MEMORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: PREJUDICE FORMATION AMONG YOUNG MEMBERS OF THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA

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ABSTRACT

National identity finds its bases not only inside the community one belongs to, it also refers to the outgroup members and requires comparison with them. To put it differently, national identity does not only tell "who we are", but it also tells "who we are not". In some cases, the differences with other groups are perceived as interesting things to explore, in others, only the similarities are highlighted, and sometimes, these differences are used as a basis for prejudice, hatred, and even violence towards other groups. Scholars suggest that Armenian national identity has relied on the sense of victimhood and evil images of Turkish people for decades. This perception is stemming from the Armenian Genocide that happened in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and multiple waves of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in which Turkey supports Azerbaijan against Armenia. Thus, prejudices toward Turkey and Turks are intertwined in the discourse of Armenian presidents and the attitudes of ordinary people who still experience collective trauma many generations later. Although a lot of scholars explore prejudice, only a few of them pay attention to how the memory of traumatic events in a distant past is still retained in everyday practices in the form of prejudice. Moreover, they mostly study prejudice among dominant social groups against minorities. This paper shows that prejudice towards Turkish people plays an important role in the national identity building of the Armenian diaspora in Russia and the USA for decades. Thus, the thematic analysis of the 12 interviews shows three main mechanisms that (re)produce prejudice and sustain it across generations: (1) the country and regional context, (2) family context, and (3) individual political views and political context.

Keywords: prejudice, national identity, genocide, Armenian identity, diaspora, victimhood, collective trauma, enemy images, semi-structured interviews.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

While social scientists, NGOs, and various social agents explore the function of prejudices and the ways to eliminate them, authoritarian governments continue to reproduce stereotypes, discrimination, and evil images. As researchers show, without categories and different assumptions about people and objects around us, it would not be impossible to think about the world (Skey, 2011). And although neither social categorization nor prejudice are "bad" in their nature, they often lead to negative consequences even if they contain "positive" assumptions about some group (Brown, 2010). That is because prejudices distance people and create an "unbridgeable gap" between those who carry prejudices (often majorities) and those who face them (often minorities) contributing to the exclusion of the minorities from the "national [or any other] ingroup" (Brown, 2010; Hadarics et al., 2017, p. 24). Consequently, the stigmatization and inequality continue to prosper sometimes leading to acts of violence like physical attacks, hate crimes, and ethnic cleansing (Allport, 1954), (Appendix I). But before trying to eliminate prejudices or making people more aware of them, one should explore what are the mechanisms of their transmission and what are their functions. This is one of the goals of the paper, thus, this research has an important public relevance.

Although there are researchers who explore the role of prejudice, its function, and its connection to national identity, most of them focus on Western countries. Moreover, they mostly study prejudice among dominant social groups against minorities, believing that minorities are more empathetic towards others, since they know how tough it is to face discrimination. The case of Armenian diaspora members who carry prejudice against Turks shows that minorities also have prejudices. However, this research contributes to the scholarly debate not only because of that. It has academic significance also because, firstly, prejudices of the Armenian diaspora members are turned towards a group with which there is currently

little direct social interaction and experience. Secondly, it shows the long-term effect of collective trauma, in this case the Armenian Genocide of 1915, on prejudice among a group that has been for a long time victimized.

The Armenian identity heavily relies on collective trauma and a sense of victimhood which are based on a set of tragic events including the genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire in 1915, earthquakes of 1988, and multiple waves of the Nagorno-Karabakh wars. All the events are used as a basis for the sense of victimhood. According to the research of social and political psychologists, collective victimhood is "a state of mind that is brought into being by society members and transmitted to the members of new generations" (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 237). It often relies on real experiences and events and on the social construction process that also engages with collective trauma, collective memory, and collective identity processes (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Smelser et al., 2004). Collective victimhood allows to exploit old fears and hatred and mobilize people of common identity (national, e.g.) in conflicts (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). To illustrate, for a long time, starting from 1991, Armenian presidents have regularly presented Turkish people as aggressors in their speeches (Terzyan, 2018). In this way, Armenian political elites often referred to both Turkey and Azerbaijan¹ as "barbaric, cruel, uncivilized" enemies aiming to trigger the emotions of fear and by that "mobilize [people] for or against a particular idea" (Terzyan, 2018, p.162). One could assume that Armenians adopt prejudice towards Turkish people from the official discourse and do not really believe in them. However, even when the authorities were striving to get away from the discourse of victimhood and highlight the importance of diplomatic and economic cooperation with Turkey, ordinary people reacted to that with protests (Terzyan, 2018). This shows that "the

¹ Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in the series of the Nagorno-Karabakh wars and part of the Armenia has been currently occupied by Azerbaijan for more than 100 days. Azerbaijan is seen by many Armenians as another 'evil' that is also supported and influenced by Turkey.

enemy image of Turkey is deeply embedded [in people's perception], rather than a product of manipulation" (Terzyan, 2018, p. 157). Thus, if connecting the beliefs and the sense of victimhood among people with the speeches of political elites, it seems that people "do not simply mimic those variants traded in elite discourse," they rather "resonate with the currents and rhythms of their everyday concerns and predicaments" (Fox and Miller 2008, p. 540).

However, since Turkey does not admit that its forces committed genocide, besides the concept of collective victimhood, the concept of competitive victimhood is useful to present the context of the case. Competitive victimhood is "a tendency to see one's group as having comparatively suffered relative to an out-group" (Young & Sullivan 2016, p. 3). It might lead to "either demand of apology and reparation or rejection of accusations or justification of past violence" and this is exactly what happens between Armenia and Turkey, regarding the events of 1915 (Demirel & Eriksson, 2019, p. 1). The Turkish government, elites, and part of the society blame Armenians for rebellions, claim that Turks were the victims, rewrite history and provide justifications for Turkish authorities' deeds in the official narratives and textbooks for school children (Demirel & Eriksson, 2019). To illustrate, they downplay the number of people killed (see that in Üngör (2014), claim that Turks of the Ottoman Empire were threatened by Armenians; and instead of the word "genocide" use phrases like "so-called genocide" (see that in Dikkaya and Özdemir (2016) or "relocation" (see that in Davutoğlu, 2014). According to Turkey's history books and even some academics, Armenians were "relocated" to other parts of the country "where there was no war, to end the turmoil" in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 (Demirel & Eriksson 2019, p. 9; Hovannisian, 1999). Turkish authorities and elites also accuse the Armenian state and its government of fostering negative "Armenian sentiments towards Turks" that were baselessly constructed (see Sağ 2016, p. 135). Both the genocide denial and the failure of Armenians to acknowledge the sufferings of

the Turks in the Ottoman Empire with "the series of assassinations carried out by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) in the 1980s" give rise to a competitive victimhood that keeps the distance between people, and blocks attempts to resolve the conflict and build a dialogue between people that would be beneficial for both nations (Kasbarian & Oktem, 2014, p. 131; Demirel & Eriksson, 2019).

Both sides are unwilling to take a closer look at the opponent's position and instead insist on their statuses of victims which can be considered "an institutionalized way of escaping guilt, shame or responsibility" (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 246). As researchers suggest, the "denialist state position in Turkey has been evolving from aggressive anti-Armenian policies of complete denial and blame of the victims to the more nuanced argument of 'just memory' advanced by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu" (Kasbarian & Öktem, 2014, p. 123). And the denial still has a huge psychological effect on the Armenians. On the one hand, the denial of genocide can be viewed as "a double killing of the victims" that "has had a critical impact on the subsequent psychological development of its victims and their descendants" (Kay, 2015, p. 114). On the other hand, denial causes rage and anger in the 'victims' and serves as a justification for later violence. "Rage" and "revenge" "may have played [a huge role] in the actions of both survivors and their progeny against Turkish targets, from the immediate postgenocide period to recent decades" (Kay, 2015, p. 115). It also influences the perception of the ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Cheterian, 2017). Thus, reconciliation could serve as an important step in bringing peace to the Caucasus. However, the replacement of competitive victimhood with a shared one does not seem to be so easy to implement since political memory is one of the "core component of collective identity" (Demirel et al., 2019; Üngör, 2014, p. 161). In this way, abandoning the predominant position on the Armenian Genocide existing in Turkey and Armenia for more

than one hundred years could "entail a loss of collective identity," so "any deviation from that memory [could be experienced by Armenians and Turks as] a direct attack on their very identity" (Üngör, 2014, p. 161). Thus, governments and their elites continue to impose a sense of collective victimhood and collective trauma and reinforce the reproduction of ethnic prejudices among both groups.

Moreover, victimization and the construction and mobilization of prejudice can serve different 'useful' functions. To illustrate, collective victimhood unites people, and creates a sense of belonging by opposing 'ingroup' members to the 'outgroup', the 'aggressor'. It also gives people justification to circulate "evil images" and commit crimes in revenge. And for diaspora members, the construction of collective victimhood can be even more beneficial. In this way, it can move responsibility or provide justification for their diasporic conditions. As researchers suggest, members of the Armenian diaspora still mobilize 'other-condemning' emotions ("anger, disgust and contempt") towards Turks blaming them for their disadvantaged positions (Wodak, 2020, p. 56; Safran, 1991). In this way, the Armenian diaspora "attributes [their diaspora conditions] to the sins of others: the cruelties of the Ottoman Turks" (Safran, 1991, p. 92). Besides, it creates an illusion of one common history and memory that both Armenians in Armenia and members of the Armenian diasporas scattered around the world have. Thus, from the point of view of social identity theory, victimization and evil images also create a strong sense of belonging (Tajfel, 1979). In short, for the members of the diaspora, memory of the past and anger towards the "aggressor" might give proof of their belonging to the homeland they were expelled from and the nation scattered around the globe.

But why is the prejudice towards Turks so stable given that 108 years already have passed since the genocide? What are the transmitting mechanisms of the evil images and prejudice among the members of the largest Armenian diasporas in Russia and the US? And how does the context of the country the diaspora lives in influences the prejudices? To find out what are the transmitting mechanisms of prejudice among the Armenian diaspora, I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews with members of the Armenian diaspora in Russia and the US, (6 per country). This helps to see what is the role of the context of the host country in prejudice formation. Initially, I hypothesized that since US Armenians do not face as much discrimination from the majority population as they face in Russia, they will report less prejudices towards Turks. However, as the thematic and discourse analysis of the interviews shows, although the country's context indeed plays a crucial role in the process of transmitting prejudices, it is not the only mechanism, family and political contexts are equally important. To specify, country context determines if (1) direct contact between Armenians and Turks is possible in the hosting countries; (2) people can feel a sense of belonging or are being othered by the majority; (3) the Armenian community lives separately from the rest of population investing more in strong connections with other Armenians. Family context determines if (1) parents transmit or encourage prejudices against Turks and other nations (2) parents instill a sense of pride and focus on the ethnic identity, "Armenianness", as a crucial part of their children's identity. Lastly, the political context and personal stances on politics are also important, they determine if (1) there is a current conflict triggering collective trauma and a sense of victimhood; (2) media sources play on the fears of the future (and continuing) ethnic cleansings, and disappearance of the nation.

In the Introduction chapter of the paper, I present the social and academic significance of the research, give a brief introduction to the topic and provide crucial facts on the context of the

case. In the Literature Review chapter, I discuss the existing findings on the topics of (1) diaspora and national identity; (2) sense of victimhood and collective trauma, and (3) prejudice. After presenting the theoretical background I move to the Methodology chapter, explaining the ethical aspects of the work and data collection process. The fourth chapter discusses my data and the main patterns found after the analysis. And, finally, in the next part of the paper I provide readers with conclusions, discussions, and future research possibilities.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

To explore the role of prejudice in the diaspora's national identity formation, this study engages with many different concepts such as: prejudice, national identity, collective trauma, collective memory, diaspora, and a sense of victimhood. All these terms meet in the intersection of three main literature groups discussed: (1) the national identity of diaspora members, (2) the sense of victimhood and collective trauma, and (3) the connection of national identity with ethnic prejudice. The three subchapters include a theoretical part and a part related specifically to the Armenian case study. These sections are important to show both the theoretical groundwork helpful for the exploration of the case study and the connection between the concepts themselves. In short, the Armenian national identity strongly relies on the sense of victimhood and collective trauma constructed around the Armenian Genocide that happened in 1915 in the Ottoman Empire. This tragic event also forced a lot of people to leave their 'homeland' and find their places in new countries, forming a diaspora. Having difficulties to integrate into the 'hosting' community and being isolated from their country, many diaspora members had an even stronger desire to embrace their national identities and cope with their condition. Emphasizing the core part of the Armenian identity, collective trauma and sense of victimhood which often leads to scapegoating, diaspora members engage in transmission of ethnic prejudice. This is how all three sections are interconnected and this is the reason to study them all here.

2.1 DIASPORA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Whereas the classics of nationalism studies often focused on the origins of the nation itself, nowadays the aspect of national identity in a globalized world and emotional attachment to it attracts the attention of scholars from different fields more and more. As Skey (2011) writes, individuals are interested in having a national identity because it creates a "powerful framework for orientating them in the world," creating stability and confidence, building a map of the world in their heads which is manageable to follow and contain (p. 11). Moreover, national identity, like other collective group identities, also provides people with ontological security which helps them to rely on the world and not feel alone. In other words, it satisfies an existential need of the human being, the need for belonging and meaning in our "disparate lives" (Skey, 2011, p. 26). It also serves as an important basis for values, beliefs, and emotions and creates confidence in relation to the persistence of things, so that we "as an isolated individual[s], can rely on things – people, objects, places, meanings – remaining tomorrow, by and large, as they were today and the day before" (Skey, 2011, p. 23) (Appendix II). That is why globalization with its chaos and blurred boundaries only highlighted the importance of national identity. And, as researchers suggest, things that "were initially seen as harbingers of globalisation and cosmopolitanism," (like digital technologies, e.g.), turned out to play an important role in the rise of "nationalism and right-wing populism" (Mihelj & Jiménez-Martínez, 2020, p. 331).

Although many scholars perceive diaspora as a transnational phenomenon, Floya Anthias (2008), a professor of sociology studying ethnicities and social division, suggests that it still relies on the same basis as nation-states, i.e. a "national imaginary of social location" (p. 11). In other words, diaspora members often connect their national identity and have a sense of

belonging in relation to two or three 'homelands', still relying on the idea of nation-states, while the cosmopolitan views remain unpopular for them (Anthias, 2008; Dekker et al., 2003). Although the concept of diaspora "has been stretched in various directions" in the last decade, when defining the Armenian diaspora, one of the classical diasporas, the common definition of the term works well (Brubaker, 2005, p. 1; Safran, 1991). In this way, diaspora is (1) dispersed in space, (2) oriented to a 'homeland,' and (3) has boundary-maintenance (Brubaker, 2005). But maintaining boundaries and their national identity is not an easy task for diaspora members. On the one hand, diaspora can be treated as a deviation from a dominant pattern of immigrant adaptation since people did not give up their national identities to assimilate in the host country after a few generations (Bauböck, 2010). On the other hand, diaspora members of societies by the majorities (in both host and home countries) and do not feel a strong belonging anywhere (Du Bois, 1903). Based on the often-faced issues with integration and a sense of belonging to any of the 'homelands', diaspora members implement different coping strategies.

Being scattered around the world, the biggest number of Armenian diaspora members are placed in Russia and the United States consisting of 2,3 and 1,5 million people (Bolsajian, 2018, p. 31). Many diaspora members still try to preserve their culture and history teaching Armenian traditions and language to their children and grandchildren. Some of them decide to live in homogeneous groups, others engage in "intermarriages" and some strive to integrate into the hosting community completely giving up their Armenian part of identity. The strategy they choose to deal with their national identity depends not only on personal preferences but also on the country-specific context. Facing strong discrimination in Russia, migrants from the North Caucasus engage in six main strategies to cope with the faced stigma (Kozlova,

2016). Although members of the Armenian diaspora have different migration trajectories, I believe that they implement similar coping strategies. Among them are: (1) compensatory strategies – highlighting the 'advantages' of the ingroup members, (2) aggressive-defensive strategies – highlighting 'disadvantages' of the outgroup members, (3) dissociation – avoidance of the ingroup members and any kind of connections with them; (4) identification with a stigmatized group – engaging in social activities to help the ingroup members; (5) orientation to personal categories – ignoring any group identities and focusing on the personal qualities and (6) orientation towards other non-ethnic group affiliations (Kozlova, 2016).

Similarly to the "ideal type of the Jewish diaspora," the solidarity of the Armenian community is based on a "common religion and language, a collective memory of national independence in a circumscribed territory, and a remembrance of betrayal, persecution, and genocide" (Safran, 1991, p. 84). Thus, "the core of the [Armenian] national identity" includes a set of tragic events like the Armenian Genocide, the earthquakes of 1988, and multiple waves of the Nagorno-Karabakh war (Demirel & Eriksson 2019, p. 15). All of them form a collective trauma and a sense of victimhood on which Armenian national identity relies for decades (Suny, 2015); (Demirel & Eriksson, 2019). Even though not every member of the Armenian community has their "personal experience of violence," victimization became "an identity-generating narrative that is shared across generations" (Demirel & Eriksson 2019, p. 4). Moreover, as Suny (2011), the historian of the Armenian Genocide, shows, the sense of Armenian victimhood seems to appear as early as they started to develop their national identity, and it served as an important source for prejudices. Similarly, most of my respondents turn to the (1) compensatory coping strategies, (2) aggressive-defensive strategies and (6) orienting towards other non-ethnic group affiliation as coping mechanisms (Kozlova, 2016). Thus, in order not to lose their social identity, many of them heavily rely on Armenian

history and unite around the created evil image of the specific out-group-members who are to blame for the expulsion from the homeland.

To conclude the discussion on national identity, this research paper does not strive to essentialize the national groups of the Turks and the Armenian diaspora members in Russia and the USA. It acknowledges that there is a big diversity of "significant groups with differing sets of collective memories and experiences," including the Armenians of Turkey, Kurds, Turkish people living and born in other countries, and many others (Kasbarian & Oktem, 2014, p. 126). The research rather deals with the 'imagined' Turk existing in the perception of the Armenian diaspora members interviewed who often rely on the existing narratives regarding vague images of the 'aggressor' and the 'victim' grasped from the political speeches, media, and other sources.

2.2 COLLECTIVE TRAUMA AND SENSE OF VICTIMHOOD

Collective trauma is perceived differently by researchers depending on the point of view they take, they even name it differently – political trauma, national trauma, intergenerational trauma, cultural trauma, and so on. Yet, the phenomenon they discuss is of the same nature, it is just analyzed from different perspectives. Thus, collective trauma refers to "an invasive and overwhelming event that is believed to undermine or overwhelm one or several essential ingredients of a culture or the culture as a whole" (Smelser et al., 2004). Importantly, according to sociologists studying cultural trauma, the response to an event is socially constructed (Smelser et al., 2004). In other words, they suggest that "even when claims of victimhood are morally justifiable, politically democratic, and socially progressive," they are still not "automatic or natural responses to the actual nature of an event itself" (Smelser et al., 2004, p. 9). American sociologist, Neil Smelser (2004) draws a parallel between the notion of

Anderson's (1991) imagined communities and "imagined" traumatic events saying that it is not the trauma that causes strong emotional responses but rather "ideological narratives of nationalist history" (Smelser et al., 2004, p. 8). Thus, he suggests that national histories and identities are constructed "around injuries that cry out for revenge" (Smelser et al., 2004, p. 8). These constructed narratives of traumas significantly revise the collective identity because cultural trauma is a severe "threat to some part of personal identities" (Smelser et al., 2004, p. 40). And this threat brings negative affects including prejudices and a desire to avenge (Smelser et al., 2004). Moreover, it also constitutes "a major situation to be coped with on the part of many individuals in the society, even if it does not constitute a personal trauma for them" (Smelser et al., 2004, p. 48).

Although psychological studies agree that cultural or collective traumas often lead to the appearance of coping mechanisms, they show that the traumas are not as artificially constructed as suggested by some sociologists. The empirical research shows that even if people did not experience trauma themselves, the offspring of the traumatized parents (having post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)) display higher rates of PTSD than the offspring of those parents who "did not directly endure the horrors of the Holocaust" (Solomon et al., 1988, p. 868). Even if not having PTSD, stress, and trauma influences parenting styles and still leave a mark on children's psyche (Fenton, 2018). It influences the "increased psychological vulnerabilities or tendencies that would otherwise not be part of their original makeup" (Fenton, 2018, p. 9). Collective trauma can influence people's traits of personality, the appearance of disorders, and even small aspects of the routine. For instance, many generations later, the descendants of the war blockade's survivors could still oppose throwing food away even if not being conscious about the reasons. That might happen because people still transmit some habits and behaviors they learned from parents who managed to survive

through traumatic events and came up with specific coping strategies and triggers. But not only behavior influences the inheritance of collective trauma, as research shows, "telling and retelling their [survivors'] stories of trauma" leads to "various forms of maladaptive coping strategies, as well as the phenomenon of vicarious trauma" in their offspring (Fenton, 2018, p. 7). Thus, society's influence and role of the social construction of trauma is pivotal, however, we should also keep in mind that even without the social construction, shocking events like cruel killings, violence, and genocide bring harmful consequences to people's psyches.

A sense of victimhood coming from the collective trauma can be also considered a social construct that assigns the characteristics of 'victim' and "legitimizes the label" (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 233). In other words, group members experience their victimhood "on the basis of their identification with the group" (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 245). The sense of victimhood relies on three main foundations: (1) the realization of harm experienced either directly or indirectly; (2) social recognition of an act as illegitimate harm; and (3) the attempt to maintain the status of a victim "once individuals perceive themselves" as such (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 233). Referring to the social psychological theory of self-categorization of Turner and his colleagues (1987), Bar-Tal et al. (2009) claim that "sharing beliefs is one of the basic elements for group formation and the expression of common social identity since beliefs with particular contents prototypically define a group" (p. 235). That is why it is so crucial for people to identify with a socially constructed perception of a 'victim' since political memory is often "a core component of collective identity" and a 'loss' of political memory "entails a loss of collective identity, a prospect fundamentally problematic for many people" (Üngör, 2014, p. 161). Thus, the 'chosen trauma' leads to the overemphasizing of the "group's past experiences of victimization, to the point when the entire identity of the group's members may center on it" transmitting it to the new generations (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 237).

Although the sense of victimhood often highlights the greater morality of the 'victims' in contrast to their 'aggressors,' the fact that people are receptive to this rhetoric and build crucial parts of their national identity on the collective sense of victimhood, does not necessarily raise a groups' self-esteem. On the contrary, the traumatic event "links people through a continuing sense of powerlessness" which makes them easy to be manipulated (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 237). The instrumentalization of the collective trauma image is also beneficial for a government representing the traumatized group since it can be utilized, manipulated, and turned into a powerful position by both people and government because "it is viewed as morally superior, entitled to sympathy and consideration and protected from criticism" (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, p. 235). Thus, justifying their victimhood one could do whatever they want. This might be a reason why so many countries have their own histories of trauma and strive to focus on them 'forgetting' about how much violence they committed towards other people (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). In this way, as Michael Billig (1995), a social scientist, suggests, nations are formed by remembering and forgetting, and it is often forgotten how much violence was caused to become a nation-state (Billig, 1995). And Armenian politics seem to implement this logic striving to utilize the constructed sense of victimhood amongst the population. This helps Armenian political leaders to hold power and sustain an authoritarian regime by cooperating with the Kremlin while presenting Russia as the only "savior" (Terzyan, 2018). It also helps to legitimize state policies or justify the personal failures of the rulers by imposing a "rhetoric of insecurity" (Terzyan, 2018, p. 159). They also utilize collective trauma to mobilize people's emotions.

As suggested by researchers, both collective trauma and a sense of victimhood bring many negative effects. When focusing on the case of the memory of the Armenian Genocide,

collective trauma had a profound effect on the "Armenian nationalist movement" (Üngör, 2014, p. 162). Accordingly, "rage" and "revenge" have played an important role "in the actions of both survivors and their progeny against Turkish targets, from the immediate postgenocide period to recent decades" (Kay, 2015, p. 125). This includes immediate acts of revenge like the assassination of one of the crucial figures of the genocide, former Ottoman Grand Vizier Talât Pasha, by Soghomon Tehlirian in 1921, and "the series of assassinations carried out [later] by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) in the 1980s (Suny, 2015; Kasbarian & Oktem, 2014, p. 131). Thus, as researchers suggest, children and grandchildren of survivors are "witnesses through the imagination" (Kay, 2015, p. 127).

Additionally to the Armenian Genocide, the sense of victimhood feeds on "Turkish genocide denial, Soviet diminishment of Armenian society," the earthquakes of 1988, the episodes of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and so on (Kay, 2015, p. 119). All these events are somehow built into one picture. To illustrate, studies note that "earthquake survivors commonly reported nightmares with images related not to the earthquake but to the Armenian Genocide that their parents or grandparents had experienced" (Kay, 2015, p. 127). The Armenian government, ordinary people, and academics also find the connections between the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan and the Armenian Genocide memory. They suggest that Turkey's denialist policy "had a major influence in shaping the emerging Azerbaijani nationalist discourse later in the same decade [the 1980s], and hence played an important role in the making of the Karabakh conflict" (Cheterian, 2017, p. 77). All the events constitute a core for the collective identity of both dwellers of Armenia and Armenian diaspora members. That is why it is so difficult for Armenians and Turks to "experience any deviation from that memory" as it is perceived as "a direct attack on their very identity" (Üngör, 2014, p. 161).

However, some researchers share a more optimistic perspective saying that "the distance from the immediate trauma may also allow the progeny of the survivors to find their own voice to describe and deal with their historical and cultural legacy" (Kay, 2015, p. 128). This could hopefully help to accept and acknowledge the position and losses of both nations, look beyond the conflicts, and rather "seek episodes of coexistence and synergy in past and present Armenian and Turkish [...] encounters" (Kasbarian & Oktem, 2014, p. 127). This might switch the competitive victimhood to the shared ones (Demirel & Eriksson 2019). And to do so, it would be helpful to understand what are the prejudice's sources, functions, and transmitting mechanisms in such a long memory of the tragic event, so we could be more conscious about them and later be able even to eliminate them.

2.3 PREJUDICES

Prejudices are always based on group membership and derive from social categorization which, as Skey (2011) suggested, helps us to structure such a complex world in a simple manner to be able to comprehend it (Brown, 2010). Neither social categorization nor prejudice are "bad" in their nature; without categories, we would not be able to think about the world (Brown, 2010). However, prejudices often have negative consequences even if they contain "positive" assumptions about some group in its essence because they distance people and create an "unbridgeable gap" between those who carry prejudices (often majorities) and those who face them (often minorities) excluding the minorities from the "ingroup" (Brown, 2010; Hadarics et al., 2017, p. 24). Moreover, at some point prejudice can be perceived as a social norm by the group, so they transfer from one generation to another and it becomes difficult to eliminate them. It is also difficult to get rid of them because of their complex nature. Prejudice consists of three components: cognitive (how we think and rationalize statements), affective (how we feel and respond emotionally), and behavioral (how we act based on our beliefs) (Brown, 2010). And prejudices could be very stable also because they serve important functions in our societies.

As the father of social identity theory, Henri Tajfel (1979), suggests, prejudices give a source of belonging to the group and social world. In this sense, social identity is defined as "part of an individual's self-conception which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (Tajfel, 1979, p. 255). Social identity is linked with social categorization, which helps to make a sense out of the world and have a sense of belonging, by social comparison. In other words, it can be "defined through the effects of social categorization segmenting an

individual's social environment into their own group and others" (Tajfel, 1979, p. 258). Some groups are able to protect their social identities only by attributing negative characteristics to the out-group members, and prejudice is one of the tools. In his Model of Stereotypic Contents' Formation and Change, Bar-Tal (1997) suggests that there are different aspects influencing the appearance of beliefs about negative characteristics of the out-group members (Appendix III). Among them are not only "background variables" that relate to the ingroup and outgroup relations (like the behavior of other groups; nature of intergroup relations; economic conditions; socio-political factors; history of intergroup relations), but also "transmitting mechanisms" related to a smaller unit of social interactions (family climate and contents; direct contact; political-social-cultural-educational channels) and personal "mediating variables" (beliefs; attitudes; cognitive skills; motivations, etc.) (Bar-Tal, 1997). Although this model describes the appearance of stereotypes, I believe, it also reflects the complex nature of prejudice and multiple variables that influence its (dis)appearance.

Although Armenians have a strong feeling of victimhood, prejudices towards Turkish people often highlight their superiority. To illustrate, "by the late nineteenth century the nationalists narrated their past and present through the prism of the nation, and in their own affective disposition Armenians felt themselves as innocent victims who at the same time were morally, intellectually, and culturally superior to the ruling Turks and Kurds" (Suny, 2011, p.77). And although Armenians perceived themselves superior one cannot ignore the fact that they were often suppressed by the ruling class and 90% of the Ottoman Armenians were removed, assimilated, or killed by the end of 1915 (Suny, 2011). Besides, they often blame Turkey and its people for the disadvantaged political and economic situation of Armenia. Thus, besides the feeling of superiority, the feeling of threat, danger, and anger appear. This makes prejudice among the Armenian community even more complex.

When implementing the framework of the stereotype content model introduced by Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2008), which is based on the measurements of the warmth (low or high) and competence (low or high) attributed by the in-group members to outgroup members, the findings are contradictory (Appendix IV). If the warmth category is clear – many Armenians do not feel a lot of warmth for Turkish people – the category of competence is harder to assess (Demirel & Eriksson 2019). On the one hand, various phrases used by Armenian people refer to some "intellectual poorness" and low competence of Turks. On the other hand, Turkish people were the ones who killed Armenians in the Genocide, an event that lies on the bases of a sense of Armenian victimhood, which means that Turkish people seem to be competitive. So, the relation to Turks is complex. I suggest that since the community feels a threat to their social status and security due to the differences in the power relations between groups, they use prejudices to cope with that threat, trauma, and (perceived) injustice (Crandall & Stangor, 2005).

As a summary conclusion, although there are many scholars who explore prejudice, only a few of them pay attention to how the memory of traumatic events in the distant past is still carried forward in everyday practices in the form of prejudice and plays a big role in national identity formation (especially for diaspora members). This paper explores what are the transmitting mechanisms and the role of prejudice towards Turkish people in the Armenian diaspora's national identity building.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 QUALITATIVE STUDY

To see what lies behind the reproduction of evil images and prejudice among the Armenian diaspora members towards Turks and what purposes they serve, I collected 12 semi-structured interviews with the members of the Armenian diaspora in the US and Russia (6 per each group). Semi-structured interviews help "to hear from respondents about what they think is important about the topic at hand and to hear it in their own words" (Bryman, 2006, p. 241). Thus, this type of interviewing presupposes that "the researcher has topics and questions in mind to ask, but questions are open-ended and flow according to how the participant responds to each" (Blackstone, 2012, chapter 9.1) (Appendix VII). This is especially important since prejudices are not considered to be a social norm among many people, so not every person can be open and direct about what they think and feel. The semi-structured interviews allow to touch upon the sensitive topics of genocide and the Nagorno-Karabakh war, diaspora identity, and sense of victimhood as well as to trigger prejudices if they are there. Besides the questions related to collective trauma and national identity, I also explore the personal histories of respondents about their families' migration trajectories, conditions of life, and experiences of othering. This is important because prejudices do not come only from the wider community (like the diaspora) or presidential speeches. According to the Model of Stereotypic Contents' Formation and Change, prejudices also depend on personal variables (beliefs, motivations, values, e.g.); educational, social, cultural, and political channels; family climate and contents; contacts with the outgroup members and so on (Bar-Tal, 1997), (Appendix III).

One of the most crucial questions for the understanding the transmitting mechanisms of prejudice are related to the respondents' experiences of othering and their sense of belonging. As Anthias (2008) suggests, when exploring diasporic formations, they should not be treated "outside of the parameters of unequal power relations that exist between and within cultures" (p. 11). To illustrate, the conditions of life and contexts of diasporas in the US and Russia are different since Armenians faced a lot of struggles with Russian tsars and censorship before the genocide, as well as after it (Suny, 2011). They also met a lot of violence from the Russian population itself in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and continue to be perceived as Others (Suny, 2011) (Kozlova, 2016). Thus, initially, I hypothesized that Armenians in Russia have more prejudices against Turks than Armenians in the USA, because prejudice help to cope with their disadvantaged past and present conditions (Safran, 1991). In this way, the diaspora in the US served as a control group showing that Armenian people still have prejudice towards Turks in spite of being exposed to low levels of prejudice in the host society. Meaning that the history of violence in the Russian context does not play a crucial role (although it might strengthen the prejudice). And although after the analysis, the hypothesis was not proven, country context as well as political and family context turned out to be most influential in the prejudice transmission process.

Since my goal is "in-depth, idiographic understanding rather than more general, nomothetic understanding," to find respondents, I implemented the nonprobability sampling strategies (Blackstone, 2012, chapter 7.2). In specific, I used snowball sampling, meaning that once I asked a respondent to share contacts of their friends willing to participate in the study, and convenience sample, meaning that I used social media accounts of different organizations that connect Armenians around the world (Birthright Armenia or AGBU, e.g.) and Armenian bloggers to easily contact people. The interviews were collected online and lasted from 30 to

80 minutes. The languages used are English, Russian, and Armenian. After the collection of interviews, they were transcribed and analyzed with the help of two-stage coding. For the analysis of collected data, I implemented thematic and discourse analysis. Thematic analysis is important for finding patterns in the respondents' words by comparing and analyzing almost the same categories of code (Tackett, 2005). Discourse Analysis is crucial for exploring what arguments people use to justify their prejudices, what traits and features "they attribute" to Turks, and how "individual argumentation patterns are reformulated and contextualized in different contexts" (USA and Russia) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Liebhart et al., 1988, p. 9). Besides, I used a multimodality approach that allows focusing not only on the words but also on the gestures, postures and sighs of respondents (Machin, 2013). Since prejudice is not a socially encouraged phenomenon in many societies (especially in the USA), it was important to see if the words and emotional expressions of the interviewees go in parallel or in contrast with each other.

3.2 RESEARCH ETHICS

In order to be able to transcribe the interviews, I made audio and video recordings which were stored on my computer with private access. The respondents' informed consent was gained verbally, but I shared my contacts with all of them so they could easily contact me. All of the respondents were older than 18 years. Before I scheduled a meeting with my participants, I explained that the purpose of my research was academic. Also, since prejudices are not commonly accepted in many societies to invite people to participate in my study, I used a legend saying that I explore national identity and potential for Turkish-Armenian relations based on the opinion of Armenian diaspora members (Appendix VII). I promised confidentiality for my interviewees and warned them that they can interrupt me at any time and skip any questions they consider inappropriate. Though, no one hesitated to answer all my

questions, even about family stories related to the Armenian Genocide or personal experience of contact with other nations. Also, to keep confidentiality, in my research I use only pseudonyms of the respondents, not revealing their real names (Appendix, VIII).

3.3 PERSONAL INTEREST AND BIASES

Being a member of the Armenian diaspora, I was always confused when hearing or feeling about Turkish people and this confusion and interest brought me to the topic. My own family never treated any nation as unworthy or unequal. However, growing up in the Armenian community in Russia I sometimes heard confusing phrases about Turkish people. For instance, my very distant relative while playing paintball said to the opposing team: "You are dead. I will imagine you are Turks," or another one was using a stable Armenian aphorism while talking to her son with irritation: "Did you not understand what I told you? Are you Turk or something?" Many adults use such phrases as "pn1pp tp nn1" ("Are you a Turk?") or "tu pn1pptptu unu1" ("am I speaking Turkish?") when referring to a person who does not seem to understand something. In simple words, these phrases put an 'equal' sign between the Turks and not very 'smart' people, referring to the intellectual backwardness of Turks. As a child, I could never understand that rationally and nobody told me what stands behind these phrases. But emotionally I felt a sense of fear and disgust in these sayings. That is how I got curious why these sayings are still relevant and how common it is for Armenian diasporic families to continue reproducing prejudice towards Turks 108 years after the genocide.

I also suppose that the stories I heard from my childhood, the books and films I read about the genocide make me emotionally mobilized by the topic of genocide. Thus, this research risks having interpersonal interviewer bias. Besides, recently my classmate coming from Turkey engaged in genocide denial which also brought some difficult emotions which also

emotionally affected me, as an Armenian person studying prejudices towards Turks tramming from the genocide. However, by making the questions not direct and open-ended I could neutralize the interpersonal interviewer bias by not revealing my position on the topic. In addition, to eliminate this bias, I was striving to be careful with interpretations of the data and rely only on the theoretical groundwork used in the research and the words of respondents finding common patterns in there. The other source of interpersonal bias that could happen is related to the fact that I contacted the respondents from my personal accounts on social media (Facebook, Instagram, and VK) which might have influenced their impression of me as an interviewer. However, to eliminate this bias I did not post anything related to the interview or the topics of the Armenian Genocide and prejudices. Lastly, since most of the respondents I contacted using the convenient sampling strategy were subscribed to some social media groups and communities related to Armenia (like news/cooking recipes/etc.), the sample includes those people who do not hide their national identity in any way. And it excludes those Armenians who prefer to dissociate from their national identity and avoide any kind of connections with ingroup members. Although there are some respondents whom I found in the basic VK search relying on their surname ending (all the Armenian surnames end with 'yan' part), they still form the minority in a sample.

The language translational methods bias can also take place since English is not my native language and English or Russian might not have been the native language for some of the respondents. However, being able to speak Armenian helped to switch from one language to another when struggling. The bias of cultural noise could also happen because there are different norms and things accepted. Finally, since this is a qualitative study, it can deeply explore the reasons and the ways prejudices towards Turks transferred in the Armenian diasporas in the USA and Russia but it would not be possible to draw generalizable

conclusions about the Armenian community as a whole, especially lacking research on similar topics. And yet, these findings are important because they can start wider discussions on the transmitting mechanisms of prejudice and give material to start testing the hypothesis and patterns of this research on a wider and more representative sample.

CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS

Based on the two-stage coding and thematic analysis of the 12 interviews with the members of the Armenian diaspora in Russia and the US, I find that there are three main mechanisms that (re)produce prejudice and sustain it across generations. The first mechanism, as hypothesized, is indeed an influential country, or even specific regional context. There are a few points that most respondents report about in this case: the context determines if (1) direct contact between Armenians and Turks is possible in the hosting countries; (2) people can feel a sense of belonging or are being othered at school, on the streets and in other instances of contact with the majority population; and if (3) the Armenian community lives separately from the rest of population investing more in strong connections with other Armenians – diaspora organizations, friends and relatives. The second mechanism is related to the family context which determines if (1) parents transmit or encourage prejudices against Turks and other nations (2) parents instill a sense of pride and focus on the ethnic identity, "Armenianness", as a crucial one in their children. Lastly, the political context and political stance of a person are also important, they determine if (1) there is a current conflict triggering collective trauma and a sense of victimhood and if (2) media sources that people follow play on the fears for the future and disappearance of the nation.

If relating the found patterns to Bar-Tal's (1997) model of stereotypic contents' formation and change, the mechanisms influencing respondents' prejudice are mostly related to the transmitting and background variables – history of intergroup relations, family climate, and contents, direct contact, and political-social-cultural-educational channels (Appendix III). Yet, as interviews show, personal "mediating variables" (beliefs; attitudes; cognitive skills; motivations, etc.) also matter and sometimes they contradict the what a person learned from

the aspects of transmitting and background variables. Thus, the multimodality approach helps to see that sometimes respondents hesitate to answer questions right away and engage in a thinking process (they take longer pauses, change their postures, and sigh) (Machin, 2013). I believe, this illustrates the tension between the narratives people learned in their schools and families and their personal beliefs that do not seem to match with the reality they saw in less prejudice-encouraging contexts, for instance. One of the examples is when I asked one of the respondents about Armenian aphorisms expressing stereotypical views about Turkish people and usually used as an insult, "pn1pp tp nn1" ("Are you a Turk?"), he responds after a long pause:

"I think it's pretty stupid. Um... (pause) Yeah, I think it's just dumb. Um, there are Turks that accept the Armenian Genocide. There are Turkish authors that have written about the Armenian Genocide. So just calling someone a Turk isn't really an insult. Um, so if you want to call them a traitor, you can use a different word. Calling someone a Turk, I don't think that's like, that's not a good insult." (Misho, personal interview, May 13, 2023).

Misho's family expresses prejudices explicitly and even taught him them when he was a kid, his surrounding community is also pretty nationalistic, according to him. Thus, before answering questions that aim to trigger prejudice, he takes time to think through. Similar examples of inconsistencies or short-term confusion appear in the words and body expressions of other respondents as well.

4.1 COUNTRY AND REGIONAL CONTEXT

There are many things in the country's context that seem to influence people's prejudice – how well are the Armenian organizations working in the country, what is the political regime of the country, what is the general quality of the education, why did people move to the hosting country. For instance, most of the respondents living in USA were born or moved

there because some of their ancestors migrated there after the genocide, while respondents born or moved to Russia were rather coming to find a job during or after the Soviet Union. Yet, there are a few patterns that appear from one interview to another and show the transmitting mechanisms. Among them are: (1) the possibility of direct contact between Armenians and Turks in the hosting countries; (2) the sense of belonging or the othering that people face in schools, on the streets, and in other instances of contact with the majority population; and (3) the region people live in – how diverse it is, whether the Armenian community lives separately from the rest of population or seems to be integrated.

Around half of the respondents live in cities that do not have a lot of Turks, so instances of direct contact with them are very rare or non-existent. One of the examples of such cities is the city of Glendale in the US, which is populated by the largest number of members of the Armenian communities (they make up 40% of the city's population), who migrated there fleeing from the Genocide in the early 20th century (Fittante, 2017). Thus, there it would be difficult to meet a Turkish person, so most of the respondents coming from that region did not have any direct contact with them and rather rely on the common narratives, information from the internet, or other 'second-sources':

"Communication with the Turks? There was not a single familiar acquaintance. I had some communication with the Azeris [ethnophaulism² for Azerbaijanis], but with the Turks... I think I probably never met the Turks. Not in Russia, not anywhere. I don't even know what they look like" (Hayk, personal interview, May 20, 2023).

And when such a rare opportunity for direct contact appears (in the other region or country, e.g.), many people prefer to still keep distance not being used to that and already sharing

² Ethnophaulism is "a derogatory emotional and evaluative name for representatives of racial, national or ethnic groups" [my translation from Russian] (Komarova & Osmak, 2020).

some myths and beliefs about the nation and the impossibility of friendship between Armenians and Turks:

"Just they were in my class, I didn't talk to them that much about Armenia or genocide, but *they were from Turkey*, so I *knew* that they were like, either they didn't know about the genocide or they were taught something different, so I know that they learned that didn't happen or if anything, the Armenians killed the Turks... It [the contact with them] wasn't negative, but it was maybe neutral. But there was some tension between us. *Like they knew I was Armenian, I knew they were Turkish*, so we weren't very friendly with each other. But we weren't that hostile either, just neutral" (Misho, personal interview, May 13, 2023).

This seems to create a vicious circle – the less direct contact people have, the more they base their views and beliefs on the assumptions and prejudice existing in family or culture, so they distance themselves from the 'outgroup' and avoid direct contact even when the possibility for it exists. Meanwhile, many researchers studying prejudice suggest that direct contact with people might help to reduce prejudices (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). Consequently, people who had a lot of direct contacts or had Turkish neighbors do not seem to draw a line between Turks, Armenians, and other nations. To illustrate, Nino who has been living in the so-called "Turkish neighborhood" in Brooklyn, New York, says:

"Um I've had Turkish friends, I've had Turkish boyfriends like I don't know... it was just... They are people with their own culture, and their own food, and their own tastes and, their own music and you know like that's all it is really about [...] Person to a person I have good experiences, I have some shitty experiences as well, but I think that's very general like there are assholes and there are nice people [in any culture], it's not like all Turkish people are evil, I have Turkish friends" (Nino, personal interview, April 26, 2023).

Thus, in accordance with social contact theory, the findings show that if a person grows up having direct contact with Turkish people it would be more difficult for them to follow prejudiced narratives because they see that these assumptions do not always match with reality (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). However, not all the findings match with the main assumptions in the study of prejudice. As mentioned in the introduction, it is believed that

minorities who face discrimination and prejudice on a daily basis, knowing how hard it is to face them, do not share prejudices themselves. Thus, most of the academic works are written about prejudice that carry majorities against the minorities. Both quantitative research and patterns found in the interviews suggest this conclusion is not relevant to every group (CRRC, 2015). Instead, I found an opposite tendency: the less belonging respondents felt in the hosting country and the more othered they were by the majority population, the more they were relying on prejudices about other nations. In other words, they strive to cope with the othering by believing in the superiority of their own nation (Kozlova, 2015). To illustrate, Armine shares that she never felt being a part of the community:

Classmates, yes, my classmates [were always joking]. Basically, they called me 'khachik' [a word that Russians use to offend Caucasian people] and so on. Well, these were children, I acknowledge that, but still, children learn it somewhere, from parents or somewhere... But in Moscow, they didn't accept me [...]. Well, even today I can go out into the street talking on the phone with my mother in Armenian, and people make a remark to me or stare" (Armine, personal interview, May 7, 2023).

Choosing the coping strategy of highlighting the advantages of the Armenian nation and the disadvantages of other nations, Armine expresses a lot of prejudice (Kozlova, 2016). Other respondents who faced discrimination and stereotypes support the pattern. In this way, Anush, who also had difficulties with socialization in Russian school and university highlights the difference and moral superiority of the Armenians in contrast to Russians:

"My upbringing is based more on Armenian traditions and customs. Plus, I was always surrounded by Armenians. Even, well, even at school, at the university, I didn't have Russian friends, I didn't really have ... I did not manage to become integrated, to communicate with them, that's it. Therefore, I always communicated with Armenians. [...]. And the difficulty to integrate happened because their upbringing was different and they did things that I would never allow myself to do" (Anush, personal interview, April 4, 2023).

In the last sentence, Anush refers to the more permissive behavior of Russians that she considers to be bad. So, when providing examples, she would say that Russians are starting to

date in primary school already, or they can drink as teenagers, come home late, and so on. This is a common narrative of the Armenian diaspora members in Russia who strive to defend their patriarchal beliefs and highlight their moral superiority. Striving to maintain their boundaries, they also suggest that intermarriages and sometimes even friendship with other nations, especially Turks or Azerbaijanis, are not okay. And the topic of intermarriage seems to be the most effective tool to trigger prejudice. For instance, Armine answers:

"Why [I am against]? Well, because you can't break your genetic code. It's just you going against everything. [...] You should not in any way merge this [Azerbaijani, Turkish, Armenian] blood. It is not right. *These are different genetic codes*. There are so many stories. Because even before the child is born, the history is already in his *DNA* [...]. It's... I'm so... It's very bad. This greatly affects the future of the child. No matter how tolerant a parent is" (Armine, personal interview, May 7, 2023).

In this way, Armine says that she is against marrying other nations using the example of potential Armenian-Azerbaijani or Armenian-Turkish marriage. And again, like many other respondents, she essentializes 'characteristics' of different nations by using words like 'genetic code', 'DNA', 'Armenian blood', and so on, i.e., biological justifications for her assumptions. In other words, when using these concepts, respondents refer to the difficulties to be lovers or friends with Turks and Azerbaijanis not because of the political situation but because of some characteristics they consider to be "alleged inherent and essential traits" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p. 11).

In contrast to respondents living in Russia, Americans rather suggest that intermarriages are okay, but could be emotionally and psychologically difficult for people who will make this decision. They connect it not to the biological traits or objective facts, instead, they suggest that difficulties could be related to the conservative families, surrounding people, and difficult political situations (meaning the ongoing wars and conflicts). The difference in relation to intermarriages can be connected to the fact that respondents from the USA report being less othered in the country. Consequently, they do not have such a strong need to cope with their stigmatized position by highlighting the advantages of their nation and disadvantages of other nations reproducing prejudice. However, sometimes they still feel prejudiced against and struggle from the absence of a sense of belonging. When asked if he was prejudiced against by the American majority Arman responds:

"So yeah, I mean a little bit, especially in America, having an Armenian identity, you do not really belong in any box. Because, you know, maybe to some Americans, they might say that you are white. Some Americans will not say that you're white. But, you know, amongst Armenians, if we say that we're Middle Eastern, that doesn't really describe us very well. You know, I don't feel very Middle Eastern, you know, I don't think that that's kind of accurate to my culture. So, there is that level of prejudice of who are you, what are you and if anybody were to ask me that question directly, I would say I don't know" (Arman, personal interview, May 15, 2023).

And yet, as initially hypothesized, respondents from the US also faced instances of

discrimination from the majority. Moreover, the international culture of the place they lived in

(in contrast to the city of Glendale) also helped them to feel a sense of belonging to America.

One of the great examples that might show the role of the context in prejudice formation and

reproduction in dynamics was shared by Nelly:

"I was really lucky in where I grew up when I was younger in elementary school. It was a really diverse neighborhood, a really diverse area. So, I went to school with kids from all different cultural backgrounds. It was like a Persian family, like a white American family, my family, a Nigerian family, like a Caribbean family, there was just every culture. I had Filipino friends, it was just crazy. It was a really diverse neighborhood and I was little so I didn't really know any difference. I didn't feel very othered at that point in my life. I just felt like we all came from different cultures and we got to share and it was really cool. And most of us were bilingual. That was a really normal thing as well. [...]. But then we moved when I went to high school and we moved to a much more white American kind of neighborhood area. It was a lot more out in the country. It was just not what I was used to. And the school, the high school I went to was very large and there was definitely some diversity, but it wasn't nearly in the same context or the same way that I had previously experienced. And so, I definitely, for the first time, faced a bit more of feeling othered or feeling not quite like fitting in, if that makes sense" (Nelly, personal interview, April 12, 2023).

Although Nelly does not report any prejudice against other nations, respondents who grew up in a less inclusive atmosphere were often othered and preferred to close in themselves and have contacts only with Armenians, as Anush mentioned in her quote. Thus, (1) the absence of direct contact with other nations, (2) the lack of a sense of belonging to the host society, and (3) the isolation of the Armenian community from the rest of the population influences the transfer and reproduction of prejudices.

4.2 FAMILY CONTEXT

As Berger and Luckman, theorists of social constructionism, (1996) suggest, the family is the main actor of primary socialization, accordingly, through the family an individual "becomes a member of society" (p. 149). Thus, in primary socialization "the individual's first world is constructed" and a person starts to engage with social dialectic (Berger & Luckman, 1996, p. 155). According to the authors, social dialectic assumes that society is a human product because people established the institutions, social boundaries, and so on. However, at the same time, the human world is a social product because we are born in the already existing society, we inherit all the rules and continue to reproduce the social reality (Berger & Luckman, 1996). Prejudice also become a part of the world construction process in a family. Prejudice has a complex nature consisting of three main components: cognitive (how we think and rationalize statements), affective (how we feel and respond emotionally), and behavioral (how we act based on our beliefs) (Brown, 2010). The family is highly influential on prejudice formation also because, during primary socialization, children often mirror their parents and identify with their significant others. Thus, growing up often "takes place under circumstances that are highly charged emotionally" (Berger & Luckman, 1996, p. 151). And if family members share prejudice against a specific group and kids feel that, later on, it might

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take a lot of strength to refuse to believe this prejudice. Thus, as both theory and the findings from the interviews show, family context often determines whether (1) prejudice against Turks and other nations are transmitted or encouraged and whether (2) the sense of pride and focus on "Armenianness" as ethnic identity is instilled in children as a crucial part of their identity.

At least half of the respondents share explicit prejudice against Turks and other nations themselves or report about the prejudice that their parents carry. To illustrate, when asked about his family's views, Misho reports:

"If they see a Turk, they'll tell me... I remember one time when I was growing up, we went to the beach and there was a Turkish family and they had a child and I was going to go play with the kid and my dad said: "Oh, they're Turks, don't play with them, don't talk to them, they're Turks." And we left, we just didn't even look at them. So yeah, it's very explicit" (Misho, personal interview, May 13, 2023).

While Misho managed to look at his parents' views from his own critical perspective, not all of the respondents have the courage or power to share another point of view, different from the views of their parents. There are no clear characteristics or definitions of the Armenian patriarchate because it differs from one context to another— it can be assumed that in the Armenian villages it is still pretty severe, in the capital city it is less brutal and in the democratic countries people migrated to it can be even less visible. And yet, it still exists and gender inequality is evident. In this way, power inequality in families influences a woman's ability to share her views individually. For instance, the figure of a father/parent who prohibits doing something in a way an adult woman wants to do appears frequently. To illustrate, when asked to share her opinion on the intermarriages, Tahmina says:

"Well, when I was younger, I didn't think so much about this topic, and my parents told me that it's ok for them if I marry a Russian guy, the most important thing is that

he is a *Christian*. Now my parents think, well, they want me to marry an Armenian. And I myself want this too" (Tahmina, personal interview, May 9, 2023).

Here she does not tell us directly that this question is dependent on her parents, although she still presents us with their opinion first and then claims she shares the same. She also shows that even when her parents did not mind if she marries "a Russian guy" there still were strong criterion for the future partner: he should be certainly a male person and share Christian beliefs. Tahmina does not seem to doubt this. And there is another story that shows how power relations and gender inequality in the Armenian patriarchate makes it even more difficult to fight with prejudice. Thus, when Tahmina working in a tourist company receives an offer to go to Turkey, the following is happening:

"That year [2019] I had the opportunity to go on a promotional tour representing our company, and I was offered Istanbul. I came home and told my parents, and dad was like: "No, you won't go there." To be honest, I was interested to go, and probably, as a travel agent, I was interested to visit Istanbul to see what kind of place it is. Well, because I know that this place once, well, it also belonged to us, I would like to just have a look at it from a historical point of view. [...] But I still didn't go to Turkey, dad didn't let me to" (Tahmina, personal interview, May 9, 2023).

This citation not only indicates gender inequality, but it is remarkable because it also illustrates the defense strategies that some respondents implement. In this way, they do not simply say that they want to go to Turkey, listen to Turkish music, watch popular Turkish movies, and so on, instead, they always use justifications. Maybe being afraid to be not a 'proper' Armenian and a 'betrayer,' maybe being afraid of the condemnation coming from the Armenian community, they do not let themselves say that they are simply interested in a different culture. They justify the desire by saying that they "would never go to the Antalya coast or the Aegean coast, just to relax," they simply want to visit a historic place where Armenians lived. Otherwise, if choosing a place to rest, they "would rather go to Sevan³"

³ Sevan is an Armenian lake, the largest source of water in Armenia and the Caucasus region

(Tahmina, personal interview, May 9, 2023). Same justifications are used by other respondents who talk about sympathy to Turkish music, TV shows, food, and so on. It seems that they are expected to treat Turkey as an evil, otherwise they could be considered as betrayers. Hayk's personal experience of living in the traditional Armenian community seems to support this idea showing how social control is reinforcing traditional family norms in the society as well:

"Well, I lived in Armenia, I lived there for a few years while I was a teenager and there are people...The city is small, everyone knows each other and everyone is watching you closely. So, there are people who are watching. You are walking, and people stare at you. At first, it really bothered me. Then, over time, I began to watch people myself. Well, I don't know... It seems like a trifle, but there is such a thing. [...] And here [in Russia] it's a little different. Why would people watch you? Everyone has their own business" (Hayk, personal interview, May 20, 2023).

Thus, if referring to social identity, prejudice indeed helps people to feel a sense of belonging to the 'ingroup' and distance themselves from the 'outgroup' showing that they care about the country and its history. That is also why 'Armenianness' may play such an important role in the process of raising children by highlighting the 'advantages' of the nation. Almost all of the respondents share that the sense of national pride and the focus on their national identity as a primary one was actively instilled. It does not necessarily always lead to prejudice formation, however, it still often happens. For instance, Arman who had positive and neutral direct contacts with Turkish people outside of Russia and who says to believe that every nation is equal, still occasionally highlights the advantages of 'Armenianness' in contrast to other nations:

[&]quot;I like it [that parents made him acquainted with Armenian culture] because I think that they instill in us, especially if comparing to the places I lived in and encountered different cultures, I think they instill wonderful qualities in us. Among them are – to not offend people, to not ... to respect everybody, to show love, to show tenderness and... and friendship. In other words, the most beautiful qualities, which, unfortunately, in other cultures, nationalities are often ignored" (Arman, personal interview, May 15, 2023).

Although this sense of national pride does not necessarily correlate with prejudice, still, many people admire their culture while contrasting it with other nations, similarly to what Arman does. And as seen from the analysis, both (1) prejudice against Turks and other nations and (2) "Armenianness" as a sense of pride and focus on the ethnic identity are transmitted and instilled in children by the family members. However, firstly, not all of the parents transmit prejudices, some of them, on the opposite, teach their children that all people and nations are equal. This is what my own parents did and what a few respondents, including Hayk report on. Secondly, if the parents are prejudiced, this does not always mean that a child will be prejudiced as well. Different contexts, institutions, and surrounding people helped some respondents to find their own views which could match their reality better. This is what they were learning and mirroring from parents for decades.

4.3 POLITICAL CONTEXT AND INDIVIDUAL STANCE ON POLITICS

As researchers suggest, diaspora often serves as a soft power for both 'home' and 'host' governments (Adamson, 2013). There are different factors contributing to that including a sense of identity of diaspora members, transnational ties, political conditions in the host and home countries, economic factors, and so on (Sablina, 2023; Adamson, 2013). And as scholars point out, the inability to integrate into the host society and disadvantaged position in relation to the majority makes people "vulnerable to psychic crisis" and creates a potential to recruit them into "violent activities" mobilizing them around a defensive identity and offering a "sense of collective identity and belonging" (Brinkerhoff, 2008, p. 68). The topics of defensive identity and the need to unite frequently appear in the interviews. Respondents

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highlight the importance of learning Armenian history, traditions, and language to engage in politics and strive to "defend" the homeland and make the geopolitical situation in Armenia better.

Paradoxically, most of the respondents, even those people who suggest that one should engage in politics and 'protect' Armenia, occasionally say that they are "not experts in politics," they strive "to stay away from it" and they also struggle to name their personal stance in politics. At the same time, at least half of them freely discuss their expectations from Armenia-Turkey relations, have a clear position on the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and share their beliefs on how Turkish or Azerbaijani politics is working. Although findings based on 12 interviews cannot be generalizable, those respondents who engaged in activism and were clear about their political views expressed fewer prejudices. My hypothesis is that not having any experience in political activism and not having expertise in which TV channels or Internet sources are more reliable and which are less, they receive all their knowledge regarding politics from their relatives, governmental propaganda, and targeted Internet sources. Unfortunately, sometimes these sources are full of prejudice. Moreover, as Bar-Tal (2009) shows, the sense of victimhood also causes the selected and biased information processing which again creates a vicious circle and only reinforces the victimization and prejudice formation (Appendix V). Thus, individual stance on politics and political context seem to also determine if (1) there is a current conflict triggering collective trauma and a sense of victimhood and if (2) media sources that people follow play on the fears for the future and disappearance of the nation.

All the Armenian news express concerns regarding the current situation in Artsakh, the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor and left people

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without proper food and medicine supplies (Sargsyan, 2023). But many pro-Armenian or diaspora led sources cover these events using specific narratives relating the existing conflicts with the past ones and referring to the threat of repeating history. Probably relying on the collective trauma of the Armenian Genocide and constructed sense of victimhood, various politically engaged sources highlight the danger of current and further ethnic cleansing. To illustrate, in 2020 members of the Armenian diaspora in Russia released a petition regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in which they claim:

"In connection with the current humanitarian catastrophe, aggression from the Azerbaijani and Turkish sides with the support of international terrorists and the State of Israel, with the tacit consent of other countries, the local population and the population of the Republic of Armenia, who cannot allow the *Armenian Genocide* in Artsakh to happen, are being exterminated" (Change.org, 2020)⁴

Although it is very important to raise awareness on the topic and talk about the sufferings of Armenian (and non-Armenian) people living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, such texts seem to aim to trigger a sense if victimhood and old fears ingrained in people's minds. Thus, the perception of current events evokes a lot of fears that are rooted in the collective trauma and constructed sense of victimhood of Armenians. And as some researchers show, fear, evil images, and victimization often accompany prejudice (White et al., 2020; Bar-Tal, 2009). Thus, many respondents reproduce similar narratives also expressing fear and anger directed towards the government or people of that government. To illustrate, Nino says:

"Yeah, yeah I mean Turkey and Azerbaijan, you know, it's still... there's still time to *ethnically cleanse* Armenians and it's like a hundred years later and *it's still happening*, so I feel like it was a really number one conversation with all Western and Eastern Armenians" (Nino, personal interview, April 26, 2023).

⁴ The quotation also seems to show anti-semitic prejudice. Having different ethnic and gender prejudice, sexual discrimination and other kind of negative stereotypes is not a rare case, since people are rarely prejudiced against one specific group. Instead, they often share a whole range of different prejudices against 'outgroup' members.

Although Nino expresses concerns about possible ethnic cleansings, she does not report any direct prejudice towards Turkish and Azerbaijanis people instead she talks about the governments. However, this is not the case for everybody. To illustrate, Anvar justifies prejudices claiming there is a direct threat to Armenians:

"Sure...Well, you know, let's say yes, that they do hold a negative stereotype, but you know what? I would not even call it a negative stereotype. I mean, they hold a survival stereotype, right? I mean, this is the stereotype of people that are having, *they pose a direct danger* on the lives of every person that is living in that country" (Anvar, personal interview, May 20, 2023).

Although one should not disvalue the danger to many Armenians blockaded in Artsakh and suffering from wars in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the prejudices seem to be addressed to all the Turkish and Azerbaijani people not depending on where they are and what is their position. Moreover, this fear exists even in the interpersonal contact of Turks and Armenians who are meeting each other outside of their home countries. To illustrate, here is the experience of Arpine who went to the market in Vienna after 2020:

"There are not that many shoppers, some of the stores are being closed. And I don't know whether they were Turks or Azeris specifically, but it was me and two of my friends, three of us, were walking and they started making comments, asking questions and [...] And then these people who are selling the dry fruits, this guy, he's like: "Where are you from?" I'm like: "We're from Los Angeles." And then they like, he goes back to his friend and they kind of started laughing as if they don't believe we live in Los Angeles. And it was a very tense moment. I'm like: "Oh my God, what do we do? What do we do?" [nervously laughs]. [...] So after that, we just left the market. So yeah, we kind of like ran away from them. Now that I look back, it's funny, but then at that moment... [...] You're like, you're outside in the world in a strange place where it seems like a lot of people are from the nation that likes your enemies pretty much. You don't know what's going to happen to you. And then my friend, we talked about the instance and she was like: "If it was before 2020, if this was before the war, I wouldn't feel this way. But right now, after the war, I kind of got scared for my life" (Arpine, personal interview, May 13, 2023).

I believe that it is crucial also to apply a gender perspective here because it is always terrifying when male people behave very insistently, independently of their national origin. However, this story still shows the distance that people have between them and the terror they feel because of the current events and the narratives reproduced. Moreover, in her story, Arpine gives no hint that the vendors identified her and her friend as Armenians, but still they felt threatened because of their Armenian identity. Thus, the current conflict and the way it is depicted provokes many fears and stereotypes. In this way, some respondents talk about Turkish spies in Armenia, the desire of Turks to cleanse Armenians, the fear that Armenians could disappear from the Earth soon and they also express many other concerns. As shown before, the fear to disappear and lose the Armenian "genetic codes" gives rise to many prejudices regarding intermarriages as well:

"I think that Armenians are at such a stage now that we cannot scatter people like this [meaning marrying people of other nationalities] [...] maybe this is a very radical position, but in such a situation we cannot have not a radical one when it comes to Armenians" (Lilith, personal interview, April 4, 2023).

Besides the fear of ethnic cleansing and the official discourse about the conflict and evil images reproduced, the narratives of the Armenian nation as a martyr nation are popular as well (Terzyan, 2018). They also feed the sense of victimhood and essentialize people's national belonging. One of the symbols of this martyrdom can be seen in Ararat (Uuuhu), the sacred mountain currently placed on the territory of Turkey (Petrosyan, 2007). A lot of things related to the Armenian culture are connected to the mountain. To illustrate, Christians believe that Noah's Arc was placed on the Ararat, the mountain serves as a brand symbol for Armenia, after it the Yerevan Brandy Company is named (which ironically now belongs to France), the exhibitions are dedicated to the it and many other things are related to Ararat (Petrosyan, 2007). Based on that narrative of the mountain being a symbol of Armenia and a symbol of martyrdom, Tahmina reproduces her own telling the story of how she saw Ararat from the Junp 4[hpuuu] [Khor Virap] monastery located near the border with Turkey. The picture of the Khor Virap monastery and the Ararat mountain on the background is another brand symbol for the Armenians and popular motive for images and paintings. Tahmina shares:

"I just walked away from my group, from the guide, I climbed a bit and looked at Ararat and I just had tears. I didn't understand why I was crying, but it seems to me that it's just from the inside of everyone, well, not like everyone, most Armenians, perhaps, but it's just my opinion, it's just *already lives inside us*, it's like some kind of *call of blood*, I don't know, at least it affects me very much. In short, it was tough and I didn't expect it from myself, I was like: 'Damn it, Tahmina, what's happening to you, calm down, damn...'" (Tahmina, personal interview, May 9, 2023).

Although that is what many members of Armenian diaspora, including me, can feel watching Ararat, it happens because according to the constructed narrative the mountain indeed became a symbol of struggle. However, Tahmina again essentializes the nation and also makes a sense of victimhood a center of the Armenian identity. In contrast to her, some of the respondents highlight that it is time to stop feeling bad about the Genocide denial and stop engaging in the conflicts and evil images creation. Similarly to researchers, they suggest that a sense of victimhood and hate do not bring a lot of goods to the country and people (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Demirel & Eriksson, 2019). Respondents highlight that the responsibility should be taken by Armenia:

"There's a conflict that exists between us and other countries, that's inevitable. But like, we have our own shit to figure out to like, we really need to work on our own problems too, because we have a lot of them that we need to work through. It's a beautiful country. It's a beautiful culture. And you know, we're all trying our best now to, you know, support in whatever way we can, whether we're in country or within the diaspora, whatever that looks like in our own individual lives. But, like, yeah, we just have our own stuff to work on too. So, I think we need a little bit of an inwards reflection as a whole, as a whole community. I love our people so much, but yeah, that needs, we need to do our own self-work as well" (Nelly, personal interview, April 12, 2023).

Hayk concludes his interview with the same note:

"I believe there are many people in Armenia who are angry at Turks. But it also seems to me that there are people who remember but do not hold anger or something else. In the end, anger kills the one who is angry, right? Hatred kills the one who hates. Like that" (Hayk, personal interview, May 20, 2023).

In addition to the words of my respondents, quantitative studies also show that many Armenians believe the country should move on not depending on whether Turkey recognizes the genocide or not (CRRC, 2015). Maybe that will allow finally to see people and not enemies and provide possibilities for direct contact between people.

All in all, as shown, the individual stances on politics and political context determine if (1) there is a current conflict triggering collective trauma and a sense of victimhood and if (2) media sources that people follow play on the fears for the future and disappearance of the nation.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS

The analyzed literature helps to see what are the functions of ethnic prejudice, what are the transmitting mechanisms and what are the reasons for their appearance. However, it still focuses mostly on the majority population and assumes implicitly that minorities rarely carry prejudice. Moreover, most of the studies are drawing conclusions based on findings in the Western context which are not always identical to what happens in other parts of the world, given cultural differences and different historical contexts there. This research contributes to the scholarly debate since the case of Armenian diaspora members carrying prejudice against the Turks: (1) sheds light on non-Western context; (2) explores the case of the prejudices which are turned towards a group with which there is currently little direct social interaction and experience (3) reveals what is the long-term effect of historic trauma (exemplified by the Armenian Genocide of 1915) on prejudice among a group that has been for a long time victimized; (4) and, lastly, illustrates that minorities also have prejudices.

Thus, based on the 12 semi-structured interviews analyzed with the help of thematic and discourse analysis, my case study shows that there are three main transmitting mechanisms for prejudice reproduction. Among them are: (1) the country context; (2) the family context and (3) individual stances on politics and political context. In particular, the country context determines whether (1) direct contact between Armenians and Turks is possible in the hosting countries; (2) people can feel a sense of belonging to the host society or are being othered by the majority; (3) the Armenian community lives separately from the rest of population investing more in the strong connections with other Armenians. The second mechanism is related to the family context and determines whether (1) parents transmit or encourage prejudices against Turks and other nations (2) parents instill a sense of pride and focus on the

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ethnic identity, i.e., "Armenianness" as a crucial part of their children's identity. Lastly, the political context and position are also important, they determines whether (1) there is a current conflict triggering collective trauma and a sense of victimhood and whether (2) media sources that people follow play on the fears for the future and disappearance of the nation.

Unfortunately, the Armenian Genocide is not the only genocide that happened in human history. And yet, many cases of ethnic cleansing remain either silent or understudied regarding the psychological effects of the tragic event on survivors, their descenders, and the surrounding population (Kay, 2015). Unfortunately, and for many reasons, most of the researchers turn to the Western context which could be connected to structural inequality and greater resources for research in the West, but of course, there are other factors as well. To illustrate, the Armenian Genocide was understudied for many reasons: (1) it occurred in a "pre-psychologized world"; (2) Soviet Armenia "discouraged any expression of national identity," including matters related to the genocide; (3) "postgenocide Armenia" was suffering from the extreme poverty; (4) there is a lack of Armenian professionals in the field of psychology, and so on (Kay, 2015, p. 131).

While in case of Armenians we do not have any opportunity to study the experience of survivors and must therefore focus on intergenerational trauma (and its construction) and on the genocide's consequences on the victim's descendants, there are still some survivors of the other nations that suffered from ethnic cleansings and war crimes not so long ago. Studying the former could be important case for the understanding of prejudice formation – it could help to see what is the immediate and long-term influence of the tragic event and collective trauma on the population.

Moreover, the literature often focuses on the topics of antisemitism, anti-roma and other racist attitudes, rarely pointing out how these attitudes of majorities influence prejudice formation among the minorities themselves. And although the findings based on 12 interviews are not generalizable, they suggest that the less sense of belonging in their host society people have, the more closed in themselves and prejudiced against 'outgroups' they become. Quantitative studies testing the found patterns on bigger and more representative samples could help to see how prejudices appear, transfer and reproduce. When constructing representative samples, it is important to consider not only demographical data (like age, education, gender, etc.); but it is also crucial to look at the persons' expression of national identities. To illustrate, my respondents use the compensatory coping strategies – highlighting the 'advantages' of ingroup members, aggressive-defensive strategies – highlighting 'disadvantages' of the outgroup members, and orientation towards other non-ethnic group affiliations (Kozlova, 2016). These people are mostly prone to be proud of their identity and turn to the ethnic prejudices. However, these are not the only 'types' of diaspora members. There are people who prefer to turn to the following coping strategies as well: dissociation - avoidance of the ingroup members and any kind of connections with them; identification with a stigmatized group – engaging in social activities to help the ingroup members; orientation to personal categories - ignoring any group identities and focusing on the personal qualities (Kozlova, 2016). It is crucial to explore what they think about Turkish-Armenian relations and how they feel their national identity to have a wider picture of how prejudice function. And I believe this categorization could be applied to many other minorities.

Besides, based on my data and literature I explored, it still remains unclear why politically inactive people carry more prejudice than people who are engaged in politics and activism in both home- and host-countries. Future research could explore that from the perspective of political psychology as well. And although I did not find a correlation between the country

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diaspora members live in and the prejudice they carry, it would be still important to test this variable as well. Russia is a more politically polarized and more discriminative place for Caucasian people to live in than the USA. And both criteria of political disinterest and lack of the sense of belonging to the country seem to influence the reproduction of prejudice. In addition, the study of the differences in prejudice between the diaspora members or minorities living in other countries and people staying in their 'homeland' could also bring a lot to the table. Lastly, it might be important to study the instances of direct contact between two "enemy" nations to see what kind of strategies they prefer to use in communication, what prejudices are triggered and how they feel during the conversations. Because only the acknowledgement of narratives of both sides, empathy, apology and reconciliation could significantly help people to move on (Demirel & Eriksson, 2019) (Appendix VI).


APPENDIX

APPENDIX I. ALLPORT'S SCALE




Source: MEMIM Encyclopedia. (n.d.). Allport's Scale [Image]. Retrieved June 8, 2023, from https://memim.com/allport%27s-scale.html

APPENDIX II. NATIONAL ATTITUDE EXPLANATORY MODEL




Source: Dekker, Henk, Darina Malová, and Sander Hoogendoorn. (2003). "Nationalism and its explanations." Political Psychology 24, no. 2, pp. 345-376.

APPENDIX III. MODEL OF STEREOTYPIC CONTENT FORMATION AND CHANGE




Source: Bar-Tal, D. (1997). Formation and change of ethnic and national stereotypes: An integrative model. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 21(4), 495.

APPENDIX IV. STEREOTYPE CONTENT MODEL




Source: Cuddy, A., Fiske, S., Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as universal dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model and the BIAS map. Advances in experimental social psychology 40: pp. 61-149.

APPENDIX V. MODEL OF SENSE OF SELF-COLLECTIVE VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT



Source: Bar-Tal, D., Chernyak-Hai, L., Schori, N., & Gundar, A. (2009). A sense of selfperceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts. International Review of the Red Cross, 91(874), pp. 229-258.

APPENDIX VI. THE RECONCILIATION PYRAMID



Source: Demirel, C & Eriksson, J. (2019). Competitive victimhood and reconciliation: the case of Turkish–Armenian relations, Identities, Global Studies in Culture and Power 27: pp. 1547-3384. <u>https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2019.1611073</u>

APPENDIX VII. INTERVIEW GUIDE

Legend: I am writing my thesis paper on Armenian identity among the members of Armenian diaspora. I also study international relations between Turkey and Armenia.

Identity:

- Where were you born and raised?

- How much did your family try to make you acquainted with Armenian culture, language, traditions, history? How do you feel about your family's efforts?

- How USA/Russian context influences your identity? How much do you participate in the political/social events in the USA/Russia?

- How strong are your connections with other Armenians?

- Do you know about the Armenian Genocide? How did you learn about it?

- How did the genocide affect your family? Does this history still influence you? In what sense?

Turkey:

- Are you aware of the fact Turkey has never admitted it committed genocide? How do you feel about that?

- Have you had any experience with Turkish people? What kind? Did you have any contrary experiences (or hear about such experiences) with Turkish individuals?

- Does your perception differ towards Turks in contrast to Azerbaijani, Americans? Russians? Kurds? And other nations?

- How do you think Turks feel about Armenians?

- Do you think there is an opportunity for Armenia-Turkey relations in the near future? What should be done?

- Did you hear the Armenian phrases "turkes du?" "turkerenem hosum?" and others? What do you think about them?

Demographic Data:

Age, gender, profession, education, political views

APPENDIX VIII. DEMOGRAPHY TABLE

	Pseudonyms	Country	Age	Gender	Education	Profession	Political Views
1	Henri	Russia	31	male	Bachelor in history and political science	Orkestra artist and 3D designer	Conservative
2	Anush	Russia	22	female	Bachelor in Management, Masters in Advertisement	SMM and Digital Marketing Specialist	Liberal
3	Arman	Russia	26	male	Bachelor and Masters in Economics	Marketer	-
4	Lilith	Russia	22	female	Bachelor in Law	Lawyer	-
5	Armine	USA	24	female	Bachelor in Economics	Economist	-
6	Tahmina	Russia	26	female	Bachelor in Sociology	Manager in Tourism	-
7	Hayk	Russia	28	male	Secondary special education	Owner of the jazz group	-
8	Misho	USA	27	male	Master's in computer science	Machine learning engineer	Liberal
9	Arpine	USA	32	female	Doctoral program in education	an administrator in higher education	Liberal
10	Nino	USA	27	female	Bachelor of Fine Arts	graphic school	progressive
11	Anvar	USA	30	male	Master's in counseling	psychotherapist	leftist
12	Nelly	USA	32	female	Bachelor's (double) degree – dance and communication	Dancer/ dance teacher	liberal

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