

**Officers and soldiers in the colonial wars of the Russian
Empire
Khiva Campaign of 1873 case**

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Abstract

This thesis explores Russian officers and soldiers in the Khiva Campaign of 1873 and discusses the benefits which they could get from participation in the colonial campaign. For officers, the desire for awards, especially orders, promotion, and financial wellbeing, motivated participation in the Khiva campaign. They were also interested in exploring Khiva as a "terra incognita" and providing service to Russia. They received generous rewards for participation compared to the lower ranks. Lower ranks, mostly recruits, had poor career prospects and were less enthusiastic about the campaign. However, hereditary soldiers, the Cossacks, were excited about the campaign and eager to settle scores with the Khivans. The thesis contributes to knowledge of Russian military culture during the reform period and expands understanding of military campaigns of the Russian Empire in Turkestan. It complements the discussion of Turkestan campaigns with the Khiva campaign of 1873, providing insight into the personal interests and motivations of officers and common soldiers. By analyzing the benefits of participation in colonial campaigns, the thesis provides a new perspective on the role of the army as an institution in the Russian Empire's turbulent period of the second half of the 19th century.

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Introduction

To some war is hell, to others a kindly mother.

Russian proverb

The Russian army was a gigantic institution, one of the pillars of the Russian Empire. At the beginning of 1870, more than 750 thousand people voluntarily or not served in the Russian imperial army¹. Russia did not participate in large-scale wars with other Empires, and its activity on traditional fronts such as the Caucasus faded. The fighting in the Caucasus practically ended in 1864, and the last major clash with the European powers and Turkey in 1853-1856, called the Crimean War, ended in a crushing defeat for Russia. However, there was a place where the fighting was still going on. On the southern border, in Turkestan, the Russian Empire continued to conduct military operations and annex new territories.

The Khiva campaign of 1873 was a prominent part of the conquest of Central Asia. This campaign was undertaken after the subjugation of the Kokand (1866) and Bukhara (1868) khanates. The complexity of the Khiva campaign and the previous failures of Russia in the fight against this state, riveted the views of contemporaries. The idea of the Russian command was to march on Khiva by four detachments from Tashkent, Orenburg, Mangyshlak, and from Krasnovodsk. Four detachments had to connect under the walls of Khiva and jointly storm the city. However, the initially well-developed plan turned into a competition between these detachments and, as a result, almost a failure. Russia was able to subdue Khiva with difficulty and expand its territories, but what did officers and common soldiers, by whose hands was this done, get? Did they want to be in the unfriendly sands of Khiva?

¹ Beskrovny L. Russkaya armiya i flot v XIX century. Voenno-ekonomicheskij potencial Rossii [Russian army and navy in the 19th century. Military and economic potential of Russia]. (Moscow: Nauka, 1973)

Writing about military campaigns and colonial campaigns particularly, historians used to take macro perspective and explore benefits that the state could derive from them. Historians know a lot about what England, France, the Russian Empire, and other European (and non-European) powers got from the invasion, conquest, and colonization of territories around the world. Hundreds of interesting studies have been written about the economic, political, and social consequences of wars. However, the people by whose hands these conquests were made attracted less attention, although from the time of Rome and before it, noble and non-noble men earned their reputation on the battlefield and subsequently had a huge impact on world history.

Personnel were recruited from the army to occupy key government posts in the empire. The military largely decided the fate of the empire, so it is important to understand what kind of military culture developed in the army. Many military men who played a big role in the fate of the Empire managed to take part in the conquest of Turkestan.

The purpose of this work is analyzing the Russian imperial army in the reform period to understand what benefits Russian common soldiers and officers could get from participation in colonial campaigns on the example of the Khiva Campaign. More broadly, these thesis seek to investigate how higher and lower ranks were motivated to participate in the company, given what benefits they could receive from participation in the military campaign.

I treat officers and soldiers as active players who themselves determined what benefits they could receive by participating in a military campaign, in particular in the Khiva military campaign of 1873. The object of analysis is the official awards that the participants of the Khiva Campaign could receive, that is, military decorations, monetary awards, promotion. Following Bruno S. Frey and Jana Gallus I trace the following reasons of positive perception of awards among the military who received them: awards express appreciation and recognition, awards create special treatment for the awarded person, awards entail social and material advantages, recipients acquire social status².

² Frey, Bruno S., and Jana Gallus. "Towards an economics of awards." *Journal of Economic Surveys* 31, no. 1 (2017): 190–200.

I regard the army participating in the Khiva Campaign of 1873 as an army of honor. John Lynn distinguished army of honor, which is based on loyalty to the monarch and monarchical principles, and army of virtue, which are loyal to the state, people, and nation³. In the army of honor, the military retained a strong aristocratic sentiment and aspired to personal privileges, and the system itself encouraged the selfish desire for honors. This thesis will discuss such benefits as gaining a reputation, realizing as the military men, and correlating personal interests and goals of the military campaign.

This thesis is aimed to expand knowledge of what military service and participation in hostilities meant for the Russian common soldiers and officers during the reform period, as well as expand understanding of the military campaigns of the Russian Empire in Turkestan.

Historiographical review

This thesis engages with the body of scholarly literature about conquest of Turkestan by Russian Empire, as well as discussion about service in the Russian Army during the period of reforms.

Studies on the conquest of Turkestan by the Russian Empire mainly examine this topic from a macro perspective and discuss the causes and consequences of the conquest. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, many such works were carried out both in the USSR and in the West. In the Soviet Union, historians had changed their perspective on the Conquests of Central Asia several times. An evolution has been passed from considering the conquest as an absolute evil and a

³ Lynn, John A. "Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815." *French Historical Studies* 16, no. 1 (, 1989): 152

manifestation of imperialism⁴ to first the concept of “lesser of evils”⁵ and then accepting the concept of the progressive and voluntary character of the Russian conquest of Central Asia⁶. In that times, anglophone historiography experienced a significant lack of archival data and either considered the conquest through the lens of light of colonial theory⁷, or focused on biographies. An important work of the latter kind is David MacKenzie, where he explored the motives of ambitious commanders leading military campaigns in Turkestan and their opposition to the government. St. Petersburg envisioned a cautious, limited expansion, but the local commanders sought expansion and personal glory, and their actions were at odds with the wishes of the government⁸.

Recent works on the conquest of Turkestan call for a shift in focus from states to groups and personalities and turn to a micro perspective. A striking example of this approach is the book “*The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion*”, published in 2020 by Alexander Morrison. In this book, Morrison constructs a story of conquest, concentrating on details and local factors⁹. Among other things, he provided a detailed history of the Khiva campaign of 1873, where he delved into the logistics of the campaign, the movement of the four detachments, and the role of individuals in successes and failures. The Khiva Campaign was an

⁴ For example, Pokrovskij M. *Diplomatiya i vojny carskoj Rossii v XIX stoletii* [Diplomacy and wars of tsarist Russia in the 19th century] (Moscow: Krasnaya nov', 1923)

⁵ For example, Vyatkin M. *Očerki po istorii Kazahskoj SSR* [Essays on the history of the Kazakh SSR] (Moscow: OGIZ Gospolitizdat, 1941)

⁶ For example, Halfin N. *Prisoedinenie Srednej Azii k Rossii (60-90gg XIX v.)* [Accession of Central Asia to Russia (60-90s of the XIX century)] (Moscow: The science, 1965)

⁷⁷ For example, Pierce, Richard A. “*Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule.*” *The American Historical Review* 66, no. 3 (April 1, 1961): 737.

⁸ MacKenzie, David. “*Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg vs. the Turkestan Generals (1863-1866).*” *Canadian American Slavic Studies* 3, no. 2 (January 1, 1969): 286–311

⁹ Morrison, Alexander. *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814–1914.* (Cambridge University Press, 2020.)

arena for the rival ambitions of the officers, and the ambition of the command was clearly manifested in it. Morrison, in the chapter on the Khiva campaign, mentions that officers rushed to Turkestan and Khiva for medals and promotions¹⁰.

Turning to benefits that individual received and motivation for service in the Russian army in 1860-70th, it is necessary to mention the work of the military historian Sergei Volkov "*Russian officer corps*"¹¹. This book is devoted to the history and characterization of the Russian officer corps from the time of Peter the Great to the Revolution. It tells about the social and material situation, incentives for service, the concept of duty and honor and the position in society of a Russian officer. This book is mainly aimed at describing the officer corps and it shows that in the pre-reform period the officer corps was patriotic, although not the richest, and the officer corps itself was not closed to non-aristocrats. In the book devoted to Russian army in the second half of 19th century, Roger Reese argues there was a big gap between the interests of officers (especially hereditary aristocrats) and soldiers, and the officers sought to maintain their difference from the progressive elements of civil society, protecting their privileges and values¹². For soldiers, military service was less profitable than for officers.

This thesis is aiming to analyze the motivation of the Russian military to participate in the colonial campaign, as well as the benefits that they could receive from participating in the military campaign using an example of Khiva Campaign. This work uses Morrison, Reese, and other scholars' findings, but seeks to deepen the understanding of military service in the reform era in the Russian Empire and extend the understanding of the importance of service in Turkestan. This thesis discusses the benefits that Russian officers and soldiers received from participation in colonial campaigns on the example of the Khiva Campaign in more detail, including discussion of

¹⁰ Ibid, 310

¹¹ Volkov S. *Russkij oficerskij korpus [Russian officer corps]* (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003), 397

¹² Reese, Roger R. *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856–1917*. (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2019)

officers and ordinary soldiers. In this work various types of awards are separated and analyzed using archival sources. It discusses military decorations and the reasons why officers strive for them, the economic problems and motivations of the officer class, the desire for promotion in higher and lower ranks, as well as the relation between campaign goals and personal goals. The perception of benefits by officers and soldiers is put in the context of the era of reforms in the Russian Empire, and it is also discussed what impact the reforms had on the Russian Army on the example of the Khiva Campaign.

Primary sources

This work engages a wide range of primary sources from archival data on the awarded to the memoirs of contemporaries and folklore sources.

To analyze the awards officially received by the participants of the Khiva Campaign, the fund 1393 of the Russian State Military Historical Archive was involved. It stores award lists, award lists, correspondence about awards. From the state of the fund, it seems that some of the documents are missing there, so the conclusions are based on available documents. More than 2000 handwriting sheets were studied.

Because the higher ranks were more prolific in writing and they left more evidence, a limitation of this work is a greater focus on the officer corps than on the lower ranks. Officers and contemporaries who had information and insights about the Khiva campaign, wrote many works partially or fully dedicated to the Khiva campaign. Some of them do not fit to this research since they fully concentrate on dry description of the expedition and do not allow say anything that go beyond the description of hostilities. Such works, for example, include the notes of sapper Evgraf Saranchov *"The Khiva Expedition of 1873"*, published in 1874 in hot pursuit of the campaign¹³. In

¹³ Saranchov E. *Hivinskaya ekspeditsiya 1873 goda [Khiva expedition of 1873]*. (St. Petersburg: Printing house of F. Sushchinsky, 1874)

this book, he dryly and concisely described the actions of the detachments and the structure of the Khiva Khanate itself, but does not share either his experiences and desires, or his fellow officers. Also fully focusing on the campaign itself and its causes, a book "*The Khiva campaign of 1873*" was published in 1888 by the chief of staff of the Mangyshlak detachment Nikolay Grodekov¹⁴, as well as description of the actions of the Krasnovodsk detachments, also published in the late 80s by the head of this detachment, Vasily Markozov¹⁵.

However, there is still a lot of work to extract useful insights. Mikhail Terentiev wrote the description of the Khivan campaign in the second volume of "*The History of the Conquest of Central Asia*"¹⁶. Terentiev came from a landowner family and devoted most of his life to military service. He started his service in Turkestan in the second half of the 60s and took part in campaigns against the Bukhara Khanate, and then took part in the development of a plan for the upcoming campaign against the Khiva Khanate. He published his multi-volume work in full only in 1906, although he began writing it back in the 60s. Thus, despite the late publication date, information about the Khiva campaign was also collected in hot pursuit. Unlike Saranchov, Terentiev showed the campaign's backstage and presenting the participants as people with their own desires and views.

Some members of the Khiva expedition had literary talent to share their stories. Maksud Alikhanov-Avarsky, who was a member of the Mangyshlak detachment, left vivid memories about the Khivan Campaign. He came from a military family and had been preparing for a military career since childhood. He graduated from the Military School and in 1864 was released as a cornet in

¹⁴ Grodekov N. *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda. Dejstviya kavkazskih otryadov [Khiva campaign in 1873. Actions of the Caucasian detachments]*. (St. Petersburg: Printing house V.S. Balasheva, 1888)

¹⁵ Markozov, V. *Krasnovodskij otryad. Ego zhizn' i sluzhba so dnya vysadki na vostochnyj bereg Kaspijskogo morya po 1873 vkluchitel'no [Krasnovodsk detachment. His life and service from the day of landing on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea to 1873 inclusive]*. (St. Petersburg: printing house of E. Arngold, 1898)

¹⁶ Terentiev M. *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii, T. 2 [History of the conquest of Central Asia, V. 2]*. (St. Petersburg: Typography-Lithography V.V. Komarova, 1906)

the Sumy Hussar Regiment. Before the Khiva campaign he managed to be an adjutant of the Military Chief of the Dagestan Region, Grand prince Michael. Thus, Alikhanov-Avarsky belonged to a privileged stratum of officers. His book "*Khivan Campaign (Caucasus Detachments)*" was published in 1899 to the 25th anniversary of the campaign¹⁷. This book is based on notes that he made during the campaign and were partially printed in 1879. The notes were published in the *Russki Vestnik [Russian Vestnik]* magazine under the heading "*Steppe and Oasis*"¹⁸.

In the memoirs of a member of the Tashkent detachment Vladimir Poltoratsky, published in 1895¹⁹, and the book of a member of the Magdyshlak detachment Alexei Maslov "*The Conquest of Akhal-Teke: Essays from Skobelev's Last Expedition. Materials for the Biography and Characteristics of Skobelev*"²⁰, published in 1885, the Khiva expedition was one of the episodes, but both works provide an opportunity to learn about the thoughts and feelings of the officers who served in Turkestan and participated in the Khiva campaign.

The work "*Turkistan; notes of a journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*", published in 1876, stands apart²¹. It, unlike the previous ones, was written by a foreigner - the American consul and traveler Eugene Schuyler. In the early 70s he worked as secretary of the American mission in St. Petersburg, and in 1873 he went on a trip to Turkestan. His book is primarily an account of this journey, but also includes important notes by Eugene Schuyler on the Khiva campaign. Eugene Schuyler had contacts among the Russian officer corps and wrote with

¹⁷ Alikhanov-Avarsky M., *Pohod v Hivu (Kavkazskih Otryadov) [Campaign to Khiva (Caucasian Detachments)]*. (St. Petersburg: Ya. I. Lieberman's Steam Rapid Printing, 1899) VII

¹⁸ Alikhanov-Avarsky M., *Step and Oasis [Step' i Oazis]* Russian Bulletin, V. 142, (1879)

¹⁹ Poltoratsky V.A. *Vospominaniya V.A. Poltorackogo [Memoirs of V.A. Poltoratsky]* Historical Bulletin V. LIX, No. 1-3; V. LX, N. 4-6; V. LXI, N. 7 (1895)

²⁰ Maslov A.N. *Zavoevanie Ahal-Teke. Ocherki iz poslednej ekspedicii Skobeleva (Materialy dlya biografii i Harakteristiki Skobeleva) [Conquest of Akhal-Teke. Essays from the last expedition of Skobelev (materials for the biography and characteristics of Skobolev)]*. (St. Petersburg: Edition A.S. Suvorin, 1887)

²¹ Schuyler E. *Turkistan; notes of a journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*. (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & co, 1876)

insights about what is happening inside. He gave a view not from inside the Russian officer corps, but as an outsider, not as subject of officer traditions. American journalist Januarius Aloysius MacGahan joined the Khivan Campaign and visited the very center of the conflict, meeting and making friends with many Russian officers²². He published his book “Campaigning on the Oxus, and the fall of Khiva” a year after the campaign, in 1874, in London, and then in 1875 published in Moscow.

The memoir sources are in the public domain and these sources were actively used by scientists of various generations and countries to describe campaigns in Turkestan, including Khiva. It should be noted that Morrison's, who is cited here, and this thesis primary sources intersect, because there are a limited number of published memoir sources about the Khiva campaign. Some of the above sources have already been cited by Morrison in his book “*The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814-1914*”, including Terentiev, Alikhanov-Avarsky, Maslov, Poltoratsky, Grodekov, McGahan, and Schuyler. However, even though these sources have already been cited by Morrison, this thesis focuses on a different part of these sources and the sections cited in this work and in Morrison almost do not overlap. This thesis focusses on campaigners' perceptions of various awards, while Morrison's primary concern is to describe the campaign.

The next corpus of sources are notes published in periodical magazines. This corpus of sources is useful in that it printed small notes that were not later converted into books, and because campaign materials were printed there most quickly. The main source of this type is the monthly magazine “*Voennyj Sbornik*” [*Milliraty Collection*], which was the official organ of the Military Ministry of the Russian Empire. In it, the military published their memoirs, stories from military life, memoirs, biographies, historical essays, reflections on military affairs. Popular weekly

²² McGahan, E.A. *Voennye dejstviya na Oksuse i padenie Hivy* [*Military operations on the Oksus and the fall of Khiva.*] (Moscow: University printing house Katkov and K, 1875)

magazines for a wide audience as "*Vsemirnaya Illyustraciya*" [*Worldwide Illustration*] and "*Niva*" were used.

The lower ranks involved in the campaign were not prolific in writing, and the study of their benefits turns out to be more of a chain of speculation. Folklore sources were used for their research, as well as interviews collected by contemporaries. Thus, were used songs of the Orneburg Cossacks, collected by the Cossack Alexander Myakutin, a member of the Orenburg Scientific Archival Commission, at the beginning of the 20th century²³, as well as recorded conversations of the Cossack writer Ioasaf Zheleznov with the Cossacks of the middle 19th century²⁴.

Thesis outline

This work is structured into three chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the description of the Khiva Campaign of 1873. This chapter describes the background of the campaign, the composition of its participants, as well as the course of the campaign. This chapter shows that the conquest of Khiva in 1873 was more of a competition for officers and served as an expression of their ambitions than an effective campaign.

The second chapter of this work is devoted to the motivation and benefits of higher ranks. It looks at what motivated officers to join the campaign and what benefits they received, including military decorations, money, promotions. This chapter also discusses the question of what role national interests played in the motivation of officers in Turkestan, as well as their non-military activities in the campaign. This chapter argues that the officers were sent to Turkestan and Khiva to receive orders and medals, improve their material well-being, and advance their careers.

²³ Myakutin A.I. *Pesni orenburgskih kazakov* [*Songs of the Orenburg Cossacks*]. (Orenburg: Type-lithography B. Breslin, 1904)

²⁴ Zheleznov, I. *Ural'cy: ocherki byta ural'skih kazakov: polnoe sobranie sochinenij Ioasafa Ignat'evicha ZHeleznova*. [*Uralians: Essays on the Life of the Ural Cossacks: Complete Works of Ioasaf Ignatievich Zheleznov*] (St. Petersburg: Public benefit, 1910)

The third chapter focuses on the lower ranks, that is, non-commissioned officers and privates. It is discussed that the lower ranks received much less from participation in the Khiva campaign of 1873, and they had less enthusiasm for their participation than the officers. The lower ranks did not have the choice to participate or not in the campaign and their motivation for taking part, but many factors influenced their combat motivation during the course of the campaign.

Chapter 1. The Khiva campaign of 1873

*One stroke of sword and all the world is yours.
Make plain to all men that the crowds who decked
Pompeius' hundred pageants scarce were fit
For one poor triumph —*

Marcus Annaeus Lucanus, Pharsalia, Book VII, line 278,
as translated by Sir Edward Ridley

1.1. Background of the Khiva Campaign

Faced with a crushing defeat from a coalition of the British, French, Ottoman, and the Kingdom of Sardinia allied forces in 1856, the authorities of the Russian Empire realized the need to reform society and the army. Along with the liberation of the peasants from serfdom, Zemstvo reform, judicial reform, educational reform and others, a military reform was carried out. Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin was its inspirer and developer was. For the sake of increasing the effective system of military administration, the Russian Empire was divided into military districts, and the army and navy were also rearmed with the latest weapons. The officer corps had to be expanded at the expense of non-nobles, as well as to significantly improve officer education. Reformers coped with the second task by organizing a system of cadet schools in the 60s, and the discussion of the first dragged on until the mid-70s. The key reform was the replacement of the conscription. Until 1874, the lower ranks were replenished by recruits who were recruited from tax-paying estates and were required to serve for several decades. In 1874, a reform was carried out, according

to which military service extended to all men over the age of 20, regardless of social origin, but the period of service was significantly reduced. The purpose of the reform, which lasted for almost two decades, was to increase the effectiveness of the army and overcome the problems that it encountered during the unsuccessful Crimean War. The new army showed itself in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. However, even during the period of reform, the army participated in military campaigns. In the 1860s and 1870s, the campaign to conquer Central Asia intensified.

The combination of public and private interests gave rise to the Khiva Campaign of 1873. By the early 1870s, the Russian Empire managed to conquer the two largest states in Central Asia - the Bukhara Emirate and the Kokand Khanate, partially annexing their lands and turning the states themselves into protectorates. The Khiva Khanate remained the last de facto independent Uzbek khanate.

The Khanate of Khiva was an oasis on the lower reaches of the Amu Darya River, washed by the Aral Sea from the north and surrounded by sandy steppes from all other sides. These steppes were inhabited by self-willed Kirghiz and Turkmens, who were not completely subjugated to Khiva. This place was less accessible than many other parts of Central Asia²⁵.

The city of Khiva was the heart of the khanate. The city, founded long before the birth of Christ, changed its owners more than once. Khiva was one of the cities of ancient Khorezm, turned out to be dependent on the Seljukids, was destroyed by the armies of Genghis Khan and resurrected after. At the beginning of the 16th century, Khiva became part of a new state headed by one of the branches of the Shaybānīd dynasty. The capital of this khanate was the city of Urgench, but in 1598 the unpredictable Amu Darya River changed its course and receded from the former capital. Then it was decided to move the center of the state to a new place - to Khiva. By this time, Khiva was a small, fortified town with almost 20 centuries of history. In the 17th century the city became

²⁵ Sartori, Paolo. "Introduction: On Khvārazmian Connectivity: Two or Three Things that I Know about It", *Journal of Persianate Studies* 9, 2 (2016): 133-157

famous for its large slave markets. Thousands of Persians and subjects of the Russian tsar, having lost their freedom, found themselves in the slave market of Khiva.

Russia tried to take Khiva more than once. The first two official attempts to conquer Khiva were unsuccessful. The campaign of 1717, led by Alexander Bekovich-Cherkassky, ended because of the death of the commander, and the detachment of 1839–1840, led by the Orenburg governor Vasily Perovsky, could not reach Khiva. The third and only successful campaign against Khiva began in the spring of 1873.

Russian discontent with Khiva had been accumulating for a long time. The Russians suspected that the Khivans were inciting various Central Asian tribes to attack the Russian troops and supported the rebels in Russian Turkestan territories²⁶. Besides, the Russian Empire maintained claims to Khiva due to the large number of Russian slaves sold on the Khanate's slave market. Most likely, there were almost no Russian slaves in Khiva by the beginning of the invasion, but the slave trade was still used as an argument for starting a military campaign against the khanate²⁷. Alexander Morrison wrote that the issue of prestige and security caused the Khiva campaign²⁸. Russians clearly claimed a civilizing mission, speaking not only of the liberation of Russian slaves, but also Persian ones. The Russian Empire as a "great power" was irritated by the disobedience of the "insignificant" Khanate of Khiva. The Turkestan governor Konstantin von Kaufmann insisted that it was necessary to 'finish with' the khanate²⁹.

Khiva understood the danger posed by Russia, and throughout the 1860s Khan's ambassadors tried to negotiate and resolve tension through diplomacy. However, the negotiations did not progress because the Khan of Khiva wanted to conduct them with an "equal to himself", the Russian emperor, and not von Kaufman from Tashkent³⁰. Konstantin von Kaufman, in turn,

²⁶ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 315

²⁷ Ibid, 316

²⁸ Ibid, 316

²⁹ Ibid, 316

³⁰ Ibid, 319

had his personal interest in the confrontation with Khiva. A hereditary military man from a Baltic German family, he became the first Governor-General of Russian Turkestan and commander of the Turkestan military district. As for the prospective commander of the expedition to Khiva, for von Kaufman the capture of Khiva could become the desired triumph, the pinnacle of his Turkestan career³¹. From other side, the American Consul in St. Petersburg Eugene Schuyler believed that von Kaufmann needed a successful campaign to hide Turkestan's mismanagement and financial distress from the Petersburg authorities³². According to the consul, through the Khiva Campaign, the governor of the Turkestan wanted to divert public attention and attract allies to his side³³.

1.2. Movement of detachments and the fall of Khiva

The expedition was planned for early spring to avoid the heat - the main ally of the locals and the most merciless enemy of any foreigners. Campaign planners understood what potential problems the detachments could face during the expedition. They calculated the required number of supplies and took care in advance to purchase camels - the main means of transportation in the desert and steppes. However, when plans collided with reality, neither enough camels nor enough food and water were taken for the expedition. All parts of troops in one way or another faced a lack of supplies. As the consequence, three of the four columns were on the verge of failure of the expedition even before crossing the Khivan border due to heat and dehydration.

The troops advanced under the leadership of Konstantin von Kaufman from Tashkent (under the leadership of von Kaufman), Orenburg (under the leadership of General-Major Nikolai Veryovkin), Mangyshlak (under the leadership of lieutenant colonel Nikolai Lomakin) and Krasnovodsk (under the leadership of lieutenant colonel Vasily Markozov). The three detachments

³¹ Ibid, 313

³² Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 333; Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 308

³³ Ibid, 333

that reached Khiva (Turkestan, Orenburg, and Mangyshlak detachments) consisted of 12 thousand people, including those who remained in the rear and officials³⁴. Most of the troops belonged to the Turkestan detachment (slightly less than half of all troops). A quarter of all troops accounted for the Orenburg and Mangyshlak detachments. The lower ranks made up 96% of all troops. There were 484 male officers of the highest ranks, of which almost 79% were chief officers, and about 19% were headquarters officers. There were 8 generals for three detachments.

Both the officers and the lower ranks had a motley national composition. It is impossible to give an exact assessment of it, since nationality was not noted in the track record, but among the participants one can meet both Russian and German, Baltic, Georgian, surnames. Servants and guides from among the local population also joined the expedition.




Figure 1. Map for the Khiva campaign, compiled by A. Khrebtov

³⁴ Grodekoy, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, appendix 53-59

Source: Khrebtov A. N. Trudy Komissii pedagogicheskogo otdela Muzeya Prikladnyh Znanij po sostavleniyu chtenij dlya vojsk i naroda [Khiva campaign. Proceedings of the Commission of the Pedagogical Department of the Museum of Applied Knowledge on the compilation of readings for the troops and the people] (St. Petersburg: Publishing house N. G. Martynov, 1875). A black and white version of this map can also be found in Morrison, 2020 (P. 328)

The Turkestan column advanced from Tashkent in March and on the way numerous difficulties fell upon it. The detachment was able to get through the first cold, and then through the heat to get to Khiva. The most difficult part of the journey, as originally planned, lay from Balta-Sadyr through Ming-Bulak to the Amu Darya. At this point, the route plan had been changed. According to the official version, the path through Ming-Bulak was not chosen, because there was a risk that the Khivans had poisoned the wells, and, in addition, this path was twice as long³⁵. Schuyler found the reason for this decision in the hunt for awards³⁶. Mikhail Terentiev noted that von Kaufman was afraid that Markozov's Krasnovodsk column would outstrip his column³⁷. The commander of the campaign did not want to give way to his subordinate, and therefore decided to change the route. At that time Kaufman had no idea that Markozov's column had not reached Khiva at all...

The Krasnovodsk column under the leadership of Colonel Vasily Markozov, although they were the most experienced, did not reach Khiva. Markozov allegedly dreamed of the glory of taking Khiva³⁸. During the negotiations in June 1872, he sent an armed reconnaissance group to the outskirts of Khiva, but this mission failed. In the autumn of the same year, Markozov tried to

³⁵ Ibid, 333

³⁶ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 339

³⁷ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 171

³⁸ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 341

repeat his attempt to get to Khiva. He quarreled with residents because of a new attempt to force the capture of camels. This campaign was also unsuccessful and Markozov's detachment retreated to Krasnovodsk.

Markozov made a new attempt to get to Khiva in 1873. Markozov chose a shorter, but riskier path, and it led to failure. They did not have enough water and food, which could lead to the death of the detachment³⁹. The exhausted soldiers and officers did not want (and many could not) move on. It was decided to return to Krasnovodsk. Terentyev blamed Markozov for the Krasnovodsk column's fail. He wrote, that a direct, but more dangerous and unpredictable path was chosen than a convenient, but longer one. Enough provisions and water were not stored for the perilous journey through the desert. And all the suffering was endured only to "*seize the laurels from under the hands of other detachments*"⁴⁰.

The Mangyshlak detachment was formed after it became clear that the forces led by Markozov would be small due to problems with finding camels⁴¹. The Caucasian command wanted to take part of the campaign, so they expected that if not one, then the second detachment would reach Khiva⁴². The main goal of this detachment was to connect with the Orenburg detachment and strengthen it before entering Khiva⁴³.

The Orenburg column suffered less than the rest during its path. The detachment, apparently, was better equipped than the others⁴⁴. The following reports came from the detachment: *«life is healthy and merry: fresh air, fresh food, constant movement: only the enemy is lacking»*⁴⁵. The Orenburg column advanced towards Khiva without any problems, although with

³⁹ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 139

⁴⁰ Ibid, 125

⁴¹ Grodekov, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, 77; Maslov, *Zavoevanie Ahal-Teke*, 223

⁴² Maslov, *Zavoevanie Ahal-Teke*, 223

⁴³ Grodekov, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, 163

⁴⁴ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 183

⁴⁵ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 353

a slight delay due to mud and weather conditions. As in other detachments, the commanders of the Orenburg column wanted to be the first to reach Khiva and get ahead of other columns. When the Orenburgers realized that they were being delayed, they had the hope that, due to even more unfavorable conditions, the Turkestan and Caucasian columns would be delayed more than they were⁴⁶.

By the end of May, the three remaining columns were strengthened near Khiva and had to decide what to do with the city. On May 28, Khan's cousin Iltuzar Inak arrived for negotiations with von Kaufmann. Von Kaufmann ordered Verevkin not to shoot at the city yet, but Verevkin did not have time to receive the note, as he had already moved on the city. It is not entirely clear what exactly Verevkin was trying to do. Either he did not want to give the glory of taking the city to Kaufman, or he simply made a mistake, but the detachments under his leadership marched towards Khiva. They did not capture city, but 29 may Khivans capitulated. Skobelev, a very active officer, dissatisfied with the fact that he did not have time to take part in the hostilities⁴⁷, stormed the gates, broke into the city, and captured the gates leading to the citadel (they were not locked) and the Khan's palace.

Despite all the all perturbations, von Kaufmann entered the city to the sound of a march. Already on June 12, von Kaufmann solemnly proclaimed the abolition of slavery. In August, the Gendemanian peace treaty was signed between the Russian Empire and the Khanate of Khiva, according to which he recognized himself as «*a humble servant of the All-Russian Emperor*»⁴⁸. The Khiva Khanate turned into a protectorate of the Russian Empire and was deprived of the opportunity to conduct an independent foreign policy, and Russian merchants got the opportunity

⁴⁶ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 201

⁴⁷ Maslov, *Zavoevanie Ahal-Teke*, 235.

⁴⁸ Potemkin V. *Istoriya diplomatii*. T.2: *Diplomatiya v novoe vremya (1871-1914)* [The history of diplomacy. Vol. 2: Diplomacy in modern times (1871–1914)] (Moscow: OGIZ, 1963)

to trade duty-free in the khanate. The territory of the khanate on the right bank of the Amu Darya River passed to the Russian Empire, and the khan paid an indemnity of 2.2 million rubles.

However, the history of the Khiva campaign was not over. The capture of Khiva was followed by an expedition on Yomuds, one of the tribes inhabited by the Khivan oasis who did not immediately submit to Russia. It is not very clear what exactly caused such a decision, but many sources hint that the cause again was ambitions. Terentyev gave a simple explanation of why von Kaufman sent a punitive detachment before the reason for “punish” really appeared⁴⁹. Kaufman himself justified the campaign by the need to regulate relations between locals. He characterized the Yomuds as robbers who did not obey the khan, wished to continue the war, resist the Russian authority, and robbed other locals. For this, he decided to impose on them a large contribution, which he did not expect that they would pay voluntarily.

Even though the Yomuds did not refuse to fulfill the conditions, the campaign was carried out. Kaufman's instructions to the detachment commander Golovachev were cruel. He commanded «*give over these nomadic Yomud and their families to complete ruin and extermination, and their property and herds to confiscation*»⁵⁰ These instructions have been followed. As a result of this expedition, many Turkmens died, and the Turkmen resistance was broken.

In the autumn of 1873, the active phase of the Khiva campaign ended. Khiva was taken, the Turkmens were forced to "peace" and an agreement beneficial to the Russian Empire was signed. The combat losses of the Russian troops were 33 killed (4 officers and 29 lower ranks) and 124 wounded (2 generals, 18 officers and 104 lower ranks)⁵¹. Von Kaufmann could celebrate the triumph, and the campaigners could reap the rewards of victory.

The Khiva campaign of 1873, despite the controversial course of the movement to Khiva and the fighting, became one of the victorious wars of the Russian Empire in the post-Crimean

⁴⁹ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 270

⁵⁰ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 365

⁵¹ Grodekov, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, Appendix 63—64

period. Bruce Lincoln argued the haste of Russian weapons and diplomacy in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia contributed to the strengthening of the position of the conservatives, as they brightened up the bitterness of defeat in the Crimean War and partly returned confidence in the Russian army⁵².

1.3. Summary

In 1860-1870, the Russian Empire did not interfere in conflicts in Europe and was busy carrying out reforms, including military ones. However, the conquest of Central Asia, which the Russian Empire had been waging for decades, continued. In the 1860s-1870s, the conquest intensified, and the Russian Empire conquered the large principalities of Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva.

The Khiva campaign of 1873 was a competition of officers' ambitions. Four detachments took part in the campaign, which left Krasnovodsk, Mangyshlak, Orenburg, and Tashkent. However, only three detachments reached Khiva, and then with big problems, since the path through the waterless desert and steppes was poorly planned, and the commander's decisions were inspired not so much by efficiency as by the desire for rewards. Three of the four detachments of Khiva, only three reached, and despite the inconsistency, they were able to take the city and forced the Khiva people to a peace treaty.

⁵² Lincoln, W. Bruce, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia*, Northern Illinois University Press 1990, 176

Chapter 2. Higher ranks

In most cases men willingly believe what they wish

Julius Caesar, Gallic War, Book 3, chapter 18

2.1. Imperial heroes and lust for awards

For officers from European empires Asia and Africa became places where they could build a career, gain reputation, and make a fortune. In an era when there was practically peace in Europe, colonial campaigns were the main method of obtaining official rewards for officers⁵³. Careerist sentiments were shown by the French officers who participated in the conquest of Algeria 1830-1847. For them, Algeria was an arena for professional growth⁵⁴. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that *"Africa is the only place one hears the clash of arms today. All eyes are drawn to it. Reputations are made there, often very cheaply, that don't offend anyone"*⁵⁵. In the British colonies, officers and officials competed for awards and titles⁵⁶. For Russian officers, Turkestan was such a place. After the end of the Caucasian wars in the early 1860s and until the outbreak of the conflict in the Balkans in the second half of the 1870s, Turkestan was the only place where they could take part in the fighting. The officers sought to take part in the Khiva campaign. Why?

Officers specifically sought to go to Turkestan to participate in military campaigns and to be assigned to the Khiva campaign⁵⁷. The testimonies campaign participants and of

⁵³ Fichter, James R. *British and French Colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Connected Empires across the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 30

⁵⁴ Sessions, Jennifer E. *By Sword and Plow: France and the conquest of Algeria*. (Cornell University Press, 2015), 139

⁵⁵ De Tocqueville, Alexis. *Writings on empire and slavery*. (JHU Press, 2001), 78

⁵⁶ Cannadine, David. *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*. (Oxford University Press, USA 2002)

⁵⁷ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 311

contemporaries indicate that many officers perceived the Khiva Campaign as an opportunity to receive awards. The regulation on service awards provided for 8 types of awards: promotion, transfer to the guard and other parts of the troops with an advantage in ranks, orders, golden weapons, assignment of leases and grants of land, one-time cash payments, gifts from the Highest Name, the highest favor⁵⁸. For participation and deeds in the Khiva campaign, officers received monetary awards, orders, award weapons, and promotion. In most of cases, officers received 2-3 awards in the form of an order and (or) promotion in addition to monetary rewards. Rewarding depended on the participation of officers in "affairs". If the awarded participated only in the capture of Khiva, then they were usually given 2 awards each, and if they were also in the "*subduing the Turkmens*", then 3 awards each⁵⁹.

Russian officer paid great attention to medals and orders. The armies of different countries at different times had different attitudes towards military decorations. For example, American veterans of World War II were not impressed with the medals and did not even always take them⁶⁰. For Russian officers, military decorations were almost of paramount importance. The officers were especially interested in orders and medals. Maksud Alikhanov-Avarsky began his story about the campaign with the following lines:

About two months before the campaign, in the clubs, in restaurants and in the living rooms of Tiflis, only one could hear about Khiva, and the officers set in motion all the springs just to achieve an assignment to one of the expeditionary

⁵⁸ *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe T. XXXIV. 1859. [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection II T. XXXIV. 1859]* (St. Petersburg: Type. II Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, 1861), 745—755.

⁵⁹ Russian State Military Historical Archive. Fund 1393. Inventory 1. File 27. Page 471

⁶⁰ Newsome, Bruce Oliver. "*The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation.*" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 24–46.

*detachments. As usual, many aspired, of course, to the so-called "Cross campaign" or campaign for crosses*⁶¹.

In the original, writing "cross campaign", Alikhanov-Avarsky played with words and made a reference to the medieval crusades. But did he mean that the campaign's participants wanted to fight for the Christian faith against the Muslims in the spirit of the crusaders? Unlikely. It was not a campaign for Christian crosses, but for the Cross of St. George and the Order of St. George - the highest awards for military merit and courage.

The military could be awarded the orders of St. George, St. Vladimir, St. Anna, St. Svyatoslav (in order of seniority), each order had 4 degrees. The awarding of the Order of St. George stood separately. It was the rarest and most prestigious award. Only military personnel could receive this order, unlike other orders. The first three degrees were awarded very rarely. Orders of the 1st degree were issued only 23 pieces, 2nd - 123 pieces, 3rd - 652 pieces⁶². The fourth degree was more common, among other things, because it could be obtained for length of service (25 years in an officer's rank, but in 1855 this rule was abolished, although awards continued until 1867⁶³). In total, 10,500 orders of St. George of the 4th degree were issued, including only 2054 by 1913 were issued for military distinctions⁶⁴.

Not only Alikhanov-Avarsky noted strong desire for awards among officers. American consul Eugene Schuyler wrote that the officers were interested in expeditions primarily because of the opportunity to receive medals:

⁶¹ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *Pohod v Hivu*, VII

⁶² Shishkov S. S. *Nagrady Rossii 1698-1917 [Awards of Russia 1698-1917] Volume 2.* (Moscow: Art-Press, 2003), 13

⁶³ Ibid., 45

⁶⁴ Ibid., 13

The officers, almost without exception — and one could hardly blame them for it — were always desirous of some new expedition by which they could win crosses and rewards. The ‘St. Anne’s fever,’ as Mr. Grant Duff aptly expressed it in the House of Commons, is very prevalent in Turkistan, and more than one expedition in Central Asia has been undertaken, with really no higher aim than to secure decorations for the men who carried it on. ⁶⁵

Morrison in his book noted the importance of gaining medals or promotion for officers participating in the Turkestan campaigns⁶⁶. In discussing the reasons behind the Yomud Campaign, he cited Schuyler and Terentiev as saying that the campaign was driven by a desire for medals⁶⁷. Schuyler noted that some decisions in this campaign was made in such a way, that decision makers could be awarded subsequently⁶⁸. In addition, he attributed the campaign against the Yomuds, which happened after the capture of Khiva, to the desire to receive more awards:

... the officers of the Tashkent detachment were not satisfied. They had started on the campaign for the purpose of obtaining decorations and increased rank. There had been great intrigues before the campaign began as to the persons who should accompany it, and further intrigues during the course of it for prominent and advantageous commands. Awards, it is true, had been distributed with a lavish hand for the skirmish near Khalata, as well as for all those on the banks of the Amu Darya. Nearly every officer had, three times at least, been presented for reward — for having safely made the march over the

⁶⁵ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 334

⁶⁶ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 310

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 316-317

⁶⁸ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 339

*desert, for having crossed the Amu Darya, and for having reached and entered Khiva. Still there had been no actual fight, and the Cross of St. George — the highest esteemed reward — could not be given without that. Something had to be done, and it was suggested to make a campaign against the Turkomans*⁶⁹

This was indirectly confirmed by Terentiev, who noted that the officers, who sent to expedition, arrived after taking the city and they were sent to this task to “taste powder”⁷⁰. In addition, Lomakin in his letter to Grand Duke Mikhail Romanov also suspected that the cause of the punitive operation is that *«it is essential that the 8th Turkestan Battalion, which has not yet fired a single shot in the course of the expedition, should be given an opportunity to distinguish itself»*⁷¹.

Terentiev noted that Kaufman's subordinates argued little against him during the movement to Khiva. Terentiev explained this by their concern for their own careers. Whether or not they received awards and promotions depended on von Kaufman⁷². Thus, the proposal to award Mikhail Skobelev with the St. George Order was most likely rejected by Kaufman because he did not like Skobelev, who tried with all his might to curry favor and committed acts that irritated Kaufman very much⁷³. Thus, for the officers it was better not to argue with the commander even when he made not the smartest decisions.

Officer striving for award to the detriment of efficiency could be explained by Russian military culture in those times. By Roger Reese the Russian imperial army in the pre-reform period is classified as an army of honor, in which officers aspire to honors and attach great importance to

⁶⁹ Ibid, 354 - 355

⁷⁰ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 267

⁷¹ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 364

⁷² Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 176

⁷³ Ibid, 261

honor⁷⁴. It remained so until the First World War, despite the reforms. The Russian army as an army of honor manifests itself in the Khiva Campaign of 1873. Instead of coordinated actions, the officers dreamed of rewards and feats.

The story of Mikhail Skobelev is revealing. He was born in a family of hereditary military men, his grandfather headed the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg, and his father was the commander of His Imperial Majesty's own convoy. Mikhail Skobelev started his career in the 1860s, and the Khiva expedition was his first military campaign. Memories of Skobelev's participation in the Khivan Campaign were written by his colleague Alexei Maslov. Maslov wrote about Skobelev with great sympathy but did not hesitate to portray him not only as a commander, but also as a person who had his personal interest. In the Khiva campaign, Skobelev wanted to receive the St. George Order.

Maslov recalled that during the first conversation, he and Skobelev mainly discussed the difficulties of the upcoming campaign, as well as future awards⁷⁵. Skobelev was not satisfied with his position as a staff officer of the General Staff and sought to play an independent role⁷⁶. As a result, he achieved the role of commander of the vanguard.

On May 5, the vanguard under the command of Skobelev reached the outskirts of the Khiva oasis and entered the first "battle", but not with the Khiva troops. The brave officers were impatient to fight against the enemy, so they were very happy to see someone even remotely defined as Khivan troops - a trade caravan. The caravanners refused to give their camels to the soldieries, Skobelev did not accept the refusal and rushed with a sword to them. The battle was short, as the merchants preferred to drop their cargo and run away when they saw the approach of the vanguard infantry. Skobelev himself was very pleased with this farcical episode. He ordered his groom to

⁷⁴ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 129

⁷⁵ Maslov, *Zavoevanie Ahal-Teke*, 227

⁷⁶ Ibid, 228

count the wounds⁷⁷. Later, burning with the desire to distinguish himself, Skobelev proved himself at the walls of Khiva⁷⁸.

Both von Kaufman and Skobelev's chief Lomakin were dissatisfied with his arbitrariness⁷⁹. Skobelev was still nominated for the St. George Order, but this proposal was rejected⁸⁰. He was terribly upset and considered himself offended, because he believed that not even for the assault on May 29, but for all his activities during the campaign, he should be awarded⁸¹. Skobelev managed to get a St. George Order 4 degree. Maslov recalled that Skobelev was personally nominated by Kaufman for this award after in July he explored the section of the path that Markozov had not traveled and proved that this path was unsafe, in connection with which, as a result, Markozov was acquitted⁸². Maslov wrote that when Skobelev caught up with the detachment, he was *“radiant and pleased that he finally achieved what he so ardently desired”*⁸³.

In total, the Order of St. George of the 4th degree was awarded to 5 members of the expedition (Ivan Kvinitadze, Mikhial Skobelev, Fride Alexei, Evgeny Maximilianovich, the 5th Duke of Leuchtenberg, Alexander Buravtsov), two were awarded the Order of the 3rd degree (Nikolai Golovachev and Nikolai Verevkin), and the order of the 2nd degree was only the commander of the expedition, von Kaufman. Thus, 8 senior officers received the Order of St. George for the Khiva Expedition of 1873. All of them came from families of hereditary military⁸⁴. Prior to this, except Eugene Maximilianovich, 5th Duke of Leuchtenberg, they had already participated in hostilities.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 231 - 232.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 236

⁷⁹ Ibid, 237 - 238

⁸⁰ Ibid, 238

⁸¹ Ibid, 235 - 237

⁸² Ibid, 238- 239

⁸³ Ibid, 239

⁸⁴ It is unknown only about Alexander Buravtsov

Why Skobelev wanted St. George order so much? Order of St. George for sure increased status and improved career prospects, but for Skobelev and other heirs of military dynasties, this order meant not only career. Maslov did not recall that Skobelev also took care, for example, of a promotion or other types of awards. Skobelev himself gave answer to this question. He said that *"both my grandfather and father wore St. George's crosses, and I should be a Knight of St. George"*⁸⁵. Skobelev was an heir to a famous and noted military family. A high bar was set for him. Most likely, he felt that if he did not receive the St. George Order, he would, in one form or another, shame his ancestors. But not only a sense of duty to the family led Skobelev. He himself was an active person and just doing the minimum was not enough for him. According to Maslov, in this expedition Skobelev not only wanted to distinguish himself, but also to play an independent role⁸⁶.

Other members of the expedition were awarded less prestigious, but still valuable medals. Orders of St. Vladimir, St. Anna, St. Svyatoslav could be received not only by the military. Order of St. Vladimir gave hereditary nobility⁸⁷, and those who were awarded the Order of St. Anna 1st degree received the right to hereditary nobility. Holders of these orders received a pension.

Based on 300 award lists of members of the Turkestan, Mangyshlak, and Orenburg detachments, except for the Cossacks⁸⁸, it can be concluded that the main type of awards for participating in the campaign was promotion. Next in descending order were the Order of St. Stanislaus 3rd class, the Order of St. Anne 4th class "For Courage", the Order of St. Stanislaus 2nd class (Appendix 2). The higher the reward was, the less it was given out. There was a tendency that the lower the rank of the recipient was, the lower the status of the order he received. For example, colonels and lieutenant colonels were awarded the Order of St. Anne of the 2nd degree,

⁸⁵ Ibid, 210

⁸⁶ Ibid, 224

⁸⁷ Shishkov, *Nagrady Rossii 1698-1917 V. 2.*, 18

⁸⁸ Lists of awards for about 25% of the officers could not be found. Either they were not awarded, or the lists were lost.

then the ranks below were mostly awarded only the 3rd degree, but still some individuals were awarded the Order of the 2nd degree.

Participants were also awarded golden weapons. In the Russian Empire, it was customary to reward on behalf of the sovereign for military exploits only with edged weapons. They could only be awarded to ranks from ensign to general, who have already been awarded either the Order of St. Anna, 4th degree, or the Order of St. George, 4th degree⁸⁹. The award was considered very prestigious, because it could only be received for a specific feat on the battlefield. After campaign, only the highest ranks received the Golden Weapon as a reward. 21 people received the Golden Saber, adorned with diamonds, with the inscription "For Bravery", including 5 captains, 2 lieutenant colonels, 13 colonels and 1 major general⁹⁰. Just the Golden Saber with the inscription "For Bravery" was awarded to 6 participants (2 colonels, 3 adjutant wing). A golden checker with the inscription "For courage" was awarded to 2 colonels and 1 captain. These awards, although they seem generous, do not compare with the awards received by participants in major wars, such as Russo-Turkish War of 1877. During large-scale wars, legislation was even changed to award more military personnel, bypassing the usual restrictions.

Military decorations not only flattered vanity. The awards, especially the St. George Order, were recognition of merit and recognition of successful realization of a man as a military. The Khivan campaign was perceived as an opportunity for officers to finally realize itself. *"Well, what is it, please tell me, a military man who has never been to war, if not an architect or an architect, for example, who has not built anything in his life?"*⁹¹, said one of the Alikhanov-Avarsky' interlocutors, the officer who was going to take part in the campaign. Poltoratsky wrote that because the expedition at the time of his arrival in Tashkent was not yet foreseen, the world became

⁸⁹ Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov 1859., 755

⁹⁰ Ismailov E.E. *Spiski kavalerov svyatogo velikomuchenika i pobedonosca Geogiya za boevye otlichia 26 noyabrya 1769 - 1 sentyabrya 1880 [Golden weapon with the inscription For bravery. Lists of Cavaliers. 1788-1913]* (Moscow: Staraya Basmannaya, 2007), 285 - 287

⁹¹ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *Pohod v Hivu*, VIII

“colorless” for him⁹². After two and a half months, without participation, or at least the prospect of hostilities, he “*was exhausted to the edge*” and wrote that “*isn’t it desperately sad for those who came to Turkestan to revel in the glory of the feats accomplished in previous centuries*”⁹³. Poltoratsky was an old warrior and had already managed to earn a name and awards, but still, he could not stay on one place still.

Participation in a military campaign was the fulfillment of the mission of an officer, and the awards were a symbol of recognition of the fulfillment of this duty, the realization of the individual as a military man, as an officer. Participation in the Turkestan campaigns and in the Khiva Campaign of 1873 made it possible for officers to become heroes. Russian officers were romantic about the war. Officers saw their goal not in conducting an effective campaign, but in performing heroic deeds that would bring them orders and other benefits⁹⁴. The battles on the fields of Turkestan provided an opportunity to develop a heroic reputation. The army in the Russian Empire did not have such a disastrous reputation as the British army in the middle of the 19th century, to raise its reputation with the help of colonial campaigns, but there were few opportunities to participate in battles in 60-70⁹⁵. From the end of the Caucasian Wars in 1864 to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, only Turkestan was a place where the military could accomplish a "feat" and become "heroes". Participants in military campaigns in the Russian Empire were revered as heroes even if this military campaign ended in failure (Heroes of Sevastopol and the Crimean War 1853-1856). The Khiva campaign, which began in the harsh conditions of the desert, stood out and made the participants and the Russian public feel a sense of pride. For example, in the popular weekly magazine *World Illustration*, the following lines were written:

⁹² Poltoratsky, *Vospominaniya*, 129

⁹³ Ibid, 132

⁹⁴ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 77

⁹⁵ About this in Heroic imperialists in Africa: The promotion of British and French colonial heroes, 1870–1939

*This campaign, successfully carried out under conditions that have long been unimaginable for any of the European armies, this victorious struggle against tropical heat, thirst and all the unfavorable conditions of crossing vast sandy and deserted steppes, serves as a measure of what is capable of even after many years world army, eleven months defending Sevastopol ...*⁹⁶

Turkestan was a place where many militaries gained fame and a heroic reputation. For example, a few years before the Khiva Campaign, Mikhail Chernyaev took Tashkent without the permission of his superiors, for which he received great popularity in the press and the nickname "Tashkent Lion"⁹⁷.

In the late 1870s, many of "heroes", who gained experience and fame in Turkestan, ended up in the Balkans and took part in the Russo-Turkish War. Mikhail Chernyaev, dismissed from service for his willfulness, strengthened his fame as the commander-in-chief of the Serbian army, where he was considered a kind of symbol of Slavic unity and brotherhood. Mikhail Skobelev became a hero of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877, where he received the nickname "White General". There will also be Maksud Alikhanov-Avasky, Johann-Friedrich-Gustav Aminov, Evgeny Maximilianovich Duke of Leuchtenberg, Alexander Kaulbars, Vladimir Saranchev, Dmitry Rezvoy and many other participants of the Khiva Campaign.

Returning to the discussion of awards, it is important to note that awards and feats were not equal. Both the story of the Yomuds expeditions and Skobelev movement reveal this. Farcical episodes could be used to receive awards, and many situations were created specifically for receiving awards. Such behavior did not improve the reputation among the military. Maslov, who

⁹⁶ Vsemirnaya Illyustraciya [Worldwide Illustration.] 1873. Volume IX. №26, 2

⁹⁷ Menning Bruce W. 2000. *Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914*. Indiana University Press., 12

respected Skobelev, wrote about the episode about the caravan with a slight grin. Other authors also recall the desire of officers to receive awards and promotions without respect, and sometimes with contempt. Such careerists and award-seekers were called "pheasants". Morrison, quoting Alikhanov-Avarsky, noted that many so-called "pheasants" participated in the Khiva campaign⁹⁸. This term appeared even before the Turkestan campaigns and was often used in the Caucasus. Alexander Gaines, who managed to take part in the Crimean War and served in Turkestan, wrote in 1864:

*At present, those who come to the detachments for a short time, for awards, are called pheasants. Outward signs of them: an untanned face, a good frock coat, white gloves worn everywhere and a small bundle of things. Their appearance always predicted some good movement, which could break out in crosses, ranks and other blessings. This kind of pheasants were not a burden for the detachment; but it happened that among them there were those who positively harmed everyone: they came with the intention of commanding units ... God save if happened to get into such a column!*⁹⁹

Already mentioned Skobelev was subject to similar criticism. He partly looked like "pheasant" at least because he came to Turkestan with small luggage and with a great desire to excel. Some of his colleagues in the expedition called him "schemer" and "upstart"¹⁰⁰. Vladimir

⁹⁸ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 310

⁹⁹ Gaines K. 1866 "Pshekhskij otryad s oktyabrya 1862 goda po noyabr' 1864 goda" [Pshekh detachment from October 1862 to November 1864] St. Petersburg: Printing house of the appanage department, 133- 134

¹⁰⁰ Maslov, *Zavoevanie Ahal-Teke*, 224

Nalivkin was very suspicious of Skobelev's reconnaissance and generally called him "*not ours*"¹⁰¹. In these memoirs, he also cites the opinion of officer Nikolai Yermolov, who at the same time was a close acquaintance of Skobelev¹⁰²: "*Nothing, my soul, I don't know for sure; I can only tell you one thing - do not go to the General Staff Academy, they will corrupt you there, and you will also become a charlatan*"¹⁰³.

The problem with receiving rewards and other benefits through such farcical episodes was their insincerity. "Pheasants" in white gloves did not look like military men. The military, who had been in Turkestan for a long time, perceived such newcomers negatively since the latter without pain had gain. The officer environment was very sensitive to injustice and valued equal treatment¹⁰⁴. Such attempts to slip out of turn were remembered and spoiled the reputation.

It cannot be said that many ambitious officers wishing to satisfy their own interests influenced the decision on expeditions. There were reasons for the campaigns in Turkestan and they were discussed at length in St. Petersburg. There were exceptions, such as Mikhail Chernyaev's initiative to take Tashkent. However, this was only a few episodes. The campaigns in Turkestan were not entirely limited to the ambitions of the officers on the ground¹⁰⁵. The purpose of these theses is not to clarify the reasons for the conquest of Turkestan and how much the large number of striving officers from outside the high command influenced the frequency of the military campaigns there. However, it seems that if ambitious officers, if they did not influence the decision-making about military campaigns, then they used them to realize their ambitions.

¹⁰¹ Nalivkin V.P. *Moi vospominaniya o Skobelev* [My memories of Skobelev] in *Half a Century in Turkestan*. Vladimir Petrovich Nalivkin: *Biography, Documents and Works*, ed. Abashin S.N. et al (Moscow: Publishing House Mardzhani, 2015) 525 - 554, 530 - 531

¹⁰² Ibid, 529

¹⁰³ Ibid, 531

¹⁰⁴ Volkov, *Russkij oficerskij korpus*, 332

¹⁰⁵ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 256

However, even if they did not directly influence the decision to start expeditions, the ambitions of the officers influenced the course of the campaign itself. This can also be seen in the example of the Khiva Campaign. As already noted, decisions about the course of the expedition were influenced by the desire for rewards, and the detachments competed. Similar competition between detachments also distinguished other campaigns in Central Asia. In particular, the inconsistency of the strike during the assault on different columns, which wanted to preempt one another, served as one of the reasons for the crushing defeat of the Russian army in the First Battle of Geoktepe in 1879.

2.2. Financial issues

Not only the orders were of interest to the officers when they joined the campaign. Thus, Skobelev ordered his groom to count the wounds with a reason. The wounds testified to the zeal and devotion of the military. The officers understood that participating in a military campaign strengthened their negotiating position in resolving various issues. Often these issues were related to the deplorable state of the finances of the officers. Vladimir Poltoratsky recalled how, even before the Khiva campaign, he tried to get a special "higher guardianship", which helped to resolve property problems¹⁰⁶. With the help of acquaintances, relying on his merits and wounds, he was able to get it. One of the officials who helped him recommended placing special emphasis on the statement *«may the shed blood in the battles for the right to the special favor of your sovereign, the emperor, be counted to me»*¹⁰⁷. The same official then told Poltoratsky that the emperor considered all the merits and was impressed by the affairs of Poltoratsky in the Caucasus and Turkey. This episode shows that participation in military campaigns had a long-term effect, and awards and wounds could be appealed to if any issue needed to be resolved.

¹⁰⁶ Poltoratsky, *Vospominaniya*, 110 - 115

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 112

Poltoratsky himself went to Turkestan to improve his financial affairs. In 1862, he retired, but, as he himself writes in his memoirs, the prosperity was replaced by a loss of fortune and responsibility to his family forced him to put on his uniform again¹⁰⁸.

Many young people, voluntarily or at the request of their parents, went into military service to have a source of income¹⁰⁹. Considering the increasing marginalization of the landowning hereditary nobility due to the emancipation of serfs, many chose a military career for financial reasons. The salaries of the military in the Russian Empire were small in comparison with European countries¹¹⁰, but officers' income exceeded the cost of living and in 1872 their salaries were already raised¹¹¹. However, the spending of officers was enormous even in remote places from the capital. They strove to maintain, in their opinion, the standard of living necessary for their status as an officer and, consequently, sky-high spending¹¹².

Participation in a military campaign could help not only to consider the negotiating position of an officer, but also solve financial problems by replenishing his wallet with a cash reward. Participation in hostilities made it possible to significantly improve the financial situation. In addition to the fact that usually all officers received monetary rewards for participating in a military campaign, an additional pension was relied on for wounds and orders. The higher rank that could be obtained by participating in the campaign also led to higher wages and pensions later. All officers received monetary rewards for participating in the Khiva campaign. The emperor ordered to assign a one-time annual salary to officers *«for their labors and achievements and during the*

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 115

¹⁰⁹ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 38

¹¹⁰ Volkov, *Russkij oficerskij korpus*, 256

¹¹¹ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 87

¹¹² Ibid, 87

*Khiva campaign of 1873»*¹¹³. It was the highest amount of money that they could get since monetary award could not exceed the annual salary¹¹⁴.

The solution of financial problems as the main reason for serving in Turkestan for the officers indicated by Januarius MacGahan. In the 19th chapter of his book, he describes two portraits of Russians - an officer from the eminent noble family Andrei Alexandrovich and his former serf Ivan Ivanovich¹¹⁵. Andrei Alexandrovich came from an ancient noble family, and his father took part in the Napoleonic Wars. Andrei Alexandrovich was arranged for the Corps of Pages, where Andrei Alexandrovich communicated with the imperial family. Like many sons of the eminent nobles, he went to the elite Russian Imperial Guard corps, where he spent all his money in 3 years and suffered a financial ruin, since the life of a guard's officer required adherence to a strict code of conduct and huge expenses that not every family could withstand. As a result, Andrei Alexandrovich lost all his fortune, got into debt, and, unable to maintain the guard standard of living, moved from the guard to the army. As McGahan wrote, «*Andrei Alexandrovich finally has to choose one of the following three outcomes: marry a rich merchant's wife and thereby improve his fortune; try his luck in the civil service; or finally go to Turkestan*», and in the end, Andrei Alexandrovich chooses Turkestan, since «*the prospect of a charming revelry of camp life, with a double salary and a double opportunity to curry favor, is also drawn to the side of Turkestan*»¹¹⁶. These are again the three main motives that moved the officers to Turkestan and Khiva: interest in participating in military campaigns, the opportunity to earn (ranks and awards) and money. Many, like Andrei Alexandrovich (or Poltoratsky), lost money for one reason or another and went on military campaigns.

¹¹³ Russian State Military Historical Archive. Fund 1393. Inventory 1. File 42. Page 61

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 755

¹¹⁵ McGahan, *Voennye dejstviya na Oksuse i padenie Hivy*

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 238

McGahan noted that Turkestan began to play the role of the former Caucasus, where military clashes had ceased by that time, «*presenting a ready refuge for people like Andrey, who squandered their fortune, but have not yet lost their last hope of getting out of their position*»¹¹⁷. Andrei Alexandrovich's career was, to put it mildly, uneven. In Turkestan, Andrei Alexandrovich quickly wins ranks and orders for participating in hostilities (he received an order and two ranks for siege operations near the Ak-Meschet). For a duel with a fatal outcome, he was demoted to the soldier, but very quickly returned to his former rank and received several new orders. Due to an unsuccessful feat near the walls of Tashkent, he was again demoted to the rank and could not find an opportunity to curry favor before the Khiva campaign. It should be noted here that the officers and soldiers who were punished for any violations did not have the opportunity to curry favor. Participation in hostilities and exploits in them essentially served as the only opportunity for a military man with a fine to receive an order or promotion. After twenty years of service, he reached the high rank of ensign¹¹⁸. For the Khiva expedition, he was awarded the orders of St. Vladimir and St. Anna, and could receive a promotion, but refused this, since, in his opinion, the salary of an ensign and lieutenant is so insignificant. He was more interested in the money that his aunt would have sent him for receiving the Order of Vladimir¹¹⁹.

One might suspect that Russian soldiers also improved their financial situation at the expense of the vanquished, as often happens in wars. However, no mention of robberies by the Russians can be found in the sources. Apparently, most of the Russian military was counting only on awards from the state.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 238

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 238-240

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 241

2.3. Lust for promotion

Participation in battles could significantly speed up promotion to the next rank, but the period between promotion to the next rank were strictly observed. For example, officers could not be promoted to chief officer before two years of service in the rank, and to staff officer - not earlier than three years¹²⁰. In addition, promotion to the next rank depended on the number of available vacancies. Thus, even if an officer served the required number of years, he could not be promoted to the next rank if there were no vacancies.

Answering the question of who went to serve in Turkestan, Poltoratsky wrote that these were «*people who are hungry to exploit the still fresh land and clutching at straws so as not to drown completely; many went with the goal of improving situation, if not with money, then with a career*»¹²¹. The absence of hostilities was not beneficial for such people, since it was in them that they could advance and, as Poltoratsky wrote, during the calm period from 1867 to 1870, only the hope of a movement encouraged everyone¹²². Opportunities not only to be awarded, but also to build a career, attracted the military to Turkestan. Desire for promotion was mentioned less than desire for awards, although seemed important to the officers. It could be said that desire for promotion was on the second place for them. Poltoratsky described the case of lieutenant Abramov, who took part in the campaign against Kokand and Bukhara, and quickly rose first to a line officer, and then to a staff officer on duty. After three years in Turkestan, he had already become a major general¹²³. Terentiev also recalled the case of Abramov when he noted that the officers, fearing not to be awarded and promoted, did not argue with Kaufman. Thus, Terentiev

¹²⁰ *Svod voennykh postanovlenij 1869 goda. Kniga 8. Nagrady, pensii, posobiya i prizrenie chinov voennogo vedomstva: (po 1 yanvarya 1902 g.)* [Code of military regulations of 1869. Book 8. Awards, pensions, allowances and charity of the ranks of the military department: (until January 1, 1902)] (St. Petersburg: State Printing House, 1902), 24

¹²¹ Poltoratsky, *Vospominaniya*, 413

¹²² *Ibid*, 413

¹²³ *Ibid*, 413

wrote that *“the fabulous career of Abramov, who did not miss a single expedition and slipped from lieutenant to general in four years, tempted almost everyone”*¹²⁴.

Of course, in Turkestan, thanks to military operations, one could quickly rise through the ranks. This attracted military there, who in other places would have waited long time for a promotion. In Turkestan men quickly raised in ranks but fall quickly too. Andrei Alexandrovich, an acquaintance of MacGahan, lost everything several times and became a private, but then rose again, but eventually became an ensign from a guard's officer. Alikhanov-Avasky in 1873 received the rank of major, and in 1875 he was demoted to the ranks due to a quarrel with another officer. He became a major again only in 1884. Service in Turkestan allowed officers to both quickly earn ranks and orders, and quickly lose them.

The promotion was the most common award for the Khiva Campaign. Officers in the ranks of lieutenant, second lieutenant, and ensign, that is, the lower ranks of officers of higher ranks, received the most promotions. However, this does not mean that they were more likely to be promoted to a higher rank, since there were more of them in the total mass of officers. The command of the Khiva campaign received a promotion, even if they were already in high ranks before. For example, von Kaufmann was promoted to engineer general in 1874, Nikolai Lomakin was promoted from colonel to the rank of major general with seniority. On the other hand, the commander of the Orenburg detachment, Nikolai Verevkin, did not receive a promotion and remained a lieutenant general. Thus, promotion was a reward for all ranks.

More officers could get a promotion as a reward if it were not for statutory restrictions on promotion. Officers were required to serve for several years before they could be promoted to a higher rank. For some of those who were awarded, receiving orders was a substitute for promotion in rank, since they could not yet receive a higher rank due to their length of service. For example, Major Bek-Uzarov was offered to be awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel, but instead he was given the Order of St. Stanislav, 2nd degree, since he did not serve 2 years in the rank and,

¹²⁴ Terentiev, *Istoriya zavoevaniya Srednej Azii*, 176

according to the law, could not be promoted to a higher rank. He nevertheless received the rank of lieutenant colonel later, on November 22, 1874, when it was exactly 2 years since he was promoted to major¹²⁵. Also, Lieutenant Colonel Svishchevsky, since he did not serve and 2 years in the rank, was nominated for the Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree and the Golden Saber (did not receive)¹²⁶.

Officers were more interested in medals and monetary awards than promotion. Career was mentioned much rarer than them. There may be several reasons for this. The awards could really interest the officers more, since, as already mentioned, awards served as confirmation of the officer's fulfillment of his duty. Without participating in hostilities, having been a headquarters, it was possible to rise to a high rank. But what was such a rank worth if a military man, like a shoemaker without boots, "an architect who built nothing" did not take part in hostilities? This was in line with the traditions of the Russian officer corps. The desire for a career was acceptable in the eyes of the officers when it stimulated heroic deed, at least in their notes. Thus, Nikolai Glinetsky, a general who participated in the Crimean and Caucasian wars, wrote in 1887 that *"legal provisions relating to the production of ranks are also important for the moral strength of the troops: they support the spirit of ambition in the military personnel - this powerful spring of all military virtues"*¹²⁷.

In addition, even if the authors were interested in a promotion, they might not want to write about it directly, but leave only indirect evidence that someone else wanted a promotion, not say that this someone is them. The genre of war memoirs traditionally involves the celebration of patriotism and heroic deeds, so the authors pay more attention to heroic deeds and related awards

¹²⁵ Ibid, 362 -361, 367

¹²⁶ Ibid, 167

¹²⁷ Glinetsky N. Istoricheskij ocherk razvitiya oficerskih chinov i sistemy chinoproizvodstva v russkoj armii [Historical sketch of the development of officer ranks and the system of rank production in the Russian army] Military collection № 4, 1887

than to questions of career or money¹²⁸. Perhaps the authors did not hesitate to describe the desire to receive orders, since it was part of the desire for a feat, the fulfillment of one's duty as a military man. The desire for rank was more likely perceived as careerism, so the authors may have sought to mention the desire for rank less.

It should also not be overlooked that the awards significantly increased the chances of a promotion candidate to receive that promotion. Even without receiving a direct promotion in Turkestan for participation in the battles, the "new line in the resume" clearly added points to the candidate both when receiving a new appointment and when receiving other benefits.

From other side, this may be due to the nature of the sources on which this chapter is based. The authors referred to belonged to the old military dynasties and obviously could have been promoted in other ways. Alikhanov-Avarsky considers Skobelev's arrival in Turkestan as another facet of the latter's folly, since he *"voluntarily gave up a luxurious life on the banks of the Neva, he flew to Kinderly literally in what he was"*¹²⁹. One way or another, they could get a good place, if not officially, then through the informal connections that they acquired during their service, and that their relatives had. Orders were more difficult to obtain and because of this, they could be more attractive.

However, most likely the careerism of the officers (and solders) was limited. In 1860-1870 military service was not yet fully considered as a career¹³⁰. Milyutin's reforms were aimed to turn military service into a career, raising salaries, systematizing the pension process, and bureaucratizing the promotion process. Bruce Lincoln argued the reforms of the 1860s destroyed the foundation upon which the old Russian army rested, so a military force based on serfdom and aristocratic privileges could no longer exist¹³¹. John Bushnell, analyzing the prefomance of the

¹²⁸ Howard Michael, *'The Use and Abuse of Military History'* in *"The Causes of Wars and other Essays"* (London, 1983), 188 – 197.

¹²⁹ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *"Step and Oasis"*, 122

¹³⁰ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 135

¹³¹ Lincoln, *The Great Reforms*, 144

Russian army in the Russian-Turkish war, concluded that the equipment and railways worked well, but the army was still ineffective and reforms to professionalize the army have not yet yielded results¹³². By 1877 the reforms had failed to create an efficient military machine. Milyutin, among other things, because of the resistance of the traditionalists, could not create an army where professional competence would be a key criterion as a criterion for promotion to the highest military posts. The army that participated in the Khiva Campaign was even more similar to pre-reform army, than the army participating a few years later in the Russo-Turkish War, since in 1874 that a key reform was carried out to introduce conscription for all men, which incorporated the army more into society and made the army less of a separate world¹³³.

In 1873 their effect was not yet sufficiently noticeable and during the Khiva Campaign, the army was even more similar to the pre-reform one, when the officer service was either a pastime for rich nobles or a source of income for poor nobles¹³⁴. In 1860–70, when many nobles became impoverished due to the impoverishment of the nobility during the previous decades, they sent sons who were not needed on the estate or at home to the army so that the latter would have employment and a source of income¹³⁵. Obtaining the rank of colonel was the main goal of the service, since this position provided a lot of income, but not because of wages, but because of corruption, since the colonels were able to manipulate the regimental economy¹³⁶.

The system that existed in 1860 - 70 did not encourage achievements in the proper measure during promotion. It took into account the achievements of specific individuals less than the length of service and the recommendations of the commanders, therefore, even without differences, but having acquaintances, it was possible to advance in ranks. In 1873, there was only a fierce debate

¹³² Bushnell John “*Miliutin and the Balkan War, Military Reform vs. Military Performance*” In *Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881* (Indiana University Press, 1994)

¹³³ Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling. *From serf to Russian soldier*. Vol. 1076. Princeton University Press, 2014., xiii

¹³⁴ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 135

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 38

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 75

about the full-fledged opening of the officer corps for non-nobles. At hearings in the Senate about changes to the system, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the future main ideologist of the counter-reforms of Alexander III, vehemently opposed the opening of an officer corps for men based on talent, as this would mean the death of the aristocracy as a privileged class¹³⁷. Thus, reforms in the army that could significantly affect the promotion system and influence the attitude towards career growth among the military in Turkestan have not yet been carried out. And in general, the effect of military reforms is not yet noticeable on the military culture in Turkestan. Administrative and reforms and technological renewal have already affected the army, but the behavior and values of the military have not yet been significantly affected.

2.4. Campaign goals and personal goals

It could be seen that Khiva was just another place where the military could get awards and promotions, and Turkestan itself has no place in this story. This would mean that a significant part of the picture has been overlooked. What did they think of Khiva itself? Did they feel they were participating in a useless campaign?

For the officers, their personal interests were intertwined with the interests of the state. Describing his feelings and the feelings of his colleagues finally approached Khiva, Alikhanov-Avarsky wrote:

People seem to have been reborn and grown in their own opinion. And it is understandable: everyone was aware that he had participated in a difficult but brilliant campaign; that he overcame the desert, which is the most formidable of all the obstacles encountered by the troops; that he was a unit in that, in essence, a handful of people, to whose lot the honor fell to render

¹³⁷ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 31

*some service to Russia, breaking resistance and leading to the submission of the enemy, numerous and proud of the inaccessibility of his den; finally, everyone saw in the future awards that were completely unusual: it was already ordered to reward the officers for two awards, and the participants in the so-called Turkmen campaign, which will be discussed below, also for the third*¹³⁸.

They were looking forward to the rewards, they were proud of themselves that they had overcome such a difficult obstacle as the desert, and they were satisfied with their help to Russia. They did not participate in useless event to receive awards and money, but also helped Russia.

It is difficult to determine to what extent the officers were driven by patriotism. The officers almost identically explain the reasons for the Khiva Campaign (if they explain and care about it at all). This is a response to the "incitement" of Khivans¹³⁹. The people of Khiva did not want to establish "good" relations with the Russians and decided to face off with the "great power". In general, Khiva should have been punished for her insolence. Participants' memories are laced with a sense of racial and cultural superiority. As Michael Howard noted, the memoirs of the military do not imply a critical distance and are associated with the promotion of patriotism and honoring military exploits¹⁴⁰. In general, it seems that the reasons for the campaign for the officers were not as interesting as the process itself. For the military, previous unsuccessful attempts to conquer Khiva made the victory over this khanate even more desirable¹⁴¹. The impregnability of Khiva, the struggle with nature represented a hurdle that was very tempting to take.

¹³⁸ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *Pohod v Hivu*, 279

¹³⁹ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *Pohod v Hivu*, 15; Grodekoy, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, 1-2

¹⁴⁰ Howard, *The Use and Abuse of Military History*

¹⁴¹ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *Step and Oasis*, 114

The Khiva campaign stands among other campaigns of that period that Russia waged in Turkestan and other territories. The officers were not so much interested in the goals of the company as in their own interests. Instead of coordinated actions, they competed with each other, deliberately (or accidentally) ignored the orders of their superiors. The frivolous attitude is also noticeable in other military campaigns of the Russian Empire of that period. For example, in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877, they wanted to get promoted, earn medals for heroism, while they themselves were lounging and playing cards¹⁴².

However, unlike the Khiva campaign, many officers complained about their participation, since they did not want to join this war¹⁴³, while other had strong Slavic sentiment, which motivated them to take part in the battle even before the war was officially declared. In comparison with the war of 1877, the Khiva campaign was more perceived by officers as a means of satisfying their own interests.

If the protection of national interests in the memories of the participants is still somehow pecking, then the religious component could not be found. Perhaps there were officers who were driven by religious motives, but memories of them have not been preserved. However, most likely the officers, who were representatives of secular society, apparently were not interested in the religious component of the conflict (the Russian Empire was predominantly Orthodox, and Khiva was Muslim). As in the Caucasian wars, where for the highlanders the Muslim aspect was of great importance, the officers had no religious motivation¹⁴⁴. This distinguished them from the lower ranks, who, as will be noted below, had a religious resentment.

Participants and contemporary of the Khiva Campaign do not remember that the capture of the city of Khiva was followed by acts of violence. However, the expedition to Yomuds that

¹⁴² Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 188

¹⁴³ Ibid, 187

¹⁴⁴ Dubrovin A. V. "The image of the enemy" in the memoirs of Russian officers who participated in the Caucasian War of the XIX century" Bulletin of the Adyghe State University. Series 1: Regional studies: philosophy, history, sociology, jurisprudence, political science, cultural studies, no. 3, 2011, pp. 157-165.

followed was described by contemporaries as a "massacre"¹⁴⁵. Why did the Russian military not stop after the capture of Khiva and staged an expedition to the Yomuds?

Russian troops from time to time committed acts of violence against local residents. Ian Campbell, analyzing the capture of Geok-Tepe in 1880-1881, concluded that it was an act of violence, which was the result of the prevailing ideas about the "Asian" war among the Russian commanders¹⁴⁶. It was a kind of "pedagogical murder", that is, violence, the purpose of which was to teach the locals not to resist the colonial troops. Skobelev, who led the Akhal Tekni expedition, wrote, «I hold it as a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they will be quiet afterwards. We killed nearly 20,000 Turcomans at Geok Tepé. The survivors will not soon forget the lesson»¹⁴⁷.

The Yomud campaign was also a "pedagogical" act of violence. The commanders of the Khiva expedition considered it necessary to "pacify" the local Turkmens with the help of violence. The troops were ordered «*bring our forces to cruelly conquer and crush the regions*»¹⁴⁸. The order was executed. Although the main motive of the expedition to Yomud was "demonstrative flogging", Morrison, as one of the possible reasons for the expedition to Yomud, notes the desire of the high command to give officers the opportunity to receive more awards, so units that did not have time to take part in the capture of Khiva were sent to the expedition to Yomud¹⁴⁹. For participation in the expedition, officers and soldiers received additional awards that were so desired by them.

¹⁴⁵ McGahan, *Voennye dejstviya na Oksuse i padenie Hivy*, 265

¹⁴⁶ Campbell, Ian W. "Bloody Belonging: Writing Transcaspia into the Russian Empire" In *Empire and Belonging in the Eurasian Borderlands* edited by Krista A. Goff and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 35-47. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019.

¹⁴⁷ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 409

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 363

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 310

2.5. Military travelers, writers, artists, and researchers

Going to the colonies and joining the colonial wars, Europeans took on not only the role of soldiers, but also travelers. In the first half of the 19th century, when going to the Dutch East Indies for military service, Dutch soldiers not only performed military tasks, but also traveled in a way and subsequently published travel accounts of their experiences¹⁵⁰. English military and diplomats also tried on the roles of naturalists, geographers, and ethnographers¹⁵¹.

Russian officers kept up with their Dutch and English counterparts and used the opportunity to explore uncharted places. The officers in the Khiva campaign were not only military. Many of them realized their passions during the campaign. The Khiva Oasis remained almost inaccessible to the Russians until the Khiva Expedition of 1873. Rare reports of Khiva came from Russian prisoners, who were captured and sold as slaves in Khiva. The Russian officers were excited to get pioneering experience and explore this "terra incognita". Thus, in the earlier version of his book, Alikhanov-Avasky writes in the words of an officer *"before our eyes ... the veil under which terra incognita is hiding will be pulled down"*¹⁵².

Even before the start of the campaign, the officers were preparing to start writing travel notes. Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich, who was a member of the Turkestan Detachment, wrote to his father Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich (nephew of Alexander II) in a letter dated February 22, 1873:

¹⁵⁰ Honings, Rick. "Guardians of the Colony: Nineteenth-Century Military Travellers in the Dutch East Indies." *Studies in Travel Writing* 25, no. 4 (2022): 461–86

¹⁵¹ Pratt, Mary Louise. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge 2008), 58

¹⁵² Alikhanov-Avasky, "Step and Oasis", 114

Both of them¹⁵³ asked me to draw up, with my participation, travel notes of the entire journey, in which they think to include, in addition to events, everything that will amaze us and that may be of military, scientific and industrial interest. We propose to keep records in our own journals, and then, at every courier's departure, at every opportunity, bring them together and send them to you. I think this idea deserves your approval. At the same time, what I forget or what I don't know how to judge will be replenished by others. Therefore, if you allow, you can send them after your reading to the "Russky Invalid " for printing. Thus, a series of articles will be compiled like those that were published about Uncle Nizi's¹⁵⁴ trip to Egypt, but much more interesting for the Russian public, since Egypt is an accessible and well-known land, and we have a lot of new, unexplored. I will wait for your permission¹⁵⁵.

After the capture of Khiva, many notes and sketches were published in magazines. The sketches were published, in the popular magazines Vsemirnaya Illyustraciya¹⁵⁶ and Niva¹⁵⁷. For example, over the course of several issues, Vsemirnaya Illyustraciya magazine published drawings

¹⁵³ Podpolkovnik Kaulbars and Polkovnik Romanov

¹⁵⁴ Family nickname of the third son of Nicholas I, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich Sr.

¹⁵⁵ State archive of the Russian Federation. Fund 722. Inventory 1. File 806. Pages 114-116

¹⁵⁶ The magazine was one of the most popular magazines of its type in the Russian Empire and was published weekly with a circulation of 10,000 copies. Many well-known figures of literature and art collaborated with the magazine, in particular A. Chekhov, I. Aivazovsky, A. Vasnetsov, V. Surikov. Also, the Weekly was a pioneer in the creation of a military photo report in Russia, carrying out a phased survey of the course of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.

¹⁵⁷ Popular Russian weekly magazine positioned itself as a magazine for family reading. It published L. Tolstoy, F. Tyutchev, A. Chekhov

by Lieutenant Dikkoff under the heading "Khiva Campaign. From the travel book of a Russian officer" (1873)¹⁵⁸.

Not only drawings, but many pieces of writing were published after the campaign. Genres ranged from dry military travel accounts to scientific publications. Many of them have already been cited in this work, such as Alikhanov Avarsky's "Campaign to Khiva"¹⁵⁹ or "The Khiva Campaign of 1873. Actions of the Caucasian detachments" by Nikolai Grodekov¹⁶⁰. Other members of the expedition, not previously cited in this work, were also published. For example, Captain Kostenko published an article in the *Voennyj sbornik*, where he describes the structure of the city of Khiva and the life of the Khiva people¹⁶¹.

Articles, notes, books of the expedition members were full of ethnographic descriptions of the life and customs of the Khivans. However, there were special people in the Russian detachments who were entrusted with research in a variety of areas. Archaeological and historical research was carried out by Alexander Kuhn. While occupying the palace of the Khiva Khan, he collected many manuscripts and other relics. Researchers who joined the expedition collected zoological collections, investigated the botanical features, were engaged in astronomical research¹⁶².

The officers were engaged in the study of the area too. For example, lieutenant colonel Kaulbars explored the northern coast of the Amu Darya, and colonel Glukhovskoy made a study of the former channels of the Amu. Many others made many notes and observations, later used in

¹⁵⁸ For example, Dikkoff, Karazin N., Weierman K. *Hivinskij pohod. Iz putevoj knizhki russkogo oficera [Khivan campaign. From the travel book of a Russian officer]*. World illustration. Volume X. No. 22. November 24, 1873

¹⁵⁹ Alikhanov-Avarsky, *Step and Oasis*

¹⁶⁰ Grodekov, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, 1888

¹⁶¹ Kostenko L. *Ocherk Verhnechirchikskogo kraya; From Hivy do Kazalinska [Essay on the Verkhnechirchik region; From Khiva to Kazalinsk]*; Military collection, No. 11-12 (1873)

¹⁶² *Nauchnye raboty vo vremya Hivinskogo pohoda [Scientific work during the Khiva campaign]*. Turkestanskiye Vedomosti. No 50. December 18, 1873

scientific work on the Khiva Oasis. These people successfully combined military and scientific activities and received awards for both military distinctions and contributed to science. They were engaged in research not only in the Khiva campaign, but throughout their service. For example, Captain Kostenko was a founding member of the Central Asian Scientific Society and lieutenant colonel Kaulbars explored many new mountain passes of the Tien Shan.

Russian officers in the Khiva campaign of 1873 not only "performed their military duty" or earned orders and other awards. By joining the expedition, they received impressions. The experience of participation in the expedition contributed to their realization as a writer, artists, and researchers. It can be suspected that the lower ranks, who did not publish such notes, also received stories about the campaign that they could tell their children and grandchildren. However, the Khiva campaign of 1873 was not entirely unique in this regard since the rest of the expeditions in Central Asia also followed dozens of notes and drawings.

2.6. Summary

Russian officers came to Turkestan to realize their ambitions, improve their financial condition and to get new impressions. The ambitions of officers, although hardly influenced the frequency of military campaigns in Turkestan, certainly influenced the course of the campaigns themselves. This was clearly illustrated by the example of the Khivnian campaign of 1873, where many decisions were made not to increase the effectiveness of the campaign, but to receive medals and orders. There was a stratum of officers, called "pheasants" by their college. These officers viewed the Caucasus and Turkestan as a steppingstone in their careers. Many such pheasants joined the Khiva Campaign of 1873.

Awards and in particular medals interested the officers the most, as they expressed their success as military officers. Promotion was less interesting for them, although Turkestan was a place where officers could quickly move up the career ladder and many were attracted to this very

aspect. Service in Turkestan and participation in the Khiva campaign was seen to improve their financial situation, which was shaken by high costs in previous duty stations.

If they officers were interested in Khiva, it was only from the point of view of getting new impressions. Khiva itself attracted officers as an unexplored place where they could get unique experiences. Many officers during the campaign performed not only military functions, but also made notes and sketches, which were subsequently published. They were interested in Khiva as "terra incognita" and they were satisfied, having overcome such an obstacle as the desert and taking impregnable Khiva. They were less interested in state interests than their own.

Chapter 3. Lower Ranks

*The less a man is acquainted with the sweets of life,
the less reason he has to be afraid of death.*

Flavius Vegetius Renatus,
The Military Institutions of the Romans

3.1. Recruits and Volunteers

The lower ranks that participated in the Khiva campaign can be divided into three groups: recruits, volunteers, and Cossacks. Person could start serving as a volunteer. Volunteers had many privileges in compare with recruits. For example, volunteers could pass an exam for the right to be promoted in officers immediately upon entering the service and could retake it¹⁶³. In the middle of the 19th century, about half of the generals and more than half of the junior officers came from volunteers¹⁶⁴.

The group of volunteers consisted of servicemen of the most diverse social and ethnic backgrounds. This group was formed from children of merchants and philistines, as well as artisans and nobles who did not have either enough money or enough knowledge to immediately receive an officer's rank. Due to their heterogeneity, it is difficult to say for sure. Considering that they

¹⁶³ *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe T. XXXIII. 1858. [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection II T. XXXIII. 1858]* (St. Petersburg: Type. II Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, 1860)

¹⁶⁴ Volkov, *Russkij oficerskij korpus*, 397

independently and voluntarily entered the service, it can be assumed that they were striving for promotion and receiving awards.

Before the reform of 1874, which introduced the conscription, and after this reform, the reasons for which civilians entered the service were slightly different. The reform of 1874 introduced compulsory service for all men, but if a man voluntarily entered the service, these years could be much easier. Before 1874 men from the non-taxable estates were not threatened to enter the military service and they chose it voluntarily mainly for financial reasons or for to find a job. In fact, this point has already been discussed above, since many impoverished nobles first fell into non-commissioned officers, and only then received an officer rank.

The taxable estates were obliged to choose from the community several healthy young men aged 20 to 30 as recruits. With the introduction of recruitment duty in 1705, they served in army for the whole life, then the terms were gradually reduced and at the beginning of the reign of Alexander II, a 15-year conscript obligation was introduced. With the introduction of a 15-year recruitment service, the term of active service was set at 12 years and indefinite leave at 3 years. By the abolition of conscript obligation in 1874, the term of active service was about 7 years.

The officers instilled in the lower ranks the values of hierarchy and obedience to superiors¹⁶⁵. The main value for the soldiers was not honor, but submission¹⁶⁶. Russian peasants were accustomed to obey the landowner, and when they entered the service they obeyed the officers. Recruits could not choose their fate and went with the flow. Peasants cut off from their usual life by conscript obligation, and generally had little enthusiasm for military service¹⁶⁷. Military service was seen by many as a fate predetermined by a higher power, although many young people resorted to self-mutilation to avoid the fate of a recruit¹⁶⁸. The recruits were not

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 98

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 98

¹⁶⁷ Kormina Zh.V. *Provody v armiyu v poreformennoj Rossii [Seeing off to the army in post-reform Russia]* (Moscow: New Literary Review, 2005), 218

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 221

excited by wars, unlike officers or Cossacks. Mostly, they did not like the authorities and were afraid of the state¹⁶⁹. An eloquent portrait of a recruit in the Khiva campaign of 1873 was written by Januarius MacGahan¹⁷⁰. Ivan Ivanov was born a serf and entire generations of his ancestors were serfs. Ivan Ivanov was not distinguished by a particular refinement of morals, education, or an enlightened way of thinking; there was no free initiative in him.

The army and civil service in the Russian Empire were channels of social mobility. By the middle of the 19th, about 59% of the estate, and at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. - 66% of the nobility received their status for service¹⁷¹. In the pre-reform period, there was not a large choice of channels for social mobility for a man. Industry and trade were still poorly developed. Barriers to entry into the civil service were high and required at least being literate and belonging to the free class. The army welcomed everyone. The army was one of the few places where a peasant could learn to read and write and, with some luck and diligence, improve his social status, and representatives of other classes quickly climb the career ladder thanks to diligent service and exploits. However, during the first half of the 19th century, the conditions for obtaining nobility for military service became more complicated. For example, in 1856, in order to receive hereditary nobility, the qualification was again increased in military service to the rank of colonel (V class). In addition, in the post-reform era, the civilian service army as a channel of social mobility had competitors. Russian society became more complex in the post-reform period. Thanks to economic development and urbanization, new groups emerged between the old noble elite and the peasant masses. Deep-rooted structures changed slowly, but already in the late 60s and 70s, the growth of industry and trade became noticeable and social mobility in the Russian Empire became easier.

Promotion of officers from the lower military ranks of non-noble origin was common until the 1830s, but Nicholas I made it difficult for people from the non-noble class to receive an officer

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 224-225

¹⁷⁰ MacGahan, *Voennye dejstviya na Oksuse i padenie Hivy*, 1875

¹⁷¹ Mironov, B. N. *Russian Empire: from tradition to modernity* T. 1 (St. Petersburg: DMITRY BULANIN, 2014), 449

rank. Nevertheless, it was not the nobles who found their way into the officer corps. In 1864 - 30% of the officers came from non-nobles, including 20% came from lower ranks¹⁷².

The path of recruits to officers was the most difficult of all and the recruits had little prospect of finishing their long tour of duty as an officer and earning a rank in the Table of Ranks. There were several ways to get into the officer corps. Basic principle was that before being promoted to the officer rank, a person had to serve for some time as a non-commissioned officer and pass an exam. They were promoted for vacancies, that is, when there was a need for officers in a certain unit. In 1869, an updated regulation on entry into the service for volunteers was issued¹⁷³. According to this law, promotion in a non-commissioned officer could be carried out “by education” or “by origin”. For promotion to military officers “by education”, graduates of higher and secondary educational institutions had to pass an exam and spend from several months to a year in training camp, depending on education. Those who entered "by origin" firstly, after the exam, became non-commissioned officer. In 60-70, about half of the officers were recruited from non-commissioned officers¹⁷⁴. To be promoted to military officers, volunteers had to serve from 2 to 6 years depends on their estate. In 1860–1870, most were promoted to officers “by origin”¹⁷⁵. Those who entered the military service as recruits could also receive an officer's rank. To do this, they were required to serve 10 years, of which 6 years as a non-commissioned officer and 1 year as a senior non-commissioned officer. After serving this term, a recruit could enter the Junker schools. All those who passed the examinations for the officer rank before being promoted to officers were called harness-junkers.

Participation in a military campaign and deeds could not be a reason for receiving the first higher rank. During periods of large-scale or important military conflicts for Russia, the promotion

¹⁷² Mironov, *Russian Empire: from tradition to modernity*, 450

¹⁷³ *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii. Sobranie vtoroe T. XLIV. 1869. [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Collection II T. XLIV. 1869](St. Petersburg: Type. II Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, 1873)*, 198

¹⁷⁴ Volkov, *Russkij oficerskij korpus*, 368

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 359

to officers was accelerated. During some wars, such as the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the rules for the promotion to the officer rank were facilitated and the first officer rank could be obtained by military distinctions without an exam and for shortened terms of service. Same, during the Polish uprising of 1863, all graduates of higher educational institutions were accepted as non-commissioned officers without an exam and were promoted to officers after 3 months without vacancies. However, this did not apply to the Khiva Campaign of 1873.

The army allowed people with different backgrounds to rise up the career ladder, but Wirtschafter noted that in the first half of the century a strong distinction between noble and non-noble officers persisted¹⁷⁶. The nobles stayed in their social circles, and the officers from the servile classes remained very close to the soldier's way of life. Reese argued that the wall between officers from the nobility and officers from the non-nobles did not collapse even after the reforms¹⁷⁷. Even the descendants of officers who received nobility through service experienced some discrimination from officers from hereditary nobles.

There were examples when a recruit made a brilliant career. For example, the father of one of the key commanders of the white movement Anton Denikin, Ivan Denikin, came from serfs and was recruited into the army. For distinction in the Crimean War, he was promoted to sergeant major, and after that he successfully passed the exams for the officer rank and was promoted to ensign. He finished his service with the rank of major. The issue of social mobility in the army of the Russian Empire still needs to be studied, but even the data on the Khiva Campaign show that the lower ranks did not receive many awards and did not receive promotion on the same scale as officers.

Compared to officers, only a small proportion of the lower ranks received promotions as an award for the participation in the Khiva Campaign. In the Orenburg detachment, more than half of the officers received a promotion, while non-commissioned officers and privates only about

¹⁷⁶ Wirtschafter. *From Serf to Russian Soldier*, 51

¹⁷⁷ Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace*

1.5%¹⁷⁸. Promotion to the first higher officer rank and received only a few dozen people. For the harness-junkers, that is, those who had already passed the exams and were waiting for promotion to the first higher officer rank, participation in the Khiva Campaign became a real opportunity to finally receive an officer's rank. For example, major General Golovachev asked to submit two harness-junkers of the 4th Turkestan line battalion Nikolaev and Reingradt for their promotion to warrant officers¹⁷⁹. In total, 34 harness-junkers and non-commissioned officers of the troops of the Turkestan, Orenburg and Mangyshlak detachments were presented for promotion to officers¹⁸⁰. This was about 3.5% of the number of non-commissioned officers who participated in the Khiva Campaign.

If for the higher ranks service and participation in the Khiva Campaign of 1873 in particular was a matter of money or occupation, then for the recruit service was a duty. Duty, which, although the young man did not want to serve, he was obliged. “*Let serve the tsar. What to do, and it's a pity, it is necessary!*”, said one of the old men of the Bechevinsky region¹⁸¹

A Russian peasant who lived in serf relations until 1861 and continued to live under the yoke of the former owners after, outwardly obeying instructions unquestioningly, but did not expect that their social superiors would improve their situation, although they wished this¹⁸². And a military campaign could really improve it, albeit with a small probability.

When moving from higher ranks to lower, the stream of awards turned into a thin stream. This is noticeable in the example of awards for the Khiva campaign. In relation to the total number of lower ranks, the number of those awarded was much less than that of the higher ranks. For example, in the Orenburg detachment, 105 people were presented for the insignia of a military

¹⁷⁸ Russian State Military Historical Archive. Fund 1393. Inventory 1. File 51, P. 109

¹⁷⁹ Russian State Military Historical Archive. Fund 1393. Inventory 1. File 57, P. 7.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 23

¹⁸¹ Baranov D., Konovalov A. *Russkie krest'yane. ZHizn'. Byt. Nrvy. T. 7. Novgorodskaya guberniya. [Russian peasants. Life. Everyday life. Morals. V. 7. Novgorod province]*. (St. Petersburg: Business printing, 2004), 252

¹⁸² Reese, *The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution*, 100

order, 306 people for a monetary award, 46 people for promotion, and 11 people for forgiveness of fines¹⁸³. In total, there were 2880 lower ranks in the detachment¹⁸⁴. At the same time, almost every officer was awarded in one way or another. About half received a promotion, and almost all received one or more awards. All officers received monetary awards.

The lower ranks were awarded cash rewards ranging from 5-6 rubles to 90 rubles or an annual salary. Largest monetary awards (on average, more than 30 rubles and up to an annual salary) were received by medical personnel. The lower ranks received small monetary awards in absolute terms. They ranged from 5 to 25 rubles. However, these amounts were significant in relation to the wages of the lower rank. The increased salary of an ordinary infantry was 5 rubles 25 kopecks, and the increased salary of a sergeant major was 36 rubles¹⁸⁵. Monetary rewards, although not universal as among officers, could temporarily improve the financial condition of the lower ranks.

Based on their merits, the expedition members also asked for help. For example, retired non-commissioned officer Mikhail Ivanov asked von Kaufmann in August 1874 *«for his service in the Turkestan military district entrusted to you and forgetfulness on the expedition on the ship of the Aral flotilla against the Khivans»* financial assistance. The request was granted¹⁸⁶.

Another award was the st. George Cross, that is Insignia of the Military Order of St. George. For the lower ranks, the equivalent of the Order of St. George was the Insignia of the Military Order (George's Cross). It also had 4 degrees. Those, who was awarded by George's Cross, received an increased salary (from a 1/3 to 1,5), depending on the degree of the order. This increment kept even after dismissal from military service and was paid to the widow after death

¹⁸³ These were overlapping sets

¹⁸⁴ Grodekov, *Hivinskij pohod 1873 goda*, appendix 53-59

¹⁸⁵ Obruchev N. N. *Voenno-statisticheskij sbornik [Military statistical collection]* (St. Petersburg: Military printing house 1871), Part 2, 157

¹⁸⁶ Russian State Military Historical Archive. Fund 1393. Inventory 1. File 42, P. 71

within a year¹⁸⁷. Those who were awarded the Order of St. George were automatically promoted to a higher rank¹⁸⁸. The George Cross was awarded to both privates and non-commissioned officers.

3.2. Cossacks

The Cossacks had a feature that distinguished them from the other two groups. They had their own accounts with the Khivans. If for other lower ranks Khiva was most likely just another place where the authorities sent them, then for the Cossacks the victory over the Khiva was important itself.

The Cossacks who participated in the Khiva Campaign belonged to the Orenburg and Ural Cossack troops, two of the ten that existed in the Russian Empire at that time. 5 hundreds of Ural Cossacks and 9 hundreds of Orenburg Cossacks participated in the Khiva campaign.

The Ural Cossacks arose at the end of the 16th century, and the Orenburg Cossack Host was established in the 18th century to guard the Russian borders from nomads. The main goal of the life of the Cossacks was serving the state and the fatherland¹⁸⁹. If for recruit's service and participation in military campaigns was perceived rather negatively, then for the lower ranks of the Cossacks it was rather positive, but it was also their duty, and not a career. The Ural and Orenburg Cossack troops participated in almost all the wars waged by Russia. However, their main function was border guards.

For centuries, the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks faced the inhabitants of the steppe in battles. The Cossacks defended the borders of Russia from the invasion of the nomads of Central Asia, and sometimes they themselves visited them. The first recorded campaign against Khiva was

¹⁸⁷ Shishkov, *Nagrody Rossii 1698-1917* V. 2., 154

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 38

¹⁸⁹ Kotovchikhina, Natalia. "Sociocultural characteristics of the cossacks" *Revista Inclusiones* 7.S3-2 (2020): 280-292.

undertaken by the Ural Cossacks in 1605. Descriptions of the campaign were preserved in Khiva sources, while the Cossacks had only one legend about it¹⁹⁰. The Cossacks broke into the city of Urgench, cut down its inhabitants, took the best goods from it, took women with them, and tried to go back to Russian territory. However, the Khiva Khan found out about the raid of the Cossacks and chased after them and destroyed the detachment.

Cossacks participated in all campaigns against Khiva. They were members of the detachment of Prince Bekovich-Cherkassky in 1714-1717 and joined the campaign against Khiva under the command of the Orenburg Governor-General V. A. Perovsky in 1839-1840 (see Chapter 2). They became active participants in the conquest of Turkestan in 1860-1880. The Cossacks have been in constant service in Turkestan since 1853 and year after year their number has increased.

The memory of these campaigns remained with the Cossacks for a long time. The Cossack writer and researcher of the life of the Ural Cossacks, Ioasaf Zheleznov, collected many stories of the Ural Cossacks, including ones about Khiva¹⁹¹. Zheleznov had a conversation with the old Cossack A. D. Barsukov, a member of Perovsky's campaign against Khiva. This testimony does not refer to the Khiva campaign of 1873, but sheds light on the attitude of the mass of Cossacks to Khiva and campaigns against Khiva. Although several decades passed between Perovsky's campaign of 1839-1840 and the Khiva campaign of 1873, it can be assumed that the thoughts expressed by Barsukov continued to hover in the minds of the Cossacks in 1873.

Barsukov remembered past unsuccessful campaigns and tried to comprehend the reasons for this. «*Khiva is a cursed country; for the time being, it is impossible to subdue it with any forces*», said the old Cossack¹⁹². He thought that a spell had been cast on Khiva, which prevented

¹⁹⁰ Ivanin M.I. *Opisanie zimnego pohoda v Hivu v 1839–1840 godu [Description of the Winter Campaign to Khiva in 1839–1840]*. (St. Petersburg: printing house of the partnership "Public benefit", 1874), 328

¹⁹¹ Zheleznov, *Ural'cy*

¹⁹² Ibid, 76

both Berkovich from capturing it and Perovsky from reaching Khiva. Recalling Perovsky's campaign, he said:

«I say, we have a rumor that there will be a campaign against Khiva; our people are depressed. Not because I was depressed that the campaign - we are no strangers to hiking - but because we are going to Khiva, that's the problem! It comes from our ancestors that Khiva will be taken in recent times, at the same time as Jerusalem and Tsaregrad; this is supposedly written in books. I don't want to lie myself; I have never read in books about Khiva, but I have read about Tsaregrad myself; I even have a list about Tsaregrad and about the Antichrist; do you want me to show you?

..... Khiva is not mentioned here; yes, after all, I told you that I myself have not read about it anywhere; I can only assure you that it comes from our ancestors that somehow they will conquer Khiva, so they will go around the world to Jerusalem, and from Jerusalem again around the world they will go to Tsargrad; and as soon as Tsargrad is taken, the world will end!¹⁹³

Thus, in the view of the Cossack, Khiva was connected with Jerusalem and the Apocalypse. The Cossacks were very religious. The anti-Muslim resentment among the highest ranks not noticeable and, at least on paper, they did not care about opponent's religion, but the Cossacks had completely different views. Orthodoxy determined the life path of the Cossack from the first day of their life, and in their system of values, Orthodoxy occupied the first place along with serving Russia. For the Cossacks, the fight against Khiva was not only a fight against the enemy of Russia,

¹⁹³ Ibid, 91-92

but also against the “infidels”. The Cossack song about the Khiva campaign of 1873, which was recorded and published by Alexander Myakutin at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, had the following lines:

Let's stand with our chest on the infidels,

God and the Tsar are with us, hooray!

Let's go guys

On Khiva Khan.¹⁹⁴

And the old Cossack interlocutor of Zheleznov shares the memory of the campaign of Berkovich-Cherkassky: “... *from all places the Khiva people gathered in Khiva to the Khan to celebrate, according to their filthy faith, a blasphemous triumph over the Russian*”.¹⁹⁵

Not only faith inflamed the antagonism of the Cossacks to the Khivans. For decades, captured Cossacks were sold as slaves in Khiva¹⁹⁶. Talking about the campaign of Perovsky, the old Cossack Barsukov remembered the song that the Cossacks often sang on the campaign. It contains the following lines:

All Khiva will perish here.

We will rescue from captivity

Our countrymen;

Let's smash all Khivans-scoundrels¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Myakutin, *Pesni orenburgskih kazakov*, 204

¹⁹⁵ Zheleznov, *Ural'cy*, 80

¹⁹⁶ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 88

¹⁹⁷ Myakutin, *Pesni orenburgskih kazakov*, 119

The Cossacks in 1839-1840 went not only to fulfill the order, but also to save their comrades from the Khiva captivity. Did the Cossacks want the same three decades later? In 1873, most likely, there was most likely no one to save, because the Khivans released all Russian prisoners, trying to prevent a confrontation with Russia¹⁹⁸. However, the memory of the Cossacks was not short. In 1839 they remembered previous failures and those who died in Khiva, and sought to avenge them:

*Let's go, brothers, to visit Khiva,
Let's break their gates
And Bekovich's bones
Let's bring it here with us;
And for death and for insult
We'll have a memorial service there:
Instead of a palm smoke
Military smoke with cast iron¹⁹⁹.*

Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich also recalls the bad attitude of the Cossacks towards the Khivans. Describing the Orenburgers, he notes «*Joy was written on the faces of all those going on a campaign (Khivans are hated by everyone here, because every year they kill someone and where they can only profit)*»²⁰⁰

In 1873, when Khiva was finally conquered after so many attempts, the Cossacks were satisfied. The severity of the campaign, past failures, a long history of confrontation with Khiva made the victory of 1873 even more valuable. The Cossacks fulfilled their duty, and their feat was recognized. The following lines were written about this:

¹⁹⁸ Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia*, 316

¹⁹⁹ Myakutin, *Pesni orenburgskih kazakov*, 133-135

²⁰⁰ State archive of the Russian Federation. Fund 722. Inventory 1. File 806. pp. 117-118

*Glory to us! Khivan wild
Bowed his head;
What did Peter the Great think
Alexander completed!
For this, the Tsar sent us "thank you"
And medals to all troops;
To the ends of the world we would go
For being so kind to us!
Bekovich went on a campaign in the old days,
And Perovsky stood up,
But their campaigns are gone,
And for a long time their trace disappeared
Only our harsh campaign
Will be remembered, will be honored;
But now it is not new for us
to serve the White Tsar! ²⁰¹*

In their war songs, the Cossacks expressed their satisfaction with participation in the campaign, including because it was the Khiva Campaign of 1873 that was able to achieve the goal and conquer the Khivans.

3.3. Summary

²⁰¹ Myakutin, *Pesni orenburgskih kazakov*, 201-202

For the lower ranks, participation in military campaigns provided far fewer opportunities than for officers. Most of the lower ranks were recruits for whom the main value they brought from civilian life was obedience to superiors. For them participation in Khiva Campaign was another stage of a long service and fulfillment of their duty to the Tsar.

The lower ranks were awarded for participation in the campaign, but their awards cannot be compared with the awards of officers. The lower ranks were given the St. George Cross, which gave them a number of privileges, as well as monetary rewards and promotions, but the lower ranks were awarded less than the higher. Only a few participants of the campaign were able to go to the officer rank, but they had already passed the exam and were ready for promotion to the officer rank even before the campaign, they were just waiting for a vacancy.

Most of the lower ranks were rather indifferent to Khiva and the goals of the campaign, however, part of the Russian military, namely the Cossacks, had their own scores with Khiva. They wanted to develop with the Khivans for their previous failures.

Conclusion

In 1860-1870 the Russian Empire was in the process of major structural reforms. The army, which lost in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, was also reformed. Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin, who developed and implemented the reforms, aimed to increase the effectiveness of the Russian army, and turn military service into a career. However, the Khiva campaign of 1873 shows that at the beginning of the 70s these goals were still far from being fulfilled.

This thesis complements the discussion of the Turkestan campaigns carried out by the Russian Empire and Russian military culture in the second half of the 19th century, discussing these themes on the example of the Khiva Campaign of 1873. The Khiva campaign of 1873 was a continuation of the conquest of Turkestan by the Russian Empire, begun several decades earlier and intensified in 1860-1870. The Khiva campaign was prompted by a matter of prestige and security, as well as by the personal interest of the governor of Russian Turkestan, Konstantin von Kaufmann. Four Russian detachments had to overcome tens of miles through waterless deserts and steppes and conquer Khiva. Despite long planning, the expedition nearly ended in failure even before reaching the city. The detachments competed for who would be the first to reach Khiva and conquer the city. The decision-making during the campaign was influenced by the ambitions of the officers who wanted to receive more awards. As a result, only 3 out of 4 detachments reached Khiva and, as a result, the city was taken. The capture of the city was followed by an expedition against one of the local Yomud tribes, which in fact represented an act of intimidation and was described by many authors as a "massacre".

This thesis discussed what the officers wanted to get from participating in the campaign and what benefits they received from participating in the Khiva Campaign of 1873. Russian officers wanted to take part in the Khiva Campaign primarily to receive awards, they were especially interested in orders and medals. Officers strived for orders because in their environment the orders were considered prestigious (especially the Order of St. George) and the awarding of

the order was an expression of their self-realization as officers. The officers were also interested in improving their financial well-being through service in Turkestan and participation in military campaigns, including Khiva Campaign. In 1860-1870, many officers who came from noble families found themselves in a difficult financial situation due to large expenses. They considered Turkestan as a place where they could solve their financial problems. In addition, the officers also desired to get promoted by serving in Turkestan and participating in military campaigns. However, this interest was less pronounced than the desire for awards or money, including due to the rigid system of promotion in the army. The military could speed up promotions by participating in military campaigns, but many restrictions remained, and promotions depended on commanders. However, promotion was one of the main types of awards for participation in the Khiva Campaign of 1873. Officers received promotion by one rank. In addition, all officers received a monetary reward in the amount of one salary (maximum) and were also generously presented with orders.

The officers were pleased when the detachments were able to take the city, not only because of awards, but also because they were able to provide, in the words of one of the participants, "a service to Russia". However, the reasons for the campaign and Khiva itself as an adversary interested the officers much less than satisfying their own interests. Russian officers were interested in Khiva as "terra incognita", a place that they can explore as pioneers. Many officers during the campaign took on not only the role of the military, but also writers, artists, and researchers, publishing a large amount of material on the campaign in subsequent years.

The lower ranks were far less enthusiastic about the Khiva Campaign. Most of lower ranks were recruits who joined the military service not voluntarily and who did not have great career prospects. They were not proactive and basically obeyed the orders of the officers. Rewards for the lower ranks were much less generous. The lower ranks received medals, which conferred less privileges than officers, as well as financial rewards, which were also less than officers, and some received promotions. For several lower ranks, the Khiva campaign became an opportunity to move

from lower ranks to officers. However, it is worth the fate that these military men had already passed the exam and were ready for the transfer and were only waiting for an opportunity to do so.

The other part of the lower ranks were the Cossacks, who were hereditary soldiers. They were much more excited about taking part in the campaign, not only because of the opportunity to fulfill their role as soldiers, but also because they had their own attitude towards the Khivans specifically. If other members of the Russian detachments were almost not interested in Khiva, the Cossacks were eager to settle scores with the Khivans, who for centuries took their comrade as slaves and whose campaigns ended in failure several times. The Cossacks were satisfied that they were finally able to conquer Khiva.

The army was one of the pillars of the Russian Empire, and an impressive part of the adult male population of the Empire was employed in military service. In this work, the Russian imperial army in the reform period was analyzed to investigate what benefits Russian common soldiers and officers could get from participation in colonial campaigns on the example of the Khiva Campaign. Using the conclusions of this work, it is possible to continue studying the army as an institution in Russian Empire in the turbulent period of the second half of the 19th century.

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Appendix

Appendix 1. Military ranks

Rank	Army			
	Infantry	Cavalry	Cossacks	Artillery and engineering troops
I	Field Marshal General			
II	General of the Infantry	General of the cavalry	General of the artillery	General of the Infantry
III	Lieutenant General			
IV	Major General			
V	Colonel			
VI	Lieutenant colonel			
VII	Major		Army foreman	Major
VIII	Captain	Rittmeister	Esaul	Captain
IX	Staff-Captain	Staff-Rittmeister	-	Staff-Captain
X	-	-	-	-
XI	Lieutenant		Sotnik	Lieutenant
XII	Second Lieutenant		-	Second Lieutenant
XIII	Ensign	Cornet	Standard-bearer	-
XIV	Second Ensign		Second Standard-bearer	Second Ensign

	Feldwebel	Wachtmeister	Wachtmeister	Feldwebel
	Non-commissioned officer		Senior Constable	Senior Feuerwerker
	Junior non-commissioned officer		Junior Constable	Junior Feuerwerker
	Gefreiter		Prikáznyj	Bombardier
	Private		Cossack	Cannoneer

Table 1. Higher and lower ranks (in descending order)

Source: Ganichev, P. P. *Voinskie zvaniya [Military ranks]* Moscow: Publishing house DOSAARF USSR, 1989., 11

Appendix 2. Officer awards




Figure 2. Officer awards

Constructed by author based on Russian State Military Historical Archive. Fund 1393.

Inventory 1. File 27. PP. 13-20, PP. 63 - 90