustee mayor policy.

6.2 The Terrorist Funeral

The previous section established that the regime relates the politics of death to the technologies of mourning and perceives funerals as a security concern. In this chapter, we have observed that at the discursive level, the actors construct the Self as biopower against the necropolitical Other. It is a dichotomous position of those who govern by protecting and elevating life against those who know nothing but death. There are, however, other forms of

power present, power that not only shows itself at the discursive level but is performatively produced. This section delves into the politics of funerals, analyzes technologies of mourning as a component of dead body management, and presents funerals as a site of sovereign/normative assemblages.

6.2.1 Sakine Cansız's Funeral: Sovereignty as a Zero-Sum Concept

By studying the case of Sakine Cansiz's funeral, one of the founders of the PKK, this section demonstrates how security and sovereignty are related and how this relationship produces sovereignty as a zero-sum concept. We have established that the "politics of death" is perceived as a tactic -a technology- only employed by the Other; the Self is exempt from it because parties frame their own actions either in terms of security (AKP) or on a suprapolitical level (HDP). This discussion between the AKP and the HDP is a dichotomous and reciprocal opposition wherein the AKP accuses the HDP of legitimatizing terrorism through "terrorist funerals", and the HDP accuses the AKP of being harsh and unlawful against the funerals. However, before the peace process failed in 2015 and the AKP government re-launched the military and political campaign against the Kurdish insurgency, the government itself was at the center of criticisms regarding "terrorist funerals", the majority of them coming from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The peace negotiations between the state and the PKK, known as the "Solution Process" (*çözüm süreci*), was preceded by what is called the "democratic initiative process" (*demokratik açılım süreci*), a project launched in 2010. It aimed to strengthen the democratic institutions, freedom, and respect for human rights, thus alleviating the ethnic and religious tensions.[441]

The AKP government has often represented the Solution Process as a part or continuation of the democratization process, opening the reorganization of the administrative

[441] Because the primary goal was addressing the polarization, the project was also called "Unity and Fraternity Project" (*Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi*).

structures of the republic for discussion. In 2013, the MHP vehemently opposed the government's proposal that suggested changes to the provincial and municipal administration system by giving more power and autonomy to local authorities. Highlighting the proposal as something that the PKK demands, MHP deputy Kalaycı said in a parliamentary debate regarding the bill:

> Distinguished deputies, don't we all know that these municipalities governed by PKK supporters defy the law? Although they are a public office, they function as a headquarters for terrorism. Don't we know how they helped terrorists -who died while fighting against our security forces- to be buried covered with terrorist flags, and how they provided spaces for condolences? If we know all this, isn't it obvious what giving more power to local authorities will result in? We are giving more power and legitimacy to the PKK. If this bill passes, the PKK will assert its hegemony in the region. If it passes, we will leave millions of our people to the PKK's mercy.[442]

In Kalaycı's speech against the proposal, a few points arose which are important for our discussion in this chapter. First, in his speech, Kalaycı uses organizing funerals to support the organic link between the Kurdish municipalities and the PKK. The AKP, who was at the center of accusations in Kalaycı's speech, later employed this rhetorical tactic of using the funerals as proof in the post-2015 period. Kalaycı does not name what law these municipalities defy or how exactly they function as a headquarters for terrorism.

Intertextuality does not solve this problem either; reports on the links between the municipalities and terrorism came only after 2016, when the new Minister of the Interior, Süleyman Soylu, launched the trustee mayors policy.[443] Organizing funerals seems like enough evidence to build this link for Kalaycı. If the link between the municipalities and the PKK is clear, then granting more autonomy to the municipalities would mean an existential security threat to the state. It is existential because the centralized government is seen as the central

[442] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 24, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 21, November 11, 2012, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic_yazici?P4=21332&P5=H&page1=45&page2=165

[443] "Belediyelerdeki Kayyum Sistemi ve Mevcut Durum Raporu [The Report on the Trustee Mayor System and the Current Situation in the Municipalities]" (T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı, March 18, 2019), https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar/icisleri.gov.tr/IcSite/illeridaresi/Yayinlar/KayyumRaporu/kayyum_nihai_rapor.pdf.

pillar of the republic, which is a view widely shared also by the secular main opposition, the CHP (Republican People's Party). Local autonomy is, therefore, seen as a step to secession.

Second, this narrative is another example of bio/necropower at the discursive level, a discursive attempt to situate the Self as a biopower seeking to protect and care for the population and the PKK as the agent of death. 'Millions of people' indicates a governmental understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism based on risk. Considering the tactics and capabilities of the PKK, it is contested whether many civilians would indeed be under any physical threat. However, the PKK commonly causes civilian deaths. Even if the casualties were low, the victim could be anyone; thus, millions of people are under threat. It also highlights the dichotomous understanding of a bio/necro tension. It indicates concerns over the state losing its biopolitical grip by losing the centralized administrative control of local, small offices. As a unitary and centralized state, biopolitical care is conducted through sovereign apparatuses; losing it would mean leaving the population at the mercy of a necropolitical agent.

Although the proposal did not pass, both the government and the PKK made some compromises during the peace negotiations. To maintain the de-escalation, the government turned a blind eye to some practices that used to be an issue, such as funerals. When three women affiliated with the PKK, -including one of PKK's founders, Sakine Cansız, were killed under suspicious circumstances in Paris in 2013, their bodies were transported to Turkey via a Turkish Airlines' plane granted by the state. This is an important fact to keep in mind considering that HDP municipalities were later charged with transporting bodies. A grandiose funeral ceremony was held in Diyarbakir, the de-facto capital of Kurdistan, where thousands of people attended, and Kurdish politicians gave their eulogies in Kurdish. As the magnitude of the funeral ceremony created discomfort in the masses, the main opposition – the MHP and the CHP- blamed the AKP government for allowing and helping the funeral to take place.

Particularly for the MHP, Cansız's funeral was also a security issue. MHP deputies not only accused the government of actively helping the funeral by transporting the dead bodies from Paris to Turkey but also of the government's inaction and passivity against the Kurdish authorities taking more active roles. In a parliamentary discussion, they argued that "Turkishness and the Turkish flag were insulted" during the funeral ceremony.[444] Since insulting Turkishness is a crime according to the Turkish Penal Code, Article 301, the government was blamed for turning a blind eye to it and letting terrorists and criminals go unpunished. More importantly, in the same speech, Deputy Türkoğlu also stated, "...and there was not a single soldier or police present".[445] The lack of security forces at the funeral was perceived as another sign that the state was losing the war due to the ongoing peace process. MHP deputy Kalaycı's points that he raised in a general assembly meeting demonstrate the concerns:

> The government shares the right to rule with the terrorist organization [referring to the PKK]. The government is legitimizing the PKK while delegitimizing itself. By talking to the PKK, the Turkish state treated the PKK like a state, thus reducing the status of the Turkish state to the status of a terrorist organization… The funeral of the three founders of the PKK turned into a show of force. A terrorist organization is challenging the state now. The pieces of rag [referring to flags] of the PKK covered the coffins. We have been informed that the BDP [Peace and Democracy Party] ensured the security of the PKK funerals. I invite the authorities to stop committing crimes against the state and the nation.[446]

Considering there were no violent events or signs of turmoil at the funeral, and the security was arranged by the BDP , the pro-Kurdish party that preceded the HDP, the problem that deputies stress is not a lack of security per se but rather the lack of the Turkish army or police's presence. Therefore, the security forces' significance is not based on their capacity to provide security but rather on what they signify. In this discourse, the act of providing security appears

[444] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 81, March 21, 2013, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=11755
[445] Ibid.
[446] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 81, March 21, 2013, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21877&P5=H&page1=21&page2=21

as an exercise of sovereign power. Hence, the lack of Turkish security forces and the presence of the BDP's security personnel, in a zero-sum game, signifies defeat against the PKK.

With the peace process ending in 2015 and the AKP losing its majority in the parliament, the MHP went through a drastic change regarding where it positioned itself. Quitting their staunch opposition to the AKP government, the MHP started to support the government, particularly in their security and foreign policy, and they ended up forming an alliance with the AKP and becoming part of the government in 2018. On the other hand, as the main opposition, the CHP was not as outspoken as the MHP against the AKP regarding Cansız's funeral in 2013. However, when the government started to accuse the CHP of attending "terrorist funerals" in the post-2015 period, the CHP adopted a similar narrative to the MHP, accusing the government retroactively of helping the "terrorist funerals" themselves.[447] In other words, the CHP became an actor in the "who does politics of death" game. Although the actors changed, the discourse that associates funerals with sovereignty, security, and treason has continued after the peace process failed.

What Cansız's funeral exemplifies is significantly different from the discourses around organizing funerals in the post-2015 period. Whereas in Cansız's funeral, the government was at the center of the accusations, following 2015, the government has put the HDP at the center. The shift can be traced to the HDP gaining more power and support throughout the country in 2015, some municipalities' declaration of autonomy/self-governance after the peace process failed, the general atmosphere of war that followed, the new Minister of the Interior, Süleyman Soylu, and the state of emergency declared in 2016 after the failed coup attempt. The most critical element marking the regime of governmentality regarding organizing funerals in the

[447] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 101, June 6, 2017, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22916&P5=H&page1=27&page2=27

post-2015 period is the technologies of power over mourning and memorialization and the trustee mayor policy.

6.2.2 The HDP and Organizing Funerals: Sovereign/Normative Assemblages

As discussed in the previous chapter, organizational elements of funerals, such as providing a funeral vehicle, allocating the space for burial, and providing a space for condolence visits if the family asks for it, are among the municipalities' responsibilities. The municipality can outsource this service to subcontractors. Subcontractors, and even municipalities, commonly refuse to provide certain services for "terrorist funerals". This illustrates Butler's point about normalizing the state of exception in a governmental manner where petty sovereigns appear. In 2017, for example, subcontractors and the provincial municipality of İzmir refused to give a funeral vehicle to the father of M.Ç,-a PKK fighter who died in an armed clash in İzmir, forcing the father to rent a truck that transports coal. The coffin, accompanied by the father, both darkened by the black dust hanging in the air as the media visuals demonstrate, were transported from İzmir, the most western point of Turkey, to the southeast, among sacks of coal.[448]

No law or regulation explicitly states that terrorist bodies shall be exempt from the municipalities' responsibilities and obligations. Therefore, deputies and mayors were officially sentenced for promoting terrorist propaganda and being a member of a terrorist organization. However, it is also possible to observe that "attending and organizing funerals" was listed as a crime or accusation without linking it with terrorist propaganda. The bills of indictments that the prosecution proposed and the narratives in the parliamentary debates on lifting the immunity of HDP representatives include "attending and organizing terrorist funerals".[449] For

[448] Taylan Yıldırım, "Terörist cenazesi kömür çuvallarıyla taşındı, [The terrorist's corpse was transported with coal sacks]" *CNN Türk*, January 7, 2017, https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/terorist-cenazesi-komur-cuvallariyla-tasindi.
[449] "HDP Kapatma Davası Iddianamesinin Tam Metni [The Full Script of the Bill of Indictment to Close HDP]," *Evrensel*, June 21, 2021, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/436031/hdp-kapatma-davasi-iddianamesinin-tam-metni.

example, Selçuk Mızraklı, the former mayor of Diyarbakır, was accused of "providing funeral vehicles to terrorist funerals and giving assistance to find a proper location for the body to be buried".[450]

The securityness of funerals is built rather more explicitly by highlighting the propaganda aspect. This is evident especially in prosecutors' indictments and some of the media representation that narrated funerals as "terrorist funerals that turned into the propaganda of the terrorist organization".[451] Terrorist propaganda is often underlined by pointing out the flags, banners, and symbols on the coffin and funeral vehicles, and the slogans shouted during the ceremony.[452] In some cases, however, the public memorial of the dead, e.g., by displaying their pictures and names, reciting poetry, and naming cemeteries after the fallen fighters, are seen as terrorist propaganda.[453] It is worth stopping and reflecting on this memorial aspect. It demonstrates how the regime perceives what Hişyar Özsoy calls the "politics of resurrection" as a threat.

A funeral is an event comprising various performances. The performances with resurrectory features, such as renaming, reciting poetry, and displaying names and pictures, challenge the governmental regime of erasure and pushing death into the private sphere. Killing the living body and eliminating the physical threat is insufficient since the PKK fighter's

[450] Ibid.
[451] "Diyarbakır'da terör operasyonu: HDP'li yöneticiler gözaltında, [A counterterrorism operation in Diyarbakır: HDP deputies are detained]" *TRT Haber*, April 26, 2021, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/diyarbakirda-teror-operasyonu-hdpli-yoneticiler-gozaltinda-575783.html.
[452] Constitutional Court of Republic of Turkey, The Appeal of Tuncer Bakırhan, Appeal Number: 2017/28478, October 10, 2018, https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2017/28478; Constitutional Court of Republic of Turkey, The Appeal of Ali Kandil, Appeal Number: 2014/13224 , November 19, 2019, https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2014/13224; The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 49, January 3, 2017, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic_yazici?P4=22806&P5=H&page1=110&page2=110
[453] Sertaç Bulur and Orhan Onur Gemici, "HDP'li Vekiller Terörist Cenazelerinin Baş Aktörü Oldu, [HDP deputies became the leading actor of terrorist funerals]" *Anadolu Ajansı*, January 31, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/hdpli-vekiller-terorist-cenazelerinin-bas-aktoru-oldu/1379781; "HDP iddianamesinin ayrıntıları belli oldu [The details of HDP's bill of indictment]," *Sözcü*, March 18, 2021, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/gundem/son-dakika-hdp-iddianamesinin-ayrintilari-belli-oldu-6320770/.

ontological threat survives biological death. The scope of the ontological threat extends beyond the "Kurdish national-symbolic" and covers more individual elements, such as the public life of the dead terrorist. Their name and pictures become sources of ontological insecurity. The regime seeks to address this insecurity by erasing public life from the public sphere. At this particular point, we can witness the blurred lines between sovereign and normative power. The single act of criminalizing memorialization is simultaneously a sovereign exercise, because the law is suspended, and the practice of normative power, because it regulates the normative schemes of intelligibility, or, who counts as human.

The securityness of organizing funerals is not always established by reference to propaganda; the signifier - "terrorist funeral" - seems to be enough to build the link. The municipalities' responsibilities and obligations are disregarded; furthermore, it is depicted as scandalous that a public office has a role in organizing the funerals. Because the municipality is a public office related to the state, organizing terrorist funerals is seen as treason. We should not understand treason in legal terms, since no Kurdish politician was actually charged with treason, but rather as practically and discursively defying the state and the imagined will of the Turkish nation. The traitor is a deviant subjectivity that fails to embrace and celebrate Turkishness and the Turkish state.

The treason theme is also pervasive in civil society discourses. To illustrate, representatives of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Union (*Memur-sen*) stated:

> Killing an innocent person is like killing all humanity. Opening / organizing a tent for condolence for a terrorist who kills our citizens means uprising against our state and the flag… And it is treason to the families of the innocent people that the PKK killed. Whatever is necessary must be done for these traitors.[454]

[454] Sebahatdin Zeyrek, Soner Kılınç, and Suat Deniz, "HDP Van Milletvekili Hezer'e tepkiler, [Reactions to HDP Van Representative Hezer]" *Hürriyet*, February 25, 2016, sec. izmir, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/hdp-van-milletvekili-hezere-tepkiler-37248667.

Unlike the preparation and transportation of dead bodies, providing spaces for condolence is not the municipalities' obligation but resides in their authority. When families request it, the municipality provides a designated space for the family to receive people visiting to express their condolence. While the family of the "terrorist" is overlooked in this statement, the victim's family is underlined. Treason, however, is not only committed against the families of innocent people as the flag represents the unity of the country. Therefore, an uprising against the state and the flag targets the state and what the state represents.

Treason is discursively established in mainly two ways. First, the funeral is individualized and privatized. To clarify, the funeral ceremony is seen and represented as solely about the deceased, "the terrorist". I would not argue against the individual aspects of the funeral; it is, after all, a memorialization event. As I have discussed earlier, the lack of a funeral is often interpreted as normative violence that erases the political life of the dead. However, the funeral is also about the family and the community. As Memur-sen's narrative illustrates, the family and the community of "the terrorist" is selectively erased while the family of the victim is underscored. Similarly, the city council of Uşak argued that "memorizing someone who caused many civilian deaths in a tent for condolence simply means glorification of terrorism".[455] The publicness of the tent makes it a glorification of terrorism. The family might be innocent, yet they cannot publicly grieve since it indicates a public memorialization of a terrorist.

Second, the public status of the deputies and governors is highlighted. In this context, however, publicness refers to the actors' relation to the state. Deputies and governors, as civil servants who earn their salary from the state, are not supposed to defy the state. Representing the Association of Justice Defenders, Fahri Demirel said:

[455] Ibid.

> It reopens our wounds to see that the person who is in the parliament and gets their salary from this state attended a condolence visit. No country in the world would accept such things. Our expectation from the government is that the perpetrators should be caught and given to judicial authorities, and whatever necessary should be done. Those who established the tent for condolence and everyone who visited there should face the judiciary. We expect the immunity of those deputies who visited terrorists' condolence tents to be lifted and face legal consequences.[456]

Both the organizers and attendees are seen as perpetrators and criminals. Calling for "whatever necessary should be done" and the judiciary to do its work is part of the securitizing campaign that has paved the way for the HDP deputies and governors' imprisonment. The civil servant – treason association, on the other hand, appears as a rhetorical tool.

The parliament responded to the securitizing call from the NGOs and the media by passing a bill that lifted the immunity of the HDP politicians, and the judiciary swiftly launched the legal process and imprisoned governors, deputies, and both co-chairs of the party. Organizing funerals have occupied a central role in the discourse. Particularly, AKP deputies and the Minister of the Interior, Soylu, kept referring to the funerals in their attempt to justify the trustee mayor policy. Defending the mayor policy in a parliamentary discussion in 2017, Minister Soylu said: "We can see that the municipality gave construction equipment and vehicles to the terrorist organization to dig trenches. We can also see giving municipalities' vehicles to terrorist funerals, covering them with terrorist symbols, giving social welfare to terrorists' families, using resources…".[457] Organizing funerals is not the only reason why the governors were charged. However, using the municipalities' resources to support the PKK could have been sufficient for the bills of indictment. Furthermore, the presence of terrorist symbols seems like it was not the only reason behind the criminalization of organizing funerals. The comma between "giving vehicles to terrorist funerals" and "covering them with terrorist

[456] Ibid.

[457] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 49, January 3, 2017 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic_yazici?P4=22806&P5=H&page1=110&page2=110 During the urban war, the militant youth wing of the PKK dug trenches to block armored vehicles and engage in guerilla warfare. In this speech, Soylu accuses the municipalities of helping to dig trenches.

symbols" indicates that these are two separate crimes since the sentence lists the crimes one by one. In short, organizational aspects of terrorist funerals are singled out and targeted.

6.2.3 Attending Funerals: Technologies of Mourning

The criminalization of organizing and attending funerals is marked by sovereignty. At times, the sovereign exception is performatively produced by petty-sovereign figures, such as the police or the governors. In other instances, a discursive sovereign decree accompanies the practice that produces the exception. For example, Minister Soylu declared in a parliamentary debate that "it is true that we don't send HDP deputies to the funerals of those we killed as terrorists. Whatever you do, we will not allow this, we will prevent it, whatever you do!"[458] However, we cannot easily, and unproblematically, conceptualize this as a sovereign decree preceding the exception, since there was no law or such utterance before the exception of prohibiting attending funerals; rather, Soylu was retroactively offering justifications.

Nevertheless, sovereignty is not the only form of power at play; technologies of mourning inevitably bring normative and necropower into the scene. The violable bodies become disposable subjectivities. The criminalization and securitization of public grief punish and discipline the living by targeting the dead, not corporeally, but by erasing their subjectivities and regulating who and what is allowed in the public space. In the bills of indictment against the elected HDP mayors, organizing and attending funerals usually go hand in hand. On the other hand, HDP deputies were primarily accused of attending funerals as the organizational capacity of the municipality's office is out of the equation. The reason I chose to focus on organizing and attending separately, however, is not related to the actors, but rather to the distinct analytical role and political implications of organizing and attending funerals. Legal actions taken against both organizing and attending funerals constitute the withdrawal of

[458] TBMM, 26/2/49.

law, thus, sovereignty. However, while organizing funerals relate to the entire public space, including the dead, attending funerals specifically targets the living. It brings another technology of mourning onto the scene: *the capacity to mourn*.

In this section, I studied the discourses on attending funerals and its securitization. This brief study reveals a few important points that can deepen our understanding of dead body management and its discursive techniques and technologies. First, we can observe a visual regime of representation in the media that places corporeal signifiers of grief at the center. Visuals, once again, appear as a technology, a cog in the machine, of the dead body management ensemble. Unlike visual representations of postmortem violence, however, this visual regime is not necessarily a continuation of violence and a technology of necroviolence. It is rather a discursive tool that takes terrorist propaganda out of its context and frames attending funerals as a crime on its own. It also reminds us that corporeality never leaves the scene.

Second, a textual narrative in the media, accompanying the visual regime, offers a particular interpretation of the events that contributes to securitization. Third, we can identify a pattern in the state actors' narratives that retroactively justifies the trustee mayor policy by pointing to funeral attendance. Overall, these discourses securitize and criminalize the issue, justifying the trustee mayor policy while erasing performances of grief from public spaces by strategically employing and suspending the law, thus creating subjects who shall not be mourned, as well as subjects who shall not mourn.

Now, let us focus on the mechanics of these discourses closer. To begin with, the media has played a crucial role in this campaign with their sensationalist language, individually targeting deputies, and strategically using visuals. The media created an illusion of investigative journalism by presenting the news of the HDP politicians' presence at the funerals

as if the politicians were trying to hide it, and the media revealed it through investigation and research. One of the mainstream media giants, *Hürriyet*, for example, published a piece of news where the only text is "It is confirmed that HDP's Ağrı Deputy, Dirayet Tasdemir, attended the funeral of a terrorist, who was captured dead in a military operation in the province of Kars".[459] Seven photographs accompany the text. The photos are taken from afar, and they are zoomed into the group of people attending the funeral. While most photos show a small group waiting by the grave, two of them are close-ups of Tasdemir. Tasdemir's face is circled in one picture by a red line to point her out. No symbols or flags representing the PKK are present in the visuals. The lack of symbols signifying the PKK or Kurdishness is essential, considering the legal accusations are based on promoting terrorist propaganda. On the other hand, how the photographs are set, specifically shots that zoom in to focus on Tasdemir and circling her with a red line, help construct the investigative journalism narrative.

Similarly, the pro-government media outlet, *Sabah*, came out with the headline: "Newsflash: Shock due to an HDP deputy who attended a terrorist's funeral", and the visuals in the news prove to us that not only the political symbols but corporeal signifiers of public grief are targeted.[460] The shock they refer to is the decision of the prosecutor's office to launch an investigation against HDP's Batman Deputy, Ayşe Acar Başaran, for attending a funeral. The news *Sabah* published claims that the investigation started following some other newspaper articles in the media that proved her presence at the funerals. This demonstrates the significant role of the news, like *Hürriyet*'s reporting on Tasdemir, in securitizing the issue. It also illustrates the media as an actor in the necro-assemblage. In addition to its role as an actor

[459] "HDP'li Taşdemir terörist cenazesine katıldı, [HDP deputy Taşdemir attended a terrorist funeral]" *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2016, sec. gundem, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/galeri-hdpli-tasdemir-terorist-cenazesine-katildi-40097047.

[460] "Son dakika: Terörist cenazesine katılan HDP'liye şok, [A shock due to the HDP deputy who attended a terrorist funeral]" *Sabah*, November 23, 2017, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/11/23/son-dakika-terorist-cenazesine-katilan-hdpliye-sok.

(re)producing discourses, the media appears as an informant serving other apparatuses, like the police and the judiciary.

Like *Hürriyet*'s news on Tasdemir, *Sabah*'s reporting on Başaran is textually shorter but accompanied by visuals. These visuals are not taken from afar, which allows the viewer to see Başaran's face. Her face is bent down, eyes dimmed, and eyebrows furrowed. Although she looks like she is crying, one cannot be sure based on the picture. Nevertheless, she is visibly and clearly sad. In the visual, there is a text in big white bold letters against a red background that says, "the scandals of HDP deputies do not end".[461] Similarly, no political symbols or flags are present. It is merely her presence at the funeral and corporeal signifiers of sadness that are scandalous and worthy of a 'newsflash'.

Whereas the previous examples function on a minimal amount of text and more visuals, another method relies on a textual narrative, sometimes accompanied by visuals. Using their capacity to frame and represent events in a certain way, news outlets offer us a very particular interpretation and framing of events. To illustrate, the state-run news agency, *Anadolu Ajansi* (AA), reported that:

> According to the information compiled by our AA informant, the PKK was planning to spread terrorist propaganda during the funerals. The PKK gives so-called aid to families, and in order to keep the dead terrorists' names in public discourse, they give the dead terrorists' names to their operations. For this goal [propaganda], the PKK made a photo album for their deceased members and prepared poems for their memories.[462]

After discursively establishing that funerals are tools for the PKK to spread propaganda, AA continues: "The PKK called for support to the funerals. The HDP took it as an order and showed their presence at many funerals. Deputies tried to capitalize on their immunity to stop the security forces responsible for preventing terrorist propaganda. Photographs prove their

[461] Ibid.
[462] "HDP'li Vekiller Terörist Cenazelerinin Baş Aktörü Oldu, [HDP deputies became the leading actor of terrorist funerals]"

presence at the funerals".[463] Attending funerals is rhetorically used to demonstrate the support that the HDP gives to terrorism. With this narrative, however, AA takes a step further and explicitly suggests that the HDP takes orders from the PKK. Thus, they establish a hierarchical and organic relationship between the HDP and the PKK. Furthermore, by highlighting deputies 'capitalizing their immunity,' this narrative becomes a part of a larger securitizing discourse that frames HDP deputies as a matter of security.[464] The investigative journalism image that some media outlets create by referring to their informants and providing a large photo album of HDP deputies at the funerals makes them more credible securitizing actors.

We can find other examples that rely on textual narratives and still function on the rhetorical use of sensationalist language and concealing the context. The sensationalist language used in reporting the HDP deputies' presence at the funerals as shocking and scandalous helps to represent attending funerals as a crime and security issue without requiring further justification. To illustrate, *Sabah* reported HDP's Mus Deputy Burcu Çelik Özkan's presence at a "terrorist funeral" as scandalous because she left a flower on the grave and said, "these are times when we are out of words when no sentence can explain the situation. Dozens of our youth, comrades, and kids were massacred".[465] What is excluded from the narrative, however, is the context to which Deputy Özkan is responding. The funeral ceremony took place amidst the urban war, where many civilians were killed along with PKK fighters. Özkan refers to the unprecedented violence of the urban war by saying, "we are out of words"; the youth, comrades, and the children she refers to are, thus, actually civilians.[466] Excluding the context,

[463] Ibid.
[464] Many actors from a wide range of the political spectrum call for the closure of the HDP as a political party. They share the same sentiment that the HDP is organically linked to a terrorist organization; thus, they have no place in the parliament.
[465] "HDP'li vekil teröristin mezarına çiçek koydu [HDP deputy left a flower on a terrorist's grave]," *Sabah*, September 30, 2015, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/30/hdpli-vekil-teroristin-mezarina-cicek-koydu.
[466] She also embraces the PKK militia when she refers to "comrades". However, the kids and youth killed during the urban war were predominantly civilians.

however, it creates the impression that Özkan is out of words and upset because the terrorists are killed, a sentiment illustrated by her leaving a flower on the terrorist's grave.

The media is not the only actor; from prosecutors to the Minister of the Interior to AKP deputies, attending funerals found a place in securitizing and criminalizing discourses. For example, Selçuk Mızraklı, the mayor of Diyarbakır, was sentenced to nine years and four months in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization. Being a medical doctor, Mızraklı was accused of treating wounded terrorists and freeing them from the hospitals. Among these claims in the bill of indictment, there are also points about Mızraklı attending terrorist funerals and expressing his condolences to families.[467] The criminalization of treating wounded 'terrorists' is a necropolitical act itself. Although it might not be surprising to many that it is a crime, the international law that Turkey is also subject to prescribes parties take care of the wounded, regardless of their enemy status. Yet, for the argument, I would like to draw your attention to listing "attending funerals" in the bill as an accusation. Mızraklı's case is not the only one; many other deputies and mayors were charged for similar reasons. In HDP's Diyarbakır deputy Sibel Yiğitalp's ongoing trial, for example, the prosecutor is arguing for up to 26 years in prison. Among other accusations, Yiğitalp is charged with "promoting terrorist propaganda and legitimizing terrorist violence by attending a terrorist's funeral where the coffin was covered with the so-called flags of the PKK".[468]

However, we do not always see the traditional securitization process occur, as understood by the Copenhagen School. Although there were parliamentary discussions prior to the decision to lift HDP deputies' immunities, the realm of "normal politics" was debatable

[467] "Eski Diyarbakır Belediye Başkanı Selçuk Mızraklı'nın Cezası Belli Oldu [The Verdict of Former Diyarbakir Mayor Selçuk Mızraklı]," *Hürriyet*, March 9, 2020, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-haberi-eski-diyarbakir-belediye-baskani-selcuk-mizraklinin-cezasi-belli-oldu-41464787.
[468] Aziz Aslan, "HDP'li Sibel Yiğitalp'e 26 Yıla Kadar Hapis Istemi [Demanding 26 Years Imprisonment for Sibel Yiğitalp]," *Anadolu Ajansı*, January 3, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/hdpli-sibel-yigitalpe-26-yila-kadar-hapis-istemi/1354736.

from the start. The proposal was being discussed in May 2016 when the urban war was going on, some cities were sealed-off, and a partial state of emergency and special security zones were declared in Kurdistan. Whereas lifting the immunities and the subsequent imprisonment of deputies had some discussion before the action, the disposal of, and often imprisonment of, the mayors and their replacement by trustees was done arbitrarily. Utilizing the extraordinary measures that the general state of exception declared after the failed coup attempt in July 2016, Minister of the Interior Soylu became the architect of the trustee policy. Many decisions were taken by decree that the state of the exception allowed; therefore, the rationale behind the decisions was provided after the act. In other words, public debates, where the securityness of the issue was discussed, followed these "extraordinary measures".

AKP representatives and ministers have given numerous speeches on various platforms to justify the trustee mayor policy retroactively. A common pattern catches the eye; attending funerals is listed as a justification by itself, without even being associated with terrorist propaganda. This does not mean that the propaganda-funeral association has not been made at all. There are a few examples that define the act as "attending terrorist funerals that turned into rallies for the terrorist organization".[469] Most speeches, however, list attending funerals among other criminal acts. For example, in his speech in the parliament defending the state of emergency and the purge that followed it, AKP representative Dalkılıç said:

> People are criticizing the state of emergency. What should the state have done? Ignore those who support terrorism or fail to put a distance between themselves and terrorist groups? Is there anyone who was arrested because they are in a political party/head of a party? No! There are people arrested because of treason, terrorist organizations, walking together with them, attending their funerals, digging trenches…[470]

[469] "Diyarbakır'da terör operasyonu: HDP'li yöneticiler gözaltında [A counterterrorism operation in Diyarbakır: HDP deputies are detained]".

[470] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 70, February 15, 2017 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22848&P5=H&page1=27&page2=27

Here, Dalkılıç lists attending funerals as another justification for the purge along with other accusations, like digging trenches. Instead of highlighting terrorist propaganda, this narrative 'proves' that HDP politicians and co-chairs have an organic link with the PKK.

Similarly, responding to a parliamentary inquiry on why trustee mayors were appointed to the municipalities, AKP deputy Ilyas Seker stated:

> Were they appointed because the municipalities did their job and responsibilities according to the law or they were appointed because the municipalities supported the PKK, an organization that is a tool of foreign agents and seeks to divide the country? If we look at their services/what they did as a municipality, we can see that they hired people close to the terrorist organization into the municipalities' bodies, they created cemeteries for the terrorists that were neutralized in counterterrorism operations, they attended terrorist funerals, using vehicles to dig trenches…."[471]

One might argue that there is no need to repeatedly build the association between funerals and terrorist propaganda; thus, this is not surprising. However, particularly in some cases, this association is not clear or even present. As the visuals I discussed above also exemplify, in some funerals, no political symbols were present. Yet attending those funerals is still considered a criminal act. Some funerals represented as "terrorist funerals" were for civilians and even babies. Against this background, continuously listing attending funerals as a crime instead of framing the crime as terrorist propaganda creates a reality that criminalizes attending funerals.

In the regime's discourse, if one attends a "terrorist's funeral", it means that they not only support the terrorist organization but also have organic links with them, or in other words, they must be a member of the organization. HDP politicians have challenged this on many occasions and in various ways. The HDP often does so by revealing the identity of the deceased and noting the cases that are difficult to contest. For example, HPD's Istanbul representative, Filiz Kerestecioğlu, brought the bills of indictments against the HDP representatives to the

[471] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 77, March 2, 2017 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=58344

attention of the general assembly and said: "regarding a trial of a suspect who was present in Tahir Elçi's funeral, a prosecutor called Elçi's funeral 'a terrorist funeral' in the bill of indictment. A terrorist funeral! For Elçi! What judiciary, what rule of law are you talking about?"[472] Being a prominent human rights defender and the Diyarbakır Bar Association chairman, Tahir Elçi was an accepted and respected public figure. He was also known for his contribution to the peace process. Although Elçi condemned the PKK for escalating the violence and their insistence on the armed struggle from time to time, he also publicly stated that the PKK should not be considered a terrorist organization. This created unrest among the public, and his assassination was generally overlooked.

HDP politicians also underlined more shocking cases. In a general assembly meeting, Mahmut Toğrul from the HDP came with a long list of people to reveal the identities of what the AKP presented as "dead PKK terrorists"; the list consists of people like Miray İnce, a 3-month-old baby killed during the urban counterterrorism operations, and Mehmet Şahin, a 77-year-old blind man killed by tank fire.[473] The contrast in ages has become part of the HDP's discourse. On numerous occasions, İdris Baluken, parliamentary group leader of the HDP, has challenged the AKP because they call everyone a terrorist. Pointing out an example that AKP deputies referred to "a terrorist funeral" in a parliamentary inquiry, Baluken said: "What you called a terrorist funeral, what you used as an example, was the funeral of the 57-year-old Taybet İnan. You are showing a 3-month-old baby and a 57-year-old mother as terrorists".[474]

Another counter-narrative that the HDP uses is accepting the assumption that these are terrorists' funerals but framing the funeral as an event for the family and the community. It

[472] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 29, November 28, 2017 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=63881
[473] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 32, January 26, 2016 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=43831
[474] Ibid. The same session, with a different link: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=43795

does not mean that the HDP recognizes the PKK fighters as terrorists. Rather the argument is that *even if* it is a terrorist's funeral, HDP politicians attend the funerals for the families that lost their relatives. As Meral Daniş Beştaş reminded the general assembly, they are the representative of these families after all. The Kurdish funerals are also community events; particularly in small towns and villages, life stops as most of the population attends the funeral. As the representative of this population, HDP deputies feel a sense of responsibility to attend. This narrative, however, is countered by AKP's deputies and ministers, who argue that while HDP politicians express grief for dead terrorists, they are silent when Turkish soldiers are killed.

The AKP's counter-narrative is not entirely wrong; although the HDP as a party often condemns violence from both parties (the state and the PKK), they do not engage in performances of public grief regarding soldiers' deaths. However, this should not justify their imprisonment. AKP deputy Hurşit Yıldırım, for example, used this narrative in a parliamentary debate on lifting the immunities of HDP deputies. He argued that HDP deputies' immunities should be lifted because they have failed to put a distance between themselves and terror as "they gave a shoulder to carry terrorists' coffins, but they were silent when our soldiers were being martyred".[475] Once again, we can see the instrumental use of the law and its suspension that functions through the dead and aims to punish expressions of, or the lack thereof, emotions and to discipline deviant subjectivities that are not in line with the idea of the 'patriot citizen'. To conclude, I will unpack this argument and theoretically discuss what the criminalization of grief means.

[475] The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 17, November 8, 2016 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22743&P5=H&page1=30&page2=30

6.3 Capacity to be Mourned and the Capacity to Mourn

At first glance, without pushing ourselves to read between the lines and offer alternative interpretations, what we observe here in its naked and literal form is the criminalization of grief. Such criminalization is reminiscent of King Creon in the story of Antigone. Like Creon's decree that Polynices shall not be mourned because of his treason, the AKP regime, through the judiciary actions taken, bans the "traitor" Kurdish fighters from being mourned. Like how Antigone is buried alive on Creon's order to slowly die of starvation for defying the sovereign's order and burying Polynices, Figen Yüksekdağ, and many other HDP deputies and mayors, are imprisoned where they are subject to "slow death" as an exercise of necropower in the incarceration system.

However, in the story of Antigone, the sovereign's discursive decree, the illocutionary speech act, precedes Antigone's act of giving Polynices a proper burial and her public grief as resistance; Antigone's action is resistance particularly because it overtly defies the sovereign decree. In the case of Kurdish politicians, on the other hand, no decree explicitly bans public grief that preceded the act of grief. No law states it is a crime to attend a "terrorist funeral"; furthermore, it is not even clear who counts as a terrorist as the examples of Tahir Elçi and Taybet İnan show. The sovereign decree is not exclusively textual. It is not necessarily the utterance of the ban that creates the decree. As petty sovereigns, the police officers' arbitrary decision of not allowing the politicians access to the funeral site can be shown as an example of such a performance. More importantly for this dissertation, it is performances, practices, and discourses of securitization, criminalization, and the subsequent act of imprisonment, that constitutes the sovereign ban.

Security, and to be precise, the securitization of funerals, plays a critical productive role in this final element of dead body management. First, criminalization was made possible by framing the issue as a security threat with the help of terrorism as a master signifier. Then,

criminalization, which brought the legal mechanisms into play, made the trustee mayor policy possible. Second, the securitization of funerals constructs certain bodies/subjects and the social order in which these subjects are hierarchically structured. This social order is constructed through the technologies of mourning that securitization and criminalization enable and constrain.

"Is our capacity to mourn in global dimensions foreclosed precisely by the failure to conceive Muslim or Arab lives as *lives*" asks Judith Butler.[476] We can pose the same question by changing Muslim or Arab lives to Kurdish or socialist lives. It would be unrealistic to expect "us" to mourn for the "enemy them". What we witness in these cases, however, is not simply the Turkish population not mourning the PKK fighters. It is more than that; we see the production of the dead who cannot be mourned by anyone at all. Furthermore, from the cases of the "basement massacre" to other civilian deaths in Cizre and Sur, we cannot reduce the state's violence and the silence of the majority of the population down to only the PKK fighters. Rather, "our capacity to mourn" seems to reach its threshold regarding the Kurdish population, regardless of their status as (non)combatants. For Butler, grievability is a condition for humanization. Muslim or Arab lives are not mourned because they are not counted as lives from the start. Ungrievable lives, in Butler's formulation, are not necessarily abandoned by power, rather they have never been acknowledged by power. This is not necessarily the case in Turkey's conflict with the PKK. Some lives, the civilian deaths in Cizre and Sur for example, are not mourned, and they are not even acknowledged by the state or the media. Whereas, for others, such as the PKK fighters, mourning is banned. Power acknowledges these deaths, fears them, and invests in managing them.

[476] Butler, *Precarious Life*, 12.

Butler talks about one's *capacity to be mourned*, but what about one's *capacity to mourn*? If to be mourned is about being counted as human, would not mourning be about being counted as human as well? Grief requires a relational ontology in which the Self and the Other cannot be separated. With the loss of the Other, we lose a part of the Self. In this regard, mourning can be transformative; we grieve for the loss of the Other as we might also grieve for the loss of the Self that left with the Other; only through grief can we start to heal. This, however, is a conceptualization of grief as an individually embodied experience. In this dissertation, we rather talk about public grief - one's grievability in the public space. Yet, the prohibition of public grief still relates to being counted, abandoned, or disregarded by power. It relates not only counting as a life, or a human, but also as a political subject and citizen with equal rights.

Butler examines the relationship between violence and mourning and asks: "Is the prohibition on grieving the continuation of the violence itself?"[477] It is indeed a continuation of violence. Like the display of mutilated and desecrated dead bodies, the prohibition of grief targets a community or a population through the individual. "The derealization of loss, the insensitivity to human suffering and death, becomes the mechanism through which dehumanization is accomplished," Butler continues.[478] It is a form of violence that functions through both a derealizing and dehumanizing logic and produces ungrievable lives while simultaneously marking the Kurdish population as subjects who can neither mourn nor be mourned. It is a form of violence that pushes the Kurds out of the public space and seeks to punish defiance. I do not wish to call this form of violence necroviolence as Banu Bargu does. It is a form of violence that is made possible by sovereign means -suspension of the law-, and serves both necropolitical and normative functions; thus, a form of violence where the lines

[477] Butler, *Precarious Lives*, 148.
[478] Ibid.

among various forms of power get blurred, yet sovereign and normative elements manage to shine. *An assemblage!*

Conclusion: The Road Ahead

The empirical concern of this dissertation is the relationship between the Turkish state (apparatuses) and the dead bodies of PKK fighters in the context of the counterinsurgency that restarted and took a different shape in 2015, or *dead body management*; the theoretical concern is the power relations that dead body management entails. Previous studies have highlighted that dead bodies become subject to management, they can be subjects and objects of security, and specific forms of power, such as biopolitics, necropolitics, etc., and function in distinct areas of 'dead body management', such as the necropolitics of mass graves. Responding to the calls to pay more attention to dead bodies in security studies, this dissertation sought to move beyond focusing on a particular 'component of dead body management' and reading it through a specific form of power. Instead, it unpacked dead body management in the Turkish regime with the dead bodies of PKK fighters, from postmortem violence to burial, and analyzed how various forms of power are interlinked.

In this dissertation, I drew upon some influential accounts of power and the body, such as Foucault's biopolitics, Agamben and Butler's account of sovereignty, M'bembe's necropolitics, and Butler's normative power (ungrievable lives), as well as the recent advancements in the literature building upon these accounts, and I combined them using the concept of assemblages. I argued that even though the stakeholders we study invest in managing dead bodies, there is no 'the dead body management' as a generalizable framework, no theory of power can account for dead body management alone, and various forms of power interplay when functioning in and through dead body management. I showed the specific components and technologies of dead body management, how exactly power assemblages

operate, and what these assemblages and dead body management politically perform throughout the empirical analyses.

Chapter 4 introduced postmortem violence as a key element of dead body management, where necro/normative power is visible, accompanied by sovereign power. Sovereignty here was understood as the right to take life and dominate subjects with legal impunity. It showed us that while some violence seeks theatricality and visibility of dead bodies, others attempt to eradicate corporeality and seek invisibility. Whereas practices, like burning and hiding the bodies, manage populations in the classical sense of "eradicating sub-populations" as M'bembe suggests, displaying the mutilated dead bodies not only produces violable racialized and sexualized bodies but also conveys a message to the living. The discursive analysis I conducted showed us that women, Kurdish women, and the Kurdish population in general feel targeted. These targeted groups interpret the message of violence as disciplining and intimidating the deviant (resisting) women, and punishing the Kurdish people for the election results and supporting the insurgency. While doing so, the state reveals its violent face. However, even in the case of seeking corporeal visibility, dead body management erase subjectivities, reduce subjects into corporeal remains: a necro/normative assemblage.

Chapter 5 traced the journey of the dead and focused on what can be called "the pre-burial processes", which primarily involve the transportation of dead bodies and forensic autopsies. Here we can observe a necro/sovereign (read: bio-necro/sovereign) assemblage. The distinctive feature of the Turkey-PKK conflict is that there are Turkish citizens (both soldiers and insurgents) that are fighting outside of Turkish territories. This brings in borders as a critical technology. By closing the borders over security concerns about funerals, the regime did not allow the dead bodies of YPG/YPJ fighters to pass the Syrian border, subjecting them to decay. While the arbitrariness of the decision constitutes a sovereign exception, decay and

the policy's function of disciplining and punishing the families indicate a necropolitical function. Furthermore, Kurdish municipalities, which are legally responsible for transporting dead bodies, can also be charged with terrorism for transporting "terrorist bodies". On the other hand, autopsies' biopolitical function of generating knowledge is instrumentalized to construct a Christian, foreign, infidel terrorist that aims to challenge the claims of ethnic insurgency, reducing the issue into a mere problem of foreign-backed separatist terrorism. In this regard, Chapter 5 also demonstrated the critical role of security discourses in dead body management.

Chapter 6 studied the politics of funerals and technologies of mourning. Perceiving politicization and the resurrectory features of the insurgents' funerals as ontological security threats, the regime securitized and criminalized the funerals, leading to the imprisonment of deputies and the dismissal of elected mayors who were then replaced by loyal trustee mayors. A sovereign/normative assemblage is more visible at this stage. Mayors were charged with terrorism for organizing funerals, even though it is among their responsibilities. Deputies were also accused because they participated in the funerals and publicly grieved. Displaying the photographs of the deceased and reciting poetry in their name were portrayed as criminal acts, contributing to normative power. However, this chapter also demonstrated that technologies of mourning should not be reduced to *ungrievable lives*. Sovereign apparatuses are employed to prohibit mourning; thus, in addition to *the capacity to be mourned*, we can see a mechanism of *the capacity to mourn*. Last but not least, this chapter highlighted the machinic connection between dead body management, security (discourses), and colonialism, since the securitization of funerals paved the way for the colonial administration through trustee mayors.

Like in every research, this dissertation also has some limitations. In fact, it might have raised more questions than it answered. However, I believe that this is a good thing for knowledge production. Considering the understudied nature of dead bodies, it is only fair that

we take small and humble steps in explaining phenomena, raising questions, and highlighting areas for further research on the studies of power, (dead) bodies, and security. The rest of this chapter discusses some limitations, notes some points I have raised but underexplored, and highlights areas for future research.

Towards Politics of Bones and Stones

In this dissertation, I have used "journey" as an allegory to trace and study the processes that dead bodies of the enemy Other go through. Logically, one might assume that the journey ends with the burial. After all, we bury the dead to ensure they do not come back and mourn the dead to have closure. The journey must end at one point - or at least that is what we assume or even hope for… If there is ever an end to the relationship between the dead body and the regime, burial is not it. *The noises of the heavy machinery, a hydraulic excavator -for example-, break the silence of death. The eternal rest is disrupted as bombs and artilleries drop on the cemeteries, as hammers break gravestones, as shovels touch the earth. Bones, stones, pieces of shrapnel, and dust… Another assemblage?*

Graves are excavated, dead bodies are exhumated, bones are relocated, gravestones are damaged and/or the writings and symbols are changed, and cemeteries are destroyed. These cases are not as rare. Analytically, they are not any less important than postmortem violence. They illustrate the continuous and systematic nature of dead body management. There are two reasons I have not included 'post-burial' in this dissertation as a separate chapter. First and foremost, there is simply not enough space. I chose to analyze the dead's journey and their relationship with the regime chronologically; thus, considering space limitations, burial was a fair point to end the discussion. Furthermore, the relocation of bones opens up a new field of analysis and questions regarding spatial politics, such as why some bones were relocated from Kurdistan to Istanbul, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization; thus, it would complicate the

argument too much. Second, there is not enough discursive data about post-burial politics; the analysis, therefore, would require fieldwork, which was not possible due to security reasons.[479]

Nevertheless, we can briefly discuss what dead body management in post-burial looks like and what kind of power relations it entails. As mentioned above, the most prevalent practices of dead body management that occur in the post-burial period are exhumation and the relocation of bodies or bones and the destruction of cemeteries. Particularly exhumation and relocation are practices that encompass all the forms of power I have discussed in this dissertation and are clear examples of the entangled assemblages. Let me clarify this point by succinctly going over one empirical example: the Xerzan (Garzan) cemetery. In December 2017, during the curfew declared in the province of Bitlis, the grave site called Xerzan, where PKK fighters are buried, was excavated. Exploiting the curfews and the state of exception, this excavation was conducted without notifying the families, with hydraulic excavators, without caring whether the heavy machinery would damage the corporeal remains. As the public's anger grew, the Mayoral Office of Bitlis released a press announcement where they claimed that 279 graves, ornated with "illegal symbols", were excavated.[480]

A necro/sovereign assemblage is at play here. To begin with, a relationship of 'belonging' is established. As the territory and the subjects living within it belonged to the sovereign in the pre-modern, pre-biopolitical (in a Foucauldian sense) era, Erdoğan's regime exercises sovereign power that claims absolute ownership over space and the corporeal remains within this space. Sovereignty extends to the cemeteries, to not only the dead bodies but to the corporeal remains that cannot even be called a body anymore. Simultaneously, it is a form of population management. The 'baby killer, perverted, monstrous' PKK fighters are not treated

[479] Even newspaper articles that I saved as data to study later are inaccessible now due to the government's purge against Kurdish journalists and media outlets.
[480] "Basına ve Kamuoyuna Saygıyla Duyurulur [Announcing the Press and Public with Respect]," January 2, 2018, http://www.bitlis.gov.tr/basina-ve-kamuoyuna-saygiyla-duyurulur-02012018.

as humans deserving dignity in the postmortem; similarly, their families are not perceived as political subjects with rights. The law does not apply to them, their will is not recognized; besides getting their permission, they are not even notified. Once again, the living is punished through the dead.

You might have noticed that I have not explicitly discussed exercises of biopower in the previous chapters. This does not mean that biopower is absent in dead body management but rather entangled with necropower. When I talked about biopower, it was mostly about the discursive construction of the Self as biopower. However, the case of Xerzan cemetery can bring our attention from discursive manifestations of biopower to biopolitical exercises and apparatuses, including discourses. First, the official justification for the excavation is that the area is recorded as a meadow, not a graveyard site approved by the state.[481] Second, the regime insisted on identification, and some of the bodies were given back to the families only after they were transported to the state institution of forensic medicine, went through DNA tests, and the data was entered into the system. Third, the bodies that were not given back to the families or could not be identified were transported to Istanbul and buried at sites designed and approved by the state as 'official cemeteries'.

In addition to sovereign, necropolitical, and biopolitical power, the questions of memorialization, mourning, and who counts as a political subject or even human are also present. In its official statement, the Mayoral Office of Bitlis referred to the cemetery as "the so-called cemetery".[482] This partly relates to the official justification that the area is not recognized as a grave site, which is a contested justification because even in Ottoman archives, the area is listed as a cemetery, and there had been no issue until 2015.[483] However, it is possible

[481] Ibid.
[482] Ibid.
[483] "Garzan Mezarlığı: Tarihe ve Belleğe Saldırı [Garzan Cemetery: An Attack to History and Memory]," *Mezapotamya Ajansı*, December 18, 2021,

to find other instances wherein cemeteries are referred to as "so-called".[484] It seems as though the insurgents cannot have cemeteries; when they do, they cannot be acknowledged; they simply cannot turn into a reality. *The insurgent cannot have a proper funeral, cannot be publicly mourned, cannot have a cemetery, cannot rest in peace, cannot be in one piece, cannot be in the same location... The family is punished with the insurgent; necropolitics is at play.* However, it is not only a matter of disciplining and managing; the very existence of the Kurdish population is at stake. They are rendered as a population that cannot live, cannot die… *cannot, cannot, cannot…*

The security apparatus is also integral to the post-burial stages of dead body management. Similar to the previous stages, securitization enables or constrains action. However, in this particular case, security is not limited to the discursive realm. The security logic of elimination strikes back. Bombs, artilleries, and jet fighters join the assemblage, making machinic connections with machines like earth diggers. *'Machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections'.* The logic of elimination strikes in a literal sense; the security forces bomb and destroy cemeteries. Although in some cases, the action is justified by arguing that cemeteries were used as arsenals, in other instances, security forces proudly circulate the visuals of bombing a cemetery, saying, "look at the so-called martyrs' cemetery" before the explosion.[485] Yet, this does not mean discursive securitization and its material implications are irrelevant. Some of the graves are targeted because of the gravestones and even the colors of the flowers.

http://mezopotamyaajansi35.com/GUNCEL/content/view/http%3A%2F%2Fmezopotamyaajansi35.com%2FGUNCEL%2Fcontent%2Fview%2F156069.

[484] "PKK'nın Kampı ve Sözde Mezarlık Olarak Kullandığı Mühimmat Deposu Yerlebir Edildi [The Armory That PKK Used as a Base Camp and so-Called Cemetery Was Destroyed]," *Milliyet*, December 10, 2015, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/sirnak/pkk-nin-kampi-ve-sozde-mezarlik-olarak-kullandigi-muhimmat-deposu-yerle-bir-edildi-11105938.

[485] "PKK Mezarlığı Imha Edildi [PKK Cemetery Is Eliminated]," *Vatan*, October 18, 2015, https://www.gazetevatan.com/gundem/pkk-mezarligi-imha-edildi-875290; "Şırnak'ta PKK mezarlığı bombalandı [PKK cemetery in Şırnak was bombed]," *Ensonhaber*, June 13, 2017, sec. Video Haber, https://www.ensonhaber.com/video/sirnakta-pkk-mezarligi-bombalandi.

The pro-government news outlets singled out a grave in Istanbul for being decorated with flowers that have "the colors of the PKK" (which, in fact, are the colors of Kurdistan, not the PKK), and accused the popular opposition Mayor of Istanbul of allowing terrorist propaganda.[486]

There is a tendency in the existing literature to study exhumation and mass graves to theorize or empirically make sense of collective memory, injustice, and narratives regarding identity. These cases illustrate some new areas that we can focus on instead. Why did the regime insist on relocating the bones, and what does it mean for dead body management? Can we make sense of the relocation of bones as a continuation of colonial rationality? Can we rethink security assemblages in the light of the politics of bones and stones? Do post-burial practices mean that there is no end to the relationship between the state and dead bodies? What kind of temporality and subjectivities does it create if that is the case?

Dead Body Management and Colonization

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 4 (4.2.3), there have been debates since the 1980s about whether Kurdistan can be conceptualized as an inner colony; yet, the thesis of Kurdistan as a colony is widely and vehemently rejected even among the Turkish left. İsmail Beşikçi, who first suggested analyzing Kurdistan as an international colony academically, highlights a few aspects of Kurdistan and its relationship with Turkey to draw attention to its colonization.[487] First, underlining the territorial characteristics, Beşikçi calls Kurds "a nation that could not even be a colony" because a colony has a territorial formation and political status,

[486] Halit Turan, "İstanbul'da Mezarlıkta Skandal Görüntü! PKK Renkleriyle Süslediler [Scandalous Images in an Istanbul Cemetery! Ornated with PKK Colors]," *Sabah*, January 14, 2022, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/son-dakika-haberi-ibb-mezarliginda-skandal-mezar-peyzajini-pkk-renkleriyle-suslediler-5827150.
[487] Beşikçi, *International Colony Kurdistan.* Beşikçi later conceptualized Kurdistan as an international colony, divided among and colonized by Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

whereas Kurdistan has no designated borders.[488] Besides borders, the spatial relationship between Turkey and Kurdistan has colonial features; Kurdistan's forests, villages, and animals have been subject to violence, subjugation, and administrative control by the Turkish central government. Second, Beşikçi draws attention to the aspect of subjectivities. He argues that there is an affective relationship between the colonizer and colonized, where the Kurdish population is shamed, humiliated, and seen as inferior.[489]

However, Beşikçi is not the first or only to claim that Kurdistan is a colony; this claim has been central to the PKK and the Kurdish political movement. They highlight the military occupation of Kurdistan, systematic assimilation policies, and economic colonization. The increasing presence and influence of Turkey in northern Syria strengthened the claims that Turkey has characteristics of a colonizer. For instance, more military bases were built, the olives in the region were transported back to Turkey, and the central government in Ankara appointed mayors to some areas in northern Syria.

This study of dead body management and power relations illustrated more examples that strengthen the thesis of Kurdistan as an internal colony. First, M'bembe shows us that biopolitics often takes the form of necropolitics in the colony. The colony is where law is suspended; the sovereign (colonizer) can kill with impunity. Populations are managed via the deadly force of war machines, subject to mass killings or slow death. *The colony is where death lurks in the background*. From the urban war in Cizre and Sur to the mutilation and display of dead bodies, we can see similar rationality and practices in Kurdistan. Second, a Foucauldian framework suggests that the central government's involvement in transporting the bodies and

[488] Alyssa Bivins, "Tracing the Conceptual Genealogy of Kurdistan as International Colony," *Middle East Research and Information Project*, August 19, 2020, https://merip.org/2020/08/tracing-the-conceptual-genealogy-of-kurdistan-as-international-colony/.
[489] İsmail Beşikci, *"Hayali Kürdistan"ın Dirilişi [The Resurrection of Kurdistan Imaginary]* (İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı Yayınları, 2013).

regulating where the bodies are allowed to be buried relate to bio/necropolitics. However, this bio/necropolitical management of populations also relates to the colonial spatiality that Beşikçi talks about. Alongside the forests, villages, and animals, dead bodies and the sites where they are buried in Kurdistan become subject to subjugation, violence, and control. 'The martyrs of Kurdistan' cannot be buried in Kurdistan, and families need to leave Kurdistan to visit the graves; this way, the regime hinders the connection between space and national identity and asserts itself as the colonial authority that can decide on the fate of the bodies.

Third, dead body management contributes to assimilation policies. I have argued numerous times throughout the dissertation that subjectivities and what can be shown in the public space are disciplined through dead bodies. I also argued that there are ontological insecurities behind the securitizing narratives that enabled the specific practices of dead body management. This is not only a matter of (in)security; deliberately targeting the 'Kurdish national-symbolic' on the bodies, funeral vehicles, or tombstones is a crucial element of the assimilation campaign. Last but not least, by instrumentalizing technologies of mourning, the regime dismissed mayors from office, replaced them with trustee mayors, and imprisoned many deputies, hence reducing the HDP's number of seats in the parliament. Therefore, dead body management directly connects to the colonial administration of Kurdistan.

In short, while I did identify one of the most significant political functions of dead body management and the power assemblages it entails as (re)producing Kurdistan as an internal colony, I could not explore and elaborate on this enough due to space limitations. As we should have a better understanding of dead body management, further research should examine the relationship between dead body management and colonization more sophisticatedly. A few questions immediately arise: what is the relationship between bodies and colonization? Can we think of this relationship through a dichotomous understanding of the colonizers' bodies against the colonized bodies, or are there potentialities for a different approach to this

relationship? How do dead bodies relate to this relationship? How can we theorize about the relationship between dead bodies, space, nation, and colonization?

Back to Critical Security Studies

While unpacking and making sense of dead body management, this dissertation predominantly pursued power relations. Considering Turkey's dead body management was happening in the context of counterinsurgency, security studies was my starting point. More precisely, I departed from and situated the dissertation in CSS since it gives more room to study bodies, power, and politics of security. As mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1, Jessica Auchter argues that dead bodies are not only managed but also can be subjects and objects of security. Through examples like retrieval of soldiers' bodies, the securitization of bin Laden's funeral, and the role of mass graves in identity formations and pursuit of justice, she explores how dead bodies can shed light on the understanding of security. Even though I pursued the links between dead bodies and securities, like Auchter, I followed different reasoning: instead of exploring how dead bodies can change our understanding of security, I examined the role of security in dead body management. However, such an examination still hints at what dead bodies can tell us about the study of security.

First, this research guides us to move beyond how security assemblages are usually studied and encourages us to rethink security assemblages. This dissertation demonstrated that security assemblages are in a machinic relationship with power assemblages that govern the dead. Whereas security assemblages are often understood as the collaboration between public and private security entities, and new technologies, like drones or cyber-security, in the existing literature, I refer to a different ensemble of security discourses, practices, and actors.[490] I refer

[490] Jamie Collier, "Cyber Security Assemblages: A Framework for Understanding the Dynamic and Contested Nature of Security Provision," *Politics and Governance* 6, no. 2 (June 11, 2018): 13–21,

to an assemblage that does not extensively focus on private security contractors and new technologies but includes actors not traditionally counted in security studies, such as public prosecutors, forensic pathologists, religious figures, like imams or bishops… The study of dead bodies opens doors to understanding security assemblages differently and analyzing the role of traditionally unacknowledged actors, as such actors are not necessarily unique to the Turkish case. IRA funerals, for example, were not only securitized by the British government but also exempted from religious service by the Bishop of Derry. Regardless of the country, dead bodies become subject to forensic investigations and/or autopsies. Forensics and autopsies do not have to be manipulated to be part of the security assemblages; the simple and bureaucratic act of data recording is worth inquiring about the biopolitics of security.

In this study, we also observe that securitization has become a vital technology of power assemblages operating in dead body management. If we shift our attention away from power, for this instance, then we can see securitization has also become a key technology of counterinsurgency and the colonial mode of administration. Securitization, as understood by the rigid framework of the Copenhagen School, may seem odd in the context of counterinsurgency, as securitization refers to an issue moving from the so-called realm of 'normal politics' to the realm of security and counterinsurgency, indicating that the issue is already securitized and military actions are being taken. However, as we have seen throughout the dissertation, the military activities of counterinsurgency have corporeal and ontological aftermath. Dead bodies are transported, go through autopsies, and are buried, which involves practices and discourses as signifiers. Bodies, and the signifiers they entail, are constructed as (ontological) security threats.

https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i2.1324; Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, "Security Privatization and Global Security Assemblages," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2011): 171–80.

This securitization process enables and constrains actions and discourses that play a significant role in (re)shaping the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism. To illustrate, the securitization of funerals and public grief has led to mayors and representatives being framed along the lines of the discursive formation of counterterrorism, resulting in their imprisonment and colonial administration of the region. On the other hand, practices of dead body management have become critical for securitization. For example, forensic autopsies contribute to the discursive construction of the PKK as a separatist terrorist organization supported by foreign forces, which (re) produces the Kurdish Question as a matter of (counter)terrorism, not an ethnic insurgency.

Furthermore, Chapter 6 drew attention to another mechanism of securitization that is worth further inquiry: the securitization of politicization. State agents and the media built a securitizing narrative about the politicization of insurgents' funerals, constructing it as a security threat. As a result, funerals were securitized in two ways: first, they were discursively constructed as security threats, becoming a matter of security; second, funerals were physically securitized with a heavy presence of security forces, checkpoints, etc. However, the securitization of funerals simultaneously sought depoliticization. In some cases, funerals were allowed only if they were attended privately by a few, without the presence of any political signifiers. In this regard, the securitization of politicization sought depoliticization, further challenging the assumptions of the Copenhagen School about security, politics, and non-politics as distinct realms.

As security assemblages are often conceptualized by reference to the private security industry, poststructuralist approaches to security, power, and (counter)insurgency/terrorism are predominantly concerned with a particular understanding of *dispositif de sécurité* that builds on risks, contingencies, and surveillance. Dead body management in a case like Turkey

demonstrates that Foucauldian and other poststructuralist approaches do not have to limit themselves to the studies of surveillance and risk. Even Foucault argues that biopolitics and governmentality work hand in hand, or parallel to, sovereignty. M'beme reminds us that necropolitics always assists biopolitics.

Regarding security, this means that, in the poststructuralist approaches to counterterrorism/insurgency, we can move beyond the logic of risk management and involve the logic of exception and the logic of elimination. However, dead body management also shows that regardless of whether we are interested in risk and contingencies or securitization and the elimination of threats, studies of counterterrorism/insurgency need to take politics of security seriously. This involves the political conditions that both give birth to the securityness of an issue, or that security functions under, *and* the political functions that security performs. For example, if we had exclusively focused on what new things dead body management tells us about security, we would have missed dead body management's political functions like colonization, structuring a racialized and sexualized order, managing populations, etc. To conclude, CSS needs to pay more attention to dead bodies, not necessarily because dead body management changes our understanding of security, but because it helps us approach the politics of security in a more nuanced way. By giving more space for the politics of security, CSS can remain a distinct field in broader security studies.

Resistance and the PKK's dead body management

This dissertation primarily concerns how *the state* manages dead bodies through its *various apparatuses* and how power operates through this management. Therefore, I have studied dead body management conducted only by the state and focused on the power exercised by practices and discourses of the state and its apparatuses. This approach has its limitations: first, it has the risk of creating an illusion of an omnipotent state; second, it neglects dead body

management conducted by the PKK or other actors of the Kurdish movement. Following Foucault, I conceptualized power as something exercised, relational, and contingent. As Foucault famously argues, "wherever there is power, there is resistance".[491] The various forms of power operating in and through Turkey's dead body management are no exception to this principle. Some forms of resistance and the Kurdish movement's dead body management were implicit in our discussions. For example, in Chapter 4 (4.2.3), I illustrated how the Kurdish political movement interpreted and portrayed postmortem violence as an act that reveals the violent face of the state. One can construe this portrayal as a discursive resistance; considering the official state discourse seeks to discursively construct a biopolitical Self and erase the traces of violence, revealing the violent face of the state and its necropolitical underpinnings challenge such an endeavor.

It was not my intention to discuss power as though it is omnipotent. However, dead body management is significantly understudied, and even this dissertation is only a humble step in uncovering this complex phenomenon. Therefore, I chose to allocate the limited space I have to a more detailed analysis of the state's *attempts* to exercise power. An exhaustive study of the resistance to dead body management is required and can be a subject for further research. Nevertheless, I can briefly mention some forms of resistance that caught my attention and raise some questions for further research.

To begin with, the ambivalent functions of the visuals of dead body management make visual politics a site for resistance and images a means for resistance. The existing literature supports this point. David Campbell argues that war photography, especially the images of the dead, illustrates the violence and horror of war more efficiently than textual narratives; thus, they can "the basis for mobilization against atrocity and violence".[492] Abir Hamdar's work on

[491] Foucault, *The History of Sexualiaty*, 95.
[492] Campbell, "Horrific Blindness", 61.

the images of "the Syrian corpse" relates better to this study.[493] He explores Palestinian and Syrian artists' work that attempts to "re-individualize a corpse which has been stripped of its identity".[494] Following Bargu's concept of necropolitical violence, Hamdar argues that photography and other forms of visual arts can be recognized as "necropolitical resistance".

We can walk on the road Hamdar paved and contribute to his conceptualization. As we have established that necropolitics is often assembled with other forms of power, visuals' re-individualization functions are, in fact, a *necro/normative* resistance. It is possible to observe such resistance in Turkey as well. For example, Kurdish women and other feminist groups in Turkey organized street protests, gave press releases, and wrote newspaper articles and commentaries following the naked display of Kevser Eltürk/Ekin Wan. The resistance placed "nakedness" at the center of their discourse and conveyed the message that they are not scared. Most common slogans and signs in the protests were "Ekin Wan is our honor", "Ekin Wan is the naked form of our resistance", "women, life, freedom", "vengeance", and "we are not afraid, we will not be intimidated".[495] In Stockholm, a woman stripped her clothes and laid naked on the floor, beside some pictures of Eltürk, in front of the Swedish parliament.[496]

In Chapter 4 (4.2.1), we have established that the regime seeks to discipline, subdue, and punish the Kurdish women and 'resisting women' by displaying Eltürk's dead body naked. Women embody nakedness; contra to the regime that weaponizes nakedness against the Kurdish nation's 'honor', they embrace Wan as "their honor", and display their own body to draw attention to the atrocity. They also embrace resistance; they challenge the disciplinary

[493] Abir Hamdar, "The Syrian Corpse: The Politics of Dignity in Visual and Media Representations of the Syrian Revolution," *Journal for Cultural Research* 22, no. 1 (2018): 73–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/14797585.2018.1429083.
[494] Ibid., 74.
[495] "Nusaybinli kadınlar."
[496] "Ekin Wan için çıplak protesto [A naked protest for Ekin Wan]," *Evrensel*, August 23, 2015, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258876/ekin-wan-icin-ciplak-protesto.

functions of necroviolence by displaying that they are not deterred from resisting and defying the patriarchal values of the regime—a*n embodied resistance.*

Necropolitical resistance is complemented by resistance to normative violence. While the protest in Stockholm challenged the regime's necropolitical goals by embracing nakedness, it simultaneously sought to re-individualize the victim by displaying Eltürk's photos and her name. Even a routinized and mundane practice can turn into resistance against normative violence that erases individuality and political life. For example, since a dead PKK fighter is either only a number or a 'carcass' for the state officials, a nameless and faceless figure, a routinized act like carrying photographs and displaying the name of the deceased turns into resistance. Reciting poetry for the fallen fighter and reminding the audience about the deceased's politics, personal characteristics, hobbies, and interests are also common for PKK funerals. Katherine Verdery reminds us that "a remembered dead body is more than a corpse; it is a material symbol of history".[497] Thus, these examples stand as forms of resistance against the necro-normative assemblage that seeks to eradicate the subjectivity, political life, and memory of the dead, turn them into merely a corpse, and discipline the living population.

After observing that necro/normative resistance embraces and visualizes political life against the politics of death, I expected to identify a pattern, thinking that the way to resist a regime that kills and instrumentalizes death, or in other words pursuing politics of death, must be embracing a 'politics of life'. However, my dichotomous reasoning was proved wrong when I spent some time in the community centers of Cologne and Berlin. In 2018, large-scale hunger strikes began in Turkey and spread to Europe against the isolation of the PKK's Chairman Öcalan and the general prison conditions in Turkey.[498] There was an atmosphere of celebrating

[497] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*.
[498] "Welsh Hunger Striker Calls off Kurdish Protest," *BBC News*, May 26, 2019, sec. Wales, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-48412885.

death in the massive demonstrations in Cologne. "A funeral is the Kurd's wedding", told a man walking next to me. In another instance, a lady in her sixties sat next to me in one of the community centers; while we were 'small-talking', all of a sudden, she said, "I had a son around your age. He was martyred a few years ago. I am proud of him, though. If I had more sons, all of them could sacrifice themselves for Kurdistan".[499] "I am sorry for your loss", I replied, "this regime knows only of death". "This nation has suffered a lot", she responded and continued with a Turkish idiom, "I have one life; let them take it".

It seems as though the Kurdish community resists the regime's politics of death not by underlining and supporting life but rather by celebrating and even encouraging death, sending the message that they will not be disciplined, tamed, and subdued by death. A culture of martyrdom is established. As someone who did not grow up under bombs, hearing the news of another family member's death every other week, watching dead bodies decomposing on the streets due to curfews, it is not my place to criticize how the Kurdish community resists. Yet, I cannot help to think: would not such ingrainedness of death in Kurdish subjectivities strengthen the construction of Kurdistan as a *deathscape*? The topic of resistance raises some further questions: Does the expectation that the 'politics of life' is the 'proper resistance' demonstrate certain subjectivities shaped by the liberal biopolitical paradigm? Can we not only theorize but also devise practical prescriptions for resistance that would not reproduce power relations?

To conclude, this dissertation showed us that in the eyes of the regime, the traitor, sexually deviant, monstrous insurgent does not deserve dignity after death. Their bodies are violable and disposable, and their deaths are ungrievable. The insurgent cannot have a proper funeral; they cannot be publicly mourned, cannot even have a cemetery, and cannot rest in

[499] Fieldnotes, Cologne, March 2018.

peace, in one piece, in the same location. The family is punished with the insurgent; necropolitics is at play. However, it is not only a matter of disciplining and managing, and it is not only about 'the terrorists'; the very existence of the Kurdish population is at stake. They are rendered as a population that cannot live and cannot die, cannot mourn, and cannot be mourned. The signifiers of the Kurdish nation need to be erased, eradicated, and can be visible only when they serve an agenda or signify the state's victory, just like dead bodies. We should be disturbed, sad, angry, curious… After all, dead bodies have the effect of invoking action. However, despite this grim picture, we should not be hopeless, for 'where there is power, there is resistance'.

Antigone: Ancient gods of our Thebes, land of our fathers!

This is the end! They are taking me away!

See here, great land owners of Thebes! Look upon your last princess!

Look how I'm suffering and by whose hand, only because

I kept my reverence to the gods.

Bibliography

A Haber. "FETÖ'cü Polisten Demirtaş'a WhatsApp'tan Canlı Yayın [Live WhatsApp Broadcast of FETÖ's Police for Demirtaş]." *A Haber*, May 8, 2018. https://www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2018/05/08/fetocu-polisten-demirtasa-whatsapptan-canli-yayin.

Abrahamsen, Rita, and Michael C. Williams. "Security Privatization and Global Security Assemblages." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2011): 171–80.

Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Agerholm, Harriet. "Israeli Officials 'Backing Shoot-to-Kill Policy against Palestinians.'" *The Independent*, January 2, 2017, sec. News. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-shoot-to-kill-policy-palestinian-suspects-human-rights-watch-idf-soldiers-west-bank-gaza-strip-a7505486.html.

Ahluwalia, Pal. "Post-Structuralism's Colonial Roots: Michel Foucault." *Social Identities* 16, no. 5 (September 1, 2010): 597–606. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2010.509563.

Akin, Cihan Erdost, and Jacqueline Dufalla. "Sovereignty and Death: Post-Mortem Visual Representations in Turkey and Russia's Media." *Millennium* 49, no. 2 (January 1, 2021): 224–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298211031995.

Akit. "Haç kolyeli terörist bakın kim çıktı! [Look at who the terrorist with cross necklace is]." *Akit*, April 21, 2017. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/hac-kolyeli-terorist-bakin-kim-cikti-309714.html.

Akkaya, Hamdi Ahmet. "Kürt hareketinin örgütlenme süreci olarak 1970'ler [1970s as the period of the Kurdish movement's mobilization process]." *Toplum ve Bilim* 127 (2013). https://iletisim.com.tr/dergiler/toplum-ve-bilim/3/sayi-127-2013/9997/kurt-hareketinin-orgutlenme-sureci-olarak-1970ler/10194.

Akşam. "MHP Genel Başkanı Bahçeli: Döktüğünüz şehit kanlarında boğulacaksınız [MHP's Chairman Bahçeli: You will drown in the martyrs' blood you spilled]." *Akşam*, October 4, 2018. https://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/bahceli-doktugunuz-sehit-kanlarinda-bogulacaksiniz/haber-780004.

Akyol, Taha. "PKK ve dış güçler [PKK and Foreign Powers]." *Hürriyet*, December 13, 2016, sec. taha-akyol. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/taha-akyol/pkk-ve-dis-gucler-40306064.

Alim Dalgıç, Sema. "İran Asıllı PKK'lı Kadın Teröristin Üzerinden Haç Işareti Çıktı [Cross Found on the Iranian Female Terrorist]." *Sabah*, March 3, 2017. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/03/03/iran-asilli-pkkli-kadin-teroristin-uzerinden-hac-isareti-cikti.

Alsaafin, Linah. "Israel Slammed for 'Necroviolence' on Bodies of Palestinians." *Al Jazeera*, February 24, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/24/israel-slammed-for-necroviolence-on-bodies-of-palestinians.

Altay, Mehmet Efe. "Cizre'de bodrum kat karanlığı; ilk günden bugüne neler yaşandı? [The darkness of the basement; what has happened since day one?]." *T24*, February 8, 2016. https://t24.com.tr/haber/cizrede-bodrum-kat-karanligi-ilk-gunden-bugune-neler-yasandi,327392.

Altman, Lawrence K. "Making the Right Call, Even in Death." *The New York Times*, July 1, 2013, sec. Health. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/health/making-the-right-call-even-in-death.html.

Anadolu Ajansı. "HDP'li Vekiller Terörist Cenazelerinin Baş Aktörü Oldu [HDP Deputies Became the Leading Actor of Terrorist Funerals]." *Anadolu Ajansı*, January 31, 2019. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/hdpli-vekiller-terorist-cenazelerinin-bas-aktoru-oldu/1379781.

———. "Öldürülen Teröristten 'haç Şeklinde Kolye' Çıktı [There Was a Cross Necklace on the Dead Terrorist]." *Anadolu Ajansı*. April 21, 2017. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/oldurulen-teroristten-hac-seklinde-kolye-cikti/802248.

———. "Terörist Inlerindeki Görüntüler 'YPG-PKK Ayrımı'Nı Yalanlıyor [Images from Terrorist Lairs Disprove the Lie of 'YPG-PKK Difference']." *Anadolu Ajansı*, October 23, 2019. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/terorist-inlerindeki-goruntuler-ypg-pkk-ayrimini-yalanliyor/0.

Anaïs, Seantel. "Ethical Interventions: Non-Lethal Weapons and the Governance of Insecurity." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 537–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611425367.

ANF News. "DİAYDER: Cenazelerin verilmemesi İslam'a aykırı [DIAYDER: Withholding dead bodies is against Islam]." *ANF News*. August 1, 2015. https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/diayder-cenazelerin-verilmemesi-islam-a-aykiri-51858.

———. "HDP'den Davutoğlu'na 'bekletilen cenazeler' soruları [HDP's questions for Davutoğlu about the 'waiting dead bodies']." *ANF News*. November 26, 2015. https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/hdp-den-davutoglu-na-bekletilen-cenazeler-sorulari-58962.

———. "Prisoner Dies in Solitary Cell in Manisa." *ANF News*. April 7, 2022. https://anfenglish.com/news/prisoner-dies-in-solitary-cell-in-manisa-59172.

———. "Thousands in Şırnak: Ekin Wan's Naked Body Is Our Honor." *ANF News*. August 10, 2015. https://anfenglish.com/women/thousands-in-sirnak-ekin-wan-s-naked-body-is-our-honor-12440.

Arslan, Ferhat. "Baytar: Güneşte bekletilen cenazeler için BM harekete geçmeli [Baytar: The UN needs to take action for the dead bodies waiting under the sun]." *ANF News*, August 12, 2015. https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/baytar-guneste-bekletilen-cenazeler-icin-bm-harekete-gecmeli-52407.

Arslan, Sırrıberk. "Esra'yı 14'ünde kaçırdılar 18'inde infaz ettiler [They kidnapped 14 years old Esra, executed her when she was 18]." *Sabah*, September 27, 2019. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2019/09/27/esrayi-14unde-kacirdilar-18inde-infaz-ettiler.

Artı Gerçek. "'Cami İmamı, cezaevinde şüpheli şekilde ölen Mehmet Sevinç'in cenazesini yıkamadı [Imam refused to wash Mehmet Sevinç's dead body, who suspiciously died in prison]." *Artı Gerçek*, April 8, 2022. //artigercek.com/haberler/bir-utanc-daha-cami-imami-mehmet-sevinc-in-cenazesini-yikamadi.

Aslan, Aziz. "HDP'li Sibel Yiğitalp'e 26 Yıla Kadar Hapis Istemi [Demanding 26 Years Imprisonment for Sibel Yiğitalp]." *Anadolu Ajansı*. January 3, 2019. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/hdpli-sibel-yigitalpe-26-yila-kadar-hapis-istemi/1354736.

Auchter, Jessica. "On Viewing: The Politics of Looking at the Corpse." *Global Discourse* 7, no. 2–3 (July 3, 2017): 223–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1314908.

———. "Paying Attention to Dead Bodies: The Future of Security Studies?" *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 36–50. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv005.

Ayyıldız, Faruk. "O fotoğraftaki kişinin Kevser Eltürk olduğu anlaşıldı [It was found out that the person in the photograph is Kevser Eltürk]." *Evrensel*, August 16, 2015. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258456/o-fotograftaki-kisinin-kevser-elturk-oldugu-anlasildi.

Baaz, Maria Eriksson, and Maria Stern. *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond*. London ; New York, NY : Uppsala, Sweden: Zed Books, 2013.

Bakiner, Onur. "' These Are Ordinary Things': Regulation of Death under the AKP Regime." In *Turkey's Necropolitical Laboratory: Democracy, Violence and Resistance*, edited by Banu Bargu. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019.

Balzacq, Thierry, ed. *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. PRIO New Security Studies. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2011.

Bargu, Banu. "Another Necropolitics." *Theory & Event* 19, no. 1 (February 19, 2016). https://muse.jhu.edu/article/610222.

Başer, Bahar, and Alpaslan Özerdem. "Conflict Transformation and Asymmetric Conflicts: A Critique of the Failed Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 33, no. 8 (November 17, 2021): 1775–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1657844.

"Basına ve Kamuoyuna Saygıyla Duyurulur. (02.01.2018)." Accessed November 25, 2019. http://www.bitlis.gov.tr/basina-ve-kamuoyuna-saygiyla-duyurulur-02012018.

"Basına ve Kamuoyuna Saygıyla Duyurulur [Announcing the Press and Public with Respect]," January 2, 2018. http://www.bitlis.gov.tr/basina-ve-kamuoyuna-saygiyla-duyurulur-02012018.

Bataille, Georges. *The Accursed Share. 2/3: The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books, 1991.

———. *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939*. Edited by Allan Stoekl. 1st edition. Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1985.

Baysal, Nurcan. "Kürdü Çıplak Soymak [Stripping the Kurd Naked]." *T24*, October 10, 2017. https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/nurcan-baysal/kurdu-ciplak-soymak,18262.

BBC News. “Osama Bin Laden: What Happened to His Body?,” May 2, 2011, sec. South Asia. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13261680.

———. “Welsh Hunger Striker Calls off Kurdish Protest.” *BBC News*, May 26, 2019, sec. Wales. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-48412885.

BBC News Türkçe. “13 kişinin hayatını kaybettiği Kuzey Irak’taki operasyonla ilgili neler biliniyor? [What do we know about the operation in Northern Iraq where 13 people died].” *BBC News Türkçe*, February 14, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-56060642.

———. “‘Bombalı araç, Yüksekdağ ve Önder’in tutulduğu komplekse ulaşacaktı’ [The bombed vehicle was going to arrive where Yuksekdag and Onder was].” *BBC News Türkçe*. Accessed June 14, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/37882868.

———. “Cizre: ‘Üçüncü bir bodrum katında yaralılar var’ iddiası [Cizre: The claim that there are more wounded in a third basement].” *BBC News Türkçe*, February 10, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160210_cizre_ucuncu_bodrum.

———. “Demirtaş’ın Twitter’da paylaştığı fotoğrafla ilgili soruşturma [Investigation for the picture Demirtaş shared on Twitter].” *BBC News Türkçe*, October 5, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151004_demirtas_fotograf_sirnak.

———. “İçişleri Bakanı Soylu: PKK 40 yıl önce de bebek katiliydi, bugün de bebek katili [Minister Soylu: PKK was baby killers 40 years ago, baby killers today].” *BBC News Türkçe*, August 1, 2018, sec. Türkiye. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-45027161.

———. “Lokman Birlik’in sürüklenmesi: İki polis açığa alındı [Dragging Lokman Birlik: Two police officers were dismissed].” *BBC News Türkçe*, October 15, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151012_sirnak_goruntu.

———. “MİT tırları soruşturması: Neler olmuştu? [The case of the MIT trucks: What happened?].” *BBC News Türkçe*, November 27, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/11/151127_mit_tirlari_neler_olmustu.

———. “Sınırda YPG’li cenaze krizi [Crisis of YPG corpses at the border].” *BBC News Türkçe*, August 3, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/08/150803_ypg_cenaze_sinir.

Bedir, Akif. “Mıntıka temizliği [Area cleaning].” *Haber7*, October 16, 2019. https://www.haber7.com/yazarlar/akif-bedir/2906738-mintika-temizligi.

“Belediyelerdeki Kayyum Sistemi ve Mevcut Durum Raporu [The Report on the Trustee Mayor System and the Current Situationin the Municipalities].” T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı, March 18, 2019. https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar/icisleri.gov.tr/IcSite/illeridaresi/Yayinlar/KayyumRaporu/kayyum_nihai_rapor.pdf.

Bellamy, Alex. *Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America’s Post-9/11 Wars*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Bengin, Tunca. "PKK'lı Teröristlerin Inlerine Kış Baskını [Winter Raid on PKK Lairs]." *Milliyet*, October 3, 2019. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tunca-bengin/pkkli-teroristlerin-inlerine-kis-baskini-6045093.

Beşikci, İsmail. *"Hayali Kürdistan"ın Dirilişi [The Resurrection of Kurdistan Imaginary]*. İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı Yayınları, 2013.

Beşikçi, Ismail. *International Colony Kurdistan*. Gomidas Inst, 2016.

Bianet. "Geçmişin 'PKK'liler Sünnetsiz' Söylemi, Burhan Kuzu'yla Yeniden [The Old Discourse of 'Uncircumcised PKK Members' Resurrected with Burhan Kuzu]." *Bianet*. September 8, 2015. https://www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/167447-gecmisin-pkk-liler-sunnetsiz-soylemi-burhan-kuzu-yla-yeniden.

———. "Yüksekdağ: Bir Türk Kadını Olarak Bu Fotoğrafa Sessiz Kalmayı Hakaret Sayarım [Yüksekdağ: As a Turkish Woman I Take It as an Insult to Stay Silent to This Photo]." *Bianet*. February 12, 2016. https://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/172063-yuksekdag-bir-turk-kadini-olarak-bu-fotografa-sessiz-kalmayi-hakaret-sayarim.

Bigo, Didier. "Security : A Field Left Fallow." In *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*, edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal. Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008.

———. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives* 27, no. 1_suppl (February 1, 2002): 63–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105.

Birgün. "2017'ye girerken ekmek, yaşam ve özgürlük için bir yol var [There is a road to bread, life, and freedom on our way to 2017]." *Birgün*, December 27, 2016. https://www.birgun.net/haber/2017-ye-girerken-ekmek-yasam-ve-ozgurluk-icin-bir-yol-var-141006.

"Bitlis İli Tatvan İlçesi Yukarıölek Köyü Yakınlarındaki Mezarlığın (279 Mezar) Ortadan Kaldırılmasına Dair Rapor (The report on destruction of Garzan Cemetery)." Special Report. Bitlis: Insan Haklari Dernegi (Human Rights Association), March 9, 2018. https://www.ihd.org.tr/bitlis-ili-tatvan-ilcesi-yukariolek-koyu-yakinlarindaki-mezarligin-279-mezar-ortadan-kaldirilmasina-dair-rapor/.

Bivins, Alyssa. "Tracing the Conceptual Genealogy of Kurdistan as International Colony." *Middle East Research and Information Project*, August 19, 2020. https://merip.org/2020/08/tracing-the-conceptual-genealogy-of-kurdistan-as-international-colony/.

Bloch, Maurice, and Jonathan Parry, eds. *Death and the Regeneration of Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511607646.

Boukalas, Christos. "Government by Experts: Counterterrorism Intelligence and Democratic Retreat." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5, no. 2 (August 1, 2012): 277–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.703809.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812507.

Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke. "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology." *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (January 1, 2006): 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa.

Bulur, Sertaç, and Orhan Onur Gemici. "HDP'li Vekiller Terörist Cenazelerinin Baş Aktörü Oldu [HDP Deputies Became the Leading Actor of Terrorist Funerals]." *Anadolu Ajansı*, January 31, 2019. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/hdpli-vekiller-terorist-cenazelerinin-bas-aktoru-oldu/1379781.

Butler, Judith. "Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions." *The Journal of Philosophy* 86, no. 11 (1989): 601–7.

———. *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* Reprint edition. London ; New York: Verso, 2010.

———. *Gender Trouble*. 1 edition. New York: Routledge, 1990.

———. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. Reprint edition. London ; New York: Verso, 2006.

———. "Sexual Inversions." In *Foucault and the Critique of Institutions*, edited by John D Caputo and Mark Yount. University Park (Pa.): Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.

———. *Undoing Gender*. New York ; London: Routledge, 2004.

Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory." *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 253–76.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Campbell, David. "Horrific Blindness: Images of Death in Contemporary Media." *Journal for Cultural Research* 8, no. 1 (2004): 55–74.

Carver, Terrel. "'Public Man' and the Critique of Masculinities." *Political Theory* 24, no. 4 (November 1, 1996): 673–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591796024004004.

Cavarero, Adriana. *Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence*. Translated by William McCuaig. Columbia University Press, 2008.

Chambers, Samuel A. "Normative Violence after 9/11: Rereading the Politics of Gender Trouble." *New Political Science* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140601170792.

"Cizre Gözlem Raporu [Cizre Observation Report]." Special Report. Cizre: Insan Haklari Dernegi (Human Rights Association), March 31, 2016. https://tihv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Cizre-G%C3%B6zlem-Raporu_31-Mart2016.pdf.

CNN Türk. "PKK'daki çocuk ve kadın istismarını anlattı [He told about sexual exploitation of women and children in PKK]." *CNN Türk*, December 11, 2018. https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/pkkdaki-cocuk-ve-kadin-istismarini-anlatti.

Collier, Jamie. "Cyber Security Assemblages: A Framework for Understanding the Dynamic and Contested Nature of Security Provision." *Politics and Governance* 6, no. 2 (June 11, 2018): 13–21. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i2.1324.

Connor, Jon Michael. "Forensics Brings New Ways to Fight Counterinsurgency Warfare." *U.S Army* (blog), January 8, 2019. https://www.army.mil/article/215780/forensics_brings_new_ways_to_fight_counterinsurgency_warfare.

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. The Appeal of Ali Kandil. Appeal Number: 2014/13224 , November 19, 2019. https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2014/13224

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. The Appeal of Tuncer Bakırhan. Appeal Number: 2017/28478, October 10, 2018. https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2017/28478

Cramer, Christopher. *Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries*. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2006.

Crossland, Zoë. "The Agency of the Dead." In *Distributed Agency*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190457204.003.0019.

Cumhuriyet. "Görüntü Cizre'ye ait değil diyen Şırnak valisine Sarıyıldız'dan fotoğraflı yanıt [A visual response from Sarıyıldız to the governor who claimed the visual is not from Cizre]." *Cumhuriyet*, February 16, 2016. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/goruntu-cizreye-ait-degil-diyen-sirnak-valisine-sariyildizdan-fotografli-yanit-480075.

———. "'PKK'nın arkasında büyük dış güçler var' [There are major foreign powers behind PKK]." *Cumhuriyet*, June 12, 2010. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/pkknin-arkasinda-buyuk-dis-gucler-var-153304.

Çilem Küçükkeleş. Parliamentary Inquiry No: 439 (Ankara: Grand National Assembly of Turkey, August 19,2015). https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d25/7/7-1580s.pdf

Darıcı, Haydar, and Serra Hakyemez. "Neither Civilian nor Combatant: Weaponised Spaces and Spatialised Bodies in Cizre." In *Turkey's Necropolitical Laboratory: Democracy, Violence and Resistance*, edited by Banu Bargu. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019.

De León, Jason. *The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail*. California Series in Public Anthropology 36. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015.

Debrix, François, and Alexander D. Barder. "Nothing to Fear but Fear: Governmentality and the Biopolitical Production of Terror." *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 398–413. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00083.x.

DeCaroli, Steven. "Boundary Stones: Giorgio Agamben and the Field of Sovereignty." In *On Agamben: Sovereignty and Life*, edited by Steven DeCaroli and Matthew Calarco, 2007.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Illustrated edition. New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 2009.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. *Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. 002 Edition. Minneapolis: UNIV OF MINNESOTA PR, 1987.

———. *What Is Philosophy?* European Perspectives. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Pr, 1994.

Demirören Haber Ajansi. "Eşcinsel sapık ilişkiler başladı! PKK'dan kaçan kadın teröristin itirafı [Gay pervert relationships started! Confessions of a woman who escaped PKK]." *Demirören Haber Ajansi*, March 18, 2019. https://www.internethaber.com/escinsel-sapik-iliskiler-basladi-pkkdan-kacan-kadin-teroristin-itirafi-2008092h.htm.

Dicle Haber Ajansi. "'Kadın Bedenini Teşhir Eden Devlet Kendini Çırılçıplak Soyuyor' [The State That Displays Women's Bodies Is Stripping Itself Naked]." *Dicle Haber Ajansi*, February 14, 2016. http://www.diclehaber.com/tr/news/content/view/499673?from=1251254157.

Dijk, Teun A. van. "Discourse Semantics and Ideology:" *Discourse & Society*, July 26, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926595006002006.

Dijk, Teun Adrianus van. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Dimensions of Discourse*. Academic Press, 1985.

Diken. "AKP'li Dağ Böyle Okudu: Hatun Tuğluk'un Cenazesine Saldırı 'bayat Operasyon' [That's How AKP Deputy Dag Read It: Hatun Tugluk Incident Is a Banal Conspiracy]." *Diken*, September 17, 2017, sec. Aktüel. http://www.diken.com.tr/akpli-dag-boyle-okudu-hatun-tuglukun-cenazesine-saldiri-bayat-operasyon/.

———. "'Bu Zulmü Kabul Etmeyin': Habur'da 13 YPG'linin Cenazesi Dört Gündür Bekletiliyor ['Don't Accept This Cruelty': Dead Bodies of 13 YPG Fighters Have Been Waiting at Habur for Four Days]." *Diken*, July 30, 2015. https://www.diken.com.tr/bu-zulmu-kabul-etmeyin-haburda-13-ypglinin-cenazesi-dort-gundur-bir-tirin-icinde-bekletiliyor/.

———. "Hacı Birlik'in Cansız Bedeninin Karakol Önüne Getirildiği Görüntüler Ortaya Çıktı [New Visuals Show Birlik's Dead Body Brought to the Police Station]." *Diken*, October 6, 2015. https://www.diken.com.tr/haci-birlikin-cansiz-bedeninin-karakol-onune-getirildigi-goruntuler-ortaya-cikti/.

———. "IŞİD'in Öldürdüğü 13 YPG'linin Cenazesi Altı Gündür Ailelerine Verilmiyor [13 YPG Fighters' Bodies, Killed by the IS, Have Not Been given to the Families for Six Days]." *Diken*, August 1, 2015. https://www.diken.com.tr/isidin-oldurdugu-13-ypglinin-cenazesi-alti-gundur-ailelerine-verilmiyor/.

Dillon, M, and A Neal. *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4323985.

Dillon, Michael. "Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence." *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 7–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00002.x.

Dişkaya, Neşet. "İtirafçı PKK'lıdan Kandil hikayeleri [Kandil stories from a confessor]." *HaberTürk*, October 11, 2012. https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/784253-itirafci-pkklidan-kandil-hikayeleri.

Dixit, Priya. “Let the Dead Speak! Mobility, Visibility and (in)Security in Qatar.” *Critical Studies on Security* 3, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 112–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1005419.

Does, Antonia. “Securitization Theory.” In *The Construction of the Maras : Between Politicization and Securitization*. ECahiers de l’Institut. Genève: Graduate Institute Publications, 2013. http://books.openedition.org/iheid/719.

Downie Jr, Leonard Downie. “Ulster Prepares for Sands’ IRA Funeral.” *Washington Post*, May 6, 1981. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/05/06/ulster-prepares-for-sands-ira-funeral/1bcfac65-8b2a-4ddd-a49f-72dd44104095/.

Elden, Stuart. “Strategies for Waging Peace: Foucault as Collaborateur.” In *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*, edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

Emek Ve Adalet Platformu. “KŞKMİ: ‘Ekin Wan Savaşın Çıplak Yüzüdür’ [KSKMI: "Ekin Wan is the Naked Face of the War].” *Emek ve Adalet Platformu*, August 23, 2015. https://www.emekveadalet.org/alinti/ekin-wan-savasin-ciplak-yuzudur/.

Ensonhaber. “Şırnak’ta PKK mezarlığı bombalandı [PKK cemetery in Şırnak was bombed].” *Ensonhaber*, June 13, 2017, sec. Video Haber. https://www.ensonhaber.com/video/sirnakta-pkk-mezarligi-bombalandi.

Erakat, Noura. “Extrajudicial Executions from the U.S to Palestine.” *Just Security*, August 7, 2020. https://www.justsecurity.org/71901/extrajudicial-executions-from-the-united-states-to-palestine/.

Ercan, Harun. “Is Hope More Precious than Victory?: The Failed Peace Process and Urban Warfare in the Kurdish Region of Turkey.” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 118, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 111–27. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-7281636.

Erin, Steuter, and Wills Deborah. “Discourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror.” *Global Media Journal : Canadian Edition* 2 (January 1, 2009).

Erzurum Gazetesi. “Öldürülen Töreristin Kolunda Haç Dövmesi Çıktı [Tattoo of Cross Found on the Dead Terrorist’s Arm].” *Erzurum Gazetesi*, March 28, 2018. http://www.erzurumgazetesi.com.tr/haber/Oldurulen-toreristin-kolunda-hac-dovmesi-cikti/115118.

Esen, Berk, and Şebnem Gümüşçü. “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey.” *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 9 (September 1, 2016): 1581–1606. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732.

Evin, Mehveş. “Soyulmuş Ölü Kadın Bedeni, Neyin Intikamı? [Naked Dead Body of a Woman Is the Revenge of What?].” *Diken*, February 12, 2016. http://www.diken.com.tr/soyulmus-olu-kadin-bedeni-neyin-intikami/.

Evrensel. “Cenazeleri 10 gün boyunca bekletilen gerillaları on binler uğurladı [Tens of thousands said farewell to the guerillas waited at the border for 10 days].” *Evrensel*, August 5, 2015.

https://www.evrensel.net/haber/257653/cenazeleri-10-gun-boyunca-bekletilen-gerillalari-on-binler-ugurladi.

———. “Cizre’de Öldürülen Duymak’ın Eşi: 5 Kilo Kemik Vererek, ‘Al Bu Senin Eşin’ Dediler [Duymak’s Wife: They Gave Me 5 Kilos of Bones and Said ’Here’s Your Husband’].” *Evrensel*. February 26, 2016. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/273580/cizrede-oldurulen-duymakin-esi-5-kilo-kemik-vererek-al-bu-senin-esin-dediler.

———. “Ekin Wan için çıplak protesto [A naked protest for Ekin Wan].” *Evrensel*, August 23, 2015. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258876/ekin-wan-icin-ciplak-protesto.

———. “HDP Kapatma Davası Iddianamesinin Tam Metni [The Full Script of the Bill of Indictment to Close HDP].” *Evrensel*, June 21, 2021. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/436031/hdp-kapatma-davasi-iddianamesinin-tam-metni.

———. “Nusaybinli kadınlar: Ekin Wan direnişimizin çıplak halidir [Women of Nusaybin: Ekin Wan is the nakedness of our resistance].” *Evrensel*, August 16, 2015. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258484/nusaybinli-kadinlar-ekin-wan-direnisimizin-ciplak-halidir?a=bfa40.

———. “Öldürüldükten sonra çıplak halde teşhir edilen kadın bedeni için önerge [Parliamentary question for the female body that was displayed naked after she was killed].” *Evrensel*, February 15, 2016. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/272679/oldurulduktan-sonra-ciplak-halde-teshir-edilen-kadin-bedeni-icin-onerge?a=78c75.

———. “Tutuklu Mehmet Sevinç yaşamını yitirdi [Prisoner Mehmet Sevinç lost his life].” *Evrensel*, April 7, 2022. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/458861/tutuklu-mehmet-sevinc-yasamini-yitirdi.

Fairclough, Norman. *Discourse and Social Change*. New edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.

———. *Language and Power*. London; New York: Longman, 1989.

———. *Media Discourse*. 1st Edition edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1995.

Faison, Seth. “Lirong Journal; Tibetans, and Vultures, Keep Ancient Burial Rite.” *The New York Times*, July 3, 1999, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/03/world/lirong-journal-tibetans-and-vultures-keep-ancient-burial-rite.html.

Fischoff, Baruch, Scott Atran, and Noam Fischoff. “Counting Casualties: A Framework for Respectful, Useful Records.” *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 31, no. 1 (February 2007): 1–19.

Fırat, Gökçe. “Dinsizin Hakkindan Imansiz Gelir [An Old Poacher Makes the Best Gamekeeper].” *Türk Solu*, September 28, 2014.

Fontein, Joost. “Remaking the Dead, Uncertainty and the Torque of Human Materials in Northern Zimbabwe.” In *Governing the Dead: Sovereignty and the Politics of Dead Bodies*, edited by Finn Stepputat, 114–40. Manchester University Press, 2020. https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526151599/9781526151599.00016.xml.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.

———. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. 1st American Ed edition. New York: Vintage, 1980.

———. *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*. Translated by David Macey. First edition. New York: Picador, 2003.

———. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978 - 79*. 1st pbk ed., [Repr.]. Lectures at the Collège de France. New York: Picador, 2010.

———. *The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1980.

———. "Two Lectures." In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Pantheon Books, 1980.

Foundation Institut Kurde de Paris. "The Kurdish population," January 12, 2017. https://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/the-kurdish-population-1232551004.

Gavaghan, Julian. "Why Kobane Is the Kurds' Stalingrad and How ISIS Fight like the Nazis." *Yahoo News*, October 27, 2014. http://uk.news.yahoo.com/why-kobane-is-the-kurds--stalingrad-and-how-isis-fight-like-the-nazis-180036523.html.

Gazete Karınca. "Cezaevinde bir ölüm daha: Tutuklu Mehmet Sevinç yaşamını yitirdi [Another death in the prison: Prisoner Mehmet Seviç lost his life]." *Gazete Karınca*, April 7, 2022, sec. Cezaevleri. https://gazetekarinca.com/cezaevinde-bir-olum-daha-tutuklu-mehmet-sevinc-yasamini-yitirdi/.

Gazete Patika. "İnsanlığın Belleğine Nakşedilen Bir Resim: Hacı Lokman Birlik [An Image Carved on the Humanity's Memory]." *Gazete Patika*, October 4, 2021. https://gazetepatika16.com/insanligin-bellegine-naksedilen-bir-resim-haci-lokman-birlik-24344.html.

Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts*. Princeton University Press, 2009.

Gibson, Margaret. "Death and Mourning in Technologically Mediated Culture." *Health Sociology Review* 16, no. 5 (December 1, 2007): 415–24. https://doi.org/10.5172/hesr.2007.16.5.415.

Gordon, Avery F. *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*. New University of Minnesota Press edition. Minneapolis London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.

Green, Michael K. "Images of Native Americans in Advertising: Some Moral Issues." *Journal of Business Ethics* 12, no. 4 (April 1, 1993): 323–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01666536.

Gregory, Thomas. "Civilian Casualties, Non-Combatant Immunity and the Politics of Killing: Review Essay." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 187–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1175271.

———. “Dismembering the Dead: Violence, Vulnerability and the Body in War.” *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 944–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115618244.

Griffin, Jessika O. “‘We Are the Walking Dead’ : Zombie Spaces, Mobility and the Potential for Security in Zone One and The Walking Dead,” May 5, 2012. http://cardinalscholar.bsu.edu/handle/123456789/196002.

Grosz, E. A. *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*. Theories of Representation and Difference. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Haberler. “MHP’li Büyükataman: "Arkadaşı Demirtaş, Dostu Kılıçdaroğlu Olandan Milletin Menfaatine Olacak Bir... [Büyükataman from MHP...].” *Haberler*, May 1, 2019, sec. Politika. https://www.haberler.com/politika/mhp-li-buyukataman-arkadasi-demirtas-dostu-12003655-haberi/.

HaberTürk. “HDP Eş Genel Başkanı Selahattin Demirtaş Muharrem Sarıkaya’ya konuştu: Seçimi AİHM’e götürürüz [HDP’s Co-Chair Demirtaş spoke to Muharrem Sarıkaya: We will take the election to ECHR].” *HaberTürk*, May 20, 2015, sec. gundem. https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1080414-selahattin-demirtas-secimi-aihme-gotururuz.

———. “PKK’lılar sünnetsiz çıktı [It turned out that PKK members were uncircumcised].” *HaberTürk*, February 5, 2008, sec. yasam. https://www.haberturk.com/yasam/haber/54386-pkklilar-sunnetsiz-cikti.

Hackman, Rose. “‘Necrophilia Legislator’ on a Crusade to Outlaw Loophole of Arcane Era.” *The Guardian*, September 4, 2015, sec. Life and style. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/sep/04/necrophilia-laws-massachusetts-loophole-aaron-vega.

Halkların Demokratik Partisi. “Beştaş: Kevser Eltürk’e yapılanlar IŞİD barbarlığının simgesi haline gelmiş uygulamalardır [Beştaş: What happened to Kevser Eltürk are practices that have become the symbol of the IS’ barbarism].” Accessed June 7, 2022. https://hdp.org.tr/tr/bestas-kevser-elturk-e-yapilanlar-isid-barbarliginin-simgesi-haline-gelmis-uygulamalardir/6301.

Halkların Demokratik Partisi. “Güven, IŞİD’e karşı savaşta yaşamını yitiren 23 YPG’linin cenazesinin sınırda bekletilmesini meclis gündemine taşıdı [Güven brought the issue of 23 YPG fighters who died in the war against IS waiting at the border to the parliament].” Accessed April 20, 2022. https://hdp.org.tr/tr/guven-isid-e-karsi-savasta-yasamini-yitiren-23-ypg-linin-cenazesinin-sinirda-bekletilmesini-meclis-gundemine-tasidi/6293.

Hamdar, Abir. “The Syrian Corpse: The Politics of Dignity in Visual and Media Representations of the Syrian Revolution.” *Journal for Cultural Research* 22, no. 1 (2018): 73–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/14797585.2018.1429083.

Hansen, Lene. “Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis*.” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (January 19, 2011). https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110388593.

Harding, Vanessa. “Burial of the Plague Dead in Early Modern London.” *Centre for Metropolitan History Working Papers Series* 1 (1993): 53–64.

Harding, Wendy. “Spectacle Lynching and Textual Responses.” *Miranda*, no. 15 (September 18, 2017). https://doi.org/10.4000/miranda.10493.

Haritaworn, Jin, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco. *Queer Necropolitics*. Routledge, 2014.

Harris, Emily. “Israel’s Return Of Palestinian Bodies Is Fraught With Emotion And Politics.” *NPR*, January 5, 2016, sec. Conflict Zones. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/05/462037563/israels-return-of-palestinian-bodies-is-fraught-with-emotion-and-politics.

Hawar News. “Turkish State Continues to Kill Detainees in Prisons.” *Hawar News*, April 7, 2022. http://hawarnews.com/en/haber/turkish-state-continues-to-kill-detainees-in-prisons-h29966.html.

Hearty, Kevin. “Spoiling Through Performative Nonviolence: Ritualistic Funerary Practice as a Violent Dissident Irish Republican (VDR) Spoiling Tactic.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 42, no. 6 (June 3, 2019): 581–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1402430.

Heath-Kelly, Charlotte. *Death and Security: Memory and Mortality at the Bombsite*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016.

Hertz, Robert. *Death and the Right Hand*. 1st edition. London: Routledge, 2006.

Holmes, Dave, and Jean Daniel Jacob. *Power and the Psychiatric Apparatus: Repression, Transformation and Assistance*. Routledge, 2016.

Howell, Alison, and Melanie Richter-Montpetit. “Is Securitization Theory Racist? Civilizationism, Methodological Whiteness, and Antiblack Thought in the Copenhagen School.” *Security Dialogue* 51, no. 1 (February 1, 2020): 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010619862921.

———. “Racism in Foucauldian Security Studies: Biopolitics, Liberal War, and the Whitewashing of Colonial and Racial Violence.” *International Political Sociology* 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 2–19. https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/oly031.

Human Rights Watch. “Turkey: State Blocks Probes of Southeast Killings,” July 11, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/11/turkey-state-blocks-probes-southeast-killings.

Hürriyet. “Eski Diyarbakır Belediye Başkanı Selçuk Mızraklı’nın Cezası Belli Oldu [The Verdict of Former Diyarbakir Mayor Selçuk Mızraklı].” *Hürriyet*, March 9, 2020. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-haberi-eski-diyarbakir-belediye-baskani-selcuk-mizraklinin-cezasi-belli-oldu-41464787.

———. “HDP’li Taşdemir terörist cenazesine katıldı [HDP deputy Taşdemir attended a terrorist funeral].” *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2016, sec. gundem. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/galeri-hdpli-tasdemir-terorist-cenazesine-katildi-40097047.

———. “PKK’da sapık ilişki [Perverted relationships in PKK].” *Hürriyet*, January 29, 1998. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pkkda-sapik-iliski-39004310.

İhlas Haber Ajansı. “Seks karşılığı PKK’ya baskın istihbaratı [Intel for PKK in exchange of sex].” *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, November 18, 2009. https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-seks-karsiligi-pkkya-baskin-istihbarati-97013/.

———. “Teröristten yoz ilişki itirafı [A terrorist’s confessions of a perverted relationship].” *İhlas Haber Ajansı*, November 27, 2012. https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-teroristten-yoz-iliski-itirafi-252262/.

İleri Haber. “Muş valiliği Ekin Van’a işkenceyi reddetmedi [The Mayoral Office of Muş did not deny the torture on Ekin Van].” *İleri Haber*, August 16, 2015. https://ilerihaber.org/icerik/mus-valiligi-ekin-van39a-iskenceyi-reddetmedi-20350.html.

Ilhan, Merve. “Karadeniz’de PKK leşleri! [PKK’s carcasses in the Black Sea].” *Samsun Gazetesi*, July 15, 2018. https://www.samsungazetesi.com/samsun-haber/son-dakika-karadeniz-de-pkk-lesleri-h1121422.html.

Islekel, Ege Selin. “Absent Death: Necropolitics and Technologies of Mourning.” *PhiloSOPHIA* 7, no. 2 (2017): 337–55. https://doi.org/10.1353/phi.2017.0027.

Human Rights Watch. “Israel: Release Body of Slain Palestinian,” September 14, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/14/israel-release-body-slain-palestinian.

Jabri, Vivienne. “Michel Foucault’s Analytics of War: The Social, the International, and the Racial.” *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 67–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00005.x.

Jackson, Brian A. “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a ‘Long War’: The British Experience in Northern Ireland.” *Military Review*, Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment, LXXXVII, no. 1 (February 2007). https://marshallcenterciss.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16378coll5/id/439.

Jakobs, Günther. “Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsgutsverletzung” 97, no. 4 (January 1, 1985): 751–85. https://doi.org/10.1515/zstw.1985.97.4.751.

Jongerden, Joost. “Gender Equality and Radical Democracy: Contractions and Conflicts in Relation to the ‘New Paradigm’ within the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).” *Anatoli. De l’Adriatique à La Caspienne. Territoires, Politique, Sociétés*, no. 8 (October 1, 2017): 233–56. https://doi.org/10.4000/anatoli.618.

Kamer, Hatice. “HDP’li Birlik: Sürüklenen akrabam yaralı ele geçirildikten sonra infaz edildi [Deputy Birlik: My relative was caught injured and later executed].” *BBC News Türkçe*. October 6, 2015, sec. Haberler. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151005_sirnak_leyla_birlik.

Karadaş, Yusuf. “Dağ Türkleri [Mountain Turks].” *Evrensel*, February 20, 2017. https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/78521/dag-turkleri.

Karakaşlı, Karin. “‘Cizre halkından güç almaya gidiyorum’ ["I’m going to get strength from the people of Cizre].” *Agos*, September 26, 2015. https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/12849/cizre-halkindan-guc-almaya-gidiyorum.

Kayhan Pusane, Özlem. “Turkey’s Military Victory over the PKK and Its Failure to End the PKK Insurgency.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 5 (September 3, 2015): 727–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2014.979801.

Kazaz, Gozde. "İHD'den sınırda bekletilen cenazeler için uluslararası çağrı [International call from IHD for the dead bodies waiting at the border]." *Agos*, August 4, 2015. http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/12366/ihd-den-sinirda-bekletilen-cenazeler-icin-uluslararasi-cagri.

Keskin, Eren. "Kader Kevser Eltürk (Ekin Van) Olayına Dair İnceleme Raporu [Examination Report of the Kader Kevsel Elturk Incident]." Special Report. Insan Haklari Dernegi [Human Rights Association], September 4, 2015. https://www.ihd.org.tr/kader-kevser-elturk-ekin-van-olayina-dair-inceleme-raporu/.

Khan, Tehmoor. "The Sri Lankan Soldiers 'Whose Hearts Turned to Stone.'" *Channel 4 News*, July 27, 2011. https://www.channel4.com/news/the-sri-lankan-soldiers-whose-hearts-turned-to-stone.

Kırmızıtaş, Hasan. "Terör örgütlerinin bilinmeyen yüzü [The unknown faces of terrorist organizations]." *Milliyet*. July 24, 2008. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/teror-orgutlerinin-bilinmeyen-yuzu-970666.

König, Güray Çağlar. "Dil ve Cins: Kadın ve Erkeklerin Dil Kullanımı." *Dilbilim Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 1 (February 1, 1992): 25–36.

Kristensen, Benedikte Møller. *The Proper Funeral: Death, Landscape and Power among the Duha Tuvinians of Northern Mongolia*. *Governing the Dead*. Manchester University Press, 2020. https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526151599/9781526151599.00012.xml.

Kristeva, Julia. *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Translated by Leon Roudiez. Reprint edition. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Kuray, Zeynep. "Mürşitpınar'da bekletilen cenaze sayısı 20'ye yükseldi [The number of corpses waiting at Mürşitpınar increased to 20]." *ANF News*, August 11, 2015. https://anfturkce.com/kurdIstan/mursitpinar-da-bekletilen-cenaze-sayisi-20-ye-yukseldi-52360.

Lacan, Jacques. *Desire and Its Interpretation: The Seminar of Jacque Lacan, Book VI*. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Polity, 2019.

———. *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*. Translated by Bruce Fink. 1st edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007.

———. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Psychoses*. Translated by Jacques-Alain Miller and Russell Grigg. Reprint edition. New York London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Lacina, Bethany, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths." *European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie* 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 145–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6.

Laurier, Joanne. "The Kill Team: Are US Military Atrocities in Afghanistan Just the Work of a Few 'Bad Apples'?" *World Socialist Web Site*, January 10, 2020. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/01/10/kill-j10.html.

Leylak, Ali. "PKK mitingi gibi terörist cenazesi [A rally like terrorist funeral]." *Milliyet*. May 5, 2012. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/pkk-mitingi-gibi-terorist-cenazesi-1536666.

———. “PKK’lı teröriste miting gibi cenaze töreni [A rally like funeral for a PKK terrorist].” *Milliyet*, August 27, 2008. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/galeri/pkkli-teroriste-miting-gibi-cenaze-toreni-450968.

———. “Terörist cenazesi PKK gösterisine döndü [Terrorist funeral turned into a PKK rally].” *Milliyet*, June 26, 2010. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/terorist-cenazesi-pkk-gosterisine-dondu-1255763.

Loizidou, Elena. “Butler and Life: Law, Sovereignty, Power.” In *Judith Butler’s Precarious Politics: Critical Encounters*, edited by Terrell Carver and Samuel Allen Chambers. London ; New York: Routledge, 2008.

Mackey, Robert. “Turkey to Investigate Images of Dead Kurdish Man Being Dragged.” *The New York Times*, October 5, 2015, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/world/europe/turkey-to-investigate-images-of-dead-kurdish-man-being-dragged.html.

Manisalı, Erol. “Dincilik, PKK ve emperyalizm sarmalındaki Türkiye [Turkey encircled by fundamentalism, PKK, and imperialism].” *Cumhuriyet*, February 7, 2017. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/erol-manisali/dincilik-pkk-ve-emperyalizm-sarmalindaki-turkiye-671767.

Marcus, Aliza. *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, 2009. http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9780814796115.

M’bembe, Achille. “Necropolitics.” *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.

McSorley, Kevin, ed. *War and the Body: Militarisation, Practice and Experience*. First issued in paperback. War, Politics and Experience. London New York: Routledge, 2015.

Merli, Claudia, and Trudi Buck. “Forensic Identification and Identity Politics in 2004 Post-Tsunami Thailand: Negotiating Dissolving Boundaries.” *Human Remains and Violence: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2015): 3–22. https://doi.org/10.7227/HRV.1.1.2.

Merwe, H. van der. “Violence as a Form of Communication: Making Sense of Violence in South Africa.” *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 3 (January 1, 2013): 65-84–84.

Mezapotamya Ajansı. “Garzan Mezarlığı: Tarihe ve Belleğe Saldırı [Garzan Cemetery: An Attack to History and Memory].” *Mezapotamya Ajansı*, December 18, 2021. http://mezopotamyaajansi35.com/GUNCEL/content/view/http%3A%2F%2Fmezopotamyaajansi35.com%2FGUNCEL%2Fcontent%2Fview%2F156069.

Milliyet. “Bakan Soylu: Afrin, PKK Tarafından Dünyanın En Büyük Uyuşturucu Merkezi Haline Getiriliyordu [Minister Soylu: PKK Was Making Afrin the Biggest Drug Center in the World].” *Milliyet*, January 24, 2020. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/bakan-soylu-afrin-pkk-tarafindan-dunyanin-en-buyuk-uyusturucu-merkezi-haline-getiriliyordu-6129449.

———. “‘Bazı PKK’lılar sünnetsiz’ [Some PKK members are uncircumcised].” *Milliyet*, August 21, 2010. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/bazi-pkk-lilar-sunnetsiz-1279153.

———. “Bildiriyi İmzalayan Akademisyenlere Tepki [Reactions to the Academics who Signed the Petition].” *Milliyet*, January 18, 2016. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/bursa/bildiriyi-imzalayan-akademisyenlere-tepki-11168645.

———. “Çarpık İlişkiler Örgütü Pkk [PKK: An Organization of Pervert Relationships].” *Milliyet*, December 12, 2018. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/carpik-iliskiler-orgutu-pkk-ankara-yerelhaber-3210965/.

———. “Kayyum nedir, neden atanır, görevleri nelerdir? [What is a trustee mayor, why are they appointed, what are their duties?].” *Milliyet*, September 11, 2016. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/kayyum-nedir-neden-atanir-gorevleri-nelerdir-2309792.

———. “PKK’nın Kampı ve Sözde Mezarlık Olarak Kullandığı Mühimmat Deposu Yerlebir Edildi [The Armory That PKK Used as a Base Camp and so-Called Cemetery Was Destroyed].” *Milliyet*, December 10, 2015. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/sirnak/pkk-nin-kampi-ve-sozde-mezarlik-olarak-kullandigi-muhimmat-deposu-yerle-bir-edildi-11105938.

———. “Son Dakika: Valinin Su Içtiği Çeşmenin 700 Metre Yakınında Üslenmişler [Flash: They Built a Base 700 Meter from the Well That the Governor Uses].” *Milliyet*, March 27, 2018. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/son-dakika-valinin-su-ictigi-cesmenin-700-metre-yakininda-uslenmisler-2635378.

Münkler, Herfried. *The New Wars*. Polity, 2005.

Murray, Stuart J. “Thanatopolitics: Reading in Agamben a Rejoinder to Biopolitical Life.” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 5, no. 2 (June 2008): 203–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420802024350.

Myrttinen, Henri. “Languages of Castration - Male Genital Mutillation in Conflict and Its Embedded Messages.” In *Sexual Violence Against Men in Global Politics*, edited by Marysia Zalewski, Paula Drumond, Elisabeth Prugl, and Maria Stern, n.d.

Nail, Thomas. “What Is an Assemblage?” *SubStance* 46, no. 1 (2017): 21–37.

Najjar, Farah. “The Palestinian Flag: A Target for ‘Erasure’ by Israeli Forces.” *Al Jazeera*, May 13, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/13/why-is-israel-afraid-of-the-palestinian-flag.

Nicholson, Judith A., and Mimi Sheller. “Race and the Politics of Mobility—Introduction.” *Transfers* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 4–11. https://doi.org/10.3167/TRANS.2016.060102.

Nicky, Rousseau. “Death and Dismemberment: The Body and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare in Apartheid South Africa1.” In *Destruction and Human Remains*. Manchester University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719096020.003.0009.

NTV. “PKK sapık ve iğrenç bir ideoloji üzerine kurulu [PKK is based on a perveredt and disgusting ideology].” *NTV*, December 24, 2011. https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/pkk-sapik-ve-igrenc-bir-ideoloji-uzerine-kurulu,X-zZ28DDaEqWgpygZBpI3g.

Öcalan, Abdullah. *Democratic Confederalism*. Cologne: International Initiative Ed., 2013.

———. *Liberating Life: Women’s Revolution*. Cologne: International Initiative Ed., 2013.

OdaTv. “Tartışma Yaratan Kareyi Sabah Doğruladı [Sabah Confirmed the Controversial Image].” *OdaTv*, October 4, 2015. https://www.odatv4.com/siyaset/tartisma-yaratan-kare-0410151200-82565.

Öksüz, Hazal. “Mersin Kadın Platformu: ‘Ekin Wan Çırılçıplak Onurumuzdur’ [Mersin Women’s Platform: "Ekin Wan Is Our Naked Honor].” *Bianet*, August 18, 2015. https://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/166929-mersin-kadin-platformu-ekin-wan-cirilciplak-onurumuzdur.

Ong, Aihwa, and Stephen J. Collier, eds. *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

Örsan, K. Öymen. “Türkiye’de kim anti-emperyalist? [Who is anti-imperialist in Turkey].” *Cumhuriyet*, November 4, 2019. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/orsan-k-oymen/turkiyede-kim-anti-emperyalist-1573286.

Özdil, Yılmaz. “Sayın kaçakçı [Dear Smuggler].” *Hürriyet*, January 6, 2012, sec. yilmaz-ozdil. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/sayin-kacakci-19614987.

Özpek, Burak Bilgehan. *The Peace Process between Turkey and the Kurds: Anatomy of a Failure*. London: Routledge, 2017. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315122182.

Özsoy, Hişyar. “Between Gift and Taboo: Death and the Negotiation of National Identity and Sovereignty in the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey.” The University of Texas at Austin, 2010. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-854/OZSOY-DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=2.

Philipose, Liz. “The Politics of Pain and the Uses of Torture.” *Signs* 32, no. 4 (2007): 1047–71. https://doi.org/10.1086/513022.

“PKK/KCK Terör Örgütünün Suriye Kolu: PYD-YPG [PYD/YPG: The Syrian Branch of the PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization].” Strategic Reports. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, May 2017. https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar/icisleri.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/deneme/YAYINLAR/%C4%B0%C3%87ER%C4%B0K/pyd_arapca.pdf.

Polat, Fatih. “Cizre Ön Inceleme Raporu: Bodrumda Yanmış Kemikler, Yanmamış Yünler [Cizre Preliminary Observation Report: Burnt Bones, Unburnt Wools in the Basement].” *Evrensel*, March 7, 2016. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/274330/cizre-on-inceleme-raporu-bodrumda-yanmis-kemikler-yanmamis-yunler.

Posel, Deborah, and Pamila Gupta. “The Life of the Corpse: Framing Reflections and Questions.” *African Studies* 68, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 299–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/00020180903381248.

Puar, Jasbir. *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007.

Rabar, Ruwayda Mustafah. “What Is the Kurdish Question?” *OpenDemocracy*, September 23, 2011. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/what-is-kurdish-question/.

Radikal. "Dersim gerçeği [The Truth of Dersim]." *Radikal*, November 19, 2011. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/dersim_gercegi-1070007/.

Ramoğlu, Ersin. "Kusursuz Fırtına [The Perfect Storm]." *Sabah*, August 20, 2015. https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/bolgeler/ramoglu/2015/08/20/kusursuz-firtina.

Republic of Turkey Association of Veterans and Martyr Families. "Apo Bebek Katili Bir Teröristtir, Ona Güzelleme Yapan Da Teröristtir [Apo Is a Baby Killer Terrorist, so Is Anyone Supporting Him]," 2014. https://www.gaziler.org.tr/?/0/haber_detay/1941.

Republic of Turkey, Governor's Office of Şırnak. "Basın Duyurusu [Press Release]," February 11, 2016. http://www.sirnak.gov.tr/basin-duyurusu-11022016.

Republic of Turkey, Governor's Office of Tunceli. "BOYNUNDA VE ELİNDE HAÇ İŞARETİ OLAN TURUNCU LİSTEDEKİ PKK'LI TERÖRİST TUNCELİ'DE ÖLÜ OLARAK ELE GEÇİRİLDİ [PKK Terrorist on the Orange List Who Had Cross on His Neck and Hand Was Captured Dead]," March 27, 2018. http://www.tunceli.gov.tr/boynunda-ve-elinde-hac-isareti-olan-turuncu-listedeki-pkkli-terorist-tuncelide-olu-olarak-ele-gecirildi.

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior. "Bakanımız Sn. Soylu Terörle Mücadele Şube Müdürleri Değerlendirme Çalıştayına Katıldı [Our Minister Soylu Joined the Workshop on Counterterrorism]," January 11, 2022. https://icisleri.gov.tr/bakanimiz-sn-soylu-terorle-mucadele-sube-mudurleri-degerlendirme-calistayina-katildi-11-01-2022.

Riisoy, Anne Irene. "Deviant Burials: Societal Exclusion of Dead Outlaws in Medieval Norway." In *Cultures of Death and Dying in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, edited by Mia Korpiola and Anu Lahtinen. Helsinki: the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2015.

Roffe, Jon, and Hannah Stark. "Introduction: Deleuze and the Non/Human." In *Deleuze and the Non/Human*, edited by Jon Roffe and Hannah Stark, 1–16. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137453693_1.

Rushdy, Ashraf. "Exquisite Corpse." *Transition*, no. 83 (2000): 70–77.

Sabah. "Figen Yüksekdağ teröristin taziyesine gitti (Figen Yuksekdag went to condolence visit for a terrorist)." *Sabah*, September 2, 2015. https://www.sabah.com.tr/aktuel/2015/09/02/figen-yuksekdag-teroristin-taziyesine-gitti.

———. "HDP'li vekil teröristin mezarına çiçek koydu [HDP deputy left a flower on a terrorist's grave]." *Sabah*, September 30, 2015. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/30/hdpli-vekil-teroristin-mezarina-cicek-koydu.

———. "Öldürülen Terörist'in üzerinden haç işareti çıktı [Cross found on the dead terrorist]." *Sabah*, September 28, 2015. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/28/oldurulen-teroristin-uzerinden-hac-isareti-cikti.

———. "PKK'lı teröristin cesedinin sırrı ortaya çıktı [The secret behind the PKK terrorist's corpse is revealed]." *Sabah*, October 4, 2015. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/10/04/pkkli-teroristin-cesedinin-sirri-ortaya-cikti.

———. “PKK’lı Teröristlerin Inlerine Girildi [PKK Lairs Were Penetrated].” *Sabah*, January 27, 2020. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/01/27/bitliste-pkkli-teroristlerin-kullandigi-5-siginak-imha-edildi.

———. “Terörist cenazesine katılan HDP’liye şok [A shock for the HDP deputy who attended a terrorist funeral].” *Sabah*, November 23, 2017. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/11/23/son-dakika-terorist-cenazesine-katilan-hdpliye-sok.

Salter, Mark B., and Can E. Mutlu, eds. *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Sarıoğlu, Bülent. “PKK’ya ‘silahlı muhalefet’ dedi, Meclis karıştı [Called PKK ’armed opposition, tension in the grand assembly].” *Hürriyet*, February 15, 2020, sec. gundem. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pkkya-silahli-muhalefet-dedi-meclis-karisti-41447857.

Sarkees, Meredith Reid, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer. “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): 49–70.

Scheipers, Sibylle, and Daniela Sicurelli. “Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?*.” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 2 (2007): 435–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00717.x.

Schmid, Alex P., and Janny de Graaf. *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. London ; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1982.

Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Translated by George Schwab. 1st edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Schouten, Peer. “Security as Controversy: Reassembling Security at Amsterdam Airport.” *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613515014.

Scull, Maggie. “The Troublesome World of Paramilitary Funerals.” *RTÉ News and Current Affairs*, July 8, 2020, sec. Brainstorm. https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/0708/1151996-northern-ireland-paramilitary-funerals-troubles-bobby-storey-provisional-ira/.

Selahattin Demirtaş [@hdpdemirtas]. “Bu fotoğrafa iyi bakın. Önceki gün Şırnak’ta çekildi. Kimse unutmasın, biz unutmayacağız çünkü.” Tweet. *Twitter*, October 4, 2015. https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/650585392752762881.

Sendika.Org. “Davutoğlu’nun talimatıyla YPG/YPJ’lilerin cenazeleri sınırdan içeri alınmıyor [Dead bodies of YPG/YPJ are not allowed to pass the border because of Davutoglu’s instructions].” *Sendika.Org*, August 11, 2015, sec. 5 Deniz. https://sendika.org/2015/08/davutoglunun-talimatiyla-ypgypjlilerin-cenazeleri-sinirdan-iceri-alinmiyor-284626/.

Siyasi Haber. “SYKP Kadın Meclisi: Çıplak ve ölü bedeni yere serilmesin diye direniyordu kadınlar! [SYKP Women’s Assembly: Women are resisting not to lay dead and naked on the ground].” *Siyasi Haber*, February 12, 2016. http://siyasihaber4.org/sykp-kadin-meclisi-ciplak-ve-olu-bedeni-yere-serilmesin-diye-direniyordu-kadinlar.

"Şırnak İli Uludere İlçesi Gülyazı (Bujeh) Ve Ortasu (Roboski) Köylerinden 38 İnsanın Öldürülmesine İlişkin İhd Ve Mazlum-Der Önizlenim Raporu [Preliminary Observation Report of IHD and Mazlum-Der on 38 People Killed in Roboski Villages]." Special Report. İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association), December 29, 2011.

Sjoberg, Laura. *Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War*. Columbia University Press, 2013.

Sjoberg, Laura, and Caron E. Gentry. *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics*. First edition. London: Zed Books, 2007.

Skolimowska, Anna. "The European Union as a 'Normative Power' in International Relations." *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, no. 18 (2015): 111–31.

Sontag, Susan. *On Photography*. New Ed edition. London: Penguin, 1979.

———. *Regarding the Pain of Others*. F First Paperback Edition Used. New York, N.Y: Picador, 2004.

Sözcü. "Bitlis'te 10 teröristin öldüğü operasyonda 2 PKK'lı böyle yakalandı [2 PKK terrorists were captured like this in the operation where 10 terrorists were killed in Bitlis]." *Sözcü*. March 3, 2017. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/son-dakika-haberi/bitliste-10-teroristin-oldugu-operasyonda-2-pkkli-boyle-yakalandi-1711358/.

———. "Erdoğan'a tepki yağıyor [Revulsion to Erdogan]." *Sözcü*, August 17, 2015. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/erdogana-tepki-yagiyor-911643/.

———. "HDP iddianamesinin ayrıntıları belli oldu [The details of HDP's bill of indictment]." *Sözcü*, March 18, 2021. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/gundem/son-dakika-hdp-iddianamesinin-ayrintilari-belli-oldu-6320770/.

Stanton, Gregory. "The 8 Stages of Genocide." *Genocide Watch*, 1996. http://genocidewatch.net/2013/03/14/the-8-stages-of-genocide/.

Star. "Figen Yüksekdağ o Alçakların Cenazesinde (Figen Yuksekdag Was at the Funeral of These Scoundrals)." *Star*, December 23, 2015. https://www.star.com.tr/guncel/figen-yuksekdag-o-alcaklarin-cenazesinde-haber-1078066/.

———. "Terör örgütü PKK'nın inleri imha edildi [Terrorist PKK's lairs were exterminated]." *Star*, February 19, 2019. https://www.star.com.tr/guncel/pkkli-teroristlere-ait-6-barinak-ve-siginak-imha-edildi-haber-1435222/.

Stepputat, Finn, ed. *Governing the Dead: Sovereignty and the Politics of Dead Bodies*. 1 edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016.

Steuter, Erin, and Deborah Wills. "'The Vermin Have Struck Again': Dehumanizing the Enemy in Post 9/11 Media Representations." *Media, War & Conflict* 3, no. 2 (August 1, 2010): 152–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635210360082.

T24. "Davutoğlu'nun 'Hacı Birlik'i sürükleyen polisler görevden alındı' açıklamasına HDP'den yalanlama [HDP disproved Davutoğlu's claim that 'police officers who dragged Hacı Birlik

are dismissed']." *T24*, December 20, 2015. https://t24.com.tr/haber/davutogluna-yalanlama-haci-lokman-birliki-surukleyen-polisler-gorevden-alinmadi,321101.

———. "Diyarbakır Barosu'ndan Cizre'de öldürülen kadınları teşhir eden görevliler hakkında suç duyurusu [Criminal complaint from Diyarbakir Bar Assocciation against the security forces who displayed dead bodies of women in Cizre]." *T24*, February 12, 2016. https://t24.com.tr/haber/diyarbakir-barosundan-cizrede-oldurulen-kadinlari-teshir-eden-gorevliler-hakkinda-suc-duyurusu,327946.

———. "Otopsi raporu: Şırnak'ta cesedi yerlerde sürüklenen Hacı Lokman Birlik'e 28 mermi isabet etmiş! [Autopsy Report: 28 bullets found on Hacı Lokman Birlik, whose corpse was dragged on the streets]." *T24*, October 5, 2015. https://t24.com.tr/haber/otopsi-raporu-sirnakta-cesedi-yerlerde-suruklenen-haci-lokman-birlike-28-mermi-isabet-etmis,311902.

———. "TRT, 'Cizre'de Bodrum Kat Operasyonunda 60 PKK'lı Terörist Öldürüldü' Haberini Yayından Kaldırdı! [TRT Deleted the News of '60 PKK Terrorists Were Killed in a Basement in Cizre']." *T24*, February 8, 2016. https://t24.com.tr/haber/trt-cizrede-bodrum-kat-operasyonunda-60-pkkli-terorist-olduruldu-haberini-yayindan-kaldirdi,327316.

———. "Valilik de kabul etti; öldürülen Kevser Eltürk'ün kıyafetlerini çıkarıp çıplak fotoğraflarını kim çekti ve dağıttı? [The Mayoral Office accepted too; who took and distributed the naked photos of Kevser Elturk]." *T24*, August 16, 2015. https://t24.com.tr/haber/valilik-de-kabul-etti-oldurulen-kevser-elturkun-kiyafetlerini-cikarip-ciplak-fotograflarini-kim-cekti-ve-dagitti,306455.

Tahincioğlu, Gökçer. "Rafta kalmış uçurtma [The kite left on the shelf]." *Milliyet*, February 16, 2014. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/gokcer-tahincioglu/rafta-kalmis-ucurtma-1837357.

Takvim. "İşte PKK'nın sapık ve iğrenç yüzü! [Here is PKK's pervert and disgusting face]." *Takvim*, November 16, 2012. https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2012/11/16/iste-pkknin-sapik-ve-igrenc-yuzu.

Tan, Altan. *Kürt sorunu [The Kurdish Question]*. 10th ed. Timaş yayınları Düşünce dizisi, 1960 5. İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2011.

Tax, Meredith. "Turkey Helps ISIS Attack Rojava." *The Nation*, February 1, 2022. https://www.thenation.com/article/world/turkey-isis-rojava-prisoners/.

Taylor, John. *Body Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe and War*. Manchester University Press, 1998.

TBMM Meclis Haber. "HDP Grup Başkanvekili Baluken'in Basın Toplantısı [Press Statement of HDP's Deputy Chair Baluken]." *TBMM Meclis Haber*, October 5, 2015. https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=134126.

T.C Bitlis Valiligi. "Hizan Ilçesinde Bölücü Terör Örgütü (BTÖ) Mensuplarına Operasyon Icra Edildi. [An Operation Was Conducted against the Separatist Terrorist Organization in Hizan]." Accessed March 8, 2020. http://bitlis.gov.tr/hizan-ilcesinde-bolucu-teror-orgutu-bto-mensuplarina-operasyon-icra-edildi.

T.C Muş Valiliği. "Basın Duyurusu [Press Release]," August 16, 2015. http://www.mus.gov.tr/basin-duyurusu16.

"Terör Çalıştayı Raporu [Report of Workshop on Terror]." Ankara: Uluslararası Terörizm ve Güvenlik Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2016. https://www.pa.edu.tr/Upload/editor/files/Teror_Calistayi_Raporu.pdf.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting. Legislative Year: 1, Session: 32, January 26, 2016 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=43831

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 39, February 16, 2016. https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=44340.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting. Legislative Year: 2, Session: 77, March 2, 2017 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=58344

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting. Legislative Year: 3, Session: 29, November 28, 2017 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=63881

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting. Legislative Year: 3, Session: 38, December 15, 2017. https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_kurul.cl_getir?pEid=64658

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of the General Assembly. Period: 26, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 27, January 13, 2016. https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22507&P5=H&page1=41&page2=41

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 24, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 44, December 21, 2011. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21085&P5=B&page1=43&page2=43

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting. Period: 24, Legislative Year: 3, Session: 54, January 17, 2013. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21877&P5=H&page1=21&page2=21

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting, Period: 26, Legislative Year: 1, Session: 38, February 11, 2016. https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22531&P5=H&page1=7&page2=7

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). Minutes of General Meeting. Period: 26, Legislative Year: 2, Session: 17, November 8, 2016. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=22743&P5=H&page1=30&page2=30

TimeTürk. “Muş Valiliği, çıplak PKK’lı kadın cesedini doğruladı [The Mayoral Office of Muş confirmed the naked female PKK fighter’s corpse].” *TimeTürk*, August 16, 2015. https://www.timeturk.com/mus-valiligi-ciplak-pkk-li-kadin-cesedini-dogruladi/haber-44316.

Topuz, Ali Duran. “Siyaset meydanında ölüye zulüm diriye zulüm [Oppression of the living, oppression of the dead in the political sphere].” *Artı Gerçek*, April 11, 2022. http://artigercek.com/yazarlar/ali-duran-topuz/siyaset-meydaninda-oluye-zulum-diriye-zulum.

TRT Haber. “9 aylık Muhammed bebek YPG/PKK’nın kurbanı oldu [9 months old Muhammed became a victim of YPG/PKK].” *TRT Haber*, October 10, 2019. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/9-aylik-muhammed-bebek-ypgpkknin-kurbani-oldu-435129.html.

———. “Diyarbakır’da terör operasyonu: HDP’li yöneticiler gözaltında [A counterterrorism operation in Diyarbakır: HDP deputies are detained].” *TRT Haber*, April 26, 2021. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/diyarbakirda-teror-operasyonu-hdpli-yoneticiler-gozaltinda-575783.html.

Turan, Halit. “İstanbul’da Mezarlıkta Skandal Görüntü! PKK Renkleriyle Süslediler [Scandalous Images in an Istanbul Cemetery! Ornated with PKK Colors].” *Sabah*, January 14, 2022. https://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/son-dakika-haberi-ibb-mezarliginda-skandal-mezar-peyzajini-pkk-renkleriyle-suslediler-5827150.

“Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı.” Accessed February 27, 2020. https://www.tsk.tr/Home/YurticiOlaylar.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İletişim Başkanlığı. “İletişim Başkanlığı PYD/YPG’nin gerçek yüzünü anlatan film hazırladı [Directorate of Communications prepared a film revealing the real face of PYD/YPG].” Accessed April 20, 2022. https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/stratejik_iletisim_calismalari/detaylar/iletisim-baskanligi-pyd-ypgnin-gercek-yuzunu-anlatan-film-hazirladi/.

Turner, Terence. “Social Body and Embodied Subject: Bodiliness, Subjectivity, and Sociality among the Kayapo.” *Cultural Anthropology* 10, no. 2 (1995): 143–70.

Umumi Hıfzısıhha Kanunu [Public Health Law] 1930, https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.3.1593.pdf

UN News. “‘Alarming’ Reports of Major Violations in South-East Turkey,” May 10, 2016. https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/528832-alarming-reports-major-violations-south-east-turkey-un-rights-chief#.WkT67lWnGUk.

Ünal, Mustafa Coşar. “The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Popular Support: Counterterrorism towards an Insurgency Nature.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 432–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.661610.

UPI. “Funerals Become Potent Weapon for IRA.” *UPI*, April 12, 1987. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/04/12/Funerals-become-potent-weapon-for-IRA/5986545198400/.

Üstündağ, Nazan. "Ekin Wan'ın bedeninde ifşa olan devlet ya da kadınlar sıra bizde [The disclosure of the state through Ekin Wan's body or women, it is our turn]." *Evrensel*, August 23, 2015. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/258899/ekin-wanin-bedeninde-ifsa-olan-devlet-ya-da-kadinlar-sira-bizde?a=2e1e4.

Vatan. "PKK Mezarlığı Imha Edildi [PKK Cemetery Is Eliminated]." *Vatan*, October 18, 2015. https://www.gazetevatan.com/gundem/pkk-mezarligi-imha-edildi-875290.

Verdery, Katherine. *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Vohra, Anchal. "Why Israel Is Afraid of Palestinian Funerals." *Foreign Policy*, May 25, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/25/shireen-abu-akleh-funeral-israeli-palestinian-conflict-journalist-killing/.

Vuori, Juha A. "A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object." *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 3 (June 1, 2010): 255–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610370225.

Walters, William. *Governmentality: Critical Encounters*. 1. publ. Critical Issues in Global Politics, 3#. London: Routledge, 2012.

Wilcox, Lauren B. *Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations*. Oxford Studies in Gender and International Relations. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Wilkinson, Claire. "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?" *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (March 2007): 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607075964.

Wood, Amy Louise. *Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940*. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2011.

Wright, Melissa W. "Necropolitics, Narcopolitics, and Femicide: Gendered Violence on the Mexico-U.S. Border." *Signs* 36, no. 3 (2011): 707–31. https://doi.org/10.1086/657496.

Yarkın, Güllistan. "İnkâr Edilen Hakikat: Sömürge Kuzey Kürdistan." *Kürd Araştırmaları*, June 30, 2019. http://kurdarastirmalari.com/yazi-detay-nk-r-edilen-hakikat-s-m-rge-kuzey-k-rdistan-26.

Yeni Akit. "Bebek katili Abdullah Öcalan'dan HDP'ye yeni çağrı [Baby killer Ocalan's new call to HDP]." *Yeni Akit*, August 16, 2019. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/bebek-katili-abdullah-ocalandan-hdpye-yeni-cagri-888994.html.

———. "Londra'da PKK'lı İtler, Türk Derneğine Saldırdı! [PKK Dogs in London Attacked a Turkish Institution]." *Yeni Akit*, August 4, 2019. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/londrada-pkkli-itler-turk-dernegine-saldirdi-697813.html.

———. "PKK leşleri her yerde [PKK carcasses are everywhere!]." *Yeni Akit*, September 10, 2015. https://m.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/pkk-lesleri-her-yerde-92609.html.

———. “PKK’ya Çok Ağır Darbe! Leş Sayısı : 390 Terörist Öldürüldü [Heavy Damage on PKK! Number of Carcasses: 390].” *Yeni Akit*, August 8, 2015. https://www.fibhaber.com/nevsehir/pkkya-cok-agir-darbe-les-sayisi-390-terorist-olduruldu-h38041.html.

Yeni Çağ Gazetesi. “PKK’lı teröristlerin inleri ortaya çıktı [The Lairs of PKK terrorists revealed].” *Yeni Çağ Gazetesi*, January 30, 2018. https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/-422587h.htm.

———. “Seçim uğruna Öcalan açılımı! [An Öcalan process for the elections].” *Yeni Çağ Gazetesi*, June 22, 2019. https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/secim-ugruna-ocalan-acilimi-239106h.htm.

Yeni Dönem. “MHP’den CHP’ye ‘Memnun musun Bahçeli?’ tepkisi! [MHP’s reaction to CHP’s statement of ’Are you glad Bahçeli?’].” *Yeni Dönem*, April 22, 2019. https://www.yenidonem.com.tr/mhp-den-chp-ye-memnun-musun-bahceli-tepkisi/66708/.

Yeni Şafak. “Terörist Cenazesine Katılmak Isteyen HDP’li Vekile Polisten Tarihi Ayar [A Phenomenal Comeback from the Police against a HDP Deputy Wanting to Attend a Terrorist Funeral].” *Yeni Şafak*, October 21, 2018. https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/terorist-cenazesine-katilmak-isteyen-hdpli-vekile-polisten-tarihi-ayar-2185005.

———. “Teröristin Üstünden ‘Haç’ Çıktı [Cross Found the Terrosit].” *Yeni Şafak*, March 11, 2016. https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/teroristin-ustunden-hac-cikti-2432206.

Yeni Söz. “Küresel şeytanların Sapıklık Koalisyonu: LGBTİ [Coalition of Perversion among Global Devils: LGBTI].” *Yeni Söz*, June 17, 2016. http://www.yenisoz.com.tr/kuresel-seytanlarin-sapiklik-koalisyonu-lgbti-haber-13870.

Yıldırım, Taylan. “Terörist cenazesi kömür çuvallarıyla taşındı [The terrorist’s corpse was transported with coal sacks].” *CNN Türk*. January 7, 2017. https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/terorist-cenazesi-komur-cuvallariyla-tasindi.

Young, Craig, and Duncan Light. “Corpses, Dead Body Politics and Agency in Human Geography: Following the Corpse of Dr Petru Groza.” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38, no. 1 (2013): 135–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00502.x.

Yu, Jae Eon, and Jeong Woo Lee. “Creating Rhizomatic Networks and Ethics for the Marginalized Group.” *Systemic Practice and Action Research* 21, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 253–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11213-008-9095-7.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. *Gender and Nation*. SAGE Publications, 1997.

Zeyrek, Sebahatdin, Soner Kılınç, and Suat Deniz. “HDP Van Milletvekili Hezer’e tepkiler [Reactions to HDP Van Representative Hezer].” *Hürriyet*, February 25, 2016, sec. izmir. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/hdp-van-milletvekili-hezere-tepkiler-37248667.