# RIGHT-WING PARTIES' OPPOSITION TO CLIMATE POLICY IN THE EU

### Understanding the Role of Anti-Internationalism in Environmental Politics

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#### ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the circumstances under which right-wing parties vote in favor of environmental policies. It argues that there is an important distinction between climate and other environmental issues. One factor that distinguishes the two is the requirement climate policy has for international cooperation. Since right-wing parties are rather opposed to binding treaties, international institutions, or aid for foreign countries, they are also expected to oppose climate policy. Environmental policy on the other hand does not have the same requirements for international cooperation, which is why right-wing parties can support these policies while staying in line with their nationalist and protectionist ideology. I find empirical support for this hypothesis both in roll call vote data in the European Parliament and a case study of an EU policy on energy efficiency from 2018. The thesis categorizes roll call vote data from 2014-2019 into climate and environmental issues and shows that all far-right-wing party groups prefer environmental policy over climate policy. The case study uses process tracing and provides further case-specific evidence for the hypothesis. While there are likely other causes as well, the thesis concludes that requiring international cooperation likely deters right-wing parties from voting for climate policies.

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#### INTRODUCTION

This thesis discusses right-wing parties (RWP) and their stances on climate and environmental issues in the European Union (EU). Lockwood (2018) argues that RWPs pose a challenge to tackling climate change and advancing green issues, because they frame green issues as propagated by a liberal, cosmopolitan elite. RWPs are generally assumed not to advocate for green policies (Kulin, Johansson Sevä, and Dunlap 2021; Lockwood 2018). However, there are cases that contradict this assumption. For example, the Austrian FPÖ was adamant to ban glyphosate from agricultural use in the EU (Tosun and Debus 2021), all RWP groups in the European Parliament (EP) voted for labelling of the country of origin for meat in processed foods (Hix et al. 2022) and supported legislation concerning the maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination following a nuclear accident (Hix et al. 2022). Thus, it remains unclear, why RWP sometimes oppose, and other times support green policies.

From this puzzle the following research question arises: When do right-wing parties in the European Union support green issues? This thesis specifically focuses on the aspect of international cooperation. I divide general "green issues" into climate and environmental issues using the factor of international cooperation. My working definition says that climate protection requires international cooperation, environmental protection does not. Since RWPs are less likely to encourage international cooperation, they are less likely to support climate policies rather than environmental ones. RWP usually insist on the sovereignty of the nation and oppose supranational institutions that aim to enforce regulation on greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, my hypothesis is twofold. I expect that RWPs support climate rather than environmental issues. I also expect that international cooperation deters RWPs from supporting climate policies.

Discussing the role of RWPs in the context of green legislation is highly relevant. In Europe, the public support for RWPs has risen across countries, allowing them entry into government positions (Schaller and Carius 2019). At the same time, public support for climate protection has also increased (Stokes, Wike, and Carle 2015). Thus, RWPs need an answer to environmental problems to remain relevant to voters. Additionally, with the increase of emissions and the urgency of climate change, what RWPs vote on climate policy matters to everyone. This research is valuable both in theory and practice. On the theoretical side, it lays the foundation for distinguishing between environmental and climate issues in studying party politics. On the practical side, it can help civil society understand RWPs' attitudes towards climate change and environmental problems.

While there is literature regarding RWPs and their stance on green issues, usually there is no distinction between climate and environmental protection (Bernstein 2020; Gemenis, Katsanidou, and Vasilopoulou 2012; Katsanidou and Gemenis 2010; Lockwood 2018). I argue that this distinction is crucial to understanding why RWPs sometimes oppose, and other times support green issues. To this aim, I describe the voting behaviour of RWPs in the European Parliament. I compare the voting behaviour of three RWP groups in the EP in the legislative period between 2014 and 2019 on environmental and climate proposals. Then, I select one climate policy proposal in favour of energy efficiency, which was on the floor of the EP in 2018 and discuss why one RWP group opposed it to provide case specific evidence.

I find empirical support for my hypotheses both in the quantitative statistics and the qualitative case study using process tracing. The first part indicates that there is a significant difference between voting on climate and environmental policies in the EP by RWP groups Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) while the difference is less evident for Europe of Conservatives and Reformists

(ECR). The case study on a proposal concerning the Energy Union supports the expectation that international cooperation is a deciding factor for RWP-voting. Therefore, I find that the requirement for international cooperation is a likely cause for RWPs voting against climate policies.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, I give an overview of the existing literature on the linkages between RWPs and green issues. RWPs oppose green policies for different reasons. Lockwood (2018) specifically points out that RWPs endorse climate scepticism and hostility towards a climate agenda (Lockwood 2018). Some scholars, such as Kulin also support the notion that there is a strong correlation between right-wing populism, climate scepticism and a lack of trust in science and institutions (Engels et al. 2013; Fraune and Knodt 2018; Huber, Greussing, and Eberl 2022; Kulin, Johansson Sevä, and Dunlap 2021).

Other scholars focus on economic reasons (Gemenis, Katsanidou, and Vasilopoulou 2012). Gemenis et al. (2012) find evidence that RWPs Europe frame ecological protection as a trade-off with economic growth. RWPs across Europe often frame environmental regulation as an unnecessary and elitist burden on the economy that specifically harms the working class (Gemenis, Katsanidou, and Vasilopoulou 2012). A large cross-country study also finds that RWPs mostly oppose climate and energy transition policies (Schaller and Carius 2019). The authors speculates that this opposition is related to a general opposition to restrictions on the national economy (Schaller and Carius 2019).

Other scholars agree with the idea that nationalist values strongly shape policy stances on climate change (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2015; Krange, Kaltenborn, and Hultman 2021). For example, Forchtner and Kølvraa (2015) demonstrate how RWPs frame climate protection as a threat to national sovereignty in the UK and Denmark. Kulin et al. (2021) also show that nationalist ideology clashes with accepting international climate agendas in theory and practice. The researchers find that RWPs - regardless of their belief in anthropogenic climate change - see climate policies as a threat to national autonomy (Kulin, Johansson Sevä, and

Dunlap 2021). Additionally, one study found that Euroscepticism is often a reason for RWPs to vote against climate policy in the European Parliament (Buzogány and Ćetković 2021). The study indicates that anti-internationalism plays a key role in right-wing voting behavior (Buzogány and Ćetković 2021). Thus, there are different explanations why RWPs oppose green policies.

On the other hand, there is also some disagreement with the suggestion that RWPs are generally anti-environment. Tosun and Debus (2021) illustrate this through the case of the Austrian FPÖ, advocating for a ban of glyphosate in the EP. Glyphosate is a substance used in agriculture, but also a probable carcinogen, which is why the Austrian right-wing party FPÖ advocated for a ban (Tosun and Debus 2021). The authors argue that the FPÖ framed glyphosate use in the EU as a threat to the native population (Tosun and Debus 2021). Thus, ecological protection can be framed as a nationalist narrative.

One possible cause for these different findings is the lack of distinction between climate and environmental issues. Out of the aforementioned authors, only Forchtern, Kølvraa (2015), Schaller and Carius (2019) and Kulin et al. (2021) make a distinction between environmental and climate issues. On the other hand, Gemenis et al. (2012) follows a conceptualization, that groups climate change in one environmental category with environmental issues, such as biodiversity regulations or pollution. This may lead to an oversight of key differences between climate and environmental policy in party research, as it is plausible for any party to have varying stances on these issues. Thus, I aim to address this gap in the literature by focusing specifically on the distinction between climate and environment and the aspect of international cooperation in it, as this has so far not been explored sufficiently.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Climate policy usually requires international cooperation, while environmental policy does not. More specifically, effective climate policy usually requires binding agreements between states (IPCC 2023; Keohane and Victor 2016; Oberlack and Eisenack 2014). For example, participation in international markets for emission reduction avoids a loss in competitiveness for individual countries, internationally coordinated financing can address the heightened vulnerability of some regions to the impacts of climate change, internationally coordinated carbon taxes can avoid carbon leakage, and international governance can set norms to reduce emissions from aviation or shipping (IPCC 2023). A publication by the European Central Bank (ECB) finds that limiting global warming to below 2°C is not attainable without international cooperation. Modelling two countries' climate policies, the researchers find that both states need to commit to lowering emissions to implement effective mitigating policies (Ferrari and Pagliari 2021).

These policies require giving away some of a country's autonomy by binding itself to a common mission. Giving away part of national autonomy goes strictly against RWPs' defence of national sovereignty, which is one defining factor of RWPs (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Heinisch, Werner, and Habersack 2020). RWPs are usually opposed to international cooperation (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Ecker-Erhardt (2014) argues that as international institutions increase in power, so does a backlash driven by national identity. This narrative is most easily picked up by nationalist RWPs that proclaim to protect their nation against being overruled by international institutions (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Therefore, I expect that when there is international cooperation involved in a policy issue RWPs likely oppose it. Since climate policy requires international cooperation, I expect that their opposition to climate

policy at least partly originates in their opposition to international cooperation. However, this does not apply to non-climate environmental issues. In fact, when it comes to non-climate environmental issues, RWPs can build on their nationalist, nativist narratives to protect the "homeland" (Hamilton 2002; Tosun and Debus 2021; Voss 2014). Thus, a distinction between climate and environmental issues is necessary.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

I analyse voting of RWP groups in the EP in two parts. Firstly, I quantitatively analyse roll call vote data in the EP. Secondly, I conduct process tracing on one EU policy proposal for binding energy efficiency targets. The quantitative part aims to find support for H1, while the qualitative part builds on the support for H1 and finds support for H2.

H1: Right-wing parties oppose climate policies rather than environmental policies.

H2: International cooperation deters right-wing parties from voting for climate policies.

Both parts distinguish between climate and environmental policy, use roll call vote data from the European Parliament, and investigate right-wing party voting. The following explains the distinction, justifies the use of roll call votes in the EP, and defines right-wing party groups, which sets the stage for the rest of the analysis.

While climate and environmental policies often overlap, I claim that there is a political difference between the two, which I expect to observe in RWPs' voting behaviour. Thus, I divide green issues into non-climate environmental issues and climate issues. I consider this distinction a conceptual contribution to existing literature in the field, but I do not claim to define a universally adoptable concept. Rather, this a working definition to emphasise the aspect of international cooperation in right-wing voting behaviour. Climate policy requires international cooperation, while environmental policy does not. Examples of non-climate environmental issues are air or water pollution, waste management, marine conservation, or plastic use.<sup>1</sup> Examples of climate issues include measures that directly reduce greenhouse gas

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Some scholars argue that environmental policy is a valence issue, meaning the electorate is in agreement about the ideal outcome and party competition is based on performance (Flanagan and Dalton 1984; D. E. Stokes 1963). As a result, datasets on party positions often assume that environmental stances only differ with regards to the importance the party attributes to the environment (Gemenis, Katsanidou, and Vasilopoulou 2012;

emissions, such as Emission-Trading-Systems, taxes on fossil fuels or binding carbon budgets, which need international cooperation.

I apply this distinction to voting in the European Parliament. This is because EP voting data is public, and the EP decides on issues regarding international cooperation. This also makes policy comparable across nations and parties to make conclusions about right-wing-attitudes in general, instead of limiting the results to one country or party. Studies have shown that the EP works along a similar left-right-spectrum as national parliaments and European Party Groups (EPGs) tend to vote along ideological lines (Noury and Roland 2002; Rasmussen 2008). Thus, voting behaviour from the EP is representative of general left-right-attitudes and will be useful for this analysis.<sup>2</sup>

To analyse voting in the EP, I use roll call votes. There are three types of voting procedures in the EP: a show of hands, an electronic vote and a roll call vote (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2018). The latter records each MEP's vote in the publicly available minutes of the plenary session. As Hix et al. (2018) explain, there used to be a strategic bias regarding roll call votes in the European Parliament. However, since 2009 all final legislative votes must be roll call votes, which makes them useful for this analysis (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2018).

I limit the inquiry to the legislative period between 2014 and 2019. This is useful for several reasons. Some limitation of the time period is necessary due to the scope of this thesis. This legislative period is pivotal for global governance on climate change due to the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015 (Schaller and Carius 2019). Thus, this period witnessed increased politicization of climate change itself (Chao et al. 2016), making it a political issue separate


Lehmann et al. 2022). Here, environment and climate will be treated as a position issue as done in Farstad 2018; Gemenis, Katsanidou, and Vasilopoulou 2012; Katsanidou and Gemenis 2010; Lockwood 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> When it comes to environmental and climate policies specifically, the EP is empirically more "green" than national parliaments (Schaller and Carius 2019). The institutional set-up of strong rapporteurs and committees helps maintain firm positions on environmental issues (Schaller and Carius 2019). Therefore, right-wing voting behaviour in the EP may generally be more environmentally friendly than in national parliaments, which should be considered regarding the results of this thesis.

from environmental protection. To illustrate the context of this time period, Figure 1 shows

the EPGs in the European Parliament between 2014 and 2019.

Figure 1: Outgoing European Parliament of 2019 with all EPGs: European People's Party (EPP), Socialists and Democrats (S&D), ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), The Left (GUE/NGL), The Greens, Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) and non-attached MEPs.



To analyse voting behaviour of RWP groups in the EP, it is necessary to define which EPGs in the EP are right-wing.<sup>3</sup> To this date and the best of my knowledge, EPGs have not been coded across a left or right spectrum. Thus, to identify the RWP groups, it is necessary to look at their member parties.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> There is conceptual debate, whether RWPs can be grouped along grievances at all. Ivarsflaten (2008) argues that there is no consensus about the grievances mobilized by RPWs in western Europe, except immigration. However, it is common practice to group them into one right-wing category (Döring et al. 2023; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Lockwood 2018; Voss 2014).

Figure 2: Average positions of EPGs between 2014 and 2019 based on ParlGov dataset information about all parties in the party group that have three or more seats in the EP. 0 is the most left, 10 the most right (Döring et al. 2023).<sup>4</sup> Underlying data is presented in Table 5 in the Appendix.

Average Party Group Positions 2014-2019										
0	1	GUE/NGL	Greens 3	S&D 4	5	ALDE 6	EPP 7	ECR EFD	ENF 9	10

*Figure 2* shows the average party positions of all EPGs in the EP between 2014 and 2019. According to the average of the left-right position of national parties in the EPGs, the ENF, and the EFDD are the two most right-wing parties, with ECR not far behind. Thus, RWP groups in the EP make up 20% of all MEPs as shown in *Figure 1*. On the left-right scale they are followed by the European People's Party (EPP), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Greens, and The Left (GUE/NGL). To further ensure that these party groups can be classified as right-wing, I cross-check the dataset by Döring et. al (2023) with the Comparative Manifesto Project and existing literature about the EPGs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> There are only two parties in the EFDD with three or more seats, UKIP and the Italian 5 Star Movement. The latter is not coded as left or right by Döring et al. (2023). Thus, the average party position of EFDD is UKIP's left-right value.

Table 1: Right-wing party groups in the EP, number of seats of outgoing Parliament in 2019, classification by Comparative Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2022), Eurosceptic classification by authors McDonnell and Werner 2018; Ondarza 2016; Ripoll 2019.

Party group	ECR	EFDD	ENF		
Seats	77	42	36		
CMP classification	Conservative (c) to nationalist (n)	Special Issue Party (si)	Nationalist (n)		
Member parties with +3 seats	Order and Justice (n) Conservative Party UK (c) Danish People's Party (n) New Flamish Alliance (n)	UKIP (si) Five Star Movement (si)	National Rally (n) Dutch Party for Freedom (n) Lega (n) FPÖ (n) UKIP (si)		
Eurosceptic	somewhat	yes	yes		
Leadership	Conservative Party UK Order and Justice	UKIP	National Rally Dutch Party for Freedom		

*Table 1* shows the EPGs most classified as right-wing, their seats in the EP, national party classification by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), whether they are Eurosceptic and which party led the EPG. One key difference between the three EPGs is that the leadership of the ECR - unenthusiastically - supported remaining in the European Union (Ondarza 2016). Moreover, ECR also hosts parties, that the Comparative Manifesto Project codes as conservative, while the others only include "Special Issue" or nationalist parties (Lehmann et al. 2022). Both leading parties of the EFDD are classified as a "Special Issue", as UKIP focused on Brexit and the Five Star Movement was a populist anti-elitist party that refused to position itself on the left-right-spectrum (Ondarza 2016). This is not a complete analysis of left-right positions of EPGs. However, it will suffice as a categorization of RWP groups for this study.

Thus, both parts of this study use roll call vote data in the European Parliament of the three right-wing EPGs: EFDD, ENF and ECR. The quantitative part analyses their votes on climate compared to environmental policy proposals, while the qualitative part analyses one policy proposal.

### **Quantitative Roll Call Votes Analysis**

This section describes the quantitative analysis of this thesis. It shows how I use the roll call vote data by Hix et al. (2022) to contrast climate and environmental policy proposals. I use keyword analysis to distinguish between the two and apply the distinction to the votes of EFFD, ENF and ECR between 2014 and 2019.

From 2072 final roll call votes in the VoteWatch dataset by Hix et. al (2022), I limit my inquiry to 137 in the dataset's policy area "environment and public health" and proceed to exclude public health matters that are not related to green issues. This leaves 113 green issues. Next, I code the remaining votes into the climate and non-climate environmental categories using keyword analysis. Analysing the corresponding text provided by the website of the EP, I searched for the following main keywords.

Climate	Non-climate environmental				
Climate change	Air pollution				
Global warming	Water pollution				
Greenhouse gases	Waste management				
Carbon emissions	Biodiversity conservation				
Paris Agreement	Marine conservation				
Kyoto Protocol	Sustainable land use				
COP (Conference of the Parties)	Animals				

Table 2: Keywords used for distinguishing between climate and non-climate environmental issues

Some cases are more straightforward than others. For example, the resolution titled "Towards a new international climate agreement in Paris" (2015), "Binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement" (2017), "Governance of the Energy Union" (2018) are clearly placed in the climate category. "Sustainable use of pesticides" (2019), "Reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment" (2018), "Motions for resolutions - A global ban on animal testing for cosmetics" (2018) are placed in the non-climate environmental category. However, there are also some unclear cases, such as policies regarding genetically modified organisms, the ozone layer or the Dieselgate scandal, which are put in the "unclear" section.<sup>5</sup> Unclear cases remain in the analysis as "green" issues but do not count towards climate or environmental issues.

For each vote, I determine whether voting for or against the proposal is the environmentally friendly option. To do this, I treat what the Greens voted as equivalent to being the environmentally friendly vote. The Greens have both the highest party group cohesion in the EP (Klüver and Spoon 2015) and can be relied upon to vote in an environmentally friendly way (McElroy and Benoit 2007). However, when there is low party group cohesion or a high rate of abstentions among the Greens, this is questionable. Therefore, I have excluded such cases from the sample.<sup>6</sup>

For each proposal I proceeded as follows. I put the remaining 110 proposals into three categories, climate, non-climate environment and unclear. This leaves me with 73 proposals in non-climate environment, 30 in climate and seven unclear cases. For each proposal I registered whether the green party voted mostly in favour or against the proposal. What the Greens voted for; I labelled the "green" vote. The opposite I labelled "non-green". For each proposal I then determined the green and non-green votes of each of the three RWP groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For further examples of how the policy proposals were coded, check the appendix.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Three votes were taken out of the sample, because of disagreement in the Green party.

Then, I subtract the votes against from the votes in favour and divide them by the sum of votes given excluding abstentions and absences:

$$x = (a - b)/(a + b)$$
 for a is green votes and b is non-green votes

This reveals the percentage x, which can be negative or positive. A positive percentage indicates that a majority of votes was green. A negative one indicates that the majority of votes were non-green. This process is repeated for each of the party groups.

I illustrate this further with one example. In the dataset there is a voted proposal with the ID 219. First, I check whether 219 is an environmental or climate issue. Then, I register that the Greens voted in favour of the proposal by a vast majority. Next, I see that 15 MEPs of the EFDD party group voted green and 21 voted non-green. Thus, they voted non-green by a margin of six MEPs or -17%. Since the number of MEPs voting on the proposals differs percentage points achieve comparability. I repeat this process for all proposals and all RWP groups. It is important to note that out of all proposals in the green category, only four proposals did not pass the general vote in the parliament. Two decisions that did not pass were non-climate environmental and two were climate proposals.<sup>7</sup>

In sum, for the first part of my methodology, I divide green issues into two categories using keyword analysis and register whether the three right-wing EPGs voted the same as the Greens on 110 policy proposals in the EP.

 $<sup>^{7}</sup>$  Check the appendix for the complete list of coded issues based on the VoteWatch EU dataset (Hix et al. 2022). If in the graphs, some bars appear thicker than others, this is due to a printing or technical error and is not relevant for the statistic.

#### **Results of Roll Call Vote Analysis**

This section shows the results of analysis the roll call votes by three right-wing EPGs. The results provide evidence that RWPs vote differently on climate vs. environmental policy proposals.

The reader is encouraged to read the following *Figure 3, 4* and 5 and *Table 3* as follows. The graphs show the green and non-green votes of the RWP group in the policy area of nonclimate environmental and environmental issues. Green votes are votes in alignment with the Green Party's vote. Each bar represents the RWP group's votes on one policy proposal. The graphs only consider MEPs that voted in favour or against. Those who abstained count as if they had been absent. Blue lines indicate votes in the non-climate environmental category and orange indicates votes in the climate category. Points that range from 0-100% on the y axis indicate a pro-environmental stance, while points in the negative area of the graph indicate an anti-environmental stance. Votes that range near the x-axis indicate a split vote within the party group. I expect that blue bars should be above the x-axis and orange bars mostly below the x-axis, as this would indicate that the EPG voted pro-environment, but not pro-climate.





Figure 3: EFDD voting on green issues between 2014 and 2019 in the European Parliament; Data taken from VoteWatch EU (Hix et al. 2022).

*Figure 4: ENF voting on green issues between 2014 and 2019 in the European Parliament; Data taken from VoteWatch EU (Hix et al. 2022)* 






Figure 5: ECR voting on green issues between 2014 and 2019 in the European Parliament; Data taken from VoteWatch EU (Hix et al. 2022)

Overall, the ENF and the EFDD show the expected results. Both party groups voted green on most non-climate environmental issues in the dataset, while opposing climate policy. The ECR does not show a clear difference between voting in the two categories. The Welch-T-Test for the ENF and EFDD show statistically significant differences, while the difference between the two categories for the ECR are not statistically significant. The following *Table 3* further illustrates these differences.

Party group	EFDD	ENF	ECR
Average number of MEPs voting "green" on <b>environmental</b> issues	11,42 ( <i>SE</i> : 1,52)	16,26 (SE 2,18)	12,1 (SE 3,72)
Average number of MEPs voting "green" on <b>climate</b> issues	-3,17 (SE: 2,38)	-8,73 (SE: 3,42)	10,133 (SE: 5,81)
p-value by Welch-T-Test for the two categories	1,3795E-07	2,66104E-09	0,83893

Table 3: Average support for environmental or climate issues by EFDD, ENF, ECR with Standard Error (SE) of the mean (Hix et al. 2022).

*Table 3* indicates that the average number of right-wing MEPs voting for an environmental issue is consistently higher across all party groups than the number of average MEPs voting for a climate issue. The red boxes indicate that EFDD and ENF voted anti-climate, while the green boxes indicate a pro-environmental stance. The more Eurosceptic party groups are more in line with H1 than the more moderate ECR. This could indicate that Euroscepticism as a form of anti-internationalism further contributes to opposing climate policy. However, there may also be other contextual explanations for this. As the ECR is considered more moderate than the others, perhaps H1 applies more strongly for far-right parties than for right parties. Climate votes on which the ECR stance differed strongly from the others concerned for example the Kyoto Protocol, the emission trading scheme, circular economy, emission limits for non-road mobile machinery or the Paris agreement.

However, certain limitations should be considered when reviewing this data. My study relies on the VoteWatch EU dataset's categorization of the "environment and public health" category. It is possible that there are proposals, which I would classify as relevant to either of my own categories that are not included here or misclassified. Additionally, further legislative periods would ideally be added to these statistics. Further, my quantitative study only conducts descriptive statistics. While this provides valuable insights, it does not allow for in-depth analysis, control variables or any causal inference. There is also a lack of contextual information in this study. This study does not consider the broader political, economic, or social factors that may have influenced the MEPs' decision making. While all are in one EPG, different parties have different national contexts that are not considered in this study. Moreover, roll call votes do not give a full picture of MEPs' attitudes towards a policy issue (Rasmussen 2008). While MEPs' voting for or against a policy is here taken to mean support or opposition towards it, one MEP's support or opposition can also mean protest against the EPG or protest against the national party (Rasmussen 2008).

To summarize, despite some limitations the statistics show that both the ENF and the EFDD voted in line with the expectations of this study, while the ECR showed less of a difference between voting on environmental and climate policies.

#### **Case Study Research Design**

The previous analysis has found empirical support for the distinction between climate and environmental policies. However, it does not reveal any reason why parties oppose one and support the other. The aim of the case study is to provide a possible causal factor. I conduct process tracing to find evidence that international cooperation is a possible causal factor for RWPs' opposition to climate policies.

Process tracing offers an approach to assess causality ex-post without a control group or counterfactual data (Collier 2011). I use Bayesian logic of inference that provides process tracing tests (straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun and doubly decisive) (Collier 2011). The prior probability of the hypothesis is taken to be the aforementioned theory and statistical empirical support. I aim to find evidence for H2:

H2: International cooperation deters right-wing-parties from voting for climate policies.

In this specific case the hypothesis is that the ENF did not support an energy efficiency policy, because it required international cooperation:

H2a: The ENF opposed "proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency", partly because it required international cooperation.

I analyse media articles, speeches and existing literature to provide evidence for the causal mechanisms. The case I analyse is a typical case, meaning that both the cause (international cooperation) and the outcome (ENF's opposition) is present. I chose a typical case because this is a theory-building type of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013). That is to say that the aim of this research is to identify a causal mechanism that can be empirically tested, based on the previous theorization. The case is useful, as it provides somewhat transferable

results. That is because the policy is about one of many instances of the general conflict between climate policy and international cooperation, (Szulecki et al. 2016) and it does not just concern the voting of one party, but a party group. However, I acknowledge that there may be contextual factors that may limit its generalizability.

In sum, I intend to find evidence for the causal relationship between international cooperation requirements and right-wing party voting on climate policy, by conducting process tracing on a specific case.

#### **Process Tracing**

I investigate a proposal in the EP, discussed on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 2018, titled "proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency" (Poche 2017). It was brought in by the committee on industry, research and energy by the rapporteur Mirsolav Poche (Poche 2017). Not one member of the ENF voted in favour of the proposal, but it did pass the EP (Hix et al. 2022).

The proposal was part of the general idea of an Energy Union, which was a set of policy proposals mostly put forth by Donald Tusk in 2014 (Donahue 2014). The main ideas were to have joint EU supply contracts with energy providers, strengthen mechanisms to supply member states with gas in case of a disruption and diversifying oil and gas supplies to break Russia's monopoly on gas (Tusk 2014). It also took climate targets into account (Szulecki et al. 2016). Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I only regard the voting behaviour of the ENF party group, as this party group was most in line with the hypothesis in the descriptive statistics.

The proposal set a 30% energy efficiency target for 2030 at EU level and a drop in final energy consumption of 17% compared to 2005. It also set energy saving obligations for

member states and required that energy poverty is taken into account in designing energy measures in member states (Legislative Observatory European Parliament 2018). The proposal was published at the end of 2016, but it was not until November of 2018 that the final act was signed into law (Legislative Observatory European Parliament 2018).

Figure 6 shows an abstraction of the causal mechanism. The top box shows the possible

Figure 6: Abstraction of causal mechanisms leading to the ENF's opposition of energy efficiency policy in the European Parliament 2018

Policy requires international cooperation. ENF promotes protection of national sovereignty. ENF sees policy as infringing on national sovereignty. ENF promotes energy efficiency on domestic level. ENF opposes the policy in the European Parliament.

cause leading to the bottom box, the outcome.

The outcome is defined as the ENF opposing the policy. 28 members of the 36 ENF party group members voted against the proposal, not one voted in favour, the rest abstained or were absent (Hix et al. 2022).

> The cause is defined as the policy requiring international cooperation. This is evident from the policy proposal draft. In the final text adopted by the EP, it says that while there are no binding national targets for energy efficiency, member states shall achieve

a cumulative end-use energy savings target every year (Legislative Observatory European Parliament 2018). Additionally, they shall define their national contribution to the Union's energy consumption, which should not exceed a certain amount of energy (Legislative Observatory European Parliament 2018). Thus, member states are asked by the Union to cut down on their respective energy consumption to achieve a common reduction target. This is evidence that the proposal required international cooperation. The Energy Union, of which this proposal is one important pillar, also intends to strengthen international cooperation (Austvik 2016; Szulecki et al. 2016). Thus, the potential cause is present.

Event one leading to the outcome is defined as ENF promoting the protection of national sovereignty. To show that the ENF opposes this policy because of its requirements of international cooperation, it needs to hold true that the ENF generally promotes the protection of national sovereignty and rather opposes policies that unreasonably infringe on the autonomy of member states.

There is plenty of evidence of the ENF promoting national sovereignty. On their website, it says that "The opposition of any transfer of national sovereignty to supranational bodies and/or European Institutions is one of the fundamental principles uniting Members of the ENF" (ENF Group in the European Parliament 2019). Media articles also seem to agree that the ENF follows a "Nations First"-approach, which puts national interests above European ones (Brady 2017; Euractiv 2017; Euronews 2019; Guiffrida 2019; MacKenzie 2015). The ENF hosts parties, which are all deemed nationalist by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2022). Moreover, literature shows that nationalist parties are usually against international cooperation (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). This evidence indicates that the promotion of national sovereignty strongly influences their position on international cooperation in any policy matter. I take it to be a type of "hoop" evidence because it is a necessary condition, setting the stage for their stance on climate policy, but it does not guarantee their specific opposition in this case.

Event two is defined as the ENF interpreting promoting national sovereignty as opposing rules set by international institutions. This is an important causal link as there can be many different interpretations of putting the nation first. Thus, the study needs to prove that in the eyes of the ENF, climate policies are infringing on national autonomy. Speeches from the parliamentary sessions in which the proposal was discussed serve as evidence. Two speeches

given by representatives of the ENF group stand out.

Christelle Lechevalier spoke at the reading in parliament on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 2018. In her speech (translated from French to English), she says:

"This text is a strong attack on national sovereignty and lays the first foundations for the federalization of the energy market" and "this governance [...] tries to impose the Commission as the leader in energy matters by allowing it to judge the state's policies and its energy mix to the detriment of national interest".

In the same debate Bernard Monot said:

"The spirit which underpins the Energy Union is worthy of the Soviet Union and the Energy Union should be abandoned entirely. Not only does the European Union force states to change their energy policy, but the energy is also harmful for all citizens of the Union." (European Parliament 2018; Legislative Observatory European Parliament 2018).

Both statements show a clear link between national sovereignty and climate policy. Both statements also show that the opposition to the proposal is driven by its need for international cooperation. Thus, this is a "smoking gun" type of evidence. We can say with high confidence that the MEPs of the ENF voted against the proposal because it infringes on national autonomy.

Event three is defined as the ENF being in favour of contents of the proposal on the domestic level. If the group is, one can further isolate the factor of international cooperation. While I assume that energy efficiency is a valence, not a position issue, one controversial aspect of the proposal was its promotion of nuclear energy. The policy treated renewable energy the same as potentially harmful nuclear energy (Legislative Observatory European Parliament 2018; Poche 2017). From the French national election, we know that the head of the ENF Marine Le Pen strongly supports nuclear energy (Hess and Renner 2019; Stefanini and Solletty 2017). Thus, it is likely that neither the factor of energy efficiency, nor nuclear energy deterred the head of the ENF. However, this is merely a straw-in-the-wind type of evidence. It does make the hypothesis somewhat more likely to be true, but it cannot guarantee the exclusion of other hypotheses. Therefore, event three is not necessary or sufficient.

Considering all the presented evidence, the confidence in the validity of the hypothesis has increased. I show that the posterior probability exceeds the prior probability, making the outcome likely to be caused by the presented causal mechanism. Therefore, it is likely that the ENF voted against the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, because it required increased international cooperation.

## **CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION**

In this thesis, I investigated the RWP-voting on green issues. More specifically, I addressed the different explanations for why RWPs vote anti-environment by introducing a distinction between climate and environmental policy issues. I suggest that this distinction is a theoretical and practical contribution to the field. Previous research has not sufficiently considered that climate policy usually requires international cooperation, while environmental policy does not necessarily have the same requirement. As RWPs are usually opposed to international cooperation, this is a significant factor to consider. In my analysis I find that right-wing EPGs often vote pro-environment, while opposing climate policy. Moreover, I find that one likely cause for RWPs opposition to climate issues is their anti-internationalist attitudes.

To find empirical support for the hypothesis that RWP vote pro-environment but anti-climate, I investigated EP roll call vote data from the three RWP groups, EFDD, ENF and ECR in the legislative period between 2014 and 2019. Having categorized the proposals in plenary sessions as either "climate issues" or "non-climate environmental issues", I found some empirical support for the hypothesis that RWPs vote pro-environment, but anti-climate. Party groups EFDD and especially ENF showed a clear preference for non-climate environmental issues compared to climate issues. As for the ECR, I also observed a preference, but it is not as clear. Therefore, the far-right EPGs of the EP seem more likely to support environmental rather than climate policies. In previous research, there is a tendency to focus on the national level (Albanese, Barone, and De Blasio 2022; Autor et al. 2020; Hardy 2019; Kestilä and Söderlund 2007; Margalit 2011; Rasmussen 2008; Rensmann 2018; Swank and Betz 2003; Tosun and Debus 2021). This research addresses this gap by using data from the EP.

To go beyond statistical support, I also conducted a case study, using process tracing. I investigated a 2018 policy proposal, titled "proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency", which is part of a set of proposals to strengthen the Energy Union. The proposal was adopted in the EP, but not one member of the ENF group voted in favour of it. Process tracing revealed a strong likelihood that this was at least partly because the policy involves international cooperation. The ENF saw this as an infringement on national sovereignty, which can be observed in speeches, manifestos, and media articles. Therefore, it is likely that the ENF opposed the policy because of its requirement for international cooperation.

However, there are also other possible explanations for different voting behaviour regarding environmental and climate policies. For one, RWPs often support a free market. Climate change policies often limit the free market by implementing taxes, tariffs or bans on certain carbon intensive sectors. It may be that RWPs oppose climate policies because of their preference for free markets. Moreover, climate change scepticism may also still play a role in opposing climate change policy. To support environmental issues, such as air pollution, clean water, or protection of forests, one does not have to believe that climate change is caused by humanity's greenhouse gas emissions. However, to support climate issues, that is a necessity. Nevertheless, these alternative explanations do not cancel out the possibility that international cooperation is a deciding factor as well. Therefore, it seems likely that the distinction between climate and environmental issues matters for right-wing voting behaviour and that international cooperation is one underlying cause, while there may also be others.

This thesis adds an important theoretical contribution to the field of environmental politics, namely the distinction between climate and environmental issues. It also adds one possible explanation for the cause of this difference in voting behaviour. However, the distinction is

not fully fleshed out. Further research needs to conceptualize a more detailed distinction between the two political concepts. In this conceptualization, international cooperation can play an important role in defining climate politics. Moreover, it could be explored whether the categories hold on all levels of democratic decision-making, such as local, regional, or national and whether the distinction also holds in other democracies outside of the European Union. From the evidence in this thesis, it seems likely that RWPs are opposed to climate issues, while often supporting environmental ones because of anti-internationalism. It follows that nationalism may be a key obstacle in tackling climate change. Possible linkages between nationalism and climate policy should be analysed further to see what exactly it is about climate policy that RWPs oppose. Given the urgency of the climate crisis and the increasing popularity of RWPs, this research will be highly relevant.

## **APPENDIX**

Table 4:All green votes categorized by climate, environment and unclear. Pass indicates whether the proposal passed the EP. Vote ID is the given ID by the dataset. The "Green vote" indicates whether the green party voted for (1) or against (2) the proposal. Green and non-green for each party group indicates how many members of the party group voted the same as the Greens (green) or against the Greens (non-green). Data taken from (Hix et al. 2022).

				EFDD		ENF		ECR				
Pas s	Date	Vote ID	The "Green" Vote	green	Non- green	green	Non- green	green	Non- green	Environ ment	Climate	Unclear
+	2014	218		14	21	10	16	54	3			1
+	2014	219	1	15	21	8	18	56	3	1		
-	2014	257	1	14	22	5	21	3	30		1	
+	2015	369	1	20	5	17	1	53	7	1		
-	2015	861	1	13	21	8	14	3	49	1		
+	2015	875	2	13	5	5	16	2	49	1		
+	2015	912	1	13	9	17	4	22	26			1
+	2015	929	1	13	20	1	19	47	0		1	
+	2015	931	1	13	23	1	20	54	0		1	
+	2015	1147	1	0	35	0	24	37	6		1	
+	2015	1148	1	0	34	0	24	36	12		1	
+	2015	1243	1	14	22	1	19	8	3		1	
+	2015	1250	2	33	3	19	6	56	2	1		
+	2015	1315	1	15	17	10	7	24	29	1		
+	2015	1397	1	16	17	9	18	7	33			1
+	2015	1625	1	2	36	3	19	54	0	1		
+	2015	1626	1	16	21	7	18	54	0	1		
+	2015	1666	1	15	5	8	16	24	2	1		
+	2015	1716	1	14	21	1	20	3	17		1	
+	2015	1787	2	19	15	17	1	43	10		1	
+	2015	1907	1	1	19	0	22	40	13	1		
+	2015	1954	2	19	2	25	1	3	53			1
+	2015	2215	1	18	19	21	4	12	48	1		
+	2015	2410	1	18	19	19	1	31	30	1		
+	2016	2590	1	17	15	5	14	58	0	1		
+	2016	2601	1	18	14	18	3	29	11	1		
+	2016	2606	1	30	1	22	0	29	32	1		
+	2016	2609	1	29	3	22	0	31	31	1		
+	2016	2612	1	30	2	22	0	32	32	1		
-	2016	2613	1	15	6	5	18	10	52		1	
+	2016	3289	1	20	1	20	3	49	7	1		
+	2016	3504	1	19	1	24	0	29	26	1		

+	2016	3505	1	20	0	23	1	30	23	1		
+	2016	3580	1	3	20	2	19	61	3		1	
+	2016	3774	1	17	1	9	1	55	1	1		
+	2016	3945	1	16	14	1	11	46	1		1	
+	2016	4063	1	14	15	1	23	3	33		1	
+	2016	4078	1	16	2	26	0	30	18	1		
+	2016	4079	1	16	2	26	0	30	17	1		
+	2016	4080	1	16	2	26	0	31	16	1		
+	2016	4081	1	16	2	26	0	31	17	1		
+	2016	4082	1	16	2	26	0	32	14	1		
+	2016	4366	2	3	19	21	4	20	41		1	
+	2016	4409	1	20	11	20	4	6	53	1		
+	2016	4442	1	15	1	4	1	55	0	1		
+	2016	4841	2	21	2	29	0	27	36		1	
+	2017	4999	1	18	19	3	25	55	8	1		
+	2017	5007	1	15	20	4	24	27	32		1	
+	2017	5009	1	16	21	4	23	31	30	1		
+	2017	5019	1	17	21	4	23	33	27	1		
+	2017	5118	1	19	1	19	6	58	3	1		
+	2017	5200	1	22	5	25	3	32	29	1		
+	2017	5355	1	17	1	17	4	52	0	1		
+	2017	5364	1	17	11	17	6	52	6			1
+	2017	5371	1	16	10	24	2	34	30	1		
+	2017	5372	1	17	10	25	0	34	30	1		
+	2017	5462	1	16	17	0	23	36	24		1	
+	2017	5530	1	16	5	8	19	57	1			1
+	2017	5531	1	20	1	18	7	61	0	1		
+	2017	5641	1	0	13	0	9	10	12		1	
+	2017	5671	1	15	21	2	25	64	1		1	
+	2017	5675	2	31	5	22	4	9	55		1	
+	2017	5678	1	16	0	28	0	33	32	1		
+	2017	5834	1	20	0	28	0	35	23	1		<u> </u>
+	2017	5835	1	20	0	28	0	36	23	1		
+	2017	5899	1	4	15	22	4	15	51	1		
+	2017	5900	1	17	0	26	0	29	34	1		
+	2017	5901	1	17	0	26	0	33	31	1	<b>_</b>	
+	2017	6124	1	19	1	16	6	64	0		1	<u> </u>
+	2017	6223	1	3	19	3	10	53	0	1	1	
-	2017	6260	1	19	5	21	7	9	51	1	1	<u> </u>
+	2017	6412	1	18	2	19	9	9	3		1	
+	2018	6479	1	15	15	0	28	3	47	1	1	<u> </u>
+	2018	6590	1	16	3	23	2	31	29	1		
+	2018	6591	1	17	2	25	0	32	28	1		

+	2018	6948	1	18	18	4	7	25	2		1	
+	2018	7177	1	21	0	30	0	37	23	1		
+	2018	7184	1	17	9	28	2	59	1	1		
+	2018	7209	1	19	3	32	1	38	26	1		
+	2018	7210	1	17	3	32	1	38	27	1		
+	2018	7374	1	16	17	19	7	45	9		1	
+	2018	7695	1	15	6	23	5	53	1	1		
+	2018	7704	1	15	3	26	5	7	17	1		
+	2018	7743	1	16	16	0	17	11	48		1	
+	2018	7813	1	14	15	9	6	63	1		1	
+	2018	7929	1	19	19	20	11	36	7	1		
+	2018	7934	1	18	1	30	1	35	24	1		
+	2018	7935	1	18	0	31	1	34	25	1		
+	2018	8153	1	17	20	1	32	9	59		1	
+	2018	8181	1	18	16	7	4	54	0	1		
+	2018	8323	1	14	0	24	4	46	19	1		
+	2018	9014	1	17	0	29	0	38	20	1		
+	2018	9015	1	17	0	28	0	35	24	1		
+	2018	9016	1	17	0	28	0	35	24	1		
+	2018	9017	1	17	0	28	0	33	26	1		
+	2019	9039	1	18	6	25	7	10	5	1		
+	2019	9143	1	17	4	19	7	10	20	1		
+	2019	9515	1	18	5	15	13	20	7	1		
+	2019	9536	1	18	4	28	1	9	44	1		
+	2019	9537	1	21	0	29	0	32	21	1		
+	2019	9538	1	19	0	28	0	34	19	1		
+	2019	9539	1	19	0	28	0	32	21	1		
+	2019	9540	1	19	4	28	1	8	45	1		
+	2019	9670	1	16	13	1	22	6	25		1	
+	2019	9970	1	21	3	30	0	30	27	1		
+	2019	9971	1	20	2	30	0	31	26	1		
+	2019	9972	1	21	1	30	0	37	20	1		
+	2019	9973	1	20	4	30	0	4	53	1		
+	2019	1006 6	1	16	9	7	5	5	43			1
+	2019	1019	1	16	12	17	12	38	4		1	
		8										1

EPP S&D ALDE Greens Posit Posit Party Posit Posit Party name Seats Party name Seats Seats Party name Seats ion ion name ion ion 3,72 6,47 Open 7,00 2,46 ÖVP 5 SPÖ 93 5 VLD 53 3 Grüne 3 33 04 6,68 2,93 2,93 GERB 3 8,8 6 PS (BE) 4 MR Grüne (DE) 11 07 89 08 2,89 4,58 Europe 3,15 KDU-CSL 5,88 3 BSP (BG) 82 3 DPS 28 4 écologique 6 5 Coal.TOP 3,04 3,37 5,92 7,4 CSSD FDP MP (SE) 3 09+STAN 3 63 4 33 3 89 6,25 3,64 5,80 CDU 03 GP (UK) 3 29 SPD 51 27 KESK 27 3 2,57 3,80 4,50 7,28 CSU 71 5 A(S) (DK) 11 3 D66 66 4 6,73 3,73 7,34 VVD  $N.\Delta/N.D$ 65 5 PSOE 77 13 82 3 7,59 2,93 PP (ES) 69 PS (FR) 07 9 16 7,24 2,62 KOK 3 PD (IT) 51 26 16 7,49 Articolo 1-2,62 LR 97 MDP (IT) 3 16 16 7,10 4,21 HDZ PL/MLP 3 53 4 05 6,54 3,61 FIDESZ 32 3 11 PvdA 18 6,43 2,82 FG 72 4 SLD 99 3 7,14 4,04 FI (IT) 59 9 PS (PT) 92 8 6,44 6,29 CSV/CS 74 3 PSD (RO) 49 10 3,73 V 7,4 S(SE) 5 4 77 3,37 5,71 PN/NP 43 3 SMER 99 4 5,93 4,35 76 18 CDA 5 Lab 62 6,23 PO 55 18 4,18 PSL 56 4 6,29 PSD 49 6 6,95 PNL 43 8 7,89 М 07 3 6,99 SDS 96 3 7,10 KDH (SK) 3 82 179 151 23 26 6,7836 3,6422 5,8549 2,9383

Table 5: This table indicates each party group and their average party position. For each party group there are several national party members. All those that have three or more seats in the EP are listed here and given a certain value of left-right by Döring et al. 2023. The values, with the number of seats each national party and party group has gives a weighted average of left-right position.

6358

0435

3462

6592

	ENF			EFDD			ECR				GUE/NGL	
Party name	Positio n	Seats	Party name	Positio n	Seat s	Party name	Positio n	Seats		Party name	Positio n	Seats
FPÖ	8,3494	4	M5S	###	11	N-VA	6,5321		4	KSCM Die	0,7498	3
RN	9,6854	15	UKIP	7,8429	18	O (DF)	8,2269		3	Linke SY.RIZ.	1,2152	7
LN	7,8007	6				PiS Cons	7,6997		14	А	2,8947	3
PVV	7,0053	4				(UK)	7,4261		18	Podemos	1,3	5
UKIP	7,8429	3								FG	6,4372	3
										SF	2,7935	3
										PCP (PT)	2,2233	3

32	29	39	27
8,6572718		7,4942230	2,233403
8		8	7

Table 6: Shown here are examples of policy proposals with dates and their file number that this thesis categorizes as climate issues (Hix et al. 2022).

Date	Title	Interinstitutional File Number
10.06.2015	EU-Iceland agreement on Iceland participation in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol	2014/0151/NLE
8.07.2015	Market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme	2014/0011/COD
9.07.2015	Resource efficiency: moving towards a circular economy	2014/2208/INI
14.06.2017	Binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement	2016/0231/COD
13.09.2017	EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): continuing current limitations of scope for aviation activities and preparing to implement a global market-based measure from 2021	2017/0017/COD
13.09.2017	Inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry into the 2030 climate and energy framework	2016/0230/COD
14.11.2018	CO2 emission performance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles	2018/0143/COD

Date	Title	Interinstitutional File Number
20.05.2015	Outbreak of Xylella fastidiosa affecting olive trees (Motion by EFDD & GUE/NGL)	2015/2652/RSP
9.07.2015	Maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination following a nuclear accident	2013/0451/NLE
8.09.2015	Cloning of animals kept and reproduced for farming purposes	2013/0433/COD
8.10.2015	Lessons learned from the red mud disaster five years after the accident in Hungary	2015/2801/RSP
06.10.2016	Objection pursuant to Rule 106: Placing on the market of genetically modified maize Bt11 seeds <sup>8</sup>	2016/2919/RSP
14.03.2017	End-of-life vehicles, waste batteries and accumulators and waste electrical and electronic equipment	2015/0272/COD
12.02.2019	Sustainable use of pesticides	2017/2284/INI

Table 7:Shown here are examples of policy proposals with dates and their file number that this thesis categorizes as non-climate environmental issues (Hix et al. 2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In the European Union institutions it was largely environmental institutions that dealt with GMOs, which is why GMOs are treated here as a green issue, not a public health one (Varzakas, Arvanitoyannis, and Baltas 2007).

Date	Title	Interinstitutional File Number
16.12.2014	Scientific examination of questions relating to food	2014/0132/COD
27.05.2015	Decision on the opening of, and mandate for, interinstitutional negotiations on Aid scheme for the supply of fruit and vegetables, bananas and milk in the educational establishments	2015/2659/RSP
8.09.2015	Follow up to the European citizens' initiative Right2Water	2014/2239/INI
28.10.2015	Novel foods	2013/0435/COD
16.05.2017	Resource efficiency: reducing food waste, improving food safety	2016/2223/INI

Table 8: Shown here are examples of policy proposals with dates and their file number that this thesis categorizes as green but unclear issues (Hix et al. 2022).

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