CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2023
| Author | Borcin, Nevim |
|---|---|
| Title | The Theoretical Underpinnings Of Aristotle's Practical Philosophy |
| Summary | Abstract This dissertation argues that when Aristotle constructs his arguments in his ethics (political science more broadly), he sometimes, though not always, appeals to concepts, principles, or accounts of his metaphysics, physics, and psychology and thus, his practical philosophy is dependent on his theoretical philosophy to a considerable degree. In chapter 1, I examine EN vii 1.1145b2-7, a methodological statement that has widely been taken as the clearest announcement and application of dialectical methodology. I challenge the received interpretation of EN vii 1 and argue for a deflationary and non-dialectical account which conforms with Aristotle’s scientifically oriented general methodology. I argue that Aristotle’s practical philosophy follows a scientific method as employed in other scientific treatises which argue from facts and observations rather than endoxa, i.e., reputable opinions, as such. In chapter 2, I argue that the ergon, i.e., the function, of human beings in the ergon argument at EN i 7 must be construed against a teleological framework of Aristotelian natural science. I show that the concept of ergon is used in the same sense as it has been argued for in extra-ethical treatises. I argue that this reading does not entail the following two claims: First, human beings are not analogous to artificial tools or bodily parts in terms of their ergon. Second, natural teleology that operates strictly in the case of other living beings does not determine human beings in the same way. Human beings require certain internal and external enabling conditions to complete their form. In chapter 3, I turn to the Protrepticus an early text devoted to making exhortations to do philosophy. I argue for the following claims: First, Aristotle coherently defends the view that while theoretical knowledge is intrinsically valuable and choiceworthy as an end in itself, it has some accidental utility in practical life. Second, Aristotle considers theoretical knowledge of the human end, the human soul, and its parts as a requirement for the good person or politician to perform fine actions and lay down good laws. Third, the theoretical knowledge required for the good person or politician has to be construed in a non-minimalist sense, that is, it cannot be gained by mere observation or experience but rather by doing philosophy to some extent. Fourth, the non-minimalist requirement of theoretical knowledge for the good person or politician is retained in Aristotle’s later, more mature treatises. In chapter 4, I take up a vexing question in Aristotle’s political science. Aristotle believes that some people can be enslaved without injustice on the basis of their nature. The question of how we should understand the nature Aristotle ascribes to the natural slave is a matter of contention. I argue that the natural slave is a legitimate human being who nevertheless has an ineliminable rational deficiency. Moreover, because natural slaves share the same defining ergon with the rest of human beings, Aristotle’s theory of human nature that grounds his political science is not inconsistent. |
| Supervisor | Bodnár, István |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2023/borcin_nevim.pdf |
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